Today in Judaism - TODAY IS: WEDNESDAY, ADAR I 26, 5774 • FEBRUARY 26, 2014
TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• FIRST PROPERTY PURCHASE IN THE US BY JEWISH CONGREGATION (1677)
In 1658, fifteen Jewish families emigrated from South America to (what was to become) the United States. These families were of Sephardic lineage and settled together in Newport, Rhode Island, where they established a Jewish congregation. For many years they held weekly prayer services in private homes.
When the need arose for a Jewish cemetery, the community purchased a piece of land on Wednesday, February 28, 1677.
This was the very first piece of land in the colonies which was owned by a Jewish congregation. In this cemetery are buried many of the early members of this congregation, and it is still maintained by the Jewish community today.
For more about the Newport Jewish community, see entry for the 8th of Elul.
DAILY QUOTE:
Marriage is giving it your all, and appreciating that you are but a half.--The Chassidic Masters
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Pekudei, 4th Portion Exodus 39:33-39:43 with Rashi
• Chapter 39
33. Now they brought the Mishkan to Moses, the tent and all its furnishings its clasps, its planks, its bars, its pillars and its sockets, לג. וַיָּבִיאוּ אֶת הַמִּשְׁכָּן אֶל משֶׁה אֶת הָאֹהֶל וְאֶת כָּל כֵּלָיו קְרָסָיו קְרָשָׁיו בְּרִיחָיו וְעַמֻּדָיו וַאֲדָנָיו:
Now they brought the Mishkan to Moses, etc.: Because they could not erect it. Since Moses had done no work in the Mishkan, the Holy One, blessed is He, left for him the task of erecting it [the Mishkan], since no human being could erect it [by himself] because of the heaviness of the planks; and no human was strong enough to put them up, but Moses [was able to] put it up. Moses said before the Holy One, blessed is He, “How is it possible for a human being to erect it [the Mishkan]?” He [God] replied, “You work with your hand.” He [Moses] appeared to be erecting it, and it arose by itself. This is [the meaning of] what it says: “the Mishkan was set up” (Exod. 40:17). It was set up by itself. [This is found in] the midrash of Rabbi Tanchuma. -[from Midrash Tanchuma 11]
ויביאו את המשכן וגו': שלא היו יכולין להקימו, ולפי שלא עשה משה שום מלאכה במשכן, הניח לו הקדוש ברוך הוא הקמתו, שלא היה יכול להקימו שום אדם מחמת כובד הקרשים, שאין כח באדם לזקפן, ומשה העמידו. אמר משה לפני הקדוש ברוך הוא איך אפשר הקמתו על ידי אדם, אמר לו עסוק אתה בידך נראה כמקימו, והוא נזקף וקם מאליו, וזהו שנאמר (שמות מ יז) הוקם המשכן, הוקם מאליו. מדרש רבי תנחומא:
34. the covering of rams' skins dyed red, the covering of tachash skins, and the screening dividing curtain, לד. וְאֶת מִכְסֵה עוֹרֹת הָאֵילִם הַמְאָדָּמִים וְאֶת מִכְסֵה עֹרֹת הַתְּחָשִׁים וְאֵת פָּרֹכֶת הַמָּסָךְ:
35. the Ark of the Testimony and its poles and the ark cover, לה. אֶת אֲרוֹן הָעֵדֻת וְאֶת בַּדָּיו וְאֵת הַכַּפֹּרֶת:
36. the table, all its implements and the showbread, לו. אֶת הַשֻּׁלְחָן אֶת כָּל כֵּלָיו וְאֵת לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים:
37. the pure menorah, its lamps, the lamps to be set in order and all its implements, and the oil for the lighting, לז. אֶת הַמְּנֹרָה הַטְּהֹרָה אֶת נֵרֹתֶיהָ נֵרֹת הַמַּעֲרָכָה וְאֶת כָּל כֵּלֶיהָ וְאֵת שֶׁמֶן הַמָּאוֹר:
38. the golden altar, the anointing oil and the incense, and the screen of the entrance to the tent, לח. וְאֵת מִזְבַּח הַזָּהָב וְאֵת שֶׁמֶן הַמִּשְׁחָה וְאֵת קְטֹרֶת הַסַּמִּים וְאֵת מָסַךְ פֶּתַח הָאֹהֶל:
39. the copper altar and its copper grating, its poles and all its implements, the washstand and its base, לט. אֵת | מִזְבַּח הַנְּחשֶׁת וְאֶת מִכְבַּר הַנְּחשֶׁת אֲשֶׁר לוֹ אֶת בַּדָּיו וְאֶת כָּל כֵּלָיו אֶת הַכִּיֹּר וְאֶת כַּנּוֹ:
40. the hangings of the courtyard, its pillars and its sockets, and the screen for the gate of the courtyard, its ropes and its pegs, and all the implements for the service of the Mishkan, of the Tent of Meeting, מ. אֵת קַלְעֵי הֶחָצֵר אֶת עַמֻּדֶיהָ וְאֶת אֲדָנֶיהָ וְאֶת הַמָּסָךְ לְשַׁעַר הֶחָצֵר אֶת מֵיתָרָיו וִיתֵדֹתֶיהָ וְאֵת כָּל כְּלֵי עֲבֹדַת הַמִּשְׁכָּן לְאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד:
41. the meshwork garments for the service in the Holy, the holy garments for Aaron the Kohen [Gadol] and his sons' garments for serving [as kohanim]. מא. אֶת בִּגְדֵי הַשְּׂרָד לְשָׁרֵת בַּקֹּדֶשׁ אֶת בִּגְדֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ לְאַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן וְאֶת בִּגְדֵי בָנָיו לְכַהֵן:
42. In accordance with all that the Lord had commanded Moses, so did the children of Israel do all the work. מב. כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֶת משֶׁה כֵּן עָשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת כָּל הָעֲבֹדָה:
43. Moses saw the entire work, and lo! they had done it-as the Lord had commanded, so had they done. So Moses blessed them. מג. וַיַּרְא משֶׁה אֶת כָּל הַמְּלָאכָה וְהִנֵּה עָשׂוּ אֹתָהּ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה כֵּן עָשׂוּ וַיְבָרֶךְ אֹתָם משֶׁה:
So Moses blessed them: He said to them, “May it be His will that the Shechinah should rest in the work of your hands. And may the pleasantness of the Lord our God be upon us…” (Ps. 90:17), and this is one of the eleven psalms in “A prayer of Moses” (Ps. 90:1). -[from Num. Rabbah 12:9]
ויברך אותם משה: אמר להם יהי רצון שתשרה שכינה במעשה ידיכם, (תהלים צ יז) ויהי נועם ה' אלהינו עלינו ומעשה ידינו וגו', והוא אחד מאחד עשר מזמורים שבתפלה למשה:
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Tehillim: Psalms Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
• Verses 97-176
97. O how I love Your Torah! All day it is my discussion.
98. Your commandments make me wiser than my enemies, for they are ever with me.
99. From all my teachers I have gained wisdom, for Your testimonies are my discussion.
100. I will be more perceptive than elders, because I have guarded Your precepts.
101. I have restrained my feet from every evil path, that I might keep Your word.
102. I have not turned away from Your judgments, for You have instructed me.
103. How sweet are Your words to my palate, [sweeter] than honey to my mouth!
104. From Your precepts I gain understanding, therefore I hate every path of falsehood.
105. Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.
106. I have sworn-and I will fulfill it-to keep Your righteous judgments.
107. I am afflicted to the extreme; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your promise.
108. Accept with favor, O Lord, the offerings of my lips, and teach me Your laws.
109. My soul is in danger always, yet I have not forgotten Your Torah.
110. The wicked laid a snare for me, yet I have not strayed from Your precepts.
111. I have taken Your testimonies as an eternal heritage, for they are the joy of my heart.
112. I have inclined my heart to perform Your statutes, forever, to the last.
113. I despise vain thoughts, but I love Your Torah.
114. You are my refuge and my shield; I place hope in Your promise.
115. Turn away from me, you evildoers, and I will keep the commandments of my God.
116. Support me according to Your promise, and I will live; let me not be shamed because of my hope.
117. Sustain me, and I will be saved, and I will be engrossed in Your statutes always.
118. You trample all who stray from Your statutes, for their ploy is a lie.
119. You have purged all the wicked of the earth like dross, therefore I love Your testimonies.
120. My flesh bristles from fear of You, and I am in awe of Your judgments.
121. I practiced justice and righteousness; leave me not to my oppressors.
122. Guarantee Your servant goodness; let not the wicked exploit me.
123. My eyes long for Your salvation, and for the word of Your righteousness.
124. Treat Your servant according to Your kindness, and teach me Your statutes.
125. I am Your servant; grant me understanding, that I may know Your testimonies.
126. It is time to act for the Lord; they have abrogated Your Torah.
127. Therefore I love Your commandments more than gold, even fine gold.
128. Therefore I affirmed all Your precepts; I have hated every path of falsehood.
129. Your testimonies are wondrous, therefore does my soul guard them.
130. Your opening words illuminate, enlightening the simple.
131. I opened my mouth and swallowed, because I craved Your commandments.
132. Turn to me and favor me, as is [Your] law for those who love Your Name.
133. Set my steps in Your word, and let no iniquity rule over me.
134. Deliver me from the oppression of man, and I will keep Your precepts.
135. Let Your face shine upon Your servant, and teach me Your statutes.
136. My eyes shed streams of water, because they do not keep Your Torah.
137. Righteous are you, O Lord, and Your judgments are upright.
138. You commanded Your testimonies in righteousness and great faithfulness.
139. My zeal consumes me, because my enemies have forgotten Your words.
140. Your word is very pure, and Your servant cherishes it.
141. I am young and despised, yet I do not forget Your precepts.
142. Your righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and Your Torah is truth.
143. Trouble and anguish have taken hold of me, yet Your commandments are my delight.
144. Your testimonies are righteous forever; give me understanding, that I may live.
145. I call out with all my heart; answer me, O Lord; I will keep Your statutes.
146. I call out to You; save me, and I will observe Your testimonies.
147. I rose before dawn and cried out; my hope is in Your word.
148. My eyes preceded the night watches, that I may discuss Your word.
149. Hear my voice in keeping with Your kindness; O Lord, grant me life as is Your practice.
150. Those who pursue mischief draw near; they are far from Your Torah.
151. You are near, O Lord, and all Your commandments are truth.
152. From the beginning I discerned from Your testimonies that You had established them forever.
153. Behold my affliction and deliver me, for I have not forgotten Your Torah.
154. Wage my battle and redeem me; grant me life for the sake of Your word.
155. Salvation is far from the wicked, for they seek not Your statutes.
156. Your mercies are great, O Lord; grant me life as is Your practice.
157. My pursuers and my enemies are many, yet I did not turn away from Your testimonies.
158. I saw traitors and I quarreled with them, because they do not keep Your words.
159. Behold how I love Your precepts; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your kindness.
160. The beginning of Your word is truth, and forever are all Your righteous judgements.
161. Princes have pursued me without cause, but it is Your word my heart fears.
162. I rejoice at Your word, like one who finds abundant spoil.
163. I hate falsehood and abhor it, but Your Torah I love.
164. Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous judgments.
165. There is abundant peace for those who love Your Torah, and there is no stumbling for them.
166. I hoped for Your salvation, O Lord, and I performed Your commandments.
167. My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them intensely.
168. I have kept Your precepts and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You
169. Let my prayer approach Your presence, O Lord; grant me understanding according to Your word.
170. Let my supplication come before You; save me according to Your promise.
171. My lips will utter praise, for You have taught me Your statutes.
172. My tongue will echo Your word, for all Your commandments are just.
173. Let Your hand be ready to help me, for I have chosen Your precepts.
174. I long for Your salvation, O Lord, and Your Torah is my delight.
175. Let my soul live, and it will praise You, and let Your judgment help me.
176. I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out Your servant, for I have not forgotten Your commandments.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 32
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson Adar I 26, 5774 • February 26, 2014
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 32
ומה שכתוב בגמרא שמי שרואה בחבירו שחטא, מצוה לשנאותו, וגם לומר לרבו שישנאהו
As for the Talmudic statement 1 that if one sees his friend sinning, he should hate him, and should also relate the fact to his teacher so that he too will hate him, — how does this conform with what was said above?
היינו בחבירו בתורה ומצות
This applies only to one’s companion — one’s equal— in the study of Torah and the observance of the mitzvot.
The sinner in question is a Torah-observant scholar, but has lapsed in this one instance. In this case his sin is much more severe than usual, since it is written that even the inadvertent misdeeds of a scholar are as grave as deliberate sins. 2 But even this general assumption of the gravity of his conduct is not sufficient cause to hate him, as the Alter Rebbe continues. Yet another condition must first be satisfied:
וכבר קיים בו מצות הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך, עם שאתך בתורה ובמצות, ואף על פי כן לא שב מחטאו, כמו שכתוב בספר חרדים
He has also fulfilled with him — with the sinner — the injunction, 3 “You shall repeatedly rebuke your friend.” The word used here for “your friend” (עמיתך) also indicates, as the Talmud points out4 עם שאתך - “him who is on a par with you in the Torah and the mitzvot,” as it is written in Sefer Charedim.
At this point there is no need to exaggerate the gravity of his sin: it is clearly a deliberate transgression.
FOOTNOTES
1. Cf. Pesachim 113b.
2. From a note by the Rebbe. Apparently, the Rebbe is addressing the difficulty inherent in the requirement to hate a pious and scholarly Jew who lapses on occasion, but to love one who is far removed from study and observance of the Torah.
The reason for this differentiation cannot be, says the Rebbe, that one might learn from the lapses of the pious Jew, who is on a level similar to one's own, but is less likely to learn from the behavior of the non-observant Jew, who in any case lives differently in general.
