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- ב"ה - Today in Judaism - Today is Shabbat, 26 Tevet, 5778 · January 13, 2018Torah Reading:
Va'eira: Exodus 6:2 - 9:35
Ezekiel 28:25 - 29:21
Va'eira: Exodus 6:2 God spoke to Moshe; he said to him, “I am Adonai. 3 I appeared to Avraham, Yitz’chak and Ya‘akov as El Shaddai, although I did not make myself known to them by my name, Yud-Heh-Vav-Heh [Adonai]. 4 Also with them I established my covenant to give them the land of Kena‘an, the land where they wandered about and lived as foreigners. 5 Moreover, I have heard the groaning of the people of Isra’el, whom the Egyptians are keeping in slavery; and I have remembered my covenant.
6 “Therefore, say to the people of Isra’el: ‘I am Adonai. I will free you from the forced labor of the Egyptians, rescue you from their oppression, and redeem you with an outstretched arm and with great judgments. 7 I will take you as my people, and I will be your God. Then you will know that I am Adonai your God, who freed you from the forced labor of the Egyptians. 8 I will bring you into the land which I swore to give to Avraham, Yitz’chak and Ya‘akov — I will give it to you as your inheritance. I am Adonai.’”
9 Moshe said this to the people of Isra’el. But they wouldn’t listen to him, because they were so discouraged, and their slavery was so cruel.
10 Adonai said to Moshe, 11 “Go in; and tell Pharaoh, king of Egypt, to let the people of Isra’el leave his land.” 12 Moshe said to Adonai, “Look, the people of Isra’el haven’t listened to me; so how will Pharaoh listen to me, poor speaker that I am?” 13 But Adonai spoke to Moshe and Aharon and gave them orders concerning both the people of Isra’el and Pharaoh, king of Egypt, to bring the people of Isra’el out of the land of Egypt.
(ii) 14 These were the heads of their families: the sons of Re’uven the firstborn of Isra’el were Hanokh, Pallu, Hetzron and Karmi. These were the families of Re’uven.
15 The sons of Shim‘on were Y’mu’el, Yamin, Ohad, Yakhin, Tzochar and Sha’ul the son of a Kena‘ani woman. These were the families of Shim‘on.
16 These are the names of the sons of Levi with their descendants: Gershon, K’hat and M’rari. Levi lived to be 137 years old. 17 The sons of Gershon were Livni and Shim‘i, with their families. 18 The sons of K’hat were ‘Amram, Yitz’har, Hevron and ‘Uzi’el. K’hat lived to be 133 years old. 19 The sons of M’rari were Machli and Mushi. These were the families of Levi with their descendants.
20 ‘Amram married Yokheved his father’s sister, and she bore him Aharon and Moshe. ‘Amram lived to be 137 years old. 21 The sons of Yitz’har were Korach, Nefeg and Zikhri. 22 The sons of ‘Uzi’el were Misha’el, Eltzafan and Sitri. 23 Aharon married Elisheva daughter of ‘Amminadav and sister of Nachshon, and she bore him Nadav, Avihu, El‘azar and Itamar. 24 The sons of Korach were Asir, Elkanah and Avi’asaf. These were the Korchi families. 25 El‘azar the son of Aharon married one of the daughters of Puti’el, and she bore him Pinchas. These were the heads of the families of Levi, family by family.
26 These are the Aharon and Moshe to whom Adonai said, “Bring the people of Isra’el out of the land of Egypt, division by division,” 27 and who told Pharaoh king of Egypt, to let the people of Isra’el leave Egypt. These are the same Moshe and Aharon.
28 On the day when Adonai spoke to Moshe in the land of Egypt, (iii) 29 he said, “I am Adonai. Tell Pharaoh, king of Egypt, everything I say to you.”
30 Moshe answered Adonai, “Look, I’m such a poor speaker that Pharaoh won’t listen to me.”
7:1 But Adonai said to Moshe, “I have put you in the place of God to Pharaoh, and Aharon your brother will be your prophet. 2 You are to say everything I order you, and Aharon your brother is to speak to Pharaoh and tell him to let the people of Isra’el leave his land. 3 But I will make him hardhearted. Even though I will increase my signs and wonders in the land of Egypt, 4 Pharaoh will not listen to you. Then I will lay my hand on Egypt and bring my armies, my people the sons of Isra’el, out of the land of Egypt with great acts of judgment. 5 Then, when I stretch out my hand over Egypt and bring the people of Isra’el out from among them, the Egyptians will know that I am Adonai.”
6 Moshe and Aharon did exactly what Adonai ordered them to do. 7 Moshe was eighty years old and Aharon eighty-three when they spoke to Pharaoh.
(iv) 8 Adonai said to Moshe and Aharon, 9 “When Pharaoh says to you, ‘Perform a miracle,’ tell Aharon to take his staff and throw it down in front of Pharaoh, so that it can become a snake.” 10 Moshe and Aharon went in to Pharaoh and did this, as Adonai had ordered — Aharon threw down his staff in front of Pharaoh and his servants, and it turned into a snake. 11 But Pharaoh in turn called for the sages and sorcerers; and they too, the magicians of Egypt, did the same thing, making use of their secret arts. 12 Each one threw his staff down, and they turned into snakes. But Aharon’s staff swallowed up theirs. 13 Nevertheless, Pharaoh was made hardhearted; and he didn’t listen to them, as Adonai had said would happen.
14 Adonai said to Moshe, “Pharaoh is stubborn. He refuses to let the people go. 15 Go to Pharaoh in the morning when he goes out to the water. Stand on the riverbank to confront him, take in your hand the staff which was turned into a snake, 16 and say to him, ‘Adonai, the God of the Hebrews, sent me to you to say: “Let my people go, so that they can worship me in the desert.” But until now you haven’t listened; 17 so Adonai says, “This will let you know that I am Adonai”: I will take the staff in my hand and strike the water in the river, and it will be turned into blood. 18 The fish in the river will die, the river will stink and the Egyptians won’t want to drink water from the river.’”
19 Adonai said to Moshe, “Say to Aharon, ‘Take your staff, reach out your hand over the waters of Egypt, over their rivers, canals, ponds and all their reservoirs, so that they can turn into blood. There will be blood throughout the whole land of Egypt, even in the wooden buckets and stone jars.’” 20 Moshe and Aharon did exactly what Adonai had ordered. He raised the staff and, in the sight of Pharaoh and his servants, struck the water in the river; and all the water in the river was turned into blood. 21 The fish in the river died, and the river stank so badly that the Egyptians couldn’t drink its water. There was blood throughout all the land of Egypt.
22 But the magicians of Egypt did the same with their secret arts, so that Pharaoh was made hardhearted and didn’t listen to them, as Adonai had said would happen. 23 Pharaoh just turned and went back to his palace, without taking any of this to heart. 24 All the Egyptians dug around the river for water to drink, because they couldn’t drink the river water.
25 Seven days after Adonai had struck the river, 26 (8:1) Adonai said to Moshe, “Go in to Pharaoh and say to him, ‘Here is what Adonai says: “Let my people go, so that they can worship me. 27 (8:2) If you refuse to let them go, I will strike all your territory with frogs. 28 (8:3) The river will swarm with frogs. They will go up, enter your palace and go into your bedroom, onto your bed. They will enter the houses of your servants and your people and go into your ovens and kneading bowls. 29 (8:4) The frogs will climb all over you, your people and your servants.”’”
8:1 (5) Adonai said to Moshe, “Say to Aharon, ‘Reach out your hand with your staff over the rivers, canals and ponds; and cause frogs to come up onto the land of Egypt.’” 2 (6) Aharon put out his hand over the waters of Egypt, and the frogs came up and covered the land of Egypt. 3 (7) But the magicians did the same with their secret arts and brought up frogs onto the land of Egypt.
4 (8) Then Pharaoh summoned Moshe and Aharon and said, “Intercede with Adonai to take the frogs away from me and my people, and I will let the people go and sacrifice to Adonai.” 5 (9) Moshe said to Pharaoh, “Not only that, but you can have the honor of naming the time when I will pray for you, your servants and your people to be rid of the frogs, both yourselves and your homes, and that they stay only in the river.” 6 (10) He answered, “Tomorrow.” Moshe said, “It will be as you have said, and from this you will learn that Adonai our God has no equal. (v) 7 (11) The frogs will leave you and your homes, also your servants and your people; they will stay in the river only.” 8 (12) Moshe and Aharon left Pharaoh’s presence, and Moshe cried to Adonai about the frogs he had brought on Pharaoh. 9 (13) Adonai did as Moshe had asked — the frogs died in the houses, courtyards and fields; 10 (14) they gathered them in heaps till the land stank. 11 (15) But when Pharaoh saw that he had been given some relief, he made himself hardhearted and would not listen to them, just as Adonai had said would happen.
12 (16) Adonai said to Moshe, “Say to Aharon: ‘Reach out with your staff and strike the dust on the ground; it will become lice throughout all the land of Egypt.’” 13 (17) They did it — Aharon reached out his hand with his staff and struck the dust on the ground, and there were lice on people and animals; all the dust on the ground became lice throughout the whole land of Egypt. 14 (18) The magicians tried with their secret arts to produce lice, but they couldn’t. There were lice on people and animals. 15 (19) Then the magicians said to Pharaoh, “This is the finger of God.” But Pharaoh was made hardhearted, so that he didn’t listen to them, just as Adonai had said would happen.
16 (20) Adonai said to Moshe, “Get up early in the morning, stand before Pharaoh when he goes out to the water and say to him, ‘Here is what Adonai says: “Let my people go, so that they can worship me. 17 (21) Otherwise, if you won’t let my people go, I will send swarms of insects on you, your servants and your people, and into your houses. The houses of the Egyptians will be full of swarms of insects, and likewise the ground they stand on. 18 (22) But I will set apart the land of Goshen, where my people live — no swarms of insects will be there — so that you can realize that I am Adonai, right here in the land. (vi) 19 (23) Yes, I will distinguish between my people and your people, and this sign will happen by tomorrow.”’” 20 (24) Adonai did it: terrible swarms of insects went into Pharaoh’s palace and into all his servants’ houses — the insects ruined the entire land of Egypt.
21 (25) Pharaoh summoned Moshe and Aharon and said, “Go, and sacrifice to your God here in the land.” 22 (26) But Moshe replied, “It would be inappropriate for us to do that, because the animal we sacrifice to Adonai our God is an abomination to the Egyptians. Won’t the Egyptians stone us to death if before their very eyes we sacrifice what they consider an abomination? 23 (27) No, we will go three days’ journey into the desert and sacrifice to Adonai our God, as he has ordered us to do.” 24 (28) Pharaoh said, “I will let you go, so that you can sacrifice to Adonai your God in the desert. Only you are not to go very far away. Intercede on my behalf.” 25 (29) Moshe said, “All right, I am going away from you, and I will intercede with Adonai; so that tomorrow, the swarms of insects will leave Pharaoh, his servants and his people. Just make sure that Pharaoh stops playing games with the people by preventing them from going and sacrificing to Adonai.”
26 (30) Moshe left Pharaoh and interceded with Adonai, 27 (31) and Adonai did what Moshe had asked: he removed the swarms of insects from Pharaoh, his servants and his people — not one remained. 28 (32) But this time, too, Pharaoh made himself stubborn and didn’t let the people go.
9:1 Then Adonai said to Moshe, “Go to Pharaoh, and tell him, ‘Here is what Adonai, the God of the Hebrews, says: “Let my people go, so that they can worship me. 2 If you refuse to let them go and persist in holding on to them, 3 the hand of Adonai is on your livestock in the field — on the horses, donkeys, camels, cattle and flocks — and will make them suffer a devastating illness. 4 But Adonai will distinguish between Egypt’s and Isra’el’s livestock — nothing belonging to the people of Isra’el will die.”’” 5 Adonai determined the exact time by saying, “Tomorrow Adonai will do this in the land.” 6 The following day, Adonai did it — all the livestock of Egypt died; but not one of the animals belonging to the people of Isra’el died. 7 Pharaoh investigated and found that not even one of the animals of the people of Isra’el had died. Nevertheless, Pharaoh’s heart remained stubborn, and he didn’t let the people go.
8 Adonai said to Moshe and Aharon, “Take handfuls of ashes from a kiln, and let Moshe throw them in the air before Pharaoh’s eyes. 9 They will turn into fine dust over all the land of Egypt and become infected sores on men and animals throughout Egypt.” 10 So they took ashes from a kiln, stood in front of Pharaoh and threw them in the air; and they became infected sores on men and animals. 11 The magicians couldn’t even stand in Moshe’s presence because of the sores, which were on them as well as on the other Egyptians. 12 But Adonai made Pharaoh hardhearted, so that he didn’t listen to them — just as Adonai had said to Moshe.
13 Adonai said to Moshe, “Get up early in the morning, stand before Pharaoh, and say to him, ‘Here is what Adonai says: “Let my people go, so that they can worship me. 14 For this time, I will inflict my plagues on you, yourself, and on your officials and your people; so that you will realize that I am without equal in all the earth. 15 By now I could have stretched out my hand and struck you and your people with such severe plagues that you would have been wiped off the earth. 16 But it is for this very reason that I have kept you alive — to show you my power, and so that my name may resound throughout the whole earth. (vii) 17 Since you are still setting yourself up against my people and not letting them go, 18 tomorrow, about this time, I will cause a hailstorm so heavy that Egypt has had nothing like it from the day it was founded until now. 19 Therefore, send and hurry to bring indoors all your livestock and everything else you have in the field. For hail will fall on every human being and animal left in the field that hasn’t been brought home, and they will die.”’”
20 Whoever among Pharaoh’s servants feared what Adonai had said had his slaves and livestock escape into the houses; 21 but those who had no regard for what Adonai had said left their slaves and livestock in the field.
22 Adonai said to Moshe, “Reach out your hand toward the sky, so that there will be hail in all the land of Egypt, falling on people, animals and everything growing in the field, throughout the land of Egypt.” 23 Moshe reached out with his staff toward the sky, and Adonai sent thunder and hail, and fire ran down to the earth. Adonai caused it to hail on the land of Egypt — 24 it hailed, and fire flashed up with the hail; it was terrible, worse than any hailstorm in all of Egypt since it became a nation. 25 Throughout all the land of Egypt, the hail struck everything in the field, people and animals; and the hail struck every plant growing in the field and broke every tree there. 26 But in the land of Goshen, where the people of Isra’el were, there was no hail.
27 Pharaoh summoned Moshe and Aharon and said to them, “This time I have sinned: Adonai is in the right; I and my people are in the wrong. 28 Intercede with Adonai — we can’t take any more of this terrible thunder and hail; and I will let you go, you will stay no longer.” 29 Moshe said to him, “As soon as I have gone out of the city, I will spread out my hands to Adonai; the thunder will end, and there won’t be any more hail — so that you can know that the earth belongs to Adonai. 30 But you and your servants, I know you still won’t fear Adonai, God.” 31 The flax and barley were ruined, because the barley was ripe and the flax in bud. 32 But the wheat and buckwheat were not ruined, because they come up later. (Maftir) 33 Moshe went out of the city, away from Pharaoh, and spread out his hands to Adonai. The thunder and hail ended, and the rain stopped pouring down on the earth. 34 When Pharaoh saw that the rain, hail and thunder had ended, he sinned still more by making himself hardhearted, he and his servants. 35 Pharaoh was made hardhearted, and he didn’t let the people of Isra’el go, just as Adonai had said through Moshe.
Ezekiel 28:25 “Adonai Elohim says, ‘Once I have gathered the house of Isra’el from the peoples among whom they are scattered, once I have shown my holiness in them as the Goyim watch, then they will live in their own land, which I gave to my servant Ya‘akov. 26 They will have security when they live there, building houses and planting vineyards; yes, they will live in safety, once I have executed judgments against all their contemptuous neighbors. Then they will know that I am Adonai their God.’”
29:1 On the twelfth day of the tenth month of the tenth year, the word of Adonai came to me: 2 “Human being, turn your face against Pharaoh king of Egypt; prophesy against him and against all Egypt; 3 speak out; and say that Adonai Elohim says:
‘I am against you,
Pharaoh king of Egypt,
you big crocodile
lying in the streams of the Nile!
You say, “My Nile is mine;
I made it for myself.”
4 But I will put hooks in your jaws
and make your Nile fish stick to your scales.
Yes, I will bring you up from your Nile,
with all your Nile fish sticking to your scales,
5 and leave you in the desert,
you and all your Nile fish.
You will fall in the open field
and not be gathered or buried;
but I will give you as food
to wild animals and birds.
6 Then all who live in Egypt
will know that I am Adonai,
because they have been a support made of straw
for the house of Isra’el.
7 When they grasped you in hand, you splintered
and threw all their shoulders out of joint;
when they leaned on you, you broke
and made them all wrench their backs.’
8 “Therefore Adonai Elohim says, ‘I will bring the sword against you and eliminate both your people and your animals. 9 The land of Egypt will become a desolate waste, and they will know that I am Adonai; because he said, “The Nile is mine; I made it.” 10 So I am against you and your Nile; and I will make the land of Egypt a totally desolate waste from Migdol to S’venah, all the way to the border of Ethiopia. 11 No human foot will pass through it, and no animal foot will pass through it; it will be uninhabited for forty years. 12 Yes, I will make the land of Egypt desolate, even when compared with other desolate countries, likewise her cities in comparison with other ruined cities; they will be desolate forty years. I will scatter the Egyptians among the nations and disperse them through the countries.’
13 “For this is what Adonai Elohim says: ‘At the end of forty years I will gather the Egyptians from the peoples where they were scattered — 14 I will restore the fortunes of Egypt and cause them to return to the land of their origin, Patros. But there they will be a humble kingdom, 15 the humblest of kingdoms. It will never again dominate other nations; I will reduce them, so that they never again rule other nations. 16 Moreover, they will no longer be a source of confidence for Isra’el to turn to; rather, it will only bring to mind their guilt in having turned to them before. Then they will know that I am Adonai Elohim.’”
17 On the first day of the first month of the twenty-seventh year, the word of Adonai came to me: 18 “Human being, N’vukhadretzar king of Bavel had his army mount a massive expedition against Tzor; [the loads of dirt they carried] made every head bald and every shoulder raw; yet neither he nor his army derived any benefit from Tzor out of this expedition against it. 19 Therefore Adonai Elohim says, ‘I will give the land of Egypt to N’vukhadretzar king of Bavel. He will carry off its riches, take its spoil and its prey; and these will be the wages for his army. 20 I am giving him the land of Egypt as his wages for which he worked, because they were working for me,’ says Adonai Elohim. 21 ‘When that day comes I will cause power to return to the house of Isra’el, and I will enable you [Yechezk’el] to open your mouth among them. Then they will know that I am Adonai.’”
