Today in Jewish History:
• Moses Completes the Torah (1273 BCE)
Moses completed the book of Deuteronomy, concluding his review of the Torahwhich he began several weeks earlier, on the 1st of Shevat. He then wrote down the completed Five Books of Moses, word for word, as dictated to him by G-d. This scroll of the Torah was put into the Holy Ark, next to the Tablets of Testimony.
Links:
Moses' Passing
Giving of the Torah
• First Print of Torah with Onkelos & Rashi (1482)
The first edition of the Five Books of Moses (Torah) with the Targum Onkelos(Aramaic translation of the Torah) and the commentary of the famed commentator Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, known as Rashi, was published on this date in 1482. It was published in Bologna, Italy by Joseph b. Abraham Caravita, who set up a printing-press in his own home.
Links:
Onkelos
Rashi
• Passing of R. Shmaryahu Gurary (1989)
Rabbi Shmaryahu Gurary ("Rashag") was born in 1898; his father, a wealthy businessman and erudite scholar, was a leading chassid of the fifth Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Sholom DovBer Schneersohn (1860-1920). In 1921, Rabbi Shmaryahu wed Chanah Schneersohn (1899-1991) the oldest daughter of the 6th Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn (1880-1950). When Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak passed away in 1950, there were those who saw Rabbi Shmaryahu -- an accomplished Chassidic scholar and elder of the Rebbe's two surviving sons-in-law -- as the natural candidate to head of the movement; but when the younger son-in-law, Rabbi Menachem Mendel, was chosen as rebbe, Rabbi Shmaryahu became his devoted chassid. Rabbi Shmaryahu served as the excutive director of Tomchei Temimim, the world-wide Lubavitch yeshiva system -- a task entrusted to him by his father-in-law -- until his passing on the 6th of Adar I in 1989.
Daily Quote:
Just as it is incumbent upon every Jew to put on tefillin every day, so is there an unequivocal duty which rests upon every individual, from the greatest scholar to the most simple of folk, to set aside a half-hour each day in which to think about the education of his children.[- Rabbi Sholom DovBer of Lubavitch (1860-1920)]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Tetzaveh, 4th Portion Exodus 29:1-29:18 with Rashi
• Chapter 29
1And this is the thing that you shall do for them to sanctify them to serve Me [as kohanim]: take one young bull and two rams, perfect ones. אוְזֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה לָהֶם לְקַדֵּשׁ אֹתָם לְכַהֵן לִי לְקַח פַּר אֶחָד בֶּן בָּקָר וְאֵילִם שְׁנַיִם תְּמִימִם:
take: Heb. לְקַח, like קַח, and these are two roots, one of קִיחָה and one of לְקִיחָה, but they have the same meaning [i.e., take]. לקח: כמו קח, ושתי גזרות הן, אחת של קיחה, ואחת של לקיחה, ולהן פתרון אחד:
one young bull: This was to atone for the incident of the [golden] calf, which was a bull. -[from Midrash Tanchuma 10] פר אחד: לכפר על מעשה העגל שהוא פר:
2And unleavened bread and unleavened loaves mixed with oil, and unleavened wafers anointed with oil; you shall make them out of fine wheat flour. בוְלֶחֶם מַצּוֹת וְחַלֹּת מַצֹּת בְּלוּלֹת בַּשֶּׁמֶן וּרְקִיקֵי מַצּוֹת מְשֻׁחִים בַּשָּׁמֶן סֹלֶת חִטִּים תַּעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם:
And unleavened bread and unleavened loaves… and unleavened wafers: These refer to three types [of matzah]: scalded dough, loaves, and wafers (Men. 78a). The unleavened bread is what is called further in the section (verse 23) “loaf of oil bread,” because he [Moses] would put as much oil into the scalded dough as in the loaves and the wafers (Men. 89a), and of each of the types [of unleavened bread referred to here], ten loaves were brought. ולחם מצות וחלת מצת ורקיקי מצות: הרי אלו שלשה מינין רבוכה, וחלות ורקיקים לחם מצות, היא הקרויה למטה בענין (פסוק כג) חלת לחם שמן, על שם שנותן שמן ברבוכה כנגד החלות והרקיקין, וכל המינין באים עשר עשר חלות:
mixed with oil: When it [the bread] was flour, he [Moses] would pour oil on them and mix them. -[from Men. 75a] בלולת בשמן: כשהן קמח יוצק בהן שמן ובוללן:
anointed with oil: After they were baked, he [Moses] would anoint them like a sort of Greek “chaff,” which resembles our [Hebrew letter of the alphabet] “nun.” -[from Men. 74b] משחים בשמן: אחר אפייתן מושחן כמין כי יונית, שהיא עשויה כנו"ן שלנו:
3And you shall place them upon a basket, and you shall bring them in the basket, and the bull and the two rams. גוְנָתַתָּ אוֹתָם עַל סַל אֶחָד וְהִקְרַבְתָּ אֹתָם בַּסָּל וְאֶת הַפָּר וְאֵת שְׁנֵי הָאֵילִם:
and you shall bring them: to the courtyard of the Mishkan on the day it will be erected. והקרבת אתם: אל חצר המשכן ביום הקמתו:
4And you shall bring Aaron and his sons near the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and you shall bathe them in water. דוְאֶת אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת בָּנָיו תַּקְרִיב אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד וְרָחַצְתָּ אֹתָם בַּמָּיִם:
and you shall bathe them: This [refers to] the immersion of the entire body. ורחצת: זו טבילת כל הגוף:
5And you shall take the garments and clothe Aaron with the tunic, with the robe of the ephod, with the ephod, and with the choshen, and you shall adorn him with the band of the ephod. הוְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת הַבְּגָדִים וְהִלְבַּשְׁתָּ אֶת אַהֲרֹן אֶת הַכֻּתֹּנֶת וְאֵת מְעִיל הָאֵפֹד וְאֶת הָאֵפֹד וְאֶת הַחשֶׁן וְאָפַדְתָּ לוֹ בְּחֵשֶׁב הָאֵפֹד:
and you shall adorn: Adorn and affix the belt and the apron around him. ואפדת: קשט ותקן החגורה והסינר סביבותיו:
6You shall place the cap upon his head and place the holy crown upon the cap. ווְשַׂמְתָּ הַמִּצְנֶפֶת עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וְנָתַתָּ אֶת נֵזֶר הַקֹּדֶשׁ עַל הַמִּצְנָפֶת:
the holy crown: Heb. נֵזֶר הַקֹּדֶשׁ. This is the showplate. נזר הקדש: זה הציץ:
