Today's Laws & Customs:
• Count "Thirteen Days to the Omer" Tonight
Tomorrow is the thirteenth day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer fortomorrow's date tonight, after nightfall: "Today is thirteen days, which are one week and six days, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all day tomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day isShavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Yesod sheb'Gevurah -- "Connection in Restraint"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" --Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed,Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
Today in Jewish History:
• Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943)
In the summer of 1942, about 300,000 Jews were deported from Warsaw to Treblinka. When reports of the mass murder in the killing center leaked back to the Warsaw ghetto, an organized resistance began forming, which managed to smuggle a modest chache of arms into the ghetto. On the 14th of Nissan of 1943, the remaining 35,000 Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto (from an original 450,000) staged an organized uprising, and drove back the Nazis with a rain of bullets when they came to begin the final removal of all Jews. The Jewish resistance lasted 27 days. A heroic stand was made in an underground bunker under 18 Mila Street, where hundreds of fighters, including the 24-year-old leader of the uprising, Mordechai Anilevitch, met their death. Although the Ghetto was burned to the ground by Iyar 3, a few stray survivors hid in the rubble and fired at the Nazis for two months longer.
In tribute to the uprising, the Israeli government designated the 27th of Nissan as its official "Holocaust and Bravery Day," and in many Jewish communities the day is observed as an annual Holocaust remembrance day. But because of the halachic prohibition to conduct eulogies and other mournful events in the festive month of Nissan, the chief rabbinate of Israel, and many Jewish communities, observe instead the 10th of Tevet as a day to mourn and remember the six million, which include many whose yahrtzeit (date of passing) remains unknown.
Daily Quote:
"All her pursuers overtook her between the straits" (Lamentations 1:3)--this refers to the days of trouble and stricture, from the 17th of Tammuz to 9th of Av[Midrash Rabbah, Eicha 1:29]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Shemini, 5th Portion Leviticus 10:16-10:20 with Rashi
• Chapter 10
16And Moses thoroughly investigated concerning the sin offering he goat, and behold, it had been burnt! So he was angry with Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron's surviving sons, saying, טזוְאֵת | שְׂעִיר הַחַטָּאת דָּרשׁ דָּרַשׁ משֶׁה וְהִנֵּה שׂרָף וַיִּקְצֹף עַל אֶלְעָזָר וְעַל אִיתָמָר בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן הַנּוֹתָרִם לֵאמֹר:
the sin-offering he-goat: The he-goat of the רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ מוּסְפֵי, the additional offerings of Rosh Chodesh . On that day [Rosh Chodesh Nissan], three sin-offering goats were sacrificed: a) “[Take] a he-goat [as a sin-offering]” (Lev. 9:3); b) the he-goat of Nahshon [the son of Aminadab, leader of the tribe of Judah] (Num. 7:16); and c) the he-goat [of the additional offering] of Rosh Chodesh. Now, of all of these, the only one burnt was this one [i.e., this additional offering of Rosh Chodesh. And why did they burn it?] The Sages of Israel are divided on the matter (Torath Kohanim 10:52; Zev. 101a). Some said that it was burnt on account of uncleanness that had come into contact with it, [while] others said that it was burnt because [Aaron’s sons were] אוֹנְנִים, because this [sacrifice came under the category of] holy [sacrifices] that would also be sacrificed in [future] generations. [Thus they deemed it fit for burning, as the law would require for future generations.] However, when it came to holy [sacrifices] that were [brought] only at that time [like the other two goat offerings], they relied on Moses, who had said to them regarding the meal-offering, “eat it as unleavened loaves” (verse 12) [even though they were אוֹנְנִים, assuming that since that meal-offering was brought only at that time (see Rashi on verse 12), so must Moses’ command apply to all holy sacrifices brought at that time only]. שעיר החטאת: שעיר מוספי ראש חודש. ושלשה שעירי חטאות קרבו בו ביום שעיר עזים, ושעיר נחשון ושעיר ראש חודש, ומכולן לא נשרף אלא זה. ונחלקו בדבר חכמי ישראל יש אומרים, מפני הטומאה שנגעה בו נשרף. ויש אומרים, מפני אנינות נשרף, לפי שהוא קדשי דורות, אבל בקדשי שעה סמכו על משה שאמר להם במנחה (פסוק יב) ואכלוה מצות:
thoroughly investigated: Heb. דָרשׁ דָרַשׁ. [This double expression signifies] two investigations. [Moses asked:] a) “Why has this sacrifice been burnt?” and b) “Why have the other sacrifices been eaten?” Thus it is taught in Torath Kohanim (10:52). דרש דרש: שתי דרישות הללו מפני מה נשרף זה, ומפני מה לא נאכלו אלו, כך הוא בתורת כהנים:
[he was angry] with Eleazar and Ithamar: Out of respect for Aaron, Moses turned towards his sons and was angry [with them, even though he was angry with Aaron as well, regarding what had happened]. — [Torath Kohanim 10:53] על אלעזר ועל איתמר: בשביל כבודו של אהרן הפך פניו כנגד הבנים וכעס:
saying: He said to them, “Answer my questions!” - [Torath Kohanim 10:53] לאמר: אמר להם, השיבוני על דברי:
17"Why did you not eat the sin offering in the holy place? For it is holy of holies, and He has given it to you to gain forgiveness for the sin of the community, to effect their atonement before the Lord! יזמַדּוּעַ לֹא אֲכַלְתֶּם אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ כִּי קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הִוא וְאֹתָהּ | נָתַן לָכֶם לָשֵׂאת אֶת עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה:
Why did you not eat the sin-offering in the holy place?: But had they eaten it outside the holy place? Had they not burnt it? What then [did Moses mean] when he said, “in the holy place?” But, [by phrasing the question in this way,] Moses was asking [Aaron’s sons]: "Perhaps that sacrifice went out of the hangings [of the courtyard], thereby becoming invalid [and that was why you burned it]? מדוע לא אכלתם את החטאת במקום הקדש: וכי חוץ לקדש אכלוה, והלא שרפוה, ומה הוא אומר במקום הקדש, אלא אמר להם שמא חוץ לקלעים יצאה ונפסלה:
For it is a holy of holies: which becomes invalid by going out [of the hangings].“ They answered him, ”No.“ [So Moses] said to them: ”Well, since it remained within the holy place, why did you not eat it?" - [Torath Kohanim 10:54] כי קדש קדשים הוא: ונפסלת ביוצא, והם אמרו לו לאו. אמר להם הואיל ובמקום הקדש היתה, מדוע לא אכלתם אותה:
and He has given it to you to gain forgiveness [for the sin of the community]: For the kohanim eat [the sacrifice], and [thereby] its owners are granted atonement. — [Torath Kohanim 10:54] ואתה נתן לכם לשאת וגו': שהכהנים אוכלים ובעלים מתכפרים:
to gain forgiveness for the sin of the community: From here, we learn that it [the he-goat that was burned] was the he-goat of Rosh Chodesh, which atones for the sin of uncleanness concerning the sanctuary and its holy [sacrificial] food, for the sin-offering of the eighth day [of the investitures] and the sin-offering of Nahshon [Ben Aminadab] were not brought to effect atonement. — [Torath Kohanim 10:52] לשאת את עון העדה: מכאן למדנו ששעיר ראש חודש היה, שהוא מכפר על עון טומאת מקדש וקדשיו, שחטאת שמיני וחטאת נחשון לא לכפרה באו:
18Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within, so you should have surely eaten it within holy [precincts], as I commanded!" יחהֵן לֹא הוּבָא אֶת דָּמָהּ אֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ פְּנִימָה אָכוֹל תֹּאכְלוּ אֹתָהּ בַּקֹּדֶשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוֵּיתִי:
Behold, [its blood] was not brought: For if [its blood] had been brought [into the Holy], then indeed you would have been required to burn it, as it is said, “But any sin-offering some of whose blood [was brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the Holy, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire]” (Lev. 6:23). - [Torath Kohanim 10:55] הן לא הובא וגו': שאילו הובא היה לכם לשרפה, כמו שנאמר (ויקרא ו כג) וכל חטאת אשר יובא מדמה וגו':
so you should have surely eaten it: [I.e.,] “You should have surely eaten it,” even though you are אוֹנְנִים. אכל תאכלו אתה: היה לכם לאכלה אף על פי שאתם אוננים:
as I commanded: you, regarding the meal-offering. כאשר צויתי: לכם במנחה:
19And Aaron spoke to Moses, "But today, did they offer up their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord? But [if tragic events] like these had befallen me, and if I had eaten a sin offering today, would it have pleased the Lord?" יטוַיְדַבֵּר אַהֲרֹן אֶל משֶׁה הֵן הַיּוֹם הִקְרִיבוּ אֶת חַטָּאתָם וְאֶת עֹלָתָם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה וַתִּקְרֶאנָה אֹתִי כָּאֵלֶּה וְאָכַלְתִּי חַטָּאת הַיּוֹם הַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינֵי יְהֹוָה:
And Aaron spoke: The expression דִּבּוּר [in Scripture, unless followed by the expression לֵאמֹר] always denotes boldness, as it is said, “And the people [thus] spoke (וַיְדַבֵּר) [against God and Moses, ‘Why did you bring us up from Egypt to die in the desert…?’” (Num. 21:5). Thus, in this verse, Aaron boldly responded to Moses’ investigation.] Is it possible that Moses addressed his anger to Eleazar and Ithamar, and Aaron answers? However, this [demonstrates to us that the behavior of Aaron’s sons] was only out of respect [for their father and their teacher]. They said, “It is inappropriate that while our father is sitting [in front of us], we should answer in his presence, and it is also inappropriate that a disciple should refute his master.” One might suggest that [the sons did not respond] because Eleazar was not capable [i.e., he did not have the courage] to answer. Scripture, [however,] says, “And Eleazar the kohen spoke to the men of the army…” (Num. 31:21). Thus, we see that when Eleazar wanted to, he spoke before Moses and before the princes [and hence, here, he was deliberately silent]. I found this [explanation] in the second version of the Sifrei. — [Sifrei Zuta on Numbers, ed. Horowitz, p. 329, Yalkut Bamidbar on Num. 31: 21] וידבר אהרן: אין לשון דיבור אלא לשון עז, שנאמר (במדבר כא ה) וידבר העם וגו'. אפשר משה קצף על אלעזר ועל איתמר, ואהרן מדבר, הא ידעת שלא היתה אלא מדרך כבוד. אמרו אינו בדין שיהא אבינו יושב ואנו מדברים לפניו, ואינו בדין שיהא תלמיד משיב את רבו. יכול מפני שלא היה באלעזר להשיב, תלמוד לומר (במדבר לא כא) ויאמר אלעזר הכהן אל אנשי הצבא וגו', הרי כשרצה, דבר לפני משה ולפני הנשיאים, זו מצאתי בספרי של פנים שני:
But today, did they offer up: What is he saying? [He could have simply said, “Such tragic events like these have befallen me….”] Rather, Moses said to them, “Did you perhaps sprinkle its blood while you were אוֹנְנִים, and [as you probably know,] an אוֹנֵן who performs the service renders [that sacrifice] invalid?” So Aaron answered him,… הֵם הִקְרִיבוּ, i.e., “But did they who offer up [the sacrifices]?” They are ordinary kohanim [for whom the law of invalidation by an אוֹנֵן applies.] I offered [them] up! For I am a Kohen Gadol, and [a Kohen Gadol] is permitted to offer [a sacrifice] while he is an אוֹנֵן] [Zev. 101a] הן היום הקריבו: מהו אומר, אלא אמר להם משה שמא זרקתם דמה אוננים, שהאונן שעבד חילל. אמר לו אהרן וכי הם הקריבו, שהם הדיוטות, אני הקרבתי, שאני כהן גדול ומקריב אונן:
But [if tragic events] like these had befallen me: [By these words, Aaron was effectively saying: “My point would be just as valid] even if those who died were not my sons, but other relatives for whom I am obligated to mourn as an אוֹנֵן like these,” such as all those enumerated in the parashah of the kohanim [i.e., Parashathאֱמוֹר, Lev. 21:13], for whom a kohen may become unclean. — [Torath Kohanim 10:59] ותקראנה אותי כאלה: אפילו לא היו המתים בני אלא שאר קרובים שאני חייב להיות אונן עליהם כאלו, כגון כל האמורים בפרשת כהנים שהכהן מטמא להם:
and if I had eaten a sin-offering today: [Lit., “and I ate a sin-offering.” However, here the meaning is:] “But if I had eaten [the sin-offering],” would it have pleased [the Lord]? ואכלתי חטאת: ואם אכלתי הייטב וגו':
[If I had eaten the sin-offering] today: [today it would not have been pleasing to the Lord; however, tonight I could have eaten it, because] an אוֹנֵן is permitted [to eat sacrifices] at night, for one is considered an אוֹנֵן only on the day of burial. — [Torath Kohanim 10:59; Zev. 101b] היום: אבל אנינות לילה מותר, שאין אונן אלא יום קבורה:
would it have pleased the Lord?: If you heard this [special law that an אוֹנֵן may eat] holy sacrifices brought exclusively for a special occasion [like the people’s sin-offering goat and Nahshon’s goat, both offered just today], you have no right to be lenient [regarding this law] regarding holy sacrifices offered for [future] generations [like the sacrifice on Rosh Chodesh, about which you asked us, “Why did you not eat…?”]. — [Zev. 101a] הייטב בעיני ה': אם שמעת בקדשי שעה אין לך להקל בקדשי דורות:
20Moses heard [this], and it pleased him. כוַיִּשְׁמַע משֶׁה וַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינָיו:
and it pleased him: [Moses] admitted [that Aaron was correct,] and was not ashamed, [for he could have covered up by] saying, “I have not heard [of this law.” Rather, Moses frankly said to Aaron, “You are right! I did hear that an אוֹנֵן must not eat from sacrifices that will be offered in future generations, but I forgot!”]. — [Torath Kohanim 10:60; Zev. 101a] וייטב בעיניו: הודה ולא בוש לומר לא שמעתי:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 120 - 134
• Chapter 120
This psalm rebukes slanderers, describing how the deadly effect of slander reaches even further than weapons.
