Today's Laws & Customs:
Today in Jewish History:
• Majorcan Jews Guaranteed Protection (1393)
The governor of Majorca issued an edict for the protection of the Jewish inhabitants, providing that any citizen who injures a Jew will be hanged.
The advantageous position of the islands, as well as their newly found protection, attracted many Jews from Provence, Sicily, Tunis, and Algiers, amongst other African cities. The Jews even had their own organizations and representatives by sanction of the King.
DAILY QUOTE:
Everything is by Divine Providence. If a leaf is turned over by a breeze, it is only because this has been specifically ordained by
G-d to serve a particular function within the purpose of creation.[Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov]
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:• Majorcan Jews Guaranteed Protection (1393)
The governor of Majorca issued an edict for the protection of the Jewish inhabitants, providing that any citizen who injures a Jew will be hanged.
The advantageous position of the islands, as well as their newly found protection, attracted many Jews from Provence, Sicily, Tunis, and Algiers, amongst other African cities. The Jews even had their own organizations and representatives by sanction of the King.
DAILY QUOTE:
Everything is by Divine Providence. If a leaf is turned over by a breeze, it is only because this has been specifically ordained by
G-d to serve a particular function within the purpose of creation.[Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov]
DAILY STUDY:
Chumash: Beshalach, 2nd Portion Exodus 14:9-14:14 with Rashi
• Chapter 14
9. The Egyptians chased after them and overtook them encamped by the sea every horse of Pharaoh's chariots, his horsemen, and his force beside Pi hahiroth, in front of Ba'al Zephon. ט. וַיִּרְדְּפוּ מִצְרַיִם אַחֲרֵיהֶם וַיַּשִּׂיגוּ אוֹתָם חֹנִים עַל הַיָּם כָּל סוּס רֶכֶב פַּרְעֹה וּפָרָשָׁיו וְחֵילוֹ עַל פִּי הַחִירֹת לִפְנֵי בַּעַל צְפֹן:
10. Pharaoh drew near, and the children of Israel lifted up their eyes, and behold! the Egyptians were advancing after them. They were very frightened, and the children of Israel cried out to the Lord. י. וּפַרְעֹה הִקְרִיב וַיִּשְׂאוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת עֵינֵיהֶם וְהִנֵּה מִצְרַיִם | נֹסֵעַ אַחֲרֵיהֶם וַיִּירְאוּ מְאֹד וַיִּצְעֲקוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל יְהֹוָה:
Pharaoh drew near: Heb. וּפַרְעֹה הִקְרִיב, lit., and Pharaoh brought near. It [the verse] should have said: קָרַב. What is the meaning of הִקְרִיב ? He [Pharaoh] drew himself near and strove to go before them [his army], as he had stipulated with them. —
ופרעה הקריב: היה לו לכתוב ופרעה קרב, מהו הקריב, הקריב עצמו ונתאמץ לקדם לפניהם, כמו שהתנה עמהם:
the Egyptians were advancing after them: Heb. נֹסֵעַ [in the singular]. With one accord, like one man. Alternatively, [in the singular it means that] and behold, Egypt was advancing after them, [denoting that] they [the Israelites] saw the heavenly prince of Egypt advancing from heaven to aid the Egyptians. [From] Tanchuma.
נסע אחריהם: בלב אחד כאיש אחד. דבר אחר והנה מצרים נוסע אחריהם, ראו שר של מצרים נוסע מן השמים לעזור למצרים. תנחומא:
cried out: They seized the art of their ancestors [i.e., they prayed]. Concerning Abraham, it [Scripture] says: “to the place where he had stood before the Lord” (Gen. 19:27). 2 Concerning Isaac, [it is stated] “to pray in the field” (Gen. 24:63). Concerning Jacob, “And he entreated the Omnipresent” (Gen. 28:11). (See Judaica Press comm. digest on that verse.)-[from Mechilta; Tanchuma Beshallach 9]
ויצעקו: תפשו אומנות אבותם. באברהם הוא אומר (בראשית יט כז) אל המקום אשר עמד שם, ביצחק (שם כד סג) לשוח בשדה, ביעקב (שם כח יא) ויפגע במקום:
11. They said to Moses, Is it because there are no graves in Egypt that you have taken us to die in the desert? What is this that you have done to us to take us out of Egypt? יא. וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֶל משֶׁה הֲמִבְּלִי אֵין קְבָרִים בְּמִצְרַיִם לְקַחְתָּנוּ לָמוּת בַּמִּדְבָּר מַה זֹּאת עָשִׂיתָ לָּנוּ לְהוֹצִיאָנוּ מִמִּצְרָיִם:
Is it because there are no graves: Heb. הִמִבְּלִי אֵין קְבָרִים. Is it because of the want? Namely that there are no graves in Egypt in which to be buried, that you have taken us out of there? Si por falyanze de non fosses in Old French [i.e., Is it for lack, that there are no graves?].
המבלי אין קברים: וכי מחמת חסרון קברים שאין קברים במצרים ליקבר שם לקחתנו משם. ש"י פו"ר פיילנצ"א ד"י נו"ן פושי"ש בלעז [האם בגלל מחסור של לא קברים]:
12. Isn't this the thing [about] which we spoke to you in Egypt, saying, Leave us alone, and we will serve the Egyptians, because we would rather serve the Egyptians than die in the desert יב. הֲלֹא זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְנוּ אֵלֶיךָ בְמִצְרַיִם לֵאמֹר חֲדַל מִמֶּנּוּ וְנַעַבְדָה אֶת מִצְרָיִם כִּי טוֹב לָנוּ עֲבֹד אֶת מִצְרַיִם מִמֻּתֵנוּ בַּמִּדְבָּר:
Isn’t this the thing [about] which we spoke to you in Egypt: When had they said [this]? "And they said to them, “May the Lord look upon you and judge’ ” (Exod. 5:21). [from Mechilta]
אשר דברנו אליך במצרים: והיכן דברו, (שמות ה כא) ירא ה' עליכם וישפוט:
than die: Heb. מִמֻּתֵנוּ, than we should die. If it [מִמֻּתֵנוּ] were vowelized with a “melupum” (i.e., a “cholam,” [מִמּוֹתֵנוּ] as it is known that the grammarians called a “cholam” a “melupum.” See Rashi below on Exod. 19:24), it would be explained as: “than our death.” Now that it is vowelized with a “shuruk” [מִמֻּתֵנוּ], it is explained as “than we should die.” Likewise [in the verse], “If only we had died (מּוּתֵנוּ)” (Exod. 16:3), [means] that we would die. [Similarly,] “If only I had died (מּוּתֵי) instead of you” (II Sam. 19:1), referring to Absalom [means, I should have died]; [And מּוּתִי is similar to (קוּמִי) in the verse:] “for the day that I will rise up (קוּמִי)” (Zeph. 3:8); [and also similar to (ֹשוּבִי) in the verse] “until I return (ֹשוּבִי) in peace” (II Chron. 18:26), [which mean respectively] that I rise up, that I return.
ממתנו: מאשר נמות, ואם היה נקוד מלאפו"ם היה נבאר ממיתתנו, עכשיו שנקוד בשור"ק נבאר מאשר נמות, וכן (להלן טז ג) מי יתן מותנו - שנמות, וכן (שמואל ב' יט א) מי יתן מותי, דאבשלום - שאמות, כמו (צפניה ג ח) ליום קומי לעד, (דברי הימים ב' יח כו) עד שובי בשלום, שאקום שאשוב:
13. Moses said to the people, Don't be afraid! Stand firm and see the Lord's salvation that He will wreak for you today, for the way you have seen the Egyptians is [only] today, [but] you shall no longer continue to see them for eternity. יג. וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה אֶל הָעָם אַל תִּירָאוּ הִתְיַצְּבוּ וּרְאוּ אֶת יְשׁוּעַת יְהֹוָה אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה לָכֶם הַיּוֹם כִּי אֲשֶׁר רְאִיתֶם אֶת מִצְרַיִם הַיּוֹם לֹא תֹסִפוּ לִרְאֹתָם עוֹד עַד עוֹלָם:
for the way you have seen the Egyptians, etc.: The way you have seen them-that is only today. It is [only] today that you have seen them, but you shall no longer continue [to see them].
כי אשר ראיתם את מצרים וגו': מה שראיתם אותם אינו אלא היום, היום הוא שראיתם אותם ולא תוסיפו עוד:
14. The Lord will fight for you, but you shall remain silent. יד. יְהֹוָה יִלָּחֵם לָכֶם וְאַתֶּם תַּחֲרִשׁוּן:
The Lord will fight for you: Heb. לָכֶם, for you, and similarly [the “lammed” in the verse], “because the Lord is fighting for them (לָהֶם)” (verse 25), and similarly [in the verse] “Will you contend for God (לָאֵל) ?” (Job 13:8). And similarly, "and Who spoke about me (לִי) (Gen. 24:7), and similarly, “Will you contend for the Baal (לַבַּעַל) ?” (Jud. 6:31).
ה' ילחם לכם: בשבילכם. וכן (פסוק כה) כי ה' נלחם להם, וכן (איוב יג ח) אם לאל תריבון, וכן (בראשית כד ז) ואשר דבר לי וכן (שופטים ו לא) האתם תריבון לבעל:
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Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 35 - 38
• Chapter 35
This psalm is an awe-inspiring and wondrous prayer about David's enemies-that they be as chaff before the wind, chased by the angel of God. It also declares that everything comes about through God's help.
1. By David. Fight my antagonists, O Lord, battle those who battle against me.
2. Take hold of shield and armor and arise to help me.
3. Draw a spear, and bar the way before my pursuers; say to my soul, "I am your deliverance.”
4. Let those who seek my life be shamed and disgraced; let those who devise my harm retreat and be humiliated.
5. Let them be as chaff before the wind; let the angel of the Lord thrust them away.
6. Let their path be dark and slippery; let them be chased by the angel of the Lord.
7. For without cause have they laid their nets in the pit for me; without cause have they dug [pits] for my soul.
8. Let darkness come upon him unawares; let the very snare that he hid trap him, in darkness he will fall in it.
9. And my soul shall exult in the Lord, rejoice in His deliverance.
10. My entire being shall declare: Lord, who is like You? Who saves the poor from one stronger than he, the poor and the destitute from one who would rob him.
11. Corrupt witnesses rise up [against me], they demand of me things of which I do not know.
12. They repay me evil for good, death for my soul.
13. But I wore sackcloth when they were ill; I afflicted my soul with fasting. Let my prayer return upon my own bosom.
14. As if it were my friend, my brother, I went about; like a mother in mourning, I was bent over in gloom.
15. But when I limped, they rejoiced and gathered; the lowly gathered against me-even those whom I do not know; they laugh and cannot be quiet.
16. With flattery and scorn, for the sake of a meal,1 they gnash their teeth at me.
17. My Lord, how long will You look on? Restore my life from their darkness; from young lions, my soul.
18. I will thank You in a great congregation, amidst a mighty nation I will praise You.
19. Let not those who hate me without cause rejoice over me; [let not] those who despise me without reason wink their eye.
20. For they speak not of peace, rather they scheme deceitful matters against the broken of the land.
21. They opened their mouths wide against me, they said, "Aha! Aha! Our eyes have seen [his misfortune].”
22. You saw, Lord, be not silent; my Lord, be not distant from me.
23. Rouse and awaken Yourself to my judgement, to my cause, my God and my Lord.
24. Judge me according to your righteousness, Lord my God; let them not rejoice over me.
25. Let them not say in their hearts, "Aha! We have our desire!" Let them not say, "We have swallowed him!”
26. Let them be shamed and disgraced together, those who rejoice at my trouble; let them be clothed in shame and humiliation, those who raise themselves arrogantly over me.
27. Let those who desire my vindication sing joyously and be glad; let them say always, "Let the Lord be exalted, Who desires the peace of His servant.”
28. My tongue will speak of Your righteousness, Your praise, all day long.
Chapter 36
This psalm is a message to those who follow their evil inclination, that tells them, "Do not place the fear of God before you," and brings them to sin by beautifying evil deeds in their eyes. For so is his way: "He descends (to earth) and corrupts, then goes up (to the Heavenly Court) and prosecutes."
1. For the Conductor, by the servant of the Lord, by David.
2. [I think] in my heart: Sin says to the wicked, "There is none [who need place] the fear of God before his eyes.”
3. For Sin makes itself appealing to him, until his iniquity be found and he is hated.
4. The speech of his mouth is evil and deceit; he fails to reason, to improve.
5. On his bed he contemplates evil, he stands in a path that is not good; he does not despise evil.
6. O Lord, Your kindness is in the heavens; Your faithfulness is till the skies.
7. Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains, Your judgements extend to the great deep; man and beast You deliver, O Lord.
8. How precious is Your kindness, O God; man takes shelter in the shadow of Your wings.
9. They will be filled by the abundance of Your house; from the stream of Your Eden, You will give them to drink.
10. For the source of life is with You; in Your Light do we see light.
11. Extend Your kindness to those who know You, and Your righteousness to the upright of heart.
12. Let not the foot of the arrogant overtake me; let not the hand of the wicked drive me away.
13. There1 the doers of evil fell, thrust down, unable to rise.
Chapter 37
King David exhorts his generation not to be jealous of the prosperity of the wicked, for it may lead to falling into their ways. Rather, put your trust in God, conduct yourselves with integrity, and God will take care of everything.
1. By David. Do not compete with the wicked; do not envy doers of injustice.
2. For like grass they will be swiftly cut down; like green vegetation they will wither.
3. Trust in the Lord and do good; then will you abide in the land and be nourished by faith.
4. Delight in the Lord, and He will grant you the desires of your heart.
5. Cast your needs upon the Lord; rely on Him, and He will take care.
6. He will reveal your righteousness like the light, your justness like the high noon.
7. Depend on the Lord and hope in Him. Compete not with the prosperous, with the man who invents evil schemes.
8. Let go of anger, abandon rage; do not compete with [one who intends] only to harm.
9. For the evildoers will be cut down; but those who hope in the Lord, they will inherit the earth.
10. For soon the wicked one will not be; you will gaze at his place and he will be gone.
11. But the humble shall inherit the earth, and delight in abundant peace.
12. The wicked one plots against the righteous, and gnashes his teeth at him.
13. My Lord laughs at him, for He sees that his day will come.
14. The wicked have drawn a sword and bent their bow to fell the poor and destitute, to slaughter those of upright ways.
15. But their sword shall enter their own hearts, and their bows shall break.
16. Better the little of the righteous, than the abundant wealth of the wicked.
17. For the strength of the wicked will be broken, but the Lord supports the righteous.
18. The Lord appreciates the days of the innocent; their inheritance will last forever.
19. They will not be shamed in times of calamity, and in days of famine they will be satisfied.
20. For the wicked shall perish, and the enemies of the Lord are as fattened sheep: consumed, consumed in smoke.
21. The wicked man borrows and does not repay; but the righteous man is gracious and gives.
22. For those blessed by Him will inherit the earth, and those cursed by Him will be cut off.
23. The steps of man are directed by God; He desires his way.
24. When he totters he shall not be thrown down, for the Lord supports his hand.
25. I have been a youth, I have also aged; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his offspring begging bread.
26. All day he is kind and lends; his offspring are a blessing.
27. Turn away from evil and do good, and you will dwell [in peace] forever.
28. For the Lord loves justice, he will not abandon his pious ones-they are protected forever; but the offspring of the wicked are cut off.
29. The righteous shall inherit the earth and dwell upon it forever.
30. The mouth of the righteous one utters wisdom, and his tongue speaks justice.
31. The Torah of his God is in his heart; his steps shall not falter.
32. The wicked one watches for the righteous man, and seeks to kill him.
33. But the Lord will not abandon him in his hand, nor condemn him when he is judged.
34. Hope in the Lord and keep His way; then He will raise you high to inherit the earth. When the wicked are cut off, you shall see it.
35. I saw a powerful wicked man, well-rooted like a vibrant, native tree.
36. Yet he vanished, behold he was gone; I searched for him, but he could not be found.
37. Watch the innocent, and observe the upright, for the future of such a man is peace.
38. But sinners shall be destroyed together; the future of the wicked is cut off.
39. The deliverance of the righteous is from the Lord; He is their strength in time of distress.
40. The Lord helps them and delivers them; He delivers them from the wicked and saves them, because they have put their trust in Him.
Chapter 38
A prayer for every individual, bewailing the length of the exile. One who is in distress should recite this psalm, hence its introduction, "A psalm... to remind" (to remind us to recite it in times of distress). One can also derive many lessons from it.
1. A psalm by David, to remind.
2. O Lord, do not rebuke me in Your anger, nor chastise me in Your wrath.
3. For Your arrows have landed in me, Your hand descended upon me.
4. There is no soundness in my flesh because of Your rage, no peace in my bones because of my sin.
5. For my iniquities have flooded over my head; like a heavy load, they are too heavy for me.
6. My wounds are rotted; they reek because of my foolishness.
7. I am bent and extremely bowed; all day I go about in gloom.
8. My sides are inflamed; there is no soundness in my flesh.
9. I am weakened and extremely depressed; I howl from the moaning of my heart.
10. My Lord, all that I desire is before You; my sighing is not hidden from You.
11. My heart is engulfed, my strength has left me; the light of my eyes they, too, are not with me.
12. My friends and companions stand aloof from my affliction; my intimates stand afar.
13. The seekers of my life have laid traps; those who seek my harm speak destructiveness; they utter deceits all day long.
14. But I am like a deaf man, I do not hear; like a mute that does not open his mouth.
15. I was like a man that does not perceive, and in whose mouth there are no rebuttals.
16. Because for You, O Lord, I wait; You will answer, my Lord, my God.
17. For I said, "Lest they rejoice over me; when my foot falters they will gloat over me.”
18. For I am accustomed to limping, and my pain is constantly before me.
19. For I admit my iniquity; I worry because of my sin.
20. But my enemies abound with life; those who hate me without cause flourish.
21. Those who repay evil for good resent me for my pursuit of good.
22. Do not forsake me, O Lord; do not be distant from me, my God.
23. Hurry to my aid, O my Lord, my Salvation.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 20
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Monday, 6 Shevat, 5775 • 26 January 2015
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 20
ולמשל כמו בנפש האדם כשמדבר דבור אחד, שדבור זה לבדו כלא ממש אפילו לגבי כללות נפשו המדברת
To illustrate from the soul of a human being: When a man utters a word, this single word is as absolutely nothing even when compared only to his articulate soul (i.e., power of speech) as a whole,
שהוא בחינת לבוש האמצעי שלה, שהוא כח הדבור שלה
which is the soul’s middle “garment” i.e., organ of expression, namely its faculty of speech.
The soul has three “garments” — thought, speech, and action, of which speech is the middle one, with action being lower than it, and thought, higher; one word has no value even in comparison with this faculty,
יכול לדבר דבורים לאין ק׳ ותכלית
since this faculty can produce an infinite number of words — and next to infinity, one word has no value whatever.
In actual practice, there is a limit to the number of words one can speak. However, this is only because the physical organs involved in speech have a limited functional ability. The soul’s capacity for speech is limitless.
וכל שכן לגבי בחינת לבוש הפנימי שלה שהוא המחשבה, שממנה נמשכו הדבורים והיא חיותם
Surely, then, this word has no value when compared to the soul’s innermost “garment” i.e., that “garment” which is closest to the soul itself, namely, its faculty of thought, which is the source of speech and its life-force.
Since thought is higher and closer to the soul than is speech, this one word surely has no value in comparison with it.
ואין צריך לומר לגבי מהות ועצמות הנפש, שהן עשר בחינותיה הנ״ל, חכמה בינה דעת כו׳
It goes without saying, that this word is as naught when compared with the essence and entity as opposed to the “garments” of the soul, these being its ten attributes mentioned above:1 Chochmah, Binah, Daat, and so on, i.e., the seven emotional attributes
שמהן נמשכו אותיות מחשבה זו המלובשות בדבור זה כשמדבר
from which are derived the “letters” of thought that are clothed in one’s speech, when it is uttered.
Since all of man’s thoughts are either of an intellectual or an emotional nature, they derive from the soul’s intellectual or emotional faculties. When one speaks, the letters of his thought descend to a lower level.
כי המחשבה היא גם כן בחינת אותיות כמו הדבור, רק שהן רוחניות ודקות יותר
For thought too, like speech, consists of letters, except that the letters of thought are more spiritual and refined — thus thought and speech share a common characteristic.
אבל עשר בחינות, חכמה בינה דעת כו׳, הן שרש ומקור המחשבה ואין בהם בחינת אותיות עדיין קודם שמתלבשות בלבוש המחשבה
But the ten attributes — Chochmah, Binah, Daat, and so on, are the root and source of thought and, before being clothed in the garment of thought, they as yet lack the element of letters.
The letters are formed only when one applies his thoughts to a particular idea or a feeling, as explained further.
Since the intellectual and emotional soul-powers are so subtle and amorphous that they cannot be defined even in terms of the spiritual thought-letters, they are obviously of an altogether different, more spiritual, order than thought, and the spoken word is surely without value in comparison to them. What follows is a description of the process whereby the letters of thought are formed.
למשל כשנופלת איזו אהבה וחמדה בלבו של אדם קודם שעולה מהלב אל המוח לחשב ולהרהר בה
For example, when a man suddenly becomes conscious of a certain love or desire in his heart, before it has risen from the heart to the brain to meditate on it and ponder it,
אין בה בחינת אותיות עדיין, רק חפ׳ פשוט וחשיקה בלב אל הדבר ההוא הנחמד אצלו
it has not yet acquired the element of letters; it is only a pure desire and longing for the object of his affection.
וכל שכן קודם שנפלה התאוה והחמדה בלבו לאותו דבר, רק היתה בכח חכמתו ושכלו וידיעתו
All the more so before he began to feel in his heart a craving and desire for that thing, when it was yet confined within the realm of his intellect (Chochmah), understanding (corresponding to Binah), and knowledge (Daat),
שהיה נודע אצלו אותו דבר שהוא נחמד ונעים וטוב ויפה להשיגו ולידבק בו, כגון ללמוד איזו חכמה או לאכול איזה מאכל ערב
meaning that the thing was known to him to be desirable and gratifying, something good and pleasant to attain and to cling to; as for instance, to study a certain discipline or to eat some delicacy — then, in this state of intellectual appreciation of the desirable object, before the appreciation has even developed into an emotion, there are certainly no “letters” present in one’s mind.
רק לאחר שכבר נפלה החמדה והתאוה בלבו בכח חכמתו ושכלו וידיעתו
Only after the desire and craving have already descended into his heart i.e., after they have developed into emotions through the stimulus of his wisdom, understanding and knowledge,
ואחר כך חזרה ועלתה מהלב למוח לחשב ולהרהר בה איך להוציא תאותו מכח אל הפועל, להשיג המאכל או למידת החכמה בפועל
and only after they have ascended once again from the heart back to the brain, to think and meditate on how to implement his desire by actually obtaining that food or actually studying that subject,
הרי בכאן נולדו בחינת אותיות במוחו, שהן אותיות כלשון עם ועם המדברים ומהרהרים בהם כל עניני העולם
it is only at this point — when one applies his thoughts to implementing his desire — that “letters” are born in one’s mind, corresponding to the language of each of the nations, who employ these letters when speaking and thinking about everything in the world; i.e., each of us thinks in his own language.
“Pure” feeling, however, that is feeling that has not yet reached the “applied”, implemental stage of thought, transcends differences of nation and language, since it does not express itself in “letters”.
From all this we may understand the Alter Rebbe’s earlier statement that a spoken word is utterly without value in comparison with the soul’s intellectual and emotional powers (which are described here, for our purposes, as the essence of the soul). Surely, then, the Divine “Word” by which G‑d creates and animates all the worlds has no value at all next to G‑d, Who is truly and absolutely infinite. Thus all the worlds created and sustained by the Divine Word are as if nonexistent, from G‑d’s perspective, and their presence does not effect any change in His unity. This theme will be further discussed in the following chapter.
——— ● ———
FOOTNOTES
1. Ch. 3.
____________________________
Rambam:
Daily Mitzvah N321 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Monday, 6 Shevat, 5775 • 26 January 2015
Daily Mitzvah N321 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Monday, 6 Shevat, 5775 • 26 January 2015
Negative Commandment 321
Going Beyond City Limits on Shabbat
"Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day"—Exodus 16:29.
It is forbidden on Shabbat to travel more than 2,000 cubits (approximately 3000 ft.) out of a city's parameters.
oing Beyond City Limits on Shabbat
Negative Commandment 321
Translated by Berel Bell
The 321st prohibition is that we are forbidden to travel [even by foot] on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1, "No man may leave his place on the seventh day."
Oral Tradition defines limit of "travel" as 2000 amos2 beyond the city limit; one may not walk even a single amoh more. However, one may walk within 2000 amos from the city limit in any direction.3
The Mechilta says: " 'No man may leave his place,' — this means beyond 2000 amos."
Our Sages said in tractate Eruvin4, "For violating the prohibition of the Shabbos limit, one receives lashes by Biblical ordinance."5
The details of this commandment are discussed in that same tractate.
FOOTNOTES
1.Shmos 16:29.
2.Approximately 3000 ft. In Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Shabbos 27:1), the Rambam rules that walking 2000 amos is prohibited only by Rabbinic law, while the Biblical prohibition is in effect only at 12 mil, or approximately 24,000 amos.
The Rambam himself explains, however, (in responsa 310, quoted in Mishneh Torah, Kapach ed., p. 575) that there is no contradiction between his two works. Sefer Hamitzvos is meant only to give a general description of the mitzvah, so he did not mention the two categories. Mishneh Torah, on the other hand, gives all the relevant halachic details. See also Introduction to Sefer Hamitzvos.