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Today's Laws & Customs:
• Blessing the New Month
This Shabbat is Shabbat Mevarchim ("the Shabbat that blesses" the new month): a special prayer is recited blessing the Rosh Chodesh ("Head of the Month") of upcoming month of Shevat, which falls on Wednesday of next week.
Prior to the blessing, we announce the precise time of the molad, the "birth" of the new moon. Click here for molad times.
It is a Chabad custom to recite the entire book of Psalms before morning prayers, and to conduct farbrengens (chassidic gatherings) in the course of the Shabbat.
Links: On the Significance of Shabbat Mevarchim; Tehillim (the Book of Psalms); The Farbrengen
Today in Jewish History:
• Sicilian Jews Forced to Wear Jewish Badges (1369)
On December 25, 1369 (5129), King Frederick III of Sicily ordered all Jews to wear a badge indicating their heritage. The badge consisted of a piece of red material, not smaller than the largest royal seal; men were required to wear it under the chin, and women on the chest.
Daily Torah Study:
Chumash: Va'eira, 7th Portion Exodus 9:17-9:35 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation
• Video Class
• Daily Wisdom (short insight)
Exodus Chapter 9
17If you still tread upon My people, not letting them out, יזעֽוֹדְךָ֖ מִסְתּוֹלֵ֣ל בְּעַמִּ֑י לְבִלְתִּ֖י שַׁלְּחָֽם:
If you still tread upon My people: Heb. מִסְתּוֹלֵל, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: כְּבִישַׁתבֵּיהּ בְּעַמִי. This is an expression of a highway (מְסִלָה) (Num. 20:19), rendered by the Targum אֹרַח כְּבִישָׁא, a trodden road, and in Old French, calcher, to trample underfoot. I already explained at the end of [the section entitled] וַיְהִי מִקֵץ (Gen. 44:16) that in every word of which the first root letter is “sammech,” when used in the “hithpa’el” form, the “tav” of the prefix is placed in the middle of the root letters, such as here, and such as “and the grasshopper will drag itself along (וְיִסְךְתַּבֵל) ” (Eccl. 12:5) from the root סבל “that you rule (תִשְךְתָּרֵר) over us” (Num. 16:13), an expression of a prince (שַֹר) and a ruler; “I looked (מִסְךְתַּכַּל)” (Dan. 7:8). [Actually, the word is מִשְֹתַּכַּל, but the same rule applies for a “sin” as for a “sammech.”]
עודך מסתולל בעמי: כתרגומו כבישת ביה בעמי, והוא מגזרת (ישעיהו יא טז) מסלה, דמתרגמינן אורח כבישא, ובלעז קלקיי"ר [לכבוש]. וכבר פירשתי בסוף ויהי מקץ כל תיבה שתחלת יסודה סמ"ך והיא באה לדבר בלשון מתפעל, נותן התי"ו של שמוש באמצע אותיות של עיקר, כגון זו וכגון (קהלת יב ה) ויסתבל החגב, מגזרת סבל, (במדבר טז יג) כי תשתרר עלינו, מגזרת שר ונגיד, (דניאל ז ח) משתכל הוית:
18behold, I am going to rain down at this time tomorrow a very heavy hail, the likes of which has never been in Egypt from the day of its being founded until now. יחהִנְנִ֤י מַמְטִיר֙ כָּעֵ֣ת מָחָ֔ר בָּרָ֖ד כָּבֵ֣ד מְאֹ֑ד אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹֽא־הָיָ֤ה כָמֹ֨הוּ֙ בְּמִצְרַ֔יִם לְמִן־הַיּ֥וֹם הִוָּֽסְדָ֖ה וְעַד־עָֽתָּה:
at this time tomorrow: [Heb. כָּעֵתמָחָר lit., at the time tomorrow, meaning] at this time tomorrow. He made a scratch on the wall [to demonstrate that] “Tomorrow, when the sun reaches here, the hail will come down.” -[from Tanchuma, Va’era 16]
כעת מחר: כעת הזאת למחר, שרט לו שריטה בכותל למחר כשתגיע חמה לכאן ירד הברד:
its being founded: Heb. הִוָּסְדָה, when it was founded (נִסְיַסְּדָה). Every word whose first root letter is “yud,” like יסד to found, ילד, to bear, ידע, to know, [and] יסר, to chastise, when it is used in the passive voice, a “vav” replaces the yud, like “its being founded הִוָסְדָה ” ; “she was born (הִוָלְדָה) ” (Hos. 2:5); “And… became known (וַיִוָדַע) ” (Esther 2: 22); “And to Joseph were born (וַיִוָלֵד) ” (Gen. 46:20); “A slave cannot be chastised ((יִוָּסֶר with words” (Prov. 29: 19).
הוסדה: שנתיסדה וכל תיבה שתחלת יסודה יו"ד כגון יסד, ילד, ידע, יסר, כשהיא מתפעלת תבא הוי"ו במקום היו"ד, כמו הוסדה (הושע ב ה) הולדה (אסתר ב כה) ויודע (בראשית מו כ) ויולד ליוסף, בדברים לא יוסר עבד (משלי כט יט):
19And now, send, gather in your livestock and all that you have in the field, any man or beast that is found in the field and not brought into the house the hail shall fall on them, and they will die." ' " יטוְעַתָּ֗ה שְׁלַ֤ח הָעֵז֙ אֶת־מִקְנְךָ֔ וְאֵ֛ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁ֥ר לְךָ֖ בַּשָּׂדֶ֑ה כָּל־הָֽאָדָ֨ם וְהַבְּהֵמָ֜ה אֲשֶׁר־יִמָּצֵ֣א בַשָּׂדֶ֗ה וְלֹ֤א יֵֽאָסֵף֙ הַבַּ֔יְתָה וְיָרַ֧ד עֲלֵהֶ֛ם הַבָּרָ֖ד וָמֵֽתוּ:
send, gather in: Heb. הָעֵז, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: שְׁלַח כְּנוֹֹש send, gather in. Likewise, “the inhabitants gathered הֵעִיזוּ ” (Isa. 10:31); “Gather (הָעִזוּ) the sons of Benjamin” (Jer. 6:1).
שלח העז: כתרגומו שלח כנוש. וכן (ישעיהו י לא) יושבי הגבים העיזו, (ירמיהו ו א) העיזו בני בנימן:
and not brought into the house: Heb. יֵאָסֵף, an expression of bringing in.
ולא יאסף הביתה: לשון הכנסה הוא:
20He who feared the word of the Lord of Pharaoh's servants drove his servants and his livestock into the houses. כהַיָּרֵא֙ אֶת־דְּבַ֣ר יְהֹוָ֔ה מֵֽעַבְדֵ֖י פַּרְעֹ֑ה הֵנִ֛יס אֶת־עֲבָדָ֥יו וְאֶת־מִקְנֵ֖הוּ אֶל־הַבָּתִּֽים:
drove: Heb. הֵנִיס, caused to flee, an expression derived from “and fled (וַיָנָס) ” (Exod. 4:3).
הניס: הבריח לשון (שמות ד ג) וינס משה:
21But he who did not pay attention to the word of the Lord left his servants and his livestock in the field. כאוַֽאֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־שָׂ֛ם לִבּ֖וֹ אֶל־דְּבַ֣ר יְהֹוָ֑ה וַיַּֽעֲזֹ֛ב אֶת־עֲבָדָ֥יו וְאֶת־מִקְנֵ֖הוּ בַּשָּׂדֶֽה:
22The Lord said to Moses, "Stretch forth your hand heavenward, and hail will be upon the entire land of Egypt, upon man and upon beast and upon all the vegetation of the field in the land of Egypt." כבוַיֹּ֨אמֶר יְהֹוָ֜ה אֶל־משֶׁ֗ה נְטֵ֤ה אֶת־יָֽדְךָ֙ עַל־הַשָּׁמַ֔יִם וִיהִ֥י בָרָ֖ד בְּכָל־אֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרָ֑יִם עַל־הָֽאָדָ֣ם וְעַל־הַבְּהֵמָ֗ה וְעַ֛ל כָּל־עֵ֥שֶׂב הַשָּׂדֶ֖ה בְּאֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
heavenward: Heb. עַל-הַֹשָמַיִם, lit., over the heavens. Toward the heavens. According to the Midrash Aggadah (Tanchuma, Va’era 15), however, [it means that] the Holy One, blessed be He, raised Moses above the heavens.
על השמים: לצד השמים, ומדרש אגדה הגביהו הקב"ה למשה למעלה מן השמים:
23So Moses stretched forth his staff heavenward, and the Lord gave forth thunder and hail, and fire came down to the earth, and the Lord rained down hail upon the land of Egypt. כגוַיֵּ֨ט משֶׁ֣ה אֶת־מַטֵּ֘הוּ֘ עַל־הַשָּׁמַ֒יִם֒ וַֽיהֹוָ֗ה נָתַ֤ן קֹלֹת֙ וּבָרָ֔ד וַתִּֽהֲלַךְ־אֵ֖שׁ אָ֑רְצָה וַיַּמְטֵ֧ר יְהֹוָ֛ה בָּרָ֖ד עַל־אֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
24And there was hail, and fire flaming within the hail, very heavy, the likes of which had never been throughout the entire land of Egypt since it had become a nation. כדוַיְהִ֣י בָרָ֔ד וְאֵ֕שׁ מִתְלַקַּ֖חַת בְּת֣וֹךְ הַבָּרָ֑ד כָּבֵ֣ד מְאֹ֔ד אֲ֠שֶׁ֠ר לֹֽא־הָיָ֤ה כָמֹ֨הוּ֙ בְּכָל־אֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרַ֔יִם מֵאָ֖ז הָֽיְתָ֥ה לְגֽוֹי:
flaming within the hail: [This was] a miracle within a miracle. The fire and hail intermingled. Although hail is water, to perform the will of their Maker they made peace between themselves [that the hail did not extinguish the fire nor did the fire melt the hail]. — [from Tanchuma, Va’era 14]
מתלקחת בתוך הברד: נס בתוך נס, האש והברד מעורבין, והברד מים הוא, ולעשות רצון קונם עשו שלום ביניהם:
25The hail struck throughout the entire land of Egypt, all that was in the field, both man and beast, and the hail struck all the vegetation of the field, and it broke all the trees of the field. כהוַיַּ֨ךְ הַבָּרָ֜ד בְּכָל־אֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרַ֗יִם אֵ֚ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁ֣ר בַּשָּׂדֶ֔ה מֵֽאָדָ֖ם וְעַד־בְּהֵמָ֑ה וְאֵ֨ת כָּל־עֵ֤שֶׂב הַשָּׂדֶה֙ הִכָּ֣ה הַבָּרָ֔ד וְאֶת־כָּל־עֵ֥ץ הַשָּׂדֶ֖ה שִׁבֵּֽר:
26Only in the land of Goshen, where the children of Israel were, there was no hail. כורַ֚ק בְּאֶ֣רֶץ גּ֔שֶׁן אֲשֶׁר־שָׁ֖ם בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל לֹ֥א הָיָ֖ה בָּרָֽד:
27So Pharaoh sent and summoned Moses and Aaron and said to them, "I have sinned this time. The Lord is the righteous One, and I and my people are the guilty ones. כזוַיִּשְׁלַ֣ח פַּרְעֹ֗ה וַיִּקְרָא֙ לְמשֶׁ֣ה וּלְאַֽהֲרֹ֔ן וַיֹּ֥אמֶר אֲלֵהֶ֖ם חָטָ֣אתִי הַפָּ֑עַם יְהֹוָה֙ הַצַּדִּ֔יק וַֽאֲנִ֥י וְעַמִּ֖י הָֽרְשָׁעִֽים:
28Entreat the Lord, and let it be enough of God's thunder and hail, and I will let you go, and you shall not continue to stand." כחהַעְתִּ֨ירוּ֙ אֶל־יְהֹוָ֔ה וְרַ֕ב מִֽהְיֹ֛ת קֹלֹ֥ת אֱלֹהִ֖ים וּבָרָ֑ד וַֽאֲשַׁלְּחָ֣ה אֶתְכֶ֔ם וְלֹ֥א תֹֽסִפ֖וּן לַֽעֲמֹֽד:
and let it be enough: It is enough for Him what He has already brought down. — [after Jonathan ben Uzziel]
ורב: די לו במה שהוריד כבר:
29And Moses said to him, "When I leave the city, I will spread my hands to the Lord. The thunder will cease, and there will be no more hail, in order that you know that the land is the Lord's. כטוַיֹּ֤אמֶר אֵלָיו֙ משֶׁ֔ה כְּצֵאתִי֙ אֶת־הָעִ֔יר אֶפְרֹ֥שׂ אֶת־כַּפַּ֖י אֶל־יְהֹוָ֑ה הַקֹּל֣וֹת יֶחְדָּל֗וּן וְהַבָּרָד֙ לֹ֣א יִֽהְיֶה־ע֔וֹד לְמַ֣עַן תֵּדַ֔ע כִּ֥י לַֽיהֹוָ֖ה הָאָֽרֶץ:
When I leave the city: Heb. כְּצֵאתִי אֶת-הָעִיר, [equivalent to] מִן-הָעִיר, [lit., when I go out] from the city, but within the city he did not pray, because it was full of idols. — [from Exod. Rabbah 12:5]
כצאתי את העיר: מן העיר, אבל בתוך העיר לא התפלל, לפי שהיתה מלאה גלולים:
30But you and your servants I know that you still do not fear the Lord God, לוְאַתָּ֖ה וַֽעֲבָדֶ֑יךָ יָדַ֕עְתִּי כִּ֚י טֶ֣רֶם תִּֽירְא֔וּן מִפְּנֵ֖י יְהֹוָ֥ה אֱלֹהִֽים:
you still do not fear: Heb. טֶרֶם ךְתִּירְאוּן, you do not yet fear, and so every [instance of] טֶרֶם in the Scriptures means “not yet,” and it is not a term meaning “before.” [This is] like טֶרֶם יִֹשְכָּבוּ, [which Onkelos renders:] עַד לֹא שְׁכִיבוּ, “They had not yet retired” (Gen. 19:4); טֶרֶם יִצְמָח, [which Onkelos renders:] עַד לֹא צְמָח, “neither did…yet grow” (Gen. 2:5). This too means the same. [I.e.,] I know that you still do not fear [God], and as soon as relief comes, you will continue in your corruption. — [from Onkelos]
טרם תיראון: עדין לא תיראון. וכן כל טרם שבמקרא עדיין לא הוא, ואינו לשון קודם, כמו (בראשית יט ד) טרם ישכבו, עד לא שכיבו (שם ב ה) טרם יצמח, עד לא צמח, אף זה כן הוא ידעתי כי עדיין אינכם יראים ומשתהיה הרוחה תעמדו בקלקולכם:
31though the flax and the barley have been broken, for the barley is in the ear, and the flax is in the stalk. לאוְהַפִּשְׁתָּ֥ה וְהַשְּׂעֹרָ֖ה נֻכָּ֑תָה כִּ֤י הַשְּׂעֹרָה֙ אָבִ֔יב וְהַפִּשְׁתָּ֖ה גִּבְעֹֽל:
though the flax and the barley have been broken: Heb. נֻכָּתָה, has been broken, an expression similar to “Pharaoh-Neco (פַּרְעֹה נְכֹה) ” [the lame Pharaoh] (II Kings 23: 29); “broken-hearted (נְכָאִים) ” (Isa. 16:7); and likewise, “have not been broken (נֵכּוּ)” (below, verse 32). It is incorrect to interpret it as an expression of smiting (הַכָּאָה), because a “nun” does not come in place of a “hey,” that נֻכָּתָה should be explained like הֻכָּתָה, smitten, and נֻכּוּ like הֻכּוּ, smitten. The “nun” is, however, a root letter in the word, and it is of the same form as “and his bones are dislocated (ֹשֻפּוּ) ” (Job 33:21).
והפשתה והשערה נכתה: נשברה לשון (מלכים ב כג כט) פרעה נכה, (ישעיהו טז ז) נכאים, וכן (פסוק לב) לא נכו. ולא יתכן לפרשו לשון הכאה, שאין נו"ן במקום ה"א לפרש נכתה כמו הוכתה, נכו כמו הכו, אלא הנו"ן שורש בתיבה והרי הוא מגזרת (איוב לג כא) ושפו עצמותיו:
for the barley is in the ear: It has already ripened and is standing in its stalks, and they have been broken and have fallen. Likewise, the flax has already grown and has become hardened [enough] to stand in its stalks.
כי השערה אביב: כבר ביכרה ועומדת בקשיה ונשתברו ונפלו. וכן הפשתה גדלה כבר והוקשה לעמוד בגבעוליה:
the barley is in the ear: Heb. אָבִיב, it has stood in its stalks, an expression like “the green plants of (בְּאִבֵּי) the valley ” (Song of Songs 6:11).
השעורה אביב: עמדה באביה, לשון (שיר השירים ו יא) באבי הנחל:
32The wheat and the spelt, however, have not been broken because they ripen late." לבוְהַֽחִטָּ֥ה וְהַכֻּסֶּ֖מֶת לֹ֣א נֻכּ֑וּ כִּ֥י אֲפִילֹ֖ת הֵֽנָּה:
because they ripen late: Heb. אִפִילֹת, late, and they were still tender and were able to withstand the hard [hail]. Although it says: “and the hail struck all the vegetation of the field” (verse 25), the simple meaning of the verse may be explained as referring to the herbs that were standing in their stalks, which could be smitten by the hail. In the Midrash of Rabbi Tanchuma (Va’era 16), some of our Rabbis differed with this and interpreted כִּי אִפִילֹת to mean that “wonders of wonders (פִּלְאֵי פְלָאוֹת) ” were wrought for them, that they were not smitten.
כי אפילת הנה: מאוחרות, ועדיין היו רכות ויכולות לעמוד בפני קשה. ואף על פי שנאמר (פסוק כה) ואת כל עשב השדה הכה הברד יש לפרש פשוטו של מקרא בעשבים העומדים בקלחם הראויים ללקות בברד. ובמדרש רבי תנחומא יש מרבותינו שנחלקו על זאת ודרשו כי אפילות פלאי פלאות נעשו להם, שלא לקו:
33Moses went away from Pharaoh, out of the city, and he spread out his hands to the Lord, and the thunder and the hail ceased, and rain did not come down to earth. לגוַיֵּצֵ֨א משֶׁ֜ה מֵעִ֤ם פַּרְעֹה֙ אֶת־הָעִ֔יר וַיִּפְרֹ֥שׂ כַּפָּ֖יו אֶל־יְהֹוָ֑ה וַיַּחְדְּל֤וּ הַקֹּלוֹת֙ וְהַבָּרָ֔ד וּמָטָ֖ר לֹֽא־נִתַּ֥ךְ אָֽרְצָה:
did not come down: Heb. לא נתך, did not reach. Even those [hailstones] that were in the air did not reach the ground. Similarly: ותתך עלינו, “the curse and the oath” of Ezra (sic) (Dan. 9:11), [which means they] have befallen us. Menachem (Machbereth Menachem, p. 184), however, classified it (נִךְתַּ) in the group headed by “As silver is melted (כְּהִךְתּוּ) ” (Ezek. 22:22), an expression of pouring [molten] metal, and I approve of his words, as the Targum renders וַיִצֹק (Exod. 38:5) as וְאַךְתִּי, “And he cast,” [and], לָדֶקֶת (Exod. 38:27) as לְאַךְתָּכָא, “to cast.” This too, לֹא נִךְתַּ אָרְצָה, means: was not poured to earth.