Chapter 121
This psalm alludes to the Lower Paradise, from which one ascends to the Higher Paradise. It also speaks of how God watches over us.
Chapter 122
The psalmist sings the praises of Jerusalem and tells of the miracles that happened there.
Chapter 123
The psalmist laments the length of time we have already suffered in exile .
Chapter 124
Chapter 125
Chapter 126
The psalmist speaks of the future, comparing our Divine service in exile to one who sows arid land, then cries and begs God to send rain upon it so that the seed not be wasted. When he merits to reap the crop, he offers thanks to God.
Chapter 127
King David instructs his generation, and especially his son Solomon, to be sure that all one's actions be for the sake of Heaven. He also criticizes those who toil day and night in pursuit of a livelihood.
Chapter 128
This psalm extols one who enjoys the fruits of his own labor, avoiding theft and deception, even refusing gifts. It also describes behavior appropriate to the God-fearing.
Chapter 129
The psalmist laments the troubles of Israel.
Chapter 130
The psalmist prays for an end to this long exile.
Chapter 131
In this prayer , David declares that never in the course of his life was he haughty, nor did he pursue greatness or worldly pleasures.
Chapter 132
David composed this psalm while he and the elders of Israel wore sackcloth, in mourning over the plague that had descended upon the land, and their being distant from the Holy Temple. David therefore offers intense prayers, entreating God to remember the hardship and sacrifice he endured for the sake of the Temple.
Chapter 133
Chapter 134
The psalmist exhorts the scholarly and pious to rise from their beds at night, and go to the House of God.
• Lessons in Tanya
• Thursday, Nissan 27, 5775 · April 16, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 42
והנה כל אדם מישראל, יהיה מי שיהיה, כשיתבונן בזה שעה גדולה בכליום, איך שהקב״ה מלא ממש את העליונים ואת התחתונים, ואת השמים ואת האר׳ ממש מלא כל האר׳ כבודו ממש
Now, therefore, each individual Jew, whoever he may be, i.e., whatever his spiritual state, when he ponders upon this for a considerable time each day — how G‑d is truly omnipresent in the higher and lower [worlds], and the actual heaven and earth (i.e., not only the spiritual heaven and earth, the Supernal Sefirot, but the actual heaven and earth itself) is truly filled with His glory,
וצופה ומביט ובוחן כליותיו ולבו וכל מעשיו ודבוריו, וכל צעדיו יספור
and that He looks, seeks and searches his “kidneys and heart” (i.e., his inner thoughts and emotions) and all his actions and words, and counts his every step —
אזי תקבע בלבו היראה לכל היום כולו, כשיחזור ויתבונן בזה אפילו בהתבוננות קלה
then fear will be implanted in his heart throughout the day, even when he is occupied with other matters and cannot contemplate the above, when he will again meditate on this, even with a superficial reflection that does not demand a particular effort and a set time;
בכל עת ובכל שעה יהיה סור מרע ועשה טוב במחשבה דבור ומעשה, שלא למרות חס ושלום עיני כבודו אשר מלא כל האר׳
at any time1 or moment, he will thus turn away from evil and do good, (i.e., he will refrain from transgressing negative commands and perform positive commands) in thought, speech and deed, so as not to rebel, G‑d forbid, in the sight of His glory whereof the whole world is filled.
וכמאמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי לתלמידיו כנ״ל
This is in accord with the statement2 of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai to his disciples, quoted above, viz., “May it be G‑d’s Will that the fear of heaven be upon you [and keep you from sinning] like the fear of a human being [who by observing your actions keeps you from sinning].”
וזה שאומר הכתוב: כי אם ליראה את ה׳ אלקיך, ללכת בכל דרכיו
This, then, is the meaning of the verse:3 “[G‑d demands of you] only to fear the L‑rd your G‑d, to walk in all His ways.”
The question arises: Is attaining the fear of G‑d such an easy thing that the verse says, “onlyto fear Him”? The answer which is given (“For Moses it is a simple matter”) is difficult to comprehend, for the verse speaks of what “G‑d demands of you” — of every Jew. The explanation is as follows: the verse is referring here to a level of fear which is indeed simple for every Jew to reach, that level being fear that leads one to “walk in all His ways.”
שהיא יראה המביאה לקיום מצותיו יתברך, בסור מרע ועשה טוב, והיא יראה תתאה הנ״ל
For this is the fear that leads to the fulfillment of G‑d’s commandments, which involve turning away from evil and doing good. This is the “lower-level fear” which has been discussed earlier.
Accordingly, the Gemara’s answer (“For Moses it is a simple matter”) is now understandable. It means:
ולגבי משה, דהיינו, לגבי בחינת הדעת שבכל נפש מישראל האלקית, מילתא זוטרתי היא, כנ״ל
As it applies to “Moses”, that is to say, in relation to the quality of Daat that is in the divine soul of every Jew, this quality being the quality of Moses found within“you”, within each Jewish soul, this is indeed a minor thing, as has been stated above — that when a Jew reflects with his Daat upon matters that arouse fear of G‑d, he will surely succeed in attaining it,
שהדעת הוא המקשר מצפוני בינת הלב אל בחינת גילוי במחשבה ממש, כידוע ליודעי ח״ן
(4for Daat is [the faculty] which connects the hidden understanding of the heart with revelation in actual thought, as is known to those who are familiar with the Esoteric Discipline).
As mentioned earlier, all Jews possess a “hidden treasure of fear of heaven” in their hearts. Through the faculty of Daat, this fear of heaven is revealed and felt in one’s thought, and also affects his speech and actions.
* * *
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Note of the Rebbe: At first glance it would seem that there is no compelling evidence as to whether “at any time or moment” is connected to the earlier clause (“when he will again meditate... even with a superficial reflection at any time or moment”), or whether it is connected to the following clause (“at any time or moment, he will turn away from evil and do good...”). However, since “any time or moment” is mentioned in ch. 14 with regard to a person’s ability to become a Beinoni, and the Alter Rebbe explains there that this phrase refers to his thought, speech and deed, it follows that here, too, “at any time or moment” relates to the following clause — “he will turn away from evil and do good, in thought, speech and deed.” |
| 2. | Berachot 28b. |
| 3. | Devarim 10:12. |
| 4. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Thursday, Nissan 27, 5775 · April 16, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 121
Fallen Stalks
"The gleanings of your harvest you shall not harvest; you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger"—Leviticus 23:22.
We are commanded to leave [for the poor] the leket [stalks that fall to the ground in the course of harvesting].
This biblical precept only applies in the Land of Israel.
Fallen Stalks
Positive Commandment 121
Translated by Berel Bell
The 121st mitzvah is that we are commanded to leave over leket [stalks1 of grain which have fallen during the harvesting process].
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "Do not pick up the stalks which fall during harvest. You must leave them for the poor and the stranger."3
This mitzvah is also in the category of lav shenitak l'aseh (a prohibition with a remedial positive commandment), as explained in tractate Makkos regarding pe'ah.4
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Pe'ah.5
The Biblical prohibition applies only in Eretz Yisroel.6
FOOTNOTES
1.This mitzvah applies only of one or two stalks were dropped. If three were dropped together, the owner can take them. See Hilchos Matnos Aniyim, 4:1.
2.Lev. 23:22.
3.The first part of the verse serves as the prohibition, N211. The second part is the positive commandment discussed here.
4.See N210, N214.
5.Ch.4.
6.See note to P120 above.
Negative Commandment 211
Gathering the Fallen Stalks
"You shall not gather the gleanings of your harvest"—Leviticus 23:22.
It is forbidden for the landowner to harvest the stalks that fall to the ground in the course of the harvest, rather they must be left for the poor.
Gathering the Fallen Stalks
Negative Commandment 211
Translated by Berel Bell
The 211th prohibition is that we are forbidden from taking for ourselves the stalks which fall during the harvesting process. Rather, they must be left for the poor.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not pick up the stalks which fall during harvest."
This mitzvah is also in the category of lav shenitak l'aseh (a prohibition with a remedial positive commandment), as explained regarding pe'ah.2
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Pe'ah.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 23:22.
2.See above, N210, N214.
Positive Commandment 123
Defective Grape Clusters
"...you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger"—Leviticus 19:10.
We are commanded to leave the olelot [grape clusters that have not developed normally] for the poor.
This biblical precept only applies in the Land of Isreal.
Defective Grape Clusters
Positive Commandment 123
Translated by Berel Bell
The 123rd mitzvah is that we are commanded to leave over for the poor those [poor-quality1] grape clusters which are normally2 left in the vineyard during the harvesting process. These are called olelos.
The same verse,3 "You must leave them for the poor and the stranger," also refers to this mitzvah, since it follows mention of olelos.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Pe'ah.
The Biblical prohibition applies only in Eretz Yisroel.4
FOOTNOTES
1.In Hilchos Matnos Aniyim 4:17-18, the Rambam defines olelos as clusters which are incompletely formed, either lacking grapes attached to the central stem, or grapes which lie on one another.
2.See Kapach, 5731, note 32 to N212.
3.Lev. 19:10. See above, P120.
4.See note to P120 above.
Negative Commandment 212
Harvesting the Defective Grape Clusters
"You shall not harvest the defective clusters from your vineyard"—Leviticus 19:10.
It is forbidden for the landowner to remove all the grapes from the vineyard in the course of the harvest, rather he must leave for the poor the grape clusters that have not developed normally.
This prohibition applies to vineyards only, not to any other fruit, even those similar to grapes.
Harvesting the Defective Grape Clusters
Negative Commandment 212
Translated by Berel Bell
The 212th prohibition is that we are forbidden from completely harvesting a vineyard.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not pick the olelos in your vineyard." You must instead leave them for the poor.2
This law does not apply to other trees, even though they are similar to grapevines. The prohibition,3 "When you beat the fruit from your olive tree, do not go back over it" [is not related to this mitzvah of olelos but is] part of the prohibition against taking shik'cho (forgotten produce).4 From this verse which prohibits taking shik'cho from olive trees we learn that shik'cho applies to all trees. [The law of olelos, however, only applies to grapes.]
This mitzvah is also in the category of lav shenitak l'aseh (a prohibition with a remedial positive commandment).
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Pe'ah.5
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev.19:10.
2.See Ibn Tibbon translation.
3.Deut. 24:20.
4.See N214 below.
5.Ch.7, Mishneh 4.
Shabbos - Chapter Fifteen
Halacha 1
A person standing in a public domain may move [articles] throughout a private domain. Similarly, a person standing in a private domain may move [articles] within a public domain, provided he does not transfer them beyond four cubits.1 If he transfers an article [beyond that distance], he is not liable, because he is located in a different domain.2
Similarly, a person standing in a private domain may open [a door with a key3] in a public domain.4 [One standing] in a public domain may open [a door with a key] in a private domain.
One may force feed an animal whose head is inside [a stall, although] the major portion of its body is outside.5 One may not, [however, force feed a] camel unless its head and the major portion of its body is within [the stall], since its neck is long.
Halacha 2
A person should not stand in a private domain and [extend his head into] the public domain to drink, nor [should he stand] in a public domain and [extend his head into] a private domain to drink, unless he brings his head and the majority of his body into the domain in which he is drinking.