3.In Mishneh Torah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that this area is considered within the suburbs of the city (see Num. 35:5).
4.17b.
5.With this quote, the Rambam proves that this mitzvah in included in the count of the 613 mitzvos
________________________________________
Going Beyond City Limits on Shabbat
"Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day"—Exodus 16:29.
It is forbidden on Shabbat to travel more than 2,000 cubits (approximately 3000 ft.) out of a city's parameters.
oing Beyond City Limits on Shabbat
Negative Commandment 321
Translated by Berel Bell
The 321st prohibition is that we are forbidden to travel [even by foot] on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1, "No man may leave his place on the seventh day."
Oral Tradition defines limit of "travel" as 2000 amos2 beyond the city limit; one may not walk even a single amoh more. However, one may walk within 2000 amos from the city limit in any direction.3
The Mechilta says: " 'No man may leave his place,' — this means beyond 2000 amos."
Our Sages said in tractate Eruvin4, "For violating the prohibition of the Shabbos limit, one receives lashes by Biblical ordinance."5
The details of this commandment are discussed in that same tractate.
FOOTNOTES
1.Shmos 16:29.
2.Approximately 3000 ft. In Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Shabbos 27:1), the Rambam rules that walking 2000 amos is prohibited only by Rabbinic law, while the Biblical prohibition is in effect only at 12 mil, or approximately 24,000 amos.
The Rambam himself explains, however, (in responsa 310, quoted in Mishneh Torah, Kapach ed., p. 575) that there is no contradiction between his two works. Sefer Hamitzvos is meant only to give a general description of the mitzvah, so he did not mention the two categories. Mishneh Torah, on the other hand, gives all the relevant halachic details. See also Introduction to Sefer Hamitzvos.
3.In Mishneh Torah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that this area is considered within the suburbs of the city (see Num. 35:5).
4.17b.
5.With this quote, the Rambam proves that this mitzvah in included in the count of the 613 mitzvos
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter a Day: Avodah Kochavim Avodah Kochavim - Chapter SevenAvodah Kochavim - Chapter Seven
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment to destroy false deities, all their accessories, and everything that is made for their purposes, as [Deuteronomy 12:2] states: "You shall surely destroy all the places [where the gentiles... served their gods]" and, as [implied by Deuteronomy 7:5]: "Rather, what you should do to them is tear down their altars."
In Eretz Yisrael, the mitzvah requires us to hunt after idol worship until it is eradicated from our entire land. In the diaspora, however, we are not required to hunt after it. Rather, whenever we conquer a place, we must destroy all the false deities contained within.
[The source for this distinction is Deuteronomy 12:3, which] states: "And you shall destroy their name from H3this place," [implying that] you are obligated to hunt false deities in Eretz Yisrael, but you are not obligated to do so in the diaspora.
Halacha 2
It is forbidden to benefit from false deities, their accessories, offerings for them, and anything made for them, as [implied by Deuteronomy 7:26]: "Do not bring an abomination to your home."
Anyone who derives benefit from any of the above receives two measures of lashes: one because of the prohibition, "Do not bring an abomination...," and one because of the prohibition, "Let nothing which is condemned cling to your hand."
Halacha 3
It is forbidden to benefit from an animal which was sacrificed to false deities in its entirety - even its excrement, its bones, its horns, its hooves, and its hide. It is forbidden to benefit from it at all.
To cite an example, the hide of an animal which is marked by a sign that indicates that it was offered as a sacrifice to false deities - e.g., it has a round hole in the place of the heart through which the heart is extracted, which was a common practice [of idolaters] - It is forbidden to benefit from all of these hides and others of the like.
Halacha 4
What is the difference between an idol belonging to a gentile and one belonging to a Jew? It is forbidden to benefit from an idol belonging to a gentile immediately [after it is fashioned], as [implied by Deuteronomy 7:25]: "You shall burn the sculptures of their gods with fire" - i.e., they are considered gods as soon as they have been sculpted.
[In contrast,] it is not forbidden to benefit from a Jew's [idol] until he worships it, as [implied by Deuteronomy 27:15]: "[Cursed is the person who makes an idol...] and places it in a hidden place" - i.e., it is not forbidden until he does private acts - i.e., worship - on its behalf.
The accessories of idol worship, whether belonging to a Jew or to a gentile, are not forbidden until they were actually used for the purpose of idol worship.
Halacha 5
[When] a person makes an idol for another person - although he receives lashes - his wage is permitted. [This applies] even when he made [the idol] for a gentile, and it is therefore forbidden immediately.
[What is the rationale for the latter decision? The idol] is not forbidden until it is completed and the hammer-stroke which completes it is not worth a penny.
[The following rules apply when] a person buys scrap metal from a gentile and finds idols within it: If he has already paid the money, but has not taken possession of it, he should return it to the gentile. The same [rules] apply if he took possession of it, but did not pay the money. Though taking possession represents a formal transfer of ownership in dealings with a gentile, the transaction was made in error. If he paid the money and took possession [of the scrap], he must take [the idols] to the Dead Sea.
Similarly, when a gentile and a convert [divide] the estate of their father - a gentile - the convert may tell the gentile, "Take the idols and I will take the money," "Take the forbidden wine and I will take the produce." Once [idols] come into the possession of the convert, however, they are forbidden.
Halacha 6
We are allowed to benefit from images which gentiles made for aesthetic purposes. It is forbidden, however, to benefit from images that are made for the purpose of idol worship.
What is implied? It is forbidden to benefit from any images found in villages, for one may assume that they were made for the sake of idol worship. When images are found in a city, they are forbidden only when they are found at the entrance to the city and hold a staff, bird, globe, sword, crown, or ring in their hands. Otherwise, we may assume that they were made for aesthetic purposes, and benefit from them is permitted.
Halacha 7
Statues of false deities which are found discarded in the marketplace or in a scrap metal heap are permitted. Needless to say, this applies to pieces of statues.
In contrast, should one find a hand, a foot, or another limb from the form of one of the constellations or celestial signs, it is forbidden to benefit from it. Since one knows that this limb is one of the images that is worshiped, the prohibition against [benefiting from it] remains until one knows that the gentiles who worshiped it, nullified it.
Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when] a person finds articles which have the form of the sun, the moon, or a d'rakon upon them: If they are golden or silver objects, or silk garments, or if these forms were engraved on a nose-ring or finger-ring, they are forbidden. If these forms are found on other articles, they are permitted, since we may assume that they were made for aesthetic purposes. Similarly, we may assume that any other form which is found on an article was intended for aesthetic purposes. Therefore, [the articles] are permitted.
Halacha 9
A false deity, its accessories, and the objects offered to it are always forbidden, regardless of the proportion [of a mixture they make up].
What is implied? If an idol becomes mixed together with statues made for aesthetic purposes - even if the proportion is merely one in several thousand - the entire group must be taken to the Dead Sea. Similarly, if a goblet [used for] idol worship becomes mixed together with many other goblets, or a piece of meat [coming from a sacrifice to a false deity] becomes mixed with other meat, the entire group must be taken to the Dead Sea. Similarly, if a hide with a hole through which the heart was removed becomes mixed with other hides, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire mixture.
[When] a person transgresses and sells a false deity, one of its accessories, or an object that was offered to it, it is forbidden to benefit from the money received, and that prohibition [remains if these funds become mixed with others], regardless of the proportion [of the mixture] they make up. [Deuteronomy 7:26] states: "Lest you become condemned like it." [From this we infer,] that anything that comes from a false deity, from any of its accessories, or from [anything] offered to it is [governed by the same prohibitions] as it is.
Halacha 10
When a false deity or an asherah is burned, it is forbidden to benefit from its ashes. A coal taken from an idol is forbidden; a flame [from an idol] is permitted, for it is not an entity with substance.
When there is a doubt whether an object is connected to idol worship or not, it is forbidden. If, however, that doubt is questionable, it is permitted.
What is implied? Should a goblet used for idol worship fall into a storage room of goblets, they are all forbidden, because a false deity and all its accessories are always forbidden, regardless of the proportion [of a mixture they make up]. If one of the cups from this mixture falls together with two other cups, the the [entire second mixture] is permitted.
Should a ring [used to adorn] an idol become mixed together with one hundred other rings, and then two of them fall into the Mediterranean Sea, it is permissible to use all of them. We presume that the [forbidden] ring was among the two [which fell].
Should [a forbidden ring] become mixed together with a hundred others and then [the group] becomes divided, forty being separated in one group and sixty in another, and then the entire [group of] forty fall into another group of rings, it is permissible to use all of them. We presume that the forbidden ring remained among the majority. If the [group of] sixty fall into another group of rings, they are all forbidden.
Halacha 11
Sitting under the shade of the trunk of an asherah - whether it is worshiped itself or whether an idol was placed under it - is forbidden. It is, however, permissible to sit under the shade of its branches and its leaves.
If a person has another route, it is forbidden for him to pass under it. If he has no other route, he may pass under it, provided he runs.
Halacha 12
Chicks which do not need their mother and nest in [an asherah] are permitted. In contrast, the chicks and eggs which need their mother are forbidden for theasherah is considered as if it is a base for them. The nest itself - [even though it is] in the top of the tree - is permitted, for the birds bring the wood for it from other places.
Halacha 13
It is forbidden to benefit from wood which one takes from it. Should a person have heated the oven with such wood, he must cool it off. Afterwards, he should kindle it with other, permitted, wood and then bake within.
Should he bake bread in [an oven heated in this manner] without cooling it, he is forbidden to benefit from the bread. If [such a loaf] became mixed together with others, he must bring the value of that loaf to the Dead Sea so that he will never benefit from it. The other loaves, however, are permitted.
Halacha 14
If one took [a piece of wood from an asherah to use as] a shuttle, and wove a garment with it, it is forbidden to benefit from [the garment]. Should the garment become mixed together with other garments, he must bring the value of that garment to the Dead Sea. All the other garments, however, are permitted.
It is permissible to plant vegetables under [an asherah] - whether in the summer - when they need the shade - or in the winter. [This leniency is granted] because the vegetables' growth is produced by two factors: the shade of the asherah, which is forbidden, and the earth, which is permitted. Whenever an effect is produced by the combination of a forbidden factor and a permitted factor, it is permitted. Therefore, if a field was fertilized with fertilizer [that was forbidden because of a connection with] idol worship, one may sow it. Similarly, [the meat of] a cow that was fed with beans [that were forbidden because of a connection with] idol worship, may be eaten. The same principle applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 15
It is not forbidden to benefit from meat, wine, and fruits that were prepared as offerings for idols. Although they were brought into the temple of a false deity, [they are not prohibited] until they are actually brought as offerings.
Once they are brought as offerings, [their status changes] and they remain forbidden forever, even if they were later removed [from the temple].
Torah law forbids benefiting from anything that is found in a temple of a false deity, even water or salt. If a person eats even the slightest amount from such substances, he is [punished by] lashing.
Halacha 16
[The following laws apply when] a person finds garments, utensils, or money [placed] on the head of an idol. If he finds them [placed] in a derisive manner, they are permitted. If he finds them [placed] in a deferential manner, they are forbidden.
What is implied? If one finds a purse hanging around its neck, folded garments placed on its head, or a utensil overturned on its head, they are permitted, because [they were placed] in a derisive manner. The same applies to other similar situations. [In contrast,] if one finds an object of a type which is used as an offering for the [Temple] altar on the head [of an idol], it is forbidden.
When does the above apply? When one finds such articles outside its [usual] place of worship. When, however, one finds such articles within the [idol's place of worship], regardless of whether it was placed in a derisive manner or in a deferential manner, or whether it is of the type of objects used as sacrifices for the [Temple] altar, any article found within [such a structure] - even water or salt - becomes forbidden.
[Different laws apply regarding] Pe'or and Marculis. It is forbidden to benefit from anything that is found together with them, whether [it is found] in their [temple] or outside of it. Similarly, with regard to the stones [found near a symbol of] Marculis: If a stone appears to be together with it, it is forbidden to benefit from it.
Halacha 17
When [the shrine of] a false deity possesses a bathhouse or a garden, benefit may be derived from it, provided one does not offer appreciation [in return]. [If] one must offer appreciation, it is forbidden.
[If the garden or bathhouse] is mutually owned by [the shrine] and another entity, one may derive benefit from it even if one provides its priests with appreciation. One may not, however, pay a fee.
Halacha 18
It is permitted to bathe in a bathhouse even though an idol is located within, because it is placed there for aesthetic purposes and not to be served. [This leniency can be inferred from the use by Deuteronomy 12:2 of the term:] "their gods" - i.e., the prohibition applies when they treat them as gods, and not when they humiliate them, such as in an instance where [the idol] stands over the sewage pipe and they urinate before it.
Should [the idol's] worship involve such activities, it is forbidden to enter [the bathhouse].
Halacha 19
It is permitted to benefit from [an animal] slaughtered using a knife [forbidden because of its connection to] idol worship, because one is detracting from [the animal's] value. If the animal is in danger [of dying], it is forbidden, because one is enhancing its value, and this improvement involves benefit from an accessory of idol worship.
Similarly, it is forbidden to cut meat with [such a knife], because one is enhancing its value. Should one cut with a destructive intent, causing a loss, the meat is permitted.
Commentary Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment - Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 185) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 436) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
to destroy false deities - The process of destruction is described in Chapter 8, Halachah 6.
all their accessories, and everything that is made for their purposes - Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.) states that the mitzvah is to destroy "every entity which is worshiped and their temples," from which one might conclude that the destruction of the accessories of idol worship is a Rabbinic injunction. Avodat HaMelech, however, cites Avodah Zarah 51b, which also derives the injunction to destroy the accessories of idol worship from a Biblical proof-text.
as [Deuteronomy 12:2] states: "You shall surely destroy all the places [where the gentiles... served their gods]" - Note the Bnei Binyamin, which states that when fulfilling this commandment, we should recite a blessing: "Blessed... who commanded us to eradicate idol worship from our land." Other commentaries explain that reciting a blessing is inappropriate, based on the principle (Rashba, Vol. I, Responsum 18) that a blessing is not recited for a mitzvah that comes to correct a sin. The Bnei Binyamin, however, maintains that this principle does not apply here, since the transgression was committed by gentiles.
and, as [implied by Deuteronomy 7:5]: "Rather, what you should do to them is tear down their altars." - Kinat Eliyahu questions the purpose of the second proof-text.
In Eretz Yisrael, the mitzvah requires us to hunt after idol worship until it is eradicated from our entire land. - Kinat Eliyahu explains that this obligation has its source in the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael. Because it is God's holy land, we must rid it of idol worship. In contrast,
In the diaspora, however - The obligation to destroy false deities is of a different nature.
we are not required to hunt after it. - Since these lands are not holy, we are not obligated to eradicate idol worship from them.
Rather, whenever we conquer a place, we must destroy all the false deities contained within - because a false deity may not exist under a Jew's authority.
In his notes on the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 146:20), the Vilna Gaon explains that the Rambam's statements appear to mean that whenever the Jews conquer a land, they are obligated to destroy all false deities and their places of worship. These statements may, however, also be interpreted as meaning that whenever an individual finds or takes possession of a false deity, it must be destroyed.
[The source for this distinction is Deuteronomy 12:3, which] states: "And you shall destroy their name from this place," - i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The opening verse of the Biblical passage cited states: "These are the statutes... you must heed... in the land that God... is giving you."
[implying that] you are obligated to hunt false deities in Eretz Yisrael, but you are not obligated to do so in the diaspora. - The Bnei Binyamin writes that even according to the opinions which permit gentiles to believe in Christianity, Jews are obligated to destroy their objects of worship and churches. This raises a question regarding the churches that exist in Eretz Yisrael today. Should their existence be tolerated, or are we, as a people and as individuals, obligated to destroy them?
Commentary Halacha 2
It is forbidden to benefit from false deities - i.e., statues, trees, or other entities which are worshiped.
their accessories, offerings for them - The Rambam considers the prohibition against benefiting from wine offered as a libation for false deities as a mitzvah in its own right (Negative Commandment 194). Therefore, he does not mention the laws governing this prohibition here, but in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, where he devotes three chapters to the subject.
[The fact that the Rambam associates the prohibition against benefitting from objects offered to idols with a Biblical proof-text appears to indicate that he considers this prohibition as having its roots in the Torah itself. Note Tosafot, Bava Kama 72a which states that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.]
and anything made for them, as [implied by Deuteronomy 7:26]: "Do not bring an abomination to your home." - Note the Pri Chadash,who questions whether a person who brings a false deity home without benefiting from it also receives lashes.
Anyone who derives benefit - Yad HaMelech contrasts the prohibition against benefiting from false gods with other Torah prohibitions where benefit is forbidden: e.g., non-kosher species of animals. In the latter case, though all types of benefit are forbidden, the Torah requires that punishment be administered only for eating the forbidden substances, and not for deriving other types of benefit (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot8:16), while with regard to false deities, punishment is administered for deriving any type of benefit.
The source for this difference is that the Torah uses the expression "Do not eat" or the like when forbidding the other prohibitions. Accordingly, punishment is administered only for eating. In contrast, the verses prohibiting false deities are more inclusive in nature.
from any of the above receives two measures of lashes: one because of the prohibition, "Do not bring an abomination..." -Sefer HaMitzvot(Negative Commandment 25) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 429) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
and one because of the prohibition, "Let nothing which is condemned cling to your hand." - As mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 7, the latter prohibition primarily concerns the property of a condemned city (עיר הנדחת). Nevertheless, since false deities are also described as "condemned," benefiting from them is also included in the scope of the above prohibition (Megillat Esther, Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 194).
Though the Ramban (Hasagot L'Sefer HaMitzvot) disputes the Rambam's decision, support for the Rambam's opinion can be found in several Talmudic sources - e.g., Avodah Zarah 34b, 51b.
The prohibition stated in this halachah and the positive commandment mentioned in the previous one serve as the foundation for all the laws discussed in this and the following chapter.
Commentary Halacha 3
It is forbidden - because of the prohibition mentioned in the previous halachah. (See also Deuteronomy 32:38.)
to benefit from an animal which was sacrificed to false deities in its entirety - The standard published text of the Mishneh Torah states שהקריבוה כולה לעכוóם - i.e., the phrase "in its entirety" modifies the verb "sacrifices," leading to the conclusion that were an animal to be consecrated only partially to a false deity different rules would apply. Note the Kessef Mishneh, Avodat HaMelech, and Or Sameach, which discuss this concept.
Authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah, however, read אסורה כולה - i.e., "in its entirety" modifies "forbidden." According to this version, the explanation is straightforward, when an animal is sacrificed to a false deity the prohibition includes
even its excrement, its bones, its horns, its hooves, and its hide - i.e., the prohibition involves not only the animal's meat, but even these less important elements of its being.
It is forbidden to benefit from it at all. To cite an example, the hide of an animal which is marked by a sign that indicates that it was offered as a sacrifice to false deities - e.g., it has a round hole - if the hole is oblong, there is no prohibition (Avodah Zarah 2:3).
in the place of the heart through which the heart is extracted - They would slit open the animal's hide and kill it by cutting out the heart (Keter HaMelech)
which was a common practice [of idolaters] - when offering sacrifices (Avodah Zarah, ibid.):
It is forbidden to benefit from all of these hides and others of the like -because we assume that the animal was used as a sacrifice to idols and is therefore forbidden.
Commentary Halacha 4
What is the difference - with regard to the prohibition mentioned in the previous law
between an idol belonging to a gentile and one belonging to a Jew? It is forbidden to benefit from an idol belonging to a gentile immediately [after it is fashioned], as [implied by - the Torah's command to destroy idols
Deuteronomy 7:25]: "You shall burn the sculptures of their gods with fire;" i.e. - the mention of the word "sculptures" is an addition, teaching that
they are considered gods as soon as they have been sculpted - whether they have been worshiped or not. Therefore, they are forbidden from that time onward. Note the comments of the Lechem Mishneh, which mentions an apparent contradiction between these statements and Chapter 8, Halachah 8. (See our commentary on that halachah.)
[In contrast,] it is not forbidden to benefit from a Jew's [idol] until he worships it, as [implied by Deuteronomy 27:15]: "[Cursed is the person who makes an idol...] and places it in a hidden place," - When does the curse fall? Not when the idol is made, but when it is placed in a hidden place.
i.e., it is not forbidden until he does private acts - i.e., worship - for it is unlikely that a Jew would worship a false deity openly.
on its behalf.
The accessories of idol worship, whether belonging to a Jew or to a gentile, are not forbidden until they were actually used for the purpose of idol worship. - Avodah Zarah 51b derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 12:2, which states "You shall surely destroy all the places where the gentiles... served their gods." The gentiles' places of worship and the other accessories to idol worship are not forbidden until the false deities are "served."
Commentary Halacha 5
[When] a person makes an idol for another person - although he receives lashes - as stated above, Chapter 3, Halachah 9
his wage is permitted. - We do not say that the wage is benefit derived from false deities, and is therefore forbidden.
[This applies] even when he made [the idol] for a gentile, and it is therefore forbidden immediately - as explained in the previous halachah.
[What is the rationale for the latter decision? The idol] is not forbidden until it is completed and the hammer-stroke which completes it - See Shabbat 73a, 75b and commentaries regarding the final hammer-stroke which completes a project.
is not worth a penny. - Avodah Zarah 19b explains that this law is dependent on the following principle of business law: Every moment an artisan works on a project is considered as a separate entity. When he finishes the project, it is considered as if the entire sum of money - with the exception of the value of the final hammer-stroke - is owed him from beforehand. Since benefit from the idol is not forbidden until it is completed, the money which is owed him previously is permitted.
[The following rules apply when] a person buys scrap metal from a gentile - There is an apparent contradiction between the laws which follow and Halachah 7, which states that idols found in a scrap metal heap are permitted. Two possible resolutions are offered:
a) According to the version (see our commentary on that halachah) which reads "statues" and not "statues of idols," there is no contradiction.
b) The prohibitions mentioned in this halachah were instituted because of the appearance that might be created if the Jew were to keep the idols he purchased. Accordingly, stricter laws were instituted.
a) According to the version (see our commentary on that halachah) which reads "statues" and not "statues of idols," there is no contradiction.
b) The prohibitions mentioned in this halachah were instituted because of the appearance that might be created if the Jew were to keep the idols he purchased. Accordingly, stricter laws were instituted.
and finds idols within it: - Once the Jew becomes the full legal owner of the idols, he is obligated to destroy them, and cannot nullify the transaction and return them. The question in the following instances is whether the transaction has been completed or not.
If he has already paid the money, but has not taken possession - We have taken some liberty in translating the word, ומשך. Literally, it means "and drew it after him." Performing this activity, however, is one of the means of formalizing a business transaction (see Hilchot Mechirah 3:1) and, therefore, the word was translated as above.
of it, he should return it to the gentile. - Though paying money represents the finalization of a transaction (kinyan) between a Jew and gentile (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:14), the transaction was made in error, as explained below. Since, in transactions carried out between two Jews, the transaction would not be completed until the recipient takes possession of the article, a Jew can return the idols to the gentile in this instance.
The same [rules] apply if he took possession of it, but did not pay the money. Although taking possession represents a formal transfer of ownership in dealings with a gentile - See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, ibid.
the transaction was made in error - Since, in transactions carried out between two gentiles, the transaction would not be completed until the money was paid, it can be nullified in this instance.
If he paid the money and took possession [of the scrap] - even though the transaction was carried out in error, since it appears to have been completed, it is forbidden to benefit from the idols because of the impression it may create. Therefore, they must be destroyed (Avodah Zarah 53a, 71b). (See also Siftei Cohen 1464.)
Our commentary follows the interpretation of Rav Kapach. It must be noted that many of the classic commentaries on the Mishneh Torah have questioned why the Rambam mentions the concept of a transaction made in error only in the case when the Jew took possession and did not pay, but not when he paid and did not take possession. They have offered several possible resolutions, including a sweeping statement by Avodat HaMelech that our Sages nullified the effectiveness of monetary payment as an effective means of finalizing the transfer of property (kinyan), not only with regard to transactions between two Jews (see Hilchot Mechirah 3:1,4-5), but also with regard to transactions between a Jew and a gentile.
(Interestingly, though the Rambam's phraseology has raised such problems, it is quoted verbatim by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 146:3.)
When stating that a forbidden object must be destroyed, our Sages frequently used the expression:
he must take [the idols] to the Dead Sea. -Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 43b, explain that one need not literally take the idols to the Dead Sea. By using that term, our Sages implied a place where the idols will never benefit man. Similarly, the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 146) explains that the Dead Sea is mentioned because it is a desolate area, not frequented by ships. If an article is cast into that sea, we can assume that it will not be recovered.
Tosafot also relates that, in practice, one need not take the idols to the Dead Sea. All that is necessary is to destroy the article in a manner in which neither it, nor its ashes or dust, will benefit man. See also Chapter 8, Halachah 6.
[It must be noted that though the Rambam occasionally uses the term 18חלמהáםי to refer to the Mediterranean Sea (see the conclusion to his Commentary to the Mishnah), in this context, it is clear that his intent is the Dead Sea.]
Similarly, when a gentile and a convert [divide] the estate of their father - a gentile - The problem in this instance is that it is forbidden to exchange an idol for other property. Hence, before taking possession of the inheritance,
the convert may tell the gentile, "Take the idols and I will take the money" or "Take the forbidden wine and I will take the produce." - In which case, the idols have never come into the convert's possession and, hence, he is not considered to have benefited from their exchange.
Once [idols] come into the possession of the convert, however - they are considered to be idols belonging to a Jew, and
they are forbidden - and must be destroyed.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (D'mai 6:10), the Rambam writes that were a similar situation - an inheritance containing property from which one heir would be allowed to benefit from and one would be forbidden - to occur among Jews, the leniencies mentioned above would not be permitted.