The Rebbe rejects this on several grounds: (1) If the requirement to hate the sinner were based in the fear that one might come to learn from him, then this hatred should be directed at a sinner who is in contact with oneself at any level, not necessarily one's peer in Torah observance or scholarship. (2) To avoid imitation of the sinner, it would be enough to keep one's distance from him; why the need to hate him? (3) The whole concept that someone is to be hated, not because of something hateful about him, but to protect the hater, is most difficult to accept. Chassidut requires one to actually suffer harm himself if failure to do so might lead to the remote possibility of his harming his fellow. Such a doctrine would certainly not countenance the suggestion of definitely harming one's fellow (by hating him) in order to forestall possible harm to oneself; and, at that, to forestall a harm that could befall one only if he failed to resist his own evil inclination!
Clearly, then, the requirement to hate the sinner is not intended to solve one's own problem of learning from his sinful ways. This problem is in any event solved by the exhortation of the Mishnah, "Do not consort with a rasha" Avot 1:7. The Alter Rebbe's differentiation between one's peer in Torah and Mitzvot and others is thus grounded in the reason given in the text.
3. Vayikra 19:17.
4. Shevuot 30a.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 320
Working on Shabbat
"You shall not do any manner of work"—Exodus 20:10.
We are forbidden from performing work on Shabbat.
Working on Shabbat
Negative Commandment 320
Translated by Berel Bell
The 320th prohibition is that we are forbidden to do melachah1 on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2, ["It is Shabbos to the L‑rd, your G‑d;] do not do any melachah."
If the act was intentional, but the court has insufficient proof, Scripture3 specifies the punishment as kores.4 If the act was intentional, and there is sufficient proof,5 the punishment is execution by s'kilah.6 If the act was unintentional, he must bring a sin-offering.7
The details of this commandment are discussed in the tractate Shabbos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Although melachah is commonly translated as "work," it actually indicates any one of 39 specific activities singled out by Torah tradition. Included among the 39 are such actions as writing, carrying outside, and tying a knot, even though they do not correspond to the English word "work."
2.Shmos 20:1. Devarim 5:14.
3.Ex. 31:14.
4.See Principle 14, where the Rambam defines kores as losing one's portion in the World to Come (unless the person does teshuvah before death). See also Hilchos Teshuvah, Chapter 8, Halachah. 1.
5.Literally, "the testimony was accepted." This phrase includes such requirements as prior warning of the defendant (hasra'a), testimony of at least 2 witnesses, etc. See N352.
6.Commonly translated as "stoning," it actually consisted of being thrown from a high platform. Only if the person did not die from the fall were actual stones used. See P229.
7.See P69. This offering is called a "fixed sin-offering" to distinguish it from the offering of adjustable value. See P72.
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Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: Hilchot Nizkei Mammon Chapter Two
Chapter Two
1. [The following laws apply with regard to] the major categories of damages and their derivatives. [If a person's property is considered] mu'ad with regard to the major category, it is considered mu'ad with regard to its derivatives. [If it is considered] tam with regard to the major category, the same law applies with regard to its derivatives.
From the outset, [a person's property is considered] to be mu'ad with regard to all the major categories of damage and their derivatives, with the exception of goring and its derivatives. In that instance, [an animal is considered] tam until it has been deemed prone [to goring],1 as explained.2
2. All the derivatives of a category of damages are governed by the same laws as the major category, with the exception of stones that are propelled by an animal while walking.
This activity is considered a derivative of the category of treading,3 and one is therefore not liable for damage caused in the public domain. Nevertheless, if such stones cause damage in a person's private domain, [the owner of the animal] must pay [for the damages] from his most choice property,4 as he must pay for damages caused by treading, the major category. And yet, he is required to pay only half the amount of the damages.5
3. What is implied? When an animal enters a courtyard belonging to another person and proceeds to walk, and in doing so propels stones from under its feet that break utensils, [the owner of the animal] must pay half the amount of the damage from his most choice property. This matter is a law communicated by the Oral Tradition.6
4. Similarly, if [an animal] was proceeding in the public domain7 and stones were propelled from under its feet into a domain belonging to someone else, and they broke utensils there, [the owner of the animal] must pay half the damages.
If [an animal] treads on a utensil in a domain belonging to someone else and breaks it, and shards from the broken utensil fall on another utensil and break it, [the owner of the animal] must pay the entire [damages for the destruction of] the first utensil, and half [the damages for the destruction of] the second utensil.8
5. If an animal was walking in the public domain and it kicked9 [the ground] and propelled stones that caused damage in the public domain, [the owner] is not liable. If the person whose property was damaged seized a fourth [of the cost] of the damages, it should not be expropriated from him.10 [The rationale is that] there is a doubt regarding the matter: perhaps this is considered a deviation from the ordinary pattern and it is not a derivative of treading, for [the animal] kicked.11
6. If the animal kicked the earth in the domain belonging to another person and stones were propelled because of its kick and caused damages, [the owner] is liable to pay a fourth of the damages, for this is a deviation from the ordinary manner of propelling stones. If the person whose property was damaged seized half [of the cost] of the damages, it should not be expropriated from him.12
Even if an animal was walking in a place where it would be impossible for it not to propel stones, and it kicked [the earth] and propelled stones, [the owner] is liable to pay a fourth of the damages.13 If the person whose property was damaged seized half [of the cost] of the damages, it should not be expropriated from him.
7. Whenever a person must pay full damages, the payment is considered to be a monetary obligation that he is liable to pay, as if he had borrowed [money] from his colleague. When, by contrast, a person must pay half the damages, the monetary obligation is considered a fine, with the exception of the half damages liable from stones,14 which is a halachah [transmitted by the Oral Tradition], as we have explained.15
8. This is the operating principle: Whenever a person pays for the damage that he caused, it is considered a monetary obligation. Whenever he pays more or less - e.g., the double payment (for theft) or half the amount of damages - the amount that is greater or less than the principal is considered to be a fine.
A fine is required only when one is obligated through the testimony of witnesses. When a person admits that he is liable for a fine, he is absolved of the obligation.16
9. [The following rules apply when] a rooster sticks its head inside a glass container, crows while doing so and breaks it [as a result of the sound]. If there were spices or the like inside [the container, and the rooster] stuck its head in to eat them, [the owner] must pay full damages for the spices17 and half the damages for the container, as one pays half damages for stones [that are propelled].18 [The rationale is that this is the animal's] ordinary pattern.19
If, however, the container is empty, this is a deviation from the norm, and [the owner] is liable to pay half the damages, as in the case with other fines.20
10. Similarly, if a horse yelped or a donkey bellowed and utensils were broken as a result, the owner is obligated to pay only half the damages.21
Roosters are considered prone to break utensils as they proceed in their ordinary pattern. If there was a string or a strap tied to [a rooster's] legs22 and a utensil became entangled with the string and rolled and broke, [the owner] is required to pay half the damages.23
When does the above apply? When the string was tied to the rooster by a person.24 If, however, the string became ensnarled around the rooster's foot, its owner is not liable.25 If that string was owned by a given person,26 rather than being ownerless, the owner of the string is liable to pay half the damages, because the string is like a moving pit.27
11. If the owner of the string hid the string, and the roosters trod on it and took it out, and then it became ensnarled around their feet, and as a result utensils were broken, the owner of the string is also freed of liability,28 for [the damage] was beyond his control.29
12. [The following rules apply when] roosters flew from place to place and broke utensils. If they broke the utensils with their wings, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage.30 If the utensils were broken by the wind generated by [the roosters'] wings, [the owner] is liable for half the damages.31
13. [If roosters] were digging32 at dough or at produce and soiled it or pecked at it, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage.33 If they caused damages with the dust or stones that they raised with their feet or with their wings, [the owner] is liable for half the damages.34
14. If [roosters] were pecking at a rope [that held a bucket], the rope tore, and the bucket broke, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage. [This applies when] the bucket rolled until it fell and broke because of them.35
If there was food on the rope, and the rope tore while they were eating, they are liable to pay the entire amount of the damage to the rope as well.36
15. When a dog or a goat jumps from a roof downward and breaks utensils, [the owner] is liable for the entire damages, because they are prone to this.37
Similarly, if they fell and caused damages, [their owner is liable], because the fact that they climbed to the roof is considered negligence.38 [Therefore,] even if they fell because of forces beyond [the owner's] control, [he is liable], because whenever a person is negligent at the outset, and damage subsequently occurs because of forces beyond his control, he is liable.39
16. If [the animals] jump upward [and cause damage], [the owner] is liable for half.40 This applies when a goat climbs upward or a dog jumps. If, however, a dog climbed upward and a goat leaps, whether upward or downward, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage.41
Similarly, if a rooster jumps either upward or downward, [the owner] is liable to pay for the entire amount of the damage.
17. [The following laws apply when] a dog takes a cake [from a fire where it is cooking, a coal is stuck to the cake], and [the dog] takes [the cake] to a grain heap. If it places [the cake] down on the grain heap, eats the cake and kindles the grain heap, [the owner] is liable to pay the full damages for the cake and the place where it placed the cake [in the grain heap].42 For the remainder of the grain heap, he is required to pay only half the damages.43
If [the dog] dragged the cake all over the grain heap, burning it as it proceeded, [the owner] is liable to pay the entire damages for the cake. For the place of the coals,44 [the owner] is liable to pay half the damages,45 and for the remainder of the grain heap he is not liable at all.46
18. When does the above apply? When the owner of the coal guarded his fire and closed the door, and yet the dog dug underneath [until it could enter and] take the cake from the fire.47 If, however, he did not guard his fire, the owner of the fire is liable for the burning of the grain heap,48 and the owner of the dog is liable for the cake and the place where it was placed.49
19. When a person sets a dog belonging to a colleague on a [third] individual, he is not held liable by mortal courts;50 the laws of heaven, however, obligate him to pay.51
The owner of the dog is liable to pay half the damages.52 Since he knows that if his dog is set upon [a person] maliciously he will bite him, he should not have allowed [his dog to be left to do this].
If [a person] set a dog [belonging to a colleague] to bite the person himself, the owner of the dog is not liable. For when there is already a deviation from the norm,53 and a person brings about a further deviation,54 [the owner] is not liable.
20. When there are two cows in the public domain, one lying down and one walking, if the one walking kicks the one lying down, [the owner] is liable for half the damages.55 Even though it would be the ordinary practice for [the cow] to tread on the cow that is lying down, it is not its ordinary practice to kick it.56
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The Ra'avad emphasizes that when an animal has been deemed prone to cause damage through goring or one of its derivatives, it is deemed mu'ad only with regard to the particular activity that it performed repeatedly, but not with regard to any of the other derivatives of goring. |
| 2. | See Chapter 1, Halachah 4-5. |
| 3. | For like damages caused by treading, it involves damages caused accidentally by an animal when walking in its ordinary manner. |
| 4. | The Lechem Mishneh raises questions regarding this point, but the Rambam's ruling is justified by the later commentaries. |
| 5. | See Halachah 7, which clarifies the distinction between this and other instances where half payment is required. |
| 6. | I.e., it is a law that was communicated orally to Moses on Mount Sinai and then transmitted orally from generation to generation. Although such laws are usually not even alluded to in the Written Law, their authority is the same as that of a law stated in Scripture. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin, Chapter 6). |
| 7. | Despite the fact that the animal was walking in the public domain, since the damage took place in a private domain, the owner is liable. |
| 8. | The damage to the first utensil is an ordinary instance of treading, while the damage to the second utensil is a case of the law illustrated in the previous two halachot. |
| 9. | Intentionally. |
| 10. | See Chapter 1, Halachah 11 and notes. |
| 11. | This law is the subject of an unresolved question in Bava Kama 19a. The question is whether kicking the stone is considered like goring - for the kicking was done intentionally - in which case the owner would be liable for damage caused in the public domain, or it is considered to be an ordinary instance of stones that were propelled, and since the damage took place in the public domain, the owner is not held liable.Even according to the logic that maintains that the owner is liable, he is liable for only a fourth of the damage. This figure is arrived at as follows: When damage is caused by propelling stones, the owner is required to pay only half. Since the animal is considered to be a tam - i.e., it is not prone to cause such damages - the owner is required to pay only half of the amount for which he would be liable. Thus, one half of a half is a quarter.Since the question was not resolved by the Sages, the owner should not be held liable. Conversely, if the person whose property was damaged seized the money involved, it should not be expropriated from him.The Ra'avad raises objections to the Rambam's ruling, based on a different understanding of the Talmudic passage. The later authorities, however, follow the Rambam. |
| 12. | This law is an extension of the unresolved question mentioned in the previous halachah. Since the damage took place in a private domain, the owner is definitely held liable. The question is whether he is liable for half the damages or for only a quarter of the damages. According to the opinion that maintains that kicking is considered a deviation, he should be held liable for only a fourth. According to the opinion that maintains that a deviation is not significant with regard to this category of damages, he is liable to pay half the damages.Since the matter was left unresolved, the owner may be required to pay only one fourth. If, however, the person whose property was damaged seized the owner's property, he need not relinquish half the value of the damages. |
| 13. | The principles operating in this instance are the same as those operating in the first clause. The only reason for mentioning this law is that since it is impossible that the animal would not propel stones, one might not think that the deviation is significant, and the owner should be held liable for half the damages, as in an ordinary case of this nature. This premise is, nevertheless, not accepted. |
| 14. | In this instance, although the owner does not pay for the full extent of the damages, none of the leniencies stated below apply.With regard to the payment of half-damages, according to ordinary logic - and indeed, this was the practice of the secular laws at that time - since the animal was not mu'ad, prone to cause damage, one would not think to hold the owner liable. Nevertheless, to insure higher standards of respect for property, Torah law fined the owner of the animal for half the damages. |
| 15. | See Halachah 3. |
| 16. | This applies even if after a person admits that he is liable for a fine, witnesses testify to that effect (Hilchot Geneivah 3:8-9 and the Maggid Mishneh). There are also other distinctions between fines and monetary obligations; for example, cases involving fines were arbitrated only by judges who were given semichah. Thus, they are not arbitrated in the present era. |
| 17. | As is the case when one's animal eats produce belonging to someone else. |