לא נתך: לא הגיע, ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ, ודומה לו (דניאל ט יא) ותתך עלינו האלה והשבועה, דעזרא, ותגיע עלינו. ומנחם בן סרוק חברו בחלק (יחזקאל כב כב) כהתוך כסף, לשון יציקת מתכת, ורואה אני את דבריו, כתרגומו ויצק (שמות לח ה) ואתיך, (שם כז) לצקת לאתכא, אף זה לא נתך לארץ לא הוצק לארץ:
34And Pharaoh saw that the rain, the hail, and the thunder had ceased; so he continued to sin, and he strengthened his heart, he and his servants. לדוַיַּ֣רְא פַּרְעֹ֗ה כִּֽי־חָדַ֨ל הַמָּטָ֧ר וְהַבָּרָ֛ד וְהַקֹּלֹ֖ת וַיֹּ֣סֶף לַֽחֲטֹ֑א וַיַּכְבֵּ֥ד לִבּ֖וֹ ה֥וּא וַֽעֲבָדָֽיו:
35And Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and he did not let the children of Israel go out, as the Lord had spoken through the hand of Moses. להוַיֶּֽחֱזַק֙ לֵ֣ב פַּרְעֹ֔ה וְלֹ֥א שִׁלַּ֖ח אֶת־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֛ר דִּבֶּ֥ר יְהֹוָ֖ה בְּיַד־משֶֽׁה:
Tehillim: Psalms Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
• Hebrew text
• English text
Verses 97-176
97. O how I love Your Torah! All day it is my discussion.
98. Your commandments make me wiser than my enemies, for they are ever with me.
99. From all my teachers I have gained wisdom, for Your testimonies are my discussion.
100. I will be more perceptive than elders, because I have guarded Your precepts.
101. I have restrained my feet from every evil path, that I might keep Your word.
102. I have not turned away from Your judgments, for You have instructed me.
103. How sweet are Your words to my palate, [sweeter] than honey to my mouth!
104. From Your precepts I gain understanding, therefore I hate every path of falsehood.
105. Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.
106. I have sworn-and I will fulfill it-to keep Your righteous judgments.
107. I am afflicted to the extreme; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your promise.
108. Accept with favor, O Lord, the offerings of my lips, and teach me Your laws.
109. My soul is in danger always, yet I have not forgotten Your Torah.
110. The wicked laid a snare for me, yet I have not strayed from Your precepts.
111. I have taken Your testimonies as an eternal heritage, for they are the joy of my heart.
112. I have inclined my heart to perform Your statutes, forever, to the last.
113. I despise vain thoughts, but I love Your Torah.
114. You are my refuge and my shield; I place hope in Your promise.
115. Turn away from me, you evildoers, and I will keep the commandments of my God.
116. Support me according to Your promise, and I will live; let me not be shamed because of my hope.
117. Sustain me, and I will be saved, and I will be engrossed in Your statutes always.
118. You trample all who stray from Your statutes, for their ploy is a lie.
119. You have purged all the wicked of the earth like dross, therefore I love Your testimonies.
120. My flesh bristles from fear of You, and I am in awe of Your judgments.
121. I practiced justice and righteousness; leave me not to my oppressors.
122. Guarantee Your servant goodness; let not the wicked exploit me.
123. My eyes long for Your salvation, and for the word of Your righteousness.
124. Treat Your servant according to Your kindness, and teach me Your statutes.
125. I am Your servant; grant me understanding, that I may know Your testimonies.
126. It is time to act for the Lord; they have abrogated Your Torah.
127. Therefore I love Your commandments more than gold, even fine gold.
128. Therefore I affirmed all Your precepts; I have hated every path of falsehood.
129. Your testimonies are wondrous, therefore does my soul guard them.
130. Your opening words illuminate, enlightening the simple.
131. I opened my mouth and swallowed, because I craved Your commandments.
132. Turn to me and favor me, as is [Your] law for those who love Your Name.
133. Set my steps in Your word, and let no iniquity rule over me.
134. Deliver me from the oppression of man, and I will keep Your precepts.
135. Let Your face shine upon Your servant, and teach me Your statutes.
136. My eyes shed streams of water, because they do not keep Your Torah.
137. Righteous are you, O Lord, and Your judgments are upright.
138. You commanded Your testimonies in righteousness and great faithfulness.
139. My zeal consumes me, because my enemies have forgotten Your words.
140. Your word is very pure, and Your servant cherishes it.
141. I am young and despised, yet I do not forget Your precepts.
142. Your righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and Your Torah is truth.
143. Trouble and anguish have taken hold of me, yet Your commandments are my delight.
144. Your testimonies are righteous forever; give me understanding, that I may live.
145. I call out with all my heart; answer me, O Lord; I will keep Your statutes.
146. I call out to You; save me, and I will observe Your testimonies.
147. I rose before dawn and cried out; my hope is in Your word.
148. My eyes preceded the night watches, that I may discuss Your word.
149. Hear my voice in keeping with Your kindness; O Lord, grant me life as is Your practice.
150. Those who pursue mischief draw near; they are far from Your Torah.
151. You are near, O Lord, and all Your commandments are truth.
152. From the beginning I discerned from Your testimonies that You had established them forever.
153. Behold my affliction and deliver me, for I have not forgotten Your Torah.
154. Wage my battle and redeem me; grant me life for the sake of Your word.
155. Salvation is far from the wicked, for they seek not Your statutes.
156. Your mercies are great, O Lord; grant me life as is Your practice.
157. My pursuers and my enemies are many, yet I did not turn away from Your testimonies.
158. I saw traitors and I quarreled with them, because they do not keep Your words.
159. Behold how I love Your precepts; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your kindness.
160. The beginning of Your word is truth, and forever are all Your righteous judgements.
161. Princes have pursued me without cause, but it is Your word my heart fears.
162. I rejoice at Your word, like one who finds abundant spoil.
163. I hate falsehood and abhor it, but Your Torah I love.
164. Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous judgments.
165. There is abundant peace for those who love Your Torah, and there is no stumbling for them.
166. I hoped for Your salvation, O Lord, and I performed Your commandments.
167. My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them intensely.
168. I have kept Your precepts and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You
169. Let my prayer approach Your presence, O Lord; grant me understanding according to Your word.
170. Let my supplication come before You; save me according to Your promise.
171. My lips will utter praise, for You have taught me Your statutes.
172. My tongue will echo Your word, for all Your commandments are just.
173. Let Your hand be ready to help me, for I have chosen Your precepts.
174. I long for Your salvation, O Lord, and Your Torah is my delight.
175. Let my soul live, and it will praise You, and let Your judgment help me.
176. I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out Your servant, for I have not forgotten Your commandments.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 16
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Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 16
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וזה רמזו רבותינו ז״ל
Our Sages, of blessed memory, hinted at this principle stated here, that the tevunah-love, too, has the power of elevating one’s Torah and mitzvot
באמרם: מחשבה טובה הקב״ה מצרפה למעשה
when they said:1 “The Holy One, blessed be He, joins a good thought to the deed.”
והוה ליה למימר: מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו עשאה
The simple meaning of the phrase, that when one intends to do a mitzvah, but is prevented from doing so, G‑d ascribes it to him as though he had actually performed it, warrants the expression: “Torah considers him as though he had actually done it.”
Why the oblique expression, “G‑d joins the thought to the deed,” which seems to indicate that the thought was indeed implemented, but that the action is somehow detached from it, and requires that G‑d join the two together?
אלא הענין
The explanation, however, lies in the previously-mentioned principle:
כי דחילו ורחימו שבהתגלות לבו הם המתלבשים במעשה המצות, להחיותם לפרחא לעילא
It is the revealed fear and love of G‑d in the heart that vest themselves in one’s performance of the commandments, giving them vitality to soar on high.
כי הלב הוא גם כן חומרי, כשאר אברים שהם כלי המעשה
For the heart is also corporeal, like the other organs of the body which are the instruments of action.
Therefore, when one feels a palpable love in his heart — which indicates that the revelation in the soul has become “materialized” to the point where it can be experienced as a feeling of love in the corporeal heart — then this soul-revelation, this love, can also be received by and expressed in the other corporeal organs of the body. When it is so received, and when the organs act in accordance with the love in the heart, then this love lends vitality to these actions, for the heart is the source of vitality for all the organs, as the Alter Rebbe goes on to say.
אלא שהוא פנימי וחיות להם
The heart is, however, internal and is the organs‘ source of vitality.
ולכן יכול להתלבש בהם להיות להם גדפין להעלותם
Therefore, because the heart, in its corporeality, is close to the other organs, and also provides their vitality, it can clothe itself in their actions, to be their “wings”, elevating them.
As we see in practice: When one acts out of love, his hands suddenly become animated; for, as stated, when the soul’s revelation reaches the point where it is felt in a revealed love, it has become so materialized that it can be experienced in the other organs of the body, and can therefore animate their actions.
אך הדחילו ורחימו שבתבונות מוחו ותעלומות לבו הנ״ל
However, the above-mentioned fear and love that are in the intelligence of the brain and the recesses of the heart
גבהו דרכיהם למעלה מעלה מבחינת המעשה
are of a far higher order than the level of “action”.
ואי אפשר להם להתלבש בבחינת מעשה המצות, להיות להם בחינת מוחין וחיות, להעלותן לפרחא לעילא
Therefore, they cannot clothe themselves in the performance of the commandments, to become their intellectual power and vitality, to elevate them, so that they may soar on high;
The inability of the love to find expression beyond the mind — which is far more spiritual than the other organs — indicates that the revelation of soul present in the tevunah-love has not become materialized enough to affect the other, more corporeal organs. As we see, when one’s actions are motivated, not by the desire of his heart, but solely by his understanding that he ought to act in a particular manner, then his actions lack vitality. So it is too of the tevunah-love, and tevunah-fear; they are so far removed from the organs, that they are incapable of lending vitality to the actual performance of the mitzvot, and to elevate them thereby.
אם לא שהקב״ה מצרפן ומחברן לבחינת המעשה
if not for the fact that G‑d joins and unites them together with the action, so that they may serve as its “wings”.
והן נקראות בשם מחשבה טובה, כי אינן דחילו ורחימו ממש בהתגלות לבו
They — the tevunah-fear and love — are called “good thought,” for they are not actual fear and love in a revealed state in the heart,
כי אם בתבונת מוחו ותעלומות לבו כנ״ל
but only in the intelligence of the brain and the recesses of the heart, as mentioned above;*since they express themselves in the mind, they are called “good thought.”
This, then, is the allusion contained in the statement, “G‑d joins the good thought to the deed”: G‑d joins the “good thought” — the tevunah-love and fear — to the good deed (that one has actually performed), so that the deed is not separate from the thought, but instead is elevated by it.
In the following note, the Alter Rebbe states that this idea is expressed in the Kabbalah in terms of the Sefirot(the Divine attributes), and from this we may understand its parallel in the human faculties.
הגהה
וכמו שכתוב בזוהר וע׳ חיים, דתבונה אותיות ב״ן וב״ת שהן דחילו ורחימו
*NOTE
Thus it is also written in the Zohar and Etz Chayim, that the Hebrew word תבונה (“understanding”) comprises the letters which form the words בן and בת (“son” and “daughter”), which, in terms of human emotions, represent love and fear.
ולפעמים התבונה יורדת להיות מוחין בנוקבא דזעיר אנפין, שהן אותיות התורה והמצות
Sometimes the tevunah descends to become the intelligence in the feminine aspect of the “small image” (i.e., the recipient of the Divine middot, or attributes, which are referred to collectively as the “small image”), which, in the human sphere, refers to the letters of Torah and mitzvot.
The normal order would be that the tevunah descend first to the “small image” (the middot) and thence to the “feminine aspect” (the attribute of Malchut). Sometimes, however, there is a direct flow from Binah to Malchut,bypassing the intervening middot. In terms of one’s service to G‑d this means: The normal procedure should be that the understanding derived from one’s meditation should affect his emotions, arousing a love and fear within him, and these emotions should, in turn, express themselves in one’s actual performance of the commandments. There is, however, an alternative method of affecting one’s actions — through the direct influence of the tevunah.
והמשכיל יבין
The initiated shall understand. I.e., the kabbalistic references contained in the note will be more fully elucidated in the course of further study.
END OF NOTE
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to say that the effect of G‑d’s joining the “good thought” of tevunah to one’s good deeds, is that in this way the mitzvot are able to ascend to the World of Beriah. This is a “world of comprehension,” and all the mitzvot motivated by emotions arising from an understanding of G‑d’s greatness ascend thereto. But even without this act of joining the good thought to the deed, one’s Torah and mitzvot ascend to the (lower) World of Yetzirah, a “world of feeling,” since one’s performance is motivated (at the very least) by the inherent love and fear of G‑d that is hidden in the heart of every Jew.
אך צירוף זה מצרף הקב״ה כדי להעלות מעשה המצות ועסק התורה, הנעשים על ידי מחשבה טובה הנ״ל, עד עולם הבריאה
But G‑d effects this joining of tevunah to action in order to elevate the performance of the commandments and the Torah study — which are carried out through the influence of the “good thought” (viz., the tevunah) mentioned above — into the World of Beriah;
מקום עליית התורה והמצות הנעשים על ידי דחילו ורחימו שכליים, אשר בהתגלות לבו ממש
the World of Beriah being the level to which ascends the performance of Torah and mitzvotwhen motivated by a fear and love deriving from one’s meditation, and which are truly revealed in one’s heart.
אבל בלאו הכי נמי עולים לעולם היצירה על ידי דחילו ורחימו טבעיים המסותרים בלב כל ישראל בתולדותם, כמו שכתוב לקמן באריכות
However, even without this joining they rise to the World of Yetzirah, by means of the natural fear and love which are latent in the heart of all Jews from birth, as will be later explained at length.2
In summary: Even he who cannot create a conscious, palpable love and fear of G‑d in his heart, can serve G‑d with a perfect service through the tevunah-emotions. Thereby, too, his performance of the Torah and mitzvot will ascend to the same level as that motivated by a revealed love and fear of G‑d.
——— ● ———
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Cf. Kiddushin 40a. |
| 2. | Chs. 38, 39, 40. |
• Sefer Hamitzvot:
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Shabbat, Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
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Positive Commandment 94
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
"That which issues from your lips you shall keep and perform"—Deuteronomy 23:24.
We are commanded to carry through that which we pledge to do [or not to do].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
Positive Commandment 94
Translated by Berel Bell
The 94th mitzvah is that we are commanded to fulfill every verbal obligation we have taken upon ourselves, whether an oath, a vow, a korban,1 etc.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "You shall be careful to carry out whatever you say."
Although our Sages have split up this verse and explained each word separately as referring to something different, the general meaning of everything they say is: it is a positive commandment for a person to fulfill every verbal obligation he has taken upon himself, and a prohibition not to do so. This will be explained in our discussion of the prohibitions.3
The Sifri says, "The verse, 'Whatever you say,' constitutes a positive commandment." You find it obvious that the words, "whatever you say" by themselves have no meaning whatsoever. The intention [of the Sifri] is therefore as I explained above — that the plain meaning of the verse is that a person is obligated to carry out his verbal commitments.
This commandment is stated a second time in G‑d's statement,4 "A person must fulfill all he has verbally said."
The details of this mitzvah — i.e. how exactly the person must fulfill his obligation, and how he can be released [from his obligation] when in doubt regarding his statement — are explained in a number of passages in Sh'vuos, Nedarim, the end of Menachos, as well as in Kinim.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, a sacrifice. When a person says, "a sacrifice that I won't eat something of yours," he means to say that he considers that person's food to be forbidden for him to eat just as a sacrifice is forbidden to him. This constitutes a vow not to eat that person's food.
2.Deut. 23:24.
3.N157.
4.Num. 30:3.
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter A Day: Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter One
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Introduction to Hilchos Shabbos
They contain five mitzvot: two positive commandments and three negative commandments:
1) To rest on the seventh day;
2) Not to perform work on this day;
3) [For the court] not to administer punishment on the Sabbath;
4) Not to proceed beyond the limits [established by the Torah] on the Sabbath;
5) To sanctify the day by taking note [of it].
These mitzvot are explained in the chapters [which follow].
הלכות שבת - הקדמה
יש בכללן חמש מצות שתי מצות עשה. ושלש מצות לא תעשה. וזהו פרטן:
א) לשבות בשביעי.
ב) שלא לעשות בו מלאכה.
ג) שלא לענוש בשבת.
ד) שלא לצאת חוץ לגבול בשבת.
ה) לקדש את יום השבת בזכירה:
וביאור מצות אלו בפרקים אלו:
1
Resting from labor on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on it]."
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, he is liable for karet; if witnesses who administer a warning are present, he should be stoned [to death]. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression, he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.
א
שביתה בשביעי ממלאכה מצות עשה שנאמר וביום השביעי תשבות. וכל העושה בו מלאכה ביטל מצות עשה ועבר על לא תעשה שנאמר לא תעשה כל מלאכה ומהו חייב על עשיית מלאכה. אם עשה ברצונו בזדון חייב כרת. ואם היו שם עדים והתראה נסקל. ואם עשה בשגגה חייב קרבן חטאת קבועה:
Commentary on Halachah 1
2
Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is liable" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for karet, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering.1
ב
כל מקום שנאמר בהלכות שבת שהעושה דבר זה חייב הרי זה חייב כרת. ואם היו שם עדים והתראה חייב סקילה. ואם היה שוגג חייב חטאת:
3
Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.2
In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic3 in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."4Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion5 is given "stripes for defiance."
