Today's Laws & Customs:
• Burial Society Day
The Chevrah Kadisha (Jewish Burial Societies) hold their annual get-together and feast on Adar 7th. This is based on the tradition that G-d Himself buried Moses on this day -- granting them a respite from their labors.
• Sanctification of the Moon
Once a month, as the moon waxes in the sky, we recite a special blessing calledKiddush Levanah, "the sanctification of the moon," praising the Creator for His wondrous work we call astronomy.
Kiddush Levanah is recited after nightfall, usually on Saturday night. The blessing is concluded with songs and dancing, because our nation is likened to the moon—as it waxes and wanes, so have we throughout history. When we bless the moon, we renew our trust that very soon, the light of G‑d's presence will fill all the earth and our people will be redeemed from exile.
Though Kiddush Levanah can be recited as early as three days after the moon's rebirth, the kabbalah tells us it is best to wait a full week, till the seventh of the month. Once 15 days have passed, the moon begins to wane once more and the season for saying the blessing has passed.
Links:
Brief Guide to Kiddush Levanah: Thank G‑d for the Moon!
More articles on Kiddush Levanah from our knowledgebase.
Today in Jewish History:
• Moses' Birth & Passing (1393 and 1273 BCE)
Moses was born in Egypt on the 7th of Adar of the year 2368 from creation (1393 BCE) and passed away on his 120th birthday -- Adar 7, 2488 (1273 BCE)
Links:
A brief biography
The Birth of a Leader
The Head
Moses Disappears
More on Moses
• The Spanish Inquisition (1481)
The Inquisition was created in the twelfth century to find "Christian heretics" who would be punished or killed. Eventually, Jews too were open to such charges of heresy, simply for being Jewish; and torture was routinely used to extract "confessions." Over the years, the inquisition, which operated with Papal consent, spread to many countries.
In 1481 the Inquisition began to function in Spain to expose the secret Jews, known as the Anusim or Marranos. This Inquisition was anti-Jewish more than in any previous countries. The first public sentencing and burning alive of six marrano men and one woman by the Spanish Inquisition was held on this date in Seville in Southern Spain.
Following the start of the Spanish Inquisition many Jews fled Spain (see "Today in Jewish History" for Sivan 4).
Daily Quote:
And if you shall say: What shall we eat in the seventh year, if we do not plant, nor gather our crops? But I will command my blessing upon you in the sixth year, and it shall bring forth fruit for three years . . .[Leviticus 25:20–21]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Tetzaveh, 5th Portion Exodus 29:19-29:37 with Rashi
• Chapter 29
19And you shall take the second ram, and Aaron and his sons shall lean their hands upon the ram's head. יטוְלָקַחְתָּ אֵת הָאַיִל הַשֵּׁנִי וְסָמַךְ אַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו אֶת יְדֵיהֶם עַל רֹאשׁ הָאָיִל:
20You shall slaughter the ram, take [some] of its blood and put it upon the cartilage of Aaron's right ear and upon the cartilage of Aaron's sons' right ears, upon the thumbs of their right hands, and upon the big toes of their right feet, and you shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar all around. כוְשָׁחַטְתָּ אֶת הָאַיִל וְלָקַחְתָּ מִדָּמוֹ וְנָתַתָּה עַל תְּנוּךְ אֹזֶן אַהֲרֹן וְעַל תְּנוּךְ אֹזֶן בָּנָיו הַיְמָנִית וְעַל בֹּהֶן יָדָם הַיְמָנִית וְעַל בֹּהֶן רַגְלָם הַיְמָנִית וְזָרַקְתָּ אֶת הַדָּם עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ סָבִיב:
cartilage: Heb. ךְתְּנוּ. That is the cartilage, the middle wall within the ear, which is known [in Old French] as tendron, tendrum, tenron, tenrum, or teneros. תנוך: הוא הסחוס האמצעי שבתוך האוזן שקורין טנדרו"ם [סחוס]:
the thumbs of their… hands: Heb. בֹּהֶן יָדָם This is the thumb, and [the blood was to be applied to] the middle joint. -[from Sifra on Lev. 8:24] בהן ידם: הגודל ובפרק האמצעי:
21You shall [then] take [some] of the blood that is upon the altar and [some] of the anointing oil, and sprinkle it upon Aaron and upon his garments, upon his sons and upon the garments of his sons with him; thus he will become holy along with his garments, and his sons and their garments with him. כאוְלָקַחְתָּ מִן הַדָּם אֲשֶׁר עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וּמִשֶּׁמֶן הַמִּשְׁחָה וְהִזֵּיתָ עַל אַהֲרֹן וְעַל בְּגָדָיו וְעַל בָּנָיו וְעַל בִּגְדֵי בָנָיו אִתּוֹ וְקָדַשׁ הוּא וּבְגָדָיו וּבָנָיו וּבִגְדֵי בָנָיו אִתּוֹ:
22And you shall take out of the ram the fat and the fat tail and the fat that covers the innards, the diaphragm of the liver, the two kidneys along with the fat that is upon them, and the right thigh, for it is a ram of perfection. כבוְלָקַחְתָּ מִן הָאַיִל הַחֵלֶב וְהָאַלְיָה וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב | הַמְכַסֶּה אֶת הַקֶּרֶב וְאֵת יֹתֶרֶת הַכָּבֵד וְאֵת | שְׁתֵּי הַכְּלָיֹת וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב אֲשֶׁר עֲלֵיהֶן וְאֵת שׁוֹק הַיָּמִין כִּי אֵיל מִלֻּאִים הוּא:
the fat: This is the fat on the intestines or [the fat on] the maw [the obomasum, or the last stomach of a ruminant animal]. [from Chullin 49a, b] החלב: זה חלב הדקים או הקיבה:
and the fat tail: Below the kidneys, as is explained in [parshath] Vayikra, as it is said: “opposite the atzeh (הֶעָצֶה) he shall remove it” (Lev. 3:9), [meaning] the place where the kidneys give advice (יוֹעִצוֹת) (Chul. 11a). In connection with the sacrificial parts of the bull, however, the fat tail is not mentioned, because the fat tail is sacrificed only with a male lamb, a ewe lamb, and a ram, but a bull and a goat do not require the [sacrifice of] the fat tail. [In fact, bulls and goats have no fat tails. Rashi means that the tail need not be sacrificed.] והאליה: מן הכליות ולמטה, כמו שמפורש בויקרא (ג ט) שנאמר לעומת העצה יסירנה, מקום שהכליות יועצות, ובאמורי הפר לא נאמר אליה, שאין אליה קריבה אלא בכבש וכבשה ואיל, אבל שור ועז אין טעונים אליה:
and the right thigh: We do not find that the right thigh should be sent up in smoke with the sacrificial parts except this one alone. ואת שוק הימין: לא מצינו הקטרה בשוק הימין עם האמורים אלא זו בלבד:
for it is a ram of perfection: Heb. מִלֻאִים, [the same as] שְׁלָמִים, an expression denoting perfection שְׁלֵמוּת i.e., it has been completed with everything. Scripture informs [us] that the perfection offering is a peace offering, because it makes peace for the altar, for the one who performs the service, and for the owner (Mid. Tanchuma, Tzav 4; Sifra 8:19). Therefore, I [God] require that the breast be given to the one who performs the service, as a portion. This was Moses, who officiated at the investiture rites, and the rest was eaten by Aaron and his sons, who were the owners [of the sacrifices], as is explained in [the section dealing with] this topic. כי איל מלאים הוא: שלמים, לשון שלמות שמושלם בכל. מגיד הכתוב שהמלואים שלמים, שמשימים שלום למזבח ולעובד העבודה ולבעלים, לכך אני מצריכו החזה להיות לו לעובד העבודה למנה, וזהו משה ששימש במלואים, והשאר אכלו אהרן ובניו שהם בעלים, כמפורש בענין:
23And one loaf of bread, one loaf of oil bread, and one wafer from the basket of matzoth that stands before the Lord, כגוְכִכַּר לֶחֶם אַחַת וְחַלַּת לֶחֶם שֶׁמֶן אַחַת וְרָקִיק אֶחָד מִסַּל הַמַּצּוֹת אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה:
and one loaf of bread: of the loaves. וככר לחם: מן החלות:
one loaf of oil bread: of the kind [of bread known as] the scalded dough. -[from Men. 78a] וחלת לחם שמן: ממין הרבוכה:
and one wafer: of the wafers, one out of ten of each kind (Men. 76a). We do not find that the offering of bread that comes with any sacrifice should be burned except this [bread] only, for the offering of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering and the ram of the Nazirite are given to the kohanim with the breast and the thigh, but from this [sacrifice] Moses had for [his] portion only the breast. ורקיק: מן הרקיקין, אחד מעשרה שבכל מין ומין ולא מצינו תרומת לחם הבא עם זבח נקטרת אלא זו בלבד, שתרומת לחמי תודה ואיל נזיר נתונה לכהנים עם חזה ושוק, ומזה לא היה למשה למנה אלא חזה בלבד:
24and you shall place it all upon Aaron's palms and upon his sons' palms, and you shall wave them as a waving before the Lord. כדוְשַׂמְתָּ הַכֹּל עַל כַּפֵּי אַהֲרֹן וְעַל כַּפֵּי בָנָיו וְהֵנַפְתָּ אֹתָם תְּנוּפָה לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה:
upon Aaron’s palms…, and you shall wave: Both of them were engaged in the waving, the owner [of the animal] and the kohen. How so? The kohen placed his hand under the owner’s hand and waved (Men. 61b). In this case, Aaron and his sons were the owners, and Moses was the kohen. על כפי אהרן וגו' והנפת: שניהם עסוקים בתנופה, הבעלים והכהן. הא כיצד, כהן מניח ידו תחת יד הבעלים ומניף, ובזה היו אהרן ובניו בעלים, ומשה כהן:
as a waving: He would wave it to and fro to the One to Whom the four directions of the world belong. The waving keeps back and does away with punishment and harmful winds. The lifting up [consisted of] raising and lowering, to the One to Whom the heavens and earth belong, and it keeps back harmful dews. -[from Men. 62a] תנופה: מוליך ומביא למי שארבע רוחות העולם שלו, ותנופה מעכבת רוחות רעות. תרומה מעלה ומוריד למי שהשמים וארץ שלו, ומעכבת טללים רעים:
25You shall then take them from their hand[s] and make them go up in smoke upon the altar with the burnt offering as a spirit of satisfaction before the Lord; it is a fire offering for the Lord. כהוְלָקַחְתָּ אֹתָם מִיָּדָם וְהִקְטַרְתָּ הַמִּזְבֵּחָה עַל הָעֹלָה לְרֵיחַ נִיחוֹחַ לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אִשֶּׁה הוּא לַיהֹוָה:
with the burnt offering: With the first ram that you [already] offered up as a burnt offering. על העולה: על האיל הראשון שהעלית עולה:
as a spirit of satisfaction: Heb. לְרֵיחַ נִיחוֹחַ, as satisfaction for the One Who commanded and [saw that] His will was performed. לריח ניחוח: לנחת רוח למי שאמר ונעשה רצונו:
a fire offering: It is given to the fire. אשה: לאש נתן:
for the Lord: For the name of the Omnipresent. לה': לשמו של מקום:
26And you shall take the breast of the ram of perfection which is Aaron's, and wave it as a waving before the Lord, and it will become your portion. כווְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת הֶחָזֶה מֵאֵיל הַמִּלֻּאִים אֲשֶׁר לְאַהֲרֹן וְהֵנַפְתָּ אֹתוֹ תְּנוּפָה לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה וְהָיָה לְךָ לְמָנָה:
waving: Heb. ךְתְּנוּפָה, an expression of moving to and fro, vantiler or ventiller in Old French, to make [horizontal] movements to and fro. תנופה: לשון הולכה והובאה, וינטילי"ר בלעז [להניף:
27And you shall sanctify the breast of the waving and the thigh of the uplifting, which was waved and which was lifted up, of the ram of perfection, of that which is Aaron's and of that which is his sons'. כזוְקִדַּשְׁתָּ אֵת | חֲזֵה הַתְּנוּפָה וְאֵת שׁוֹק הַתְּרוּמָה אֲשֶׁר הוּנַף וַאֲשֶׁר הוּרָם מֵאֵיל הַמִּלֻּאִים מֵאֲשֶׁר לְאַהֲרֹן וּמֵאֲשֶׁר לְבָנָיו:
And you shall sanctify the breast of the waving and the thigh of the uplifting, etc.: Sanctify them for generations [to come], that their uplifting and their waving shall prevail like the breast and the thigh of the peace offering, but not [in reference] to the burning. Rather, [in the future, the ram’s breast and thigh] “shall remain for Aaron and his sons” (verse 28) to eat. וקדשת את חזה התנופה ואת שוק התרומה וגו':קדשם לדורות, להיות נוהגת תרומתם והנפתם כחזה ושוק של שלמים, אבל לא להקטרה, אלא והיה לאהרן ולבניו לאכול:
waving: Heb. ךְתְּנוּפָה, an expression of moving to and fro, vantiler or ventiller in Old French, to make [horizontal] movements to and fro. תנופה: לשון הולכה והובאה, וינטילי"ר בלעז [להניף]:
was lifted up: Heb. הוּרָם, an expression of raising and lowering. הורם: לשון מעלה ומוריד:
28And so it shall remain for Aaron and his sons as a perpetual allotment from the children of Israel; for it is an offering, and it shall remain an offering from the children of Israel of their peace offerings; it is their offering to the Lord. כחוְהָיָה לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו לְחָק עוֹלָם מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כִּי תְרוּמָה הוּא וּתְרוּמָה יִהְיֶה מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִזִּבְחֵי שַׁלְמֵיהֶם תְּרוּמָתָם לַיהֹוָה:
as a perpetual allotment from the children of Israel: [i. e.,] that the peace offerings shall belong to the owners [of the animals], but the breast and the thigh they shall give to the kohen. לחק עולם מאת בני ישראל: שהשלמים לבעלים, ואת החזה ואת השוק יתנו לכהן:
for it is an offering: This breast and thigh. כי תרומה הוא: החזה ושוק הזה:
29The holy garments that are Aaron's shall be for his sons after him, to be exalted through them and invested with full authority through them. כטוּבִגְדֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר לְאַהֲרֹן יִהְיוּ לְבָנָיו אַחֲרָיו לְמָשְׁחָה בָהֶם וּלְמַלֵּא בָם אֶת יָדָם:
for his sons after him: for [the one] who comes into greatness after him. לבניו אחריו: למי שבא בגדולה אחריו:
to be exalted: Heb. לְמָשְׁחָה, [which usually means “for anointment,” here signifies] to be exalted through them. There are [instances of] מְִִשִׁיחָה that are an expression of authority, like “I have given them to you for greatness (לְמָשְׁחָה)” (Num. 18:8); “Do not touch My great ones (בִמְשִׁיחָי)” (Ps. 105:15). למשחה: להתגדל בהם, שיש משיחה שהיא לשון שררה, כמו (במדבר יח ח) לך נתתים למשחה, (תהלים קה טו) אל תגעו במשיחי:
and invested with full authority through them: Through the garments, he is invested with the Kehunah Gedolah. ולמלא בם את ידם: על ידי הבגדים הוא מתלבש בכהונה גדולה:
30Seven days shall the one of his sons [who will be] the kohen in his place wear them, the one who is to enter the Tent of Meeting to serve in the Holy. לשִׁבְעַת יָמִים יִלְבָּשָׁם הַכֹּהֵן תַּחְתָּיו מִבָּנָיו אֲשֶׁר יָבֹא אֶל אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לְשָׁרֵת בַּקֹּדֶשׁ:
Seven days: [I.e., seven] consecutive [days]. שבעת ימים: רצופין:
shall… [who will be] the kohen in his place wear them: [The son] who will arise from his [Aaron’s] sons in his place to the Kehunah Gedolah, whom they will appoint to be Kohen Gadol. ילבשם הכהן: אשר יקום מבניו תחתיו לכהונה גדולה, כשימנוהו להיות כהן גדול:
the one who is to enter the Tent of Meeting: [I.e.,] that kohen who is prepared to enter the inner sanctum on Yom Kippur, and that is the Kohen Gadol, for the service of Yom Kippur is acceptable only through him. -[from Yoma 73a] אשר יבא אל אהל מועד: אותו כהן המוכן ליכנס לפני ולפנים ביום הכפורים, וזהו כהן גדול, שאין עבודת יום הכפורים כשרה אלא בו:
one of his sons… in his place: [This] teaches [us] that if the Kohen Gadol has a son who equals him, they must appoint him Kohen Gadol in his place [i.e., after him]. -[from Sifra on Lev. 6:15] תחתיו מבניו: מלמד שאם יש לו לכהן גדול בן ממלא את מקומו, ימנוהו כהן גדול תחתיו:
[who will be] the kohen in his place: From here there is proof that every expression of כֹּהֵן is an expression of doing, of actually serving. Therefore, the cantillation of the “tevir” extends before it [indicating a connection to the following word]. הכהן תחתיו מבניו: מכאן ראיה כל לשון כהן לשון פועל עובד ממש, לפיכך ניגון תביר נמשך לפניו:
31You shall take the ram of perfection and cook its flesh in a holy place. לאוְאֵת אֵיל הַמִּלֻּאִים תִּקָּח וּבִשַּׁלְתָּ אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ בְּמָקֹם קָדשׁ:
in a holy place: [I.e.,] in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, for these peace offerings were most holy sacrifices [which had to be eaten in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting or the courtyard of the Temple, and not in the camp of Israel or the city of Jerusalem]. במקום קדוש: בחצר אהל מועד, שהשלמים הללו קדשי קדשים היו:
32Aaron and his sons shall eat the flesh of the ram and the bread that is in the basket, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. לבוְאָכַל אַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו אֶת בְּשַׂר הָאַיִל וְאֶת הַלֶּחֶם אֲשֶׁר בַּסָּל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד:
at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting: The entire courtyard is called thus. פתח אהל מועד: כל החצר קרוי כן:
33They shall eat those things with which atonement has been effected, in order to invest them with full authority, to sanctify them, but a stranger shall not eat [of them], because they are a sacred thing. לגוְאָכְלוּ אֹתָם אֲשֶׁר כֻּפַּר בָּהֶם לְמַלֵּא אֶת יָדָם לְקַדֵּשׁ אֹתָם וְזָר לֹא יֹאכַל כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הֵם:
They shall eat those things: Aaron and his sons [shall eat them] because they are their [the ram’s and the bread’s] owners. ואכלו אתם: אהרן ובניו, לפי שהם בעליהם:
with which atonement has been effected: [I.e., with which] all alienism and repugnance [have been atoned for] for them [Aaron and his sons]. אשר כפר בהם: כל זרות ותיעוב:
in order to invest them with full authority: with this ram and this bread. למלא את ידם: באיל ולחם הללו:
to sanctify them: For through these investitures, they were fully initiated into and sanctified for the kehunah. לקדש אותם: שעל ידי המלואים הללו נתמלאו ידיהם ונתקדשו לכהונה:
because they are a sacred thing: [I.e., they are] the most holy sacrifices. From here we learned a warning [a prohibition] against a stranger [a non-kohen] who eats the most holy sacrifices, since the Torah text gives as the reason for the matter, [the fact] that they are a sacred thing. כי קדש הם: קדשי קודשים, ומכאן למדנו אזהרה לזר האוכל קודש קודשים, שנתן המקרא טעם לדבר משום דקדש הם:
34If any of the flesh of the perfection [offering] or of the bread is left over until the next morning, what is left over you shall burn in fire; it shall not be eaten because it is a sacred thing. לדוְאִם יִוָּתֵר מִבְּשַׂר הַמִּלֻּאִים וּמִן הַלֶּחֶם עַד הַבֹּקֶר וְשָׂרַפְתָּ אֶת הַנּוֹתָר בָּאֵשׁ לֹא יֵאָכֵל כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הוּא:
35So shall you do to Aaron and his sons, according to all that I have commanded you; for seven days you shall perform their investiture. להוְעָשִׂיתָ לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו כָּכָה כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִי אֹתָכָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תְּמַלֵּא יָדָם:
So shall you do to Aaron and his sons: The Torah text repeated this and doubled it to render it essential, that if he [Moses] omitted anything of all that was stated in [the section dealing with] this matter, they [Aaron and his sons] would not be invested to be kohanim, and their service would be invalid. -[from Yoma 5a] ועשית לאהרן ולבניו ככה: שנה הכתוב וכפל לעכב, שאם חסר דבר אחד מכל האמור בענין, לא נתמלאו ידיהם להיות כהנים ועבודתם פסולה:
you: Heb. אֹתָכָה, like אוֹתָ. אתכה: כמו אותך:
for seven days you shall perform their investiture: in this manner and with these sacrifices, daily. שבעת ימים תמלא וגו': בענין הזה ובקרבנות הללו בכל יום:
36And a bull as a sin offering you shall offer up every day for the atonements, and you shall purify the altar by performing atonement upon it, and you shall anoint it, in order to sanctify it. לווּפַר חַטָּאת תַּעֲשֶׂה לַיּוֹם עַל הַכִּפֻּרִים וְחִטֵּאתָ עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ בְּכַפֶּרְךָ עָלָיו וּמָשַׁחְתָּ אֹתוֹ לְקַדְּשׁוֹ:
for the atonements -: Heb. עַל-הַכִּפֻּרִים, for the atonements, [meaning] to atone for the altar for all alienism and repugnance. Since it is stated: “for seven days you shall perform their investiture,” I know only [that] what is offered up for their [the kohanim’s] sake [must be brought all seven days], such as the rams and the bread, but what is offered up for the sake of the altar, such as the bull, which is for the purification of the altar, we did not [yet] hear [that it must be brought for seven days]. Therefore, this verse was necessary. The midrash of Torath Kohanim (Lev. 8:14) states: The atonement for the altar was necessary because perhaps someone had donated a stolen article for the work of the Mishkan and the altar. על הכפרים: בשביל הכפורים, לכפר על המזבח מכל זרות ותיעוב. ולפי שנאמר (פסוק לה) שבעת ימים תמלא ידם, אין לי אלא דבר הבא בשבילם, כגון האילים והלחם, אבל הבא בשביל המזבח, כגון פר שהוא לחטוי המזבח, לא שמענו, לכך הוצרך מקרא זה. ומדרש תורת כהנים אומר כפרת המזבח הוצרך, שמא התנדב איש דבר גזל במלאכת המשכן והמזבח:
and you shall purify: Heb. וְחִטֵאתָ, [which Onkelos renders:] וּתְדַכֵּי, and you shall purify. An expression of placing the blood that is applied with the finger is called חִטּוּי. וחטאת: ותדכי, לשון מתנת דמים הנתונים באצבע קרוי חטוי:
and you shall anoint it: with the anointing oil [as below (Exod. 30:22-33)]. All anointings [were made] like a sort of Greek “chaff.” [See above on verse 2.] ומשחת אותו: בשמן המשחה וכל המשיחות כמין כי יונית:
37For seven days you shall perform atonement upon the altar and sanctify it. Henceforth, the altar shall be a holy of holies. Whatever touches the altar will be holy. לזשִׁבְעַת יָמִים תְּכַפֵּר עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְקִדַּשְׁתָּ אֹתוֹ וְהָיָה הַמִּזְבֵּחַ קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים כָּל הַנֹּגֵעַ בַּמִּזְבֵּחַ יִקְדָּשׁ:
Henceforth the altar shall be a holy: Now what was its [the altar’s] sanctity? “Whatever touches the altar will be holy.” Even an invalid sacrifice that was placed upon it-the altar sanctified it to render it fit so that it would not be taken off [the altar]. Since it is said: “Whatever touches the altar will be holy,” I understand it to mean whether it is fit or whether it is unfit, such as something whose disqualification did not come in the sanctuary, such as a male animal or a female animal that was intimate with a human, [or] an animal set aside for a sacrifice to idols, [or] an animal that was worshipped as a god, or an animal that suffered a mortal wound or terminal illness, or [any other disqualification] like them. Therefore, the Torah states: “And this is what you shall offer upon the altar,” immediately following it [this verse]. Just as the burnt offering is fit, so is it with anything that was already fit and became disqualified after entering the courtyard, such as a sacrifice that stayed overnight, a sacrifice that was taken out of the courtyard, a sacrifice that was ritually unclean, [a sacrifice] that was slaughtered with an intention of [offering it up or eating its flesh] outside the time allotted for it or outside the proper place, and [any other disqualification] like them. -[from Zev. 83a, Sifra on Lev. 6:2] והיה המזבח קדש: ומה היא קדושתו, כל הנוגע במזבח יקדש, אפילו קרבן פסול שעלה עליו, קדשו המזבח להכשירו שלא ירד. מתוך שנאמר כל הנוגע במזבח יקדש, שומע אני בין ראוי בין שאינו ראוי, כגון דבר שלא היה פסולו בקדש, כגון הרובע והנרבע ומוקצה ונעבד והטרפה וכיוצא בהן, תלמוד לומר וזה אשר תעשה, הסמוך אחריו, מה עולה ראויה אף כל ראוי, שנראה לו כבר ונפסל משבא לעזרה, כגון הלן והיוצא והטמא ושנשחט במחשבת חוץ לזמנו וחוץ למקומו וכיוצא בהן:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 39 - 43
• Chapter 39
David's prayer bewailing his suffering. But it is not suffering itself that pains him, rather he is saddened by its disturbing his Torah study. For man's days are few, "and if not now, when (will he study)?" for he may die, today or tomorrow. He therefore requests that his suffering be removed, to enable him to study Torah and acquire a place in the World to Come.