| 18. | The parallel between this instance and stones that are propelled can be explained as follows: When an animal propels a stone and the stone causes damage, the damage is not caused directly by the animal's body, but indirectly by the power it generated. Similarly, when the rooster breaks the container by crowing, the damage is caused indirectly, as a result of the animal's energy. |
| 19. | I.e., a rooster is likely to stick its head into a container in order to eat food, and it is likely to crow while eating. |
| 20. | Since this is a deviation from the animal's ordinary pattern, one is liable only for half the damages. The Ra'avad raises the question: Since the first clause of the halachah draws an analogy between the rooster's crowing and an animal's propelling stones, how is this instance different from the law stated in Halachah 6, where the owner is held liable for only a quarter of the damages his animal caused?The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's rationale is difficult to understand, but offers the following explanation. When there are no spices in the container, crowing and breaking the container is considered to be a derivative of goring, not of propelling stones.The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 390:9) does not resolve the issue, explaining that since a deviation from the ordinary pattern is involved, the case is considered a fine and is not arbitrated in the present era. |
| 21. | These are not considered departures from the norm. Instead, they are considered derivatives of the category of propelling stones. Therefore, payment is required for only half the damages. |
| 22. | The Ra'avad raises many questions concerning the Rambam's decision, and similarly, Rabbenu Asher interprets the passage in Bava Kama 17a differently from the Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 390:10) quotes the Rambam's interpretation, while the Ramah refers to the Rambam's rulings as satum, closed to us, and follows the approach of Rabbenu Asher. |
| 23. | It appears that the Rambam considers the string to be like stones propelled by an animal's feet (tz'rurot). They are not considered as a pit, an inanimate object that causes damage, for as the Ra'avad notes, one is liable for the full damages caused by a pit and not half the damages. |
| 24. | I.e., by the rooster's owner. If it was tied by another person, the owner is not held liable, and the others are required to pay half the damages. |
| 25. | As mentioned, the string is considered to be a pit. With regard to that category of damages, Bava Kama 19b states that the pit must be brought into being by a person. If it is brought into being by an animal, the owner of the animal is not liable. In this case, since the owner did not tie the string to the rooster, he is not liable. |
| 26. | Other than the owner of the rooster. |
| 27. | As stated by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 411:4), when an object belonging to a person is left in the public domain, moved by an animal and then causes damage, the owner of the animal and the owner of the article must share the cost of the damages equally. |
| 28. | I.e., the owner of the rooster is freed of liability, because as above, he did not tie the string to the rooster. |
| 29. | I.e., he did everything he could to prevent the damage from occurring. |
| 30. | I.e., this is comparable to an animal's breaking a utensil by treading upon it. |
| 31. | The wind produced by the roosters' wings is comparable to an an animal's propelling stones. |
| 32. | Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 2:1). |
| 33. | I.e., since the roosters caused the damage in an ordinary fashion with their bodies, the owner is liable for the entire amount. |
| 34. | This is also comparable to an animal's propelling stones. |
| 35. | I.e., the roosters pushed the bucket until it fell and broke. They were thus the direct cause of its breaking, and this is considered as treading.If the bucket broke as a result of the rope's tearing, the ruling depends on whether the rope is new or worn. We assume that a rooster will peck at a rope slightly to sip its moisture. Thus, if the rope is worn, it is normal for it to snap. Hence, the owner is liable for the entire damages. If the rope is new, for the rope to tear from such pecking is not ordinary, and the owner is liable for only half the damages (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 390:11). |
| 36. | Since there is food on the rope, we assume that the roosters will peck on it exceedingly, and it will tear even if it is new. |
| 37. | This is considered to be a derivative of treading. |
| 38. | I.e., the animals' owner should have known that his animals are prone to climb to the roof, and he should have taken precautions against that happening. |
| 39. | Bava Metzia 42a explains that the logic is that, if not for the negligence, the damage would never have been caused by forces beyond their control. |
| 40. | For this is a departure from the norm. |
| 41. | For this is their ordinary pattern. The Rambam's ruling follows the version of Bava Kama 22a cited by Rabbenu Chanan'el and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard version of the Talmud we possess today differs.Our translation differs from that of Rashi and the Nimukei Yosef who translate as lowered itself while hanging. |
| 42. | This is the ordinary pattern of a dog, who will grab food from a fire in order to eat it. And since it is likely that a coal will remain attached to the cake, the owner of the dog is liable for the place where the cake is placed down as well. |
| 43. | The standard printed texts of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 2:3) offer the following rationale: This is a deviation from the ordinary pattern. This does not follow any of the explanations given in the Talmud. Rav Kapach's text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah explains that the burning of the rest of the grain heap is compared to stones that are kicked, for in both cases the damage is caused indirectly. This follows Rabbi Yochanan's position, Bava Kama 22a. |
| 44. | According to the Radbaz (Volume V, Responsum 1662), this refers to all the places over which the dog dragged the coals. |
| 45. | For this is considered comparable to stones that are kicked. |
| 46. | The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the owner is forced to pay one fourth of the damages, because he considers this case comparable to propelling stones, except that a deviation from the normal pattern is involved. The Tur also follows this approach. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 392:1) follows the opinion of the Rambam, while the Ramah mentions that of the Tur.The Rambam's opinion can be substantiated based on Hilchot Rotze'ach 6:15, which states that a person is not liable for ko'ach kocho, an activity that comes about as an indirect result of his exertion of energy. It appears that the Rambam considers the damage caused by propelling stones to be kocho, a direct result of the person's energy, and not ko'ach kocho (Kessef Mishneh, Radbaz). The Ra'avad, by contrast, considers propelling stones to be ko'ach kocho. |
| 47. | In which case, the owner of the dog is responsible for all the damages, for the fire took place because of his negligence. |
| 48. | For it is his negligence that made the fire possible. |
| 49. | For the dog caused this damage directly.The Ra'avad and the Tur, who in the previous law maintain that the owner of the dog must pay one fourth of the damages to the grain heap, maintain that he is liable for that amount in this instance as well. Hence, the owner of the fire is liable for only three fourths of the damages. In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the opinion of the Rambam, while the Ramah mentions that of the Tur. |
| 50. | This reflects a fundamental principle in the laws of damages. Grama, being an indirect cause, does not generate liability. |
| 51. | I.e., he has a moral and ethical obligation to pay for the damages. See Bava Kama 55b, which gives several instances of grama and states that the person who indirectly caused the damage has a moral obligation to compensate for it. |
| 52. | Dogs do not usually bite. Therefore, the fact that the person who set the dog on the third person provoked it to do so is considered a departure from the norm, and the owner is liable for only half the damages.The Ra'avad adds that if the dog is known to be prone to bite, the owner is liable for the entire amount of the damages. The Maggid Mishneh differs, maintaining that since the dog was provoked by the person who set it, this is considered a departure from the norm. (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 5.) Sefer Me'irat Einayim 395:2 quotes the Maggid Mishneh's view. |
| 53. | Causing the dog to bite. |
| 54. | Causing the dog to bite his own master. |
| 55. | This is considered a derivative of goring. Since the cow is not known to be prone to kick other animals, the owner is liable for only half the damages. |
| 56. | The owner would not have been liable if the cow had caused the damage by treading on the other cow. Since he did cause the damage by kicking, the owner is liable. |
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Eruvin Chapter Three, Eruvin Chapter Four, Eruvin Chapter Five
Chapter Three
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] there is a window between two courtyards: If the window is four handbreadths by four handbreadths1 or larger and it is within ten handbreadths of the ground - whether it is [almost] entirely above ten handbreadths and only a [small] portion is within ten handbreadths, or it is [almost] entirely within ten handbreadths and only a [small] portion is above ten handbreadths - [an option is granted to] the inhabitants of the courtyards.2
If they desire to join in a single eruv, they may. This causes [the entire area] to be considered a single courtyard, and carrying is permitted from one [courtyard] to the other.3 If they desire, they may make two eruvim, each for [the inhabitants of their respective courtyards]. [It is then forbidden] to carry from one courtyard to the other.]
If the windows are smaller than four [handbreadths by four handbreadths] or the entire window is above ten handbreadths from the ground,4 they may make twoeruvim, each for [the inhabitants of the respective courtyard].
Halacha 2
When does the above apply? To a window between two courtyards. When, by contrast, the window lies between two houses,5 [they are permitted to make aneruv] even if the window is above ten handbreadths from the ground.6
Similarly, when there is a window between a house and a loft, if the inhabitants desire to establish a single eruv they may, even if there is not a ladder [leading to the window], provided [the window] is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths]. If the window is round and it can circumscribe a square that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], it is considered as if it were square.
Halacha 3
When there is a wall or a mound of hay that is less than ten handbreadths high7between two courtyards, they must make a single eruv and may not make twoeruvim. If [the wall or the mound] is ten or more handbreadths high, they must make two eruvim, each for the respective courtyard.
If there is a ladder8 on either side of the wall,9 it is considered to be an entrance, and if they desire, they may establish a single eruv. Even if the ladder is standing upright, next to the wall, and it is impossible to ascend it without moving its lower portion away from the wall, it permits [them to participate in a single eruv]. [Moreover,] even if the top of the ladder does not reach the top of the wall, if there are less than three handbreadths between them,10 it permits them to participate in a single eruv if they desire.
Halacha 4
If the wall is four [handbreadths] wide and a ladder is positioned on either side of the wall, they may make a single eruv, if they desire.11 If the wall is not four [handbreadths] wide, and there are less than three handbreadths between the [two] ladders, they may make a single eruv.12 If there are more than three handbreadths between [the ladders], they must make two eruvim.13
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] one builds a bench14 above a bench at the side of a wall [separating two courtyards]: If the lower bench is four handbreadths [high], [we consider it as if the height of the wall] were reduced.15 If the lower [bench] is not four handbreadths [high], but there are less than three handbreadths between it and the upper [bench], [we consider it as if the height of the wall] were reduced.
[In such situations,] if [the inhabitants of the courtyards] desire, they may make a single eruv. Similar [principles apply] regarding wooden steps placed close to a wall.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] there is a high wall separating two courtyards, and a projection16 protrudes from the middle of the wall: If less than ten cubits remain from the projection to the top of the wall, one may lean a ladder in front of the projection,17 and [this grants the inhabitants] the option of making a single eruv. If, however, one stands the ladder [against the wall] at the side of the projection, [we do] not [consider it as if the height of the wall were] reduced.18
If the wall is nineteen handbreadths high, [it is sufficient] to have a projection protrude for the inhabitants to have the option of making a single eruv. For there are less than ten handbreadths from the earth to the projection, and less than ten handbreadths from the projection to the top of the wall.19
Were the wall to be twenty handbreadths high, two projections are required for the inhabitants to have the option of establishing a single eruv. [Moreover, the projections] may not be parallel to each other:20 [In this way,] there will be less than ten handbreadths between the lower projection and the ground, and less than ten handbreadths between the upper projection and the top of the wall.
Halacha 7
If a date palm is chopped down and inclined from the earth to the top of a wall, the inhabitants have the option of establishing a single eruv.21 It is not necessary for them to make it a permanent part of the structure. Similarly, the [very] weight of a ladder22 causes it to be considered as having been placed permanently; it is not necessary to affix it to the structure.
If [the divider] separating two courtyards is made of straw,23 [the inhabitants] may not make a single eruv although there are ladders on either side. A person will not ascend the ladder, because nothing is supporting it.24 If the ladders are in the center, [leaning on a firm support,] and there is straw on either side, [the inhabitants] have the option of making two eruvim.25
Halacha 8
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] a wall is ten handbreadths high, and [the inhabitants] desire [to tear down a portion of the wall] to reduce itsheight so that they will be able to establish a single eruv. They have the option of establishing a single eruv, provided the portion whose height they reduce is [at least] four handbreadths long.30
If [the inhabitants of one of the adjoining courtyards] tear down a portion [of their side] of the wall so that it is less than ten [handbreadths high], they are granted [permission to use] the shorter portion of the wall.31 The remainder of the wall that is high is divided between [the inhabitants of] both courtyards.
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a high wall between [two] courtyards is breached: If the breach is ten cubits [wide] or less, they [still may] establish twoeruvin.32 They do, however, have the option of establishing a single eruv, because [the breach] can be considered to be an opening. If [the breach] is more than ten [cubits wide], their only option is to establish a single eruv; they may not establish two eruvin.33
Halacha 11
If the breach is less than ten [cubits wide], and one [desires to] make it more than ten cubits, it is necessary to hollow out34a portion of the wall ten handbreadths high.35 [When this is done, the only option remaining is to] establish a single eruv.
At the outset, if one desires to open a breach larger than ten [cubits] in the wall, it is necessary that the height of the breach be equivalent to that of [an ordinary] person.36
Halacha 12
When there is a trench at least ten handbreadths deep and at least four handbreadths wide between two courtyards, it is necessary for [the inhabitants] to establish two eruvin.37 If its dimensions are less than this, [the inhabitants] must establish a single eruv; [they] do not [have the option of] establishing twoeruvin.38
If the depth of the trench is reduced by [adding] earth or pebbles, [the inhabitants] must establish a single eruv; [they] do not [have the option of] establishing two eruvin.39 For it can be assumed that the earth and the stones were intended to become a permanent part of the trench.40 If, by contrast, one reduced [the depth of the trench] by adding straw or hay, the reduction is not [significant] unless one intends41 that they become a permanent part [of the trench].
Halacha 13
Similarly, if one reduces the width [of the trench] with a board or with reeds42 by placing them across the entire length of the trench, [the inhabitants] must establish a single eruv; [they] do not [have the option of] establishing two eruvin.
Any entity that may be carried on the Sabbath43 - e.g., a basket or a cup - is not considered to reduce its depth, unless one affixes it to the earth [firmly], in such a manner that one must dig with a spade to dislodge it.
Halacha 14
When one places a board that is [at least] four handbreadths wide across the trench, [the board is considered to be an entrance]. [Therefore, the inhabitants] may establish a single eruv. They also have the option of establishing twoeruvin.
Similar [rules apply when] two balconies are positioned opposite each other [across the public domain], and a board is extended from one balcony to the other.44 [The inhabitants] may establish a single eruv. They also have the option of establishing two eruvin, each one for his own balcony.