ג
וכל מקום שנאמר שהעושה דבר זה פטור הרי זה פטור מן הכרת ומן הסקילה ומן הקרבן אבל אסור לעשות אותו דבר בשבת ואיסורו מדברי סופרים והוא הרחקה מן המלאכה. והעושה אותו בזדון מכין אותו מכת מרדות. וכן כל מקום שנאמר אין עושין כך וכך או אסור לעשות כך וכך בשבת העושה אותו דבר בזדון מכין אותו מכת מרדות
4
Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act.6 Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]7
ד
וכל מקום שנאמר מותר לעשות כך וכך הרי זה מותר לכתחלה. וכן כל מקום שנאמר אינו חייב כלום או פטור מכלום אין מכין אותו כלל:
5
It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty8 - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor9 will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.10
What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench11 and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.12
Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair.13 Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.
ה
דברים המותרים לעשותן בשבת ובשעת עשייתן אפשר שתעשה בגללן מלאכה ואפשר שלא תעשה. אם לא נתכוין לאותה מלאכה הרי זה מותר. כיצד גורר אדם מטה וכסא וספסל וכיוצא בהן בשבת ובלבד שלא יתכוין לחפור חריץ בקרקע בשעת גרירתן. ולפיכך אם חפרו הקרקע אינו חושש בכך לפי שלא נתכוין. וכן מהלך אדם על גבי עשבים בשבת ובלבד שלא יתכוין לעקור אותן. לפיכך אם נעקרו אינו חושש. ורוחץ ידיו בעפר הפירות וכיוצא בו ובלבד שלא יתכוין להשיר השער. לפיכך אם נשר אינו חושש. וכן פרצה דחוקה מותר להכנס בה בשבת אף על פי שמשיר צרורות. וכן כל דבר שאין מתכוין כגון זה הרי זה מותר:
6
[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable14 even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].
What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken,15 he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.
ו
אבל עשה מעשה ונעשית בגללו מלאכה שודאי תעשה בשביל אותו מעשה אע"פ שלא נתכוין לה חייב. שהדבר ידוע שאי אפשר שלא תעשה אותה מלאכה. "כיצד הרי שצריך לראש עוף לצחק בו הקטן וחתך ראשו בשבת אע"פ שאין סוף מגמתו להריגת העוף בלבד חייב שהדבר ידוע שאי אפשר שיחתוך ראש החי ויחיה אלא המות בא בשבילו וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
7
Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.16
What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing,17 but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.
Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him,18 and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.
ז
כל העושה מלאכה בשבת אף על פי שאינו צריך לגופה של מלאכה חייב עליה. כיצד הרי שכבה את הנר מפני שהוא צריך לשמן או לפתילה כדי שלא יאבד או כדי שלא ישרף או כדי שלא יבקע חרש של נר. מפני שהכיבוי מלאכה והרי נתכוין לכבות ואע"פ שאינו צריך לגוף הכבוי ולא כבה אלא מפני השמן או מפני החרש או מפני הפתילה הרי זה חייב. וכן המעביר את הקוץ ארבע אמות ברשות הרבים או המכבה את הגחלת כדי שלא יזוקו בהן רבים חייב ואע"פ שאינו צריך לגוף הכבוי או לגוף ההעברה אלא להרחיק ההיזק הרי זה חייב וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
8
Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.19
What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.
How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit,20 and instead, the stone passed into the public domain.21 He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable.22 For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground,23 he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.
ח
כל המתכוין לעשות מלאכה ונעשה לו מלאכה אחרת שלא נתכוין לה פטור עליה לפי שלא נעשית מחשבתו. כיצד זרק אבן או חץ בחבירו או בבהמה כדי להורגן והלך ועקר אילן בהליכתו ולא הרג הרי זה פטור. הרי זה קל וחומר אם נתכוין לאיסור קל ונעשה איסור חמור. כגון שנתכוין לזרוק בכרמלית ועברה האבן לרשות הרבים שהוא פטור וכן כל כיוצא בזה. נתכוין לעשות דבר המותר ועשה דבר אחר כגון שנתכוין לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר אינו חייב כלום וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
9
Should a person intend24 to pick black figs and pick white figs instead25 - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable.26 He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade.
ט
נתכוין ללקוט תאנים שחורות וליקט לבנות או שנתכוין ללקוט תאנים ואחר כך ענבים ונהפך הדבר וליקט הענבים בתחלה ואחר כך תאנים פטור אף על פי שליקט כל מה שחשב הואיל ולא ליקט כסדר שחשב פטור שבלא כוונה עשה שלא אסרה תורה אלא מלאכת מחשבת:
10
When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable,27 for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.28
To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being]29 and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.
י
היו לפניו שתי נרות דולקות או כבויות נתכוין לכבות זו וכבה את זו להדליק זו והדליק את זו חייב שהרי עשה מן המלאכה שחשב לעשותה. הא למה הוא דומה למי שנתכוין ללקוט תאנה זו וליקט תאנה אחרת. או למי שנתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה שהרי נעשית מלאכה שחשב לעשותה:
11
One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.30] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.31
If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable.32 The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.33
יא
אבל אם נתכוין להדליק ראשונה ולכבות שניה אחריה ונהפך הדבר וכבה ראשונה ואחר כך הדליק שניה אחריה פטור. כבה זו והדליק זו בנשימה אחת חייב. שאע"פ שלא הקדים ההדלקה הרי זה לא איחר אותה אלא שתיהן כאחת ולפיכך חייב וכן כל כיוצא בזה וכל העושה מלאכה במתעסק ולא נתכוין לה פטור:
12
Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable.34 If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.35
What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.
יב
כל המתכוין לעשות מלאכה ונעשית ביותר על כוונתו חייב בפחות מכוונתו פטור. כיצד הרי שנתכוין להוציא משא לאחריו ובא לו לפניו חייב שהרי נתכוין לשמירה פחותה ונעשית שמירה מעולה. אבל אם נתכוין להוציא לפניו ובא לו לאחריו פטור שהרי נתכוין להוציא בשמירה מעולה והוציא בשמירה פחותה וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
13
[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt36 and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.37
יג
היה חגור בסינר והשליך המשא בין בשרו וחלוקו בין שבא זה המשא שדרכו להוציאו בדרך הזאת לפניו בין שבא לאחריו חייב שכן דרכו להיות חוזר:
14
Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability,38 he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.39
For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.40
Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands.41 Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.
יד
כל המתכוין לעשות מלאכה בשבת והתחיל בה ועשה כשיעור חייב. אף על פי שלא השלים כל המלאכה שנתכוין להשלימה. כיצד הרי שנתכוין לכתוב אגרת או שטר בשבת אין אומרים לא יתחייב זה עד שישלים חפצו ויכתוב כל השטר או כל האגרת אלא משיכתוב שתי אותיות חייב. וכן אם נתכוין לארוג בגד שלם משיארוג שני חוטין חייב ואף על פי שכוונתו להשלים הבגד הואיל ועשה כשיעור בכוונה חייב וכן כל כיוצא בזה
15
Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself,42 they are [both] free of liability.43
This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.
טו
כל מלאכה שהיחיד יכול לעשות אותה לבדו ועשו אותה שנים בשותפות בין שעשה זה מקצתה וזה מקצתה כגון שעקר זה החפץ מרשות זו והניחו השני ברשות אחרת בין שעשו אותה שניהם כאחד מתחלה ועד סוף כגון שאחזו שניהם בקולמוס וכתבו או אחזו ככר והוציאוהו מרשות לרשות הרי אלו פטורין:
16
When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].44 For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone,45 and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.
[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all.46 The same applies in other similar situations.
טז
ואם אין אחד מהן יכול לעשותה לבדו עד שיצטרפו כגון שנים שאחזו קורה והוציאוהו לרשות הרבים הואיל ואין כח באחד מהן לעשותה לבדו ועשו אותה בשותפות מתחלה ועד סוף שניהן חייבין ושיעור אחד לשניהן. היה כח באחד להוציא קורה זו לבדו והשני אינו יכול להוציאה לבדו ונשתתפו שניהם והוציאוה. זה הראשון שיכול חייב והשני מסייע הוא ומסייע אינו חייב כלום וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
17
Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.47 What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,48 one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.
A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.49 Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.
יז
כל המקלקלין פטורין. כיצד הרי שחבל בחבירו או בבהמה דרך השחתה וכן אם קרע בגדים או שרפן או שבר כלים דרך השחתה הרי זה פטור. חפר גומא ואינו צריך אלא לעפרה הרי זה מקלקל ופטור אע"פ שעשה מלאכה הואיל וכוונתו לקלקל פטור:
18
Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable.50 For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place,51 one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.
The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.52
יח
כל המקלקל על מנת לתקן חייב. כיצד הרי שסתר כדי לבנות במקומו או שמחק כדי לכתוב במקום שמחק או שחפר גומא כדי לבנות בתוכה יסודות וכל כיוצא בזה חייב ושיעורן כשיעור המתקן:
19
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally,53 he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.
One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning.54 Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature55 when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.
יט
כל העושה מלאכה בשבת מקצתה בשוגג ומקצתה בזדון בין שהזיד ולבסוף שגג בין ששגג ולבסוף הזיד פטור עד שיעשה שיעור המלאכה כולה מתחלה ועד סוף בזדון ואחר כך יהיה חייב כרת. ואם יהיה בעדים והתראה חייב סקילה. או שיעשה שיעור מלאכה כולה בשגגה מתחלה ועד סוף ואחר כך יהיה חייב חטאת קבועה
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Rambam is explaining that by performing a forbidden act on the Sabbath, a person incurs liability. The nature of this liability depends on his intent and on whether witnesses are present. These factors are common, however, to all the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore, in the future, all that is necessary to say is that "the person is liable," and based on the principles stated here, we can determine what his liability is.
2.
Shabbat 3a makes a similar statement of principle, but states that there are three exceptions to this rule. When discussing these exceptions, the Rambam deviates from the terminology used in the Talmud and states that these three acts are "permitted."
3.
Our translation reflects the usual interpretation of the Hebrew expression מדברי סופרים. There are commentaries (e.g., the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut 2:1) who cite the Rambam's statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2) and explain that this expression can refer to a prohibition of the Torah which is derived through the accepted traditions of Biblical exegesis. In this instance, however, the Rambam's intent is clear; the term refers to prohibitions that the Rabbis instituted on their own initiative as safeguards.
4.
The Rambam discusses this punishment in Hilchot Edut 18:6, explaining that the person is flogged to the extent of the court's discretion (in contrast to the number of lashes received for the violation of a Torah command, which is fixed at 39). Other authorities offer different interpretations.
5.
Shoshanat Ha'amakim states that this expression implies that a person must be given a warning before such a punishment is administered.
6.
I.e., there is no prohibition whatsoever for performing the act in question.
7.
This expression implies that, at the outset, it is improper to perform such an act. Nevertheless, doing so does not warrant punishment (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh).
8.
If, however, it is certain that the forbidden labor will be performed, it is prohibited to perform the permitted act, as explained in the following halachah.
9.
Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 9), explains that by using the term "forbidden labor" in this and the following halachah, the Rambam implies that there is a difficulty only if a prohibition from the Torah is involved. If merely a Rabbinic prohibition is concerned, it is permitted without question. This question is also discussed by the Mishneh L'Melech.
10.
The Rambam's decision is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (See Beitzah 23b and other sources.) Rabbi Shimon maintains that although a forbidden labor results from a person's activity, since he did not desire that this labor be performed, he is not held liable. Rabbi Yehudah, in contrast, holds the person liable, for his actions brought about the performance of a forbidden labor.
The commentaries explain Rabbi Shimon's opinion based on the principle (Chaggigah 10b) that "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." A deed is forbidden only when it is associated with a purposeful intent. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
The concept discussed in this halachah, אינו מתכוין, differs from an ordinary example of a labor performed unintentionally. When we speak of a labor performed unintentionally (בשוגג), the person had no thought whatsoever of performing a forbidden activity. In the case of אינו מתכוין, by contrast, the person performs an act consciously with the knowledge that there is a possibility that it may lead to a forbidden act. Nevertheless, since there is no certainty that the transgression will be committed, he is not held liable.
Although this principle is applicable to the Sabbath laws in particular, the difference of opinion between these two sages on this issue is relevant, not only to the Sabbath laws, but to all other prohibitions in the Torah as well.
Based on Pesachim 25b-26b, it appears that one is allowed to perform an activity that may result in the incidental performance of a forbidden labor even when one has an alternative manner of accomplishing one's objective, which does not involve any risk of a forbidden labor being performed. See Hilchot Kilayim 10:16.
11.
Our text follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, which quotes the text of Shabbat 22b. The original manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute מגדל, "cabinet," instead of ספסל, "bench."
12.
Digging a groove is forbidden because it is included in the category of forbidden labor, plowing. Nevertheless, since one did not intend to perform this labor, the fact that it was performed is of no consequence. Similarly, all the subsequent activities mentioned by the Rambam involve the performance of a forbidden labor without the intent to do so.
13.
See Chapter 22, Halachah 13.
14.
As mentioned in Halachah 2, the use of this term implies that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham). Although some authorities have explained that since the person had no intent for the labor itself, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature, from the Rambam's perspective it appears that since he knows that the labor will be performed, it is considered as if he performed it intentionally.
15.
The addition of the word "merely" implies that the person has a desire to slaughter the fowl. Albeit, his desire may not be to kill the fowl for food, but even for use as a toy it is preferable that the fowl be dead than alive.
This leads to another concept. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). In his notes on Chapter 10, Halachah 17, Rabbenu Chayim Soloveitchik states that the Rambam also subscribes to this opinion.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:18) gives an example of this situation: The plug of a barrel of wine was closed with flax. Although some wine will inevitably be squeezed out when the barrel is unplugged - and squeezing is a forbidden labor - since the wine that is squeezed out will be lost, there is no prohibition.
This opinion is not, however, accepted by all authorities. Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher in their glosses on Shabbat 103a differ and maintain that, since it is inevitable that a forbidden labor will be performed, such an act is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch's statements, it would appear that it is preferable to follow the more stringent view, but that the more lenient perspective has become popularly accepted.
16.
This also represents a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as evident from Shabbat 29b-30a, 73b, and other sources.
As in the laws mentioned in Halachah 7, the source of their difference of opinion is Rabbi Shimon's principle, "the Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." To explain: The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is derived from the labors performed to construct the Sanctuary (see the commentary on Chapter 7, Law 1), and with regard to the construction of the Sanctuary, the Torah uses the expression, מלאכת מחשבת, "contemplative work." Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the Torah's prohibition against labor is related to thought. Only when one's actions are purposeful can they be forbidden.
For this reason, Rabbi Shimon maintains - as explained in Halachah 5 - that when a person performs a forbidden labor without the intention to do so (אינו מתכוין), he is not liable. Although a forbidden activity results from his conduct, since his thought was not involved in the matter, his work does not resemble the labor that was necessary to construct the Sanctuary. Hence, one is not held liable for such labor on the Sabbath.
In the situation at hand, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, the person performing the forbidden labor is doing so intentionally. Nevertheless, since his intent is not the same as that ordinarily associated - or according to some authorities, associated at the time of the construction of the Sanctuary - with this labor, he is not held liable. (See the comments of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh.)
Rabbi Yehudah differs on both issues, maintaining that since the performance of a forbidden labor results from this person's conscious activity, he is held liable. The Rambam (following the opinion of Shemuel, Zevachim 92a) accepts Rabbi Shimon's view with regard to אינו מתכוין, but follows Rabbi Yehudah's view with regard to a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
The difference between these opinions can be explained based on the interpretation of the command תשבות, "rest," on which basis we observe the Sabbath laws. We find another difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and the other Sages (Pesachim 27a) concerning a word with a similar root. With regard to the command (Exodus 12:15), תשביתו שאור, "destroy leaven," Rabbi Yehudah maintains that leaven must be burned. The other Sages (including Rabbi Shimon) maintain that leaven may be destroyed be other means.
What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the destruction of leaven must be utter and complete as possible, while the Sages maintain that all that is necessary is to negate its usefulness (potential for purposeful use). Similarly, in the present instance, Rabbi Yehudah explains that all semblances of labor are forbidden on the Sabbath. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that only purposeful labor is forbidden; only when both the activity and the intent for which it is performed are analogous to the activities performed to construct the Sanctuary is a transgression committed. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 7, p. 190-191.)
Shemuel and the Rambam take an intermediate position. They agree with Rabbi Shimon that an activity must be coupled with a purposeful intent, but maintain that since a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is an intentional act, it is forbidden as such a combination.
It must be noted that the Rambam's view is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra'avad, Tosafot (Zevachim, ibid.) and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities state that Rabbi Shimon's opinion is accepted in both these instances. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1, 334:12) accepts Tosafot's decision. Nevertheless, even the authorities who accept Rabbi Shimon's view maintain that, if there is no danger to the community involved, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree.
17.
I.e., his intent in extinguishing the lamp was not to produce coals to use for kindling an even flame, the purpose for which extinguishing was performed in constructing the Sanctuary.
18.
I.e., when constructing the Sanctuary, articles were transported because they were desired, and coals were extinguished to use for kindling an even flame.
19.
Although the instance stated by the Rambam is not found in the Talmud, it is a logical extension of the principle stated in Keritot 19b and Shabbat 97b (and expressed in the following halachah), "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." Since the labor ultimately performed was not the one originally intended, this is not considered to be "purposeful work."
20.
As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, a carmelit is a domain in which the Sages applied the prohibitions against transporting and throwing articles which apply in the public domain by virtue of Torah law. Thus, the person had the intent of violating merely a Rabbinic law.
21.
The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Chapter 13, Halachah 21, which states that even when a person intended to throw an object four cubits in the public domain and instead the object traveled eight cubits, he is not held liable, because he did not accomplish his intent. Hence, he explains that the intent is not that the public domain is beyond the carmelit and the object did not rest in the carmelit as intended, but rather continued to the public domain.
Instead, the Rambam is referring to an instance where a person is standing in a private domain with both a public domain and a carmelit before him. Although he intended to throw the object into the carmelit, it traveled into the public domain.
22.
See Hilchot Shegagot 7:11. This halachah represents a progressive sequence. In the first instance mentioned, the forbidden activity the person intended to perform was not performed at all. In the second instance, he intended to perform the forbidden activity - removing an object from his property - but his intent was not to transgress a Torah prohibition. In this third instance, the person had the intent of performing the activity that he performed for the sake of the result that activity produced. Nevertheless, since he desired to perform this activity with a permitted entity and that aspect of the desire was not fulfilled, he is not held liable (Rav Kapach).
23.
The Maggid Mishneh offers two different interpretations of the Rambam's words: one that the person cut a different plant from the one he intended to cut, and one that he thought the plant he intended to cut had been detached from the earth, and discovered that it was attached. Although, both interpretations are halachically acceptable, the Maggid Mishneh favors the second one. The Kovetz and other authorities, however, favor the first.
24.
This halachah develops the theme stated in the previous halachah, giving a further example of a case where a person is not held liable for a forbidden activity he performed, because of the principle, "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]."
25.
