Thursday, December 14, 2017

Chabad.org Calendar of New York, New York, United States - TODAY IN JUDAISM: 24 Kislev, 5778 - Tuesday, December 12, 2017 - - - ב"ה - Today in Judaism - Today is Tuesday, 24 Kislev, 5778 · December 12, 2017

Chabad.org Calendar of New York, New York, United States - TODAY IN JUDAISM: 24 Kislev, 5778 - Tuesday, December 12, 2017 -  -  - ב"ה - Today in Judaism - Today is Tuesday, 24 Kislev, 5778 · December 12, 2017
Menorah Lighting
Please set your location to view Menorah lighting times ––:––

Today's Laws & Customs:
• Chanukah Begins Tonight; Kindle One Light this evening
The eight-day festival of Chanukah begins tonight. In commemorartion of the miracle of the oil (see "Today in Jewish History" for Kislev 25) we kindle the Chanukah lights -- oil lamps or candles -- each evening for eight days, increasing the number of lights each evening. Tonight, the first night of Chanukah, we kindle one light. (In the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall; this evening, then, commences the 1st day of Chanukah).
On the 1st night of Chanukah, we recite three blessings before lighting; for text and audio of the blessings, click here.
For a more detailed guide to Chanukah lighting click here.
The lights—which ideally should be kindled soon after sunset—must burn for at least half an hour after nightfall. Learn more about the proper lighting time here.
For additional Chanukah observances, see Laws & Customs for tomorrow, Kislev 25.
Today in Jewish History:
• Construction of the Second Temple Resumes (353 BCE)
In the first year of rule of Cyrus, the King of Persia, Jews were given permission to return to Israel and rebuild the Holy Temple. A group of Jews led by Zerubavel set out for Jerusalem and began working on the second Temple. However, the Cutheans falsely accused the Jews of plotting a rebellion against King Cyrus and were successful in halting the construction of the Holy Temple for the remainder of his reign and throughout the reign of Ahasuerus, his successor. Construction resumed in the second year of the reign of Darius, Ahasuerus's son, on the 24th of Kislev.
Daily Quote: A little bit of light dispels a lot of darkness (Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi)
Daily Torah Study:
Chumash: Mikeitz, 3rd Portion Genesis 41:39-41:52 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation
Video Class
Daily Wisdom (short insight)

Genesis Chapter 41
39Then Pharaoh said to Joseph, "Since God has let you know all this, there is no one as understanding and wise as you. לטוַיֹּ֤אמֶר פַּרְעֹה֙ אֶל־יוֹסֵ֔ף אַֽחֲרֵ֨י הוֹדִ֧יעַ אֱלֹהִ֛ים אֽוֹתְךָ֖ אֶת־כָּל־זֹ֑את אֵֽין־נָב֥וֹן וְחָכָ֖ם כָּמֽוֹךָ:
there is no one as understanding and wise as you: To seek an understanding and wise man as you said, we will not [be able to] find anyone like you.
 
אין נבון וחכם כמוך: לבקש איש נבון וחכם שאמרת, לא נמצא כמוך:
40You shall be [appointed] over my household, and through your command all my people shall be nourished; only [with] the throne will I be greater than you." מאַתָּה֙ תִּֽהְיֶ֣ה עַל־בֵּיתִ֔י וְעַל־פִּ֖יךָ יִשַּׁ֣ק כָּל־עַמִּ֑י רַ֥ק הַכִּסֵּ֖א אֶגְדַּ֥ל מִמֶּֽךָּ:
shall be nourished: Heb. יִשַׁק [Onkelos renders:] יִתְּזַּן, shall be nourished, shall be sustained. All my people’s necessities shall be provided through you, similar to“the steward of my household (בֶּן מֶשֶׁק)” (Gen. 15:2), and“Arm yourselves (נַשְׁקוּ) with purity” (Ps. 2:12), garnis(s) on in Old French, provision.
 
ישק: יתזן, יתפרנס. כל צרכי עמי יהיו נעשים על ידך, כמו (לעיל טו ב) ובן משק ביתי, וכמו (תהלים ב יב) נשקו בר, גרנישו"ן בלע"ז [אספקה]:
only [with] the throne: That I will be called king.
 
רק הכסא: שיהיו קורין לי מלך:
the throne: A term denoting the kingship, like“and make his throne greater than the throne of my lord, King [David]” (I Kings 1:37).
 
כסא: לשון של המלוכה כמו (מלכים א א לז) ויגדל את כסאו מכסא אדוני המלך:
41So Pharaoh said to Joseph, "Look, I have appointed you over the entire land of Egypt." מאוַיֹּ֥אמֶר פַּרְעֹ֖ה אֶל־יוֹסֵ֑ף רְאֵה֙ נָתַ֣תִּי אֹֽתְךָ֔ עַ֖ל כָּל־אֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
I have appointed you: Heb. נָתַתִּי אֹת‏ְ. [Onkelos renders:] מַנֵיתִי יָת‏ָ, I have appointed you. It is nevertheless an expression of placing (lit., giving), like“and to place you (לְתִתּ‏ְ) above” (Deut. 26:19). Whether for greatness or lowliness, the term נְתִינָה is appropriate, like“I, [too,] have made you (נָתַתִּי אֶתְכֶם) contemptible and low” (Mal. 2:9).
 
נתתי אתך: מניתי יתך, ואף על פי כן לשון נתינה הוא, כמו (דברים כו יט) ולתתך עליון, בין לגדולה בין לשפלות נופל לשון נתינה עליו, כמו (מלאכי ב ט) נתתי אתכם נבזים ושפלים:
42And Pharaoh removed his ring from his hand and placed it on Joseph's hand, and he attired him [with] raiment of fine linen, and he placed the golden chain around his neck. מבוַיָּ֨סַר פַּרְעֹ֤ה אֶת־טַבַּעְתּוֹ֙ מֵעַ֣ל יָד֔וֹ וַיִּתֵּ֥ן אֹתָ֖הּ עַל־יַ֣ד יוֹסֵ֑ף וַיַּלְבֵּ֤שׁ אֹתוֹ֙ בִּגְדֵי־שֵׁ֔שׁ וַיָּ֛שֶׂם רְבִ֥ד הַזָּהָ֖ב עַל־צַוָּארֽוֹ:
And Pharaoh removed his ring: [The] giving [of] the king’s ring is a sign to the one to whom it is given [that he is] to be second to him in greatness [rank].
 
ויסר פרעה את טבעתו: נתינת טבעת המלך הוא אות למי שנותנה לו להיות שני לו לגדולה:
raiment of fine linen: This is an item of value in Egypt.
 
בגדי שש: דבר חשיבות הוא במצרים:
chain: Heb. רְבִד, a chain, and because it consists of links placed in a row, it is called רְבִד, and similarly,“I have decked (רָבַדְתִּי) my couch” (Prov. 7:16). I have decked my couch with rows of ornaments. In the language of the Mishnah:“surrounded by rows (רוֹבְדִין) of stone” (Middoth 1:8);“on the row of stones (רוֹבֶד) in the forecourt” (Yoma 43b), which is the pavement.
 
רבד: ענק, ועל שהוא רצוף בטבעות קרוי רביד. וכן (משלי ז טז) רבדתי ערשי, רצפתי ערשי מרצפות. בלשון משנה (מדות א ח) מוקף רובדין של אבן, (יומא מג ב) על הרובד שבעזרה, והיא רצפה:
43And he had him ride in his chariot of second rank, and they called out before him, "[This is] the king's patron," appointing him over the entire land of Egypt. מגוַיַּרְכֵּ֣ב אֹת֗וֹ בְּמִרְכֶּ֤בֶת הַמִּשְׁנֶה֙ אֲשֶׁר־ל֔וֹ וַיִּקְרְא֥וּ לְפָנָ֖יו אַבְרֵ֑ךְ וְנָת֣וֹן אֹת֔וֹ עַ֖ל כָּל־אֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
in his chariot of second rank: Heb. מִרְכֶּבֶת הַמִשְׁנֶה. The one second to his chariot, which goes next to his.
 
במרכבת המשנה: השניה למרכבתו, המהלכת אצל שלו:
the king’s patron: Heb. ‏ֵאַבְר, as the Targum renders: This is the patron of the king. [The word] ר‏ֵ in Aramaic means “king.” In [the chapter entitled]“The partners” (Baba Bathra 4a), he (Herod) is neither a king (רֵיכָא) nor the son of a king (בַּר רֵיכָא). [Thus, ר‏ֵ like rex in Latin, means king.] In the Aggadah (Sifrei Deut. 1), Rabbi Judah expounded: אַבְר‏ֵ refers to Joseph, who was a father (אָב) in wisdom, and tender (ר‏ַ) in years. Ben Durmaskith said to him,“How long will you pervert the Scriptures for us? אַבְר‏ֵ is only a term denoting knees (בִּרְכַּיִם) , for all would enter and exit under his hand, as the matter that is stated: ”appointing him, etc."
 
אברך: כתרגומו דין אבא למלכא. רך בלשון ארמי מלך. בהשותפין (בבא בתרא ד א) לא ריכא ולא בר ריכא. ובדברי אגדה דרש ר' יהודה אברך זה יוסף שהוא אב בחכמה ורך בשנים, אמר לו רבי יוסי בן דורמסקית עד מתי אתה מעוות עלינו את הכתובים, אין אברך אלא לשון ברכים, שהכל היו נכנסין ויוצאין תחת ידו, כענין שנאמר ונתון אותו וגו':
44And Pharaoh said to Joseph, "I am Pharaoh, and besides you, no one may lift his hand or his foot in the entire land of Egypt." מדוַיֹּ֧אמֶר פַּרְעֹ֛ה אֶל־יוֹסֵ֖ף אֲנִ֣י פַרְעֹ֑ה וּבִלְעָדֶ֗יךָ לֹֽא־יָרִ֨ים אִ֧ישׁ אֶת־יָד֛וֹ וְאֶת־רַגְל֖וֹ בְּכָל־אֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
I am Pharaoh: I have the power to enact a decree upon my kingdom, and I decree that no one should raise his hand, etc.
 
אני פרעה: שיש יכולת בידי לגזור גזרות על מלכותי, ואני גוזר שלא ירים איש את ידו:
and besides you: [I.e.,] without your permission. Another interpretation: I shall be the king, and besides you, etc. This is parallel to“only [with] the throne” (verse 40). - [from Gen. Rabbah 90:2] [I.e., although I give you the exclusive power to raise your hand and foot, as explained below I am still the supreme ruler over the land.]
 
בלעדיך: שלא ברשותך. דבר אחר אני פרעה אני אהיה מלך ובלעדיך וגו' וזהו דוגמת (פסוק מ) רק הכסא:
his hand or his foot: As the Targum renders [no man shall raise his hand to bear arms or his foot to ride a horse.]
 
את ידו ואת רגלו: כתרגומו:
45And Pharaoh named Joseph Zaphenath Pa'neach, and he gave him Asenath the daughter of Poti phera, the governor of On, for a wife, and Joseph went forth over the land of Egypt. מהוַיִּקְרָ֨א פַרְעֹ֥ה שֵֽׁם־יוֹסֵף֘ צָֽפְנַ֣ת פַּעְנֵ֒חַ֒ וַיִּתֶּן־ל֣וֹ אֶת־אָֽסְנַ֗ת בַּת־פּ֥וֹטִי פֶ֛רַע כֹּהֵ֥ן אֹ֖ן לְאִשָּׁ֑ה וַיֵּצֵ֥א יוֹסֵ֖ף עַל־אֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
Zaphenath-Pa’neach: He who explains hidden things, and Pa’neach has no parallel in Scripture. — [from Targum Onkelos]
 
צפנת פענח: מפרש הצפונות, ואין לפענח דמיון במקרא:
Poti-phera: He is Potiphar, but he was called Poti-phera because he became emasculated since he desired Joseph for homosexual relations. — [from Sotah 13b]
 
פוטי פרע: הוא פוטיפר, ונקרא פוטיפרע על שנסתרס מאליו, לפי שחמד את יוסף למשכב זכר:
46And Joseph was thirty years old when he stood before Pharaoh the king of Egypt, and Joseph went out from before Pharaoh and passed through the entire land of Egypt. מווְיוֹסֵף֙ בֶּן־שְׁלשִׁ֣ים שָׁנָ֔ה בְּעָמְד֕וֹ לִפְנֵ֖י פַּרְעֹ֣ה מֶֽלֶךְ־מִצְרָ֑יִם וַיֵּצֵ֤א יוֹסֵף֙ מִלִּפְנֵ֣י פַרְעֹ֔ה וַיַּֽעֲבֹ֖ר בְּכָל־אֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
47And in the seven years of plenty, [the inhabitants of] the land gathered [food] by handfuls. מזוַתַּ֣עַשׂ הָאָ֔רֶץ בְּשֶׁ֖בַע שְׁנֵ֣י הַשָּׂבָ֑ע לִקְמָצִֽים:
And…[the inhabitants of] the land gathered: Heb. וַתַּעַשׂ הָאָרֶץ, lit., and the land made. [This is to be understood] as the Targum renders:“And…the inhabitants of the land gathered.” The language, however, does not lose its meaning of making.
 
ותעש הארץ: כתרגומו, ואין הלשון נעקר מלשון עשייה:
by handfuls: Heb. לִקְמָצִים. Handful over handful, hand over hand, they were storing it.
 
לקמצים: קומץ על קומץ, יד על יד היו אוצרים:
48And he collected all the food of the seven years that was in the land of Egypt, and he placed food in the cities, the food of the field surrounding the city, he put within it. מחוַיִּקְבֹּ֞ץ אֶת־כָּל־אֹ֣כֶל | שֶׁ֣בַע שָׁנִ֗ים אֲשֶׁ֤ר הָיוּ֙ בְּאֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרַ֔יִם וַיִּתֶּן־אֹ֖כֶל בֶּֽעָרִ֑ים אֹ֧כֶל שְׂדֵֽה־הָעִ֛יר אֲשֶׁ֥ר סְבִֽיבֹתֶ֖יהָ נָתַ֥ן בְּתוֹכָֽהּ:
the food of the field surrounding the city, he put within it: Because each land preserves its own produce, and they would put into the grain some of the soil of the place, and it would preserve the grain [and prevent it] from decaying. - [from Gen. Rabbah 90:5]
 
אכל שדה העיר אשר סביבותיה נתן בתוכה: שכל ארץ וארץ מעמדת פירותיה ונותנין בתבואה מעפר המקום ומעמיד את התבואה מלירקב:
49And Joseph gathered grain like the sand of the sea, in great abundance, until [one] stopped counting, because there was no number. מטוַיִּצְבֹּ֨ר יוֹסֵ֥ף בָּ֛ר כְּח֥וֹל הַיָּ֖ם הַרְבֵּ֣ה מְאֹ֑ד עַ֛ד כִּֽי־חָדַ֥ל לִסְפֹּ֖ר כִּי־אֵ֥ין מִסְפָּֽר:
until [one] stopped counting: Until the one who counted stopped counting. This is an elliptical verse. [The subject of חָדַל is missing.]
 
עד כי חדל לספר: עד כי חדל לו הסופר לספור, והרי זה מקרא קצר:
because there was no number: Heb. כִּי because there was no number, and here כִּי is used as an expression of “because.”
 
כי אין מספר: לפי שאין מספר, והרי כי משמש בלשון דהא:
50And to Joseph were born two sons before the year of the famine set in, whom Asenath the daughter of Poti phera, the governor of On, bore to him. נוּלְיוֹסֵ֤ף יֻלָּד֙ שְׁנֵ֣י בָנִ֔ים בְּטֶ֥רֶם תָּב֖וֹא שְׁנַ֣ת הָֽרָעָ֑ב אֲשֶׁ֤ר יָֽלְדָה־לּוֹ֙ אָֽסְנַ֔ת בַּת־פּ֥וֹטִי פֶ֖רַע כֹּהֵ֥ן אֽוֹן:
before the year of the famine set in: From here is derived that a person may not engage in marital relations during years of famine. — [from Ta’anith 11a]
 
בטרם תבוא שנת הרעב: מכאן שאסור לאדם לשמש מטתו בשני רעבון: 
51And Joseph named the firstborn Manasseh, for "God has caused me to forget all my toil and all my father's house." נאוַיִּקְרָ֥א יוֹסֵ֛ף אֶת־שֵׁ֥ם הַבְּכ֖וֹר מְנַשֶּׁ֑ה כִּֽי־נַשַּׁ֤נִי אֱלֹהִים֙ אֶת־כָּל־עֲמָלִ֔י וְאֵ֖ת כָּל־בֵּ֥ית אָבִֽי:
52And the second one he named Ephraim, for "God has made me fruitful in the land of my affliction." נבוְאֵ֛ת שֵׁ֥ם הַשֵּׁנִ֖י קָרָ֣א אֶפְרָ֑יִם כִּֽי־הִפְרַ֥נִי אֱלֹהִ֖ים בְּאֶ֥רֶץ עָנְיִֽי:
Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 113 - 118
Hebrew text
English text