The difference between the two cases is that when a Jew inherits property from his father, the transfer of ownership is immediate, and from the moment of his father's death, the forbidden property belongs to the heir, who must take responsibility for it. In contrast, a convert's inheritance of his gentile father's estate is a Rabbinic decree, instituted in consideration of the convert. According to the Torah, once he converts, he has no connection to his natural parents. The Sages extended the leniency they granted in allowing him to acquire the inheritance to include the right to barter these forbidden articles before they actually become his property. (See also Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De'ah 146:5.
Commentary Halacha 6
We are allowed to benefit - i.e., enjoy the artistic talent and/or sell or use as scrap metal
from images - The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 141) states that these laws apply only to human images. Other authorities (and indeed certain interpretations of the Tur) disagree, and consider the statements as referring to all images. From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:1), it appears that the latter opinion reflects his view.
which gentiles made for aesthetic purposes. - Note Chapter 3, Halachah 10, with regard to the prohibition against Jews making human images even for these purposes. See our commentary on that halachah, with regard to the place of art in Jewish life.
It is forbidden, however, to benefit from images that are made for the purpose of idol worship - even if they are artistic masterpieces. Thus, the entire realm of the gentile's sacramental art is forbidden to us.
What is implied? - The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De'ah 141:4) explains that the statements that follow (which are based on Avodah Zarah 41a) reflect the socio-cultural environment in which the Rambam lived. The criteria he mentions are thus not hard and fast rules, and will vary if different conditions prevail in other societies.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah, ibid., based on Avodah Zarah 40-41), the Rambam explains that although Rabbi Meir maintained that all gentile images were forbidden because they would be used for different pagan rites, the Sages disagreed and laid down the following general rules.
It is forbidden to benefit from any images found in villages for - Simple villagers are not expected to have artistic tastes. Therefore,
one may assume that they were made for the sake of idol worship. - Even if we have no proof to that effect, we follow the general rule that it is forbidden to benefit from an image which is merely suspected of being worshiped as an idol.
When images are found - even when the circumstances mentioned in the following halachah do not apply
in a city - Since the inhabitants of a metropolis are expected to be cultured and sophisticated, the images found there are not necessarily idols. Hence,
they are forbidden only when they are found at the entrance to the city -a position which implies their authority over the entire city.
and hold a staff, bird, globe, sword, crown, or ring in their hands. - All of these are also symbols of authority or sovereignty.
Otherwise, we may assume - The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 141:1, which frequently quotes the Rambam verbatim, changes the phraseology used in this clause from "we may assume" to "surely." The Siftei Cohen (141:1) explains that this change clarifies that even though it is forbidden to benefit from an image which is merely suspected to have been worshiped as an idol (see Halachah 10), our assumption
that they were made for aesthetic purposes - is so strong that this is not considered as a case of doubt
and benefit from them is permitted.
Commentary Halacha 7
Statues of false deities - Our text follows the published texts of the Mishneh Torah. The words "of false deities" and several of the other points in this halachah appear to be printer's additions, which are not found in the authoritative manuscripts and run contrary to the explanation of these concepts in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:2). Note also the apparent contradiction mentioned in our commentary on Halachah 5.
Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 141:2 does not mention "idols," but "statues."
which are found discarded in the marketplace or in a scrap metal heap are permitted. - Avodah Zarah 41a-b explains this law as follows. The Mishnah uses the expression "statues" - i.e., a statue which we do not know that it has been worshiped. Shmuel, one of the Talmudic sages, adds, however, that the leniency also applies to idols which we know were worshiped.
His decision is based on the principle (Chapter 8, Halachah 8) that if the gentiles who worship an idol no longer consider it a god, the prohibition against benefiting from it is nullified. In this instance, the fact that these statues were found discarded is the clearest proof that their worshipers forsook them.
Afterwards, the Talmud quotes a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, concerning idols which are broken accidentally. In the context of the explanation of that difference of opinion, the Talmud mentions the explanation of the Mishnah in question by Rabbi Yochanan (whom the halachah follows, see Chapter 8, Halachah 11). He explains that the pieces of the statues (not idols) are permitted because we are not sure that they were ever worshiped. Even if they have been worshiped, it is possible that they were nullified.
Thus, according to the Talmud, the interpretation of these laws is as follows: If one finds an idol that was obviously purposefully broken (Shmuel's law), it is permitted to benefit from it. If, however, the idol was not destroyed with an obvious destructive intent, it is forbidden to benefit from it, as Rabbi Yochanan states.
Needless to say, this applies to pieces of statues. - The fact that they were broken would appear to indicate that their worshipers nullified them.
In contrast, should one find a hand, a foot, or another limb from the form of one of the constellations or celestial signs - The phrase, "from the form of one of the constellations or celestial signs," is a printer's addition, which runs contrary to the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah, ibid. This phrase implies that this clause refers to a limb broken from an idol. The authoritative manuscripts state "should one find a hand... which is the form of a deity."
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that this clause (found both in the mishnah and in this halachah) does not refer to a limb that is broken from an idol, but rather to an instance where the limb itself is worshiped. The Rambam explains that since the previous clause states that broken limbs of statues are permitted, this clause must be speaking about a different concept.
it is forbidden to benefit from it. - Though the fact that it was abandoned in a scrap heap could be considered as an indication that it was nullified,
Since one knows that this limb is one of the images that is worshiped -i.e., the prohibition against its use is firmly established,
the prohibition against [benefiting from it] remains until one knows - i.e., it is established with equal certainty
that the gentiles who worshiped it, nullified it - at which point its use is no longer prohibited, as explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 8.
Commentary Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when] a person finds articles which have the form of the sun, the moon - As mentioned in the commentary on Chapter 3, Halachah 11, the Rambam writes in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:3:
This does not mean a sphere which represents the sun, or a hemisphere which represents the moon, but rather the images which the astrologers [i.e., those following Greek mythology] attribute to the stars... - e.g., Saturn is represented as a dark old man of venerable age, Venus is represented as a beautiful maiden adorned with gold, and the sun is represented as a king with a diadem sitting in a chariot.
The Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 141:3) quotes this explanation as halachah.
or a d'rakon - In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam describes this image as a fishlike man with fins and many scales, probably referring to the Greek god Neptune. Rashi, Avodah Zarah 42b, and others interpret the form as that of an animal similar to a serpent. Perhaps this term is the source for the word "dragon."
upon them: - The question is whether these forms should be considered to be representations of deities (and hence, forbidden).
If they are golden or silver objects, or silk garments - i.e., objects of great value.
or if these forms were engraved on a nose-ring or finger-ring - Rings, in addition to their value, also are a symbol of subservience: a slave wears his master's ring.
they are forbidden. - The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 141:3) mentions that even valuable objects are permitted if one is certain that they have never been used as articles of worship.
If these forms are found on other articles, they are permitted - The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah, ibid.) states the general rule: "If these articles are found on objects of value, they are forbidden. If they are found on articles of little worth, they are permitted." The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) mentions pots or kettles as examples of objects of little worth.
since we may assume that they were made for aesthetic purposes. - The Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 3:3) states that if we are certain that these images were made for the purposes of worship, the article is forbidden even if it is of little value. TheShulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes this principle.
The Ramah states that since paganism is not common at present, we assume that these forms were made for artistic purposes. Hence, it is not forbidden to benefit from an article even if it contains pagan images. One may not, however, keep such an article in one's possession. He adds that even at present, certain individuals are stringent with themselves and do not benefit from an article containing the three forms mentioned above.
Similarly, we may assume that any other form which is found on an article was intended for aesthetic purposes. - Avodah Zarah 42b asks rhetorically: "Are these the only forms that are worshiped?" and explains that it is possible that the other forms would also be worshiped, but they are generally not made for that purpose. In contrast, the three forms mentioned above are generally made for the purpose of worship.
Therefore, [the articles] are permitted.
Commentary Halacha 9
A false deity, its accessories, and the objects offered to it - Avodah Zarah 29b derives the prohibition against benefiting from wine used by pagans as a libation (yayin nesech) from the prohibition against benefiting from animals sacrificed to idols. Since the mishnah (Avodah Zarah 74a) specifically mentionsyayin nesech as forbidden, regardless of the proportion of the mixture involved, the same principle applies to all objects offered to an idol.
are always forbidden, regardless of the proportion [of a mixture they make up]. - As mentioned in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, Chapter 16, the prohibition against benefiting from different substances can be negated when the substance is accidentally mixed with other substances. For example, the prohibition against eating certain forbidden foods (e.g., non-kosher meat, fats, mixtures of meat and milk) is lifted when these substances become mixed with 60 times their amount of other substances. The prohibitions against terumah (and any other substances which are also called terumah) are lifted when it becomes mixed with 100 times their amount of other substances and similarly, the prohibitions against orlah andkilai hakerem are lifted when these substances are mixed with 200 times their amount of other substances.
Because of the serious nature of the prohibition against idol worship, these principles do not apply and anything connected with it is forbidden, regardless of the proportion of the mixture the forbidden substances make up. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 5:8.)
What is implied? If an idol becomes mixed together with statues made for aesthetic purposes - which are permitted
even if the proportion is merely one in several thousand - the entire group must be taken to the Dead Sea - i.e., it is forbidden to benefit from them and they must be destroyed.
Similarly, if a goblet [used for] idol worship - i.e., an accessory of idol worship
becomes mixed together with many other - identical
goblets - Needless to say, if one can distinguish between the forbidden goblet and the permitted ones, there is no reason to forbid the use of the permitted ones.
or a piece of meat [coming from a sacrifice to a false deity] becomes mixed with other meat - See the following halachah.
the entire group must be taken to the Dead Sea. - TheLechem Mishneh(noting the Rambam's statements, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 16:29) questions why in this instance, the Rambam does not suggest that the entire mixture be sold to a gentile, and then, the value of the forbidden article destroyed. This question is discussed by many commentaries; their consensus is that, although such a provision is made regarding closed barrels of yayin nesech, it applies in that specific case alone, but not with regard to other instances.
Similarly, if a hide with a hole through which the heart was removed - i.e., a round hole, as mentioned in Halachah 3. This was one of the common practices of idol worship.
becomes mixed with other hides, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire mixture - and it must be destroyed.
[When] a person - i.e., a Jew. Different laws apply regarding a gentile. (SeeShulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 132:7, 144:1.)
transgresses and sells a false deity, one of its accessories, or an object that was offered to it - The sale is forbidden, because it is forbidden to derive any benefit from a false deity. This prohibition is unique; whenever one sells other forbidden substances (with the exception of the fruits of the seventh year), the fact that their sale was forbidden does not affect the status of the money received for them. In contrast, when selling anything forbidden because of idol worship
it is forbidden to benefit from the money received - Rather, the money must be destroyed, like the idols themselves. If the proceeds from the sale or exchange of an idol are used to acquire another object, that object is also forbidden. See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.
and that prohibition [remains if these funds become mixed with others] regardless of the proportion [of the mixture] they make up. - i.e., the same severe restrictions that would apply to an idol itself, apply to the money received from its sale.
This principle is derived as follows:
[Deuteronomy 7:26] states: - "Do not bring an abomination (an idol) into your house...
"Lest you become condemned like it." [From this - The Hebrew word והיה
we - Avodah Zarah 54b
infer] that anything that comes - into your possession
from a false deity, from any of its accessories, or from [anything] offered to it - See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 132:5-7, which elaborates on this concept with regard to the laws pertaining to yayin nesech.
is [governed by the same prohibitions] as it is. - Note the commentary ofMishneh LaMelech, which questions whether the same ruling would be rendered if the purchaser did not know that the article which he acquired is connected with a false deity. Mishneh LaMelech maintains that the transaction is nullified, and the money the seller receives must be returned to the purchaser.
Commentary Halacha 10
When a false deity or an asherah - For a definition of the term asherah, see Chapter 6, Halachah 9, and see the following halachah.
is burned, it is forbidden to benefit from its ashes. - Ash was used for certain purposes - e.g., the manufacture of soap.
Although the idol was destroyed, the prohibition that applied to it applies to its ashes as well. (For this reason, our Sages suggested taking idols to the Dead Sea. Since this is a desolate area, there is little likelihood that anyone will ever benefit from the idols.)
Temurah 34a notes that this prohibition differentiates substances associated with idols from other forbidden substances that must be burned.
A coal taken from - a fire which is lit as an act of service to
an idol - is considered to be an accessory of the idol. It
is forbidden - to be used for any other purpose.
a flame [from an idol] is permitted, - to be used - e.g., to light another flame
for it is not an entity with substance - i.e., there is no entity to which the prohibition can be attached. Although as a safeguard, the Rabbis forbade the use of certain flames, they did not pass such a decree against flames from idol worship. In general, Jews were repelled by any association with idol worship. Hence, the Rabbis did not feel that it was necessary to institute a prohibition (Beitzah 39a).
When there is a doubt whether an object is connected to idol worship or not, it is forbidden. - When there is a doubt regarding whether a substance is prohibited or not, we follow the principle that מדאורייתא (according to Torah law), it is permitted. מדרבנן (according to Rabbinic decree), it is forbidden.
If, however, that doubt is questionable - The Hebrew, 18קפס אקיפס, implies that there is a doubt whether our original suspicion continues to apply, as illustrated by the examples mentioned in the latter clauses of the halachah.
The prohibition against benefiting from an object whose prohibited status is in question is only Rabbinic in nature. Whenever there is a doubt regarding whether a Rabbinic prohibition applies or not, a lenient approach is permitted (ספק דרבנן לקולא).
it is permitted. - For the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to institute a decree in such an instance.
What is implied? Should a goblet used for idol worship - i.e., an accessory of idol worship, which is forbidden, as mentioned in the previous halachah.
fall into a storage room of - identical
goblets, they are all forbidden, because a false deity and all its accessories are always forbidden, regardless of the proportion [of a mixture they make up]. - Since there is a doubt whether each of the goblets is the forbidden one or not, none of them may be used.
If one of the cups from this mixture falls together with two - This translation follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, which reads כוסות שנים. The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1406) suggests (and indeed, many manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah support this contention) that the text read כוסות שניים, which would be rendered as "other cups." This version is closer to the text of Zevachim 74a, the Talmudic passage that serves as the source for this law.
other cups - Here, there is a doubt whether our original suspicion continues to apply. Perhaps the cup one chooses from the new mixture did not come from the original mixture. Even if it did come from the original mixture, perhaps it is not the cup that was used for idol worship.
the [entire second mixture] is permitted. - The Kessef Mishneh and other commentaries question the Rambam's decision, noting that the text ofZevachim, ibid., appears to indicate that it is necessary for there to be three mixtures. Indeed, in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 16:10, when discussing the prohibitions of a דבר חשוב (a forbidden substance whose importance prevents it from ever being nullified in a mixture), the Rambam himself appears to follow this view, stating:
If one pomegranate from a mixture [containing a forbidden pomegranate] falls together with two other pomegranates... and from these three, one pomegranate falls together with other pomegranates, the latter [mixture] is permitted.
Indeed, on the basis of the statements in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 140) deviates from the Rambam's opinion and requires three mixtures.
This approach, however, is not followed by all commentaries. Rashi andTosafot (Zevachim, ibid.) explain that even with regard to a דבר חשוב, only two mixtures are necessary. These views are quoted as halachah by the Turei Zahav and the Siftei Cohen in their glosses on the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 110:8).
Among the suggestions made by the commentaries to resolve the difference between the Rambam's statements here and those in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurotare the following:
a) Most people are careful regarding the prohibition against benefiting from any object connected with idol worship. Therefore, there is no need to reinforce the prohibition. In contrast, the prohibition against benefiting from a דבר חשוב is far less known. Hence, the Rabbis added severe safeguards to make sure that it be observed (Kessef Mishneh).
b) Here, the Rambam is speaking about a prohibition against benefiting from a forbidden object (איסור הנאה). In contrast, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot is concerned with partaking of forbidden foods, where the prohibition is more severe (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De'ah 110:52).
a) Most people are careful regarding the prohibition against benefiting from any object connected with idol worship. Therefore, there is no need to reinforce the prohibition. In contrast, the prohibition against benefiting from a דבר חשוב is far less known. Hence, the Rabbis added severe safeguards to make sure that it be observed (Kessef Mishneh).
b) Here, the Rambam is speaking about a prohibition against benefiting from a forbidden object (איסור הנאה). In contrast, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot is concerned with partaking of forbidden foods, where the prohibition is more severe (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De'ah 110:52).
Even the authorities who permit the second mixture to be used do not allow a single individual to partake of the entire mixture at one time. In such an instance, there would be only a single doubt whether he used the forbidden object or not.
The Rabbis (Zevachim, 74b) mentioned another example of a mixture which is permitted because of circumstances which create a doubt whether our original suspicion continues to apply:
Should a ring [used to adorn] an idol become mixed together with one hundred other rings, and - they would thus all be forbidden according to the above principles. However, if
then two of them fall - accidentally. If one intentionally throws one into the sea, the leniency does not apply (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 110:7).
into the Mediterranean Sea - and are thus lost. If two merely become separated from the group, the others remain prohibited (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.). (Note the Kessef Mishneh's comments that here, the Dead Sea is intended.)
it is permissible to use all of them. - i.e., all the rings that remain. The prohibition does not continue to apply, because
We presume that the [forbidden] ring was among the two - The Kessef Mishneh notes that when stating a similar law in Hilchot Terumah 15:2, the Rambam required only a single barrel of wine to be lost. The difference between these two laws can be resolved by taking into account the nature of the prohibited substances: Rings are small, and the loss of a single ring does not make a substantial difference to the entire group. In contrast, barrels of wine are large, and the loss of even one will attract attention.
[which fell]. - The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 140) limits this leniency, stating that it is forbidden to use a single ring alone, nor may one person benefit from the entire group of rings at once.
The Rabbis (Zevachim, ibid.) mentioned a third example of a mixture which is permitted because of circumstances which create a doubt whether our original suspicion continues to apply:
Should [a forbidden ring] become mixed together with a hundred others and - they would thus be forbidden according to the above principles. However, if
then [the group] becomes divided, forty - i.e., the minority
being separated in one group, and sixty - i.e., the majority
in another, and then the entire [group of] forty fall into another group of rings, it is permissible to use all of them - the second mixture.
We presume that the forbidden ring remained among the majority. - There is a doubt whether the forbidden ring was among the forty. Even if it had been included within that forty, perhaps the ring one chooses from the second mixture is not the forbidden one.
In this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 140) does not accept the Rambam's view, and forbids the second mixture. Even according to the Rambam, it is not permissible to eat the entire second mixture at one time, for then there would be only a single doubt.
If the - entire
[group of] sixty fall into another group of rings, they are all forbidden. -Should, however, only a portion of the sixty fall into another mixture, the Rambam (but not the Shulchan Aruch) would permit their use. In such an instance, their status would parallel that of the second mixture of goblets mentioned above.
Commentary Halacha 11
Sitting under the shade of the trunk of an asherah - a tree associated with the worship of false deities
whether it is worshiped itself - as mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 3.
or whether an idol was placed under it - as mentioned in Chapter 6, Halachah 9, and Chapter 8, Halachah 4. In such instances, the tree was intended for aesthetic purposes and for offering shade to the worshipers.
is forbidden - because one will be deriving benefit from a false deity or its accessories.
It is, however, permissible to sit under the shade of its branches and its leaves. - This decision has been questioned by other authorities, who wonder why the Rambam distinguished between the tree's trunk and branches. On the surface, the same prohibition should apply to both of them.
The Rambam's decision is based on his interpretation of Avodah Zarah 48b, which is derived from the Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 3:8). The Talmud explains that even though the shade of an asherah is forbidden, צל הצל, literally, "the shade of its shade," is permitted. The Jerusalem Talmud interprets 18לצ לצה as shade produced by the parts of the tree which would not touch the trunk if they fell.
[Rashi offers a different interpretation of Avodah Zarah, ibid. His view is accepted by most commentaries. When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 142:9) does not differentiate between the shade produced by the trunk and that of its leaves.
If a person has another route - to reach his desired destination, which is no longer than the one which passes under the asherah. If the alternate route is longer, the person is not required to deviate from the path leading under theasherah (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.).
it is forbidden for him to pass under it. - This prohibition appears to have been instituted lest one benefit from the tree's shade. Note, however, the Ramah's statements (Yoreh De'ah, ibid.), which permit one to pass under theasherah's shade, though not under the tree itself. According to his opinion, the prohibition stems from the impurity of idol worship.
If he has no other route, he may pass under it, provided he runs - Avodah Zarah (ibid.) relates that Rav Sheshet would run when he passed under an asherah. This Talmudic passage mentions the requirement to run only with regard to a person of distinction. Nevertheless, since there is no great difficulty in running for this short distance, the Rambam imposes this stringency on all people (Kessef Mishneh).
Commentary Halacha 12
Chicks which do not need their mother - i.e., which can fly on their own
and nest in [an asherah] are permitted. - Even though these chicks are permitted, Me'ilah 14a does not allow one to climb up the tree and take them in a normal manner. Rather, one must knock the chicks down with a stave, and then collect them. The Hagahot Maimoniot (and the Turei Zahav, Yoreh De'ah142:12) explain that climbing on the tree or using it as support for a ladder would involve deriving benefit from the forbidden tree.
The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Me'ilah 3:9, suggests a different interpretation. There, the Rambam specifically writes that when taking the nest - as stated in the final clause of this halachah - it permissible to climb up the tree in the normal manner. Therefore, it appears that one should knock down the chicks to see if they are capable of flying on their own or not. This explanation also clarifies why the Rambam does not mention in this halachah the need to knock down the chicks. By stating that only those which do not need their mother are permitted, he implies that one must determine whether or not the chicks need their mother (Rav Kapach).
In contrast, the chicks and eggs which need their mother are forbidden, for the asherah is considered as if it is a base for them. - Avodah Zarah42b explains that this is a Rabbinic decree imposed lest the people desire to benefit from the asherah itself. Since these chicks and eggs require the asherah, they are prohibited as the asherah is.
The nest itself - [even though it is] in the top of the tree - is permitted, -and the wood from which it is composed may be used for other purposes
for the birds bring the wood for it from other places. - Were the wood, however, to come from the asherah itself, it would be forbidden even though it had been separated from it already, as is obvious from Chapter 8, Halachah 3.
The Ra'avad states that one must explicitly know that the birds built their nest from other wood. Avodat HaMelech explains that the Rambam does not require such knowledge, because of the following Talmud principle: When there is a question whether a substance came from the most probable source (רוב) or the closest source (קרוב), we presume it came from the most probable source.
Commentary Halacha 13
It is forbidden to benefit from wood which one takes from it. - i.e., from anasherah. Even though the wood has been separated from the tree itself, it is forbidden to benefit from the wood. (See Chapter 8, Halachot 1,3, and 4 for additional explanations regarding the nature of this prohibition.)
This prohibition applies not merely לכתחילה (a priori), but even in the following instance.
Should a person have heated an oven with such wood - and thus seek to benefit from the forbidden wood, he is not permitted to use the oven. Rather,
he must cool it off. - Note the contrast between the Rambam's statements here and those in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 16:22, where the Rambam states that if an oven is heated with the shells or peels of fruit which is forbidden (because it is either orlah or kil'ei hakerem), it is sufficient to remove the wood which is burning. The coals and the heat produced by the initial fire, however, are not forbidden and one may bake with them. He does not make such statements here, because, as stated in Halachah 10, even the coals and ashes of an asherah are forbidden.
[Curiously, when mentioning these laws in the Shulchan Aruch (142:4), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, substituting forbidden wood for orlah, without distinguishing between the different prohibitions. Accordingly the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch(Turei Zahav 145:5, Siftei Cohen 145:10) object to his decision.]
Afterwards, he should - remove the forbidden wood and
kindle it with other, permitted wood and then bake within. - In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:9), the Rambam explains that the above decision applies whether the oven is new or old.
The Mishnah states that if such wood is used in a new oven, the oven may never be used again. In Talmudic times, the ovens were made of clay and the clay would not harden sufficiently until the oven was kindled once. Thus, since kindling the oven for the first time prepared it to be used on all subsequent occasions, some Rabbis forbade its use when this first kindling was made with a forbidden substance. This opinion is, nevertheless, not accepted as halachah. The Rambam's view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, ibid. (See the explanation of זה וזה גורם in the following halachah.)
Furthermore, this prohibition is extended beyond the oven:
Should he bake bread in [an oven heated in this manner] without cooling it - even if, afterwards, he added permitted wood
he is forbidden to benefit from the bread - because the beneficial effect of the forbidden wood preceded the influence of the permitted wood.
If [such a loaf] became mixed together with others - the entire mixture is forbidden. He can, however, cause that prohibition to be lifted if he carries out the following instructions.
[This mixture of bread can be differentiated from the mixtures mentioned in Halachah 10. Those mixtures involved objects which were themselves used as accessories for idol worship, while here the loaf itself was never used for such purposes. Hence, the severe laws mentioned there do not apply in this instance.]
he must bring the value of that loaf - even if it is more valuable than the wood (Siftei Cohen 142:9).
to the Dead Sea - or destroy it in another way (see the notes on Halachah 5)
so that he will never benefit from it. - The Siftei Cohen 142:8 states that the Rambam's [and, thus, the Shulchan Aruch's (Yoreh De'ah 142:3)] phraseology implies that it is not sufficient to destroy the value of the wood (regardless of whether the forbidden loaf becomes mixed with others or not). He does, however, suggest selling the loaf to a gentile (less the value of the forbidden wood) in a manner in which one could be sure that it would not be resold to a Jew.
The other loaves, however, are permitted - even to be eaten. In other similar situations, one is permitted to benefit from a forbidden mixture (e.g., sell it to a gentile), but partaking of it oneself is prohibited. (See Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot16:29.) Here, one is allowed to partake of the bread itself (Siftei Cohen 142:10).