When do the above [restrictions] apply? When he is drinking with attractive vessels that he needs.6 [In this instance, our Sages instituted a] decree, lest he transfer [the drinking vessels]. If, however, [the person uses] vessels that are not attractive and which he does not require, all that is necessary is that he bring in his head; it is not necessary that he bring in the majority of his body.7 If a cistern of water is located in a carmelit, [the above leniency applies] even when [the person] uses vessels that are attractive.8
Halacha 3
A person may stand in a public domain, [extend his hand,] collect water that is flowing from a drainpipe or a wall [while the water is] in the air, and drink, provided he does not touch the drainpipe or the wall and collect the water from them.9
[The following rules apply] should he [in fact] touch [the drainpipe or the wall]: If the place he touches is more than ten [handbreadths] high and within three handbreadths of the roof, the act is forbidden.10 It is as if he removed [the water] from the roof, which is a private domain.
Similarly, if the drainpipe was four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] and one collected water from it, this is forbidden regardless of whether the pipe is within ten handbreadths of the ground11 or above ten handbreadths.12 Why is the person not held liable? Because the water is not at rest, but rather continuing to flow.13
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when] a projection extends [from the wall of a building] near a window: If the projection is above ten handbreadths high, its use is permitted,14 for the public domain extends only ten handbreadths [above the ground].15 Therefore, it is permissible to use the entire wall, with the exception of the bottom ten handbreadths.16
Halacha 5
When does the above apply? When there is [only] one projection extending into the space. When, however, there are two projections extending from the wall, one below the other,17 even though they are both more than ten handbreadths high,18 [different rules apply]: If the upper projection near the window is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area, its use is forbidden,19 for it is a domain in its own right, and the projection below it is a separate domain.20Accordingly, they each cause the other to be forbidden,21 for [the people in] two domains cannot [jointly] use the space of one domain.
Halacha 6
If both the upper projection and the lower projection are not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths], both of them may be used.22 Similarly, [in such a situation,] one may use the entire wall with the exception of the bottom ten handbreadths.
If the lower projection was four [handbreadths by four handbreadths], but the upper projection was not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths], [an individual dwelling in the upper storey] may use only that portion of the upper [projection] that is directly opposite his window.23 It is forbidden to use the remainder of the projection that extends on either side of the window, because of the lower projection, which is considered to be a separate domain.24
Halacha 7
Whenever there is a projection that extends over the public domain25 and may be used, one may place upon it and remove from it only utensils of earthenware, glass, or the like, for if they fall into the public domain they will break. Other utensils and food are prohibited [to be placed there], lest they fall into the public domain, and [one descend and] bring them [into the home].26
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when] there are two houses on opposite sides of the public domain: If a person throws an article from one to the other and the article is ten [handbreadths] above the ground, he is not liable,27 provided both houses belong to him or there is an eruv between them.28 One may throw even garments and metal utensils.29
If one of [the two houses] was higher than the other, and they were thus not on the same level, it is forbidden to throw a garment or the like, lest it fall and [one descend and] bring it. One may, however, throw earthenware utensils and the like.30
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] a cistern located in the public domain has an opening [to a home] above it: The cistern and the sand [piled around it] are measured together [to see if their height reaches] ten [handbreadths]. [If it does,31] one may draw water from it on the Sabbath.
When does the above apply? When [the cistern] is within four handbreadths of the wall, for then a person cannot pass between them.32 If, however, it is further removed,33 one may not draw water from it unless the sand [piled around it] is ten [handbreadths] high.34 Thus, when the bucket is raised above the sand [pile],35 it enters a makom patur.
Halacha 10
It is permitted to pour water [from] a window [of a home] to a garbage heap located in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high, on the Sabbath.36
To what does the above apply? To a garbage heap belonging to the community, for this is unlikely to be removed. We may not, however, pour water onto a garbage heap belonging to an individual.37
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply to] a water conduit that passes through a courtyard: If it is ten [handbreadths] high and between four [handbreadths] and ten cubits wide, we may not draw water from it on the Sabbath, unless one erects a partition [in the water] ten handbreadths high at its entrance [to the courtyard] and its exit.
If it is not ten [handbreadths] high or is less than four [handbreadths] wide, we may draw water from it without [erecting] a partition.
Halacha 12
When [the water conduit that passes through the courtyard]40 is more than ten cubits wide, although it is less than ten handbreadths high, we may not draw water from it unless a partition is erected. Since it is more than ten [cubits] wide, it is considered to be an open space and nullifies the existence of the divider.41
What is the ruling regarding carrying in the courtyard as a whole?42 If there is even a small portion [of the wall] remaining on both sides of the opening, or if a portion [of the wall] four handbreadths in size remains on one side of the opening, it is permitted to carry in the entire courtyard.43 It is forbidden only to draw water from the conduit.44 If, however, no portion of the wall remains, it is forbidden to carry in the entire courtyard, for it has been opened up to the sea,45 which is a carmelit.
Halacha 13
How must the partitions be erected in the water? If [the majority of the partition] is above the water, at least a handbreadth of the partition must descend into the water.46 If the partition as a whole descends into the water, at least a handbreadth must rise above the water level. [In this manner,] the water in the courtyard will be distinct, [from the water in the conduit on either side of the courtyard].
Although the partition does not reach the ground [in the conduit], since it is ten handbreadths high, it is permitted. The use of a partition that remains hanging was allowed only with regard to water.47 Since the prohibition against carrying this water is Rabbinic in origin,48 [the Sages] were lenient regarding [the nature of] the partition [required], for its purpose is only to create a distinction.
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply] when a conduit of water passes between several courtyards and there are openings [from the courtyards] to it:49 If it is not the minimum size [of a domain],50one may lower buckets from the windows and draw water from it on the Sabbath.51
When does the above apply? When [the conduit] is not more than three handbreadths away from the wall. If, however, [the conduit] is more than three handbreadths away from the wall, we may not draw water from it52 unless there are projections extending from the walls on either side. Thus the conduit would be considered as if it passes through the courtyard.53
Halacha 15
[The following rules govern] a balcony54 that extends over a body of water with an aperture55 [in its floor] that opens to the water: We may not draw water from it on the Sabbath56 unless a partition ten handbreadths high is constructed over the water parallel to the opening in the balcony.57 Alternatively, we may construct a partition descending from the balcony to the water. Then, we consider this partition as descending until it touches the water.58
Halacha 16
We must not pour water into a courtyard that is less than four cubits by four cubits61 on the Sabbath, because [the water] will flow into the public domain rapidly.62
Therefore, it is necessary to dig a pit that contains two seah63 in the courtyard or in the public domain next to the courtyard, so that the water will collect there. [If the pit is within the public domain], one must build a domed covering64 over this pit from the outside so that the pit will not be seen in the public domain.65
The courtyard and the patio adjoining it are combined [when calculating] the four cubits. How large is a pit that contains two seah? [A pit] half a cubit by a half a cubit in area and three fifths of a cubit high.
Halacha 17
If the pit cannot contain two seah, we may pour [no more than] its contents into it. If it can contain two seah, we may pour [any amount of] water into it, even 60 seah, despite the fact that the water will overflow and spill from the pit outward.
When does the above apply? In the rainy season, at which time the courtyards are muddied and many drainpipes spread water. Thus, onlookers will not say that this person is making use of the courtyard and the water is flowing into the courtyard because of his power. In the summer, by contrast, if [the pit] can contain two seah, only that amount may be poured into it. If it cannot contain two seah, no water at all may be poured into it.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply] to a drain through which water is poured and the water flows under the ground into the public domain, and to a gutter when water is poured over its mouth and the water flows down a wall and descends to the public domain: Even if the wall is 100 cubits long or the stretch of ground under which [the water] passes is 100 cubits long, it is forbidden to pour into the mouth of this drain or this gutter, for because of one's power, the water flows into the public domain. Instead, one should pour outside the drain, [allowing the water to] flow into the drain on its own accord.
Halacha 19
When does the above apply? In the summer. In the winter, by contrast, one may pour [water as mentioned above], and indeed, do so repeatedly, without inhibition. At that time, the gutters are flowing [with water], and a person desires that the water will be absorbed in its place.
[In contrast,] it is permitted for a person to pour water over a drain which flows into the carmelit, even in the summer. No decrees were enacted against [the effect of] a person's power in a carmelit. For this reason, it is permitted to pour [water] down the side of a ship and have it descend to the sea.
Halacha 20
A person who is standing in a ship should not draw water from the sea unless he builds a protrusion, four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], extending from the ship above the sea.
When does the above apply? When [the deck of the ship] is within ten [handbreadths of the water level]. If, however, [the deck] is more than ten [handbreadths above the water level], he may draw water after erecting a protrusion of the smallest size. [The rationale for this leniency is that] he is drawing water through a makom patur, and the protrusion is necessary only to make a distinction.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when] a person was reading a scroll in a carmelit, a portion of the scroll rolled into the public domain, and a portion remained in his hand: If it rolled more than four cubits, he should turn it face down and leave it. This is a decree, enacted lest [the scroll] drop from his hand and he carry it [more than] four cubits. If it rolled less than four cubits, he should roll it back toward himself. Similarly, if it rolled into a private domain, he should roll it back towards himself.
[The following rules apply when] a person was reading in a private domain and the scroll rolled into a public domain]: If it came to rest, he should turn the scroll face down. If it did not come to rest, but rather remained suspended in the air above the public domain and did not reach the earth, he may roll it back to himself.
Halacha 22
A person who moves thorns so that the public at large will not be injured [should adhere to the following guidelines]: If [the thorns] were in the public domain, he should move them less than four cubits at a time. If they were located in a carmelit, he may move them even 100 cubits in a normal manner.
Similarly, if a corpse [began to decompose,] emit foul odors, and become extremely abhorrent to the extent that the neighbors cannot bear to remain [in the same place], it may be taken from a private domain to a carmelit.
After a person descends to bathe in the sea, he should dry himself when he ascends, lest he carry the water that is on him more than four cubits in a carmelit.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
In both these instances, there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition against moving the articles. As mentioned in the notes on the following halachah, Rashi and the Rashba state that this leniency applies only with regard to articles the person does not require in the domain in which he is standing. If he needs them, the Rabbis decreed that they may not be moved, lest the person forget and bring the articles into the domain where he is standing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1) appears to favor the view of these authorities.
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| 2. |
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's decision, noting that Eruvin 99a would appear to hold a person liable in such a situation. The difficulty with the Rambam's statements is compounded by the fact that the passage cited above associates the law in question with the following decision, "A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head." Since the Rambam holds one liable in the latter instance (see Chapter 12, Halachah 14), it would seem that he would hold one liable with regard to the law under discussion. The Ra'avad's arguments are so powerful that the Maggid Mishneh suggests amending the text of the Mishneh Torah accordingly.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1527) notes the Ra'avad's question, and states that he checked all the ancient manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah available to him, and they all state that the person is not liable. Therefore, he explains that a person is not liable for transfering an article unless he is standing in one of the domains involved in the transfer. This concept is derived from the transfer of the articles in the construction of the Sanctuary. In this instance, the people were not standing in a domain other than those involved in the transfer. Based on this foundation, he offers an interpretation - albeit a slightly strained one - for the passage in Eruvin.
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| 3. |
This and the following law refer to situations where the key is located in the domain where the door is located.
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| 4. |
The Maggid Mishneh mentions the possibility of placing the key in the door as a forbidden transfer. In the present day, almost every keyhole would be considered to be a makom patur.
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| 5. |
I.e., we are not worried that perhaps the animal will withdraw its neck and the person will carry the food outside the stall. Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 17, Halachah 29.
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| 6. |
As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, in their commentary on Eruvin 99a, the source for these halachot, Rashi and the Rashba maintain that if the person requires the vessels, the above restrictions apply even if the vessels are not attractive. The Maggid Mishneh states that although the Rambam's ruling appears most appropriate within the context of the Talmudic passage, in practice the more stringent ruling should be followed. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch also rules accordingly.
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| 7. |
This relects a significant leniency. We are requiring the person to drink while bent over. Even so, the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to forbid the person from drinking, lest he forget, stand upright, and thus bring the drinking vessel into the other domain.
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| 8. |
The prohibition against transferring an article from a carmelit is Rabbinic in nature. Hence, even if the person were to forget and transfer the drinking vessels to his domain, he would not violate Torah law. Accordingly, there is no need to prohibit him from drinking as a further safeguard.
This represents the opinion of Ravvah (Eruvin 99a) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 350:1). Significantly, however, the Talmud also records the opinion of Abbaye, who differs and maintains that since the forbidden labor of transferring articles is a matter that may be taken lightly, the Sages instituted safeguards with regard to Rabbinic decrees as well.
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| 9. |
As long as he takes the water from the air, there is no difficulty. If he takes the water from ten handbreadths or more above the ground, he has taken it from a makom patur. If he takes it from less than ten handbreadths, he has moved an article less than four cubits in the public domain.
