Today in Judaism: Today is: Sunday, 26 Tevet 5774 · 28 December
2013
Today in Jewish History:
• Sicilian Jews Forced to Wear Jewish Badges (1369)
On December 25, 1369 (5129), King Frederick III of Sicily
ordered all Jews to wear a badge indicating their heritage. The badge consisted
of a piece of red material, not smaller than the largest royal seal; men were
required to wear it under the chin, and women on the chest.
Daily Quote:
The wholesome simplicity of the simple Jew touches on the
utterly simple essence of G-d(Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov)
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Bo, 1st Portion Exodus 10:1-10:11 with Rashi
• Chapter 10
1. The Lord said to Moses: "Come to Pharaoh, for I have
hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, in order that I may place
these signs of Mine in his midst, א. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה בֹּא אֶל פַּרְעֹה
כִּי אֲנִי הִכְבַּדְתִּי אֶת לִבּוֹ וְאֶת לֵב עֲבָדָיו לְמַעַן שִׁתִי אֹתֹתַי אֵלֶּה
בְּקִרְבּוֹ:
The Lord said to Moses: Come to Pharaoh: and warn him.
ויאמר ה' אל משה בא אל פרעה: והתרה בו:
that I may place: Heb. שִׁתִי, lit., My placing, that I may
place. — [after the targumim]
שתי: שימי שאשית אני:
2. and in order that you tell into the ears of your son and your
son's son how I made a mockery of the Egyptians, and [that you tell of] My
signs that I placed in them, and you will know that I am the Lord." ב. וּלְמַעַן
תְּסַפֵּר בְּאָזְנֵי בִנְךָ וּבֶן בִּנְךָ אֵת אֲשֶׁר הִתְעַלַּלְתִּי בְּמִצְרַיִם
וְאֶת אֹתֹתַי אֲשֶׁר שַׂמְתִּי בָם וִידַעְתֶּם כִּי אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
I made a mockery: Heb. הִתְעַלַלְתִּי, I mocked, like “Because
you mocked (הִתְעַלַלְתִּי) me” (Num. 22:29); “Will it not be just as He mocked
(הִתְעַלֵל) them” (I Sam. 6:6), stated in regard to Egypt. It is not an
expression meaning a “deed and acts (מַעִלָלִים),” however, for were that so,
He would have written עוֹלַלְתִּי, like “and deal (וְעוֹלֵל) with them as You
have dealt (עוֹלַלְתָּ) with me” (Lam. 1:22); “which has been dealt (עוֹלֵל) to
me” (Lam. 1:12).
התעללתי: שחקתי, כמו (במדבר כב כט) כי התעללת בי, (שמואל א' ו ו) הלא
כאשר התעולל בהם, האמור במצרים. ואינו לשון פועל ומעללים, שאם כן היה לו לכתוב עוללתי,
כמו (איכה א כב) ועולל למו כאשר עוללת לי, (שם כב) אשר עולל לי:
3. So Moses and Aaron came to Pharaoh and said to him, "So
said the Lord, the God of the Hebrews, How long will you refuse to humble
yourself before Me? Let My people go, and they will worship Me. ג. וַיָּבֹא
משֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן אֶל פַּרְעֹה וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֵלָיו כֹּה אָמַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵי הָעִבְרִים
עַד מָתַי מֵאַנְתָּ לֵעָנֹת מִפָּנָי שַׁלַּח עַמִּי וְיַעַבְדֻנִי:
to humble yourself: Heb. לֵעָנֹת, as the Targum [Onkelos]
renders, לְאִתְכְּנָעָא, and it is derived from עָנִי. You have refused to be
humble and meek before Me.
לענת: כתרגומו לאתכנעא, והוא מגזרת עני, מאנת להיות עני ושפל מפני:
4. For if you refuse to let [them] go, behold, tomorrow I am
going to bring locusts into your borders.
ד. כִּי אִם מָאֵן אַתָּה לְשַׁלֵּחַ אֶת
עַמִּי הִנְנִי מֵבִיא מָחָר אַרְבֶּה בִּגְבֻלֶךָ:
5. And they will obscure the view of the earth, and no one will
be able to see the earth, and they will eat the surviving remnant, which
remains for you from the hail, and they will eat all your trees that grow out
of the field. ה. וְכִסָּה אֶת עֵין הָאָרֶץ וְלֹא יוּכַל לִרְאֹת אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְאָכַל
| אֶת יֶתֶר הַפְּלֵטָה הַנִּשְׁאֶרֶת לָכֶם מִן הַבָּרָד וְאָכַל אֶת כָּל הָעֵץ הַצֹּמֵחַ
לָכֶם מִן הַשָּׂדֶה:
the view of the earth: Heb. עֵין הָאָרֶץ, the view of the earth.
את עין הארץ: את מראה הארץ:
and no one will be able: Heb. יוּכַל lit., and will not be able.
The seer [will not be able] to see the earth, but [the text] speaks briefly.
ולא יוכל וגו': הרואה לראות את הארץ, ולשון קצרה דבר:
6. And your houses and the houses of all your servants and the
houses of all the Egyptians will be filled, which your fathers and your
fathers' fathers did not see since the day they were on the earth until this
day.' " [Therewith,] he turned and left Pharaoh. ו. וּמָלְאוּ בָתֶּיךָ וּבָתֵּי
כָל עֲבָדֶיךָ וּבָתֵּי כָל מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר לֹא רָאוּ אֲבֹתֶיךָ וַאֲבוֹת אֲבֹתֶיךָ
מִיּוֹם הֱיוֹתָם עַל הָאֲדָמָה עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה וַיִּפֶן וַיֵּצֵא מֵעִם פַּרְעֹה:
7. Pharaoh's servants said to him, "How long will this one
be a stumbling block to us? Let the people go and they will worship their God.
Don't you yet know that Egypt is lost?"
ז. וַיֹּאמְרוּ עַבְדֵי פַרְעֹה אֵלָיו עַד
מָתַי יִהְיֶה זֶה לָנוּ לְמוֹקֵשׁ שַׁלַּח אֶת הָאֲנָשִׁים וְיַעַבְדוּ אֶת יְהֹוָה
אֱלֹהֵיהֶם הֲטֶרֶם תֵּדַע כִּי אָבְדָה מִצְרָיִם:
Don’t you yet know: Heb. הִטֶרֶם תֵּדַע, do you not know yet
that Egypt is lost?-[Rashi and Rashbam from targumim]
הטרם תדע: העוד לא ידעת כי אבדה מצרים:
8. [Thereupon,] Moses and Aaron were brought back to Pharaoh,
and he said to them, "Go, worship the Lord your God. Who and who are
going?" ח. וַיּוּשַׁב אֶת משֶׁה וְאֶת אַהֲרֹן אֶל פַּרְעֹה וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם
לְכוּ עִבְדוּ אֶת יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם מִי וָמִי הַהֹלְכִים:
were brought back: They were brought back by a messenger, whom
they [the Egyptians] sent after them, and they returned them to Pharaoh.
ויושב: הושבו על ידי שליח ששלחו אחריהם והשיבום אל פרעה:
9. Moses said, "With our youth and with our elders we will
go, with our sons and with our daughters, with our flocks and with our cattle
we will go, for it is a festival of the Lord to us." ט.
וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה בִּנְעָרֵינוּ וּבִזְקֵנֵינוּ נֵלֵךְ בְּבָנֵינוּ וּבִבְנוֹתֵנוּ בְּצֹאנֵנוּ
וּבִבְקָרֵנוּ נֵלֵךְ כִּי חַג יְהֹוָה לָנוּ:
10. So he [Pharaoh] said to them, "So may the Lord be with
you, just as I will let you and your young children out. See that evil is
before your faces. י. וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם יְהִי כֵן יְהֹוָה עִמָּכֶם
כַּאֲשֶׁר אֲשַׁלַּח אֶתְכֶם וְאֶת טַפְּכֶם רְאוּ כִּי רָעָה נֶגֶד פְּנֵיכֶם:
just as I will let you… out: and surely I will not let the
flocks and the cattle out as you said.
כאשר אשלח אתכם ואת טפכם: אף כי אשלח גם את הצאן ואת הבקר כאשר אמרתם:
See that evil is before your faces: [Understand this] as the
Targum [Onkelos] renders it. I have [also] heard an Aggadic midrash, however
[which explains the passage as follows]: There is a star named Ra’ah [i.e., רָעָה
meaning evil]. Pharaoh said to them [Moses and Aaron], “With my astrology I see
that star ascending toward you in the desert [where you would like to go], and
that is a sign of blood and slaughter.” When the Israelites sinned with the
calf, and the Holy One, blessed be He, sought to kill them, Moses said in his
prayer, “Why should the Egyptians say, ‘With Ra’ah He took them out…?’” (Exod.
32:12) This is what he [Pharaoh] said to them, “See that Ra’ah [evil] is
opposite your faces,” [implying that their blood would be shed in the desert].
Immediately, “The Lord repented of the Ra’ah [the sign of the star]” (Exod.
32:14), and He turned the bloodshed [symbolized by this star] into the blood of
the circumcision, for Joshua [in fact] circumcised them. This is the meaning of
what is said: “This day I have rolled away the reproach of the Egyptians from
you” (Josh. 5:9), for they were saying to you, “We see blood over you in the
desert.” -[from Midrash Shir Hashirim, Wertheimer 1:2]
ראו כי רעה נגד פניכם: כתרגומו. ומדרש אגדה שמעתי כוכב אחד יש ששמו
רעה. אמר להם פרעה רואה אני באיצטגנינות שלי אותו כוכב עולה לקראתכם במדבר, והוא סימן
דם והריגה וכשחטאו ישראל בעגל ובקש הקב"ה להרגם אמר משה בתפלתו (שמות לב יב) למה
יאמרו מצרים לאמר ברעה הוציאם, זו היא שאמר להם ראו כי רעה נגד פניכם, מיד (שם יד)
וינחם ה' על הרעה והפך את הדם לדם מילה, שמל יהושע אותם, וזהו שנאמר (יהושע ה ט) היום
גלותי את חרפת מצרים מעליכם, שהיו אומרים לכם דם אנו רואין עליכם במדבר:
11. Not so; let the men go now and worship the Lord, for that is
what you request." And he chased them out from before Pharaoh. יא. לֹא כֵן לְכוּ נָא הַגְּבָרִים וְעִבְדוּ
אֶת יְהֹוָה כִּי אֹתָהּ אַתֶּם מְבַקְשִׁים וַיְגָרֶשׁ אֹתָם מֵאֵת פְּנֵי פַרְעֹה:
Not so: as you have said [that you want] to take the young
children with you, but let the men go and worship the Lord. — [from Jonathan]
לא כן: כאשר אמרתם להוליך הטף עמכם אלא לכו נא הגברים ועבדו את ה':
for that is what you request: ([meaning] that worship) you have
requested until now, [telling me,] “Let us offer and sacrifice to our God”
(Exod. 5:8), and young children do not usually offer up sacrifices. — [from
Exod. Rabbah 13:5]
כי אתה אתם מבקשים: כי אותה בקשתם עד הנה (שמות ה ח) נזבחה לאלהינו,
ואין דרך הטף לזבוח:
And he chased them out: This is elliptical, for it does not
specify who the chaser was.
ויגרש אתם: הרי זה לשון קצר ולא פירש מי המגרש:
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Daily Tehillim: Psalm Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
• Verses 97-176
97. O how I love Your Torah! All day it is my discussion.
98. Your commandments make me wiser than my enemies, for they
are ever with me.
99. From all my teachers I have gained wisdom, for Your
testimonies are my discussion.
100. I will be more perceptive than elders, because I have
guarded Your precepts.
101. I have restrained my feet from every evil path, that I
might keep Your word.
102. I have not turned away from Your judgments, for You have
instructed me.
103. How sweet are Your words to my palate, [sweeter] than honey
to my mouth!
104. From Your precepts I gain understanding, therefore I hate
every path of falsehood.
105. Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.
106. I have sworn-and I will fulfill it-to keep Your righteous
judgments.
107. I am afflicted to the extreme; grant me life, O Lord,
according to Your promise.
108. Accept with favor, O Lord, the offerings of my lips, and
teach me Your laws.
109. My soul is in danger always, yet I have not forgotten Your
Torah.
110. The wicked laid a snare for me, yet I have not strayed from
Your precepts.
111. I have taken Your testimonies as an eternal heritage, for
they are the joy of my heart.
112. I have inclined my heart to perform Your statutes, forever,
to the last.
113. I despise vain thoughts, but I love Your Torah.
114. You are my refuge and my shield; I place hope in Your
promise.
115. Turn away from me, you evildoers, and I will keep the
commandments of my God.
116. Support me according to Your promise, and I will live; let
me not be shamed because of my hope.
117. Sustain me, and I will be saved, and I will be engrossed in
Your statutes always.
118. You trample all who stray from Your statutes, for their
ploy is a lie.
119. You have purged all the wicked of the earth like dross,
therefore I love Your testimonies.
120. My flesh bristles from fear of You, and I am in awe of Your
judgments.
121. I practiced justice and righteousness; leave me not to my
oppressors.
122. Guarantee Your servant goodness; let not the wicked exploit
me.
123. My eyes long for Your salvation, and for the word of Your
righteousness.
124. Treat Your servant according to Your kindness, and teach me
Your statutes.
125. I am Your servant; grant me understanding, that I may know
Your testimonies.
126. It is time to act for the Lord; they have abrogated Your
Torah.
127. Therefore I love Your commandments more than gold, even
fine gold.
128. Therefore I affirmed all Your precepts; I have hated every
path of falsehood.
129. Your testimonies are wondrous, therefore does my soul guard
them.
130. Your opening words illuminate, enlightening the simple.
131. I opened my mouth and swallowed, because I craved Your
commandments.
132. Turn to me and favor me, as is [Your] law for those who
love Your Name.
133. Set my steps in Your word, and let no iniquity rule over
me.
134. Deliver me from the oppression of man, and I will keep Your
precepts.
135. Let Your face shine upon Your servant, and teach me Your
statutes.
136. My eyes shed streams of water, because they do not keep
Your Torah.
137. Righteous are you, O Lord, and Your judgments are upright.
138. You commanded Your testimonies in righteousness and great
faithfulness.
139. My zeal consumes me, because my enemies have forgotten Your
words.
140. Your word is very pure, and Your servant cherishes it.
141. I am young and despised, yet I do not forget Your precepts.
142. Your righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and
Your Torah is truth.
143. Trouble and anguish have taken hold of me, yet Your
commandments are my delight.
144. Your testimonies are righteous forever; give me
understanding, that I may live.
145. I call out with all my heart; answer me, O Lord; I will
keep Your statutes.
146. I call out to You; save me, and I will observe Your
testimonies.
147. I rose before dawn and cried out; my hope is in Your word.
148. My eyes preceded the night watches, that I may discuss Your
word.
