Daily Quote:
If you wait until you find the meaning of life, will there be enough life left to live meaningfully?[The Lubavitcher Rebbe]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Re'eh, 2nd Portion Deuteronomy 12:11-12:28 with Rashi
• Chapter 12
11And it will be, that the place the Lord, your God, will choose in which to establish His Name there you shall bring all that I am commanding you: Your burnt offerings, and your sacrifices, your tithes, and the separation by your hand, and the choice of vows which you will vow to the Lord. יאוְהָיָה הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם בּוֹ לְשַׁכֵּן שְׁמוֹ שָׁם שָׁמָּה תָבִיאוּ אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם עוֹלֹתֵיכֶם וְזִבְחֵיכֶם מַעְשְׂרֹתֵיכֶם וּתְרֻמַת יֶדְכֶם וְכֹל מִבְחַר נִדְרֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר תִּדְּרוּ לַיהֹוָה:
It will be, that the place [which the Lord your God will choose… there you shall bring all that I am commanding you]: [At that time,] build for yourselves the Temple in Jerusalem. And so [Scripture] states concerning David, “And it was, when the king sat in his house and the Lord had given him rest from all his enemies surrounding him, that the king said to Nathan the prophet, 'See now, I dwell in a house of cedars, but the Ark of God dwells within the curtain’” (II Sam. 7:1, 2) [i.e., the temporary Mishkan]. והיה המקום וגו': בנו לכם בית הבחירה בירושלים. וכן הוא אומר בדוד (שמואל ב' ז, א - ב) ויהי כי ישב המלך בביתו, וה' הניח לו מכל אויביו מסביב. ויאמר המלך אל נתן הנביא ראה נא אנכי יושב בבית ארזים, וארון האלהים יושב בתוך היריעה:
there you shall bring [all that I am commanding you]: Above (verse 6), [the same expression] is stated referring to Shiloh, but here it is stated referring to Jerusalem. Accordingly, Scripture separates the two to permit [sacrificing on a bamah during the intermediate period] between the existence of] one [sanctuary] and the other. After Shiloh was destroyed, and they came to Nob [and erected the Mishkan there], and then again, when Nob was destroyed and they came to Gibeon, [sacrificing on] a bamah was permitted-until they [finally] arrived in Jerusalem. — [Zev. 119a] שמה תביאו וגו': למעלה אמרו (פסוק ו) לענין שילה וכאן אמור לענין ירושלים, ולכך חלקם הכתוב, ליתן היתר בין זו לזו, משחרבה שילה ובאו לנוב, וחרבה נוב ובאו לגבעון, היו הבמות מותרות עד שבאו לירושלים:
the choice of your vows: This teaches that one should bring [offerings] from the choicest. — [Sifrei] מבחר נדריכם: מלמד שיביאו מן המובחר:
12And you shall rejoice before the Lord, your God you and your sons and your daughters and your menservants and your maidservants, and the Levite who is within your cities, for he has no portion or inheritance with you. יבוּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם אַתֶּם וּבְנֵיכֶם וּבְנֹתֵיכֶם וְעַבְדֵיכֶם וְאַמְהֹתֵיכֶם וְהַלֵּוִי אֲשֶׁר בְּשַׁעֲרֵיכֶם כִּי אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק וְנַחֲלָה אִתְּכֶם:
13Beware, lest you offer up your burnt offerings any place you see. יגהִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ בְּכָל מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּרְאֶה:
Beware, [lest you offer up your burnt-offerings any place you see]:[This negative form of the positive command in verse 11 is repeated in order] to attach a negative commandment to this matter. השמר לך: ליתן לא תעשה על הדבר.
any place you see: [i.e.,] that enters your mind. However, you may offer [anywhere] by the bidding of a prophet, for example, as Elijah [did] on Mount Carmel (I Kings 18: 22). - [Sifrei] בכל מקום אשר תראה: - אשר יעלה בלבך, אבל אתה מקריב על פי נביא, כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל:
14But only in the place the Lord will choose in one of your tribes; there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you. ידכִּי אִם בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה בְּאַחַד שְׁבָטֶיךָ שָׁם תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ וְשָׁם תַּעֲשֶׂה כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּךָּ:
[But only in the place the Lord will choose] in one of your tribes: in the territory of Benjamin. But above (verse 5), it says, “[the place which the Lord… will choose] from all your tribes.” How can these be reconciled? When David purchased the threshing-floor [later to become the Temple site] from Araunah the Jebusite (II Sam. 24:24), he collected the [required] gold from all the tribes; however, the threshing-floor itself was [situated] in the territory of Benjamin. — [Sifrei] באחד שבטיך: בחלקו של בנימין. ולמעלה הוא אומר (פסוק ה) מכל שבטיכם. הא כיצד, כשקנה דוד את הגורן מארונה היבוסי גבה הזהב מכל השבטים, ומכל מקום הגורן בחלקו של בנימין היה:
15However, in every desire of your soul, you may slaughter and eat meat in all your cities, according to the blessing of the Lord, your God, which He gave you; the unclean and the clean may eat thereof, as of the deer, and as of the gazelle. טורַק בְּכָל אַוַּת נַפְשְׁךָ תִּזְבַּח | וְאָכַלְתָּ בָשָׂר כְּבִרְכַּת יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן לְךָ בְּכָל שְׁעָרֶיךָ הַטָּמֵא וְהַטָּהוֹר יֹאכְלֶנּוּ כַּצְּבִי וְכָאַיָּל:
However, [you may slaughter and eat meat in all your gates,] in every desire of your soul: What is the text speaking about? If [you think that] it [is speaking] about [non-sacrificial] meat eaten to satisfy the appetite, to permit it for them without offering up any sacrificial portions, [we already have a reference to this, for Scripture] says elsewhere: “When the Lord, your God, expands your boundary… and you say, 'I will eat meat… [you may eat meat…]’” (verse 20). So what is this [verse] speaking about? It is [referring to] animals designated for holy [sacrificial] purposes that had [subsequently] become blemished, that they are to be redeemed [that is, replaced by their equivalent value in money] and they may [then] be eaten anywhere. Now one might think that [this rule applies] even if the blemish is a temporary one. Therefore, Scripture says: רַק -“However” [lit., “only.” This limits the permission to that of a permanent blemish]. — [Sifrei] רק בכל אות נפשך: במה הכתוב מדבר, אם בבשר תאוה להתירה להם בלא הקרבת אימורים, הרי הוא אומר במקום אחר (פסוק כ) כי ירחיב ה' אלהיך את גבולך וגו' ואמרת אוכלה בשר וגו', במה זה מדבר, בקדשים שנפל בהם מום, שיפדו ויאכלו בכל מקום. יכול יפדו על מום עובר, תלמוד לומר רק:
you may slaughter and eat [meat]: You have no permission to sheer or milk [the blemished animals], but only to eat the [meat] after their ritual slaughter. — [Bech. 15b] תזבח ואכלת: אין לך בהם היתר גיזה וחלב, אלא אכילה על ידי זביחה:
the unclean and the clean [may eat thereof]: Since they formerly had holy status, about which it is stated: “And the flesh that touches any unclean thing shall not be eaten” (Lev. 7:19), it is necessary to give explicit permission for both the unclean and clean person alike to eat [from the meat, even] from the same dish… הטמא והטהור: לפי שבאו מכח קדשים, שנאמר בהם (ויקרא ז, יט) והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל, הוצרך להתיר בו, שטמא וטהור אוכלין בקערה אחת:
as of the deer and as of the gazelle: of which no sacrifice is [ever] brought. כצבי וכאיל: שאין קרבן בא מהם:
as of the deer, and as of the gazelle: This [comparison to a deer and a gazelle] exempts these [redeemed animals] from [the obligation of] “the foreleg, the jaws, and the maw” (see Deut. 18:3) [just as the deer and the gazelle are exempt from these gifts to the kohen]. — [Chul. 130a; Sifrei] כצבי וכאיל: לפוטרן מן הזרוע והלחיים והקיבה:
16However, you shall not eat the blood; you shall spill it on the ground like water. טזרַק הַדָּם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם:
However, you shall not eat the blood: Although I said that these [animals] do not require sprinkling the blood on the altar, you shall not eat it. רק הדם לא תאכלו: אף על פי שאמרתי שאין לך בו זריקת דם במזבח לא תאכלנו:
you shall spill it [on the ground] like water: [This comes] to tell you that it does not require covering [with earth (see Lev. 17:13)] (Sifrei ; Chul. 84a). Another explanation: [The phrase,“like water,” teaches us that] it is like water insofar as it renders seeds susceptible [for receiving ritual uncleanness (Lev. 11:38).] - [Chul. 35b] תשפכנו כמים: לומר לך שאין צריך כסוי. דבר אחר הרי הוא כמים להכשיר את הזרעים:
17You may not eat within your cities the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your cattle or of your sheep, or any of your vows that you will vow, or your donations, or the separation by your hand. יזלֹא תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְתִירשְׁךָ וְיִצְהָרֶךָ וּבְכֹרֹת בְּקָרְךָ וְצֹאנֶךָ וְכָל נְדָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר תִּדֹּר וְנִדְבֹתֶיךָ וּתְרוּמַת יָדֶךָ:
You may not eat within your cities the tithe of your grain]: Scripture comes to attach a negative commandment to this matter [i.e., eating the firstborn, tithes, etc., outside the walls of Jerusalem, in addition to the positive command (stated in verse 6)]. You may not [eat] [Heb. לֹא תוּכַל lit., “you cannot eat.”] Rabbi Joshua the son of Korchah said: You are able, but you are not permitted [to do so]. Similar to this, in the verse “As to the Jebusites, the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the children of Judah could not drive them out” (Josh. 15:63), they were [physically] able to do so but they were not so permitted, since Abraham had made a [non-aggression] treaty with them when he bought the cave of Machpelah from them. [In fact,] they were not Jebusites [of the Jebusite nation] but Hittites. They were, however, called Jebusites after the city, named Jebus. So it is explained in Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer (chapter 36). And this is what is stated [when David was about to drive out the Jebusites. They said to him], “Unless you take away the blind and the lame [you shall not come in here]” (II Sam. 5:6), [referring to] the images [that stood at the gates] upon which the oath [that Abraham had taken regarding the Jebusites] was written. לא תוכל: בא הכתוב ליתן לא תעשה על הדבר. רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר יכול אתה, אבל אינך רשאי, כיוצא בו (יהושע טו, סג) ואת היבוסי יושבי ירושלים לא יכלו בני יהודה להורישם, יכולים היו, אלא שאינן רשאין, לפי שכרת להם אברהם ברית כשלקח מהם מערת המכפלה. ולא יבוסים היו אלא חתיים היו, אלא על שם העיר ששמה יבוס [נקראים יבוסים]. כך מפורש בפרקי דרבי אליעזר. והוא שנאמר (שמואל ב' ה, ו) כי אם הסירך העורים והפסחים, צורות שכתבו עליהם את השבועה:
[You may not eat within your gates…] the firstborn of your cattle: This prohibition is addressed to the kohanim [in contrast to “the tithe of your grain,” since Israelites were never permitted to eat the firstborn, even within the walls of Jerusalem]. ובכורות בקרך: אזהרה לכהנים:
or the separation by your hand: This refers to the first fruits (see above on verse 6). - [Sifrei , Mak. 17a] ותרומת ידך: אלו הבכורים:
18But you shall eat them before the Lord, your God, in the place the Lord, your God, will choose you, your son, your daughter, your manservant, your maidservant, and the Levite who is in your cities, and you shall rejoice before the Lord, your God, in all your endeavors. יחכִּי אִם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ וּבִתֶּךָ וְעַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתֶךָ וְהַלֵּוִי אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְשָׂמַחְתָּ לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכֹל מִשְׁלַח יָדֶךָ:
