Today's Laws & Customs:
• Torah Reading
On the Eighth Day of Passover we read Deuteronomy 15:19-16:17. Like the reading for the second day, it catalogs the annual cycle of festivals, their special observances, and the offerings brought on these occasions to the Holy Temple in Jerusalem.
The Eighth Day's special connection with the Future Redemption is reflected in the Haftorah (reading from the Prophets) for this day--Isaiah 10:32-12:6.
• Yizkor
Yizkor, the remembrance prayer for departed parents, is recited today after the morning reading of the Torah.
Links:
The Yizkor Prayer
Honor Due to Parents
On Breavement and Mourning
• Moshiach's Meal
The last day of Passover ("Acharon Shel Pesach") is particularly associated withMoshiach and the future redemption. The Haftarah (reading from the Prophets) for this day is from Isaiah 11, which describes the promised future era of universal peace and divine perfection. Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov instituted the custom of partaking of a "Moshiach's meal" on the afternoon of the last day of Passover; in addition to the matzah eaten at "Moshiach's meal", the Rebbes of Chabad added the custom of drinking four cups of wine, as in the seder held on Passover's first days.
Links:
Haftarah for 8th of Passover
The Third Seder
Moshiach: an Anthology
• Count "Eight Days to the Omer" Tonight
Tomorrow is the eighth day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer for tomorrow'sdate tonight, after nightfall: "Today is eight days, which are one week and one day, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all daytomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day isShavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Chessed sheb'Gevurah -- "Kindness in Restraint"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" --Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed,Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
Today in Jewish History:
• Isaac Circumcised (1713 BCE)
Eight days following his birth on the 15th of Nissan (see Jewish history for that day), Isaac was circumcised; becoming the very first child to enter the covenant with G-d on the eighth day following his birth.
Links:
Why do we have a Circumcision?
The Commandment of Circumcision, the Brit Milah
• Encirclement of Jericho Begun (1273 BCE)
Shortly after crossing the Jordan River and entering the Land of Canaan, the Jews set their sights on conquering the walled and heavily fortified city of Jericho. Following Joshua's instructions, on the 22nd of Nissan the Israelites encircled Jericho. The Israelites marched around the city walls, led by the priests who carried the Holy Ark, and sounded the shofar (ram's horn).
This performance was repeated for seven days. On the seventh day, the walls of the city collapsed. (see Jewish History for the 28th of Nissan).
Links:
Crossing the Jordan
Joshua 6
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Shemini, 7th Portion Leviticus 11:33-11:47 with Rashi
• Chapter 11
33But any earthenware vessel, into whose interior any of them falls, whatever is inside it shall become unclean, and you shall break [the vessel] itself. לגוְכָל כְּלִי חֶרֶשׂ אֲשֶׁר יִפֹּל מֵהֶם אֶל תּוֹכוֹ כֹּל אֲשֶׁר בְּתוֹכוֹ יִטְמָא וְאֹתוֹ תִשְׁבֹּרוּ:
into whose interior: An earthenware vessel becomes unclean only through [the defiling item entering] its inner space [even if it does not touch the vessel wall. If it touches the outer wall, however, the vessel does not become unclean]. — [Chul. 24b] אל תוכו: אין כלי חרס מיטמא אלא מאוירו:
whatever is inside it becomes unclean: The vessel in turn defiles whatever is in its inner space (other editions: in its interior). כל אשר בתוכו יטמא: הכלי חוזר ומטמא מה שבאוירו:
and you shall break [the vessel] itself: This teaches us that it [an earthenware vessel] cannot be purified in a mikvah. [Consequently, if you wish to use it, you must break it so that it cannot be used for its original use.]- [Torath Kohanim 11:132] ואתו תשבורו: למד שאין לו טהרה במקוה:
34Of any food that is [usually] eaten, upon which water comes will become unclean, and any beverage that is [usually] drunk, which is in any vessel, shall become unclean. לדמִכָּל הָאֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל אֲשֶׁר יָבוֹא עָלָיו מַיִם יִטְמָא וְכָל מַשְׁקֶה אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁתֶה בְּכָל כְּלִי יִטְמָא:
Of any food that is [usually] eaten: This refers back to the preceding verse, [as if to say]: whatever is inside it shall become unclean… of any food that is [usually] eaten, upon which water comes-if it is inside an unclean earthenware vessel-will become unclean. Likewise, any liquid that is [usually] drunk, in any vessel, meaning that it is in the inner space of an unclean earthenware vessel, will become unclean. From here we learn many things. We learn that food becomes predisposed and prepared to contract uncleanness only if water had, at one time, come upon it. And once water has come upon it, the food can contract uncleanness forever, even if it is dry. Wine, oil, and whatever is called a beverage (מַשְׁקֶה) predisposes seeds to receive uncleanness, just as water [does] (Torath Kohanim 11:135). [The liquids that fall under the category of מַשְׁקֶה are: water, dew, oil, wine, milk, blood, and bee-honey.] For our verse [here] is to be expounded as follows: “upon which water comes will become unclean, or any beverage that is [usually] drunk, which is in any vessel, it shall become unclean.” [I.e.] the food [will become unclean]. Our rabbis also learned from this verse that an item with a secondary degree of uncleanness does not defile vessels, for we learned (Shab. 138b): One might think that all vessels would become defiled [when they enter] the inner space of an [unclean] earthenware vessel; Scripture, therefore, says (verses 3334): כֹּל אֲשֶׁר בְּתוֹכוֹ יִטְמָא [lit., “anything inside it becomes unclean]… מִכָּל הָאֹכֶל [lit., of any food]”; i.e., food and liquid are defiled by the inner space of an [unclean] earthenware vessel, but [other] vessels do not become defiled by the inner space of an [unclean] earthenware vessel. Because a שֶׁרֶץ is a primary source of uncleanness (אָב הַטֻּמְאָה), and the vessel that becomes defiled by it is a secondary source of uncleanness (וְלָד הַטֻּמְאָה). Consequently, it does not in turn defile [other] vessels contained within it. We also learned [from this verse] that if a שֶׁרֶץ fell into the inner space of an [earthenware] oven that contained bread, and the שֶׁרֶץ did not touch the bread, the oven becomes [defiled with] first degree [uncleanness], while the bread is [defiled with] second degree [uncleanness. In this case,] we do not say that the oven is perceived as though it were “filled with uncleanness,” so that the bread contained within becomes [defiled as well with] first degree [uncleanness], for if we were to say so, no vessel would be excluded from becoming defiled by the inner space of an earthenware vessel since uncleanness itself has directly touched the surface of this second vessel (Shab. 138b). We also learned [from this verse] about the contact of water [with food]-that this predisposes seeds [to receive uncleanness] only if the water wetted the seeds after they had been detached from the earth. For, if one were to say that they become predisposed [to contract uncleanness] while still attached [to the ground], there is [no food produce] upon which no water has come [at one time or another]. In that case, why would [Scripture] tell us: “upon which water comes”? [It must therefore mean: after it has been detached from the earth] (Torath Kohanim 11:150). We also learned [from this verse] that [unclean] food will defile other items only if the food has a [minimum] volume equal to a [hen’s] egg, as it is said, “[Any food] that is [usually] eaten,” meaning: [the amount of] food that can be eaten at one time. And our Sages estimated that the pharynx cannot hold more than [the volume of] a hen’s egg" (Yoma 80a). מכל האכל אשר יאכל: מוסב על מקרא העליון, כל אשר בתוכו יטמא, מכל האוכל אשר יאכל אשר יבא עליו מים והוא בתוך כלי חרס הטמא, יטמא. וכן כל משקה אשר ישתה בכל כלי, והוא בתוך כלי חרס הטמא, יטמא. למדנו מכאן דברים הרבה למדנו שאין אוכל מוכשר ומתוקן לקבל טומאה עד שיבאו עליו מים פעם אחת, ומשבאו עליו מים פעם אחת מקבל טומאה לעולם ואפילו נגוב. והיין והשמן וכל הנקרא משקה מכשיר זרעים לטומאה כמים. שכך יש לדרוש המקרא אשר יבא עליו מים או כל משקה אשר ישתה בכל כלי יטמא האוכל. ועוד למדו רבותינו מכאן, שאין ולד הטומאה מטמא כלים, שכך שנינו יכול יהיו כל הכלים מיטמאין מאויר כלי חרס, תלמוד לומר כל אשר בתוכו יטמא מכל האוכל, אוכל מיטמא מאויר כלי חרס, ואין כל הכלים מיטמאין מאויר כלי חרס, לפי שהשרץ אב הטומאה והכלי, שנטמא ממנו, ולד הטומאה, לפיכך אינו חוזר ומטמא כלים שבתוכו. ולמדנו עוד, שהשרץ שנפל לאויר תנור והפת בתוכו, ולא נגע השרץ בפת, התנור ראשון והפת שנייה. ולא נאמר רואין את התנור כאלו מלא טומאה ותהא הפת תחלה, שאם אתה אומר כן לא נתמעטו כל הכלים מלהטמא מאויר כלי חרס, שהרי טומאה עצמה נגעה בהן מגבן. ולמדנו עוד על ביאת מים, שאינה מכשרת זרעים אלא אם כן נפלו עליהן משנתלשו, שאם אתה אומר מקבלין הכשר במחובר, אין לך שלא באו עליו מים, ומהו אומר אשר יבוא עליו מים, משנתלשו. ולמדנו עוד שאין אוכל מטמא אחרים אלא אם כן יש בו כביצה, שנאמר אשר יאכל, אוכל הנאכל בבת אחת, ושיערו חכמים אין בית הבליעה מחזיק יותר מביצת תרנגולת:
35And anything upon which any of their carcasses of these [animals] fall, will become unclean. [Thus,] an oven or stove shall be demolished; they are unclean, and, they shall be unclean for you. להוְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִפֹּל מִנִּבְלָתָם | עָלָיו יִטְמָא תַּנּוּר וְכִירַיִם יֻתָּץ טְמֵאִים הֵם וּטְמֵאִים יִהְיוּ לָכֶם:
oven or stove: They are movable objects, made of earthenware, and they have a hollow inside [i.e., an inner space]; and one places the pot over the opening of the cavity. Both have their openings on the top [rather than on the side. See Shab. 38b.] תנור וכירים: כלים המטלטלין הם, והם של חרס ויש להן תוך, ושופת את הקדרה על נקב החלל ושניהם פיהם למעלה:
shall be demolished: Because an earthenware vessel cannot be purified by immersion [in a mikvah]. יתץ: שאין לכלי חרס טהרה בטבילה:
and they shall be unclean for you: Lest you say, “I am commanded to demolish them,” Scripture says, “they shall be unclean for you” [meaning that] if you wish to keep them in their unclean state, you are permitted [to do so]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:142] וטמאים יהיו לכם: שלא תאמר מצווה אני לנותצם, תלמוד לומר וטמאים יהיו לכם, אם רצה לקיימן בטומאתן רשאי:
36But a spring or a cistern, a gathering of water remains clean. However, one who touches their carcass shall become unclean. לואַךְ מַעְיָן וּבוֹר מִקְוֵה מַיִם יִהְיֶה טָהוֹר וְנֹגֵעַ בְּנִבְלָתָם יִטְמָא:
But a spring or a cistern, a gathering of water: which are attached to the ground, do not contract uncleanness. We also learn from the phrase יִהְיֶה טָהוֹר [lit., “he will be clean”] that anyone who immerses in these [collections of water] “will become clean” from his uncleanness. — [see Pes. 16a] אך מעין ובור מקוה מים: המחוברים לקרקע, אין מקבלין טומאה. ועוד יש לך ללמוד יהיה טהור הטובל בהם מטומאתו:
However, one who touches their carcass shall become unclean: If someone touches the uncleanness [of their carcasses] even while he is inside a spring or a cistern, he becomes unclean. Lest you say, [It can be derived from a] kal vachomer : “If [these collections of water] purify defiled [people] from their uncleanness, how much more so should they prevent a clean [person standing inside them] from becoming defiled!” Therefore, [Scripture] says, “ one who touches their carcass shall become unclean.” - [Torath Kohanim 11:146] ונוגע בנבלתם יטמא: אפילו הוא בתוך מעין ובור ונוגע בנבלתם יטמא, שלא תאמר קל וחומר אם מטהר את הטמאים מטומאתם, קל וחומר שיציל את הטהור מליטמא, לכך נאמר ונוגע בנבלתם יטמא:
37And if of their carcass falls upon any sowing seed which is to be sown, it remains clean. לזוְכִי יִפֹּל מִנִּבְלָתָם עַל כָּל זֶרַע זֵרוּעַ אֲשֶׁר יִזָּרֵעַ טָהוֹר הוּא:
a sowing seed which is to be sown: [This refers to] the sowing of [various] kinds of seeds (זֵרוּעַ). [The word] זֵרוּעַ [lit., “something which is planted,”] is a noun, as in the verse, “and let them give us some pulse (הַזֵּרֹעִים) ” (Dan. 1:12). זרע זרוע: זריעה של מיני זרעונין. זרוע שם דבר הוא, כמו (דניאל א יב) ויתנו לנו מן הזרועים:
it remains clean: Scripture teaches you that it is not predisposed and prepared to be regarded as “food [fit] to receive uncleanness” until water has come upon it. טהור הוא: למדך הכתוב שלא הוכשר ונתקן לקרות אוכל לקבל טומאה, עד שיבואו עליו מים:
38But if water is put upon seeds, and any of their carcass falls on them, they are unclean for you. לחוְכִי יֻתַּן מַיִם עַל זֶרַע וְנָפַל מִנִּבְלָתָם עָלָיו טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם:
But if water is put upon seeds: after they have been detached [from the ground]. For if you say that [produce] attached [to the ground] can become predisposed [to receive uncleanness], then there would be no seed that would remain unprepared [to receive uncleanness, since all plants are watered]. — [Chul. 118b] וכי יתן מים על זרע: לאחר שנתלש, שאם תאמר יש הכשר במחובר, אין לך זרע שלא הוכשר:
water…upon seeds: [The law applies] both to water and to other beverages, whether they fell on the seed or the seed fell into them. All this is expounded on in Torath Kohanim (11:151, 152). מים על זרע: בין מים בין שאר משקין, בין נפלו הם על הזרע, בין הזרע נפל לתוכן, הכל נדרש בתורת כהנים:
and any of their carcass falls on them: even if they have dried, for the Torah was particular only it should be regarded as “food,” then as soon as it has become predisposed to contract uncleanness once [by becoming wet], this predisposition can never be removed from it. ונפל מנבלתם עליו: אף משנגב מן המים, שלא הקפידה תורה אלא להיות עליו שם אוכל, ומשירד עליו הכשר קבלת טומאה פעם אחת, שוב אינו נעקר הימנו:
39If an animal that you [normally] eat, dies, one who touches its carcass shall be unclean until evening. לטוְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר הִיא לָכֶם לְאָכְלָה הַנֹּגֵעַ בְּנִבְלָתָהּ יִטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב:
[one who touches] its carcass: [but] not its bones or its sinews, nor its horns, hooves or hide [unless they are attached to the carcass]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:159] בנבלתה: ולא בעצמות וגידים ולא בקרנים וטלפים ולא בעור:
40And one who eats of its carcass shall immerse his garments, and he shall be unclean until evening. And one who carries its carcass shall immerse his garments, and he shall be unclean until evening. מוְהָאֹכֵל מִנִּבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב וְהַנֹּשֵׂא אֶת נִבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב:
And one who carries its carcass: טֻמְאַת מַשָּׂא [uncleanness resulting from lifting up an unclean item, even without touching it, e.g., by lifting it up with a stick,] is more stringent than טֻמְאַת מַגָּע [uncleanness resulting from touching an unclean item], for one who lifts [a carcass, in addition to becoming unclean himself, also] defiles his garments, but one who [merely] touches it does not defile his garments, for regarding him it does not say, “he shall immerse his garments.” והנשא את נבלתה: חמורה טומאת משא מטומאת מגע, שהנושא מטמא בגדים, והנוגע אין בגדיו טמאין, שלא נאמר בו יכבס בגדיו:
And one who eats of its carcass: One might think that his eating renders him unclean. However, when [Scripture] says, regarding the carcass of a clean bird, “He shall not eat carrion or one stricken by a fatal disease or injury, to be defiled through it” (Lev. 22:8), [the seemingly superfluous word] בָהּ [“through it,” is explained as follows]: One defiles his garments “through it,” [i.e.,] through eating it, but the carcass of an animal does not defile if one eats it without lifting it up. For example, if someone else forced it down his pharynx. If so, why does it say, “And one who eats [of its carcass]”? To specify the [minimum] volume [needed to render someone unclean] through his touching or lifting up [an unclean carcass], namely, the volume that one [normally] eats [at a time], namely, the size of an olive," [half the volume of a hen’s egg] (Torath Kohanim 11:16). [One should note that, for food to defile other items, it must have a minimum volume possibly edible at one time, namely, equal to that of a hen’s egg. See Rashi on Lev. 11:34]. והאכל מנבלתה: יכול תטמאנו אכילתו, כשהוא אומר בנבלת עוף טהור (ויקרא כב ח) נבלה וטרפה לא יאכל לטמאה בה, אותה מטמאה בגדים באכילתה, ואין נבלת בהמה מטמאה בגדים באכילתה בלא משא, כגון אם תחבה לו חבירו בבית הבליעה, אם כן מה תלמוד לומר האוכל, ליתן שיעור לנושא ולנוגע כדי אכילה והוא כזית:
and he shall be unclean until evening: Even though he has already immersed himself, he requires sunset [in order to be completely clean]. וטמא עד הערב: אף על פי שטבל צריך הערב שמש:
41And any creeping creature that creeps on the ground is an abomination; it shall not be eaten. מאוְכָל הַשֶּׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ עַל הָאָרֶץ שֶׁקֶץ הוּא לֹא יֵאָכֵל:
that creeps on the ground: This comes to exclude mites founds in chickpeas and in beans, and the pea-beetles found in lentils, since they did not creep on the ground but within the food [which was already detached from the ground]. However, when they exit into the air and creep, they become prohibited [because they fall into the category of שֶׁרֶץ, those that “creep on the ground”]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:161] השרץ על הארץ: להוציא את היתושין שבכליסין ושבפולין ואת הזיזין שבעדשים, שהרי לא שרצו על הארץ אלא בתוך האוכל, אבל משיצאו לאויר ושרצו הרי נאסרו:
it shall not be eaten: [This phrase comes] to render guilty someone who feeds a person [with the flesh of a creeping animal] just as if he would have eaten it [himself] (Torath Kohanim 11:162). A שֶׁרֶץ means a low, short-legged creature, which appears [in its motion] only as if slithering and moving. לא יאכל: לחייב על המאכיל כאוכל. ואין קרוי שרץ אלא דבר נמוך קצר רגלים, שאינו נראה אלא כרוחש ונד:
42Any [creature] that goes on its belly, and any [creature] that walks on four [legs] to any [creature] that has many legs, among all creeping creatures that creep on the ground, you shall not eat, for they are an abomination. מבכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ עַל גָּחוֹן וְכֹל | הוֹלֵךְ עַל אַרְבַּע עַד כָּל מַרְבֵּה רַגְלַיִם לְכָל הַשֶּׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ עַל הָאָרֶץ לֹא תֹאכְלוּם כִּי שֶׁקֶץ הֵם:
that goes on its belly: This is the snake (Torath Kohanim 11:163). The word גָּחוֹן denotes “bending low” [and it is used to describe the snake] because it moves while bent a prostrated posture, prostrated on its belly. הולך על גחון: זה נחש, ולשון גחון שחייה, שהולך שח ונופל על מעיו:
Any [creature] that goes: [This comes] to include earthworms and what resembles those that resemble them [i.e., that have tiny legs, but nevertheless slither like a worm on their bellies]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:163] כל הולך: להביא השלשולין ואת הדומה לדומה:
that walks on four [legs]: This [refers to] a scorpion. — [Torath Kohanim 11:163] הולך על ארבע: זה עקרב:
any [creature]: [This word comes] to include the beetle, called escarbot in French, and what resembles those that resemble them. — [Torath Kohanim 11:163] כל: להביא את החפושית אישקרבו"ט בלע"ז [חיפושית] ואת הדומה לדומה:
any [creature] that has many legs: This is the centipede, a creature with legs from its head to its tail, on either side, called centipede [in French]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:163] מרבה רגלים: זה נדל שרץ שיש לו רגלים מראשו ועד זנבו לכאן ולכאן, וקורין ציינפיי"ש [נדל]:
43You shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping creature that creeps, and you shall not defile yourselves with them, that you should become unclean through them. מגאַל תְּשַׁקְּצוּ אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם בְּכָל הַשֶּׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ וְלֹא תִטַּמְּאוּ בָּהֶם וְנִטְמֵתֶם בָּם:
You shall not make [yourselves] abominable: By eating them, for it says: נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם, “your souls” [lit., “Do not make your souls abominable”], and merely touching [an unclean item] does not cause “abomination of the soul” [whereas eating it does. See Me’ilah 16b, Rashi there]; similarly, “and you shall not defile yourselves” [means] by eating them. אל תשקצו: באכילתן, שהרי כתיב נפשותיכם, ואין שיקוץ נפש במגע, וכן ולא תטמאו באכילתן:
that you should become unclean through them: [God says:] “If you defile yourselves through these [creatures] on earth, I too will defile you in the world to come and in the heavenly academy.” - [Yoma 39a] ונטמתם בם: אם אתם מטמאין בהם בארץ אף אני מטמא אתכם בעולם הבא ובישיבת מעלה:
44For I am the Lord your God, and you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, because I am holy, and you shall not defile yourselves through any creeping creature that crawls on the ground. מדכִּי אֲנִי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם וְהִתְקַדִּשְׁתֶּם וִהְיִיתֶם קְדשִׁים כִּי קָדוֹשׁ אָנִי וְלֹא תְטַמְּאוּ אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם בְּכָל הַשֶּׁרֶץ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל הָאָרֶץ:
For I am the Lord your God: Just as I am holy, for I am the Lord your God, so too, you shall make yourselves holy, [i.e.,] sanctify yourselves below [on earth]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:168] כי אני ה' אלהיכם: כשם שאני קדוש שאני ה' אלהיכם, כך והתקדשתם קדשו עצמכם למטה:
and be holy: before Me, for I will make you holy above and in the world to come. — [Yoma 39a] והייתם קדשים: לפי שאני אקדש אתכם למעלה ובעולם הבא:
and you shall not defile yourselves: [This prohibition is written to make a transgressor guilty of] transgressing many negative commandments. And for [the transgression of] each negative commandment, [the perpetrator receives] lashes. This is what [the Sages said in the Talmud (Mak. 16): “If one eats a פּוּטִיתָא [a small unclean aquatic creature], one receives four series of lashes [i.e., four separate series of lashes for the four negative commandments transgressed by eating that one creature]; if one eats an ant, one receives five series of lashes; if one eats a hornet, [he receives] six series of lashes” (Mak. 16b). ולא תטמאו וגו': לעבור עליהם בלאוין הרבה. וכל לאו מלקות, וזהו שאמרו בתלמוד [מכות טז] אכל פוטיתא לוקה ארבע, נמלה לוקה חמש, צרעה לוקה שש:
45For I am the Lord Who has brought you up from the land of Egypt to be your God. Thus, you shall be holy, because I am holy. מהכִּי | אֲנִי יְהֹוָה הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לִהְיֹת לָכֶם לֵאלֹהִים וִהְיִיתֶם קְדשִׁים כִּי קָדוֹשׁ אָנִי:
For I am the Lord Who has brought you up: On the condition that you accept My commandments, I have brought you up [out of Egypt] (Torath Kohanim 11:170). Another explanation of “For I am the Lord Who has brought you up” : Everywhere [Scripture] says, “Who has brought [you] out(הוֹצֵאתִי) [of the land of Egypt],” while here it says, “Who has brought [you] up (הַמַּעֲלֶה).” [What is the meaning of the unusual expression here of bringing up?] the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: [God says,] “If I had brought up Israel from Egypt only so that they would not defile themselves with creeping creatures like the other nations, it would have been sufficient for them, and this is an exaltation for them.” This, then, explains [the use of] the expression הַמַּעֲלֶה - [B.M. 61b] כי אני ה' המעלה אתכם: על מנת שתקבלו מצותי העליתי אתכם. דבר אחר כי אני ה' המעלה אתכם, בכולן כתיב והוצאתי, וכאן כתיב המעלה, תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אלמלי לא העליתי את ישראל ממצרים אלא בשביל שאין מטמאין בשרצים כשאר אומות, דיים, ומעליותא היא גבייהו, זהו לשון מעלה:
46This is the law regarding animals, birds, all living creatures that move in water and all creatures that creep on the ground, מוזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָעוֹף וְכֹל נֶפֶשׁ הַחַיָּה הָרֹמֶשֶׂת בַּמָּיִם וּלְכָל נֶפֶשׁ הַשֹּׁרֶצֶת עַל הָאָרֶץ:
47to distinguish between the unclean and the clean, and between the animal that may be eaten and the animal that may not be eaten. מזלְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַטָּמֵא וּבֵין הַטָּהֹר וּבֵין הַחַיָּה הַנֶּאֱכֶלֶת וּבֵין הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵאָכֵל:
to distinguish: Not only must you learn [these laws concerning prohibited creatures in order to know the laws for the sake of knowing Torah], but also you shall know and recognize [these creatures], and be proficient [in identifying] them. להבדיל: לא בלבד השונה, אלא שתהא יודע ומכיר ובקי בהן:
between the unclean and the clean: But is it necessary [for Scripture] to state [that we should know] the difference between [kosher and non-kosher animals such as] a donkey and a cow, when these [differences] have already been explained? Rather, [what is meant here, is to distinguish] between what is unclean because of you and what is clean because of you, namely between [an animal] whose trachea was slaughtered halfway through [which is considered “unclean” and may not be eaten], and [an animal] who had most of its trachea slaughtered, [rendering the animal “clean” and it may be eaten]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:173:7] בין הטמא ובין הטהר: צריך לומר בין חמור לפרה והלא כבר מפורשים הם, אלא בין טמאה לך לטהורה לך, בין נשחט חציו של קנה לנשחט רובו:
and between the animal that may be eaten: Does [Scripture] have to tell us [that one must be able to distinguish] between a deer and a wild donkey? Are they not already delineated? Rather, [to distinguish] between [an animal] in which signs of a treifah have developed, and it is nevertheless kosher [such as an animal whose injury does not render it treifah], and an animal in which signs of a treifah have developed, and it is not kosher. - [Torath Kohanim 11:173:8] ובין החיה הנאכלת: צריך לומר בין צבי לערוד, והלא כבר מפורשים הם, אלא בין שנולדו בה סימני טרפה כשרה, לנולדו בה סימני טרפה פסולה:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 106 - 107
• Chapter 106
The psalmist continues the theme of the previous psalm, praising God for performing other miracles not mentioned previously, for "who can recount the mighty acts of God?" Were we to try, we could not mention them all!
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is everlasting.
2. Who can recount the mighty acts of the Lord, or proclaim all His praises?
3. Fortunate are those who preserve justice, who perform deeds of righteousness all the time.
4. Remember me, Lord, when You find favor with Your people; be mindful of me with Your deliverance;
5. to behold the prosperity of Your chosen, to rejoice in the joy of Your nation, to glory with Your inheritance.
6. We have sinned as did our fathers, we have acted perversely and wickedly.
7. Our fathers in Egypt did not contemplate Your wonders, they did not remember Your abundant kindnesses, and they rebelled by the sea, at the Sea of Reeds.
8. Yet He delivered them for the sake of His Name, to make His strength known.
9. He roared at the Sea of Reeds and it dried up; He led them through the depths, as through a desert.
10. He saved them from the hand of the enemy, and redeemed them from the hand of the foe.
11. The waters engulfed their adversaries; not one of them remained.
12. Then they believed in His words, they sang His praise.
13. They quickly forgot His deeds, they did not wait for His counsel;
14. and they lusted a craving in the desert, they tested God in the wilderness.
15. And He gave them their request, but sent emaciation into their souls.
16. They angered Moses in the camp, and Aaron, the Lord's holy one.
17. The earth opened and swallowed Dathan, and engulfed the company of Abiram;
18. and a fire burned in their assembly, a flame set the wicked ablaze.
19. They made a calf in Horeb, and bowed down to a molten image.
20. They exchanged their Glory for the likeness of a grass-eating ox.
21. They forgot God, their savior, Who had performed great deeds in Egypt,
22. wonders in the land of Ham, awesome things at the Sea of Reeds.
23. He said that He would destroy them-had not Moses His chosen one stood in the breach before Him, to turn away His wrath from destroying.
24. They despised the desirable land, they did not believe His word.
25. And they murmured in their tents, they did not heed the voice of the Lord.
26. So He raised His hand [in oath] against them, to cast them down in the wilderness,
27. to throw down their progeny among the nations, and to scatter them among the lands.
28. They joined themselves to [the idol] Baal Peor, and ate of the sacrifices to the dead;
29. they provoked Him with their doings, and a plague broke out in their midst.
30. Then Phineas arose and executed judgement, and the plague was stayed;
31. it was accounted for him as a righteous deed, through all generations, forever.
32. They angered Him at the waters of Merivah, and Moses suffered on their account;
33. for they defied His spirit, and He pronounced [an oath] with His lips.
34. They did not destroy the nations as the Lord had instructed them;
35. rather, they mingled with the nations and learned their deeds.
36. They worshipped their idols, and they became a snare for them.
37. They sacrificed their sons and daughters to demons.
38. They spilled innocent blood, the blood of their sons and daughters whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan; and the land became guilty with blood.
39. They were defiled by their deeds, and went astray by their actions.
40. And the Lord's wrath blazed against His people, and He abhorred His inheritance;
41. so He delivered them into the hands of nations, and their enemies ruled them.
42. Their enemies oppressed them, and they were subdued under their hand.
43. Many times did He save them, yet they were rebellious in their counsel and were impoverished by their sins.
44. But He saw their distress, when He heard their prayer;
45. and He remembered for them His covenant and He relented, in keeping with His abounding kindness,
46. and He caused them to be treated mercifully by all their captors.
47. Deliver us, Lord our God; gather us from among the nations, that we may give thanks to Your Holy Name and glory in Your praise.
48. Blessed is the Lord, the God of Israel, forever and ever. And let all the people say, "Amen! Praise the Lord!"
Chapter 107
This psalm speaks of those who are saved from four specific perilous situations(imprisonment, sickness, desert travel, and sea travel) and must thank God, for their sins caused their troubles, and only by the kindness of God were they saved. It is therefore appropriate that they praise God and tell of their salvation to all.
1. Give thanks to the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is everlasting.
2. So shall say those redeemed by the Lord, those whom He redeemed from the hand of the oppressor.
3. He gathered them from the lands-from east and from west, from north and from the sea.
4. They lost their way in the wilderness, in the wasteland; they found no inhabited city.
5. Both hungry and thirsty, their soul languished within them.
6. They cried out to the Lord in their distress; He delivered them from their afflictions.
7. He guided them in the right path to reach an inhabited city.
8. Let them give thanks to the Lord, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man,
9. for He has satiated a thirsting soul, and filled a hungry soul with goodness.
10. Those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death, bound in misery and chains of iron,
11. for they defied the words of God and spurned the counsel of the Most High-
12. He humbled their heart through suffering; they stumbled and there was none to help.
13. They cried out to the Lord in their distress; He saved them from their afflictions.
14. He brought them out of darkness and the shadow of death, and sundered their bonds.
15. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His kindness, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man,
16. for He broke the brass gates and smashed the iron bars.
17. Foolish sinners are afflicted because of their sinful ways and their wrongdoings.
18. Their soul loathes all food, and they reach the gates of death.
19. They cried out to the Lord in their distress; He saved them from their afflictions.
20. He sent forth His command and healed them; He delivered them from their graves.
21. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His kindness, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man.
22. Let them offer sacrifices of thanksgiving, and joyfully recount His deeds.
23. Those who go down to the sea in ships, who perform tasks in mighty waters;
24. they saw the works of the Lord and His wonders in the deep.
25. He spoke and caused the stormy wind to rise, and it lifted up the waves.
26. They rise to the sky, plunge to the depths; their soul melts in distress.
27. They reel and stagger like a drunkard, all their skill is to no avail.
28. They cried out to the Lord in their distress, and He brought them out from their calamity.
29. He transformed the storm into stillness, and the waves were quieted.
30. They rejoiced when they were silenced, and He led them to their destination.
31. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His kindness, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man.
32. Let them exalt Him in the congregation of the people, and praise Him in the assembly of the elders.
33. He turns rivers into desert, springs of water into parched land,
34. a fruitful land into a salt-marsh, because of the wickedness of those who inhabit it.
35. He turns a desert into a lake, and parched land into springs of water.
36. He settles the hungry there, and they establish a city of habitation.
37. They sow fields and plant vineyards which yield fruit and wheat.
38. He blesses them and they multiply greatly, and He does not decrease their cattle.
39. [If they sin,] they are diminished and cast down through oppression, misery, and sorrow.
40. He pours contempt upon distinguished men, and causes them to stray in a pathless wilderness.
41. He raises the needy from distress, and makes their families [as numerous] as flocks.
42. The upright observe this and rejoice, and all the wicked close their mouth.
43. Let him who is wise bear these in mind, and then the benevolent acts of the Lord will be understood.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 41• Lessons in Tanya
• Shabbat, Nissan 22, 5775 · April 11, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 41
In summary: Since all Jews desire to do G‑d’s Will, and He desires that their souls all unite with their source, there is a measure of truth in a Jew’s intent to bring about this union, even if his love of G‑d is not completely selfless.
The Alter Rebbe will now go on to say that a Jew’s desire for his own soul to be united with its source is an utterly honest one, for every Jew possesses an innate love of G‑d.
אבל יחוד נפשו והתכללותה באור ה׳ להיות לאחדים
But the union of the person’s own soul with, and its absorption into, the light of G‑d, making them one,
בזה חפץ כל אדם מישראל באמת לאמיתו לגמרי, בכל לב ובכל נפש
this is what every member of Israel desires in absolute and utter truth, with all his heart and all his soul,
מאהבה הטבעית המסותרת בלב כל ישראל, לדבקה בה׳ ולא ליפרד ולהיות נכרת ונבדל חס ושלום מיחודו ואחדותו יתברך בשום אופן, אפילו במסירות נפש ממש
because of the natural love that is hidden in every Jewish heart to cleave to G‑d and not, under any circumstances, to be parted or sundered or separated, G‑d forbid, from His blessed Unity and Oneness, even at the cost of his very life.
This readiness for self-sacrifice surfaces, for example, when a Jew is forced by heathens to bow down to an idol. Even if merely going through the motions would satisfy them, and they do not impose their belief upon him, the Jew will be ready to literally sacrifice his life so as not to be sundered from his unity with G‑d.
ועסק התורה ומצות והתפלה הוא גם כן ענין מסירת נפש ממש, כמו בצאתה מן הגוף במלאת שבעים שנה
Being engaged in the Torah and commandments and prayer is also a matter of actual surrender of the soul, just as when it leaves the body at the end of seventy years,
שאינה מהרהרת בצרכי הגוף, אלא מחשבתה מיוחדת ומלובשת באותיות התורה והתפלה, שהן דבר ה׳ ומחשבתו יתברך, והיו לאחדים ממש
for then it does not think of bodily needs, but its thought is united with, and clothed in, the letters of the Torah and prayer, which are the word and thought of G‑d, and they (the soul and the letters of Torah and prayer — G‑d’s thought and speech)truly become one.
שזהו כל עסק הנשמות בגן עדן, כדאיתא בגמרא ובזהר
This is [also] the whole occupation of the souls in the Garden of Eden, as is stated in the Gemara and in the Zohar,
Just as the soul in heaven has no other occupation apart from Torah and prayer, so too, a person occupied in Torah and prayer in this world is immersed in it to the exclusion of all material needs and desires. As such, he is then renouncing all materiality and is totally surrendering his soul to G‑d. This comes as a result of the love of G‑d concealed within every Jewish heart.
אלא ששם מתענגים בהשגתם והתכללותם באור ה׳
except that there, i.e., when souls in Gan Eden are immersed in the letters of Torah and prayer, they delight in their apprehension of, and absorption into, the light of G‑d.
Though this delight is lacking in this world, the manner of service remains the same.
וזהו שתקנו בתחלת ברכות השחר קודם התפלה: אלקי נשמה וכו׳ אתה נפחתה וכו׳ ואתה עתיד ליטלה ממני כו׳
This is why it was ordained by the Men of the Great Assembly that one recite at the beginning of the morning blessings, before the prayers: “My G‑d, the soul [which you have placed within me is pure]... You have breathed it [into me]... And You will eventually take it from me....”
כלומר: מאחר שאתה נפחתה בי ואתה עתיד ליטלה ממני, לכן מעתה אני מוסרה ומחזירה לך, לייחדה באחדותך
That is to say: Inasmuch as You have breathed it into me and You will eventually take it from me, I therefore as of now hand it over and return it to You, to unite it with Your Oneness,
וכמו שכתוב: אליך ה׳ נפשי אשא
as it is written:1 “To You, O L‑rd, I lift my soul,” in order to unite it with G‑d,
והיינו על ידי התקשרות מחשבתי במחשבתך ודיבורי בדבורך, באותיות התורה והתפלה
that is, through binding my thought with Your thought, and my speech with Your speech, by means of the letters of the Torah and prayer which I utter;
ובפרט באמירה לה׳ לנכח, כמו: ברוך אתה, וכהאי גוונא
and, especially, when one addresses G‑d in the second person, as in the phrase, “Blessed are You,” and the like.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Tehillim 25:1. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Shabbat, 22 Nissan 5775 / April 11, 2015
Today
Rabbi Mendel Kaplan - Sefer HaMitzvot: Day 118 (13:36)
Day 118 of 339 (13:16)
Positive Commandment 145 (Digest)
Sanctified Objects ("Cherem")
"However, a cherem that a man shall vow to set aside for G‑d from anything he possesses, whether human or beast"—Leviticus 27:28.