Commentary Halacha 14
If one took [a piece of wood from an asherah to use as] a shuttle - the piece of the loom which passes the woof through the threads of the warp.
and wove a garment with it, it is forbidden to benefit from [the garment] -because it is prohibited to use anything made from idol worship.
Should the garment become mixed together with other garments, he must bring the value of that garment to the Dead Sea. - Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:9), where he explains why it is necessary to state both cases (the bread and the garment).
All the other garments, however, are permitted - as explained in the previous halachah. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 142:3.)
It is permissible - 18הליחתכל (a priori)
to plant vegetables under [an asherah], whether in the summer - when they need the shade - and thus, one will receive direct benefit from theasherah
or in the winter - when the influence of the asherah is less felt.
[This leniency is granted] because the vegetables' growth is produced by two factors: the shade of the asherah, which is forbidden, and the earth, which is permitted. - We follow a principle that is employed in many other areas of Torah law:
Whenever an effect is produced by the combination of a forbidden factor and a permitted factor, it is permitted. - In such instances, the leniency is generally granted only בדיעבד (after the fact). In this situation, however, the leniency is granted a priori, because the person does not receive any benefit when he sows the field and, afterwards, the benefit comes in and of itself (Rabbenu Nissim).
Therefore, if a field was fertilized with fertilizer [that was forbidden because of a connection with] idol worship, one may sow it - because the crop growth also depends on the earth, which is not forbidden. At the outset, however, it is forbidden to use such fertilizer (Siftei Cohen 142:11).
Similarly, [the meat of] a cow that was fed with beans - The Hebrew term כרשינים refers to "vetch," a species of bean commonly used for animal fodder.
[that were forbidden because of a connection with] idol worship, it may be eaten - because its growth was also influenced by the permitted food it ate. If, however, it was raised solely on forbidden food, different rules apply (Turei Zahav 142:17).
[Significantly, in Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 3:9, the Rambam feels it necessary to give a different reason why a cow that was given such a diet might be used as a sacrifice. The Sages, however, always ruled more stringently with regard to sacrifices than with regard to food consumed by private individuals.]
The same principle applies in other similar situations.
Commentary Halacha 15
It is not forbidden to benefit from meat, wine, and fruits that were prepared as offerings for idols. - This law reflects a contrast to the Temple offerings. Once a person dedicated an animal to be offered as a sacrifice, or an article to be donated to the Temple treasury, it became consecrated (הקדש) and could no longer be used for mundane purposes. This principle does not apply with regard to articles designated to be used as offerings for idols, as explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 1.
Although they were brought into the temple of a false deity, [they are not prohibited] until they are actually brought as offerings. - However, as is obvious from the latter clause of this halachah, an object found in a temple of a false deity is forbidden, unless we have explicit knowledge that it was not brought as an offering. We assume that it was used for this forbidden purpose.
Once they are brought as offerings, [their status changes] and they remain forbidden - as stated in Halachah 2
forever, - Avodat HaMelech interprets this as a reference to Chapter 8, Halachah 9, where the Rambam states that the prohibition against using an offering brought to an idol can never be nullified. Although the prohibition against using an idol itself can be nullified, more stringent rules apply with regard to an offering.
even if they were later removed [from the temple]. - The change in their location does not effect a change in status.
Torah law - not merely Rabbinic decree
forbids benefiting from anything that is found in a temple of a false deity, even water or salt. - See the following halachah. (Also note Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 139:3.)
If a person eats even the slightest amount from such substances, he is [punished by] lashing. - Note Halachah 2, where the Rambam states that a person who benefits from offerings brought to a false deity receives a double measure of lashes. Apparently, the Rambam is not explicit here because he is relying on this previous statement.
Commentary Halacha 16
[The following laws apply when] a person finds garments, utensils, or money [placed] on the head of an idol. - Avodah Zarah 51b states that the prohibition applies only when the articles are placed on the idol itself. The fact that they are positioned near the idol is not sufficient to have them forbidden.
If he finds them [placed] in a derisive manner, they are permitted -because the manner in which they are placed indicates that they were not intended as adornment or service for the idol.
If he finds them [placed] in a deferential manner, they are forbidden. -Avodah Zarah, ibid., derives this concept from the exegesis ofDeuteronomy 29:16: "You saw their putridities (their idols)... the gold and silver which is with them," explaining that "anything which is 'with them' is 'putrid,' forbidden as the idols are. Since these are articles that are used to adorn an idol, they are prohibited.
What is implied? If one finds a purse hanging around its neck, folded garments placed on its head, or a utensil overturned on its head, they are permitted, because [they were placed] in a derisive manner. - The position of the article indicates that it was not placed there with the intent of adorning the idol. On the contrary, placing these articles on an idol in such a fashion reflects one's contempt for it. Therefore, there is no reason for the article to be forbidden.
The same applies to other similar situations. [In contrast,] if one finds an object of a type which is used as an offering for the [Temple] altar - This includes the animals used as sacrifices, wine, flour, or oil. Avodah Zarah 51b notes that this prohibition includes even water, which is used for the water libation on Sukkot, and salt, which is added to all the sacrifices offered on the altar.
on the head [of an idol], it is forbidden. - The fact that these articles are used as offerings in the Temple leads to the conclusion that they were presented to the idol for a similar purpose.
When does the above - distinction between a deferential and a derisive position
apply? When one finds such articles outside its - the idol's
[usual] place of worship. When, however, one finds such articles within the [idol's place of worship] - The fact that the article was brought into the idol's temple indicates that it was used in its service. Accordingly,
regardless of whether it was placed in a derisive manner or in a deferential manner, or whether it is of the type of objects used as sacrifices for the [Temple] altar, any article found within [such a structure] - even if it is not placed upon the idol itself
even water or salt - The Rambam's mention of these articles is somewhat problematic. Since they were offered on the Temple altar, as explained above, they are forbidden even if they are not found within the temple of an idol. The commentaries explain that since these articles are of little consequence and are not generally themselves brought as offerings to an idol, we would not think that they were forbidden. Therefore, it is necessary to mention them explicitly.
becomes forbidden. - Note Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ot 6:7, where the Rambam states that the forbidden nature of foods offered to idols can never be negated. When, however, utensils are offered, the prohibition against using them can be negated, as explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 8.
[Different laws apply regarding] Pe'or and Marculis. - See the description of the service of these deities in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.
It is forbidden to benefit from anything that is found together with them, whether [it is found] in their [temple] or outside of it. - Since these deities are served in a derisive manner, no distinction is made between the manner in which articles placed upon them are found. Even when an article is found in a derisive position, it is forbidden.
Similarly, with regard to the stones [found near a symbol of] Marculis: If a stone appears to be together with it - Since a shrine to this deity consists of stones piled on each other, we assume that any stone found in proximity to it was once part of such a pile. Hence,
it is forbidden to benefit from it. - Rashi, Avodah Zarah 50a states that all stones within a cubit of the deity are forbidden. Stones which are further removed are permitted. Tosafot maintains that any stones found within a radius of four cubits are forbidden.
Commentary Halacha 17
When [the shrine of] a false deity possesses a bathhouse or a garden, benefit may be derived from it, provided one does not offer appreciation -We have rendered טובה as "appreciation" because, as evident from the final clause of the halachah, the benefit mentioned by the Rambam is not monetary or even goods that can be exchanged for money (Kessef Mishneh).
[Thus, the Rambam's interpretation differs from that of Rashi, who, in his commentary on Avodah Zarah 51b, understands טובה as referring to monetary payment.]
[in return]. - Our translation follows the standard published texts of theMishneh Torah. The manuscript versions read: "provided one does not offer benefit to its priests." This version is supported by the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:3). If the benefit is offered to the idol's worshipers and not to its priests, one may make use of the bathhouse or garden even if it is necessary to pay a fee (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah143:3).
[If] one must offer appreciation, it is forbidden. - The Kessef Mishnehexplains that this prohibition was instituted lest a person develop close feelings towards the priests who serve a false deity.
[If the garden or bathhouse] is mutually owned by [the shrine] and another entity, one may derive benefit from it - and one is not considered to have benefited from a false deity,since the bathhouse or garden is not itself a shrine
even if one provides its priests with appreciation. - The commentaries explain that since the prohibition is Rabbinic in nature (because it is appreciation and not a fee which is being offered), if the appreciation is not being given solely to the priests, the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to impose a prohibition.
One may not, however, pay a fee - because doing so provides direct benefit to the false deity.
This prohibition caused severe problems in Europe, where frequently many of the community services necessary for everyday life - e.g., flour mills, ovens, and the like - were owned by the Catholic Church. The rabbinic authorities of these areas interpreted these laws more leniently, offering different explanations of how one could benefit from church-owned property. (See Ramah and the Turei Zahav, Yoreh De'ah, ibid.) All authorities, however, agree that if a fee must be paid to the false deity itself and not to its attendants, no benefit is permitted.
Commentary Halacha 18
It is permitted to bathe in a bathhouse even though an idol is located within - This halachah is based on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:4, which relates:
Rabban Gamliel was bathing in the bathhouse of Aphrodite (the Greek goddess of beauty) in Akko, and Praclus ben Paluslus asked him: "Why are you bathing in Aphrodite's bathhouse? Does your Torah not command: 'Let nothing which is condemned cling to your hand'?
He responded: "One does not reply in a bathhouse." After he had departed, he told him, "I did not come into her territory, she came into mine. One does not say, 'This bathhouse is becoming to Aphrodite.' One says, 'Aphrodite is becoming to the bathhouse.' Furthermore, no matter how much money you were offered, you would not enter your idol's temple naked... and urinate before it." (The mishnah continues, mentioning the interpretation ofDeuteronomy 12:2 quoted by the Rambam.)
He responded: "One does not reply in a bathhouse." After he had departed, he told him, "I did not come into her territory, she came into mine. One does not say, 'This bathhouse is becoming to Aphrodite.' One says, 'Aphrodite is becoming to the bathhouse.' Furthermore, no matter how much money you were offered, you would not enter your idol's temple naked... and urinate before it." (The mishnah continues, mentioning the interpretation ofDeuteronomy 12:2 quoted by the Rambam.)
[Significantly, Rashi (Avodah Zarah 44b) interprets the mishnah differently from the Rambam. They explain that rather than the idol being located within the bathhouse, the bathhouse was located within premises belonging to the idol.]
because it is placed there for aesthetic purposes and not to be served. -This is the Rambam's interpretation of Rabban Gamliel's first point. He did not enter a place where the statue was served (Aphrodite's territory). Rather, he entered a bathhouse (his territory) where a statue had been placed as an adornment.
[The Rambam's interpretation is also found in the Tosafot Rid and the Eshkol. Rashi and others interpret Rabban Gamliel's statements differently.]
[This leniency can be inferred from the use by Deuteronomy 12:2 of the term:] "their gods" - when describing the commandment to nullify idol worship
i.e., the prohibition applies when they - the gentiles
treat them - their statues
as gods, and not when they humiliate them, such as in an instance where [the idol] stands over the sewage pipe and they urinate before it. -Avodah Zarah 44b clarifies that the performance of a humiliating act before an idol does not necessarily nullify its forbidden character. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 10.) Nevertheless, since an idol placed in a bathhouse is constantly subjected to deprecating situations, we can assume that the gentiles do not regard it as a god.
Should [the idol's] worship involve such activities - As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 2, there are some idols which are worshiped in a deprecatory manner - e.g., Pe'or, whose worshipers would defecate before it.
it is forbidden to enter [the bathhouse]. - As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, even when a person performs these activities with the intent of humiliating the idol, since this is its mode of worship, he is considered to have inadvertently violated the commandment against idol worship, and is obligated to bring a sin offering for atonement.
Commentary Halacha 19
It is permitted to benefit - The Kessef Mishneh interprets the Rambam's phraseology as implying that although, after the fact, the meat is not forbidden, at the outset (לכתחילה), it is forbidden to slaughter an animal with such a knife. Other authorities, however, do not share this opinion, and maintain that there is no prohibition against using such a knife. (See Ramah, Yoreh De'ah 142:2 and the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, 10:1, which accept the latter view as halachah.)
from [an animal] slaughtered using a knife [forbidden because of its connection to] idol worship] - Chulin 8b clarifies that we are speaking about an instance where the knife has already been kashered, and thus, the only question involves benefiting from an accessory of idol worship. In Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:7, the Rambam discusses the process of kashering the knife and what must be done if the knife was used without being kashered. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, ibid.)
because one is detracting from [the animal's] value. - While an animal is alive, it can be used for work and for breeding, and is therefore of greater value.
If the animal is in danger [of dying], it is forbidden, because one is enhancing its value - If the animal dies naturally, a Jew will not be permitted to eat its meat. Thus, the animal's slaughter enhances its value.
and this improvement involves benefit from an accessory of idol worship. - Hence, it is forbidden, as stated in Halachah 2. The Kessef Mishneh states that, based on Halachot 12 and 13, it would appear that the Rambam maintains that all the meat from the animal is forbidden, and there is no way one may benefit from it. The Kessef Mishneh does not accept that view, and argues that it is sufficient to destroy an amount of meat equivalent to the value of the knife.
Similarly, it is forbidden to cut meat - i.e., cut large pieces of meat into smaller ones
with [such a knife], because one is enhancing its value - making it fit to be sold or cooked. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De'ah 142:6) relates that if one cut pieces of meat with such a knife, even the Rambam would not forbid use of the meat entirely. It would be necessary, however, to destroy an amount of meat equivalent to the value of the knife.
Should one cut with a destructive intent, causing a loss - e.g., cut pieces which are of a size fit for cooking into smaller ones, which would be less attractive. See Chulin 8b.
the meat is permitted - because no benefit was derived from an accessory of an idol. On the contrary, a loss was caused.
Rambam:
• 3 Chapters a Day: Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Eighteen, Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Nineteen, Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Twenty
Shabbos - Chapter Eighteen
Halacha 1
A person who transfers an article from a private domain into the public domain, or from the public domain into the private domain is not liable,1 unless he transfers an amount that will be beneficial [to accomplish a purpose].2 The following are the minimum amounts for which one is liable for transferring:3
Halacha 2
[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] wine is a quarter of a revi'it;7 if it has congealed, a k'zayit. For the milk of a kosher animal, a gulp.8 For non-kosher milk, enough to apply to one eye. For a woman's milk and egg-white, enough to put in an ointment. For oil, enough to anoint the the small toe of a newborn infant.
Halacha 3
[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] straw from grain is a cow's mouthful.14 Straw from beans, a camel's mouthful.15 If, however, one transfers bean straw with the expressed purpose of feeding it to a cow, one is liable for transferring a cow's mouthful.16 Eating that involves difficulty is still considered to be eating. Straws from the ears of grain,17 a lamb's mouthful.18Grass, a kid's mouthful.19
Leaves of garlic and leaves of onion20 when fresh are considered to be human food. Hence, their measure is the size of a dried fig. When they are dry, their measure is a kid's mouthful.
[Should one take out a combination of these substances,] their amounts should not be combined to hold one liable according to the more stringent measure. They should, however, be combined to hold one liable according to the more lenient measure. What is implied? When a person takes out both straw from grain and straw from beans, if the amount he takes out is enough to fill a cow's mouth, he is not liable.21 If it is enough to fill a camel's mouth, he is liable.22 The same applies regarding all similar dimensions of the Sabbath laws.
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] spices is the amount necessary to spice an egg. [Different] spices can be combined [to make up this measure].28
Pepper,29 even the slightest amount. Pine sap,30 even the slightest amount.31 A substance with a pleasant fragrance, even the slightest amount.32 A substance with an unpleasant fragrance, even the slightest amount.33 Perfumes, even the slightest amount. Fine purpled dye,34 even the slightest amount. Rosebuds, even the slightest amount.
Pieces from utensils made from hard metal35 - e.g., bronze or iron - even the slightest amount. [Chips] from the stones of the altar, or from the earth of the altar,36 [pieces] of decayed scrolls or their wrapping cloths,37 even the slightest amount, for [these articles] are [required to be] entombed.38
Halacha 6
A person who transfers seeds of garden plants41 that are not fit for human consumption42 is liable for [transferring] a measure that is almost the size of a dried fig.43 [A person is liable for transferring] two cucumber seeds, two gourd seeds, and five Egyptian bean seeds.44
[A person who] transfers coarse bran [is liable for transferring a quantity] fit to place on the opening of the crucible of a gold refiner.45 [The measure for which a person is liable for transferring] fine bran [depends on his intent]: If [he intends to use the bran as] food [for humans], the measure is the size of a dried fig. As food for animals, a kid's mouthful. For paint, enough to paint a small cloth.
The buds of shrubs46 and carobs that have not yet become sweet, the size of a dried fig. After they become sweet, a mouthful of a kid. In contrast, luf,47mustard, turmos,48and all other foods that are pickled, whether they have become sweet or not, [the measure for which one is liable is] the size of a dried fig.49
Halacha 7
[When a person] transfers seeds50 to eat, [he is liable for transferring] five. [If his intent] is to use them as fuel, they are considered to be wood.51 For counting,52 two, for sowing, two.
[Similarly, the measure for which a person is liable for transferring] hyssop [depends on his intent]. If [his intent] is for human consumption, he is liable for [an amount equal to] the size of a dried fig. For fuel, the measure of wood; for sprinkling,53 the measure acceptable for sprinkling.
Halacha 8
[A person who] transfers nut shells, pomegranate shells, isatis,54 pu'ah,55 and other dyes [is liable for transferring a quantity] that is sufficient to dye a small garment - e.g.,56 the hairnet young girls place on their heads.
Similarly, one who transfers urine that is forty days old,57 Alexandrian niter, soap, cimonia, ashlag,58 and all other cleansing agents [is liable for transferring] the amount necessary to wash a small garment - e.g., the hairnet young girls place on their heads.
A person who transfers herbs that are soaking [is liable for transferring] an amount sufficient to dye a sample for a weaver.
Halacha 9
A person who transfers ink on a quill [is liable for transferring] a measure sufficient to write two letters.59 If, however, a person removes [the dried concentrate used to make] ink or ink in an inkwell, a larger amount is necessary [for him to be liable], i.e., the amount necessary for a person to dip a pen in and write two letters.
If [a person transfers] enough [ink] to write one letter in an inkwell and enough [ink] to write one letter on a quill or enough dry ink to write one letter and enough ink to write one letter on a quill, there is a doubt whether he is liable or not.60
[When a person takes out enough ink to write] two letters and writes them as he is walking, he is liable. Writing them is considered to be placing them down.61[When a person takes out enough ink to write] one letter and writes and then takes out [enough ink to write] a second letter and writes it, he is not liable.62For [the ink for] the first letter is lacking.63
Halacha 10
[A person who transfers] eye paint, whether for medicinal64 or cosmetic purposes, [is liable for transferring an amount sufficient] to paint one eye.65 In places where [a woman] would not apply eye paint to less than two eyes as a cosmetic practice,66 a person who takes out eye paint for cosmetic purposes is not liable unless he takes out a quantity sufficient to paint two eyes.
Halacha 11
[A person who transfers] red clay71 [is liable for transferring an amount] sufficient to make a seal for a letter.72Clay, enough to make the opening of a crucible.73
Manure or fine sand, enough to fertilize a leek. Coarse sand, enough to mix with a full trowel of lime.74 Firm clay,75 enough to make the opening of a goldsmith's crucible. Hair, enough to mix with clay to make the opening of a goldsmith's crucible.76 Lime, enough to apply to a girl's smallest finger.77 Dust or ash, enough to cover the blood of a small bird.78 A pebble, enough for an animal to feel if it was thrown at it79 - i.e., the weight of ten zuzim. A shard, enough to contain a revi'it.
Halacha 12
[A person who transfers] rope [is liable for transferring an amount] sufficient to make a handle for a container. Reeds,80 enough to make a hook to hang a sifter or a sieve.81 Palm leaves, enough to make a handle for an Egyptian basket. Palm bast, enough to use as a stopper for a small pitcher of wine.82Unprocessed wool, enough to make a ball the size of a nut.
Bone, enough to make a spoon. Glass, to sharpen the point of a weaver's needle or to cut two threads at once.83
Halacha 13
[A person] is liable for transferring two hairs from the tail of a horse or of a cow.84 If he transfers one bristle from a pig's [back],85 he is liable. Fibers from a date palm, two. The bark of the date branches, one.86
From cotton, from silk, camel's wool, rabbit's wool, wool from an animal of the sea, or any other fibers that can be spun, enough to spin a thread four handbreadths long.87
When a person transfers cloth, sack, or leather, the same minimum measurements that apply with regard to the laws of ritual purity also apply with regard to transferring [on the Sabbath]: [The size of] a cloth for which one is liable for transferring] is three [fingerbreadths] by three [fingerbreadths];88sackcloth,89 four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths]; leather, five [handbreadths] by five [handbreadths].90
Halacha 14
When a person transfers an animal hide that was not processed at all and is thus soft, the measure [for which he is liable] is enough to wrap a small weight the size of a shekel. When [it is in the first stages of being processed - i.e.,] salt has been applied to it, but not flour and gall-nut juice, the measure [for which one is liable] is enough to make an amulet.91 If flour has been applied to it, but not gall-nut juice, the measure is enough to write a bill of divorce upon it. If it has been processed entirely, its measure is five [handbreadths] by five [handbreadths].
Halacha 15
[A person who transfers] processed parchment92 [is liable for transferring a piece] sufficient for the passage from Shema to uvish'arecha.93 Duchsustos, enough to write a mezuzah on it.
Paper, enough to write on it two letters for a customs officer's receipt. These two letters are larger than the letters we [usually write]. A person who transfers a customs officer's receipt is liable even though he has already shown it to the customs officer and has been exempted because of it,94 for it will serve forever as proof [of his having paid].
Halacha 16
A person who transfers an animal, a wild beast, or a fowl is liable even if it is alive. A living person, by contrast, is not considered to be a burden.97Nevertheless, if he is bound or sick, a person who transfers him is liable.98
A woman may walk her son if he can pick up one foot and place down the other.99
Halacha 17
A person who transfers a living child with a purse hanging around his neck is liable, because of the purse, for the purse is not considered to be subsidiary to the child.100 If, however, one transfers an adult who is wearing clothes and rings on his hands, one is not liable, for everything is considered to be subsidiary to him. If, by contrast, his garments were folded [and held] on his shoulder,101 a person who carries him is liable.
Halacha 18
[A person who transfers] a live locust of the smallest size [is liable].102 If it is dead, [he is liable for transferring an amount] the size of a dried fig.103 [For transferring] "a bird of the vineyards,"104 [one is liable for transferring] even the smallest amount, regardless of whether it is alive or dead, since it is preserved for medicinal105 purposes.106 The same applies in all similar cases.
The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring [flesh from] a human corpse, [flesh from] the carcass of an animal, or [flesh from] a dead crawling animal107 is the same as the minimum amount of these substances capable of imparting ritual impurity: From a human corpse108 and from an animal carcass,109 the size of an olive. From a crawling animal,110 the size of a lentil.
Halacha 19
If there is exactly an olive-sized portion [of an animal carcass in one place] and a person removes a portion half the size of an olive111 from it, he is liable. [This decision is rendered,] because his actions are effective in reducing [the amount of impure substance to the extent] that the minimum amount that can convey impurity is no longer present.
If, however, he removes a quantity aproximately half the size of an olive from a quantity that is one and a half times the size of an olive, he is not liable.112 The same principles apply with regard to other sources of impurity.
Halacha 20
When does [the abovementioned rule,] that a person is liable only when he transfers the minimum of a standard measure of a substance, apply? When the person transfers the substance without any specific intent.113 If, however, a person transfers a [seed] to sow,114 or a substance for medicinal purposes, to show as an example, or the like,115 he is liable for the slightest amount.
Halacha 21
Should a person who stores a substance to use as seed, or to use for medicinal purposes, or a substance to be shown as a sample, [afterwards,] forget the reason for which he stored the substance,116 and remove it117 without any specific intent,118 he is liable regardless of its size.119 Another person, by contrast, is not liable [if he transfers this article] unless it is of the prescribed measure.120
If after transferring the article [for the intent he originally had], the person throws it into a storeroom, even if it is [set aside] in a distinct place,121 his original intent is considered to have been nullified. Therefore, if he brings in the article afterwards, he is not liable unless it is of the prescribed measure.
Halacha 22
When an entity is not usually stored away,122 nor is it fit to be stored away123 - e.g., a woman's menstrual discharge - a person who stores it and then transfers it is liable.124 Other people, by contrast, are exempt for [transferring] such an article, for [in general] one is not liable unless one transfers an article that is fit to be stored and that people generally store.
Halacha 23
A person who transfers half125 of the prescribed measure [of a substance] is not liable.126 Similarly, a person who performs half the measure of any of the other [forbidden] labors is not liable.
If a person transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance], places it down, and then returns and transfers the second half, he is liable.127 If, however, he picks up the first half before he places down the second half, it is as if [the first half] were burned,128 and he is not liable.
When a person transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance], places it down, and then returns and transfers the second half, passing it over the first [half without placing it on the ground], he is liable [if the second half] is [held] within three handbreadths of the first half.129 [The rationale is] that transferring is considered equivalent to placing the object down on a substance.
Halacha 24
[When a person] transfers half the prescribed measure [of a substance], and afterwards transfers another half of the prescribed measure [of that substance] to the same domain in a single period of unawareness, he is liable.132
[Different rules apply if] he transfers [the two half-measures] to two different domains. If there is a domain into which one would be liable [for transferring an article interposed] between [the two domains], one is not liable [for transferring these two halves].133 If there is a carmelit between them, they are considered to be a single domain,134 and [the person who transfers the two half-measures] is liable to bring a sin offering.135
Halacha 25
When a person transfers less than the prescribed measure [of a substance], but before he places it down, [the substance] swells in size and reaches the prescribed measure [he is not liable].136 Similarly, one is not liable if one transfers more than the prescribed measure [of a substance], but before he places it down [the substance] diminishes in size and becomes less than the prescribed measure.