[But you shall eat them] before the Lord: [i.e.,] within the walls [of Jerusalem]. לפני ה': לפנים מן החומה:
and the Levite who is in your cities: If you have nothing to give him from his portion, such as the first tithes, then give him the tithe of the poor. And if you have no tithe of the poor, invite him [to partake of] your peace offering. — [Sifrei] והלוי אשר בשעריך: אם אין לך לתת לו מחלקו, כגון מעשר ראשון, תן לו מעשר עני. אין לך מעשר עני, הזמינהו על שלמיך:
19Beware, lest you forsake the Levite all your days upon your land. יטהִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲזֹב אֶת הַלֵּוִי כָּל יָמֶיךָ עַל אַדְמָתֶךָ:
Beware, lest you forsake the Levite: This [in addition to the positive command expressed in the previous verse,] is to attach a negative commandment to the matter. השמר לך: ליתן לא תעשה על הדבר:
[Beware, lest you forsake the Levite…] upon your land: But in exile, you are not admonished regarding him more than poor Israelites. — [Sifrei] על אדמתך: אבל בגולה אינך מוזהר עליו יותר מעניי ישראל:
20When the Lord, your God, expands your boundary, as He has spoken to you, and you say, "I will eat meat," because your soul desires to eat meat, you may eat meat, according to every desire of your soul. ככִּי יַרְחִיב יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת גְּבֻלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ וְאָמַרְתָּ אֹכְלָה בָשָׂר כִּי תְאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ לֶאֱכֹל בָּשָׂר בְּכָל אַוַּת נַפְשְׁךָ תֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר:
When [the Lord your God] expands [your boundary… and you say, “I will eat meat,”… you may eat meat]: The Torah teaches proper conduct, that one should not desire to eat meat unless [one lives] in abundance and wealth. — [Chul. 84a.] כי ירחיב וגו': למדה תורה דרך ארץ, שלא יתאוה אדם לאכול בשר, אלא מתוך רחבת ידים ועושר:
[you may eat meat,] according to every desire of your soul: In the desert, however, the meat of a non-consecrated animal was forbidden to them, unless one first consecrated it and offered it up as a peace offering. — [Sifrei : Chul. 16b] בכל אות נפשך וגו': אבל במדבר נאסר להם בשר חולין, אלא אם כן מקדישה ומקריבה שלמים:
21If the place the Lord, your God, chooses to put His Name there, will be distant from you, you may slaughter of your cattle and of your sheep, which the Lord has given you, as I have commanded you, and you may eat in your cities, according to every desire of your soul. כאכִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָשׂוּם שְׁמוֹ שָׁם וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן יְהֹוָה לְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ וְאָכַלְתָּ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ בְּכֹל אַוַּת נַפְשֶׁךָ:
If the place the Lord, your God, chooses to put His Name there, will be distant from you: And you will [consequently] be unable to come and make peace-offerings every day, as [you do] now when the Mishkan goes along with you. כי ירחק ממך המקום: ולא תוכל לבוא ולעשות שלמים בכל יום כמו עכשיו שהמשכן הולך עמכם:
you may slaughter… as I have commanded you: We learn [from here] that there is a commandment regarding slaughtering, how one must slaughter. [Since this commandment is not written in the Torah we deduce that] these are the laws of ritual slaughtering given orally to Moses on [Mount] Sinai. — [Sifrei ; Chul. 28a] וזבחת וגו' כאשר צויתך: למדנו שיש צווי בזביחה היאך ישחוט, והן הלכות שחיטה שנאמרו למשה בסיני:
22But as the deer and the gazelle are eaten, so may you eat them; the unclean and the clean alike may eat of them. כבאַךְ כַּאֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל אֶת הַצְּבִי וְאֶת הָאַיָּל כֵּן תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ הַטָּמֵא וְהַטָּהוֹר יַחְדָּו יֹאכְלֶנּוּ:
But as the deer [and the gazelle] are eaten, [so you may eat them]:You are not admonished to eat them in a state of ritual purity; if, however, [you will reason:] Just as the fat of the deer and the gazelle is permitted [as food], so too should the fat of non-consecrated animals be permitted. Therefore [to counter this] Scripture says,“but” (אַךְ). אך כאשר יאכל את הצבי וגו': אינך מוזהר לאכלן בטהרה. אי מה צבי ואיל חלבן מותר, אף חולין חלבן מותר, תלמוד לומר אך:
23However, be strong not to eat the blood, for the blood is the soul; and you shall not eat the soul with the flesh. כגרַק חֲזַק לְבִלְתִּי אֲכֹל הַדָּם כִּי הַדָּם הוּא הַנָּפֶשׁ וְלֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם הַבָּשָׂר:
However, be strong not to eat the blood: Since it is stated “be strong” [i.e., resist temptation], you learn that the [Israelites] were inclined to eating blood. Therefore, it is necessary to state,“be strong.” [These are] the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Simeon the son of Azzai, however, says: Scripture comes only to caution you and to instruct you as to what extent you must be steadfast in [fulfilling] the commandments: If regarding blood, which is easy to watch out for, since a person has no desire for it, [the Torah] needed to strengthen you with its admonition, how much more so [must one strengthen oneself] for all other commandments! - [Sifrei] רק חזק לבלתי אכל הדם: ממה שנאמר חזק אתה למד שהיו שטופים בדם לאכלו, לפיכך הוצרך לומר חזק, דברי רבי יהודה. רבי שמעון בן עזאי אומר, לא בא הכתוב אלא להזהירך וללמדך עד כמה אתה צריך להתחזק במצות, אם הדם, שהוא קל להשמר ממנו, שאין אדם מתאוה לו, הוצרך לחזקך באזהרתו, קל וחומר לשאר מצות:
and you shall not eat the soul with the flesh: This is an admonition against אֵבֵר מִן הַחַי, [the eating of] a limb from a live animal. — [Sifrei; Chul. 102a] ולא תאכל הנפש עם הבשר: אזהרה לאבר מן החי:
24You shall not eat it, you shall spill it on the ground, like water. כדלֹא תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם:
You shall not eat it: This is an admonition against the eating (דָם הַתַּמְצִית), (the last blood oozing [from the incision of slaughtering]). — [Ker. 4b] לא תאכלנו: אזהרה לדם התמצית:
25You shall not eat it, in order that it be good for you, and for your children after you, when you do what is proper in the eyes of the Lord. כהלֹא תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ לְמַעַן יִיטַב לְךָ וּלְבָנֶיךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ כִּי תַעֲשֶׂה הַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינֵי יְהֹוָה:
You shall not eat it: This is an admonition against the eating of the blood contained in the limbs [of the animal]. — [Ker. 4b] לא תאכלנו: אזהרה לדם האיברים:
in order that it be good for you…: Go forth and learn the [magnitude of] the reward for [observing] the commandments: If [in the case of] blood, which disgusts a person, he who abstains from it earns merit [both] for himself and for his children after him, how much more so [does this apply] to abstaining from theft and immorality, after which man’s soul of does lust. — [Mak. 23b] למען ייטב לך וגו': צא ולמד מתן שכרן של מצות, אם הדם שנפשו של אדם קצה ממנו, הפורש ממנו זוכה לו ולבניו אחריו, קל וחומר לגזל ועריות שנפשו של אדם מתאוה להם:
26However, your holy offerings which you will have, and your vows, you shall carry, and come to the place that the Lord chooses. כורַק קָדָשֶׁיךָ אֲשֶׁר יִהְיוּ לְךָ וּנְדָרֶיךָ תִּשָּׂא וּבָאתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה:
However, your holy offerings [… you shall carry, and come to the place which the Lord chooses]: Although you are permitted to slaughter unconsecrated animals, I did not permit you to slaughter consecrated animals and eat them in your cities without offering [them] up [on the altar]; rather, you must bring them to the Temple. רק קדשיך: אף על פי שאתה מותר לשחוט חולין, לא התרתי לך לשחוט את הקדשים ולאכלן בשעריך בלא הקרבה, אלא להביאם לבית הבחירה:
27And you shall make your burnt offerings the flesh and the blood upon the altar of the Lord, your God, and the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord, your God, and you shall eat the flesh. כזוְעָשִׂיתָ עֹלֹתֶיךָ הַבָּשָׂר וְהַדָּם עַל מִזְבַּח יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְדַם זְבָחֶיךָ יִשָּׁפֵךְ עַל מִזְבַּח יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְהַבָּשָׂר תֹּאכֵל:
And you shall make your burnt-offerings: If [your sacrifices] are burnt-offerings, place the flesh and the blood on the altar [as it says: הַבָּשָׂר וְהַדָּם עַל-מִזְבַּח -“the flesh and the blood on the altar of the Lord,” with respect to burnt offerings]. But if they are peace-offerings, “the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured upon the altar” first, and afterwards “you shall eat the flesh.” Our Rabbis further deduced that [the words] “However, your holy offerings… [you shall carry]” (verse 26) come to instruct us regarding consecrated animals that are outside the Land [of Israel], as well as to instruct us regarding animals that have been exchanged for other consecrated animals, and regarding the offspring of consecrated animals, that [all of] these must [also] be offered up [in Jerusalem]. — [Sifrei; Bech. 14b] ועשית עלתיך: אם עולות הם תן הבשר והדם על גבי המזבח, ואם זבחי שלמים הם, דם זבחיך ישפך על המזבח תחלה ואחר כך והבשר תאכל. ועוד דרשו רבותינו (פסוק כו), רק קדשיך בא ללמד על הקדשים שבחוצה לארץ וללמד על התמורות ועל ולדות קדשים שיקריבו:
28Keep and hearken to all these words that I command you, that it may benefit you and your children after you, forever, when you do what is good and proper in the eyes of the Lord, your God. כחשְׁמֹר וְשָׁמַעְתָּ אֵת כָּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּךָּ לְמַעַן יִיטַב לְךָ וּלְבָנֶיךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ עַד עוֹלָם כִּי תַעֲשֶׂה הַטּוֹב וְהַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ:
Keep [and hearken to all these words that I command you]: This [term שְׁמֹר, “keep”] refers to the studying of the Oral Law. [Since it is not written down,] you must “guard” it “in your innards,” so that it should not be forgotten, as it is said,“For it is pleasant that you guard them (תִּשְׁמְרָם) in your innards” (Prov. 22:18). And if you studied, you may understand and fulfill [the commandments], but one who is not [immersed] in study, cannot be [immersed] in practice. — [Sifrei] שמור: זו משנה שאתה צריך לשמרה בבטנך שלא תשכח. כענין שנאמר (משלי כב, יח) כי נעים כי תשמרם בבטנך, ואם שנית אפשר שתשמע ותקיים, הא כל שאינו בכלל משנה אינו בכלל מעשה:
[Keep…] all these words [that I command you]: This means that a light commandment should be as precious to you as a difficult commandment. — [Sifrei] את כל הדברים: שתהא חביבה עליך מצוה קלה כמצוה חמורה:
[That it may benefit you…when you do] what is good: in the eyes of Heaven. הטוב: בעיני השמים:
and proper: in the eyes of man. — [Sifrei] והישר: בעיני אדםDaily Tehillim: Psalms Chapter 119, Verses 1-96
• Verses 1-96
David composed this prominent psalm in alphabetical sequence-eight verses for each letter. Every verse contains one of the following words (referring to different aspects of Torah): Way; Torah; Testimony; Precept; Commandment; Statement (translated here as Word or Promise); Word; Judgement (or Laws); Righteousness; Statute. Replete with morals and prayers, this psalm should be recited daily, as a powerful preparation for the service of God. (In verses beginning with one of the letters of the mnemonic PeReTZ BeN DaMaH, the word "עדותיך" is pronounced "eidvotecha.")