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| 10. |
Based on the principle of l'vud, since the pipe is within three handbreadths of a private domain, it is considered to be an extension of that domain.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that if the roof is less than thirteen handbreadths above the ground, the principle of l'vud does not apply. This is so because the principle of l'vud cannot cause a space that is part of the public domain to be considered an extension of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 11. |
In this instance, the pipe would be considered to be a carmelit. Transferring from a carmelit to a public domain is forbidden.
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| 12. |
In this instance, the drainpipe is considered to be a private domain in its own right.
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| 13. |
Note the distinction between this ruling and Chapter 13, Halachah 4, which describes removing water that is at rest.
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| 14. |
I.e., to place articles upon it, transferring them from the building. Note, however, the restrictions mentioned in Halachah 7.
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| 15. |
The space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is a makom patur. Hence, one may transfer articles to and from it (Chapter 14, Halachah 12).
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| 16. |
This applies even if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area and directly below an open window. Since it is low enough to be used by the passersby in the public domain, it is considered to be a carmelit.
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| 17. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, these restrictions apply even when the two projections are not directly above each other.
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| 18. |
As the Rambam explains, the difficulty is that people from different properties cannot both use a third property which adjoins them - for example (Hilchot Eruvin 3:16), a wall that is four handbreadths wide that separates between two different properties. In particular, there are two conceptions of the Rambam's statements:
a) that of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:2), which explains that the two projections extend from two windows belonging to two different individuals who have not made an eruv. Since these individuals are forbidden to transfer articles from one projection to the other by Rabbinical decree, certain restrictions were also placed on using the projections themselves.
b) that of the Ritba, who explains that we are speaking of a wall that possesses only a single window. Nevertheless, the lower projection may be used by the passersby in the public domain. (Although the public domain extends only to ten handbreadths, the people in the public domain have the right to use projections and holes in the wall that are above that height.) When there is only one projection, they refrain from using it, because it will be used by the inhabitants of the house. When, however, there are two projections, the passersby feel free to use the lower one. This in turn causes there to be certain restrictions with regard to the use of both projections on the Sabbath. See the diagram on the opposite page.
Although the Merkevet HaMishneh and others explain that the Ritba's interpretation is more appropriate to the wording chosen by the Rambam, our notes will follow the approach of theShulchan Aruch, for it is accepted by the subsequent halachic authorities. It also must be noted that Rashi's version of the text of Eruvin 98b differs from that of the Rambam. Accordingly, he and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities have a different conception of these rulings.
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| 19. |
Note that Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 353:11 explain that this refers to articles that were kept inside the house. Articles that were left on the projection before the Sabbath may be moved on it. See Hilchot Eruvin 3:18-19.
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| 20. |
This applies even if the lower projection is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:4; Mishnah Berurah 353:12).
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| 21. |
Note the Mishnah Berurah 353:12, which cites opinions that allow the people whose window opens up to the lower projection to use it when it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths.
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| 22. |
There are no restrictions whatsoever, for neither projection is a domain in its own right.
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| 23. |
This is permitted, because the projection is considered to be an extension of the window, like a hole in the wall of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 24. |
Since the lower projection is a domain in its own right, it includes the space above it until the heavens, and the entire wall is considered as a part of it. In this instance, since the upper projection is not considered to be a domain in its own right, it is divided into portions. The portion directly opposite the window is considered an extension of the window as in the previous note, but the portion on either side is considered part of the lower projection.
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| 25. |
If the projection extends over a carmelit and is ten handbreadths high, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 353:3).
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| 26. |
Bringing the articles from the public domain to the home constitutes a forbidden activity. Hence, our Sages instituted this safeguard.
Note the Rashba, who states that if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it. Although the Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 353:3) quotes the Rambam's ruling, the Ramah states that on a roof or balcony on which a person stands comfortably, all articles may be carried.
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| 27. |
Our translation follows the version of the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. Many early printings and manuscripts of the text state "one is permitted...." From the context, the latter version appears more appropriate.
One is forbidden to transfer from one private domain to another private domain when they are separated by a public domain. Nevertheless, since the public domain extends for only ten handbreadths above the ground, the transfer is not being made through a public domain, but rather through a makom patur (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:1).
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| 28. |
See Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-4, which explains that although according to the Torah itself, one may transfer from one private domain to another, our Sages forbade this unless an eruv was constructed.
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| 29. |
These articles are not breakable. Nevertheless, since the houses are on the same level, it is not difficult to throw from one to the other. Accordingly, our Sages did not feel the need for a safeguard, lest the article fall and the person descend to the public domain and bring them into his home, a private domain.
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| 30. |
Even if the articles fall into the public domain, they will break. Hence, there is no need to worry that the person may bring them home.
The above restrictions apply only to houses on two sides of a public domain. If two houses are located on two sides of a carmelit, there are no restrictions regarding the type of articles that may be thrown, because there is no possibility of a Torah prohibition being violated (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 31. |
A cistern that is ten handbreadths deep is considered as a private domain. Were the sand piled around the cistern to be ten handbreadths high, the enclosure would be considered a private domain. Eruvin 99b teaches us a new concept, that the sum of ten handbreadths can be reached by combining the two together.
Hence, there is no difficulty in drawing water from the enclosure to the house, since one is transferring from one private domain to another. Needless to say, it is forbidden to transfer from such an enclosure to the public domain.
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| 32. |
Since there is no room for a person to pass comfortably between the sand pile and the wall of the house, the space between them is not considered as part of the public domain, but rather as acarmelit (compare to Chapter 14, Halachah 6). Therefore, the space above it is also considered as a carmelit. Thus, one would be transferring from a private domain to a private domain via acarmelit. In this instance (in contrast to Chapter 14, Halachah 14), our Sages allowed such a transfer.
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| 33. |
When there is room for people to pass between the cistern and the house in a normal manner, the space between them is considered as part of the public domain. Therefore, a person who draws water through the opening to his home would be considered to be transferring from a private domain - the cistern - through a public domain - the area above the space between the sand pile and the home - to one's home - a private domain. See Chapter 13, Halachah 16.
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| 34. |
Here, the importance of the height of ten handbreadths is not significant because it creates a private domain, but because, as explained in the following note, this will cause the bucket to be more than ten handbreadths above the ground as it passes over the sand pile.
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| 35. |
I.e., as the bucket is transferred from the enclosure to the home, it passes above the public domain. In this instance, since the sand pile is ten handbreadths high, there is no difficulty, because the space ten handbreadths above the public domain is a makom patur.
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| 36. |
Since the garbage heap is ten handbreadths high, it constitutes a private domain.
Thus, when water is poured from the house, the water will pass from a private domain through amakom patur - the space more than ten handbreadths above the public domain - to another private domain. This is permitted.
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| 37. |
This is a Rabbinic decree, instituted for the reason to be explained. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 354:3 states that this restriction applies even if the garbage heap is located in a carmelit.
|
| 38. |
Eruvin 99b cites an example where the Sages considered such a possibility.
|
| 39. |
I.e., we suspect that without looking, the person will follow his usual habit and pour water onto the place where the garbage heap was located previously without noticing that it had been removed.
|
| 40. | In this halachah as well, most commentaries maintain that the Rambam is referring to a water conduit that passes through a place where a portion of the wall of the courtyard has been taken down. As mentioned above, the Ra'avad interprets Eruvin 12b, the source for this halachah, differently, and therefore objects to the Rambam's ruling. Significantly, the Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the second clause of the halachah appears to indicate that the conduit breaks through the wall entirely, and it therefore offers a different interpretation of the Rambam's words. |
| 41. | Since the conduit is not deep enough to constitute a domain of its own, it would normally be considered part of the domain through which it passes. (See Chapter 14, Halachah 24.) Nevertheless, since this conduit is so wide, it is no longer considered part of the private domain. |
| 42. | I.e., does the conduit nullify the courtyard's distinction as a private domain? Significantly, this question is asked in this halachah and not in the previous one. In the previous halachah, although the conduit itself was considered a separate domain, since the opening was less than ten handbreadths, it is considered as an entrance and the enclosure is not nullified. This halachah, however, mentions an opening of more than ten cubits, an aperture which ordinarily nullifies an enclosure. |
| 43. | Several explanations have been offered for the Rambam's ruling. Among them: the small portion of the wall which remains juts out over the water. Therefore, the opening to the courtyard is less than ten cubits (Rabbenu Yonason, commenting on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The portions of the wall which remain on either side are considered like poles. As stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 7, it is permitted to carry in a courtyard with poles on either edges of the entrance to the fourth side (an ancient commentary on the Mishneh Torah from Egypt). See also the Or Sameach. |
| 44. | For the reasons mentioned above, the wall of the courtyard is an acceptable divider, and thus the courtyard as a whole is still considered to be a private domain. Nevertheless, since the wall was not made for the purpose of distinguishing the water that is outside the courtyard from that which is within the courtyard, a separate partition is required for that purpose (ibid.). |
| 45. | When there are no portions jutting out over the water (according to the first interpretation in note 49) or when the entire wall is destroyed (according to the second), the courtyard is considered as enclosed on three sides alone and it is forbidden to carry within. |
| 46. | For the entire intent of this partition is to make a distinct separation between the water in the courtyard and the water in the public domain outside of it. [See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishneh (Eruvin 8:6). See also Hilchot Eruvin 3:21-22 where the Rambam mentions a similar requirement.] |
| 47. | Generally, a partition must descend within three handbreadths of the ground. |
| 48. | For, as mentioned above, the courtyard is a private domain, and carrying within it is permitted. Furthermore, even the water conduit is considered as a private domain according to the Torah itself and its designation as a carmelit is Rabbinic in origin. |
| 49. | In contrast to the conduit mentioned in the previous halachot, this conduit does not pass through the courtyards, but merely by their side. Hence, it cannot be considered as part of the courtyard itself. |
| 50. | I.e., ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide. |
| 51. | The conduit is considered to be a carmelit; the windows, the holes adjacent to a carmelit. One may transfer an article from a carmelit to such holes. This interpretation follows Rabbenu Chanan'el's interpretation of Eruvin 87b. The Ra'avad has a different conception of this passage, and hence objects to the Rambam's rulings. |
| 52. | Since the opening is more than three handbreadths away, it is no longer considered to be a hole adjacent to the carmelit, but rather a separate entity. Hence, it is forbidden to transfer from thecarmelit to it. |
| 53. | I.e., the projections would cause the courtyard to be considered as extending beyond its wall, into the space of the conduit. Therefore, taking water from the conduit would be considered as moving an article within a single private domain. |
| 54. | In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains that just as it is customary to erect balconies over the public domain, it is also customary to erect balconies over bodies of water. |
| 55. | The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:1) states that the aperture must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths. |
| 56. | Since the body of water is considered to be a carmelit. It is forbidden to transfer from a carmelit to a private domain. |
| 57. | The partition need not reach the water itself. Because of the principle gud acheit mechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends into the water, even though it actually ends above its surface. This leniency is granted, because the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. Thus it is considered as if the hole extends into the water itself. Accordingly, we are allowed to draw water through it, because the portion of the body of water beneath it is considered to be an extension of the private domain [the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.)]. |
| 58. | The partition need not reach the balcony. Because of the principle gud asik mechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends to the balcony, even though it actually ends below it (ibid.). See also Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:1). |
| 59. | Eruvin 88a explains that the leniency of pouring into the body of water has an added dimension of severity. The current of the water will cause the water that has been poured to flow beyond the periphery of the aperture and into the portion of the body of water that is a carmelit. Nevertheless, since the person does not perform this transfer himself, there is no restriction. |
| 60. | Since the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, the construction of such a partition is sufficient (Ma'aseh Rokeach). |
| 61. | The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's wording is intended to negate an opinion mentioned in Eruvin 88a, which states that even if a courtyard is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths, if its total area is 16 square handbreadths (e.g., it is is eight cubits by two), the restrictions mentioned in this halachah do not apply. Significantly, the Rashba accepts the more lenient view and, in this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 357:1) follows his ruling. |
| 62. | Pouring the water into the courtyard does not violate a Torah prohibition, because the courtyard itself is an extension of the home. Although the water flows into the public domain, this is due to the forces of gravity and inertia. Thus, the person's pouring of the water is considered as merely a cause; it is not considered as if he poured the water into the public domain directly. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade pouring the water in this manner. |
| 63. | A seah is approxinmately 8.25 liters according to Shiurei Torah and 14.4 liters according to theChazon Ish. The Sages chose this measure because they considered this to be the average quantity of water used by a person every day (the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Eruvin 8:9). |
| 64. | Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which differs and mentions a covering of boards, which most likely is flat. |
| 65. | In his Commentary on the Mishnah (op. cit.), the Rambam explains that the covering will cause the pit to be separated from the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 357:1 and the Be'ur Halachah, which explain that because of its dome-like cover, people will not walk over it easily. Hence, since its opening faces the private domain, it is considered to be a hole adjacent to the private domain or a makom patur.) Note the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 357) who explains that the reason for the cover is to prevent people's suspicions from being aroused. |
Matnot Aniyiim - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
Any food that grows from the earth,1 is guarded,2 is harvested at the same time, and is placed in storage3 is required that pe'ah [be separated from it], as [Leviticus 19:9] states: "When you reap the harvest of your land."4
Halacha 2
Anything that resembles a crop that is harvested by having these five qualities requires that pe'ah be separated from it, e.g., grain, legumes, carobs, nuts, almonds, pomegranates, grapes, olives, dates - whether dried or fresh - and any similar produce.