Halacha 26
[The following rule applies when] a person transfers a portion [of a food] the size of a dried fig with the intent of eating it,137 but before he places it down it diminishes in size: If he [reconsiders and] decides to use it to sow, or for medicinal purposes,138 he is liable, because of the intent he had at the time he placed it down.139
If a person transfers [a quantity of seeds] smaller than the size of a dried fig with the intent of sowing them, but before he places them down, changes his mind and decides to eat them, he is not liable.140 If [the seeds] swell in size before they are placed down and reach the size of a dried fig before141 he changes his mind [and decides to] eat them, he is liable.142 Even if he had not change his mind, he would still have been liable because of his original intent.
Halacha 27
When a person transfers a portion [of a food] the size of a dried fig with the intent of eating it, it diminishes in size, and then it swells [to the size of a dried fig] again before it is placed down, there is a question [whether he is liable or not]: [Does the fact that in the interim, it was not of sufficient size for its transfer to incur liability cause that liability] to be deferred [forever] or not?143
When a person throws a portion of the food the size of an olive into a house that is impure144 and by doing so, complements the quantity of food145 that was already in the house, causing there to be an amount [of food] the size of an egg [in the impure house], there is a question [whether he is liable or not]: Is he liable for transferring [the portion of] food that is equivalent to the size of an olive, because he completed the measure of food that is significant with regard to the laws of ritual impurity, or is he not liable?146
Halacha 28
A person who transfers less than the standard measure [of a substance] is not liable even though he transfers it in a container. [The rationale is that] the container is subsidiary [to its contents]; [when the person transfers it,] he is concerned not with the container, but with its contents.147
Accordingly, if a person transfers a man who is alive and who is not bound on a bed, he is not liable,148 for the bed is considered to be subsidiary to the man. These principles apply in all similar situations.
A person who transfers a perfumer's box is liable for only a single [sin offering], although it contains many different types [of scents].149 [Similarly,] even if he transfers [several items] in his hand,150 he is liable for only a single sin offering, for [he has performed] a single act of transfer.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
All the authorities agree that a person is not liable until he transfers an amount of a substance large enough to be of benefit to a person, and that it is forbidden to transfer any article regardless of its size. The commentaries question, however, whether transferring less than a beneficial amount is forbidden according to Torah law or whether the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin.
Liability for most of the prohibitions of the Torah is associated with a specific measure (שיעור). For example, with regard to the majority of the prohibitions against eating forbidden foods, one is liable only if one eats a k'zayit (a measure of food the size of an olive). Should one eat less than that amount (חצי שיעור), one is considered to have transgressed the Torah's commandment. Nevertheless, one is not liable for punishment. (See Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 3:6, 7:15.)
The Mishneh LaMelech states that this same principle applies with regard to transferring objects on the Sabbath. Although one is liable only for transferring a beneficial amount, transferring any amount is forbidden by the Torah itself.
Note, however, Totza'ot Chayim (8) and others, who explain that according to the Rambam, there is no concept of חצי שיע ור with regard to the prohibition against work on the Sabbath. On the Sabbath, a person is liable only for performing מלאכת מחשבת, "purposeful work." If an activity is not in itself beneficial, it does not serve a purpose. Therefore, it is not forbidden by the Torah on the Sabbath.
Kinat Eliyahu notes that in Halachah 23, the Rambam states that "A person who transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance] is not liable." According to the principles the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the term "is not liable" (פטור) indicates that the prohibition was instituted by our Sages. Significantly, in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, loc. cit., and in other places where the Rambam discusses this issue, he uses the term אסור, "forbidden." Thus the use of the term פטור in regard to the Sabbath laws clearly indicates a difference. See alsoS'dei Chemed, Klallim, Ma'areches Chatzi Shiur.
|
| 2. |
See Chapter 12, Halachah 9, and notes.
|
| 3. |
In this and in the following halachot, the Rambam proceeds to list the minimum amounts for which one is liable for transferring particular substances. As explained in Halachot 20-21, this applies when one transfers an object without any specific intent. If, however, one intends to use the article one transfers for a specific purpose, one is liable for transferring even a smaller amount.
|
| 4. |
As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 8, Halachah 5, he considers a dried fig to be one-third the size of an egg. (As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, there are differing opinions regarding this measure.) Eating a smaller amount of food would not be significant at all. Therefore, one is not liable.
|
| 5. |
I.e., it is not that one must transfer an amount equal to the size of a dried fig from one particular type of food. Even if one transfers this amount from a combination of different foods, one is liable.
|
| 6. |
For they are not food.
|
| 7. |
Shabbat 8:1 states "wine, enough to mix a cup." In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that a cup refers to the cup over which the grace after meals was recited, which must contain a revi'it. The wines of the Talmudic period were stronger, and it was customary to mix three portions of water to every portion of wine.
|
| 8. |
Tosafot 76b defines this as מלא לוגמיו, "a cheekful." The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that a smaller measure is intended.
|
| 9. |
The popular translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.) mentions "river water" instead of "dew." Rav Kapach explains, however, that this is an erroneous translation of the Arabic, and there, too, the Rambam's intent is "dew."
|
| 10. |
Rav Moshe Cohen objects to the fact that the Rambam mentioned a measure that is not spoken of in the Babylonian Talmud. The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam's source is in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 8:1), which he favors in this instance, because there is a difference of opinion on this matter in the Babylonian Talmud.
|
| 11. |
This represents somewhat of a new concept, because generally the Sages followed the principle (Shabbat 78a) that whenever an object has both an uncommon use and a common use, we follow the more lenient measure. For this reason, kosher milk, although just as beneficial as an eyewash as non-kosher milk, is considered to be a food. Accordingly, it is given a more lenient measure.
If so, the fact that honey is considered to be a salve instead of food raises questions. The Talmud, however, explains that since honey is also very commonly used as a salve, there is no difficulty.
|
| 12. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:8), the Rambam interprets this is as sores that come from improper amputations. (Note Rav Kapach's translation, which differs slightly from the standard text.)
|
| 13. |
This is useful for mixing clay for building (Shabbat 78a).
|
| 14. |
This is the most common use for this substance.
|
| 15. |
A larger measure than stated previously. Bean straw is harder than grain straw and is therefore given to camels, who have stronger jaws and larger mouths.
|
| 16. |
This reflects a general principle applicable with regard to the minimum measures for which one is liable for transferring: When a person has an individual desire for an object that makes it beneficial for him, he is liable even though most people would not use that object for that purpose. (See Halachah 20.)
|
| 17. |
This refers to softer straw that need not be chewed as forcefully as the straw from grain mentioned at the beginning of the halachah ( Tiferet Yisrael, Shabbat 7:4). Hence, it is suitable for smaller animals with smaller and less-powerful mouths.
|
| 18. |
A lamb's mouthful is equal to the size of a dried fig. Nevertheless, our Sages speak in terms of a lamb so that we will understand the motivating principle for this measure (Tosafot, Shabbat 76a).
|
| 19. |
This is the smallest measure in this halachah.
|
| 20. |
I.e., the leaves that sprout above ground (Tosefot Yom Tov, Shabbat 7:4).
|
| 21. |
Since the cow will not normally eat the bean straw, the amount of straw the person has taken out is not beneficial. Hence, he is not l iable.
|
| 22. |
For the camel will eat the grain straw. Thus, the person has taken out an amount of fodder that will be beneficial.
|
| 23. |
This is the food that requires the least heat to cook (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Shabbat 8:5).
|
| 24. |
The egg will then cook faster. Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.).
|
| 25. |
In the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), he mentions that the pot is already preheated, so that the wood must produce sufficient heat to cook the egg alone, and not to warm the pot as well.
|
| 26. |
In the Talmudic era, it was common for the point of a reed to be sharpened to serve as a pen in a manner similar to a quill.
|
| 27. |
I.e., the amount to cook a portion of an egg, as mentioned in the beginning of the halachah.
|
| 28. |
The rationale is that all spices serve a similar purpose (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Shabbat 9:5).
|
| 29. |
Rashi (Shabbat 90a) explains that this does not refer to the species of pepper used as a spice (for if so, there is no reason to differentiate between it and other spices), but rather to a different species, which is used as a breath freshener.
|
| 30. |
See the notes on Chapter 5, Halachah 10, regarding our translation of the name of this substance.
|
| 31. |
Rashi (Shabbat 90a) states that this was used as a remedy for headaches. Even the slightest amount was beneficial.
|
| 32. |
For people will appreciate its fragrance.
|
| 33. |
For people will appreciate the removal of an unpleasant odor. Rashi (Shabbat 90a) offers a different interpretation.
|
| 34. |
This also has a pleasant fragrance (Rashi).
|
| 35. |
Our translation follows the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:6), which notes that these metals are mentioned in connection with spices and explains that this refers to parts of a utensil used for crushing spices. Even a small portion of metal is beneficial, because it can be fashioned into a needle or pin.
|
| 36. |
See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:15.
|
| 37. |
See Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:3-4.
|
| 38. |
As mentioned in the sources cited in the previous two notes, we are obligated to show respect for even the slightest piece of any of these articles and entomb them, rather than allow them to be discarded as trash. Accordingly, even the smallest amount is considered significant. Hence, one is liable for transferring it on the Sabbath.
|
| 39. |
For it may be used for cooking, or kindling a fire.
|
| 40. |
Beitzah 39a explains that a flame has no substance. Hence, one is not liable. This applies, however, only when the person carries only a flame and not the coal, or the piece of wood that is burning.
|
| 41. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:7), the Rambam interprets this as referring to carrot seeds, turnip seeds, or onion seeds. (We have used Rav Kapach's translation which differs slightly from the standard text.)
|
| 42. |
Were the seeds fit for human consumption, the minimum measure for which one would be liable would be the size of a dried fig. We assume that the primary reason for which a person would transfer seeds is to serve as food. Since these seeds, by contrast, are not fit for human consumption, they are given a smaller measure.
Rashi (Shabbat 90a) differs and explains that this law applies even to seeds that are fit for human consumption. Although these seeds are also fit to be eaten, a person usually takes them out with the intent of sowing them.
|
| 43. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), where he interprets the Mishnaic phrase, פחות מכגרוגרת in this fashion. Note the Mayim Chayim, which interprets this as referring to a k'zayit.
|
| 44. |
Since these seeds were more valuable than those of most garden vegetables, they were assigned a smaller measure.
|
| 45. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4), the Rambam explains that bran is placed on the opening of the crucible during the smelting process. Rav Kapach explains (based on his experience as a jeweler) that the bran is intended to burn, and in that process to clear away impurities that cloud the smelter's vision.
|
| 46. |
Which grow in vineyards. Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shvi'it 7:5).
|
| 47. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe'ah 6:10), the Rambam defines luf as a sub-species of onion.
|
| 48. |
A species of beans.
|
| 49. |
The commentaries note that although the Rambam's statements are based on the Tosefta, Shabbat 9:8, they are problematic, for there is another Tosefta (Ma'aser Sheni 1:13) that appears to be a direct contradiction. The difficulty is intensified by the fact that the Rambam also quotes the latter Tosefta in Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 7:8. It is possible, however, to explain the contradiction based on the possibility that in our halachah, the word ימתיקו, translated as "become sweet," is a euphemism and means "become bitter." See also Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin1:14 and Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:6, where the Rambam mentions similar subjects, and the Responsa of the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1425) and the Merkevet HaMishneh, who offer possible resolutions.
|
| 50. |
Shabbat 90b quotes a similar, but slightly different passage from the Tosefta. We can assume that the Rambam's text of that passage differed from the one in our text of the Talmud.
|
| 51. |
The amount necessary to cook an egg, as mentioned in Halachah 4.
|
| 52. |
The seeds were used as a primitive calculator. Rashi (Shabbat 90b) explains that when transactions were made, a seed was used as a symbol for a gold coin.
|
| 53. |
I.e., to use in the purification process of a metzora or a person who came into contact with a human corpse. (See Leviticus 14:6 and Numbers 19:18.)
|
| 54. |
Isatis is a substance which produces an indigo dye. Similarly, nut shells and pomegranate shells are used to produce dyes.
|
| 55. |
A root that produces a red dye.
|
| 56. |
This represents a difference between the Rambam's interpretation of Shabbat 9:5 and that of other commentaries, including Rashi and Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro. Instead of stating בגד קטן כסבכה, as in the Rambam's version of the Mishnah, the text quoted by the latter authorities states בגד קטן בסבכה, "a small cloth in the hairnet," referring not to the entire hairnet, but to one cloth within it.
|
| 57. |
Note Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 9:37, which states that aged urine is one of the cleansing agents used to determine whether a stain is blood or not.
|
| 58. |
These are also cleansing agents and are mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah (loc. cit.).
|
| 59. |
The Mishnah (Shabbat 8:3) states that one is liable for transferring an amount of ink sufficient to write two letters. The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) states that one is not liable unless one transfers this amount of ink while it is on the pen. Otherwise, there is a doubt (as reflected in the following clause), for it is difficult for all the ink that is in an inkwell to be picked up by a pen.
|
| 60. |
The person is not liable for transferring the quill or the inkwell, for they are considered secondary to the ink. As the Rambam states in Halachah 28, when a person transfers a measure for which he is not liable in a utensil, he is not liable for transferring the utensil, since it is considered secondary to its contents.
|
| 61. |
The hanachah without which one is not liable for transferring.
|
| 62. |
He is not liable for transferring. He is, however, liable for writing.
|
| 63. |
At no one time did he transfer the minimum measure for which he would be held liable, for by the time he transfers the second portion of ink, part of the first portion will have dried. Therefore, he remains exempt (Rashi, Shabbat 80a).
|
| 64. |
כחול, rendered by some translators as "stibium," was reputed to have medicinal properties in addition to its cosmetic qualities. Even if only one of a person's eyes was affected, it would be common for him to apply כחול to that eye alone. Hence, one is liable for transferring the amount necessary to paint one eye.
|
| 65. |
Rashi, Shabbat 80a, relates that modest women would veil their faces entirely, exposing only one eye to enable them to see. They would, however, paint this eye.
|
| 66. |
Rashi (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to small villages, where frivolity was not commonplace. Therefore, women would walk outside with their faces uncovered. Hence, if a woman painted her eyes for cosmetic purposes, she would paint both eyes. Note the Ra'avad, who offers a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage.
|
| 67. |
Rashi (Shabbat 78a) interprets this as referring to a phial of mercury that is sealed closed with these substances. Afterwards, a hole is made in the sulfur or tar with a pin through which the mercury can be poured, but through which it will not spill excessively if the b ottle falls on its side. The Meiri interprets the Talmud as referring to making a seal for a jug of wine.
|
| 68. |
The Maggid Mishneh interprets this as referring to stopping a hole in a wine barrel.
|
| 69. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a board with paste taken into a dovecote on which the fledglings perch and are thus captured. Rashi (Shabbat 80a) interprets this as a board with paste used to catch wild fowl.
|
| 70. |
A coin of the Talmudic period with a width of a handbreadth, approximately 8 cm. according to Shiurei Torah.
|
| 71. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:5), where he emphasizes that the Hebrew אדמה means both "earth" and "red."
|
| 72. |
In the Talmudic period, letters were sealed with clay. This refers to a seal like that of a notary placed on a letter to testify to its authenticity.
|
| 73. |
Rav Kapach notes that in this instance the Rambam does not state "a goldsmith's crucible," for crucibles used for smelting other metals need not be as heat-resistant as those used for gold.
|
| 74. |
Shabbat 80b relates that plaster is mixed with sand in order to strengthen the structure.
|
| 75. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4). Rashi (Shabbat 78b) interprets חרסית as "crushed brick."
|
| 76. |
Shabbat 80b states that hair was mixed with clay when a crucible was fashioned for smelting gold.
|
| 77. |
Shabbat 80b states that lime would be applied to the bodies of young girls, one limb at a time. Rashi states it would make their skin red. Tosafot maintains that it would whiten their skin.
|
| 78. |
As Leviticus 17:13 states that after a bird or a wild animal is slaughtered, its blood must be covered with earth or ashes. (See Hilchot Shechitah, Chapter 14.)
|
| 79. |
For in this way, the pebble will be beneficial in shooing the animal (Shabbat 81a).
|
| 80. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:2), the Rambam gives a more specific definition, mentioning an Arabic term that Rav Kapach identifies as cypress.
|
| 81. |
This is a smaller measure than the amount sufficient to make a handle. Nevertheless, rope would not be used for this purpose, because it is coarse and might damage the utensil (Shabbat 78b).
|
| 82. |
To use as a filter (ibid.).
|
| 83. |
The Mishnah (Shabbat 8:6) mentions sharpening a needle. The Talmud (Shabbat 81a) mentions cutting threads. Apparently, the Rambam considers the two measures to be identical.
|
| 84. |
Rashi, Shabbat 90b, states that these hairs were used by bird hunters.
|
| 85. |
Rashi (ibid.) states these hairs are used in sewing leather.
|
| 86. |
From the Rambam's statements, it appears that his interpretation - a nd perhaps even the wording in his text - of Shabbat 90b was different from Rashi's interpretation of our version of that passage. (See the commentaries of the Meiri and Rabbenu Chanan'el on that passage.)
|
| 87. |
The Rambam's source appears to be the Tosefta, Shabbat 9:3 which states m'lo hasit kafulwhich, as mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 10, is equivalent to four handbreadths.
|
| 88. |
See Hilchot Keilim 22:1.)
|
| 89. |
Fabric made from camel's hair and other fibers that are rough and are therefore generally not used to make garments for humans.
|
| 90. |
See Hilchot Keilim 23:3.
|
| 91. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:3), the Rambam interprets this as referring to the wrapping in which the amulet was held, and not to the amulet itself.
|
| 92. |
Although at present, the word k'laf is commonly translated as "parchment," the Rambam is referring to a more specific meaning. In Hilchot Tefillin 1:6-8, he differentiates between three types of parchment, stating:
|
| 93. |
This is the shortest passage of the four passages included in the tefillin. In the head-tefillin, each of these passages is written on a separate piece of parchment.
|
| 94. |
This appears to be the Rambam's interpretation of the statement of the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:2), "One who transfers a customs officer's receipt is liable." Since the Mishnah already stated that a person who transfers a piece of paper large enough to write such a receipt is liable, it goes without saying that a person who transfers an unused receipt is liable. When explicitly telling us that a person is liable for transferring such a receipt, the Mishnah is obviously referring to a receipt that has already been used. See Shabbat 78b.
|
| 95. |
Note Shabbat 78b, 79a which discusses the propriety of maintaining possession of such a promissory note.
|
| 96. |
Since the paper has already been erased, it is no longer fit for writing. Therefore, it is considered to be suitable for other purposes and requires a larger measurement.
|
| 97. |
Shabbat 94a quotes Rabbi Natan as stating, "A living creature carries itself." Although the Sages differ with him, their objections concern animals only, for the latter resist being carried and struggle to free themselves. In contrast, a human being assists in being carried. This is obvious from the fact that it is far easier to carry a living person than the same amount of "dead weight."
It must be emphasized that although there is no prohibition from the Torah against carrying a living person, our Sages forbade this. (See Mishnah Berurah 308:153,154.)
|
| 98. |
For in this instance, the person being carried is unable to assist the one carrying him.
|
| 99. |
I.e., the child must propel himself forward. His mother may not, however, drag him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:41). Note the Mishnah Berurah 308:154, which states that the principle, "A living being carries itself," does not apply to a child unless he is old enough to take steps by himself.
|
| 100. |
As reflected in Halachah 28, when a person transfers two articles, one of primary importance and one of secondary importance, whether or not he is liable depends on the article of primary importance. If he would be liable for transferring this article by itself, he is liable. If not, he is not liable. The article of secondary importance is of no significance whatsoever.
When does this apply? When the article of secondary importance is subsidiary to the article of primary importance. If they are, as in the example cited in this halachah, two unrelated objects, the person is liable for transferring the article of secondary importance.
|
| 101. |
They are considered to be separate objects, unrelated to the person who is holding them.
|
| 102. |
Shabbat 90b states that locusts are often used as playthings for children. Hence, regardless of the locust's size, one is liable.
The Rambam's ruling is quoted from the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:7), which also mentions two opinions: One that maintains that this applies only to a kosher locust, and that of Rabbi Yehudah, which states that it applies to all locusts, whether kosher or nonkosher. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that the halachah does not follow Rabbi Yehudah's opinion.
From the fact that the Rambam does not mention whether the locust must be kosher or not in this halachah, the Merkevet HaMishneh concludes that he has reversed his opinion and accepts Rav Yehudah's view. Others differ and maintain that this is clarified by the second clause, which mentions "[an amount] the size of a dried fig" - i.e., the measure applying to food. Just as the second clause applies only to kosher locusts, so too, does the first clause.
|
| 103. |
As mentioned in the previous note, this is the minimum measurement for food.
|
| 104. |
In Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:21 the Rambam (as does Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Aruch) defines this as a species of kosher locusts. Others define it as a bird.
|
| 105. |
Shabbat 10:1 states that one is liable for transferring even the slightest amount of any substance that is retained for its medicinal purposes.
|
| 106. |
According to Shabbat 90b, partaking of such a creature enhances one's intellectual capacities.
|
| 107. |
Shabbat 93b-94a states that Rabbi Shimon exempts a person from liability in this instance, for in contrast to other situations, the person is not removing the impure object because he desires it itself, but because he desires the place to be free of impurity. Hence, this is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, a labor that is not performed for the same purpose for which the labor was performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In the construction of the Sanctuary, articles were transfered because they were, themselves, desired. In contrast, in this instance, the person's intent is to remove impurity. Nevertheless, as the Rambam rules in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
|
| 108. |
See Hilchot Tum'at Meit 2:1-2.
|
| 109. |
See Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah 1:1.
|
| 110. |
More specifically, this refers to the eight species mentioned in Leviticus 11:29- 30. (See Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah 4:2.)
|
| 111. |
In this instance, the phrase "half the size of an olive" is not intended to serve as an exact measure. The intent is any measure that will reduce the size of the portion of the animal carcass to less than the size of an olive. The same principles apply to flesh from a human corpse.
|
| 112. |
For an amount large enough to convey ritual impurity still remains intact.
|
| 113. |
Since even the small amount of the substance the person transfers is valuable to him, he has a reason for transferring it. Accordingly, his act is considered to be "purposeful." See the notes to Halachah 1.
|
| 114. |
The commentaries note that Halachah 6 mentions taking seeds for sowing and mentions specific measures. Among the possible resolutions is that there is ordinarily a measure for seeds as well. This halachah, however, specifically focuses on the exceptions to the general rule, and there are indeed individuals who will sow a single seed in a flower pot (Rav Kapach, Kinat Eliyahu).
|
| 115. |
Note the Mishneh LaMelech, who states that with this statement the Rambam does not intend to negate totally the measures he mentioned previously. For example, if a person transfers food, he is not liable unless it is the size of a dried fig. Even if a particular person desires to eat a smaller amount, that intent is not considered significant, since most people would not appreciate such an amount. In this halachah, the Rambam is stating that in certain instances, as in the examples he mentions, there is a particular intent which requires merely a tiny amount of a substance to be accomplished. In such an instance, the person is liable for transferring an object of this small size.
|
| 116. |
Before the commencement of the Sabbath (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat10:1).
|
| 117. |
On the Sabbath (ibid.).
|
| 118. |
I.e., even if he forgot the intent for which he originally stored away the article.
|
| 119. |
By setting the article aside for a specific purpose, the person shows that it is important to him, regardless of its size. Therefore, if he later transfers the article, he is liable (Shabbat 90b, 91a).
|
| 120. |
I.e., the intent a particular individual has for an article is important regarding the measure for which he is liable for transferring that article. It does not affect the status of that article vis-a-visothers.
|
| 121. |
As opposed to being mixed together with the other objects in the storeroom. This might be considered to be a sign that it is being saved for a specific purpose.
|
| 122. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:3), the Rambam interprets this phrase as excluding an article that is commonplace and easily obtainable. Therefore, it is not stored away. [Note Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro and Rashi (Shabbat 75b), who interpret this as excluding an amount of a substance smaller than the prescribed measure.]
|
| 123. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that this excludes objects that will spoil if stored.
|
| 124. |
By storing the article in question, the person indicates that he considers it important. Therefore, he is liable for transferring it.
|
| 125. |
The intent is any amount less than the full measure.
|
| 126. |
See the notes on the first halachah of this chapter which discuss whether the prohibition against this activity stems from the Torah itself or is Rabbinic in origin. As mentioned there, according to the principles the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the word פטור indicates that the prohibition was instituted by our Sages.
|
| 127. |
For he has transferred a full measure of the article in question. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, it is clear from the following halachah that this refers to actions performed in a single period of unawareness.
|
| 128. |
Since a full measure of the entity in question was never transferred into the second domain and placed down there at a single time, the person is not liable.
|
| 129. |
Based on the principle of l'vud, an article held within three handbreadths of a second article is considered as having been placed down on that article, as implied by Chapter 13, Halachah 6. Therefore, the two half-measures of the substance in question are considered to have been placed down in the same place. Hence, the person who placed them down is liable. See the commentary of Rabbenu Chananel to Shabbat 80a.
|
| 130. |
Even if it passes within three handbreadths of the ground, as long as it does not come to rest even momentarily (see Chapter 13, Halachah 16, and notes).
|
| 131. |
As mentioned in the notes on the halachah cited above, it would appear that the object would have to come to rest on a substance four handbreadths by four handbreadths, or come to rest within three handbreadths of the ground.
|
| 132. |
One is liable to bring a sin offering for performing a forbidden labor only if one performed the labor without intent to violate the Torah's commandments. Furthermore, if in the midst of one's performance of a forbidden activity, one becomes conscious of the prohibition involved, even if one loses awareness immediately afterwards and completes the measure of forbidden activity without the desire to violate the law, one is not liable. (See Hilchot Shegagot 6:8.)
|
| 133. |
As long as the two half-measures were taken from the same original domain and placed down together in the same domain, they can be combined. If, however, a totally separate domain interposes between them, the two actions cannot be considered to be complementary.
|
| 134. |
For according to the Torah, a carmelit is considered to be a makom patur. (See the notes on Chapter 14, Halachah 1). Hence, it is not considered to be an interruption between the two domains.
|
| 135. |
The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:11. (See the gloss of the Lechem Mishneh on that halachah.)
|
| 136. |
As explained in Chapter 13, Halachah 5, the forbidden labor of transferring involves removing an article from one domain and placing it down in another domain. A sin offering is not required unless both activities are performed in a forbidden manner.
|
| 137. |
Thus the akirah (removal) of the article is performed when the article is of sufficient size to incur liability (Halachah 1).
|
| 138. |
In which case, he is liable, regardless of the size of the article (Halachah 20).
|
| 139. |
Since at the time of both the removal and the placing down (hanachah) of the substance, its size was sufficient to incur liability according to the intent which the person had in mind, he is liable. The fact that he experienced a change of mind in the interim is not of consequence.
|
| 140. |
For at the time he placed the object down, it was not of sufficient size to incur liability.
|
| 141. |
Based on the following halachah, it is clear that the increase in the seed's size must take place before the person's change of mind.
|
| 142. |
For at the time the article was removed from its original place and it the time it was placed down, it was of sufficient size to incur liability.
|
| 143. |
The question of the Rambam (based on Shabbat 91b) is whether the fact that the object was too small for its transfer to incur liability in the time between its akirah and its hanachah causes these actions to be considered as unconnected or not.