Chapter 113
This psalm recounts some of the wonders of the exodus from Egypt.
1. Praise the Lord! Offer praise, you servants of the Lord; praise the Name of the Lord.
2. May the Name of the Lord be blessed from now and to all eternity.
3. From the rising of the sun to its setting, the Name of the Lord is praised.
4. The Lord is high above all nations; His glory transcends the heavens.
5. Who is like the Lord our God, Who dwells on high
6. [yet] looks down so low upon heaven and earth!
7. He raises the poor from the dust, lifts the destitute from the dunghill,
8. to seat them with nobles, with the nobles of His people.
9. He transforms the barren woman into a household, into a joyful mother of children. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 114
This psalm explains why the tribe of Judah merited kingship.
1. When Israel went out of Egypt, the House of Jacob from a people of a foreign tongue,
2. Judah became His holy [nation], Israel, His domain.
3. The sea saw and fled, the Jordan turned backward.
4. The mountains skipped like rams, the hills like young sheep.
5. What is the matter with you, O sea, that you flee; Jordan, that you turn backward;
6. mountains, that you skip like rams; hills, like young sheep?
7. [We do so] before the Master, the Creator of the earth, before the God of Jacob,
8. Who turns the rock into a pool of water, the flintstone into a water fountain.
Chapter 115
A prayer that God bring this long exile to an end, for the sake of His Name-that it not be desecrated.
1. Not for our sake, Lord, not for our sake, but for the sake of Your Name bestow glory, because of Your kindness and Your truth.
2. Why should the nations say, "Where, now, is their God?”
3. Indeed, our God is in heaven; whatever He desires, He does.
4. Their idols are of silver and gold, the product of human hands.
5. They have a mouth, but cannot speak; they have eyes, but cannot see;
6. they have ears, but cannot hear; they have a nose, but cannot smell;
7. their hands cannot touch; their feet cannot walk; they can make no sound in their throat.
8. Those who make them will become like them-all who put their trust in them.
9. Israel, trust in the Lord; He is their help and their shield.
10. House of Aaron, trust in the Lord; He is their help and their shield.
11. You who fear the Lord, trust in the Lord; He is their help and their shield.
12. The Lord who is ever mindful of us, may He bless: May He bless the House of Israel; may He bless the House of Aaron;
13. may He bless those who fear the Lord, the small with the great.
14. May the Lord increase [blessing] upon you, upon you and upon your children.
15. You are blessed by the Lord, the Maker of heaven and earth.
16. The heavens are the Lord's heavens, but the earth He gave to the children of man.
17. The dead cannot praise the Lord, nor any who descend into the silence [of the grave].
18. But we will bless the Lord from now to eternity. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 116
This psalm contains magnificent praises to God. It also describes David's love for God, in light of all the miracles He performed for him. David does not know how to repay God, declaring it impossible to pay back for all God has done for him.
1. I would love if the Lord would listen to my voice, to my supplications;
2. if He would turn His ear to me on the days when I call.
3. The pangs of death encompassed me and the misery of the grave came upon me; I encounter trouble and sorrow.
4. I invoke the Name of the Lord, "Lord, I implore you, deliver my soul!”
5. The Lord is gracious and righteous; our God is compassionate.
6. The Lord watches over the simpletons; I was brought low, and He saved me.
7. Return, my soul, to your tranquility, for the Lord has bestowed goodness upon you.
8. For You have delivered my soul from death, my eyes from tears, my feet from stumbling.
9. I shall walk before the Lord in the lands of the living.
10. I had faith even when I declared, "I am greatly afflicted";
11. [even when] I said in my haste, "All men are deceitful.”
12. How can I repay the Lord for all His beneficences to me?
13. I will raise the cup of deliverance and proclaim the Name of the Lord.
14. I will pay my vows to the Lord in the presence of all His people.
15. Grievous in the eyes of the Lord is the death of His pious ones.
16. I thank you, Lord, that since I am Your servant, I am Your servant the son of Your maidservant, You have loosened my bonds.
17. To You I will bring an offering of thanksgiving, and proclaim the Name of the Lord.
18. I will pay my vows to the Lord in the presence of all His people,
19. in the courtyards of the House of the Lord, in the midst of Jerusalem. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 117
This psalm of two verses alludes to the Messianic era, when the Children of Israel will enjoy their former glory. All will praise God, in fulfillment of the verse, "All will then call in the Name of God."
1. Praise the Lord, all you nations; extol Him, all you peoples.
2. For His kindness was mighty over us, and the truth of the Lord is everlasting. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 118
This psalm describes David's immense trust in God. It also contains many praises to God, Who has fulfilled that which He has promised us.
1. Offer praise to the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is everlasting.
2. Let Israel declare that His kindness is everlasting.
3. Let the House of Aaron declare that His kindness is everlasting.
4. Let those who fear the Lord declare that His kindness is everlasting.
5. From out of distress I called to God; with abounding relief, God answered me.
6. The Lord is with me, I do not fear-what can man do to me?
7. The Lord is with me among my helpers, and I will see [the downfall of] my enemies.
8. It is better to rely on the Lord than to trust in man.
9. It is better to rely on the Lord than to trust in nobles.
10. All the nations surrounded me, but in the Name of the Lord I will cut them down.
11. They surrounded me, they encompassed me, but in the Name of the Lord I will cut them down.
12. They surrounded me like bees, yet they shall be extinguished like fiery thorns; in the Name of the Lord I will cut them down.
13. You [my foes] repeatedly pushed me to fall, but the Lord helped me.
14. God is my strength and song, and He has been a help to me.
15. The sound of rejoicing and deliverance reverberates in the tents of the righteous, "The right hand of the Lord performs deeds of valor.
16. The right hand of the Lord is exalted; the right hand of the Lord performs deeds of valor!”
17. I shall not die, but I shall live and recount the deeds of God.
18. God has indeed chastised me, but He did not give me up to death.
19. Open for me the gates of righteousness; I will enter them and praise God.
20. This is the gate of the Lord, the righteous will enter it.
21. I offer thanks to You, for You have answered me, and You have been my deliverance.
22. The stone which the builders scorned has become the chief cornerstone.
23. From the Lord has this come about; it is wondrous in our eyes.
24. This is the day which the Lord has made; let us be glad and rejoice on it.
25. We implore You, Lord, deliver us. We implore You, Lord, grant us success.
26. Blessed is he who comes in the Name of the Lord; we bless you from the House of the Lord.
27. The Lord is a benevolent God and He has given us light; bind the festival offering with cords until [you bring it to] the horns of the altar.
28. You are my God and I will praise You, my God-and I will exalt You.
29. Praise the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is everlasting.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, Chapter 2
English Text (Lessons in Tanya)
Hebrew Text
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Tuesday, Kislev 24, 5778 · December 12, 2017
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, Chapter 2
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ונפש השנית בישראל היא חלק אלו-ה ממעל ממש
The second, uniquely Jewish, soul is truly “a part of G-d above,”
“A part of G-d above” is a quotation from Scripture (Iyov 31:2). The Alter Rebbe adds the word “truly” to stress the literal meaning of these words. For, as is known,1 some verses employ hyperbolic language. For example, the verse2 describing “great and fortified cities reaching into the heavens” is clearly meant to be taken figuratively, not literally. In order that we should not interpret the phrase “a part of G-d above” in a similar manner, the Alter Rebbe adds the word “truly”, thus emphasizing that the Jewish soul is quite literally a part of G-d above.
כמו שכתוב: ויפח באפיו נשמת חיים
as it is written3 concerning Adam (whose soul was a comprehensive one, a neshamah klalit, in that it contained all the particular souls of subsequent generations): “And He (G-d) blew into his nostrils a soul of life”;
ואתה נפחת בי
and as we say in prayer concerning the soul of every individual Jew,4 “You blew it into me.”
The significance of the verb “to blow” as it relates to the infusion of the Jewish soul is now explained.
וכמו שכתוב בזוהר: מאן דנפח מתוכיה נפח, פירוש מתוכיותו ומפנימיותו
It is written in the Zohar,5 “He who blows, blows from within him,” that is to say, from his inwardness and his innermost being.
שתוכיות ופנימיות החיות שבאדם מוציא בנפיחתו בכח
For it is of his inward and innermost vitality that a man emits through blowing with force.
Blowing tires a person much more quickly than speaking, as is readily observed, for it requires a greater exertion of effort and vitality. Hence, the fact that the metaphor of blowing is used to describe G-d’s implanting the Jew’s soul in his body signifies that this soul originates in the “innermost” aspect of G-dliness.
That the Jew is rooted in G-d’s innermost and essential being is indicated further by the designation of the Jewish people as G-d’s “children”, whose souls originate in His “thought” just as a child stems from his father’s brain, as the Alter Rebbe explains presently.
כך על דרך משל נשמות ישראל עלו במחשבה
So, too, allegorically speaking, have Jewish souls risen in the [Divine] thought,6
The Jew has his source in Divine “thought” — the innermost level of G-dliness. All other created beings, even angels, are rooted in and created by Divine “speech”. Speech is external in comparison with thought.
כדכתיב: בני בכורי ישראל
as it is written7 regarding the Jewish nation, “Israel is My firstborn son”;
בנים אתם לה׳ אלקיכם
and concerning Jews as individuals,8 “You are children unto G-d your L-rd.”
פירוש: כמו שהבן נמשך ממוח האב
That is to say, i.e., the significance of the Jew’s being called G-d’s child is that just as a child is derived from its father’s brain — his inner and essential being,
כך כביכול נשמת כל איש ישראל נמשכה ממחשבתו וחכמתו יתברך
so too (to use an anthropomorphism) is the soul of every Jew derived from G-d’s thought and wisdom.
The Alter Rebbe now takes this concept a step further. Deriving from G-d’s thought and wisdom actually implies that it derives form G-d Himself, as he goes on to explain.
דאיהו חכים ולא בחכמה ידיעא, אלא הוא וחכמתו אחד
For9 “He is wise — G-d possesses the quality of wisdom — but not with a wisdom that is known to us created beings,” because He and His wisdom are one,
וכמו שכתב הרמב״ם שהוא המדע והוא היודע כו׳
and as Maimonides writes,10 “He is Knowledge and simultaneously the Knower... Who knows and comprehends — through the ”Knowledge“...; [and He is that which is Known]” — G-d is also thesubject of knowledge and comprehension, as Maimonides concludes.
This means that G-d’s wisdom and comprehension are totally different from man’s. In human comprehension there are three separate and distinct components: (a) the person’s soul, the “knower” and possessor of knowledge; (b) the power of intellect and comprehension — the “knowledge” — by which the person knows; (c) the subject of the knowledge — the “known” — such as a law in the Mishnah or a discussion in the Gemara which is apprehended and known.
Concerning G-d’s wisdom, however, Maimonides states: “He is the ‘Knowledge’, the ‘Knower’, and the ‘Known’.” G-d is the means of comprehension — the “Knowledge,” and at the same time is He Who understands — the “Knower”, and is also that which is understood — the “Known”.
ודבר זה אין ביכולת האדם להבינו על בוריו כו׳
Maimonides continues: “And this is not within the power of any man to comprehend clearly”;
כדכתיב: החקר אלו-ה תמצא, וכתיב: כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם וגו׳
as it is written,11 “Can you find and understand G-d by searching?” And it is also written,12“For My thoughts are not your thoughts,” [says G-d]; and consequently “your” [human] thoughts cannot possibly comprehend “My” thoughts.
Since His wisdom is one with G-d Himself, as has been shown, it follows that the Jewish soul, which stems from Divine wisdom (as stated above), actually derives from G-d Himself.
Many Jewish philosophers13 rejected Maimonides‘ description of G-d as “the Knower, the Knowledge and the Known.” In fact they considered it erroneous to ascribe to G-d a description of any sort — even of the lofty level of intellect of which Maimonides writes — inasmuch as description implies limitation, and G-d is inherently limitless.
The Alter Rebbe therefore points out in this note that the Kabbalists agreed with Maimonides, with the qualification that his concept does not apply to G-d’s essence. For His essence is truly infinite — even higher than the inscrutable level of “Knowledge” that Maimonides refers to. Regarding His essence, those who disagree with Maimonides are correct in maintaining that G-d cannot be defined in terms of “knowledge”, since He transcends it infinitely. Only after G-d limits the infinite light of His essence through the process of tzimtzum (progressive contractions), and thereby assumes the attribute of Chochmah (“Wisdom”), — only then can it be said of G-d that He is the “Knower, Knowledge and Known.”
הגהה
והודו לו חכמי הקבלה, כמו שכתוב בפרדס מהרמ״ק
NOTE
The Kabbalists have agreed with him (that G-d can be described as “Knower, Knowledge and Known”), as stated in Pardes of Rabbi Moshe Cordovero.14
Even according to the Kabbalah of the AriZal (Rabbi Isaac Luria, of blessed memory), Maimonides‘ statement stands.
The Kabbalah of the AriZal provides an even deeper insight into the limitlessness of G-d’s essence, higher than even that level of “knowledge” to which Maimonides refers. Still, even according to the teachings of theAriZal, Maimonides‘ statement is acceptable — with one proviso, however.
בסוד התלבשות אור אין סוף ברוך הוא, על ידי צמצומים רבים, בכלים דחב״ד דאצילות
This is so only when applied to the mystic principle of the clothing of the Ein Sof-light — by means of numerous “contractions” (tzimtzumim) — in the vessels of the Sefirot of CHaBaD (חב"ד — an acronym of Chochmah, Binah and Daat — “wisdom”, “understanding”, and “knowledge”, respectively; the triad of Sefirot which represent Divine “intellect”) of the world of Atzilut (“Emanation”).
Through a process of self-limitation called tzimtzum (“contraction”), G-d manifests (or, in kabbalistic terminology, “clothes”) His infinite essence (referred to by the Kabbalists as Ein Sof — “the endless, infinite One”) in the Sefirot, which are His attributes. This manifestation occurs first in Atzilut; specifically, in CHaBaDof Atzilut — Divine Intellect. Thus, at the level of Atzilut, G-d can indeed be defined in Maimonides‘ terms of “Knower, Knowledge and Known,” i.e., intellect,
אך לא למעלה מהאצילות
but not higher than Atzilut.
Above the World of Atzilut the Unknowable G-d cannot be defined. Accordingly, in terms of the kabbalistic scale, Maimonides had nothing to say about G-d except from the World of Atzilut and “down”.
וכמו שכתוב במקום אחר, שאין סוף ברוך הוא מרומם ומתנשא רוממות אין ק׳ למעלה מעלה ממהות ובחינת חב״ד
As explained elsewhere,15 the Ein Sof, blessed be He, is infinitely exalted over, and transcends, the essence and level of ChaBad.
In fact, the level of ChaBad is regarded as being equally inferior as material action in relation to Him.
Thus it is written,16 “You have made them all with wisdom.”
“You have conceived them all with wisdom” would seem more appropriate: conceiving, not “making”, is surely the proper function of G-d’s wisdom. “You have made them all with wisdom” indicates however that to G-d, “wisdom” — the highest level within the Worlds — is as lowly as Asiyah, the lowest level.
END OF NOTE
The Alter Rebbe now addresses a difficulty arising from his previous statement that every soul emanates from Divine wisdom. Since all souls emanate from one source — Supernal Wisdom — it should follow that all souls are of the same level and rank. How then do the various levels and ranks found in Jewish souls come about?
ואף שיש רבבות מיני חלוקי מדרגות בנשמות, גבוה מעל גבוה לאין ק׳
True, there are myriads of different gradations of souls (Neshamot), rank upon rank,ad infinitum.
כמו גודל מעלת נשמות האבות ומשה רבינו, עליו השלום, על נשמות דורותינו אלה דעקבי משיחא
For example, the souls of the Patriarchs and of Moses our Teacher are by far superior to the souls of our own generations, [which belong to] the period preceding the coming (lit., the “heels”, i.e., the footsteps) of the Messiah;
שהם בחינת עקביים ממש לגבי המוח והראש
for [the latter souls] are like the very soles of the feet in comparison with the brain and the head.
Just as the life-force found in the soles of the feet cannot possibly be compared to that found in the head and brain, so too can there be no comparison between the souls of these present generations and those souls (here called the “head” and “brain”) of earlier generations.
וכן בכל דור ודור יש ראשי אלפי ישראל, שנשמותיהם הם בחינת ראש ומוח לגבי נשמות ההמון ועמי האר׳
Similarly, within each generation we find the same disparity among Neshamot: there are those who are the “heads (the leaders) of the multitude of Israel,” so designated becausetheir souls are in the category of “head” and “brain” in comparison with those of the masses and the ignorant.
וכן נפשות לגבי נפשות כי כל נפש כלולה מנפש רוח ונשמה
Likewise there are similar distinctions between Nefashot and Nefashot (the soul-levels of Nefesh),for every soul consists of Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah.17
Just as the soul-level of Neshamah varies from one Jew to another, so too do the levels of Ruach and Nefesh.
Thus we see how manifold are the differences in the ranks of souls. Accordingly, we would expect similar variations in their divine sources — the greater the soul, the higher its source.
מכל מקום שורש כל הנפש רוח ונשמה כולם, מראש כל המדריגות עד סוף כל דרגין, המלובש בגוף עמי האר׳ וקל שבקלים
Nevertheless, the root of every Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah, from the highest of all ranks to the lowest — the “lowest” being those souls embodied within the illiterate and the most light-minded of light-minded Jews, —
נמשך ממוח העליון שהיא חכמה עילאה כביכול
all are derived, as it were, from the Supreme Mind which is Chochmah Ila‘ah(Supernal Wisdom).
In order to help us better understand why the levels of individual souls vary so widely despite their common source, the Alter Rebbe now returns to the analogy of a father and son (used earlier to illustrate the description of Jews as G-d’s “children” who are derived from Chochmah Ila‘ah — G-d’s “brain”, as it were).
An explanation in brief: In the analogy we observe that the child’s entire body is derived from a drop of semen originating in its father’s brain. Yet the many physical components which constitute the child’s body are by no means uniform. They vary greatly, from the brain — the highest component— to the nails of the feet, the lowest.
These radical differences come about through the presence of the drop of semen in the mother’s womb during the nine months of gestation. It is this period of physical development that produces the differences between one organ and another: the more materialized a particular component of the drop becomes, the more it diverges from its original state and becomes an entity with its own unique physical characteristics. We thus observe that though all the organs share a common source, nevertheless in the process of development there arise differences as radical as that between brain and nails.
Another matter evident from the analogy: Though the nails are the most insignificant part of the child’s body, they are still bound and united with their first source — the father’s brain. For, like the other parts of the child’s body, the nails too receive their nourishment and life from its brain. Since the child’s brain retains the essence of its source (the father’s brain) and is thus constantly bound to its source, even the nails are therefore bound up with their original source.
The same is true regarding souls. All souls are derived from the same source and root, from Chochmah Ila‘ah.But the soul must descend therefrom through a multitude of Worlds and levels, before clothing itself in a physical body. It is this descent that creates changes in the soul’s level and differences between one soul and another, for one soul is affected by this descent to a greater degree than another.
The second aspect of the analogy too applies here. Although a soul may descend to the very lowest of levels, it is still bound up and unified with its original source in Chochmah Ila‘ah. In the analogy, the nails remain bound to the father’s brain through their unity with the son’s brain. Similarly, these souls of the lowest level remain bound to their source in Chochmah Ila’ah through their attachment to the souls of the righteous and the sages of their generation, from whom they receive their spiritual nourishment. Even when in this physical world, souls of a higher level (analogous to the child’s brain) retain the spiritual level of their source — the level of “head” and “brain”; and through these souls even the souls of lower levels remain bound and unified with their source within G-d. This, briefly, is what the Alter Rebbe goes on to explain.
כמשל הבן הנמשך ממוח האב, שאפילו צפרני רגליו נתהוו מטפה זו ממש
[The manner of the soul’s descent] is analogous to a child who is derived from his father’s brain: even the nails of his feet come into existence from the very same drop of semen which comes from the father’s brain. How then were nails created from it?
על ידי שהייתה תשעה חדשים בבטן האם, וירדה ממדריגה למדריגה, להשתנות ולהתהוות ממנה צפרנים
— by being in the mother’s womb for nine months, descending degree by degree, changing continually, until [even] the nails are formed from it.
Though the child’s organs all derive from the same source — the drop of semen which comes from the father’s brain — yet they develop into entities as radically diverse as the brain and the nails.
ועם כל זה עודנה קשורה ומיוחדת ביחוד נפלא ועצום במהותה ועצמותה הראשון, שהיתה טפת מוח האב
Furthermore: Although the drop has been so altered as to become the substance of the child’s nails, yet it is still bound to and united in a wondrous and mighty unity with its original essence and being, namely, the drop of semen as it came from the father’s brain.
וגם עכשיו בבן, יניקת הצפרנים וחיותם נמשכת מהמוח שבראש
Even now, in the son, the nails receive their nourishment and life from the brain that is in his head.
The nails derive their life from the child’s brain, which in turn retains the substance of its source, the brain of the father. Thus the nails too are bound up — through the brain of the son — with the father’s brain.
Evidence is now brought that the nails remain bound to the father’s brain:
כדאיתא בגמרא נדה שם : לובן שממנו גידים ועצמות וצפרנים
As is written in the Gemara (Niddah, ibid.18), “From the white of the father’s drop of semenare formed the veins, the bones and the nails of the child.”
According to the Kabbalah too, there is a connection between the nails and the brain, as shall be presently stated.
וכמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים, שער החשמל, בסוד לבושים של אדם הראשון בגן עדן
(In Etz Chayim, Shaar HaChashmal, it is likewise stated in connection with the esoteric principle of Adam’s garments in the Garden of Eden,
שהיו צפרנים מבחינת מוח תבונה
that they (the garments) were of “nails” [derived] from the cognitive faculty of the brain.)
וככה ממש כביכול בשורש כל הנפש רוח ונשמה של כללות ישראל למעלה
Exactly so, as it were, is the case with regard to every Nefesh, Ruach, and Neshamahin the community of Israel on high.
The soul, too, is changed from its original state by a process of “development” similar to the gestation which transforms the drop of semen; in the case of the soul, however, this process consists of a descent from World to World, and from level to level within each World, as mentioned briefly above.
The Alter Rebbe will now go on to state the details of this descent.
Specifically, the soul passes through four spiritual Worlds, in its descent from Supernal Wisdom to the human body. These “Worlds”, or stages in the creative process, are (in descending order): Atzilut (the World of Emanation), Beriah (the World of Creation), Yetzirah (the World of Formation) and Asiyah (the World of Action). (They are written acrostically as אבי"ע, pronounced ABiYA.)
The function and significance of these “Worlds” will be clarified further in the Tanya; for the moment a brief explanation will suffice.
Atzilut (Emanation) is a World where the Ein Sof-light radiates, so that Atzilut is, in effect, G-dliness Itself “transplanted” (so to speak) to a lower level. (This takes place by means of tzimtzum.) For this reason, Atzilut is still united with its source — Ein Sof.
These two characteristics of Atzilut are indicated in its very name. The word Atzilut is etymologically related to two roots: (a) The verb לצא, meaning “to delegate”, as in the verse,19 “I (G-d) shall delegate something of your (Moses‘) spirit and place it upon them (the seventy Elders).” The verse is saying, then, that the spirit of prophecy possessed by the seventy Elders was merely an extension of Moses’ spirit, not something new, and separate from him. Similarly, the properties of Atzilut are extensions, on a lower level, of the Ein Sof. (b) Atzilut is also related to the word “etzel”, meaning “near” — thus indicating the unity of Atzilut with its source.
The World of Beriah (Creation), as its name implies, is a creation, not Divinity itself. It is the first creation to come about in a manner of Yesh Me‘Ayin — creatio ex nihilo; from Ayin (“nothingness”) there comes about aYesh, a definite state of existence. Beriah, however, represents merely the passage out of non-existence; it is a state in creation which cannot yet be spoken of as giving rise to proper “existence”, definable in terms of form and structure.
Yetzirah (Formation) is the World where that which was created from Ayin assumes shape and form.
The World of Asiyah refers to the completed creation. Understandably, this completed creation is still spiritual. The final world of creation (“physical Asiyah”), comprising our physical world with all its creatures, comes into being only at a later stage.
Together, these worlds form the Seder Hishtalshelut, “the chain-like order of descent,” so designated because just as the lowest link in a chain is connected to the highest by means of all the interlocking links, similarly, in theSeder Hishtalshelut, the lowest level in Asiyah is connected to the highest level in Atzilut; all the levels interlock and flow from each other.
In the course of its descent from Chochmah Ila‘ah (Supernal Wisdom — the highest level in Atzilut) to the physical body, the soul passes through the entire Seder Hishtalshelut; and, as stated earlier, this descent produces the various levels of souls, just as gestation causes the drop of semen to be transformed into the child’s bodily organs, even to the point where it is formed into nails.
After this introduction, we return to the Alter Rebbe’s words:
בירידתו ממדריגה למדריגה על ידי השתלשלות העולמות, אצילות בריאה יצירה עשיה מחכמתו יתברך
By [the soul’s] descending degree by degree through the Hishtalshelut of the Worlds of Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, from G-d’s wisdom,
כדכתיב: כולם בחכמה עשית
as it is written: “You have made them all with wisdom (Chochmah)” (i.e., everything emanates from Chochmah, which is the source of all Hishtalshelut),
נתהוו ממנו נפש רוח ונשמה של עמי האר׳ ופחותי הערך
[through this descent] the Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah of the ignorant and least worthy come into being.
Their souls were most strongly affected by this descent, and therefore they are on the lowest level. Similarly, all the various levels of “higher” and “lower” souls are determined by the soul’s descent through Hishtalshelut;some souls are affected to a greater degree, others less.
The Alter Rebbe now relates the second point in the analogy to our case. Just as in the analogy, the nails of the child are still bound up with their first source through their being constantly nurtured by the child’s brain, so too, in the case of the soul:
ועם כל זה עודינה קשורות ומיוחדות ביחוד נפלא ועצום במהותן ועצמותן הראשון, שהיא המשכת חכמה עילאה
Nevertheless (notwithstanding the fact that they have already become souls of the lower levels — the souls of the ignorant and the least worthy), they (these lesser souls) remain bound and united with a wonderful and mighty unity with their original essence, namely, an extension ofChochmah Ila‘ah (Supernal Wisdom),
כי יניקת וחיות נפש רוח ונשמה של עמי האר׳ הוא מנפש רוח ונשמה של הצדיקים והחכמים ראשי בני ישראל שבדורם
for the nurture and life of the Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah of the ignorant are drawn from the Nefesh, Ruach, and Neshamah of the righteous and the sages, the “heads” of Israel in their generation.
By drawing their nuture and life from those who represent the levels of “head” and “brain”, all Jews are bound up with their source in Chochmah Ila‘ah — Supernal Wisdom.
ובזה יובן מאמר רבותינו ז״ל על פסוק: ולדבקה בו — שכל הדבק בתלמיד חכם מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו נדבק בשכינה ממש
This explains the comment of our Sages20 on the verse,21 “And cleave unto Him”(concerning which the question arises: How can mortal man cleave to G-d? In answer, our Sages comment): “He who cleaves unto a [Torah] scholar is deemed by the Torah as if he had actually become attached to the Shechinah (the Divine Presence).”
This seems difficult to comprehend: How can one equate cleaving to a Torah scholar with cleaving to theShechinah? However, in light of the above, this is readily understood.
כי על ידי דביקה בתלמידי חכמים, קשורות נפש רוח ונשמה של עמי האר׳ ומיוחדות במהותן הראשון ושרשם שבחכמה עילאה
For, through attachment to the scholars, the Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah of the ignorant are bound up and united with their original essence and their root in Supernal Wisdom,
שהוא יתברך וחכמתו אחד, והוא המדע כו׳
(and thereby with G-d Himself, since) He and His wisdom are one, and “He is the Knowledge...”
והפושעים ומורדים בתלמידי חכמים
(22As for those who willfully sin and rebel against the Torah sages: How do they receive their spiritual nurture and life? Spiritual life and nurture flow only where there is a desire to nurture and give life. In answer to this, the text continues:
יניקת נפש רוח ונשמה שלהם מבחינת אחוריים של נפש רוח ונשמת תלמידי חכמים
the nurture of their Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah comes from the hind-part, as it were, of the Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah of the scholars.)
Nurture from “the hind-part” can be understood by way of comparison to one who gives an object to his enemy — obviously, not out of a true desire to give, but rather due to some external factor. The grudging reluctance with which he gives will be reflected in his manner; he will turn away from him, tossing the object to his enemy over his shoulder. The same is true in the spiritual sphere. When spiritual nurture is given unwillingly, it is described as coming from “the hind-part” of the giver — an external level of nurture.
Nevertheless, even those who rebel against the sages receive some measure of spiritual nourishment from them. For every soul, without exception, must be bound up with its root and source, as explained earlier. The level of nurture they receive, is however from the “hind-part” of the souls of the sages.
Having23 concluded that every Jew has a holy soul which emanates “from above” (from Supernal Wisdom), the Alter Rebbe now states that even the quality (the “rank” or “level”) of each individual soul is determined only by factors “from above” — spiritual factors, such as the soul’s above-mentioned descent through Hishtalshelut.No actions of this physical world can determine its quality and rank. The Alter Rebbe makes this statement indirectly by clarifying a quotation from the Zohar which seems to indicate the contrary.
ומה שכתוב בזהר ובזהר חדש שהעיקר תלוי שיקדש עצמו בשעת תשמיש דוקא
As for what is written in the Zohar24 and in Zohar Chadash25 that the essential factor is to conduct oneself in a holy manner during sexual union,
מה שאין כן בני עמי האר׳ כו׳
which is not the case with the children of the ignorant and their ilk who do not conduct themselves thus,
The ignorant — as the Zohar goes on to imply — draw down for their child a soul of a lower level, which seems to indicate that an action occurring in this physical world can, in fact, affect the soul’s level. Not so, declares the Alter Rebbe. The Zohar is not referring to the soul at all, but to the soul’s spiritual “garment” — as follows:
היינו משום שאין לך נפש רוח ונשמה שאין לה לבוש מנפש דעצמות אביו ואמו
this is because no Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah is without a garment which stems from the Nefesh of its father’s and mother’s essence.
וכל המצות שעושה, הכל עד ידי אותו הלבוש כו׳, ואפילו השפע שנותנים לו מן השמים, הכל הוא על ידי לבוש זה
All the commandments that it fulfills are influenced by that garment — it is through this garment that the soul achieves its ability to affect the body and to perform the commandments involving physical matters; even the benevolence that flows to one from heaven is all given through that garment. Because the soul is so strongly bound up with this garment, the Zohar refers to the garment, in this context, as the person’s “soul”.
ואם יקדש את עצמו, ימשיך לבוש קדוש לנשמת בנו
Now, if the person sanctifies himself, he will bring forth a holy garment for theneshamah of his child, thereby enabling the child to serve G-d more readily.
ואפילו היא נשמה גדולה, צריכה לקידוש אביו כו׳
However great a soul it may be, it still needs the father’s sanctification at the time of intercourse.
אבל הנשמה עצמה, הנה לפעמים נשמת אדם גבוה לאין ק׳ בא להיות בנו של אדם נבזה ושפל כו׳
But the soul itself as distinct from its “garment” is not affected by the parents‘ sanctification; in fact it sometimes happens that the soul of an infinitely lofty person comes to be the son of an ignoble and lowly person.
כמו שכתב האר״י ז״ל כל זה בליקוטי תורה פרשת וירא, ובטעמי מצות פרשת בראשית
All this has been explained by Rabbi Isaac Luria, of blessed memory, in Likutei Torahon Parshat Vayera, and in Taamei HaMitzvot on Parshat Bereishit.
Thus the physical world — of which the parents are a part — can in no way affect the soul’s spiritual rank. Even the statement of the Zohar that the essential factor regarding the state of the soul is the holy manner of conduct during sexual union, pertains only to the soul’s “garment”. The soul itself, with all its various levels, emanates “from above.”
——— ● ———
FOOTNOTES
1.See Tamid 29a.
2.Devarim 1:28.
3.Bereishit 2:7.
4.Siddur, Morning Prayer; cf. Berachot 60b.
5.Not found in our editions of the Zohar.
6.See Bereishit Rabbah 1:4.
7.Shmot 4:22.
8.Devarim 14:1.
9.Introduction to Tikkunei Zohar.
10.Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:10.
11.Iyov 11:7.
12.Yeshayahu 55:8.
13.Including Rabbi Yehudah Loewe (Maharal) of Prague in his Gevurot HaShem.
14.Shaar Mahut VeHanhagah, ch. 13.
15.See, e.g., Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah (Tanya, Part II), ch. 9.
16.Tehillim 104:24.
17.See Zohar I, 206a; also Rabbi Yeshayahu Hurwitz, Shnei Luchot HaBrit I, 9b.
18.31a.
19.Bamidbar 11:17.
20.Ketubbot 111b.
21.Devarim 30:20.
22.Parentheses are in the original text.
23.This interpretation of the following passage of Tanya follows a comment of the Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, of righteous memory. This paragraph forms (for the most part) a translation of this comment.
24.See Zohar II, 204b; III, 80-82.
25.Bereishit, p. 11.
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvot:
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Tuesday, Kislev 24, 5778 · December 12, 2017
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
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Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 212Reproduction
"Be fruitful and multiply"—Genesis 1:28.
We are commanded to reproduce in order to perpetuate the human species. For this reason, a groom on the night of his wedding is exempt from the biblical obligation to recite the Shema, for his mind is presumably preoccupied with the impending mitzvah that he will perform.
This mitzvah is only mandatory for males.