The difference in the color of the figs causes them to be regarded as two different types of fruit. This is significant, as is obvious from the contrast to the following halachah.
26.
The Ra'avad takes issue with this point, arguing that since the person picking the fruit accomplished his objective, he should be held liable. It is insignificant that the order in which he picked them differed from that which he originally intended.
It can be explained, based on Keritot 19b, that the Rambam's understanding is that for a person to be held liable, not only must he accomplish his ultimate intent, but also, while he is performing the labor, his actions must be controlled by his thoughts.
Commenting on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh notes that there is no difference regarding practical halachah at present. The only difference will be in the Era of the Redemption, at which time there will be a question whether it is necessary for such a person to bring a sin offering or not, and in that era, "the righteous instructor (Mashiach) will come" and render a decision.
27.
This is the text of Keritot 20a according to the Rambam and others. Our text of Keritot differs and frees a person of liability in such an instance. On this basis, the Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's position.
28.
In contrast to the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person does not derive any advantage from kindling or extinguishing either candle; he merely wants to kindle or distinguish a candle. The same effect results from kindling or extinguishing one as the other. Hence he is liable, for he performed a forbidden labor, and he is considered to have performed it willfully. Were there to be an advantage to kindling or extinguishing one of the two candles, the situation would resemble that described in Halachah 11.
29.
The intent does not appear to be that he desired to kill a person, for it is highly unlikely that there would be no difference killing one person or the other. Rather, the Rambam appears to be referring to the killing of an insect or an animal, an act that is also forbidden on the Sabbath.
30.
The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Keritot 20a.
31.
As in Halachah 9, the fact that the person did not perform the tasks in the order in which he originally intended indicates that, at the time he performed them, he was not in control of his deeds. Hence, this is not considered to be "purposeful work." In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs and holds the person liable.
The new concept this halachah teaches is that even when the tasks which the person intended to perform involve two separate labors (as opposed to Halachah 9 when only a single forbidden labor is involved), he is held liable only when he performs the tasks in the order he originally intended.
32.
Since the order in which the person desired to perform the activity was not reversed, his actions are "purposeful work."
33.
Rashi, Keritot 19b, differentiates between this type of behavior, referred to as מתעסק, and an inadvertent transgression of a commandment (שוגג) as follows: When a person transgresses בשוגג, he willfully performs the forbidden activity, but is unaware of the prohibition involved. In all the situations described as מתעסק, the person may be aware of the prohibition, but is not consciously controlling his behavior.
34.
Although he accepts the Rambam's premise, the Ra'avad objects to the wording the Rambam chose, explaining that there is an instance - a person who desired to write the name שמעון and instead, wrote the name שם - where a person does not fulfill his intention and is still liable.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, the person also had the intent to write the letters of the name שם and is therefore held liable, as implied by Halachah 14. By putting the focus on intent, the Rambam emphasizes that the leniency stated in this halachah is also an outgrowth of the principle that "The Torah prohibited purposeful work."
35.
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the expression "he is not liable," means that a person should not be punished - nor is he liable to bring a sin offering - for his deed. Nevertheless, performing such a deed constitutes the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. As mentioned, this concept is applicable throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the Mishneh Torah as a whole.
36.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:4. Rashi and others offer alternate definitions of the term.
37.
The intent here is that since it is usual for the article to shift position in such an instance, this is considered to be part of the person's original intent.
Although this law is more specific than most mentioned in this chapter, it is still worthy of mention, because it illustrates how a person's intention can be general in nature and include several different possible ways in which a forbidden labor could be performed.
38.
Here the Rambam introduces a new concept, שיעור, the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. When the Torah forbade the performance of labor on the Sabbath, it also specified that a person is not held liable unless his activities are sufficient to bring about a significant result. Thus, a particular שיעור was established for every specific labor.
A similar concept applies with regard to other prohibitions. For example, with regard to most forbidden foods one is not held liable unless one eats an amount equivalent to the size of an olive.
[Yoma 74 discusses whether a person who performs a forbidden activity, but does so involving less than a שיעור, is considered to have violated a prohibition from the Torah (although he is not liable for punishment or a sin offering) or whether he is considered to have violated merely a Rabbinic commandment.]
39.
One might think that since the person did not complete his intended objective, his activity is not considered "purposeful labor." The Rambam explains, however, that since the work the person did complete was performed "purposefully," and since he completed a significant amount of work (a שיעור), he is held liable.
40.
See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.
41.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 18.
42.
A situation in which a forbidden labor requires the efforts of more than one individual is discussed in the following halachah.
43.
Shabbat 3a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, explaining that that verse teaches that one is liable only "when one performs the entire labor and not a portion of it; when one person performs the labor and not two."
See also Rashi, Shabbat 93a and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:7 explain that a person is not liable for performing a labor in this manner, because this is not the ordinary manner in which the labor is performed.
44.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the same applies when a forbidden labor is performed by three or more individuals and the performance of the forbidden labor requires the efforts of all the individuals involved. Nevertheless, if three individuals perform a forbidden labor and it requires only the efforts of two, none of the individuals is held liable, for no one is capable of performing the task alone.
45.
Tosafot, Shabbat 93a emphasizes that the matter is not dependent on strength alone. Even when a person has sufficient strength to carry an object alone, but requires a second person's assistance because of the object's bulk, neither is liable. In practice, the transfer of the object requires both their efforts.
46.
This principle is also applied in other contexts aside from the laws of the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Tum'at Mishkav UMoshav 7:6 and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 5:18. See also the commentary to the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.)
47.
As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.
(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.)
48.
However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion.
49.
The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (see Halachah 7), for the digger has no desire for the pit, the object of the work. As mentioned, other authorities free a person in such an instance; the Rambam, however, would normally hold one liable.
50.
Indeed, several of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath - e.g., tearing, erasing, and demolishing - involve activities that are essentially destructive in nature. Nevertheless, when one performs these activities for an ultimate constructive intent, one is held liable.
51.
The commentaries note the contrast between the Rambam's wording in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 15, where he omits the expression, "in its place." Accordingly, the commentaries question whether one is liable for demolishing a building for the sake of building another, when the other building will not be built in the place of the first. (See the gloss of the Or Sameach on Chapter 10, Halachah 12.)
52.
For example, the minimum measure (שיעור) for which one is liable for the constructive act of writing is two letters. Therefore, one is liable for erasing two letters. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 9, a person is liable when he erases one letter which is large enough for two to be written in its place.
53.
The definition of "unintentionally" (בשוגג) is that one is unaware that the activity is forbidden, or one is unaware that the day is the Sabbath. Thus, the situation described by the Rambam would involve, for example, writing one letter knowing that it is the Sabbath and that it is forbidden to do so, and writing a second letter having forgotten either of these factors.
54.
See Halachah 1.
55.
See Halachah 1.
Rambam:
• 3 Chapters A Day: Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 1, Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 2, Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 3
English Text | Hebrew Text
Audio: Listen | Download | Video ClassNedarim - Chapter 1
Introduction to Hilchos Nedarim
They contain 3 mitzvot: two positive commandments and one negative commandment. They are:
1. To heed the utterances of one’s mouth and to carry out one’s vow;
2. Not to desecrate one’s word;
3. To nullify a vow or an oath; this is the law concerning the nullification of oaths explicitly stated in the Torah.
These mitzvot are explained in the ensuing chapters.
רמב"ם הלכות נדרים - הקדמה
הלכות נדרים. יש בכללן שלש מצות, שתי מצות עשה, ואחת מצות לא תעשה. וזה הוא פרטן:
א) שישמור מוצא שפתיו ויעשה כמו שנדר.
(ב) שלא יחל דברו.
(ג) שיפר הנדר או) השבועה, זהו דין הפרת נדרים המפורש בתורה שבכתב.
וביאור מצות אלו בפרקים אלו.
1
There are two categories of vows: The first is to forbid oneself [from benefiting] from entities permitted to him;1 e.g., he said: "The produce from this-and-this country is forbidden to me for 30 days" or "...forever." "This type of produce is forbidden to me" or "This produce is forbidden." Regardless of the language in which the prohibition is stated,2 they become forbidden to him, even though there is no oath at all, nor did it mention God's name or a term used to describe Him.3 Concerning this, the Torah [Numbers 30:3] states: "To cause a prohibition to take effect upon his soul," i.e., to cause permitted entities to become forbidden to him. Similarly, such a vow takes effect if he says: "They are forbidden to me." I call this category: "vows involving prohibitions."
א
הנדר נחלק לשתי מחלוקות החלק הראשון הוא שיאסור על עצמו דברים המותרים לו כגון שיאמר פירות מדינה פלונית אסורין עלי כל שלשים יום או לעולם או מין פלוני מפירות העולם או פירות אלו אסורין עלי בכל לשון שיאסור הרי זה נאסר בהן ואע"פ שאין שם שבועה כלל ולא הזכרת שם ולא כנוי ועל זה נאמר בתורה לאסור אסר על נפשו שיאסור על עצמו דברים המותרים וכן אם אמר הרי הן עלי איסר הרי אלו אסורין וחלק זה הוא שאני קורא אותו נדרי איסר:
2
The second category is to obligate himself for a sacrifice that he is not required to bring. For example, he said: "I obligate myself [to bring] a burnt offering," "I obligate myself to bring a peace offering," "...a meal offering," or "This animal is a burnt offering," or "...a peace offering."
When he says: "I obligate myself [to bring]...", this is called a vow.4 When he says: "This is...", it is called a donation.5 Donations and vows are of the same type [of pledges], but [the one making the pledge] is responsible for a vow.6With regard to a donations, by contrast, he is not responsible.7 Concerning these the Torah states [Deuteronomy 12:17]: "Your vows which you pledge and your donations...." This category, I refer to as "vows of sanctification."
ב
והחלק השני הוא שיחייב עצמו בקרבן שאינו חייב בו כגון שיאמר הרי עלי להביא עולה או הרי עלי להביא שלמים או מנחה הרי בהמה זו עולה או שלמים והאומר [הרי] עלי הוא הנקרא נדר והאומר הרי זו הוא הנקרא נדבה והנדבה והנדר ממין אחד הוא אלא שהנדרים חייבין באחריותן ונדבות אין חייבין באחריותן ועל זה נאמר בתורה ונדריך אשר תדור ונדבותיך וגו' וחלק זה הוא שאני קורא אותו נדרי הקדש:
3
The laws concerning the first category and its relevant matters are [the subject] we will discuss in these halachot. The laws concerning vows of sanctification and their particulars will be discussed in their appropriate place in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot.8
ג
ודיני החלק הראשון וענינו הם שאנו מבארים בהלכות אלו אבל דיני נדרי הקדש ומשפטיהם כלם יתבארו במקומם בהלכות מעשה הקרבנות:
4
It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for a person to carry out his oath or vow9 whether it be a vow involving prohibitions or a vow of sanctification, as [Deuteronomy 12:23] states: "Heed the utterances of your mouth and do as you vowed." And [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth."10
ד
מצות עשה של תורה שיקיים אדם שבועתו או נדרו בין שהיה מנדרי איסר בין שהיה מנדרי הקדש שנאמר מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית כאשר נדרת ונאמר ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה:
5
When a person forbids himself from partaking of a particular type of food, e.g., he said: "Figs are forbidden to me," "Figs from such-and-such a country are forbidden to me," "These figs are forbidden to me," or the like, if he partakes of any amount of them, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law,11 as [Numbers, Ibid.] states: "He shall not desecrate his word."
There is no minimum measure [for the desecration of] a vow, for by taking a vow [not to partake of] a substance, it is as if one explicitly stated that he would not partake of even the slightest amount.12 If one said: "It is forbidden for me to eat the produce of this-and-this country" or "...to eat these fruit," he does not receive lashes unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion.
ה
האוסר על עצמו מין ממיני מאכל כגון שאמר תאנים אסורין עלי או תאנים של מדינה פלונית אסורים עלי או תאנים אלו אסורין עלי וכיוצא באלו ואכל מהן כל שהוא לוקה מן התורה שנאמר לא יחל דברו שאין לנדרים שיעור שכל הנודר מדבר הרי זה כמפרש כל שהוא אמר אכילה מפירות מדינה פלונית אסורין עלי או אכילה מפירות אלו אינו לוקה עד שיאכל כזית:
6
If a person forbade himself from eating figs and grapes - whether in two vows or in one - the two can be combined to make up the measure of an olive-sized portion.13 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ו
אסר על עצמו אכילה מן התאנים ואכילה מן הענבים בין בנדר אחד בין בשני נדרים הרי אלו מצטרפין לכזית וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
7
When a person says: "This produce is considered like a sacrifice," or he tells a colleague: "Everything that I partake of with you is a sacrifice,"14 "...like a sacrifice," "or considered like a sacrifice for me," they are forbidden to him. For it is possible that a person will make a vow for a sacrifice and make an animal that is ordinary a sacrifice and thus be forbidden for him.15
ז
האומר פירות אלו עלי קרבן או שאמר הרי הם כקרבן או שאמר לחבירו כל מה שאוכל עמך עלי קרבן או כקרבן או הרי הן עלי קרבן הרי אלו אסורין עליו מפני שאפשר שידור אדם קרבן ויעשה בהמה שהיתה חול קרבן ותאסר:
8
If, however, a person says: "This produce is considered for me...", "This type of produce is considered for me...", "What I will eat with so-and-so will be considered as pig meat," "...as a false deity," "...as nevelot and trefot," or the like, they are permitted and no vow takes effect. [The rationale is that] it is impossible for a person to make something that is not pig meat as pig meat.16
ח
אבל האומר פירות אלו עלי או מין פלוני עלי או מה שאוכל עם פלוני עלי כבשר חזיר או כעכו"ם או כנבלות וטרפות וכיוצא באלו הרי אלו מותרין ואין כאן נדר שאי אפשר שיעשה דבר שאינו בשר חזיר כבשר חזיר:
9
This is the general principle [that applies] whenever anyone attempts to have permitted entities considered as forbidden entities: If he could have endowed that forbidden entity with its status by taking a vow,17 [the permitted entities] are forbidden. If he cannot endow it with its status by taking a vow,18 [the permitted entities] remain permitted.
ט
זה הכלל כל המשים דברים המותרים כדברים האסורים אם אותו דבר האסור יכול לעשותו בנדר הרי אלו אסורים ואם אינו יכול לעשותו בנדר הרי אלו מותרין:
10
Sin-offerings and guilt-offerings cannot be brought as vows or as donations, as will be explained in the appropriate place.19 Nevertheless, it is possible for a person making a vow to offer them as a result of his vow. For a person who takes a nazirite vow must bring a sin offering,20 and if he becomes impure,21 he must bring a guilt offering, as will be stated.22 Accordingly, when one says: "This produce is considered for me like a sin-offering" or "...like a guilt-offering," or he says: "It is a sin-offering" or "It is a guilt-offering," it is forbidden. Needless to say, if he says: "It is a burnt-offering," "...a peace-offering," "...a meal-offering," or "...a thanksgiving-offering," it is forbidden, for all of these offerings can be brought as vows or as donations.23
י
החטאת והאשם אף על פי שאינן באין בנדר ונדבה כמו שיתבאר במקומו אפשר לנודר להביא אותם מחמת נדרו שהנודר בנזיר מביא חטאת ואם נטמא מביא אשם כמו שיתבאר לפיכך האומר פירות אלו עלי כחטאת או כאשם או שאמר הרי הן חטאת או הרי הן אשם הרי אלו אסורין ואין צריך לומר באומר הרי הן עולה או שלמים או מנחה או תודה שהן אסורין שכל אלו באין בנדר ונדבה:
11
If, however, one says: "This produce is considered for me like the challah [brought] to Aaron" or "...like the terumah for him,"24 it is permitted. For there is no way that these can be brought as vows or as donations.25
יא
אבל האומר פירות אלו עלי כחלת אהרן או כתרומתו הרי אלו מותרין שאין שם דרך להביא אלו בנדר ונדבה:
12
If one says: "This produce is considered for me like notar,"26"...like piggul,"27 or "...like sacrificial meat that has become impure,"28 it is forbidden. For the person has, nonetheless, made the substance like sacrificial meat.29
יב
האומר הרי הפירות האלו עלי כנותר כפגול כבשר טמא של קדשים הרי אלו אסורין שהרי עשאן כבשר קרבן מכל מקום:
13
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like the tithe-sacrifice of an animal,"30 it is forbidden, for the sanctity [of the tithe-sacrifices] is conveyed upon them by mortals.31 If he says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a firstborn,"32it is permitted, for the sanctity [of the firstborn] is not conveyed by mortals.33It cannot be designated [for another sacred purpose] with a vow, as [Leviticus 27:26] states: "A man should not consecrate it."34
יג
האומר הרי הן עלי כמעשר בהמה הרי אלו אסורין הואיל וקדושתו בידי אדם הרי הן עלי כבכור הרי אלו מותרין שאין קדושתו בידי אדם ואינו יכול להתפיסו בנדר שנאמר לא יקדיש איש אותו:
14
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a devotion offering for Above,"35 it is forbidden, for the devotion offering for Above are [set aside] for improvements within the Temple.36
[A vow takes effect and produce] becomes forbidden although the person did not mention a sacrifice [if he makes any of the following statements]: "[This produce] is considered for me like the donations for the chamber,"37 "...like the daily sacrifices," "...like the storage rooms,"38 "...like the wood,"39 "...like the fire-offerings,"40 "...like the altar," or "...like any of the utensils of the altar," e.g., he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like the altar rakes,"41 "...like the ewers [for the blood of the sacrifices],"42 "...like the altar forks,"43 or the like. [This law also applies] if he says: "This produce] is considered for me like the Temple,"44 "...like Jerusalem."45 [The rationale is that] all of these statements are similar to saying: "[This produce] is considered for me like a sacrifice."
יד
אמר הרי הן עלי כחרמי שמים הרי אלו אסורין שחרמי שמים לבדק הבית הרי הן עלי כתרומת הלשכה כתמידים כדירים כעצים כאשים כמזבח או כאחד ממשמשי המזבח כגון שאמר הרי הן עלי כיעים כמזרקות כמזלגות וכיוצא בהן וכן האומר הרי הן עלי כהיכל כירושלים הרי אלו אסורין ואף על פי שלא הזכיר שם קרבן שכל דברים אלו ענינם כאומר הרי הן עלי קרבן:
15
[When there was] sacrificial meat - even meat from a peace offering whose blood had been poured [on the altar] which is permitted to non-priests - before a person and he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like this meat," it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] he attached [his vow] to the fundamental element of the meat, and that was forbidden.46
[Different rules apply if] the meat was from a firstborn sacrifice. If its blood had not been poured [on the altar], [the produce] is forbidden.47 If it had been poured, it is permitted.