Note the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Hilchot Sh'ar Avot HaTum'ah 4:13, which quotes the distinction made by Rav Yitzchak Korcus between that halachah and the present one.
|
| 144. |
Because of the presence of a corpse or the presence of tzara'at.
|
| 145. |
The Maggid Mishneh questions why the Rambam changes the wording used in the source for this teaching (Shabbat, loc. cit.), which mentions food that is terumah and applies this concept to all foods. The Mishneh LaMelech, however, resolves this difficulty, explaining that according to the Rambam's conception of the laws of ritual impurity (see Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 4:1), there is no difference between terumah and other foods.
|
| 146. |
The commentaries cite this passage as a source, teaching that a dried fig is larger than an olive. Ordinarily, a person who transfers an amount of food the size of an olive is not liable. Nevertheless, this instance is different, because of the laws of ritual impurity.
Food cannot impart ritual impurity to other substances unless a portion equivalent to the size of an egg is present. Thus, before the person threw the food into the house, there was not sufficient food there to impart impurity, and the food he threw in completed that measure. Hence, the Rambam (based on Shabbat, loc. cit.) asks whether the fact that the transfer of the food is significant with regard to the laws of ritual impurity is of consequence with regard to the Sabbath laws.
|
| 147. |
Since the container is desired only because of its function as an accessory for its contents, it is not considered to be an entity in its own right. Unless the person has a desire for it itself, he is not liable for transferring it, regardless of its size. (See Shabbat 93b.)
Likkutei Sichot (Vol. XVII, p. 48, Vol. XIX, p. 193) focuses on the homiletic dimensions of this halachah, interpreting it as an indication of how an object's spiritual qualities are of such primacy that they eclipse totally its material dimensions.
|
| 148. |
This ruling depends on the principle stated in Halachah 16: "A living creature carries itself." As mentioned in that halachah, this principle does not apply if the person is bound. Since the person would not be liable for carrying the man, he is also not liable for carrying the bed on which he is lying.
|
| 149. |
Although the box contains several distinct entities, the person is considered to have performed a single forbidden activity. Therefore, he is not liable for a separate sin offering for every article he transfers.
|
| 150. |
With this clause, the Rambam indicates that this ruling is not dependent on the principle (see Chapter 12, Halachah 11) that the contents of a box are considered to be a single entity, but on a different rationale.
|
Shabbos - Chapter Nineteen
Halacha 1
We may not go out [wearing] any weaponry on the Sabbath.1 [The following rules apply should one] go out [wearing weaponry]: If they are objects that are worn as garments - e.g., a coat of mail, a helmet, or iron boots2 - one is not liable. If, however, one goes out [carrying]3 articles that are not worn as garments - e.g., a spear, a sword, a bow, a round shield4 or a triangular shield - he is liable.5
Halacha 2
We may not go out wearing a sandal studded with nails to fasten it.6 Even on festivals, the Sages decreed that we should not go out wearing [such sandals].7
It is permitted to go out wearing a belt with pieces of gold and silver imbedded into it as kings wear, for this is a piece of jewelry, and it is permitted [to wear] all jewelry. [This license is granted] provided [the belt] does not hang loosely, lest it fall in the public domain and one go and bring it.8
Halacha 3
A ring that has a seal9 is considered to be a piece of jewelry for a man, but not for a woman. A ring without a seal, by contrast, is considered to be a piece of jewelry for a woman,10 but not for a man. Accordingly, a woman who goes out wearing a ring that has a seal and a man who goes out wearing a ring without a seal are liable.11
Why are they liable? They did not transfer them in an ordinary manner12 - i.e., it is not an ordinary practice for a man to wear a ring on his finger that is not appropriate for him, nor for a woman to wear a ring on her finger that is not appropriate for her. [Nevertheless,] there are times when a man gives his ring to his wife to hide at home and she places it on her finger while she is walking. Similarly, there are times when a woman gives her ring to her husband to take to a jeweler to fix, and he places it on his finger while he is walking to the jeweler's store. Therefore, [although the rings are not appropriate for the individuals mentioned above, because they do occasionally wear such rings,] they are considered to have transferred them in an ordinary manner. Accordingly, they are liable.
Halacha 4
Although a ring that does not have a seal is considered to be a piece of jewelry for a woman, a woman should not go out wearing such a ring, lest she take it off in the public domain and show it to her friends, as women often do.13 If, however, she went out wearing such a ring, she is not liable.14
A man, by contrast, may go out wearing a ring that has a seal, for it is considered to be a piece of jewelry for him and it is not usual practice for a man to show off [his jewelry to others].15 It has, [nevertheless,] become accepted practice for people to go out without wearing any rings at all.
Halacha 5
A woman who goes out [wearing] a pin with an eye is liable,16 while a man is not liable.17 A man who goes out [wearing] a pin without an eye is liable,18 while a woman is not liable, for this is considered to be a piece of jewelry for her.19She is prohibited against wearing it only because of a decree lest she [take it off and] show it to her friends.
The [following] general principles apply: Whenever a person goes out wearing an item that is not considered to be jewelry for him, and it is not [worn as] a garment, he is liable if he transfers it in an ordinary manner.
Whenever a man goes out wearing a piece of jewelry that hangs loosely and could easily fall and thus cause him to bring it through the public domain, and similarly, whenever a woman goes out wearing a piece of jewelry that she is likely to take off and show [to her friends], they are not liable.
Whenever an adornment that is not likely to fall, nor is it likely to be shown to others, [a woman] is permitted to go out [wearing] it. Therefore, she may go out [wearing] a bracelet that is placed on the forearm or [a garter that is placed on] the thigh if it clings tightly to the flesh and will not slip off.20 These rules apply in other similar situations.
Halacha 6
A woman should not go out with woolen strands, linen strands, or straps attached to her head lest she remove them when she immerses herself21 and carry them in the public domain.
She should not go out [wearing] a frontlet on her forehead,22 nor with bangles of gold that hang from the frontlet on her cheeks if they are not sewn together.23 Nor may [she go out wearing] a crown of gold on her head,24 nor with the ankle chains worn by maidens so that they will not take long strides and thus destroy [the signs of] their virginity.
It is forbidden to go out [wearing] any of these articles lest they fall and one carry them by hand.
Halacha 7
A woman should not go out [wearing] a necklace,25 a nose ring,26 a flask of perfume27 attached to her forearm, a small round pouch28 in which balsam oil29is placed, referred to as a cochellet.30
Nor should she wear a wig that will give the appearance that she has a full head of hair,31 nor a woolen pad that goes around her face,32 nor a false tooth, nor a golden crown that she places over a black tooth or a red blemish that she has on her teeth. She may go out with a silver tooth, because this is not obvious.
All these prohibitions were instituted lest {the article fall and [the woman] carry it in her hand or}33 lest she remove it and show it to a friend.
Halacha 8
Whenever the Sages forbade wearing an item in the public domain, it is forbidden to go out [wearing] that item even in a courtyard for which there is noeruv.34 An exception is made with regard to a face pad and a wig; permission is granted to go out [wearing] them to a courtyard where there is no eruv so that [the woman] would not appear unattractive to her husband.
A woman who goes out [carrying] an empty flask with no perfume is liable.
Halacha 9
A woman may go out [wearing] strands of hair that are attached to her head.35Water passes through them and they are therefore not considered to be an interposing substance were she to immerse herself. [Consequently,] she will not remove them. Hence, there is no necessity to prohibit [wearing them lest she remove them] and carry them into the public domain.
This applies regardless of whether [the strands of hair were taken from] the woman's own tresses, those of another woman, or from an animal.36 An elderly woman should not, however, go out [wearing strands of hair from] a young woman, for they are becoming to her, [and we fear that] she might remove them and show them to a friend. A young woman, by contrast, may go out [wearing] strands of hair from an elderly woman.37
Any woven hair-covering may be worn.
Halacha 10
A woman may go out [wearing] strands38 [tied around] her neck, because she does not tie them tightly,39 and they are therefore not considered to be an interposing substance [with regard to ritual immersion]. If, however, they are colored, she may not go out wearing them, lest she show them to a friend.
A woman may go out wearing a golden diadem, since these are worn only by dignified woman who are not accustomed to removing [their jewelry] and showing them to their friends.40 A woman may also go out [wearing] a frontlet on her forehead with bangles of gold [that hang from the frontlet], provided they are sewn into her head-covering so that they do not fall.41 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 11
A women may go out with wadding in her ear42 provided it is attached to her ear, with wadding in her sandal43 provided it is attached to her sandal, and with wadding for her menstrual discharge44 even though it is not attached. [The latter rule applies] even if it has a handle. Since it is repulsive, even if it falls, she would not carry it.
Halacha 12
She may go out with pepper, a grain of salt, or any other substance that is placed in the mouth [to prevent] bad breath. She should not, however, place these substances in her mouth on the Sabbath itself.45
Women may go out [wearing] slivers of wood in their ears,46 or with bells47 on their necks or garments, and with a cloak fastened with a make-shift button.48
Indeed, a woman may fasten her cloak in this manner using a stone or a nut49on the Sabbath and go out, provided she does not [use this leniency as] a ruse and use a nut for this purpose in order to bring it to her young son. Similarly, she should not fasten her cloak in this manner using a coin,50 for it is forbidden to carry it. If her cloak was fastened [using a coin],51 she may go out wearing it.
Halacha 13
A man may go out to the public domain with a sliver of wood in his teeth52 or in his sandal. If, however, it falls, he should not put it back. [He may go out with] wadding or a sponge over a wound,53 provided he does not wind a cord or a string over them. [The latter restriction applies] because he considers the cord or the string as important and they do not assist [the healing of] the wound.54
[He may go out with] a garlic peel or an onion peel on a wound, and with a bandage on a wound. He may open and close [the bandage] on the Sabbath. [He may go out with] a compress, a plaster, or a dressing on a wound. [Similarly, one may go out with] a sela55 on a footsore, a locust's egg,56 a fox's tooth,57 a nail from a gallows,58 and any other entity that is hung on a person's body to [bring] a cure, provided that physicians say that it is effective.59
Halacha 14
[A woman] may go out with a tekumah60 stone or with the weight of a tekumahstone61, which was weighed [and carried] with the intent that it serve as a remedy. This applies not only to a pregnant woman, but to all women, [as a safeguard] lest they become pregnant and miscarry.
One may go out [wearing] an amulet that has proven its efficacy. What is an amulet that has proven its efficacy? [An amulet] that has cured three individuals62 or that was prepared by an individual who cured three people with other amulets. If a person goes out wearing an amulet that has not proved its efficacy, he is not liable.63 [The rationale:] he carried it out as a garment.64Similarly, a person who goes out [wearing] tefillin is not liable.65
Halacha 15
A person who has a wound on his foot may go out [wearing] one sandal on his healthy foot. If, however, a person does not have a wound on his foot, he may not go out [wearing] a single sandal.66
A child67 should not go out [wearing] the sandals of an adult.68 He may, however, go out [wearing] the cloak of an adult. A woman should not go out [on the Sabbath], [wearing] a loose-fitting sandal,69 nor [wearing] a new sandal that she did not wear for even a short period of time before [the commencement of the Sabbath].70
Halacha 16
[A man] may go out [wearing] tufts of flax or a woolen wig worn by men with sores on their heads.73 When does this apply? When he colored them with oil and wound them,74 or he went out [wearing] them [at least] momentarily75before the commencement of the Sabbath. If, however, he did not perform a deed [that indicated his desire to use these articles], nor did he go out [wearing] them before the Sabbath, it is forbidden for him to go out [wearing] them.
Halacha 17
We may go out [wearing] coarse sackcloth, tent-cloth,76a thick woolen blanket,77 or a coarse wrap78 [as protection] against rain.79 We may not, however, go out [wearing] a chest, a container, or a mat, [as protection] against the rain.80
When a pillow and a blanket are soft and thin as garments are, one may go out [wearing] them as a wrap on one's head on the Sabbath. When they are firm, they are considered to be burdens and it is forbidden.
Halacha 18
We may go out with bells woven81 into our clothes.82 A servant83 may go out [wearing] a clay seal84 around his neck,85 but not with a metal seal, lest it fall and he carry it.
[The following rules apply when] a person wraps himself in a tallit86 and folds it, either [holding the folds] in his hand, or [placing them] on his shoulder: If his intent is that [the ends of the garment] should not tear or become soiled, it is forbidden.87 If his intent is for the sake of fashion, since this is the style in which people of his locale wear their clothes, it is permitted.
Halacha 19
A person who goes out [to the public domain] with a garment that is folded and placed on his shoulders is liable. He may, however, go out with a wrap [folded] around his shoulders even though a thread is not tied to his fingers.88
Whenever a wrap does not cover [a person's] head and the majority of his body,89 he is forbidden to go out [wearing it]. A cloth that is worn as a head covering90 that is short and not wide should be tied below one's shoulders. Thus, it will serve as a belt and one will be permitted to go out [wearing] it.
Halacha 20
It is permitted to wrap oneself in a tallit91 that has unwoven strands92 at its edges, even though they are long and do not enhance the appearance of thetallit, because they are considered to be subsidiary to it. The person [wearing the tallit] does not care whether they exist or not.93
Based on the above, a person who goes out [wearing] a tallit whose tzitzit are not halachically acceptable is liable. For these strands are important to him and he is concerned with completing what they are lacking, so that they can be considered to be tzitzit.94
When, however, the tzitzit are halachically acceptable, it is permitted to go out [wearing this garment] during the day and during the night.95 Tzitzit that are halachically acceptable are not considered to be a burden, but rather to be an article that enhances the garment and beautifies it. Were the strands of tzitzitthat are halachically acceptable to be considered a burden, one would be liable [for wearing such a garment] even on the Sabbath day, since a positive commandment [whose negation] is not [punishable by] karet does not supersede the Sabbath [prohibitions].96
Halacha 21
A tailor should not go out on the Sabbath with a needle stuck into his clothes, nor a carpenter with a sliver of wood behind his ear,97 nor a weaver with wool in his ear, nor a carder of flax with a string around his neck, nor a money-changer with a dinar in his ear, nor a dyer with a sample in his ear.
If one [of these individuals] goes out [wearing such an article], he is not liable. Although this is the usual practice for artisans of this craft, [he is not liable,] because he is not considered to have transferred the article in an ordinary manner.98
Halacha 22
A zav99 who goes out with his receptacle is liable, for this is the only way this receptacle is transferred. [He is liable] although he has no need to take out [the receptacle] itself; [he needs it] only to prevent his clothes from being soiled.100For a person who performs a labor is liable even when he has no need for the actual labor he performed.101
Halacha 23
What should a man102 do when he finds tefillin in the public domain on the Sabbath?103 He should wear them in the ordinary fashion, placing the headtefillin on his head and the arm tefillin on his arm, enter a home and remove them there. Afterwards, he should go out, return, put on a second pair, [return to the home,] remove them, and [continue this pattern] until he brings in all [thetefillin].
If there were many pairs of tefillin and there was not enough time to bring them in during the time by wearing them as garments, he should remain [watching] them until [after] nightfall, and bring them in on Saturday night.104 In a time of oppressive decrees,105 when one might fear to linger and watch them until the evening because of the gentiles, he should cover them where they are located, leave them, and proceed [on his way].
Halacha 24
Should he be afraid to wait until after nightfall because of thieves, he should take the entire group at once and carry them less than four cubits at a time, or he should give them to a colleague [standing within four cubits], who in turn will give them to another colleague106 until they reach the courtyard at the extremity of the city.107
When does the above apply? When they are found together with their straps that are tied with the knots with which tefillin are tied, since then they are surelytefillin. If, however, their straps are not tied, one should not pay attention to them.108
Halacha 25
Halacha 26
On Friday, shortly before nightfall, a tailor should not go carrying a needle in his hand,112 nor should a scribe [go out carrying] his pen, lest he forget and transfer it on the Sabbath.
A person is obligated to check his clothes on Friday before nightfall, lest he forget something in them and [inadvertently] transfer it on the Sabbath.
It is permissible to go out wearing tefillin on Friday shortly before sunset. Since a person is obligated to touch his tefillin at all times,113 there is no possibility that he will forget them. If a person forgets and goes out to the public domain [wearing] tefillin,114 [when] he remembers the tefillin on his head, he should cover his head115 until he reaches his home or the house of study.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
I.e., this prohibition applies to all weaponry. As the Rambam continues, there are instances where carrying such weaponry violates a Torah prohibition, and other instances where the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
This chapter represents a turning point in the structure of this text. From the middle of Chapter 12 onward, the Rambam has delineated the various factors involved in the forbidden labor of transferring articles from one domain to another. In this halachah, he begins speaking of the Rabbinic safeguards associated with this forbidden labor.
|
| 2. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:2).
|
| 3. |
Even when hanging from one's garments - e.g., a sword in a scabbard attached to one's belt.
|
| 4. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:4). Rashi (Shabbat 63a) renders this term as "a mace."
|
| 5. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on Shabbat 63a, which mentions a difference of opinion between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer. Our Sages rule that one is liable, while Rabbi Eliezer differs and states that one is not liable for carrying weapons, for they are ornaments, like jewelry.
Our Sages support their position by quoting Isaiah's (2:4) prophecy of the Era of the Redemption, "And they shall beat their swords into plowshares.... Nation shall not lift up sword against nation...." Since weaponry will be nullified in that era of ultimate fulfillment, it is a sign that it is not a true and genuine ornament.
The Lechem Mishneh (in his gloss on Hilchot Teshuvah 8:7) notes that there is a slight difficulty with the Rambam's ruling. The Talmud associates the opinion of the Sages (which the Rambam accepts) with the conception that Mashiach's coming will initiate a miraculous world order, and Rabbi Eliezer's ruling with the opinion of Shemuel that "there is no difference between the present era and the Messianic era except [for the emancipation from] the dominion of [gentile] powers." InHilchot Teshuvah 9:2, and more explicitly in Hilchot Melachim 12:1-2, the Rambam explains Shmuel's position, stating:
Nevertheless, this approach does not necessarily contradict the Rambam's rulings here. The Rambam also maintains that war will be nullified in the Messianic era, as he writes (loc. cit. 12:5): "In that era, there will be neither famine nor war, neither envy nor competition." Nevertheless, its nullification will not come because of miracles that defy the natural order, but because of the reasons he continues to mention in that halachah - that "good will flow in abundance" and "'the world will be filled with the knowledge of God' (Isaiah 11:9)."
|
| 6. |
The Ritba (in his gloss on Shabbat 60a) states that these nails were used to fasten the soles of the sandals to the upper portion.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 6:2 (based on Shabbat, loc. cit., and Beitzah 14b)], the Rambam explains that in an era of religious oppression, many Jews gathered together for prayer and study in a hidden place. When they heard a noise outside, they suspected that they had been discovered by their enemies and panicked. In the confusion, hundreds were crushed by these nailed sandals.
|
| 7. |
Since these are days of public assembly, our Sages felt that wearing these sandals would arouse disturbing memories of the abovementioned incident.
There is a question whether the prohibitions against wearing such sandals apply at present despite the fact that our nailed sandals are made differently from those of Talmudic times. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes this prohibition in his Halachot. Since he mentions only those laws that are relevant in the post-Talmudic era, this inclusion would seem to imply that the prohibition should be followed now as well. Rabbenu Asher differs. Significantly, Rav Yosef Karo does not mention this prohibition in his Shulchan Aruch, nor does the Ramah refer to it in his gloss on that text.
|
| 8. |
This reason, that perhaps an article will fall and be carried in the public domain, is mentioned several times throughout this chapter and is relevant to both men and women.
|
| 9. |
As reflected by Esther 3:10 and other sources, in Biblical and Talmudic times men wore signet rings, using the seal to authorize their approval of documents.
|
| 10. |
The commentaries draw attention to a problematic statement in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:1), where he states that a ring without a seal is somewhat like, but not exactly, a piece of jewelry for women.
|
| 11. |
Since these rings are not considered to be jewelry for these individuals, they are considered to be carrying them in the public domain.
|
| 12. |
As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 12-14, a person is liable for transferring an article only when he does so in an ordinary fashion.
|
| 13. |
This point is mentioned several times in this chapter as a rationale for restrictions governing women's wearing jewelry in the public domain.
|
| 14. |
Although all Talmudic authorities prohibit women from wearing jewelry in public on the Sabbath, from the era of the Geonim onward, and particularly in the Ashkenazic community, it has become customary for women to do so. Among the rationales offered by the Rabbis (Tosafot, Shabbat64b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 303:18) for this leniency are:
a) Today, there is no concept of a true public domain, for there are no places through which 600,000 people pass at one time. Since the restrictions against carrying in a carmelit are only safeguards against carrying in a public domain, it would be improper to impose a safeguard against carrying in a carmelit, for a safeguard is not instituted to protect a safeguard.
[There are several difficulties with this rationale: Firstly, many Rishonim (including the Rambam) do not accept this principle. Furthermore, today many large metropolises are a public domain according to all views.]
b) The socio-economic climate of the age has changed. In the Talmudic period, most women did not have jewelry, nor did they see their friends that often, nor did they have private places in which to socialize. Therefore, there was reason for the concern that jewelry would be taken off and displayed in the public domain. When the above mentioned conditions changed, this suspicion no longer applied, and there was no reason for this stringency.
|
| 15. |
Indeed, our Sages never imposed any restrictions on men's carrying in the public domain for this reason.
|
| 16. |
Since it has an eye, it is used as a needle for sewing, and therefore is not considered an ornament. Women are liable for transferring them on the Sabbath, because they frequently sew, and often carry needles by sticking them in their clothes. Hence, they are considered to have carried the needle in an ordinary manner.
|
| 17. |
With the exception of a tailor, a man is not liable for carrying a needle stuck in his clothes on the Sabbath, since this is not the ordinary way in which these items are carried.
Our explanation in this and the previous note follows the interpretation of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 16). It must be emphasized that the Rambam's rulings in Halachah 21 present a difficulty to this explanation. Rav Kapach offers a resolution to this difficulty by explaining that Halachah 20 refers to a needle which is a symbol of the tailor's trade. Wearing it is not considered to be transferring an article in the ordinary manner. In contrast, the present halachah refers to a functional needle that is carried in a craftsman's garment from time to time.
Significantly, Rashi and other Rishonim interpret Shabbat 62a, the source for this halachah, differently. Their views are given greater emphasis by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim301:8).
|
| 18. |
Since it is not a piece of jewelry for him.
|
| 19. |
Shabbat 60a relates that ordinarily these pins would have a gold plate attached to them. The pointed end of the pin would be stuck into her head-covering, and the plate would hang down over her forehead.
|
| 20. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:4). As mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 303:15), there are authorities who forbid the wearing of forearm bracelets.
|
| 21. |
These threads are tied to the woman's hair. Accordingly, they would be considered to be a חציצה, "intervening substance," and would have to be removed before immersion (see Hilchot Mikvaot 1:12, 2:5). The suspicion is that afterwards, they would be carried in the public domain.
|
| 22. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 6:1 (based on Shabbat 57b), the Rambam describes this as a gold plate extending on the forehead from ear to ear.
|
| 23. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (according to Rav Kapach's translation), which is based on Shabbat 57b], the Rambam adds "and are sewn into her head-covering." Since a woman is not likely to remove her head-covering entirely when her jewelry is sewn into it, we do not suspect that she will take it off and show it to her friends in the public domain. (See Halachah 10.)