upon the cap: As I explained above (Exod. 28:37): through the middle thread [of the showplate] and the two threads on his head, all three of which were tied behind the nape [of the Kohen Gadol’s neck], he places it [the showplate] upon the cap like a sort of hat. על המצנפת: כמו שפירשתי למעלה (שמות כח לז) על ידי הפתיל האמצעי ושני פתילין שבראשו הקשורין שלשתן מאחורי העורף, הוא נותנו על המצנפת כמין כובע:
7You shall take the anointing oil and pour [it] on his head and anoint him. זוְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת שֶׁמֶן הַמִּשְׁחָה וְיָצַקְתָּ עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וּמָשַׁחְתָּ אֹתוֹ:
and anoint him: This anointment was also like a sort of Greek “chaff.” [See commentary above on verse 2, and Rambam, Laws of Temple Vessels 1:7.] He [Moses] would apply oil to his [Aaron’s] head and between his eyebrows and join them with his finger. -[from Kereithoth 5b] ומשחת אותו: אף משיחה זו כמין כי יונית, נותן שמן על ראשו ובין ריסי עיניו ומחברן באצבעו:
8And you shall bring his sons near, and you shall clothe them with tunics. חוְאֶת בָּנָיו תַּקְרִיב וְהִלְבַּשְׁתָּם כֻּתֳּנֹת:
9And you shall gird them with sashes, Aaron and his sons, and you shall dress them with high hats, and the kehunah will be a perpetual statute for them, and you shall invest Aaron and his sons with full authority. טוְחָגַרְתָּ אֹתָם אַבְנֵט אַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו וְחָבַשְׁתָּ לָהֶם מִגְבָּעֹת וְהָיְתָה לָהֶם כְּהֻנָּה לְחֻקַּת עוֹלָם וּמִלֵּאתָ יַד אַהֲרֹן וְיַד בָּנָיו:
will be… for them: This investiture, for eternal kehunah. והיתה להם: מלוי ידים זה לכהונת עולם:
and you shall invest: through these things. ומלאת: על ידי הדברים האלה:
Aaron and his sons: with the fulfillment (בְּמִלְוּי) and the appointment to the kehunah. יד אהרן ויד בניו: במילוי ופקודת הכהונה:
10You shall bring the bull to the front of the Tent of Meeting, and Aaron and his sons shall lean their hands upon the head of the bull. יוְהִקְרַבְתָּ אֶת הַפָּר לִפְנֵי אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד וְסָמַךְ אַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו אֶת יְדֵיהֶם עַל רֹאשׁ הַפָּר:
11You shall [then] slaughter the bull before the Lord, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. יאוְשָׁחַטְתָּ אֶת הַפָּר לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד:
at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting: In the courtyard of the Mishkan, which is in front of the entrance. פתח אוהל מועד: בחצר המשכן שלפני הפתח:
12And you shall take [some] of the blood of the bull and apply it on the horns of the altar with your finger, and you shall pour out all the blood upon the base of the altar. יבוְלָקַחְתָּ מִדַּם הַפָּר וְנָתַתָּה עַל קַרְנֹת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ בְּאֶצְבָּעֶךָ וְאֶת כָּל הַדָּם תִּשְׁפֹּךְ אֶל יְסוֹד הַמִּזְבֵּחַ:
on the horns: On top, actually on the horns. -[from Zev. 53a] על קרנות: למעלה בקרנות ממש:
and… all the blood: [I.e.,] the remaining blood. ואת כל הדם: שיירי הדם:
upon the base of the altar: A sort of protruding receptacle was made all around it [the altar] after it was elevated a cubit from the ground. -[from Middoth 3:1] אל יסוד המזבח: כמין בליטת בית קבול עשוי לו סביב סביב לאחר שעלה אמה מן הארץ:
13You shall then take all the fat that covers the innards, and the diaphragm with the liver, also the two kidneys and the fat that is upon them, and make them go up in smoke upon the altar. יגוְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת כָּל הַחֵלֶב הַמְכַסֶּה אֶת הַקֶּרֶב וְאֵת הַיֹּתֶרֶת עַל הַכָּבֵד וְאֵת שְׁתֵּי הַכְּלָיֹת וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב אֲשֶׁר עֲלֵיהֶן וְהִקְטַרְתָּ הַמִּזְבֵּחָה:
the fat that covers the innards: That is the membrane on the rumen [i.e., the first stomach of a ruminant animal], which is called tele [in Old French, toile in modern French]. -[from Tosefta Chullin 9:3] החלב המכסה את הקרב: הוא הקרום שעל הכרס שקורין טייל"א [קרום]:
and the diaphragm: הַיֹּתֶרֶת. This is the membrane of the liver, called ebres [in Old French]. ואת היתרת: הוא טרפשא דכבדא שקורין איבדי"ש [סרעפת]:
with the liver: He must also take part of the liver along with it. -[from Sifra, Lev. 3:8] על הכבד: אף מן הכבד יטול עמה:
14But the flesh of the bull, its hide and its dung you shall burn in fire outside the camp; it is a sin offering. ידוְאֶת בְּשַׂר הַפָּר וְאֶת עֹרוֹ וְאֶת פִּרְשׁוֹ תִּשְׂרֹף בָּאֵשׁ מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה חַטָּאת הוּא:
you shall burn in fire: We do not find any [reference to an] “outside” sin offering burnt except this one. תשרף באש: לא מצינו חטאת חיצונה נשרפת אלא זו:
15And you shall take the one ram, and Aaron and his sons shall lean their hands upon the ram's head. טווְאֶת הָאַיִל הָאֶחָד תִּקָּח וְסָמְכוּ אַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו אֶת יְדֵיהֶם עַל רֹאשׁ הָאָיִל:
16You shall slaughter the ram, and you shall take its blood and sprinkle [it] on the altar all around. טזוְשָׁחַטְתָּ אֶת הָאָיִל וְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת דָּמוֹ וְזָרַקְתָּ עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ סָבִיב:
and sprinkle: with a vessel. He [Moses] would grasp the sprinkling basin and sprinkle [the blood] opposite the horn [of the altar], in order that it [the blood would] be visible on both sides. The only sacrifice requiring the blood to be applied with the finger is the sin offering. The other sacrifices require neither [that the blood be sprinkled on the] horn, nor [that it be applied with the] finger, because the application of their [the other sacrifices’] blood is on the lower half of the altar, and [the kohen] does not ascend the ramp [of the altar], but he stands on the ground and sprinkles [the blood]. -[from Zev. 53b] וזרקת: בכלי, אוחז במזרק וזורק כנגד הקרן כדי שיראה לכאן ולכאן, ואין קרבן טעון מתנה באצבע אלא חטאת בלבד, אבל שאר זבחים אינן טעונין קרן ולא אצבע, שמתן דמם מחצי המזבח ולמטה, ואינו עולה בכבש אלא עומד בארץ וזורק:
all around: Heb. סָבִיב. Thus it is delineated in Shechitath Kodashim (Zev. 53b) that סָבִיב refers to only two applications, which [actually] are four-one [application is] on this corner and one on the diagonally opposite corner. Each application was visible on both sides of the corner, thus the blood was applied on the four directions all around. Therefore, it [the sprinkling of the blood] is called סָבִיב, all around. סביב: כך מפורש בשחיטת קדשים (זבחים נב ב) שאין סביב אלא שתי מתנות שהן ארבע, האחת בקרן זוית זו, והאחת בקרן שכנגדה באלכסון, וכל מתנה נראית בשני צדי הקרן אילך ואילך, נמצא הדם נתון בארבע רוחות סביב, לכך קרוי סביב:
17And you shall dissect the ram into its parts, and you shall wash its innards and its legs and put them with its parts and with its head, יזוְאֶת הָאַיִל תְּנַתֵּחַ לִנְתָחָיו וְרָחַצְתָּ קִרְבּוֹ וּכְרָעָיו וְנָתַתָּ עַל נְתָחָיו וְעַל רֹאשׁוֹ:
into its parts: Heb. עַל-נְתָחָיו, [equivalent to] עִם-נְתָחָיו, with its parts, in addition to the rest of the parts. על נתחיו: עם נתחיו, מוסף על שאר הנתחים:
18and you shall make the entire ram go up in smoke upon the altar; it is a burnt offering made to the Lord; it is a spirit of satisfaction, a fire offering for the Lord. יחוְהִקְטַרְתָּ אֶת כָּל הָאַיִל הַמִּזְבֵּחָה עֹלָה הוּא לַיהֹוָה רֵיחַ נִיחוֹחַ אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה הוּא:
it is a spirit of satisfaction: It is satisfaction to Me that I commanded and My will was performed. -[from Zev. 46b] ריח ניחוח: נחת רוח לפני, שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני:
a fire offering: Heb. אִשֶׁה, a word related to fire אֵשׁ, and it means burning the limbs that are on the fire. אשה: לשון אש, והיא הקטרת איברים שעל האש:Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 35 - 38
• Chapter 35
This psalm is an awe-inspiring and wondrous prayer about David's enemies-that they be as chaff before the wind, chased by the angel of God. It also declares that everything comes about through God's help.
1. By David. Fight my antagonists, O Lord, battle those who battle against me.
2. Take hold of shield and armor and arise to help me.
3. Draw a spear, and bar the way before my pursuers; say to my soul, "I am your deliverance.”
4. Let those who seek my life be shamed and disgraced; let those who devise my harm retreat and be humiliated.
5. Let them be as chaff before the wind; let the angel of the Lord thrust them away.
6. Let their path be dark and slippery; let them be chased by the angel of the Lord.
7. For without cause have they laid their nets in the pit for me; without cause have they dug [pits] for my soul.
8. Let darkness come upon him unawares; let the very snare that he hid trap him, in darkness he will fall in it.
9. And my soul shall exult in the Lord, rejoice in His deliverance.
10. My entire being shall declare: Lord, who is like You? Who saves the poor from one stronger than he, the poor and the destitute from one who would rob him.
11. Corrupt witnesses rise up [against me], they demand of me things of which I do not know.
12. They repay me evil for good, death for my soul.
13. But I wore sackcloth when they were ill; I afflicted my soul with fasting. Let my prayer return upon my own bosom.
14. As if it were my friend, my brother, I went about; like a mother in mourning, I was bent over in gloom.
15. But when I limped, they rejoiced and gathered; the lowly gathered against me-even those whom I do not know; they laugh and cannot be quiet.
16. With flattery and scorn, for the sake of a meal,1 they gnash their teeth at me.
17. My Lord, how long will You look on? Restore my life from their darkness; from young lions, my soul.
18. I will thank You in a great congregation, amidst a mighty nation I will praise You.
19. Let not those who hate me without cause rejoice over me; [let not] those who despise me without reason wink their eye.
20. For they speak not of peace, rather they scheme deceitful matters against the broken of the land.
21. They opened their mouths wide against me, they said, "Aha! Aha! Our eyes have seen [his misfortune].”
22. You saw, Lord, be not silent; my Lord, be not distant from me.
23. Rouse and awaken Yourself to my judgement, to my cause, my God and my Lord.
24. Judge me according to your righteousness, Lord my God; let them not rejoice over me.
25. Let them not say in their hearts, "Aha! We have our desire!" Let them not say, "We have swallowed him!”
26. Let them be shamed and disgraced together, those who rejoice at my trouble; let them be clothed in shame and humiliation, those who raise themselves arrogantly over me.
27. Let those who desire my vindication sing joyously and be glad; let them say always, "Let the Lord be exalted, Who desires the peace of His servant.”
28. My tongue will speak of Your righteousness, Your praise, all day long.
Chapter 36
This psalm is a message to those who follow their evil inclination, that tells them, "Do not place the fear of God before you," and brings them to sin by beautifying evil deeds in their eyes. For so is his way: "He descends (to earth) and corrupts, then goes up (to the Heavenly Court) and prosecutes."
1. For the Conductor, by the servant of the Lord, by David.
2. [I think] in my heart: Sin says to the wicked, "There is none [who need place] the fear of God before his eyes.”
3. For Sin makes itself appealing to him, until his iniquity be found and he is hated.
4. The speech of his mouth is evil and deceit; he fails to reason, to improve.
5. On his bed he contemplates evil, he stands in a path that is not good; he does not despise evil.
6. O Lord, Your kindness is in the heavens; Your faithfulness is till the skies.
7. Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains, Your judgements extend to the great deep; man and beast You deliver, O Lord.