1. Fortunate are those whose way is artless, who walk with the Torah of the Lord.
2. Fortunate are those who keep His testimonies, who seek Him with all their hearts.
3. Indeed, they have not done iniquity; they walk in His ways.
4. You have commanded Your precepts to be observed diligently.
5. My wish is that my ways be directed to keep Your statutes.
6. Then I will not be ashamed, when I behold all Your commandments.
7. I will give thanks to You with uprightness of heart, when I learn Your righteous judgments.
8. I will keep Your statutes; do not utterly forsake me
9. How can a young man keep his way pure? By observing Your word.
10. With all my heart I have sought You; do not let me stray from Your commandments.
11. I have harbored Your word in my heart, that I might not sin against You.
12. Blessed are You, O Lord; teach me Your statutes.
13. With my lips I have declared all the judgments of Your mouth.
14. I have rejoiced in the way of Your testimonies, as I would with all riches.
15. I will speak of Your precepts, and gaze upon Your ways.
16. I will delight in Your statutes; I will not forget Your word.
17. Deal kindly with Your servant, that I may live to keep Your word.
18. Unveil my eyes, that I may behold wonders from Your Torah.
19. I am a sojourner on earth; do not hide Your commandments from me.
20. My soul is crushed with a longing for Your judgments every moment.
21. You have rebuked the accursed scoffers, those who stray from Your commandments.
22. Remove insult and contempt from me, for I have kept Your testimonies.
23. Though princes sat and spoke against me, Your servant speaks of Your statutes.
24. Indeed, Your testimonies are my delight; they are my counsellors.
25. My soul cleaves to the dust; revive me in accordance with Your word.
26. I have spoken of my ways, and You answered me; teach me Your statutes.
27. Make me understand the way of Your precepts, and I will speak of Your wonders.
28. My soul drips away out of grief; sustain me according to Your word.
29. Remove from me the way of falsehood, and graciously endow me with Your Torah.
30. I have chosen the way of faith; Your judgments have I laid before me.
31. I held fast to Your testimonies, O Lord; put me not to shame.
32. I will run on the path of Your commandments, for You will broaden my heart.
33. Teach me, O Lord, the way of Your statutes, and I will keep it to the last.
34. Grant me understanding and I will keep Your Torah; I will observe it with all my heart.
35. Direct me in the path of Your commandments, for that is my desire.
36. Incline my heart to Your testimonies, and not to greed.
37. Avert my eyes from seeing vanity; by Your ways give me life.
38. Fulfill for Your servant Your promise, which brings to the fear of You.
39. Remove my shame which I fear, for Your judgments are good.
40. Behold, I have longed for Your precepts; give me life in Your righteousness.
41. And let Your kindness come to fruition for me, O Lord, Your salvation as You promised.
42. I will offer a retort to those who taunt me, for I trust in Your word.
43. Do not at all remove the word of truth from my mouth, for I hope [to fulfill] Your judgments.
44. I will keep Your Torah continually, for ever and ever.
45. And I will walk in spacious paths, for I seek Your precepts.
46. I will speak of Your testimonies before kings, and I will not be ashamed.
47. And I will delight in Your commandments, which I love.
48. I will lift up my hands to Your commandments, which I love, and I will speak of Your statutes.
49. Remember the word [promised] to Your servant, by which You gave me hope.
50. This is my comfort in my affliction, for Your word has given me life.
51. [Though] the wicked ridicule me severely, I have not strayed from Your Torah.
52. When I remember Your judgments of old, O Lord, I take comfort.
53. Trembling seized me because of the wicked, those who forsake Your Torah.
54. Your statutes have been my songs in the house of my wanderings.
55. At night I remembered Your Name, O Lord, and I kept Your Torah.
56. All this came to me because I kept Your precepts.
57. The Lord is my portion; I pledged to keep Your words.
58. I pleaded before You with all my heart: have compassion upon me according to Your word.
59. I contemplated my ways, and returned my feet to Your testimonies.
60. I hurried and did not delay to keep Your commandments.
61. Bands of wicked men plundered me, [but] I did not forget Your Torah.
62. At midnight, I rise to thank You for Your righteous judgments.
63. I am a friend to all who fear You, and to those who keep Your precepts.
64. Your kindness, O Lord, fills the earth; teach me Your statutes.
65. You have dealt goodness to Your servant, O Lord, in accord with Your promise.
66. Teach me the goodness and wisdom of the [Torah's] reasons, for I believe in Your commandments.
67. Before I afflicted myself, I would blunder; but now I observe Your word.
68. You are good and benevolent; teach me Your statutes.
69. The wicked have smeared me with lies, [when in truth] I keep Your precepts with all my heart.
70. Their hearts grew thick as fat; but as for me, Your Torah is my delight.
71. It is for my good that I was afflicted, so that I might learn Your statutes.
72. The Torah of Your mouth is better for me than thousands in gold and silver.
73. Your hands have made me and prepared me; grant me understanding, that I may learn Your commandments.
74. Those who fear You will see me and rejoice, because I hoped in Your word.
75. I know, O Lord, that Your judgments are just; righteously have You afflicted me.
76. Let Your kindness be my comfort, as You promised to Your servant.
77. Let Your mercies come upon me, that I may live, for Your Torah is my delight.
78. Let the scoffers be shamed, for they have maligned me with falsehood; but I will meditate upon Your precepts.
79. May those who fear You return to me, and those who know Your testimonies.
80. May my heart be perfect in Your statutes, so that I not be shamed.
81. My soul longs for Your salvation; I hope for Your word.
82. My eyes long for Your promise, saying, "When will You comfort me?”
83. Though I became [dried out] like a wineskin in smoke, I did not forget Your statutes.
84. How many are the days of Your servant? When will You execute judgment upon my pursuers?
85. The wicked have dug pits for me, in violation of Your Torah.
86. All Your commandments teach truth, [yet] they pursue me with lies, help me!
87. They nearly consumed me upon the earth, but I did not forsake Your precepts.
88. As befits Your kindness, grant me life, and I will keep the testimony of Your mouth.
89. Forever, O Lord, Your word stands firm in the heavens.
90. Your faithfulness persists for all generations; You established the earth, and it stands.
91. They stand ready today [to execute] Your judgments, for all are Your servants.
92. Had Your Torah not been my delight, I would have perished in my affliction.
93. Never will I forget Your precepts, for through them You have sustained me.
94. I am Yours; save me, for I have sought Your precepts.
95. The wicked hope to destroy me, but I meditate upon Your testimonies.
96. To every goal I have seen a limit, but Your commandment is immensely broad.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 8• Lessons in Tanya
• Monday, Menachem Av 25, 5775 · August 10, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 8
זורע צדקות, מצמיח ישועות
[It is written:] “He sows tzedakot and causes deliverance to sprout forth.”1
Tzedakot, the plural form of tzedakah, can mean both “acts of righteousness” and “acts of charity.”
הנה מה שכתוב לשון זריעה במצות הצדקה
The use of the idiom “sowing” in relation to the commandment of charity,
וכמו שכתוב בפסוק: זרעו לכם לצדקה גו׳
and likewise in the verse,2 “Sow for yourselves for tzedakah, [and reap according to the measure ofChesed],”
יובן על פי מה שאמרו רז״ל: רבי אליעזר יהיב פרוטה לעני, והדר מצלי, דכתיב: אני בצדק אחזה פניך
may be understood in the light of a teaching of our Sages:3 “Rabbi Eliezer would give a coin to a poor person, and would then pray, for it is written,4 ‘Through tzedek will I behold Your face,’” and tzedek(“righteousness”) is closely related to tzedakah (“charity”).
פירוש
This means, i.e., the reason prayer is deemed “seeing G‑d’s face,” and the reason why this is attained by prefacing prayer with charity is:
כי גילוי אלקותו יתברך, המתגלה במחשבתו של אדם וכונתו בתפלה
that the manifestation of Divinity — which is revealed in the thought of man and in his devotion during prayer,
כל חד לפום שיעורא דיליה
in each individual according to his own measure —
הוא בתורת צדקה וחסד ה׳ מעולם ועד עולם על יראיו
is [granted to man] by way of Divine charity, and by [the descent of]5 “G‑d’s lovingkindness from world to world upon those who fear Him....”
כלומר, שאור ה׳ אין סוף ברוך הוא, המאיר למעלה בעולמות עליונים בהארה רבה, בבחינת גילוי רב ועצום
This means that the light of G‑d, the [infinite] Ein Sof, radiates with so (quantitatively) great and so(qualitatively) intense a manifestation in the higher worlds above,
עד שבאמת הן בטלין במציאות, וכלא ממש חשיבי קמיה
that they (and the beings which inhabit them) are truly in a state of self-nullification, and considered as truly naught before Him,
ונכללין באורו יתברך
and are absorbed in His light.
והן הן ההיכלות עם המלאכים והנשמות שבהן, המבוארים בזהר הקדוש בשמותם למקומותם, בסדר התפלה שסדרו לנו אנשי כנסת הגדולה
These [higher worlds] are the heichalot, with the angels and souls within them, that are spoken of in the sacred Zohar by their names and according to their places [and levels, as alluded to] in the liturgy arranged for us by the Men of the Great Assembly.
הנה משם מאיר האור כי טוב לעולם השפל הזה
Now, this6 “light, which is good,” radiates from there to this lowly world,
על יראי ה׳ וחושבי שמו
upon7 “those that fear G‑d and meditate upon His Name,”
החפצים לעבדו בעבודה שבלב, זו תפלה
who desire to worship Him with the8 “service of the heart, meaning prayer.”