This interpretation (which resolves the question the Ra'avad raises in his gloss on this halachah and which reflects the interpretation of our Sages, Shabbat 57b) presents difficulties, because of the Rambam's final clause, "It is forbidden to go out [wearing] any of these articles, lest they fall and one carry them by hand." Note the commentaries of the Merkevet HaMishneh and the Seder HaMishneh, who address themselves to this difficulty.
|
| 24. |
A golden crown engraved with an impression of the city of Jerusalem.
|
| 25. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:1), the Rambam interprets this as a necklace with golden beads. Rashi (Shabbat 57b, 59b) interprets this as referring to a golden choker necklace. (See the notes on Halachah 4 regarding the Rabbinic opinions regarding wearing jewelry at present.)
|
| 26. |
Significantly, even in Talmudic times earrings were permitted. Rashi explains that this leniency was granted because earrings are difficult to remove. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 303:8) offers a different rationale: that a woman's head covering would cover her ears as well. Hence, there is no need to worry about her showing the earrings to her friends.
|
| 27. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:3), the Rambam mentions that musk would usually be carried.
|
| 28. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions that this pouch was also attractive, being made of gold or silver.
|
| 29. |
Balsam oil is renowned for its pleasant fragrance.
|
| 30. |
Significantly, our text of the Mishnah states kovellet, replacing the כ with a ב. The meaning of the term, however, does not change.
|
| 31. |
This refers to attractive hair glued to a thin surface and placed on a woman's head (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:5).
Needless to say, in addition to the more inclusive leniencies involving jewelry in general, the nature of wigs and false teeth are different today. Therefore, there is no difficulty in wearing these items in the public domain.
|
| 32. |
This pad was placed on a woman's forehead beneath the frontlet of gold (Shabbat 57b) in a manner similar to the woolen pad that the High Priest would wear under his forehead plate (Chulin 138a). Apparently this pad was also attractive and could serve as an ornament in its own right.
|
| 33. |
This clause is set off by braces, because based on manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah and early printings, it appears to be a printer's addition and not part of the Rambam's original text. According to the Rambam, this suspicion is not relevant with regard to these particular articles.
|
| 34. |
Although the prohibition against carrying in such a courtyard is Rabbinic in origin and there is no possibility of transgressing a Torah prohibition, our Sages imposed the restrictions against carrying there as well. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is not considered as instituting "a safeguard for a safeguard." Were women allowed to wear these adornments in a courtyard, they would most likely inadvertently proceed into the public domain while wearing them.
The Maggid Mishneh also explains that according to the Rambam, there appears to be no prohibition against women wearing such articles at home. We do not suspect that they will inadvertently go outside while wearing them. Other Rishonim (the Ramban and the Rashba) differ and prohibit wearing ornaments even in one's home. As mentioned above, however, at present it is customary to adopt a more lenient approach regarding the entire issue of wearing jewelry.
|
| 35. |
In contrast to the strands of wool or linen mentioned in Halachah 6. As the Rambam continues to explain, the reasons the Sages forbade wearing strands from other fabrics do not apply in this instance.
|
| 36. |
See Shabbat 64b for an explanation why it is necessary to mention all three instances.
|
| 37. |
Based on an alternate interpretation [or perhaps an alternate version] of Shabbat 64b, Rabbenu Asher and others differ and also forbid a young woman from wearing strands of hair from an elderly woman.
|
| 38. |
Even of wool and linen. As the Rambam continues to explain, the reasons why it was forbidden to wear strands of these fabrics tied to one's hair do not apply in this instance.
|
| 39. |
It is, however, forbidden for a woman to wear a choker necklace (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 40. |
This ruling serves as the basis for some of the lenient opinions mentioned in the notes on Halachah 4, which allow women to wear jewelry in the public domain at present. All our women are dignified and are not accustomed to removing their jewelry and showing it to their friends.
|
| 41. |
See Halachah 6 and notes.
|
| 42. |
To absorb the fluids it produces (Rashi, Shabbat 64b).
|
| 43. |
To make walking more comfortable (ibid.).
|
| 44. |
As reflected by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:13), this applies only when the woman's intent is that the blood from the discharge will not cause her discomfort when it dries. If her intent is to prevent the discharge from soiling her clothes, it is forbidden. See Halachah 22.
|
| 45. |
I.e., if a woman had such a substance in her mouth before the Sabbath, she may continue holding it in her mouth on the Sabbath. She may not, however, place these substances in her mouth on the Sabbath itself, nor may she return such a substance to her mouth if it falls out.
Based on Chapter 21, Halachah 24, it appears that the restrictions on placing a substance in one's mouth on the Sabbath to prevent bad breath apply only when one will continue carrying those substances in one's mouth outside.
|
| 46. |
So that the holes in their pierced ears will not close (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Shabbat 6:6).
|
| 47. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid. Rashi (Shabbat65a) and others translate רעולות as "veiled." See the notes on Halachah 18, which discuss the laws regarding wearing bells on the Sabbath.
|
| 48. |
Jewish women living in Media would wear a coat with a strap in one of its upper corners. They would place a stone, nut, coin, or the like under the cloak to serve as a makeshift button. The strap would be looped around this button to fasten the cloak closed (Rashi, loc. cit.).
|
| 49. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 303:22) emphasizes that a stone must be set aside for this purpose before the commencement of the Sabbath. Otherwise, it is muktzeh and is forbidden to be moved.
|
| 50. |
Even if a coin was set aside for this purpose before the Sabbath, it is still considered to bemuktzeh (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
|
| 51. |
Before the commencement of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
|
| 52. |
A toothpick.
|
| 53. |
We are permitted to wear any entity that heals the body on the Sabbath. Such articles are not considered to be a burden, but a garment or jewelry. In Chapter 21, Halachot 26-27, the Rambam discusses whether it is permissible to place wadding or bandages on a wound on the Sabbath.
|
| 54. |
These restrictions do not apply to a rag, because it is inconsequential. Since a cord or a string is considered somewhat important, it is not considered to be subsidiary to the bandage. Hence, the person is considered to be carrying them in the public domain.
|
| 55. |
A coin from the Talmudic period.
|
| 56. |
A cure for weak thighs (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:10).
|
| 57. |
A cure for both insomnia and hyperactivity (ibid.).
|
| 58. |
A cure for continuous high fever (ibid.).
|
| 59. |
This halachah is very problematic for the Rambam. As explained at length in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 11, the Rambam maintains that all occult arts and superstitious practices are not only prohibited, but are absolute nonsense. It would appear that the latter cures mentioned are surely not practical medical advice, but rather a charm stemming from folklore (and perhaps pagan folklore). Indeed, for the latter reason, Rabbi Meir (according to the Rambam's text ofShabbat 6:10, our version states "the Sages") forbids the use of these practices even during the week.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1436) compounds our difficulty in understanding the Rambam's view, citing the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Yoma 8:4), which states:
The Radbaz, therefore, maintains that the Rambam is describing a situation where these articles are worn as pendants. Hence, they can be considered equivalent to pieces of jewelry. (See the following halachah with regard to an amulet that has not proved its efficacy.) If, however, they are carried by hand, it is forbidden to go out to the public domain with them on the Sabbath. TheShulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:27) does not make such a stipulation and quotes the Rambam's words in this halachah without emendation.
|
| 60. |
A stone worn by a woman to prevent a miscarriage (Rashi, Shabbat 66b).
|
| 61. |
A weight equivalent to that of the tekumah stone, which is purported to have a similar positive effect (ibid.).
|
| 62. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that, in contrast to Rashi's view, according to the Rambam, an amulet that healed one person three times is not considered to have proved its efficacy.
|
| 63. |
At the outset, however, one is forbidden to go out wearing such an amulet.
|
| 64. |
I.e., the amulet is considered to be an ornament, like a piece of jewelry.
|
| 65. |
There is no obligation to wear tefillin on the Sabbath, and we are therefore forbidden to wear them in most circumstances. (See Halachah 23 with regard to the exceptions.) Nevertheless, since they are worn as a garment, a person is not liable for wearing them.
|
| 66. |
Rashi (Shabbat 60a) gives two rationales for this ruling:
a) The Jerusalem Talmud states that a person who wears only one shoe will be suspected of carrying the other in his cloak.
b) Wearing one shoe may arouse the attention of others and cause them to mock him. We fear that in such a situation the person will remove the sandal that he is wearing and carry it.
It is questionable whether the Rambam accepts the latter rationale. Although Rashi suggests that it applies with regard to several of the items mentioned in the previous halachot, the Rambam does not mention it - neither in this chapter nor in his Commentary on the Mishnah.
|
| 67. |
This is the simple interpretation of the word קטן. Note, however, the commentary of Rashi onShabbat 141b, where he interprets the term as referring to a small adult. Since the obligation of a child is Rabbinic in origin, the Sages would not enforce any further safeguards on his conduct.
|
| 68. |
The rationale is that the sandal may fall off and the child might carry it in the public domain.
|
| 69. |
Rashi interprets the Talmud (loc. cit.) as referring to a torn sandal.
|
| 70. |
Lest the sandal prove uncomfortable and the woman carry it.
|
| 71. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:8). Shabbat66b offers three different Aramaic interpretations of this term. These interpretations, in turn, are understood differently by the later commentaries.
In the above source, the Rambam states that since it is uncomfortable to walk in wooden shoes, they are not considered to be garments.
|
| 72. |
For he did not transfer them in an ordinary manner (Merkevet HaMishneh).
|
| 73. |
This reflects a fusion of the interpretation by Rav Hai Gaon (and Tosafot) of Shabbat 50a, which understands these substances to be makeshift wigs to cover baldness, and that of Rashi, who explains that these terms refer to wool that is placed on wounds.
|
| 74. |
I.e., he performed a deed that indicates that he desires to use the wool as a wig.
|
| 75. |
If he wore the wool as a wig once before the Sabbath, this indicates that he is willing to use it for this purpose. Otherwise, since most people would not wear a wig of this nature, it is forbidden to wear it on the Sabbath because it is muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:62).
|
| 76. |
The source for this halachah is Nedarim 55b. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 7:3), the Rambam defines this term as "coarsely woven material that is not sown."
|
| 77. |
Our translation is taken from Rav Kapach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Oholot 11:3).
|
| 78. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 7:3), the Rambam defines this term as "a wrap made from an extremely coarse and thick fabric... used for protection from rain."
|
| 79. |
Although these are not proper garments, since they resemble clothing and are useful in protecting one against the rain, they may be worn.
|
| 80. |
In this instance, although the person is seeking protection from the rain, since these are not garments, he is considered to be carrying a burden (Rashi Nedarim, loc. cit.).
|
| 81. |
If, however, the bells are not woven into the garment, there are restrictions against wearing them, lest they become severed and the person carry them in the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:21, Mishnah Berurah 301:80.)
|
| 82. |
Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 301:23), who states that this leniency applies only to bells whose clappers have been removed. Otherwise, it is forbidden to wear them, for jingling a bell is forbidden on the Sabbath.
|
| 83. |
This refers to an eved Cana'ani - i.e., a servant who has been circumcised and has been immersed in the mikveh, and who has accepted the observance of the Torah's laws. Such a servant is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot incumbent on a woman (Chaggigah 4a). (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 12:11, 13:18.)
|
| 84. |
A seal of identification, indicating to whom he belongs. The seal is permitted because it resembles a piece of jewelry. In contrast to a metal seal, the servant is allowed to go out wearing a clay seal, since were it to fall, it would break and would be worthless.
|
| 85. |
But not hanging from his clothes (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 86. |
The intent here is not necessarily a prayer shawl, but also a garment worn for mundane purposes as well. We have, nevertheless, merely transliterated the Hebrew term rather than translate it as "garment," to indicate the type of clothing that is under discussion. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:31) specifically states that this restriction does not apply to contemporary garments, because they are of a different type.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:36 and the Mishnah Berurah 301:117 emphasize that even the garments worn at present should not be lifted up extremely high.
|
| 87. |
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not state that the person is liable, for the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
|
| 88. |
Rashi (Shabbat 147a) explains that tying the string around one's finger will prevent the wrap from falling. We do not fear that the wrap will fall and the person will carry it in the public domain.
The commentaries explain that in contrast to the garment mentioned in the first clause, since it is customary to wear a wrap folded, there is no difficulty in wearing it in this manner on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, in light of the final clause, they require that the wrap be large enough to cover one's head and the majority of one's body.
Although there are more stringent opinions, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:37 and the Mishnah Berurah 301:115 permit the wearing of scarfs that are not this large if it is accepted practice in a community to wear such garments.
|
| 89. |
The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh explain that this clause refers to a passage fromShabbat 147b which describes a wrap worn by women after a bath.
|
| 90. |
Our translation is based on Rashi, Shabbat 147b. Rav Kapach suggests a different version of that text. Since this cloth is not large enough to cover the person's head and the majority of his body, the only way it may be worn is when one ties it as a belt.
|
| 91. |
This does not refer to a tallit used for prayer, but rather to an ordinary shawl that resembles such a garment.
|
| 92. |
See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 29:1).
|
| 93. |
Since they are of no consequence to the person whatsoever, they have no halachic importance either. It is as if they did not exist at all. If, however, the person was disturbed by their presence, it would be forbidden.
|
| 94. |
Since the tzitzit are important to the person, they are not considered to be subsidiary to the garment. Hence, wearing a garment to which they are attached is considered to be carrying a burden.
|
| 95. |
The Rambam elaborates slightly in this instance to negate the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who maintains that it is forbidden to wear tzitzit on Friday night. He explains that since one does not fulfill a mitzvah by wearing tzitzit at night, and yet the tzitzit are important, wearing a garment to which they are attached is equivalent to carrying a burden on the Sabbath.
The Rambam does not accept this rationale, explaining that since the tzitzit are halachically acceptable, they are considered to be an adornment of the garment even when a mitzvah is not fulfilled by wearing them. In one of his responsa, the Rambam deals with this issue at length.
In this context, note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:45, which states that this applies to a man, but not to a woman. For a woman, tzitzit are always considered a burden on the Sabbath. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah, which cites differing views.
|
| 96. |
The commentaries note a slight difficulty with the Rambam's statements. Although there are only two positive commandments whose observance supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions - circumcision and the offering of the Paschal sacrifice - it is because of a specific divine decree and not because of the fact that they are punishable by karet that these mitzvot supersede the Sabbath laws.
|
| 97. |
Used by a carpenter to see if the different pieces of wood are level (Rashi, Shabbat 11b). This and all the other items mentioned are symbols that the various artisans would wear so that people could identify their professions.
|
| 98. |
I.e., since it is not the ordinary practice for most people to carry an article in this fashion, the fact that certain people do carry in this manner is not significant.
It must be noted that this ruling (which follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, Shabbat 11b) appears to contradict the explanation given by Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, to Halachah 5. (See the notes on that halachah.)
|
| 99. |
A man with a discharge from his sexual organ resembling that resulting from venereal disease. (See Leviticus, chapter 15; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, chapter 2.)
|
| 100. |
As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, it is forbidden to wear an article merely to prevent one's clothes from being soiled.
|
| 101. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.
|
| 102. |
We have used the word "man" in consideration of the ruling of the Magen Avraham 301:53, who states that for a woman, tefillin are always considered to be a burden. (See the Mishnah Berurah301:158, which cites a differing opinion.
|
| 103. |
Halachah 14 states that a person who wears tefillin is not liable - i.e., since tefillin are worn as a garment, he is exempt. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade wearing tefillin, because there is no mitzvah to do so on the Sabbath. They did not, however, apply this prohibition in this instance out of reverence for the sacred articles. Were the tefillin to be left there, they might be treated with disrespect.
The Sha'agat Aryeh (Responsum 41) questions the Rambam's ruling, because - as reflected byHilchot Tefillin 4:11 - the Rambam maintains that there is a prohibition from the Torah against putting on tefillin when there is no obligation to do so. He resolves that difficulty by stating that the prohibition applies only when one puts them on at an improper time, with the intent of fulfilling a mitzvah. If that is not one's intent, there is no prohibition.
|
| 104. |
Since he will not have time to bring them in until after nightfall, it is preferable to stay there and protect them all rather than bring them in one pair at a time. When, by contrast, there is a possibility of bringing them in before nightfall, the Sages were willing to allow him to leave the remainder of the tefillin unattended briefly, so that he could complete the task earlier.
|
| 105. |
Shabbat 130a relates that the Romans made the wearing of tefillin punishable by death.
|
| 106. |
See Chapter 12, Halachah 17, which explains this leniency applies even with regard to one's personal concerns. Surely, it applies with regard to matters associated with a mitzvah.
|
| 107. |
There, a person in the courtyard should remove the tefillin from the body of the person who was carrying them while he is still walking outside the courtyard. Thus, one person will have performed the akirah (the removal of the article from its original place) and another the hanachah[the placement of the article (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:52)].
|
| 108. |
For the possibility exists that they are merely an amulet (Eruvin 97a).
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's conception of that Talmudic passage and maintains that there is no question concerning the identity of the tefillin, for we do not suspect that a person would make an amulet that resembles tefillin. The difficulty is that if the knots of the tefillin are not tied, it is forbidden to tie them on the Sabbath. Thus, it will be impossible to wear the tefillin on the Sabbath.
The difference between these two views is that, according to the Ra'avad, if one finds tefillinwithout straps, one is obligated to remain watching them until after nightfall. The Rambam, by contrast, would allow a person to leave them.
The Maggid Mishneh cites a responsum purported to be written by the Rambam to the scholars of Lunil concerning tzitzit, which indicates that he accepted the Ra'avad's position. When citing the law regarding tefillin, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:42) quotes the Rambam's view. The Magen Avraham 301:53 states that even if the Rambam's view would have applied in previous generations, it is not relevant at present, for amulets are not commonly made in the form of tefillin. Therefore, he suggests following the Ra'avad's ruling.
|
| 109. |
Since a Torah scroll is not usually worn as a covering, the person is not allowed to cover himself with it under ordinary circumstances. Rather, he must linger and protect the scroll until after nightfall.
|
| 110. |
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:54 states that one should cover the scroll to protect it. It is questionable why the Rambam makes such a statement with regard to tefillin (Halachah 23), but does not do so in this instance.
|
| 111. |
Although a Torah scroll is not usually worn, and indeed, doing so is not respectful to the scroll, this leniency is granted lest the scroll become ruined.
The Or Sameach questions why the person cannot carry the scroll less than four cubits at a time, as mentioned in the previous halachah. He explains that the problem is transferring the scroll from the public domain to the home. In Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam states that one should throw an article that one is carrying from the public domain into a courtyard in an abnormal manner. This would be disrespectful to the Torah scroll. Therefore, it is preferable to wear the scroll. With regard to the propriety of wearing parchment as a garment, the Or Sameach cites the use of similar substances, as mentioned in Halachah 17. See also the suggestion of Shulchan Aruch HaRav mentioned in Note 107.
|
| 112. |
The Maggid Mishneh cites Shabbat 11b, which, as the Rambam states in Halachah 21, rules that a tailor is not liable for carrying his needle stuck into his clothes. Therefore, forbidding a tailor from wearing his needle on Friday afternoon would be a "safeguard to a safeguard," a Rabbinic decree enforced to insure the observance of another Rabbinic decree. Therefore, the prohibition is directed only at carrying a needle in one's hand.
|
| 113. |
See Hilchot Tefillin 4:14, which states that the holiness of tefillin surpasses that of the tzitz, the frontlet worn by the High Priest. Hence, they are worthy of such constant attention.
|
| 114. |
Compare to Hilchot Tefillin 4:12, which mentions similar concepts.
|
| 115. |
The commentaries state that this is necessary lest others receive the impression that it is permissible to wear tefillin on the Sabbath.
|
Shabbos - Chapter Twenty
Halacha 1
It is forbidden to transfer a burden on an animal on the Sabbath, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "[On the seventh day, you shall cease activity,] and thus your ox and your donkey may rest."1 This includes [not only] an ox and a donkey, but all animals, beasts, and fowl.2
Halacha 2
Behold, there is [also] an explicit prohibition in the Torah [against working with an animal] as [Exodus 20:10] states: "Do not do any work on the Sabbath. [This includes] you, your son, your daughter, your servant, your maidservant and your beast."5
[This means that one should not perform forbidden labors such as] plowing and the like [together with an animal]. Since this is a prohibition which is punishable by death, [its violation does not incur] lashes.6
Halacha 3
It is forbidden for a Jew to lend or hire a large animal to a gentile so that the latter may perform work with it on the Sabbath, since [the Jew] is commanded to have his animal rest.7
Halacha 4
It is permitted to sell a gentile a horse, since a horse is used only for human transportation13 and not for transporting burdens.14 [Hence, there is no forbidden labor involved, because] "a living entity carries itself."15
Just as it is forbidden to sell [such an animal] to a gentile, so too is it forbidden to sell it to a Jew who, we suspect, might sell it to a gentile.16
One may, however, sell [a gentile] a cow for the purpose of slaughter, [provided] he slaughters it in the seller's presence. One should not, however, sell [any animal], even an ox fattened for slaughter, without an explicit condition, lest the purchaser delay and work with it [on the Sabbath in the interim].17
Halacha 5
In a place where the accepted custom is to sell a small animal18 to gentiles, one may make such a sale. In a place where the accepted custom is not to make such sales, one should not.19
In all places, however, a large non-domesticated animal should not be sold [to a gentile], just as a large domesticated animal should not be sold unless one does so via a broker.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] a person is on a journey and night falls on Friday, [but] he is not accompanied by a gentile to whom he could give his purse:20 If he has an animal with him,21 he should place his purse on [the animal] while it is walking, and when [the animal] desires to stand, he should remove [the purse] from it, so that it will not stand still while carrying [the purse]. [In this manner,] neither the removal of an article from its place, nor placing it down in a new position will have been performed [by the animal].22
It is forbidden for him to direct the animal, even with his voice alone, as long as the purse is on it, so that he will not be considered to be directing his animal on the Sabbath.23 Our Sages decreed24 that one should not place a purse on an animal on the Sabbath unless one is not accompanied by a gentile.25
Halacha 7
Although the person is also accompanied by a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual, and a minor26, he should place his purse on the donkey rather than give to one of these individuals, for they are humans and are members of the Jewish people.27
If he is accompanied by a deaf-mute and a mentally incompetent individual, and does not have an animal with him, he should give it to the mentally incompetent individual.28 If [he is accompanied by] a mentally incompetent individual and a minor, he should give it29 to the mentally incompetent individual.30 If [he is accompanied by] a deaf-mute and a minor, he may give it to whomever he desires.31
Halacha 8
It is permitted to lead an animal in the public domain with its reins and its bridle,36 provided the bridle and reins are appropriate for it37 - for example, a horse with a neck-ring, a camel with a rope tied to its mouth, a female camel with an iron bit,38 and a dog with a muzzle.
If, however, one took out an animal with a bridle that is insufficient - e.g., one tied a rope in the mouth of a horse - or with a bridle that is excessive, for it would be controlled with a lesser one, - for example one took out a donkey with a horse's neck-ring, or a cat with a muzzle, it is considered to be a burden.39For any excessive or insufficient restraint is considered to be a burden.40
Halacha 9
A person should not tie camels together and lead them. [Moreover,] even when they were tied together on Friday, he should not lead them on the Sabbath. One may, however, gather the ropes [of many camels] in one's hand,41provided none of the ropes extends more than a handbreadth outside one's hand42 and the rope leading from [each] camel's mouth to one's hand is at least a handbreadth above the earth.43
Why is one prohibited from leading camels that are tied to each other? Because it appears as if he is leading them to the marketplace where animals are sold or used for sport.44 For this reason, a person should not go out [leading] an animal wearing a bell around its neck, even if its clapper is plugged [so that] it does not produce a sound.45
Halacha 10
An animal should not go out with a bell [attached to] its coverings,46 a seal47[attached to] its neck, a seal [attached to] its coverings,48 a strap on its foot,49or a ladder on its neck.50
Halacha 11
Chickens56 may not go out with cords,57 nor with straps on their feet.58 Rams may not go out with a small wagon under their fat tail.59 Ewes may not go out with [chips of] wood that are placed in their nostrils so that they sneeze and dislodge the worms in their brains.60
A calf may not go out with a small yoke [that is placed] on its neck to break [its nature] and accustom it [to bearing a yoke so that later it will wear a larger yoke for] plowing. An animal may not go out with a muzzle placed in its mouth so that it will neither bite nor eat. A cow may not go out with a hedgehog skin on its teats so that crawling animals61 will not suck from it when it sleeps,62 nor may it go out with a strap between its horns, regardless of whether it is placed there as an ornament or as a restraint.63
When a goat's horns are pierced, it may go out with a rope tied to its horns on the Sabbath. If the rope is tied to [the goat's] beard, it is forbidden, lest it tear off and the person carry it in his hands in the public domain. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 12
Rams may go out with a wide strap tied against their genitals so that they will not copulate with females, with a hard piece of leather strapped over their hearts so that they will not be attacked by wolves,64 and with an embroidered cloth that is placed on them to make them more attractive.65
Ewes may go out with their fat tail tied to their backs, [exposing them] so that rams will copulate with them, or tied downward so that rams will not copulate with them. They may go out covered with a cloth so that their wool will remain clean.66
Halacha 13
A donkey should not go out [wearing] a saddle even when it is tied upon it on Friday.69 A horse may not go out wearing a foxtail70 or with a scarlet thread between its eyes.71
An animal should not go out with a feeding bag [attached] to its mouth, nor with metal shoes,72 nor with an amulet that has not proven its efficacy for an animal.73 An animal may, however, go out with a bandage placed on a wound,74 with plates placed on a broken bone,75 or with a placenta that is hanging from it.