1. For the Conductor, for yedutun,1 a psalm by David.
2. I said that I would guard my ways from sinning with my tongue; I would guard my mouth with a muzzle, [even] while the wicked one is before me.
3. I became mute with stillness, I was silent [even] from the good, though my pain was crippling.
4. My heart grew hot within me, a fire blazed in my utterance, as I spoke with my tongue.
5. O Lord, let me know my end and what is the measure of my days, that I may know when I will cease.
6. Behold, like handbreadths You set my days; my lifetime is as naught before You. But all is futility, all mankind's existence, Selah.
7. Only in darkness does man walk, seeking only futility; he amasses riches and knows not who will reap them.
8. And now, what is my hope, my Lord? My longing is to You.
9. Rescue me from all my transgressions; do not make me the scorn of the degenerate.
10. I am mute, I do not open my mouth, for You have caused [my suffering].
11. Remove Your affliction from me; I am devastated by the attack of Your hand.
12. In reproach for sin You chastened man; like a moth, You wore away that which is precious to him. All mankind is nothing but futility, forever.
13. Hear my prayer, O Lord, listen to my cry; do not be silent to my tears, for I am a stranger with You, a sojourner like all my forefathers.
14. Turn from me, that I may recover my strength, before I depart and I am no more.
Chapter 40
The psalmist speaks of the numerous wonders that God wrought for the Jewish people, asking: "Who can articulate His might? I would relate and speak of them, but they are too numerous to recount!" He created the world and split the sea for the sake of Israel, [yet] He desires no sacrifices, only that we listen to His voice.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. I put my hope in the Lord; He turned to me and heard my cry.
3. He raised me from the turbulent pit, from the slimy mud, and set my feet upon a rock, steadying my steps.
4. He put a new song in my mouth, a hymn to our God; multitudes will see and fear, and will trust in the Lord.
5. Fortunate is the man who has made the Lord his trust, and did not turn to the haughty, nor to those who stray after falsehood.
6. You have done much, O You, Lord my God-Your wonders and thoughts are for us; none can compare to You; should I relate or speak of them, they are too numerous to recount!
7. You desired neither sacrifice nor meal-offering, but [obedient] ears You opened for me; You requested neither burnt-offering nor sin-offering.
8. Then I said, "Behold, I come with a Scroll of the Book written for me."1
9. I desire to fulfill Your will, my God; and Your Torah is in my innards.
10. I proclaimed [Your] righteousness in a vast congregation; behold I will not restrain my lips-O Lord, You know!
11. I did not conceal Your righteousness within my heart; I declared Your faithfulness and deliverance; I did not hide Your kindness and truth from the vast congregation.
12. May You, Lord, not withhold Your mercies from me; may Your kindness and truth constantly guard me.
13. For countless evils surround me; my sins have overtaken me and I cannot see; they outnumber the hairs of my head, and my heart has abandoned me.
14. May it please You, Lord, to save me; O Lord, hurry to my aid.
15. Let those who seek my life, to end it, be shamed and humiliated together; let those who desire my harm retreat and be disgraced.
16. Let those who say about me, "Aha! Aha!" be desolate, in return for their shaming [me].
17. Let all those who seek You exult and rejoice in You; let those who love Your deliverance always say, "Be exalted, O Lord!”
18. As for me, I am poor and needy; my Lord will think of me. You are my help and my rescuer; my God, do not delay!
Chapter 41
This psalm teaches many good character traits, and inspires one to be thoughtful and conscientious in giving charity-knowing to whom to give first. Fortunate is he who is thoughtful of the sick one, providing him with his needs.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. Fortunate is he who is thoughtful of the poor, [for] the Lord will save him on the day of evil.
3. The Lord will guard him and keep him alive; he will be praised throughout the land; You will not deliver him to the desires of his enemies.
4. The Lord will support him on the bed of illness; You will turn him over in his bed all throughout his sickness.
5. I said, "Lord, be gracious to me! Heal my soul, for I have sinned against You!”
6. My foes say that evil [awaits] me: "When will he die, and his name perish?”
7. And if one comes to see [me], he speaks insincerely, for his heart gathers iniquity for himself, and when he goes out he speaks of it.
8. Together they whisper against me-all my enemies; against me they devise my harm, [saying]:
9. "Let his wickedness pour into him; now that he lies down, he shall rise no more.”
10. Even my ally in whom I trusted, who ate of my bread, has raised his heel over me.
11. But you, Lord, be gracious to me and raise me up, and I will repay them.
12. With this I shall know that You desire me, when my enemies will not shout gleefully over me.
13. And I, because of my integrity, You upheld me; You set me before You forever.
14. Blessed is the Lord, the God of Israel, to all eternity, Amen and Amen.
Chapter 42
This psalm awakens the hearts of the Children of Israel who do not feel the immense ruin, loss, and bad fortune in their being exiled from their Father's table. Were they wise, they would appreciate their past good fortune in coming thrice yearly, with joy and great awe, to behold God during the festivals, free of adversary and harm. May God place mercy before us from now to eternity, Amen Selah.
1. For the Conductor, a maskil1 by the sons of Korach.
2. As the deer cries longingly for brooks of water, so my soul cries longingly for You, O God!
3. My soul thirsts for God, for the living God. When will I come and behold the countenance of God?
4. My tears have been my bread day and night, when they say to me all day, "Where is your God?”
5. These do I recall, and pour out my soul from within me: how I traveled [to Jerusalem] in covered wagons; I would walk leisurely with them up to the House of God, amid the sound of rejoicing and thanksgiving, the celebrating multitude.
6. Why are you downcast, my soul, and why do you wail within me? Hope to God, for I will yet thank Him for the deliverances of His countenance.
7. My God! My soul is downcast upon me, because I remember You from the land of Jordan and Hermon's peaks, from Mount Mitzar.2
8. Deep calls to deep3 at the roar of Your channels; all Your breakers and waves have swept over me.
9. By day the Lord ordains His kindness, and at night His song is with me, a prayer to the God of my life.
10. I say to God, my rock, "Why have You forgotten me? Why must I walk in gloom under the oppression of the enemy?”
11. Like a sword in my bones, my adversaries disgrace me, when they say to me all day, "Where is your God?”
12. Why are you downcast, my soul, and why do you wail within me? Hope to God, for I will yet thank Him; He is my deliverance, [the light of] my countenance, and my God.
Chapter 43
A significant prayer concerning the magnitude of the troubles we have suffered at the hands of the impious nations. May it be God's will to send Moshiach and Elijah the Prophet, who will lead us to the Holy Temple to offer sacrifices as in days of old.
1. Avenge me, O God, and champion my cause against an impious nation; rescue me from the man of deceit and iniquity.
2. For You are the God of my strength; why have You abandoned me? Why must I walk in gloom under the oppression of the enemy?
3. Send Your light and Your truth, they will guide me; they will bring me to Your holy mountain and to your sanctuaries.
4. Then I will come to the altar of God-to God, the joy of my delight-and praise You on the lyre, O God, my God.
5. Why are you downcast, my soul, and why do you wail within me? Hope to God, for I will yet thank Him; He is my deliverance, [the light of] my countenance, and my God.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 31• Lessons in Tanya
• Adar 7, 5775 · February 26, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 31
וזאת תהיה עבודתו כל ימיו בשמחה רבה, היא שמחת הנפש בצאתה מהגוף המתועב, ושבה אל בית אביה כנעוריה בשעת התורה והעבודה
This, then, should be one’s lifelong aim in the service of G‑d with great joy — the joy of the soul upon leaving the loathsome body, and returning, during one’s study of the Torah and service of G‑d through prayer, to “her father’s house as in her youth,” i.e., to the unity with G‑d that it enjoyed before it descended into the body.
וכמאמר רז״ל: להיות כל ימיו בתשובה
This corresponds to the statement of our Sages 1 that one ought to engage inteshuvah throughout his life.
If the word teshuvah is understood only in the sense of repentance for sin, why the need for further repentance once one has already repented
However, teshuvah as explained here, returning the soul to its source, is something in which one may well engage throughout his life — whenever he studies Torah or performs amitzvah.
ואין לך שמחה גדולה כצאת מהגלות והשביה, כמשל בן מלך שהיה בשביה וטוחן בבית האסורים ומנוול באשפה
Surely, there is no joy as great as that of being released from exile and captivity. It is comparable to the joy of a prince who was taken captive, and was subjected to the hard labor of turning the millstone in prison, 2 while covered with filth,
ויצא לחפשי אל בית אביו המלך
and who then goes free to the house of his father, the king.
Such a prince, descended from the Supreme King, is the soul — and by means of the Torah and the mitzvot it is redeemed from the captivity and degradation imposed on it by the body.
ואף שהגוף עומד בשיקוצו ותיעובו, וכמו שכתוב בזהר, דנקרא משכא דחויא
True, the body remains abominable and loathsome, and as the Zohar says, it is called “a serpent’s skin,” 3
כי מהותה ועצמותה של הנפש הבהמית לא נהפך לטוב, ליכלל בקדושה
since the essential character of the animal soul has not been transformed to good, so that it might be absorbed into the realm of holiness.
For, as explained above, the Beinoni may indeed elevate the “garments” of the animal soul — the thought, speech and action through which it expresses itself — by performing themitzvot by means of his thought, speech and action; but the essential character of the animal soul — its intellectual and emotional faculties — remains subject to the realm of kelipat nogah.How, then, can one be expected to rejoice, knowing that his body and animal soul are still in such an undesirable state
מכל מקום תיקר נפשו בעיניו לשמוח בשמחתה יותר מהגוף הנבזה,שלא לערבב ולבלבל שמחת הנפש בעצבון הגוף,
Yet, let his divine soul be more precious to him than his loathsome body, so that he rejoices in the soul’s joy at its liberation, through the observance of the Torah and themitzvot, from the exile of the body, without letting the sadness on account of the lowly state of his body interfere with or disturb the joy of the soul.
והנה בחינה זו היא בחינת יציאת מצרים, שנאמר בה: כי ברח העם
This form of divine service — in which the divine soul breaks free of its exile within the body, while the body and animal soul remain in their lowly state — is analogous to the Exodus from Egypt, of which it is written that4 “the people escaped.”
The Jews told Pharaoh that they would leave Egypt for only three days, but upon being released from his land they escaped.
דלכאורה הוא תמוה למה היתה כזאת, וכי אילו אמרו לפרעה לשלחם חפשי לעולם, לא היה מוכרח לשלחם
At first glance it seems strange: Why should it have been so, in a manner of flightHad they demanded of Pharaoh that he set them free forever, would he not have been forced to do so, having been stricken by the Plagues
The explanation, the Alter Rebbe goes on to say, lies in the spiritual aspect of the Exodus, and this was reflected in its physical counterpart just as every event in Jewish history reflects a parallel spiritual process.
The corporeal enslavement of the Jewish people in Egypt reflected the enslavement of their souls by the kelipah of Egyptian impurity. Their Exodus from Egypt likewise represented a spiritual liberation from this kelipah. Since the spiritual Exodus was an act of escape — i.e., their soul broke away and “escaped” from the impurity of Egypt, while the body and animal soul were still in exile within the kelipah — therefore the physical Exodus likewise assumed the manner of an escape.
In the Alter Rebbe’s words:
אלא מפני שהרע שבנפשות ישראל עדיין היה בתקפו בחלל השמאלי
But escape was necessary because the evil in the [animal] souls of Israel was still strong in the left part of the heart, the seat of the animal soul,
כי לא פסקה זוהמתם עד מתן תורה
for their impurity (the impurity of kelipah) did not cease until the Giving of the Torah. 5
רק מגמתם וחפצם היתה לצאת נפשם האלקית מגלות הסטרא אחרא, היא טומאת מצרים, ולדבקה בו יתברך
Yet their aim and desire was that their divine soul leave the exile of the sitra achra — the impurity of Egypt, and that it cleave to G‑d. 6
וכדכתיב: ה׳ עוזי ומעוזי ומנוסי ביום צרה וגו׳, משגבי ומנוסי וגו׳,והוא מנוס לי וגו׳,
So it is written7 — that there is a divine service which consists of the divine soul’s “escape” from the impurity of the body and animal soul: “G‑d is my strength and my fortress, myrefuge in the day of affliction”; 8 “[He is] my high tower and my refuge”; and9“He is my escape...”
And the Exodus from Egypt exemplified this idea of “escape”.
ולכן לעתיד, כשיעביר ה׳ רוח הטומאה מן האר׳, כתיב: ובמנוסה לא תלכון כי הולך לפניכם ה׳ וגו׳
Hence it is written of the Redemption which will take place in the time to come, when G‑d will remove the spirit of impurity from the earth and there will therefore be no evil necessitating spiritual escape: 10 “[You will not go out in haste,] nor go in flight, for G‑d will go before you.”
The Exodus from Egypt, however, took place in a manner of flight, for the evil was still strong in the people’s animal soul. Similarly, whenever one disregards the lowliness of his body and animal soul and engages in the Torah and the mitzvot in order to free the divine soul from its corporeal exile, he effects the spiritual equivalent of the Exodus from Egypt.
FOOTNOTES
1. Cf. Shabbat 153a.
2. Cf. Shoftim 16:21; Rashbam on Shemot 11:5.
3. The term "serpent" refers to the three utterly impure kelipot. The body of a Jew, which derives its vitality from kelipat nogah, is thus the "skin" - the "outer shell," so to speak, of the "serpent." The subject is explained at length by R. Menachem Mendel of Lubavitch (author of Tzemach Tzedek) in his Sefer HaChakirah, p. 136.
4. Shemot 14:5.
5. Shabbat 146a.
6. This explains why "[when the hour of Redemption arrived G-d did not detain them [in Egypt] even for a moment” (Mechilta on Shemot 12:41) - lest the evil within them drag them back to the impurity of Egypt. (- Based on a comment by the Rebbe.)
7. Yirmeyahu 16:19.
8. II Shmuel 22:3.
9. From the hymn that begins "Adon Olam."
10. Yeshayahu 52:12.Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Adar 7, 5775 · February 26, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 262
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
"He shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or conjugal rights"—Exodus 21:10.
The Torah tells us that if a man marries a Jewish slave-girl, he may not torment her by denying her appropriate food, clothing, or conjugal rights. Rather, he must accord her the rights due to all "the daughters [of Israel]." Thus it is clear that this precept applies to all wives.
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
Negative Commandment 262
Translated by Berel Bell
The 262nd prohibition is that one who purchases a Jewish maidservant and then marries her is forbidden from afflicting her. When I say "from afflicting her," I mean that he may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights (sh'eirah, k'susah, onasah) with the intention of afflicting her and causing her anguish.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights."
This same prohibition also applies to one who has married any Jewish woman; he also is prohibited from afflicting her in any of these three areas, with the intention of causing her anguish and distress.
The source for this is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) regarding the Jewish maidservant [whose master marries her and] whose food, clothing, and conjugal rights may not be withheld, "She must be treated exactly as other [married] women." From here we learn that the [proper] treatment of all married women is that one may not diminish their food, clothing, and conjugal rights.
Our Sages explained this in the Mechilta: "What does the verse, '[She must be treated] exactly as other [married] women' teach us [about the treatment of the maidservant]? It appears to come here to teach us something; but rather it ends up being taught about."3
There it is also explained that sh'eirah refers to food; k'susah is meant literally [i.e. clothing], and onasah refers to conjugal rights.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 21:10.
2.Ex. 21:9.
3.By saying that a maidservant must be treated like a regular married woman, it would seem that we know something about the regular woman that we don't know about the maidservant. In reality, however, the opposite is true: we learn from verse 10 that a maidservant's food, clothing, and conjugal relations may not be diminished. By saying in verse 9 that the maidservant is treated like a regular woman, we learn that the same applies to a regular woman.
Tefilah and Birkat Kohanim - Chapter Twelve
Halacha 1
Moses, our teacher, ordained that the Jews should read the Torah publicly on the Sabbath and on Monday and Thursday mornings, so the [people] would never have three days pass without hearing the Torah.
Ezra ordained that [the Torah] should be read during the Minchah service on the Sabbath, because of the shopkeepers. He also ordained that on Mondays and Thursdays, three people should read [from the Torah], and that they should read no fewer than ten verses.
Halacha 2
These are the days when the Torah is read publicly: Sabbaths, festivals, Rashei Chadashim, fast days, Chanukah, Purim, and Mondays and Thursdays each week.
The haftarah is read only on Sabbaths, festivals, and Tish'ah B'Av.