וכמו שכתוב: וה׳ יגיה חשכי
As it is written,9 “And G‑d will enlighten my darkness,” even in this world, which is so lowly that G‑dliness is generally not manifest here.
והנה ירידת הארה זו למטה, לעולם הזה, נקראת בשם חסד ה׳
Now, the descent of this illumination downwards to this world, is called “G‑d’s kindness,”
For though this illumination is drawn down as a response to the divine service of the Jew, it outshines it out of all proportion. Its bestowal upon the lower worlds is thus truly an act of “G‑d’s kindness,”
המכונה בשם מים, היורדים ממקום גבוה למקום נמוך כו׳
“G‑d’s kindness” is drawn down through man’s “arousal initiated from below.” It is thus the coin that one gives a pauper that grants the giver the gift of “beholding G‑d’s face” — the internal aspect of G‑dliness — during prayer. In this way, man’s kindness and tzedakah elicit G‑d’s kindness and tzedakah.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Liturgy, the morning prayers (Siddur Tehillat HaShem, p. 44). |
| 2. | Hoshea 10:12. |
| 3. | Bava Batra 10a. |
| 4. | Tehillim 17:15. |
| 5. | Ibid. 103:17. |
| 6. | Cf. Bereishit 1:4. |
| 7. | Cf. Malachi 3:16. |
| 8. | Beginning of Tractate Taanit. |
| 9. | II Samuel 22:29. |
| 10. | Zohar II, 175b. |
| 11. | Cf. Tikkunei Zohar 69:105a. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:MOnday, Menachem Av 25, 5775 · August 10, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 109
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
"He shall bathe all his body in water"—Leviticus 15:16.
A person who chooses to become cleansed of any ritual impurity is commanded to immerse in a mikvah [a natural pool of water]. According to the tradition of the Oral Law, for a mikvah to be kosher it must contain enough water for [an average] person to submerge himself within them—unless it is a moving stream of water, in which case even the smallest amount of water suffices [for a smaller than average individual, or for immersing a ritually impure utensil].
Some details:
Of all the types of ritually impure people, only the zav requires immersion in a moving stream of water.
This mitzvah is not obligatory. As long as an individual has no intention of entering the Temple Mount, he may remain in his ritually impure state.
An individual's purification process is not finalized until the sun sets on the day he immerses.
There may not be anything separating between the person's body and the waters of the mikvah.
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
Positive Commandment 109
Translated by Berel Bell
The 109th mitzvah is that we are commanded to immerse in the waters of a mikvah and thereby be purified from whichever form of tumah previously existed.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He must immerse his entire body in water." The Oral Tradition2 explains that [the phrase "his entire body" also teaches that] there must be enough water to cover his entire body.3 This is the minimum size of a mikvah unless the water is from a spring, in which case there is no minimum amount,4 as explained in the laws which deal with this mitzvah.
Among the conditions [governing the mikvah] is that only in the case of a zav is spring water required,5 as the verse6 states, "mayim chaim."
When we say that immersion is a mitzvah, this does not mean that any person who is tameh is required to immerse himself — as one who wears a four-cornered garment must put tzitzis on it, or that anyone with a house must build a fence around the roof. [When I say, "it is a mitzvah,"] I refer to the laws of immersion — that we are commanded that anyone who wants purification from tumah can do so only through immersion in water, after which he becomes tahor.
The Sifra7 says, "One might think that the phrase8 'He must immerse in water' is a Divine decree [and that it is an absolute requirement to immerse]. The verse therefore says, 'then he can return to the camp' [after being purified] from tumah." This hints to the principle I just explained, i.e. that the mitzvah is just the law, i.e. that one who wants to be purified should take certain steps. This law is itself the mitzvah. This does not mean however, that there is an independent requirement to immerse — should he want to remain tameh and not enter the machaneh Shechinah9 for any period of time, he may do so.
The Book of Truth (i.e. the Torah) explains that even though after the person immerses he becomes tahor, his purification is incomplete until sunset.10 The Oral Tradition also explains that during immersion he must be naked and that his entire body must come in contact with the water. As our Sages put it,11 "The phrase, 'his entire body' teaches that there can be nothing intervening between his body and the water."
We have therefore explained that this mitzvah of immersion includes the laws of mikvah, of intervening substances, and t'vul yom.12 This mitzvah is explained in tractates Mikva'os and T'vul Yom.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 15:16.
2.Sifra.
3.This is 40 se'ah of water.
4.In practice, even a mikvah of spring water must contain 40 se'ah.
5.In other cases, even for a zavah, rain water is sufficient.
6.Lev. 15:13.
7.Ibid., 16:26.
8.Ibid., 14:8.
9.Corresponding to the Temple courtyard.
10.See Lev. 22:6. A person in this state is called a t'vul yom.
11.Eruvin 4b.
12.One who has immersed and is awaiting sunset, as mentioned above
Gerushin - Chapter Eight
Halacha 1
When [a man] divorces [his wife] according to a conditional arrangement, and the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is effective. If the condition is not fulfilled, the divorce is not effective. All the laws governing conditional agreements have been explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 6.1
There it is explained that when [a man] divorces [his wife] according to a conditional arrangement, and the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is effective from the time the condition is fulfilled, and not from the time the get is given to her.
As such, a husband may nullify a get, add to his conditions or add a further condition, until the original condition is fulfilled although [the woman] has already been given the get.
If the husband dies [before the condition is fulfilled],2 or the get is lost or consumed by fire before the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is not effective.3 A priori, [the woman] should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled.4 If, however, she has already married, she need not leave [her second husband],5unless she is no longer able to fulfill [the condition].6 [For since] the condition is nullified [the divorce is void.]
There it is explained that if [the husband] tells [his wife]: "You are divorced from the present time - or from today - on the following condition," or "You are divorced on the condition7 that this and this be done," when the condition is fulfilled the divorce becomes effective retroactively from the time the getreaches the woman.
Therefore, once the get reaches the woman's possession, [the husband] can no longer nullify the get,8 add to his conditions or add a further condition. If theget is lost or consumed by fire, or even if the husband dies before the condition is fulfilled, she should fulfill the condition after his death, and the divorce is considered effective from the time the get was given to her.
Halacha 2
Whenever [a man] divorces [his wife] conditionally - whether he states, "from this time onward," or makes [a repeated statement of the condition, as required] - he should not enter into privacy with his wife throughout the entire time the condition remains unfulfilled.
Instead, [all his dealings with her should be] in the presence of [at least one] witness. Even a servant or a maid-servant can serve this purpose, with the exception of her [private] maid-servant or her young son. For she is not embarrassed to enter into marital relations in the presence of these people.
It is well known that if [the husband] enters into privacy [with his wife] in the presence of two witnesses at the same time, the status of the divorce is doubtful, even if the condition was fulfilled. [We suspect] that he engaged in marital relations [with her],11 and nullified the get,12 as will be explained in these laws.
Halacha 3
How should a man divorce [his wife] conditionally? He should not say: "Write aget for my wife on this condition," or "Write a get and give it to her on this condition." Needless to say, he should not write in the get: "So and so divorces so and so on the [following] condition."13
What procedure should instead be followed? He should instruct the scribe to write [a get] and the witnesses to sign. They should write an acceptable get that does not mention any condition at all. Afterwards, he should give her the getand tell her: "This is your get..." or "Behold you are divorced on the following condition." Or he should tell [the witnesses] or his agent: "Give her this get on the following condition."14
Halacha 4
If [a husband] had a condition15 written in the get after the essential portion of the get16 was written, the get is acceptable, regardless of whether [the condition] was written before the signature of the witnesses or after their signature.
If, however, [the condition] was written before the essential portion of the get - even if he used the wording, "on the following condition"17 - the status of the divorce is doubtful, for the husband retains rights in the essential matter of theget. Similarly, if he verbally stated a condition before the essential portion of theget was written, the status of the divorce is doubtful.18
Halacha 5
[These rules apply when a man] divorces his wife and [makes the following conditions] whether verbally or in writing, after the essential portion [of the get] has been written,19. If he tells her: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man aside from so and so," or "...with the exception of so and so," [the ruling would depend on the identity of the individual specified].
If that individual is a gentile, a servant or a person with whom the woman is forbidden to engage in marital relations - e.g., her father, her brother, his father or his brother - the get is acceptable.20 If, however, the individual is one who could consecrate her [as a wife], the get is void,21 even if there is a negative prohibition [that is not punishable by death - neither at the hand of God nor the court - involved in such relations]22 or that individual is a minor.23 [The rationale is that by making such a condition,] the husband retained certain rights with regard to the divorce, and [the bond between the couple] is not [entirely] severed.
If [the individual mentioned] is the husband of the wife's sister, the status of the divorce is in doubt. For although at present relations between the wife and that man are forbidden, if her sister dies, she will become permitted to marry him.
Halacha 6
The status of the divorce is in doubt24 when [a husband divorces his wife and] tells her: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man, aside from a man who will be born in the future, who does not exist at present," "...aside from promiscuous relationships" - i.e., it is as if he said: "Behold, you are permitted to marry any man, but with regard to promiscuous relations, it is as if you remain forbidden like a married woman."
[This ruling also applies if he tells her:] "You are permitted to any man who will engage in relations with you in the ordinary manner, but with regard to anal intercourse, you remain prohibited," "You are permitted [to marry] any man, aside from one who consecrates you with a legal document" - i.e, the woman may be consecrated by [a gift of] money or via sexual relations, but if one consecrates her with a legal document, she is forbidden like a married woman - or "You are permitted [to marry] any man, with the exception of [the right to] nullify your vows" - i.e., [I] retain none of the rights of the marriage relationship except [the right to] nullify your vows; in that regard, it is as if you remained my wife.
[Similarly, if the husband desires that the woman be considered as if she were married with regard to her right] to partake of terumah,25 or with regard to his right to inherit her property if she dies [in his lifetime, the status of the divorce is in doubt].
Halacha 7
[If a husband] tells [his wife]: "You are permitted [to marry] any man aside from Reuven and Shimon," and then tells her: "You are permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon," the divorce is acceptable.26 For he has nullified his condition, permitting his wife [to marry] the men [concerning whom] the condition was made.
Halacha 8
[If, after telling his wife that she is permitted to marry any man aside from Reuven and Shimon, the husband] tells her: "You are permitted [to marry] Reuven," the divorce is void, because he has not nullified the condition [preventing her from marrying] Shimon.
If he tells her: "You are permitted to [marry] Shimon," or "You are even permitted to [marry] Shimon," the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps he permitted her only to Shimon, and she is still forbidden to Reuven. By saying "even to Shimon," he meant "to everyone, even to Shimon." [Nevertheless, the divorce is not void, for] perhaps he permitted her to everyone, and by saying "even to Shimon," he meant "to Shimon and also to Reuven." [This is plausible,] for Shimon was mentioned after Reuven in his condition.
Halacha 9
If [a husband] makes a condition, saying; "Today you are not my wife, but tomorrow you will be my wife," the divorce is not effective.27 Although the connection between the couple is severed on the day [of the get, it is renewed afterwards]. For this reason, in the wording of the get, is written the phrase: "from the present day onward."