Anything sanctified as cherem must be given to a priest (unless the person specified that it is "cherem to G‑d," in which case it is donated to the Temple coffers).
The 145th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding the law of ch'ramim, i.e. when a person declares something he owns to be forbidden by saying, "This is cherem," he must give that object to a kohen, because a statement of cherem which is unspecified1 goes to the kohanim. If, however, he specified that it is for G‑d,2 then it goes for the Temple fund (bedek habayis).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,3 "Any cherem to G‑d which a person declares from among his possessions, whether a human being or an animal [or a hereditary field, cannot be sold or redeemed]."
[The Torah] teaches us that a statement of cherem which is unspecified goes to the kohanim by saying4 [Regarding a field that is released by the jubilee year, "It becomes consecrated to G‑d;] like a field that has been made cherem, it becomes the property of the kohanim."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the eighth chapter of Erachin and the beginning of Nedarim.
Rabbi Berel Bell is a well-known educator, author and lecturer. He and his family reside in Montreal, Canada.
From "Sefer Hamitzvot in English," published by Sichos in English.
FOOTNOTES
1.Erachin, Ch. 8, Mishneh 6. There are two opinions brought regarding cheramim in which one did not specify whether they are for the kohanim or for bedek habayis. One opinion is that they go to bedek habayis and the other (brought here by the Rambam) is that they go to the kohanim.
2.E.g. by saying, "This is cherem for G‑d."
3.Lev. 27:28.
4.Ibid. 27:21.
Negative Commandment 110 (Digest)
Selling Sanctified Objects ("Cherem")
"No cherem thing...shall be sold"—Leviticus 27:28.
Any object that is sanctified as cherem [and consequently must be given to a priest] may not be sold—even to the Temple treasurer.
The 110th prohibition is that we are forbidden from selling — even to the Temple treasurer — objects which have been declared to be cherem.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Any cherem...cannot be sold."
In the words of the Sifra, " 'It cannot be sold' — [even to] the Temple treasurer."
The cherem referred to is only one which is unspecified.2
Rabbi Berel Bell is a well-known educator, author and lecturer. He and his family reside in Montreal, Canada.
From "Sefer Hamitzvot in English," published by Sichos in English.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid. 27:28.
2.Which goes to the kohanim. See P145, above. That which is dedicated to bedek habayis is already in the hands of the Temple treasurer.
• 1 Chapter: Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Ten Shabbos - Chapter Ten
Halacha 1
A person who ties a knot which is intended to remain permanently and which can be tied [only] by craftsmen1 is liable. Included in this category are the knots tied by camel drivers, the knots tied by seamen, the knots tied by shoemakers when making shoes and sandals.2
One who ties a knot that is intended to remain permanently, but does not require a craftsmen [to tie it], is not liable. A knot that will not remain permanently and does not require a craftsman may be tied with no compunctions.
Halacha 2
How is [the intermediate category] defined? If one of a person's sandal straps tore and he tied it, a rope tore and one tied it, one tied a rope to a bucket, or one tied the bridle of an animal, the person is not liable. The same applies to all other knots that do not require professional expertise, but are always tied with the intention that they remain permanently.3
Any knot that is not intended to remain permanently is forbidden to be tied using a knot that requires professional expertise.4
Halacha 3
A woman may tie the opening of her cloak although it has two openings.5 She may tie the strands of a hairnet although it hangs loosely on her head.6
One may tie the straps of shoes and sandals that are tied around one's foot when donning them.7 One may tie pouches of wine and pouches of oil although they have two protrusions.8 One may tie a pot of meat although it is possible to remove the meat without untying the knot.9
One may tie a bucket with a linen cord, a belt or another similar entity, but not with an ordinary rope.10 One may tie a rope before an animal or tie it to an animal's foot so that it will not go out, although this involves two knots.11
If a rope is tied to a cow, one may tie it to its feeding trough. If a rope is tied to a feeding trough, one may tie it to a cow. One may not, however, bring a rope from one's home and tie it to [both] a cow and a feeding trough. If, however, one has a weaver's rope which one is permitted to carry,12 one may bring it and tie it to both the cow and the feeding trough.
[The rationale for these laws is that] all [the above] knots do not require professional expertise, nor are they intended to remain. On the contrary, a person ties them and unties them at will. Therefore, it is permitted to tie them with no compunctions.
One may untie the openings of baskets of dates and dried figs, break off or cut off the cord, take them and eat them.13
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
It is permissible to tie a knot that is not permanent in nature for the purpose of a mitzvah.22 For example, one may tie a knot to calibrate one of the Torah's measures.23
One may tie a harp string that snaps in the Temple,24 but not anywhere else. One may not tie a harp string for the first time on the Sabbath, even in the Temple.
Halacha 7
Halacha 8
A person who winds together a rope from palm branches, love grass,27 strands of wool, strands of flax, strands of goat's hair or the like is liable for performing a derivative of the [forbidden] labor of tying.28
The minimum measure for which one is liable is a length of rope sufficient to remain wound without being tied, for then the work the person performed is permanent.29
Similarly, a person who unwinds cords performs a derivative of the forbidden labor of untying and is liable. [This applies] provided one's intent is not merely destructive in nature.30 The minimum measure for which one is liable is the same as that for winding a cord.
Halacha 9
A person who sews two stitches is liable,31 provided he ties32 the stitches at both ends so that they will remain and not slip out.33 If, however, one sews an additional stitch, one is liable even if one did not tie [the ends], for one's stitching will remain.
A person who pulls taut a thread used for sewing34 on the Sabbath is liable, because this activity is necessary for sewing.
Halacha 10
A person who tears [a length of a garment] sufficient to tie two stitches35 for the sake of tying two stitches is liable.36 In contrast, one who tears with the intent to ruin is not liable, for [his activity] is destructive in nature.37
A person who tears in a fit of rage or [one who rends his garments] for the sake of a deceased person for whom he is required to rend his garments38 is liable, for by doing so he settles his mind and calms his natural inclination. Since his anger is soothed through this act, it is considered to be constructive in nature and he is liable.39
A person who makes an opening for a neck [in a garment] on the Sabbath is liable.40
Halacha 11
A person who attaches paper or hides together with scribe's glue and the like is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of sewing.41
Conversely, a person who separates papers or hides that are stuck together is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of tearing42 if his intent is not merely destructive.
Halacha 12
A person is liable for building even the slightest amount.43
A person who levels the floor inside a house is liable.44 Whether he lowers a raised piece of earth or fills a cavity, he is considered to be building and is liable.
When one person places down a stone and another the mortar, the one who places down the mortar is liable.45 For the highest row [of stones], one is liable merely for lifting up the stone and placing it on the mortar, since other mortar is not placed upon it.
A person who builds on a base of utensils is not liable.46
Halacha 13
A person who erects a permanent tent is liable for performing a derivative47 [of the forbidden labor] of building.48
Similarly, a person who fashions an earthenware utensil - e.g., an oven or a jug - before they are fired [in a kiln] is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.49
Similarly, one who makes cheese performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.50 One is not liable until one makes an amount of cheese equivalent to the size of a dried fig.51
A person who inserts the blade of an axe onto its handle or one who performs any similar activity performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building. Similarly, one who attaches one piece of wood to another, whether he attaches them with a nail or by inserting one piece of wood into another until they become a single entity, is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.52
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
A person who demolishes even the slightest amount is liable, provided he demolishes with the intent to build.55 If his intent in demolishing is merely destructive, he is not liable.56
A person who demolishes a permanent tent or separates a piece of wood attached to another is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of demolishing, provided his intent is to improve it [afterwards].57
Halacha 16
A person who gives the [final] blow with a hammer is liable. [Similarly,] a person who performs any activity that represents the completion of a task is liable for performing a derivative of dealing [the final] hammer blow.58
What is implied? A person who blows a glass vessel,59 one makes a design, or even a portion of a design, on a utensil,60 one who planes61 [the edges of a utensil],62 one who makes a hole of even the smallest size in a piece of wood, a building, a piece of metal, or a utensil is liable for performing a derivative of dealing [the final] hammer blow.
One is not liable for making [a hole] unless it can be used to bring in and bring out.63
Halacha 17
A person who pierces a blister on the Sabbath to widen the opening of the wound, as physicians do, with the intent of widening the opening of the wound is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow,64 for this is a labor performed by a physician.
If one pierced it to remove its pus, [the act] is permitted.65
Halacha 18
One who files a stone66 to even the slightest degree is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow. A person who aligns a stone in the foundation of a building, adjusting its position with his hands and settling it in its proper place,67 is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow.
A person who removes threads, straws, or splinters of wood68 from a garment by hand - for example, the splinters that are found in woolen garments - is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow. [This applies] provided the person is disturbed by them.69 If, however, he removes them as a matter of course, [without thinking,]70 he is not liable.71
Halacha 19
A person who traps a living creature from a species that is common to trap75 - e.g., beasts, fowl,76 or fish - is liable77 provided he traps them in a place where no further efforts are required to trap them.
What is implied? One chased after a deer until one caused it to enter a room,78a garden, or a courtyard, and one locked it inside, one caused a fowl to fly into a closet and locked it, one removed a fish from the sea and placed it in a bowl of water. [In all these instances,] the person is liable.79
If, however, a person caused a bird to fly into a room and locked it, caused a fish to swim from the sea into a pool of water, or chased a deer until he caused it to enter a large hall, and locked it, he is not liable. [The living creature] is not completely trapped, for if he to desired to take it, he would have to chase it and trap it in [this new place].80 Therefore, a person who traps a lion is not liable until he causes it to enter the pen in which it will be enclosed.
Halacha 20
[The following] - a place in which if a person ran, he could reach the animal in a single movement,81 and a place so narrow that the shadow of both walls would merge in the middle - are considered to be small places. If one chased a deer or the like into such a place, one is liable. If a place is larger than this, a person who chases an animal or a fowl into it is not liable.
Halacha 21
[The following principle applies regarding] the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah82 and similarly, other creeping animals and crawling things:83When a species is usually trapped, a person who traps any one of them - whether for a purpose, or without a purpose, even merely for the sake of sport - is liable, since he intended to trap and actually did so.84 A person is liable for performing a [forbidden] labor even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed.85
A person who traps an animal that is sleeping or a blind animal is liable.86
Halacha 22
When a person sends out dogs to trap deer, rabbits, and the like, the deer flees because of the dog,87 and the person chases after the deer or stands before it and as such, frightens it so that the dog can catch it,88 he is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of trapping.89 The same applies with regard to [trapping] fowl.
Halacha 23
When a deer enters a room and one person closes90 it, the latter is liable.91 If two people close it, they are not liable. If the door cannot be closed by a single person and they both close it, they are both liable.92
When one person sat in the entrance and did not block it, and a second person sat down and blocked it, the second person is liable.93
When the one person blocks the entrance when he sits down, and a second person sits down next to him [in a manner that also obstructs the entrance], the first person [alone] is liable.94 [This applies] even if he later rises and leaves, [and the second person remains blocking the entrance],95 for the second person has not done anything. He is permitted to remain seated in the doorway until the evening and then take the deer.96 To what could this be compared? To one who locks his house to protect it and finds a trapped deer inside.97
If a fowl enters under the edge of a person's clothes, he may [continue] sitting and watch it until nightfall.98 It is [then] permitted [to take it].
Halacha 24
A person who traps a deer that is old, limping, sick, or small is not liable.99
A person who releases an animal, a beast, or a fowl from a trap is not liable.100A person who traps a beast or a fowl that is in his domain - e.g., ducks, chickens, or doves from a cote - is not liable.101 A person who traps a living being whose species is not usually trapped - e.g., locusts,102 wild bees, hornets, mosquitoes, fleas, and the like - is not liable.103
Halacha 25
Crawling beasts that are dangerous - e.g., snakes, scorpions and the like - may be trapped104 on the Sabbath. [This leniency is granted] even when they are not deadly, but merely bite, provided one's intent is to prevent [someone from] being bitten.105
What should one do? Place a utensil over them, cover them with something, or tie them so they cannot cause damage.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
A knot that requires professional expertise and cannot be tied by an untrained person.
|
| 2. |
The fishermen who would catch chilazon that were necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary would tie their nets with special knots that required professional expertise. Similarly, these knots were intended to remain permanently. Therefore, tying such a knot is considered a category of forbidden labor.
It must be emphasized that Rashi and Rabbenu Asher do not accept the criteria mentioned here by the Rambam (which are based on the Halachot of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi from Shabbat111b). They maintain that tying a knot with the intention that it remain permanently causes one to be liable if the knot is strong enough to remain, even though tying the knot does not require professional expertise.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 317:1) follows the Rambam's perspective. The Ramah, however, rules according to the view of Rashi and Rabbenu Asher.
|
| 3. |
According to Rashi and Rabbenu Asher, one would be liable for tying such knots.
|
| 4. |
Rabbi Yosef Korcus explains the difference between the two clauses of this halachah. Since the knots mentioned in the first clause are intended to last permanently, one would think that one is liable. Therefore, the Rambam emphasizes that one is not.
By contrast, since the knots mentioned in the second clause are not intended to last permanently, one would think that it is permitted to tie them. Hence, the Rambam emphasizes that this is forbidden.
|
| 5. |
This law - and most of the subsequent clauses of this halachah - are based on Shabbat 15:2. In each of the clauses, the Rambam (based on the Talmud) further develops the concepts stated in the Mishnah.
In this instance, Shabbat 112a explains that such a cloak had two straps, each one extending from one corner of the garment to the other. Since a woman could remove the garment by untying only one strap and slipping it over her head, there is reason to think that one of the knots would be considered as permanent, and therefore forbidden to be tied on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is not accepted, and tying and untying both knots is permitted.
|
| 6. |
Shabbat (loc. cit.) relates that these nets are also tied to a woman's hair. Hence, since the net is not tight fitting, it could be slipped off without untying it. Thus one might consider the knot as permanent. Nevertheless, since usually, these nets are untied, there is no difficulty in tying them.
|
| 7. |
Since they will be untied when the shoes are removed, tying them is permitted.
|
| 8. |
Shabbat (loc. cit.) explains that the pouches were tied at each of these protrusions. Although the liquid could be removed by opening only one of them, neither of the knots is considered to be permanent, because it was customary to open both knots, for then the liquids flowed more freely.
|
| 9. |
Shabbat (loc. cit.) states that although the food could be removed from the pot without untying the knot, we do not consider the knot permanent. We assume that the people will follow the usual practice and untie the knots before opening the pot.
|
| 10. |
It is forbidden to tie a bucket with an ordinary rope, because it is likely that one will leave the rope there permanently. A linen cord, a belt, or another similar entity is not really fit for this purpose. Hence, it is probable that one will untie it after using it (Maggid Mishneh, based on Shabbat 113a).
Even though the Rambam would maintain that tying an ordinary rope to a bucket does not make one liable according to Torah law, there is still reason for this additional decree.
|
| 11. |
The animal's owner closed the stall by tying a rope before it, tying it to both ends of the entrance (or, according to other commentaries, by tying two ropes). Although the stall could be opened by untying only one knot, we do not assume that the rope(s) will be left there permanently (Shabbat112b).
|
| 12. |
This phrase is the key to the Rambam's understanding of this law (which is based on Shabbat113a). Since tying the animal does not necessitate using a knot that requires professional expertise, the Rambam would not consider it prohibited according to Torah law. And as the Rambam states, since the intention is not to leave the animal tied permanently, there is no reason for even a Rabbinic prohibition. Nevertheless, since it is forbidden to use a rope on the Sabbath unless it was designated for use beforehand, one may not bring a rope from home. If one tied the rope to the animal or to the feeding trough before the commencement of the Sabbath, however, it is obvious that one intended to use it on the Sabbath.
|
| 13. |
Shabbat 146a explains that dates and dried figs were strung on a cord and placed in palm branch baskets. One may untie the baskets and cut the cords and eat the fruit.
|
| 14. |
Other substances fit for tying would be muktzeh, forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath.
|
| 15. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:5), the Rambam explains that a reed will never be used to tie a permanent knot.
|
| 16. |
This halachah is based on Shabbat 112a, which relates that Rav Yirmiyah saw Rabbi Abahu act in this manner when his sandal strap snapped on the Sabbath. That narrative took place in acarmelit.
The Talmud continues mentioning a situation where Abbaye's sandal strap snapped in a private courtyard and Rav Yosef forbade him to employ a similar technique. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:15) mentions both these rulings.
|
| 17. |
In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 317:2), the Ramah mentions that this is permitted only when it does not involve much effort.
|
| 18. |
The Magen Avraham 317:8 states that were one to tie a knot, it would be forbidden, because we can assume that the knot would be left permanently.
|
| 19. |
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 317:5) states that one may even tie a single knot with a loop above it, provided one does not intend to leave it permanently. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 317:3,Mishnah Berurah 317:29.
|
| 20. |
I.e., there is no reason to decree that a loop is forbidden, lest one tie a knot.
|
| 21. |
The Kessef Mishneh objects to the Rambam's decision, noting that Shabbat 113a states that if one employs a linen cord, one may tie a knot, but if one employs a rope, one must tie a loop. In his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 317:4), Rav Yosef Karo rules according to his understanding of that passage.
Yad David and others reconcile the Rambam's wording, explaining that he means "wind a linen cord around it, or tie it [i.e., the rope itself] with a loop."
|
| 22. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:5), the Rambam states that leniency was granted with regard to tying knots that are intended to remain permanently if they are tied for the sake of a mitzvah on the Sabbath. Rashi, by contrast maintains that the Mishnah grants leniency with regard to measuring alone and not with regard to tying knots that are not temporary in nature.