If the two balconies are on the same side [of the public domain], but are not at the same height - instead, one is higher than the other [the following rules apply]: If they are within three handbreadths of each other, they are considered to be a single balcony45 and [the inhabitants] may establish only a single eruv. If they are more than three [handbreadths] apart, they must establish twoeruvin,46 each one for his own balcony.
Halacha 15
[The following rule applies when] between two courtyards, there is a wall four handbreadths wide,47 which is ten handbreadths high from one courtyard, and at ground level48 at the second courtyard: The width of the wall is granted to the inhabitants of the courtyard at which it is at ground level, and it is considered to be an extension of their courtyard. [The rationale is] that since it is easily accessible to the inhabitants [of this courtyard], and more difficult to use for [the inhabitants of the other], it is granted to those for whom it is easily accessible.
Similarly, if there is a trench between the two courtyards that is ten handbreadths deep for the courtyard on one side and at ground level for the courtyard on the other side, the width of the trench is granted to the inhabitants of the courtyard at which it is at ground level. [The rationale is] that since it is easily accessible to the inhabitants [of this courtyard], and more difficult to use for [the inhabitants of the other], it is granted to those for whom it is easily accessible.
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when] there is a wall between two courtyards that is lower than the upper courtyard, but higher than the lower courtyard:49 [During the week,] the inhabitants of the upper courtyard may make use of the breadth of the wall by lowering articles to it, and the inhabitants of the lower courtyard may make use of it by throwing articles onto it.
On the Sabbath, the inhabitants of both courtyards are forbidden to use the wall unless they establish a single eruv. If they do not establish an eruv, it is forbidden to bring articles that were left on the breadth of this wall into the homes,50 nor may one bring articles from the homes to the breadth of the wall.
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when there is] a ruin that is a private domain between two houses: If [the inhabitants of] both houses can use the ruin by throwing objects into it,51 each one causes the other to be forbidden to use it [unless they establish an eruv].
If it is easy for [the inhabitants of] one [of the houses] to use [the ruin], while [the inhabitants of] the other may not throw articles into it [easily], because it is deeper than [their domain], it is granted to those who can use it [more] easily.52They may use it by throwing articles into it.
Halacha 18
All the following are considered to be [parts of] a single private domain:53 all the roofs of the city - despite the fact that some are high and some are low - all the courtyards, all the enclosures that were enclosed for purposes other than dwelling and are each less in area than that required to sow two se'ah,54 the breadths of all the walls, and all the lanes [in which one may carry because] either a post or a beam has been erected.
One may carry articles left in one [of these areas] at the commencement of the Sabbath to another without an eruv. One may not, however, transfer articles left in the homes to these areas unless an eruv is made.
Halacha 19
What is implied? When an article was left in a courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath, whether the inhabitants of the courtyards established an eruvfor themselves or whether they failed to do so, it is permitted to take the article from the courtyard to the roof or to the top of the wall. Afterwards, it may be taken from the roof to another roof adjacent to it, even if [the second roof] is higher or lower than it.
From the second roof, it may be taken to another courtyard, and from the other courtyard to a third roof in a third courtyard. From this courtyard, it may be taken to a lane, and from the lane to a fourth roof. Indeed, one may carry throughout the entire city through the courtyards and roofs, through the enclosed areas and roofs, or through the courtyards and the enclosed areas, or through [any combination] of these three types of areas, provided one does not bring this article into any of the houses [in the city].55 [The latter is forbidden] unless all [the inhabitants of] these different areas join together in a single eruv.
Halacha 20
[Conversely,] if an article was located in a house at the beginning of the Sabbath, and it was later taken out to a courtyard,56 it may not be taken to another courtyard, to another roof, to the top of a wall, or to an enclosed area unless the inhabitants of all the areas through which the article passes join together in a single eruv.
Halacha 21
When a cistern is located between two courtyards,57 it is forbidden to draw water from it on the Sabbath unless a partition ten handbreadths high has been erected58 so that everyone would be drawing water from his own property.
Where should the partition be erected? If the partition is above the water, it is necessary that at least one handbreadth of the partition descend into the water.59 If the partition was constructed within the water, it must project a handbreadth outside the water, so that one domain will be distinct from the other.
Halacha 22
Similarly, if a beam four handbreadths wide60 has been placed over the mouth of the cistern, one may fill [his bucket] from this side of the beam, and the other may fill [his bucket] from the other side of the beam. Although the water is not divided below [the beam], it is considered as if one portion [of the cistern] were separated from the other. This is a leniency enacted by the Sages with regard to water.
Halacha 23
When a well lies in the midst of a path61 between the walls of two courtyards, [the inhabitants of] both courtyards may draw water from it; there is no necessity for them to extend projections to the well.62 [This ruling applies] even though the well is more than four handbreadths from each of the walls. [The rationale is] that [the presence of] a colleague's [domain] does not cause a person to be forbidden to carry [when he is lifting an entity] through the air.63
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when the wall of] a small courtyard is broken down, opening [the courtyard] entirely to a large courtyard before the commencement of the Sabbath:64 The inhabitants of the large courtyard may establish an eruvfor themselves and they are permitted to carry, for portions of their wall still remain [standing] on each side.65
The inhabitants of the small courtyard, by contrast, are forbidden to remove articles from their homes to the courtyard until they establish a single eruvtogether with the inhabitants of the larger courtyard. [The governing principle is that] the dwellings of the larger courtyard are considered to be [part of] the smaller courtyard, while the dwellings of the smaller courtyard are not considered to be [part of] the larger courtyard.66
Halacha 25
When two courtyards have established a single eruv together through a shared opening or window, and that opening or window was closed on the Sabbath,67[the inhabitants of] each of the courtyards may carry within [their own courtyard].68 Since [carrying] was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath.
Similarly, if [the inhabitants of] two courtyards have each established a separateeruv and the wall between them fell on the Sabbath, [the inhabitants of each courtyard] are still permitted [to carry] within their original area.69 They may each take articles from their homes and carry them to the point where they could originally.
[The rationale is that] since [carrying] was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath.70 Although the number of people [within the courtyard] was increased, an increase of people on the Sabbath itself does not cause carrying to be forbidden.
[In the instance mentioned in the first clause, if after the opening or window was closed on the Sabbath,]71 the window was opened inadvertently, or an entrance was made, or gentiles made [an opening] on their own volition, it is again permitted [to carry from one to the other].
Similarly, if two ships were tied to each other and an eruv was established between them, it becomes forbidden to carry from one to the other if the connection between them is severed.72 [This ruling applies] even if they are surrounded by a partition. If the connection was reestablished inadvertently, it is again permitted [to carry from one to the other].
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
As reflected by the Rambam's ruling, Hilchot Tum'at Meit 7:1, this is the minimum size that a human being can squeeze through. For this reason, it is necessary that it be at least four handbreadths on each side; a total area of 16 square handbreadths is not sufficient (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:5; Mishnah Berurah 372:30). (See also the following halachah.)
|
| 2. |
Since the window is of sufficient size and it is close to the ground, the inhabitants of the courtyards are granted the option of considering it an entrance. If this option is taken, it causes the two courtyards to be considered a single entity.
|
| 3. |
The Mishnah Berurah 372:27 emphasizes that this ruling applies only when the courtyards did not join together in a shituf to permit carrying in the entire lane.
|
| 4. |
The window cannot be considered to be an entrance. Hence, the courtyards are considered to be separate.
|
| 5. |
This refers to an instance when an eruv was not established in the courtyard. Were that the case, it would be possible to transfer articles from house to house through the window, even without a separate eruv.
|
| 6. |
Eruvin 76b explains that a house is considered as if it is full, and thus it is as if there were less than ten handbreadths between the window and the ground.
|
| 7. |
A divider that is less than ten handbreadths high is not significant. Therefore, the entire area is considered to be a single domain, and all the inhabitants must join in one eruv.
|
| 8. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:8) states that the ladder must be at least four handbreadths wide and have four rungs. The commentaries question why the Rambam does not include these restrictions.
|
| 9. |
How close the ladders must be to each other is explained in the following halachah.
|
| 10. |
Based on the principle of l'vud, when there is a distance of less than three handbreadths between two entities, it is considered as though they were adjacent.
|
| 11. |
Since the wall is more than four handbreadths wide, it is possible to walk from one ladder to the other ladder on the wall.
|
| 12. |
Based on the principle of l'vud, it is considered as though the ladders were adjacent.
|
| 13. |
Because the ladders are distant from each other, the two courtyards are considered to be separate entities.
|
| 14. |
Our translation is based on Eruvin 77b, the apparent source for the halachah.
|
| 15. |
Since one can climb over the wall easily by ascending onto the bench, the wall is no longer considered an absolute division between the courtyards, and it is possible to establish an eruv, joining both courtyards.
This is the conception of the Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:9,11) follows the view of Rabbenu Asher which is more stringent and which maintains that a bench does not create the option of fusing the two courtyards into a single entity. The only leniency which is permitted is that the inhabitants of the courtyard where the bench is located may use the top of the wall.
|
| 16. |
The projection must be at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 372:12).
|
| 17. |
In this way, the inhabitants can easily cross over the wall by climbing from the ground to the projection and from the projection to the top of the wall.
|
| 18. |
When the ladder is leaning on the projection, they are considered to be a single unit. When, by contrast, the ladder is leaning against the wall, even if it is in within three handbreadths of the projection, they are not considered to be a single unit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:15; Mishnah Berurah 372:98-99).
|
| 19. |
Thus, they can climb over the wall easily in this fashion.
|
| 20. |
In this way, a ladder can be extended from one projection to another. Also, these projections must lie within ten handbreadths of each other. Thus, the people can climb from the earth to the first projection, from the first projection to the second, and from the second to the top of the wall.
In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:12) follows the view of Rabbenu Asher which is more stringent and which maintains that the projections do not create the option of fusing the two courtyards into a single entity. The only leniency which is permitted is that the inhabitants of the courtyard where the projections are located may use the top of the wall.
|
| 21. |
I.e., the date palm is considered to be a ladder, enabling people to climb across the wall.
|
| 22. |
The Maggid Mishneh notes that Eruvin 78a mentions a Babylonian ladder, for these ladders were large and heavy. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this concept is intimated by the Rambam's words "the [very] weight of the ladder...." These rules do not apply to a light ladder that is easily carried from place to place.
|
| 23. |
Our additions to the text are based on the commentary of the Meiri on Eruvin, loc. cit. A similar approach is also reflected in the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on this halachah. Rashi offers a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage, and his understanding is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:13).
|
| 24. |
I.e., the straw divider will not support the weight of a person climbing on the ladder.
|
| 25. |
They also have the option of establishing a single eruv, if they so desire. Certain commentaries suggest amending the text of the Mishneh Torah to include this concept.
|
| 26. |
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 21:1, the Sages specified certain activities as forbidden as a safeguard to the observance of the Sabbath prohibitions. Each of the forbidden activities is referred to as a sh'vut. See also Hilchot Shabbat 21:6 which prohibits climbing trees.
|
| 27. |
For when a mitzvah is involved, we are not bound by the prohibitions in the category of sh'vutduring beyn hash'mashot (Hilchot Shabbat 24:10), and that is when the eruv takes effect (Chapter 1, Halachah 21). Since the eruv was acceptable beyn hash'mashot, it is acceptable for the entire Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:18).
|
| 28. |
A tree that is worshiped. The Torah prohibits deriving any benefit from such a tree. See Exodus 34:13; Deuteronomy 7:5 and 12:3; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:3.
|
| 29. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:15) notes that Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Eruvin78b) reverses the rulings and permits the establishment of a single eruv if an asherah is used as a ladder, but not if an ordinary tree is used for that purpose. The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.; Mishnah Berurah 372:116) favor the Rambam's interpretation.
|
| 30. |
If the portion of the wall that was torn down is at least four handbreadths wide, it can be considered to be an opening.
|
| 31. |
The interpretation of the passage in Eruvin 77a, the source for this halachah, is a matter of dispute among the commentaries. Our translation is based on the Lechem Mishneh's gloss on theMishneh Torah.
|
| 32. |
For the breach is not large enough to nullify the importance of the entire divider, provided the entire wall has not been destroyed.
|
| 33. |
An opening of that size causes the entire divider to be considered as having no significance. It is as if there were only one courtyard. (See Hilchot Shabbat 16:16.)
|
| 34. |
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 78b. The Ra'avad and others conceive of this passage in a different light. It is their view that is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim372:14).
|
| 35. |
This is sufficient, even though there is a portion of the wall that is higher than ten handbreadths.
|
| 36. |
Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh. Others explain this to mean the full height of the wall.
