TODAY'S LAWS & CUSTOMS:
• COUNT "ELEVEN DAYS TO THE OMER" TONIGHT
Tomorrow is the eleventh day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer for tomorrow's date tonight, after nightfall: "Today is eleven days, which are one week and four days, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all day tomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day is Shavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Netzach sheb'Gevurah -- "Ambition in Restraint"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" -- Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed, Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• EGYPTIANS "SUE" FOR GOLD & SILVER (4th Century BCE)
Egyptian representatives appeared in the court of Alexander the Great, demanding that the Jews pay restitution for all the Egyptian gold and silver they took along with them during the Exodus. Geviha the son of Pesisa, a simple but wise Jew, requested the sages' permission to present a defense on behalf of the Jews.
Geviha asked the Egyptians for evidence that the Jews absconded with their wealth. "The crime is clearly recorded in your Torah," the Egyptians gleefully responded.
"In that case," Geviha said, "the Torah also says that 600,000 Jews were unjustly enslaved by the Egyptians for many, many years. So first let us calculate how much you owe us..."
The court granted the Egyptians three days in which to prepare a response. When they were unable to do so they fled on the following day, the 25th of Nissan, and never returned.
In Talmudic times, the day when the Egyptian delegation fled was celebrated as a mini-holiday.
Links:
Alexander The Great
Jews Take Egyptian Wealth
DAILY QUOTE:
A person's emissary is as the person himself--Talmud, Berachot 34b
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Kedoshim, 6th Portion Leviticus 20:8-20:22 with Rashi
• Chapter 20
8. And you shall observe My statutes and fulfill them. I am the Lord, Who sanctifies you. ח. וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם אֲנִי יְהוָֹה מְקַדִּשְׁכֶם:
9. For any man who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death; he has cursed his father or his mother; his blood is upon himself. ט. כִּי אִישׁ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל דָּמָיו בּוֹ:
he has cursed his father or his mother: [This phrase] comes to include [in this prohibition and its penalty], cursing one’s father or mother even] after [their] death. — [Sanh. 85b]
אביו ואמו קלל: לרבות לאחר מיתה:
his blood is upon himself: This refers to [the death penalty by] stoning. And likewise, wherever it is stated, “his blood is upon himself,” or “their blood is upon themselves” (see verse 27 below) [it refers to death by stoning]. And we learn [this principle] from [those who practice the sorcery of] Ov or Yid’oni, for regarding them, Scripture says (verse 27), “they shall pelt them with stones; their blood is upon themselves.” - [Torath Kohanim 20:103; Sanh. 66a] [According to] the simple meaning of the verse, however, it is like “his blood is upon his [own] head” (Josh. 2:19), i.e., no one is punished for his death but he himself, because he brought it upon himself to be killed.
דמיו בו: זו סקילה, וכן כל מקום שנאמר דמיהם בם, ולמדנו מאוב וידעוני שנאמר בהם באבן ירגמו אותם דמיהם בם (פסוק כז). ופשוטו של מקרא, כמו דמו בראשו (יהושע ב יט), אין נענש על מיתתו אלא הוא, שהוא גרם לעצמו שיהרג:
10. And a man who commits adultery with [another] man's wife, committing adultery with the wife of his fellow the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death. י. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִנְאַף אֶת אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִנְאַף אֶת אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ מוֹת יוּמַת הַנֹּאֵף וְהַנֹּאָפֶת:
And a man [who commits adultery]: [The term “man”] comes to exclude a minor [from the death penalty]. — [Torath Kohanim 20:105; Sanh. 52b]
ואיש: פרט לקטן:
who commits adultery with [another] man’s wife: [The term “man’s wife” comes] to exclude the wife of a minor. [From here,] we learn that a minor cannot hold [the legal status of Jewish] marriage. And for which “man’s wife” have I held you liable ?
אשר ינאף את אשת איש: פרט לאשת קטן, למדנו שאין לקטן קידושין. ועל איזו אשת איש חייבתי לך:
committing adultery with the wife of his fellow: [Thus] excluding the wife of a non-Jew. [From here,] we learn that [the legal status of Jewish] marriage cannot be held by a non-Jew. — [Torath Kohanim 20:105; Sanh. 52b]
אשר ינאף את אשת רעהו: פרט לאשת גוי, למדנו שאין קידושין לגוי:
The adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death: Wherever a death penalty is mentioned in the Torah without specification [as to the mode of death, it exclusively refers to strangulation. — [Torath Kohanim 20:106, Sanh. 52b]
מות יומת הנאף והנאפת: כל מיתה האמורה בתורה סתם אינה אלא חנק:
11. And a man who lies with his father's wife has uncovered his father's nakedness: both of them shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon themselves. יא. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָבִיו עֶרְוַת אָבִיו גִּלָּה מוֹת יוּמְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם:
12. And a man who lies with his daughter in law both of them shall surely be put to death; they have committed a depravity; their blood is upon themselves. יב. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת כַּלָּתוֹ מוֹת יוּמְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם תֶּבֶל עָשׂוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם:
they have committed a depravity: Heb. תֶּבֶל, a shameful act. Another meaning: They mingle (בּלל) the seed of the father with the seed of the son. — [see Torath Kohanim 20:108]
תבל עשו: גנאי. לשון אחר מבלבלין זרע האב בזרע הבן:
13. And a man who lies with a male as one would with a woman both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon themselves. יג. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת זָכָר מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה תּוֹעֵבָה עָשׂוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹת יוּמָתוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם:
as one would with a woman: [I.e.,] if he inserts [his membrum] as an applicator [is inserted] into a tube [of eye shadow]. — [B.M. 91a]
משכבי אשה: מכניס כמכחול בשפופרת:
14. And a man who takes a woman and her mother it is evil counsel. They shall burn him and them in fire, and there shall be no evil counsel in your midst. יד. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת אִשָּׁה וְאֶת אִמָּהּ זִמָּה הִוא בָּאֵשׁ יִשְׂרְפוּ אֹתוֹ וְאֶתְהֶן וְלֹא תִהְיֶה זִמָּה בְּתוֹכְכֶם:
They must burn him and them: You cannot say that they should burn his first wife, because he married her permissibly, and she did not become forbidden to him. Rather, [the case of a man marrying] “a woman and her mother” written here, is [one, in which] both were forbidden to him, [namely,] that he married his mother-in-law and then her mother [in which case both women are burned along with him]. There are some of our Rabbis who say: [This case] means that only his mother-in-law [is to be burnt]. [If so,] what is the expression אֶתְהֶן, them ? It means “one of them,” being derived from the Greek term hen, meaning “one.” - [Sanh. 76b]
ישרפו אתו ואתהן: אי אתה יכול לומר אשתו הראשונה ישרפו, שהרי נשאה בהיתר ולא נאסרה עליו, אלא אשה ואמה הכתובין כאן, שתיהן לאיסור, שנשא את חמותו ואמה. ויש מרבותינו שאומרים, אין כאן אלא חמותו. ומהו אתהן, את אחת מהן, ולשון יוני הוא הן אחת:
15. And a man who lies with an animal, shall surely be put to death, and you shall kill the animal. טו. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן שְׁכָבְתּוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָת וְאֶת הַבְּהֵמָה תַּהֲרֹגוּ:
And you shall kill the animal: If the man sinned, in what way did the animal sin? However, since a failing came [upon a person] through [the animal], therefore, Scripture says: It must be stoned [to death]! How much more so [is this relevant] to a human being, who knows how to distinguish between good and evil, and yet brings evil upon his fellow [by causing him] to commit a transgression. Similar to this matter, it says, “You shall utterly destroy from all the places [where the nations…worshipped-their gods]” (Deut. 12:2). It is surely [possible here to draw] an inference from minor to major: If [in the case of] trees, which do not see and do not hear, when a failing comes [upon a man] through them, the Torah says, Destroy them! Burn them! Annihilate them!- how much more culpable is a human who leads his fellow astray from the path of life to the paths of death! - [Torath Kohanim 20:115]
ואת הבהמה תהרגו: אם אדם חטא בהמה מה חטאה, אלא מפני שבאה לאדם תקלה על ידה, לפיכך אמר הכתוב תסקל. קל וחומר לאדם שיודע להבחין בין טוב לרע וגורם רעה לחבירו לעבור עבירה. כיוצא בדבר אתה אומר (דברים יב ב) אבד תאבדון את כל המקומות, הרי דברים קל וחומר, מה אילנות שאינן רואין ואינן שומעין על שבאת תקלה על ידם אמרה תורה השחת שרוף וכלה, המטה את חבירו מדרך חיים לדרכי מיתה על אחת כמה וכמה:
16. And a woman who comes close to any animal so that it will mate with her you shall kill the woman and the animal; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon themselves. טז. וְאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר תִּקְרַב אֶל כָּל בְּהֵמָה לְרִבְעָה אֹתָהּ וְהָרַגְתָּ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאֶת הַבְּהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָתוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם:
17. And a man who takes his sister, whether his father's daughter or his mother's daughter, and he sees her nakedness, and she sees his nakedness it is a disgraceful act, and they shall be cut off before the eyes of the members of their people; he uncovered his sister's nakedness; he shall bear his sin. יז. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת אֲחֹתוֹ בַּת אָבִיו אוֹ בַת אִמּוֹ וְרָאָה אֶת עֶרְוָתָהּ וְהִיא תִרְאֶה אֶת עֶרְוָתוֹ חֶסֶד הוּא וְנִכְרְתוּ לְעֵינֵי בְּנֵי עַמָּם עֶרְוַת אֲחֹתוֹ גִּלָּה עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא:
it is a disgraceful act: The Aramaic term for “disgrace” is חִסוּדָא. - [see Onkelos on Gen. 34:14] Its Midrashic interpretation, however, is: If you [object and] say, “But Cain married his sister!” [the answer is:] the Omnipresent [in permitting this marriage,] performed an act of kindness (חֶסֶד), to build His world through him, as it is said: “the world is built on kindness (חֶסֶד) ” (Ps. 89:3). - [Torath Kohanim 20:116]
חסד הוא: לשון ארמי חרפה (בראשית לד יד) חסודא. ומדרשו אם תאמר קין נשא אחותו, חסד עשה המקום לבנות עולמו ממנו, שנאמר (תהלים פט ג) עולם חסד יבנה:
18. And a man who lies with a woman who has a flow, and he uncovers her nakedness he has bared her fountain, and she has uncovered the fountain of her blood. Both of them shall be cut off from the midst of their people. יח. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת אִשָּׁה דָּוָה וְגִלָּה אֶת עֶרְוָתָהּ אֶת מְקֹרָהּ הֶעֱרָה וְהִוא גִּלְּתָה אֶת מְקוֹר דָּמֶיהָ וְנִכְרְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מִקֶּרֶב עַמָּם:
he has bared: Heb. הֶעֱרָה, he has uncovered. And likewise, every instance of the term עֶרְוָה [in Scripture], denotes “uncovering,” and the “vav” is inserted into the word [root ערה] for the noun form. Similarly, [the noun] זַעֲוָה, “trembling,” stems from the root [זָע, “tremble,” as in the verse], “and he did not rise, nor did he tremble (זָע) ” (Esther 5:9). Likewise, the noun אַחֲוָה, “brotherhood,” stems from the root אָח, “brother.” Now, regarding this הַעֲרָאָה, “uncovering” [in the context of illicit relations], our Rabbis differed [with respect to what constitutes “uncovering”]. Some say that it is the [mere] contact ofthe membrum, while others say that it is the insertion of the tip of the membrum. — [Yev. 55b]
הערה: גלה. וכן כל לשון ערוה גלוי הוא, והוי"ו יורדת בתיבה לשם דבר, כמו זעוה, מגזרת (אסתר ה ט) ולא קם ולא זע, וכן אחוה מגזרת אח. והעראה זו נחלקו בה רבותינו, יש אומרים זו נשיקת שמש, ויש אומרים זו הכנסת עטרה:
19. And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother's sister or your father's sister, for he would be baring his close relative; they shall bear their sin. יט. וְעֶרְוַת אֲחוֹת אִמְּךָ וַאֲחוֹת אָבִיךָ לֹא תְגַלֵּה כִּי אֶת שְׁאֵרוֹ הֶעֱרָה עֲוֹנָם יִשָּׂאוּ:
the nakedness of your mother’s sister [or your father’s sister]: Scripture repeats the warning [already given in 18:12,13], to tell us that one is warned against [cohabiting with] these [specific relatives], whether it is with one’s father’s or mother’s sister from one father or whether it is their sisters from one mother. However, [concerning] the nakedness of the wife of his father’s brother, he is warned only if she is the wife of his father’s brother from one father. — [Torath Kohanim 20:118]
וערות אחות אמך וגו': שנה הכתוב באזהרתן, לומר שהוזהר עליהן בין על אחות אביו ואמו מן האב בין על אחיותיהן מן האם, אבל ערות אשת אחי אביו לא הוזהר אלא על אשת אחי אביו מן האב:
20. And a man who lies with his aunt he has uncovered his uncle's nakedness; they shall bear their transgression; they shall die childless. כ. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת דֹּדָתוֹ עֶרְוַת דֹּדוֹ גִּלָּה חֶטְאָם יִשָּׂאוּ עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ:
who lies with his aunt […they shall die childless]: This verse comes to teach us concerning the punishment of excision stated above, [“anyone who does any of these abominations… shall be cut off” (Lev. 18:29)] that it constitutes the punishment of going childless.