149. Hear my voice in keeping with Your kindness; O Lord, grant
me life as is Your practice.
150. Those who pursue mischief draw near; they are far from Your
Torah.
151. You are near, O Lord, and all Your commandments are truth.
152. From the beginning I discerned from Your testimonies that
You had established them forever.
153. Behold my affliction and deliver me, for I have not
forgotten Your Torah.
154. Wage my battle and redeem me; grant me life for the sake of
Your word.
155. Salvation is far from the wicked, for they seek not Your
statutes.
156. Your mercies are great, O Lord; grant me life as is Your
practice.
157. My pursuers and my enemies are many, yet I did not turn
away from Your testimonies.
158. I saw traitors and I quarreled with them, because they do
not keep Your words.
159. Behold how I love Your precepts; grant me life, O Lord,
according to Your kindness.
160. The beginning of Your word is truth, and forever are all
Your righteous judgements.
161. Princes have pursued me without cause, but it is Your word
my heart fears.
162. I rejoice at Your word, like one who finds abundant spoil.
163. I hate falsehood and abhor it, but Your Torah I love.
164. Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous
judgments.
165. There is abundant peace for those who love Your Torah, and
there is no stumbling for them.
166. I hoped for Your salvation, O Lord, and I performed Your
commandments.
167. My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them
intensely.
168. I have kept Your precepts and Your testimonies, for all my
ways are before You
169. Let my prayer approach Your presence, O Lord; grant me
understanding according to Your word.
170. Let my supplication come before You; save me according to
Your promise.
171. My lips will utter praise, for You have taught me Your
statutes.
172. My tongue will echo Your word, for all Your commandments
are just.
173. Let Your hand be ready to help me, for I have chosen Your
precepts.
174. I long for Your salvation, O Lord, and Your Torah is my
delight.
175. Let my soul live, and it will praise You, and let Your
judgment help me.
176. I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out Your
servant, for I have not forgotten Your commandments.
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Today in Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 14
• Sunday, 26 Tevet 5774 – 29 December 2013
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 14
In previous chapters the Alter Rebbe explained that though the
Beinoni is unsullied by sin in thought, speech or action, the internal evil of
his animal soul remains strong enough to desire evil. That these desires do not
find any practical expression is due only to the divine soul’s restraining
them, with the aid given it by the Almighty. The Alter Rebbe now continues:
והנה מדת הבינוני היא מדת כל אדם ואחריה כל אדם ימשוך
Now, the rank of Beinoni is one that is attainable by every man;
each person should strive after it if he has not yet attained it, and should
not think it beyond his reach,
שכל אדם יכול להיות בינוני בכל עת ובכל שעה
for every person can, at any time or hour, be a Beinoni,
כי הבינוני אינו מואס ברע
because a Beinoni does not abhor evil; unlike the tzaddik, he
does not find worldly pleasures revolting and loathsome.
שזהו דבר המסור ללב
For this is a matter entrusted to the heart, and as explained
earlier, the Beinoni has yet to conquer [the evil in] his heart; consequently,
he does not loathe evil.
ולא כל העתים שוות
Also, not all times are alike.
There are times — such as during prayer — when one’s heart is
open and receptive; at such time he may evoke a loathing towards evil. At other
times the heart may be “blocked” and spiritually insensitive, and one is
incapable of loathing evil.
Inasmuch as the Beinoni’s attitude towards evil varies, while
his status of Beinoni remains constant, it is understood that loathing evil is
not the measure of the Beinoni.
אלא סור מרע ועשה טוב דהיינו בפועל ממש במעשה דבור ומחשבה
Rather, the task of the Beinoni is only to “turn away from evil
and do good,” in actual practice — in deed, speech and thought.
שבהם הבחירה והיכולת והרשות נתונה לכל אדם
In these matters, as opposed to “matters of the heart,” every
man is given the choice, ability and freedom
לעשות ולדבר ולחשוב גם מה שהוא נגד תאות לבו והפכה ממש
to act, speak and think even that which is contrary to the
desire of his heart and diametrically opposed to it.
כי גם בשעה שהלב חומד ומתאוה איזו תאוה גשמיית בהיתר, או באיסור חס
ושלום
For even when one’s heart craves and desires a material
pleasure, whether permitted, in which case it is only the lustful nature of the
desire that is evil (instead of desiring the pleasure “for the sake of heaven,”
as he should, he seeks self-gratification), or whether, G‑d forbid, he desires that which is forbidden, and the desire is
intrinsically evil; whatever sort of craving it is —
יכול להתגבר ולהסיח דעתו ממנה לגמרי, באמרו ללבו
he can conquer [this desire] and divert his attention from it
altogether, by declaring to himself (“saying to his heart”) [as follows]:
אינני רוצה להיות רשע אפילו שעה אחת
“I do not want to be a rasha — in succumbing to the blandishments
of the animal soul — even for a moment,
כי אינני רוצה להיות מובדל ונפרד חס ושלום מה׳ אחד בשום אופן, כדכתיב:
עונותיכם מבדילים וגו׳
because under no circumstances do I want to be parted and
severed, heaven forbid, from the One G‑d; as is
written,1 “Your iniquities separate. [you from G‑d].”
By reflecting that sin separates one from G‑d, one will conclude that he does not wish to be a rasha, since
he will thereby sever his bond with Him. In this way, one can always “turn away
form evil” and refrain from sin although his heart craves it.
Similarly, in order for one to “do good” and actively perform
the mitzvot, he should declare to himself:
רק אני רוצה לדבקה בו נפשי רוחי ונשמתי, בהתלבשן בשלשה לבושיו יתברך
“I desire, instead, to unite my Nefesh, Ruach and Neshamah with G‑d through investing them in ‘His’ three garments,
שהם מעשה דבור ומחשבה בה׳ ותורתו ומצותיו
namely, action, speech and thought dedicated to G‑d, His Torah and His commandments.
These are called “His” (G‑d’s) three
garments because they lend expression to His wisdom (Torah) and Will (mitzvot),
which are one with G‑d Himself.
מאהבה מסותרת שבלבי לה׳, כמו בלב כללות ישראל שנקראו אוהבי שמך
“This desire to unite with G‑d arises out
of the love of G‑d that is
(surely) hidden in my heart though I do not feel it, just as [this love is
found] in the heart of all Jews, who are called2 ‘lovers of Your (G‑d’s) Name’ by reason of their inherent love of G‑d, although they do not all feel this love consciously.
ואפילו קל שבקלים יכול למסור נפשו על קדושת ה׳, ולא נופל אנכי ממנו
בודאי
“For this reason, even a kal shebekalim (a most unworthy Jew) is
capable of sacrificing his life for the sanctity of G‑d should he be forced to deny Him, G‑d forbid. Surely I am not inferior to him.
As will be explained in later chapters, the ability of even the
lowliest Jew to give up his very life for G‑d stems from
every Jew’s innate, hidden love of G‑d, which is
activated and aroused whenever he feels that he is being torn away from Him.
But if the kal shebekalim does indeed love G‑d so deeply
that he will surrender his life for Him, why is he a kal shebekalim? Why does
he sin? Why does he not observe the mitzvot?
אלא שנכנס בו רוח שטות, ונדמה לו שבעבירה זו עודנו ביהדותו, ואין נשמתו
מובדלת מאלקי ישראל
“It is only that a spirit of folly has overcome (lit., ‘entered’)
him, as our Sages say:3 ‘No man sins unless overcome by a spirit of folly’; he
imagines that committing this sin will not affect his Jewishness, and that his
soul will not be severed thereby from the G‑d of Israel.