Reproduction
Positive Commandment 212
Translated by Berel Bell
The 212th mitzvah is that we are commanded to be fruitful and to multiply, and to have the intention of perpetuating the species. This is known as the mitzvah of pirya v'rivya (be fruitful and multiply).

The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "Be fruitful and multiply."

Our Sages2 have explained that a groom who has wed a virgin is exempt from the mitzvah of reciting the Shema3 [before consummating the marriage]; and have given the reason that he is "occupied with a mitzvah."4

The details of this mitzvah and its oblibations are found in the sixth chapter of Yevamos.5

Women are exempt from this mitzvah, as our Sages said explicitly,6 "Men have the obligation to be fruitful and multiply, not women."7
FOOTNOTES
1.
Gen. 1:28. 9:7. See Heller, note 6. Kapach 5731, note 6.

2.
. Berachos 16a.

3.
See P10.

4.
From this expression, we see that this is a mitzvah, and therefore is included in the count of 613.

5.
61b.

6.
Yevamos 65b.

7.
Although women are not obligated in this mitzvah, when they bear children, they nevertheless receive the special reward associated with this special mitzvah just as the man. See Ran, Kiddushin, Ch. 2.; Likkutei Sichos, 8:214. 14:41-42.
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter A Day: Tefilah and Birkat Kohanim Tefilah and Birkat Kohanim - Chapter Fifteen
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Tefilah and Birkat Kohanim - Chapter Fifteen
1
There are six factors that prevent [a priest] from reciting the priestly blessings: [an inability] to pronounce [the blessings properly], physical deformities, transgressions, [lack of] maturity, intoxication, and the ritual impurity of [the priest's] hands.

[An inability] to pronounce [the blessings properly]: What is implied? Those who cannot articulate the letters properly - e.g., those who read an aleph as an ayin and an ayin as an aleph, or who pronounce shibbolet as sibbolet and the like - should not recite the priestly blessings.

Similarly, a stutterer or one who speaks unclearly, whose words cannot be understood by everyone, should not recite the priestly blessing.

א
ששה דברים מונעין נשיאת כפים: הלשון והמומין והעבירה והשנים והיין וטומאת הידים הלשון כיצד העלגים שאין מוציאין את האותיות כתיקונן כגון שקורין לאלפי"ן עייני"ן ולעייני"ן אלפי"ן או לשבולת סבולת וכיוצא בהן אין נושאין את כפיהן וכך כבדי פה וכבדי לשון שאין דבריהם נכרים לכל אין נושאין את כפיהן:

Commentary on Halachah 1
2
Physical deformities: What is implied? A priest should not recite the priestly blessings if he has blemishes on his face, hands, or feet - for example, his fingers are bent over, crooked, or covered with white spots - for they will attract the people's attention.

A person whose spittle always dribbles when he speaks, and also a person who is blind in one eye should not recite the priestly blessings. However, if such a person was well known in his city and everyone was familiar with the person who was blind in one eye or whose spittle dribbled, he may recite the priestly blessing, for he will not attract their attention.

Similarly, a person whose hands were colored purple or scarlet should not recite the priestly blessings. If the majority of the city's population is involved in such a profession, he is permitted, for this does not attract the people's attention.

ב
המומין כיצד כהן שיש מומין בפניו או בידיו או ברגליו כגון שהיו אצבעותיו עקומות או עקושות או שהיו ידיו בוהקניות לא ישא את כפיו לפי שהעם מסתכלין בו מי שהיה רירו יורד על זקנו בשעה שהוא מדבר וכן הסומא באחת מעיניו לא ישא את כפיו ואם היה דש בעירו והכל היו רגילים בזה הסומא באחת מעיניו או בזה שרירו זב מותר לפי שאין מסתכלין בו וכן מי שהיו ידיו צבועות אסטיס ופואה לא ישא את כפיו ואם רוב אנשי העיר מלאכתן בכך מותר לפי שאין מסתכלין בו:

Commentary on Halachah 2
3
Transgressions: What is implied? A priest who killed someone should never recite the priestly blessings, even if he repents, as [implied by Isaiah 1:15 which] states: "Your hands are full of blood," and states: "When you spread out your hands, I will hide My eyes from you."