8. How precious is Your kindness, O God; man takes shelter in the shadow of Your wings.
9. They will be filled by the abundance of Your house; from the stream of Your Eden, You will give them to drink.
10. For the source of life is with You; in Your Light do we see light.
11. Extend Your kindness to those who know You, and Your righteousness to the upright of heart.
12. Let not the foot of the arrogant overtake me; let not the hand of the wicked drive me away.
13. There1 the doers of evil fell, thrust down, unable to rise.
Chapter 37
King David exhorts his generation not to be jealous of the prosperity of the wicked, for it may lead to falling into their ways. Rather, put your trust in God, conduct yourselves with integrity, and God will take care of everything.
1. By David. Do not compete with the wicked; do not envy doers of injustice.
2. For like grass they will be swiftly cut down; like green vegetation they will wither.
3. Trust in the Lord and do good; then will you abide in the land and be nourished by faith.
4. Delight in the Lord, and He will grant you the desires of your heart.
5. Cast your needs upon the Lord; rely on Him, and He will take care.
6. He will reveal your righteousness like the light, your justness like the high noon.
7. Depend on the Lord and hope in Him. Compete not with the prosperous, with the man who invents evil schemes.
8. Let go of anger, abandon rage; do not compete with [one who intends] only to harm.
9. For the evildoers will be cut down; but those who hope in the Lord, they will inherit the earth.
10. For soon the wicked one will not be; you will gaze at his place and he will be gone.
11. But the humble shall inherit the earth, and delight in abundant peace.
12. The wicked one plots against the righteous, and gnashes his teeth at him.
13. My Lord laughs at him, for He sees that his day will come.
14. The wicked have drawn a sword and bent their bow to fell the poor and destitute, to slaughter those of upright ways.
15. But their sword shall enter their own hearts, and their bows shall break.
16. Better the little of the righteous, than the abundant wealth of the wicked.
17. For the strength of the wicked will be broken, but the Lord supports the righteous.
18. The Lord appreciates the days of the innocent; their inheritance will last forever.
19. They will not be shamed in times of calamity, and in days of famine they will be satisfied.
20. For the wicked shall perish, and the enemies of the Lord are as fattened sheep: consumed, consumed in smoke.
21. The wicked man borrows and does not repay; but the righteous man is gracious and gives.
22. For those blessed by Him will inherit the earth, and those cursed by Him will be cut off.
23. The steps of man are directed by God; He desires his way.
24. When he totters he shall not be thrown down, for the Lord supports his hand.
25. I have been a youth, I have also aged; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his offspring begging bread.
26. All day he is kind and lends; his offspring are a blessing.
27. Turn away from evil and do good, and you will dwell [in peace] forever.
28. For the Lord loves justice, he will not abandon his pious ones-they are protected forever; but the offspring of the wicked are cut off.
29. The righteous shall inherit the earth and dwell upon it forever.
30. The mouth of the righteous one utters wisdom, and his tongue speaks justice.
31. The Torah of his God is in his heart; his steps shall not falter.
32. The wicked one watches for the righteous man, and seeks to kill him.
33. But the Lord will not abandon him in his hand, nor condemn him when he is judged.
34. Hope in the Lord and keep His way; then He will raise you high to inherit the earth. When the wicked are cut off, you shall see it.
35. I saw a powerful wicked man, well-rooted like a vibrant, native tree.
36. Yet he vanished, behold he was gone; I searched for him, but he could not be found.
37. Watch the innocent, and observe the upright, for the future of such a man is peace.
38. But sinners shall be destroyed together; the future of the wicked is cut off.
39. The deliverance of the righteous is from the Lord; He is their strength in time of distress.
40. The Lord helps them and delivers them; He delivers them from the wicked and saves them, because they have put their trust in Him.
Chapter 38
A prayer for every individual, bewailing the length of the exile. One who is in distress should recite this psalm, hence its introduction, "A psalm... to remind" (to remind us to recite it in times of distress). One can also derive many lessons from it.
1. A psalm by David, to remind.
2. O Lord, do not rebuke me in Your anger, nor chastise me in Your wrath.
3. For Your arrows have landed in me, Your hand descended upon me.
4. There is no soundness in my flesh because of Your rage, no peace in my bones because of my sin.
5. For my iniquities have flooded over my head; like a heavy load, they are too heavy for me.
6. My wounds are rotted; they reek because of my foolishness.
7. I am bent and extremely bowed; all day I go about in gloom.
8. My sides are inflamed; there is no soundness in my flesh.
9. I am weakened and extremely depressed; I howl from the moaning of my heart.
10. My Lord, all that I desire is before You; my sighing is not hidden from You.
11. My heart is engulfed, my strength has left me; the light of my eyes they, too, are not with me.
12. My friends and companions stand aloof from my affliction; my intimates stand afar.
13. The seekers of my life have laid traps; those who seek my harm speak destructiveness; they utter deceits all day long.
14. But I am like a deaf man, I do not hear; like a mute that does not open his mouth.
15. I was like a man that does not perceive, and in whose mouth there are no rebuttals.
16. Because for You, O Lord, I wait; You will answer, my Lord, my God.
17. For I said, "Lest they rejoice over me; when my foot falters they will gloat over me.”
18. For I am accustomed to limping, and my pain is constantly before me.
19. For I admit my iniquity; I worry because of my sin.
20. But my enemies abound with life; those who hate me without cause flourish.
21. Those who repay evil for good resent me for my pursuit of good.
22. Do not forsake me, O Lord; do not be distant from me, my God.
23. Hurry to my aid, O my Lord, my Salvation.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 31• Lessons in Tanya
• Adar 6, 5775 · February 25, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 31
ואחר כך יבא לידי שמחה אמיתית, דהיינו, שזאת ישיב אל לבו לנחמו בכפליים אחר הדברים והאמת האלה הנ״ל
He will then arrive at a true joy, as follows: In order to comfort his heart in double measure, let him — in the wake of the above words of truth concerning his lowly spiritual stature — tell himself the following.
The comfort is dual: not only is his depression eliminated, but he will also attain a joy which he would never experience were it not for his earlier depression.