Making a breach of this height indicates that one desires to pass freely from one courtyard to another. If the breach is not this high, one might think that the opening was made solely for the purpose of transferring articles (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 37. |
For a trench of this size is not easy to cross and hence is considered to be a divider, and each of the courtyards a distinct entity. (See Hilchot Shabbat 14:23.)
|
| 38. |
A trench of this size can be crossed easily. Therefore, the entire area is considered to be a single courtyard.
|
| 39. |
This refers to a situation in which the depth of the trench is reduced across its entire length. If one reduces the portion in one area alone, that portion is considered to be an entrance from one courtyard to the other, and the inhabitants have the option of establishing either one or two eruvin(Mishnah Berurah 372:122).
|
| 40. |
Inside a dwelling, by contrast, different concepts apply. (See Hilchot Sukkah 4:13. Note, however, Hilchot Tum'at Meit 7:6.)
|
| 41. |
According to Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:19, one must make an explicit statement, specifying one's intent. The Mishnah Berurah 372:121 cites that view, but also quotes an opinion that maintains that it is sufficient to have such thoughts in one's heart.
|
| 42. |
The width of the board or the reeds themselves is not significant; what is important is that they cause the width of the trench to be reduced (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 43. |
I.e., which is not forbidden to be carried, because of the prohibitions of muktzeh.
|
| 44. |
Based on the rulings of the Rashba, the Maggid Mishneh states that the same rules apply if there are less than four handbreadths between the two balconies, for it is easy to step from one balcony to the other as mentioned in Halachah 12. The Maggid Mishneh allows only one eruv to be established. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 373:1) gives the people the option of establishing one or two.
|
| 45. |
Because of the principle of l'vud.
|
| 46. |
They do not have the option of extending a board from one balcony to the other, because: a) as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 16:20, an entrance is not made in a corner; b) since the balconies are at different heights, a person will be afraid to walk from one to the other.
|
| 47. |
If it is less than four handbreadths wide, it is a makom patur, and may be used freely by the inhabitants of both courtyards, as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 14:7.
|
| 48. |
Rashi (Eruvin 77a), the Maggid Mishneh, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:6) explain that this does not mean precisely ground level, but rather less than ten handbreadths high. Similar concepts apply regarding the trench mentioned in the second clause of the halachah.
|
| 49. |
This describes a situation in which both courtyards are situated on an incline.
|
| 50. |
The inhabitants of both courtyards may, however, transfer articles that had been left in their courtyards to the wall as reflected by Halachot 18 and 19 (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 51. |
I.e., there is not an entrance on either side of the ruin, but the inhabitants can throw articles into the ruin through its windows.
|
| 52. |
This follows the principle stated in Halachah 15. The inhabitants of the other house may not use the ruin at all unless they establish an eruv.
|
| 53. |
Our Sages decreed that although a walled city is a private domain, an eruv is necessary before one may carry freely within. They, nevertheless, restricted the scope of that decree to carrying articles from the houses outside, and from the areas outside the houses to the houses. The rationale for this leniency is that one does not usually leave articles outside. Hence, the Sages did not include this possibility in their original decree (Rashi, Eruvin 89a).
|
| 54. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 16:1 for more particulars.
|
| 55. |
Eruvin 91a gives several examples of how these principles were applied by the Sages.
|
| 56. |
The rule that follows applies even when an eruv was established in this particular courtyard, and it was permitted to bring the article there from the house.
|
| 57. |
Which did not establish an eruv together. Note the accompanying diagram.
|
| 58. |
Separating a portion of the cistern for each individual courtyard. Although there is no prohibition from the Torah against drawing water from such a cistern, the Sages forbade using the cistern, just as they forbade using other property that is jointly owned.
|
| 59. |
A partition that is suspended in the air is not normally acceptable. In this instance, however, additional leniency is granted, because the entire concept of forbidding carrying within water is Rabbinic in origin. (See also Hilchot Shabbat 15:13.)
|
| 60. |
This width is required so that one person will not be drawing water from his colleague's side of the cistern. Eruvin 86b states that the Sages estimated that a bucket would not travel more than four handbreadths under water.
|
| 61. |
The Maggid Mishneh notes that the word "path" implies a private walk and not a public thoroughfare. See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9. With this, he counters the objections of the Ra'avad, who maintains that it is necessary for the well to be surrounded by a partition ten handbreadths high in order to draw water from it.
|
| 62. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:14, where such projections are required.
|
| 63. |
I.e., the inhabitants are not carrying the water from the well, but lifting it up through windows that open to the path.
Some commentaries interpret the Rambam's wording as extending the application of this ruling even to an instance where there is an opening from the courtyards to the path. Other authorities (Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh; Tur, Orach Chayim 376), by contrast, maintain that if there are entrances from the courtyards to the path, a projection is required. The difference between these two approaches is reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 376:2).
|
| 64. |
If, however, the wall is broken on the Sabbath itself, the inhabitants of the smaller courtyard may continue to carry since they were permitted to do so at the commencement of the Sabbath (the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 9:2).
|
| 65. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 374:3) states that portions of the wall of the small courtyard must jut into the large courtyard. If that is not the case, it is permitted to carry in the small courtyard as well. From the Rambam's wording and the drawings attributed to him that accompany his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:2), it does not appear that he considers this to be a necessity.
|
| 66. |
See also similar statements in Hilchot Tefillah 8:7 and Hilchot Kilayim 7:19.
|
| 67. |
This refers to a situation in which the window or the opening was buried under an avalanche or the like and could not be opened without violating the Sabbath laws (Rashi, Eruvin 93b).
|
| 68. |
The Ra'avad extends the leniency even further and maintains that the inhabitants of the courtyards may also pass articles from one courtyard to the other - e.g., by passing them over the wall. His opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 374:1).
|
| 69. |
We do not say that the entire area should now be considered a single courtyard, and since aneruv was not established before the Sabbath, carrying is forbidden.
|
| 70. |
When citing this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:2) makes a point of emphasizing that if the wall between a courtyard and a public domain or a carmelit falls on the Sabbath, carrying is no longer permitted within the courtyard.
|
| 71. |
In this instance, as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) mentions a further leniency. If an eruvhas been established for an entire year between two courtyards, the opening between them was closed during the week (and thus at the commencement of the Sabbath it was not permitted to carry from one to the other), if an opening were made on the Sabbath, it would be permitted to carry from one to the other.
|
| 72. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on his interpretation of Eruvin 101b. Other authorities have different conceptions of that Talmudic passage.
|
Chapter Four
Halacha 1
When the inhabitants of a courtyard eat at the same table1 - even though they have their own individual dwellings - they are not required to establish an eruv; they are considered to be the inhabitants of a single household.
Just as the presence of a person's wife, the members of his household, or his servants does not cause him to be forbidden [to carry], nor does their presence make an eruv necessary, so too, these individuals are considered to be the members of a single household, for they all eat at the same table.2
Halacha 2
Similarly, if [the inhabitants of this courtyard] must establish an eruv together with the inhabitants of another courtyard, they are required to bring only one loaf to the place where the eruv is established.3
Similarly, if the eruv is established in their [house], they do not have to contribute to the eruv, just as the house in which an eruv is placed does not have to contribute a loaf of bread. [The rationale for both these laws is] that all these dwellings are considered to be a single dwelling.
Halacha 3
Similarly, the inhabitants of a courtyard who established an eruv together are considered to be [the members of] a single household.4 If it is necessary for them to establish an eruv together with the inhabitants of another courtyard, they are required to bring only one loaf to the place where the eruv is established. Similarly, if the eruv is established in their [house], they do not have to contribute a loaf of bread.
Halacha 4
When five people collect an eruv5 [for one courtyard] with the intent of bringing it to the place where an eruv will be established [together with the inhabitants of another courtyard],6 it is not necessary for all five to bring the bread there. Moreover, all th at is necessary is to bring a single loaf of bread. Since the eruvwas collected, all [the inhabitants of the courtyard] are considered to be the members of a single household.
Halacha 5
When a father and his son, or a teacher and his student7are dwelling in the same courtyard, it is not necessary for them to establish an eruv; they are considered to be a single household. Although at times they eat at a single table and at times they do not eat [together], they are considered to be a single household.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply to] brothers, each of whom has a house of his own, and who do not eat at their father's table, and to wives and servants who do not eat at their husband's or master's table at all times, but rather they [occasionally] eat at his table in payment for the work they do for him,8 or as an expression of his favor for a specific amount of time, such as a person who enjoys a colleague's hospitality for a week or a month.9
If there are no other people dwelling together with them in the courtyard, they are not required to establish an eruv. If they establish an eruv with [the inhabitants of] another courtyard, a single eruv suffices for them. If the eruv is established in [one of] their [homes], they are not required to contribute a loaf of bread.
If there are other people living in the courtyard together with them, each of them is required to contribute a loaf of bread [for the eruv] like the other inhabitants of the courtyard. [The rationale is that] they do not eat at one table at all times.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] five groups spend the Sabbath together in a single large hall: If a partition that reaches the ceiling10 separates each of the groups [from the others], it is as if each group has a room of its own, or is in a loft of its own. In such an instance, every group must contribute a loaf of bread. If, however, the partition does not reach the ceiling, a single loaf11of bread is sufficient for all of them. For they are all considered to be the members of a single household.
Halacha 8
When a person owns one [of the following] structures12 - a gatehouse that people frequently walk through, an exedra,13a porch, a barn, a shed for straw, a shed for wood, or a storehouse - in a courtyard belonging to a colleague, he does not cause [his colleague] to be forbidden to carry. [Our Sages decreed that the presence of a person causes carrying] to be forbidden unless an eruv is established, only when the person possesses a dwelling in the courtyard in which he will [ordinarily] eat [a meal of] bread. The [possession of a] place to sleep, by contrast, does not cause carrying to be forbidden.
For this reason, even if a person decided to eat his meals consistently in a gatehouse or an exedra, his presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden, because this is not considered a dwelling.14
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] there are ten dwellings, one within the other:15[The inhabitants of] the innermost dwelling and the one before it are required to provide the eruv. The eight outer dwellings, by contrast, are not required to contribute to the eruv. [The rationale is that] since many people walk through them, they are regarded as a gatehouse. [As mentioned above,] a person who lives in a gatehouse [does not cause others to be forbidden to carry].16
[The person living in] the ninth [house] does not have many people passing through his property - only one. Therefore, his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden unless he contributes to the eruv.
Halacha 10
[The following rulings apply in the situation to be described:] There are two courtyards [each containing several houses] and three houses [in between them]. The houses have entrances to each other, and [the outer two houses]17have entrances to the courtyards.
The inhabitants of one courtyard brought their eruv through the house that had an entrance for them and placed it in the middle house. Similarly, the inhabitants of the other courtyard brought their eruv through the house that had an entrance for them and placed it in the middle house.
[The inhabitants of] these three houses do not have to contribute a loaf of bread [to the eruv [for the following reasons]: The middle house is the house in which the eruv was placed. The two houses on its side are each considered to be a gatehouse for the inhabitants of the courtyard.
Halacha 11
[Different rules apply, however, if the situation changes. For example,] there are two courtyards [each containing several houses] and two houses [in between them] with entrances to each other. [The inhabitants of one courtyard] bring their eruv through the house that is open to them and place it in the second house, which is adjacent to the other courtyard.
[The inhabitants of the other courtyard also] bring their eruv through the entrance that is open to them and place it in the other house [which is adjacent to the other courtyard]. In such a situation, [the inhabitants of] neither [of the courtyards are considered to have] established an eruv. For each of them has placed his eruv in the gatehouse of another courtyard.18
Halacha 12
Although one of the inhabitants of a courtyard is in the midst of his death throes,19 even when [it is obvious] that he will not survive the day, his presence causes the other inhabitants of the courtyard to be forbidden [to carry] until they grant him [by proxy]20 a share in a loaf of bread and include him in the eruv.
Similarly, when a minor [owns a house in the courtyard], although he is incapable of eating an amount of food the size of an olive, his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden until [the inhabitants of the courtyard] include him in the eruv. [The presence of] a guest, by contrast, does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden, as explained above.21
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when] one of the inhabitants of a courtyard leaves his home and spends the Sabbath in another courtyard, even in a courtyard adjacent [to the one in which his home is located]: If he had no thought of returning to his home on the Sabbath, he does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden.22
Halacha 14
When the owner of a courtyard rents houses in the courtyard to others and [stipulates that] he may [continue] to leave articles or types of merchandise in each of these homes, [the presence of the renters] does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. Since he still has authority in each of the houses, everyone is considered to be his guest.25
When does the above apply? When he left an article that may not be carried26on the Sabbath - e.g., tevel27 or slabs of metal,28 in these homes. When, by contrast, he leaves articles that may be carried in each of the homes, [the presence of the renters] causes [carrying] to be forbidden unless they establish an eruv. For it is possible that he will remove them [on the Sabbath], and then he will be left without any authority [in these dwellings].
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a courtyard forgot and did not establish an eruv. They may not remove articles from their homes to the courtyard, nor from the courtyard to their homes. However, concerning articles that were left in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath:29 [the inhabitants] may carry such articles throughout the courtyard and all its extensions.30
[The following rules apply when] there is a porch31 or an upper storey [that opens out to a courtyard],32 and the inhabitants of the courtyard have established an eruv for themselves and the inhabitants of the porch have established an eruv for themselves:33 Regarding articles that were left in their homes at the beginning of the Sabbath, the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey are permitted to carry them throughout the porch and all of its extensions or throughout the upper storey and all of its extensions. The inhabitants of the courtyard may carry within the courtyard and all its extensions, [but they are forbidden to carry from the courtyard to the upper storey or the porch, or from the upper storey or the porch to the courtyard unless an eruv is established].
Similarly, if one person lives in the courtyard, and another person lives in the upper storey, and they forgot to establish an eruv, the owner of the upper storey may carry within the upper storey and all of its extensions, and the owner of the courtyard may carry within the courtyard and all of its extensions. [They may not, however, carry from one domain to the other without an eruv].
Halacha 16
What is implied? When there is a rock or a mound within the courtyard that is less than ten handbreadths high, it is considered to be [important to] both the courtyard and the porch, and [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to bring articles there from their homes.
If [the rock or the mound] is ten handbreadths high and is less than four handbreadths removed from the porch, it is considered to be an extension of the porch, for they are of similar [height]. Therefore, the inhabitants of the porch may carry on it.
If it is four or more handbreadths removed from the porch, even when it is ten [handbreadths high] it is considered to be an extension of both the courtyard and the porch, since both can use it by throwing [objects onto it]. Therefore, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to bring articles there from their homes until they establish an eruv.
When there is a pillar four [or more] handbreadths wide in front of the porch [it is considered to be a divider]. [Therefore, the presence of] the porch does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden within the courtyard, for a separation has been made between [one domain and the other].
Halacha 17
When projections protrude from the walls [of the courtyard], all those that are below ten handbreadths high are considered to be extensions of the courtyard, and may be used by the inhabitants of the courtyard. All those that are within ten handbreadths of the upper storey may be used by the inhabitants of the upper storey.
The remainder, those that are located more than ten handbreadths above the ground and more than ten handbreadths below the upper storey, are forbidden to them both. Neither may use them for articles from the homes unless an eruvis established.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply to] a cistern located in [such] a courtyard: If it is filled with produce that was tevel - and hence is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath - or with objects of a similar kind, it and the enclosure around it,34 are regarded like a rock or a mound in a courtyard.35 If [the enclosure] is ten handbreadths high and close to the porch, it is considered to be an extension of the porch.
If, by contrast, it is filled with water,36 neither the inhabitants of the courtyard nor the inhabitants of the porch may bring [water] to their homes from it unless they establish an eruv.