On this basis, this halachah must be interpreted to mean that one is allowed to tie knots that will not remain permanently, even with a knot that requires professional expertise, or a knot that is intended to remain for an extended period if it does not require professional expertise. (See theBe'ur Halachah 317.)
|
| 23. |
The concluding Mishnah in the tractate of Shabbat states that "In the days of Rabbi Tzadok's father and Abba Shaul ben Botnit, they... tied a cup with a reed to ascertain whether a vat possessed an opening that was a handbreadth in size."
|
| 24. |
This is not considered a permanent knot, because we assume that after the Sabbath it will be changed. There are opinions in the Talmud (Eruvin 102b) that permit only a loop to be tied. Based on the p rinciple, "Restrictions in the category of sh'vut are not enforced in the Temple," the Rambam, however, chooses the more lenient view (Kessef Mishneh, Or Sameach).
|
| 25. |
Just as tying is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor, so is untying. Accordingly, all the principles described above concerning tying apply with regard to untying.
|
| 26. |
Tosafot (Shabbat 73a) states that one is liable only when one unties with the intent of retying, for this was the practice of the chilazon fishermen in the construction of the Sanctuary. Significantly, the Rambam does not mention that requirement. Rashi (Shabbat 74b) rules more stringently, holding one liable even when one does not have the intent of retying the knot immediately. Needless to say, even according to Rashi's view, one must untie the knot for a positive purpose.
|
| 27. |
Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's version of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 17:17).
|
| 28. |
The commentaries question why this activity is not considered a derivative of the forbidden labor of spinning thread. The Migdal Oz resolves this question by citing as a source the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 15:1. That passage relates that an experienced tailor connects two ends of a thread together by undoing their twine, and then rewinding them. Since the tailor's object is to connect the two ends, the activity is considered a derivative of tying.
|
| 29. |
See Chapter 9, Halachah 13 and Halachah 1 of this chapter.
|
| 30. |
See Chapter 1, Halachot 17-18.
|
| 31. |
This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor.
|
| 32. |
Many of the commentaries question why the Rambam does not mention that the person is also liable for tying. It would appear, however, that this knot does not require professional expertise. Furthermore, sewing and not tying, is the subject of the Rambam's statements here.
|
| 33. |
Only if the stitches are tied at both ends will they remain permanently. Rav Kapach notes that inHilchot Kilayim 10:24, the Rambam does not require the two stitches to be attached for one to be liable for sha'atnez, echoing a similar ruling of the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:10).
Rav Kapach explains that the obligations of the two prohibitions differ. With regard to sha'atnez, there is no requirement that wool and linen be permanently attached for one to be liable. In contrast, if the forbidden activity one performs on the Sabbath is not lasting in nature, one is not liable.
|
| 34. |
After one sews several stitches, one pulls the thread taut (Shabbat 75a).
|
| 35. |
Our translation is based on the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.
|
| 36. |
This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. Although this activity was performed in the Sanctuary for this purpose, the Rambam maintains that a person who performs a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is liable. Therefore, he maintains that one is liable even if he tears for other purposes. The Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), however, describes this forbidden labor as "one who tears to sew two stitches."
|
| 37. |
See Chapter 1, Halachot 17-18.
|
| 38. |
The Rambam discusses the obligation to rend one's garments over a deceased person inHilchot Eivel, Chapters 8 and 9.
|
| 39. |
See Chapter 8, Halachah 8, and notes.
|
| 40. |
The Merkevet HaMishnah states that this refers to simply opening up a place for the head in a garment. Since the Rambam maintains that a person who performs a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is liable, he maintains that a person is liable for cutting such an opening even if he does not sew it.
Rashi (Shabbat 48a) states that one is liable for this activity for performing a derivative of the forbidden category of labor מכה בפטיש, making an entity ready for use. (Rashi cannot hold one liable for tearing, since he differs with the Rambam and maintains that a person who performs a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is not liable.)
The latter interpretation is reflected in the statements of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted in the Ma'aseh Rokeach, which explain that after a garment was completed, the neck was sewed up with temporary stitches to show that it was never worn. When the purchaser desired to put on the garment, these stitches were undone. See also Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Orach Chayim 317:3).
|
| 41. |
For just as a person who sews, he attaches two entities to each other.
|
| 42. |
See the Magen Avraham 340:18, which states that the entities one separates must have been attached to each other with the intent of remaining permanently. Based on a similar rationale, theChacham Tzvi (Responsum 39) does not hold one liable for opening an envelope, since the flap is not intended to remain permanently closed.
There is a common application of this principle today: the use of disposable baby diapers. Since the flap is not intended to remain permanently closed, fastening it or unfastening it is not considered as related to the forbidden labors of sewing and tearing.
|
| 43. |
This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. One is liable for even the smallest act of construction, because if there was even the slightest nick or hole in one of the walls of the Sanctuary, hot lead would be poured into it to fill it (Shabbat 102b).
|
| 44. |
For building, since with this activity, he prepares the building's floor. As mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 1, a person who performs this activity in a field is liable for plowing.
Significantly, based on Rashi (Eruvin 104a), Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:24 also holds one liable for performing a derivative of building when one levels the ground in one's yard.
|
| 45. |
Without the mortar, the stones would not hold in place.
|
| 46. |
As the source for this halachah, the Maggid Mishneh points to the following passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2, 12:1):
From this passage, it is clear that building on a base of utensils is not considered to be building according to Torah law. Note that this law refers to constructing a building by using a utensil as a base. The discussion of whether fashioning a utensil or connecting its parts is a derivative of the forbidden labor of building is discussed in the following halachah and notes.
|
| 47. |
The commentaries question why the erection of a tent is merely given the status of a derivative and is not considered to be a מעין מלאכה of the forbidden labor of building. The P'nei Yehoshua(Sukkah 16b) explains that a building is a stable structure, while a tent is far more fragile in nature.
The Even HaEzel explains that building involves two actions:
a) joining separate entities into a single whole;
b) spreading a roof over a structure.
Constructing a structure - or part of a structure - which contains both these actions is considered to be building proper. If either - but only one - of the two is involved, the act is deemed a derivative. Thus, erecting a tent is considered a derivative, because it involves spreading a roof, and making cheese is considered a derivative, because it involves joining separate entities into a single whole.
|
| 48. |
Significantly, neither in this halachah nor in Chapter 22, Halachah 27, when he mentions the Rabbinic prohibition against erecting a temporary tent does the Rambam explain whether the concept of permanence depends on the strength of the structure or the intent of the builder. It appears that he relies on his statements in Chapter 9, Halachah 13, "Whenever one performs a labor that does not have a permanent effect on the Sabbath, one is not liable." (See the notes on that halachah.)
|
| 49. |
Beitzah 22a relates a difference of opinion between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai. The School of Shammai maintains that one is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of building when fashioning a utensil, while the School of Hillel rejects this thesis: "There is no [concept of] building with regard to utensils."
There is, however, a difference of opinion between the Rabbis about the interpretation of this statement. Rashi understands the statement simply. Fashioning a utensil can never be a derivative of building. One is liable for making a utensil, but one's liability stems from the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש, completing a utensil. This view is shared by Rav Hai Gaon, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi (according to Rabbenu Nissim), and others.
As obvious from this halachah, the Rambam differs and maintains that one is liable for building when fashioning a utensil. The leniency mentioned by the School of Hillel refers only to putting together a utensil that is made up of several component parts. [This is, however, forbidden by Rabbinic decree, because it resembles building (Chapter 22, Halachah 26).] Fashioning a new utensil, by contrast, is surely considered a derivative of building.
This latter opinion is shared by Tosafot (Shabbat 74b), the Ramban, the Rashba, and others. It is also accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:1).
|
| 50. |
See Chapter 7, Halachah 6.
|
| 51. |
Although one is liable for building even the slightest amount, with regard to this derivative the minimum measure for which one is liable is the size of a dried fig - the minimum measure associated with the labors related to food. Unless one makes an amount of cheese that size, one's activity is not significant at all.
|
| 52. |
The Rambam discusses the Rabbinic prohibitions associated with this activity in Chapter 22, Halachah 25. (See also the discussion of the issue in the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 313:9] and commentaries.)
|
| 53. |
Note that in Halachah 16, the Rambam states that one who makes a hole in a building is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש. Similarly, in Chapter 23, Halachah 1, he states that a person who makes a hole in a chicken coop for the sake of letting light in and letting foul air out is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש.
Among the resolutions offered is that in addition to being liable for מכה בפטיש, one is liable for building (Lechem Mishneh). Alternatively, in this halachah, the Rambam mentions making a hole of any size, while in Chapter 23, he mentions making an opening, implying that it is of a larger size, and only then is one liable for מכה בפטיש (Sefer HaKovetz).
|
| 54. |
These doors serve as part of the floor of the building. Therefore, putting them in place is a derivative of building. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 25, and the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh.)
|
| 55. |
Whenever the encampment of the Jewish people moved, the Sanctuary was taken down and then reconstructed in the new camp (Shabbat 31b).
The commentaries note that in Chapter 1, Halachah 18, the Rambam mentions that one is liable for "demolishing to build in its place," while in this halachah, the words "in its place" are not mentioned.
|
| 56. |
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 17, one is not liable for performing any forbidden labor with merely a destructive intent. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 8, if one destroys with the intent of venting one's anger, one is liable. Seemingly, the Rambam should have mentioned this point in this context as well.
|
| 57. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is to illustrate how one is liable for demolishing for performing the converse of every positive activity for which one is liable for building.
Perhaps the Rambam's wording also alludes to the concept that a person is liable only when he demolishes a structure that is strong enough to last. If the structure he demolishes is not that sturdy, he is not liable. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:19.
|
| 58. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), in definition of this category of forbidden labor, the Rambam writes:
|
| 59. |
Tosafot, Shabbat 74b, asks: Since glass utensils are fashioned by blowing, why is one not liable for building as one is for making any other vessel? (See Halachah 13.) Indeed, the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2) holds a person who blows a glass utensil liable for performing that forbidden labor.
The Yesodei Yeshurun and Rav Kapach point out that Rashi (Shabbat 75b) explains that the activity referred to involves cutting a glass utensil by exposing it to a current of air. This is also implied by the Hebrew words המנפח בכלי זכוכית - "one who blows at a glass utensil."
|
| 60. |
If, however, one makes a drawing or a design on a paper (or on a similar substance), one is liable for performing a derivative of writing or dyeing (Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 7:2). (See also Chapter 11, Halachah 17, and Be'ur Halachah 340.)
|
| 61. |
The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 11, Halachah 7, renders the term used in our halachah as מגרר, "scrape."
|
| 62. |
See also Chapter 23, Halachah 4.
|
| 63. |
I.e., to cause one to be held liable, any opening must be fit to be used as an entrance through which entities are brought in, and an exit through which entities are taken out.
|
| 64. |
The Ra'avad, Rashi (Shabbat 107a), and others maintain that performing this activity is a derivative of the labor of building. The Ziv HaMishnah explains the Rambam's position, focusing on the words "for this is a labor performed by a physician" - i.e., one i s not building a structure, but completing a specific labor that physicians perform.
|
| 65. |
I.e., one may perform the act without any compunctions (Shabbat 107a). Although the Rambam's ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:28), Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:32 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:88 suggest that it is preferable to have this act performed by a gentile.
According to Rashi and many other authorities, this activity is permitted, because it is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Although generally there would be a Rabbinic prohibition against such an act, in this instance, no prohibition was enforced because of the suffering involved.
This explanation is, however, untenable for the Rambam, for as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, he holds one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Among the explanations given for the Rambam's position is that in removing the pus one does not complete the task involved, for an opening sufficient to be useful for another purpose has not been made (Maggid Mishneh). Similarly, Sefer HaBatim explains that in removing the pus, the person thinks only of relieving his pain and does not have any intent of making an opening. Thus the situation differs from the examples stated in Chapter 1, where the person performed the forbidden activity intentionally.
See also the commentary of Rav Chayim Soloveichik who explains that this decision is not dependent on the principle of מלאכה ש אינה צריכה לגופה, but rather on the concept of אינו מתכווין (see Chapter 1, Halachot 5-6) that a person who performs an activity which unintentionally causes a forbidden labor to be performed is not liable.
Although the Rambam agrees that when it is certain that one's actions will result in the performance of a forbidden labor, one is liable, the latter principle does not apply when one does not appreciate the results of the performance of the forbidden labor (פםיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). In such an instance, the Rambam follows the opinion of the Aruch who maintains that one is not liable.
|
| 66. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 12:1), where he explains that this refers to "smoothing it with a tool known to be used for this purpose." Rashi (Shabbat 102b) renders this term as "chisel."
|
| 67. |
The Or Sameach (based on Shabbat 102b) states that this applies only in setting the stones of a building's foundation, and not those of its walls.
One might ask: Why is the person who performs this activity not liable for building (see Rashi and Tosafot, Shabbat, loc. cit.)? It is possible to explain that it goes without saying that the Rambam would hold such an individual liable for building, the new concept taught by this halachah is that he is also liable for dealing [the final] hammer blow.
|
| 68. |
Our translation is based on the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Shabbat 75b.
|
| 69. |
The Kessef Mishneh explains that this means that the person removes them from the garment with the intention of making it more attractive, even though he could wear the garment while they are still adhering to it. This interpretation is quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:7 and theMishnah Berurah 302:10.
|
| 70. |
As explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 11, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden activity as a מתעסק - i.e., without consciously controlling his behavior. In this instance as well, it is common for people to pick at their clothes, without giving the matter any thought at all.
|
| 71. |
It is, nevertheless, forbidden according to Rabbinic decree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:6,Mishnah Berurah 302:11).
|
| 72. |
The early manuscripts and printings of the Mishneh Torah state הציהוב הלבן. Based on the dictionary of Rabbi Tanchum of Jerusalem, this term is interpreted to mean "bright white threads."
|
| 73. |
Based on Shabbat 147a, the Ra'avad, Rashi, and others, interpret this as shaking dew from a new garment, and the activity being a derivative of the forbidden labor of whitening. This interpretation is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:1).
|
| 74. |
Rav Sa'adiah Adana explains that according to the general principles the Rambam outlined in the beginning of the text, it would have been sufficient for him to state "is liable," as is his practice throughout the text. Nevertheless, in this instance he quotes the Sages' expression (Shabbat147a), "is liable for a sin offering"; because of the nature of the activity, one might think that one is liable only for stripes for rebelliousness, the punishment given for violating a Rabbinic decree.
|
| 75. |
See Halachah 24, where the Rambam mentions some of the species not included in this category.
|
| 76. |
The commentaries note that Shabbat 106b differentiates between a צפור דרור - a swallow - and other fowl. On this basis, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 316:1) states that other birds are also considered trapped when enclosed in houses, and it is only a swallow - because it is small - that must be trapped in a closet.
The Merkevet HaMishneh and others explain that Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rambam interpret the conclusion of that Talmudic passage as indicating that there is no difference between one type of fowl and another. It is too difficult to trap any bird when enclosed in a house.
|
| 77. |
This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor.
|
| 78. |
The Hebrew בית usually means house. Here, however, it refers to a one-room structure.
|
| 79. |
The commentaries explain that a deer is trapped even when there are open windows and when there is no roof.
|
| 80. |
See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:7, where the Rambam develops this principle.
|
| 81. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that this means "without having to pause."
|
| 82. |
Leviticus 11:29. See Chapter 8, Halachah 9, for a definition of the species referred to.
|
| 83. |
The distinction between the eight species mentioned in the Torah and other crawling animals is relevant within the context of the Mishnah, Shabbat 14:1, which follows the view of Rabbi Shimon that one is not held liable for performing a [forbidden] labor when he has no need for the actual labor he performed. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate between the eight species mentioned in the Torah (which are generally trapped for their hides) and other crawling animals when that is not necessarily the case.
|
| 84. |
This ruling depends on the principle stated by the Rambam immediately afterwards, that one is held liable for performing a [forbidden] labor when he has no need for the actual labor he performed.
|
| 85. |
This subject, referred to as a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה in Hebrew, is discussed at length in Chapter 1, Halachah 7. As mentioned, there are many authorities who differ with the Rambam's opinion on this issue.
|
| 86. |
As obvious from Halachah 24, a person who traps an animal that is physically disabled is not liable. Shabbat 106b differentiates between the animals mentioned in that halachah and those mentioned in this halachah as follows: An animal that is sleeping or blind is sensitive to man's steps. Unless he approaches stealthily, the animal will be startled and flee. In contrast, those mentioned in Halachah 24 will not be able to escape capture.
|
| 87. |
Note the Maggid Mishneh, who quotes Rabbenu Chanan'el's commentary, which explains this as a continuation of the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah. Rashi (Shabbat 106b) interprets the passage differently. (See the Be'ur Halachah 316.)
|
| 88. |
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 316:2) emphasizes that even during the week, this behavior is undesirable. In his Darchei Moshe, he emphasizes that such cruelty will prevent a person from participating in the feast of the Leviathan in the era of the redemption.
|
| 89. |
The Magen Avraham 316:4 emphasizes that if the person merely sends out the dogs and is not personally involved in the deer's capture, he is not held liable at all. There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved.
|
| 90. |
Here, we have chosen to translate the Hebrew נעל as "close," rather than "lock." Closing the door is sufficient to confine the deer inside and cause one to be liable for trapping it.
|
| 91. |
Although he did not actively pursue the deer into the room, since it becomes trapped through his deed, he is responsible.
|
| 92. |
This halachah illustrates the principle stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 15- 16:
See Sefer HaKovetz and others for explanations why this is not a mere reiteration of the principles stated previously.
|
| 93. |
The first person's act did not obstruct the deer's escape, while the second person's did. Although the first person assisted the second, since his assistance was passive - he did absolutely nothing - he does not share in the liability. Furthermore, as the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 13:7), he is permitted to remain seated.
|
| 94. |
For he completed the capture of the animal by sitting down. This is a fait acccompli to which the second person adds nothing.
|
| 95. |
Without moving.
|
| 96. |
He may not, however, take the deer on the Sabbath itself. Although it is already trapped, it ismuktzeh, forbidden to be handled. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 26.)
|
| 97. |
In this instance, we have translated the Hebrew נע ל as "lock" rather than "close" as above. Were a person to close the door and thus trap the deer, he would be liable. The Rambam is speaking of a situation where the deer was trapped previously (in the analogy, by the first person) and then locked in (blocked further by the second person).
|
| 98. |
In this instance as well, it is forbidden to take the bird on the Sabbath because it is muktzeh.
|
| 99. |
As explained in the notes on Halachah 21, one is not liable for trapping these creatures, because no real effort is required in doing so.
|
| 100. |
The Maggid Mishneh questions why the Rambam uses the term "is not liable," which implies that it is forbidden to do so by Rabbinic decree. What prohibition is there in releasing an animal from a trap? He answers that perhaps the intent is that the person is liable for violating the Rabbinic prohibition that deems an animal as muktzeh. Note the Magen Avraham 316:11 which states that one may release an animal or a fowl from a trap, provided one does not touch them.
|
| 101. |
See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:5, where the Rambam states that chickens and ducks are considered as within a person's grasp. Note, however, the distinction between the different types of doves mentioned in that halachah and in this halachah. Because of that difference, the Maggid Mishneh considers the mention of doves in this halachah as a printing error. Mention of them is found, however, in most early manuscripts and printings, and other authorities justify their mention.
|
| 102. |
Rav Kapach states that this refers to non-kosher locusts. A person who catches kosher locusts is liable. The Mishnah Berurah 316:13, however, differs, and maintains that the Rambam does not hold one liable for trapping such species.
|
| 103. |
Since it is not customary to trap these species, even a person who traps them for a specific purpose is not held liable (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:4). There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved. For that reason, one must even take precautions not to trap such creatures accidentally (Ramah, Orach Chayim 316:3).
|
| 104. |
I.e., not only is one not liable, but is permitted to do so.
|
| 105. |
Most commentaries explain this ruling according to the opinions that do not hold one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Although generally there would be a Rabbinic prohibition against such an act, in this instance no prohibition was enforced because of the danger involved.