לאמר ללבו: אמת הוא כן בלי ספק שאני רחוק מאד מה׳ בתכלית,ומשוק׳ ומתועב כו׳,
Let him say to his heart: “Indeed, without a doubt, I am far removed, utterly remote from G‑d, and am despicable, contemptible, and so on.
אך כל זה הוא אני לבדי, הוא הגוף עם נפש החיונית שבו
But all this is true only of me — that is, my body and the animating soul within it.
אבל מכל מקום יש בקרבי חלק ה׳ ממש, שישנו אפילו בקל שבקלים,שהיא נפש האלקית עם ניצו׳ אלקות ממש המלובש בה להחיותה,
Yet within me there is a veritable ‘part’ of G‑d, which is present even in the most worthless of my fellows, so that even if I am no better than he, I still have this ‘part’ of G‑d within me, namely, the divine soul and the spark of G‑dliness itself clothed in it, animating it.
רק שהיא בבחינת גלות
It is only that when the body and animating soul are in such a lowly state, the divine soul is in exile within them.
ואם כן, אדרבה, כל מה שאני בתכלית הריחוק מה׳, והתיעוב ושיקו׳
“If so, then, on the contrary, the further I am removed from G‑d, and the more despicable and contemptible,
הרי נפש האלקית שבי בגלות גדול יותר, והרחמנות עליה גדולה מאד
the deeper in exile is my divine soul, and all the more is it to be pitied.
ולזה אשים כל מגמתי וחפצי להוציאה ולהעלותה מגלות זה,להשיבה אל בית אביה כנעוריה,
“Therefore, I will make it my entire aim and desire to extricate it from this exile, and to ‘return her to her father’s house i.e., to restore it to its source and its original state as in her youth,’
קודם שנתלבשה בגופי, שהיתה נכללת באורו יתברך ומיוחדת עמו בתכליתו
i.e., as it was before being clothed in my body, when it was completely absorbed in G‑d’s light and united with Him.
וגם עתה כן תהא כלולה ומיוחדת בו יתברך, כשאשים כל מגמתי בתורה ומצות, להלביש בהן כל עשר בחינותיה כנ״לי
“Now too will it likewise be absorbed and united with Him once again, when I concentrate all my aspirations on the Torah and the mitzvot, in an effort to clothe therein all [of the soul’s] ten faculties; i.e., by applying my mental faculties to Torah study, and my emotive faculties to the performance of the mitzvot with the vitality lent them by the love and fear of G‑d, as explained above in ch. 4. Thus will my divine soul be reunited with G‑d.
ובפרט במצות תפלה, לצעוק אל ה׳ בצר לה מגלותה בגופי המשוק׳, להוציאה ממסגר, ולדבקה בו יתברך
“Especially in fulfilling the mitzvah of prayer will I try to release my divine soul, by crying out to G‑d because of the distress of its exile in my loathsome body, so that He release it from captivity and bind it to Himself.”
וזו היא בחינת תשובה ומעשים טובים
This service of G‑d, in which one seeks to restore the soul to its source, is referred to as 1“teshuvah with good deeds.”
This is an oft-used Talmudic expression denoting the mitzvot (as in the statement, “One hour of teshuvah with good deeds in this world is better than all the life of the World to Come”). At first glance, the juxtaposition of the two seems incongruous; teshuvah deals with atoning for one’s past imperfections, while “good deeds” are performed in the present and would seem to bear no relation to one’s past. According to the Alter Rebbe’s statement, however, that one’s performance of the mitzvot should be motivated by a desire to return his soul to its source within G‑d, the connection between the two is clear: the “good deeds” themselves actually constitute teshuvah, which means “return”. As the Alter Rebbe continues:
שהן מעשים טובים שעושה כדי להשיב חלק ה׳ למקורא ושרשא דכל עלמין
This denotes the “good deeds” which one does with the intention of returning the soul which is part of G‑d, to the [Divine] source and root of all the worlds.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Avot 4:17. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Adar 6, 5775 · February 25, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Negative Commandment 355
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
"There shall be no indecent women among the daughters of Israel"—Deuteronomy 23:18.
It is forbidden for a man and woman to be intimate unless married to each other.
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
Negative Commandment 355
Translated by Berel Bell
The 355th prohibition is that we are forbidden from having relations with a woman without [giving her] a Kesubah and acquiring her (kiddushin).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "There may not be any prostitutes among Jewish girls."
This same commandment is repeated, but using a different expression, in G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The Sifra says, " 'Do not defile your daughter' — this command is directed towards a man who hands over his unmarried daughter for sexual relations without marriage, as well as a girl who herself has sexual relations without marriage."
Now listen as I explain why the prohibition is repeated with this wording,3 and what the repetition adds. G‑d (exalted be He) has already instructed us in the Torah that a man who has relations with a virgin incurs none of the punishments4, regardless of whether he seduced or raped her. Rather, he must pay a monetary fine and marry the girl that he harmed, as explained in the Torah.5
Accordingly, a person might think that since the offender is only required to pay a fine, therefore this is looked upon as a purely financial case. Therefore, just as a person, if he wishes, is allowed to give away his money to another person, or to forgive a debt, so too, [he might think,] he may take his unmarried daughter and give her to a man to have relations with her. This would be like forgiving a debt due to him, since the 50 silver [shekels which the seducer or rapist must pay] go to the father. Alternatively, a person might think that [since this is purely a financial matter,] he may give his daughter on condition that the man pays a certain amount of money.
Therefore, the Torah prohibited this and said, "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The monetary fine only refers to a case where the seduction or rape actually occurred. But it is still completely forbidden for them to engage in sexual relations, even when they both agree.
The Torah also reveals the reason for this prohibition: ["Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations,] and you will then not make the land sexually immoral, and the land [will not] be filled with perversion." The explanation of this: seduction and rape occur very rarely, but if the Torah allowed premarital relations when both parties agree, it would occur often and become widespread throughout the world.
This is a fine and wondrous explanation of this verse, and fits all the sayings of our Sages and laws of the Torah.
This prohibition, i.e. the prohibition of [having relations with] an unmarried woman, is punishable by lashes.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in Kesubos and Kiddushin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 23:18.
2.Lev. 19:29.
3.Directed to the father, unlike the other verse, which is phrased as a general prohibition.
4.. Such as lashes or execution.
5.Ex. 22:15. Deut. 22:28. See P220, P218.
Tefilah and Birkat Kohanim - Chapter Eleven
Halacha 1
Wherever ten Jews live, it is necessary to establish a place for them to congregate for prayer at the time of each prayer service.