A priest who served false gods, even if he was compelled to do so or did so inadvertently - though he has repented - may never recite the priestly blessing, as [can be inferred from II Kings 23:9, which] states: "However, the priests of the high places shall not ascend [to God's altar in Jerusalem]." [The recitation of the priestly] blessings is equated to service [in the Temple], as [Deuteronomy 10:8] states: "to serve Him and to bless in His name."

Similarly, a priest who converted to the worship of false gods - even though he repents - may never recite the priestly blessing. Other transgressions do not prevent [a priest from blessing the people].

ג
העבירה כיצד כהן שהרג את הנפש אף על פי שעשה תשובה לא ישא את כפיו שנאמר ידיכם דמים מלאו וכתיב ובפרשכם כפיכם וגו' וכהן שעבד כוכבים בין באונס בין בשגגה אע"פשעשה תשובה אינו נושא את כפיו לעולם שנאמר אך לא יעלו כהני הבמות וגו' וברכה כעבודה היא שנאמר לשרתו ולברך בשמו וכן כהן שהמיר לעכו"ם אע"פ שחזר בו אינו נושא את כפיו לעולם ושאר העבירות אין מונעין:

Commentary on Halachah 3
4
[Lack of] maturity: What is implied? A young priest should not recite the priestly blessings until he grows a full beard.

Intoxication: What is implied? A [priest] who drank a revi'it of wine at one time should not recite the priestly blessings until the effects of the wine wear off. [This restriction was imposed] because an association was established between [reciting the priestly] blessing and service [in the Temple].

Should [a priest] drink a revi'it of wine on two different occasions or mix a small amount of water in it, he is permitted [to recite the priestly blessings]. If he drank more than a revi'it, even though it was mixed with water or even though he drank it intermittently, he should not recite the priestly blessings until the effects of the wine wear off.

How much is a revi'it? [The volume of an area] two fingerbreadths by two fingerbreadths and two and seven tenths of a fingerbreadth high. Whenever the term "finger" is mentioned as a measure throughout the entire Torah, it refers to a thumbbreadth. The thumb is called bohen yad [in the Torah].

ד
השנים כיצד כהן נער לא ישא את כפיו עד שיתמלא זקנו והיין כיצד מי ששתה רביעית יין בבת אחת אינו נושא את כפיו עד שיסיר את יינו מעליו לפי שהוקשה ברכה לעבודה שתה רביעית יין בשתי פעמים או שנתן לתוכו מעט מים מותר ואם שתה יותר מרביעית אף על פי שהיה מזוג אע"פששתאו בכמה פעמים לא ישא את כפיו עד שיסיר את יינו מעליו וכמה היא רביעית אצבעים על אצבעים ברום אצבעים וחצי אצבע וחומש אצבע כגודל וזה האצבע שמושחין בו בכל התורה כולה הוא הגודל והוא הנקרא בהן יד:

Commentary on Halachah 4
5
The ritual impurity of [the priest's] hands: What is implied? A priest who did not wash his hands should not recite the priestly blessing. Rather, he should wash his hands to the wrist, as is done when sanctifying the hands for the service in the Temple, as [Psalms 134:2] states: "Raise up your hands [in] holiness and bless God."

A challal does not recite the priestly blessing, for he is not a priest.

ה
טומאת הידים כיצד כהן שלא נטל את ידיו לא ישא את כפיו אלא נוטל את ידיו עד הפרק כדרך שמקדשין לעבודה ואחר כך מברך שנאמר שאו ידיכם קדש וברכו את יי' והחלל אינו נושא את כפיו לפי שאינו בכיהונו:

Commentary on Halachah 5
6
A priest who does not have any of the factors which hinder the recitation of the priestly blessings mentioned above should recite the priestly blessing, even though he is not a wise man or careful in his observance of the mitzvot. [This applies] even though the people spread unwholesome gossip about him, or his business dealings are not ethical.

He should not be prevented from [reciting the priestly blessings] because [reciting these blessings] is a positive mitzvah incumbent on each priest who is fit to recite them. We do not tell a wicked person: Increase your wickedness [by] failing to perform mitzvot.

ו
כהן שלא היה לו דבר מכל אלו הדברים המונעין נשיאת כפים אף ע"פ שאינו חכם ואינו מדקדק במצות או שהיו הבריות מרננים אחריו או שלא היה משאו ומתנו בצדק הרי זה נושא את כפיו ואין מונעין אותו לפי שזו מצות עשה על כל כהן וכהן שראוי לנשיאת כפים ואין אומרים לאדם רשע הוסף רשע והמנע מן המצות:

Commentary on Halachah 6
7
Do not wonder: "What good will come from the blessing of this simple person?" for the reception of the blessings is not dependent on the priests, but on the Holy One, blessed be He, as [Numbers 6:27] states: "And they shall set My name upon the children of Israel, and I shall bless them." The priests perform the mitzvah with which they were commanded, and God, in His mercies, will bless Israel as He desires.

ז
ואל תתמה ותאמר ומה תועיל ברכת הדיוט זה שאין קבול הברכה תלוי בכהנים אלא בהקדוש ברוך הוא שנאמר ושמו את שמי על בני ישראל ואני אברכם הכהנים עושים מצותן שנצטוו בה והקב"ה ברחמיו מברך את ישראל כחפצו:

Commentary on Halachah 7
8
The people standing behind the priests are not included in the blessing. Those standing at their sides are included in the blessing. [Even] if there is a partition - even an iron wall - between the priests and the people who are being blessed, since they are facing the priests, they are included in the blessing.

ח
עם שהם אחורי הכהנים אינם בכלל הברכה והעומדים מצדיהן הרי הם בכלל הברכה ואם היתה מחיצה בין הכהנים ובין המתברכים אפילו היא חומה של ברזל הואיל ופניהם מול פני הכהנים הרי הם בכלל הברכה:

Commentary on Halachah 8
9
The priestly blessing is recited [only] when ten people [are present]. The priests can be included in that number.

If [the congregation in a particular] synagogue are all priests, they should all recite the priestly blessing. Who should they bless? Their brethren in the north and the south. Who will respond "Amen" to their [blessings]? The women and the children. If more than ten priests remain besides those who ascend to the duchan, these ten [priests] respond "Amen" and the remainder of the priests recite the blessings.

ט
נשיאת כפים בעשרה וכהנים מן המנין בית הכנסת שכולן כהנים כולם נושאים את כפיהם ולמי הם מברכים לאחיהם שבצפון ולאחיהם שבדרום ומי עונה אחריהם אמן הנשים והטף ואם נשארו שם עשרה כהנים יותר על אלו שעלו לדוכן העשרה עונין אמן והשאר מברכין:

Commentary on Halachah 9
10
When there is no priest in the community other than the leader of the congregation, he should not recite the priestly blessings. If he is sure that he can recite the priestly blessings and return to his prayers [without becoming confused], he may [recite the priestly blessing].

If there are no priests present at all, when the leader of the congregation reaches [the blessing] Sim shalom, he recites [the following prayer]:

Our God and God of our fathers, bless us with the threefold blessing written in the Torah by Moses, Your servant, and recited by Aharon and his sons, the priests, Your consecrated people, as it is said:
May God bless you and keep you.
May God shine His countenance upon you and be gracious to you.
May God turn His countenance to you and grant you peace.
And they shall set My name upon the children of Israel and I will bless them.

The people do not respond "Amen" to these blessings. He [resumes his recitation of the Shemoneh Esreh], beginning the recitation of [the blessing] Sim shalom.

י
ציבור שלא היה בהן כהן אלא שליח ציבור לבדו לא ישא את כפיו ואם היתה הבטחתו שהוא נושא את כפיו וחוזר לתפלתו רשאי ואם אין להם כהן כלל כשיגיע שליח ציבור לשים שלום אומר אלהינו ואלהי אבותינו ברכנו בברכה המשולשת בתורה הכתובהע"ימשה עבדך האמורה מפי אהרן ובניו כהנים עם קדושך כאמור יברכך יי' וישמרך יאר יי' פניו אליך ויחנך ישא יי' פניו אליך וישם לך שלום ושמו את שמי על בני ישראל ואני אברכם ואין העם עונין אמן ומתחיל ואומר שים שלום:

Commentary on Halachah 10
11
A priest who recited the priestly blessings and went to another synagogue and found the congregation in the midst of prayer, before the [recitation of] the priestly blessings, should bless them. [He may recite the priestly blessings] several times during the day.

A priest who does not move from his place to ascend to the duchan when the leader of the congregation recites [the blessing] R'tzey should not ascend [to the duchan] during that prayer service. However, if he moved [from his place], even though he did not reach the duchan until after the [conclusion of the blessing R'tzey], he may ascend [the duchan] and bless [the people].

יא
כהן שנשא את כפיו בבית הכנסת והלך לבית הכנסת אחר ומצא ציבור שמתפללין ולא הגיעו לברכת כהנים נושא ידיו להן ומברכן ואפילו כמה פעמים ביום כהן שלא עקר רגליו ממקומו לעלות לדוכן בשעה שאמר שליח ציבור רצה שוב אינו עולה באותה תפלה אבל אם עקר רגליו לעלות אף על פי שלא הגיע לדוכן אלא אחר עבודה הרי זה עולה ומברך:

Commentary on Halachah 11
12
Any priest who does not ascend to the duchan - even though he neglects [the performance] of [only] one commandment - is considered as if he violated three positive commandments, as [Numbers 6:23-27] states: "This is how you shall bless the children of Israel," "Say to them," "And you shall set My name..."

Any priest who does not recite the priestly blessing will not be blessed, and any priest who blesses [the people] will be blessed, as [Genesis 12:3] states: "And I will bless those who bless you."

יב
כל כהן שאינו עולה לדוכן אע"פ שבטל מצות עשה אחת הרי זה כעובר על שלש עשה שנאמר כה תברכו את בני ישראל אמור להם ושמו את שמי וכל כהן שאינו מברך אינו מתברך וכל כהן המברך מתברך שנא' ואברכה מברכיך:

Commentary on Halachah 12
Rambam:
• 3 Chapters A Day: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Twenty Three, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Twenty Four, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Twenty Five
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Ishut - Chapter Twenty Three
1
[The following rules apply when] a woman makes a provision with her husband in which he agrees to forgo one of the privileges that a husband is granted. If he wrote down [this provision] for her after she was consecrated, but before nisu'in, there is no need to formalize the matter with an act of contract; everything he wrote to her is binding.1 If he wrote down [this provision] for her after nisu'in, he must formalize the matter with an act of contract.2

א
האשה שהתנית על בעלה לבטל זכות מדברים שזוכה בהן הבעל אם כתב לה ועודה ארוסה קודם הנישואין אינו צריך לקנות מידו. אלא כל מה שכתב לה קיים. ואם כתב לה אחר הנישואין צריך לקנות מידו:

2
If, [after nisu'in,] the husband stipulates that he will have no say with regard to [his wife's] property, and she sells it or gives it away as a present, the sale or the present is binding.3 Nevertheless, [the husband] is entitled to the benefits [that accrue from the property] during the time it is in her possession.4

If he affirmed these statements with an act of contract between consecration [and nisu'in], he is considered to have waived his rights to the land itself, and he no longer has any rights to the benefits that accrue from her property.5

His words are not heeded if he protests this action, saying: "I did not realize that this act of contract formalized my waiver of all rights to benefit from the property. [I thought that it only entitled my wife] to make a binding sale. [This interpretation is justified,] for no one will marry a woman without property." Instead, he is considered to have waived [all] rights to the land itself.

ב
התנה עמה שלא יהיו לו דין ודברים בנכסיה אם מכרה ונתנה מכרה ומתנתה קיים. אבל אוכל פירותיהן כל זמן שהן ברשותה. ואם קנו מידו כשהיא ארוסה שאין לו דין ודברים בנכסיה הרי סילק עצמו מגוף הקרקע ואין לו בנכסיה פירות לעולם. ואפילו ערער על קניינו ואמר לא עלה בדעתי שאין לי פירות מפני קנין זה אלא שאם מכרה מכרה קיים שאין אדם נושא אשה בלא נכסים אין שומעין לו אלא כבר סילק עצמו מגוף הקרקע:

3
If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, he is not entitled to this benefit. Nevertheless, the benefit that accrues should be converted to financial resources, landed property should be purchased, and [the husband] is entitled to the benefits from that property.6 For he waived only the rights to the property [she owned originally].

ג
התנה עמה שלא יאכל פירות נכסיה ה"ז אינו אוכל פירותיהן אבל מוכרין את הפירות ולוקחין בהן קרקע והוא אוכל פירותיה. שלא סילק עצמו אלא מפירות נכסים אלו בלבד:

4
If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, nor to receive the benefit that results from property purchased with the income from her original property, the proceeds from that property should be used to purchase other property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefits that accrue. These are called "the fruit of the fruit's fruit."

This pattern continues until the husband makes a provision that he has no right to any by-product of the proceeds from [his wife's property]. [If he makes such a provision,] he has no right to any benefit during her lifetime, but if she dies, he inherits her entire estate.

ד
התנה עמה שלא יאכל פירות נכסיה ולא פירי פירותיהן לוקחין הפירות וקונין בהם קרקע ולוקחין פירות קרקע זו וקונין בהם קרקע שנייה והוא אוכל פירות אלו שהן פירי פירי פירות וכן הדבר תמיד עד שיתנה עמה שלא יהיו לו לא פירות ולא פירי פירותיהן עד לעולם. ואח"כ לא יהיו לו פירות בחייה אבל אם מתה יירש הכל:

5
If he makes a provision that he will not inherit [his wife's] property, the provision is binding. He is, however, entitled to receive the benefits that accrue [from this property] during her lifetime.

Similarly, [his word] is binding if he stipulates that he will inherit [only] a portion of her estate, or if he stipulates that if she dies without bearing children, her estate will return to her father's household.

ה
התנה עמה שלא יירשנה הרי זה לא יירשנה אבל אוכל פירות בחייה. וכן אם התנה עמה שיירש מקצת נכסים וכן אם התנה עמה שאם מתה בלא בנים יחזרו נכסין לבית אביה הכל קיים:

6
When does the above apply? When he made this provision before nisu'in.7 For a man has the prerogative to forgo an inheritance that comes to him from a source outside his family before he acquires the rights to it. If, however, he made the provision after nisu'in, his provision is not binding, and he inherits her estate as we explained.8

ו
בד"א שהתנה עמה קודם שתנשא שהנחלה הבאה לו לאדם שלא ממשפחתו מתנה עליה שלא יירשנה קודם שתהא ראויה לו. אבל אם התנה עמה אחר שנישאת תנאו בטל ויירשנה כמו שביארנו:

7
When, after nisu'in, [a husband] stipulates9 that he has no say with regard to his wife's property - not with regard to the benefits from that property nor any eventual byproducts from them during her lifetime - then after her death he is not entitled to any benefit from this property at all.10 If she dies, however, he inherits her estate, as explained [above].

ז
התנה עמה אחר נישואין שלא יהיו לו דין ודברים בנכסיה. ולא בפירי פירותיה עד עולם בחייה ובמותה הרי זה אינו אוכל פירות כלל אבל אם מתה יירשנה כמו שביארנו:

8
[The following rules apply] when a husband spends money [to improve property belonging to his wife that is classified as] nichsei m'log. Whether he spent a small amount and derived much benefit, or spent a large amount and derived little benefit [he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed.

[The above applies] even if he ate only one dried fig in a respectful manner,11 if he ate a dinar's worth of produce in a haphazard manner, or if he did not even take produce [from the field on which he spent money] and took merely a bundle of twigs.12

ח
הבעל שהוציא הוצאות על נכסי מלוג בין שהוציא מעט ואכל פירות הרבה בין שהוציא הרבה ואכל פירות מעט ואפילו אכל גרוגרת אחת דרך כבוד או שאכל דינר אחד אפילו שלא דרך כבוד ואפילו לא לקח בפירות ממה שהוציא אלא חבילה אחת של זמורות מה שהוציא הוציא ומה שאכל אכל:

9
Similar [laws apply] if a woman inherited funds in a distant place, and the husband undertook expenses in order to bring them [to their home], or [expenses were required] to take them from the person who was holding them. If [the husband] purchased land [with these funds] and ate the measure of fruit [mentioned above, he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed.

[The following procedure is adhered to if] a husband incurred expenses [on behalf of his wife's property] and did not derive any benefit or derived less benefit than the above measure. We evaluate the increment to the property, and we ask him the extent of his expenses.

If the increment is greater than the expenses, the husband must take an oath holding a sacred object, stating how much he spent. He is then reimbursed for those expenses.13 If the increment is less than the expenses, he receives only the amount of the expenses that is justified by the increment, and he must take an oath [with regard to the extent of those expenses].

ט
וכן אם נפלו לה כספים במקום רחוק והוציא עליהן הוצאות עד שהביאן או עד שהוציאן מיד מי שהיו אצלו ולקח בהן קרקע ואכל פירותיה כשיעור מה שהוציא הוציא ומה שאכל אכל. הוציא ולא אכל או שאכל פחות מכשיעור שמין כמה שהשביחו ושואלין אותו כמה הוציא. אם השבח יתר על ההוצאה ישבע בנקיטת חפץ כמה הוציא ונוטל ההוצאה. ואם ההוצאה יתירה על השבח אין לו מן ההוצאה אלא כשיעור השבח ובשבועה:

10
When does the above apply? When a husband divorces his wife [under ordinary circumstances]. [Different rules apply regarding] a woman who rebels against her husband [and denies him intimacy].14 Even if he derived much benefit, the benefit that he derives should be evaluated and subtracted from the amount fit to be given him for the expenses he undertook.15 After he takes an oath [affirming his claim], he is entitled to collect it. For he did not [incur these expenses on behalf of his wife] so that she would take them and leave him on her own accord.