Halacha 3
The Torah is never read in public in the presence of fewer than ten adult free men. No fewer than ten verses are read. Vayedaber is counted as one of them. No fewer than three men should read.
[When] beginning a passage from the Torah, [one should read] at least three verses, and one should not conclude less than three verses from the conclusion of a passage. Each reader should not read fewer than three verses.
Halacha 4
[When] three people read ten verses: Two read three [verses each] and one, four [verses]. It is praiseworthy regardless of whether the one who read four [verses] is first, last, or in the middle.
Halacha 5
Each one of the readers opens the Torah scroll and looks at the place from which he is to read. Afterwards, he declares, Barchu et Ado-nai hamevorach, and all the people answer: Baruch Ado-nai hamevorach le'olam va'ed. He then recites the blessing:
Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who has chosen us from among all the nations and given us His Torah. Blessed are You, God, the Giver of the Torah.
All the people respond: "Amen." Afterwards, he reads until he completes the reading, rolls the scroll [closed] and recites the blessing:
Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who has given us His Torah, the Torah of truth, and implanted eternal life in our midst. Blessed are You, God, the Giver of the Torah.
Halacha 6
The person reading the Torah is not allowed to begin reading until the congregation ceases responding "Amen." If one erred while reading, even regarding the careful pronunciation of one letter, [the reader] is forced to repeat [the reading] until he reads it correctly.
Two people should not read at the same time. Rather, one should read alone. If one was reading and lost the ability to speak, another should replace him. He should begin from the place where the one who lost the ability to speak began, and recite the blessing after concluding.
Halacha 7
The reader is not permitted to [begin] reading until the person of greatest stature within the community tells him to [begin] reading. Even the chazan or the gabbai should not begin reading on their own initiative until the community [as a whole] or the person of greatest stature begins to read.
[When the chazan reads from the Torah,] another person should stand with him while he reads, just as the chazan stands together with the other readers.
Halacha 8
The reader may skip from place to place in one subject - for example, fromAcharei mot... to Ach be'asor, in the portion Emor el Hacohanim - provided he does not read by heart. It is forbidden [for a reader] to say even one word [without looking at the text]. [When] skipping [in this fashion, the reader] should not wait longer than it takes for the translator to translate one verse.
Halacha 9
Once the reader begins reading the Torah, it is forbidden [for the congregants] to talk, even regarding matters of Torah law. Rather, everyone should listen, remain silent, and pay attention to what is being read, as [Nechemiah 8:3] states: "The ears of all the people were [attentive] to the Torah scroll."
It is forbidden to leave the synagogue while the reader is reading from the Torah. However, one is permitted to leave between aliyot. A person who is constantly involved in Torah study, and Torah is his occupation, is permitted to involve himself in Torah study while the Torah is being read.
Halacha 10
From the time of Ezra, it was customary that a translator would translate to the people the [passages] read by the reader from the Torah, so that they would understand the subject matter.
The reader should read one verse alone and remain silent while the translator translates it. Afterwards, he should read a second verse. The reader is not permitted to read to the translator more than one verse [at a time].
Halacha 11
The reader is not permitted to raise his voice above that of the translator, nor should the translator raise his voice above that of the reader. The translator is not permitted to [begin] translating until the reader completes reading the verse, nor may the reader [begin] reading another verse until the translator has completed the translation.
The translator should not lean on a beam or on a pillar. Rather, he should stand with awe and fear. He should not translate from a written text, but rather should recite the translation by heart.
The reader is not permitted to assist the translator, lest people say: "The translation is written in the Torah scroll." A person of lesser stature may serve as a translator for a person of greater stature. However, it is not befitting the honor of a person of greater stature to serve as a translator for a person of lesser stature. Two people should not serve as translators simultaneously; rather, one person should read and one should translate.
Halacha 12
Not all passages from the Torah are translated in public. All [of the following passages] should be read, but not translated: the incident involving Reuven, the priestly benediction, [the passage describing the sin] of the golden calf from "And Moses told Aharon" (Exodus 32:21) until "And Moses saw the people" (Exodus 32:25) and one other verse, "And God set a plague upon the people" (Exodus 32:35).
In the [description of] the incident concerning Amnon (II Samuel, Chapter 13), the verse which states, "Amnon, the son of David" (13:1) should be neither read nor translated.
Halacha 13
The person who reads the haftarah must read from the Torah first. Even three verses [are sufficient]. He should read again the passage that had been read previously.
He should not [begin] reading the haftarah until the Torah scroll has been rolled closed. He should not read fewer than twenty-one verses [as the haftarah]. However, if a concept is completed in fewer [verses] than that, he need not add more. If he read only ten verses, but the haftarah is translated, it is sufficient even if the concept is not completed.
[When reading] from the prophets, one reads and even two may translate. One may skip from one concept to another. However, one should not skip from one prophet to another, except among the twelve prophets. Furthermore, [even within a book from a single prophet,] one should not skip from the conclusion of the book until its beginning. Whenever one skips, one should not wait longer than it takes the translator to complete his translation.
Halacha 14
A person reading from the prophets may read three verses to the translator at one time, and the translator translates them one after another. If the three verses are three separate passages, [the reader] should read them to the translator only one at a time.
Halacha 15
The person who reads the haftarah recites one blessing before [beginning his reading]: Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who chose prophets....
After [completing the reading], he recites four blessings. He concludes the first blessing: "the God who is faithful in all of His words." He concludes the second blessing: "who builds Jerusalem." He concludes the third blessing: "the Shield of David." He concludes the fourth blessing with the mention of the sacred aspect of the day, as he does in the Shemoneh Esreh. Similarly, if Rosh Chodesh falls on the Sabbath, the one who reads the haftarah mentions Rosh Chodesh in this blessing, as he does in the Shemoneh Esreh.
Halacha 16
How many readers [are called to the Torah]? On Sabbath morning, seven; on Yom Kippur, six; on festivals, five. This number may not be reduced. However, it may be increased.
On Rashei Chadashim and on Chol Hamo'ed, four people [are called to read [from the Torah]. On the Sabbath and Yom Kippur during the Minchah service, on Mondays and Thursdays throughout the entire year, on Chanukah and Purim in the morning service, and on fast days in the morning and Minchahservices three people [are called to] read [from the Torah]. This number may not be reduced, nor may it may be increased.
Halacha 17
A woman should not read the Torah publicly, as a token of respect for the community. A minor who knows how to read and is aware of the One who is being blessed may be counted as one of the required number [of people called to the Torah].
Similarly, the one who recites the haftarah is counted as one of the required number [of people called to the Torah], because he also reads from the Torah. [However,] if the leader of the congregation interrupted [by reciting] Kaddishbetween the conclusion of the Torah reading and the reading of the person who recites the haftarah, [the latter] is not included as one of the required number [of people called to the Torah].
If there is only one person in the community who knows how to read [from the Torah], he should be called to the Torah, read, descend [from the platform], return and read again a second and a third time until he completes the number of aliyot designated for that day.
Halacha 18
In all of these [Torah] readings, a priest reads first; after him, a Levite; and after him, an Israelite. It is common custom at present that even a priest who is a common person is given precedence and allowed to read before a wise man of great stature in Israel.
Whoever is greater than his colleague in wisdom is given precedence regarding the reading [of the Torah]. The last person who rolls the Torah scroll closed receives a reward equivalent to that of all the others. Therefore, even the person of the greatest stature in the community can receive the concludingaliyah.
Halacha 19
When there are no priests present, an Israelite is called to the Torah and a Levite should not be called after him at all.
When there are no Levites present, the priest who received the first aliyahreturns and reads [from the Torah] a second time in place of the Levite. Another priest should not read [from the Torah] after him, lest others say that there is a blemish in the first's lineage, and, therefore, another priest was given the aliyah.
Similarly, one Levite should not read [from the Torah] after another Levite, lest others say that there is a blemish in the lineage of one of them.
Halacha 20
What is the order [of the service] when the Torah is read after prayer? On a day when there is a Musaf service, after the leader of the congregation completes the morning service, he recites Kaddish and takes out the Torah scroll. He calls the members of the community, one by one, and they ascend and read from the Torah. When they have completed the reading, he returns the Torah scroll to its place, recites Kaddish, and then the [congregation] recites the Musafservice.
On days when the haftarah is read and there is a Musaf service, it is customary to recite Kaddish before the person who reads the haftarah ascends [for hisaliyah]. There are places where it is customary to recite Kaddish after the person who reads the haftarah [completes his Torah reading].
Halacha 21
During the Minchah service on the Sabbath and on Yom Kippur, after the leader of the congregation completes Tehillah l'David and the order of Kedushah, he recites the Kaddish, and takes out a Torah scroll. [Those called to the Torah] ascend and read and then, [the Torah scroll] is returned [to its place. The leader of the congregation] recites Kaddish, and the [congregation] recites theMinchah service.
Similarly, on a fast day, the Torah is read [before] the Minchah service. Afterwards, Kaddish is recited, and the Minchah service is recited. On festivals, it is not customary to read [the Torah] in the Minchah service.
Halacha 22
[When the Torah is read on] a day when Musaf is not recited, after the morningShemoneh Esreh is completed, [the leader of the congregation] recites theKaddish and takes out a Torah scroll. [After the portion is] read from it, [the Torah scroll] is returned [to its place. The leader of the congregation] recitesTehillah l'David and the order of Kedushah, as is the practice every day. [Afterwards,] he recites the Kaddish and the people depart.
Halacha 23
It is not proper to read from chumashim in synagogues, as a token of respect for the community.
A Torah scroll should not be rolled [from one portion to another portion] in the presence of the community, because of the difficulty it would cause the people, forcing them to remain standing while the Torah scroll is being rolled. Therefore, if it is necessary to read two separate concepts, two Torah scrolls are taken out. [However,] one person should not read one concept from two Torah scrolls, lest people say that the first scroll was invalid and, therefore, they read from the second.
Halacha 24
When a person rolls a Torah scroll [closed], he should roll it from the outside. When he ties it, he should tie it from the inside. He should leave the stitching [in the center], so that it will not rip.
In a place where a Torah scroll is taken [from the synagogue] to another room where it is kept, the congregation is not allowed to leave until the Torah scroll is taken. They should accompany it, following it to the place where it is kept.
Commentary Halacha 1
Moses, our teacher, ordained that the Jews should read the Torah publicly on the Sabbath - See also Chapter 13, Halachah 8.
and on Monday and Thursday - Tosafot, Bava Kama 82a relates that these days are days of Divine favor.
mornings - The Mishnah Berurah 135:1 states that, although ideally the Torah should be read in the morning service, if one fails to do so, it may be read the entire day.
so the [people] would never have three days pass without hearing the Torah. - Bava Kama 82b quotes Exodus 15:22: "And they travelled three days without finding water," and explains:
Water refers to the Torah, as [implied by Isaiah 55:1]: "May all the thirsty go to the water." Since they travelled three days without Torah, they complained. The prophets among them arose and ordained that they read [Torah] on the Sabbath, refrain [from reading] on Sunday, read on Monday, refrain [from reading] on Tuesday and Wednesday, read on Thursday, and refrain from reading on Friday, so that they will not spend three days without [reading from] the Torah.
Ezra ordained that [the Torah] should be read during the Minchah service on the Sabbath, because of the shopkeepers. - The Hebrew, יושבי קרנות, literally means "those who sit on the street corners." Our translation is based on Rashi's commentary (Bava Kama, loc. cit.). He explains that during the week, these people were involved with their businesses and could not attend the Torah reading. Therefore, Ezra instituted a special Torah reading for them on the Sabbath, when work is prohibited.
Rav David Arameah interprets the phrase literally, explaining that on the Sabbath, since work is prohibited, people would gather in the afternoon in the marketplace, and spend their time in idle conversation. Therefore, Ezra ordained the public Torah reading to draw them into the synagogue.
He also ordained that on Mondays and Thursdays, three - Megillah 21b relates that the number three reflects the three divisions among the Jewish people: priests, Levites, and Israelites; alternatively, the three divisions in the Written Law (the Torah, Prophets, and Holy Writings).
people should read - In Talmudic times, the person called to the Torah would read from the Torah himself. Our custom of having one reader is discussed in the commentary on Halachah 17.
[from the Torah] - Bava Kama (loc. cit.) explains that originally either one person would read three verses, or three people would read three verses.
and that they should read no fewer than ten verses. - Megillah (loc. cit.) states that the ten verses allude to the ten commandments and the ten utterances of creation; alternatively, they represent the ten people who attend a synagogue at all times. (See Halachah 3.)
Commentary Halacha 2
These are the days when the Torah is read publicly: Sabbaths, festivals -including Chol Hamo'ed, the intermediate days of the festival. (See Chapter 13, Halachot 8-16.)
Rashei Chadashim - Soferim 10:1 attributes the introduction of the practice of reading the Torah on all the abovementioned days to Moses. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 4, regarding the Rosh Chodesh Torah reading.)
fast days - See Chapter 13, Halachah 18.
Chanukah, Purim - See Chapter 13, Halachah 17.
and Mondays and Thursdays each week.
The haftarah - The Pardes states that the reading of the haftarah was instituted on the days when work is forbidden because the people had more time then and were able to devote themselves to Torah study. The Avudrahamrelates that the reading of the haftarah was instituted when the Greeks forbade the public reading of the Torah. To compensate, the Jews instituted the reading of parallel portions from the prophets. Even after the decree was nullified, the custom remained.
is read only - In Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:17, the Rambam states that on fast days declared because of communal distress, the haftarah is read in the afternoon service. However, the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 574) explains that the laws concerning the reading of the Torah and the haftarah are discussed primarily in this and the following chapter of the Mishneh Torah. Hence, the decision here should be followed and the haftarah should not be recited.
on Sabbaths, festivals - when work is not permitted
and Tish'ah B'Av. - Although work is permitted on Tish'ah B'Av, as mentioned in Hilchot Ta'aniot 5:10, Torah Sages have accepted the custom not to work on that day, and our Sages declared that no one will see a sign of blessing from work done on that day. Hence, there is no difficulty in reading the haftarah in the morning. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 18.)
In Ashkenazic communities, it is also customary to read the haftarah on fast days in the Minchah service (Ramah, Orach Chayim 566:1).
Commentary Halacha 3
The Torah is never read in public in the presence of fewer then ten adult free men. - See Chapter 8, Halachot 4-6.
No fewer than ten verses are read. - See Halachah 1. Hagahot Maimoniotnotes that the reading for Purim contains only nine verses, but explains that since this passage discusses a complete subject, an exception is made. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 137:1.)
Vayedaber - i.e., a verse beginning "And God said to Moses:...." Although it is merely an introductory phrase, it...
is counted as one of them - i.e., one of the required ten verses. TheShulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 137:4) states that, after the fact, if only nine verses were read, it is sufficient.
No fewer than three men should read. - See Halachah 1.
[When] beginning a passage - In addition to the 54 weekly Torah portions, the Torah is divided into 290 smaller passages (parshiot). (See Hilchot Sefer Torah, Chapter 8.)
from the Torah, [one should read] at least three verses - A person who begins a new passage in the midst of his aliyah should read at least three verses, lest another person enter when he begins that passage and think that he has read fewer than three verses (Megillah 22a).
The 14Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim, loc. cit.) states that if a person read only two verses, they must be read again.
and one should not conclude less than three verses from the conclusion of a passage - lest someone who leaves before the next person reads from the Torah come to the mistaken conclusion that he has read fewer than three verses (Megillah, loc. cit.). (See Chapter 13, Halachah 4. See also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 138.)
Each reader should not read fewer than three verses. - The three verses allude to the threefold division of the written law (Megillah 24a). Even when an entire passage has only two verses, the reader must add at least three more verses from another passage.
From this halachah, it appears that the custom of reading the first aliyah of the portion to be read on the following Sabbath on Mondays and Thursdays was not fixed in the Rambam's time. Hence, these ground rules were necessary. (See Mishnah Berurah 137:4.)
Commentary Halacha 4
[When] three people read ten verses: Two read three [verses each] and one, four [verses]. It is praiseworthy regardless of whether the one who read four [verses] is first - for the most important person is called to the Torah first (Megillah 21b).
last - based on the principle to "always proceed higher in holy matters" (loc. cit.).
or in the middle - regarding the Menorah, the middle branch was most important (loc. cit.).
Commentary Halacha 5
Each one of the readers opens the Torah scroll and looks at the place from which he is to read. - Megillah 32a mentions a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that the blessings for the Torah should be recited while the Torah scroll is open (as quoted by the Rambam), and Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the Torah scroll should be closed, lest the people err and think that the blessings are written in the Torah.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 139:4) quotes the Rambam's decision, the Be'ur Halachah explains that Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one is not obligated to close the Torah scroll before reciting the blessing. However, there is nothing wrong in doing so. Therefore, in many communities the custom is to roll the Torah closed before reciting the blessing.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit., 140:3) regarding the ruling when one looks at the wrong passage in the Torah before reciting the blessing.
Afterwards, he declares - The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit., 139:6) emphasizes how Barchu and the blessings for the Torah should be recited in a loud voice.
Barchu et Ado-nai hamevorach, and all the people - the person reciting the blessing also joins in reciting the following phrase (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:7)
answer: Baruch Ado-nai hamevorach le'olam va'ed. - See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
He then recites the blessing: - Note the description of Ezra's reading of the Torah, in Nechemiah, Chapter 8, which relates how "Ezra opened the scroll... and blessed God."
Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who has chosen us from among all the nations and given us His Torah. Blessed are You, God, the Giver of the Torah. - This is the third of the blessings of the Torah mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachah 10. Even someone who had just recited the blessings before the Torah as part of his individual prayers recites this blessing as a gesture of respect for the community.
As mentioned in the commentary on that halachah, the Ramban considers the obligation to recite the blessings before the Torah as one of the 613 mitzvot. Some later commentaries explain that this refers only to the blessings recited before reading the Torah in public.
All the people respond: "Amen." - Note Rashi's commentary, Berachot 21a. Note also the comments of the Hagahot Maimoniot, Chapter 7, Halachah 15, that a person can fulfill his requirement of reciting one hundred blessings on the Sabbath by answering "Amen" to these blessings.
Afterwards, he reads until he completes the reading, rolls the scroll [closed] - The Kessef Mishneh states that this is done in deference to Rabbi Meir's opinion mentioned above. The Lechem Yehudah explains that it is a gesture of respect for the Torah.
and recites the blessing: Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who has given us His Torah, the Torah of truth, - This is the text usually recited in Sephardic communities. In Ashkenazic communities, the word, תורתו (His Torah), is not included in the blessing. Interestingly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah also omit this word.
and implanted eternal life - Our translation follows the printed text of theMishneh Torah. Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 139:10), which follows the text - חיי העולם (adding a ה as a modifier) - "the life of the world (to come)."
in our midst. - It is proper to recite this phrase only once the Torah has been read. Only after it has been studied, does the Torah serve as a source of life (Avudraham).
Blessed are You, God, the Giver of the Torah.
Commentary Halacha 6
The person reading the Torah is not allowed to begin reading until the congregation ceases responding "Amen" - so that their recitation of "Amen" will not drown out the Torah reading. Today, in communities where the Torah is read by a person other than the one reciting the blessings, it is customary for the reader to prolong his recitation of "Amen" slightly, so that everyone will know when the Torah reading begins (Mishnah Berurah 141:17).
If one erred while reading, even regarding the careful pronunciation of one letter - Rabbenu Manoach explains that this law reflects a fundamental philosophical principle. Sanhedrin 99a states that anyone who says that even one letter of the Torah was not given by God is considered as "one who scorned the word of God." Therefore, every letter in the Torah must be pronounced correctly.
[the reader] is forced to repeat [the reading] until he reads it correctly. -This applies even if one has already read other verses or even recited the blessing over the verse which was read incorrectly (Mishnah Berurah 142:2).
Two people should not read at the same time. Rather, one should read alone - for the voice of two people cannot be heard at the same time. Note the Rambam's decision, Hilchot Shofar 3:6. See also a contrasting decision inHilchot Megillah 2:7.
In communities where the Torah is read by a person other than the one who recites the blessings, the person reciting the blessings should be careful not to read out loud (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 141:2).
If one was reading and lost the ability to speak, another should replace him. He should begin from the place where the one who lost the ability to speak began - In his responsa, the Rambam cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachot 5:3) to explain why this law differs from the law mentioned in Chapter 10, Halachah 4, which states that if a chazan cannot continue the recitation of the Shemoneh Esreh, the person who replaces him begins from the point where he left off. The Rambam explains that it is necessary for the second person reading the Torah to repeat the verses, because otherwise, the verses read by the initial reader will not be included in the concluding blessing.
and recite the blessing after concluding. - Nevertheless, according to the Rambam, the second reader need not recite the blessing before the Torah reading. Rabbenu Asher (whose opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit., 140:1) does not accept this decision, and requires the person who continues reading to recite the first blessing before he begins reading the Torah.
The difference between the two opinions is that the Rambam considers the blessings to be associated with the Torah portion and not with the reader. In contrast, Rabbenu Asher considers the blessings as the personal responsibility of the reader in preparation for reading from the Torah.