Halacha 10
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never drink wine for the rest of your life," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed.28
If the condition states "for as long as I live" or "for as long as so and so lives," the divorce is effective, for the relationship between the couple is severed. When that person dies, [the woman] will no longer have any connection with [her previous husband].
Halacha 11
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you do not go to your father's house for 30 days, the divorce is effective. "...That you never go to your father's house," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed.
[Similarly, if a husband] tells [his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never eat meat," or "...that you never drink wine," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed. "...[that you not eat meat or drink wine] for 30 days, the divorce is effective.
Halacha 12
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never marry so and so," the divorce is not effective.29 To what can this be compared? to his telling her: "This is your get on the condition that you never drink wine," "...that you never go to your father's home," or "[that you not go to your father's home] for the rest of your life."30
If, however, he tells her: "[This is your get] on the condition that you do not marry so and so for fifty years,"31 the divorce is effective; she may not marry the person during the time specified.32 If she marries him, the divorce is nullified retroactively.33
If [the woman] engages in promiscuous sexual relations with the man specified, any child born to her is legitimate, and the divorce remains acceptable. For [the husband's] condition mentioned only marriage.
Halacha 13
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you marry so and so," if she marries him [the divorce is effective], as it would be if other conditions were involved. Nevertheless, our Sages said that she should not marry either the man specified or any other man.
She should not marry the man specified, lest the people say: "They are giving their wives as presents to each other."34 Nor should she marry anyone else, for the get is effective only when the condition is fulfilled.
If she transgresses and marries the man specified, she need not be divorced. If she marries another person before she marries the man specified, the get is nullified, and she must leave her second husband. Any child she bears [the second husband] is illegitimate. He must, however, divorce her with a get.35
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
If he engraved a get on a plate of gold and gave it to her, telling her: "This is [both] your get and [the money due you by virtue of] your ketubah, [the divorce is] acceptable and she is considered to have received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah,38 provided the plate is worth the value of her ketubah. If it is not, he should compensate [for the difference].
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when a man] divorces [his wife] conditionally, including a stipulation that causes the divorce to be considered void - e.g., that she never eat meat or drink wine for the rest of her life, or that she be free to marry any man with the exception of a particular individual, or that he mentioned other conditions before the essential portion of the get was written: If the condition was written in the get, and he rubbed it out and gave it to her, the status of the divorce is in doubt.39 If the condition was stated verbally,40 he should take the get from her and give it to her again without mentioning a condition, or mention a condition that is acceptable.
Halacha 17
What is implied? [A man] gave a get to his wife and told her, "Behold, you are divorced with this [get] and are free [to marry] any man aside from so and so."41If he took [the get] from her and gave it to her and said: "Behold you are free [to marry] any man," or "This is your get," the divorce is effective. The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 18
When [a man] gives a get to his wife on the condition that she give him two hundred zuz, and afterwards establishes a second condition in the presence of witnesses that she serve his father for two years, his latter statement did not nullify his original one.42 Instead, it is as if he told her: "Fulfill one of the two conditions." If she desires, she may serve his father, or if she desires, she may give [him the money]. One of the witnesses to the first condition cannot join with one of the witnesses to the second condition [to testify that the get was given on a conditional basis].43
If, however, [the husband] made a condition that the woman must give him 200zuz, and afterwards made a condition in the presence of two [witnesses] that she must give him 300 zuz, the condition of 200 has been nullified, and she must give [him] 300 zuz. The same principle applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 19
If [a husband] makes a condition that his wife must perform a specific activity without stating a duration of time, it is considered as if he stated that she should perform this activity for one day. For he did not specify any amount of time.
What is implied? If he told her: "This is your get on condition that you perform work for me," "...on condition that you serve my father," or "...on condition that you nurse my son," if she performs work for him or serves his father for one day or nurses his son for one day during the time when a child [usually] nurses - i.e., within his first 24 months [of life] - the get is effective.44If the son or the father dies before she nurses him or serves him, the get is not effective.45
Halacha 20
If [the husband] tells her: "[This is your get] on condition that you nurse my son..." or "...serve my father for two years," [for the divorce to be effective] she must complete the time specified. If the son or the father dies within this period, or the father says: "I don't want you to serve me," the get is not effective, for the condition has not been fulfilled.46 The same principles apply in all similar situations.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when a husband] tells [his wife]: "[This is your get] on condition that you give me 200 zuz within 30 days." If she gives him [the money] within 30 days with his consent, the divorce is effective. If she gives [it] after 30 days, the divorce is not effective. If she gives it to him against his will, and he refuses to accept it, the divorce is unacceptable until he willingly accepts it.47
Halacha 22
If he tells her, "[This is your get] on condition that you give me 200 zuz," without specifying a time period, and he dies before she gives [him the money], she cannot give [the sum] to his heirs; the condition was that it be given to him. [In this instance, however,] the get is not nullified [by the husband's death], since a definite time period was not specified.50 Therefore, even if the get was lost or ripped before he died, [the woman] should not marry another man until she performs the rite of chalitzah.
Halacha 23
[If the husband tells her:] "This is your get on condition that you give me this particular utensil," or "...this particular garment," and that utensil or garment is lost or stolen, even if she gives him 1000 zuz in compensation for [the desired object],51 the divorce is not effective until she gives him the specified utensil or garment, or until he nullifies the condition.52
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when a woman] is divorced conditionally, and another man consecrates her before the condition is fulfilled. If the condition is fulfilled [afterwards], she is consecrated.53 If, however, the condition is not fulfilled and the get is nullified,54 she does not require a get from the second husband,55 for [in this situation] she cannot be consecrated. If, however, she marries [a second husband], the condition is not fulfilled, and the get is nullified, she must also be divorced by the second [husband], as explained above.56
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
See Halachah 2 of that chapter, which explains that there are four rules that govern all conditional agreements:
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the action that one desires to make conditional;
d) the stipulation must be something with which it is possible to comply.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there were no condition at all. Note the details and explanations of these rules there.
|
| 2. |
This is relevant if the couple is childless, and the woman is obligated to fulfill either the rite ofyibbum or of chalitzah.
|
| 3. |
With regard to the first clause, a get can be effective only when the husband granting the divorce is still alive. If he dies, the marriage bonds are already rent by his death. With regard to the latter clause, since the get takes effect only when the condition is fulfilled, the get itself must be intact at that time. If it is not, there is no medium through which the divorce takes effect (see Gittin 74a).
|
| 4. |
Lest the husband die or the get be destroyed, and thus the divorce be nullified.
|
| 5. |
The Rambam's ruling is clarified by his statements in Chapter 9, Halachah 5, in which he states that a conditional divorce begins when the get is given and is not concluded until the condition is fulfilled. This conception has aroused objections among the commentators, who maintain that until the condition is fulfilled, the woman is like any other married woman. She cannot be consecrated, and marital relations with her are considered adulterous. Although in his Beit Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo supports the more stringent views, in his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:2), he appears to follow the Rambam's opinion (Beit Shmuel 143:2).
|
| 6. |
E.g., her husband made a condition that she give an article to his father, and his father dies.
|
| 7. |
I.e., the husband uses this expression rather than saying: "If you do such and such, the divorce is effective. If you do not do such and such, the divorce is not effective." The Ramah (Even HaEzer144:3) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4) mention opinions that do not equate "on the condition that" with "from now onwards."
|
| 8. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 143:2) quotes opinions that maintain that even when a condition is stated using the wording "on the condition that," the husband has the right to nullify the get until the condition is fulfilled.
|
| 9. |
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this ruling and declares that the woman should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled. There is, however, one exception: a condition that requires the woman to refrain from performing a particular activity before the divorce takes effect.
|
| 10. |
I.e., because of the severe consequences this will bring upon her, we do not suspect that she will fail to do what is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of her second marriage.
|
| 11. |
For entering into privacy with a woman in the presence of witnesses is considered equivalent to actual relations. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 18.)
|
| 12. |
See Chapter 10, Halachah 19, which explains that when there is a possibility that a man has had marital relations with his divorcee, we assume that he consecrated her again, rather than conducting these relations in a licentious manner. (See also Chapter 9, Halachah 25.)
|
| 13. |
This is unacceptable, as explained in the following halachah.
|
| 14. |
See the Beit Shmuel 147:1, which states that in a situation of difficulty in which the husband cannot wait until the get is written, we rely on more lenient views that differ with the Rambam. According to these views, the husband may instruct the scribe and the witnesses to write a get in the usual manner and to give it to the agent and before it is written, instruct the agent to give it to the woman conditionally.
|
| 15. |
I.e., a condition that is acceptable (Beit Shmuel 147:2).
|
| 16. |
I.e., the man's name, the woman's name, the date and the sentence: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man," as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 17.
|
| 17. |
I.e., using acceptable wording, as opposed to the wording described in the following halachah.
|
| 18. |
This ruling is questioned by the commentaries. Gittin 84b states that such a get is pasul, "unacceptable." Unlike the Rambam, for whom this term has an explicit meaning (see Chapter 10, Halachah 20), in the Talmud the interpretation of the term is somewhat ambiguous. In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that since - as mentioned in the previous halachah - the difficulty concerns a point of Torah law, and yet the Talmud did not rule the get to be void, he maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam interprets the ruling as dependent on the principle of bererah, that retroactively, when the condition is fulfilled, it becomes apparent that the get did sever the connection between the husband and the wife. Since our Sages did not determine whether or not the principle of bererah applies with regard to questions of Torah law, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Other authorities differ and maintain that if the condition was stated properly before the essential portion of the get was written and fulfilled, the get is acceptable. If the condition was written in theget itself, Tosafot, the Ramban and the Ra'avad maintain that the get is acceptable, while Rabbenu Nissim states that such a get is deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic decree.
At the outset, all the authorities maintain that the rules stated by the Rambam should be followed. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 147:2) also quotes the Rambam's ruling that the status of the divorce is in doubt. In a case of hardship, however, the Beit Shmuel 147:2 states that the more lenient views can be relied upon.
|
| 19. |
Needless to say, according to the Rambam, when any of the following conditions is binding, it invalidates the get if it was made or stated before the essential portion of the get was written. The difference between these conditions and those stated in the previous halachah is that those conditions can be fulfilled through a specific activity, and once they are fulfilled the marriage bond is severed entirely. The conditions mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, remain binding throughout the woman's life. Thus, her connection to her husband is never severed entirely.