In fact, at the moment that a Jew sins he becomes separated from
G‑d. Were the kal shebekalim to realize this, he would never sin.
The “spirit of folly,” however, deludes him into thinking otherwise.
וגם שוכח אהבתו לה׳ המסותרת בלבו
“Similarly, the kal shebekalim neglects the positive mitzvot,
although his natural love of G‑d dictates
that he fulfill them, because he also forgets the love of G‑d hidden in his heart. Were he aware of this love, he would seek
out mitzvot to perform in order to unite with G‑d.
אבל אני אינני רוצה להיות שוטה כמוהו לכפור האמת
All this applies to the kal shebekalim. “But as for me — one
should say to himself — I have no desire to be such a fool as he, to deny the
truth!”
For the truth of the matter is that sin does separate man from G‑d, and that one does have a natural love of G‑d that dictates the performance of mitzvot. “These truths,” one
must say to himself, “I do not wish to deny.”
Such arguments are effective in a conflict with one’s animal
soul over actual thought, speech and action. Using the above-mentioned
reasoning one can prevail over his evil inclination at all times (in both
“turning from evil” and “doing good”), and thereby attain the rank of the
Beinoni.
FOOTNOTES
1. Yeshayahu 59:2.
2. Tehillim 5:12.
3. Sotah 3a.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah Sefer Hamitzvos:
P180
Positive Commandment 180
Punishing False Witnesses
"You shall do to him as he thought to have done to his
brother"—Deuteronomy 19:19.
We are commanded to punish false witnesses by sentencing them to
the exact punishment they wished to impose upon their innocent fellow. If their
testimony was intended to expropriate money, they must pay the amount they
wished the other to lose. If their testimony was intended to impose upon the
defendant corporeal or capital punishment, they are the ones flogged or put to
death.
The 180th mitzvah is that we are commanded to punish witnesses
who have testified falsely with the same consequence they tried to accomplish
with their testimony.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "You must do the same to
them as they plotted to do to their brother."
This is the law regarding eidim zom'mim: if their testimony
would have resulted in someone losing money, we take that amount from them. If
they testified in a case where the defendant would be executed, we kill them
with that form of execution. If they testified in a case where the defendant
would be lashed, we administer lashes to them.
The details of this mitzvah, the various questions which have
been raised regarding it, and how it is proven that the witnesses are zom'mim
to be punishable under this law are explained in tractate Makkos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 19:19.
-------
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: She'ar Avot haTum'ah Chapter 18
Chapter 18
Halacha 1
No matter to what degree doubts and compounded doubts are
multiplied in a public domain, the person or object involved is pure. In a
private domain, by contrast, he is impure.
What is implied? If one entered an alley and there was impurity
in the courtyard to which the alley led. If there was a question whether or not
he entered the courtyard, he is impure because of the doubt, because an alley
is considered a private domain. This same ruling applies if:
a) there is impurity in a house and there is a doubt whether one
entered the house or not, or
b) even if one entered, but there was a doubt whether there was
impurity there or not, or
c) even if one would say that impurity was present when one
entered, there is a doubt whether it comprises the required measure or not, or
d) even if the substance certainly comprises the required
measure, there is a doubt whether it is impure or not, or
e) even if it is certainly impure, there is a doubt whether or
not one touched it.
Halacha 2
If there are nine carcasses of frogs and one carcass of a
creeping animal in a private domain and a person touched one of the carcasses,
but did not know which one, he is impure because of the doubt. If there are
nine carcasses of frogs and one carcass of a frog in a public domain and a person
touched one, he is pure despite the doubt.
This is the general principle: Any time there is a question
concerning impurity in the public domain, the person is pure unless he says:
"I certainly contracted impurity." Any time there is such a question
in a private domain, he is impure unless he says: "It is certain that I
did not contract impurity."
Accordingly, if there are bones from a human corpse and bones
from an animal carcass in the public domain or clods of pure earth and clods of
earth from abeit hapras or from the Diaspora and one touched or
moved one of them, but does not know what he touched or moved, he is pure. This
same ruling applies if there was an olive-sized portion from a human corpse and
an olive-sized portion of an animal carcass and one held a portion of his body
over one of them, but did not know over which one he held a portion of his
body. And it applies if there are two paths, one pure and one impure, one
walked down one of them, but did not know which one he walked down, he touched
a person on the road, but did not know whether he was pure or impure, or there
were two people, one impure and one pure, he touched one, but he did not know
which one he touched.
Halacha 3
The following laws apply when a person journeyed on a road and found
a corpse lying across the width of the road. If it was intact and it extended
from one side of the road to the other, he is impure with regard to terumah,
for it can be assumed that he touched it. If he had space on either side to
pass by or the corpse was dismembered and torn into pieces so that he could
have passed between his hips and the other portions of his body, he is pure.
If a grave extended over the entire width of the road, the
entire corpse is considered as a single entity because of the grave, and one
who passes over it is impure. This instance does not resemble other
questionable situations. Instead, it is assumed that he touched the grave.
Halacha 4
When the carcass of a creeping animal is found in an alley, it
imparts impurity retroactively to all those who passed through until the time
that one said: "I checked this alley on this and this day and there was no
carcass of a creeping animal there." Even if the alley was swept, if it
was not checked, it imparts impurity to those who passed through from before
the time it was swept and afterwards.
When does the above apply? When the carcass that was discovered
was dry. If it was fresh, it does not impart impurity retroactively for that
length of time, only for the length of time in which the animal could have died
and remained as fresh as it was found.
Halacha 5
The following laws apply when there were two spots of saliva in
a private domain. One was pure and one was of unknown origin when discovered
and hence, was decreed to be impure, as explained previously. If one touched or
moved one of them, but does not know which, the status of terumah which
he touches is held in abeyance, because a compounded doubt is involved: Perhaps
he touched the saliva that was known to be pure and perhaps he touched the one
that was found whose status was unknown. Even if he touched the one that was
found, perhaps it was impure, but perhaps it was pure.
Different laws apply if there were two spots of saliva in the
public domain. If they were dry and deposited there and a person touched one of
them, he is pure, despite the doubt. If he carried one of them, the status of
articles he touches is held in abeyance. The rationale is that after he carried
it up, it is no longer deposited in the public domain. Similarly, if one of
them was moist and the moist saliva became attached to him, the status of
articles he touches is held in abeyance, for since it is on his garment, we can
no longer apply the principle: when something is deposited in the public
domain, it is pure despite the doubt.
We already explained that, in all situations, if one touched,
carried, or moved saliva of unknown origin that is discovered, terumah should
be burnt because of it, like a beit hapras, and the like, in which
instances, terumah is burnt in all situations when one has
definitely made contact.
Halacha 6
The following laws apply when a person was sitting in the public
domain and another person whose status is unknown came and trod on his garments
or spat and the saliva touched the person who was sitting. Terumah which
he touches is burnt because of the saliva. With regard to the status of his
clothes, the determination is made based on the status of the majority of the
town's inhabitants. If most are impure, his clothes are considered to have
contractedmidras impurity. If most are pure, he is pure.
Halacha 7
When a person lost a k'li and discovered it in
a private domain, it is considered to have contracted midras impurity
and the impurity connected with a human corpse. If he found it in the public
domain, it is pure, provided he lost it during the day and found it that day.
If he lost it during the day and found it at night, lost it at night and found
it during the day, or lost it during the day and found it on the following day,
it is presumed to be impure.
This is the general principle: Whenever the night - or a portion
of it - passed while an article was lost, it is impure.