Rabbenu Asher's opinion is accepted by the later authorities. Even in communities where a person other than the one who recites the blessings reads from the Torah, this law applies (Ramah).
Commentary Halacha 7
The reader is not permitted to [begin] reading until the person of greatest stature within the community - the Rabbi or spiritual leader.
tells him to [begin] reading. - Though this law is apparent from the Toseftareferred to below, no explicit source is mentioned by the commentaries.
Even the chazan or the gabbai - Our translation is based on Rashi's commentary (Yoma 68b), which describes the rosh hak'nesset as the one who appoints the leader of prayer and gives out the aliyot.
should not begin reading on their own initiative until the community [as a whole] or the person of greatest stature begins to read. - This law is quoted from the Tosefta, Megillah 3:21, which explains that this restriction was instituted to prevent the synagogue functionaries from taking advantage of their position, and thus create a rift between them and the other congregants.
[When the chazan reads from the Torah,] - As discussed in the commentary on Halachah 17, the Rambam requires the person who receives an aliyah to read from the Torah himself. Thus, the chazan would read only when he, himself, received an aliyah.
another person should stand with him while he reads, just as the chazan stands together with the other readers. - The Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah4:1) explains the source for this practice. Just as an intermediary was involved with the giving of the Torah - as Deuteronomy 5:5 states: "I stood between you and God, your Lord" - so, too, another person should stand together with the reader at the reading of the Torah.
Note Soferim 14:14 (quoted by the Mishnah Berurah 141:16), which mentions the custom that two other people stand by the reader while the Torah is read, one on his right and one on his left.
Commentary Halacha 8
The reader may skip from place - from one passage in the Torah
to place - to a different passage in the Torah
in one subject - However, skipping from one subject to another subject is forbidden, because it may confuse the listeners. (See the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 144:1.)
for example - The Rambam chooses as his example the passages read by the High Priest in the Temple on Yom Kippur. However, as explained in the Mishnah (Yoma 7:1), the High Priest, himself, would not skip from passage to passage in the Torah.
from Acharei mot... - Leviticus, Chapter 16, which describes in detail the Yom Kippur offerings.
to Ach be'asor, in the portion Emor el Hacohanim - Leviticus 23:26-32, which describes the mitzvah to fast and the prohibition of work on Yom Kippur.
provided he does not read by heart. It is forbidden [for a reader] to say even one word [without looking at the text]. - Rav Kapach cites the Midrash Tanchuma, Va'era 5, which states:
A reader is forbidden to take his eyes off the Torah scroll, for the Torah was given only in writing, as [Exodus 34:2] states: "And I will write the words on the tablets."
Note also Gittin 60b, which mentions a general prohibition against reciting verses from the written Torah by heart.
[When] skipping [in this fashion, the reader] should not wait longer than it takes for the translator - See Halachah 10.
to translate one verse - because waiting any longer would be an affront to the congregation (Yoma 69b).
At present, it is customary to skip from passage to passage in the reading of the Torah on public fast days alone. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 18.) Even then, the transition is made between the first and second aliyot, so that it will not be noticeable to the listeners.
Commentary Halacha 9
Once the reader begins reading the Torah, it is forbidden [for the congregants] to talk - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 146:1) states that the prohibition applies even between aliyot.
even regarding matters of Torah law. - The Mishnah Berurah 146:5 mentions that if it is necessary to prevent a person from committing a sin, one may speak even while the Torah is being read.
Rather, everyone should listen, remain silent, and pay attention to what is being read, as [Nechemiah 8:3] states: "The ears of all the people were [attentive] to the Torah scroll." - This describes Ezra's reading of the Torah to the people who returned to Zion on Rosh HaShanah.
It is forbidden to leave the synagogue while the reader is reading from the Torah. - This prohibition applies even though one has already heard the Torah reading oneself and there are ten other people listening to the Torah reading (Mishnah Berurah 146:1).
Berachot 8a interprets Isaiah 1:28, "Those who turn away from God will be destroyed," as a reference to a person who leaves the synagogue when the Torah scroll is open.
However, one is permitted to leave between aliyot - provided there are ten others who will remain to hear the Torah reading, and one has fulfilled (or will be able to fulfill) one's obligation to hear the Torah. Even under these circumstances, leaving the synagogue is not desirable (Mishnah Berurah 146:2-3).
A person who is constantly involved in Torah study, and Torah is his occupation - The license for such a person to ignore the Torah reading in order to concentrate on his studies is taken from Berachot (loc. cit.), which relates that while the Torah was being taken out, Rav Sheshet would turn his back and occupy himself in his studies, saying, "Let them be occupied in what concerns them, while we will be occupied in what concerns us."
See Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:4, which states that the mitzvah of Torah study takes precedence over all other commandments. Based on this principle, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his disciples would not interrupt their studies even for prayer (Shabbat 11a - see Chapter 6, Halachah 8). However, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 106:3) states that this applies only to scholars like Rabbi Shimon, who never interrupt their studies at all. However, at present, even scholars whose occupation is Torah must interrupt their studies for prayer, for they make other interruptions as well.
The Rabbis question whether the law under discussion applies only to scholars of Rabbi Shimon's level, or whether it is also relevant to scholars of the present day. The Kessef Mishneh notes that the citation of the behavior of Rav Sheshet as a source for this halachah appears to support the latter opinion. Rav Sheshet, like the other Amoraim of the Talmudic period, was not considered to be on the same level as Rabbi Shimon. In contrast, the Mishnah Berurah 146:9 maintains that, at present, we have no scholars who have the level of devotion to Torah study that would permit such a leniency.
is permitted to involve himself in Torah study while the Torah is being read. - The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 146:2) and the Mishnah Berurah 146:8-10 place various restrictions on this license. There must be ten others listening to the Torah, the person must study quietly, and he should turn away and begin his studies before the Torah reading is begun.
Commentary Halacha 10
From the time of Ezra - when the Jews who returned from the Babylonian exile did not speak Hebrew fluently. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 4.)
it was customary that a translator would translate to the people the [passages] read by the reader from the Torah, so that they would understand the subject matter. - The Book of Nechemiah, Chapter 8, describes Ezra's reading of the Torah to the people on Rosh HaShanah. Verses 7 and 8 explain that "they caused the people to understand the reading."Megillah 3a explains that this refers to the translation of the Torah.
The reader should read one verse alone and remain silent while the translator translates it. - For the two voices will prevent the people from hearing either of them.
Afterwards, he should read a second verse. The reader is not permitted to read to the translator more than one verse [at a time] - lest the translator become confused.
The Tur (Orach Chayim 145) writes that even in Talmudic times, it was not customary to translate the Torah in all communities. He explains that, in his age, the custom of translating the Torah had already been ceased because the people did not understand the Aramaic translation traditionally used. The rabbis did not want to translate the Torah into the languages which the people did understand, because of the possibility of error and misinterpretation. Such fears had not existed in regard to the Aramaic translation, since it had been composed with Ruach Hakodesh (Divine inspiration).
[The Tur, however, also mentions the opinion of Rav Natrunai Gaon, who maintains that the translation should be done freely, so that the people can understand, without referring to the traditional text.]
The Tur's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 145:3) and in nearly all contemporary Jewish communities, the custom of using a translator during the Torah reading is no longer practiced. For this reason, rather than present a running commentary on Halachot 11 and 12, we have limited our comments to short footnotes.
1. Berachot 45a states that this principle is derived from the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai. God, "the Reader," did not lift his voice over that of Moses, "the translator."
1. Berachot 45a states that this principle is derived from the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai. God, "the Reader," did not lift his voice over that of Moses, "the translator."
It was also customary to use a מתורגמן in teaching the oral law. Hence, parallels to many of the laws mentioned in this halachah can also be found in Hilchot Talmud Torah 4:3.
2. The Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah 4:1) mentions that we should approach the Torah reading with awe, reflecting the awe experienced by the Jews at Mount Sinai.
3. Rabbenu Nissim maintains that this prohibition only applied before Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi permitted the oral tradition to be recorded. Afterwards, it was permitted for the translator to use a written text. Rabbenu Nissim's position is somewhat difficult to accept, since the Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah, loc. cit.), the source for this law, was written several hundred years after Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi granted this leniency. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Nissim's view was widely accepted.
4. The Tosefta, Megillah 3:21, cites the example of Aharon, who served as a spokesman for Moses. See also Kessef Mishneh.
5. Genesis 35:22. The direct translation of this verse would be unbecoming to both Reuven and Jacob (Rashi, Megillah 25a).
6. The third of the priestly blessings states: "May God turn His countenance to you...." This appears to be a direct contradiction to the description of God (Deuteronomy 10:17) as "not turning His face...." Though our Sages resolved that difficulty (Berachot 20b), a problem might come up in a simple translation of the verse.
2. The Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah 4:1) mentions that we should approach the Torah reading with awe, reflecting the awe experienced by the Jews at Mount Sinai.
3. Rabbenu Nissim maintains that this prohibition only applied before Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi permitted the oral tradition to be recorded. Afterwards, it was permitted for the translator to use a written text. Rabbenu Nissim's position is somewhat difficult to accept, since the Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah, loc. cit.), the source for this law, was written several hundred years after Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi granted this leniency. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Nissim's view was widely accepted.
4. The Tosefta, Megillah 3:21, cites the example of Aharon, who served as a spokesman for Moses. See also Kessef Mishneh.
5. Genesis 35:22. The direct translation of this verse would be unbecoming to both Reuven and Jacob (Rashi, Megillah 25a).
6. The third of the priestly blessings states: "May God turn His countenance to you...." This appears to be a direct contradiction to the description of God (Deuteronomy 10:17) as "not turning His face...." Though our Sages resolved that difficulty (Berachot 20b), a problem might come up in a simple translation of the verse.
Rav Kapach notes that the Yemenite texts of Targum Onkelos lack a translation for the three verses of the priestly benediction.
7. Were the common people given the opportunity of hearing the full story of the golden calf, they might believe that it had spiritual power (Rashi, loc. cit.). Alternatively, the narrative places a major burden of responsibility on Aharon (Tosafot, Megillah, loc. cit.).
8. The commentaries note that this passage is not read as a haftarah at present. Rav Kapach states that the need to make this statement indicates that in Talmudic times, the passages that were read as haftarot were not fixed and there was some room for choice.
9. Verses from the Torah cannot be skipped in a public Torah reading. However, it is permitted to skip verses from the prophets while reading thehaftarah (Tos'fot Yom Tov, Megillah 10:3).
7. Were the common people given the opportunity of hearing the full story of the golden calf, they might believe that it had spiritual power (Rashi, loc. cit.). Alternatively, the narrative places a major burden of responsibility on Aharon (Tosafot, Megillah, loc. cit.).
8. The commentaries note that this passage is not read as a haftarah at present. Rav Kapach states that the need to make this statement indicates that in Talmudic times, the passages that were read as haftarot were not fixed and there was some room for choice.
9. Verses from the Torah cannot be skipped in a public Torah reading. However, it is permitted to skip verses from the prophets while reading thehaftarah (Tos'fot Yom Tov, Megillah 10:3).
Commentary Halacha 13
The person who reads the haftarah - See the commentary on Halachah 2 for a description of the origin of the custom of reading the haftarah.
must read from the Torah first. - This was instituted as a token of respect for the Torah reading. Reading from the prophets without reading from the Torah would imply an equivalence between the seven people who read from the Torah and the one who reads from the prophets (Megillah 23a).
Even three verses [are sufficient]. - As mentioned in Halachah 3, each person called to the Torah must read at least three verses.
He should read again the passage that had been read previously - i.e., the concluding three lines of the Torah reading.
Note Tosafot, Megillah 23a, which states that in Talmudic times, the person who recited the haftarah would read a separate portion from the Torah. It is our custom that on festivals and in the special circumstances described in Chapter 13, Halachot 20-24, that the person who reads the haftarah reads a separate Torah portion.
He should not [begin] reading the haftarah until the Torah scroll has been rolled closed. - Rashi, Sotah 39b, states that the person reading the haftarah should wait to allow the person who rolled the Torah closed also to hear the haftarah. Others explain that it is not respectful to the Torah for it be open while thehaftarah is being read.
He should not read fewer than twenty-one verses [as the haftarah]. -Since an aliyah has a minimum of three verses, the twenty-one verses of thehaftarah will parallel the seven aliyot of the Torah reading (Megillah 23a).
However, if a concept is completed in fewer [verses] than that, he need not add more. - Megillah (loc. cit.) cites the eight concluding verses from Jeremiah, Chapter 7, which were read as the haftarah for Parashat Tzav. (At present, it is customary to add a number of other verses to that haftarah. Thehaftarah read for Parashat Ki Tetzey has only ten verses.)
If he read only ten verses, but the haftarah is translated, it is sufficient even if the concept is not completed. - Rabbenu Nissim explains that after the final verse is translated, one should repeat the verse in its original to conclude with the words of the prophet. Thus, the ten verses, the ten translations, and the repetition of the verse will reach the sum of twenty-one.
[When reading] from the prophets, one reads and even two may translate. - Though Halachah 11 prohibits two people to serve as translators for the Torah simultaneously, this restriction is not enforced regarding the haftarah. Rashi,Megillah 21b, explains that the prohibition was instituted to prevent confusion. However, since the haftarot are concerned more with ethics than halachic concepts, the Sages did worry that much about the possibility of confusion arising.
One may skip from one concept to another. - Here, the same principle is involved. Though skipping in this manner in a Torah reading is forbidden (Halachah 8), there is no such restriction for the haftarah. Indeed, in many of the haftarot read at present, it is customary to skip certain verses.
However, one should not skip from one prophet to another - for this would be too confusing (Megillah 24a).
except among the twelve prophets - for they are considered to be a single book.
Furthermore, [even within a book from a single prophet,] one should not skip from the conclusion of the book until its beginning - for it is improper to reverse the order of the verses as they are mentioned in the Bible.
Whenever one skips, one should not wait longer than it takes the translator to complete his translation. - Megillah (loc. cit.) explains that this is a practice of respect for the congregation, to prevent them from being forced to wait in silence.
Commentary Halacha 14
A person reading from the prophets may read three verses to the translator at one time - Though verses from the Torah should be read to a translator one at one time (see Halachah 10), as mentioned in the previous halachah, more leniency is taken regarding verses from the haftarah.
and the translator translates them one after another. If the three verses are three separate passages - Megillah 24a cites the verses from Isaiah 52:3-5 (included in the haftarah of Parshat Shoftim) as an example of such a phenomenon. [It must be noted that these verses are included in two passages (and not three as stated by the Rambam) in all texts of the Bible. Note the commentary of Rabbenu Nissim, who explains two passages as "two different concepts."]
[the reader] should read them to the translator only one at a time - to prevent confusion.
Commentary Halacha 15
The person who reads the haftarah recites one blessing before [beginning his reading]: Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who chose prophets.... - The full text of this blessing is found in the Order of Prayers for the Entire Year. This blessing is considered to be one long blessing, which begins with Baruch and concludes with Baruch (Rav David Arameah).
After [completing the reading], he recites four blessings. - Thus, he recites a total of seven blessings, corresponding to the seven people called to the Torah (Soferim 14:1).
He concludes the first blessing - which begins: "Blessed are You..."; the entire prayer is considered to be one blessing.
"the God who is faithful in all of His words." - The Avudraham explains that since the object of most of the prophecies is "Zion, Elijah, and David" (i.e., the Messianic redemption), after praising God as faithful to fulfill His prophecies, we begin the second blessing, which centers on the return to Jerusalem.
He concludes the second blessing: "who builds Jerusalem" - as in the grace after meals. This text is also found in the siddurim of Rav Amram Gaon and Rav Sa'adiah Gaon. Soferim 13:12 concludes the blessing "who causes Zion to rejoice in her children." The Ra'avad and the Kessef Mishneh suggest concluding the blessing in this fashion. This is the commonly accepted practice today.
He concludes the third blessing: "the Shield of David." - Pesachim 117b compares this to the conclusion of the first blessing of the Shemoneh Esreh, "the Shield of Abraham."
He concludes the fourth blessing - which centers on the Sabbath or festival celebrated
with the mention of the sacred aspect of the day, as he does in the -fourth blessing of the
Shemoneh Esreh. - See Chapter 2, Halachot 5 and 7.
Similarly, if Rosh Chodesh falls on the Sabbath, the one who reads thehaftarah mentions Rosh Chodesh in - the middle of
this blessing, as he does in the - middle of the fourth blessing of the Musaf
Shemoneh Esreh. - However, he does not conclude the blessing with the mention of Rosh Chodesh, as he would in the Musaf prayer. (See Chapter 2, Halachah 11.)
Shabbat 24b questions whether Rosh Chodesh should be mentioned in this blessing. On one hand, when Rosh Chodesh falls during the week, the haftarahis not read. Hence, one might assume that there is no connection between the two and, hence, there is no need to mention Rosh Chodesh in the blessings. However, on the other hand, we find that when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, the Sabbath is mentioned in the Ne'ilah service, despite the fact that the Ne'ilah service would otherwise not be recited on the Sabbath.
Though Rashi and Rav Yitzchok Alfasi interpret the passage in the same manner as the Rambam, Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim rule that no mention should be made of Rosh Chodesh in this blessing. The Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 284:2 follows the latter position.
[The siddurim of Rav Amram Gaon and Rav Sa'adiah Gaon include mention of Rosh Chodesh in the conclusion of the blessing as well. The text of the authoritative Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah also accept this view.]
Commentary Halacha 16
How many readers [are called to the Torah]? On Sabbath morning, seven; on Yom Kippur, six; on festivals, five. - This reflects a descending order of holiness. Working on the Sabbath is punishable by execution; working on Yom Kippur by כרת (premature death by the hand of heaven); and on festivals, certain labors are permitted.
This number may not be reduced. - In order to distinguish each day with the measure of holiness which it is due.
However, it may be increased. - This statement is quoted from the Mishnah (Megillah 3:2). Rabbenu Nissim explains that the license to increase the number of people called to the Torah applies only on the Sabbath, in order to clearly differentiate between the different holy days. However, Rashi (like the Rambam, here) explains that it refers to all three occasions. Since working at one's occupation is prohibited on all three occasions, there is no difficulty in adding to the number of people called to the Torah.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 282:1) states that it is customary to follow Rabbenu Nissim's opinion.
On Rashei Chadashim and on Chol Hamo'ed, four people [are called to] read [from the Torah]. - These days are put in a category of their own, because although they are distinguished by the recitation of the Musaf service, work (albeit with restrictions on Chol Hamo'ed) is permitted
On the Sabbath and Yom Kippur during the Minchah service, on Mondays and Thursdays throughout the entire year, on Chanukah and Purim in the morning service, and on fast days in the morning and Minchah services, -See Chapter 13, Halachah 18.
three people [are called to] read [from the Torah]. This number - three or four, respectively
may not be reduced - since, as stated in Halachot 1 and 3, a minimum of three people must be called to the Torah, and a distinction must be made between the days when Musaf is recited and when it is not recited.
nor may it may be increased. - On all these occasions, with the exception of the Minchah services of the Sabbath and Yom Kippur, work is permitted, and the Rabbis did not want to have people lose time from work by calling extra people to the Torah. On the Sabbath no additions were made, since it was customary to hold study sessions during the afternoon. Since the reading on Yom Kippur afternoon was instituted as parallel to that of the Sabbath afternoon, no additions are made then.
Commentary Halacha 17
A woman should not read the Torah publicly, as a token of respect for the community. - This decision (quoted from Megillah 23) implies that a woman could receive an aliyah and recite the blessings over the Torah. However, as a gesture of respect to the community, women were not given this privilege.
Note the comments of the Magen Avraham 282:6, who states that women are obligated to hear the weekly Torah reading.
A minor - i.e., a male under thirteen
who knows how to read - since, as stated below, according to the Rambam, only a person who knows how to read can be called to the Torah.
and is aware of the One who is being blessed - i.e., understands that reciting the blessings and reading the Torah is part of the service of God. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Berachot 7:2.
may be counted as one of the required number [of people - There is a question among the commentaries if this refers only to the number of seven readers who must be called to the Torah on the Sabbath, or if this also refers to the three readers whom Ezra established as the minimum required to read from the Torah at all times. Rav Kapach relates that in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Megillah 4:6), he originally accepted a child as one of the seven, but not as one of the three. However, afterwards, he amended the text so that it appears that he accepts a child even as one of the three.
called to the Torah]. - However, the Magen Avraham (ibid.) states that a child should be called only for maftir and even that custom is not practiced in most communities at present.
Similarly, the one who recites the haftarah is counted as one of the required number [of people called to the Torah], because he also reads from the Torah - although, as mentioned in Halachah 13, he reads a portion that has already been read.
[However,] if the leader of the congregation interrupted [by reciting] Kaddish between the conclusion of the Torah reading and the reading of the person who recites the haftarah - See Halachah 20.
[the latter] is not included as one of the required number [of people called to the Torah] - because the Kaddish marks the conclusion of the required Torah reading. In such an instance, since the required number of people were not called to the Torah, the entire Torah reading must be repeated (Rav David Arameah).