Halacha 19
[The following rules apply when] there are two courtyards, one lying behind the other, and the inhabitants of the inner courtyard enter and exit by passing through the outer courtyard: When [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard have established an eruv, but [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard have not, [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard may carry [within their domain], but [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard may not.37
When [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard have established an eruv, but [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard have not, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to carry; [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard because they did not establish an eruv, and the inhabitants of the outer courtyard because the people who pass through [their domain] did not establish an eruv [even within their own domain].38
If [the inhabitants of] both domains have established separate eruvin,39 they may each carry within their own domain; they may not carry from one [domain] to the other.
Halacha 20
[If the inhabitants of both domains have established separate eruvin,] but one of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard forgot to join in the eruv [in his domain], the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are still permitted to carry.40
When, by contrast, one of the inhabitants of the inner courtyard forgot to join in the eruv [in his domain], [not only are the inhabitants of the inner courtyard forbidden to carry, the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard are also forbidden to do so. [This restriction is instituted] because the inhabitants of the inner courtyard whose eruv is not acceptable pass through their [domain].
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when] both courtyards establish a single eruv: If theeruv is placed in the outer courtyard, and one of the inhabitants - whether an inhabitant of the outer courtyard or of the inner courtyard - forgets to join in theeruv, [all] the inhabitants of both courtyards are forbidden [to carry]41 unless he subordinates [the ownership of] his domain to them. [This is possible for, as we explained,42 one may subordinate the ownership of a domain in one courtyard to [people dwelling in] another.
[Different rules apply when] the eruv is placed in the inner courtyard: If one of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard did not join in the eruv, [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard are forbidden to carry. [The inhabitants of] the inner courtyard, by contrast, are permitted to carry within their own [domain].43 If one of the inhabitants of the inner courtyard did not join in the eruv, [all the inhabitants of] both [courtyards] are forbidden [to carry]44 unless he subordinates [the ownership of] his domain to them.
Halacha 22
If [only] one person45 was dwelling in one [of these] courtyards and [only] one person was dwelling in the other, there is no need for them to establish aneruv;46 each one is permitted to carry in his courtyard.
If, however, a gentile dwells in the inner courtyard, even though he is merely a single [household], he is considered as many individuals, and [his presence] causes [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard to be forbidden to carry until his domain is rented.47
Halacha 23
[The following laws apply when there are] three courtyards with entrances to each other, and there are many people dwelling in each courtyard: When [the inhabitants of] the two outer courtyards have established an eruv together with [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard,48 [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard are permitted to carry within the outer courtyards, and [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyards are permitted to carry within the inner courtyard, but the inhabitants of the two outer courtyards may not carry in the other outer courtyard unless all three join in a single eruv.
If a single individual dwells in each courtyard, there is no need for them to establish an eruv, although many individuals pass through the outer courtyard.49 [The rationale is that] each of these individuals is permitted to carry in his own domain. If, however, there are two individuals living in the inner courtyard [different rules apply]. Since [these individuals] are forbidden to carry in their own domain until they establish an eruv, they cause the single individuals in the middle and in the outer domains to be forbidden [to carry] unless the two inhabitants of the inner domain establish an eruv.
This is the governing principle: When a person who is forbidden to carry in his own domain passes through another domain, his passage causes carrying to be forbidden there. When, by contrast, the person may carry in his own domain, his passage through another domain does not cause carrying to be forbidden there.
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when] there are two balconies positioned over a body of water, and one is positioned above the other: Although [the inhabitants of] each of them have constructed a partition ten handbreadths high descending [to the water],50 if the two balconies are within ten handbreadths of each other,51 it is forbidden for [their inhabitants] to draw water unless they establish a single eruv. [The rationale is that, because of their closeness] they are considered to be a single balcony.52
If the distance between the upper balcony and the lower balcony is more than ten handbreadths, and [the inhabitants of] each have established separateeruvin, they are both permitted to draw [water].
Halacha 25
If [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] did not make a partition, but the inhabitants of the lower [balcony] did, even [the inhabitants of] the lower balcony are forbidden to draw [water]. [The rationale is that] the buckets of the upper [balcony], which are forbidden, pass through their domain.53
If [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] have made a partition, but [the inhabitants of] the lower [balcony] have not, [the inhabitants of] the upper balcony are permitted to draw water,54 but [the inhabitants of] the lower balcony are forbidden.55
If the inhabitants of the lower [balcony] joined together with [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] in the construction of the partition, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to draw water56 until they establish a single eruv.
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply to a building] with three storeys, one above the other; the upper and the lower storeys belong to one individual, and the middle storey belongs to another: One may not lower articles from the top storey to the bottom storey through the middle storey.57 For we may not pass articles from one domain to another domain via a third domain. One may, however, lower articles from the top [storey] to the lower [storey] [if] they do not [pass] through the middle [storey].58
Halacha 27
[The following rules apply when] two buildings face each other and there is a courtyard below them into which water is poured.59 They should not pour water into the courtyard unless they join together in a single eruv.
If [the inhabitants of one building]60 dig a pit in the courtyard into which to pour water, while [the inhabitants of the other building] do not, those who dig the pit may pour water into it. The others are forbidden to pour water into the courtyard unless they join together in a single eruv.
If [the inhabitants of both buildings] each dig a pit, each may pour water into the pit they have dug, even though they did not establish an eruv.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's wording is not to be understood literally; if people eat in the same room, even if they eat at different tables - indeed, even if they eat their own food - they are not required to establish an eruv. These concepts are also reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:7) and quoted as halachah by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 370:4).
The most common application of this concept today would be a hotel or a bungalow colony, where many people eat in the same dining room, and yet have their own private rooms or dwellings.
|
| 2. |
This highlights the principle that it is the place where a person eats, and not where he sleeps, that is most significant in defining his place of residence.
|
| 3. |
In Chapter 1, Halachah 15, the Rambam states that every household participating in the eruv is required to contribute a loaf of bread. Nevertheless, in this instance, since all the inhabitants of the courtyard are considered to be members of a single household, only one loaf is required.
|
| 4. |
Although they eat in separate places, joining together in the eruv causes them to be considered as if they share the same table.
|
| 5. |
I.e., they collected loaves of bread from each household in the courtyard.
|
| 6. |
The Shem Yosef explains that this latter phrase represents the new concept contributed in this halachah, as opposed to the previous one. Although the eruv was originally collected for the purpose of establishing an eruv with the inhabitants of another courtyard, the collection itself causes the inhabitants to be considered members of a single household.
|
| 7. |
Although the Rambam uses a singular term, the same law applies to many sons or many students.
|
| 8. |
The Rambam's comparison of these individuals to hired workers reflects his interpretation of the expression במקבלי פרס in Eruvin 73a. The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation, and his view is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 370:5- 6).
|
| 9. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is not that the presence of a guest causes carrying to be forbidden when there are others living in the same courtyard. For as explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, and in Halachah 12 of this chapter, a guest's presence makes no difference in this context. Rather, the point of the comparison above is to emphasize the intermediate status of these individuals. On one hand, like guests, they are at times considered to be members of the person's household. On the other hand, since they have their own dwellings and often eat there, there is reason to consider them as having separate households.
|
| 10. |
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba, who explains that it is sufficient for the partitions to reach within three handbreadths of the ceiling, since, based on the principle of l'vud, when they are that close it is considered as if they reached the ceiling itself. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim370:3) quotes this ruling.
|
| 11. |
I.e., they must make an eruv. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) differs and (following the interpretation of Tosafot, Eruvin 72a and Rabbenu Asher) does not require an eruv at all unless they want to join with others outside the hall.
The Shulchan Aruch, however, emphasizes that we are speaking about temporary partitions, either curtains or pieces of wood. If the partitions are permanent, they are considered as having separate dwellings, and an eruv is required.
|
| 12. |
All these structures have one thing in common - they are not ordinary dwellings where a person will eat his meals on a regular basis.
|
| 13. |
A Greek structure with two or three walls and a roof with a sky-light.
|
| 14. |
For these structures are not fit to serve as dwellings. In contrast, were a person to eat continually in a barn, a wood shed, or a shed for straw, these are considered to be dwellings, and an eruv is necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 370:1; see Chapter 1, Halachah 16).
|
| 15. |
I.e., to get to the inner dwellings, one must pass through the outer ones.
|
| 16. |
The Mishnah Berurah 370:52 extends this principle and applies it to people renting separate rooms in a single home. If the rooms lead through each other, the inhabitants of the outer rooms do not have to contribute to the eruv.
|
| 17. |
But not the middle house. See the accompanying diagram.
|
| 18. |
And an eruv that was placed in a gatehouse is not acceptable, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 16.
|
| 19. |
This reflects a general principle in Torah law. Until a person actually stops breathing, he is considered to be alive. There is no difference in his status regarding any of the Torah's laws.
|
| 20. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.
|
| 21. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
|
| 22. |
The rationale is that a dwelling without an owner is not considered to be a dwelling (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 371:1; Mishnah Berurah 371:1).
|
| 23. |
For it is unlikely that a Jew will return to his home on the Sabbath. Moreover, even if he did so, we apply the principle that since carrying was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 24. |
The Maggid Mishneh mentions a more lenient view, which states that if the gentile spends the Sabbath at a place that is more than a day's journey from home, the inhabitants are allowed to carry, because it is impossible for him to arrive on the Sabbath. This ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:1).
The Ramah grants a further leniency and permits the inhabitants to carry when the gentile stays in another courtyard in the same city. If the gentile returns to his home on the Sabbath, the Turei Zahav 371:2 permits the inhabitants to continue to carry. The Mishnah Berurah 371:8, by contrast, rules that this is forbidden.
|
| 25. |
Note the ruling of the Ramah (Orach Chayim 370:2), which states that this decision applies only when there are no other inhabitants in the courtyard besides the owner and the persons to whom he rented dwellings, or the eruv was brought into the house of the owner.
|
| 26. |
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) adds that this applies also when the articles are too heavy to be lifted on the Sabbath.
|
| 27. |
Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated. These tithes may not be separated on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 23:9,14), nor is it permitted to carry such produce on the Sabbath (loc. cit. 25:19).
|
| 28. |
Since this metal has not been fashioned into a useful article, it is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath (loc. cit.:6).
|
| 29. |
See the Be'ur Halachah 372, which explains there are authorities who differ with regard to whether one is permitted to carry an article within a courtyard when an eruv has not been established - if that article hads been placed in one of the homes at the commencement of the Sabbath, but was inadvertently taken from the home and placed in the courtyard. Although the Rambam would appear to forbid carrying the article, Rashi (Shabbat 130b) and Tosafot (Eruvin91b) maintain that carrying it is permitted within the courtyard.
|
| 30. |
See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.
|
| 31. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:3), the Rambam describes a porch as an intermediate level, at least ten handbreadths high, through which stairs lead to the courtyard.
|
| 32. |
I.e., the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey descend through a stairwell into the courtyard, and from the courtyard they proceed to the public domain. The Rabbis consider the stairwell equivalent to an entrance. Hence, they liken the situation to one in which two courtyards are positioned adjacent to each other with an entrance between them.
|
| 33. |
I.e., unless an eruv is established, the inhabitants of these domains are forbidden to carry within the others' domains and within the property shared by both.
|
| 34. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9.
|
| 35. |
I.e., since the cistern is filled with objects that are forbidden to be carried, it is not given any special importance, and instead is considered like any other large, distinct object in the courtyard.
|
| 36. |
It is, by nature, fit to be used by the inhabitants of both domains. Therefore, neither is entitled to do so, unless they establish an eruv.
|
| 37. |
The rationale for these rulings is obvious; the concept is mentioned primarily to show the contrast with the subsequent clauses of the halachah. Unlike the inhabitants of the inner courtyard, who can reach their own dwelling only by passing through the outer courtyard, there is no reason for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.
|
| 38. |
This ruling reflects the principle stated in Halachah 23, that when people are forbidden to carry within their own domain, they cause carrying to be forbidden in the domain through which they pass. Had the inhabitants of the inner courtyard established an eruv for themselves, they would not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as reflected in the following clause.
|
| 39. |
Similarly, if the single courtyard belongs to a single individual, or the owners are considered to be members of a single household - e.g., a father and his children, their presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 40. |
For their eruv is still intact and there is no necessity for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.
|
| 41. |
The eruv is not acceptable for the inner courtyard, because it is not located within the courtyard itself, and it is not acceptable for the outer courtyard, because one of the inhabitants of the courtyard did not participate.
|
| 42. |
Chapter 2, Halachah 5.
|
| 43. |
For all the inhabitants of this courtyard have joined together in a single eruv. Although they had desired to join together with the inhabitants of the outer courtyard, the failure for this desire to be fulfilled does not cause them to forfeit their initial advantage as a domain joined by an eruv. (SeeEruvin 75b.)
|
| 44. |
In this instance, the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are forbidden to carry because one of their number has failed to join in the eruv. This in turn causes carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as explained above.
|
| 45. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:10), the Rambam explains that this can refer to members of an extended household - e.g., a father and his children.
|
| 46. |
Needless to say, to carry from one courtyard to the next, an eruv is necessary.
|
| 47. |
Our Sages explained that gentiles are less private about the details of their personal dwellings than the Jews. Thus many people will know of the gentile's presence and the fact that his domain was not rented, but they may not know that only one Jew lives in the outer courtyard. Therefore, they might not realize that this is an exception, and generally, when one courtyard leads to another, an eruv is required (Eruvin 75b). Although when one Jew lives in a courtyard together with a gentile, he is generally not required to rent his domain (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), an exception is made in this instance.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 382:17) mentions this as a singular opinion, and the Mishnah Berurah 382:59 states that it is not shared by most authorities. Some have noted that the Rambam himself uses a plural form of the word "rent," and they interpret this as referring to an instance where two Jews live in the outer courtyard.
|
| 48. |
I.e., the inhabitants of the inner courtyard have established two eruvin, one with each of the outer courtyards.
|
| 49. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that these two clauses refer to different situations. The first clause refers to a situation in which all three courtyards have entrances to the public domain, while this clause refers to a situation where only the outermost courtyard has an entrance to the public domain, and the inhabitants of this courtyard must pass through it.