This explanation is, however, untenable for the Rambam, for as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, he follows Rabbi Yehudah's ruling that holds one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
The Avnei Nezer (Likkutim 189) explains that this situation is different, because of the unique nature of the labor of trapping. The concept of trapping is relevant only when one traps an object of value. Therefore even Rabbi Yehudah frees one of liability when trapping an animal whose species is not usually trapped.
Similarly, in the instance at hand, since one has no concern for the object one is trapping, merely for one's personal welfare, the entire concept of trapping does not apply. See also the notes on Halachah 17 of this chapter and Chapter 11, Halachah 4.
|
Arachim Vacharamim - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
When a person consecrates his ancestral field, it is a mitzvah for him to redeem it, for the owner receives priority.1 If, however, he does not desire to, we do not compel him.
When does the above apply? In the era that the Jubilee is observed.2 For if the Jubilee arrives and he does not redeem it, it will be expropriated for the sake of the priests, as we explained.3 In the era when the Jubilee has been nullified4and it is not expropriated for the sake of the priests, but instead will ultimately be redeemed, we compel5 the owner to make an initial bid6 and it is redeemed for its worth7 like other consecrated articles. If someone who is willing to add to [the bid] to redeem it, he may redeem it. If not, we tell him: "It has come to you," and he must give what he bid. He may not make an opening bid for less than four p'rutot so that the fifth that he will add will not be less than a p'rutah.8
Halacha 2
If the owner desired to sell other fields that he owned or to borrow to redeem this field that he consecrated, he has permission to do so.9 This applies whether [he consecrated the field] during the time the Jubilee is observed or when it is not observed. He is given precedence over others. Similarly, if he desired to redeem half of it, he may. This contrasts with the laws that apply when one sells a field to an ordinary person.10 This is the greater stringency that applies with regard to ordinary property [and not] to the Temple treasury.
Halacha 3
When a person consecrates his home,11 a non-kosher12 animal,13 or other property, they are evaluated for their worth, whether it be high or low.14 If the person who consecrated them, his wife, or his heirs15 redeem them, they must add a fifth. We compel the owner to make the first bid. The money is set aside for improvements to the Temple.
[The above] applies whether the house was from a walled city or from an unwalled habitation, [the owner] may redeem it at all times.16
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply if] another person redeemed it from the Temple treasury. If the home was within a walled city and it remained in the possession of the redeemer for twelve months, it becomes his property forever.17 If the home was located in an unwalled habitation and the Jubilee arrived while it was in the possession of the redeemer, it returns to its owner in the Jubilee.18
Halacha 5
When a person consecrates an unblemished19 kosher animal for the sake of improvements to the Temple,20 he has transgressed a positive commandment.21[Nevertheless,] the deed he performed is of consequence and sanctity is conveyed upon [the animal]. It is redeemed even though it is unblemished.22 The priest establishes its worth,23 and the money is given for improvements to the Temple. The person who redeems it, redeems it only for the sake of offering it on the altar for the type of sacrifice for which it is fitting.24[This is required, because] any [consecrated entity] that is fit for the altar is never released from [the obligation to be sacrificed on] the altar.
Halacha 6
What is the source that teaches that it is forbidden to consecrate unblemished animals for the improvement of the Temple? [Leviticus 22:23] states: "An ox or a sheep that has irregularly sized limbs or unsplit hoofs, it shall be [consecrated] as a donation." According to the Oral Tradition,25 we have learned that [the term] "donation" implies that it is consecrated for improvements to the Temple. Similarly, the situation indicates that it was consecrated only for its worth, for a blemished animal is not offered on the altar. [This is denoted by the term] "it," i.e., it26 is consecrated for improvements to the Temple, but an unblemished animal should not be consecrated as a donation for improvements to the Temple. A prohibition derived from a positive commandment has the status of a positive commandment.27
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when a person] consecrates an animal without making any specifications or consecrates his property without making any specifications: We survey all the unblemished animals that are fit to be offered on the altar. The males should be sold for the purpose of burnt offerings28 and offered as burnt offerings. The females29 are sold for the purpose of peace offerings and offered as peace offerings.
The proceeds [of the sales] should be given for improvements to the Temple. For unless explicit specification is made, all consecrated articles are for the sake of the improvement of the Temple. Concerning this [Leviticus 27:9] states: "If it is an animal which can be offered as a sacrifice to God, all parts of it that you can give to God shall be holy." Implied is that every entity that is fit to be offered as a sacrifice on the altar should be offered [on the altar].
Halacha 8
When a person consecrates his possessions without making any specifications and among them were wine, oil, fine flour, and doves that are fit to be offered on the altar, they should be sold for the purpose of [offerings that employ them] and they should be offered. The money should be used to purchase male animals that should be brought as burnt offerings.30
Halacha 9
Why should the proceeds from these sales be used to bring burnt offerings and the proceeds from the sale of an unblemished animal be used for improvements to the Temple?31 [The rationale is that] when an animal is consecrated to the altar suffers a [disqualifying] blemish, there is a concept of it being redeemed, as will be explained.32 When, by contrast, fine flour, wine, oil, and doves become unfit [for the altar], there is no concept of redeeming them.33 [This is derived from Leviticus 27:11-12 which] states: "You shall have the animal stand [before the priest and the priest shall evaluate it]." [Implied is that] any entity that is stood [before a priest] and evaluated may be redeemed. If any entity is not to be stood [before a priest] and evaluated, it may not be redeemed.
Halacha 10
When a person consecrates his possessions without making any specifications and among them was incense which is given to the craftsmen for their wages until they return and purchase it, as we explained in [Hilchot] Shekalim,34 it should be given to the craftsmen for their wages as is done with the remainder of the incense. These guidelines are also followed when one of the spices used in the incense offering is found among his possessions.35
Halacha 11
When a person consecrates an unblemished animal [as a sacrifice to be offered on] the altar and it became blemished36 and was disqualified, it should be evaluated and redeemed. Concerning this, [Leviticus 27:11] states: "When any impure animal37 of which a sacrifice should not be brought as an offering to God, you shall have the animal stand [before the priest....]" He should bring another sacrifice equivalent to it with its money.
Halacha 12
Whenever a person consecrates an animal in its lifetime - whether a kosher animal or a non-kosher one, whether it was consecrated for the sake of the Temple treasury,38 it was consecrated to be offered on the altar and it became blemished,39 or it is an unblemished animal which is fit to be offered as a sacrifice as will be explained,40 it must be stood [before the court] for evaluation, as implied by the phrase: "You shall have the animal stand [before the priest....]" Therefore, if the animal died before it is evaluated and redeemed, it should not be redeemed. Instead, it should be buried.41 If, however, a person consecrated a slaughtered animal or an animal carcass for the sake of improvements to the Temple, it should be redeemed like other movable property.
Halacha 13
[In the above situation,] if one slaughtered [the animal, slitting] the two organs42[necessary for the slaughter to be acceptable] or slit the majority of these organs43 but the animal is still making convulsive movements, it is considered as alive with regard to all matters.44 It may be evaluated and [the provisions implied by the phrases:] "You shall have.... stand and... shall evaluate" apply until it dies.45
Halacha 14
When a person consecrates the worth of an unblemished animal,46 the body of the animal becomes consecrated.47 What is implied? When a person says: 'The worth of this animal is consecrated to the altar,' the animal itself should be sacrificed.
When one consecrates the worth of one of its limbs or organs, saying: 'The worth of the feet of this cow are consecrated to the altar,' there is an unresolved question: Does the sanctity spread throughout the animal or not?48 Therefore it should be sacrificed and not redeemed.
Halacha 15
What should be done?49 We sell it in its entirety to a person who will offer it as a sacrifice.50 The proceeds of the sale are not consecrated with the exception of those of that particular limb.51 If the limb or organ [consecrated] was of vital importance [to the animal], the sanctity [is considered to] spread throughout the entire animal.52
Halacha 16
[Different rules apply if] the animal [consecrated] was blemished and unfit to be offered as a sacrifice. When one consecrates one of its limbs or organs - whether it is one of vital importance or not - only that limb becomes consecrated.53
What is implied? A person said: 'The worth of the foot of this cow...' or 'The worth of its heart is consecrated to the altar,' he and the Temple treasury own it in partnership.54
Halacha 17
Similarly, if a person says: 'The head of this servant...' or 'The heart of this donkey is consecrated to the altar,' [he is liable only for the worth of the limb or organ mentioned].55 Similarly, if he says: 'My head is consecrated to the altar,' he is liable only for the worth of his head.56 We see how much that limb or organ is worth and he must bring a sacrifice for that amount.
Halacha 18
When does the above apply? With regard to animals consecrated to the altar. If, however, a person says: 'The head of this donkey...' or 'Its liver is consecrated,' or 'The head of this servant' or 'His liver is consecrated,'57 since his life is dependent on that organ, he is liable for its entire worth. For whenever an entity is consecrated for improvements to the Temple, the consecration involves the entity's worth.58
Halacha 19
When a person says: 'I pledge my airech to the altar,' he must bring sacrifices of the value of his airech.59 If he is not financially capable of giving his entireairech,60 there is an unresolved question: Is his evaluation appraised according to his financial capacity for he made his pledge using the term airech or do we not appraise his financial capacity since he made his vow to the altar?61
Similarly, when a person consecrates his ancestral field to the altar, it should be redeemed and the proceeds should be used to purchase burnt offerings for the altar. There is an unresolved question: Should it be redeemed according to the fixed airech established for it62 or should it be redeemed according to its value, since he made his vow to the altar?63 In all these and similar instances, we rule stringently.64
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Arachin 27a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:27.
|
| 2. |
See Hilchot Shemitah ViYoval 10:3, 8-10 which explains that the Jubilee years is observed only when the entire Jewish people live in the Holy Land. Hence when the tribes of Reuven and Gad were exiled - decades before the destruction of the First Temple - the observance of the Jubilee no longer had the status of Scriptural Law.
|
| 3. |
Chapter 4, Halachot 19-20. Since either the person who redeems it or the priests will pay for it, the Temple treasury will ultimately receive its due. Hence, there is no need to compel the owner to redeem it.
|
| 4. |
As evident from Chapter 8, Halachah 8, this refers to a time when the Temple is standing, but the Jubilee year is no longer observed.
|
| 5. |
Were the person not to be compelled, it is possible that the Temple treasury would not receive its due (Radbaz).
The Ra'avad differs and states that the person is not compelled to redeem his field, but the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's understanding.
|
| 6. |
The owner is compelled to make the initial bid, because he is required to add a fifth and thus the Temple treasury will be profiting more than if another person would offer the same price. Also, we assume that since it was his property, he is attached to it and will pay more to repossess it (Arachin 27a).
|
| 7. |
I.e., for the price people are willing to pay, not for the standard value decreed by the Torah. Since the laws pertaining to arechim are taught as a single unit in the Torah and all the particulars do not apply, this fundamental factor is also not applied.
|
| 8. |
For anything less than a p'rutah is not financially significant.
|
| 9. |
Since a field that he consecrated will never return to him if he does not redeem it, he is given a greater opportunity to do so (Arachin 30a).
|
| 10. |
In which instance, these restrictions do apply. See Hilchot Shemitah ViYoval 11:17-18; 12:2.
|
| 11. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 116) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 354) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 12. |
The laws involving kosher animals are found in Halachot 5-7.
|
| 13. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 115) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 353) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 14. |
This - and not a standard value - is what the person must pay. The Torah established a standard value only for humans and fields.
|
| 15. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and notes.
|
| 16. |
I.e., as long as another person has not redeemed it first. As stated in Hilchot Shemitah V'Yoval, ch. 12, there is a difference in the relevant laws with regard to the sale of such dwellings to private individuals. A home in a walled city must be redeemed from a private purchaser within a year. Otherwise, it becomes his property forever. These restrictions do not apply with regard to a home in an unwalled habitation.
|
| 17. |
I.e., it does not return to the original owner in the Jubilee. It is as if the purchaser acquired the field from the owner.
|
| 18. |
As would be the law had he purchased it from him directly.
|
| 19. |
I.e., were the animal to have a blemish that disqualifies it from being offered as a sacrifice, these laws would not apply.
|
| 20. |
As obvious from Halachah 7, this applies when he explicitly states that he is consecrating it for this purpose.
|
| 21. |
As stated in the following halachah.
|
| 22. |
In contrast to an animal consecrated as a sacrifice which is redeemed only when it is blemished. See Halachah 11.
|
| 23. |
See Halachah 12. The commentaries have noted that in Chapter 8, Halachah 2, the Rambam mentions that a priest is required to participate in the evaluation of humans and fields, but not in that of movable property. He makes no mention of the evaluation of animals. There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Sanhedrin 15a.
|
| 24. |
I.e., depending on the type and gender of the animal it is fitting for some sacrifices and not others.
|
| 25. |
See temurah 7b.
|
| 26. |
A blemished animal like those mentioned in the verse.
|
| 27. |
I.e., although the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, since the Torah did explicitly forbid it by saying: "Do not consecrate an unblemished animal for this purpose," it is not considered as the transgression of a negative commandment. Temurah 7b states that a negative commandment is also involved. Nevertheless, based on our Sages' statements in the Sifra, the Rambam considers that passage as merely an asmachta, the derivation of support for a concept by the Rabbis and not a Scriptural prohibition.
|
| 28. |
Although they could also be used for other types of sacrifices, it is preferable to offer them as burnt offerings.
|
| 29. |
Which may not be brought as burnt offerings.
|
| 30. |
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this issue, offering a different interpretation of the Rambam's source, Shekalim 4:7-8. The Radbaz explains the rationale behind the Rambam's ruling. Since animals can be redeemed, we assume that he consecrated them with the intent that they be redeemed and the money given for improvements to the Temple building. Since these other items cannot be redeemed, by contrast, we assume that from the outset, his intent was that they be consecrated for the sake of the altar alone. These concepts also apply with regard to Halachah 9.
|
| 31. |
As stated in Halachah 7.
|
| 32. |
See Halachah 11.
|
| 33. |
The Ra'avad notes that fine flour, wine, and oil may be redeemed if they became impure before being placed in a consecrated vessel. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since they cannot be redeemed once they have been placed in a consecrated vessel, that is most significant. For until they have been placed in a consecrated vessel, they have not been sanctified in a complete sense. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 6:4-5.
|
| 34. |
As explained in Hilchot Shekalim 4:12, in every year that is not a leap year, there is a certain amount of incense left over. For 365 portions were prepared for daily offerings and there are either 353, 354, or 355 days in such a year. Thus there were extra portions left over. The holiness associated with these portions of incense was then transferred to money and that money used to purchase burnt offerings. Afterwards, the portions of incense would be given to the craftsmen who prepare the incense as their wages. They would then sell this incense back to the Temple treasury, so that it would be purchased back with the funds designated for communal sacrifices for the new year.
This halachah is speaking about an instance where one of those craftsmen consecrated the incense in his possession to the Temple treasury. It should be given to other craftsmen as their wages and then purchased back as above.
|
| 35. |
I.e., it should be given to the craftsmen as part of their wages and then purchased with the money designated for the purchase of communal sacrifices.
|
| 36. |
I.e., a blemish that will not become healed (Radbaz).
|
| 37. |
Bechorot 37b explains that the intent is not an animal from an impure species, but rather an animal from a kosher species that became disqualified because of a blemish, for there is a second verse (27:27) that speaks about evaluating non-kosher animals. See also Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:10.
|
| 38. |
As explained in Halachah 5.
|
| 39. |
After its consecration. The laws applying to the consecration of a blemished animal are the same as those applying to other movable property. See the gloss of the Ra'avad.
|
| 40. |
Some commentaries suggest emending the wording of the text and having it read 'as was explained,' i.e., referring to Halachah 5. The Merkevet HaMishneh suggests that the text should be left as is and that the reference is to Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which refers to consecrating to the Temple treasury an animal that was already designated as a sacrifice.
|
| 41. |
For the holiness that rested upon a consecrated animal cannot be transferred to money after its death. (See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Temurah 7:3). Instead, it must be buried so that no one will make use of it.
|
| 42. |
The windpipe and the esophagus. These are referred to as 'the signs' of ritual slaughter. SeeHilchot Shechitah 1:9.
|
| 43. |
For that is sufficient for the slaughter to be acceptable (ibid.).
|
| 44. |
Note a similar ruling in Hilchot Shaar Avot HaTumah 2:1.
|
| 45. |
The commentaries note that according to the Rambam, this applies even if the animal is incapable of standing unsupported. There are, however, other authorities who differ; see Shitah Mekubetzet(Bava Kama 76a).
|
| 46. |
I.e., the person desired that the animal be sold and the proceeds used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed.
|
| 47. |
Since the animal is fit to be sacrificed, it is dedicated to the altar and should be sacrificed itself (Temura 19b).
|
| 48. |
Based on Temurah 11b, the Or Sameach explains that were a person to consecrate the limb itself, there is no question that the sanctity would spread throughout the entire animal. The question is since the person did not consecrate the limb itself, merely its worth, do we make two extensions: from the worth of the limb to the limb itself and from the limb to the entire body. There are, however, those who note that in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:2, the Rambam does not accept the principle that the sanctity spreads from a limb or organ throughout the entire animal unless the limb or organ is of vital importance.
|
| 49. |
For we cannot require the donor to sacrifice the entire animal (for perhaps it did not become consecrated), nor may allow him to regard it as his personal property (for perhaps it did).
|
| 50. |
As the commentaries to Temurah 11b explain, there is a difficulty when one limb of an animal was consecrated and another person purchases it to offer it as a sacrifice, for it is as if the person offering the sacrifice is offering an animal lacking a limb. For that limb was not consecrated by him, but by the original donor. They explain that this is referring to an instance where the purchaser pledged to purchase a burnt offering of a certain value and the animal is worth that amount, even without the limb in question. See Hilchot Maaseh HaKorbanot 15:2.
|
| 51. |
We follow the principle that when there is a question concerning ownership, one who desires to expropriate property (in this instance, the Temple treasury) from a colleague (the donor), must prove the validity of his claim. Since that is not possible (because the question is unresolved), the donor may retain the proceeds from the portion of the animal that was not consecrated.
|
| 52. |
Since the animal could not live without that limb, consecrating it is equivalent to consecrating the entire animal.
|
| 53. |
Since the animal is unfit to be sacrificed, we do not say that the sanctity spread throughout the entire animal.
|
| 54. |
The animal should be sold and the proceeds from the sale of that limb or organ used to purchase a burnt offering.
|
| 55. |
Since neither a donkey or a servant is fit to offer on the altar, the principles mentioned in the previous halachah apply.
|
| 56. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating that a person's severed head is of no monetary value whatsoever, for it is forbidden to benefit from any portion of a corpse. And seemingly, if we would evaluate his head separately, it would be considered as equivalent to his entire worth, for of what worth is a person without a head? Hence, the Temple treasury should be the sole owner without leaving any portion for the person himself. Therefore the Ra'avad suggests that the intent of saying that they are partners is that the consecrated entity's value is divided in half.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Talmud clearly mentions evaluation in that passage and therefore, does not accept the Ra'avad's view. How is a head evaluated? The Kessef Mishnehexplains that we consider the tasks the servant or the person performs. To the extent he is involved with those that require intellectual activity, his head is worth more. If, by contrast, his activity is primarily physical, his head is worth less.