Halacha 8
If a person deposited or forgot a k'li in the
public domain, it is pure even when the night passed while it was there. If he
deposited or forgot it in a private domain, it is considered to have contracted midras impurity,
but not the impurity connected with a human corpse.
Why did the Sages not rule as stringently with regard to one who
deposited or forgot an article as they did with regard to one who lost an
article? Because depositing or forgetting an article in the public domain is
not that common a circumstance. Hence, they did not institute a decree
concerning it.
Halacha 9
When a person loses an article and finds it at home, it is pure,
because it can be assumed to be protected.
Halacha 10
When a person spreads utensils out in the public domain, they
are pure. In a private domain, they are impure, lest impure people have touched
them. If he was watching them, they are pure. If they fell and he went to get
them, they are impure, because they went out of his sight. Similarly, if one
lost his utensils in a private domain and found them, even that day, they are
considered to have contracted midras impurity and the impurity
connected with a human corpse, as we explained.
Halacha 11
If there is one intellectually or emotionally compromised woman
or gentile woman in a town, all of the saliva of unknown origin discovered in
any place in the town is always considered as impure.
Halacha 12
The following laws apply when a woman trod on the clothes of a
person or sat with him on a small boat: If she recognizes him and knows that he
partakes ofterumah, his clothes are pure. If not, he should ask her
concerning her state.
Halacha 13
When a person slept in the public domain and arose, his garments
are pure.
Halacha 14
When a person touched another person in the public domain at
night and did not know if he was alive or dead, but when he arose in the
morning, he found him dead, he is impure, for the status of all questions of
ritual impurity depends on the situation at the time the matter is discovered.
If he saw him alive in the evening and, in the morning, discovered that he
died, this is considered to be a doubt in the public domain, and he is pure.
Halacha 15
The following rules apply when a person in a private domain is
dangerously ill, he fainted, and it was not known whether he died or was still
living; he was taken to the public domain and then brought back into a private
domain. When he is in a private domain, any questionable situations brought
about by his condition are considered impure. When he is in a public domain,
any questionable situations brought about by his condition are considered pure.
An incident occurred with a person who was sick and was carried
from town to town in a bed. The people who carried him took turns. Ultimately,
it was discovered that he had died, but the Sages ruled that only the last
group of people who carried him was impure.
Halacha 16
The following rules apply when an impure person was standing and
speaking while at the edge of a cistern, a drop of saliva shot forth from his
mouth, and there was a question whether or not it reached the cistern. If the
cistern contained oil and was in a private domain, it is impure because of the
doubt. If the cistern contained wine, it is pure in all places despite the
doubt, because the border of the cistern will prevent it from entering.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Edut Chapter 20, Edut Chapter 21, Edut Chapter 22
Chapter 20
Halacha 1
Lying witnesses are neither executed,
given lashes, or required to make financial restitution unless both of them
were fit to serve as witnesses and they were both disqualified through hazamah after the judgment was rendered.
If, however, only one of them was
disqualified through hazamah,
they were both disqualified through hazamah before the judgment was rendered, or
after the judgment was rendered, one of them was disqualified because of family
connections or because he was unfit to serve as a witness, the witnesses are
not punished, even though they are disqualified through hazamah and no longer acceptable to deliver
testimony in all matters of Scriptural Law.
Halacha 2
Although according to Talmudic logic
one might differ, if the person against whom they testified was executed and
then they were disqualified throughhazamah, they are not executed. This
is derived from Deuteronomy 19:19: which speaks of: 'what they
conspired to do.' Implied is that it was not already done. This rule is part of
the Oral Tradition.
If, however, the person against whom
they testified was lashed, they are lashed. Similarly, if money was
expropriated from one person and given to another, it is returned to its owner
and the witnesses are required to pay the penalty.
Halacha 3
The following laws apply if there were
three or even 100 witnesses. If the witnesses deliver testimony in court one
after the other, each one testifying immediately after his colleague and
several of them were disqualified throughhazamah, they do not receive
punishment until all of them are disqualified through hazamah.
If, however, the interval between
testimonies was greater than the time it takes a student to greet a teacher,
the testimonies are divided and the two who were disqualified through hazamah are punished. The two who testified
after there was such an interlude between their testimony and that of the first
pair are not punished. This applies even though the entire testimony is
disqualified because all of the witnesses are considered as one group and when
the testimony of part of a group is disqualified, the entire testimony is
disqualified.
Halacha 4
When one witness delivers testimony,
that testimony is investigated, and the second witness states: 'I also testify
like him,' 'Yes, this is what happened,' or the like, they are both executed,
lashed, or subjected to a financial penalty if they are both disqualified
through hazamah. The
rationale is that any witness who says 'Yes, this is what happened' after his
colleague testified is considered as having testified and responded to
cross-examination as his colleague did.
There is no concept of inadvertent
transgression with regard to lying witnesses, because the transgression does
not involve a deed. Therefore there is no need for a warning as we explained.
Halacha 5
Just as two witnesses can disqualify
100 witnesses through hazamah if the 100 testify at one time; so,
too, they can disqualify them through hazamah if they testify as 50 groups, coming
two by two.
What is implied? A group of witnesses
testified that Reuven killed Shimon in Jerusalem. Two witnesses came and
disqualified that group through hazamah.
Another group came and delivered that same testimony, that Reuven killed Shimon
in Jerusalem and these same two witnesses arose and disqualified that group
through hazamah. This
happened a third time and a fourth time. Even if it happens 100 times, all the
other witnesses are executed on the basis of the testimony of these two.
Halacha 6
When one group of witnesses testify
that Reuven killed Shimon in Jerusalem and a second group come and disqualify
the first group through hazamah,
the lying witnesses should be executed and Reuven's life saved. If a third
group come and disqualify the second group through hazamah, the second group and
Reuven should be executed and the lives of the first group saved.
If a fourth group come and disqualify
the third group through hazamah,
the third and the first groups should be executed and the lives of Reuven and
the second group saved. Similarly, even if there are 100 groups, each one
disqualifying the testimony of the previous through hazamah, one group's testimony
is accepted and the other group's testimony is disqualified.
Halacha 7
When witnesses testify that a person
who is trefe murdered a person and then the
witnesses are disqualified through hazamah,
the witnesses are not executed. The rationale is that even if they had killed
him with their hands, they would not be executed, because he is trefe.
Similarly, if witnesses who were trefe testified concerning a matter
punishable by execution by the court and were disqualified through hazamah, they are not executed.
The rationale is that if their testimony was disqualified throughhazamah,
and the testimony of the witnesses who testified against them was disqualified
through hazamah, those
witnesses would not be executed, for they disqualified only a person who was trefe.
Halacha 8
The following rule applies when
witnesses testify against another person and have him convicted in a matter
that does not involve lashes, capital punishment, or a financial obligation and
then the witnesses are disqualified throughhazamah. They are given
lashes even though they did not conspire to have the defendant lashed or to
obligate him financially.
What is implied? Witnesses testified
that a priest was a challal,
e.g., they testified that his mother was divorced or released through chalitzah in their presence in this-and-this
place on this-and-this date. If the witnesses are disqualified through hazamah, they are punished by
lashing.
Similarly, if they testified that a
person inadvertently killed a colleague and they are disqualified through hazamah, they are punished by
lashing; they are not exiled. And if they testify that a person's ox killed
another person and they were disqualified through hazamah, they receive lashes
and are not required to pay an atonement fine. If they testify that a person
was sold as a Hebrew servant and they were disqualified through hazamah, they receive lashes.
These four rulings are part of the Oral Tradition.