If there is only one person in the community who knows how to read [from the Torah], he should be called to the Torah, read, descend - to distinguish between aliyot
[from the platform] - The Torah was read on a platform in the center of the synagogue. See Chapter 11, Halachah 3.
return and read again a second and a third time until he completes the number of aliyot designated for that day. - TheTur (Orach Chayim 141) explains that, at present, the custom is to have the chazan read for everyone. If only those who knew how to read from the Torah were given aliyot, two problems would arise:
a) Many people who do not know how to read from the Torah would be embarrassed;
b) People who do not know how to read correctly would claim that they do know how to read, and arguments might crop up between them and the synagogue officials.
a) Many people who do not know how to read from the Torah would be embarrassed;
b) People who do not know how to read correctly would claim that they do know how to read, and arguments might crop up between them and the synagogue officials.
Nevertheless, since there is a question whether it is acceptable for a person to recite the blessings when he does not actually read from the Torah, it is desirable that the person who recites the blessings read along with the chazanin an undertone. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 141:2, and commentaries.) Yemenite custom, even at present, is that each person called to the Torah reads himself.
Commentary Halacha 18
In all of these [Torah] readings, a priest reads first; - Though our practice has its origins in the decrees of the Sages as explained below, there is also a Torah command (see Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 32) to give precedence to a priest regarding the Torah reading. However, according to the Torah, this commandment applies only when the two are equal in wisdom (as mentioned below).
after him, a Levite; and after him, an Israelite. - Gittin 5:8 states that this practice was instituted by the Sages to establish peace among the people. Originally, the first aliyah would be given to the sage of greatest stature in the community. However, strife and contention would frequently break out concerning the designation of the person deserving of that honor.
It is common custom at present - However, in Talmudic times, if a sage was obviously of a higher stature than the priests who were present, he was called first. Thus, Megillah 22a relates that Rav would receive the first aliyah in the presence of Shmuel, although Shmuel was a priest and Rav was not.
that even a priest who is a common person is given precedence and allowed to read before a wise man of great stature in Israel. - In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin, loc. cit.), the Rambam writes:
Know that the practice which is widely accepted everywhere, that a priest reads first in the synagogue regardless of whether he is a sage or a commoner, regardless of whether there is someone of greater stature there or not, is a matter which has no basis in the Talmud.... I wonder where this blemish came from....
The Rambam continues to explain that even at present, it is proper to call a sage of greater stature to the Torah before a priest of lower stature. Though the Rambam's opinion has been supported by many commentaries, in practice the commonly accepted custom has been allowed to be continued. The reason for this is quite clear. The strife and contention that existed in Talmudic times would surely return (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 135).
Whoever is greater than his colleague in wisdom is given precedence regarding the reading [of the Torah]. - Gittin 60a states that after the priest and the Levite, the aliyot should be given to "Torah sages who serve as community leaders, the sons of Torah sages who serve as community leaders, the heads of the community, and then all people."
The last person who rolls the Torah scroll closed receives a reward equivalent to that of all the others. - Megillah 32b states that the gollel - the one who rolls the Torah closed - receives a reward equivalent to that of all the others who read from the Torah.
Apparently, the Rambam interprets this statement as referring to the person who receives the final aliyah, or on Sabbath and festivals, the one who reads the haftarah. He should also roll the Torah closed. The Mishnah Berurah(147:5-6) quotes a different view, explaining that the term גולל refers to the person who lifts the Torah up (what we refer to as Magbiah). It is customary that the person who receives this honor need not read from the Torah beforehand.
Therefore, even the person of the greatest stature in the community can receive the concluding aliyah. - Because of the principles mentioned above, one might think that the sage of greatest stature should receive the third (or the first) aliyah. However, since the reward received by the גולל is greater, the sage may be given this honor.
Commentary Halacha 19
When there are no priests present - or the priest is at a point in prayer where he is forbidden to make an interruption (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 135:5).
an Israelite is called to the Torah - Our translation follows the statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who writes that the honor should be given to an Israelite and should not be given to a Levite. However, the Ramah (Orach Chayim135:6) states that the honor may also be given to a Levite.
and a Levite should not be called after him at all - lest one think that the person called to the Torah before him is a priest (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim135).
Note the statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who maintains that in such circumstances, the Levite may be given one of the later aliyot. His opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:10). However, the Ramah maintains that a second priest or Levite should not be given one of the first seven aliyot.
When there are no Levites present, the priest who received the first aliyahreturns and reads [from the Torah] a second time in place of the Levite. - An Israelite should not be called, for this would create the impression that the first person called to the Torah was not a priest (Mishnah Berurah 135:28).
Another priest should not read [from the Torah] after him, lest others say that there is a blemish in the first's lineage - even if his father was known to be a priest, it is possible that his mother was unfit to marry a priest.
and, therefore, another priest was given the aliyah. - In contrast to the situation involving two Levites mentioned below, the second priest's lineage would not be doubted, for were he not a priest, he would not be given thisaliyah either (Mishnah Berurah 135:28).
Similarly, one Levite should not read [from the Torah] after another Levite, lest others say that there is a blemish in the lineage of one of them - i.e., even if his father was a Levite, it is possible that he married a women who is a ממזרת, and thus their children are also ממזרים (Mishnah Berurah 135:30).
Commentary Halacha 20
What is the order [of the service] when the Torah is read after prayer? -Having outlined the halachic principles governing the reading of the Torah, the Rambam turns to explaining the order of the prayer service on the days when the Torah is read. Thus, this and the following two halachot complete the description of the order of communal prayer begun in Chapter 9.
On a day when there is a Musaf service - but when the haftarah is not recited - i.e., Rosh Chodesh or Chol Hamo'ed
after the leader of the congregation completes the morning service, he recites Kaddish - full Kaddish, to indicate the completion of the morning service
and takes out the Torah scroll - The Mishnah Berurah 141:25 states that the Torah scroll should always be taken to the platform on the right side, as the reader faces the platform.
He calls the members of the community, one by one, and they ascend - to the platform on which the Torah is read. Hence, the name aliyah (ascent) is used to refer to a person called to the Torah.
and read from the Torah. When they have completed the reading, he returns the Torah scroll to its place - as mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 14, here the congregation recite Tehillah l'David and U'va l'Tzion.
recites Kaddish - half-Kaddish. The Rambam's statements are based onSoferim 21:6. It is our practice to recite Kaddish after the Torah reading and then, again, as an introduction to the Musaf prayers.
and then the [congregation] recites the Musaf service.
On days when the haftarah is read and there is a Musaf service - i.e., Sabbaths and festivals
it is customary to recite Kaddish before the person who reads thehaftarah ascends [for his aliyah]. - Thus, the Kaddish differentiates between the Torah reading, which is obligatory, and the portion read by the person who recites the haftarah, which was instituted only as a token of respect for the Torah (Soferim, loc. cit.).
The Rambam does not state whether the Torah scroll should be returned before the morning service or afterwards. In one of his responsa, he writes that there is no advantage to one practice over the other, and everything depends on local custom.
There are places where it is customary to recite Kaddish after the person who reads the haftarah [completes his Torah reading]. - Halachah 17 describes the consequences that result from this difference in custom.
Commentary Halacha 21
During the Minchah service on the Sabbath and on Yom Kippur, after the leader of the congregation completes Tehillah l'David and the order of Kedushah - i.e., U'va l'Tzion. See Chapter 9, Halachah 13. On Yom Kippur, it is our custom to recite these prayers before the Ne'ilah service, and not beforeMinchah.
he recites the Kaddish - a half-Kaddish
and takes out a Torah scroll. - The congregation should stand while the Torah scroll is being taken from the ark (Kiddushin 33b). Soferim 14:14 states that the congregation should walk after the Torah scroll while it is being taken from the ark to the reading platform and when it is returned.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 149:1) mentions the custom of training children to kiss the Torah scroll as it is taken out.
[Those called to the Torah] ascend and read and then, [the Torah scroll] is returned [to its place. - The congregation should rise and accompany it back to the ark (Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Orach Chayim 149:1).
The leader of the congregation] recites Kaddish - half-Kaddish
and the [congregation] recites the Minchah service.
Similarly, on a fast day - after the recitation ofTehillah l'David and half-Kaddish
the Torah is read [before] the Minchah service. - See Chapter 13, Halachah 18.
Afterwards, Kaddish is recited - a half-Kaddish
and the Minchah service is recited. On festivals, it is not customary to read [the Torah] in the Minchah service. - As explained in Halachah 1, the Torah reading on Sabbath afternoons was instituted for יושבי קרנות. According to the interpretation that this refers to idle people who sit on the street corners, Rabbenu Manoach explains that this reason would not apply on the festivals, when the people are involved in the preparation of their festive meals. Even according to the interpretation of the term as "shopkeepers," it is possible that in consideration of the time spent preparing the festive meals, the Rabbis did not institute the reading of the Torah in the Minchah service.
Commentary Halacha 22
[When the Torah is read on] a day when Musaf is not recited - i.e., on Mondays and Thursdays, Purim, Chanukah, and fast days
after the morning Shemoneh Esreh is completed - and the supplicatory prayers have been recited
[the leader of the congregation] recites the Kaddish - half-Kaddish
and takes out a Torah scroll. [After the portion is] read from it, [the Torah scroll] is returned [to its place. - Interestingly, this is the custom in some Ashkenazic communities. However, in Sephardic communities, it is customary to return the Torah scroll to the ark after the recitation of the full Kaddishmentioned below (Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Orach Chayim 25:13).
The leader of the congregation] recites Tehillah l'David and the order of Kedushah - U'va l'Tzion
as is the practice every day. - See Chapter 9, Halachah 13.
[Afterwards,] he recites the Kaddish - the full Kaddish, to indicate the completion of the service.
and the people depart.
Commentary Halacha 23
It is not proper to read from chumashim - In the Talmudic era, the term,chumashim, referred to scrolls that contained only one of the five books of Moses. Hence, it would be proper to read from them were it not for the honor of the community (Rabbenu Nissim). In contrast, our chumashim cannot be used for reading the Torah at all. Even if a community does not have a Torah scroll, a blessing may not be recited over a reading from a printed chumash (Ramah,Orach Chayim 143:2).
in synagogues, as a token of respect for the community - i.e., it is proper that a community possess a complete Torah scroll. The Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah 3:1) states that this prohibition was instituted so that the community would be upset that they were prevented from hearing the Torah readings, and therefore buy a Torah scroll. (See also Chapter 11, Halachah 1.)
A Torah scroll should not be rolled [from one portion to another portion] in the presence of the community, because of the difficulty it would cause the people, forcing them to remain standing while the Torah scroll is being rolled. - Rashi, Yoma 70a, offers another reason: because the congregation is forced to stand idly while the scroll is being rolled.
Therefore, if it is necessary to read two separate concepts, two Torah scrolls are taken out. - See Chapter 18, Halachot 22-24.
[However,] one person should not read one concept from two Torah scrolls - See Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 3:10, which describes the portions read by the High Priest in the Temple on Yom Kippur. He would read one passage by heart, rather than roll the Torah scroll.
The Merkevat HaMishneh explains that if the passages read from the two scrolls deal with two different subjects, one person may read from two scrolls. See Chapter 13, Halachah 4.
lest people say that the first scroll was invalid and, therefore, they read from the second. - Interestingly, the Rambam does not mention at all the laws which apply when a Torah scroll is found invalid. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 143.)
Commentary Halacha 24
When a person rolls a Torah scroll [closed] - Apparently, in Talmudic times, one person would both lift the Torah up and roll it closed. (This practice is followed today among Chabad Chassidim.)
he should roll it from the outside. - The Ramah (Orach Chayim 147:4) interprets this statement (a quote from Megillah 32b) to mean that when a Torah scroll is rolled closed, the blank side of the parchment should face the outside, and the writing should face the person holding the Torah scroll.
When he ties it, he should tie it from the inside. - Tosafot (Megillah, loc. cit.) explains that if the knot is on the outside, when the Torah scroll is opened it would have to be turned over to be untied.
He should leave the stitching - between the different columns of the Torah scroll
[in the center], so that it will not rip. - i.e., if the Torah scroll is torn because one person pulled one etz chayim (one of the rods on which the Torah scroll is mounted) from the other, the scroll will tear on the stitching and not on the text.
In a place where a Torah scroll is taken [from the synagogue] to another room where it is kept, the congregation - The Ramah (Orach Chayim 149:1) interprets the following prohibition to apply only to the community as a whole. One or two individuals are allowed to leave.
is not allowed to leave until the Torah scroll is taken. - The Tur, Orach Chayim 149, interprets Sotah 39b, the source for this prohibition, as forbidding one to leave from the same exit through which the Torah will be taken, but allowing one to leave through another exit, because it is improper for a person to walk in front of the Torah scroll.
The Rambam does not allow this leniency, since abandoning the Torah does not show respect. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 149:1) quotes the Tur'sopinion.
They should accompany it, following it to the place where it is kept. -Sotah 39b derives this law from Deuteronomy 13:5: "Follow after God, your Lord." The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that similar practices should be followed when the Torah is kept in the ark, as is customary today. (See also the commentary on Halachah 21.)
Ishut - Chapter Fourteen
Halacha 1
The [obligation of] conjugal rights1 as prescribed by the Torah [is individual in nature], depending on the strength of each particular man and the [type of] work that he performs.
What is implied? Healthy men who are pampered and indulged, and who are not employed in labor that weakens their strength - but rather eat, drink and spend [the majority of their day] at home - should fulfill their conjugal duties every night.
[The following rules apply to] workers - e.g., tailors, weavers, construction workers and the like. If they work in the city [in which they live], they should fulfill their conjugal duties twice a week. If they work in another city, they should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week.
Donkey-drivers should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. Camel-drivers should fulfill their conjugal duties once every thirty days. Seamen should fulfill their conjugal duties once every six months.
Students of the Torah should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. [Their obligation is limited,] because the Torah weakens their strength. It is the practice of Torah scholars to engage in marital relations on Friday night.2
Halacha 2
A wife has the right to prevent her husband from making business trips except to close places, so that he will not be prevented from fulfilling his conjugal duties. He may make such journeys only with her permission.
Similarly, she has the prerogative of preventing him from changing from a profession that grants her more frequent conjugal rights to one that grants her less frequent rights - e.g., a donkey-driver who wishes to become a camel-driver, or a camel-driver who wishes to become a seaman.3
Students of the Torah may, however, depart for Torah study for two or three years without their wives' permission. Similarly, a wife cannot prevent a husband who is pampered and indulged from becoming a student of the Torah.
Halacha 3
A man [has the prerogative of] marrying several wives4 - even 100, whether at one time or one after the other. His wife may not object to this, provided he has the means to provide each [wife] with her subsistence, clothing and conjugal rights as befits her. He may not, however, compel his wives to live in the same courtyard. Instead, each one is entitled to her own household.5
Halacha 4
What are [his obligations with regard to his wives'] conjugal rights? [They are determined according to] the number [of wives he has.]
What is implied? If a worker has two wives, he is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once a week. If he has four wives, he is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once every two weeks. Similarly, a seaman who has four wives is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once every two years.
Halacha 5
When a man makes a vow requiring his wife to tell other people what he told her - or what she told him - of the jests and frivolities that a man and his wife will [occasionally] speak [in preparation for] marital relations, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. For a woman may not [be compelled] to speak brazenly and tell others lascivious things.
Similarly, if a man makes a vow requiring his wife to take actions during marital relations to prevent conception, or if he makes a vow requiring her to act foolishly, [performing] acts that have no meaning and are merely foolishness,8he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her]ketubah.
Halacha 6
When a man makes a vow causing marital relations with his wife to be forbidden, he is given a respite of one week.9 After that time, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, or absolve his vow. [This ruling applies even if the man] is a seaman whose obligation towards conjugal duties is once every six months. [The rationale is that] since he took a vow, he has caused his wife distress, and she despairs [of ever resuming intimacy].
How can such a vow be effective? If he tells her: "Marital relations with me are forbidden for you," or he takes an oath not to engage in marital relations, his vow is of no consequence, and by taking an oath he violates the prohibition against taking a false oath, for he is obligated [by the Torah to engage in relations with her].10 If, however, he tells her, "The satisfaction of engaging in relations with you is forbidden to me," it is a [binding] vow, and he is forbidden to engage in relations with her.11 For a person should not be fed food that is forbidden to him.
Halacha 7
It is forbidden for a man to deprive his wife of her conjugal rights. If he transgresses and deprives her of these rights in order to cause her distress, he violates one of the Torah's negative commandments, as [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her] of her sustenance, garments or conjugal rights."12
If he becomes sick or his virility is weakened, and he is unable to engage in sexual relations, he is given a period of six months13- for [a woman is never required to wait] longer for her conjugal rights than this - in the hope that he recovers. Afterwards, the prerogative is hers [whether to remain married] or whether he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her]ketubah.
Halacha 8
A woman who withholds marital intimacy from her husband is called a moredet("a rebel"). She is asked why she has rebelled. If she answers: "Because I am repulsed by him and I cannot voluntarily engage in relations with him," her husband should be compelled to divorce her immediately. For she is not like a captive, [to be forced] to engage in relations with one she loathes.14
[In such an instance, as part of] the divorce [settlement], she does not receive any of the money promised her in her ketubah.15 She is entitled to whatever remains of the possessions she brought into the marriage arrangement, both those for which her husband assumed responsibility and those for which he did not assume responsibility - i.e., nichsei m'log.16
She is not entitled to anything that belongs to her husband. She should remove even the shoe on her foot and her head-covering that he gave her and return them to him. [Similarly,] she should return to him any presents that he gave her. For he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and [leave his home].
Halacha 9
[Different rules apply, however,] if she rebelled against her husband with the intent of causing him distress,17 saying: "I intend to cause him distress this way, because he did this or this to me," "...because he cursed me," "...because he has caused me strife," or the like, she is sent a messenger from the court, [who] tells her: "Take note. If you continue your rebellious conduct, you will forfeit yourketubah, even if it is worth one hundred maneh."18
Halacha 10
After the announcement has been made, the court sends her a messenger a second time. He tells her: "If you continue your rebellious conduct, you have forfeited your ketubah." If, nevertheless, she continues this conduct and does not retract, she is consulted by the court. [If she does not change her mind,] she then forfeits her ketubah and has no rights to a ketubah at all.21
She is not given a divorce until twelve months pass.22 During these twelve months, [her husband is] not [required] to provide for her subsistence. If she dies before being divorced, her husband inherits her [property].
Halacha 11
This is the sequence followed with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband] in order to cause him distress. These laws apply even when the woman is in the niddah state or when she is ill and is not fit to engage in sexual relations. Similarly, they apply even when her husband is a seaman whose conjugal duties are only once in six months, and even when [her husband] has another wife.23
Halacha 12
Similarly, when the time comes for an arusah to enter nisu'in,24 and she refuses to do so, rebelling in order to cause [her husband] distress, she is considered to be one who rebels [and refuses to engage] in marital relations. Similarly, the above sequence is followed when a yevamah refuses to undergo yibbum in order to cause [her yavam] distress.25
Halacha 13
When this woman who rebels is divorced after twelve months without receiving [any of the money due her because of] her ketubah, she must also return everything that belongs to her husband.
With regard to the property that she brought to [the marriage arrangement] and what remains [of her trousseau, different rules apply].26 If she takes physical possession of these articles, they are not taken from her, but if her husband takes physical possession of them,27 they are not taken from him. Similarly, her husband is not held liable for anything that has been lost from her possessions for which he accepted responsibility.28 This is the law prescribed by the Talmud with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband].
Halacha 14
There are geonim who say that in Babylonia different customs were followed with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband].29These customs have not, however, spread throughout the majority of the Jewish community, and in most places within the Jewish community, there are many sages of stature who differ with them. [Therefore,] it is proper to follow the laws prescribed by the Talmud.
Halacha 15
[The following ruling applies when] a man rebels against his wife and says, "I will support her and provide her with her subsistence, but I will not be intimate with her, because she has become loathsome to me." He must increase herketubah by the equivalent of 36 barleycorns worth of [pure] silver30 each week. They may remain married without engaging in relations for as long as she desires.31
Although her ketubah continues to increase, [her husband] also transgresses a negative commandment, for [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her of her... conjugal rights]." If the husband hates her, let him divorce her; causing her anguish, however, is forbidden.
Why is he not punished by lashes for [violating] this negative commandment? Because its [violation] does not involve a deed.32
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when] a man and his wife come to court and he claims that his wife refuses to engage in marital relations, and she replies: "I follow the way of the world with him," or if she claims that he deprives her of her conjugal rights, and he replies that he "follows the way of the world with her." At first, a ban of ostracism is issued against anyone who denies his or her spouse marital intimacy and refuses to acknowledge the matter before the court.33
Afterwards, if acknowledgement is [still] not made, the couple are asked to enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses. If they do this, and yet the claims continue as before, a request is made of the defendant, and a compromise is made [as just] as the judge can make. It is, however, forbidden to engage in relations in the presence of others. For it is forbidden to engage in relations in the presence of any living being.