By contrast, indigo, rubia, and the like are exempt, because they are not food.5Similarly, truffles and mushrooms are exempt, because they do not grow from the earth, like other produce of the earth.6 Similarly, ownerless produce is exempt, for there is no one to watch it, for it is free for anyone to take. Similarly, figs are exempt, because they are not harvested at one time. Instead, on the tree, there are some that will become ripe on one day and others that will not become ripe until after several days. Similarly, vegetables are exempt, for they are not placed in storage. Garlic and onions require that pe'ah [be separated], for they are dried out and placed in storage. Similarly, seed onions that are placed in the earth to produce seed require that pe'ah [be given from them]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
If he harvested half of it and thieves harvested the remaining half, it is exempt, for the obligation was incumbent on the half that was harvested by the thieves.11 If, however, thieves harvested half of it and [the owner] harvested the remaining half, he should leave pe'ah according to the measure of what he harvested.12
If he harvested half and sold the [remaining] half, the purchaser must leavepe'ah for the entire field.13 If he harvested half and consecrated half, the person who redeems [the half] from the Temple treasury must leave pe'ah for the entire [field].14 If he harvested half [the field] and consecrated [what he harvested], he should leave pe'ah for the entire field from the remainder [of the crop].15
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when a person] harvested [some of] the grapes in his vineyard to sell in the market place, but had the intent to leave the remainder for the vat to press [for wine].16 If he would harvest for the marketplace from either side [of the vineyard], he should give pe'ah for [the grapes] that he harvests for the vat according to the amount that remain.17 If he would harvest for the marketplace from only one side, he should leave the amount of pe'ahappropriate for the entire field from the amount remaining. [The rationale is that] since he harvested from only one side, he is not considered as harvesting haphazardly in which instance, he would be exempt [from leaving pe'ah].18
Similarly, when a person harvests ears of grain bit by bit and brings them home, he is exempt from leket, shichachah, and pe'ah, even if he harvested his entire field in this manner.
Halacha 7
When a person harvests his entire field before it becomes completely ripe, before it reaches a third of its growth, he is exempt [from pe'ah].19 If it reached a third of its growth, he is obligated. Similarly, with regard to fruit from trees, if a third of their growth is completed, there is an obligation [to leave pe'ah].
Halacha 8
When a person consecrates his field while his grain is standing and redeems it while it is [still] standing, there is an obligation [to leave pe'ah]20 from it.21If the Temple treasurer harvested it and then he redeemed it, it is exempt, for at the time when the obligation for pe'ah became relevant, [the field] was consecrated and thus there was no obligation [to leave pe'ah] from it.
Halacha 9
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
When a landowner harvested his entire field and did not leave pe'ah, he should give some of the stalks of grain as pe'ah to the poor.26 He does not have to tithe [the grain he leaves as pe'ah].27 Even if he gives the majority of the harvest as pe'ah, he is exempt from tithes.28
Similarly, if he threshed the grain, but did not winnow it, he should give thempe'ah, before he tithes. If, however, he threshed and winnowed the grain with a pitchfork and a shovel and completed the task, he should tithe29 and give [the poor] tithed produce equivalent to the appropriate measure of pe'ah for that field.30 Similar [concepts apply] with regard to trees.
Halacha 12
Pe'ah should be left only at the edge of the field, so that the poor will know where to come to collect it,31 so it will be obvious to passersby and they will not suspect [that the owner did not leave pe'ah], and so that deceivers will not intend to harvest their entire field and [will excuse themselves by] telling the observers: "I left it in the beginning of the field." Also, [leaving it there will prevent him from] waiting until a time when no one is present and leaving it for a poor person with whom he is close.
If a person transgressed and left pe'ah in the beginning or the middle of his field, it is considered as pe'ah, but he must leave an appropriate measure ofpe'ah for the portion of the field that remained after he separated the initial [pe'ah].32
Halacha 13
When the owner of a field gave pe'ah to the poor33 and they told him: "Give us from the [other] side," and he gave them from the other side [as well], both of the gifts are considered as pe'ah. Similarly, if the owner of a field separatedpe'ah and then said: "This is pe'ah and this also is" or "This is pe'ah and this,"34they are both pe'ah.
Halacha 14
It is forbidden for workers to harvest the entire field.35 Instead, they should leave the appropriate measure [of grain] for pe'ah at the end of the field. [Nevertheless,] the poor do not have a share in it until the owner willfully separates it. Therefore [although] a poor person sees pe'ah at the end of a field,36 he is forbidden to touch it lest it be considered as theft until he knows that it was left with the consent of the owner of the field.
Halacha 15
Pe'ah from grain, legumes, and other similar species of crops that are harvested and similarly, pe'ah left in vineyards and orchards37 should be given while it is [growing] from the earth. The poor should grab it by hand; they should not cut it with sickles, nor uproot it with hatchets lest one person [accidentally] strike a colleague.
Halacha 16
Pe'ah from a grape vine [draped over a high wall] and from a date palm that the poor cannot reach to grab except at great danger40 the owner of the land should bring it down41 and divide it among them. If they all desire that it be left to be grabbed, that option is followed. If, however, ninety-nine say that they desire to that it be left to be grabbed and one says that it should be divided, we listen to the latter, for his statement is in accord with Torah law.42 We obligate the owner to bring it down and divide it among them.
Halacha 17
At three times during the day,43 pe'ah is divided among the poor or left for them to take: at daybreak, at noon, and at minchah.44When a poor person does not come at these times, he is not allowed to take, so that there will be fixed times for the poor so that they will all gather together to take [pe'ah].
Why wasn't only one time a day established [for the poor to take]? Because there are poor nursing mothers that need to eat at the beginning of the day.45And there are poor children who are not awake in the morning and will not reach the field until midday and there are elderly people who will not come until the late afternoon.46
Halacha 18
When a poor person takes some of the pe'ah and throws it over the remainder, falls on it, or spreads his garment over it,47 we penalize him and make him relinquish it. Even what he took48 is removed from his possession and given to another poor person. [These laws] also apply with regard to leket and to a sheave that was forgotten.
Halacha 19
[The following rules apply if a person] took pe'ah and said: "This is for the poor person, so-and-so." If the person who took possession of the pe'ah is also poor, [the acquisition is binding]. Since he has the right to acquire it himself, he may acquire it for the other person.49 If [the person who took possession] was rich, he does not acquire it for him.50 Instead, he should give it to the poor person he finds first.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
In the following halachah, the Rambam explains how each of the five factors he mentions here is significant and excludes a different type of produce.
|
| 2. |
I.e., protected against thieves.
|
| 3. |
To keep over a long period of time.
|
| 4. |
All these concepts are implied by the word "harvest"; see the Sifri to the prooftext cited.
|
| 5. |
I.e., they are used for dye and the like.
|
| 6. |
I.e., they don't have roots in the earth through which they derive nurture (ibid.).
|
| 7. |
I.e., a field does not have to be of a given size.
|
| 8. |
The prooftext uses a plural term.
|
| 9. |
I.e., taking the produce for themselves. If, however, they harvested it for the sake of the Jews,pe'ah must be given, as stated in Halachah 10.
|
| 10. |
Although pe'ah must be given even if the grain was harvested (Chapter 1, Halachah 2), that is only because the obligation was incurred at the time of harvest. In these instances, the field was destroyed and the Jew received no benefit from the harvest. Hence, there is no obligation to leavepe'ah.
|
| 11. |
The pe'ah is included in the standing grain. Since that was stolen by the thieves, it is considered as if they stole the portion due the poor.
|
| 12. |
He need not, however, leave pe'ah for the portion stolen by the thieves.
|
| 13. |
For the pe'ah is in the remaining half. Since the purchaser was obviously aware that the first half of the field had been harvested, he implicitly accepted the responsibility to leave pe'ah for the part of the field that had been harvested previously. For the owner has no right to sell the portion of the crops belonging to the poor [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 2:8)].
|
| 14. |
I.e., he purchases the field from the Temple treasury with the understanding that he must leavepe'ah for the entire field.
|
| 15. |
Since he consecrated the crop after he harvested it, he was already obligated to leave pe'ah for it.
|
| 16. |
See Chapter 3, Halachah 23, which mentions laws that are relevant to this situation.
|
| 17. |
He does not have to leave pe'ah for the amount that he harvested previously. The rationale is that since he harvested it indiscriminately, his act is not considered as significant. It is as if he picked some grapes haphazardly. As the Rambam continues to state, pe'ah is not required for such a harvest. Hence, when he harvests the grapes for the vat, he must leave pe'ah only for the grapes he is harvesting at that time.
|
| 18. |
As explained above, a person is obligated to leave pe'ah only when he "harvests" his field. If he just gathers his food in a haphazard sporadic manner, he is not considered to have harvested and hence, is not liable to leave pe'ah.
|
| 19. |
Here, also, the same rationale applies. Since the produce did not ripen completely, reaping it is not considered as a "harvest" (Menachot 71b).
|
| 20. |
Or any of the other "presents to the poor" [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah4:7)].
|
| 21. |
For at the time he harvested it, it was his private property.
|
| 22. |
Because at the time he harvested it, he was not obligated to observe these mitzvot.
|
| 23. |
The Rambam's wording is perplexing, for he refers to two differing opinions in Pe'ah 4:6. To explain: That mishnah states: "When a gentile harvested his field and afterwards, converted, he is exempt from pe'ah, leket, and shichachah. Rabbi Yehudah obligates him in shichachah, becauseshichachah applies only when sheaves [are transferred]."
The first opinion in the mishnah maintains that we draw an equation between the obligation ofshichachah that applies to standing grain and the obligation of shichachah that applies to sheaves. Since shichachah does not apply to one, it does not apply to the other. Rabbi Yehudah, by contrast, maintains that each obligation of shichachah should be considered independently. The Rambam subscribes to the first opinion, but borrows the wording used by Rabbi Yehudah.
|
| 24. |
The Radbaz explains that we suspect that they will give either less than the required amount and thus disadvantage the poor or give more than the required amount and thus disadvantage the owner.
|
| 25. |
The fact that the individuals who did the actual harvesting were not obligated to fulfill the mitzvah does not remove the responsibility from the owner of the field.
|
| 26. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 2.
|
| 27. |
For the produce he leaves as pe'ah is not his, and hence, he is not obligated to tithe it. Nor are the poor, because they were not the owners at the time it was harvested. See Hilchot Terumot 2:9.
|
| 28. |
I.e., one might think that he is liable, because such a large gift would be considered as a present (for which tithes must be given) and not as pe'ah. Hence it is necessary to state that this is not so (Radbaz).
|
| 29. |
For he is already obligated to give tithes once he completes winnowing.
|
| 30. |
Without subtracting the amount set aside as tithes from the pe'ah.
|
| 31. |
The Tosefta (Pe'ah, ch. 1) states that this measure was instituted for the sake of the poor, so that their time would not be wasted waiting in limbo until the owner of the field designated a portion of the field as pe'ah. Instead, they could judge when he would complete his harvest and come at that time alone.
|
| 32. |
He need not, however, leave pe'ah for the entire field. The pe'ah that he separated originally is effective in discharging the obligation for the crops harvested before it was separated.
|
| 33. |
On one side of his field. Our translation is based on the gloss of the Radbaz.
|
| 34. |
Although the owner did not explicitly say "And also this," we interpret that as his intent. Since this question is left unresolved by Nedarim 6b, the Rambam rules stringently (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 35. |
For they are acting on the owner's behalf.
|
| 36. |
If, however, a poor person sees the owner separating pe'ah, he may take it, for he can assume that the owner consciously separated it.
|
| 37. |
In contrast to the following halachah, here the Rambam is speaking about orchards with low trees which are not dangerous for the poor to climb.
|
| 38. |
Instead of each person grabbing whatever he could.
|
| 39. |
For the Torah instructs us to "leave" the pe'ah for the poor, implying that each one takes what he can get (Radbaz).
|
| 40. |
Obviously, people vying with each other at heights for food could be severely dangerous.
|
| 41. |
As he harvests the remainder of his crop.
|
| 42. |
Because of the danger involved.
|
| 43. |
Neither less, nor more.
|
| 44. |
I.e., minchah ketanah, an hour and fifteen minutes before sunset.
|
| 45. |
So it was established that pe'ah would be divided in the morning so that they would receive a portion at that time.
|
| 46. |
Thus a time was established to enable every type of poor person to gather the pe'ah at an appropriate time.
|
| 47. |
I.e., he is attempting to take possession of it, but is not employing accepted kinyanim, formal means of acquisition and hence, he is not entitled to that grain.
|
| 48. |
And would rightfully belong to him.
|
| 49. |
See Hilchot Gezeilah ViAveidah 17:3, Hilchot Mechirah 4:15, which quote this principle is a binding construct in Jewish business law.
|
| 50. |
For he has no right to acquire it himself.
|
| 51. |
A coin of the Talmudic period.
|
| 52. |
And therefore able to be acquired by the finder.
|
| 53. |
And he acquires it through a formal kinyan.
|
Matnot Aniyiim - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
Pe'ah should not be left in one field for another field.