Similarly, [different rules apply when] a man undertakes expenses [to develop] property belonging to his wife who is below the age of majority, and she dissolves the marriage through the right of mi'un.16 We evaluate the amount of benefit he received, the amount of his expenses, the extent of the property's increment - and then he is given the share usually allocated to a sharecropper.17[This consideration is taken] because he had permission to work [his wife's property].18

י
בד"א במגרש אבל האשה שמרדה על בעלה אפילו אכל הרבה שמין לו כמה אכל ופוחת אותו ממה שראוי ליתן לו מן ההוצאה אחר שישבע ונוטלו שלא הקנה לה כדי שתטול ותצא מעצמה. וכן המוציא הוצאות על נכסי אשתו קטנה ומיאנה בו רואין כמה אכל וכמה הוציא וכמה השביח ושמין לו כאריס שהרי ברשות ירד:

11
There are various customs regarding [a woman's] dowry. In certain places it is customary to [state a higher figure] in the ketubah [with regard to the value of the dowry], increasing by a third, a fifth or a half. For example, if the dowry was 100 [zuz], it is written [in the ketubah] that the woman brought 150 [to the household], in order to appear more generous in the eyes of the people. [Therefore,] when the woman comes to collect her dowry, she collects only 100.

Conversely, there are places where it is customary to write a lesser amount. If it is agreed that she will bring utensils worth 100 [zuz to the household], she must bring a value of 120 or 150, and yet, [in the ketubah,] it is written that she brought only [a value of] 100.19 And there are other places where it is customary to write a value of 100 [zuz] as 100.

There are places where it is customary for a man to give a set amount of money proportionate to the dowry, for the bride to adorn herself and purchase perfume and the like. There are places where [it is customary for] the man to add an additional sum of his own for his wife and add it to her dowry, for her to appear attractive.

יא
מנהגות רבות יש בנדוניא. יש מקומות שנהגו שיכתבו בכתובות הנדוניא יתר על דמיה בשליש או בחומש או במחצה. כגון שתהיה הנדוניא מאה וכותבים שהכניסה מאה וחמשים כדי להרבות בפני העם וכשתבוא לגבות לא תגבה אלא המאה. ויש מקומות שנהגו לכתוב פחות. ואם פסקה להביא לו במאה כלים נותנת שוה מאה ועשרים או מאה וחמשים וכותבין שהכניסה לו מאה. ויש מקומות שנהגו לכתוב שוה מנה במנה. ויש מקומות שנהגו שיתן האיש מעות לפי הנדוניא דבר קצוב שתתקשט בו הכלה ותקנה בו בשמים וכיוצא בהן. ויש מקומות שיכניס האיש שום משלו לאשה ויצטרף לנדונייתה להתנאות בו:

12
When a man marries a woman without specifying any conditions, he should write her a ketubah, giving her a sum that is customarily given in that locale. Similarly, if she makes a commitment to bring [utensils to the household], she must bring what is customarily brought in that locale. And when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she collects as is customary in that locale.

In this and in all similar matters, local custom is a fundamental principle, and it is used as a basis for judgment, provided that the custom is commonly accepted in the locale.

יב
הנושא סתם כותב ונותן כמנהג המדינה. וכן היא שפסקה להכניס נותנת כמנהג המדינה וכשתבא לגבות כתובתה מגבין לה מה שבכתובתה כמנהג המדינה. ובכל הדברים האלו וכיוצא בהן מנהג המדינה עיקר גדול הוא ועל פיו דנין והוא שיהיה אותו מנהג פשוט בכל המדינה:

13
[The following rules apply when a man and a woman were engaged to each other. When he asks her, "What is the value [of the utensils] you are bringing [to the household]?", and she answers him with an amount, and she asks him, "How much will you give me [for my ketubah]?", and he answers with an amount, and afterwards he arises and consecrates her, the commitments are binding even though they were not formalized with an act of contract.20

Similarly, a commitment made by a father on behalf of his son or daughter [is binding]. For example, if he is asked, "How much will you give on behalf of your son?", and he specifies an amount, or he is asked "How much will you give on behalf of your daughter?", and he specifies an amount, [his commitment is binding].

These are commitments that are established through speech alone.21

יג
איש ואשה שהיו ביניהם שדוכין ואמר לה כמה את מכנסת לי כך וכך ואמרה לו וכמה אתה נותן לי או כותב לי כך וכך. וכן האב שפסק ע"י בנו ובתו כמה אתה נותן לבנך כך וכך וכמה אתה נותן לבתך כך וכך עמדו וקדשו קנו אותן הדברים ואע"פ שלא היה ביניהן קניין. ואלו הן הדברים הנקנים באמירה:

14
When does the above apply? When a father made a commitment on behalf of his daughter, whether she is a minor or past majority, or on behalf of his son, for their first marriage. For a man feels an inner connection to his son, and because of his happiness at his first marriage, he makes a definite commitment, and designates [the sum] for him with a verbal statement [alone].

[Different rules apply when], by contrast, a brother makes a commitment on behalf of his sister, a woman makes a commitment on behalf of her daughter, [when a commitment is made by] other relatives, and similarly, when a father makes a commitment on behalf of his son or daughter for a second marriage.22 The commitment is not binding until the person making it formalizes it with an act of contract and states the amount he will give.

יד
בד"א בשפסק האב לבתו בין קטנה ובין גדולה ופסק האב לבנו . ובנישואין ראשונים שדעתו של אדם קרובה אצל בנו ומרוב שמחתו בנישואין הראשונים גמר ומקנה לו באמירה. אבל אח שפסק לאחותו או אשה שפסקה לבתה וכן שאר קרובים וכן האב שפסק לבנו או לבתו בנישואין שניים לא קנו אותן הדברים עד שיקנו מידי הפוסק שיתן כך וכך:

15
When a father makes a commitment for his daughter, the daughter does not acquire that present until her husband consummates the marriage with her.23 Similarly, a son does not acquire [the present that he was promised] until he consummates his marriage. For whenever one makes [such] a commitment, his intent is that [it be fulfilled when] the marriage is consummated.

Therefore, when a man makes a commitment to his [prospective] son-in-law, but the son-in-law dies [after erusin, but] before the marriage is consummated, and the woman is bound to his brother, [if he desires to perform the rite of] yibbum, [the woman's] father may [retract his commitment], saying: "I desired to give your brother; I do not desire to give you." [This applies] even if the first husband was an unlearned man and the second is a Torah scholar, and even if the woman desires [to marry] the second man.24

טו
האב שפסק על יד בתו לא קנתה הבת אותה המתנה עד שיכנוס אותה בעלה. וכן הבן לא קנה עד שיכנוס שכל הפוסק אינו פוסק אלא ע"מ לכנוס. לפיכך הפוסק מעות לחתנו ומת קודם שיכנוס ונפלה לפני אחיו ליבום יכול האב לומר ליבם לאחיך הייתי רוצה ליתן ולך איני רוצה ליתן. ואפילו היה הראשון עם הארץ והשני חכם ואע"פ שהבת רוצה בו:

16
When a man makes a financial commitment to his son-in-law and then moves to another country [without fulfilling his commitment], the woman has the prerogative of telling her [prospective] husband: "I did not make this commitment myself. What can I do? Either consummate the marriage without a dowry or divorce me."25

If, however, she made such a commitment herself, and she was not able to muster the funds, she must remain [in this intermediate state] until she accumulates the sum to which she committed herself or until she dies.

Why does she not release herself from her obligation by becoming a moredet26 against her husband? [Because there is a difference between these two instances.] With regard to a moredet who has [merely] been consecrated, the husband desires to consummate the marriage; it is she who does not desire. In this instance, by contrast, the husband does not want [to consummate his marriage with] her until she gives the dowry to which she committed herself. She, however, desires him, [as reflected by] her request: "Either consummate [the marriage] or divorce me."

When does the above apply? To a woman past majority. If, however, a woman makes a financial commitment while she is still a minor, we compel [her prospective husband] either to divorce her or to consummate the marriage without a dowry.

טז
הפוסק מעות לחתנו והלך האב למדינה אחרת יכולה היא לומר לבעל אני לא פסקתי על עצמי מה אני יכולה לעשות או כנוס בלא נדוניא או פטרני בגט. אבל אם פסקה היא על עצמה ולא הגיעה ידה הרי זו יושבת עד שתמצא מה שפסקה או עד שתמות. ולמה לא תפטור עצמה במרדות. שהמורדת והיא ארוסה הבעל רוצה לכונסה והיא אינה רוצה אבל זו אין הבעל רוצה בה עד שתתן הנדוניא שפסקה והיא רוצה בו שהרי אומרת לו או כנוס או פטור. בד"א בגדולה אבל בקטנה שפסקה על עצמה כופין אותו ליתן גט או יכנוס בלא נדוניא:

17
When a man marries a woman and makes a commitment to support her daughter for [an explicit number of] years, he is obligated to support her for [all] the years to which he committed himself, provided he made this commitment at the time of the woman's consecration.27

If, however, he made the commitment [after] the kiddushin [were given], the commitment is not binding until he affirms it with an act of contract or composes a document to that effect, as will be explained in the laws of business transactions.28

[The following rules apply when] a woman is divorced within the time that her husband committed himself to support her daughter, and she married another man who also committed himself to support her daughter for a particular number of years. The first husband does not have the prerogative to say: "If she comes to my house, I will support her."29 Instead, he must bring her support to the place where she is staying together with her mother. Similarly, both husbands do not have the prerogative of saying: "We will together provide for her support." Instead, one of the husbands must provide for her support, and the other must give her the financial value of her support.

יז
הנושא אשה ופסקה עמו שיהיה זן את בתה כך וכך שנים חייב לזון אותם שנים שקיבל על עצמו. והוא שיתנו על דבר זה בשעת הקידושין. אבל שלא בשעת הקידושין עד שיקנו מידו או עד שיכתוב בשטר וכיוצא בו כמו שיתבאר בהלכות מקח וממכר. נתגרשה בתוך השנים שקיבל על עצמו לזון את בתה ונשאת לאחר ופסקה גם עמו שיהיה זן אותה הבת כך וכך שנים לא יאמר ראשון אם תבוא לביתי אזונה אלא מוליך מזונותיה למקום שהיא שם אמה. וכן לא יאמרו שניהם הרי אנו זנין אותה כאחת אלא אחד זנה ואחד נותן לה דמי מזונות:

18
[The following rules apply when the woman's] daughter marries during the time [in which her mother's husbands] obligated themselves to supply her with her sustenance. Her own husband is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, and both of her mother's husbands are obligated to give her the financial value of her support.

[Even when the men] who obligated themselves to support her die, if they affirmed their commitment to her mother with an act of contract or they composed a formal document recording their obligation, [the daughter] is considered to be a creditor whose claim is supported by a deed, and she has the prerogative of collecting her due from property that has been sold until the conclusion of the time period for which he committed himself.

If the commitment was made at the time of the kiddushin, and was not affirmed by an act of contract, it is a commitment that was not to be recorded in a contract,30 and [the daughter] does not have the prerogative of expropriating property [from purchasers] for her support.

יח
נישאת הבת בתוך זמן זה הבעל חייב במזונותיה. ובעלי אמה שניהם כל אחד ואחד נותן לה דמי מזונות. מתו אלו שפסקו לזון אותה אם קנו מידן או שחייב עצמו בשטר הרי זו כבעל חוב בשטר וטורפת מזונותיה מנכסיהן המשועבדים עד סוף הזמן שפסקו. ואם פסקו בשעת הקידושין ולא היה שם קנין הרי הם דברים שלא ניתנו ליכתב ואינה טורפת במזונותיה:

FOOTNOTES
1.
Since the man has already established a connection with this woman, but has not acquired the rights due him by virtue of the ketubah, any provision that he makes regarding those rights is binding.

2.
Since the bond of marriage has already been consummated, the husband has already acquired all the rights to which he is entitled. Therefore, a verbal statement is not sufficient, and an official act of contract is necessary to forgo those rights. (See Ketubot 83a, which compares this to the absolution of a partnership agreement.)

3.
Moreover, the husband is not entitled to any benefit that accrues from the money his wife receives from the sale (Ramah, Even HaEzer 92:1).

4.
A husband has three rights with regard to his wife's property: to receive the benefits that accrue from it, to veto any sales or presents, and to inherit it in the event of his wife's death. Since the wording of the provision in the document the husband gave his wife is not specific, he is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered to have waived the least valuable of the rights he has: the veto power over his wife's sales and gifts (Rashi, Ketubot 83b).

5.
The rationale is that before nisu'in, a deed of contract is not necessary to uphold any sale or gift that a woman may make. Since the husband took an additional step and carried out an act of contract, we assume that he did so with the intent of enhancing his wife's position and waiving all rights he has to her property (Kessef Mishneh).

This is the Rambam's interpretation of the above passage. The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher advance a different interpretation. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 92:3) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

6.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that it is imperative that the benefits from the land be converted into financial resources and be used to purchase other property. Rabbenu Asher and others do not accept this position and maintain that the woman has the right to use the benefits that accrue from the land as she desires. If, however, she decides to use them to purchase property, her husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue from that property. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 94:4) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah follows that of Rabbenu Asher.

7.
If, however, the provision is made before the woman is consecrated, it is also of no consequence. For until a connection between the man and the woman is established, his statements regarding her property are of no consequence whatsoever.

8.
See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.

9.
And affirms his provision with an act of contract (Maggid Mishneh).

10.
Nor does he have the right to veto a sale (Chelkat Mechokek 92:17).

11.
I.e., at home, on his table.

12.
This bundle must be worth at least a dinar (Chelkat Mechokek 88:12).

13.
If the wife denies his claim and states that she is sure that he spent less, her claim is accepted provided she supports it with an oath (Ramah, Even HaEzer 88:7, Beit Shmuel 88:17).

14.
See Chapter 14, Halachah 8.

15.
As reflected by the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 8:6), this applies only when the increment to the property exceeds the expenses. If the expenses exceed the increment, all he receives is the increment. (See Beit Shmuel 88:18, who quotes other authorities who differ.)

16.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 8.

17.
If the husband were not given consideration for his expenses and the increment he brought to the woman's property, he would seek only his own benefit and would deplete the property's value by failing to fertilize it and constantly sowing crops. This is unlikely to happen if he is given a sharecropper's allocation. In such an instance, he is likely to say: "It is possible that the marriage will continue, and so it is to my benefit to maintain the field's value. Even if the marriage does not continue, I will be justly reimbursed for my work."

18.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 88:10) explains that the option is the husband's. He may choose to receive a sharecropper's allocation, or he may desire to leave the property without making a reckoning, as is done in the case when his wife is past the age of majority.

19.
In this instance, the woman collects the greater sum when she collects her due.

20.
In Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:17, the Rambam adds several dimensions to this statement: a) The person making the commitment must own the items he promises. If he does not own them, his commitment is not binding, for a person cannot transfer an entity that does not yet exist.

b) The commitment is not binding on property that has been sold. For only transactions that are formalized by a written deed are binding on the purchasers of property. Moreover, since this commitment can be formalized by the spoken word alone, even if it is later recorded in a written document, it is not binding on the purchasers. If, however, a formal deed of transfer is composed, it must be honored by the purchasers (Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah). (See also Halachah 18.)

c) The transaction is not effective until the marriage takes place.

21.
In general, a business agreement must be formalized by a contractual act (a kinyan), and a verbal commitment is not sufficient. An exception is made in this instance because of the happiness and closeness engendered by the marriage relationship (Ketubot 102b).

22.
If, by contrast, a man or a woman makes a commitment for his or her own marriage, the commitment is binding without a contractual act, even if it is a second marriage that is involved.

23.
I.e., nisu'in, the second stage of marriage, as well as erusin, the first stage, must be completed before the present is binding.

24.
For it is her father who is making the financial commitment, not she.

25.
I.e., the husband must take one of these two options. He cannot leave the woman consecrated (in which case she cannot marry someone else), but not married.

This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 52:1). The Ramah states that if the woman has the financial means to meet the commitment, she must do so.

26.
See Chapter 14, Halachot 8 and 12.

27.
Generally, such commitments are not binding, for the commitment does not have a specific scope. In most situations, only when a definite sum is mentioned is the commitment obligatory. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 114.)

28.
Hilchot Mechirah 11:15-17.

29.
Needless to say, he is obligated to support his divorcee's daughter if his divorcee does not remarry. There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the husband is required to provide his divorcee's daughter with the full measure of support she requires, or he is merely obligated to give her the amount of money it would cost for him to support her in his own home. (See Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Even HaEzer 114:6.)

30.
As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 13, even if this commitment was recorded in a document, as long as a formal deed is not composed, the purchasers are not under any obligation.

Ishut - Chapter Twenty Four
1
When a man who marries an aylonit1 is childless and does not have another wife with whom he will father children, he is compelled to divorce her.2 Nevertheless, [during and after the marriage], the financial arrangements that [govern] other women [govern] her. She is entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah and [all] the provisions of the ketubah. Similarly, her husband acquires the same financial privileges with regard to her as he would with regard to another woman.

א
הנושא את האילונית ולא היו לו בנים ולא אשה אחרת לפרות ולרבות ממנה אע"פ שכופין אותו ומוציא הרי היא ככל הנשים ויש לה כתובה ושאר תנאי כתובה. וכן זוכה הבעל במה שזכה בשאר הנשים:

2
If, however, a man married a woman without recognizing her condition, and later it was discovered that she was an aylonit, or forbidden to him by virtue of a negative commandment [for which he is not liable to death - neither by the hand of God nor by an earthly court] she is not entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, nor to any of the provisions of the ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the extra amount that the husband added to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. She is not entitled to receive her sustenance, [neither during her husband's lifetime,] nor even after his death.3

The couple [should be] forced to separate.4 When that is done, the value of the produce of which the husband partook is not expropriated from him.5

The same laws apply when a man marries a sh'niyah,6 regardless of whether or not [the husband] was aware of the prohibition.