The authorities which differ with the Rambam in the previous halachah, also differ in this instance, and maintain that if this condition is written in the get itself, the get is acceptable according to Scriptural law, but disqualified by Rabbinic decree. See Beit Shmuel 137:3.
|
| 20. |
Because of the prohibitions involved, there is no possibility of the woman's establishing a marriage bond with these individuals (see Hilchot Ishut 4:14-15), and therefore, her husband's statements are of no consequence.
|
| 21. |
Note, however, Chapter 10, Halachah 1. Rabbenu Nissim and other authorities rule more leniently and maintain that such a get is acceptable according to Scriptural law and was deemed unacceptable only by virtue of Rabbinic decree.
|
| 22. |
In such instances, even though marital relations violate a prohibition, a marriage bond can be established (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).
|
| 23. |
For ultimately, the minor will attain majority. Rabbenu Chanan'el differs and states that with regard to a minor, the status of the divorce is doubtful. The difference of opinion is dependent on the text of Gittin 85b, of which two versions exist.
|
| 24. |
In all the cases to follow, the divorce does not totally sever the relationship between the husband and the wife. Nevertheless, our Sages were not certain that the rights retained by the husband were sufficient to render the divorce void (Gittin 85a, Perishah, Even HaEzer 137).
|
| 25. |
I.e., the husband is a priest, and while married his wife may partake of terumah, although she is the daughter of an Israelite.
|
| 26. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an instance where the husband takes the getback from the woman and gives it to her again, making the latter statement. This conception is also reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:1).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 137) differs with the Rambam and maintains that in this instance the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps the intent of his latter statement was to permit her to Reuven and Shimon, but to forbid her to everyone else. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer137:4) accepts the Tur's ruling. All authorities agree that if the husband says: "You are also permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon," the get is acceptable.
|
| 27. |
Rabbenu Asher and the Rashba differ and maintain that in such an instance, the divorce is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:5) follows the view of Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
|
| 28. |
There is a factor, the prohibition against drinking wine, that always maintains the connection between them.
|
| 29. |
The Rashba differs with this ruling, explaining that since the other person may die, this can be compared to an instance where the husband makes a condition that his wife not drink wine during the duration of another person's life. Just as that condition is considered to be having a limit, so too, should this condition be considered to be limited.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in the instance at hand, the woman will never be able to marry the man specified in the condition. As such, the condition is not considered limited. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:22), he quotes both opinions and states that the stringencies required by both views should be observed.
|
| 30. |
I.e., the condition is one that binds a woman to her husband for her entire life.
|
| 31. |
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum of the Rashbatz that states that the intent is that the marriage will be forbidden for a period longer than the woman is expected to live. Thus, though the husband has in effect prohibited the woman from marrying the other man forever, since this is not explicitly stated, the condition is considered to be limited in scope.
|
| 32. |
According to the Rambam, it appears that the woman is free to marry another man immediately, for we assume that she will abide by the condition, rather than place herself in a compromising situation. There are, however, other opinions that state that she is not allowed to remarry until the person specified dies. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:16) quotes both opinions without appearing to favor either one.
|
| 33. |
I.e., it is considered as if the original marriage bond had never been severed. Any children born to her between the divorce and its nullification are deemed illegitimate.
|
| 34. |
This would compromise the entire image of Jewish divorce. (See Rashi, Gittin 84a.)
|
| 35. |
The requirement for the woman's second husband to divorce her is a Rabbinic decree, instituted lest people see a woman who appears married leave her husband without a get. According to Scriptural law, a get is not necessary (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra'avad and the Tur (Even HaEzer 143) suggest that she can have the legitimacy of the children of her second husband restored retroactively by marrying the person specified in the firstget after being divorced by her second husband. In this way, the condition will have been kept.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the husband's intent was that the woman should marry the man specified before marrying anyone else. (The commentaries cite a parallel to this ruling in Hilchot Mechirah 11:10.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:15) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah follows that of the Ra'avad and the Tur.
|
| 36. |
Since the husband maintains possession of the paper on which the get is written, the couple's marriage relationship has not been totally severed. Rashi (Gittin 75b) offers a different interpretation of this ruling.
|
| 37. |
When she receives the get, the paper belongs to her. Afterwards, she willingly gives it back. This follows the principle that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered to be a present (Rashi, Gittin 20b).
|
| 38. |
Gittin 20b explains that the fact that the same article serves two purposes - effecting the divorce and providing remuneration for the woman's marriage contract - does not prevent it from being effective.
|
| 39. |
Since the get was written in an unacceptable manner, there is reason to maintain that the get can never be acceptable. This applies when the unacceptable condition was written before the essential portion of the get.
The wording used by the Rambam is, however, questionable. The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 9:1) and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on this halachah use the word pasul"unacceptable," rather than "the status of the divorce is in doubt" to describe such a get. Perhaps here, the Rambam uses the term "the status of the divorce is in doubt," because, as cited above from the Rambam's responsa, according to the Rambam, the question in these situations is whether the get is written for the sake of severing the marriage bond. And this is a question of Scriptural law (Rav Kapach).
|
| 40. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to a condition stated after the essential portion of theget was written. If such a condition was stated before the essential portion was written, the get is unacceptable, because it was not written with the intent of severing the marriage relationship. See Halachah 4 and notes.
|
| 41. |
The Sages decreed that unless the get is returned, it not effective, even if the condition was nullified. Since the original giving of such a get has a permanent effect - the woman is forbidden to marry a priest (or to remain married to her husband, if he is a priest), as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 1 - the only way such a condition can be nullified is by returning the get to the husband, and having him give it again without any condition.
The Beit Shmuel 147:6 states that this law applies only with regard to a condition that prevents her from marrying a particular man that was stated after the essential portion of the get was written. When a condition that nullifies the get was written before the essential portion of the get was written, the get is void and cannot be rectified. When a stipulation such as "on the condition that you do not drink wine for the rest of your life" was made after the essential portion of the get was written, there is no need to take the get back from the woman. It is sufficient to nullify the stipulation.
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| 42. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to an instance where the condition was stated in a twofold statement: "If you do such and such, the get is effective, but if you do not do such and such, the get is not effective." In such instances, since the divorce is not effective until the condition is fulfilled, the husband may alter the condition. When, however, a get is given "on condition that... ," the divorce is retroactively effective from the time the get was given. Hence, the condition cannot be changed.
Rashi (Gittin 76a) offers a different interpretation of this passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:10) follows the Rambam's interpretation, while the Ramah follows that of Rashi.
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| 43. |
For each of the conditions is considered to be a separate matter.
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| 44. |
This ruling reflects an interesting halachic judgment on the Rambam's part. Gittin 75b explains that the ruling cited by the Rambam was authored by Rav Ashi. Although the Gemara poses questions on Rav Ashi's view that are left unresolved, since his position was not refuted, according to the Rambam, the halachah follows his view.
The Tur follows a different view and maintains that the woman must serve her husband's father for the duration of the father's life and nurse the son for the entire two-year period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Tur.
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| 45. |
For the condition has not been fulfilled.
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| 46. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and states that since the woman did not prevent the condition from being fulfilled, the get is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) does not accept this view. The Ramah states that the more stringent view should be followed.
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| 47. |
There is a difference of opinion among our Sages regarding whether a person who forces a colleague to accept something is considered to have given it to him or not. Although the view that he is considered to have given the object is favored, the Rabbis deemed the divorce unacceptable in consideration of the other view (Gittin 74a, 75a).
More specifically, it appears that the Rambam maintains that according to Scriptural law, the get is effective, and it is disqualified merely by virtue of Rabbinic decree, while Rabbenu Asher and the Rashba maintain that, according to Scriptural law, there is a doubt regarding the issue (Beit Shmuel 143:7).
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| 48. |
As reflected in Halachah 23, a husband can nullify a condition that he makes to a get. In this instance, however, he is not nullifying the condition, but rather trying to have it satisfied in a way other than that which he originally intended. This is not acceptable. Originally, he made the condition to annoy the woman, and since she did not suffer this worrying, the divorce is not effective unless he nullifies the condition entirely (Gittin 74b; Maggid Mishneh).
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| 49. |
Thus, if the husband dies without children, she is required to perform either the rites of yibbum orchalitzah.
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| 50. |
When a specific time period is mentioned and the condition is not fulfilled in that period, the divorce is nullified. In this instance, however, since a specific time is not mentioned, the Rambam maintains that the divorce is never nullified.
Rav Kapach explains that the Rambam's approach is based on his conception (see Halachah 1 of this chapter, and Chapter 9, Halachot 1 and 5) that when a get is given on a conditional basis, theget takes effect immediately, but it is not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, in this instance, since the condition can never be fulfilled, the divorce is not completed, and chalitzah is necessary if the husband dies childless. Nevertheless, yibbum cannot be performed, for the divorce has already begun.
Other commentaries offer different interpretations of the Rambam's views. The Tur (Even HaEzer143) rejects the Rambam's ruling and maintains that the woman may also perform the rite ofyibbum. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:3) follows the Rambam's view.
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| 51. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and explains that the husband has the option of accepting the money in lieu of the object originally mentioned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer143:6) mentions both views, it appears to favor that of the Rambam.
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| 52. |
I.e., he tells the woman, "This is your get; there are no conditions attached." He does not have to take the get back from the woman.
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| 53. |
The Beit Shmuel 146:5 states that this applies when the husband gave the get "on the condition that...," for in such an instance the divorce is effective retroactively from the time the get was given. (With regard to other conditions, see the notes on Halachah 1.)
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| 54. |
E.g., the condition was limited to a specific time span, as in Halachah 22, or the condition was that she would not perform a specific act and she did perform it. If, however, the condition involves an act that she is capable of performing, we suspect that she has fulfilled the condition (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Even HaEzer 146:5).
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| 55. |
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's decision and maintains that since it was possible for the woman to have fulfilled the condition, we suspect that perhaps she did in fact fulfill it. Therefore, she is forbidden to remain married to her first husband. It is the Rambam's view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4).
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| 56. |
Halachah 13.
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Mikvaot - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
These are the substances that intervene for a person: the secretion outside the eye, the fluid outside a wound that crusts, dried blood over a wound, a bandage over a wound, crusts of filth on one's flesh, dough or mud under one's nails, particles of mud or dough that collect on one's flesh, thick mud, potters' clay, and mud that is found in the thoroughfares at all times, even in the summer. All of these substances intervene. Other mud does not intervene when wet, because it will dissolve in the water. When it is dry, it is considered as an intervening substance.
Halacha 2
When the following: honey, ink, milk, blood, and the sap of berry bushes, fig trees, wild fig trees, and carob trees are dry, they are considered intervening substances. When they are moist, they are not. The sap of other fruits are considered as intervening substances whether moist or dry.
Blood that sticks to the flesh, even if it is moist, is considered an intervening substance. A loosely hanging limb or flesh is considered an intervening substance.
Halacha 3
A woman's hidden area is considered to have intervening substances present unless she washes before her immersion, because that portion of the body is always sweaty and dust collects there and intervenes.
To whom does the above apply? To a married woman. Different rules apply for an unmarried woman. Since she is not concerned about the cleanliness of that area, it is not considered to have intervening substances present.
Halacha 4
The following rules apply to bandages on a wound, metal plates on a broken bone, necklaces, noserings, choker necklaces, and rings. When they are firm and cling to the flesh, they are considered as intervening substances. If they are loose, they are not considered as intervening substances.
Halacha 5
Strands of wool, strands of flax, and straps that women tie to their heads as adornments are intervening substances, because they separate between the body and the water. Strands of hair are not considered intervening substances, because water penetrates through them, even when they are not loose.
Halacha 6
Strands tied around one's neck, even of flax, are not considered as intervening substances, because a woman does not strangle herself with them. Tight necklaces, e.g., choker necklaces and necklets, are intervening substances, because a woman chokes herself with them to look fat.