The Radbaz maintains that if a limb or organ is of vital importance to the animal or person, the value is divided in half as the Ra'avad states. The Rambam speaks of evaluating the worth of the organ only when it is not of vital importance.
|
| 57. |
I.e., for improvements to the Temple, for as stated in Halachah 7, whenever a person consecrates an entity without explicitly stated the purpose for which it was consecrated, we assume that it was consecrated for improvements for the Temple.
|
| 58. |
Since the animal or person would not be worth anything without this organ, there is no difference between the worth of that organ and the worth of the entire entity.
The difference between this instance and those mentioned in the previous halachot is that the previous halachot involve limbs or organs explicitly consecrated to be offered on the altar. Thus that is all that may be done with them. Even when an article itself may not be sacrificed on the altar and hence, we understand that the person is referring to the value of the article, since he is singling out that limb or organ, we consider his intent to be that its individual value be offered on the altar.
In those instances, the holiness is focused on the physical substance of the limb or organ. Its value is only a substitute for that physical substance. Hence, we look it at as a particular and not part of the person or animal as a whole. In the instances referred to by this halachah, from the outset, we are concerned with value. Hence, we consider the value of the limb or organ in a more encompassing manner.
|
| 59. |
I.e., the fixed amount required by Torah law, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.
|
| 60. |
In which instance, were we speaking about a person who pledged his airech, he would be required to pay according to his financial capacity, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.
|
| 61. |
And there are no other instances where a pledge to the altar can be fulfilled by giving less that the article's worth (Arachin 5a).
|
| 62. |
A shekel and a pundiyon for each year until the Jubilee, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachot 2, 5.
|
| 63. |
And there are no other instances where a pledge to the altar can be fulfilled by giving less that the article's worth (Arachin 5a).
|
| 64. |
And the Temple treasury is always given the benefit of the doubt. If the airech is more, the donor must pay the airech. If the worth is more, he must pay the worth.
|
Arachim Vacharamim - Chapter 6
Halacha 1
Whether a person says: 'This1 is consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple,' 'This is a dedication offering2 for the sake of improvements to the Temple,' or 'This is a dedication offering for the sake of Heaven,' or he [makes] similar [statements] with regard to his property as a whole,3 saying that it is all consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple, as a dedication offering for the sake of improvements to the Temple, or as a dedication offering for the sake of Heaven, [the property] should be given for improvements to the Temple. If, however, he said [that the property should be given] as a dedication offering without making any specifications, it should be given to the priests,4 for unspecified dedication offerings are given to the priests,5 as [Numbers 18:14] states: 'All of the dedication offerings from the Jewish people will be yours.
Halacha 2
A person may make a dedication offering from his cattle, his sheep, his Canaanite servants6 and maid-servants, and his ancestral fields.7 He should not, however, designate all of his cattle, all of his servants, all of his fields, nor all of any type of movable property that he owns as a dedication offering, as [implied by Leviticus 27:28]: 'From everything that he owns.'8 If he gives all he owns from a particular type of property as a dedication offering, even if he gives everything he owns as a dedication offering, his gift is binding. [This applies] whether he designates the dedication offering for the priests or for the improvement of the Temple.
Halacha 3
When a person gives all of his property as a dedication offering or consecrates it, we take everything that he owns, even the tefillin on his head. Needless to say, [this includes] his tools and his clothes,9 for he consecrated or gave as a dedication offering all of his possessions.
Halacha 4
What is the difference between dedication offerings designated for priests and those dedicated to Heaven? Dedication offerings to Heaven become consecrated property and must be redeemed for their worth.10 The payment is given for the sake of improvements to the Temple and then the possessions become ordinary property. Dedication offerings designated for the priests, by contrast, can never be redeemed.11Instead, they are given to the priests liketerumah. Concerning dedication offerings designated for the priests, [Leviticus 27:28] states: 'It shall neither be sold,12 nor redeemed,'13 i.e., it shall neither be sold to another person,14 nor redeemed by the owner.
Halacha 5
Whether a person designates land or movable property as a dedication offering, it is given to a priest15 in the watch16 serving at the time that the dedication offering was designated.
As long as a dedication offering for the priests is in the homes of the owner, it is like consecrated property in all regards,17 as [Leviticus 27:28] states: 'All dedication offerings are consecrated as holy unto God.' Once it is given to the priests, it is considered as ordinary property, as [Numbers 18:14] states: 'All of the dedication offerings from the Jewish people will be yours.'
Halacha 6
If a priest has a field that was a dedication offering [or an ancestral field]18that he acquired after the Jubilee19 and he designates it as a dedication offering, it is considered as a dedication offering and should be given to his brethren, the priests, as [implied by Leviticus 27:21], 'It will become the priest's, [like his] ancestral property.' This teaches that a field [designated] as a dedication offering that [a priest acquires] is like an ancestral field owned by an Israelite.20If he designates it as a dedication offering, it becomes sanctified immediately.
Halacha 7
When a priest sells a field that he [had acquired after it was designated as] a dedication offering and then the purchaser consecrates it - even if the purchaser was the original owner who designated it as a dedication offering21 - it is like [the consecration of] acquired property22 and it returns to the priest who sold it in the Jubilee year.23
Land or movable property that belongs to the priests or the Levites,24 by contrast, may not be designated as a dedication offering.25 [The rationale is that] with regard to the fields [granted to them, Leviticus 25:34] states: 'For it is an eternal inheritance for them,'26 and an association is established between movable property and land with regard to dedication offerings, as [Leviticus 27:28] states: 'from anything he owns... and from his ancestral field."
Halacha 8
When a person consecrates [animals that] had been consecrated [to be offered] on the altar for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the [second] consecration is of consequence.27 The animal should be evaluated and redeemed and its worth given for the sake of improvements to the Temple. [Afterwards,] it should be offered for the purpose for which it was originally consecrated.28
When, however, a person consecrates [animals that] had been consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple [with the intent that they be offered] on the altar, saying: 'This is a burnt offering,' or '...a peace offering,' or he designates them as a dedication offering to the priests, his act is of no consequence.29 For [animals that] had been consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple cannot be consecrated [to be offered] on the altar or designated as dedication offerings, because a person cannot consecrate an entity that does not belong to him.30
Halacha 9
Halacha 10
When a person consecrates [an animal designated as] a burnt offering for the sake of improvements to the Temple, only [its evaluation by] the Temple treasurers holds back [its slaughter].37 According to Rabbinic decree, however, it should not be slaughtered until it is redeemed.38 Therefore,39 if he transgressed and slaughtered it [before it was redeemed], it is acceptable.40
Halacha 11
A person may designate as a dedication offerings - whether set aside for the priests or for improvements to the Temple - [animals consecrated as] sacrifices of the highest degree of sanctity41 or sacrifices of a lesser decree of sanctity.42If he was liable to replace these sacrifices,43 he must pay their value44whether to the priests or for the sake of improvements to the Temple. After they are redeemed, he should then offer the sacrifices for their original purposes.
Halacha 12
What is the redemption process [when a person] vowed [to bring a particular animal as a sacrifice]45and then designated it as a dedication offering?46 We evaluate how much a person would be willing to give for the right of sacrificing this animal as a burnt offering even though he is not liable to do so.47 Whoever gives this amount48 may offer this animal [for the sacrifice] for which it was originally pledged.
Halacha 13
When an Israelite designates a firstborn animal - whether unblemished or blemished49 - as a dedication offering for the sake of heaven, the designation takes effect.50 Needless to say, if the priest designates it as a dedication offering for the sake of heaven after it enters his domain, [the designation takes effect].51
Halacha 14
How is it to be redeemed? We evaluate how much a person would be willing to give for the right for this firstborn to be his so that he will have the right to give it to whichever priest he desires, to his relative or his friend. Whoever gives this amount52 may take the firstborn and give it to whichever priest he desires. The money is given for the sake of improvements to the Temple.
Halacha 15
Halacha 16
When a person consecrates his [half-]shekel56 for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration is binding.57 If one consecrates bikkurim58 for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration does not take effect.59If, however, the priest [to whom the bikkurim are given] consecrates them after they enter his domain, the consecration is binding.60
Halacha 17
When a person designates half of his servant or half of his maid-servant as a dedication offering, he and the priests are joint owners.61 If, however, he consecrates half his servant and designates half his servant as a dedication offering to Heaven, he is consecrated entirely, as we explained.62 Whenever one consecrates his Canaanite servant or maid-servant or consecrates all of his property and he owns servants, their physical person becomes consecrated Therefore it is forbidden to benefit from them63 until they are redeemed.64
Halacha 18
Halacha 19
When one consecrates his servant's hands,67 anything he earns beyond what is required for his sustenance is consecrated.68
How should this servant sustain himself? He should borrow the money [required for his sustenance], work, and repay the debt. [This is allowed] provided he always works for less than a p'rutah and pays it. For if he earned an entirep'rutah, it would be acquired by the Temple treasury as soon as he earned it.69
Halacha 20
Halacha 21
A person cannot consecrate an entity that does not belong to him.72
What is implied? If he designates his son, his daughter, his Hebrew servant, or Hebrew maid-servant, or a field he acquired as a dedication offering, they do not become dedication offerings. For a person cannot consecrate an entity when its physical person or substance is not his.73
Halacha 22
A person may not consecrate an entity that is not in his domain.
Halacha 23
When does the above apply? With regard to movable property. [Different rules apply] to landed property that was stolen and [the thief] denied [having taken it].76 If [the original owner] could have the land expropriated through legal process,77 he has the right to consecrate it even though he has not yet expropriated it. For the land itself is always considered in the domain of its [legitimate] owners.78
Halacha 24
When a person steals from his colleague and the [original] owner does not despair [of recovery],79 neither of them can consecrate it. [The robber cannot,] because the article does not belong to him and [the owner cannot,] because it is not in his possession. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 25
[The following laws apply when] a person was selling squash, eggs, or the like and a [prospective] purchaser comes, takes one, and then departs. If the price of each particular article is fixed, it is as if a price was established,80 and the seller cannot consecrate this squash, for it is not in his domain.81 If the price is not fixed and he consecrated it, it is consecrated, because it is still in his domain,82 for [the prospective purchaser] did not take it with the intent to steal it.
Halacha 26
A person cannot consecrate an article that has not yet come into existence.83
What is implied? [If a person says:] "What my net will bring up from the sea is consecrated" or "The fruit my field will produce is designated as a dedication offering," his words are of no consequence.
Halacha 27
Halacha 28
Similarly, when a person consecrates the work to be produced by his wife's hands, she may work and partake [of her earnings]. The remainder is not consecrated.86 If he tells her: "May your hands be consecrated to their Maker," since they are under lien to him,87 [the profits of] all of the work that she produces are consecrated. To what can this be compared? To one who says: "This tree is consecrated," in which instance all the fruit it produces is consecrated.88 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 29
When a person tells a colleague: "The field that I will sell you89 will be consecrated when I buy it back from you," the consecration takes effect when he buys it back.90 [The rationale is that] it is in his possession [originally] and he has the possibility of consecrating it.91
[If one tells a colleague:] "The field that I entrusted to you as security92 will be consecrated when I redeem it from you," the field becomes consecrated when he redeems it. [The rationale is that] he has the potential to redeem it.93 [The consecration is effective] even if it was given as a security for a fixed time,94because he has the potential to redeem it after that time.
Halacha 30
Halacha 31
It appears to me97 that even though a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not come into being, if he says: "I pledge to consecrate it," he is obligated to consecrate it when it will come into being to [fulfill] his vow. If he does not consecrate it, he transgresses [the prohibitions]: "Do not delay in paying it" and "He shall not desecrate his word" and [fails to fulfill the positive commandment:] "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth" as is true with regard to all other vows.98
Halacha 32
What is implied? [When a person] says: "I pledge to consecrate everything that my net will bring up from the sea," "I pledge to give the fruit produced by this field to the poor," "I pledge to designate as a dedication offering - or give for the sake of captives - all of my earnings of this year," or makes any statement of this like, he is obligated to give and/or perform what he pledged when the article comes into his possession. For these and all similar statements are vows, not acts of consecration.99
Halacha 33
Support for this can be drawn from the statements of Jacob our Patriarch [Genesis 28:22]:100 "And everything that You will give me, I will tithe." And [later,ibid. 31:13]101 states: "Where you took a vow."102 And103 when a person says: "I will not depart from this world until I become a nazirite," he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow104 although he did not actually take such a vow. Since he said that he would take a nazirite vow, he is obligated to observe those restrictions. This law parallels that. It is appropriate to rule in this manner.
Halacha 34
A consecration that is made in error is not binding.105
What is implied? If one says: "When a black ox will go out of the building first, it will be consecrated," should a white ox go out [first], it is not consecrated.106 [If he says:] "When a gold dinar comes into my hand first, it is consecrated," should a silver [dinar] come up, it is not consecrated. [If he says:] "When a barrel of wine comes into my hand first, it is consecrated," should a barrel of oil come up, it is not consecrated. [This applies] whether wine is more expensive than oil107 in that place or oil is more expensive than wine.108
If he attempts to extend the consecration to a second entity, saying: "[The status of] this is the same as [that of] the other," the second is consecrated.109Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Any specific entity.
|
| 2. |
This term is being used for the Hebrew term cherem. Cherem implies the removal of an entity from one framework of reference and its inclusion in another. Similarly, in this instance, the property is being taken from the realm of private, personal possessions and being sanctified (see the gloss of HaKtav VeHaKabalah to Leviticus 27:29). It must, however, be emphasized that the term cherem has negative connotations, meaning 'a ban' and the root has the connotation 'absolute destruction.' In that context, in his Living Torah, Rav Aryeh Kaplan interprets the term is meaning 'declare taboo,' i.e., banned from ordinary mortal use and hence, designated for the Temple treasury or the priests.
|
| 3. |
As stated in Halachah 2, a person should not dedicate all of his possessions. Nevertheless, if he chooses to do so, his statements are of consequence.
|
| 4. |
The differences between the two types of dedication offerings mentioned are described in Halachah 4. To which priests the property is given is described in Halachah 5.
|
| 5. |
The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Arachin 28b) and it appears that the conclusion of the Talmud is that if no specification is made, dedication offerings should be given for improvements to the Temple. Indeed, Rashi (Beitzah 36b) and others rule in this manner. The Or Sameachsuggests that the Rambam's source is Ezekiel 44:29 which states: 'All the dedication offerings from the Jewish people shall be yours.'
|
| 6. |
But not his Hebrew servants. See Halachah 21 and notes.
|
| 7. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 145) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 357) include the laws governing dedication offerings among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 8. |
I.e., the dedication offering must be 'from what he owns,' i.e., implying that he is giving a portion of what he owns, but not all that he owns. The rationale for this ruling is explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 13.
|
| 9. |
I.e., in contrast to a person who pledges an airech who is allowed to retain ownership of his basic necessities, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachot 14-17.
|
| 10. |
I.e., until they are redeemed - by the owner or by another person - they are the property of the Temple treasury and it is forbidden to benefit from them or use them for mundane purposes.
|
| 11. |
I.e., the owner loses all rights to them. They become the property of the priests, able to be used for whatever purposes the priest who receives the property desires, as explained in the following halachah.
|
| 12. |
I.e., before it is given to the priest. Once it is given to the priest, he may sell it if he so desires.
|
| 13. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 110-111) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 358-359) include both the prohibitions against selling and redeeming property designated as a dedication offering among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 14. |
The Rambam's apparent source is the Sifra, but the version of the standard text of the Sifraspeaks of a prohibition against selling the property to the Temple treasurer. There are those who maintain that the Rambam followed a version of the Sifra with a different reading. Significantly, however, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam defines the prohibition as forbidding the sale to the Temple treasurer.
|
| 15. |
The implication appears to be that, like terumah, the donor has the right to give the dedication offering to the priest of his choice from the watch. It is not divided among all the priests of the watch. See Arachin 28a.
|
| 16. |
As stated in the notes to Chapter 4, Halachah 24, there were 24 priestly watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week at a time according to a rotating cycle.
|
| 17. |
They may not be used by the former owner for his own purposes and the prohibition of meilah, misappropriating consecrated property, applies.
|
| 18. |
Our translation follows the commentary of the Kiryat Sefer. The version of the standard published text (which reflects that of authentic manuscripts and early printings) would be literally translated as 'When a priest possesses a field that was designated as a dedication offering which he acquired after the Jubilee.' We prefer the version of the Kiryat Sefer, because there is no connection between the Jubilee year and a priest's acquisition of dedication offerings.
|
| 19. |
See Chapter 4, Halachot 19, 24.
|
| 20. |
I.e., just like an ancestral field belonging to an Israelite is given to the priests, so too, a field owned by a priest that is designated as a dedication offering is given to the priests.
|
| 21. |
Since he was the original owner, one might think that the laws that apply when one consecrates an ancestral field would apply. This is not the case, because once he designated it as a dedication offering, it became the property of the priest.
|
| 22. |
Which, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 26, returns to its original owner. In that instance, as in this halachah, the person who consecrated it did not have everlasting ownership of it. Hence, he cannot consecrate the field forever.
|
| 23. |
For once it is given to him, the priest is considered its owner for all time.
|
| 24. |
This ruling was a matter of question for the Rambam. There is a difference of opinion concerning this point among the Sages. The standard published test of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 8:5) indicates that he favored the view that maintains that this only applies to priests. Rav Kapach maintains that this is an error and his ruling there is - as stated here - that it applies to both priests and Levites.
|
| 25. |
I.e., if they make such a dedication, it is of no consequence.
|
| 26. |
I.e., their landed property is theirs forever. It cannot be given as a dedication offering, because a dedication offering is given to a priest as his private property. Hence there would be no advantage in his making such an offering (Rashi, (Arachin 28a).