Halacha 9
With regard to the above matters, our
Sages received the following tradition: When two people cause a righteous
person to be condemned and a wicked person to be vindicated through their
testimony and two others come and disqualify their testimony through hazamah vindicating the righteous person and
condemning the wicked, the first pair of witnesses receive lashes even though
their condemnation of the righteous person would not have had him subjected to
lashes.
If, however, witnesses testify that a
person partook of milk and meat or woreshaatnez, they are punished by
lashes, as implied by Deuteronomy 19:19: 'You shall requite him as
he conspired.'
Halacha 10
When two witnesses testify that Reuven
committed adultery with the daughter of a priest, Reuven was sentenced to death
by strangulation and the daughter of the priest was sentenced to be burnt to
death, and afterwards the witnesses were disqualified through hazamah, they should be
executed by strangulation and not burnt to death. This is part of the Oral
Tradition.
1. If one of them is unacceptable as a
witness, their testimony is no loner effective. Hence they are not punished (Kessef
Mishneh).
2. The second pair of witnesses states
that one, but not the other of the first pair were with them in a different
place at the time they claim that the event transpired.
3. For the punishment was prescribed
only for a pair of witnesses (Rashi,Makkot 5b).
4. As described in Chapter 13.
5. As described in Chapters 10-12.
6. As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah
4. They are, however, acceptable in matters where leniency is granted with
regard to the acceptance of testimony, e.g., testimony concerning the death of
a woman's husband.
7. Our translation is based on the
gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who states that the fundamental
principle the Rambam is trying to convey with this phrase is that capital
punishment is not given unless it is explicitly stated in the Torah. A logical
proof is not sufficient.
What is the logic here? If a person
who conspires to have a person executed should be executed, should not one who
actually caused him to be executed.
8. From the Rambam's Commentary to the
Mishnah and from the gloss of the Radbaz, it appears that although they are not
executed, they should be punished by the court.
9. I.e., what they conspired.
10. I.e., the Torah prescribes
punishment only in such a situation.
11. The Ra'avad and the Kessef Mishneh question the Rambam's source for this
distinction. The Kessef
Mishneh explains that it is
possible to say that since judgment is ultimately in God's hands, had the
executed party not been guilty, God would not have allowed him to be executed.
Hence the lying witnesses need not be punished. Alternatively, he can be
explained that the punishments inflicted by the courts are not goals in their
own right, but means to bring a person to atonement. It is not fitting to give
lying witnesses who had a person executed the opportunity to achieve such
atonement. Since lashes is not as severe a punishment, neither of these
explanations apply.
12. I.e., the plaintiff is required to
return it.
13. For financial penalties are
established based on Talmudic logic (Kessef Mishneh).
14. As the Rambam continues to
explain, the Hebrew term translated as 'immediately after,' toch kidei dibur, has a
specific meaning: The time it takes a student to greet a teacher, saying: Shalom alecha rabbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
15. The Ra'avad questions: Since these
witnesses were not disqualified throughhazamah, why would one think that
they should be punished? The Radbaz answers that the very fact that they
appeared together with lying witnesses implicates them.
The Lechem
Mishneh explains that the
Rambam's intent is that even if the second pair of witnesses were also
disqualified through hazamah,
they are not punished. The rationale is that since their testimony was
separated from that of the first pair and by the time they testified the
defendant could have been executed because of the testimony of the first pair,
their testimony is of no consequence. Hence they are not punished.
16. Thus even if there is no
difficulty at all with the testimony of the last pair of witnesses, the
defendant is not punished. 17. Because they saw the event together and appeared
together in court.
18. The rationale for this distinction
can be explained as follows: With regard to the disqualification of witnesses,
everything is dependent on the testimony of the witnesses in court. Hence if
their testimony is separated, they are not considered as a single group. Their
classification as a single group, by contrast, depends on their coming to court
together. Since they came together with the intent to testify, they are
considered as a single group (Radbaz, Kessef
Mishneh).
The Ra'avad (and Rashi, in his
commentary to Makkot 6a) do not accept the Rambam's
approach and maintain that even though the first pair of witnesses should be
executed, if the testimony of the second pair is validated, the defendant should
also be executed.
19. I.e., he is cross-examined by the
court, as explained in Chapter 2.
20. I.e., despite the fact that he did
not actually testify, it is considered as if he did as the Rambam proceeds to
explain. See also Hilchot
Avodat Kochavim 2:8 which
states that making such statements is equivalent to actually testifying in
court.
21. I.e., they receive punishment even
if they committed the transgression without knowing that it was forbidden.
22. The Radbaz explains that Numbers 15:29, the source for the laws of
inadvertent transgression mentions 'one who acts inadvertently' (see Hilchot Shegagot 1:2). In this context (in contrast to
blasphemy), speaking is not considered as an act. Hence they are not held
liable.
Nevertheless, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer a different rationale why these
witnesses are punished without a warning: They desired to have the defendant
punished although he did not receive a warning. Therefore, they should be
punished without a warning.
23. See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.
24. For the entire purpose of a
warning is to distinguish between a transgression committed willfully and one
committed inadvertently (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2).
25. See Chapter 18, Halachah 3.
26. We do not say that they are lying
and have resolved to testify against anyone who delivers testimony in this
matter (Rashi, Makkot 5a).
27. Because the testimony of the
second group exonerates him from the onus of the testimony of the first group.
28. The second group should be
executed as lying witnesses who sought to have the first group executed. Reuven
should be executed, because once the testimony of the second group has been
disqualified, the testimony of the first group is then reinstated.
29. Because the disqualification of
the second group exonerates them.
30. I.e., he has a physical ailment
that will cause him to die within 12 months.
31. Seemingly, through their
testimony, they are trying to have the defendant executed. Nevertheless,
despite the fact they testify that the person who is trefecommitted a murder, he is
not executed. The rationale is that testimony must be able to be disqualified
through hazamah. Since it
is impossible to punish the witnesses 'as they conspired to do to their
brother,' for they conspired to have a sick person executed and they are
healthy, the concept of hazamah is not relevant, as stated in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:9.
32. And a person who kills a colleague
who is trefe is not liable for execution. For it is
as if he killed a dead person (Sanhedrin 78a; Hilchot
Rotzeach 2:8).
33. Here also, it would appear that
the intent is that since they are seeking to have the person executed, one
might think that they should be executed. In fact, however, their testimony is
not effective in having the defendant sentenced to death. Since they are trefe, there is no possibility
of requiting them 'as they conspired to do to their brother.' For they
conspired to have a healthy person executed and they are sick.
Accordingly, the Kessef Mishneh explains that we are speaking about a
situation where the court did not recognize that the witnesses were trefe when it accepted their testimony.
34. Thus the punishment is not 'as
they conspired to do to their brother.'
35. For the reasons mentioned by the
Rambam in the following halachah.
36. I.e., the descendant of a priest
who is not considered as a member of the priesthood, because he was conceived
in relations forbidden to his father. SeeHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:5.
37. Thus making his mother forbidden
to his father.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger raises a question,
noting that a woman who underwentchalitzah is only forbidden to a priest by
Rabbinic decree. Hence the Ramban and others rule that lashes should not be
given. Rabbi Akiva Eiger himself states that since the defendant is being
disqualified according to Rabbinic decree through the testimony of the
witnesses, and by giving that false testimony, they violate a Scriptural
commandment, it is appropriate that they be punished by lashing.
38. We do not say that the witnesses
should be considered as challalimthemselves.