This place is called a Beit K'nesset. The inhabitants of a city can compel each other to construct a synagogue and to purchase scrolls containing the Torah, the Prophets, and the Sacred Writings.
Halacha 2
When a synagogue is built, it should be built only at the highest point of the city [as implied by Proverbs 1:21]: "She cries at the head of the public places." It should be built [so that] its height exceeds [that of] all the other buildings in the city [as implied by Ezra 9:9]: "to lift up the house of our God."
The entrance to the synagogue should open only on the east [as implied byNumbers 3:38]: "...And those who camped before the sanctuary on the east."
In [the synagogue], a heichal, where the Torah scroll is placed, should be constructed. The heichal should be constructed in the direction to which the people pray in that city, so that they will face the heichal when they stand to pray.
Halacha 3
A platform is placed in the center of the hall, so that the one who reads the Torah or one who gives a sermon can stand on it, so that all the others will hear him.
When one positions the tevah which contains the Torah scroll, one should position it in the center of the hall, in the direction of the heichal and facing the people.
Halacha 4
How do the people sit in the synagogue? The elders sit facing the people with their backs toward the heichal. All the people sit row after row, each row facing the back of the row before it. Thus, all the people face the sanctuary, the elders, and the tevah.
When the leader of the congregation stands to pray, he stands on the ground, before the tevah, facing the sanctuary like the others.
Halacha 5
Synagogues and houses of study should be treated with respect. They should be swept clean and mopped.
All the Jews in Spain, the west, Babylonia, and Eretz Yisrael, are accustomed to light lamps in the synagogue and spread mats over the floor to sit on. In European communities, they sit on chairs.
Halacha 6
No lightheadedness - i.e., jests, frivolity, and idle conversation - should be seen in a synagogue. We may not eat or drink inside [a synagogue], nor use [a synagogue] for our benefit, nor stroll inside one.
On a sunny [day], one should not enter [a synagogue to seek shade] from the sun, and on a rainy [day], [one should not enter a synagogue to seek shelter] from the rain. [However,] the sages and their students are permitted to eat and drink in a synagogue because of the difficulty [observing the prohibition would cause them].
Halacha 7
It is forbidden to calculate accounts in [a synagogue], unless the accounts are connected with a mitzvah: for example, the collection of charity, the redemption of captives, or the like.
[Similarly,] eulogies should not be recited inside them, except a eulogy that involves many [of the inhabitants of the city]; for example, [if] there were a eulogy of the great sages of that city for which all the people would gather together and come.
Halacha 8
If a synagogue or a house of study has two entrances, one should not use it for a shortcut, i.e., to enter through one entrance and leave through the other to reduce [the distance one] travels, because it is forbidden to enter [these buildings] except for a mitzvah.
Halacha 9
A person who has to enter a synagogue to call a child or his friend should enter and read [a portion of the written law] or relate a teaching [of the oral law] and then call his friend, so that he will not have entered [a synagogue] for his personal reasons alone.
If he does not know [how to study], he should ask one of the children [to] tell him the verse he is studying or, [at the very least,] wait a while in the synagogue and then leave, since spending time [in the synagogue] is one of the aspects of the mitzvah as implied by [Psalms 84:5]: "Happy are those who dwell in Your house."
Halacha 10
A person who enters [a synagogue] to pray or to study is permitted to leave by the opposite door to shorten his way.
A person is permitted to enter a synagogue [holding] his staff, [wearing] his shoes, wearing [only] lower garments, or with dust on his feet. If it is necessary for him to spit, he may spit in the synagogue.
Halacha 11
Synagogues and houses of study that have been destroyed remain holy [as can be inferred from Leviticus 26:31]: "I will destroy your sanctuaries." [Our Sages explained]: Even though they are destroyed, they remain holy.
Just as one must treat them with respect while they are standing, so must they be treated [with respect] when they are destroyed with the exception of sweeping and mopping them. [When destroyed], they need not be swept or mopped.
If grass grows in them, it should be pulled out and left there so that it will be seen by the people [in the hope that] it will rouse their spirits and rebuild them.
Halacha 12
One should not tear down a synagogue in order to build another in its place or in another place. Instead, one should build the [new synagogue] and then, one [may] tear down the [previous] one lest unforeseen difficulties arise [which prevent it] from being built.
This applies even to a single wall of [a synagogue]. One should build the new wall next to the old wall and then, tear down the old wall.
Halacha 13
When does the above apply? When its foundations are not ruined or its walls are not leaning perilously. However, if its foundation is destroyed or its walls are leaning perilously, it should be destroyed immediately and [then, efforts to] rebuild it should be begun immediately throughout the day and night lest times become difficult and it remain destroyed.
Halacha 14
It is permitted to transform a synagogue into a house of study. However, it is forbidden to transform a house of study into a synagogue because the sanctity of a house of study exceeds that of a synagogue and one must proceed to a higher rung of holiness, but not descend to a lower rung.
Similarly, the inhabitants of a city who sold a synagogue may purchase an ark with the proceeds. If they sold an ark, they may purchase a mantle or a case for a Torah scroll with the proceeds. If they sold a mantle or a case, they may buychumashim with the proceeds. If they sold chumashim, they may buy a Torah scroll with the proceeds. If they sold a Torah scroll, the proceeds may only be used to purchase another Torah scroll, for there is no level of holiness above that of a Torah scroll.
The same [laws apply] to [any money] which remains.
Halacha 15
Similar [principles apply] if a congregation collected money to build a house of study or a synagogue or to purchase an ark, a mantle or a case [for a Torah scroll], or a Torah scroll, and desired to change [the purpose for which] all the [funds] had been [originally] collected.
It is forbidden to change [the purpose for which the funds will be used] except from a matter of lesser sanctity to one of greater sanctity. However, if [the congregation] accomplished the purpose for which they had [originally] collected [the funds], they may use the remainder for whatever they desire.
All the components of a synagogue are considered like the synagogue itself. The curtain hanging before the ark is considered like the mantle of a Torah scroll. If a condition was made concerning them, the terms of the condition are binding.
Halacha 16
When do the above statements permitting the sale of a synagogue apply? In regard to a synagogue in a village. Since it was constructed for the sake of the inhabitants of that village alone, so that they can pray inside it, they are permitted to sell it if they all desire to do so.