We may plug up a bell hanging around its neck76 and allow [an animal] to stroll with it in a courtyard.77 Similarly, one may place78 a saddlecloth on a donkey79and allow it to stroll in a courtyard. One may not, however, attach a feeding bag to [an animal] on the Sabbath [even when it will not go beyond a courtyard].80
Halacha 14
Just as a person is commanded that his animals rest on the Sabbath, so too, he is commanded that his servants and maidservants rest. Although they have the power of thought, and act according to their own volition, [their master] is obligated to watch over them and prevent them from performing [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, as [Exodus 23:12] states: "Thus your ox and your donkey may rest, and the son of your maidservant and the foreigner may find repose."81
The servants and maidservants whom we are commanded to have rest [on the Sabbath] are servants that have been circumcised and have immersed themselves [in the mikveh], so that they be granted the status of servants who have accepted the mitzvot that servants are obligated to observe.82 By contrast, servants who have not been circumcised and have not immersed themselves, but have merely accepted [the observance of] the seven [universal] laws commanded to the descendants of Noach,83 are considered equivalent to "resident aliens" and are permitted to perform [forbidden] labors for their own sake84 in public as the Jews may during the week. [The status of] a resident alien is granted only in the era when the Jubilee year is observed.85
[One might ask:] Since a resident alien may perform [forbidden] labors on his own behalf on the Sabbath, and a convert is considered equivalent to a native-born Jew in all matters, who is referred to with [the term הגר] in the phrase, "and the son of your maidservant and the foreigner [הגר] may find repose"?86
This refers to a resident alien who is an employee of a Jew, like "the son of [his] maidservant." Such a resident alien may not perform [forbidden] labors on behalf of his Jewish master on the Sabbath.87He may, however, perform [such labors] on his own behalf. Moreover, even if this foreigner is a servant [belonging to a Jewish master], [this foreigner] may perform [labors] for his own sake [on the Sabbath].88
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
We have translated the verse as it appears in the Torah. The standard printed texts of theMishneh Torah include several words that are not included in the original verse.
|
| 2. |
Bava Kama 54b explains that although the verse mentions only an ox and a donkey, the obligation to rest refers to all animals. "The Torah referred to common circumstances" - i.e., since these animals are generally those used for work, they were the ones mentioned specifically.
|
| 3. |
I.e., the positive commandment of resting on the Sabbath also implies not having one's beasts perform labor.
|
| 4. |
See Halachah 6 and notes.
|
| 5. |
This is the prohibition against working on the Sabbath mentioned in the Ten Commandments.
|
| 6. |
This principle (which has its source in Makkot 13b and which the Rambam quotes in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2) generally means that if a person transgresses a prohibition punishable by death, but for certain reasons that punishment cannot be administered, he should not be lashed instead. The rationale is that the only punishment which the Torah prescribed for this transgression is execution. There is no source in the Torah which prescribes a lesser punishment.
Nevertheless, within the context of this principle is also the concept that if a certain dimension of a prohibition involves capital punishment, the punishment of lashes is not given to a person who violates another act that is included in this prohibition, but is not punishable by death.
To apply these concepts to the case at hand: Working with an animal is the subject of a Torah prohibition. When a person works with an animal, however, he is not punished by lashes as are others who violate Torah prohibitions. Why? Because there are certain instances when working with an animal is punishable by death - i.e., when the activity is performed by a man and the animal together - for example, plowing. Therefore, even when the labor a person has the animal perform does not cause that person to incur the death sentence - for example, leading it while it is carrying a burden - he is not punished by lashes.
This is the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh. The Ramban (in his gloss on Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 14), however, interprets the Rambam's words to mean that the Torah's prohibition against working with an animal applies only to activities like plowing when the activity is performed by the man and the beast together. The only prohibition stemming from the Torah against having an animal carry a burden is the prohibition derived from the positive commandment mentioned in Halachah 1. Both these interpretations and their implications are discussed at length by the later commentaries.
|
| 7. |
Although the Jew is not making the animal work himself, he is not fulfilling the Torah's command that his animal rest.
|
| 8. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3), the Rambam emphasizes that there is no difference in this instance whether the gentile is an idolater or not.
Based on the rulings of the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 151:4) states that it is customary not to enforce this prohibition in the present age. The Siftei Cohen 151:12 states that the socio-economic conditions under which our people live have changed, and substantial losses would be sustained if the prohibition were observed. Furthermore, the reason for the prohibition is no longer applicable, for it is uncommon for a Jew to lend or hire his animals to a gentile.
|
| 9. |
The Kessef Mishneh and others note that Avodah Zarah 15a mentions another reason for this prohibition: A Jew who sells an animal to a gentile on Friday afternoon may be required to assist him in training it to follow its new master. This activity may be prolonged past the commencement of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since this is an infrequent possibility, and the Jew is not performing this task entirely by himself, the Rambam does not mention this matter here. (Significantly, however, he does mention it in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Pesachim, loc. cit.)
|
| 10. |
Note the parallel in Hilchot Avadim 8:1. Significantly, in that halachah, the Rambam states that if the gentile demands a price greater than this figure, the Jew has no further obligation.
|
| 11. |
And is unfit for most labor. Since, however, there are tasks that it can perform, the prohibition is not nullified (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
|
| 12. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that the Jewish owner must not be present while the broker is making the sale.
|
| 13. |
Note the differences between this ruling and the Rambam's statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3). The Rambam interprets that Mishnah to be referring to a specific type of horse that is used for transporting birds and not humans. Nevertheless, even according to the Commentary on the Mishnah, ordinary horses are primarily used for human transport.
|
| 14. |
Note the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 151), which states that even though it is now customary to perform other tasks with horses, since our Sages did not apply the prohibition to them originally, the scope of their decree need not be extended in the present age. See the notes on the previous halachah.
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| 15. |
See the explanation of this principle in Chapter 18, Halachah 16.
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| 16. |
Note the parallel in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:8.
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| 17. |
The Lechem Mishneh and others question if this prohibition applies when one sells an animal to a gentile butcher as well. Even if the butcher does not slaughter the animal in one's presence, it is clear that he did not purchase it for the sake of labor.
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| 18. |
E.g., a sheep or a goat.
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| 19. |
The Siftei Cohen (based on Rashi, Avodah Zarah 14b) explains that the reason for the prohibition is our suspicion that the gentile may sodomize the animal, and there is no relation to the Sabbath prohibitions at all.
Work is generally not performed with a small animal, nor would it be proper to forbid the sale of a small animal lest one sell a large animal. The sale of a large animal is only a Rabbinic prohibition. Accordingly, instituting another prohibition because of it would be improper, since the Rabbis did not "institute a safeguard for a safeguard."
Note, however, the Sefer HaKovetz, which differs and maintains that the prohibition against selling a small animal is a safeguard for the prohibition against selling a larger one. Were this not so, the Rambam would not have mentioned the prohibition against selling a small animal in these halachot.
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| 20. |
Although we are forbidden to ask a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on our behalf on the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 6, leniency is granted in this case. We suspect that if the person was required to abandon his money on the Sabbath, he would disobey the law and carry it himself instead. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat24:1.)
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| 21. |
Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:4, which states that this ruling applies only when the animal belongs to him, for the verse mentioned at the beginning of the chapter states "and thus your ox and your donkey may rest." When the animal belongs to another individual, it is preferable to have the animal carry the purse. Although we are forbidden to perform a forbidden labor with an animal (Halachah 2), that prohibition can be avoided by making sure the animal does not perform theakirah or the hanachah. There is also a Rabbinic prohibition against working with an animal that belongs to another person. That prohibition is, however, less severe than the prohibition against asking a gentile to perform labor on one's behalf.
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| 22. |
The Mishnah Berurah 266:7 explains that the prohibition against working with an animal also mentions the term melachah. Accordingly, it is the same activities that a man is prohibited from performing on the Sabbath that are forbidden to be done with an animal.
As mentioned previously, the forbidden labor of transferring involves akirah, removing the article from its previous position, and hanachah, placing the article down in a new position. When a person - or an animal - who is carrying an article begins walking, he is considered to have performed an akirah, and when he stops he is considered to have performed a hanachah. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 8.)
Accordingly, were a person to place a burden on an animal while it is at rest and remove it from him after the animal has come to rest again, he would be considered as having performed labor with the animal, for the animal will have performed both the akirah and the hanachah.
If, however, one follows the course of action suggested by the Rambam, the animal will have performed neither of these acts. Since the article was placed upon the animal after it began to walk, it is not considered to have performed the akirah. Similarly, if the article was removed from the animal before it halted, it is not considered to have performed the hanachah.
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| 23. |
The Rashba and others question the Rambam's ruling in this instance, arguing that since the animal does not perform the akirah and the hanachah (as explained above), what difference does it make whether one leads the animal or not? There is no possibility of the animal's performing a forbidden labor.
The Rambam, however, maintains that leading an animal carrying a burden is also forbidden. Otherwise, the license granted a person would be too extensive (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 24. |
Shabbat 17b.
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| 25. |
As the Rambam states in Chapter 6, Halachah 16, we are not commanded to see that a gentile rests on the Sabbath, while we do have such an obligation with regard to our animals.
(See also Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:6, which state that the above rules also apply when a person is accompanied by a gentile whom he does not trust.)
|
| 26. |
These three types of individuals are often mentioned together in the Talmudic literature. They are all considered to be lacking the intellectual capacity to control their conduct. Hence, they are not obligated to observe the mitzvot.
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| 27. |
Rashi (Shabbat 153a) adds that if one of these individuals were allowed to carry the purse, one might err and think that an ordinary Jew is also allowed to carry.
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| 28. |
The deaf-mute has a minimal amount of understanding, and thus, were he to carry an article on the Sabbath, the potential for making an error and thinking that all are allowed to carry is greater (ibid.).
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| 29. |
The Rashba, the Ramban, Rav Moshe Cohen, and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that one should should give the individual the purse while he is walking, and should remove the purse from him before he stands (as explained in the previous halachah), so that the individual carrying the purse will perform neither the akirah nor the hanachah. They maintain that although a mentally incompetent individual (and similarly, the others mentioned) are not obligated to observe the mitzvot, it is forbidden to "feed him non-kosher food with one's hands." (See Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27.) Similarly, in this instance it is forbidden to give these individuals an article and tell them to carry it. See also Chapter 24, Halachah 11, and notes.
This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:6) and accepted by the later authorities. There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether the above law applies if one gives the article to one of these individuals before the commencement of the Sabbath. On the one hand, it is obvious that one's intent is to have the individual carry the article on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since one gives the article to him before the commencement of the Sabbath, one is not considered to be "feeding him non-kosher food with one's hands." (See the glosses of the Ramah and the Magen Avraham on that law.)
|
| 30. |
Since the child will ultimately become obligated to perform mitzvot, it is preferable that he not violate them in his childhood.
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| 31. |
Shabbat 153b explains that on the one hand, it is preferable to give it to the child, because when the deaf-mute carries, the impression will be created that an adult may carry on the Sabbath. Conversely, however, there is a disadvantage in giving it to the child, for he will ultimately mature and become obligated to observe the mitzvot.
The Be'ur Halachah 266 emphasizes that when the minor is one's own son, it is definitely preferable to give the purse to the deaf-mute, for a person is obligated to train his children in the observance of the mitzvot.
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| 32. |
As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 15 and 19, a person is permitted to carry within a space of four cubits. Thus, each time he stops, the four cubits in which he is allowed to carry become redefined, and in this manner he can carry the article several miles on the Sabbath. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 10, and Chapter 6, Halachah 22.)
It must be emphasized that transferring the article less than four cubits at a time is permitted only when carrying the article in the public domain, but not with regard to transferring the article into the private domain. This must be accomplished by throwing the article in an irregular manner (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:12; Mishnah Berurah 266:17).
Significantly, in contrast to Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam does not say that the person should run without stopping until he arrives home. It is possible to differentiate between the two instances by explaining that the present halachah refers to an instance when the person had stopped after the commencement of the Sabbath, while the halachah cited refers to an instance when the person had continued walking.
|
| 33. |
The leniencies granted to allow a person to maintain possession of his own property do not apply to a lost object that he discovered, since he will not suffer a loss by leaving it. Nevertheless, once a person has already taken possession of the lost object, it is considered to be his own property.
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| 34. |
I.e., if there is a danger, because of thieves or the like.
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| 35. |
According to the Rambam, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, there is no prohibition against carrying an article less than four cubits at a time. Most authorities, however, differ with him on this issue and maintain that this is a leniency that is permitted only in rare instances. Hence, in the case of a lost article when a person will not suffer a loss, the leniency is not granted. It is the opinion of these authorities that is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:7).
|
| 36. |
The bridle and reins are not considered muktzeh, because the person had the intent of using them before the Sabbath. One must, however, be careful not to lean on the animal when putting the bridle and the reins on it, for it is forbidden to make use of a live animal (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:1 and commentaries).
|
| 37. |
This halachah revolves around the following principle: A restraint that is necessary to control an animal is not considered to be a burden and may be borne by the animal on the Sabbath.
|
| 38. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:1), the Rambam writes that female camels are more powerful than males and need stronger restraints. The rope used to tie a male camel is, however, apparently different from that mentioned later in the halachah in regard to a horse.
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| 39. |
A person who leads an animal into the public domain with such a restraint is thus considered as having violated the prohibition against having an animal work on the Sabbath.
|
| 40. |
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions "a very excessive restraint" - i.e., we are not expected to measure exactly the strength of the animal and the restraint. As long as the restraint is more or less appropriate for the animal, it is not considered to be a burden.
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| 41. |
The Tur (Orach Chayim 305) appears to differ and to allow one to lead merely one camel at a time.
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| 42. |
If the rope extends longer, it might appear that one is carrying the rope and not using it as a restraint for the animal (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:3).
|
| 43. |
If the rope hangs lower, it does not appear to be a restraint for the animal, but rather an unnecessary burden (Rashi, Shabbat 54b).
|
| 44. |
Shabbat 54a states that a person leading a group of camels appears as if he is going to a חנגא. The Rambam, based on the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el, interprets that term as having both the meanings mentioned above. It appears to refer to a country-fair that was an occasion for both commerce and celebration for the populace at large.
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| 45. |
A bell will make the animal look more attractive (Rashi, Shabbat 54b). Alternatively, a bell's sound will invite the attention of prospective customers. An onlooker may not realize that the bell has been plugged (Tiferet Yisrael, Shabbat 5:4).
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| 46. |
Rashi and Tosafot (Shabbat 58a) states that the reason stated in the previous halachah - that one appears to be taking them to a fair - applies in this instance as well.
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| 47. |
Identifying it as belonging to its master.
|
| 48. |
This prohibition applies even if the seal is woven into the animal's covering (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:15; Mishnah Berurah 305:45).
From the context here, it would appear that the reason for the prohibition is that the seal is considered to be an unnecessary burden. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.), which states that the prohibition was instituted lest the seal fall and the owner pick it up and carry it.
|
| 49. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4, based on Shabbat 54b), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a leather strap tied around the hoof of an animal that has been wounded.
|
| 50. |
This refers to wooden restraint placed on the animal's neck to prevent it from being able to turn its head backwards. Such a restraint would be placed on an animal to deter it from chewing on a wound on its back (ibid.).
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| 51. |
Shabbat 53a states that a donkey is always cold, and hence, a saddle-cloth is necessary, even in the summer, to keep it warm. Accordingly, the saddle-cloth is considered to be a garment and not a burden.
The saddlecloth must be tied to the animal, lest it fall and its owner carry it on the Sabbath. It must be tied before the Sabbath, because there is no way that it can be tied on the Sabbath itself without leaning on the animal, which is a forbidden act. Our Sages prohibited a person who violated their decree and tied the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath from taking out his donkey on that day (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2).
Other commentaries explain that if the saddle-cloth was not tied to the animal on Friday, we can assume that it does not suffer from cold so seriously. Hence, it is forbidden for it to wear the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath.
|
| 52. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.:3), the Rambam states that the patch is used as a sign of identification or for superstitious reasons. Note Rashi (Shabbat 54a), who translates מטוטלת as a "small cushion" rather than as a patch.
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| 53. |
Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's commentary.
|
| 54. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.).
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| 55. |
I.e., one of its back feet to one of its front legs, so that it can walk on only three legs (ibid.). In both these instances, the animal is able to walk, but cannot walk fast.
|
| 56. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this applies to both male and female chickens.
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| 57. |
Attached to their feet for the purpose of identification (ibid., based on Shabbat 54b).
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| 58. |
The Rambam (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to straps that hang loosely from a chicken's feet. He does not explain their purpose. Others (based on Shabbat 54b) explain that these straps served as a restraint.
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| 59. |
The Rambam (loc. cit.) explains that this refers to a unique species of rams. When they are fattened, all the fat collects in the fat tail, which swells in size. Because of its size, the ram is unable to lift it easily. Therefore, a small wagon is constructed and attached to them to support their tails and prevent them from dragging on the ground and becoming bruised and cut. The Rambam states that he was familiar with such a species of rams.
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| 60. |
The Rambam (ibid.) states that this refers to chips from the yachnun tree. Based on Shabbat 54b, he explains that these chips were not necessary for rams. Since they butt each other frequently, this would dislodge the worms from their heads.
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| 61. |
Significantly, Shabbat 54b singles out the species yalei, which Tosafot (based on Bava Batra 4a) identifies as the hedgehog itself. The Biblical name for this species anaka (Leviticus 11:30) resembles the word yenikah, "sucking," and refers to this species' tendency to suck milk.
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| 62. |
The sharp prickles of the hedgehog skin will annoy the crawling animals and prevent them from sucking the cow's milk (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., based on Shabbat 54b).
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| 63. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (based on Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah had a neighbor who let his cow go out with a strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar did not rebuke him for this act, and hence the responsibility for this transgression was considered his. The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 5:4) relates that as penance, Rabbi Elazar fasted until his teeth became black.
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| 64. |
Shabbat 53b offers both these interpretations for the word לבובין in the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2. The Rambam interprets them as not being mutually exclusive and hence cites both of them as halachah. See also the following note.
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| 65. |
Shabbat (loc. cit.) also offers this as an interpretation of the term לבובין. The Ra'avad, however, objects to this particular interpretation, explaining that, as obvious from the ruling in the previous halachah regarding a strap tied between a cow's horns, any article placed on an animal for the purpose of ornamentation is considered to be a burden and forbidden.
The Maggid Mishneh (in his notes on the following halachah) offers an explanation that can resolve this difficulty. An ornament that an animal wears during the week is also permitted on the Sabbath. The ornaments that are forbidden are those that are placed on the animal for the Sabbath day alone.
Note also an original interpretation offered by the Or Sameach, which explains that ornamentation that makes an animal attractive in the eyes of humans is forbidden. The cloth mentioned in this halachah is, by contrast, intended to make the animal attractive in the eyes of the other animals. Some support for this thesis can be derived from comparison to the other articles mentioned in this halachah.
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| 66. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:2), the Rambam states that these coverings are placed over ewes and not over rams, because ewes' wool is softer than that of rams.
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| 67. |
This may be done to change the goats' hormonal balance so that they will conceive faster.
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| 68. |
Rabbenu Yonah explains that the goats' teats were tied for this purpose on the Sabbath and not during the week. During the week, they would be milked in the morning and in the evening, and there was little chance of sufficient pressure building up to cause the milk to ooze out. On the Sabbath, by contrast, they could not be milked from sunset until after nightfall on the next day, and the possibility existed that extra milk would ooze out.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:6) follows the interpretation of Rashi, who explains that these ties are not bound tightly and the possibility exists that they will fall and that the owner will carry them in the public domain.
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| 69. |
Although a donkey may go out wearing a saddlecloth, as stated in Halachah 10, a saddle itself is considered a burden.
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| 70. |
Rashi (Shabbat 53a) explains that this was used as a talisman to ward off the evil eye.
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| 71. |
Because it is an unnecessary ornament and therefore considered a burden. See the notes on the previous halachah.
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| 72. |
Note the Mishnah Berurah 305:41, which states that this restriction does not apply to iron horseshoes that are permanently affixed to the animal's feet.
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| 73. |
Even if an amulet has proven its efficacy for a human, as long as it has not proven its efficacy for an animal, we are in doubt of its usefulness. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:21 states that a human being has angels and spiritual forces that will assist his recovery, and an animal lacks these. Therefore, the amulet used by a human need not be as powerful.
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| 74. |
Chapter 19, Halachah 13 grants a person license to go out with a bandage on a wound. The same concept applies regarding an animal.
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| 75. |
So that it will set in place and heal (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 76. |
The bell must be plugged, since it is forbidden to ring bells on the Sabbath as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 4.
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| 77. |
In this and the following instance, the leniency is granted in a courtyard, but not in the public domain.
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| 78. |
The saddle cloth may not be tied, since by doing so one would be making use of an animal. (See the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:8 and the notes on Halachah 10.)
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| 79. |
This leniency applies only to a donkey that chronically suffers from cold, as explained in the notes on Halachah 10, and not to a horse or other similar species (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
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| 80. |
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:10) mentions that, in a courtyard, a feeding bag may be attached to calves and ponies which do not have long necks and find it uncomfortable to eat by themselves.
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| 81. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, explaining that since the servants are themselves obligated to observe the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, of what purpose is the prohibition imposed on their master? The Maggid Mishneh and Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1525) explain that the servants may be lax in their observance. Therefore, an additional command is given to their master.
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| 82. |
In Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 14;9, the Rambam explains that a Cana'anite servant goes through a process similar to that of conversion when purchased by a Jewish master. This process includes circumcision, immersion in the mikveh, and the acceptance of mitzvot. Once this process is completed, the servant is bound to observe all the mitzvot that are incumbent upon Jewish women.
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| 83. |
These seven universal laws include the prohibitions against the worship of false gods, cursing God, killing, stealing, incest and adultery, eating a limb torn from a living animal and the obligation to set up courts of law to judge civil matters. The Rambam explains these laws in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 9 and 10.
A servant may temporarily refuse to accept the mitzvot incumbent upon Jewish servants. In this instance, he does not undergo the process of circumcision and immersion and is given twelve months to decide whether to accept Jewish observance or not. If he refuses, he must be sold (Hilchot Avadim 8:12).
In the interim, this servant must accept the observance of these seven universal laws. If not, he should be killed immediately (see Hilchot Avadim 1:6 and commentaries).
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| 84. |
But not for the sake of a Jew. In Chapter 6, it was explained that there is a Rabbinic prohibition preventing a Jew from instructing a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on his behalf. This halachah emphasizes that when a gentile is the Jew's servant, the Jew is violating a positive commandment of the Torah itself by having the gentile work for him on the Sabbath. See notes 87 and 88 below.
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| 85. |
As explained in Hilchot Shemitah V'Yovel 10:9, there are many mitzvot whose observance is dependent on the observance of the yovel, the Jubilee year. The observance of the Jubilee year itself is dependent on the proportion of the Jewish people living in Eretz Yisrael. Only when the majority of our people live in the holy land is this mitzvah observed.
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| 86. |
The intent of this question is not directly obvious in a translated text. The Hebrew word גר has two meanings in Halachic terminology: a convert - גר צדק - and a resident alien - גר תושב. Since, as the Rambam indicates, the verse does not appear to refer to either of these individuals, what is the intent of the word גר in that verse?
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| 87. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that this positive mitzvah prohibits not only one's servant or one's hired hand, but any gentile who has accepted the observance of these seven universal laws, from working on one's behalf on the Sabbath. For as soon as the gentile agrees to perform the forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew, he is considered as the Jew's hired hand.
The question may arise: Concerning whom is the Rambam speaking in Chapter 6 when he states that asking a gentile to work on our behalf is prohibited merely by virtue of Rabbinic decree? A gentile who has not accepted the observance of any mitzvot at all.
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| 88. |
Thus, according to the Rambam, the verse quoted above contains two prohibitions: one requiring one to watch that any servants who have accepted the mitzvot observe the Sabbath laws, and another, prohibiting us from benefiting from any work done on our behalf by a gentile who has not accepted these mitzvot.
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Hayom Yom:
Monday, 6 Shevat, 5775 • 26 January 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: Bo, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 35-38.
Tanya: This is the (p. 73)...as is explained elsewhere. (p. 75).
My father wrote that he heard in the name of the Alter Rebbe that all rabbinic authors until and including the Taz1 and Shach,2 composed their works with ruach hakodesh, the Divine Spirit. An individual's ruach hakodesh, as explained by Korban Ha'eida in Tractate Sh'kalim (Talmud Yerushalmi), end of ch. 3, means that the mysteries of Torah are revealed to him. This comes from the aspect of chochma in its pre-revelation state.3
FOOTNOTES
1. Acronym of Turei Zahav on Torah law by R. David Halevi, d. 1667.
2. Acronym of Siftei Kohein on Torah law by R. Shabtai Hacohen, 1622-1663.
3. See "On Learning Chassidus," Kehot, p. 18.
____________________________
Daily Thought:
Talking to Himself
He talks with Himself, entertained by His own thoughts. The thoughts imply a background, which is the world. But the Torah, those are the thoughts themselves.
And we?
We are the self with whom He speaks.
____________________________
Torah lessons: Chumash: Bo, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 35-38.
Tanya: This is the (p. 73)...as is explained elsewhere. (p. 75).
My father wrote that he heard in the name of the Alter Rebbe that all rabbinic authors until and including the Taz1 and Shach,2 composed their works with ruach hakodesh, the Divine Spirit. An individual's ruach hakodesh, as explained by Korban Ha'eida in Tractate Sh'kalim (Talmud Yerushalmi), end of ch. 3, means that the mysteries of Torah are revealed to him. This comes from the aspect of chochma in its pre-revelation state.3
FOOTNOTES
1. Acronym of Turei Zahav on Torah law by R. David Halevi, d. 1667.
2. Acronym of Siftei Kohein on Torah law by R. Shabtai Hacohen, 1622-1663.
3. See "On Learning Chassidus," Kehot, p. 18.
____________________________
Daily Thought:
Talking to Himself
He talks with Himself, entertained by His own thoughts. The thoughts imply a background, which is the world. But the Torah, those are the thoughts themselves.
And we?
We are the self with whom He speaks.
____________________________
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