טו
היה לפניו בשר קדש אפילו היה בשר שלמים אחר זריקת דמים שהוא מותר לזרים ואמר הרי הן עלי כבשר זה הרי אלו אסורין שלא התפיס אלא בעיקרו שהיה אסור אבל אם היה בשר בכור אם לפני זריקת דמים הרי זה אסור ואם לאחר זריקת דמים הרי זה מותר:
16
There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.
What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban. Cherek, cheref, and cherech are all terms referring to a cherem (dedication offering).
Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We follow the language used by people at large in that place and at that time.48
טז
יש מקומות שאנשיהם עלגים ומפסידין את הלשון ומכנין על דבר בדבר אחר הולכין שם אחר הכנוי כיצד כל כנויי קרבן כקרבן האומר הרי הן עלי קונם קונח קונז הרי אלו כנויין לקרבן חרק חרף חרך הרי אלו כנויין לחרם וכן כל כיוצא בזה הולכין אחר לשון כלל העם באותו מקום ובאותו זמן:
17
Just as a person can make a vow forbidding entities to himself with such terms, so, too, if he consecrates an entity with such terms, the entity is consecrated. Nicknames for such terms,49 however, are not binding50 whether for vows involving prohibitions or vows involving the consecration of property.
יז
וכשם שאוסר עצמו בכנויין כך אם הקדיש בכנויין הרי זה הקדש וכנויי הכנויין מותרין בין בנדרי איסר בין בנדרי הקדש:
18
If a person tells a colleague: "Whatever I eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food," "...will not be kosher," or "...will not be pure,"51 it is as if he told him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be like a sacrifice,"52 which is forbidden. Similarly, if he tells him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be an impure [sacrifice]," "...notar," or piggul,"53 it is forbidden.
יח
האומר לחבירו מה שאוכל עמך לא יהא חולין או לא יהא כשר או לא יהא דכי או לא יהא טהור הרי זה כמי שאמר לו כל מה שאוכל עמך יהא קרבן שהוא אסור וכן אם אמר לו כל מה שאוכל עמך טמא או נותר או פגול הרי זה אסור:
19
When a person tells a colleague: "Not ordinary food will I not eat from your [property]," it is as if he told him:54 "What I will eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food, but instead, like a sacrifice."55
Similarly, if he tells him: "The sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," or "Like a sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden [to eat from his property].56 If, by contrast, he tells him: "The sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," "Like a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "For a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," or "Not a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted in all of these instances.57 For all of these expressions do not have any implication other than he is taking an oath by a sacrifice that he will not eat from his [property] and taking an oath on a sacrifice is not binding. Alternatively, [his intent can be interpreted] as taking a vow that he will not partake of a sacrifice with him.
יט
האומר לחבירו לא חולין לא אוכל לך הרי זה כמי שאמר לו מה שאוכל לך לא יהא חולין אלא קרבן וכן אם אמר הקרבן שאוכל לך קרבן שאוכל לך כקרבן שאוכל לך הרי זה אסור אבל האומר הקרבן לא אוכל לך או כקרבן לא אוכל לך או לקרבן לא אוכל לך או קרבן לא אוכל לך או לא קרבן לא אוכל לך כל אלו מותרים שאין משמע דברים אלו אלא שנשבע בקרבן שלא יאכל לזה והנשבע בקרבן אינו כלום או שנדר שלא יאכל לו קרבן:
20
[If he tells him:] "Ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Like ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat not with you," "Like ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," it is permitted for him [to eat from his property].58
כ
חולין שאוכל לך החולין שאוכל לך כחולין שאוכל לך חולין שלא אוכל לך החולין שלא אוכל לך כחולין שלא אוכל לך הרי זה מותר:
21
If, by contrast, he says: "No impure [sacrifices] will I eat from your [property]," "No notar, will I eat from your [property]," or "No piggul will I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden. [The vow takes effect, because] the intent of his statements appears to be: "What I will eat will be piggul or impure. Therefore, I will not eat from your [property]."59
כא
אבל האומר לא טמא שאוכל לך לא נותר שאוכל לך לא פגול שאוכל לך אסור שמשמעו של דבר דבר שאוכל הוא שיהיה פגול או טמא לפיכך לא אוכל לך:
22
[If he says:] "By the Temple, I will eat from your [property]," "The Temple, I will eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will eat from your [property]," [the vow is effective,60 and] it is forbidden. "The Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," "Like the Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted.61 For this is like taking an oath by the Temple, that he will not eat from his [property]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
כב
בהיכל שאוכל לך היכל שאוכל לך לא היכל שאוכל לך אסור היכל שלא אוכל לך כהיכל שלא אוכל לך לא היכל שלא אוכל לך מותר שזה כמי שנשבע בהיכל שלא יאכל לך וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
23
When a person tells a colleague, "I am taking a vow from you," his statement implies that he will not speak with him.62 "I am separate from you" implies that he will not do business with him. "I am distant from you" implies that he will not sit within four cubits of him. That same implication is conveyed by telling him: "I am ostracized from you" or "I am banned from you."63
If, however, says "I am taking a vow from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," "I am separate from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," or "I am distant from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he is forbidden to eat from his [property].64 If he eats an olivesized portion [of food] from any of his property, he is liable for lashes for [violating the prohibition]: "He shall not desecrate his word."
כג
האומר לחבירו מודר אני ממך משמע דבר זה שלא ידבר עמו מופרש אני ממך משמעו שלא ישא ויתן עמו מרוחק אני ממך משמעו שלא ישב בארבע אמותיו וכן אם אמר לו מנודה אני לך או משמתנא ממך אבל אם אמר לו מודר אני ממך שלא אוכל לך או מופרש אני ממך שלא אוכל לך או מרוחק אני ממך שלא אוכל לך הרי זה אסור לאכול ואם אכל כזית מכל נכסיו לוקה משום לא יחל דברו:
24
If he tells him: "I am ostracized from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he may not eat from his [property, but] if he does, he is not liable for lashes.65 If he tells him: "I have drifted66 from you," he is forbidden to benefit from him.67
כד
אמר לו מנודה אני לך שלא אוכל לך אינו אוכל לו ואם אכל אינו לוקה אמר לו נדינא ממך הרי זה אסור ליהנות:
25
When a person tells a colleague: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked who make nazirite vows, vows for a sacrifice, and oaths,68 if I eat from your [property]," should he eat [from his property], he is liable for all of the above.69
Similarly, if he says: "Let it be considered for me like the pledges of the upright who make nazirite pledges70 and donations for a sacrifice,71 if I eat from your [property," should he eat from his property,] he is liable.72
כה
האומר לחבירו הרי עלי כנדרי רשעים אם אוכל לך שמנדריהם נזיר וקרבן ושבועה ואכל חייב בכולן וכן האומר הרי עלי כנדבות כשרים שמנדבותם נזיר וקרבן הרי זה חייב:
26
If one says: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked..." or "...like the pledges of the upright73 that I will eat from your [property]," or "...if I eat from your property," he is forbidden [to do so], even if he did not make an explicit statement.74
If he said: "Like the vows of the upright," his statement is of no consequence, for the upright do not take vows to prohibit things out of anger. If he says: "I am like the vows of the wicked," and a nazirite was passing before him, he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow.75 If he says: "I am responsible, like the vows of the wicked," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice.76 "Like the vows of the wicked, I will not eat from it,"77 he is liable for an oath.78
כו
אמר הרי עלי כנדרי רשעים או כנדבות כשרים שאוכל לך או אם אוכל לך הרי זה אסור אע"פ שלא פירש אמר כנדרי כשרים לא נתחייב בכלום שאין הכשרים נודרים בדרך אסור וכעס אמר כנדרי רשעים הריני והיה נזיר עובר לפניו חייב בנזירות כנדרי רשעים עלי חייב קרבן כנדרי רשעים שלא אוכל ממנו חייב בשבועה:
27
When a person takes a vow by the Torah, i.e., he says: "This produce is considered for me like this,"79 his statements are of no consequence80 and he need not ask a sage to release him from it.81 [An exception is made if] he is a common person so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.82
כז
הנודר בתורה כגון שאמר פירות אלו עלי כזו לא אמר כלום ואינו צריך שאלה לחכם אלא א"כ היה עם הארץ כדי שלא ינהגו קלות ראש בנדרים:
28
If one took a vow by what was written in [the Torah], he is forbidden [to partake of the article mentioned in his vow], for [the Torah] contains statements involving prohibitions and vows.83 If he took it in his arm and took an oath on it, it is as if he took a vow by what was written in it.84
כח
נדר במה שכתוב בה הרי זה אסור שהרי כתוב בה איסר ונדר נטלה בידו ונדר בה הרי זה כמי שנדר במה שכתוב בה:
29
When a person tells a colleague: "Let's get up and study a chapter [of Torah]," he is obligated to get up and study.85 Even though he did not use the wording of a vow, this is comparable to a vow.86
כט
האומר לחבירו נשכים ונשנה פרק עליו להשכים ולקרות שזה כמו נדר הוא ואף על פי שלא הוציאו בלשון נדר:
30
When a person tells his wife: "You are considered to me as my mother," "...as my sister,"87 "...as orlah," or "...as mixed species in a vineyard,"88 it is as if one says concerning produce: "May it be like pig meat." Just as he is permitted to partake of that produce, as explained,89 so, too, he is permitted [to engage in relations] with his wife.
If, however, he tells her: "I am taking a vow, forbidding all pleasure from you"90or "The pleasure of relations with you is forbidden to me," she is forbidden to him, as will be explained.91
ל
האומר לאשתו הרי את עלי כאמי או כאחותי או כערלה או ככלאי הכרם הרי זה כאומר על הפירות הרי אלו כבשר חזיר כשם שהוא מותר לאוכלן כמו שביארנו כך מותר באשתו אבל אם אמר לה הריני מודר ממך הניה או הנאת תשמישך אסורה עלי הרי זו אסורה עליו כמו שיתבאר:
FOOTNOTES
1.
For the intent of a vow is not to forbid what the Torah has prohibited, and certainly not to permit what the Torah has prohibited (Radbaz).
2.
I.e., it need not be stated in Lashon HaKodesh (Biblical Hebrew).
3.
As stated in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:2, an oath must mention God's name or one of the terms used to describe Him.
4.
I.e., he is personally responsible to bring a sacrifice; there is no set animal designated for that purpose.
5.
I.e., the animal is designated to be offered as a sacrifice; there is no obligation on the person.
6.
I.e., if the animal which he originally intended to be sacrificed is lost, he must provide another one, because he accepted personal responsibility. See Halachot 25 and 26 with regard to the distinction between the two terms.
7.
For it was only the one animal that was designated as a sacrifice.
8.
See Chapters 6 and 9 of those halachot which explain the difference between these types of sacrifices. There are also occasional references to such vows in these halachot. See, for example, Halachah 17 of this chapter.
9.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 575) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
10.
Although there are two different verses which point to the same commandment, they are counted only as one mitzvah. For the verse from Deuteronomy could be interpreted as a reinforcement for the negative commandment mentioned in the following verse and the verse from Numbers can be interpreted as referring only to vows involving prohibitions (Radbaz). In his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban considers these as two separate mitzvot.
11.
As is the punishment prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 157) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 407) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
12.
As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, were the person to have mentioned "eating" in his vow, we would have interpreted the prohibition as involving an olive-sized portion, the minimum measure for eating that applies with regard to other prohibitions. Since he did not, the implication is that even the slightest amount is forbidden. Compare to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:1.
13.
This does not apply with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:8). Even with regard to vows, it applies only when one uses the expression "eating." The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the law applies only when the two are included in the same oath. Their difference of opinion revolves around the understanding of Sh'vuot 22a.
14.
I.e., the person wants to forbid himself from eating together with his colleague.
15.
Just as a person cannot partake of a sacrifice until it is offered, so, too, he cannot partake of an entity forbidden by a vow. Just as the consecration of a sacrifice comes about because of a person's vow and his vow is what causes the sacrifice to become forbidden, so too, a vow causes an entity to be forbidden.
See Hilchot Meilah 4:9-10 which explains that with regard to the person forbidden by the vow, the article becomes like consecrated property. Hence, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice in atonement if he benefits from the article.
16.
For these substances are inherently forbidden; they do not become prohibited because of man's statements. An animal consecrated as a sacrifice, by contrast, is inherently permitted. It is only man's statements that cause it to become forbidden.
17.
As a person can cause a sacrifice to become forbidden.
The Rambam is explaining a fundamental principle with regard to vows. A vow becomes effective when a person establishes an equation between an entity (e.g., produce) and another entity (e.g., a sacrifice), provided it is possible for him to cause the latter entity to become forbidden on the basis of his vow alone.
18.
I.e., objects which are inherently forbidden.
19.
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:8, Hilchot Shegagot 1:1. These sacrifices are required when a person transgresses a prohibition. If he does not transgress, he may not bring such a sacrifice and if he does transgress, he is compelled to do so. Offering it is not dependent on his vow.
20.
Hilchot Nazirut 6:11; 8:1.
21.
Due to contact with a human corpse (ibid. 7:2).
22.
Ibid. 6:11; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:1.
23.
And thus bringing them is obviously dependent on his making a vow.
24.
Challah refers to a portion that must be separated from dough and given to a priest. Terumah refers to a portion of grain that must be separated and given to a priest. Since they may not be eaten by a non-priest, one might think that they could be the subject of a vow. Aaron is mentioned, because he is the progenitor of the priestly family.
25.
A person is required to separate these portions from his dough or grain. Although the amount he gives and the designation of the priest to whom he gives them is dependent on his will, he is obligated to make the gift. The Ra'avad offers a different rationale for this law.
26.
Sacrificial meat that was left after its prescribed time and hence, forbidden to be eaten.
27.
Sacrifices that were offered with the intent that they be eaten at a time when it was forbidden to do so and hence, become forbidden to be eaten.
28.
And is thus forbidden to be eaten.
29.
It is beyond his capacity to make the object concerning which he is taking a vow bound by any of the prohibitions mentioned. Nevertheless, all of these prohibitions involve sacrificial meat and sacrificial meat is forbidden to be eaten before it was offered in a proper way, because of his oath as above. Hence, the vow can take effect.
30.
As Leviticus 27:32 states, a person must bring every tenth animal born to his herd as a tithe offering. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
31.
Although we are required to separate these offerings, the tithing process through which the holiness is conveyed upon the animal is a result of man's actions.
It is possible to differentiate between such offerings and terumah, for even before the terumah was separated, the grain was not permitted to be eaten, because it was tevel. The animals, by contrast, could have been slaughtered, before the tithe was separated (see Radbaz, quoting Rabbenu Asher).
32.
Which is sanctified from birth and offered as a sacrifice.
33.
Instead, it is sanctified from birth.
34.
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham who addresses the following question that was posed to him: The prooftext from Leviticus has been interpreted by the Sifri as teaching that a firstborn may not be consecrated as another sacrifice (see Hilchot Temurah 4:11 where the Rambam quotes this concept). Moreover, although the firstborn is intrinsically holy, it is a mitzvah to consecrate it for that sacrifice (quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Bechorot 1:5), and thus seemingly, the holiness is conveyed upon it by a mortal's actions.
Rav Avraham replies that since the holiness of the firstborn is inherent and it cannot be changed to that of another sacrifice, that is a proof that a vow cannot affect it. With regard to using a first born as the basis for a vow, see also Halachah 15 and notes.
35.
See Hilchot Arachin V'Charamim 6:1 for a description of the nature of this pledge.
36.
And are forbidden to be used for mundane purposes. Thus they represent an entity that was forbidden by man's pledge.
37.
The Hebrew term terumat halishkah refers to the money collected from the half-shekel donations collected from the Jewish people and used for the communal sacrifices offered in the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2.
38.
I.e., the chambers in the Temple. This and several of the following interpretations are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:3).
39.
For the altar.
40.
I.e., the portions of the sacrifices offered on the Temple altar.
41.
Used to rake the ashes on the altar.
42.
Used to collect the blood from the sacrifices and then pour it on the altar.
43.
Used to move portions of the sacrifices around on the altar's fire, so that they would be consumed by it.
44.
I.e., like the sacrifices offered in the Temple.
45.
Like the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem.
46.
Since fundamentally, before its blood was poured on the altar, the meat was forbidden, that is the factor that we consider. We do not take into consideration the fact that afterwards it became permitted. This ruling is the subject of an unresolved question in Nedarim 11b. Hence, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
47.
For then it is forbidden to everyone. Hence one might say that just as his designation of the firstborn causes the meat to be forbidden, making a vow using a firstborn sacrifice as a basis is effective.
This ruling has created difficulty among the commentaries, because in Halachah 13 the Rambam ruled that a firstborn animal cannot be used as the basis of a vow. Similarly, as the Ra'avad points out, the Rambam's ruling does not appear to be consistent with either of the positions mentioned in Nedarim 12b, the source for this halachah. This leads the Kessef Mishneh to conclude that there was a printing error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is "[the produce] is permitted." He states that he found an ancient text that reads this way. Similarly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read in that manner, omitting the last phrase entirely.
The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham defends the ruling in the existing text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining that there is a difference between a firstborn sacrifice and the meat of a firstborn sacrifice.
48.
For this is representative of the person's intent. Taking this concept further, the Rama Yoreh De'ah 207:1) quotes opinions that maintain that this surely applies to vows made in gentile languages. And conversely, he also mentions views that maintain that if someone makes a vow using the wording of our Sages without understanding what he is saying, it does not take effect.
49.
Nedarim 10b gives examples: miknamna, miknachna, and miknasna.
50.
For they are very distant from the original wording [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 207:1)]. Kin'at Eliyahu states that apparently, they also would not have been recognized universally as having the desired intent.
51.
The Rambam states this expression twice: once in Aramaic and once in Lashon HaKodesh.
52.
I.e., the opposite of ordinary food is sacrificial food that is consecrated. Similarly with regard to his statement about impure food, we assume that his intent is an impure sacrifice in which instance, his vow is effective. Although it is possible that his intent is impure terumah (in which instance, his vow would not be binding), we follow the principle (Chapter 2, Halachah 7): Whenever there is a doubt concerning the effectiveness of a vow, we rule stringently (Rabbenu Nissim).
53.
See Halachah 11 for a definition of these terms.
54.
I.e., we interpret his statement as the Rambam explains.
55.
And hence, forbidden to be eaten (Nedarim 11b).
56.
Even though none of these expressions is precise, they are still close enough to imply that his intent is that he is forbidding eating with his colleague like a sacrifice is forbidden.
57.
I.e., his oath is not binding, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain.
58.
Because he does not mention a sacrifice in any of these expressions. The Ra'avad mentions that from Nedarim 11a, it would appear that some of these expressions would involve a vow. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's rulings.
59.