Based on the Hagahot Maimoniot, Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the fundamental aspect of this ruling is the interpretation of Rabbi Shimeon's statements that the inhabitants of the middle courtyard are permitted to carry in either of the outer courtyards (Eruvin 45b, 48b). Although these statements were made regarding a situation in which only one courtyard opened up to the public domain, one can extrapolate that the same ruling would apply when all three open to the public domain.
|
| 50. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:15, which interprets this law as referring to a balcony with a hole in its floor, from which water is drawn and through which it is poured. The partition need not extend the full distance from the balcony to the water. As long as it extends either ten handbreadths below the balcony or ten handbreadths above the water, drawing water and pouring water through the hole in the balcony are permitted.
|
| 51. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains this as referring to two balconies positioned one on top of the other. Each balcony has a hole in it, and these holes are also aligned one on top of the other.
|
| 52. |
The Ra'avad states that, based on Eruvin 88a, this ruling would appear to apply only when the two balconies are not directly above each other. The Ra'avad's position is shared by Rashi and the Rashba, while the Rambam's interpretation appears to be shared by Rabbenu Chanan'el. Although the Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam's position, most authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 355:5) follow the Ra'avad's view.
|
| 53. |
I.e., the Rambam applies the principle stated in Halachah 23 - about people passing from one domain to another - to the buckets used to draw water that pass from domain to domain. In this instance, as well, the Ra'avad, Rashi, and others interpret Eruvin (loc. cit.), the source for this halachah, differently, and their interpretation is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
|
| 54. |
The fact that their buckets pass through the area of the lower domain is of no consequence.
|
| 55. |
For they have no partition.
|
| 56. |
Since they both have a share in the partition, they are considered as full partners in a single domain. Hence, it is necessary that they be joined together in an eruv.
|
| 57. |
I.e., through a hole in the building.
|
| 58. |
E.g, from a porch to a porch.
|
| 59. |
As evident from Hilchot Shabbat 15:16-17, this refers to a courtyard larger than four cubits by four cubits. It is forbidden to pour water into a smaller courtyard unless one digs a pit, as reflected in the second clause of this halachah.
|
| 60. |
The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:11).
|
Chapter Five
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a lane join in a business partnership with regard to a particular food - i.e., they have bought wine, oil, honey, or the like [for sale]:1 They need not establish another shituf for the sake [of carrying on] the Sabbath. Instead, they may rely on the partnership they have established for business reasons.
[When does this leniency apply?] When their business partnership involves one type of produce, and [this produce] is stored in a single container. But if their partnership is such that one possesses wine and the other oil,2 or they both possess wine but hold it in two different containers, they are required to establish another shituf for the sake of the Sabbath.
Halacha 2
If one of the inhabitants of a lane asks another for wine or oil before the Sabbath, and the latter refuses to give it to him, the shituf is nullified.3 [The rationale is that this individual] revealed that his intent was that they are not all to be considered partners who do not object to each other's [use of the combined resources].
When one of the inhabitants of a lane who usually participates in a shituf fails to do so,4 the inhabitants of the lane may enter his home and take [his share for] the shituf against his will. If one of the inhabitants of a lane refuses5 to join with the others in the shituf, he may be compelled to do so.6
Halacha 3
When one of the inhabitants of a lane owns a storeroom of wine, oil, or the like, he may grant a small share to all the inhabitants of the lane and establish ashituf on their behalf. The shituf is acceptable even though he did not separate or designate [the wine he granted them, but rather left it] mixed together [with the remainder] in the storeroom.
Halacha 4
[When the inhabitants of] a courtyard that has two entrances, each leading to a different lane, establish a shituf with one of [the lanes] and not the other,7 [they] are forbidden to bring articles to and from the second lane.
Therefore, if a person [sets aside food for a shituf], grants a portion to all the inhabitants of the lane, and establishes a shituf on their behalf, he must notify the inhabitants of that courtyard. For they must make a conscious decision to join the shituf, since this is not [necessarily] to their benefit,8 because it is possible that they desire to join in a shituf with [the inhabitants of] the other lane, and not with this one.
Halacha 5
A person's wife may participate in an eruv on his behalf without his knowledge, provided he does not [intend to cause] his neighbors to be forbidden [to carry].9If he does [intend to cause] them to be forbidden [to carry], however, she may not join an eruv on his behalf, nor may she join a shituf on his behalf unless he consents.
What is meant by "[intend to cause] them to be forbidden [to carry]"? That he says, "I will not join in an eruv or a shituf with them."
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when a courtyard opens up to two lanes and] the inhabitants of the courtyard have established a shituf with [the inhabitants of] one of the lanes: If they had originally established the shituf with one type of produce, even if the produce in the shituf was consumed entirely, one may establish a second shituf and grant them a portion; there is no need to inform them a second time.10
If they have established the shituf with two types11 of produce,12 and the amount of food was reduced [from the minimum required],13 one may add to it and grant the others a share; there is no need to inform them. If [the produce] was consumed entirely, one may [establish a second shituf and] grant them a portion; it is, however, necessary to inform them.14
If the number of inhabitants within the courtyard is increased, one may grant [the newcomers] a portion in the shituf, but one must notify them.15
Halacha 7
If the inhabitants of this courtyard have established a shituf with the inhabitants of this lane from one entrance, and have established another shituf with the inhabitants of the other lane from the other entrance, they are permitted [to carry to and from] both [of these lanes]16, and [the inhabitants of] both [lanes] are permitted [to carry within the courtyard]. [The inhabitants of] both lanes are, however, forbidden [to carry] from one [lane] to the other.17
If [the inhabitants of the courtyard] have not established a shituf with either of them, they cause [the inhabitants of] both to be forbidden [to carry].18
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when the inhabitants of] this courtyard usually [pass] through one entrance [into one lane], but do not usually [pass] through a second entrance [into another lane]: They cause carrying to be forbidden [in the lane to which] the entrance through which they usually [pass opens].19 They do not cause carrying to be forbidden [in the lane to which] the entrance through which they do not usually [pass opens].20
If [the inhabitants of this courtyard] have established a shituf with [only] the lane through which they do not usually [pass], [the inhabitants of] the other lane are allowed [to carry];21 they do not have to establish a shituf with [the inhabitants of this courtyard].
Halacha 9
[A leniency is granted in the following situation.] The inhabitants of the lane [through] which [the inhabitants of] this courtyard usually pass established ashituf by themselves. [The inhabitants of the courtyard] did not joined in thisshituf, nor have they joined in a shituf with the inhabitants of the lane [through] which they do not usually pass. The inhabitants of the latter lane [also] did not established a shituf for themselves.
Since [the inhabitants of the courtyard] have not joined in a shituf at all, they are considered part of the lane [through] which they do not usually pass. Since both these groups of individuals have not established a shituf, they are classed together, so that they will not cause [the inhabitants of] the lane who established the shituf to be forbidden [to carry].22
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a courtyard has an entrance to a lane and another entrance to a valley or to an area enclosed for purposes other than habitation, which is larger than the area [needed] to sow two se'ah:23 Since it is forbidden to transfer articles from the courtyard to that enclosed area, [the inhabitants of the courtyard] rely only on the entrance to the lane. Therefore, they cause the inhabitants of the lane to be forbidden [to carry] unless they join together with them in a shituf.
If, however, the enclosed area is the size of the area [needed] to sow two se'ahor less, its presence does not cause the inhabitants of the lane to be forbidden [to carry]. Since carrying is permitted within the entire enclosed area, [the inhabitants of the courtyard] rely on the entrance that is exclusively theirs.24
Halacha 11
When one of the inhabitants of a lane goes away and spends the Sabbath in another place, [the fact that he owns a domain in the lane] does not cause carrying to be forbidden.25
Similarly, if one of the inhabitants of a lane builds a pillar that is four handbreadths wide [or more] before his entrance, [the fact that he owns a domain in the lane] does not cause carrying to be forbidden. For he has separated himself from [the other inhabitants], and has made his domain a distinct entity.26
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a lane have joined together in a shituf, but several of the inhabitants forgot and did not join: [Those who forgot] should subordinate the ownership of their domain to those who joined in the shituf. The laws governing the subordination of the ownership of their domain are the same as the laws governing the subordination of the ownership of a domain when one or more of the inhabitants of a courtyard forgot to join in an eruv.27
We have already explained28 that a person and [all] the members of his household who are dependent on him for meals are considered to be a single entity with regard to the establishment of an eruv for a courtyard and a shituf for a lane.
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when the inhabitants of] all the courtyards establishederuvin for each of the courtyards, and afterwards they all joined in a shituf for the lane: When one of the inhabitants of a lane forgot to join in the eruv with the other inhabitants of his courtyard, he does not lose any [privileges]. For all of them have joined together in a shituf, and it is on the shituf that they rely.
The only reason it was required to establish an eruv within the courtyards, together with the shituf, is so that the children will not forget the law of theeruv.29 [And in this instance, that requirement has been met,] for eruvin were established in the courtyards.
If, however, one of the inhabitants of the lane forgot to join in the shituf, carrying is forbidden in the lane.30 The inhabitants of the courtyards, however, may carry in their [respective] courtyards. [When a shituf is not established,] the relationship between courtyards and a lane is parallel to that between homes and a courtyard.31
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when the inhabitants of all the courtyards] have joined in a shituf, but all have forgotten to establish eruvin for their respective courtyards: If they do not stint on sharing their bread,32 they may rely on theshituf for one Sabbath alone. This leniency is granted, however, only because of the difficulty [of their immediate circumstance].33
Halacha 15
When eruvin have been established between the courtyards and the homes [of a lane], but a shituf has not been established, carrying [an article] more than four cubits [within the lane] is forbidden, as [would be the law] within a carmelit.
[The rationale is that] since eruvin were established between the courtyards and the homes, the lane is considered as though it opened only to homes, and not to courtyards. Therefore, we are not allowed to carry within its area at all.34
If the inhabitants of the courtyards have not established eruvin, they may carry articles left in the [lane] at the commencement of the Sabbath throughout its entire area, as is the law regarding a courtyard in which an eruv was not established.35
Halacha 16
The laws that the inhabitants of a lane must follow with regard to a gentile36 or a Sadducee37 who dwells in one of the courtyards of a lane are the same as must be followed by the inhabitants of the courtyard. They must rent the gentile's domain within the courtyard from him or from one of the members of his household, and the Sadducee must subordinate the ownership of his domain.
Halacha 17
When a gentile living in a lane has an opening40 from his courtyard to a valley, his presence does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden within the lane [although his courtyard also opens to the lane].41 Even if this entrance is small - merely four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] - and the gentile leads his camels and his wagons out through the other entrance, his presence does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. For he is concerned only with the entrance that is distinctly his own - i.e., [the one leading to] the valley.
Similarly, if he has an entrance leading to an area that was enclosed for purposes other than habitation, [and that entrance] is larger than the area needed to sow two se'ah [of grain], it is regarded like an entrance to a valley, and his presence does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. If, however, the enclosed area was the size needed to sow two se'ah of grain or less, [the gentile] is not concerned with [this area],42 and his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden,43 unless [his domain] is rented from him.
Halacha 18
[The following rule applies when] there is a lane that has gentiles living [in the courtyards] on one side and Jews living [in the courtyards] on the other side, and there are windows that open from each of the courtyards in which the Jews [live] to the other: Although they established eruvin via the windows, and thus are joined together as the members of a single household - and are, therefore, permitted to transfer [articles] to and from [one courtyard to another] via the windows - they are, nevertheless, forbidden to use the lane via its entrances44unless they rent the domains from the gentiles. For the principle that [because of an eruv] the many become considered a single entity does not apply when there are gentiles involved.45
Halacha 19
How is a shituf established in a city?46 Every courtyard should establish an eruvfor itself, so that the children will not forget [the laws of eruvin]. Afterwards, all the inhabitants of the city join together in a shituf in the same way as a shituf is established in a lane.
If the city had once been the property of a single individual, even if later it became the property of many individuals, it is possible for all [the inhabitants] to join in a single shituf and [be permitted] to carry throughout the entire city.47Similarly, although a city is owned by many, if it has only one entrance, all [the inhabitants] may join in a single shituf.48
Halacha 20
If, by contrast, [a city] was originally built as the property of many individuals,49and it has two openings used for entrance and egress, the entire [city] may not be included in the eruv. [This applies even if the city later] becomes the private property of one individual. Instead, one area - even one house in one courtyard - is set aside,50 and a shituf is established in the remainder [of the city].
All the individuals who participate in the shituf are permitted [to carry] throughout the entire city with the exception of the place that was set aside. If there are many people [living in] the place [that was set aside], they are permitted to carry in that place if they make a shituf for themselves. They are, however, forbidden to carry throughout the remainder of the city.
Halacha 21
This was instituted to make a distinction, so that [the inhabitants know that theeruv made carrying possible in this large city through which many people pass.51 [For they will see] the place that was set aside, which did not join in theshituf, in which carrying is forbidden. [Each group of individuals, the inhabitants of the city and the inhabitants of the area that was set aside] will have their separate [area].
Halacha 22
When a city belonging to many individuals has one entrance and has a ladder52[that could be used to enter or depart] at another place [in its wall], it [is possible to include] the entire [city] in the eruv; no portion need be set aside. For a ladder in the wall is not considered to be an entrance.53
The houses that are set aside [and are not included in the shituf] need not face the city. Even if they face the outside area, and their back is towards the city, they may be [designated as the houses that are] set aside, and then an eruvmay be established throughout the remainder [of the city].54
Halacha 23
Halacha 24
When all the inhabitants of a city with the exception of the inhabitants of a single lane join together in a shituf, [the presence of these individuals] causes [carrying] to be forbidden for all. [The inhabitants] should61 build a pillar62 at the entrance to the lane, so that [carrying] is not forbidden.
For this reason, a shituf is not established in half a city.63 Either the entire city joins in the shituf or [separate shitufim are made], each lane for itself. Each lane should build a pillar at its entrance to keep its domain distinct from the others, so that it will not cause [the inhabitants of] the other lanes to be forbidden [to carry].