אשר ישכב את דדתו: המקרא הזה בא ללמד על כרת האמור למעלה, שהוא בעונש הליכת ערירי:
childless: Heb. עֲרִירִי, as the Targum renders: בְּלָא וְלָד, without child. Similar to this [is the verse], “for I am going childless (עֲרִירִי) ” (Gen. 15:2). If he has children, he will bury them [i.e., they will die during his lifetime]. And if he has no children [when he commits this sin], he will die childless. This is why Scripture varied the expression in these two verses: (a) they shall die without children (our verse), and (b) they shall be childless (next verse)-“they shall die childless” [means that] if he has children at the time of the sin, he will not have any when he dies, because he will bury them in his lifetime; and “they will be childless” [means that] if he has no children at the time of the sin, he will remain all his life as he is now. — [See Torath Kohanim 20:120; Yev. 55a]
ערירים: כתרגומו בלא ולד, ודומה לו (בראשית טו ב) ואנכי הולך ערירי, יש לו בנים קוברן, אין לו בנים מת בלא בנים, לכך שנה בשני מקראות אלו ערירים ימותו ערירים יהיו. ערירים ימותו, אם יהיו לו בשעת עבירה, לא יהיו לו כשימות לפי שקוברן בחייו. ערירים יהיו, שאם אין לו בשעת עבירה, יהיה כל ימיו כמו שהוא עכשיו:
21. And a man who takes his brother's wife it is a repulsive act; he has uncovered his brother's nakedness; they shall be childless. כא. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו נִדָּה הִוא עֶרְוַת אָחִיו גִּלָּה עֲרִירִים יִהְיוּ:
it is a repulsive act: Heb. נִדָּה הִוא. This cohabitation is [an act from which one should] separate himself (מְנוּדָה) and is disgusting. Our Rabbis, however, expounded [this verse, as follows] (Yev. 54b): Scripture comes to prohibit uncovering her [nakedness] just like [the prohibition of uncovering the nakedness of] a menstruant woman (נִדָּה), concerning whom “baring” is explicitly stated (verse 18 above),“he has bared (הֶערָה) her fountain.” [I.e., one is liable for sexual contact, as is defined in the commentary on verse 18.]
נדה הוא: השכיבה הזאת מנודה היא ומאוסה. ורבותינו דרשו לאסור העראה בה כנדה, שהעראה מפורשת בה (פסוק יח) את מקורה הערה (לעיל יח):
22. And you shall observe all My statutes and all My ordinances, and fulfill them, then the Land, to which I am bringing you to dwell therein, will not vomit you out. כב. וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת כָּל חֻקֹּתַי וְאֶת כָּל מִשְׁפָּטַי וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְלֹא תָקִיא אֶתְכֶם הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לָשֶׁבֶת בָּהּ:
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Tehillim: Psalms Chapter 119, Verses 1-96
• Verses 1-96
David composed this prominent psalm in alphabetical sequence-eight verses for each letter. Every verse contains one of the following words (referring to different aspects of Torah): Way; Torah; Testimony; Precept; Commandment; Statement (translated here as Word or Promise); Word; Judgement (or Laws); Righteousness; Statute. Replete with morals and prayers, this psalm should be recited daily, as a powerful preparation for the service of God. (In verses beginning with one of the letters of the mnemonic PeReTZ BeN DaMaH, the word "עדותיך" is pronounced "eidvotecha.")
1. Fortunate are those whose way is artless, who walk with the Torah of the Lord.
2. Fortunate are those who keep His testimonies, who seek Him with all their hearts.
3. Indeed, they have not done iniquity; they walk in His ways.
4. You have commanded Your precepts to be observed diligently.
5. My wish is that my ways be directed to keep Your statutes.
6. Then I will not be ashamed, when I behold all Your commandments.
7. I will give thanks to You with uprightness of heart, when I learn Your righteous judgments.
8. I will keep Your statutes; do not utterly forsake me
9. How can a young man keep his way pure? By observing Your word.
10. With all my heart I have sought You; do not let me stray from Your commandments.
11. I have harbored Your word in my heart, that I might not sin against You.
12. Blessed are You, O Lord; teach me Your statutes.
13. With my lips I have declared all the judgments of Your mouth.
14. I have rejoiced in the way of Your testimonies, as I would with all riches.
15. I will speak of Your precepts, and gaze upon Your ways.
16. I will delight in Your statutes; I will not forget Your word.
17. Deal kindly with Your servant, that I may live to keep Your word.
18. Unveil my eyes, that I may behold wonders from Your Torah.
19. I am a sojourner on earth; do not hide Your commandments from me.
20. My soul is crushed with a longing for Your judgments every moment.
21. You have rebuked the accursed scoffers, those who stray from Your commandments.
22. Remove insult and contempt from me, for I have kept Your testimonies.
23. Though princes sat and spoke against me, Your servant speaks of Your statutes.
24. Indeed, Your testimonies are my delight; they are my counsellors.
25. My soul cleaves to the dust; revive me in accordance with Your word.
26. I have spoken of my ways, and You answered me; teach me Your statutes.
27. Make me understand the way of Your precepts, and I will speak of Your wonders.
28. My soul drips away out of grief; sustain me according to Your word.
29. Remove from me the way of falsehood, and graciously endow me with Your Torah.
30. I have chosen the way of faith; Your judgments have I laid before me.
31. I held fast to Your testimonies, O Lord; put me not to shame.
32. I will run on the path of Your commandments, for You will broaden my heart.
33. Teach me, O Lord, the way of Your statutes, and I will keep it to the last.
34. Grant me understanding and I will keep Your Torah; I will observe it with all my heart.
35. Direct me in the path of Your commandments, for that is my desire.
36. Incline my heart to Your testimonies, and not to greed.
37. Avert my eyes from seeing vanity; by Your ways give me life.
38. Fulfill for Your servant Your promise, which brings to the fear of You.
39. Remove my shame which I fear, for Your judgments are good.
40. Behold, I have longed for Your precepts; give me life in Your righteousness.
41. And let Your kindness come to fruition for me, O Lord, Your salvation as You promised.
42. I will offer a retort to those who taunt me, for I trust in Your word.
43. Do not at all remove the word of truth from my mouth, for I hope [to fulfill] Your judgments.
44. I will keep Your Torah continually, for ever and ever.
45. And I will walk in spacious paths, for I seek Your precepts.
46. I will speak of Your testimonies before kings, and I will not be ashamed.
47. And I will delight in Your commandments, which I love.
48. I will lift up my hands to Your commandments, which I love, and I will speak of Your statutes.
49. Remember the word [promised] to Your servant, by which You gave me hope.
50. This is my comfort in my affliction, for Your word has given me life.
51. [Though] the wicked ridicule me severely, I have not strayed from Your Torah.