Based on Nedarim 10b, the Lechem Mishneh explains that we offer this interpretation, because we assume that a person will not make statements unnecessarily. Hence, since his statements could be interpreted as implying a vow, we offer such an interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh struggles with the meaning of the Rambam's words and suggests that perhaps an error crept into the text.
60.
For he is forbidding himself from eating with his colleague, like he is forbidden to partake of the Temple's sacrifices.
61.
Concluding with a negative expression implies that this is his intent, as in Halachah 19 (Radbaz). In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's wording.
62.
This and the subsequent statements of this clause do not imply that he is forbidden to partake of the other person's food.
63.
For this restriction applies when a person is under a ban of ostracism (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:4).
The Turei Zahav 206:1 mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that these vows are not effective at all.
64.
He may, however, speak to him (Radbaz).
Although the person does not mention the terms "prohibition" or "sacrifice" in his vow, since his intent is obviously to prohibit himself from benefiting from the other person, that prohibition takes effect. This reflects the principle (Nedarim 3a): "The handles of vows are as vows." The intent is that even a statement that, like a handle to a cup, is merely an auxiliary to a vow is binding like a vow itself. See also a responsum authored by the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which explains that even when the intent of one's statements are not entirely clear, as in the present instance, they may constitute a vow, provided their intent is somewhat clear. This principle is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:1).
65.
From Nedarim 7a, it appears that this expression creates an unresolved question whether the one taking the vow was merely promising not to come within four cubits of the other person or whether he intended to forbid partaking of that person's property. Because of the doubt, he is forbidden to partake of the property, but is not given lashes.
66.
The term the Rambam uses relates to the Hebrew words na and nad which mean "wander" and "roam." Nevertheless, Nedarim 7a states that all authorities agree that this expression creates a binding commitment.
67.
Since he does not use the words "eat" or "partake," we assume that he intended to create a more encompassing prohibition.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the expression means that he is not allowed to partake of his property in his presence. That interpretation is also discussed by the Kessef Mishneh.
68.
The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person (Halachah 2). See also Chapter 13, Halachah 25, which states that it is undesirable to make vows.
69.
I.e., he must accept a nazirite vow, bring a burnt offering, and is liable for lashes for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
70.
See Chapter 13, Halachah 23.
71.
The term the Rambam refers to "donations," i.e., animals which the person designates as a sacrifices, but if lost do not create a lien on his person (Halachah 2).
72.
To uphold a nazirite vow and to bring a sacrifice. He is not, however, liable for an oath, because he did not mention an oath in his statements, since the upright do not take oaths casually.
73.
In either case, his statement implies a binding commitment for the wicked make vows and the upright make pledges.
74.
I.e., he did not explicitly attach his vow to a sacrifice. This is another example of "the handles of vows" mentioned above (Radbaz).
75.
Since the nazirite was passing before him, we assume that this was his intent.
76.
This applies even when an animal is not in his sight, for this appears to be his intent (Radbaz).
77.
I.e., a loaf of bread [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:4)].
78.
I.e., if he partakes of the food, he is liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
79.
I.e., a Torah scroll.
80.
For the holiness of a Torah scroll is inherent. It is not established by man's actions.
81.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Sh'vuot, ch. 6, which describe this practice.
82.
I.e., the vow is not binding. Nevertheless, we make it appear that it is and require him to seek to be released for the reason stated by the Rambam. See the parallels in Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13 and Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:4-5.
83.
The Rambam's explanation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:3). With regard to oaths, by contrast, his intent is focused on God's name.
84.
Since he knows what is written in the Torah and is holding it in a reverent manner, we assume that he is not making his statements in vain. Hence, we interpret them as referring to an option for which he would be liable.
85.
Nedarim 8a derives this concept from Ezekiel 3:22-23 which states: "And He said to me: "Arise and go out to the valley and there I will speak to you. I arose and I went out to the valley and there the glory of God was standing." Since God promised to reveal Himself to Ezekiel, He kept his word, appearing even before Ezekiel arrived there.
86.
From Nedarim 8a, it appears that although this statement establishes a binding commitment, it does not have the full power of a vow. The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 213:2) consider this statement as an actual vow.
The Rambam's perspective appears to be that a vow involves making an object forbidden. This instance where the person accepts a commitment upon himself bears a closer resemblance to the obligation incurred when making an oath. Nevertheless, since the person did not employ the wording associated with an oath, it is not binding as an oath. Nonetheless, since a mitzvah is involved, a binding commitment is established.
87.
With whom it is forbidden for him to engage in relations.
88.
Of which it is forbidden to partake. See Leviticus 19:23, Deuteronomy 22:9.
89.
Halachot 8-9. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 13.
90.
A man is obligated to give his wife conjugal rights. Hence, he is not allowed to forbid himself from engaging in relations with her. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the vow also involves satisfaction that he could forbid him, it also includes this form of satisfaction.
91.
For he did not forbid relations, but instead, the satisfaction relations bring him. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
Nedarim - Chapter 2
1
[The same laws apply] whether one took the vow on his own [volition] or another person states a vow for him and he answers Amen or says something which like Amen implies that he accepts the matter.1
א
אחד הנודר מפי עצמו או שהדירו חבירו ואמר אמן או דבר שענינו כענין אמן שהוא קבלת דברים:
2
A person who takes an oath is not forbidden [to partake of] the entity which he forbade to himself until he makes a verbal statement to that effect2 and his statements must match his intent, as we explained with regard to oaths.3
If, by contrast, one intended to take a nazirite vow and instead, vowed to bring a sacrifice, [intended to vow to bring] a sacrifice and instead, took a nazirite [vow], [intended to take] an oath and instead, [took] a vow, [intended to take] a vow and instead, [took] an oath, intended to say "figs" and instead, said "grapes," both are permitted to him.4 There is no vow.
ב
ואין הנודר נאסר בדבר שאסר על עצמו עד שיוציא בשפתיו ויהיה פיו ולבו שוין כמו שבארנו בשבועות אבל המתכוין לנדור בנזיר ונדר בקרבן בקרבן ונדר בנזיר בשבועה ונדר או שנתכוון לנדור ונשבע או שנתכוון לומר תאנים ואמר ענבים הרי זה מותר בשניהם ואין כאן נדר:
3
When a person takes a vow dependent on the intent of others, it is like he took an oath dependent on the intent of others.5 Similarly, if one takes a vow and retracts6 immediately thereafter or someone rebuked him immediately thereafter and he accepted their statement, he is permitted [to use the article mentioned].7 The laws applying to all these matters with regard to vows are the same as those applying to oaths.8
ג
הנודר על דעת אחרים הרי זה כנשבע על דעת אחרים וכן הנודר וחזר בו בתוך כדי דבור או שמיחו בו בתוך כדי דבור וקבל הרי זה מותר ודין כל אלו הדברים בנדרים כדינן בשבועות:
4
[The following laws apply when] a person issued a stipulation before he made a vow, saying: "I am retracting from any vow that I will take from now until ten years in the future," "They are nullified," or other similar statements, and then took a vow: If he remembered the stipulation at the time he made the vow, the vow is effective, for by taking the vow, he nullified the stipulation.9 If, however, he did not remember the stipulation until after he made the vow, the vow is nullified10 even if [immediately after taking the vow], he brought the stipulation to mind and maintained it. Although he did not verbalize his retraction at the time [he made the vow], the retraction preceded the vow and he verbalized it beforehand.11 There is an authority who rules stringently and says that he must remember the stipulation immediately thereafter taking the vow.12
ד
מי שהתנה קודם שידור ואמר כל נדר שאדור מכאן ועד עשר שנים הריני חוזר בהן או הרי הן בטלים וכיוצא בדברים אלו ואחר כך נדר אם היה זוכר התנאי בשעה שנדר הרי נדרו קיים שהרי בטל התנאי בנדר זה ואם לא זכר התנאי אלא אחר שנדר אף על פי שקבל התנאי בלבו וקיימו הרי הנדר בטל ואע"פ שלא הוציא עתה החזרה בפיו כבר הקדים החזרה לנדר והוציאה בפיו מקודם ויש שמורה להחמיר ואומר והוא שיזכור התנאי אחר שנדר בתוך כדי דבור:
5
[The following rules apply when] one made a stipulation [similar to that mentioned above]13 for a year or for ten years and afterwards took a vow, remembering at the time that he took the vow that he had made a stipulation, but forgetting the subject of that stipulation or what it involved. If [when taking the vow], he said:14 "I am acting according to my original intention,"15 his vow is not effective, for he has nullified it. If he does not make such a statement, he has nullified the stipulation and upheld the vow, for, at the time he took the vow, he remembered that there was a stipulation and, nevertheless, took the vow.16
ה
מי שהקדים את התנאי לשנה או לעשר ואח"כ נדר ונזכר בשעה שנדר שיש לו תנאי ושכח על אי זה דבר התנה וכיצד היה התנאי אם אמר על דעת ראשונה אני עושה אין נדרו נדר שהרי בטלו ואם לא אמר על דעת ראשונה אני עושה כבר בטל התנאי וקיים הנדר שהרי זכר בשעת הנדר שיש שם תנאי ואע"פ כן נדר:
6
There are some of the Geonim who maintain that all of these statements are applicable only with regard to vows and not to oaths,17 but there is an authority who maintains that the laws pertaining to vows and oaths are the same in this regard. Thus one may issue a stipulation nullifying an oath [beforehand] in the same manner as was stated with regard to vows.18
ו
יש מהגאונים שאומרים אין כל אלו הדברים נוהגין אלא בנדרים בלבד לא בשבועות ויש מי שמורה שדין הנדרים והשבועות בעניינות אלו אחד הם וכי יש לו להקדים תנאי לשבועתו כדרך שאמרו בנדרים:
7
[When a person takes] a vow whose object is not clear,19 we rule stringently.20 If he interprets them, there is room for both leniency and stringency.
What does this imply? If one says: "Let this produce be considered as salted meat and as wine poured as a libation for me," we ask him what his intent was. If he explained himself, saying "My intent was that salted meat refers to sacrificial meat21 and wine poured as a libation refers to libations poured on the Temple altar," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].22 If, however, he says: "My intent was a sacrifice offered to a false deity23 and wine poured as a libation to it," he is permitted.24 If he took the vow without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
ז
סתם נדרים להחמיר ופירושן יש בו להקל ולהחמיר כיצד האומר הרי הפירות האלו עלי כבשר מליח וכיין נסך אומרין לו ומה היה בלבך אם פירש ואמר כבשר מליח של קרבן וכיין שנתנסך על המזבח היה בלבי הרי זה אסור ואם אמר לא היה בלבי אלא תקרובת עכו"ם ויין שנתנסך לה הרי זה מותר ואם נדר סתם הרי זה אסור:
8
Similar principles apply when one says: "This produce is considered as cherem (a dedication offering) for me." If [his intent was] a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple, he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].25 If [his intent] was a dedication offering for the priests, he is permitted, because [these offerings] become [the priests'] personal possessions and are not forbidden [to others].26 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
ח
וכן האומר הרי הפירות האלו עלי חרם אם כחרם של בדק הבית אסור ואם כחרמי הכהנים מותר מפני שהן ממון שלהם ואין בה אסור ואם סתם אסור:
9
[If he states:] "May they be considered like the tithes for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the tithe taken from animals, [it becomes] forbidden, because these are sacrifices that he consecrates through his actions, as we explained.27 [If his intent was] the tithe taken from grain, it is permitted.28 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
ט
הרי הן עלי כמעשר אם כמעשר בהמה אסור מפני שהוא קרבן שהקדישו בידו כמו שבארנו ואם כמעשר דגן מותר ואם סתם אסור:
10
[If he states:] "May they be considered like terumah for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the money donated for the sacrificial offerings,29 it is forbidden. If his intent was terumah [separated from] the grain heap, it is permitted.30 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
י
הרי הן עלי כתרומה אם לתרומת הלשכה נתכוון הרי זה אסור ואם לתרומת הגורן נתכוון מותר ואם סתם אסור וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
11
When does the above31 apply? In a place where the terms used have these two possible meanings. In a place where the term cherem without any further definition is used only to refer to the dedication offerings for the upkeep of the Temple,32 if he says: "[This produce is considered] as cherem for me," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].33 Similarly, if their custom was to use the term cherem without any further definition to refer only to dedication offerings given the priests, he is permitted. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations, for with regard to vows, we follow the connotations understood by the people in that place in that era.34
יא
במה דברים אמורים במקום שמשמע כל אחד מאלו שם שני ענינות אבל מקום שדרכן שאין קוראים חרם סתם אלא לחרמי בדק הבית בלבד ואמר שם הרי הן עלי חרם הרי זה אסור וכן אם היה דרכן שאין קוראים חרם סתם אלא לחרמי כהנים הרי זה מותר וכן כל כיוצא בזה שאין הולכין בנדרים אלא אחר לשון אנשי אותו מקום באותו זמן:
12
[The ensuing rules apply] in all situations analogous to those exemplified: i.e., situations when a person takes a vow which appears to everyone to involve a prohibition, but he says: "My intent was for this and this specific instance,"35 for example, he takes a vow based on a cherem,36but [afterwards] said: "My intent was a sea cherem, i.e., a fishing net,"37 he took a vow based on an offering, but said: "My intent was an offering brought to the king," He told a colleague: "Myself is like a sacrifice for you," and then explained: "My intent was only to forbid him from [benefiting from] a bone38that I set aside so that I could take a vow as a lark," he took a vow that his wife could not benefit from him and then explained that his intent was his first wife whom he had divorced.
[In all the above situations,] if the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].39 If the one who took the vow is a common person, we make it appear to him that it is a vow, yet we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow.40 Whether he is a Torah scholar or a common person, we rebuke him and teach him not to conduct himself in this manner with regard to vows and not to take vows as a lark or a caper.
יב
הנודר בחרם ואמר לא היה בלבי אלא חרמו של ים שהיא המכמורת נדר בקרבן ואמר לא היה בלבי אלא בקרבנות מלכים אמר לחבירו הרי עצמי עליך קרבן ואמר לא היה בלבי אלא לאסרו בעצם שהנחתי לי להיות נודר בו דרך שחוק נדר שלא תהנה לו אשתו ואמר לא היה בלבי אלא אשתי ראשונה שגירשתיה וכן כל כיוצא באלו הדברים שמשמען לכל העם איסור והוא אומר לא נתכוונתי אלא לכך ולכך אם היה הנודר תלמיד חכם הרי זה מותר ואין צריך שאלה לחכם ואם היה עם הארץ מראין בעיניו שזה נדר ושהוא אסור ופותחים לו פתח ממקום אחר ומתירין לו ובין שהיה תלמיד חכם או עם הארץ גוערין בהן ומלמדין אותן שלא ינהגו מנהג זה בנדרים ולא יהיו נודרין דרך שחוק והתול:
13
Similarly, when a person tells his wife: "You are considered as my mother to me," or he says: "Let this produce be considered as pig meat for me," the vow is not effective, as we explained.41 If the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].42 If the one who took the vow is a common person, he must ask a sage [for the vow to be released]. We make it appear to him that his wife is forbidden to him and that the produce is forbidden,43 but we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow in order that people not act frivolously with regard to vows.44
יג
וכן האומר לאשתו הרי את עלי כאמי או האומר פירות אלו עלי כבשר חזיר שאין כאן נדר כמו שבארנו אם היה האומר תלמיד חכם אינו צריך שאלה לחכם ואם היה עם הארץ צריך שאלה לחכם ומראין בעיניו שאשתו אסורה ושאותן הפירות אסורין ופותחין לו פתח ממקום אחר ומתירין לו נדרו כדי שלא ינהגו קלות ראש בנדרים:
14
Although declaring property ownerless is not a vow,45 it resembles a vow, for the person is forbidden to retract.
What is meant by declaring property ownerless? A person says: "This property is free for everyone"46 to acquire. It applies to both movable property and landed property.
What is the law [applying to property] declared ownerless? Whoever comes first and acquires it,47 becomes the owner. He acquires it as his own and it becomes his. Even the person who declared the property ownerless has the same rights as others with regard to it. If he comes first and acquires it, it becomes his.48
יד
ההפקר אף על פי שאינו נדר הרי הוא כמו נדר שאסור לו לחזור בו ומה הוא ההפקר הוא שיאמר אדם נכסים אלו הפקר לכל בין במטלטלין בין בקרקעות וכיצד דין ההפקר כל הקודם וזכה בו קנהו לעצמו ונעשה שלו ואפילו זה שהפקיר דינו בו כדין כל אדם אם קדם וזכה בו קנהו:
15
When a person declares his property ownerless [so that it can be acquired by] the poor, but not by the rich, it is not ownerless.49 He must declare it ownerless for everyone like the produce of the Sabbatical year.
When a person declares his servants ownerless, those past majority acquire themselves.50 With regard to those below majority, whoever comes first and takes hold of them acquires them as is the law with regard to other movable property.51
טו
המפקיר לעניים אבל לא לעשירים אינו הפקר עד שיפקיר לכל כשמיטה והמפקיר עבדיו הגדולים קנו עצמן והקטנים כל הקודם והחזיק בהן זכה כשאר המטלטלין:
16
When a person declares landed property ownerless, whoever comes first and manifests his ownership52 over it acquires it.
According to Scriptural Law, even when a person declares his property ownerless in the presence of one person, it becomes ownerless and one is not required to tithe its produce,53 as will be explained in its place.54 According to Rabbinic decree, however, [property] is not ownerless until one declares as such in the presence of three people so that one can acquire it and two can act as witnesses.
Should one say: "This is ownerless and this," there is an unresolved doubt whether the second entity is ownerless.55 If he said: "...and this is like this" or "...and also this," he has associated the second entity [with the first], and it is definitely ownerless.
טז
המפקיר את הקרקע כל הקודם והחזיק בהן זכה דין תורה אפילו הפקיר בפני אחד הרי זה הפקר ונפטר מן המעשרות כמו שיתבאר במקומו אבל מדברי סופרים אינו הפקר עד שיפקיר בפני שלשה כדי שיהיה אחד זוכה אם רצה והשנים מעידים והאומר הרי זה הפקר וזה הרי השני ספק הפקר ואם אמר וזה כמו זה או שאמר וגם זה הרי התפיס השני ויהיה הפקר ודאי:
17
When a person declares his field ownerless and no one else acquires it,56 during the first three days, he may retract.57 After these three days, he may not retract unless he comes first and acquires it.58 He is like one acquiring ownerless property.59 [There is no difference] between him and another person.
יז
המפקיר את שדהו ולא זכה בה אדם כל שלשה ימים יכול לחזור בו אחר שלשה ימים אינו יכול לחזור בו אלא אם כן קדם וזכה בה הרי הוא כזוכה מן ההפקר בין הוא בין אחר:
18
When a person says: "This field is declared ownerless for one day," "...for one week," "...for one month," "...for one year," or "...for one seven-year cycle," he may retract before he or another person acquires it.60 Once it is acquired, whether by the person himself or by someone else, he may not retract.