ב
אבל הנושא אשה ולא הכיר בה ונמצאת אילונית או מחייבי לאוין. וכן הנושא שנייה בין הכיר בה בין לא הכיר בה אין לה עיקר כתובה ולא תנאי מתנאי כתובה אבל תוספת יש לה ואין לה מזונות ואפילו לאחר מותו וכשכופין אותו ומפרישין ביניהם אין מוציאין מן הבעל פירות שאכל:

3
Why are these women not granted the essential requirement of the ketubah, when they are granted the extra sum added [by the husband]? The fundamental requirement of the ketubah was instituted by our Sages so that [a man] should not think that the divorce [of his wife] is a light matter. Since he was not aware [of the prohibition or of his wife's condition], she is not granted the essential requirement of the ketubah.7

With regard to the extra amount for which he obligated himself: as long as she desired to maintain their relationship, she kept her part of the agreement. She granted him [marital] satisfaction,8 and is willing to continue their relationship; it is the Torah that deems her to be forbidden. What then can she do? Therefore, she is granted this extra amount, for it is not her deeds that cause her to be forbidden after marriage;9 she was forbidden beforehand.

ג
ולמה אין להם עיקר ויש להן תוספת. העיקר שהיא תקנת חכמים כדי שלא תהיה קלה בעיניו להוציאה הואיל ולא הכיר בה אין לה עיקר. אבל תוספת שהוא חייב עצמו בה כל זמן שתרצה ותעמוד לפניו הרי עמדה בתנאי שלה והרי הקנית לו הנאתה והרי היא עומדת [לפניו] אבל התורה אסרה אותה עליו ומה היא יכולה לעשות לפיכך יש לה תוספת שאין מעשיה הן הגורמין לה להאסר אחר הנישואין אלא אסורה היתה מקודם:

4
Why did [our Sages] not distinguish between a sh'niyah [whom her husband] recognized, and one that he did not recognize, but rather said that in all instances she is not entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah? Because [the prohibition involving these relations] is Rabbinic [in origin], they reinforced it.

If, by contrast, a man married a woman [whom he was forbidden to marry because of] a negative prohibition of the Torah [that was not punishable by death, neither by the hand of God nor by an earthly court] and he was aware of the prohibition, [his wife] is entitled to [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.[Similarly, if he marries] a woman whom he was forbidden to marry because of a positive commandment, whether he was aware of the prohibition or not, [his wife is entitled to a ketubah].

[The rationale is] that if he recognized that a woman was forbidden by a negative prohibition, he willingly undertook to damage his resources. And with regard to [relations which are forbidden] because of a positive commandment, the prohibition is light.

In both these instances, the women are entitled to support [from their husband's estate] after his death.10 Similarly, if [during his absence,] they borrowed money for their sustenance, [the husband] is liable to pay.11 And when the husband is forced to divorce [a woman in either of these situations], he is forced to reimburse her for all the benefit that he received from her property.12

ד
ולמה לא חלקו בשנייה בין שהכיר בה בין שלא הכיר בה אלא אמרו אין לה עיקר כתובה בכל מקום מפני שהיא מדברי סופרים עשו בה חזוק. אבל אם נשא אחת מחייבי לאוין והכיר בה. או אחת מחייבי עשה בין הכיר בה בין שלא הכיר בה יש לה כתובה. שחייבי לאוין שהכיר בה רצה לזון בנכסיו וחייבי עשה איסורן קל. ויש לשתיהן מזונות לאחר מותו. וכן אם לותה ואכלה חייב לשלם. וכשכופין אותן להוציא מוציאין מן הבעל כל פירות שאכל מכל נכסיה:

5
A woman who dissolves a marriage through the rite of mi'un is not entitled to a ketubah.13 She is, however, entitled to the extra amount [added by the husband to the ketubah].14 The husband is not required to reimburse her for the benefit that he received from her property.15 If she borrowed money for her sustenance while she was still his wife, and afterwards terminated the marriage through the rite of mi'un, that money is not expropriated from the husband.

ה
הממאנת אין לה כתובה אבל תוספת יש לה. ואין מוציאין מן הבעל פירות שאכל. ואם לותה כשהיתה תחתיו ואכלה ואחר כך מיאנה אין מוציאין אותן מזונות מן הבעל:

6
When a woman commits adultery [her husband is obligated to divorce her]. She is not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount. Nor is she entitled to any of the conditions of the ketubah. [The rationale is that] it is her own deeds that cause her to become forbidden to her husband.

ו
מי שזינתה תחת בעלה אין לה כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת ולא אחד מתנאי כתובה שהרי מעשיה גרמו לה להאסר על בעלה:

7
What is the law with regard to the rights these women have to their dowries? Whenever a woman's dowry endures, she is entitled to take her property when she leaves [her husband's household after divorce].16 This applies even when she commits adultery.

[If the property is not intact, the following laws apply.] If the woman was a sh'niyah or forbidden as a result of a positive commandment - whether or not her husband was aware of the prohibition - the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to her. Similarly, if the woman was an aylonit or was forbidden because of a negative prohibition of the Torah [that was not punishable by death - neither by the hand of God nor by an earthly court], the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to her.17

[What are those laws?] The husband is liable for nichsei tzon barzel. With regard to nichsei m'log, if anything was lost or stolen, she suffers the loss. [The husband] is not liable to pay.

ז
והיאך דין נשים אלו בנדוניא שלהם כל אשה שנדוניתה קיימת אפילו זינתה נוטלת שלה והולכת. ואם היתה שנייה או אחד מחייבי עשה בין הכיר בה בין שלא הכיר בה או שהיתה אילונית או מחייבי לאוין והכיר בה הרי היא בנדוניתה ככל הנשים:

8
[Different rules apply when] a woman is either an aylonit or prohibited because of a negative commandment, and [the husband] did not recognize her status. Whatever was lost, stolen, destroyed or damaged from nichsei tzon barzel, her husband is not liable to pay. For she gave him permission to use them.18

With regard to nichsei m'log, by contrast, whatever was lost or stolen, he is liable to pay. This is the opposite of all other women. Since the marriage bond is not of a binding nature, he did not acquire [rights to use] the nichsei m'log.19

ח
נכסי צאן ברזל חייב באחריותן. ונכסי מלוג מה שנגנב או שאבד אבד לה ואינו חייב לשלם. היתה אילונית או מחייבי לאוין ולא הכיר בה כל מה שאבד או נגנב או בלה או שנשחק מנכסי צאן ברזל אין הבעל חייב לשלם. שהרי היא נתנה לו רשות להיותן אצלו. וכל מה שאבד או נגנב מנכסי מלוג חייב לשלם. הפך מכל הנשים מפני שאין שם אישות גמורה לא זכה בנכסי מלוג:

9
A woman who dissolves a marriage through the rite of mi'un is not entitled to any compensation at all for property that was destroyed. Nothing is expropriated from her husband in payment for what was lost or stolen, with regard to both nichsei m'log and nichsei tzon barzel.20 Instead, she takes whatever property is intact and departs.

ט
והממאנת אין לה בליות כלל שאין מוציאין מן הבעל דבר ממה שאבד או נגנב מנכסיה בין מנכסי מלוג בין מנכסי צאן ברזל אלא נוטלת הנמצא לה ויוצאה:

10
A woman who committed adultery is not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the extra amount. Nor is the husband held responsible for any of her nichsei tzon barzel that were lost or stolen.21 Needless to say, this ruling also applies with regard to her nichsei m'log.

[The above does not apply] only to an adulteress, but also to a woman who violates the faith of Moses,22 one who violates the Jewish faith,23 or one who is divorced because of a scandalous report.24 These women are not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the extra amount - nor are they granted any of the conditions of the ketubah.

When these [women are divorced], each one should take what remains from her dowry and depart. Her husband is not liable to pay anything, neither what was reduced in value nor what was lost.

י
מי שזינתה תחת בעלה אין לה כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת. ואין מוציאין מהבעל דבר ממה שאבד או נגנב מנכסי צאן ברזל שלה. ואצ"ל נכסי מלוג. ולא המזנה בלבד אלא אף העוברת על דת משה או על דת יהודית או היוצאת משום שם רע אין לה כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת ולא תנאי מתנאי כתובה. וכל אחת מהן נוטלת הנמצא לה מנדונייתה ויוצאה ואין הבעל חייב לשלם כלום לא מה שפיחת ולא מה שאבד:

11
The following are the actions for which a woman is considered to have "violated the faith of Moses":

a) going out to the marketplace with her hair uncovered;25

b) taking vows or oaths that she does not keep;

c) engaging in sexual relations [with her husband] while in the niddah state;

d) failing to separate challah or feeding her husband food that is forbidden to eat - needless to say, this applies to forbidden crawling animals and animals that were not ritually slaughtered; it applies even to produce that was not tithed.26

How can the latter [two] matters be known? For example, she said: "So and so, the priest, [separated tithes] from this produce for me," "So and so separated challah [from this dough]," "So and so, the Sage, said this stain does not render me a niddah" - and after eating the food or engaging in sexual relations with her, the husband asked the person whose name was mentioned and he denied the occurrence of the incident. Another example: a woman's [conduct caused] it to be established in her neighborhood that she was in the niddah state,27 but she told her husband that she was ritually pure. He engaged in relations with her [and afterwards discovered the truth].

יא
ואלו הן הדברים שאם עשתה אחת מהן עברה על דת משה. יוצאה בשוק ושער ראשה גלוי. או שנודרת או שנשבעת ואינה מקיימת. או ששמשה מטתה והיא נדה. או שאינה קוצה לה חלה. או שהאכילה את בעלה דברים אסורים אצ"ל שקצים ורמשים ונבלות אלא דברים שאינן מעושרין. והיאך יודע דבר זה כגון שאמרה לו פירות אלו פלוני כהן תקנם לי ועיסה זו פלונית הפרישה לי חלתה ופלוני החכם טיהר לי את הכתם ואחר שאכל או בא עליה שאל אותו פלוני ואמר לא היו דברים מעולם. וכן אם הוחזקה נדה בשכנותיה ואמרה לבעלה טהורה אני ובא עליה:

12
What is meant by "the Jewish faith"? The customs of modesty that Jewish women practice. When a woman performs any of the following acts, she is considered to have violated the Jewish faith:

a) she goes to the marketplace or a lane with openings at both ends without having her head [fully] covered - i.e., her hair is covered by a handkerchief, but not with a veil like all other women,28

b) she spins [flax or wool] with a rose on her face29 - on her forehead or on her cheek - like immodest gentile women,

c) she spins in the marketplace and shows her forearms to men;30

d) she plays frivolously with young lads,

e) she demands sexual intimacy from her husband in a loud voice until her neighbors hear her talking about their intimate affairs, or

f) she curses her husband's father in her husband's presence.31

יב
ואי זו היא דת יהודית הוא מנהג הצניעות שנהגו בנות ישראל. ואלו הן הדברים שאם עשתה אחת מהן עברה על דת יהודית. יוצאה לשוק או למבוי מפולש וראשה פרוע ואין עליה רדיד ככל הנשים. אע"פ ששערה מכוסה במטפחת. או שהיתה טווה בשוק וורד וכיוצא בו כנגד פניה על פדחתה או על לחייה כדרך שעושות העכו"ם הפרוצות. או שטווה בשוק ומראת זרועותיה לבני אדם. או שהיתה משחקת עם הבחורים. או שהיתה תובעת התשמיש בקול רם מבעלה עד ששכנותיה שומעות אותה מדברת על עסקי תשמיש. או שהיתה מקללת אבי בעלה בפני בעלה:

13
Ezra ordained that a woman should wear a belt32 in her home at all times, as an expression of modesty. If a woman does not wear [such a belt], however, she is not considered to have violated the faith of Moses, nor does she forfeit her ketubah.

Similarly, if she goes from courtyard to courtyard without having her hair [fully] covered - as long as it is covered with a handkerchief, she is not considered to have violated the [Jewish] faith.

יג
עזרא תקן שתהיה אשה חוגרת בסינר תמיד בתוך ביתה משום צניעות. ואם לא חגרה אינה עוברת על דת משה ולא הפסידה כתובתה. וכן אם יצתה בראשה פרוע מחצר לחצר בתוך המבוי הואיל ושערה מכוסה במטפחת אינה עוברת על דת:

14
A woman who violates the faith must have had a warning issued to her [prior to her having performed the act] and [the warning and her improper conduct must be observed by] witnesses before she forfeits her ketubah.

[The following rule applies when a woman] transgresses privately, her husband knows that she violated the faith and [therefore] gives her a warning, [but the warning] was not observed by witnesses, and then she transgresses again. Should the husband claim that she violated [the faith] after receiving a warning,33 and the woman claims not to have transgressed, or not to have received a warning, the husband must pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah if he desires34 to divorce her, after she takes an oath that she has not transgressed. [This oath is required because] she would not be entitled to any payment if she admitted to having transgressed after having received this warning.

יד
העוברת על דת צריכה התראה ועדים ואח"כ תפסיד כתובתה. עברה בינו לבינה וידע שהיא עוברת על דת והתרה בה בלא עדים וחזרה ועברה הוא טוען ואומר אחר התראה עברה והיא אומרת לא עברתי כלל או לא התרה בי. אם רצה להוציא הרי זה נותן כתובה אחר שתשבע שלא עברה שאם תודה שעברה אחר התראה זו אין לה כלום:

15
What is meant by "a woman who is divorced because of a scandalous report"? For example, there were witnesses that she performed a very indecent act that indicates that a sin was committed, but there is no definitive testimony [that she committed adultery].

What is implied? She was alone in her courtyard, and they saw a perfume salesman leaving. They entered immediately afterwards and saw her getting up from bed and putting on her underwear or tying her belt, or they found wet spittle on the canopy above the bed.35 Alternatively, they saw them coming out of a dark place [together], or one helping the other up from a trench or the like, or they saw him kissing the opening of her cloak, or saw them kissing each other, or embracing each other, or they entered a room one after the other and locked the doors,36 or any similar act [that would arouse suspicion].

[In all these instances,] if her husband desires to divorce her, she is not entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. There is no necessity for a warning [in this instance].37

טו
כיצד היא יוצאה משום שם רע כגון שהיו שם עדים שעשתה דבר מכוער ביותר שהדברים מראין שהיתה שם עבירה אע"פ שאין שם עדות ברורה בזנות. כיצד כגון שהיתה בחצר לבדה וראו רוכל יוצא ונכנסו מיד בשעת יציאתו ומצאו אותה עומדת מעל המטה והיא לובשת המכנסים או חוגרת אזורה. או שמצאו רוק לח למעלה מן הכילה. או שהיו יוצאים ממקום אפל. או מעלין זה את זה מן הבור וכיוצא בו. או שראוהו מנשק על פי חלוקה או שראו אותן מנשקין זה את זה או מגפפין זה את זה או שנכנסו זה אחר זה והגיפו דלתות וכיוצא בדברים אלו. אם רצה הבעל להוציאה תצא בלא כתובה. ואין זו צריכה התראה:

16
[When a woman] violates the faith of Moses or the Jewish faith, and similarly, one about whom is issued a scandalous report, her husband is not compelled to divorce her. If he desires [to remain married], he need not divorce her.38

Nevertheless, even when her husband does not divorce her, she is not entitled to a ketubah.39 [The rationale is that] a ketubah was ordained by our Sages so that a husband should not consider the divorce [of his wife as] a light matter. Our Sages were concerned only with modest Jewish women. This institution was not enacted for women [who act] wantonly. On the contrary, let their husbands think that divorcing them is a light matter.

טז
עוברת על דת משה או על דת יהודית וכן זאת שעשתה דבר מכוער אין כופין את הבעל להוציא אלא אם רצה לא יוציא. ואע"פ שלא הוציא אין להן כתובה שהכתובה תקנת חכמים היא כדי שלא תהא קלה בעיניו להוציאה. ולא הקפידו אלא על בנות ישראל הצנועות אבל אלו הפרוצות אין להן תקנה [זו] אלא תהא קלה בעיניו להוציאה:

17
When a man sees his wife commit adultery, or he was informed of this by one of his relatives or her relatives - whether male or female - whom he trusts and whose statements he believes, he is obligated to divorce her and is forbidden to engage in relations with her,40 for he relies on their word as true.

He must [however] pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah,41 [unless] she admits that she has committed adultery, in which case she should be divorced without receiving her ketubah. Therefore, if [her husband saw her commit adultery himself], he can require her to take an oath, while she holds a sacred object, that she did not commit adultery while married to him.42 [Only afterwards] can she collect the money [due her by virtue of] her ketubah. With regard to other matters,43 he cannot require her to take an oath, except through the convention of gilgul [sh'vuah].44

יז
מי שראה אשתו שזינתה או שאמרה לו אחת מקרובותיו או מקרובותיה שהוא מאמינם וסומכת דעתו עליהם שזינתה אשתו. בין שהיה האומר איש בין שהיתה אשה הואיל וסמכה דעתו לדבר זה שהוא אמת הרי זה חייב להוציא ואסור לו לבוא עליה ויתן כתובה. ואם הודה לו שזינתה תצא בלא כתובה. לפיכך משביעה בנקיטת חפץ שלא זינתה תחתיו אם ראה אותה בעצמו ואח"כ תגבה כתובתה. אבל בדבר אחר אינו יכול להשביעה אלא על ידי גלגול:

18
When a woman tells her husband that she willingly committed adultery, no attention is paid to her words. [We suspect] that she is attracted to another man [and wants to be released from marriage to her husband so that she can marry him].45 She does, however, lose the rights to her ketubah - both the fundamental requirement and any extra amount - and [her right to any of her property] that was destroyed, for she admitted that she has committed adultery.46 If he believes her and considers her word to be true, he is obligated to divorce her.

A court, however, does not obligate a man to divorce his wife through any means, unless two witnesses come forth and testify that the person's wife willingly committed adultery in their presence. [In such a situation,] he is compelled to divorce her.