What is implied? If [a person] owned two fields, he should not harvest one entirely and leave the amount of pe'ah appropriate for both in the second field. [This is derived from Leviticus 23:22:] "Do not completely remove [the grain in] the corners of your field." [Implied is] that one should leave in each field thepe'ah that is appropriate for it. If one left [pe'ah] from one field for another, it is not pe'ah.
Halacha 2
Although one's entire field was sowed with one crop, if there was a stream - even if did not flow1 - or an irrigation ditch - provided water flowed through it and it was established2 - in the midst of the field that would prevent one from harvesting both sides at the same time,3 it is considered as two fields and one should give pe'ah on each side for the portion there.
Halacha 3
Similarly, a path belonging to a private individual which is four cubits wide or a public thoroughfare which is sixteen cubits wide separates [between one field and another]. [Different rules apply regarding] a private path that is less than four cubits wide or a public path that is less than sixteen cubits wide.4 If it is permanent, i.e., it is maintained in the summer and in the rainy season, it is considered as a separation. If it is not permanent in the rainy season, it is not considered as a separation and [the entire area] is considered as one field.
Halacha 4
There are other factors which constitute a separation into two fields:
a) land that was uncultivated, that was neither sown, nor plowed;
b) land left fallow, that was plowed, but not sown;
c) crops were interrupted with another crop, e.g., there was wheat on either side and barley in the middle;5
d) one harvested in the middle of his field before the grain reached a third of its maturity and plowed the portion which he harvested.6
[The above applies] provided the width of each of the above is three rows of plowing. [This is] less7 than the area necessary to sow a quarter [of a kav].8
When does the above apply? With regard to a small field that is 50 cubits by two cubits or less. If it is larger than this uncultivated or fallow land does not cause it to be divided in two unless it was as wide as the area necessary to sow a quarter of a kav.9 [In this instance,] even the smallest amount of another crop creates a separation.10
Halacha 5
If locusts consumed [a field] in its midst or ants destroyed it, should one plow the portion that was consumed,11 it is considered to be a separation.
Halacha 6
[The following law applies when one] sows [crops] on a mountain [slope] that is not level, but instead has knolls and hollows. Even though he cannot plow it all at once and sow it all at once, but instead must plow the knolls by themselves and the hollows by themselves, it is considered as a single field. He should leave one portion of pe'ah at the end of the mountain for the entire mountain.12
Halacha 7
[The following laws apply when one sows crops on] terraced land. [When each terrace] is ten handbreadths higher than the other, one should leave pe'ah[separately] for each terrace. If the heads of the rows are joined together, he should leave one portion of pe'ah for the entire area. If they were less than ten handbreadths higher, he should leave one portion of pe'ah even if the heads of the rows are not joined together.
[The following rules apply] if there was a rock covering the surface of the entire field. If he must lift up the plow from one side and place it on the other side, it is considered an interruption.13 If not, it is not considered an interruption.
Halacha 8
When a person sows a field that has trees - even though he sows it in squares14 between the trees and thus the entire crop does not come together as one - he should give one portion of pe'ah for the entire field. For it is known that it is one field; it is only the place of the trees that causes the crop to be divided.15
Halacha 9
When does the above apply? When all ten trees were located in an area in which a se'ah [of grain can be sowed].16 If, however, all ten trees were located in an area larger than that in which a se'ah [of grain can be sowed], he should leave pe'ah from every square separately. For the trees are far apart and they did not cause him to sow the field in squares.17
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
[The following laws apply when a person] sowed an entire field with one crop, but when certain places in the field began to dry out, he uprooted or pulled out the crops that had dried out on either side until the fresh crops appeared as separate blocks. If it was customary for people to sow that crop in individual rows, e.g., dill or mustard seed,20 he should leave pe'ah for each individual square, for an observer would say: "It was planted in separate rows."21 If it was a species that was usually sown throughout an entire field, e.g., grain or legumes, he should leave one portion of pe'ah for the entire [field].22
Halacha 12
Halacha 13
[The following law applies when a person] sowed a field with onions, beans, peas,25 or the like. If he had the intent to sell some of the fresh produce in the marketplace and leave part of the field to dry out and to be put aside in storage, he is obligated to leave pe'ah separately for both the portion he sells and the portion he harvests for storage.26 For [produce sold in] the market and produce set aside in storage are considered as two separate types.
Halacha 14
When a person sows his field with one species, he should leave one portion ofpe'ah even though he collects the crops in two grain heaps.27 If he sows two species, even though he makes only one grain heap, he should leave pe'ah for each species separately.
Halacha 15
[The following law applies when a person] sows two types of the same species, e.g., he sows two types of wheat28 or two types of barley. If he stores them in one grain heap, he should leave one portion of pe'ah. If he stores them in two grain heaps, he should leave separate portions of pe'ah. This is a halachah communicated by Moses from Sinai.29
Halacha 16
When brothers have divided [the estate they inherited], they should leave pe'ahseparately. If later30 they joined together in partnership, they should leave only one portion of pe'ah.31 When partners who have harvested half of a field break up the partnership, [one taking the grain that was harvested already and one taking the standing grain,] the one who took the grain that was harvested does not separate anything32 and the one who took the standing grain is required to separate only for the half which he took.33 If, afterwards, they reestablished their partnership34 and harvested the second half as partners, either one may separate [pe'ah] for his colleague's portion of the standing grain from his own portion of the standing grain,35 but not for the portion that was already harvested.36
Halacha 17
[There are situations in which pe'ah may be given from different parts of a field for other parts of the same field that were harvested afterwards. For example, the grain of] half of a field ripened to a third of its maturity and half did not ripen to that extent. [The owner] harvested half of the portion that reached maturity.37Afterwards, the remainder of the field ripened to one third and then he completed the harvest of the first half that reached [a third of its maturity] previously. He may separate [pe'ah] from [the crops] harvested first for the middle portion38 and from the middle portion on the first portion39 and on the last portion.40
Halacha 18
[The following laws apply when a person] sells separate portions in his field to different people. If he sold his entire field, each one of the purchasers should leave pe'ah for the portion that he purchased.41 If the owner of the field had begun to harvest his field and sold a portion and retained a portion, the owner of the field should leave [the amount of] pe'ah appropriate for the entire field. [The rationale is that] since he began harvesting [the field] he became obligated to [separate pe'ah for] the entire [field].42 If he sold [the portions of the field] before [he began harvesting], the purchaser should separate [pe'ah] for the portion he purchased and the owner for the remainder.
Halacha 19
Only a high fence that separates between [the branches of] the trees divides an orchard with regard [to the laws of pe'ah]. If, however, the fence separates on a lower level, but the branches and the trellises are intermingled above and touch the top of the fence, the orchard is considered a single entity and [only] one portion of pe'ah should be given.43
Halacha 20
When two people purchased one tree [in partnership], they should leave one portion of pe'ah from it. If one purchased the northern side [of a tree] and the other purchased [the southern side], each one should leave pe'ah individually.44
Halacha 21
[The following laws apply to] carob trees:45 Whenever one person stands next to one carob tree and his colleague stands next to another carob tree and they can see each other, [the trees] are considered as in one field and one portion ofpe'ah should be left for them.
[Different rules apply] if, however, those on the extremes can see those in the center, but those on the extremes cannot see each other, he may separate from those on the extremes for those on the center and from those in the center for those on the extremes.46 He may not, however, separate from those on one extreme for those on the other extreme.47
Halacha 22
[The following laws apply to] olive trees: All the trees on one of the sides of a city, e.g., all of the olive trees on the entire western side or the entire eastern side of a city are considered as being from one field and one portion of pe'ahshould be left for all of them.
Halacha 23
A person who harvests a portion of his vineyard from either side in order to lessen [the demand] on the vines so that the other clusters will have more room and increase in size is called one who reduces.48 We already explained49 that a person who harvests from one side is not considered as one who reduces. Therefore he must leave the amount of pe'ah appropriate for the entire field even though he harvested [with the intent of selling the grapes in] the marketplace. If, however, he reduces [the produce on the vines with the intent of] selling [the produce] in the marketplace, he should not leave pe'ah for the produce that he took off.50 [Nevertheless,] if he reduces [the produce on the vines with the intent of] taking it home,51 he should leave the amount of pe'ahappropriate for the entire field from [the grapes] he left to be trodden for the vat.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
I.e., even if at the time the stream was dried out, the ravine itself constitutes a separation (Radbaz). The Kessef Mishneh, however, interprets the Rambam as referring to a stream with water.
|
| 2. |
I.e., an irrigation ditch constitutes a separation only when water flows through it throughout the year.
|
| 3. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe'ah 2:2), the Rambam explains that this refers to a situation where a person standing on one side of the irrigation ditch cannot extend his hand and harvest the produce growing on the other.
|
| 4. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam makes a distinction between a path owned by a private individual and one used by people at large, explaining that a path owned by a private person is continually used by him. Hence, even if it is narrow, it is considered a separation. The public, by contrast, has many paths at their disposal and will not necessarily follow a particular path. Hence, unless a public path is very wide or permanent, it is not considered as a separation.
|
| 5. |
We are speaking here about a situation where it is unnecessary to make a separation because of the laws of kilayim (mixed species; see Hilchot Kilayim, the latter part of ch. 3). If it is necessary to make a separation for that reason, that separation will be large enough to constitute a separation for pe'ah as well.
|
| 6. |
As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 7, one is not obligated to leave pe'ah for such a field if he harvested it in such a preliminary state. Nevertheless, unless he plows it, the harvest alone is not considered significant enough to have divided the field with regard to the other crops (Kessef Mishneh). Needless to say, if it already grew to a third of its development and hence requiredpe'ah for its own crop, it is only considered as a divider if the land was plowed (Radbaz).
|
| 7. |
According to the Rambam's opinion, this is a far smaller figure, while according to the Ra'avad, the difference is not that great (Radbaz). The Ra'avad bases his interpretation on the treatment of this subject in the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 2:2), claiming that that text does not support the Rambam's ruling. The Kessef Mishneh explains that there is a version of the Jerusalem Talmud that supports the Rambam's position and maintains that the Ra'avad's version is in error.
|
| 8. |
The latter measure is slightly more than ten and one fifth cubits by ten and one fifth by approximately ten and one fifth cubits (Hilchot Kilayim 3:9 and notes).
|
| 9. |
Since the entire field is larger, the area which creates the separation must also be larger.
|
| 10. |
The Radbaz questions why leniency is granted with regard to separation when another crop is sown and explains that it is uncommon to sow a small amount of a second crop in between two larger portions of one crop. Hence, one can assume that it was done so only for the sake of making a distinction.
|
| 11. |
If, however, one does not plow the consumed portion, it is not considered as a separation (Menachot 71b).
|
| 12. |
This follws the second interpretation given by the Rambam in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 2:2).
|
| 13. |
Since the rock divides the field, it is considered as two separate entities. Hence, he must leavepe'ah for each portion of the field individually. The commentaries question why this instance is different than the terraces that are less than ten handbreadths higher than each other mentioned in the first clause, for there too, he must lift the plow and move it to the side while plowing. TheKessef Mishneh explains that the terraces are different because they can be sewn and hence they appear as a single field, while the rock cannot be sewn.
|
| 14. |
The term the Rambam uses literally means "the mold used to make bricks." That term is employed because the squares resemble such a mold [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 3:1).
|
| 15. |
I.e., had there not been trees in the field, the entire field would have been sown as a single entity. It was the presence of the trees alone that caused him to divide it. Thus since it is essentially one field, he leaves one portion of pe'ah.
|
| 16. |
An area 50 cubits by 50 cubits (Hilchot Shabbat 16:3; Hilchot Kilayim 4:7).
|
| 17. |
Instead, he considered each block separate for other reasons. Hence, pe'ah should be left for each one individually. The Ra'avad takes issue with the Rambam, basing his objections on the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 3:1). The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the Rambam had a different version of the Jerusalem Talmud and that accounts for the difference between their positions. They also maintain that the Rambam's position is sounder logically, for the larger the field, the more likely it is that each separate block should be considered an independent field.