52. When I remember Your judgments of old, O Lord, I take comfort.
53. Trembling seized me because of the wicked, those who forsake Your Torah.
54. Your statutes have been my songs in the house of my wanderings.
55. At night I remembered Your Name, O Lord, and I kept Your Torah.
56. All this came to me because I kept Your precepts.
57. The Lord is my portion; I pledged to keep Your words.
58. I pleaded before You with all my heart: have compassion upon me according to Your word.
59. I contemplated my ways, and returned my feet to Your testimonies.
60. I hurried and did not delay to keep Your commandments.
61. Bands of wicked men plundered me, [but] I did not forget Your Torah.
62. At midnight, I rise to thank You for Your righteous judgments.
63. I am a friend to all who fear You, and to those who keep Your precepts.
64. Your kindness, O Lord, fills the earth; teach me Your statutes.
65. You have dealt goodness to Your servant, O Lord, in accord with Your promise.
66. Teach me the goodness and wisdom of the [Torah's] reasons, for I believe in Your commandments.
67. Before I afflicted myself, I would blunder; but now I observe Your word.
68. You are good and benevolent; teach me Your statutes.
69. The wicked have smeared me with lies, [when in truth] I keep Your precepts with all my heart.
70. Their hearts grew thick as fat; but as for me, Your Torah is my delight.
71. It is for my good that I was afflicted, so that I might learn Your statutes.
72. The Torah of Your mouth is better for me than thousands in gold and silver.
73. Your hands have made me and prepared me; grant me understanding, that I may learn Your commandments.
74. Those who fear You will see me and rejoice, because I hoped in Your word.
75. I know, O Lord, that Your judgments are just; righteously have You afflicted me.
76. Let Your kindness be my comfort, as You promised to Your servant.
77. Let Your mercies come upon me, that I may live, for Your Torah is my delight.
78. Let the scoffers be shamed, for they have maligned me with falsehood; but I will meditate upon Your precepts.
79. May those who fear You return to me, and those who know Your testimonies.
80. May my heart be perfect in Your statutes, so that I not be shamed.
81. My soul longs for Your salvation; I hope for Your word.
82. My eyes long for Your promise, saying, "When will You comfort me?”
83. Though I became [dried out] like a wineskin in smoke, I did not forget Your statutes.
84. How many are the days of Your servant? When will You execute judgment upon my pursuers?
85. The wicked have dug pits for me, in violation of Your Torah.
86. All Your commandments teach truth, [yet] they pursue me with lies, help me!
87. They nearly consumed me upon the earth, but I did not forsake Your precepts.
88. As befits Your kindness, grant me life, and I will keep the testimony of Your mouth.
89. Forever, O Lord, Your word stands firm in the heavens.
90. Your faithfulness persists for all generations; You established the earth, and it stands.
91. They stand ready today [to execute] Your judgments, for all are Your servants.
92. Had Your Torah not been my delight, I would have perished in my affliction.
93. Never will I forget Your precepts, for through them You have sustained me.
94. I am Yours; save me, for I have sought Your precepts.
95. The wicked hope to destroy me, but I meditate upon Your testimonies.
96. To every goal I have seen a limit, but Your commandment is immensely broad.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 42
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Friday, Nissan 25, 5774 • April 25, 2014
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 42
The Rebbe notes that the reason the Alter Rebbe now goes on to say “There should also be etc.” is that until now it has been explained how a Jew generates the fear of heaven through intellectual contemplation. The degree of fear he arouses will correspond exactly to the extent of his contemplation; the deeper the contemplation, the greater his fear. It also depends on how much each individual is governed by his intellect. Furthermore, it is too much to expect that all people constantly achieve a state of intellectual awareness — yet all people are obliged to stand in constant fear of heaven. The Alter Rebbe therefore now goes on to elaborate on a frame of mind which can and must exist constantly — “acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven.” This is not attained through contemplation. Rather it comes as a result of faith alone — and this state can exist constantly in all individuals.
וגם להיות לזכרון תמיד לשון חז״ל: קבלת עול מלכות שמים, שהוא כענין: שום תשים עליך מלך
There should also be a constant remembrance (it is constant because it does not depend on prior contemplation, but rather on pure faith) of the dictum of the Sages, of blessed memory, “acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven,” which parallels the injunction,1 “You shall appoint a king (i.e., G d) over you,”
כמו שכתוב במקום אחר וכו׳
as has been explained elsewhere, and so on.
This is also what the Alter Rebbe says earlier in Tanya (beginning of ch. 41): “Even though after all this [meditation] no fear or dread descends upon him in a manifest manner in his heart,” still he should accept upon himself G d as his king, and accept upon himself the yoke of the heavenly Kingdom. As the Alter Rebbe explains there, this attribute is found within every Jew in a sincere manner, because of the nature of Jewish souls not to rebel against G d, the King of kings. This level of fear can therefore always be present.
כי הקב״ה מניח את העליונים והתחתונים ומייחד מלכותו עלינו וכו׳, ואנחנו מקבלים וכו׳
For G d, blessed be He, forgoes the creatures of the higher and lower worlds, i.e., they are not the ultimate intent of creation, and uniquely bestows His kingdom upon us, ...and we accept [the heavenly yoke].
וזהו ענין ההשתחוואות שבתפלת שמונה עשרה, אחר קבלת עול מלכות שמים בדבור בקריאת שמע
And this is the significance of the obeisances in the prayer of the Eighteen Benedictions, following the verbal acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven in the Reading of Shema, when we say, “...the L rd is our G d, the L rd is one,” and so on,
לחזור ולקבל בפועל ממש במעשה וכו׳, כמו שכתוב במקום אחר
whereby one accepts it once again in actual deed, and so on (for by bowing in the course of the prayer of Shemoneh Esreh one shows one’s acceptance in actual deed of one’s self-nullification to G d), as is explained elsewhere.
FOOTNOTES
1. Devarim 17:15.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Nissan 25, 5774 • April 25, 2014
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 62
Vain Oaths
"You shall not take the name of the L-rd, your G d, in vain"—Exodus 20:7.
It is forbidden to needlessly swear in the name of G d.
Examples:
•To swear falsely regarding something that is an obvious untruth [e.g., to swear regarding a simple pebble that it is made of gold].
•To swear that a phenomenon that is known to be impossible has occurred.
•To swear to do something that violates a Torah commandment.
•To swear in attestation of an obvious truth, e.g., to swear that all that are slaughtered die.
Vain Oaths
Negative Commandment 62
Translated by Berel Bell
The 62nd prohibition is that we are forbidden to swear a sh'vuas shav (a vain oath).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not take the name of G‑d your L‑rd in vain."
[A sh'vuas shav is] when one swears that something is the opposite of what it actually is;2 or that something exists, when in fact it cannot;3 or that he will violate a mitzvah of the Torah.4 So too if one swears to an obvious and undisputed fact, such as swearing to G‑d that anything which is slaughtered will die. This is also considered a sh'vuas shav.
The Mishneh says,5 "What is a sh'vuas shav? An oath which contradicts an obvious truth."
One who transgresses this prohibition intentionally is punished by lashes. If done unintentionally, he is exempt [from even bringing a sacrifice], as with many other prohibitions, as explained above.6
There — i.e. in tractate Sh'vuos — it is said that this is the sh'vuas shav for which one is lashed if done intentionally and exempt if done unintentionally. The details of this mitzvah are explained there.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 20:7.
2.Such as swearing that a pillar stone is made of gold.
3.Such as swearing that a camel can fly.
4.Such as swearing that one will not wear tefillin.
5.Sh'vuos 29a.
6.N61.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: Rotseah uShmirat Nefesh Rotseah uShmirat Nefesh - Chapter Eleven Rotseah uShmirat Nefesh - Chapter Eleven
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment for a man to build a guardrail for his roof, as Deuteronomy 22:8 says: "And you shall make a guardrail for your roof."
This applies with regard to a building used as a dwelling. But for a warehouse or a cattle barn and the like, there is no necessity. Similarly, any building that is not four cubits by four cubits does not require a guardrail.
Halacha 2
A house owned by two partners requires a guardrail. As can be inferred from Deuteronomy 22:8: "For one who falls may certainly fall from it," the obligation stems from the fact that one may fall.
If so, why does the verse state "your roof"? To exclude synagogues and houses of study, for they are not intended to serve as dwellings.
If the public domain is higher than a person's roof, he does not need to erect a guardrail, for the phrase "For one who falls may certainly fall from it" implies that the guardrail is intended to prevent people from falling "from the roof," and not onto the roof.
Halacha 3
The height of a guardrail should not be any less than ten handbreadths, so that a person who might fall will not fall from it.
A guardrail must be a partition strong enough to enable a person to lean on it without falling.
Anyone who leaves his roof open without a guardrail negates the observance of a positive commandment and violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 22:8 states: "Do not cause blood to be spilled in your home." The violation of this commandment is not punished by lashes, for it does not involve a deed.
Halacha 4
This requirement applies to a roof, and similarly, to any place that might present a danger and cause a person to stumble and die. For example, if a person has a well or a cistern in his courtyard, he must erect a sand wall ten handbreadths high around them or make a cover for them, so that a person will not fall in and die.
Similarly, it is a positive mitzvah to remove any obstacle that could pose a danger to life, and to be very careful regarding these matters, as Deuteronomy 4:9 states: "Beware for yourself; and guard your soul." If a person leaves a dangerous obstacle and does not remove it, he negates the observance of a positive commandment, and violates the negative commandment: "Do not cause blood to be spilled."
Halacha 5
Our Sages forbade many matters because they involve a threat to life. Whenever a person transgresses these guidelines, saying: "I will risk my life, what does this matter to others," or "I am not careful about these things," he should be punished by stripes for rebelliousness.
Halacha 6
They include: A person should not place his mouth over a conduit through which water flows and drink. Nor should he drink at night from rivers and lakes, lest he swallow a leech without seeing.
Similarly, a person should not drink water that was left uncovered, lest a snake or other poisonous crawling animal might have drunk from them, and as a result, the person would die.
Halacha 7
These are the liquids that are forbidden if left uncovered: water, wine - even watered-down wine, or wine whose flavor has begun to change to vinegar - milk, honey, and brine. Other liquids are not forbidden if left uncovered, because venomous animals will not drink from them.
Halacha 8
When garlic has been crushed or a watermelon cut open and left uncovered, they are forbidden. The same applies in all analogous situations.
The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to wine that has been boiled or to unfermented wine. Unfermented wine refers to wine from the time it was squeezed from the grapes until three days have passed.
Similarly, the prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to wine, water or milk that are hot to the extent that vapor arises from them, nor to liquids into which liquid is descending from above drop after drop, providing the liquid continuously descends. For crawling animals fear bubbles and vapor, and will not drink from them.
Halacha 9
The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to water used for pickling, cooking food or cooking vetch. Similarly, this prohibition does not apply when pickled foods, cooked foods or vetch have been left to soak in water, if they have changed the taste of the water. If they did not change the taste, the water is forbidden if left uncovered. Similarly, water in which quince and Syrian pears were washed for a sick person is forbidden if left uncovered.
Halacha 10
The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply when sharp tasting substances like pepper, or bitter substances like wormwood are mixed with wine to the extent that its flavor changes. The same applies with regard to other beverages.
Halacha 11
When a liquid is forbidden if left uncovered, it is forbidden whether it was left uncovered during the day or during the night. This applies even when a person was sleeping beside the liquid. For crawling animals are not afraid of sleeping men.
For how long must a liquid be left uncovered to be forbidden? For as long as it takes for a crawling animal to emerge from under the container, drink, and return to its place.
Halacha 12
The quantity of water that becomes forbidden if uncovered is an amount in which the venom could remain a distinct entity and cause danger. If, however, there is so much that the venom will be nullified as if it does not exist, the water is permitted. This applies to water contained in utensils or on the ground. The same law applies to other liquids.
Halacha 13
The prohibition against drinking uncovered beverages does not apply to a stream that is flowing, even slightly.
When a container of wine is left uncovered in a chest, a bureau or a closet, or in a larger container in a pit that is even 100 cubits deep, in a tower that is 100 cubits high, or in a hall that is ornamented and plastered, it is forbidden.
If the person checked the bureau or the chest and then put the wine there, it is permitted. If there was a hole in the chest, it is forbidden. How large must the hole be? Large enough for a child to insert his small finger.
Halacha 14
When a jug is left uncovered, a person should not drink from it, although nine people drank from it before him without dying.