Halacha 17
When a woman becomes ill, [her husband] is obligated [to provide] medical treatment for her until she recovers. If the husband sees that her illness is prolonged, and he will be forced to spend much money treating her, he may tell her: "Here is the money due you by virtue of your ketubah. Either pay for your treatment from this money, or I will divorce you and pay you what is due you and abandon you." [Although] he is given this prerogative, it is not ethical to act in this manner.34
Halacha 18
[When a man's wife] is taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her. If he is a priest, [although] she has become forbidden to him,35 he must redeem her and have her returned to her father's home. If he was in another city, he must still provide for her until she is returned to her native locale. [Then] he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
Halacha 19
A husband is not obligated to redeem his wife for more than her worth. Instead, [the laws applying] to her [redemption] are the same as with regard to others held captive.39
When her ransom exceeds [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, her husband is not given the prerogative of saying: "I will divorce her. Here is [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Let her redeem herself." Instead, [if necessary,] he should be compelled to redeem her, even if her ransom is ten times [the value of] her ketubah - even if it is equivalent to all of his assets.
When does the above apply? On the first occasion [that she is held captive]. If, however, he redeems her and she is taken captive again, if he desires to divorce her he may divorce her, pay [her the money due her by virtue of] herketubah, and [then] she must redeem herself.40
Halacha 20
When a man's wife is taken captive and he is abroad, the court expropriates his assets and sells them after announcements have been made,41 and redeems his wife as he would be required to.
Halacha 21
When a person causes his wife to be bound by a vow that requires him to divorce her42 and pay her [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and she is taken captive after he causes her to be bound by this vow, he is not required to redeem her. For from the time he caused her to be bound by the vow, he was obligated to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.43
Halacha 22
When a woman who is forbidden to [engage in relations] with her husband because of one of the Torah's prohibitions is taken captive, he is not obligated to redeem her.44 Instead, he must provide her with [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and she must redeem herself.
[One might ask: Why is this instance different from the wife of a priest who is taken captive?] A woman who has been taken captive is forbidden to a priest, and yet he is obligated to redeem [his wife in such an instance]. [There is, however, a difference between the two instances. The priest's wife] was not forbidden to him beforehand. It is the prohibition stemming from her being taken captive that causes [their relationship to be forbidden].45
Halacha 23
When a man's wife dies, he is obligated to bury her and to have eulogies and lamentations performed as is the local custom. Even a poor Jewish man should provide at least two flutes46 and one woman to lament. If [her husband] is rich, [the funeral should be carried out] in a manner appropriate to his wealth.
If the social standing of [a man's wife] exceeded his own, he must have her buried in a manner appropriate to her social standing. For [when she marries,] a woman ascends to her husband's social standing [if his is higher than hers], but does not descend [to his, if her social standing surpasses his].47 [This principle applies] even after death.
Halacha 24
If a husband does not desire [to pay for] the burial of his wife, and another person voluntarily takes the initiative and has her buried, [the costs of the burial] should be expropriated from her husband against his will and given to the person [who arranged the burial].48 [The rationale is to prevent the body of a Jew] from being thrown to the dogs.
If a man is in another city when his wife dies, the court should expropriate his property and sell it without an announcement.49 The woman should be buried as appropriate to her husband's financial resources and his social standing or her social standing.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The very word onah - and its translation as "conjugal rights" - conveys a fundamental conception with regard to the Torah's conception of marital intimacy. Marital intimacy is not for the husband's sake, but rather for his wife's. Onah also means "respond." A man should be responding to his wife's desires and satisfying her wishes for closeness.
|
| 2. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 30:14, where the Rambam states that marital relations are one of the expressions of oneg Shabbat, "Sabbath delight." (See also Hilchot De'ot 4:19, 5:4.)
|
| 3. |
Ketubot 62b states that even if the other profession is more profitable, the prerogative is granted to the woman, for a woman values intimacy with her husband more than financial advancement.
|
| 4. |
Yevamot 65a states that if it is the local custom for a man to have only one wife, a man may not deviate from that custom. In the Ashkenazic community, as ordained by the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, it is forbidden for a man to marry more than one wife. (See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:9-10).)
|
| 5. |
The commentaries draw support for this law from the Biblical narrative (Genesis 31:33), which mentions that Jacob had separate tents for Leah, Rachel, Bilhah and Zilpah. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 14.)
|
| 6. |
Yevamot 65a.
|
| 7. |
From this, it appears that the custom of engaging in sexual relations once a week was not the practice of Torah scholars alone.
|
| 8. |
To fill up pitchers of water and dump them down the drain (Ketubot 7:3; Even HaEzer 76:12).
|
| 9. |
In this time, it is hoped that he will change his mind and retract his vow.
|
| 10. |
As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 2, a husband is obligated by the Torah to give his wife conjugal rights. Once an obligation is imposed on a person by the Torah, he may not free himself of it by taking a vow or an oath.
|
| 11. |
Since this vow does not forbid anything to the woman, but states instead, that her husband is prohibited from appreciating pleasure that results from relations with her, it can be effective.
|
| 12. |
Rav Kapach notes that although this prohibition involves three rights, the Rambam mentions its violation only with regard to the denial of conjugal rights. He explains that with regard to her sustenance and garments, a woman can take legal recourse and sue for the money due. This, however, is not possible with regard to conjugal rights.
|
| 13. |
The later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 76:18; Beit Shmuel 76:17) quote the opinion in the Shiltei HaGiborim that states that if a man is afflicted with an ailment that will heal, his wife is required to remain married to him, despite the fact that the treatment will last longer than six months.
|
| 14. |
The Maggid Mishneh and many other authorities differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that a man should not be forced to divorce his wife even in such a situation. This view is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2). Even those opinions that favor the Rambam's ruling emphasize that the court should seek to clarify that the woman is not making her statements because she fell in love with another man and seeks to end her previous marriage because of him.
|
| 15. |
For, as implied by the Rambam's statements below, this money was promised to her only on the condition that she maintain the marriage relationship.
|
| 16. |
Those authorities who differ with the Rambam regarding whether the husband is compelled to divorce his wife also differ with regard to this point. They maintain that even with regard to the possessions for which her husband accepted responsibility, the woman is granted only what she takes possession of. (See Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Even HaEzer, loc. cit.).
|
| 17. |
I.e., she is not necessarily interested in terminating the marriage, but rather in withholding marital relations as a means to communicate her position to her husband.
|
| 18. |
A maneh is equivalent to 100 dinarim.
|
| 19. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) quotes the Rambam's wording. The Ramah, however, differs, stating that the announcement need be made only on four consecutive Sabbaths.
|
| 20. |
The purpose of these announcements is obviously to shame her and to cause her to reconsider her course of behavior.
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| 21. |
I.e., she does not receive the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, nor any additional amount that her husband promised her (tos'fot ketubah).
|
| 22. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that, as a favor, the court requests the husband not to divorce his wife until this time has passed, for it is disgraceful for a Jewish couple to part because of strife. It is hoped that during the twelve months they are required to wait, they will resolve their differences.
There are opinions that state that in the present age, the husband is not required to wait an entire year and may instead divorce his wife immediately. Nevertheless, the majority of authorities do not accept this view (Ramah, loc. cit.).
According to the Rambam, during these twelve months, the husband has no financial responsibilities to his wife whatsoever. If she is held captive, he is not required to redeem her, and if he dies, she does not inherit her ketubah from his estate. Rabbenu Asher (as interpreted by theTur, Even HaEzer 77) differs and maintains that during these twelve months, the woman'sketubah is still in effect. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) cites the Rambam's view, while the Ramah follows that of Rabbenu Asher.
|
| 23. |
In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the governing principle is that the fact that a woman makes a categorical statement refusing to engage in marital relations in the future is sufficient to warrant her being placed in this category, despite the fact that her conduct is of no immediate consequence.
|
| 24. |
One year, for a na'arah, one month for a bogeret, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 17.
|
| 25. |
Yibbum refers to the marriage of the widow (the yevamah) of a childless man by his brother (theyavam). The Rambam's ruling is dependent on his decision that even in the present age, the mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah (Hilchot Yibbum 1:2). The latter decision is not accepted in the Ashkenazic community, and therefore, the ruling in our halachah is also a matter of dispute. (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 165:1.)
|
| 26. |
I.e., the laws governing a woman who rebels against her husband differ from those governing a woman who claims that she is repulsed by her husband, as described in Halachah 8.
|
| 27. |
In both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:3), Rav Yosef Karo states that the husband does not have to take physical possession of this property. As long as the wife does not take possession of it, it is considered to be his.
|
| 28. |
This refers to nichsei tzon barzel, property whose full value must ordinarily be returned to the woman. In contrast, nichsei m'log - property for which the husband did not accept responsibility and is returned to the woman in whatever condition it is, regardless of its worth - must be returned to her, even if she rebels against him. (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 77:2.)
The rationale for this distinction is that since he takes responsibility for the nichsei tzon barzel, these articles are considered to be possessed by him unless she takes physical possession of them. With regard to the nichsei m'log, by contrast, since the husband does not take responsibility, they are not considered to be in his possession.
|
| 29. |
The customs of these geonim are quoted in the Halachot of Rav Yitzchak Alfasi. They are far more considerate of the woman's position and interests. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 77:3) states that if the woman gives a reasonable explanation for her conduct, these customs should be followed.
|
| 30. |
I.e., three dinarim of the currency employed during the Talmudic period.
|
| 31. |
If she does not desire to remain married, she may ask the court to compel him to grant her a divorce, as stated in Halachah 7.
|
| 32. |
And lashes are given only for a transgression that involves a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2).
|
| 33. |
Although the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:4).
|
| 34. |
As mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, there are authorities who maintain that there is an explicit prohibition preventing a husband from divorcing a wife who is too ill to care for herself. The later authorities, however, follow the Rambam's view.
In the Ashkenazic community, there is a question if the Rambam's ruling applies in the present age, after the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, which prevents divorcing a woman against her will. (See the Chelkat Mechokek 79:3, which quotes an opinion that states that as long as the husband is prepared to meet all the financial obligations of the divorce, he has the prerogative to divorce a woman against her will, even when she is ill.)
|
| 35. |
As mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 21, a priest is forbidden to have relations with a woman who engaged in sexual relations with a gentile, even when she was raped. Our Sages assumed that women taken captive by gentiles were raped by them, and therefore prohibited a priest from remaining married to such a woman. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:17-30.)
|
| 36. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 78:6) notes that even an Israelite is forbidden to remain married to a woman who is held captive by gentiles if she willingly engaged in relations with one of them. In such instances, he is not obligated to redeem her.
|
| 37. |
I.e., he may not merely redeem her and send her a divorce.
|
| 38. |
I.e., out of suspicion that she willingly engaged in relations with her captors, or because he does not want to live with a woman who had relations with others (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
|
| 39. |
As explained in Hilchot Matnot Ani'yim 8:12, our Sages decreed that captives should not be redeemed for more than their worth, so that the gentiles will not be overwhelmingly encouraged to seize Jews as captives.
The Rambam's wording has aroused the attention of the later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 78:2;Beit Shmuel 78:2), for it implies that if the husband desires to redeem her for more than her worth, he may, while with regard to other captives it is forbidden to do so. They interpret the Rambam's words as applying this prohibition to the husband as well. The Beit Shmuel interprets the ruling of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 78:2) as meaning that a husband is required to redeem his wife even though her captors demand more than her worth.
|
| 40. |
In both the Kessef Mishneh and in the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 78), Rav Yosef Karo states that the husband is not obligated to redeem his wife a second time. If he desires, he may remain married to her without redeeming her. Many, however, differ with this as the interpretation of the Rambam's words. (See Chelkat Mechokek 78:4; Beit Shmuel 78:4.)
|
| 41. |
See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 12:8-11, which states that an announcement is made regarding the sale of the person's property so that he will receive the best price.
|
| 42. |
E.g., the vows mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 8ff.
|
| 43. |
The obligation for a husband to redeem his wife stems from her ketubah, which states: "If you are taken captive, I will redeem you and take you back as my wife." Since he is already obligated to divorce her, he is not bound by this clause.
|
| 44. |
The rationale for this ruling is that the obligation to redeem one's wife involves returning her to her status as a wife, and this is forbidden in this instance. Nevertheless, although this is the rationale, the same ruling applies with regard to a High Priest who married a widow, or an ordinary priest who married a divorcee.
In these instances, the obligation of the woman's ketubah - that she be redeemed and returned to her native land - could be fulfilled without transgressing a prohibition of the Torah. Nevertheless, since relations with her were forbidden previously, her husband is not obligated to redeem her (Ketubot 52a).
|
| 45. |
With regard to a woman forbidden to her husband by virtue of a Torah prohibition, by contrast, the prohibition existed before she was taken captive.
|
| 46. |
Flutes have a mournful tone that arouses tears (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Shabbat 23:4).
|
| 47. |
This principle applies to many aspects of the financial relationship of the marriage bond - e.g., the woman's subsistence, her garments and her lodging. It is curious that this instance is the first time the Rambam mentions it explicitly.
|
| 48. |
Although the Rambam makes a distinction between this instance and a similar situation mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 19, the Rashba and others do not. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer89:2) quotes the Rambam's view, but the Beit Shmuel 89:2 states that because of the other views, the husband's property may not be expropriated against his will.
|
| 49. |
Although usually announcements are made for 30 days prior to the sale of property by the court, an exception is made in this instance, so that the woman's burial will not be delayed (Ketubot100b).
|
Ishut - Chapter Fifteen
Halacha 1
It is permissible for a woman to authorize her husband to ignore her conjugal rights. When does this apply? When he has children already and has fulfilled the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply. If, however, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is obligated to engage in sexual relations whenever his conjugal duties require, until he fathers children.1 For this is a positive commandment of the Torah, as [Genesis 1:28] states: "Be fruitful and multiply."2
Halacha 2
The mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying is incumbent on the husband and not on his wife. When does a man become obligated to fulfill this mitzvah? From the time he reaches seventeen. If he reaches twenty and has not married, he is considered to have transgressed and negated the observance of this positive commandment. If, however, he is occupied with the study of Torah and absorbed in this endeavor and is hesitant of marrying, lest he be forced to work to support his wife and thus be prevented from studying Torah, he is permitted to delay marriage. For a person who is occupied in the performance of one mitzvah is freed from the obligation to perform another. Surely this applies with regard to the study of Torah.
Halacha 3
Halacha 4
How many children is it necessary for a man to have fathered to be considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah? One boy and one girl,7 as [implied by Genesis 5:2]: "He created them, a male and a female." If the son was a saris or the daughter an aylonit, he is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah.8
Halacha 5
A man is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying [even when] he fathers [children] and they die, so long as [his children] have left behind children [of their own]. For grandchildren are considered to be children.
When does the above apply? When the person's grandchildren are both male and female, and they are descended from a male and a female, even though the male grandchild is the son of the man's daughter, and the female grandchild is the daughter of the man's son.9 Since they come from two of his children, he is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying. If, however, he had a son and a daughter who both died, and [one did not leave any children, while] one left a son and a daughter, the grandfather is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah.
Halacha 6
When [a convert] had fathered children as a gentile, and both he and they convert,10 he is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. By contrast, a freed slave who had fathered children as a slave is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah, although his children were also freed. Instead, he must father children after he has been freed. [The rationale is that] a slave is not considered to have any paternal lineage.
Halacha 7
A man should not marry a barren women, an elderly woman, an aylonit or a minor who is not fit to bear a child11 unless he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying,12 or he has another wife with whom he can father children.13
When a man has married a woman and remained married to her for ten years14without her bearing children,15 he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, or marry a woman who is fit to bear children.
If he does not desire to divorce her, he should be compelled to do so; he should be beaten with a rod until he divorces her.16 Even when he says, "I will not engage in marital relations with her. Instead, we will dwell together with witnesses so that we will not ever be in private," regardless of whether it is he or she who offers this proposition,17 it is not accepted. Rather, he is required to divorce [his wife] or marry another woman who is fit to bear children.
Halacha 8
When a man has lived [together with his wife] for ten years without her bearing children, and he releases semen as one shoots an arrow,18 it can be assumed that the affliction comes from her.19 Therefore, he should divorce her without paying her [the essential requirement of] the ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the additional sum [by which the ketubah was increased]. [The rationale is that] such a woman should not be judged more severely than an aylonit whose husband did not recognize her condition, who is granted the additional amount, as will be explained.20
If [the husband] does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow, it can be assumed that the affliction comes from him alone. When he divorces her, he must pay her [the entire sum due her by virtue of her] ketubah: the essential requirement and the additional sum.
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when there is a dispute with regard to which of the couple it is whose affliction prevents the couple from having children. The husband] claims: "It is she who cannot bear children," and she claims "He cannot conceive children, for he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow." Her word is accepted. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally against anyone who makes a claim that she does not definitely know to be true. Afterwards, he must pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
If she says, "I do not know if the difficulty stems from me or from him," she is not entitled to the essential requirement of the ketubah, as explained. [The rationale is that] the money should stay in the possession of its owner until she makes a definite claim21 that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow.
Why is the woman's word accepted when she makes such a claim? Because she can feel whether or not he [releases semen] as one shoots an arrow, and he cannot make such a distinction.
Halacha 10
When a woman demands of her husband to divorce her after ten years [of marriage], because she has not given birth,22 and she claims that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow, her request is accepted.23 Although she is not commanded to fulfill the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, she needs sons [to assist] her in her old age.24 [Therefore,] he should be compelled to divorce her.
He is required to give her only the essential requirement of the ketubah. [He is not required to give her the additional amount,] because he did not promise her this additional amount with the intent that she leave him at her will and take this money.
Halacha 11
If [a husband] travels on an [extended] business trip during these ten years, or either the husband or the wife were ill or confined in prison, [the time that the couple did not share together] is not included in the calculation [of the ten years].25
Halacha 12
If a woman miscarries, [the ten years are] recalculated from the day of the miscarriage.
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when there is a difference between the information stemming from the claims of a husband and his wife.] He claims that she has miscarried within the ten years so that they can continue [their marriage], and she denies the miscarriage. [Her claim] is believed; [if it were not true,] she would not cause herself to be considered barren.28
If he claims that she has miscarried twice, and she claims to have miscarried three times, [her claim] is believed. [If it were not true,] she would not cause herself to be considered a woman who [continually] miscarries.
[Therefore, in both instances,] he should divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. With regard to the above situations, he may require her to take a Rabbinic oath that she did not miscarry or that she miscarried three times. For this claim obligates him to pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.29
Halacha 14
[When a woman] marries one man, remains married to him for ten years without bearing a child and is divorced [for that reason], she is permitted to marry a second husband.30 If she remained married to the second husband for ten years without bearing a child, she should not marry a third husband.31
If she marries a third husband, she should be divorced; [he is] not [required to pay her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.32 [This applies] unless he has another wife, or he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying.
Halacha 15
[The following laws apply when] a woman comes to court and claims that her husband cannot perform sexually in an ordinary way that will lead to the conception of children, or that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow.33 The judges should try to arrange a compromise,34 telling the woman: "It is proper for you to conduct yourself with your husband [as follows]: Remain [married] for ten years. [If] you do not give birth, come to him with a claim at that time."
We protract the negotiations of this matter with her; we do not require her to continue living with him, nor do we judge her as a woman who rebels against her husband. Instead, the dealings are prolonged until the two parties reach a compromise.
Halacha 16
Halacha 17
It is an obligation for a man to admonish40 his wife. Our Sages declared:41 "A man will not admonish his wife unless a spirit of purity enters his being." [Nevertheless,] he should not admonish her more than necessary.42
[A man] should never compel [his wife] to engage in sexual relations against her will. Instead, [relations] should be with her agreement, [preceded by] conversation and a spirit of joy.43
Halacha 18
Similarly, our Sages commanded a woman to conduct herself modestly at home, not to proliferate levity or frivolity before her husband, not to request intimacy verbally,44 nor to speak about this matter.
She should not deny her husband [intimacy] to cause him anguish, so that he should increase his love for her. Instead, she should oblige him whenever he desires. She should keep her distance from his relatives and the members of his household so that he will not be provoked by jealousy and should avoid scandalous situations - indeed, any trace of scandal.45
Halacha 19
Similarly, our Sages commanded that a man honor his wife more than his own person, and love her as he loves his own person. If he has financial resources, he should offer her benefits in accordance with his resources. He should not cast a superfluous measure of fear over her. He should talk with her gently, being neither sad nor angry.
Halacha 20
And similarly, they commanded a woman to honor her husband exceedingly and to be in awe of him. She should carry out all her deeds according to his directives, considering him to be an officer or a king. She should follow the desires of his heart and shun everything that he disdains.
This is the custom of holy and pure Jewish women and men in their marriages. And these ways will make their marriage pleasant and praiseworthy.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Conjugal rights are a privilege granted to a wife, and she has the right to forego them if she and her husband consent. Fathering children, by contrast, is one of the Torah's commandments, and a woman may not prevent her husband from fulfilling his obligation. See Yevamot 65b.
The Turei Zahav (Even HaEzer 1:1) and the Beit Shmuel 1:1 question the Rambam's decision. For, as stated in Halachah 16, even after the person has fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is obligated by rabbinic law to continue to father children. Seemingly, just as a man's wife may not prevent him from fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by the Torah, so too, she may not prevent him from fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by our Sages.