יח
אמרה לו אשתו שזינתה תחתיו ברצונה אין משגיחין לדבריה שמא עיניה נתנה באחר. אבל אבדה כתובתה עיקר ותוספת ואבדה הבלאות שהרי הודת בזנות. ואם היה מאמינה וסומך דעתו על דבריה ה"ז חייב להוציאה. ואין ב"ד כופין את האיש לגרש את אשתו בדבר מדברים אלו עד שיבואו שני עדים ויעידו שזינתה אשתו זאת בפניהם ברצונה ואח"כ כופין אותו להוציא:

19
A woman who committed adultery unknowingly47 or who was raped is permitted to [continue marital relations with] her husband, as [implied the Numbers 5:13, which describes adultery:] "and she was not raped," indicating that if she was raped, she is permitted. [This applies whether] she was raped by a gentile or by a Jew.

Whenever [a woman] was forced into relations at the outset, she is permitted [to her husband], even if she ultimately consented - even if she says: "Let him continue, if he had not raped me, I would have hired him." For [her] natural inclination has overcome her; originally, she was forced against her will.

יט
האשה שזינתה תחת בעלה בשגגה או באונס הרי זו מותרת לבעלה שנאמר והיא לא נתפשה הא נתפשה מותרת. בין שאנסה עכו"ם בין שאנסה ישראל. וכל שתחלת ביאתה באונס אע"פ שסופה ברצון ואפילו אמרה הניחו לו שאלמלי לא אנס אותי הייתי שוכרתו הרי זו מותר. שהיצר לבשה ומתחלה [היתה] באונס:

20
When women have been abducted by robbers, they are considered as though they have been taken captive and were raped; they are permitted to their husbands.48 If, however, they were left alone and they went to the robbers on their own initiative, they are considered to have acted willingly and they are forbidden to their husbands.

The laws applying to a woman who acted unwittingly and to one who was raped are the same. For acting unwittingly is comparable to a deed committed under coercion.

כ
נשים שגנבו אותן לסטים הרי הן כשבויות שהן אנוסות ומותרות לבעליהן. ואם הניחום והלכו ללסטים מעצמן הרי אלו ברצון ואסורות לבעליהן. ודין השוגגת ודין הנאנסת אחד הוא שהשגגה צד אונס יש בה:

21
When does the above apply? When the woman's husband was an Israelite. If, however, a priest's wife [committed adultery] unwittingly or under duress, she is forbidden to her husband. For these relations cause her to be deemed a zonah at all times, and he is forbidden to have relations with a zonah, as will be explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah.49

כא
במה דברים אמורים בשהיה בעלה ישראל. אבל אשת כהן ששגגה או שנאנסה אסורה לבעלה שהרי נעשית זונה מכל מקום והוא אסור בזונה כמו שיתבאר בהלכות איסורי ביאה:

22
With regard to both an Israelite's wife and a priest's wife who have been raped, they are entitled to their ketubah - both the fundamental requirement and the additional amount. She does not lose anything in this regard. We compel50 the priest to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and then to divorce her.

כב
אחד אשת ישראל או אשת כהן שנאנסה כתובתה קיימת העיקר והתוספת ולא הפסידה מכתובתה כלום. וכופין את הכהן ליתן לה כתובתה ולגרשה:

23
When a priest's wife tells her husband: "I was raped," or "I unwittingly had relations with another man," he should not pay any attention to her words. [We suspect that perhaps] she was attracted to another man.

If he believes her, or he was told about it by a person upon whose word he relies, he should divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.51

כג
אשת כהן שאמרה לבעלה נאנסתי או שגגתי ונבעלתי לאחר אינו חושש לדבריה שמא עיניה נתנה באחר. ואם היתה נאמנת לו או שאמר לו אדם שהוא סומך על דבריו יוציא ויתן כתובה:

24
[The following rules apply when] a man tells his wife in the presence of witnesses: "Do not enter into privacy with so and so." If two witnesses observed her entering into privacy with the said person, and she and he remained there sufficient time for relations to have taken place,52 she is forbidden to engage in relations with her husband until he causes her to drink "the bitter waters",53 as will be explained in Hilchot Sotah.54

If he dies before he has caused her to drink [these waters], she is not entitled to her ketubah. Although witnesses did not see any [blatant] wanton act, there is no more wanton behavior than [disobeying her husband's words in] this [manner].

In the present age, when the waters [to test a] sotah are not available to us, the woman becomes forbidden to her husband forever. She must be divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount, for it is her evil deeds that caused her to become forbidden.55

כד
האומר לאשתו בפני שנים אל תסתרי עם איש פלוני ונכנסה עמו לסתר בפני שני עדים ושהתה כדי טומאה הרי זו אסורה על בעלה עד שישקנה מי המרים כמו שיתבאר בהלכות סוטה. ואם מת קודם שישקנה אין לה כתובה. ואע"פ שלא מצאו דבר מכוער. שאין לך דבר יותר מכוער מזה. והיום שאין שם מי סוטה נאסרה עליו איסור עולם ותצא בלא כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת שהרי מעשיה הרעים גרמו לה להאסר:

25
[The following laws apply when a husband] tells [his wife] in private: "Do not enter into seclusion with so and so." If he observed her enter into seclusion with the said person, and she and he remained there sufficient time for relations to have taken place - in the present age,56 when the waters [to test a] sotah are not available to us - the woman becomes forbidden to her husband. He is obligated to divorce her and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

If she admits entering into seclusion with the said person after having received the warning, she must be divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Therefore, she is required to take an oath in this regard.57 Only afterwards must he pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

כה
אמר לה בינו לבינה אל תסתרי עם איש פלוני וראה אותה שנסתרה עמו ושהתה כדי טומאה הרי זו אסורה עליו בזמן הזה שאין שם מי סוטה. וחייב להוציא ויתן כתובה. ואם הודית שנסתרה אחר שהתרה בה תצא בלא כתובה ולפיכך משביעה על זה ואח"כ יתן כתובה:

FOOTNOTES
1.
A woman who does not have female physical characteristics and cannot conceive children, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 6. This halachah is speaking about an instance in which the husband was aware of his wife's condition.

2.
See Chapter 15, Halachah 7.

3.
The Rambam does not explicitly mention that the woman is not entitled to receive her sustenance during her husband's lifetime. This is taken for granted. Since their marriage is forbidden, our Sages did not bind their relationship by any of the guidelines they instituted to preserve harmony and peace in marriage. Even after his lifetime, she is not entitled to receive her sustenance.

4.
In contrast to the previous and subsequent halachot, the Rambam does not mention divorce in this instance. The Noda BiY'hudah (Even HaEzer, Vol. II, Responsum 80) explains that the Rambam's wording leads to the following hypothesis: Since the husband was not aware of the woman's physical condition (if she was an aylonit), or the prohibition forbidding relations (if she was forbidden to him), he entered the marriage under mistaken premises. Hence, the marriage is not binding at all and no divorce is necessary. The couple must, however, be forced to separate.

The Noda BiY'hudah, however, rejects this hypothesis and maintains that the kiddushin are binding in such instances and a divorce is required.

5.
Even though her husband is not obligated to redeem her from captivity - and the right to benefit from the produce is associated with that obligation - he is not required to return the produce. This is a penalty that our Sages imposed upon the woman (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 115:1).

6.
A woman with whom he is forbidden to engage in relations because of Rabbinic decree. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.)

7.
For the relationship is undesirable, and our Sages wish that it be terminated.

8.
This extra amount is granted by the husband on his own volition because of the satisfaction generated by physical intimacy. It is not a requirement of the Sages (Rashi, Ketubot 101a).

9.
Note the contrast to Halachah 6.

10.
During the husband's lifetime, however, they are not entitled to support, for the court desires that the relationship be terminated (Maggid Mishneh).

11.
The Rambam's rationale is that although the husband is not liable for his wife's support while the couple are living together, this is only because the Sages desired to rend apart the couple's relationship. In principle, he should be liable, for she is entitled to a ketubah and the conditions of the ketubah. Therefore, in an instance where the couple are separating, and the woman demands payment for her support while her husband was abroad, he should be held liable.

Other authorities differ and free the husband from liability in this instance. It is their opinion that is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 116:1).

12.
This point is also the subject of a difference of opinion among the Rabbis, and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the view of the authorities who differ with the Rambam and do not hold the husband liable.

13.
Our Sages instituted the marriage of a minor for her own benefit. If she does not desire to continue the marriage, it is she who suffers the consequences.

14.
This additional amount was granted to the woman in consideration of the physical pleasure she gives her husband. Since he received that pleasure and knew that the woman had the right to terminate the relationship, he is liable for this amount.

15.
For at the time, he had permission to use her property and benefit from it.

16.
Even if the entire dowry is not intact, the woman takes the part that is intact. The remaining laws apply only to that portion of the dowry that no longer exists or that is unfit for use.

17.
As the Rambam explains in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 9:3), the rationale for this ruling is that, with the exception of the sh'niyot, the women mentioned in this halachah are all entitled to a ketubah. As a result, the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to them as well. With regard to a sh'niyah, even though she is not entitled to a ketubah, our Sages imposed penalties on both her and her husband and required them to suffer a loss.

With the exception of the case of a sh'niyah, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 116:1-4) does not accept the distinction made by the Rambam and applies the laws mentioned in the following halachah to all these instances.

18.
Although he accepted responsibility for them, his acceptance was made under false premises. Hence, just as the marriage contract is not binding, so too, his acceptance of responsibility is not binding.

19.
Therefore, he is held responsible for any loss that took place.

20.
The rationale is that the court gave him the right to use this property, and according to the conditions they established, he is liable only if he divorces her.

21.
Even if an object was lost because of the husband's negligence, he is not held liable (Chelkat Mechokek 115:20).

22.
See the following halachah for a definition of this term.

23.
See Halachah 12 for a definition of this term.

24.
See Halachah 15 for a definition of this term.

25.
Numbers 5:18 states that as part of the process of causing a sotah distress, her hair is uncovered. From this, Ketubot 72a derives the concept that a married Jewish woman's hair should always be covered. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:2) prohibits a married woman from walking in the public domain with uncovered hair.

Although this custom was not practiced conscientiously in many European communities even within the religious population, our Torah authorities have always called for its observance. The failure of a woman to cover her hair is considered adequate grounds for divorce. It must, however, be emphasized that a husband who married a woman who he knew would not cover her hair cannot later divorce her on the grounds that she fails to do so, without making full settlement of his obligations according to the marriage contract.

26.
I.e., prohibitions of Rabbinic origin as well as those explicit in the Torah.

27.
E.g., she wore clothes customarily worn when she was a niddah. In the present age, it is not customary for women to wear special clothes while they are in the niddah state.

28.
The previous halachah spoke of her going out to a public place with her hair totally uncovered. This halachah mentioned the covering of her hair, but not according to the accepted norms of modesty.

29.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:4), the Rambam mentions wearing a rose or perfume in the same manner as worn by wanton gentile women.

30.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 115:4) states that this applies when she does so frequently, implying that if she did so on one particular occasion, she is not placed in this category. (See Beit Shmuel 115:11.)

31.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) follows more stringent opinions that state that even if she curses his father outside her husband's presence, or if she curses her husband himself to his face, she is placed in this category.

32.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:4). Rashi (Bava Kama 72b) interprets this term as referring to underwear. Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah 4:1), which explains that this practice was instituted after a woman was raped by a monkey, it would appear that the intent is a chastity belt.

33.
And he is therefore not required to pay her ketubah.

34.
See Halachah 16.

35.
Why would wet spittle be found on the canopy? Obviously, someone was lying face up on the bed and could not turn to either side. This indicates that the woman had just been involved in sexual relations (Rashi, Yevamot 24b).

36.
Our translation is based on the additions of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 11:1).

37.
A woman who acts in this manner is considered to have committed adultery, and there is no need for a warning in such an instance.

38.
As mentioned in Halachah 18, the court does not compel a man to divorce his wife unless two witnesses testify that she willingly committed adultery. Nevertheless, in the situations mentioned above, it is clear that our Sages desired that the woman be divorced. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 115:4) states that it is a mitzvah to divorce such a woman.

The Ramah adds that even though in most cases we follow the enactment of Rabbenu Gershom, who forbade divorcing a woman against her will, in this instance an exception is made. Even if the woman does not consent to the divorce, her husband may divorce her.

39.
Nor is she entitled to any of the provisions of the ketubah while they remain married, as stated above (Halachah 10). Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 115:18, who states that if the couple remain married, and afterwards the woman repents and begins conducting herself modestly, her husband is obligated to write a new ketubah for her.

40.
When a married woman has committed adultery, she is forbidden to engage in sexual relations with her husband in the future. (Similarly, she is forbidden to engage in relations with the adulterer.) Since her husband either saw the matter himself or heard it from a person upon whom he relies, he is bound by this prohibition.

41.
Since he has no binding evidence that she committed adultery that will be accepted by a court, she cannot be forced to forgo her claim for the money he is obligated to pay her.

42.
The Rambam compares this to a situation in which a creditor desires to collect a debt supported by a promissory note, and the debtor states: "I have paid the note." Although the creditor is allowed to collect the debt, he must take an oath first.

43.
Our translation follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. According to this version, the intent is difficult to comprehend, as reflected in the questions raised by the Maggid Mishneh.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the proper version is בדברי אחר. The intent is that if the husband saw his wife commit adultery himself, he may require her to take an oath, because his claim is definite. If, by contrast, his claim is based on the statements of another person, his claim is not definite and he does not have the right to require her to take an oath.

44.
I.e., if she is obligated to take another oath before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, her husband may also require her to take the oath concerning adultery.

45.
The husband need not divorce her, and he may continue engaging in marital relations with her without worrying that he is transgressing the prohibition mentioned in the previous halachah.

46.
In cases of monetary law, we follow the principle that the statements of the principal himself are equal to those of 100 witnesses. Since she admitted committing adultery, she must suffer the financial consequences.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 11:12), the Rambam explains that when the husband says, "I do not believe her," he is still permitted to engage in relations with her. We do not, however, say: "If you believe her, pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah," for we divide his statements (palg'nin dibburo), and apply them in one context, but not in another. This explanation has, however, aroused questions in certain commentaries.

47.
E.g., two couples were married at the same time and the women unwittingly went into the wrong marriage chambers, and each thought that she was with her own spouse (Yevamot 33b). When, however, a woman commits adultery under the impression that she is allowed to do so, she is considered to have acted willfully, and she is forbidden to enter into relations with her husband (Ramah, Even HaEzer 178:3).

48.
Ketubot 51b relates that in Babylonia there was a time when robber bands would frequently abduct women from their homes.

49.
Chapter 17, Halachot 1 and 7; Chapter 18, Halachah 1. This prohibition is a result of the extra dimension of sanctity conveyed upon a priest and is not a reflection of the woman's lack of virtue.

50.
With regard to the priest's prohibition against relations with these women, Leviticus 21:8 states: "And you shall make him holy." Yevamot 88b implies that the intent is that he should be forced to make himself holy, even if that involves compelling him against his will.

51.
See the explanation in Halachah 18. The reason this woman is entitled to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is that she did not commit adultery willingly.

52.
Hilchot Sotah 1:2 explains this as the amount of time it takes to roast an egg and swallow it. In quantitative terms, the more stringent of the contemporary authorities have estimated this as 35 seconds.

53.
This phrase is borrowed from Numbers 5:18. Hilchot Sotah 3:10 explains that the term is used because a bitter-flavored substance was added to the water.

54.
Chapter 1, Halachah 2. Although there is no evidence that the woman actually committed adultery, since she was warned by her husband and violated his warning, the burden of proof is upon her. It is only through drinking the waters given a sotah that she can vindicate herself.

55.
The Rambam is explaining why the woman is forced to forfeit her ketubah, although there is no conclusive proof of adultery. She knew about the prohibition against entering into privacy with the said individual and violated it willingly. Hence, she is required to suffer the consequences.

56.
The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam mentions "the present age." Seemingly, in the time of the Temple as well, a similar problem would arise - if the warning was not given in the presence of witnesses, the waters given a sotah could not be used to test the woman's faithfulness.

57.
See Halachah 17 and notes.

Ishut - Chapter Twenty Five
1
When a man marries a woman without having made any specifications about that matter, and it is discovered that she is bound by vows, he [may] divorce her without having to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount.1

With regard to which vows does this rule apply? [I.e., a vow] not to eat meat, not to drink wine, or not to adorn herself with colored garments or with other objects with which women of her locale customarily adorn themselves.2 If, however, she is bound by other vows, she does not forfeit anything.

א
הנושא אשה סתם ונמצאו עליה נדרים תצא בלא כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת. באלו נדרים אמרו שלא תאכל בשר או שלא תשתה יין או שלא תתקשט במיני צבעונין והוא הדין לשאר המינים שדרך כל נשי המקום להתקשט בהן. אבל נמצא עליה נדר אחר חוץ מאלו לא הפסידה כלום:

2
Similar [rules apply when] a man marries a woman without having made any specifications about the matter, and it is discovered that she has one of the blemishes [that mar] a woman's [appeal to her husband], as outlined above.3 If the husband neither knew nor heard about this blemish, and did not willingly accept it, he [may] divorce [his wife] without having to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount.

What is implied? If there is a bathhouse in the city, and he has relatives [in the town], he does not have the prerogative of saying: "I did not know about these blemishes." [This applies even if] the blemishes were located in hidden places. For we assume that he checks with his relatives [and asks them about his wife's condition]. [If he marries her nonetheless,] we can assume that he heard [about the blemishes] and accepted them.

If the town does not possess a bathhouse, or if he does not have relatives, he may issue a claim with regard to blemishes that are usually unseen. Regular fits of epilepsy are considered to be a blemish that is unseen.4

By contrast, with regard to physical blemishes that are openly seen, the husband cannot claim [not to have known about the blemish]. For they can be seen by everyone, and it may be assumed that he heard about them and accepted [the matter]. This law applies only in those places where it is customary for women to walk in the marketplace with their faces uncovered, and everyone recognizes each other and will say: "This is so and so's daughter," and "This is so and so's sister," as in the European cities of the present era.

In places where, by contrast, women do not go out to the marketplace at all, and if a girl goes out to the bathhouse in the evening she goes out veiled, and no one will see her except her relatives, a claim may be issued with regard to blemishes that can be openly seen as well.

[Such a claim may be issued] when there is no bathhouse in the city, or [the husband] does not have a relative with whom he can check. If, however, there is a bathhouse in the city, [even] when it is not customary for women to go out with their faces uncovered, if [the husband] has a relative in the city he may not issue such a claim, for everyone sees her naked in the bathhouse.