This applies even if the witnesses are priests. Makkot 2b explains this based on Deuteronomy 19:19: 'And you shall requite him
as he conspired to do to his brother.' The obligation is to requite him, not to
requite his descendants and having him declared a challal would be a punishment against his
descendants as well as him.
39. The lying witnesses are not exiled
"as they conspired to do to" the defendant. The rationale is that Deuteronomy 19:5 says with regard to a person convicted
of inadvertent murder: 'He shall flee to one of these cities.' Makkot, loc. cit., states: ...He,' and not those who
conspire against him.'
40. For an atonement fine is not a
monetary assessment, but rather a fine designated to bring atonement for the
death of the victim. These witnesses do not need that type of atonement, for
their ox did not cause death (Rashi,Makkot, loc. cit.; see also Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:4-5).
See also the Ketzot HaChoshen 38:2 which explains that even though
the witness also caused the ox to be sentenced to death and no benefit to be
derived from it. Nevertheless, the witnesses are lashed and not subjected to
these penalties. See also the Ramban who differs and maintains that the
witnesses are required to make financial restitution and are not lashed.
41. The Nimukei Mahari (based on Makkot, loc. cit.), explains
that the intent is that the witnesses testify that the person stole and did not
have the money to make restitution for the theft.
42. Although Makkot, loc. cit., outlines how
each of these concepts is derived from the exegesis of a verse, since the
concepts are not derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis,
the exegesis is considered as only anasmachta. The binding obligation to
fulfill these directives stems from the fact that they were transmitted through
the Oral Tradition (Radbaz).
43. The Rambam is borrowing the
wording of Deuteronomy 25:1-2: 'And they shall validate
the righteous and condemn the wicked. If the wicked man is deserving of being
beaten...' which continues to speak of the punishment of lashing.
'Condemning the righteous' refers to a
situation where lying witnesses caused judgment to be rendered against a
righteous person.
44. In this situation, we follow the
instructions of the continuation of the verse and punish the person by lashes.
Delivering false testimony violates the prohibition 'Do not deliver false
testimony against your colleague.' Nevertheless, one might think that since
that prohibition does not involve a deed, it is not punishable by lashes. Hence
the exegesis of the above verse is necessary. SeeMakkot 4b (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
45. As in the four cases mentioned in
the previous halachah.
46. I.e., since the lying witnesses
delivered testimony concerning a transgression punishable by lashes, there is
no need for a special teaching to instruct us to give them that punishment.
They are requited in this manner, because this is what they 'conspired to do to
their brother' (Kessef Mishneh).
47. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 3:3 which states that the two parties
to this transgression are given different punishments.
48. Sanhedrin 90a derives this from Deuteronomy 19:19 which speaks of requiting a lying
witness, 'as he conspired to do to his brother,' his brother and not his
sister. This, however, is an asmachta.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions what the
ruling would be in a situation where the witnesses claim to have given a
warning to the woman, but not to the man. He supposes that even in such a
situation, they should be executed by strangulation, not burning.
Chapter 21
Halacha 1
The following rule applies when
witnesses testify that so-and-so divorced his wife and did not pay her the
money due her by virtue of her ketubah and, afterwards, these witnesses were
disqualified through hazamah.
Now either today or tomorrow, when the husband divorces his wife, he must pay
her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
Hence we calculate how much a person would pay for the right to collect the
money due this woman by virtue of her ketubah in the event she would be widowed or
divorced and the witnesses are required to pay this amount.
When calculating this amount, we take
into consideration the state of the woman and the amount of her ketubah. If the woman is sick
or old or there is peace between her and her husband, the value for which her ketubah will be sold will not be the same if
she is young and healthy or there is strife between the couple. For such a
woman is more likely to be divorced and less likely to die.
Similarly, the amount to be received
for a large ketubah is not the same as for a small ketubah. For example, if her ketubah is for 1000 zuz, it might be sold for 100.
If it is for 100, it will not be sold for 10 but for less. These matters are
dependent on the estimates of the judges.
Halacha 2
Similar principles apply in the following
situation. Witnesses testify with regard to a person, saying that he is
obligated to pay so-and-so 1000 zuz in 30 days. The borrower admits the
debt, but says that it is not due until five years and 30 days. If the
witnesses are disqualified through hazamah,
we evaluate how much a person would pay to have 1000 zuz available to him for five years. This
is the sum paid to the borrower. Similar laws apply in all analogous
situations.
Halacha 3
When witnesses testify that a person's
ox gored another ox and afterwards, the witnesses were disqualified through hazamah, they are required to
pay half the damages. If the ox is not worth half the damages, they are
required to pay only the value of the ox. For the fine of half of the damages
must be paid only from the body of the goring ox itself. Therefore if they
testified that the ox consumed produce or broke utensils while walking, the
witnesses are required to pay the full amount of the loss. Similar laws apply
in all analogous situations.
Halacha 4
When witnesses testify that a person
knocked out the tooth of his servant and then blinded the servant's eye, if
afterwards, the witnesses were disqualified through hazamah, they are required to
pay the master the value of the servant and the value of his eye.
A different rule applies if they
testified that the master blinded the servant's eye and afterwards knocked out
his tooth, the witnesses were disqualified throughhazamah, and it was
later discovered that the events occurred in the opposite order, the master knocked
out his tooth and afterwards blinded him. The witnesses must pay the worth of
the eye to the servant. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 5
When witnesses who testified that a
woman was warned by her husband not to enter into privacy with another man or
who testified that she disobeyed the warning and entered into privacy with him
are disqualified through hazamah,
they are punished by lashes. If one witness comes and testifies that she
committed adultery after she was warned and entered into privacy, and that
witness was disqualified through hazamah,
that witness is required to pay the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
If there were two witnesses and they
served as the witnesses for the warning, that she entered into privacy, and
that she committed adultery, should they be disqualified through hazamah, they are required to
pay the money due her by virtue of her ketubah;
they do not receive lashes. Why are they not executed - they gave testimony
with regard to adultery? Because they did not warn the woman.
Halacha 6
If the lying witnesses testified that
a person stole and slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, should they be
disqualified through hazamah,
they are required to pay the entire amount. If two witnesses testify that the
person stole and two others that he slaughtered or sold the animal, and both
pairs of witnesses are disqualified through hazamah,
the first witnesses are required to pay twice the animal's worth, and the
second pair, two or three times its worth.
If the second pair alone were
disqualified through hazamah,
the thief is required to make a double payment to his victim. The later
witnesses must pay the remainder of the four and five time payment. If one of
the last witnesses is disqualified through hazamah,
the entire last testimony is negated. If one of the first witnesses is
disqualified through hazamah,
the entire testimony is negated. For if there is no theft, slaughtering it or
selling the animal does not obligate the person to pay anything.
Halacha 7
When two witnesses testify that a
person benefited from the produce of a field for three years and are
disqualified through hazamah,
they must pay the worth of the field to its owner. If two witnesses testify
that a person benefited from the produce of a field for one year, two others
testified that he benefited from its produce for a second year, and two others
testified that he benefited from its produce for a third year, should they all
be disqualified through hazamah,
they divide the value of the field among themselves. For although the testimony
concerning the establishment of the claimant's right to the field involves
three separate testimonies, they are one testimony with regard to
disqualification through hazamah.
For this reason, when there are three
brothers and one other person, that person may join together with all three of
the brothers and testify with regard to one of the years. Although they are
three testimonies, they are considered as one testimony with regard to
disqualification through hazamah.
If they are all disqualified through hazamah,
the three brothers must together pay half the value of the field and the person
who joined together with each of them must pay the other half of its value.