An incident occurred, and it was reported that the tenth person who drank from a jug died, because the venom of the snake sank to the bottom of the jug. And there is venom from some crawling animals that rises to the surface of liquids, and other venom that becomes suspended in the middle. Therefore, everything is forbidden. This applies even if one filtered the liquid with a filter.
Similarly, when a watermelon was left uncovered, even if nine people partook of it without dying, a tenth should not partake of it.
Halacha 15
Water that was left uncovered should not be poured into the public domain, nor should it be used to settle the dust of a home, nor should it be used to mix mortar, nor should it be used to wash one's face, to water one's animal or an animal belonging to a colleague. It may, however, be used to water a cat.
Halacha 16
When dough has been mixed with water that has been left uncovered, it should be burned. This applies even if the dough was terumah. Even if it has been baked, it is forbidden.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Shvuot Shvuot - Chapter 4, Shvuot Shvuot - Chapter 5, Shvuot Shvuot - Chapter 6
Shvuot - Chapter 4
Halacha 1
When a person takes an oath that he will not eat anything on that day and he ate less than an olive-sized portion of food, he is not liable. For "eating" does not involve a quantity less than an olive-sized portion.1 It is as if he partook of less than the minimum measure of a nevelah, a trefe, or the like.2
If he said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this substance," and he ate it, he is liable even if the substance concerning which he took the oath is one mustard seed or smaller.3
Halacha 2
If he took an oath that he would not taste anything and partook of even the smallest amount of food, he is liable.4
Halacha 3
When a person takes an oath that he will not eat on a specific day and drinks, he is liable, because [a prohibition against] eating includes drinking.5 Therefore, if he both ate and drank, he is liable only for one set of lashes6 if he acted willfully or one sin offering if he transgressed inadvertently.
Halacha 4
When a person took an oath not to drink on a given day, he is permitted to eat, because [a prohibition against] drinking does not include eating. How much must he drink for him to be liable? It appears to me7 that he is not liable unless he drinks a revi'it8 as is the case with regard to other prohibitions.9
Halacha 5
When a person takes an oath that he will not eat on a particular day and partook of many types of food, or he takes an oath that he will not drink on a particular day and partakes of many types of beverages, he is only liable once.10 Even if he said: "[I am taking] an oath that today I will not eat meat, bread, or beans," and he eat all [these types of food]. He is only liable once. All [of these foods] can be joined together to reach the measure of an olive-sized portion.11
Halacha 6
When a person takes an oath that he will neither eat nor drink and then eats and drinks, he is liable twice. Although drinking is included in eating, since he specifically said: "And I will not drink," he revealed his intention not to include drinking in eating.12 Thus it is as if he took an oath on this independently and this independently. Therefore he is liable twice.
Halacha 7
Similarly, if a person said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat bread from wheat, bread from barley, or bread from buckwheat," he is liable for each one individually if he partakes of them. He mentioned "bread" three times13 to make a distinction and cause him to be liable for each one individually.
Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when a person's] colleague was persistently imploring him to eat at his [home], telling him: "Come and drink with me, wine, milk, and honey." If he answers: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not drink wine, milk, and honey," he is liable for each one individually if he partakes of them. [To be liable only once,] he should have said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not drink anything," or "...[that I will not drink] what you said." Since he repeated the phrase, stating each one individually,14 he revealed his intention that he obligated himself with an oath for each and every type [of beverage] individually. Therefore [the beverages] are not combined with each other [to reach the minimum measure]15 and the person is liable only when he eats the minimum measure from each one individually. Since a sin offering is required for each one individually, they are like fat and blood which cannot be combined for [the measure of] an olive-sized portion as explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.16
Halacha 9
[When one says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this loaf," or "...that I will not eat it," once he eats an olive-sized portion of it, he is liable.17 [If he says:] "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it up,"18 he is not liable until he eats the entire loaf.
If he says: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this loaf; [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it up," should he eat it,19 he is liable only once.20
Halacha 10
Similarly, if one said: ["I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today,"21 and then took an oath concerning a loaf that he would not eat it up, [even though] he eats the entire [loaf] that day, he is not liable only once.22 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.23 [The rationale is that] an oath does not take effect when another is already in effect.24
If, however, one took an oath that he would not eat up a loaf and afterwards, took an oath that he would not eat anything or that he would not eat this loaf, he is liable twice. [The rationale is that] at the time he took the oath that he would not eat it up, he would not be liable unless he ate the entire loaf. Thus when he took a second oath that he would not eat anything or that he would not eat the loaf, he is liable [for the latter oath,] when he eats an olive-sized portion. And when he eats the entire [loaf], he is liable for his first oath.
Halacha 11
[When a person takes] an oath not to eat figs and afterwards, takes an oath not to eat figs and grapes, he is liable twice for [eating] figs. [The rationale is that] he included the figs which were forbidden in the first oath with grapes that were permitted. Since the second oath took effect with regard the grapes, it also took effect with regard the figs and he becomes liable for two oaths, as we explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.25
Halacha 12
[If one said: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat eight [of this item]," "...an oath that I will not eat nine," and "...an oath that I will not eat ten," he is liable only once whether he ate eight, nine, or ten.26
Halacha 13
[If one said: "I am taking] an oath that I will not ten," "...an oath that I will not eat nine," and "...an oath that I will not eat eight," if he eats ten, he is liable three times, one for each oath.27 Similarly, if he eats nine, he is liable twice. If he eats eight, he is liable once.28
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat figs," and then takes another oath that he will not eat figs and dates together.29 If he forgot, ate figs, and set aside a sacrifice,30 afterwards, forgot, and ate grapes, he is not liable for the grapes. [The rationale is that] this is like half the measure [for which one is liable]31 and one does not bring a sacrifice for half the measure.
Halacha 15
Similar [laws apply if] one took an oath that he would not eat ten, and then took an oath that he would not eat ten and nine.32 If he ate ten, separated a sacrifice,33 and then forgot and ate nine, this is like half the measure and one does not bring a sacrifice for half the measure. For the final oath concerned not eating nineteen.34
Halacha 16
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this large loaf it I eat this small loaf," if he forgets this stipulation when he eats the smaller loaf and afterwards willfully eats the larger [loaf], he is liable [for lashes].35
Halacha 17
If he ate the small one while he remembered the stipulation and knew that by eating it, the larger one would become forbidden and then forgot and ate the larger one while thinking that it was not forbidden yet, he is exempt.36 If he ate both of them unintentionally,37 he is exempt.38 [If he ate them] both willfully, he is liable,39 regardless of whether he ate the larger one first40 or last.
Halacha 18
Similarly, if he made the two loafs dependent on each other,41 taking an oath saying: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat one of these [loaves] if I eat the other." If he forgot the stipulation and ate one of them and then willfully ate the other, he is liable.42
Halacha 19
If he ate the first one willfully, but the second one inadvertently, he is exempt. [If he ate them] both willfully, he is liable.43
Halacha 20
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat this loaf today," and the day passes without him eating it, should he have acted unintentionally, he must bring an adjustable guilt offering. If he acted willfully, he is not liable for lashes, because he did not perform a deed,44 even though he violated [the prohibition against] taking a false oath.
Halacha 21
Why is a person who took an oath that he ate liable for lashes [if] he did not eat and one [who took an oath] that he did not eat [liable] if he did eat, even though he did not perform a deed. Because at the time he took the oath, he was taking a false oath.45 If, however, a person takes an oath that he will perform [a particular activity], it is not a false oath at the time it was taken.
Halacha 22
[The following laws apply when] a person tells a colleague: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat at your [home],"46 or [his colleague] was persistently imploring him to eat at his [home] and he refuses. If he takes an oath and says: "My oath [will take effect] if I eat at your [home]," or if he says: "There will be no oath if I do not eat at your [home],"47 these all bring about prohibitions. [It is considered that] he took an oath that he would not eat at his [home]. If he used all of these expressions [together] and transgressed and ate, he is only liable once.48
FOOTNOTES
1.This is a principle applying to all of the Torah's prohibitions concerning eating.
2.In such an instance, as stated in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4,:7-8, the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, but the violator is not punished. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 238:1) rules that it is forbidden for the person who took such an oath to partake of even the slightest quantity of food.
3.Because he singled out a specific article and by partaking of it broke his oath.
4.For tasting does not imply eating a full measure of food. Since he used that expression, it is clear that his intent was to forbid partaking of even the slightest measure of food.
5.Sh'vuot 22b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 14:23: "And you shall eat before God, your Lord... the tithes of your grain, your wine, and your oil." Implied is that partaking of wine and oil is also eating.
6.As in Halachah 5.
7.This expression indicates a conclusion derived by the Rambam from logic without any explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source.
8.I.e., a fourth of a log. In contemporary measure, a revi'it is equivalent to 86 cc. according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cc. according to Chazon Ish.
9.The Radbaz explains that since this is the measure which the Torah considered significant in other contexts, one can extrapolate that anything less is not considered significant enough to warrant liability. Alternatively, with regard to oaths and vows, we follow the commonly accepted implications of the terms used and people do not consider partaking of a smaller measure as "drinking."
10.I.e., for one set of lashes or one sacrifice. As will be explained, this applies only when the transgressor did not become aware of his oath between eating.
11.The minimum measure for which one is liable as stated in Halachah 1. The Radbaz states that the superficial implication of the Rambam's words is that it is not necessary for one to partake of such a portion of each of the foods separately to be liable. He differs and maintains that the person must partake of all of them to be liable.
12.Otherwise, it would be considered as eating as stated in Halachah 3.
13.If, however, he mentioned "bread" only once, he is liable only once. See Halachah 5.
14.I.e., the emphasis is one repeating his colleague's words, while stating each one individually. That shows that his intent is focused on each one individually. If, however, he made such a statement on his own initiative, without repeating his colleague's words, they are not considered to have been singled out [Rav Kapach's edition of the Rambam's Comemntary to the Mishneh (Sh'vuot 3:4)].
15.I.e., if he drank half of a revi'it of wine and half of a revi'it of milk, he is not liable.
16.Chapter 4, Halachah 16.
17.We assume that his intention when taking the oath was to interpret the term eating according to its halachic definition (Radbaz).
18.Since he spoke in a colloquialism, we assume that he was not referring to the halachic meaning and instead, meant the entire loaf.
19.Whether an olive-sized portion or the entire loaf.
20.Because once eating an olive-sized portion of the loaf is forbidden by an oath, a second oath concerning that same loaf cannot take effect, as the Rambam states in the following halachah.
21.The implication is that he would not eat an olive-sized portion of food that day.
22.The Ra'avad accepts the principle stated by the Rambam, but explains that this is not a good example of it. For in this instance, the second oath does take effect, for it applies not only on the day that the first oath applies, but for all time. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would agree that the second oath will take effect as soon as the day on which the first oath is in effect ends. This he maintains is why the Rambam mentions eating it "that day."
23.For example, that mentioned in Halachah 12.