Thus there is obviously a difference between land or movable property that belongs to a priest and property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering, as stated in Halachah 6. The rationale is that property that a priest owns as an ancestral heritage is essentially his. On the other hand, property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering is not essentially his. Hence, it can be given to other priests as a dedication offering.
|
| 27. |
The rationale is that consecrating an animal for the sake of improvements to the Temple is like taking a vow to pay its value to the Temple treasury. Hence, such a vow can be taken even if the animal is already consecrated.
|
| 28. |
For the second consecration and the redemption do not effect its original status.
|
| 29. |
Tosafot (Temurah 32a) explains the difference between the two instances as follows: The owner of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice still shares a connection to it. For if it is blemished, he must redeem it and replace it. In contrast, once an animal is consecrated to the Temple treasury, it leaves the owner's domain entirely.
|
| 30. |
And once an animal has been consecrated to the Temple treasury, it is not the owner's unless he redeems it.
|
| 31. |
For the sake of improvements to the Temple. Whether he states this explicitly or not, it is consecrated for that purpose as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 7, unless he explicitly states that he is consecrating it for another purpose.
|
| 32. |
Because the consecration did not take effect yet. The Or Sameach notes that the Rambam's apparent source, the Tosefta (Temurah 3:1), states that it is permitted to partake of the animal that was slaughtered and questions why the Rambam does not rule accordingly. He explains that the Rambam considers the person who consecrated the animal equivalent to an apostate for by slaughtering the animal, he prevents his vow from being fulfilled. As stated in Hilchot Shechitah 4:14, there are certain conditions necessary for slaughter performed by such a person to be successful.
|
| 33. |
Since the original consecration has not yet taken effect, he may still consecrate it for another purpose.
|
| 34. |
I.e., if the animal does not die within 30 dies, retroactively, the consecration will take effect from the time of his statements.
|
| 35. |
Since the consecration of the animal will ultimately take effect, it may not be used for mundane purposes unless it is evaluated by the court. That evaluation may not be performed when the animal is dead (Lechem Mishneh).
|
| 36. |
Since retroactively, the animal will become consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration as a sacrifice is not of consequence, as stated in Halachah 8.
|
| 37. |
I.e., this evaluation is necessary to establish the extent of his obligation, but nothing more. We do not require him to wait until he actually redeems the animal. The Radbaz explains that there are commentaries that if the animal was not redeemed the Temple treasurers are required to be present at the offering of the animal, because the owner of a sacrifice must be present when it is offered. The Rambam does not, however, require the treasurers' presence.
|
| 38. |
For the Sages decreed that the animal be considered as if its body has become consecrated.
|
| 39. |
I.e., because the requirement to wait until its redemption is Rabbinic in origin.
|
| 40. |
Rashi (Temurah 32a,b) states that in such an instance, the person is not required to pay anything for the dedication offering, because the animal was never evaluated.
|
| 41. |
Burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.
|
| 42. |
All other sacrifices.
|
| 43. |
I.e., he pledged to bring an offering of a particular type. Afterwards, he designated an animal to be offered to fulfill his pledge. If the animal is lost or stolen, he is required to supply another animal.
|
| 44. |
Since he is obligated to replace his sacrifices, he is required to redeem the consecrated animal.
|
| 45. |
E.g., he said: "I will bring this animal as a burnt offering." In this instance, if the animal dies or is stolen, he is not required to replace it with another animal.
|
| 46. |
I.e., one might think that since the animal itself is already designated as a sacrifice and the person is not required to replace it if stolen, it is no longer his, and he does not have the right to consecrate it at all.
|
| 47. |
I.e., since the person could in fact bring the sacrifice, we evaluate how much that right is worth to a person.
|
| 48. |
Since the person who consecrated the animal is not obligated to replace it, we do not require him to redeem it and offer it. Instead, anyone who desires to pay the estimated amount has the right to do so.
|
| 49. |
An unblemished firstborn animal is offered as a sacrifice and a priest is given the right to partake of it, while a blemished one must be given to a priest to use as his private property.
|
| 50. |
And the animal must be redeemed as stated in the previous halachah.
|
| 51. |
This is speaking about a firstborn animal with a blemish. It becomes the priest's private property, as stated in Hilchot Bechorot 1:3. Hence, there is no question that he has the right to do as he pleases with it.
|
| 52. |
I.e., we do not require the person who consecrated the animal to redeem it.
|
| 53. |
See Leviticus 27:32; Hilchot Bechorot, ch. 6, for a description of this offering.
|
| 54. |
In which instance, we follow the principles stated in Halachah 12. A price to be paid to offer the sacrifice is established. Anyone willing to pay that price may redeem the animal.
|
| 55. |
I.e., if the animal selected to be sacrificed as a tithe offering dies or is stolen, he is not required to offer another animal in its place.
|
| 56. |
The Rambam is referring to the half-shekel every male is required to give to purchase his share of the communal offerings. See Hilchot Shekalim, chs. 1-3.
|
| 57. |
This is parallel to the law mentioned in Halachah 11, that a person may consecrate animals designated as sacrifices.
|
| 58. |
The first fruits that were brought to the Temple and then given to the priests. See Exodus, ch. 23; Deuteronomy, ch. 26, Hilchot Bikkurim, chs. 1-4.
|
| 59. |
For the bikkurim are not his, but rather the property of the priest.
|
| 60. |
The bikkurim become the priest's private property (ibid. 4:14). Hence he may do with them whatever he desires.
|
| 61. |
I.e., for the portion given to the priest becomes his private property.
|
| 62. |
As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 18, when a person consecrates a limb or an organ on which an animal's life depends, the entire animal becomes consecrated. Here, too, the servant cannot live with only half his body.
|
| 63. |
Nevertheless the prohibition against meilah, misappropriating sacred property, do not apply. SeeHilchot Meilah 5:10.
|
| 64. |
I.e., they are sold to others and the proceeds of the sale are used for the sake of improvements to the Temple.
|
| 65. |
For freeing them might create the impression that they were treating consecrated property with disdain and not seeking its full worth.
|
| 66. |
In which instance, they will receive the market value of the servant.
|
| 67. |
What the owner is attempting to do is to consecrate the servant's earnings. That, however, is not possible, for a person is unable to consecrate an entity that has not come into existence already (see Halachah 26). Therefore, he consecrates the servant's hands, for they do exist, and thus any earnings they produce become consecrated (Radbaz). Note the parallel in Halachah 28.
|
| 68. |
A servant's master is not liable to provide for his sustenance (Hilchot Avadim 9:7). Hence that money must be taken from the servant's earnings. Nevertheless, since his earnings are consecrated, the process the Rambam continues to explain should be followed.
|
| 69. |
Tosafot, Gittin 12b, explains that even a sum less than a p'rutah can be consecrated. (SeeHilchot Meilah 7:8.) Nevertheless, the owner had the intent that this amount not be consecrated so that the servant would be able to sustain himself.
|
| 70. |
The price that would be paid if he was sold as a servant in the marketplace.
|
| 71. |
A servant is considered as property and consecrating him makes him the property of the Temple treasury. Hence it is entitled to all of his earnings. This does not apply with regard to a free man.
|
| 72. |
Bava Kama 69b derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:14: "When a person will consecrate his house." Just as his house is his own, so too, everything he consecrates must be his own.
|
| 73. |
All of the four types of people mentioned above are considered as independent personalities. Although a father and owner possess certain rights with regard to the earnings of these individuals, he does not own their physical persons. This applies even to his children who are beneath the age of majority (Arachin 28a). Similarly, a field that one acquires is never totally his, for he must return it to its original owners in the Jubilee.
|
| 74. |
For there is no way that they could regain possession of it immediately. Nor may the watchman consecrate it, because it does not belong to him.
|
| 75. |
I.e., although it is in the physical possession of the watchman, it is still considered as belonging to - and able to be secured by - the owner. See Halachah 25 and notes.
|
| 76. |
And instead, claimed to be the legitimate owner.
|
| 77. |
Proving his ownership through the testimony of witnesses or through a valid deed of title.
|
| 78. |
This is a principle applicable in many aspects of Jewish business law. Land can never be stolen and is always considered as being in the possession of the person who has title to it. See Bava Metzia 7a.
|
| 79. |
Even if the owner despairs of the recovery of the article, it is not desirable for the thief to consecrate it. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 5:7.
|
| 80. |
Since a standard price for each article was established and the articles were left for sale, we assume that as soon as the person took the article, he committed himself to the purchase and hence, the sale is completed.
|
| 81. |
For it is as if it was already sold.
|
| 82. |
Since the price has to be established, until it is established, the sale is not complete. And until the sale is complete, the article is considered as belonging to the seller. Hence, the prospective purchaser is considered as the watchman of an entrusted article and the law stated in the final clause of Halachah 22 applies. Indeed, Bava Batra 88a mentions this instance and from it, the law stated in Halachah 22 is derived.
|
| 83. |
Kiryat Sefer explains the rationale for this ruling: Since the object has not come into existence as of yet, it is not in his domain. And, as stated in Halachah 22, a person cannot consecrate an article that is not in his domain.
|
| 84. |
Needless to say, this applies when the person never owned the field he seeks to consecrate. By mentioning this instance, the Rambam (and his source, Ketubot 58b) emphasize that even though the person originally and ultimately owned the field, since he did not own it at the time he consecrated it, the consecration is not effective.
|
| 85. |
The Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De'ah 258:15 emphasizes that his statement is not even considered a vow, because the wording used does not have the implication of a vow. See Halachah 31 which speaks of this issue. Note, however, the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Mechirah 22:15.
|
| 86. |
I.e., the consecration is not effective, because the fruits of the woman's labor did not exist at the time her husband sought to consecrate them.
|
| 87. |
As stated in Hilchot Ishut 12:3, all of the proceeds of the work a woman performs belong to her husband.
|
| 88. |
For although the fruit did not exist at the time of the original consecration, the tree did. And once the tree is consecrated all the fruit it produces is consecrated. Similarly, the woman's hands exist at the time the consecration was made, and as a result, all the products of her work are consecrated.
Rabbenu Nissim does not accept the Rambam's ruling. He explains that although our Sages ordained that the profits from a woman's labor should be given to her husband, those profits are given in exchange for his support of her. If she desires, she has the right to withdraw from the arrangement, decline his support, and keep her earnings. Since she has this right, her hands are not on lien to her husband, and he cannot consecrate them. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer81:1) follows the Rambam's view, while the Rama quotes that of Rabbenu Nissim.
|
| 89. |
I.e., at the time he makes this statement it is in his possession.
|
| 90. |
Even though he does not make a second statement, it becomes consecrated if and when he repurchases it.
|
| 91. |
Thus the fact that he sells it to another person in the interim does not detract from the consecration.
|
| 92. |
For a loan.
|
| 93. |
Even though the field was not in his possession at the time he made his statement, since he had the right to redeem it, it is considered as if it were.
|
| 94. |
And during that time, he did not have the right to redeem it.
|
| 95. |
Although the house is the tenant's for the duration of the rental period, since ultimately it belongs to the owner, his consecration takes precedence over the rental agreement. For as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 14, consecration takes precedence over other obligations.
Although as implied by the previous halachah, the owner could not consecrate a field given as security while it was in the possession of the lender, he has a greater right to the land in this instance. In the previous case, the field will not return to him unless he pays the loan, while in this instance, the home will return to him at the end of the rental period without payment. Hence he is considered to have greater rights over it and is given the right to consecrate it (Radbaz).
|
| 96. |
He may, however, avoid the prohibition by paying his rent to the Temple treasury (Arachin 21a).
|
| 97. |
This phrase indicates a law that the Rambam derived through the process of deduction without an explicit prior Rabbinic source.
|
| 98. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 1; Hilchot Nedarim 1:4-5, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:13.
|
| 99. |
I.e., were the person to have the intent to consecrate the article with this statement, the consecration would not be effective, because the article does not yet exist. He is not, however, consecrating the article, merely pledging to do so in the future. See also Hilchot Mechirah 22:15. On his notes to that source, the Ra'avad differs and maintains that for the statement to be considered a pledge, it must be worded in that matter. See Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Choshen Mishpat 212:7).
|
| 100. |
After his vision of the ladder extending to heaven. He was speaking of "what You will give me," i.e., possessions that he would acquire in the future.
|
| 101. |
When Jacob tells his wives of the message the angel gave him to return to Eretz Yisrael.
|
| 102. |
I.e., the pledge he made is considered as a vow.
|
| 103. |
The Radbaz explains that the second proof is necessary, because one might say that Jacob's reference to his vow refers to his statement: "And the Lord will be my God."
|
| 104. |
See Hilchot Nazir 1:4 which states that he must observe the nazirite restrictions immediately, because he does not know how long he will live and he is required to fulfill his pledge before he dies.
The Ra'avad accepts the support from Jacob's statement, but not that from the nazirite's pledge, bringing two objections:
a) at present, it is within his potential to carry out the nazirite vow. Hence, the comparison to an entity that has not yet come into existence is not appropriate.
b) Since the person does not know when he will die, it is as if he has committed himself to observe the vow immediately. The Radbaz brings support for the Rambam's position.
|
| 105. |
Just like a vow made in error is not binding (Hilchot Nedarim 8:3).
|
| 106. |
I.e., we assume that his mention of a black ox was deliberate and intended to be a stipulation, not merely a statement of his supposition of what would happen.
|
| 107. |
In which case, we might say that he would accept the change, because he will be saving money.
|
| 108. |
In which case, we might say that he would accept the change, because he will be bringing a more attractive offering.
|
| 109. |
This ruling has amazed the commentaries, because if the first entity does not become consecrated, how can the second? Seemingly, its consecration is dependent on that of the first.
The Radbaz seeks to explain that the second consecration is dependent not on the status of the initial article, but the intent of the donor who sought to consecrate it. He admits, however, that the interpretation is forced. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this clause is referring to a different concept entirely. If he had an article that was consecrated and extended its holiness to another article unintentionally, that article is consecrated.
|
Arachim Vacharamim - Chapter 7
Halacha 1
Consecrated articles1 may not be redeemed with land, nor with servants, for an equation was created between servants and land,2 nor with promissory notes for their physical substance is not of financial worth.3 [This is derived from the expression:]4 "And he shall give the silver." [This includes] silver and other movable property that is worth silver,5 even bran.6
Halacha 2
Whenever a person redeems his consecrated property, he must add an additional fifth. The person who consecrated the property himself, his wife, or his heirs must all add a fifth, as we explained.7 This fifth must also only be movable property. The fifth itself becomes like the consecrated property and the same laws apply to them both.
Halacha 3
When a person redeems his consecrated articles, [failure to pay] the additional fifth does not hold back [the redemption]. Once the person paid the principal, the consecrated article is considered as an ordinary article and it is permitted to benefit from it [according to Scriptural Law]. According to Rabbinic Law, it is forbidden to benefit from it until one pays the additional fifth, lest one be negligent and fail to pay it. Nevertheless, on the Sabbath, [our Sages] gave one permission to partake [of a consecrated article that was redeemed] although the fifth was not paid for the sake of the enjoyment of the Sabbath.8 [Another reason for leniency is that] it is being demanded by the Temple treasurers.9
Halacha 4
[The following laws apply with regard to animals] consecrated for the sake of [sacrifice on] the altar which were [disqualified by] a blemish:10 If the person who consecrated it redeems it, he must add an additional fifth11 as is the rule with regard to other consecrated articles.12 The person who consecrated it for his own purposes is the one obligated to add a fifth, not the one who derives atonement through the [sacrifice after] it was redeemed.13
[One is] obligate to add a fifth [when redeeming the article that was] consecrated originally, but one [need] not add a fifth [when redeeming an article] whose consecration was a derivative,14 as [implied by Leviticus 27:15]: "If the one who consecrated [it] will redeem his home, he must add a fifth." [The verse mentions] "one who consecrated," and not one who extends that holiness.
Halacha 5
Accordingly, if one transferred the holiness of a [consecrated] animal - whether one consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple15 or one consecrated for [sacrifice on] the altar that became blemished16 - to another animal or exchanged an animal consecrated for [sacrifice on] the altar,17 When he redeems the second animal to which he transferred the holiness or which he exchanged for the sacrificial animal, he is not required to add a fifth.
Halacha 6
There is an unresolved doubt [in the following situation]: A person set aside a guilt offering for the sake of his atonement and it became blemished. He added a fifth to its value and transferred its holiness to another animal and received atonement by [sacrificing] another guilt offering.18 As explained in the appropriate place,19 [the animal to which the holiness was transferred] is left to pasture [until it becomes blemished and then its holiness transferred to a third animal which is sacrificed as a burnt offering.20 The question is:] Are we required to add a fifth [when redeeming that animal], because it is a burnt offering, it involves another body21 and is consecrated for a different purpose? Or are we not so required because its [holiness] stems from the initial consecration for which a fifth was already added.22
Halacha 7
The concept of exchanging an animal23 does not apply with regard to animals consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple. For the Torah dealt with the concept of exchanging holiness only with regard to [animals] consecrated for [sacrifice on] the altar.24
What is implied? If a person had an ordinary animal and an animal consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple before him. If he said: "Let this one be substituted for this one" or "Let this one be exchanged for this one," his statements are of no consequence.25 If, however, he says: "This one is in place of this one" or "The holiness of this one is transferred to this one,"26 his statements are binding. The first animal returns to ordinary status and [its holiness] becomes attached to the second.
Halacha 8
The initial and preferred manner is that both [animals] consecrated for the sake of the improvement of the Temple and entities consecrated for the sake of the altar that became blemished should be redeemed only for their worth. If one transgressed and redeemed them for less than their worth, even if one redeemed consecrated property worth 100 dinarim with an article worth ap'rutah,27 the article is redeemed.28 It is considered as ordinary property and one is permitted to benefit from it. According to Rabbinic Law, it is necessary to evaluate its worth29 and the person redeeming it is obligated to make up the monetary difference.
Halacha 9
What is implied? A person had an animal consecrated [to be offered on] the altar and it became blemished. If it is worth ten [zuz] and there is an ordinary animal worth five and he says: "The holiness of this one is transferred to this," it is redeemed and its status becomes that of an ordinary animal. He must, however, pay the additional five [to the Temple treasury]. In the same way, [if a similar transfer was made] when the first animal was consecrated to the Temple treasury, its status becomes that of an ordinary animal. It may be shorn and put to work30 and the second animal assumes its [consecrated status] according to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, it is necessary to evaluate its worth to see whether the one to which its holiness was transferred was of equivalent value. If not, he must make up the monetary difference.
Halacha 10
If three people evaluated [the two animals involved] and said they were of equivalent value, the evaluation is not nullified even if 100 come afterwards and say that the animal that was consecrated was more valuable. Since the evaluation [of the animal's] worth is a Rabbinic requirement, our Sages were not strict with regard to it. If, however, two people made the original evaluation and then three people came and say that even the slightest advantage was taken of the Temple treasury,31 [the animal] is reevaluated.
Halacha 11
We do not redeem consecrated articles with a rough estimation instead, their worth is carefully evaluated, as we explained.32 If one redeemed a consecrated article [after making merely a rough estimation], the Temple treasury is given the upper hand.
What is implied? One says: "May the holiness of this cow that is consecrated33be transferred to this cow" or "May the holiness of this garment that is consecrated be transferred to this garment," the consecrated article is redeemed and the Temple treasury is given the upper hand. If the second article is worth more than the first, the Temple treasurers take it and remain silent. If it is not worth the value of the first, [the redeemer] must pay the difference as we explained34 and he must add a fifth.