Halacha 8
Different rules apply when an ox is
declared to have a tendency to gore on the basis of the testimony of three
groups of witnesses. If the first and the second pair of witnesses are
disqualified through hazamah,
all of the witnesses are released from liability. If all three sets of
witnesses are disqualified, they are all obligated to pay for the entire
damages even though half-damages are paid for an ordinary ox.
When does the above apply? When the
witnesses are all motioning to each other, or they appear directly after each
other, or they know the identity of the owner of the ox, but do not recognize
the ox itself. If none of these factors are present, the first and the second
group of witnesses are not liable, for they will say: "We came only to
obligate him to pay half-damages. We did not know that subsequently another
group would come and cause the ox to be deemed as a goring ox."
Halacha 9
The following law applies when two
people testified with regard to a "wayward and rebellious son" with
regard to the first testimony and two others came afterwards and testified with
regard to the second testimony which would cause him to be executed. If they
are both disqualified through hazamah,
the first group is lashed and not executed. The rationale is that they can say:
"We came to have him lashed." The second group, however, is executed,
because it is their testimony that causes him to be executed. If the second
group consisted of four witnesses: Two said: "In our presence, he
stole," and two said: "In our presence, he feasted," should they
all be disqualified through hazamah,
they are all executed.
If two witnesses testify that a person
kidnapped a Jewish person and sold him, and they were disqualified through hazamah, they should be
executed by strangulation. If two witnesses testified that a person kidnapped a
fellow Jew and another two testified that he sold him, whether the witnesses
who testified that he kidnapped or those who testified that he sold were disqualified
throughhazamah, either group which is disqualified through hazamah are executed. The rationale is that
kidnapping is the beginning of the conviction and condemnation to death of the
defendant.
If two witnesses testify that a person
sold a fellow Jew and were disqualified through hazamah, but there were no
witnesses that he kidnapped him, the witnesses are not liable. The rationale is
that even if they were not disqualified through hazamah, the defendant would
not have been executed, because he could have excused himself saying: "I
sold my servant."
If witnesses who testify to the sale
come after the disqualification of the witnesses who testified concerning the
kidnapping, they are not executed. This applies even if we see that they are
motioning to each other.
Halacha 10
The following laws apply if a person
spreads a libelous report about his wife, bringing witnesses that she committed
adultery after she had been consecrated. If her father brought witnesses who
disqualified the witnesses brought by the husband through hazamah, those witnesses are
executed. If the husband brought witnesses who disqualified the witnesses
brought by the father throughhazamah, those witnesses are executed and
are required to make financial restitution to the husband. They are executed,
because the witnesses brought by the husband were condemned to death on the
basis of their testimony. They must pay a fine, because the husband was held
liable to pay a fine because of their testimony. Thus they are obligated to be
executed because of this person and obligated financially, because of another
person.
Similarly, when two people testify
that a person engaged in relations with a consecrated maiden and they are
disqualified through hazamah,
they are executed and are not required to make a financial payment. If they
said: "He engaged in relations with the daughter of so-and-so," and
they are disqualified through hazamah,
they are executed and are required to pay the fine to her father.
If witnesses testify: "So-and-so
sodomized an ox," and they were disqualified byhazamah, they are
executed, but not held liable financially. If they said: "the ox belonging
to so-and-so," they are executed and required to pay the value of the ox
to its owner. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Chapter 22
Halacha 1
The following rules apply when two
groups of witnesses contradict each other. If one witness from one group came
together with one witness from the other group and they both delivered
testimony concerning another matter, the testimony is of no consequence. For
certainly one of them lied, but we do not know which one.
If one of these groups comes alone and
gives testimony and the other group comes alone and gives testimony regarding
another matter, we accept the testimony of both groups individually.
Halacha 2
Reuven produced two promissory notes
against Shimon: one for a maneh and one for 200 zuz. Shimon denied being
obligated for either of the promissory notes. The witnesses to one of the
promissory notes were one of the groups whose testimonies contradicted each
other and the witnesses to the other were the second group. Shimon is required
to pay only a maneh, for
the bearer of the promissory note has the position of lesser strength. He must
take an oath concerning the remainder.
It appears to me that he must take
this oath concerning the remainder while holding a sacred article, as is
required of a person who admits a portion of the claim lodged against him. For
there are two acceptable witnesses who testify concerning a portion of the
money which he denied owing entirely. And the statements of his own mouth
should not have greater legal power than the testimony of witnesses as we explained.
Halacha 3
Reuven sued Levi, producing a
promissory note signed by one of these groups of witnesses. Shimon also sued
Levi and produced a promissory note signed by the other group. Although Levi
denies both debts, both Reuven and Shimon are given the option of taking an
oath and collecting what they claim. The rationale is that certainly one of
them has a viable claim against him. The oath required is a Rabbinic
institution as is required of a storekeeper who takes an oath to collect a
claim supported by his ledger.
Halacha 4
Reuven sued Shimon producing a
promissory note signed by one of these groups of witnesses and sued Levi,
producing a promissory note signed by the other group. If both defendants deny
the debts, we follow the principle: 'A person who seeks to expropriate money
from a colleague must prove his claim.' Since Reuven cannot validate either of
these legal documents, both the promissory notes are like shards. Both of the
defendants are required to take merely a sh'vuat
heset and they are released
of obligation.
When does the above apply? When the
two groups of witnesses come to testify at the same time. Otherwise, whenever a
person produces a legal document containing testimony of one of these two
groups, he may expropriate property based upon it. Afterwards, if either he or
another person produce a legal document with testimony from the other group, it
can be used to expropriate property whether from the first borrower or from any
other person. The rationale is that it is as if each of the two groups came
alone and testified.
Halacha 5
The following rules apply when a
person brings witnesses, their testimony is investigated, they were
disqualified through hazamah,
and then he brought other witnesses concerning the same claim and they were also
disqualified through hazamah.
Even if he brings 100 groups who are disqualified, if afterwards, he brings
other witnesses regarding that same claim and the testimony of these witnesses
is found to be accurate, the case is adjudicated on this basis. Even though the
plaintiff can be presumed to bring lying witnesses, we do not operate under the
presumption that these witnesses are lying.
When, by contrast, there is a legal
document concerning which a protest has been sustained, i.e., two witnesses
came and said that the plaintiff told them to forge this legal document, we
never use that legal document to expropriate property even if the authenticity
of the signatures of the witnesses is validated.
It appears to me that if the witnesses
to the legal document came and testified concerning their signature, the legal
document may be used to expropriate money.
Blessed be God who provides assistance.
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Hayom Yom:
• Sunday, 26 Tevet 5774 – 29 December 2013
"Today's Day"
Sunday Tevet 26 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash:
Va'eira, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: Ch. 14. The rank of (p. 59)...to deny the truth!"
(p. 59).
In the b'racha V'lamalshinim (p. 55, "Let thee..." in
English), pause slightly between ut'mageir ("crush") and v'tachnia
("and subdue"), in consonance with the kavana1 that t'akeir
ut'shabeir ut'mageir ("uproot, break, crush") refer to the three
kelipot2 that must be completely eradicated. V'tachnia ("subdue")
refers to kelipat noga3 that must be subdued, but can be purified.
FOOTNOTES
1."Inner meaning" of the word.
2."Shells of evil." See Tanya, Ch. 6 (end).
3."Shell of brightness."
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Daily Thought:
Beyond Conception
G‑d knows all
before it occurs. More than that: It is His knowledge that brings all events
into being.
But we still have free choice.
You claim this is inconceivable. I ask you: Knowledge of all
existence before even the thought of existence is conceivable?
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