In contrast, a synagogue in a metropolis, since it was constructed for the sake of all the people in the world, [i.e.,] so that anyone who comes to that country can come and pray in it, it is considered as [the property] of [the entire] Jewish people and it can never be sold.
Halacha 17
The inhabitants of a village who desire to sell their synagogue in order to build another synagogue with the money, or to buy an ark or Torah scroll with the money, must establish as a condition [of the sale] that the purchaser not use the building for a bathhouse, a leatherworks, a mikveh, or a laundry.
If, at the time of the sale, the seven officials of the community made a condition in the presence of the entire community that the purchaser be allowed to use the building for the above purposes, he may.
Halacha 18
Similarly, if the seven officials of the community made a condition in the presence of the entire community that [after the community accomplished the purpose for which they sold the synagogue], the remainder of the funds could be used for mundane purposes, they may be used for such purposes. Thus, after the money has been used for building another synagogue, for purchasing an ark, a mantle or case [for a Torah scroll], chumashim, or a Torah scroll, the remainder may be used for mundane purposes in accordance with their condition, and may be used for whatever they please.
Halacha 19
Similarly, if all the inhabitants of a city - or a majority of them - accept [the authority of] a single individual, whatever actions he takes [in regard to a synagogue] are binding. He may sell [the synagogue] or give [it as a gift] alone, as he sees fit, and establish whatever conditions he desires.
Halacha 20
Just as it is permitted to sell a synagogue, it is permitted to give it away as a present. If the community had not received any benefit from giving it as a gift, it would not have given it. However, it cannot be rented or given as security.
Similarly, when a synagogue is being torn down so that it can be rebuilt, it is permitted to sell the bricks, timber, and soil, exchange them, or give them as gifts. However, it is forbidden to lend them, since their sanctity only departs in return for money or benefit which is equivalent to money.
Halacha 21
Although the people pray in a city's main street on fast days and ma'amadot, because too many people gather to fit within a synagogue, [the street] does not possess any quality of sanctity, because [praying there is only a temporary measure] and it is not established as a place of prayer.
Similarly, buildings and courtyards where people gather to pray do not possess any measure of sanctity, because they were not designated for prayer alone. Rather, [people] pray within them as a temporary measure, as a person prays within his home.
Commentary Halacha 1
Wherever ten Jews live - Since communal prayer is impossible without a quorum of ten, this is the minimum number of people that must live in a community before constructing a synagogue becomes obligatory.
it is necessary to establish a place for them to congregate for prayer at the time of each prayer service. - Note Hilchot De'ot 4:23, which states that a Torah sage is not allowed to live in a city which lacks any of ten community resources, one of which is a synagogue.
This place is called a Beit K'nesset - literally, "a house of congregation," generally, translated as "synagogue."
The inhabitants of a city can compel each other - The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 163:1) states that even if the majority of the inhabitants do not desire the construction of a synagogue, the minority have the right to compel them to build it.
to construct - i.e., participate both financially and in the actual construction work, if necessary,
a synagogue and to purchase scrolls containing the Torah, the Prophets, and the Sacred Writings. - so that these texts will be available for Torah study (Hilchot Sh'chenim 6:1). At present, when a greater number of Torah texts are available, the congregation is obligated to buy the Torah texts needed by the congregation - both adults and minors - for study (Magen Avraham 150:1).
Commentary Halacha 2
When a synagogue is built, it should be built only at the highest point of the city [as implied by Proverbs 1:21]: "She cries at the head of the public places." - These statements are quoted from the Tosefta, Megillah 3:14. The commentaries question how this verse serves as a prooftext for the law which is stated.
It should be built [so that] its height exceeds [that of] all the other buildings in the city [as implied by Ezra 9:9]: "to lift up the house of our God." - Shabbat 11a states: "Any city whose roofs are higher than the synagogue will ultimately be destroyed."
The Hagahot Maimoniot maintain that this applies only to buildings with flat roofs. However, if the roofs are slanted and therefore, will not be used by people, the height of the other buildings may exceed that of the synagogue. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 150:2) states that apartments or offices in other buildings should also not be higher than the synagogue's roof.
The Mishnah Berurah 150:5 notes that many communities are not stringent in the observance of this law and quotes sources which explain that since buildings owned by gentiles are often taller than the synagogue, the synagogue is not likely to be the tallest building in the city in any case. Therefore, other Jewish houses may also be built higher than the synagogue. His own opinion, however, is not to seek leniency in this regard.
The entrance to the synagogue should open only on the east [as implied by Numbers 3:38]: "...And those who camped before - The word "before" is understood to mean "at the entrance to."
the sanctuary on the east." - This law is quoted from the Tosefta (loc. cit.). The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 150:5) explain that this law applied only in Babylon, where their synagogues faced west. Thus, the doorway on the eastern side would be opposite the ark. However, since the Rambam mentions the possibility of the heichal being built on different walls, but mentions only one position for the entrance, it appears that he requires the entrance to be placed at the east at all times.
In [the synagogue], a heichal, where the Torah scroll is placed, should be constructed. - This refers to a fixed structure like the ark (Aron HaKodesh) which is found in contemporary synagogues. In addition, as explained in the following halachah, the custom was to have a tevah, a smaller ark, positioned next to the place where the chazan would stand.
The heichal should be constructed in the direction to which the people pray in that city - As mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 3, one should always pray facing the direction of the Temple. Thus, if the synagogue is located to the west of Jerusalem, the heichal should be built into the eastern wall.
so that they will face the heichal when they stand to pray. - It is apparent from the Rambam's statements that, if for some reason, the heichal of a synagogue was not positioned in the direction of Jerusalem, one should pray facing Jerusalem and not facing the heichal.
Commentary Halacha 3
A platform is placed in the center of the hall - both lengthwise and widthwise. (See the Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 5:1.)
so that the one who reads the Torah - as described in the following chapter
or one who gives a sermon - The Mishnah (Ta'anit 2:1) explains that on fast days, one of the elders of the congregation would speak and call the people to repent. Similarly, the Talmud mentions that some of the leading Sages would visit distant communities and address the people in the synagogue.
can stand on it, so that all the others will hear him.
When one positions the tevah which contains the Torah scroll - In contrast to the heichal whose position is fixed, thetevah is a movable ark, in which the Torah scrolls used for the public reading of the Torah were kept. (See the responsa of the Radbaz, Vol. II, 157.)
one should position it in the center of the hall - widthwise
in the direction of the heichal - i.e., close to the wall on which the heichal is constructed
and facing the people.