Halacha 7
Hair over the heart that became tangled and matted and similarly, matted hairs of the beard are intervening substances.
Halacha 8
When an arrow is stuck in a person's flesh, if it is visible, it is considered an intervening substance. If it is not visible, he may immerse in a mikveh and partake of terumah in the evening even though the arrow itself is impure. Similarly, if a person swallowed an impure ring and immersed, he is pure. If he vomited it out after immersing, he contracts impurity, because of contact with it. For, as we explained, any entities swallowed within the body of a living being, do not impart impurity or contract impurity.
If pebbles or splinters enter the cracks on the soles of a person's feet, they are considered as intervening substances.
Halacha 9
When there is a bandage, a compress, or a dressing over the hidden parts of a person's body, they are considered as intervening substances. The rationale is that even though water need not enter these parts, they must be fit for water to enter them and not have any intervening substances upon them, as we explained.
If there was one or two hairs that were outside the wound, but their tips were stuck to the wound, there were two hairs with mud or filth stuck to their tips, or there were two hairs from one's upper eyelashes that were perforated and hairs from one's lower eyelashes were threaded through them, they are considered an intervening substance.
Halacha 10
A person should not immerse with dust on his feet. If, however, he did, the dust is not an intervening substance.
Halacha 11
When one holds another person or an implement and immerses them, they remain impure. This applies even if he loosens his hand and allows water to reach the person or the article being immersed. This is a decree, lest he not loosen his hand. If he rinses his hand in water first, the immersion is acceptable.
Halacha 12
When a woman slings her infant son over her back and immerses, the immersion is not acceptable, for perhaps there was mud on the infant's feet or hands and it became attached to his mother at the time of her immersion and intervened between her body and the water, but it fell off after she emerged.
Halacha 13
When a woman who was a nidah put her hair in her mouth, clenched her fists, pursed her lips, or a bone was discovered between her teeth, it is as if she did not immerse. This applies to other impure individuals as well.
If she placed coins in her mouth and descended and immersed, she is purified from nidah impurity, but she is impure because of her spittle. Thus she is a primary derivative of impurity, like one who touched the spittle of a nidah. The same laws apply with regard to a zav.
Halacha 14
These are the substances that do not intervene for a human: the matted hair of the head, the arm pits, and the hidden parts of a man, the secretions of the eye, the scab above a wound, moist drops of filth on his skin, filth that is under a nail, a loose-hanging nail, and the thin hair that is on the skin of a child. All of these substances are not considered as intervening.
Halacha 15
When two or more hairs are knotted in one knot, they are not considered as an intervening substance, because the water can penetrate through them. If one hair is knotted, it is considered an intervening substance, provided the person is particular about it. If, however, he is not particular about it, his immersion is acceptable unless the larger portion of his hair is tied individually hair by hair. This is the ruling of the Geonim.
It appears to me that a person's hair is considered like his body with regard to immersion and is not a separate entity to the extent that it is inappropriate to speak of "the larger portion of his hair." Instead, even though all of a person's hair is tied hair by hair, if the person is not particular about the matter, his immersion is acceptable unless the hairs are combined with another intervening substance on his body and thus there are intervening substances covering the larger portion of his body, as we explained. The laws mentioned here apply equally to a woman in the nidah state and to other impure people who have hair on their heads.
Halacha 16
Ezra ordained that a woman should comb out her hair and then immerse. If it is possible for her to comb out her hair at night and immerse immediately thereafter, it is praiseworthy. In a pressing situation or when there is a question of sickness, she may comb out her hair - say - on Friday and immerse Saturday night.
Halacha 17
The following rules apply when a woman immersed and then an intervening substance was found upon her that disqualified her immersion. If she immersed on the same day that she prepared herself, she does not have to prepare herself again. Instead, she may remove the intervening substance and immerse again immediately. If not, she must prepare herself a second time and then immerse.
Halacha 18
A woman should not comb out her hair with natron, because it causes the hairs to snap, nor with oak sap, because it snarls the hair. Instead, she should use hot water, even water heated in the sun, because it hardens the hair and enables it to be combed out. Cold water, by contrast, tangles the hair and causes it to contract and thus become intertwined.
Halacha 19
When a nidah gave cooked food to her son and then immersed, the immersion is invalid because of the fatty substances on her hand.
Halacha 20
The following laws apply if a woman scratched her skin to the extent that it bled and then immersed. If the immersion was within three days of the bleeding, the place of the scratches is not considered as intervening. After three days, it is considered as intervening because the blood coagulates there, like a scab on the wound.
Similar concepts apply with regard to secretion in the eye. If it is dry and has begun to change color, it is considered as an intervening substance for a nidah.
Halacha 21
Blue ointment in the eye is not considered as an intervening substance. If it is outside the eye, it is considered as an intervening substance. If her eyes open and close frequently, even the ointment outside the eye, it is not considered as an intervening substance.
Halacha 22
If, while immersing, a woman opened her eyes to a great extent or closed them very firmly, the immersion is not acceptable.
With regard to what does the above apply? With regard to immersion to partake or touch pure foods. With regard to permitting intimacy with her husband, by contrast, she is permitted even if she gave cooked food to her son, she had an old scratch, there was blue ointment above her eye, or she opened her eyes very widely or closed them tightly. The rationale is that all of these matters and other similar ones are considered as intervening only according to Rabbinic Law and the Sages ordained their decree with regard to pure foods, but not with regard to intimacy.
Whenever a substance is considered as intervening for a nidah with regard to pure foods, it is considered as intervening for other impure people with regard to pure foods and as intervening for a convert when immersing during conversion.
Halacha 23
When a person immersed and after he ascended an intervening substance was found upon his body, even though he was involved with that substance for the entire day after the immersion, he is considered as impure unless he says: "I know with certainty that this substance was not upon me before the immersion." The rationale is that since he was categorized as impure, he is presumed to remain in that state until it is known for certain that he regained purity.
Mikvaot - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
These are the substances that intervene with regard to the immersion of keilim: Pitch, mortar, and the like.
When tar is on a cup or a bottle, it is considered an intervening substance if it is on the inside. If it is on the outside, it is not an intervening substance. When does the above apply? To a k'li in a craftsman's shop. When one belongs to a homeowner, whether the tar is on the inside or on the outside, it is an intervening substance.
When there is tar on a large pot or on a bowl, whether it is on the inside or on the outside, whether it belongs to a homeowner or comes from a craftsman's shop, it is considered as intervening.
Halacha 2
Musk and black earth are considered as intervening substances, whether in a cup, a bottle, a large pot, or a bowl, whether it belongs to a homeowner or comes from a craftsman's shop.
If pitch or mortar and the like are found on a counter-top, on a table, or on a small chair and they are clean, the foreign substances are considered as intervening, because the owner objects to their presence. If the surfaces are dirty, the foreign substances are not considered as intervening, because he does not object to their presence.
Halacha 3
If such substances were on the bed of an ordinary homeowner, they are considered intervening. If they were found on the bed of a poor person, they are not considered as intervening. If they were found on the saddle placed on a donkey belonging to an ordinary homeowner, they are considered intervening. If found on the wineskins placed on a donkey, they are not considered as intervening; on both sides of its saddle-blanket, they are considered intervening.
Halacha 4
If pitch, mortar, or the like were found on the clothes of Torah scholars, even on one side, they are considered as intervening substances, because they are careful to keep their clothes clean. If such substances are found on both sides of the clothes of unlearned people, they are considered as intervening. If they are only on one side, they are not considered as intervening.
Halacha 5
If such substances were found on the handkerchiefs of men who work with tar, potters, or tree-pruners, they are not considered intervening substances.
Halacha 6
When there is blood on the garments of a butcher, it is not considered as an intervening substance, because he does not object to its presence.
Halacha 7
When oily substances are found on the garments of one who sells such substances, they are not considered as intervening. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
If a butcher also sold oily substances and both blood and oily substances were found on his clothes, there is an unresolved question whether they are considered as intervening, because there are two stains, or whether they are not considered as intervening, since this is his work and hence he does not object to their presence.
Halacha 8
If tar, mortar, or the like were present on the inside of a sandal, on its upper surface, it is intervening; on its lower surface, it is not intervening. If they were found on a bench, on the upper surface or on the sides, they are intervening. On the lower surface, they are not intervening.
Halacha 9
Spots of filth on a chair and a carriage top that have been laundered, whether in the inside or on the outside, whether below or on the sides, are not intervening, because the water will wash them away. Filth coming from dregs left in a cup and a bottle, cotton on the inside of a necklace or inside a bell, and mud or dough on the handle of a hatchet or a rake are not considered as intervening. Should they harden, they are considered as intervening.
Halacha 10
It is clear that whenever we have said that tar, mortar, or the like do not intervene for keilim, the rationale is that the owner does not object to their presence. Therefore, if the larger portion of the k'li was covered with tar, mortar, or the like, its immersion is invalid, even though the owner does not object, as we explained. There is no difference in this context regarding any particular type of k'li. Instead, all keilim are the same in this regard.
Halacha 11
Whenever the handles of a k'li are hollow and were inserted into a mikvehupside down, they were inserted in the ordinary manner, but they were not thoroughly washed out, or they were of metal and they were bent out of shape, their immersion is invalid.
Halacha 12
When one turned the opening of a container upside down and immersed it, it is as if it was not immersed, because the water will not enter it entirely. If a utensil has a portion into which water will not enter unless it is tilted to its side, its immersion is not valid until it is tilted to its side.
Halacha 13
When a utensil is narrow on either side and wide in the center, it does not regain purity unless one turns it on its side in the water.
Halacha 14
When the rim of the opening of a bottle is turned over, it does not regain purity unless one turns it on its side in the water.
Halacha 15
An inkwell does not regain purity until a hole was made at its side so that water can enter its curved portions.
Halacha 16
When the collar of an animal was loose and it contracted impurity, it can be immersed in its place.
Halacha 17
A person should not immerse a kettle with its coals unless he moves the coals with his hands.
Halacha 18
When a container was filled with liquids and immersed in a mikveh, it is as if it was not immersed. If the container was filled with water and one immersed it in a mikveh, the water and the container regain purity simultaneously. The rationale is that water can be purified in a mikveh, as we explained in HilchotTum'at Ochalin.
If there was urine in the container, it is considered as if it were water. The following rules apply to a container holding water mixed with the ashes of the red heifer. If the greater portion of the container was empty, so that the quantity of mikveh water would be greater than that of the water mixed with the ashes of the red heifer, the container is pure. If not, it is impure, as if the water is another liquid that intervenes between the substance of the container and the water of the mikveh.
Halacha 19
When the inside of a container was pure, but the outside was impure, it was filled with white wine or milk, and immersed in a mikveh, the ruling depends on which is the greater quantity. If the greater portion of the container was empty so that there would be more water than milk or wine, it is pure. This leniency is granted, because the impurity is of Rabbinic origin. If it contained red wine or other liquids, the immersion is not effective.