The Pitchei Teshuvah 1:1 resolves this difficulty by quoting the Chidah, who explains that our Sages did not equate the obligation to continue to father children with the Torah's obligation to be fruitful and multiply. As long as a man endeavors to continue to father children from time to time, it is acceptable. There is no need to persist with the same perseverance as one who has not yet fulfilled this mitzvah. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
|
| 2. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 212) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 1) include this as one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot.
|
| 3. |
See Yevamot 63b.
|
| 4. |
The Turei Zahav 1:6 interprets this expression as meaning that, at the outset, this is not a desirable course of action to follow.
|
| 5. |
This condition applies also to the license to delay marriage mentioned in the previous halachah.
|
| 6. |
In connection with this law, the commentaries cite Yoma 29a, which states: "Thoughts of sin are more damaging than sin itself." Instead of pointing his life to spiritual refinement, the individual is directing himself to sinful thoughts.
|
| 7. |
But if a man has only several sons or only several daughters, he is not considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah.
|
| 8. |
See Chapter 2 for a definition of these terms. Since this child is incapable of conceiving children, the child's father is not considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah.
|
| 9. |
Tosafot (Yevamot 62b) states that even if the grandchildren are two males or two females, one is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:6), however, quotes the Rambam's view.
|
| 10. |
Tosafot states that even if the convert's children did not themselves convert, the convert is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. (See Beit Shmuel 1:12.)
|
| 11. |
From the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 23:1), one can infer that sexual relations with a minor are considered as emitting wasted seed, one of the more severe prohibitions of the Torah. The Ramah (loc. cit.:5) and other authorities, however, differ and explain that as long as relations are carried out in an ordinary manner, having relations with a minor or an aylonit does not violate this prohibition.
|
| 12. |
Rav Moshe Cohen states that since, as mentioned in Halachah 16, a person is obligated to continue fathering children, a man is obligated to marry a woman who can bear children even after fulfilling the mitzvah. The Maggid Mishneh states that in principle the Rambam also accepts this ruling, as indicated by his wording in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:26. In this instance, he was merely stating the law required by the Torah.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 1:3) states although it would be proper to rebuke a person for marrying such a woman, this is not done in the present age.
|
| 13. |
As mentioned previously, in the Ashkenazic community it is customary not to marry more than one wife. All the laws mentioned in this halachah must be viewed with that principle in mind.
|
| 14. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:7), the Rambam writes that the source for this practice is Sarah's giving Hagar to Abraham: "After ten years in which Abram had lived in the Land of Canaan" (Genesis 16:3). Since this period passed without her bearing children, she provided him with another wife who could.
|
| 15. |
The Rivash (Responsum 15, quoted by the Ramah 154:10) explains that if after having one child together, a couple do not have children for ten years, they are not forced to divorce.
|
| 16. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 1:3) states that in his time, it was no longer customary to compel a man to divorce a woman who has not borne children to her husband. (See also the Hagahot Maimoniot, which quote opinions that state that in this age, and particularly in the diaspora, there is no obligation to divorce a woman even though she has not borne children in this amount of time. At present, there are many Rabbis who have divorced their wives in such a situation, but at least an equal number who have not. Every person has the prerogative of making his own decision regarding this matter.)
|
| 17. |
I.e., rather than bear the expense of paying her ketubah immediately, the man desires to remain married; or from the woman's perspective, rather than have to earn her own subsistence, she desires to remain married.
|
| 18. |
Chaggigah 15a states that unless a man releases semen as one shoots an arrow, he will not be able to father children.
|
| 19. |
As reflected in the following halachah, the Rambam maintains that unless the man's wife explicitly claims that he does not release semen as one shoots an arrow, it is assumed that the affliction is the woman's. Therefore, she is not entitled to the essential requirement of the ketubah.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that for the responsibility to be placed on the woman, she must have been married to two other men previously, and in both instances, divorced after ten years for not bearing children. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 154:6) accepts this opinion.
|
| 20. |
See Chapter 23, Halachot 2 and 3.
|
| 21. |
The husband keeps possession of the money he is required to pay his wife by virtue of herketubah. Although our Sages accepted her word when she issues a claim against her husband, they did so only when that claim was definite. If she is in doubt, the money should remain in the possession of its immediate owner.
|
| 22. |
The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 154) states that as long as a woman has given birth to one child, whether a son or a daughter, she is not given the prerogative of making such a claim.
The Ma'aseh Rokeach explains that this refers to an instance in which the man fathered children before marrying this woman, but then his physical condition deteriorated, and, according to the woman's claim, he is no longer able to release semen in an ordinary way. Were this not the case, he would be compelled to divorce her in order to fulfill the mitzvah of having children. Since he has, however, fulfilled that mitzvah, he is not compelled to divorce his wife. Therefore, it is the woman who must take the initiative.
|
| 23. |
As reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:6), other authorities emphasize that the woman's request must be made solely for this reason. If the court feels that she desires [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah or to marry another man (Be'urei HaGra 154:25), her request is not accepted.
|
| 24. |
Yevamot 65b states "she needs a staff for support and a spade for burial" - i.e., sons to support her in her old age and to take care of her funeral arrangements.
|
| 25. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:11) follows the understanding of Rabbenu Asher, who interprets this ruling as applying even when it was possible for the couple to engage in marital relations during the situations mentioned. It is possible that just as their conduct aroused negative spiritual influences resulting in illness or imprisonment, those negative influences - and not the physical condition of the man or woman - prevented them from having children. From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:7), it does not appear that he shares this understanding.
|
| 26. |
Even within a period shorter than ten years (Rabbenu Asher).
|
| 27. |
She is, however, permitted to marry another man (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154:12).
|
| 28. |
The Beit Shmuel 154:29 emphasizes that this law and the following law apply only when the court does not suspect that the woman desires to marry another man. This is also reflected in the Rambam's wording, which indicates that her claim comes as a response to the court's initiative.
|
| 29. |
Although the Ra'avad differs and does not require an oath in this situation, the Maggid Mishnehand the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's position. It is the Rambam's position that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:15).
|
| 30. |
It is possible that the woman is not barren. It was merely that the two did not merit to conceive children together (Yevamot 64a).
|
| 31. |
Although a factor must normally repeat itself three times for a chazakah (a presumption that can be relied on) to be established, an exception is made with regard to the laws of marriage. In this context, the opinion that considers a twofold occurrence to be a chazakah is followed.
|
| 32. |
This ruling applies only if the husband had been unaware of the woman's condition previously. If he knew of her condition, he is obligated to pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, as is the law with regard to an aylonit (Chapter 24:1-2).
|
| 33. |
As reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (the conclusion of Nedarim), the Rambam does not interpret this as referring to an instance where the husband is sexually impotent entirely. Instead, it refers to a situation in which he can function, but it is the woman's belief that he will never conceive children. See the Lechem Mishneh and the interpretation of the Ralbach (Responsum 32). If, however, the woman were to claim that her husband is impotent, her word would be accepted.
Note, however, the Rashba (Vol. I, Responsum 628) and K'nesset HaGedolah (Even HaEzer154:60), which interpret this halachah as speaking about an instance where the husband is sexually impotent.
|
| 34. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that, in theory, it would be proper to compel the husband to grant his wife a divorce immediately. This is not done, however, out of fear that her claim is untrue and she merely desires to marry another man.
He continues, stating that the court should try to develop communication between the couple. If those efforts fail, a compromise should be negotiated - e.g., in return for not compelling the woman to wait ten years for the divorce, the amount of money the husband is required to pay because of the ketubah should be reduced.
|
| 35. |
Yevamot 62a states: "[Although a man] fathers children in his youth, he should continue to do so at an advanced age, as implied by [Ecclesiastes 11:6]: 'In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not withhold your hand.'"
As mentioned above, the Chidah explains that as long as a man endeavors to continue fathering children from time to time, it is acceptable. One need not attempt to conceive children at every opportunity. Based on this decision, there are authorities who permit the limited use of certain birth control devices. The matter is not, however, entirely clear cut and should be discussed with a competent Rabbinic authority with regard to one's actual conduct.
|
| 36. |
Similarly, having children leads to the coming of the Redemption. Yevamot 63b states that theMashiach will not come until all the souls destined to be conceived are born.
|
| 37. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:8) explains that this commandment applies when the husband cannot support a wife who can bear children and increase the size of his family.
|
| 38. |
See Yevamot 62b, which states: "Any man who is unmarried is left without happiness, without good and without blessing."
Rav David Cohen quotes Rav Yitzchak Alfasi as maintaining that the requirement to marry stems from the Torah and not from our Sages, as the Rambam maintains.
|
| 39. |
See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:26, which states that it is permissible for a woman never to marry.
|
| 40. |
Here the term לקנאת, translated as "admonish," has a specific meaning: to warn one's wife not to enter into privacy with another man. If this warning is disobeyed, the woman must undergo the rites of a sotah to continue her marriage.
|
| 41. |
Sotah 3a. Although this is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, the Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
|
| 42. |
See the conclusion of Hilchot Sotah for a more detailed treatment of this subject.
|
| 43. |
See Hilchot De'ot 5:4-5.
|
| 44. |
Eruvin 100b states that a woman requests intimacy with her heart.
|
| 45. |
See Chapter 24, Halachah 15ff.
|
Ishut - Chapter Sixteen
Halacha 1
The property that a woman brings to her husband's [resources] - be it landed property, movable property or servants - is not referred to with the termketubah, but rather with the term nedunyah.
[More particularly, there are two subdivisions within this category.] When the husband accepts responsibility for the nedunyah and it is considered to be his property1 - i.e., if it decreases in value he suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is his - the property is referred to as nichsei tzon barzel.2
Halacha 2
Similarly, all the property that a woman owns that she did not bring to her husband's household, nor had written in her ketubah, but rather left as her own, or property that came to her as an inheritance, or that was given to her as a present - all of this is referred to as nichsei m'log, for it is all in her possession.
The term ketubah, by contrast, refers only to the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - i.e., 100 [zuz for a non-virgin] or 200 [zuz for a virgin] and the additional amount that [the husband promised].6
Halacha 3
We have already explained that our Sages established the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, and that the laws governing the additional amount [promised by the husband] are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement.7
[Our Sages] did not grant a woman the option of collecting [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah whenever she desired. Instead, it is like a debt, which is not payable until a given date. For a ketubah, the time when payment is due is not until after the woman's husband dies or divorces her.
Similarly, our Sages ordained that if a husband has fields [of varying quality] - good, bad and intermediate - when the woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from this property, she is entitled to collect only from the inferior fields.8 They are referred to as ziboorit.9
Halacha 4
Similarly, our Sages ordained that when a woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah after her husband's death, she may not collect [this sum] until she takes an oath while holding a sacred article,10 that her husband did not leave any property in her possession,11 that she had not sold her ketubah to him, nor waived payment of it.12 [Her wardrobe, even] the garments she is wearing should be evaluated and the sum deducted from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.13
Halacha 5
Similarly, [our Sages] ordained that a widow17 should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from landed property only.18 [Moreover,] she may not collect [her due] from the increment in the value of that property after the husband died.19 Similarly, after their father's death, [the woman's] daughters do not receive their subsistence20 from the increment in the value of that property after his death.
Similarly, a woman may not collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubahfrom the increment in the value of [landed] property accomplished through the efforts of a purchaser, although other creditors are entitled to collect their due from that increment.21These rulings are among the leniencies [granted with regard to the the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah.
Halacha 6
Similarly, among the leniencies [granted with regard to the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah is that a woman will collect the money due her from the coinage that is of least value.
What is implied? A man married a woman in one country and divorced her in another. If the coinage of the country in which the couple married is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they divorced, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they divorced. If, by contrast, the coinage of the country in which the couple divorced is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they married, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they married.22
When does the above apply? When her ketubah states a sum of coins without specification. If, however, a specific type of coin is explicitly mentioned, whether with regard to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, or with regard to the extra amount added by the husband, the law is the same as when a person lends a colleague a specific type of coin - he must return the loan in the coinage that he took, as will be explained in Hilchot Halva'ah.23
Halacha 7
The geonim of all the yeshivot ordained that after the death of a man, a woman should be able to collect her [money due her by virtue of her] ketubah from movable property,24 just as they ordained that a creditor can collect the debt owed him from movable property.25 This mandate spread throughout the majority of the Jewish people.26
Similarly, the other conditions of a woman's ketubah are governed by the same rules as [the fundamental requirement of] the ketubah, and they are binding on the movable property of the deceased's estate, as well as on the landed property. There is, however, one exception - the right of the sons to inherit their mother's ketubah. Since the custom of granting them this inheritance was not universally accepted by all the yeshivot,27 I maintain that the law of the Talmud should be applied in this instance, and they should inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah only from the landed property [within the estate].28
Halacha 8
In all the [Jewish] communities of which I know and have heard reports from, it has already become the custom to write the ketubah so that [its obligations are binding] on both the landed property and the movable property [in the estate].29
[Making] this addition is a great asset; it was ordained by learned men of great stature. For it is a monetary stipulation, and thus a widow is entitled to collect [the money due her] from the movable property [in her husband's] estate by virtue of this stipulation, and not by virtue of the mandate of the later sages.30
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] this stipulation was not included in the text of the ketubah, but instead [the couple] married without making an explicit statement [in this regard]. If the husband knew of this ordinance established by the geonim, the woman may collect [the money due her from the movable property in his estate].
If, however, he was not [aware of this ordinance], or we are unsure whether he knew of it, we deliberate at length concerning this matter. For an ordinance of the geonim does not have the power to be applied and to have money expropriated from the heirs because of it, when it was not explicitly stated, as is the law regarding the conditions of the ketubah.31 [The distinction between the two is that the conditions of the ketubah] are ordinances instituted by the GreatSanhedrin.
Halacha 10
Our Sages also ordained that all of a husband's property should be on lien for the woman's ketubah. Even if the woman's ketubah is [only 100 zuz] and [her husband] owns property worth several thousand gold pieces, it is all under lien to her ketubah.
[Her husband] is entitled to sell all his property if he desires, and his sale is binding. Nevertheless, all the property that he sells after his marriage can be expropriated [from the purchaser] by his widow [in lieu of payment for] herketubah when he divorces her or when he dies, if he does not possess property that has not been sold.32
When a woman expropriates property [from a purchaser], she must take an oath holding a sacred article, as is taken by any of [a person's] creditors [who seek to expropriate property from its purchasers]. This provision was instituted so that he should not view [the obligation of] the ketubah lightly.
Halacha 11
When the court or the heirs require a widow to take an oath when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, the oath should be taken only outside the court.33 For the court would refrain from administering the oath, lest she not be precise with herself when making it.34
If the heirs desired that she make a vow [instead of an oath], she may make a vow linked to any object they desire.35 This vow may be administered in a court. Afterwards, she should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
Halacha 12
If a widow dies before taking this oath, her heirs should not inherit her ketubahat all, for she does not have any rights to her ketubah until she takes an oath.36
If the woman marries [a second time] before taking an oath [with regard to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from her previous husband's estate], she may take an oath after her remarriage and collect her due whenever she desires. She does not, however, have the option of making a vow, lest her [second] husband annul it.37
Halacha 13
If [a woman's husband] designated a plot of land for her in her ketubah, whether he specified [only] one of its borders or all four of its borders, she may collect her ketubah from this plot of land without taking an oath.
Similarly, if he specified movable property [in the ketubah] and this movable property exists, she may take it without taking an oath. [Moreover,] if the [movable property that was specified] was sold and other movable property purchased with the proceeds, it being known that these goods were purchased with the proceeds of [the movable property specified in the ketubah], she may take them without taking an oath.
Halacha 14
A woman who diminishes [the amount of money due her by virtue of] herketubah may collect her due only after taking an oath.38
What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims to have received only a portion of the amount. Even if there are witnesses who testify that she received the amount that she admits to having received,39 and even if she is extremely precise in accounting what she took, mentioning even [the last] half-p'rutah, she may collect the remainder only after taking an oath.40
Halacha 15
[An oath is also required in the following instance.] The husband claims that [his wife] received all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah], while the woman claims not to have received the money, and one witness testifies that she received either the entire sum or a portion of it. [The woman] may collect the entire [sum mentioned in] the ketubah, but only after taking an oath.41
Halacha 16
[When a divorcee collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah] outside the presence of her husband, she must take an oath before doing so.
What is implied? A man divorced his wife and departed. After his wife takes an oath, the court should expropriate his property and give [the woman the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
The above applies when the husband is in a distant place, where there is difficulty in notifying him. If, however, he is in a nearby place [where it is possible] to notify him, a message should be sent to notify him [of the court's impending action]. If he does not come, the woman should take the oath and collect [her due].
Halacha 17
A woman who reduces the value of her ketubah is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].42
What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims not to have received anything at all, but she admits: "I am owed only 500zuz. Although he wrote 1000 for me [in the ketubah], there was an understanding between me and him [concerning this]." In this instance, she is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].
If, however, [in the above situation,] the woman says: "My ketubah states only 500 zuz," she may not collect with this document that says [she is due] 1000zuz, for she has negated it. It is as if she has admitted that it is false. Therefore, [the husband] may take a rabbinic oath [to support his claim]; he is then freed [of all obligations].
Halacha 18
Whenever we have stated that a woman may not collect [her due] unless she takes an oath, the court tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." Whenever we said that she may collect her due without an oath, [the court] tells the husband: "Give her [what is due her]. Your claim is not acceptable until you bring proof to support it."
Halacha 19
If [in the latter instances], on his own initiative, the husband asks that [the woman] take an oath [denying] his claim, [the court] tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." She must take this oath holding a sacred article.
If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from him [in the event of a divorce] without taking any oath at all. [In the event of his death,] however, she must take an oath before collecting [her due] from his heirs.43
Halacha 20
If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from his heirs without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted by his heirs regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from the heirs without taking any oath at all.44
If, however, she comes to collect [her due] from property that has been sold, she must take an oath before collecting. Although her husband was willing to accept her word, the stipulation he made is binding only on himself and [the estate he left to] his heirs. It does not have the power to cause others to incur a financial loss.45
Halacha 21
A widow who is in possession of her [the document recording her] ketubah may collect her due, after taking an oath, even though 100 years have passed since her husband's death.46 This applies regardless of whether she resides in her [deceased] husband's home or in her father's home.47
If, however, she does not have possession of her ketubah, she is not entitled to anything, even if she makes her claim on the day her husband dies.48 Similarly, a divorcee is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubahuntil she produces her ketubah.
Halacha 22
When does the above apply? In a place where it is customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah. [Different rules apply,] however, in a place where it is not customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah, and instead, [the couple] rely on the conditions established by the Jewish court.49
[In such a situation, the woman is entitled to] collect the essential requirement of the ketubah50 even when she is not in possession of a document recording the ketubah, regardless of whether she was widowed or divorced, or whether she [continues to] reside in her husband's home or [has returned to] her father's home. She is not, however, given [anything she claims her husband promised her] in addition unless she has definite proof [of such an obligation].51
Halacha 23
Until when is a widow entitled to collect the essential requirement of theketubah52 in a place where it is not customary to compose a ketubah? If she [continues to reside] in her husband's home, there is no limit on the time she is granted.53 If she [resides] in her father's home,54 [she has this prerogative] for twenty-five years.
If, [however,] she comes to collect [the money due her because of her ketubah] after twenty-five years, she is not entitled to anything. [The rationale is that] had she not foregone [the money due her], she would not have remained silent for this long. Nor is she living together with the heirs, so that she could [excuse her silence,] explaining that she was embarrassed to sue them while she was living together with them in [one] home.
Halacha 24
For this reason, if [one of] the heirs was in the habit of bringing her subsistence while she was residing in her father's home and caring for her needs, she has the prerogative of demanding [her due] even after twenty-five years have passed. The reason why she remained silent and did not present her claim is that she was ashamed [to sue] the heir.
Halacha 25
[The following rules apply when there is a difference between the claims of a husband - or his heirs - and his wife regarding the size of the essential requirement of her ketubah.] She says, "I was a virgin when I married, and the essential requirement of my ketubah is 200 [zuz]." Her husband or his heirs claim, "She was not a virgin, and she is due only 100."
If there are witnesses who saw that the customs that people in that locale carry out when virgins are wed were carried out on her behalf - e.g., there were different types of celebrations, [she wore a] crown or a particular garment [designated for this purpose], or other rites that are performed only for the sake of virgins were performed [for her] - she is entitled to 200 [zuz]. If there are no witnesses to this, she is entitled to only 100 [zuz].
[In the latter instance,] if her husband is alive, she can require him to take an oath required by the Torah,55 for he has acknowledged a portion of a claim.