24.The rationale for this principle is that a sh'vuat bitui applies only with regard to matters that are dependent upon one's volition, not on those forbidden by the Torah (Chapter 5, Halachah 17). Accordingly, once something is forbidden by an oath, it is no longer a matter dependent on one's volition. Hence, a sh'vuat bitui cannot take effect (Kiryat Sefer).
As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 17, if the person has the first oath nullified, the second oath takes effect.
25.Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 8:6 states that although one prohibition does not take effect when an object is already prohibited, there are exceptions. One of them is when the second prohibition includes other entities that were not included in the first prohibition (issur kollel). Similarly, in this instance, since the second oath includes something which is not prohibited by the first oath (grapes), it takes effect.
26.For he cannot eat nine or ten without first eating eight. Hence, the second and third oaths do not take effect, for one oath does not take effect when the objects it concerns are already forbidden. As mentioned in the Radbaz and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 238:12), there are instances where the second oath can take effect according to the principle of issur kollel, a more inclusive prohibition.
27.For each oath was separate. After he took the oath forbidding ten, nine were still permitted. And after he took the oath forbidding nine, eight were still permitted. Hence, the later oaths take effect.
28.When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 238:13) states that if the person specifies 10 specific items in his oath, he is not liable if he later reduces their number to eight, for all ten have become forbidden to him.
29.I.e., he takes an oath against eating an olive-sized portion of each type of fruit. He does not violate his oath unless he eats both of these portions. Since the second oath also includes grapes, it takes effect with regard to the figs based on the principle of issur kollel.
30.For breaking his first oath.
31.For to be liable he must eat grapes and figs together. By realizing his transgression, he makes a distinction between the figs he ate and the grapes.
32.I.e., his first oath involved ten specific items. His second oath involved nine additional items from a larger group. The Ra'avad claims the Rambam's ruling is a distortion of Sh'vuot 28b. See also Rashi and Tosafot who discuss the proper wording of that source.
33.For breaking his first oath.
34.This version, slightly different from that of the standard printed text, is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The intent is that the second oath included the original ten, plus a second nine. In this instance as well, had he not realized his first transgression, he would have been liable twice for eating the second nine.
35.This ruling follows the version of Sh'vuot 28a suggested by Rabbenu Chananel. The standard published text of the Talmud reverses the ruling. Thus in the instance stated by the Rambam, one would be exempt as the Ra'avad notes. The ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:16) follows that of the standard printed text of the Talmud.
The Rambam's rationale can be explained as follows: Since the person willfully transgressed by eating the larger loaf, he is liable for lashes. The fact that he inadvertently caused the oath to take effect is not of consequence.
The person is liable for lashes only when he is given a warning before transgressing. From this we see that even if a warning is given conditionally, it is effective.
36.He is exempt for lashes. Nor is he required to bring a sacrifice, for as explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 6, and notes. This is considered as violated an oath due to forces beyond one's control.
The Rambam's rationale is that he did not perform the transgression knowingly. At the time, he partook of the larger loaf, he was not aware that it was forbidden. In this instance as well, the Rambam's ruling does not follow the standard printed text of the Talmud. Hence there are authorities who differ.
37.I.e., without awareness of the oath.
38.For both lashes and a sacrifice as in the previous clause.
39.For lashes (Ra'avad).
40.And thus it becomes forbidden only retroactively. Although it was already eaten, when he eats the smaller loaf, his eating the larger loaf becomes a prohibited act.
41.I.e., not only the large loaf dependent on the smaller loaf as in the previous instance, but each one was dependent on the other as the Rambam continues to explain.
42.For lashes as in Halachah 16. Again, this runs contrary to the standard published text of the Talmud and there are other authorities who differ.
43.As stated in Halachah 17.
44.See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2. Note the following halachah.
45.Hence he is liable for lashes, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 3, 7.
46.In the Hebrew, the Rambam restates this phrase using slightly different wording.
47.The double negative implies that an oath will take effect if he does eat. See Tosafot, Sh'vuot 36b.
48.I.e., it is not considered as if each one is an independent oath, because an oath cannot take effect when an object is already forbidden by another oath.
The Radbaz explains that the Rambam is interpreting Nedarim 16a. One might think that the passage means that the person took an oath that he would not eat at his colleague's home. Afterwards, his colleague implored him to eat and to appease him, he took an oath that he would eat at his home. Seemingly, this resembles an oath taken in vain, for he is taking an oath to nullify the observance of a mitzvah - the fulfillment of his previous oath. For this reason, the Rambam explains that all of these expressions should be interpreted to mean that he is taking an oath not to eat. Only one of them takes effect, because one oath does not take effect when an object is already forbidden.
Shvuot - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
When a person takes an oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea and he did not do so, or [he took an oath that] he did not throw it and he did, he is liable for taking a [false] sh'vuat bitui. [This applies] even though there is no [possibility of him taking such an oath] with regard to the future.1 For he cannot take an oath that so-and-so will throw [an article] or will not throw it.
[Indeed,] any person who takes an oath with regard to other people's [conduct - that they will or will not perform a particular activity is not liable for taking a [false] sh'vuat bitui. [This applies even if the person concerned] is his son or wife. For it is not within his potential to keep or nullify the oath. He is given stripes for rebellious conduct since it is not within his potential to keep this oath. Thus he is causing an oath to be taken in vain.2
Halacha 2
Why isn't he liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain? For it is possible for those other people to heed his [words] and keep his oath. Thus when he is given a warning at the time he takes the oath, the warning is of doubtful status. In such an instance, one is not given lashes because of it unless the prohibition is explicitly stated in the Torah, as will be explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin.3 Other people are not bound to fulfill the words of the person who took the oath unless they responded Amen, as we explained.4
Halacha 3
If they fulfilled his words,5 they are praiseworthy, for [in this manner,] they did not habituate [the person who took the oath] to take an oath in vain.6
Halacha 4
When does the above apply? When he took an oath concerning a matter that was not in his domain. For example, Reuven took an oath that Shimon would not go on a commercial journey, not eat meat, or the like.7 [Different laws apply,] however, should Reuven take an oath that Shimon may not enter his home and may not derive any benefit from his property. If Shimon transgressed and entered Reuven's house and benefited from his property without Reuven's knowledge, Reuven is exempt, for [his oath was violated] due to forces beyond his control.8 Shimon is liable, for he performed a deed prohibited to him. For Reuven took an oath only with regard to a matter within his property.9 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 5
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat," and he ate, but he ate articles that were not fit to be eaten10 or drank beverages that were not fit to be drunk, he is exempt.11 If he partook of foods that are forbidden to be eaten by the Torah, for example, he ate an olive-sized portion of a nevelah,12 a trefe,13 teeming animals, or creeping animals, he is not liable for a [false] sh'vuat bitui.14
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat," and he ate articles that were not fit to be eaten or drank beverages that were not fit to be drunk, or he partook of a nevelah, a trefe, or the like, he is not liable for a false sh'vuat bitui. He is considered to have fulfilled [his commitment to] eat. Since they are important in his eyes, eating them is considered as eating.15
Halacha 6
[When a person said: "I am taking] an oath that I did not eat," and he ate articles that were not fit to be eaten or he partook of a nevelah or a trefe, he is liable. Eating them is considered eating, because they are important to him, as evidenced by his having eaten them.16 With regard to the future, by contrast, i.e., he took an oath that he would not eat and then in an extraordinary instance, he ate them, this is not considered eating, as we explained [above].
Halacha 7
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat even the slightest amount of a nevelah or a trefe," and he ate less than an olive-sized portion, he is liable for taking a [false] oath, for he is not bound by an oath from Mount Sinai17 for half the measure [which makes him liable].18
Halacha 8
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat even less than an olive-sized portion of a nevelah or a trefe," he may be liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.19
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat earth and the like from substances that are not fit to be eaten," if he eats an olive-sized portion, he is liable. If he ate less than an olive-sized portion, there is a doubt [concerning the ruling]. Perhaps he is liable even for [eating] the smallest amount. Since these substances are not usually eaten so that a full measure must be eaten [for him to be held liable].20
Halacha 9
Similarly, when one takes an oath that he would not eat grape seeds and he eats less than an olive-sized portion, there is a doubt [concerning his liability].21If the one taking the oath was a nazirite who is forbidden to eat an olive-sized portion of grape seeds,22 he is not liable for a [false] sh'vuat bitui if he ate less than an olive-sized portion. [The rationale is that] his intent in taking the oath is only concerning the olive-sized portion for which he is already liable and [hence] the oath does not take effect.23 Therefore if one said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat even one grape seed," and ate it, he is liable.24
Halacha 10
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat dates, a nevelah or a trefe," and he ate an olive-sized portion of a nevelah or a trefe, he is liable also25 for [taking] a [false] sh'vuat bitui.26 For he included forbidden entities together with permitted entities. Since the oath took effect with regard to the dates, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden entities, as we explained.27
Halacha 11
If, however, a person took an oath that he would not eat a nevelah, a trefe, or the like,28 regardless of whether he partook of [the forbidden substance] or not, there is no obligation for an oath at all, neither a sh'vuat bitui,29 nor an oath taken in vain.30
Halacha 12
When a person takes an oath that he will partake of a nevelah, a trefe, or another similar substance forbidden by the Torah, he is liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain31 whether he partook of the substance or not.32
Halacha 13
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat this loaf. [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it," the second oath is an oath taken in vain, for he is commanded to eat it.33 He is liable for lashes for the second oath whether he partakes of [the loaf] or not.34 If he does not eat it,35 he is liable also for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.36
Halacha 14
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this loaf. [I am taking] an oath that I will eat it," the second oath is an oath taken in vain, for he is forbidden to eat it.37 He is liable for lashes for the second oath whether he partakes of [the loaf] or not. If he eats it, he is liable also for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.
Similarly, whenever one takes an oath to neglect a mitzvah and does not neglect it, he is exempt for [violating] a sh'vuat bitui.38 He is, however, liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain.39 He should perform the mitzvah that he took an oath to neglect.
Halacha 15
What is implied? For example, a person took an oath that he would not make a sukkah, he would not put on tefillin, he would not give charity, he is liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain.40 Similarly, [one is liable] if he takes an oath for a colleague that he will not give testimony that he knows or that he will not testify if he will know testimony, for he is commanded to testify.41 Similarly, if he tells a colleague: "[I am taking] an oath that I will never know testimony concerning you," it is an oath taken in vain, for it is not within his capacity [to be certain] that he will never know of testimony concerning him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 16
When a person takes an oath to fulfill a mitzvah and fails to fulfill it, he is not liable for not fulfilling a sh'vuat bitui.42
What is implied? A person took an oath to make a lulav or a sukkah, to give charity, or to testify on behalf [of a colleague] if he knew testimony [that could affect him]. If he did not make [these articles], give [the charity], or testify, he is exempt for [not fulfilling his] sh'vuat bitui. For a sh'vuat bitui takes effect only with regard to matters left to one's choice - [i.e., matters that] if he wants to, he may perform and if he does not want to, he need not perform, as implied by [Leviticus 5:4]: "whether he will do harm or do good."