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
A shituf established by the inhabitants of a lane is mentioned because it can be established with other types of food besides bread. In contrast, an eruv for a courtyard may be established only with bread (Chapter 1, Halachah 8). The Rashba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) states that the same principle would apply if the inhabitants of a courtyard established a business partnership for the sale of bread.
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| 2. |
The Tur (Orach Chayim 366) states that even if the partnership involves several types of produce, as long as it is stored in a single container, the inhabitants may rely on it for the sake of the Sabbath. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 386:3) quotes this ruling.
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| 3. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on Eruvin 68a. In his commentary on that passage, Rashi explains that this refers to the food set aside for the shituf. If the person asks for some of this food and it is not given to him, the eruv is nullified.
Although this does not appear to be the Rambam's intent, the Kessef Mishneh explains that his words can be interpreted in this manner. [And in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:5), Rav Yosef Karo rules according to his explanation in the Kessef Mishneh]. The Ra'avad goes further and explains that this law applies only when one person has granted others a share in his produce for the purpose of establishing a shituf. If, afterwards, he refuses to allow one of the members of the lane to take from the shituf, the shituf is nullified.
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| 4. |
With the intent of nullifying the shituf.
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| 5. |
I.e., in contrast to the previous law, this person was not a regular participant in the shituf.
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| 6. |
I.e., the communal court may compel him to join the shituf. Nevertheless, in contrast to the previous law, the matter may not be dealt with by the inhabitants of the lane themselves (Maggid Mishneh). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 367:1).
The Noda BiY'hudah (Vol. II, Choshen Mishpat, Responsum 39) points to Hilchot Sh'chenim 5:12 (quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 162:1), which appears to contradict this interpretation, for it states that the members of the lane may compel each other to build a pole or a beam for a courtyard. The Noda BiY'hudah explains, however, that there is a difference between the structure of a courtyard (i.e., the pole or the beam) and participation in an eruv.
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| 7. |
According to most authorities, the inhabitants of such a courtyard have the right to establish ashituf with the inhabitants of both lanes, if they desire. If they chose this option, they may bring articles to and from both lanes. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam accepts this view, as well.
There are opinions (see Rabbenu Yehonatan) that maintain that Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs with this view, and maintains that in such a situation, the inhabitants of the courtyard may join in ashituf with the inhabitants of only one lane. Some maintain that the Rambam also accepts this view. This is surely the opinion of the Ra'avad, who objects to the Rambam's ruling here.
This interpretation cannot be justified in light of the Rambam's ruling in Halachah 7. Accordingly,Merkevet HaMishneh offers a different interpretation of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view, as is explained in the following note.
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| 8. |
In Chapter 1, Halachah 20, the Rambam states: "A person need not inform the inhabitants of a lane or a courtyard that he has granted them [a portion of food] and established an eruv for them, for these deeds are to their benefit, and a person may grant a colleague benefit without the latter's knowledge."
The rationale behind that ruling is that it is surely to the benefit of the inhabitants of a courtyard to be able to bring articles to and from areas outside their courtyard. In this instance, however, the establishment of a shituf is not necessarily to the benefit of the inhabitants of that courtyard, and they must therefore be notified beforehand.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the shituf is not necessarily to their benefit, because they have another alternative to transfer articles to and from the courtyard from outside. Hence, it is possible that the inhabitants of the courtyard do not desire to join in the shituf with this lane, lest doing so increase the amount of human traffic in their courtyard.
According to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view, the question facing the inhabitants of this courtyard is: If they do not join in a shituf with either of the lanes, they are allowed to transfer articles left in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath to and from both the lanes. Should they join in a shituf with only one of the lanes, although their opportunities are greatly increased with regard to transferring articles to and from the lane with which they established the shituf, they lose the opportunity to transfer articles to and from the other lane. Perhaps they would desire to maintain the situation as it was originally rather than forfeit this opportunity.
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| 9. |
In this ruling, the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 80a (the source for this halachah) parallels that of Rabbenu Chanan'el. Rashi, the Ra'avad, and others offer a directly opposite interpretation of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 367:1) follows the latter view.
The Ra'avad's objection to the Rambam's ruling revolves around the interpretation of the passage cited above, which begins:
According to the Rambam, the law Rabbi Zeira cites as support is not entirely analogous to the situation regarding which he was asked. A Jew's wife may establish an eruv without his knowledge, but not against his will. A gentile's wife, by contrast, may rent out his domain even when he has already refused (Sefer HaKovetz).
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| 10. |
Since they agreed to join in the shituf previously, we assume that they desire to continue the arrangement (Levush, Orach Chayim 368:1).
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| 11. |
Rashi (Eruvin 80b) explains that this refers to establishing the second shituf with a different type of produce, rather than establishing the first eruv with two types of produce. His approach is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 368:1).
|
| 12. |
Note Chapter 1, Halachah 11, where the Rambam states that a shituf can be established using two types of produce. The Ra'avad objects both there and here.
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| 13. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
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| 14. |
Merkevet HaMishneh explains that, even according to the Rambam, using two types of produce for a shituf is undesirable. Therefore, if the shituf must be established anew, it is necessary to check whether the inhabitants of the lane consent.
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| 15. |
For perhaps they would desire to establish the shituf with the inhabitants of the other lane.
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| 16. |
See the notes on Halachah 4.
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| 17. |
Unless they join together in a shituf.
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| 18. |
Since there is a courtyard in their lane that has not joined in the shituf, all the inhabitants of the lane are forbidden to carry.
|
| 19. |
Unless they join in a shituf.
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| 20. |
Even when they do not join in a shituf.
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| 21. |
Provided they establish an eruv for themselves.
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| 22. |
Based on the principles stated in the previous halachah, it would seem that the fact that the inhabitants of this courtyard have not joined in the shituf of the lane through which they usually pass would cause carrying to be forbidden in this lane. Nevertheless, since the inhabitants of this courtyard have another alternative, they are considered part of the courtyard through which they do not usually pass. The rationale is that through this decision, one group of people (the inhabitants of the lane who established a shituf) benefits (for their shituf is considered acceptable), and another group (the inhabitants of the courtyard in question) does not lose (for they are forbidden to carry regardless) [Eruvin 49a].
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| 23. |
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 16:3, this is an area of 5000 square cubits. The Sages forbade carrying in such an area, even when it is surrounded by a proper partition (loc. cit.:1-2).
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| 24. |
I.e., we assume that the entrance that is more important to them is the entrance to the enclosed area and not the entrance to the lane. Hence, the fact that they have an entrance to the lane is of no significance.
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| 25. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 13.
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| 26. |
See also Halachah 24 and Chapter 4, Halachah 16.
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| 27. |
See Chapter 2, Halachot 1-5.
|
| 28. |
Chapter 4, Halachah 1.
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| 29. |
I.e., an eruv established within a courtyard will be seen by the children, and they will know that it is only because of this eruv that the restrictions against carrying are relaxed. If, however, there is only a shituf in the lane, it is unlikely to be noticed by the children, and they will not know about the restrictions established by our Sages (Eruvin 73b). (See, however, the notes on the following halachah.)
|
| 30. |
For the shituf requires the participation of all the inhabitants of the lane.
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| 31. |
See Halachah 15.
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| 32. |
I.e., if one person will give a colleague bread - other than the bread of the shituf - when asked (Ra'avad, Maggid Mishneh, based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Eruvin 6:8).
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| 33. |
Rav Moshe HaCohen notes an apparent contradiction between this halachah and Chapter 1, Halachah 19, which states that if a shituf was established with bread, there is no need for eruvinwithin the courtyards, because the children will be aware of the collection of loaves of bread. He maintains that this leniency may be accepted at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim387:1) accepts this view.
The Ramah mentions an even greater leniency. He maintains that we may rely on the shitufalthough eruvin were not established, even when the shituf was established with wine or other foods. His rationale is that in Talmudic times, the shituf was established by one member of each courtyard, who acted on behalf of all the inhabitants. At present, however, all the inhabitants of the lane contribute individually to the shituf.
This rationale is not accepted by the later authorities; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 387:1 and theMishnah Berurah 387:12 suggest following the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch.
|
| 34. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on his conception [Hilchot Shabbat 17:8; Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:8)] that a lane must have several courtyards and several houses open to it.
The Ra'avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen, and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that it follows the opinion of Rav (Shabbat 131a). Nevertheless, the halachah ultimately follows the view of Shmuel (Eruvin 74a), who maintains that the lane and the courtyards are considered to be a single entity. According to this view, when a shituf has not been established, there is no difference whether or not eruvin have been established within the courtyards. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 388:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 388:4 rule according to this view.
The Mishnah Berurah adds that the stringency suggested by the Rambam applies only when the open side of the lane is adjusted with a pole or a beam. If, however, the open side is adjusted with a frame of an entrance, even the Rambam would agree that one is permitted to carry articles that were left in the lane at the beginning of the Sabbath.
|
| 35. |
See Chapter 3, Halachot 18-19.
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| 36. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 10.
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| 37. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 16.
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| 38. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
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| 39. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.
|
| 40. |
We have translated the Hebrew פתח as "opening," rather than "entrance," in light of the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 389:1) that a window is sufficient.
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| 41. |
As reflected by Halachah 10, when a person has one entrance that is semi-private and another that is more public, the entrance that is more private is considered to be the one he will prefer. Since the gentile has an alternative of this nature, his presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden within the lane.
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| 42. |
Because of its small size.
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| 43. |
Significantly, these laws are directly opposite to those applying to a Jew, as mentioned in Halachah 10.
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| 44. |
I.e., one might think that since they are joined together as a single entity, the leniency mentioned in the final clause of Halachah 16 would apply. This, however, is not the case, as the Rambam proceeds to state.
|
| 45. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 15.
|
| 46. |
This refers to a city surrounded by a wall that has gates, for in this way it is a private domain according to the Torah (Maggid Mishneh). Other authorities - and these are the views accepted by many today - accept the possibility of a city's being encompassed by an eruv consisting of wires or string that forms an imaginary wall. The acceptability of such an enclosure is discussed in Hilchot Shabbat 16:16 and notes.
|
| 47. |
I.e., in contrast to the situation mentioned in the following halachah, there is no need to set a certain area outside the eruv.
|
| 48. |
Since the city has only one entrance, it does not resemble a public domain, and the chance that people will develop a misconception is far less. Hence, no additional measure is necessary (Mishnah Berurah 292:5).
|
| 49. |
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 59a,b. The Rashba and the Ritba offer similar, but slightly different interpretations of the passage. Significantly, Rashi interprets the Hebrew עיר של רבים as referring to a city populated by more than 600,000. His view is cited inShulchan Aruch HaRav 392:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 392:7 as an explanation for the reason that this law is not practiced at present.
|
| 50. |
For the reasons explained in the following halachah.
|
| 51. |
Since the city resembles a public domain, allowing people to carry might create a misconception. Unless a portion of the city were set aside, it is possible that some might entirely lose awareness of the prohibition against carrying.
|
| 52. |
Or even several ladders (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 392:2).
|
| 53. |
Although at times a ladder is considered to be an entrance (e.g., Chapter 3, Halachah 2), this instance is judged by different criteria.
|
| 54. |
These individuals are less likely to be upset about being excluded from the eruv of the city. (SeeEruvin 60a.)
|
| 55. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.
|
| 56. |
The Maggid Mishneh (cited also by the Mishnah Berurah 392:34) notes that the Rambam's wording implies that if only a portion of the inhabitants of a city join in the shituf, we do not automatically assume that a person would prefer to be part of them. Perhaps he would prefer to be associated with those who were not included.
|
| 57. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
|
| 58. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 13.
|
| 59. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9; Chapter 4, Halachah 13; and Halachah 16 of the present chapter.
|
| 60. |
Today, when eruvin are made in cities where Jews and gentiles live together, the gentiles' domains are usually rented through an arrangement negotiated with the municipal authorities. Since these authorities have a certain dimension of control over all land under their jurisdiction, and can enter all homes with a court order, they are entitled to rent the domain for all the gentiles living in this area.
|
| 61. |
Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the Rambam's wording implies that the inhabitants must either join in the shituf or erect a pillar.
|
| 62. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 16; and Halachah 11 of the present chapter.
|
| 63. |
The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss on Halachah 19) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim392:5) interpret this to be referring to a city that is surrounded by a wall with gates.
The Rambam's intent is interpreted to mean that if the pillar is erected in the middle of the public domain, it is not sufficient to divide one part of the city from the other.
If the city is not surrounded by a wall, it is not a private domain according to Torah law. It is possible to enclose a portion by using a Halachic conception of an enclosure, a tzurat hapetach, "a frame of an entrance," but the entire city may not be enclosed in this manner.
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Hayom Yom:
• "Today's Day" Adar I 26, 5774 • 26 February 2014
Wednesday, 26 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayakheil, Revi'i.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: As for the (p. 145)...Sefer Charedim (p. 147).
With three instruments of service - love of G-d, love of Torah and love of Israel - must young students of Torah approach their Avoda in the vineyard of the L-rd of Hosts,1 to bring the hearts of their brothers closer to observing practical mitzvot and to designating regular time for Torah study. They must do this without paying any attention to the affliction of factions. The absolute truth is that the heart of Israel is a wellspring, a source of living waters,2 and there is a "covenant"3 with effort4 and publicity - that they shall never be fruitless.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Yeshayahu 5:7.
2. See Yirmiyahu 2:13.
3. See Tishrei 12, p. 95.
4. To reach the hearts of brother-Jews.
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Daily Thought:
Wellsprings
There is a story that tells it all. On the awesome day of Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, of the year 5507 (1746), the Baal Shem Tov lay in deep meditation and ascended to the holy chamber of Moshiach.
“Master,” he asked, “when will you come?”
The answer: “When your wellsprings shall spread to the outside.”
The wellsprings are the wellsprings of the deepest inner wisdom.
Not only the water of the wellsprings, but the wellsprings themselves, must spread forth. When the furthest reaches of the material world become wellsprings of the innermost wisdom, then Moshiach will come.
This is our mandate now. We are all to become wellsprings.
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