[In cases of this nature,] testimony is accepted [from a person]56 once he became an adult, who says: "I remember that when I was a child, the rites performed for virgin brides were performed on behalf of such and such."57
As mentioned, all the above applies [only] in places where it is customary not to compose a document recording the ketubah.58
Halacha 26
When a woman tells her husband, "You divorced me," her word is accepted. [The rationale is that if this were not the truth,] she would not speak so boldly to her husband.59
Accordingly, when a woman produces her ketubah, [even] without having a bill of divorce, and tells her husband: "You divorced me. I lost my bill of divorce. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," [her claim is accepted, and her husband] is obligated to pay her the essential requirement of the marriage contract, even though he claims that he never divorced her.60 He is not, however, [obligated to] give her the additional amount he promised,61unless she brings proof that she has been divorced, or she manifests possession of both the bill of divorce and her ketubah.
Halacha 27
[In the above situation,] if [the woman's] husband said: "This is what happened. I divorced her and paid her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, both the essential requirement and the additional amount. She wrote me a receipt, but I lost it" [the following rules apply]. He requires her to take an oath while holding a sacred article [that he is liable to pay her] the essential requirement [of the ketubah], and then he must give her [that sum].62
With regard to the additional amount, his word is accepted. [The rationale is that] he could have claimed that he never divorced her, and in such an instance he would not be held liable for the additional amount. [We assume that had he desired to lie, he would have used that alternative.] He is, however, required to take a rabbinic oath with regard to the additional amount.
Halacha 28
[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce, but does not have her ketubah in her possession. If the local custom is not to compose aketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of] the bill of divorce she is holding. If, however, it is the local custom to compose a ketubah, she is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah, as was explained.63 Her husband must take a rabbinic oath denying her claim, and he is freed of liability.
Halacha 29
[When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she is entitled to collect the amount due her by virtue of both ketubot.64 If she produces twoketubot and one bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect only [the money due her for] one ketubah.65
Which ketubah should she collect? If they are both for the same amount, the later ketubah negates the earlier one, and she is entitled to collect [property that was sold to others] from the date of the later [ketubah].66 If one of them is for a greater sum than the other, she may collect whichever she desires, and the other one is voided.67
Halacha 30
[When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and one ketubah, she has [the right to collect] only [the amount due her by virtue of] one ketubah.68 For when a man divorces his wife and remarries her without specifying any conditions, [it can be assumed] that he remarried her with the intent that her original ketubah[become binding again].
[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce and aketubah after the death of her husband: If the bill of divorce is dated prior to theketubah,69 [in a place where] it is not customary to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of this] bill of divorce,70 and she is entitled to collect the entire sum [mentioned] in the second ketubah, for she acquires this sum by virtue of [her husband's] death.
If her ketubah is dated prior to the bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah only once. [We assume] that when he remarried her, his intent was that her original ketubah [become binding again].
Halacha 31
A woman's word is accepted if she says: "My husband died," so that she [be granted permission to] remarry, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin.71 One of the conditions of the ketubah is that if a woman remarries after the death of her husband, she is entitled to collect the entire sum written in her ketubah.
Therefore, if she came to the court and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry," without mentioning [the collection of the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah at all, she is granted permission to remarry. [Afterwards,] she is required to take an oath,72 and then she is given [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
If she says, "My husband died. Give me the money due me by virtue of myketubah," [not only is she not granted this money,] she is not even permitted to remarry. [We assume that] she came [only] because of the matter of theketubah. Our presumption is that her husband has not died. Her intent is not to remarry, but merely to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubahduring [her husband's] lifetime.
If she came and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry and give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," she is permitted to remarry and is granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. The rationale is that her primary intent is remarriage. If, however, she comes and says: "My husband died. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah, and grant me permission to remarry," she is permitted to remarry, but she is not granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.73 If, however, she seizes possession [of this sum], the court should not expropriate it from her possession.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
I.e., the article or land that the woman brings to the household is evaluated, and the husband takes responsibility for the value of the article. From this time onward, it is as if the article were his, and he is obligated to pay his wife a fixed amount if he divorces her or she is widowed.
|
| 2. |
This term literally means "property [that is like] iron sheep." The term iron is used to indicate that the husband's obligation is unchanging, like iron. The reference to sheep stems from the fact that during the Talmudic period in Eretz Yisrael, a similar agreement was frequently made with a shepherd with regard to the sheep entrusted to him. He was given a herd that was evaluated at a given price, and he was obligated to return either sheep of that value, or payment for them to their owner. (See the commentary of Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Yevamot 7:1.)
|
| 3. |
With this statement, the Rambam indicates that - in contrast to the opinion of certain authorities - the property belonging to a woman does not automatically become nichsei tzon barzel. For it to be placed in that category, the husband must explicitly accept responsibility for it (Maggid Mishneh). (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 85:3.)
|
| 4. |
With regard to this type of property as well, the husband has the privilege to manage the use of the property and reap its benefits during the time he remains married to the woman, but the property itself belongs to her.
|
| 5. |
The term m'log means "to pull out hairs" (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 7:1). Just as a person pulls out the hairs from a head, leaving it uncovered, so too, the husband continues to use his wife's property even though its value depreciates.
|
| 6. |
By making a distinction between the money due a woman by virtue of her ketubah and hernedunyah, the Rambam is emphasizing that they are governed by different laws. With regard to the money of the ketubah, the husband or his estate is granted certain leniencies. But with regard to the nedunyah, by contrast, the woman is considered the same as any other of her husband's creditors (Maggid Mishneh). The Beit Yosef and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 100:2) quote this explanation.
|
| 7. |
See Chapter 10, Halachah 7.
|
| 8. |
Although a creditor has the right to collect his due from the properties of intermediate value, the woman is given this disadvantage. The rationale is that a woman desires to marry and therefore is willing to accept this stipulation (Gittin 50a).
|
| 9. |
The Aruch HaShalem interprets this term as being derived from an Arab word meaning "a rocky field." The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 101:5) states that it refers to a bee that stings and is therefore considered one of the lower forms of life.
|
| 10. |
I.e., a Torah scroll, as mentioned in Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:8. An oath is required because the woman is seeking to collect money from an estate bequeathed to heirs, and whenever payment is to be collected from an estate, an oath is necessary (Ketubot 87a; Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1).
|
| 11. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) states that the woman must also take an oath that she did not seize any of her husband's property. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:2) quotes this view.
|
| 12. |
In contrast to the opinion of the Tur (loc. cit.) and the Hagahot Maimoniot, the Rambam maintains that even if a woman is in possession of her ketubah, she is required to take these oaths. (See Halachah 21.) The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rambam's view, but appears to favor that of the Tur.
|
| 13. |
This refers to a trousseau given to the woman by her husband. Although the husband gave his wife these clothes as a gift, he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and leave his household (Ketubot 54a).
|
| 14. |
In the first half of this halachah, the oath is instituted by the court to protect the interests of the heirs. In this instance, however, unless the husband himself issues a claim requiring an oath (see Halachah 19), no oath is required.
|
| 15. |
From Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 1:5, it appears that this does not apply to a woman's Sabbath and festival clothing, or to her jewelry. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 99:1) states that those articles should be evaluated and deducted from the sum due her by virtue of her ketubah.
|
| 16. |
If, however, the husband is compelled to divorce his wife, her wardrobe should be evaluated and deducted from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; see Ketubot 77a).
|
| 17. |
This restriction applies to a widow, but not to a divorcee. The Rashba and other authorities differ and maintain that the same ruling applies to a divorcee. It appears that it is their opinion that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:1).
|
| 18. |
I.e., and not from movable property. This ruling also applies to other creditors, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:11. (See, however, Halachah 7 below.)
|
| 19. |
E.g., a woman was owed 200 zuz by virtue of her ketubah. Her husband's property was worth 150 zuz at the time of his death. Although its value rose afterwards to 200, the woman is entitled to only 150, because that was its value at the time of her husband's death.
|
| 20. |
This is one of the conditions of a woman's ketubah.
|
| 21. |
Landed property that was owned by a man at the time of his marriage or acceptance of a financial obligation is considered to be on lien to his wife or to his creditor. Even if it is sold to another person, the debt can be collected from it, if the person or his estate has no other property, as stated in Halachah 10. (See also Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh, Chapter 19.)
As mentioned in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 21:1, a creditor is entitled to collect not only the property itself, but also any increment in its value, whether an increment that comes naturally, or even one that results because of effort on the part of the purchaser. A woman is not, however, given this privilege with regard to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
|
| 22. |
I.e., the woman's ketubah mentioned 200 silver coins without specifying the type of coin, and there was a difference between the value of the silver coins used in the country where the ketubah was written and those used in the country where the divorce takes place. If this were a loan contract, we would say that the intent is the coins of the country in which the loan was given. As a leniency to the husband, however, the law is different with regard to a ketubah, and he is obligated to pay only the lesser of the two values.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:5) state that this law applies only when the value of the money the woman receives is not less than 100 zuz of the Talmudic period for a non-virgin, and 200 zuz for a virgin.
|
| 23. |
Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 4:11.
|
| 24. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period, and hence a woman would not feel secure unless the obligation of her ketubah were supported by land. In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property, thus, rose in importance, and a woman would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property.
|
| 25. |
See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:12.
|
| 26. |
Since it was accepted by the majority of the Jewish people, it should be adhered to. See, however, the following halachot.
|
| 27. |
I.e., in certain places this practice was not followed. Although the Rambam maintains that the sons should be granted that privilege, their rights should not be extended beyond their original scope.
|
| 28. |
The Rambam's opinion is accepted by many authorities. Nevertheless, there are dissenting views. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:14) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one.
|
| 29. |
See the Rambam's text of the ketubah, Hilchot Yibbum 4:33.
|
| 30. |
A person has the license to bind his estate to a particular obligation, although he would not be required to pay it by law. Once he makes such a commitment, his estate is bound by it.
|
| 31. |
The Kessef Mishneh explains that in the Rambam's era, the observance of this ordinance had not spread throughout the entire Jewish world. Note the introduction to the Mishneh Torah which states that, in contrast to the ordinances of the Sages of the Talmud, an ordinance instituted by the geonim is not binding unless its observance has spread throughout the entire Jewish people.
The Chelkat Mechokek 100:2 and the Beit Shmuel 100:2 emphasize that the observance of this ordinance spread in the subsequent generations, and it is now universal Jewish practice. Therefore, it is binding even when it was not explicitly stated in the ketubah, and the husband's heirs claim that he was unaware of it.
|
| 32. |
If, however, the husband or his estate possesses property that has not been sold, neither the woman nor another creditor may expropriate property that has already been sold (Gittin 5:2).
|
| 33. |
Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba state that when an oath is made outside the court, God's name is not mentioned, and a Torah scroll is not held. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:19) quotes this view. The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that the fact that the Rambam does not mention such a distinction indicates that he does not accept this concept.
|
| 34. |
Gittin 35a explains that since a widow carries out certain activities on behalf of the heirs of her deceased husband's estate (who are, in most instances, her children), she feels free to take certain articles belonging to the estate, without taking this into consideration. Hence, she might be ready to take an oath that she did not benefit from the estate, when in fact she did.
Since the sin of - and the punishment for - taking a false oath is very harsh, our Sages wished to reduce this severity by having the oath administered outside the court.
|
| 35. |
I.e., the woman will vow never to eat bread on the condition that she benefited from property belonging to the estate. Breaking a vow is considered a less severe transgression than taking a false oath.
|
| 36. |
This principle applies universally: Whenever a person is entitled to property only after taking an oath, that property is not transferred to the person's heirs if the oath had not been taken (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 96:1).
|
| 37. |
Since the woman's second husband has the option of annulling any vows made by his wife, it is possible that she will take a false vow, relying on her husband to nullify it (Gittin 35b).
|
| 38. |
Our Sages required the woman to take an oath because they were not sure that she made a complete account of the money she received. Requiring her to take an oath insures that she will, in fact, be careful regarding this account (Ketubot 87b).
|
| 39. |
The fact that witnesses were made to observe payment of one portion of the ketubah is no proof that a second payment was not made without being observed by witnesses.
|
| 40. |
The fact that she appears precise in reporting what she admits to having received is not proof that she has made a totally precise accounting (Ketubot, loc. cit.).
Similar laws apply to a creditor who states that he is actually owed a lesser amount than is stated in the contract of loan (Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1).
|
| 41. |
Since the husband has only one witness to support his claim, and the woman's claim is supported by her ketubah, she is entitled to collect her full claim. Nevertheless, because of the witness, an oath is required.
|
| 42. |
In contrast to a woman who diminishes the amount of money due her by virtue of her ketubah(Halachah 14), this woman does not admit receiving any funds. Hence, there is no need to require an oath so that she will make a careful account (Bayit Chadash, Even HaEzer 96).
|
| 43. |
Unless a specific statement was made to that effect, the stipulation that her husband accepted at the time of the composition of the ketubah applies only to himself and not to his heirs.
|
| 44. |
The Rambam's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 98:6). The Ramah, however, cites the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and other Ashkenazic authorities, who maintain that the husband's stipulation is not binding upon his heirs.
|
| 45. |
The Ra'avad maintains that the woman's claim should be accepted without an oath. Since the husband made such a stipulation, it would have become public knowledge. Any person who purchased the property knew about the matter and accepted the risk. It is, however, the Rambam's ruling that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
|
| 46. |
The fact that she maintained possession of her ketubah indicates that her delay in presenting her claim does not indicate a willingness to forego it.
|
| 47. |
This distinction is, however, relevant in Halachah 23.
|
| 48. |
For perhaps she has already received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or she has waived payment of this debt.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:6) quotes the Rambam's rulings. The Ramah quotes rulings that allow the woman to collect the money due her even in such an instance. Nevertheless, he states that the prevailing custom is not to allow a woman to collect her claim unless she is in possession of her ketubah.
|
| 49. |
In the Talmudic period, there were places where it was not customary to compose a written document spelling out the marriage contract. Nevertheless, it was understood by both the husband and the wife that the financial dimensions of their marriage would be governed by the rules expressed in our Sages' requirements for the ketubah.
|
| 50. |
When the husband claims to have paid the woman her due, he must prove his assertion. Otherwise, the woman's claim is accepted (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 51. |
This amount is granted the woman voluntarily by her husband and is not required by Jewish law. Therefore, unless the woman has proof that the commitment was made, she is not entitled to collect anything from her husband (Maggid Mishneh).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 100) states that even if a woman can prove that her husband made a commitment for an additional amount to her at the time of the marriage, she must also prove that this commitment was not met.
|
| 52. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 101) maintains that the Rambam's wording indicates that even if she remains silent, she foregoes only the essential requirement of the ketubah, but not the additional commitment that her husband made. However, Rav Yosef Karo dismisses this interpretation in theKessef Mishneh and does not mention it in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 101).
|
| 53. |
As reflected in the conclusion of this halachah, although a widow has the right to continue dwelling in her deceased husband's home, the heirs also have the right to dwell there. Since she is deriving her subsistence from them, she is ashamed to demand payment of her due from them.
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| 54. |
Or she remarries (Ramah, Even HaEzer 101:1).
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| 55. |
Objections to this statement are raised by the Ra'avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen and others. The claim for which the husband is required to take an oath involves a liability for which landed property is under lien. In such instances, a Torah oath is never administered. The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) and others, therefore, maintain that a rabbinic oath (sh'vuat hesset) is administered.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to an instance in his time, when, as stated in Halachot 8-9, the lien of the ketubah applies to movable as well as landed property. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh's explanation is challenged by other authorities, and even theMaggid Mishneh himself raises questions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16) mentions both opinions.
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| 56. |
As in all cases of Torah law, the testimony of two witnesses is required in this instance. TheMaggid Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, both of these witnesses may have witnessed the events under consideration when they were minors. In both the Kessef Mishnehand in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo differs and states that it is acceptable if one of these witnesses observed the events as a minor, but the other must have been past majority at that time.
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| 57. |
Generally, a witness's testimony is not accepted unless he is past majority - not only at the time he testifies in court, but also at the time he sees the event under discussion. In this instance, however, leniency is granted, because we rely on the fact that, by and large, most women are virgins when they marry. Moreover, the obligation of the ketubah is a point of Rabbinic law (Ketubot 28a; Hilchot Edut 14:3).
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| 58. |
For if a ketubah was composed, the text of the ketubah will clarify the matter. There is, however, an instance where this ruling would be applicable in a place where it is customary to compose aketubah: an instance where the woman brings witnesses who testify that her ketubah was lost (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 59. |
The simple meaning of the Rambam's words is that if a woman makes such a statement, she is free to marry another person. As in Chapter 4, Halachah 13, the Ra'avad differs, explaining that the woman's statements are accepted only after the fact - i.e., after she has already married another person - and only insomuch as to require that other person to divorce her.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:2) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ra'avad's position is quoted by the Ramah. The Ramah also mentions that in the present age, since brash conduct has become more widespread, this claim is no longer accepted when presented by a woman. TheBeit Shmuel 17:4 mentions that, at present, since it is customary for a record of divorces to be kept by the rabbinical court that issues them, this claim is no longer accepted. This is particularly true in the present age, when record-keeping and communication have advanced.
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| 60. |
The Ra'avad and the Ramah differ, as above.
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| 61. |
The essential requirement of the ketubah is an obligation imposed by our Sages, granted so that she would have the means to marry another person in the case of divorce or widowhood. Hence, since she is granted the opportunity of remarrying in this instance, she is also entitled to the money due her by virtue of the ketubah. The additional amount, by contrast, is not an obligation, but rather a present promised by her husband. It is self-understood that he did not make this promise to enable her to marry another man, when he does not admit that a divorce took place (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 62. |
The authorities who free the husband of obligation in the previous halachah also free him of all liability in this instance (Chelkat Mechokek 100:40; Beit Shmuel 100:40).
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| 63. |
Halachot 21-22.
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| 64. |
We assume that the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of herketubah. Afterwards, the couple remarried, and the husband subsequently divorced her a second time, without paying her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
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| 65. |
The laws that follow apply when the dates of both the ketubot precede the date of the bill of divorce, and thus it is apparent that the woman was divorced only once.
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| 66. |
As mentioned previously, all of a husband's property is under lien to the ketubah. Therefore, if he sells his landed property to others and he does not possess sufficient property after the divorce to give his wife her due, she may collect that money by expropriating property that was sold. In this instance, we say that the woman waived payment of her ketubah originally to free from the lien property that was sold. Afterwards, her husband wrote her a second ketubah for the same amount.
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| 67. |
In this instance, we assume that the husband wrote the woman a second ketubah that would preempt the first one. In this instance, the woman has the choice of selecting which ketubah she desires - the one with the greater sum, or the one that is dated first and thus gives her greater power with regard to the expropriation of property that has been sold.
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| 68. |
As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam's statements, this refers to a situation in which the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her without composing a second ketubah.
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| 69. |
We assume that her husband divorced her and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of herketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her and composed a ketubah.
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| 70. |
As explained in Halachah 28.
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| 71. |
Chapter 12, Halachah 15. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:2.)
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| 72. |
I.e., the oath made by all widows before collecting the money due them by virtue of their ketubah(Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh), in contrast to the opinion of the Tur (Even HaEzer 100), who requires the woman to take an oath that her husband died. (See Chelkat Mechokek 17:83.)
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| 73. |
This is a question that is left unresolved by the Talmud (Yevamot 117a). The Rambam rules that since the matter is very severe - if the woman remarries, and it is discovered that she lied, she will be prohibited to remain married to both her first or second husbands, and her children from her second husband will be considered illegitimate - and if her first husband is alive, it is likely that the fact will be discovered - in theory, the woman should be allowed to remarry. Because she mentions her ketubah, however, there is a doubt, and because of the doubt, the money in question is allowed to remain in the hands of the party in whose possession it is at the time the question is raised - i.e., the heirs. That doubt, however, applies only to the financial dimension of the relationship, and not to the permission to remarry (Kessef Mishneh).
Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the doubt raised by the Talmud also applies with regard to the woman's permission to remarry. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:44), although it appears that the Rambam's approach is favored.
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• Thursday, Adar 7, 5775 · 26 February 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: T'ruma, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 39-43.
Tanya: And from this (p. 119)...little by little. (p. 121).
It is imperative that every Jew know that he is an emissary of the Master of all, charged with the mission - wherever he may be of bringing into reality G-d's will and intention in creating the universe, namely, to illuminate the world with the light of Torah and avoda. This is done through performing practical mitzvot and implanting in oneself fine character traits.
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayikra, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 39-43.
Tanya: Ch. 36. It is a (p. 163)...else besides me." (p. 163).
Walking in the street one must think words of Torah. Whether to actually pronounce the words depends on the place, if one is permitted - according to Torah law - to utter words of Torah there. But when someone goes about not occupied with Torah words,1then the stone he treads on exclaims: "Bulach! ('clod', in Russian) How dare you trample me! How are you any higher than I am?"
FOOTNOTES
1. See 15 Adar I.
Daily Thought:
Working with the Body
It used to be that the soul fought with the body, until one conquered the other by force.
Then the Baal Shem Tov came and taught a new path: The body, too, could come to appreciate those things the soul desires.
In the place of self-affliction and fasting, the Baal Shem Tov showed his students the way of meditation and joy. Every need of the body, he taught, could provide a channel to carry the soul high.[Hayom Yom, 28 Shvat. 16 Tamuz 5716. Igrot Kodesh, vol. 6 page 157. Ibid, vol. 10, pg. 240.]
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