|
| 18. |
Needless to say, there must be a distinction between the vegetables and the onions so that the laws of kilayim, mixed species, are not violated.
|
| 19. |
In this instance as well, the physical separation does not cause the squares to be considered as separate fields. The Radbaz suggests that the reason the principle stated in Halachah 4 - that if another crop separates between two plantings of one crop, separate portions of pe'ah should be left - does not apply here is that there is no obligation to leave pe'ah for vegetables.
|
| 20. |
The commentaries note that the Rambam's statements here appear to contradict his statement inHilchot Kilayim 1:9, in which he states that it is customary to sow entire fields of mustard seed. They are, however, reinforced by his statements in Hilchot Kilayim 3:18.
|
| 21. |
And thus each square is considered as a separate field, requiring its own pe'ah.
|
| 22. |
For the whole field will be considered as a single entity.
|
| 23. |
For then it appears as a single field.
|
| 24. |
For then each portion appears as a separate field. The Ra'avad disputes the Rambam's ruling based on his interpretation of the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 3:1). The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain the Rambam's position within the context of that passage.
|
| 25. |
The commentaries note that there are some species of peas that are considered vegetables - and for which pe'ah need not be left - and others are considered as legumes. Here we are speaking about a species that are considered legumes.
|
| 26. |
For each is considered as a separate harvest. The Radbaz explains that even if the person does not divide the field into separate portions, but rather harvests a small amount from each place both times, the two harvests are considered as separate. The difference in the time when they are harvested and the purpose for which they are harvested distinguishes them from each other.
|
| 27. |
This halachah is speaking about a situation where a person transgressed and harvested his entire field and then desires to correct his actions by leaving pe'ah. The Radbaz states that the Rambam's ruling applies even if he makes these grain heaps at separate times.
|
| 28. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 2:5), the Rambam gives examples: "thin kernels or thick kernels, red wheat and green wheat."
|
| 29. |
I.e., a point from the Oral Tradition for which there is no direct source in the Written Law.
|
| 30. |
Before the harvesting of the field (Radbaz).
|
| 31. |
As is the law concerning partners (Chapter 2, Halachah 3).
|
| 32. |
For at the time the grain was harvested, there was no obligation to separate pe'ah from it, for the obligation to separate pe'ah applies to the standing grain (Chapter 2, Halachah 4). Hence the partner who receives the harvested grain considers the situation analogous to that of a person who harvests half a field and then sells the remainder, in which instance, the purchaser - i.e., the second partner - is obligated to separate pe'ah for the entire field (ibid.:5).
|
| 33. |
The rationale is that the second partner does not accept that rationale. Instead, he claims that we apply the principle of bereirah - that retroactively, it is considered as if the two partner's portions were divided from the outset. Thus from the outset, he was never required to do more than dividepe'ah from his individual portion.
One might protest that in this situation, the outcome is that the poor people do not receive theirpe'ah. Indeed, that is the case. Our Sages did not resolve whether the principle of bereirah should be applied or not. Hence, each partner can claim that the responsibility for leaving pe'ah for the first half of the field lies on the other partner and not on him. Neither is not obligated to pay from his own funds, because in financial matters, we follow the principle: When one desires to expropriate money from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.
|
| 34. |
Before harvesting the second half of the field, agreeing that each one received half of the grain that was harvested and half of the grain to be harvested (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 35. |
Since they reestablished their partnership, one pe'ah can be left for the remaining portion of the field. Either of the partners may do this, leaving a portion for his own grain and that of his partner. He does not have to do this for the grain in the first part of the field, as the Rambam continues to explain.
|
| 36. |
Since there was no pe'ah required to be left for it originally, there is no requirement to leave pe'ahfor it now.
|
| 37. |
And did not leave pe'ah for this harvest although he was obligated to do so.
|
| 38. |
I.e., the crops that ripened initially, but were not harvested. Since they ripened at the same time as those which harvested first, they can be included in the same pe'ah.
|
| 39. |
As above, since they ripened at the same time, they could be considered a single field. TheKessef Mishneh states that this is preferable, because as mentioned previously, pe'ah should be left from standing grain for the portions harvested previously.
|
| 40. |
Since this portion ripened before the second portion was harvested, it and the second portion could be considered as part of a single field and one measure of pe'ah would be sufficient for them both.
|
| 41. |
For each portion of the field is considered as a separate entity.
|
| 42. |
Chulin 138a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 23:22: "When you reap the harvest of your land" which implies that the obligation to leave pe'ah begins when on starts reaping.
|
| 43. |
Based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 2:3), it appears that if trees are separated by a fence that is ten handbreadths high, they are considered as in separate fields unless their branches are intermingled above. If their branches are intermingled above, they are considered as one field, regardless of the height of the fence.
|
| 44. |
Since they are not partners, the portion of each one is considered individually.
|
| 45. |
I.e., in contrast to other trees that are separated by fences, different laws apply with regard to carobs (Rav Yosef Corcus). The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation of this law.
The Ra'avad explains that carobs and olives (mentioned in the following halachah) are governed by different laws than other trees because they are tall and the branches of one tree are likely to become intermingled with another. The Radbaz does not accept this explanation, because palm trees are taller than carobs and olives and pear trees are also taller and more likely to be intermingled. He explains instead that these trees are singled out, because they are extremely common in Eretz Yisrael.
|
| 46. |
Since they can see each other, the principles stated in the first clause apply.
|
| 47. |
Because they cannot see each other.
|
| 48. |
The owner is not obligated to leave pe'ah for the fruit harvested for this reason, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.
|
| 49. |
Chapter 2, Halachah 6.
|
| 50. |
For the primary reason he harvested it was to diminish the pressure on his vines. Since he is not interested in the harvest per se, he is not obligated to leave pe'ah.
|
| 51. |
The fact that he takes the produce home demonstrates that his harvest is a calculated act and hence requires pe'ah.
|
Matnot Aniyiim - Chapter 4
Halacha 1
What is meant by leket? Produce that fall from the sickle when one is reaping or falls from his hand when he gathers the stalks [of grain]1 and harvests. [The above applies] provided only one or two stalks fell. If, however, three fell at the same time, the three belong to the owner of the field.2 If grain fell from behind the sickle or behind one's hand,3 it is not leket even if only one stalk fell.
Halacha 2
When he was harvesting by hand without a sickle, the stalks that fall from his hand are not leket.4 When, however, one pulls out crops that are usually pulled out by hand, those which fall from his hand are leket.5 If he was harvesting [with a sickle] or pulling out crops that are usually pulled out and after he harvested an armful [of produce] or after he pulled out a handful, [the produce] fell from his hand because he was struck by a thorn, [the produce] belongs to the owner.6
Halacha 3
[The following laws apply if a person] was harvesting and left a stalk of grain standing without harvesting it, although he harvested all the grain around it. If its tip could reach the standing grain at its side and it could be harvested with that grain, it belongs to the owner of the field.7 If not, it belongs to the poor.
Halacha 4
[The following laws apply if] there were two stalks next to each other, the inner stalk could be harvested with [the remainder of] the standing grain8 and the outer could be harvested together with the inner stalk, but not with the standing grain. The inner stalk is retrieved9 and it retrieves the outer stalk.10 For it is considered as falling from the sickle, even though it was not harvested yet.11
Stalks that are among the straw belong to the owner of the field.12
Halacha 5
[The following laws apply when] the wind scattered sheaves [of grain] and the harvest belonging to the owner becomes mixed with the leket. We estimate how much leket the field would produce and that amount is given to the poor. [A greater amount is not required]13 because this comes about due to forces beyond one's control. How much is this measure? Four kabbin for an area in which a kor of wheat would grow.14
Halacha 6
What should the owner of a field do if leket fell to the ground, it was not collected by the poor and he made a grainheap of his harvest on this earth?15He should move his grain pile to another place, [but] all the stalks that are touching the ground belong to the poor. [The rationale is that] we do not know which of them was leket and whenever there is a doubt concerning [whether produce] is from the presents for the poor, [it is given] to the poor.16 [This is implied by the term (Leviticus 23:22):] "Leave," i.e., leave from your produce for them.
Halacha 7
Why don't we make an estimation and give the poor [the amount that would be left as leket?17 Because [the owner] transgressed and made his grainheap onleket, he was penalized, even if he did so inadvertently. Even if the leket was barley and he made a grainheap of wheat upon it,18 even if he called for the poor [to collect the leket] and they did not come, and even if others made the grainheap without his knowledge, all of the produce touching the ground belongs to the poor.
Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when a person] must fertilize his field before the poor collect the leket in it. If his loss will be greater than the loss to the poor, he is permitted to fertilize it. If the loss to the poor will be greater than his loss, it is forbidden for him to fertilize. If he collects all the leket and places it on the fence until a poor person comes and collects it, that is an expression of the quality of piety.
Halacha 9
When kernels of grain are found in ant holes, if the holes were located in the midst of the standing grain, [the kernels] belong to the owner of the field, for the poor people do not have a right to anything in the standing grain. If they were located in the place which was harvested,19 they belong to the poor, because perhaps they were taken from the leket. Even if the kernel [in the hole] is black,20 we do not say that it was from the previous year, because whenever there is a doubt concerning [whether produce] is leket,21 we consider it as leket.
Halacha 10
When a stalk of leket becomes intermingled with the grain heap, the owner must separate two stalks. On the first, he says: "If this is leket, it belongs to the poor. If it is not leket, may the tithes for which I am obligated from this stalk22 be fixed on the other stalk."23 He then goes back and makes this same stipulation on the second stalk. He then gives one of the stalks to the poor and the other one will be [part of] the tithes.
Halacha 11
A person should not hire a worker24 with the intent that his son collect the leketafter him.25 Sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and a person who purchased standing grain from a colleague to harvest, by contrast, may have their sons collect after them.26 A worker may bring his wife and his children to collect leketafter him.27 [This applies] even if he hired him with the intent that he receive half of the harvest, one third, or one fourth as his wage.28
Halacha 12
A person who does not allow the poor to collect the leket, allows one but does not allow another, or helps one of them, [giving him an advantage] over his colleagues is considered as stealing from the poor.29
Halacha 13
It is forbidden for a person to have a lion or the like rest in his field so that the poor will fear and flee.30 When there are those among the poor who are not entitled to collect leket,31 if the owner can rebuke them, he should. If not, he should allow them [to collect it as an expression of] the ways of peace.
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
What is meant by peret?35 One grape or two grapes that separate from the cluster in the midst of the harvest. If three grapes fall at the same time, they are not peret.
Halacha 16
When a person was reaping [his grape harvest] and cut off a cluster, [that cluster] became entangled with its leaves and it fell to the ground and became divided into individual grapes, it is not peret. If, however, [the reaper] was harvesting and throwing the clusters to the earth, [more stringent rules apply]. Even if half the cluster is discovered [broken into individual grapes], it is peret. Similarly, [even] if an entire cluster was broken up into individual grapes, they are peret.36 When a person places a basket below the vine at the time he is harvesting,37 he is stealing from the poor.
Halacha 17
What is an olelet?38 This is a small cluster which is not thick like ordinary clusters and does not have a kataf, nor are its grapes notfot39 one on top of the other, but rather scattered. If it has a kataf, but not a nataf or a nataf, but not akataf, it belongs to the owner of the vineyard. If there is a doubt, it should be given to the poor.
Halacha 18
What is kataf? Small clusters connected to the central stem40 [of the larger cluster], one on top of the other. [What is] nataf? Grapes connected to the center stem and hanging down. [The above applies] provided all of the individual grapes in the ollelot can touch the palm of his hand.41
Why is such [an underdeveloped cluster] called an ollel?42 Because it is comparable to a developed cluster in the same way an infant is comparable to an adult.
Halacha 19
The owner of the vineyard is not obligated to harvest the underdeveloped clusters and give them to the poor.43 Instead, [he should leave them for the poor] to harvest themselves. An individual grape is considered as an ollelet.
Halacha 20
[The following laws apply when] there was a cluster on a branch of a vine and an underdeveloped cluster on an offshoot of the branch. If [the offshoot] can be harvested with the cluster, it belongs to the owner of the vineyard.44 If not, it belongs to the poor.
Halacha 21
When a vineyard is comprised entirely of underdeveloped clusters, it belongs to the poor. [This is derived from Leviticus 19:10:] "Do not collect underdeveloped clusters in your vineyard," i.e., even if it comprises the entire vineyard. [The laws of] peret and ollelot apply only in a vineyard.45
Halacha 22
The poor do not have the right to take peret and ollelot until the owner of the vineyard begins harvesting his vineyard, as [Deuteronomy 24:21] states: "When you harvest your vineyard, do not collect underdeveloped clusters."46 How much must [the owner] harvest for [the poor] to receive this right? Three clusters that will produce a revi'it [of wine].