Therefore whenever anyone takes an oath to harm another person, he is exempt from a sh'vuat bitui, e.g., he takes an oath to strike so-and-so, to curse him, steal his money, or deliver him to the control of a man of force. [The rationale is that] he is commanded not to do [these things]. It appears to me that he is liable for lashes for taking an oath in vain.43
Halacha 17
If a person took an oath to harm himself, e.g., he took an oath to inflict injury upon himself, the oath takes effect even though he is not allowed to do so.44If he does not harm himself, he is liable for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.
If he took an oath to help others with regard to a matter with which he could help them,45 e.g., to speak to the ruling authorities or to show him honor, the oath takes effect. If he transgresses and does not carry out [his promise], he is liable for [not fulfilling] a sh'vuat bitui.
Halacha 18
One who takes an oath not to eat matzah for a year or two is forbidden to eat matzah on the nights of Pesach.46 If he eats it, he is liable, for violating a sh'vuat bitui. This is not considered as an oath taken in vain, since he did not take an oath [specifically] not to eat matzah on the nights of Pesach. Instead, he included the times when eating matzah is a matter of choice together with those when it is a mitzvah. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the other days, it also takes effect with regard to Pesach. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations,47 e.g., one took an oath not to sit in the shade of a sukkah forever,48 or not to wear a garment for a year or two.49
Halacha 19
If one took an oath that he put on tefillin that day or did not put them on, or wrapped himself in tzitzit or did not wrap himself in them, he is taking a sh'vuat bitui with regard to the past.50 For he is describe something which happened. He is not taking an oath whether to fulfill or not to fulfill a mitzvah.
Halacha 20
If a person took an oath that he will not sleep for a three-day period, he will not eat for seven days, or the like, it is an oath taken in vain.51 We do not say that the person should remain awake until he is overcome by pain or fast until he is overcome by pain and [only] when he no longer has the strength to bear [the suffering], eat or sleep.52 Instead, he is liable for lashes53 immediately for taking an oath in vain. He may eat and sleep whenever he desires.54
Halacha 21
When a person takes an oath that he saw a camel flying in the sky and when questioned: "How could you have taken an oath in vain?", he responded: "I saw a huge bird and because of its size, I called it a camel. This was my intent," [his words] are of no consequence. For when all people mention a camel that is their intent. His intention is nullified because of that of people at large55 and he is liable for lashes.56 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 22
It is a known matter to the sages who are masters of wisdom and knowledge that the sun is 170 times greater than the earth.57 [Nevertheless,] if one of the common people takes an oath that the sun is greater than the earth, he is not liable for taking an oath in vain.58 For even though this is the fact, this concept is not known to people at large, only to great sages. One is liable [for an oath taken in vain] only when he takes an oath concerning a matter that is known and obvious to three ordinary people, e.g., [an oath that] a man is a man or a stone is a stone.
Similarly, when he takes an oath that the sun is smaller than the earth, he is not liable for lashes [for an oath taken in vain] although this is not the reality. For this matter is not known to all people.59 Such a person is not comparable to one who takes an oath that a man is a woman. For he took the oath according to his perception, for the sun looks small. Similar laws apply to other comparable concepts from the reckoning of the factors determining the calendar, astronomy, geometry, and other abstract concepts of the like that can be perceived only by other people.
FOOTNOTES
1.Although the concept of a sh'vuat bitui applies both with regard to the past and the future (Chapter 1, Halachah 2), it is not necessary that every sh'vuat bitui have both a past and a future component.
2.As the Rambam continues to explain, the oath is not necessarily false, because the other people may do what he postulated. Rashi (Sh'vuot 25a) considers this a false oath. The Siftei Cohen 236:4 quotes Rashi's view.
3.The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh point out several difficulties with the Rambam's words. Firstly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin, the Rambam does not make such statements explicitly. The only mention of a warning of a doubtful status is in Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:4. From those statements and those here, it appears that the Rambam considers such a warning as significant. There he does not explain the distinction of whether the prohibition is explicitly mentioned in the Torah or not. Also, the prohibition against taking a false oath is explicitly mentioned in the Torah. The Radbaz explains that the intent is that the concept that such an oath is considered as having been taken in vain is not explicit in the Torah and may not be known by an ordinary person.
4.As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1, whenever one responds Amen to a colleague's oath, he is bound by it.
5.The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 236:2) mentions two opinions. One emphasizes that the one who took the oath must certainly fulfill it. For example, if one takes an oath to marry a woman, the oath is considered as having been taken in vain, because the woman may not consent. Nevertheless, if she does consent, the man should keep his word and marry here. The other, however, does not consider this as an oath taken in vain, but rather as a false sh'vuat bitui.
6.The Ma'aseh Rokeach maintains that even if the involved parties fulfill the oath, the person taking it is given stripes for rebellious conduct, for he should never have taken such an oath.
7.For in these instances, he has no control over the other person's actions.
8.For he did not know of Shimon's actions.
9.The Tur questions the Rambam's ruling, focusing on the difference between an oath (sh'vuah) and a vow (neder). When taking an oath, a person causes his own person to be prohibited against performing a particular action. To use yeshivah terminology, it is an issur gavra; the prohibition is on the person. When taking a vow, by contrast, he places the prohibition on the object. It is an issur cheftzah.
Now when a person takes a vow against a colleague benefiting from his property, there is no difficulty, because he is placing the prohibition on the property. How can he, however, place a prohibition on a colleague's person? How can his oath take effect?
The Rambam's ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 236:3; albeit using slightly different wording). The Turei Zahav 236:7 explains that the Rambam follows the principle stated by the Ramban that an oath expressed using the wording of a vow and a vow expressed using the wording of an oath is binding. The Radbaz, puzzled by the same difficulty, states that this refers to an instance where the colleague answered Amen to the oath.
10.E.g., earth or spoiled foods.
11.The Radbaz explains that he is eating them, not because he considers them as food, but in order to quench his pangs of hunger.
12.An animal that died without ritual slaughter.
13.An animal with a blemish that would cause it to die within twelve months.
14.Since he is already forbidden to partake of these entities by the oath taken by the Jewish people as a whole at Sinai, the oath he takes is of no significance (Sh'vuot 22b). See Halachah 11.
The Radbaz emphasizes that this exclusion applies only with regard to entities forbidden by Scriptural Law, but not those forbidden by Rabbinic Law. For in such an instance, he is not bound by the oath taken by our people at Sinai.
15.Rabbenu Nissim explains the difference between this and the first clause as follows: In the first clause, we assume that the not eating, he referred to in his oath was not eating foods that people usually eat. These articles were not included in his oath, for there is no reason to forbid them. In the second instance, he included everything that he considers as food in his oath.
16.Even before he took his oath.
17.As the Torah states: "Cursed is the man who will not observe the words of this Torah" (Deuteronomy 27:26).
18.The Radbaz explains that although the Rambam maintains that there is a Scriptural prohibition against eating even less than the measure for which one is liable (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 14:2), this is not considered a matter for which one is bound by an oath from Sinai. For that oath includes only those matters which are explicitly mentioned by the Torah and this prohibition is not. There are, however, other Rishonim who do not makes such a distinction. See Siftei Cohen 238:6.
19.The oath takes effect, because, as stated in the previous halachah, for this quantity, he is not bound by an oath from Sinai. The Radbaz states that preferably, he should have this oath nullified. Nevertheless, if that is not possible, it is preferable for him to keep the oath and violate the Scriptural commandment.
20.On the other hand, perhaps, he is not liable, for since he mentioned "eating" in his oath, we assumed that he meant an olive-sized portion.
21.Perhaps he is liable for, as mentioned above, since such articles are not usually eaten, he may be held liable even for eating less than the usual amount or perhaps we require an olive-sized portion.
22.As stated in Numbers 6:4.
23.As stated in Halachah 11.
24.See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.
25.I.e., in addition to violating the prohibition against forbidden foods.
26.We do not say he is required to eat the two together.
27.Chapter 4, Halachah 11.
28.Substances explicitly forbidden by the Torah.
29.This oath does not take effect, because an oath cannot take effect with regard to an object bound by another oath. Since the entire Jewish people are bound by the oath taken at Sinai not to partake of these substances, no other oath involving these entities can take effect (Kessef Mishneh).
30.Were the person to have taken an oath to eat the forbidden substance, he would be taking an oath in vain, for his oath would be to nullify one of the Torah's mitzvot. In this instance, however, he is taking an oath to fulfill the mitzvah. This is permitted. See Nedarim 8b; Chapter 11, Halachah 3.
31.See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.
32.For the oath is considered as having been taken in vain at the moment it was uttered (see Rashi, Sh'vuot 29b).
33.Due to his first oath.
34.As stated in the previous halachah.
35.I.e., within the time period he specified in the oath; alternatively, after the loaf was destroyed or eaten by others. As long as the loaf continues to exist, however, he may fulfill his oath.
36.For his first oath is binding.
37.Due to his first oath, as above.
38.For the reasons stated in Halachah 11.
39.As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6.
40.For these are all mitzvot that he is required to fulfill.
41.Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 178) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 122) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Hilchot Edut 1:1.
42.Nor is he liable for taking an oath in vain, for at the time he took the oath, it was not in vain. And one may take an oath to observe the mitzvot, so his intent was desirable (Radbaz).
43.I.e., since performing any one of these acts violates one of the Torah's prohibitions, taking an oath to perform such an act is equivalent to taking an oath to nullify a mitzvah. Nevertheless, the Rambam prefaces his ruling with the words "It appears to me" - which indicate a ruling based on his own deductive processes - for, in prior Rabbinic sources, the statement that taking an oath to nullify a mitzvah is considered taking an oath in vain were made with regard to prohibitions between man and God and these are prohibitions between man and man.
44.Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:1 states that a person may not injure himself. Nevertheless, since this prohibition is not explicitly stated in the Torah, it is not considered as one is taking an oath to nullify a mitzvah (see Halachah 7) and the oath takes effect (Radbaz).
45.If, however, it is not in his capacity to perform this favor, he is liable for taking an oath in vain, but not for failing to fulfill a sh'vuat bitui (Radbaz).
Performing deeds of kindness fulfills a mitzvah. Nevertheless, since the specific deeds are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah as mitzvot, the violation of an concerning them is considered as a false sh'vuat bitui.
46.When we are commanded to eat matzah. The mitzvah applies only on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan and not throughout the holiday.
47.The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 236:5, quoting the Maharam of Padua, Responsa 74) emphasizes that this ruling only applies with regard to positive commandments, but not with regard to the Torah's prohibitions. Thus if a person took an oath that he would eat all types of meat, we do not say that since the oath takes effect with regard to the kosher meat, it also takes effect with regard to the non-kosher meat.
48.And thus the oath also prevents one from fulfilling the mitzvah of dwelling in a sukkah on Sukkot.