Halacha 20
The following law applies to a container that is filled with impure water which had its opening closed with moist mud which was extending into the water of the container. If one immersed it, it is pure. If it was closed with thick mud, it is as if it was not immersed.
Similarly, if a ring was placed in a brick of moist mud and immersed, it is pure. If the brick is made from thick mud, it is as if it was not immersed.
Halacha 21
Water need not penetrate through the following articles for their immersion to be effective:
a) knots in the clothes of poor people as a rule; if they are particular about them, they
are intervening; by contrast, as a rule, knots in the garments of homeowners, intervene;
if they are not particular about them, they do not intervene:
b) knots in the fringes of clothes that became tied unintentionally:
c) the loops of sandals:
d) the head tefilah when its cube is firmly attached to its strand;
e) the arm tefilah when it does not move up and down freely:
f) the handles of a leather drinking pouch or a satchel; and
g) any similar entity that is tied or sewed and will not be untied in the future.
Halacha 22
Water must be able to penetrate the following articles for their immersion to be effective:
a) the knots in the openings of a cloak which are made like loops;
b) the knots that serve as loops on the shoulder;
c) the border of a sheet that must be extended:
d) the head tefilah when its cube is not attached to its strand:
e) the arm tefilah when it moves up and down freely:
f) the laces of a sandal; and knots in the fringes of clothes that were tied by humans; and
g) any similar entity that will be laid open or extended.
With regard to baskets used in winepresses and olivepresses, if the strands of material that make up the basket are firm, one must scratch out around them. If they are loose, one must shake them out. For their immersion to be effective, water must penetrate into leather pillows and cushions.
Halacha 23
Water does not have to penetrate into the inner space of a round leather cushion, a ball, a mold, an amulet, and tefillin for their immersion to be valid. This is the general principle: Whenever it is not common to remove and insert entities in the inner space of an object, it may be immersed while closed.
Halacha 24
When one immerses clothes that have been laundered, the water must penetrate through them to the extent that air bubbles arise. If they were immersed while dry, they must remain in the water until air bubbles arise and then cease arising.
Halacha 25
Whenever the accessories of a k'li are longer than necessary and one will ultimately cut them off, one may immerse them to the extent necessary.
What is implied? For the chain of a large bucket, the measure is four handbreadths; for a small one, ten handbreadths. It is necessary to immerse only this much of the chain, the remainder is pure.
Halacha 26
When one placed other keilim in an impure k'li and immersed them together, the immersion is effective for all of them, even if the opening of the k'li is very narrow. The rationale is that the water is able to enter it and since the immersion is acceptable for the larger k'li, it is also acceptable for the keiliminside of it. If he inclined it on its side and immersed it, the immersion is not acceptable for the keilim inside of it unless the opening is as wide as the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch. Similarly, if the larger k'li is pure and one placed impure keilim and immersed them together, the immersion is not acceptable for the keilim inside of it unless the opening is as wide as the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch.
When does the above apply? With regard to terumah, but with regard to consecrated food, keilim should not be immersed inside pure keilim at all, even if they were in a basket or a storage bin, as explained in its place.
Mikvaot - Chapter 4
Halacha 1
According to Scriptural Law, it is permissible to immerse in any collected body of water, as implied by Leviticus 11:36: "a gathering of water," i.e., any gathering, provided it contains enough water for the entire body of a human being to immerse in it at one time. Our Sages measured this figure as a cubit by a cubit by a height of three cubits. This measure contains 40 se'ah of water. According to Scriptural Law, the water is acceptable whether drawn or not.
Halacha 2
According to Rabbinic Law, water that is drawn is invalid for immersion. Moreover, if there was a body of water that was not drawn and three lugim of drawn water fell into it, the entire body of water is invalidated.
Although the disqualification of drawn water is a Rabbinic decree, our Sages explained it based on an association found in a Biblical verse. Leviticus, op. cit., states: "Only a spring, a cistern, or a gathering of water shall be pure." Based on a comparison of the terms used in the verse, they explained: The water of "a spring" is not dependent on man's activity at all. The water of "a cistern" is entirely dependent on man's activity, for it contains drawn water entirely. Our Sages said: The "gathering of water" should not be entirely made up of drawn water like a cistern, nor need it come entirely from the hand of heaven. Instead, if it came into being partially through human effort, it is acceptable.
Halacha 3
What is implied? When a person places barrels on top of a roof to dry, but it rained and they became filled with water, even though it is during the rainy season, he may break the barrels or turn them over and the water collected from them is acceptable for immersion. Even though all of this water had been contained in vessels, the mikveh is acceptable, because the person did not fill it up by hand. Therefore if he lifted up the barrels and overturned them, all of the water in them is considered as drawn.
Halacha 4
When a person places containers under a drainage pipe at any time and any season, both small containers and large containers, even containers of stone and the like that are not susceptible to ritual impurity, if they became filled with rainwater, the water is not acceptable for a mikveh. Even if he turned them over or broke them, the water collected from them is considered as drawn in every respect. For the containers were filled as a result of his intent, since it can be assumed that a drainpipe will conduct water. Even if one forgot containers under a drainpipe, the water is unacceptable for a mikveh. Our Sages issued a decree against one who forgot, lest a person place them there intentionally.
Similarly, if one placed containers in a courtyard when the sky was densely cloudy and they became filled with rainwater afterwards, the water inside of them is unacceptable for a mikveh, since they were filled as a result of his intent. Moreover, our Sages issued a decree against one who forgot containers in a courtyard, lest a person place them there intentionally.
If one placed containers in a courtyard when the clouds were dispersed and then the sky became cloudy and the containers became filled with rainwater, the water is acceptable for a mikveh, like that in containers left on top of a roof to dry. Similarly, when one left containers in a courtyard when the sky was densely cloudy, the clouds dispersed, and then became dense again and the containers became filled with rainwater, the water is acceptable. If he breaks the containers or turns them over, the water collected from them is acceptable for a mikveh.
Halacha 5
When one who applies lime forgot a large container in a mikveh and it became full with water, even if only a small quantity of water remained in the mikveh and the majority of the water of the mikveh is in the container, he may break the container in its place. Thus the entire mikveh will be acceptable.
Similarly, when one arranged containers in a mikveh to seal them and they became filled with water, even though the mikveh absorbed its water and no water remained except the water in the containers, one may break the containers. The water that collects from them forms an acceptable mikveh.
Halacha 6
How do three lugim of drawn water invalidate a mikveh? If there were less than 40 se'ah of acceptable water in a mikveh and three lugim of water fell in, making the entire amount 40 se'ah, all of the water is disqualified for use. If, however, there are 40 se'ah of water that was not drawn in a mikveh and then one drew water with a pitcher and poured it into the mikveh throughout the entire day, it is acceptable. Furthermore, when there are two mikveot, one above the other, and the upper mikveh had 40 se'ah of acceptable water and one was drawing water by hand and pouring it into that mikveh until the amount of water increased to the extent that 40 se'ah overflowed and descended into the lower mikveh, the lower mikveh is acceptable.
Halacha 7
When a mikveh contained exactly 40 se'ah and one added a se'ah of drawn water and then removed a se'ah of water from it, the mikveh is acceptable. Similarly, if he added a se'ah of drawn water and removed a se'ah of water from the mikveh, the mikveh is acceptable provided the greater portion of the original water remained.
Halacha 8
Drawn water does not disqualify the water of a mikveh when three lugin fall in unless they fall into the mikveh from a container. If, by contrast, the drawn water flows on the ground outside the mikveh and continues streaming until it descends into the mikveh, it does not disqualify the mikveh unless it constitutes half or more of the original 40 seah of water. If, however, the majority of the original 40 se'ah of water was acceptable, the mikveh is acceptable.
What is implied? When a mikveh contains a little bit more than 20 se'ah of acceptable water, one drew water and poured it outside the mikveh, and then the water flowed and descended into the mikveh, it is acceptable, even if it reached a total of 1000 se'ah. This applies whether the water flowed on the ground or through a conduit or the like that does not disqualify a mikveh. The rationale is that drawn water that was caused to flow is acceptable if the majority of 40 se'ah water is acceptable.
Similarly, if there was a little more than 20 se'ah of rainwater on an enclosed roof and one drew water by hand and poured less than 20 se'ah of water into the water, the entire quantity is unacceptable. Nevertheless, if one opened the drainage pipe and caused all the water to flow into one place, it constitutes an acceptable mikveh. The rationale is that when an entire quantity of drawn water was caused to flow, it is acceptable, provided the majority of the water was acceptable.
Halacha 9
Some of the scholars of the west ruled that since the Sages declared "An entire quantity of drawn water that was caused to flow is pure," it is not necessary that the majority of the water be acceptable. Instead, the perspective that required both a majority of acceptable water and that it be caused to flow are the words of only one Sage and they were already rebutted, for the conclusion of the passage states: "An entire quantity of drawn water that was caused to flow is pure."
According to the words of the scholars of the west, if one would fill a container with water and pour it out and the water would flow to one place where it collects, it would be an acceptable mikveh. Similarly, all the pools in our bathhouses would be kosher mikveot, for all the water they contain was drawn and then flowed through pipes. Never have we seen anyone who performed such a deed, i.e., ruling that such pools are acceptable for immersion.
Halacha 10
The following laws apply when rainwater and drawn water were mixed together in a courtyard and flowed into a cavity or they were mixed together on the steps leading to an underground cavern and then descended into the cavern. If the majority of the water was acceptable, the mikveh is acceptable. If the majority of the water was unacceptable, it is unacceptable.
When does the above apply? When they became mixed together before they reached the mikveh, but instead, flowed and descended together. If, however, the acceptable water and the unacceptable water were descending directly into the mikveh, different rules apply. If it is known that 40 se'ah of acceptable water fell into the mikveh before three lugim of drawn water, the mikveh is acceptable. If not, it is unacceptable.
• Monday, Menachem Av 25, 5775 · 10 August 2015
"Today's Day"
Thursday Menachem Av 25 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Re'ei, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 1-96.
Tanya: Now "The beauty of (p. 427) ...as explained elsewhere. (p. 429).
My father writes in a letter: "I heard in the name of our holy fathers the Rebbe'im, that also1 when a daughter is born we are to say the words "to Torah," (May her parents bring her up to Torah, to marriage and to good deeds. p. 186). This is based on the statement by our Sages (Berachot 17a), "How do women earn merit?2 By seeing to it that their children go to study Torah, that their husbands go to the Study Hall and by awaiting (their husbands' return, etc.").
FOOTNOTES
1. I.e. not only at the birth of a boy.
2. I.e. how do they share in the merit of the mitzva of Torah-study?
Daily Thought:
The Ultimate Delight
What is G‑d’s ultimate delight?
That a human soul will build portals of light so that the Creator’s presence may shine into His creation.
That a breath from His essence will pull herself out from the mud and turn to Him in love.
That a child of His being, exiled to the shadows of a physical world, will discover that the darkness is nothing more than Father hiding, waiting for His child to discover Him there.
But none of these can reach to the essence of all delights, the origin of all things, the hidden pleasure beyond all pleasures: The delight that this breath, this soul, this child did it all on its own.
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