If the woman's habit is to cover herself and to hide even in the bathhouse, or she washes at night, or in a small private room in the bathhouse, so she will not be seen, and no one will know of her, [her husband] may issue a claim, even with regard to blemishes that can be seen openly.

These matters are concepts that reason dictates; they are not decrees of the Torah [to be accepted on faith].

ב
וכן הכונס אשה סתם ונמצא בה מום ממומי הנשים שכבר ביארנום ולא ידע הבעל במום זה ולא שמע בו ורצה הרי זו תצא בלא כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת. כיצד היה מרחץ בעיר והיו לו קרובים אינו יכול לומר לא ידעתי מומין אלו ואפילו מומין שבסתר מפני שהוא בודק בקרובותיו וחזקה ששמע ורצה. ואם אין שם מרחץ או שלא היו לו קרובים טוען במומין שבסתר. ונכפה בעתים ידועים הרי הוא ממומי סתר. אבל במומין שבגלוי אינו יכול לטעון שהרי הכל רואין אותן ואומרין לו וחזקתו ששמע ונתפייס. דבר ידוע הוא שאין דין זה אלא באותן המקומות שהיה מנהג הנשים שם להלך בשוק ופניהן גלויות והכל יודעין אותן ואומרין זו היא בתו של פלוני וזו היא אחותו של פלוני כמו ערי אדום בזמן הזה. אבל מקומות שאין דרך הבנות שם לצאת לשוק כלל ואם תצא הבת למרחץ בנשף תצא מתנכרה ולא יראה אותה אדם חוץ מקרובותיה ה"ז טוען אף במומין שבגלוי. והוא שלא היה שם מרחץ ושלא היתה לו קרובה לבדוק בה. אבל היה שם מרחץ בעיר זו שאין דרך הנשים לצאת בה ופניהם מגולות אם יש לו קרובה אינו יכול לטעון שהרי הכל רואין אותה ערומה במרחץ. ואם דרכן להתנכר ולהתחבא אף במרחץ ושתהיה הבת רוחצת בלילה או בבית קטן במרחץ לבדה עד שלא תראה ולא תודע הרי זה טוען אף במומין שבגלוי. והדברים אלו דברים של טעם הם ואינם גזירת הכתוב:

3
Some of the geonim have ruled that our Sages' statement that a husband can check [concerning his wife's appearance] with his relatives does not apply only to his relatives, but also to his friends. [According to their thesis,] even if a man lives in a city in which he does not have any relatives at all, if there is a bathhouse in the city he does not have the right to issue a claim, for it is impossible that he will not have friends, and he can tell one of his friends to have his wife or sister check the appearance of so and so [i.e., the woman he thinks of marrying]. Therefore, we assume that he had heard of [any blemishes she had] and accepted them.

I do not agree with this conclusion.5 For a man will not reveal all the concerns he has regarding matters such as these to anyone other than his relatives. Moreover, he will rely only on the word of his relatives.

ג
הורו מקצת הגאונים שזה שאמרו חכמים מפני שהוא בודק בקרובותיו אינו קרובותיו בלבד אלא אפילו מיודעיו. ואפילו היה גר בעיר שאין לו קרוב כלל אם יש שם מרחץ אינו יכול לטעון. שא"א שלא יהיו לו רעים ואומר לאחד מרעיו שתבדוק לו אשתו או אחותו על פלונית. ולפיכך חזקתו ששמע ונתפייס. ולא יראה לי דין זה שאין כל אדם מוציא כל מה שיש בלבו מדברים אלו לכל אלא לקרוביו ועוד שאין דעתו סומכת אלא לדברי קרוביו ביותר:

4
What is meant by a claim issued because of physical blemishes? If the blemishes that were found were such that it is certain that they existed before she was consecrated - e.g., an extra finger or the like - the burden of proof is on the father. He must prove that the husband knew about them and accepted them, or that they were such that we may assume that he knew.6 If he cannot bring proof, the woman may be divorced without receiving any [of the money due her by virtue] of her ketubah at all.7

[The following rules apply when] the blemishes were such that they could have come about after she was consecrated. If the blemishes were discovered after the woman entered her husband's home, the burden of proof is on the husband. He must show that she possessed these blemishes before she was consecrated, and that he entered into the relationship under false premises. If the blemishes were discovered while she still was in her father's home, the burden of proof is on [the father]. He must show that the blemishes came about after the consecration, and the husband suffered the loss.8

ד
כיצד היא טענת המומין. אם היו המומין שנמצאו בה מומין שודאי היו בה קודם שתתארס כגון אצבע יתירה וכיוצא בו. על האב להביא ראיה שידע בהן הבעל ורצה. או שחזקתו שידע. ואם לא הביא ראיה תצא בלא כתובה כלל. היו מומים שאפשר שנולדו בה אחר האירוסין אם נמצאו בה אחר שנכנסה לבית הבעל על הבעל להביא ראיה שעד שלא נתארסה היו בה והיה מקחו מקח טעות. ואם נמצאו בה והיא בבית אביה על האב להביא ראיה שאחר האירוסין נולדו ונסתחפה שדהו:

5
If the husband brought proof that [the woman] had [the blemishes] before she was consecrated, or she admitted that fact, and the father brought proof that the husband had seen the blemishes and accepted them in silence, or that one could assume that he knew about them and accepted them, [the husband] is obligated with regard to the ketubah.

ה
הביא הבעל ראיה שעד שלא תתארס היו בה או שהודה לו בכך. והביא האב ראיה שראה ושתק ונתפייס או שחזקתו שידע בהן ונתפייס הרי זה חייב בכתובה:

6
If [a husband] had relations with his wife and waited several days,9 and [afterwards,] claimed that he discovered a blemish only then, his words are disregarded. [This applies] even if [the blemish] is in the folds [of the woman's skin] or on the sole of her foot. [The rationale is that] we presume that a man will not drink from a cup unless he checks it well first.10 [Therefore,] we assume that he knew [of the blemish] and accepted it.11

ו
בא על אשתו ושהה כמה ימים וטען שמום זה לא נראה לי עד עתה אפילו היה בתוך הקמטים או בכף הרגל אין שומעין לו חזקה שאין אדם שותה בכוס אא"כ בודקו יפה וחזקתו שידע ורצה:

7
[The following rules apply when a man] marries a woman and it is discovered that she does not have a fixed time for the onset of her menstrual period, but rather she does not feel anything until she begins to menstruate. She may engage in sexual relations only if she uses two cloths with which she checks herself, one before relations and one afterwards. In addition, her husband must also check himself with a cloth, as will be explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah.12

ז
הנושא אשה ונמצא שאין לה וסת קבוע לנדתה אלא לא תרגיש בעצמה עד שתרד דם נדה הרי זו לא תשמש אלא בשני עדים שבודקת בהן עצמה אחד לפני תשמיש ואחד לאחר תשמיש חוץ מן העד של איש שמקנח בו עצמו כמו שיתבאר בהלכות איסורי ביאה:

8
Even though this is a great blemish, it does not cause the woman to forfeit anything [with regard to her ketubah], for she can inspect herself and engage in relations.

[The following rules apply if] she inspected herself and then engaged in relations, and when she and her husband cleaned themselves afterwards, blood was found on either his cloth or her cloth.13 If this phenomenon recurred on three consecutive occasions, she is forbidden to remain married to her husband. Instead, she must be divorced, and she is not entitled to the money due [her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount.14 Nor do any of the provisions of the ketubah apply to her. [She suffers these losses] because she is not fit to engage in sexual relations.15

When he divorces her, he may never remarry her. [This restriction was instituted,] lest her condition heal, in which instance his decision to divorce her would not have been final.16

She is permitted to marry another man,17, as will be explained with regard to [the laws of] niddah.18

ח
ואע"פ שמום גדול הוא זה לא הפסידה כלום שהרי בודקת עצמה תחלה ומשמשת. הרי שבדקה עצמה ונבעלה ובעת שקנחה עצמה היא והוא נמצא דם על עד שלה או על עד שלו אם אירע זה פעם אחר פעם שלש פעמים סמוכות זו לזו הרי זו אסורה לישב עם בעלה ותצא בלא כתובה לא עיקר ולא תוספת. ואין לה תנאי מתנאי כתובה שהרי אינה ראויה לתשמיש ויוציא ולא יחזיר לעולם. שמא תתרפא ונמצא שלא גמר לגרשה בשעת גירושין. ומותרת להנשא לאחר כמו שיתבאר בענין הנדה:

9
When does the above apply? When the woman had this condition from the beginning of her marriage, and on the first occasion that she engaged in relations she menstruated.

If, however, this ailment occurred after she married, it is the husband who suffers the loss.19 Therefore, if [the couple] engaged in relations once and the woman did not menstruate, and afterwards she began to menstruate whenever they engaged in relations, he must divorce her and pay her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. He may never remarry her, as explained above.

ט
בד"א בשהיתה כך מתחלת נישואיה ומבעילה ראשונה ראתה דם. אבל אם אירע לה חולי זה אחר שנשאת נסתחפה שדהו. לפיכך אם בעל פעם אחת ולא נמצא דם ואח"כ חזרה להיות רואה דם בכל עת תשמיש יוציא ויתן כתובה כולה ולא יחזיר עולמית כמו שביארנו:

10
Similarly, if a woman suffers blemishes after marriage, even if she becomes a leper [the loss is her husband's]. If he desires to remain married to her, he may. If he desires to divorce her, he must pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

י
וכן אשה שנולדו בה מומין אחר שנשאת אפילו נעשית מוכת שחין אם רצה לקיים יקיים ואם רצה להוציא יתן כתובה:

11
[The following rules apply when] a husband suffers blemishes after he marries. Even if his hand or foot is cut off, or he becomes blinded in one eye,20 and his wife no longer desires to live with him, he is not forced to divorce her and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Instead, if she desires to remain married, she may. If she does not desire this, she may obtain a divorce without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, as is the law concerning any woman who rebels against her husband.21

If, however, he becomes22 afflicted by [constant] bad breath or a smell from his nose, or becomes a collector of dog feces, a miner of copper, or a tanner,23 he is forced to divorce his wife and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah [if she desires to terminate the marriage].24 If she desires, she may remained married to her husband.

יא
האיש שנולדו בו מומין אחר שנשא אפילו נקטעה ידו או רגלו או נסמית עינו ולא רצתה אשתו לישב עמו אין כופין אותו להוציא וליתן כתובה אלא אם רצתה תשב ואם לא רצתה תצא בלא כתובה כדין כל מורדת. אבל אם נולד לו ריח הפה או ריח החוטם או שחזר ללקוט צואת כלבים או לחצוב נחשת מעיקרו. או לעבד עורות כופין אותו להוציא וליתן כתובה. ואם רצתה תשב עם בעלה:

12
If a man becomes a leper,25 he is compelled to divorce his wife and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Even if she desires to remain married to him, her request is not heeded. Instead, they are compelled to separate, because [having relations with] her will cause his flesh to be consumed. If she says: "I will remain married to him, [and we will live in the presence of] witnesses, so that we will not engage in relations," her request is heeded.

יב
נעשה האיש מוכה שחין כופין אותו להוציא וליתן כתובה. ואע"פ שהיא רוצה לישב אין שומעין לה אלא שמפרישין אותן בעל כרחן מפני שהיא ממיקתו. ואם אמרה אשב עמו בעדים כדי שלא יבא עליה שומעין לה:

13
[The following rules apply when] a woman's husband had [constant] bad breath or a smell from his nose, or he was a collector of dog feces, or the like, and he died [childless, causing his wife to be obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of either yibbum or chalitzah]. If [the yavam] possesses the same difficulty that his brother, [the late husband,] had, she has the right to say: "I was willing to accept this difficulty with regard to your brother. I am not willing to accept it with regard to you." He should perform the rite of chalitzah and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.26

"May you see your children [father] children, and may there be peace over Israel."27

יג
מי שהיה בעלה בעל ריח הפה או ריח החוטם או מלקט צואת כלבים וכיוצא בהן ומת ונפלה לפני אחיו ויש בו אותו מום שהיה בבעלה. יכולה היא לומר לאחיך הייתי יכולה לקבל ולך איני יכולה לקבל ויחלוץ ויתן כתובה. וראה בנים לבניך שלום על ישראל:

FOOTNOTES
1.
The husband is not required to pay his wife the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, because their marriage agreement is considered to be a mekach ta'ut, an agreement entered into under false premises. For he did not expect to marry a woman bound by such vows. Nevertheless, in contrast to the law stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 6, in this instance - since the husband did not make an explicit statement to this effect when he consecrated the woman - he is required to divorce her formally.

2.
These vows are considered by Ketubot 72b to cause innui nefesh, "the oppression of the soul." When a woman is bound by these restrictions, she will be depressed, and she will not be pleasant company for her husband. Hence, he is entitled to divorce her.

3.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 7. In the instance described in the present halachah, a divorce is necessary because the husband did not make an explicit statement of intent.

4.
The intent is epileptic fits that follow a set pattern. At these times the woman will not go out in public, and her affliction will therefore not be known.

5.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 117:5) follows the Rambam's rulings. Rabbenu Asher follows the other opinion that the Rambam mentioned. It is also cited by the Ramah (loc. cit.).

6.
E.g., a blemish on her face that her prospective husband obviously must have seen.

7.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 117:8) quotes opinions that maintain that if the father issues a definite claim, the burden of proof is on the husband.

8.
The Rambam's wording literally means "his field became flooded." The intent is that the woman had already become his wife, and her suffering the blemish is his loss.

9.
The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that, as evident from the rationale the Rambam gives, what is important is that the couple engage in relations. For then we may assume that the husband looked at his wife's body first. The Rambam mentions waiting several days only to show that even if he waited - and thus it would appear that there is some basis to his claim - his words are disregarded.

10.
The Rambam is obviously using a euphemism. The intent is that a husband will not enter into relations until he has looked at his wife's body.

11.
The Maggid Mishneh notes the similarity to the laws regarding a husband's claim that his wife was not a virgin, as mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 15.

12.
In that source (Chapter 4, Halachah 16), the Rambam states that the woman must insert a cloth into her vagina before relations and inspect it to make sure that there is no sign of bleeding. Similarly, after relations, both she and her husband must wipe themselves with cloths and check whether there is any sign of bleeding.

The Rambam's opinion is not accepted by all other authorities. Although his view is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 186:2), the Shulchan Aruch favors the view that requires such an inspection only on the first three occasions of intercourse after marriage.

13.
Since the inspection was made directly after relations, we assume that she menstruated in the midst of the relations. It is forbidden to continue relations in such a situation.

14.
Although there are authorities who maintain that she is entitled to the additional amount, the Rambam (and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 117:1) frees the husband of the obligation. The rationale is that in contrast to an aylonit, he is forbidden to have relations with her. And in contrast to a sh'niyah, he could not have known that this condition existed beforehand. Hence, he is not obligated at all.

15.
The recurrence of this phenomenon on three consecutive occasions is considered to be a chazakah, causing us to presume that the woman will continue to experience menstrual bleeding in the midst of relations. Hence, these relations are forbidden.

16.
I.e., the husband might consider his divorce as if it were made conditionally - i.e., that if her condition heals, it is not effective. For this reason, it is made clear that he may never marry her again.

17.
For the sexual experience is different with each man, and it is possible that she will not menstruate in the midst of relations with another man. If, however, this occurs three times, with three different men, she is no longer permitted to marry.

18.
Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 4:21.

19.
Since there was no difficulty at the time of marriage, it is the husband who bears the burden of the loss. (See Halachah 4.)

20.
If, however, he becomes blinded in both eyes, or both his hands are cut off, he is compelled to divorce his wife (Ramah, Even HaEzer 154:4).

21.
As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 8, above.

22.
If, before marriage, his prospective bride knew that he had these difficulties, or was involved in these professions and married him nevertheless, they are not considered to be grounds for divorce (Ramah, Even HaEzer 154:1).

23.
All these professions cause a man to have a foul odor.

24.
Although divorce proceedings must be commenced by the man, in these and certain other situations the court compels a man to commence these proceedings.

25.
Here, the intent is not leprosy as described in the Torah (tzara'at), but rather the illness that is referred to as leprosy in contemporary terms.

26.
I.e., pay this money from her deceased husband's estate.

27.
This verse is lacking in all manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. It appears to be a printer's addition so that the text will conclude on a positive note. (The connection to the previous subject is based on the exegesis of the verse in Ketubot 50a.)

We find several halachot of the Mishneh Torah in which the Rambam concludes with a thought whose relevance goes beyond that of the laws that he outlined in that work, and others like this text, that conclude with the final relevant law without adding such thoughts.
Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class

Tuesday, Kislev 24, 5778 · 12 December 2017
"Today's Day"
Tuesday, Kislev 24, Eve of Chanuka, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayeishev, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 113-118.
Tanya: Ch. 1. It has been taught (p. 1)...(modes of interpretation). (p. 3).
(Continuation of Kislev 23): An explanation of the three verses beginning l'chu n'ran'na, in a manner meaningful to everyone, is as follows: Wednesday, we begin thinking: What will we have for Shabbat? This is a concern in the literal sense and also spiritually, "how can we Shabbos" (i.e. make a real Shabbat)? After all, every person is quite different on Shabbat than on a weekday. So we become a bit despondent. The solution is l'chu n'ran'na ("Come let us sing"), have faith, trust. Comes Thursday, it is now closer to Shabbat and we still have nothing. It doesn't seem to "n'ran'na" so easily and we realize we must do something. So we study Chassidus Thursday night, so that by Friday we sense the depth of "...for the L-rd is a great G-d and a great King1..."; and with this a Jew "can Shabbos."
During Mincha, tachanun is omitted.
FOOTNOTES
1.Tehillim 95:3, opening Friday-night prayers.
Daily Thought:
Staying Above
Never forget that your true place is a place of light. Even when you find yourself in the midst of darkness and sorrow, know that this is not your home.
Where is your home? Where does your true self live?
It lives absorbed within the very origin of light. From there, a glimmer of itself escapes and splashes below.
All it takes is that glimmer to transform the darkness, that it too should shine.
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