49.The Radbaz interprets the oath as preventing the person from fulfilling the mitzvah of tzitzit. Nevertheless, as the Radbaz himself notes, this interpretation is somewhat problematic, because there is no Scriptural mitzvah to wear tzitzit each day. Instead, the mitzvah is that if one is wearing a four-cornered garment, one must attach tzitzit to it. See Hilchot Tzitzi 3:11. Others interpret this as referring to priests who take such an oath and thus are prevented from wearing the priestly garments while serving in the Temple. As stated in Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 10:4, wearing such garments is a mitzvah.
50.And he is liable if the oath is false.
51.For there is no way that he can keep his word. Thus from the moment he uttered the oath, it was uttered in vain (Radbaz). See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.
52.The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim who questions the similarity between the two instances. It is impossible that a person will not sleep for seven days. He will fall asleep whether he desires to or not. Hence, he should not even try to remain awake. With regard to eating, by contrast, seemingly, the person should wait until he reaches a dangerous state and then he should be allowed to eat.
Based on the commentary of the Tzaphnat Paneach, it is possible to explain the differences in approach as follows: According to Rabbenu Nissim, the prohibition is lifted because of the danger, but it is not nullified entirely. Hence, when a person takes an oath on a matter that involves danger, we lift the prohibition, but only after we have waited until the danger is acutely felt. Hence, the oath not to eat is not necessarily a false oath. The oath not to sleep, by contrast, is definitely false, because it is impossible that he will not sleep.
According to the Rambam, by contrast, since there is danger to life involved, the prohibition is nullified entirely. Hence, even the oath not to eat is considered to have been taken in vain.
53.Our translation is based on the commentary of the Radbaz. Even if there is no court to administer this punishment to him, he may eat and sleep whenever he desires. When he is brought before the court, they will subject him to punishment.
54.For the oath is not considered to have taken effect at all.
55.Because the meaning of phrases used by people at large determines the ruling with regard to oaths and vows (Radbaz).
56.For taking an oath in vain.
57.Actually, according to the scientific data available at present, the sun is far larger than this. Some have tried to reconcile the Rambam's statements with this data by explaining that the Rambam is speaking about the actual mass of the sun and not the burning energy on its surface. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 10, p. 180.
58.I.e., one might think that since this is the reality, taking such an oath is considered an oath in vain. The Rambam is clarifying that since people at large may not be aware of this fact, it is not placed in that category.
59.The Radbaz states that even if the person taking the oath knows that the sun is larger than the earth, he is not liable for taking an oath that is smaller, for people at large do not know this fact.
Shvuot - Chapter 6
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] a person took a sh'vuat bitui1 and [then] regretted having taken the oath. If he sees that he will suffer if he upholds this oath and his intent changes or a factor occurred that was not in his intent originally when he took the oath and he changed his mind because of this, he may appeal2 [to be released from his oath] from one sage3 - or from three ordinary people4 in a place where there are no sages. His oath is repealed and he is permitted to perform the matter that he took the oath not to do or not to do the matter that he took an oath to do. This is called the release of an oath.
Halacha 2
This provision has no source in the Written Law.5 Instead, we learned from Moses our teacher through the Oral Tradition that the phrase [Numbers 30:3]: "He should not desecrate his word" means that he himself should not abuse it in a frivolous and brazen manner, as [Leviticus 19:13] states: "[For] you will desecrate the name of Your God."6 Nevertheless, if a person changed his mind and retracted, a sage may release him [from the oath].7
Halacha 3
It is not possible for a person to release himself from his own oath. A person does not have the license to release an oath or a vow in a place where there is a person whose knowledge surpasses his own.8 In a place where his teacher is found, he may only release a vow with the consent of his teacher.
Halacha 4
The person who took the oath - whether male or female - must himself come before the sage to be released. He may not appoint an agent to seek that he be released from his vow.9 A husband may, however, become an agent to express his wife's regret and we release [the oath] for her.10 [This applies] provided the three judges had already gathered together. He should not, however, gather them together at the outset to release her [oath].11 Nor may he serve as an agent to have his wife's vow released.12
Halacha 5
How do we release [an oath]? The person who took the oath must come before the distinguished sage or three ordinary people if there is no expert.13 He says: "I took an oath concerning this and this and I have changed my mind. If I knew that I would feel such discomfort concerning this, I would not have taken the oath. If, at the time of the oath, my understanding was as it is now, I would not have taken the oath."
The wise man or the foremost among the three asks: "Have you already changed your mind?"
He answers: "Yes."
He then tells him: "It is permitted for you," "It is released for you," "It is absolved for you," or the like with this intent in any language.14
If, however, he says: "[The oath] is nullified for you," "Your oath is uprooted," or anything with that intent, his statements are of no consequence, because only a husband or a father can nullify an oath.15 A sage, by contrast, may use only an expression conveying release or absolution.16
Halacha 6
Relatives are acceptable to release vows17 and oaths.18 [Oaths and vows] can be released at night19 and while standing,20 for this release is not a judgment.
For this reason, one may request a release of an oath or a vow on the Sabbath21 if it is necessary for the Sabbath,22 for example, to release his oath so that he can eat and drink today. Even if the person had the opportunity to have his oath or vow released before the Sabbath [and did not], he may have it released on the Sabbath, because it is necessary for the Sabbath.
Halacha 7
When Reuven administered an oath to Shimon and [Shimon] answered Amen23 or accepted the oath, if Shimon [later] regrets the oath and asks for it to be released, it should not be released except in the presence of Reuven24 who administered it to him.25
Similarly, if Reuven took an oath or a vow not to benefit from Shimon or that Shimon may not benefit from him and changed his mind and appealed to a sage [for the oath or vow to be released], we do not release him from it except in the presence of Shimon from whom he had vowed not to benefit. Even if Shimon was a minor or a gentile,26 [the oath or vow] is released only in his presence so that the person concerning whom the vow was taken will know that the person had his vow or oath released and thus he will benefit from him.27
Halacha 8
Both a person who took an oath in private and one who took one in public - even one who took an oath in God's ineffable name, [swearing] by God, the Lord of Israel - may appeal for a release of his oath if he changes his mind.28
If, however, one took an oath or a vow based on the understanding of many others,29 it may not be released30 except for a purpose associated with a mitzvah.31
Halacha 9
What is implied? One took an oath and made his oath dependent on the understanding of others that he would not benefit from so-and-so at all and the people of that city needed someone to teach them the Torah, to circumcise their sons, or to perform ritual slaughter on their behalf and they only found this person,32 he may ask a sage or three ordinary persons [to release him from his oath]. We release his oath. He may perform these mitzvot on their behalf and he may receive his wage33 from the people concerning whom he had taken an oath that he would not benefit from them.
Halacha 10
[The following laws apply when] a person took an oath, did not regret it, and came to the court to carry out his oath. If the judges saw that releasing this oath will lead to a mitzvah and to peace between a husband and his wife or between a man and his associates and carrying it out will lead to transgression and strife, they encourage him [to take] the option [of having the oath released].34 They discuss the matter with him, pointing out the consequences of his oath until he regrets [having taken it].35 If he changes his mind because of their words, we release his oath. If he does not change his mind and persists in his stubbornness, he must carry out his oath.
Halacha 11
What is implied? A person took an oath that he would divorce his wife, that Jews would not benefit from his property, that he would not eat meat or drink wine for thirty days or the like, they tell him: "My son, if you divorce your wife, you will cause malicious gossip to circulate concerning her children36 [for people] will say: 'Why was their mother divorced?' In the future, they will be called: 'the children of the divorcee.' [Moreover,] perhaps she will marry someone else and you will never be able to remarry her"37 and the like.38
[And they say:] "The oath you took that Jews should not benefit from your property [is not to your advantage]. Tomorrow, someone may be in need and [by maintaining your oath,] you will violate [the commandments]:39 "And your brother will live with you and you shall support him" [Leviticus 25:35-36] and "You shall surely open [your hand to him" [Deuteronomy 15:8].
[And they say:] "The oath you took not to eat meat or drink wine for thirty days [is not to your advantage]. [Within that time,] you will encounter a festival and nullify the happiness of the festivals and the pleasure of the Sabbath."40
If he says: "Were I to have known this, I would not have taken the oath," we release him [from the oath]. If he says: "Nevertheless, I have not changed my mind and I desire all of this," we do not release him [from the oath].
Halacha 12
We do not encourage one [to take] the option [of having the oath released] because of something that had not occurred [at the time the oath was taken].41
What is implied? One took an oath not to derive benefit from so-and-so and that person became the city scribe. Since the person did not regret taking the oath, we do not encourage him [to take] the option [of having the oath released]. Even if he himself said: "If I knew that [he would be given this position], I would not have taken this oath," we still do not release him from it. For he does not regret [having taken the oath]. Instead, his desire is that he should not derive benefit from him, but that person not to be appointed the scribe. If, however, on his own initiative, he regretted because of what took place and his intent changed,42 we do release the oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 13
When a person takes an oath concerning a matter and then takes a [second] oath that he will never ask to have the [first] oath repealed, [if] he changes his mind, he must first ask that the second oath - that he would never ask to have the oath repealed - be repealed.43 Afterwards, he may ask that the first [oath] be repealed.
Halacha 14
[The following laws apply if] one took an oath that he would not speak to so-and-so and afterwards, took an oath that if he asks for the repeal of this oath and has it released, he will be forbidden to drink wine forever. If he changes his mind, he must first ask for the repeal of the first oath and have it released. Afterwards, he may ask for the repeal of the second oath. For we may not have a vow or an oath repealed before it takes effect.44 Accordingly, if during Nisan, a person took an oath that he will not eat meat for thirty days beginning at Rosh Chodesh Iyar, [should] he change his mind, he may not have the oath repealed until [the month of] Iyar begins.
Halacha 15
If a person takes an oath that he will not benefit from so-and-so and that he will not benefit from the sage who releases him from this oath, first he must ask for the repeal of the first [oath] and then for that of the second.45
Halacha 16
If a person takes an oath that he will not benefit from so-and-so and that he will become a nazirite if he asks for the repeal of this oath, first he must ask for the repeal of his oath and then for that of his nazirite vow.46 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when a person says:] "I am taking [an oath that I will not eat today, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today," or "With regard to this loaf, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it, [I am taking] an oath that I will not eat it." If he asks for the repeal of the first oath and it is released, he is, nevertheless, liable for the second oath.47 Similarly, if he asks for the repeal of the second oath, he is liable for the third oath. If he asks for the repeal of only the third oath, he is liable for the first and second. [Similarly,] if he asks for the repeal of the second oath,48 he is liable for the first.