Halacha 23
When a person consecrates his vineyard before he becomes aware of the underdeveloped clusters, the underdeveloped clusters do not belong to the poor.47 If he has become aware of the underdeveloped clusters, the underdeveloped clusters belong to the poor.48 They must pay a fee wages for their [increase in value] while they grew49 to the Temple treasury.50
Halacha 24
When one prunes a vine after he became aware of ollelot, he may prune according to his ordinary pattern. Just as he cuts off [fully-formed] clusters, he cuts off underdeveloped clusters.51
Halacha 25
When a gentile sells his vineyard to a Jew to harvest, the Jew is obligated to leave the underdeveloped clusters.52 When a Jew and a gentile are partners in a vineyard, there is an obligation [to leave] ollelot in the portion belonging to the Jew. That belonging to the gentile is exempt.
Halacha 26
Halacha 27
[The following laws apply when a person] has five vines, harvests them, and [brings the grapes] into his home. If his intent is to eat them while they are grapes, he is not obligated [to leave] peret, shichichah,57 and [neta] revai'i,58but is obligated [to leave] the ollelot [for the poor].59If he reaped them to make wine, he is obligated in all of the above unless he left a portion [unharvested].60
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
I.e., he was gathering several stalks of grain together in his hand in order to cut them with a sickle. In the process, some fell from his hand. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 4:10), the Rambam summarizes the principle as follows: "[Crops] encompassed by the hand or by the sickle that fall are leket."
|
| 2. |
For three is a significant quantity that the owner would not be willing to abandon willfully.
|
| 3. |
I.e., that fell when he moved the sickle or his hand back.
|
| 4. |
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 4:5) derives this from exegesis of the phrase (Leviticus 23:22): "You shall not gather the gleanings of your harvest." "Your harvest" implies crops cut with a sickle.
|
| 5. |
This does not contradict the concept stated in the previous note. Since this is the usual way these crops are harvested, the laws of leket apply when produce falls from one's hands.
|
| 6. |
Since it did not fall from his hand as a by-product of the harvesting process.
|
| 7. |
The Sifri derives this law from the exegesis of the phrase (Deuteronomy 24:19): "Do not return to take it." As long as the stalk of grain can be harvested together with the standing grain, one is not "going back" to harvest it. A question, however, arises: Why does the Rambam (and his source,Pe'ah 5:2) mention this law in the context of the laws of leket and not together with those governing shichichah (the subject of the verse cited)? This question is resolved in Halachah 4.
|
| 8. |
And thus meets the criteria mentioned in the previous halachah.
|
| 9. |
I.e., it is considered as the owner's.
|
| 10. |
Since it can be harvested together with the inner stalk, it is governed by the laws that apply to it.
|
| 11. |
This refers to the previous halachah and serves as an explanation why these stalks are considered as leket (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 12. |
Because, generally, the laws of leket do not apply to grain that was not harvested.
|
| 13. |
As in the following halachot, where the owner is penalized for mixing his harvest with the leket.
|
| 14. |
This area is 75000 sq. cubits. Shiurei Torah 3:31 states that according to the Rambam, a kav is equivalent to 1626 grams.
|
| 15. |
Thus mixing his harvest with the leket.
|
| 16. |
The Radbaz writes that, as stated in the following halachah, this measure is a penalty imposed upon the owner. Hence, even when there is no doubt involved, as exemplified there, we give the poor all the stalks that are touching the ground. Hence, the Rambam's words must be interpreted as meaning: Since we penalized the owner, the produce is taken from him in the case of a doubt.
|
| 17. |
As in Halachah 5.
|
| 18. |
And thus there is no doubt which is leket and which is ordinary produce.
|
| 19. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 4:11), the Rambam speaks of the grain "behind the reapers."
|
| 20. |
And thus appears to have been there for a long time.
|
| 21. |
For it is possible that the black kernel is from the present year, but from inferior grain.
|
| 22. |
There is no obligation to separate tithes from leket. The stipulation is necessary because tithes must be separated while the produce is still in one's possession, before the stalk is given to the poor.
|
| 23. |
We have translated the Rambam's words directly, although there is an obvious difficulty with them. If we say, as implied by his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 5:2), that one of the stalks will be designated for the tithes, then since the identity of that stalk is not known and one of the stalks will be given to the poor, it is possible that the poor will be given the stalk that contains the tithes. Furthermore, leket cannot be used for tithes.
Therefore, the commentaries (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh, et al) suggest that we are speaking about a third stalk which would also be used for the tithes of the entire field. The stipulations are made separately on the two stalks and then one is given to the poor and the other to the owner. And the third stalk is used for the tithes of the field.
|
| 24. |
I.e., a poor man who is entitled to collect leket.
|
| 25. |
I.e., this would be like a tip for the worker. In addition to his wages, he would receive the leket his son would collect. This is, however, considered as stealing from the poor, because the worker is likely to hire himself out for a lower wage in return for this consideration. As indicated by the continuation of the halachah, there is no difficulty with the worker's family collecting the leket. Since he - and/or they - are poor, they have that privilege. The difficulty is with stipulating it in his contract.
|
| 26. |
Since they are not being paid a wage, but instead receive the produce and give a major share back to the owner, there is no difficulty in having the son collect the leket from the field, for they will not reduce their share for the license to have their son collect the leket. The other poor do not feel that the share-cropper is infringing upon their rights, because they expect that - were they to have the opportunity - their sons would be given the same privilege.
|
| 27. |
As stated above, since the worker is poor, both his wife and his children are given this privilege.
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| 28. |
The Tzaphnat Paneach differentiates between this instance and that of the share-cropper mentioned in the previous clause, noting that here the worker's wife is mentioned and there she is not. He states that the wife of the sharecropper or the like is not entitled to collect the leket. Since he owns the produce, he is not entitled to collect a share. And since he is not entitled to collect a share, his wife may not do so either. His son may, however, because he is an independent person. The rationale is that the share-cropper is the owner of the harvest and he pays a share to the owner of the land. In this instance, by contrast, the harvest belongs to the owner and he pays a share to the worker. Hence, the worker is poor and his wife has the right to collect the leket.
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| 29. |
For unlike terumah and other agricultural obligations, the owner has no right to control who will be the recipient of leket.
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| 30. |
And thus abandon the leket.
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| 31. |
See Chapter 9, Halachah 13.
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| 32. |
I.e., instead of leaving it to be the property of the poor, he desires to declare it ownerless so that it can be acquired by the rich as well as the poor.
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| 33. |
I.e., once the majority has fallen, the status of the entire quantity is defined (Radbaz).
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| 34. |
But instead, it belongs to the poor (see Temurah 25a).
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| 35. |
Individual grapes that fall that must be left for the poor, as stated in Leviticus 19:10.
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| 36. |
This law follows the same logic which motivates Halachot 6-7 which states that an owner who makes a grainheap on the place where leket has fallen must give all the stalks touching the ground to the poor. In this instance as well, since his grapes become mixed with those which fell as peret, we penalize him and preventing him from taking any of the individual grapes.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:4) mentions two opinions: one which states that this stringency applies only to half a cluster and one that it applies even to the entire cluster. The Rambam follows the latter view.
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| 37. |
So that all the individual grapes will fall into it.
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| 38. |
An underdeveloped grape cluster which should be left for the poor, as stated in Leviticus, loc. cit..
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| 39. |
These two Hebrew terms are defined in the following halachah.
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| 40. |
The Hebrew term used by the Rambam literally means "backbone."
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| 41. |
I.e., the small clusters are not large enough to prevent all the individual grapes from touching his palm.
The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation of this phrase which is taken from the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 7:4). The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's interpretation.
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| 42. |
Which means "infant" in Hebrew.
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| 43. |
As stated above with regard to pe'ah (Chapter 2, Halachah 15). Here too, the command for the mitzvah uses the term "leave," implying that the mitzvah is not to give the underdeveloped clusters to the poor, but to allow them to collect them.
The Radbaz writes that if a vine is elevated to a high trestle and it would be dangerous for the poor to climb up and collect the underdeveloped clusters, the owner should harvest them for the poor. Note the parallel in Chapter 2, Halachah 16.
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| 44. |
Thus this ruling parallels the ruling in Chapter 4, Halachah 3, with regard to leket.
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| 45. |
I.e., and not to any other type of fruit.
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| 46. |
I.e., the obligation to observe these mitzvot begins "When you harvest..." and not before.
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| 47. |
Instead, they are included in his consecration.
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| 48. |
Once he becomes aware of the underdeveloped clusters, they become the property of the poor and the owner cannot consecrate them, because a person cannot consecrate property that does not belong to him (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Pe'ah 7:8, based on the Jerusalem Talmud and Arachin 28a).
Tosafot Yom Tov asks: Since, as stated in the previous halachah, the poor are not entitled to the produce until the owner begins his harvest, seemingly, it remains the property of the owner and he has the right to consecrate it. He explains that although the poor do not have the right to collect it until the harvest begins, these clusters belong to them and not the owner and he does not have the right to consecrate them.
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| 49. |
I.e., for their increase in value from the time they were consecrated until they became ripe (ibid.).
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| 50. |
Because the grapes from the clusters belonging to the poor are deriving benefit from land and vine consecrated to the Temple treasury.
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| 51. |
I.e., just as he shows no concern for the clusters that will ultimately be his, he may ignore those that will ultimately belong to the poor. For until the harvest, there is no prohibition against cutting them off. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Pe'ah 7:5.
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| 52. |
For the obligation to leave ollelot takes effect only at the time of the harvest and the person performing the harvest is Jewish.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh note that the Rambam's source, the Tosefta (Pe'ah, the conclusion of ch. 3) also states the converse: that if a Jew sells his field to a gentile, the obligation to leave ollelot no longer applies and they question why the Rambam's omits this point.
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| 53. |
Produce from which terumah has not been separated.
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| 54. |
They belong to the poor and tithes need not be separated from them.
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| 55. |
The tenth which the Levites must separate from the tithes that they receive and give to the priests.
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| 56. |
I.e., as stated in Halachah 20, they are the Levite's private property and he can do with them as he sees fit. The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, but the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishnehexplain the Rambam's position.
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| 57. |
The Ra'avad adds that he is also not obligated to leave pe'ah. The Kessef Mishneh states that, as indicated by Chapter 2, Halachah 67, the Rambam would also accept this ruling.
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| 58. |
Neta Revai'i refers to the produce of the fourth year of a tree's growth which must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten in a state of ritual purity or exchanged for money that is brought to Jerusalem and used to purchase food that must be eaten in a state of ritual purity (see Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, chs. 9-10).
The owner is not considered as having harvested the grapes, but rather as having picked them for immediate use, e.g., as a snack. Hence he is freed from these obligations. Rambam LeAmaccepts this explanation with regard to peret and shichichah, but not neta revai'i. With regard to the first two, the obligations are dependent on harvesting and he is not considered to have harvested his grapes, but neta revai'i is not connected with harvesting, but rather is an obligation incumbent on the crops themselves.
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| 59. |
For the ollelot belong to the poor and are not dependent on whether one harvests the grapes to use as wine or as fruit.
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| 60. |
In which instance, he is not obligated for those he picked first, since he is not harvesting but taking the grapes for immediate use. The Ra'avad differs with this point and requires that the pe'ah for the entire crop be separated from the produce that remains and to leave peret and shichichah. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain the Rambam's position.
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• Thursday, Nissan 27, 5775 · 16 April 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: K'doshim, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 120-134.
Tanya: This quality of (p. 231)...The Esoteric Discipline. (p. 231).
The permissible, when done for one's pleasure,1 is completely evil, as the Alter Rebbe writes in Tanya, Chapter 7, for we are commanded, "sanctify yourself with what is permitted to you."2 One must introduce sanctity into those matters that are permissible so that they serve the purpose of enhancing one's Torah, mitzvot, fear-of-G-d and good character traits.
FOOTNOTES
1. E.g. eating kosher meat but like a glutton, etc.
2. Vayikra 19:2 and Ramban; Yevamot 20a.
Daily Thought:
Four Gates
“Judges and officers shall you appoint in all your cities…” (Deuteronomy 16:18)
Think of yourself as a city. You have four magical gates: The Gate of Seeing, the Gate of Listening, the Gate of Imagining and the Gate of Speaking.
Magical gates, because an Infinite G‑d enters your finite city through these gates. An infinite G‑d who cannot be squeezed within any place or boxed within any definition, but chooses to dress neatly in a wisdom called Torah—and these are your gates by which wisdom may enter.
That is why all the world competes to storm those gates. They want you to see the ugliness they see, hear the cacophony they hear, imagine the nonsense they imagine and speak without end. And then, you will desire all they desire and no room will be left in your city for that Infinite G‑d.
You only need master those gates and the city is yours.[Maamar Shoftim 5729.]
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