If, however, he said: May the holiness of this garment that is consecrated be transferred to this garment that is worth ten selaim" or "May the holiness of this cow that is consecrated be transferred to this cow that is worth ten selaim," he is required to add a fifth and must give two and a half selaim.35 [The rationale is that] he redeemed it at a fixed price. It is not necessary to add a fifth when redeeming the second animal, as we explained.36
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a person] redeems an article from the Temple treasury. If he drew the article into his possession37 when it was worth amaneh,38 but did not pay the money until it appreciated to 200, he must pay 200. [This is indicated by the expression:]39 "And he will pay the money and it will become his." It becomes his when he pays the money.40
If he drew it into his possession when it was worth 200, but did not pay the money until it depreciated to a maneh, he must pay 200. For the legal power of the Temple treasury should not be less than that of an ordinary person.41 He acquired it through drawing it into his possession and became liable for its value then.
Halacha 13
If he redeemed it at 200 and paid the money42 and did not draw into his possession until it depreciated to a maneh, he is considered to have acquired it when he paid the money.43 He should draw his article into his possession and the Temple treasury acquires the 200.
If he redeemed it at a maneh and paid the money, but did not draw it into his possession until it appreciated to 200, the redemption is allowed to stand. He is only required to pay the maneh that he paid already. In this instance, we do not say: The legal power of the Temple treasury should not be less than that of an ordinary person.44 [The rationale is that] even an ordinary person would not be able to retract unless he receives the admonition mi shepara, as will be explained in the appropriate place.45 And it is not proper to administer the admonition mi shepara to the Temple treasury.
Halacha 14
When a person consecrates all of his possessions and he is liable to [pay the money due his] wife [by virtue of her] ketubah or promissory notes [owed to] creditors, the woman may not collect [the money due her by virtue of her]ketubah from the Temple treasury, nor may a creditor collect the debt due him. The rationale is that consecration absolves prior liens.46 [Nevertheless,] when the Temple treasury sells his property and the field loses its consecrated status, the creditor and his wife may collect it from the redeemer, for the lien remains on this landed property.47
Halacha 15
To what can this be compared? To two purchasers. [One bought the property from a woman's husband and the other from the first purchaser. The woman] wrote to the first [purchaser] "I have no claim against you."48 [After] he sells it to the second person, she may expropriate the money due her from him.49
Halacha 16
How is this land redeemed?50 We administer an oath to the woman or the creditor first as is the process whenever one seeks to expropriate property that is on lien.51 Afterwards, we publicly announce its sale for 60 days in the morning and in the evening, as we explained.52 We say:53 How much a person will desire to give for this field in order to pay the woman [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah or the creditor his debt? A purchaser redeems it and acquires it even for a dinar,54 so that it is not said that consecrated property was released without being redeemed. Then the redeemer comes and gives the woman [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah or the creditor his debt. [This applies] even if the debt was 100 [zuz] and the field worth only 90, [for] the person who redeems it does so for this sake.
If, however, the debt was twice the value of the field, e.g., the field was worth 100 and it was on lien to a debt or a woman's ketubah for 200, we do not redeem it with the intent of paying the debt or [the money due the woman by virtue of] her ketubah. Instead, it is redeemed unconditionally,55 for if such a stipulation was required to be made, it would not be redeemed at all.
Halacha 17
When a person consecrates all of his property, divorces his wife, and [leaves her to] collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the one who redeems [his landed property] from the Temple treasury, she cannot collect [the debt] until he takes a vow,56 forbidding her to benefit from him. [This is a safeguard instituted,] lest an attempt be made to deceive the Temple treasury.57 We do not say that were he to desire [to nullify the consecration of his property], he should say: "I consecrated it in error," and ask a sage [to nullify] his consecration [in which instance, his property] would return to him.58
Halacha 18
Similarly, after59 consecrating his property, a person's word is not accepted if he says: "I owe a maneh to so-and-so" or "This utensil belongs to so-and-so."60[In this instance, we fear that] he is attempting to deceive the Temple treasury.61 Even if the creditor has a promissory note, he cannot use it to expropriate [the property from the Temple treasury].62 Instead, he must collect his due like the other creditors due, as explained.63
Halacha 19
When does the above apply? With regard to a healthy person. If, by contrast a mortally ill person consecrates all of his property and at the time he consecrates it says: "I owe a maneh to so-and-so," his word is accepted. [The rationale is that] a person will not try to deceive the Temple treasury at the time of his death and sin for the sake of others, for he is going to die.64 Therefore if he says: "Give [the creditor his debt]," [the creditor] may collect it without having to take an oath.
If he did not say: "Give [the creditor...]," we do not give him this money unless he has a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified. [In that instance,] he may collect [his debt] from the Temple treasury, because of the statements [the debtor made] on his deathbed.65 If he said to give [the money to the creditor] after he consecrated [his property],66 we do not heed his statements. Instead, this person is considered like other creditors. If the authenticity of his promissory note is verified, he must take an oath.67 He may then expropriate [the property] from the one who redeems it, but not from the Temple treasury.68
Halacha 20
We do not take heed of a rumor that says that a certain person declared all of his property ownerless, consecrated it, or made it a dedication offering unless there is clear proof69 [of its validity].
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Articles which a person consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple.
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| 2. |
This applies not only in this context, but also in many other areas of Jewish business law. SeeHilchot Sh'vuot 7:4; Hilchot Geneivah 2:2, et al.
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| 3. |
A promissory note itself is not worth money. It is valuable because of the debt that it records.
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| 4. |
There is no such verse in the Tanach. The Rambam is referring to wording used by our Sages inKiddushin 5a. They are also referring to a verse, but have shortened and edited Leviticus 27:19.
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| 5. |
This principle also applies in many aspects of Jewish business law. Objects that are worth silver may be used for the same purposes as silver (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:10).
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| 6. |
I.e., an object of minimal value.
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| 7. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 5; Chapter 5, Halachah 3, and notes. As explained there, we are speaking of a fifth of the new total, a fourth of the original amount.
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| 8. |
Our Sages did not desire that his failure to pay the fifth prevent him from partaking of the entity, for this would reduce his Sabbath pleasure.
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| 9. |
Since the treasurers demand payment of the fifth the person is not likely to forget. Nevertheless, this rationale itself is not sufficient reason for leniency. Hence, during the week, when the mitzvah of delighting in the Sabbath does not apply, the treasurers' reminder is not sufficient reason to permit use of the entity (see Bava Metzia 54a).
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| 10. |
See Chapter 5, Halachah 11, which speaks of the redemption of such animals.
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| 11. |
This is reflected by Leviticus 27:13.
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| 12. |
See Halachah 2.
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| 13. |
I.e., if a person was obligated to bring a sacrifice and a colleague set aside an animal from his own resources for him to offer, that person required to bring the sacrifice is not required to pay an additional fifth if he redeems the animal.
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| 14. |
I.e., it was consecrated in the process of redeeming another article, as the Rambam proceeds to explain in the following halachah. See Halachah 11 for details regarding the redemption of an article by transferring its holiness to a second article.
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| 15. |
In which instance, it must be redeemed whether blemished or unblemished. See Chapter 5, Halachot 5 and 12; see also Hilchot Temurah 1:12.
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| 16. |
Since it is blemished, it is necessary to redeem it, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachot 11-12.
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| 17. |
The Rambam is speaking about a practice, temurah, that involves transferring the holiness of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice to another animal. Leviticus 27:10 states that it is forbidden to make such an exchange, but if one does so both the animal originally consecrated and the one exchanged for it remain consecrated (ibid.:33; see Hilchot Temurah 1:1).
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| 18. |
Because the animal to which the holiness was transferred was lost or unable to be used for a sacrifice for other reasons.
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| 19. |
Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:14-15.
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| 20. |
For he is no longer obligated to bring a guilt offering, but must offer the worth of the animal as a sacrifice.
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| 21. |
I.e., it is not the same animal that was originally consecrated. Our translation represents a slight variation from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah that was made based on authentic manuscripts and early printings.
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| 22. |
Hence although the person is not obligated to pay the additional fifth, if the Temple treasurer seizes it, he cannot be required to relinquish it.
|
| 23. |
The Rambam is speaking about a practice, temurah, that involves transferring the holiness of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice to another animal. Leviticus 27:10 states that it is forbidden to make such an exchange, but if one does so both the animal originally consecrated and the one exchanged for it remain consecrated (ibid.:33; see Hilchot Temurah 1:1).
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| 24. |
Temurah 13a relates that the concept of temurah, exchange, applies only with regard to sacrifices and an animal consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple is not considered a sacrifice.
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| 25. |
For these expressions imply temurah, exchange.
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| 26. |
I.e., using statements that indicate that he desires to redeem the animal and not exchange it.
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| 27. |
A coin of minimal worth.
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| 28. |
With regard to transactions between men, the laws of ona'ah (unfair gain) apply and a transaction can be nullified if it is sold for more or less than a sixth of its value (Hilchot Mechirah 12:4). These principles do not apply, however, with regard to consecrated property.
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| 29. |
I.e., to carefully evaluate its worth. See Halachah 11.
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| 30. |
While it is consecrated, both of these activities are forbidden according to Rabbinic Law (Hilchot Meilah 1:12).
|
| 31. |
With regard to transactions between private individuals, by contrast, as long as the difference between the article's value and the price for which it is sold is less than a sixth, the transaction is allowed to stand (Hilchot Mechirah 12:3).
|
| 32. |
See Halachah 8.
|
| 33. |
We are speaking about a cow consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple. If it were consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, even after its holiness were transferred to another animal, it would remain consecrated itself (Radbaz).
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| 34. |
See Halachah 8.
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| 35. |
As mentioned above, the fifth is one fifth of the new total including the fifth and the amount for which the article is redeemed. Since he stated the value of the article he was giving as ten selaim, the value of the fifth is calculated accordingly even though he is paying more than would actually have been required.
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| 36. |
Halachah 4.
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| 37. |
Performing meshichah, an act that would complete the kinyan (formal act of acquisition) of the article.
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| 38. |
100 zuz.
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| 39. |
As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 1, the Rambam is not referring to an explicit verse in the Torah, but rather our Sages' restatement of the relevant verses in Kiddushin 28b.
|
| 40. |
And not when it enters his possession. Hence, he must pay the value at the time he redeems it.
|
| 41. |
See Hilchot Mechirah 9:2. As mentioned above, when an ordinary person completes meshichah, the transaction is completed and he must pay its price then. When it lost value, it was already in his possession.
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| 42. |
One might ask: Why must he actually pay the money? Seemingly the very fact that he pledged to redeem it from the Temple treasury at 200 should be sufficient to make him liable in accordance with the principle (Kiddushin 28b, et al): "A person's statements to the Temple treasury are equivalent to an ordinary person drawing the article into his possession." The Radbaz explains that in this instance, that principle is not applied, because it is possible to say that the pledge was made in error. He did not expect that the article would depreciate in value. Hence, unless he paid the money, he is not liable for the higher sum.
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| 43. |
And the depreciation is considered to have taken place in his possession as above.
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| 44. |
Since the transaction is not completed until the purchaser draws it into his possession, with regard to ordinary transactions, the purchaser would have the right to nullify the transaction. Nevertheless, were he to do so, he is liable to have the admonition mi shepara administered to him by the court (Hilchot Mechirah 7:1). As the Rambam continues to explain, it is not appropriate to have this admonition administered to the Temple treasurers.
|
| 45. |
With regard to this admonition, ibid.:2 states: "He is cursed in court and told: 'May He who exacted retribution from the generation of the Flood, the generation of the Dispersion, the inhabitants of Sodom and Amorah, and the Egyptians who drowned in the sea, exact retribution from a person who does not keep his word.'
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| 46. |
I.e., were the person to sell all his possessions to a private person, his wife and his creditors would be able to collect their due from the landed property in his domain. Since the property becomes the possession of the Temple treasury, those obligations temporarily need not be met.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the liens are in effect even when the property is in the possession of the Temple treasury. Our Sages' statement (Ketubot 59b) that consecration absolves prior liens applies only with regard to the consecration of articles that themselves will be used for the Temple or its sacrifices, not articles to be sold and the proceeds used.
One of the practical differences between the Rambam's position and that of the Ra'avad is whether a person will be liable for me'ilah, misappropriating consecrating property, for benefiting from this property. In Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 18:7, the Rambam states similar ideas as in this halachah. In his gloss to that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh takes issue with the Rambam. Although, here, in his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro defends the Rambam's position in hisShulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:7), it appears that he accepts the other view. The Tur and the Rama explicitly state that the Ra'avad's position should be followed.
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| 47. |
I.e., the property is redeemed with the awareness that it is under lien and that lien will ultimately be collected. Its price is calculated accordingly, as stated in Halachah 16.
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| 48. |
She had the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from this property, but she agreed not to press her claim against this individual.
|
| 49. |
For the field remains on lien to her. The promise she gave the first purchaser is not binding with regard to the second.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this point as well, maintaining that the woman does not have the right to expropriate the property from the second purchaser. For by purchasing the field, he purchased every right that the first purchaser had. Moreover, if forced to pay the woman, he could seek reimbursement from the first purchaser or nullify the sale. In his gloss to Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 19:8, the Maggid Mishneh supports the Ra'avad's view. The Kessef Mishneh, however, defends the Rambam's position.
|
| 50. |
Since it is on lien, obviously, no one will desire to pay its actual worth.
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| 51. |
As stated in Hilchot Ishut 16:10,20 and Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 22:10, we do not expropriate the field for the wife or the creditor until he or she takes an oath while holding a sacred object that the debt was not collected, waived, or sold to another person.
|
| 52. |
Chapter 3, Halachah 20; Chapter 4, Halachah 27.
|
| 53. |
Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text follows a slightly different version.
|
| 54. |
Although the initial preference is that consecrated property be redeemed for its full value (Halachah 8), that is not feasible in the present instance. Instead, the person is allowed to pay any sum he desires, for his profit may be small after paying the debt. Indeed, as the Rambam continues, he may even suffer a loss.
|
| 55. |
And the lien on the field is ignored.
|
| 56. |
This vow must be taken conditional to the consent of people at large. In this way, it can never be nullified. Note a parallel in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 6:9.
|
| 57. |
I.e., he would remarry her and retake possession of a portion of his property in this way. SeeHilchot Ishut 17:9-10. Arachin 23a emphasizes that we are speaking about a healthy man. If a person on his death bed divorces his wife so that she will not have to undergo yibbum, he is not required to take such an oath, for we do not suspect that a person on his death bed will try to deceive the Temple treasury. See Halachah 19.
|
| 58. |
For a consecration made in error can be nullified, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 34.
|
| 59. |
If, however, he made such statements before consecrating his property, his word is accepted (Radbaz).
See the Siftei Cohen (Choshen Mishpat 255:5) who elaborates on the concept that even if he makes this statement directly after consecrating his property, it is not accepted. As support, he cites Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:1 where the Rambam writes that after a person consecrates an animal, even if he seeks to retract his consecration immediately, he cannot. The Radbaz (see his gloss to the following halachah) supports this view. The Kessef Mishneh, however, maintains that a healthy person can also retract his statement directly after making it.
|
| 60. |
I.e., the person claims to be holding it as an entrusted article.
|
| 61. |
And prevent a certain portion of his property from having to be redeemed.
|
| 62. |
For as stated in Halachah 14, consecration lifts liens on property.
|
| 63. |
See Halachah 16.
|
| 64. |
At such a time, when he will not derive any worldly benefit from sinning and is conscious of the retribution he will receive in the world to come, he will certainly not seek to deceive the Temple treasury.
|
| 65. |
I.e., his acknowledgement of the debt. If, however, the creditor does not have a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified, he cannot collect the debt, even though the debtor acknowledged it on his deathbed. The rationale is that (as stated in Hilchot To'ain ViNitan 6:7), a person is wont to state that he owes money even if he in fact does not so that his sons do not think of themselves as rich. His estate is not bound by these statements unless, as stated above, he explicitly instructed that the debt be paid or the creditor has a promissory note that has been verified. Even though in this instance, the money will be going to the Temple treasury and not to his sons, a similar rationale can still be applied. We say that he is admitting the debt so that people will not think of him as a person who hoarded money throughout his life (Sefer Meirat Einayim255:12).
|
| 66. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, stating that the word of a person on his deathbed is accepted even he makes his statements after consecrating the article. For at the time he consecrates an article, the statements of a healthy person are also accepted.
In view of this objection, the Radbaz explains that there are three different time frameworks:
a) before the consecration is made - in which instance the statements of both a healthy man and one on his deathbed are accepted;
b) immediately after (toch k'dei dibbur) the consecration is made - in which instance the statements of a healthy man are not accepted and those of one on his deathbed are;
c) some time after the consecration is made - in which instance neither the statements of a healthy man nor those of one on his deathbed are accepted.
The Kessef Mishneh follows the same basic thrust in interpreting the Rambam, but differs regarding one point, maintaining that a healthy person can also retract his statement directly after making it. The difference between a healthy person and one on his deathbed is that when a person is on his deathbed, his word is accepted as long as he is still speaking of the deposition of his property even though it is not directly after he consecrated it.
|
| 67. |
That he has not received payment for the debt.
|
| 68. |
As stated, in Halachot 14, 16. The Ra'avad adds that if we are speaking about an entrusted article which the dying man acknowledged having received for safekeeping, it is returned to its owner without being redeemed. The Radbaz states that the Rambam would not necessarily differ on this point.
|
| 69. |
Through the testimony of witnesses or a contract that has been verified.
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• Shabbat, Nissan 22, 5775 · 11 April 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: Acharei mot, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 106-107.
Tanya: And although He (p. 221)...above in ch. 20. (p. 223).
By day we take care to follow this order: Make Kiddush, then daven Mincha, and after that eat the festive yom tov meal.1
The Baal Shem Tov used to eat three festival meals on Acharon Shel Pesach.
The Baal Shem Tov called the (third) meal of this day Mashiach's s'uda (the "festival meal of Mashiach"). Acharon Shel Pesach is the day for Mashiach's s'uda because on this day the radiance of the light of Mashiach shines openly.
In 5666 (1906) a new procedure was adopted for Pesach in the Yeshiva Tomchei T'mimim in Lubavitch: The students ate the Pesach meals all together, in the study hall. There were 3102 students present seated at eighteen tables. My father the Rebbe ate the festive meal of Acharon Shel Pesach with the yeshiva students. He ordered that four cups of wine3 be given each student, and then declared, "this is Mashiach's s'uda."
FOOTNOTES
1. A parallel to the three Shabbat meals, in contrast to the two festival meals.
2. The number 310, shai, has a significance, the number of "worlds" awaiting eachtzadik. 18 or chai represents life.
3. The Rebbe, of righteous memory, stated that "it is obvious that this practice was not to be limited to that particular year, but is for all years."
Daily Thought:
Without Measure
As soon as you start measuring good deeds, to determine which is greater, which takes priority over the other—you have already entered precarious ground.
Your job is to do whatever is sent your way.
____________________________
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