Why does he have the right to retract before it was acquired? Because this is an uncommon matter. [Generally,] a person will not declare [property] ownerless for a limited time.
יח
האומר שדה זו מופקרת ליום אחד לשבת אחת לחדש אחד לשנה אחת לשבוע אחד עד שלא זכה בה הוא או אחר יכול לחזור בו ומשזכה בה בין הוא בין אחר אינו יכול לחזור בו ומפני מה יש לו לחזור כאן עד שיזכו בה מפני שזה דבר שאינו מצוי הוא שאין אדם מפקיר לזמן קצוב:
19
When a person comes and watches over ownerless property, looking at it so that another person will not take it, he does not acquire it by looking at it. Instead, he must lift it up if it were movable property61 or manifest ownership over it if it were landed property,62 as purchasers acquire property.63
יט
דבר המופקר שבא אחד ושמרו והיה מביט בו שלא יטלנו אדם לא קנהו בהבטה אלא עד שיגביהו אם היה מטלטלין או יחזיק בקרקע כדרך שקונין הלקוחות:
FOOTNOTES
1.
See the parallels in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:1.
2.
I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions "the expression of her lips," implying that one must express his intent verbally.
3.
Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term "expression" implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one's thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one's thoughts, it is not an "expression" (Kiryat Sefer).
4.
The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them.
5.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:15.
6.
He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 210:3)].
7.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17-18. As mentioned there, the term "immediately thereafter" has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made.
8.
For Numbers 30:3 associates the two together (Kessef Mishneh). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:1).
9.
For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (see Nedarim 23b).
10.
Kiryat Sefer explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: "He shall not desecrate his word," that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect.
11.
Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz.
12.
Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:2) mentions the Rambam's view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority's view. The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it.
As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidrei prayer recited at the beginning of Yom Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De'ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.
13.
In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:3)].
14.
In one of his response, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart.
15.
I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement.
16.
I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.
17.
For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God's name must be invoked. (See Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach.
18.
The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for the nullification of vows rite recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei prayer mention oaths as well as vows.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person's original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague's statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.
19.
I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi, Nedarim 18b).
20.
We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid.). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4.
21.
For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13).
22.
For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9).
23.
For the gentiles would also salt their offerings.
24.
For there is no way, he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9).
25.
For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed.
26.
Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden.
27.
Chapter 1, Halachah 13.
28.
For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people. Moreover, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir who rules that ordinary people may not partake of these tithes, they are not forbidden due to a vow. Instead, it was forbidden to partake of the grain before they were separated and once, they were separated, they remain forbidden (Ritba, Nedarim 18b).
29.
Terumat halishkah in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used.
30.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.
31.
That we explore the person's intention.
32.
Nedarim 18b explains that in the Galilee, it was not common for priests to live. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple.
33.
For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests.
34.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
35.
I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a permitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect.
36.
I.e., he said: "Let this produce be like a cherem."
37.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15 which employs such a term.
38.
The Hebrew word atzmi means "myself," but it can also mean "my bone." Initially, it was thought that the person's intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was "his bone."
39.
His word can be accepted when he says: "This was my intent." Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5.
40.
I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required.
41.
Chapter 1, Halachah 30.
42.
For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters.
43.
The Rama (loc. cit.) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters.
44.
If the common person was allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.
45.
This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz, Ketzot HaChoshen 273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances.
Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one's own ownership over or does it involves transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless.
46.
Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim 7a). See the following halachah.
47.
Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19.
48.
I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).
See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.
49.
This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit.).
50.
I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:13).
51.
Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.
52.
Through a formal kinyan, e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence.
53.
Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 273:7) states that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law.
54.
See Hilchot Terumah 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one's own, not those acquired from ownerless property.
55.
Nedarim 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:12).
56.
If, however, another person acquires, it becomes that person's property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh).
57.
According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding.
58.
Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:13).
59.
And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh).
60.
I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz).
61.
Performing the kinyan of hagba'ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective.
62.
Performing the kinyan of chazzakah.
63.
See Hilchot Mechirah 1:3, 3:1.
Nedarim - Chapter 3
1
There are four differences between a vow and a sh'vuat bitui:
a) With regard to a sh'vuat bitui, one oath cannot take effect while another is already in effect,1 and with regard to vows, a vow can take effect while another is already in effect.
b) When one attempts to extend the scope of an oath taken previously, he is not liable,2 and with regard to vows, one is.
c) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect only with regard to actions that are left to one's choice,3 while vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice.
d) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect with regard to entity of substance and an entity that is not of substance, 4 while vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance.
א
ארבעה דברים יש בין נדרים לשבועת ביטוי שבשבועת ביטוי אין שבועה חלה על שבועה ובנדרים יחול נדר על נדר המתפיס בשבועה פטור ובנדרים חייב אין שבועת ביטוי חלה אלא על דברי הרשות ונדרים חלות על דברי מצוה כדברי הרשות שבועת ביטוי חלה על דבר שיש בו ממש ועל דבר שאין בו ממש ונדרים אינן חלין אלא על דבר שיש בו ממש:
2
What is meant by the statement that a vow can take effect while another is already in effect? If a person says: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat this loaf [of bread]," [repeats]: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat it," he is liable [to bring a sacrifice] for every oath that he takes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ב
כיצד יחול נדר על נדר האומר הרי עלי קרבן אם אכלתי ככר זו הרי עלי קרבן אם אוכלנה ואכלה חייב על כל אחת ואחת וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
3
What is meant by the statement that one who extends the scope of a vow taken previously is liable? He heard his colleague take a vow and said: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter,5 he is forbidden [to partake of] the substance that his colleague deemed forbidden.6 If a third person heard the second person say: "And I am like you," and he also said: "I am like you," [he is also forbidden]. Even if there are one hundred and each one says: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter the statements of the previous one," they are all forbidden.
ג
כיצד המתפיס בנדרים חייב שמע חבירו שנדר ואמר ואני כמותך בתוך כדי דבור הרי זה אסור במה שנאסר בו חבירו שמע השלישי זה שאמר ואני ואמר ואני אפילו היו מאה וכל אחד מהן אומר ואני בתוך כדי דבורו של חבירו הרי כולן אסורין:
4
Similarly, when one says: "This meat is considered forbidden to me,' and even after several days7 says: "This bread is like this meat," [the prohibition] is extended to the bread and it becomes forbidden. If afterwards, he said: "And this honey is like this bread, and this wine is like this honey," even if he mentions 100 [substances], they are all forbidden.
ד
וכן האומר הבשר הזה עלי אסור וחזר ואמר אפילו אחר כמה ימים והפת הזאת כבשר הזה הרי הפת נתפשה ונאסרה חזר ואמר ודבש זה כפת הזאת ויין זה כדבש זה אפילו הן מאה כולן אסורין:
5
[The following rules apply when a person's] father or teacher died on a particular day and he took a vow to fast that day8 and [actually] fasted.9 If after years past, he said: "Let this day10 be considered as the day on which my father - or my teacher - died," he is forbidden to eat on that day. For he attached this day [to his existing vow] and caused it to be forbidden as the day which is forbidden for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ה
הרי שמת אביו או רבו היום ונדר שיצום אותו היום וצם ולאחר שנים אמר הרי יום זה עליו כיום שמת בו אביו או רבו הרי זה אסור לאכול בו כלום שהרי התפיס יום זה ואסרו כיום האסור לו וכן כל כיוצא באלו:
6
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice? When a person says: "Matzah is forbidden to me on Pesach night," "Dwelling in a sukkah on that holiday is forbidden to me," or "I am forbidden to take hold of tefillin," they are forbidden to him. If he ate matzah, dwelled in a sukkah, or took tefillin, he is liable for lashes.11 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: "I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat matzah on Pesach night," is obligated to bring a sacrifice.12 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ו
כיצד חלים הנדרים על דברי מצוה כדברי הרשות האומר הרי המצה בלילי הפסח אסורה עליו הרי ישיבת הסוכה בחג הסוכות אסורה עליו והרי התפילין אסורות בנטילה עליו הרי אלו אסורין עליו ואם אכל או ישב או נטל לוקה וכן כל כיוצא בזה ואין צריך לומר במי שאמר הרי עלי קרבן אם אוכל מצה בלילי הפסח שהוא חייב בקרבן וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
7
Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath.13 When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him.14 Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai.
ז
ומפני מה נדרים חלים על דברי מצוה ושבועות אין חלות על דברי מצוה שהנשבע אוסר עצמו על דבר שנשבע עליו והנודר אוסר הדבר הנדור על עצמו נמצא הנשבע לבטל מצוה אוסר עצמו וכבר עצמו מושבע מהר סיני ואין שבועה חלה על שבועה והאוסר דבר זה בנדר זה הדבר הוא שנאסר ואותו הדבר אינו מושבע מהר סיני:
8
When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a sh'vuat bitui, [Leviticus 5:4] states: "Whether he will do harm or do good," i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained,15 e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall do everything uttered by his mouth," without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition.
ח
כשאתה מתבונן בכתוב תמצא שהדברים מראין כן כמו שקבלו חכמים מפי השמועה שהרי אומר בשבועת ביטוי להרע או להיטיב בדברי הרשות כמו שבארנו שיאכל וישתה היום או שיצום וכיוצא בהן ובנדרים הוא אומר ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה ולא חלק בין דברי מצוה לדברי הרשות:
9
When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast16 for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained.17 Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur18 falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary.19 Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree.
ט
הנודר שיצום בשבת או ביום טוב חייב לצום שהנדרים חלים על דברי מצוה כמו שבארנו וכן הנודר שיצום יום ראשון או יום שלישי כל ימיו ופגע בו יום זה והרי הוא יום טוב או ערב יוה"כ הרי זה חייב לצום ואין צריך לומר ראש חדש פגע בו חנוכה ופורים ידחה נדרו מפני הימים האלו הואיל ואיסור הצום בהם מדברי סופרים הרי הן צריכין חזוק וידחה נדרו מפני גזירת חכמים:
10
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance? If one says: "My speech is like a sacrifice for you,"20 he is not forbidden to speak to him, because speech is not an entity of substance. Similarly, if he tells him: "My speech is forbidden to you," it is not like his saying: "my produce is forbidden to you," or "My produce is like a sacrifice for you," in which instance, [the produce] would be forbidden.
Therefore, if a person tells a colleague: "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not speak with you," "...that I will not act on your behalf," or "...that I will not go with you," or he told his wife, "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not be intimate with you," his vow does not take effect in all these instances. For this is as if he is saying: "My speech, going, actions, or intimacy is like a sacrifice, and none [of these are] entities of substance.21
י
כיצד אין הנדרים חלים אלא על דבר שיש בו ממש האומר דבורי עליך קרבן אינו אסור מלדבר עמו שהדבור אין בו ממש וכן אם אמר לו דבורי אסור עליך אין זה כאומר פירותי אסורין עליך או פירותי קרבן עליך שהן אסורין עליו לפיכך האומר לחבירו קרבן שאיני מדבר עמך או שאיני עושה עמך או שאיני מהלך עמך או שאמר קרבן שאיני ישן שאיני מדבר שאיני מהלך או שאמר לאשתו קרבן שאיני משמשך אין הנדר חל בכל אלו והרי זה כאומר דבורי והלוכי ועשייתי ושמושי קרבן שהן דברים שאין בהן ממש:
11
When, by contrast, a person says: "Let my mouth be forbidden to speak, my hands to act, my feet to walk, and my eyes to sleep," his vow is effective with regard to them.22 Therefore if a person tells a colleague: "My mouth is like a sacrifice with regard to speaking with you, my hands [are so] with regard to acting on your behalf, and my feet [are so] with regard to going with you," he becomes forbidden.
Similarly, one who tells a colleague: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I speak to so-and-so" or "...if I don't speak to so-and-so," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice if he violates this commitment. Similarly, if he took a vow in which he said: "[If] I spoke [to so-and-so, I must bring a sacrifice]" or "[If] I did not speak..." or the like, [he is liable]. For these are not vows in which he accepts prohibitions upon himself23 whose ground rules we are explaining here, but vows of dedication.24
יא
אבל האומר יאסר פי לדבורו וידי למעשיהן ורגלי להלוכן ועיני לשינתן הרי הנדר חל עליהן לפיכך האומר לחבירו קרבן פי מלדבר עמך וידי מלעשות עמך ורגלי מלהלך עמך הרי זה אסור וכן האומר הרי עלי קרבן אם אדבר עם פלוני או אם לא אדבר עמו ועבר על דברו חייב בקרבן וכן אם נדר דברתי ולא דברתי וכיוצא בהן שאין אלו נדרי איסר שאנו מבארין משפטיהם אלא נדרי הקדש:
12
Although when a person takes a vow concerning entities that are not of substance and forbids them, the vow does not take effect with regard to them, we do not rule that he should act as if they are permitted. [Instead,] since he willingly [took a vow] forbidding them to him, [according to Rabbinic decree]25 the vow took effect with regard to them. Although they are not forbidden, we give him an opportunity [to ask for the vow's release] from another vantage point and then release the vow, so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.26
יב
הנודר בדברים שאין בהם ממש ואסרן אע"פ שאין הנדר חל עליהם אין מורים לו שינהוג בהן היתר הואיל ואסר עצמו בהן ובדעתו שהנדר חל עליהן אלא פותחין לו פתח ממקום אחר ומתירין לו נדרו אף על פי שלא נאסר כדי שלא ינהגו קלות ראש בנדרים:
FOOTNOTES
1.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:9-10. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachah 2.
2.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:8-9. The reverse rulings with regard to vows are described in Halachot 3-5.
3.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:14-16. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachot 6-9.
4.
This concept can be explained as follows: As stated in Halachah 6, an oath creates a prohibition on the person taking the oath (the gavra), i.e., the article is essentially permitted, he has accepted a prohibition on himself not to partake of it. Hence, it is not significant whether the article is of substance or not. With regard to vows, by contrast, the article itself (the cheftzah) becomes forbidden. Hence, for that prohibition to take effect, the article must be of substance (Radbaz). See Halachah 10 for an illustration of how this principle is effective with regard to vows.
5.
This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Elecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
6.
I.e., he is extending the scope of his colleague's vow, so that it includes not only his colleague, but he himself.
Here also the concept can be explained according to the above difference. Since an oath involves an obligation on the person taking the oath (gavra), it cannot be extended to include another individual, for each person must take his own oath. With regard to a vow, by contrast, since the prohibition caused by the vow is associated with a substance (cheftzah), another person can also extend the prohibition to himself (Rabbenu Nissim).
7.
In this instance, it is not necessary to make the statement immediately thereafter the first vow. Since the meat is visible before us, one can attach a vow to it. With regard to the previous halachah, by contrast, we are speaking about a subject that cannot be seen. Hence, unless the statements are made immediately after each other, there is no way we can be certain of the meaning of the statement: "And I am like you" (Radbaz).
8.
This is a common practice in many communities.
9.
If, however, he never fasted on that day, he cannot attach another day to this vow (Chazon Yechezkel).
10.
I.e., any given day.
11.
For breaking his vow. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 215:1) mentions a view that maintains that the person should be given corporal punishment for taking such a vow and should be compelled to ask to have the vow released.
12.
For he can fulfill the mitzvah and bring the sacrifice (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 2:2).
13.
I.e., the prohibition involves the gavra, the person himself. It cannot take effect if he is already bound to act otherwise.
14.
I.e., the prohibition involves the cheftzah, the article. Once it is forbidden, it is forbidden to fulfill the mitzvah by partaking of it or using it, for a positive commandment does not supercede a negative commandment. It would be a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression which is a forbidden act (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
15.
Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:16.
16.
Despite the fact that by doing so he negates the mitzvah of taking pleasure in the Sabbath and festivals. The Ra'avad clarifies that the matter is dependent on the wording he used in his oath. If on the Sabbath, he said: "I will fast today," he is forbidden to keep his vow.
17.
In the three preceding halachot.
18.
When it is a mitzvah to eat in preparation for the fast (Rosh HaShanah 9a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 604:1).
19.
In contrast to the Sabbath and festivals where the obligation to eat is of Scriptural origin. This is a general principle in Talmudic Law. There are times when our Sages gave their decrees greater power than Scriptural Law, for Scriptural Law is revered by the people at large and does not require reinforcement. If, by contrast, Rabbinic Law was abrogated in such instances, it might lead people to take leniencies even when uncalled for (see Ta'anis 17b; Kessef Mishneh). The Radbaz explains that if keeping one's vow was allowed to override a Rabbinic decree, then there would be no point in making such decrees. For people could nullify them by taking vows. For example, a person could take a vow to drink ordinary gentile wine.
The Kessef Mishneh also explains that although the obligation to eat on Rosh Chodesh and the day preceding Yom Kippur is also of Rabbinic origin, since our Sages found an allusion to it in the Torah, it is less likely that people will treat it lightly.
20.
I.e., he takes a vow against the other person listening to his speech.
21.
If, however, he states: "The satisfaction that I receive from any of the above is forbidden," his vow is effective, for the satisfaction is considered substantial. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
22.
For these organs are objects of substance (Nedarim 13b).
23.
And apply only to entities of substance.
24.
Which are described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, chs. 6 and 9. See also Chapter 1 where the Rambam makes a distinction between these two types of vows.
25.
See Nedarim 15a. Similarly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:1), the Rambam writes that the prohibition against desecrating one's word applies with regard to these vows. Compare to Chapter 4, Halachah 4.
26.
See Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13.
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class
Shabbat, Tevet 26, 5778 · 13 January 2018
"Today's Day"
Sunday, Tevet 26, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Va'eira, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: Ch. 14. The rank of (p. 59)...to deny the truth!" (p. 59).
In the b'racha V'lamalshinim (p. 55, "Let thee..." in English), pause slightly between ut'mageir ("crush") and v'tachnia ("and subdue"), in consonance with the kavana1 that t'akeir ut'shabeir ut'mageir ("uproot, break, crush") refer to the three kelipot2 that must be completely eradicated. V'tachnia ("subdue") refers to kelipat noga3 that must be subdued, but can be purified.
FOOTNOTES
1."Inner meaning" of the word.
2."Shells of evil." See Tanya, Ch. 6 (end).
3."Shell of brightness."
Daily Thought:
Worry Appointments
Anxieties, worries, feelings of inadequacy and failure—all these smother and cripple the soul from doing its job.
You need to find the appropriate time to deal with them. But don’t carry them around the whole day.
During the day, you are Adam and Eve before they tasted the fruit of good and evil.
---
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