If so, what is the meaning of the statement: "An oath cannot take effect [when the matter it concerns is already forbidden] by an oath"? That if the person did not repeal [any of] the oaths and ate [the forbidden article], he would be liable only once, as we explained.49
Halacha 18
When a person takes a sh'vuat bitui regarding the future and violated his oath, e.g., he took an oath that he would not eat a loaf of bread and ate it, if he changes his mind, he may ask a sage to repeal it after eating it before bringing his sacrifice if he [ate it] inadvertently or before he was lashed if he did so willingly. [If the sage] releases the oath, he is exempt from the sacrifice or from the lashes. Moreover, even if they bound him [in preparation for lashes], he asked for the repeal of the oath and it was released before they began to administer lashes, he is exempt.50
FOOTNOTES
1.Kiryat Sefer emphasizes that the concept of repealing an oath applies only with regard to a sh'vuat bitui that involves the future. With regard to a sh'vuat bitui that involves the past, an oath taken in vain, a sh'vuat hapikadon, or an oath regarding testimony, it does not apply. These oaths cannot be repealed for the transgression was performed at the time they were uttered.
More particularly, as the Radbaz explains, there is a difference between a sh'vuat bitui that involves the future and one that involves the past. For when taking a sh'vuat bitui that involves the past as well, as soon as one utters the oath it is false. Nevertheless, he states that it is customary to repeal even this oath to minimize one's punishment.
2.The Rambam uses the passive form, nishal, rather than the active form sho'el. Tosafot Yom Tov, Shabbat 24:5 explains that form is used because the person asked for the repeal of the oath is asked many questions by the sage.
3.The sage must be of unique distinction in Torah knowledge to be given the privilege of releasing oaths alone. Nevertheless, he need not have been granted the special semichah extending back to Moses our teacher. For the Torah does not describe the judges with the term elohim in the passage concerning oaths (Rabbenu Nissim).
4.In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro maintains that the Rambam's words can be interpreted simply: Even three ordinary people can perform this function. The Radbaz, by contrast, maintains that the intent is three Torah scholars who are knowledgeable, but are not worthy of being called sages. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:1), Rav Caro, however, rules that the three men repealing the oath must be knowledgeable. He also states that in the present age, there are no sages of the stature to repeal an oath alone.
5.See Chagigah 10a which states: "The release of vows is hanging in the air and they have nothing to depend on."
6.That verse begins: "You shall not take a false oath in My name."
7.See also Chapter 12, Halachah 12.
8.This is an expression of respect for the greater scholar. The Radbaz states that he has not seen this restriction observed and question why this leniency is taken. If the greater scholar grants permission, the lesser scholar may release the oath [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:2)]. Nevertheless, after the fact, if a lesser scholar releases an oath even without permission, the release is binding.
9.Nor may he send a written request to the court (Radbaz). He may, however, use a translator [Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 10:8); Rama (Yoreh De'ah 228:16)].
10.For a husband and his wife are considered as the same person.
11.Nedarim 8b explains that if a person takes the effort to gather a court together, we fear that he will also exaggerate his wife's statements and the court's cross-examination of him will not be effective.
12.I.e., he may not serve as one of the three judges who release the vow [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:57)]. This interpretation resolves the objection raised by the Ra'avad. Since he is identified with his wife to the extent that he is considered as the same person, he cannot act objectively with regard to her issues.
13.See Halachah 1.
14.I.e., he need not make a formal statement in Hebrew.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 10:8, the Rambam elaborates on this rite:
He tells [the sage or the three ordinary people]: "I took a vow... and I changed my mind."
They ask him the reason he changed his mind and he tells them.... The foremost among the three asks: "At the time, you took the vow, had you known that this and this would occur to you, would you have taken the vow?" And he says: "No."...
He asks him: "Do you regret this oath?" and he says: "Yes."
The foremost of the three addresses him with this wording: "It is permitted for you; it is permitted for you; it is permitted for you. It is absolved for you in the heavenly academy and the earthly academy as it is written (Numbers 15:26): 'And it will be forgiven for the entire congregation of Israel and the stranger who dwells among them for the entire nation has acted inadvertently.'
15.The Torah gave them this power. See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 13, for an explanation of this issue.
16.The Radbaz explains that the term "nullify" or "uproot" imply being overpowered by a stronger authority without reason. For the woman is placed under the control of her husband or father and with or without reason, he may nullify her oath even against her will. His authority overpowers the oath, as it were. "Permit," "release," or the like, by contrast, imply that a decision is made on the basis of logic and the oath is revoked as if it never existed. See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit., where he discusses the differences between these two terms.
17.Thus two relatives may sit on the same "court" that releases vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah.
18.Although they are not acceptable to serve on the same court with regard to cases of law.
19.In contrast to judgments of law which may be rendered only during the day.
20.In contrast to judgments that are rendered while sitting.
21.When it is forbidden to render judgments (Hilchot Shabbat 23:14).
22.If, however, it is not for the sake of the Sabbath, it may not be released on the Sabbath, because it is forbidden to perform any activity for the weekdays on the Sabbath (Radbaz). See Hilchot Nedarim 13:8 with regard to the nullification of vows and oaths by a husband or a father.
23.Which causes the oath to take effect, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
24.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:20) states that Reuven must "be notified." The Rama maintains that he must also consent to the oath being released. The Shulchan Aruch also states that this law applies only when the oath was taken in response to a favor the person performed for him.
25.Lest Shimon see Reuven not paying attention to the oath and think that he violated the Torah's prohibition. Alternatively, so that Reuven will be embarrassed and not treat oath and vows frivolously [Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 5:4)].
The Radbaz and the Hagahot Maimoniot state that, after the fact, if Reuven had the oath released outside Shimon's presence, the release is binding. The Radbaz, however, states that if the oath involves financial claims, the person in whose presence the oath was taken must be present.
26.Who are not obligated in the observance of mitzvot. Nedarim 65a states that since Moses took an oath in the presence of Jethro, his father-in-law, to stay in Midian, he had to have the oath nullified in Jethro's presence. At that time, Jethro was not Jewish.
27.The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah concludes "or provide benefit for him." This appears to be a printing error; it is not found in manuscripts or early printings.
28.I.e., we do not say that since the respect due God's name will be compromised, the oath may not be released.
29.At least three (Radbaz, based on Gittin 46a).
30.The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah228:21) state that we may release the oath or vow if those people consent. The Rama states that the oath can never be released. The difference between these rulings depends on the rationale for this decision. Rabbenu Nissim explains that taking an oath based on the understanding of others reinforces the severity of the oath and prevents it from being repealed. Others explain that the person is merely substituting the others for himself. Just as ordinarily an oath is dependent on his own understanding, now it is dependent on that of others.
31.For we assume the others would agree not to enforce the oath when doing so would prevent the fulfillment of a mitzvah (Tosafot, Gittin 36a).
32.I.e., the person who took the oath.
33.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating that he misinterpreted the passage from Gittin, loc. cit. The Ra'avad continues, explaining that in the situation described by the Rambam, it is preferable for the person to teach without charging a wage. Moreover, he is not responsible for the Torah education of those children and hence, the motivation to have the oath rescinded is not his.
The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam's ruling, noting (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:2) that a sage is obligated to teach all the students, not only the members of his family. The Radbaz explains that it is preferable that he work for a wage than do so gratuitously, for a person who does not receive a wage for his work will not apply himself sufficiently.
34.I.e., they try to influence him to change his mind and express his regret.
35.The Ma'aseh Rokeach explains that we are talking about a situation in which the person feels uncomfortable with keeping the oath in the future, but does not regret having made it. In such a situation, the oath cannot be repealed (see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:7). Therefore the court, as the Rambam illustrates, explains the negative consequences of the oath so that the person will feel genuine regret.
36.I.e., people will spread rumors that the children were conceived out of adultery and are illegitimate.
37.As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:12.
38.For example, Nedarim 66b states that we warn him that paying the woman's ketubah is a significant expense.
39.See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 7:1 which mentions these obligations.
40.See Hilchot Shabbat 30:10; Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:16,18 which detail how partaking of these foods leads to the fulfillment of these mitzvot.
41.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that we do encourage the person to ask for the repeal of an oath if the factor that caused the oath was a reasonable probability. To support his argument, he refers to Nedarim 64b which states that God encouraged Moses to nullify his vow not to return to Egypt, telling him that the people who caused him to flee had died. The Talmud explains that the individuals concerned, Datan and Aviram, had not actually died; they merely became impoverished and "a poor person is considered as if he died." Since poverty is a frequent occurrence, it was appropriate for God to encourage Moses to ask to have his oath repealed. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would also accept this principle, but the Kessef Mishneh differs.
42.I.e., he regretted taking the oath not to benefit from him, because he realized that he could become the city scribe.
43.Otherwise, asking for the repeal of the first oath would violate the second oath (Kessef Mishneh).
44.And the second oath will not take effect until the first oath is released. The Siftei Cohen 228:30 writes that even after the fact, an oath cannot be nullified until it takes effect.
This refers to the repeal of a vow or an oath by a sage. A father or a husband, by contrast, may nullify a vow before it takes effect. See Hilchot Nedarim 12:12.
45.For as above, the second oath cannot be repealed until it takes effect. See the Radbaz who offers explanations why the Rambam includes this and the following halachah though seemingly they could easily be derived from the previous one.
46.Even though it is a mitzvah, a nazirite vow can be repealed. See Hilchot Nazirut 3:10.
47.For even though he is not liable for that second oath until the first oath is repealed, the second oath is not nullified. Instead, it is valid and thus can take effect after the first oath is nullified.
48.The Rambam maintains that since this oath is prevented from taking effect only because of another oath, one can ask for it to be repealed. Based on this view, the Radbaz maintains that one may have all the relevant oaths repealed with one request. There are, however, other views (the Ramban), who maintain that since the second and third oaths have not taken effect, they cannot be repealed. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 228:46) cites the Ramban's view, while the Siftei Cohen 228:110 mentions that of the Rambam.
49.Chapter 4, Halachah 10.
50.Once the court begins administering the lashes, the oath cannot be repealed (Radbaz).
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Hayom Yom:
• Friday, Nissan 25, 5774 • 25 April 2014
"Today's Day"
Friday, Nissan 25, 10th day of the omer, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Acharei Mot, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 1-96.
Tanya: There should also (p. 225)...is explained elsewhere. (p. 227).
The individual's avoda must be commensurate with his character and innate qualities. There may be one who can drill pearls or polish gems but works at baking bread (the analogy in the realm of avoda may be easily understood). Though baking bread is a most necessary craft and occupation, this person is considered to have committed a "sin."1
FOOTNOTES
1. Cheit or sin, is also translated as "deficiency."
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Daily Thought:
Meditation Through a Sea of Reeds Accept the world at its face value and it won’t let you move forward. Every impulse must be bridled, every step carefully balanced —and even then, for every step forward, you fall back two. You are enslaved within an Egypt of your own making. Here is your route of escape: Meditate deeply upon the inner soul of the world; struggle to see the vision described by our teachers. Part the murky waters of a coarse, material world; enter the reality that lies beneath it; let that be your path from bondage. Grasp that inner vision and it will flow outward through the heart to the conscious self, down to the heel that steps upon the earth, until all these, as well, become mind. Your eyes are now open, your heart is awake, your hands themselves know what to grab and what to avoid, as your feet know where to walk. In the struggle for deeper vision, life becomes effortless. You are free.
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