Commentary Halacha 4
How do the people sit in the synagogue? The elders sit facing the people with their backs toward the heichal. - The Ramah (Orach Chayim 150:5) quotes this halachah, but does not mention that the elders sit with their backs to theheichal. The commentaries note that in many Sephardic communities the elders would sit with their backs to the ark, while in Ashkenazic communities, the custom is for them to sit on either side of the ark.
All the people sit row after row, each row facing the back of the row before it. Thus, all the people face the sanctuary - the heichal
the elders, and the tevah. - which should all be positioned in the direction of Jerusalem
When the leader of the congregation stands to pray, he stands on the ground - praying from a low place, as implied by Psalms 130:1: "From the depths, I called out to You, O God" (Berachot 10b).
before the tevah - Hence, the expression, 18ינפלáדרוי הביתה (literally, "descend before the ark") is often used to refer to leading communal prayer, because thechazan would pray "on the ground, before the tevah."
facing the sanctuary - the heichal
like the others - i.e., facing the same direction as the other congregants.
Commentary Halacha 5
Synagogues and houses of study should be treated with respect. - TheMishneh Berurah (151:1) notes that Megillah 29a quotes Ezekiel 11:16: "I have been a sanctuary in microcosm to them in the countries where they have come" to describe the synagogues in the Diaspora. This association allows one to infer that the obligation to honor a synagogue is related to the mitzvah (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 21) to revere the Temple.
The S'dei Chemed cites Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 65) which mentions the prohibition against "destroying the houses where God is worshiped," indicating that the obligation to honor the synagogues has its source in a Torah commandment. (Note the commentary on Halachah 12.)
They should be swept clean - Sefer Chassidim 128 relates tht Rabbi Ya'akov bar Yakar, Rashi's teacher, would polish the floor before the ark with his beard.
and mopped. - Their synagogues often had dirt floors. Thus, mopping them would also keep the dust from rising (Megillah 28b).
All the Jews in Spain, the west - i.e., North Africa,
Babylonia, - The translation is based on Targum Onkelos to Genesis 19:1.
and Eretz Yisrael - The term ארץ הצבי is applied to Eretz Yisrael, based onJeremiah 3:19: "I will give you a delightful land (ארץ צבי), the finest heritage of a host of nations." (See also Daniel 8:9, Gittin 57a.)
are accustomed to light lamps in the synagogue - The Rambam appears to imply that in addition to lighting lamps at night, when their light would be necessary, lamps were lit during the day as a mark of respect.
and spread mats over the floor to sit on. In European communities -literally, "in the cities of Edom (i.e., Rome)."
they sit on chairs.
Commentary Halacha 6
No lightheadedness - Rashi, Megillah 28a, explains that קלות ראש also connotes irreverence. These activities...
i.e., jests, frivolity, and idle conversation - cheapen the respect and awe one has for the synagogue. Rashi also includes in the category of קלות ראש all the other activities the Rambam mentions in this halachah because they all cause us to view the synagogue as a place where mundane affairs can be carried out, and thus, minimize our appreciation of its holiness.
should be seen in a synagogue. - The Sefer Mitzvot Gadol states that the sin of frivolity in the synagogues causes them to be sold to gentiles and transformed into houses of idol worship.
The Zohar (Parashat Vayakhel) severely condemns the sin of idle conversation in a synagogue, because God's presence is manifest there, and, therefore, any activity of this sort indicates a lack of reverence for Him.
We may not eat or drink inside [a synagogue] - Pesachim 101a relates that wayfarers would eat meals in the synagogue. However, Tosafot, Megillah 28a, explains that synagogues would have a side room that was used as a guest house. However, eating and drinking would not be permitted in the room used for prayer.
nor use [a synagogue] for our benefit - Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Berachot 8:6. Rashi (Megillah 28b) renders ניאותין as "adorn ourselves." According to his interpretation, the synagogue should not be a place where people come to show off their clothes and jewelry.
nor stroll inside one. - i.e., it is forbidden to go to a synagogue for the purpose of walking around to release tension (Kessef Mishneh).
On a sunny [day], one should not enter [a synagogue to seek shade] from the sun, and on a rainy [day], [one should not enter a synagogue to seek shelter] from the rain. - Megillah 28b relates that Ravina and Rav Ada bar Matanah were discussing a Halachic problem with Ravva outside. When it began raining, they entered a synagogue to continue their discussion. They explained, "We did not enter the synagogue because of the rain, but because the comprehension of the passage requires a relaxed state of mind."
[However,] the sages and their students - The Magen Avraham 151:2 states that this license is granted only to scholars who spend the majority of their time in the house of study. Others, however, are not granted such privileges.
are permitted to eat and drink in a synagogue - Megillah 28b states that a house of study is called "the rabbis' house," implying that they can do anything they would do in their own homes in the house of study. Since the holiness of a house of study exceeds that of a synagogue (see Halachah 14), we can assume that these activities are also permitted in a synagogue.
Nonetheless, this license is granted only...
because of the difficulty [observing the prohibition would cause them]. -Forcing the scholars to leave the synagogue whenever they wanted to eat or drink would cause them to waste time that could be devoted to Torah study (Magen Avraham, loc. cit.:2).
The Magen Avraham cites authorities who permit wider use of synagogue facilities if they were originally constructed with this use in mind. This leniency is based on Megillah, loc. cit., which states that the synagogues in Babylonia could be used for mundane purposes since they were constructed with this condition in mind.
Commentary Halacha 7
It is forbidden to calculate accounts in [a synagogue], unless the accounts are connected with a mitzvah - See Ketubot 5a, which states that though it is forbidden to think over one's accounts on the Sabbath, one is permitted to calculate accounts that are associated with a mitzvah even in a synagogue.
for example, the collection of charity - For a more precise definition of the term קופה, see Hilchot Matnot Ani'im 9:1.
the redemption of captives - Note the Rambam's comments on the importance of the redemption of captives, Hilchot Matnot Ani'im 8:10-18.
or the like. [Similarly,] eulogies - This does not refer to a eulogy recited in the presence of the corpse itself, but rather a public meeting in honor of the deceased after his burial (Rav Kapach).
should not be recited inside them, except a eulogy that involves many [of the inhabitants of the city]; for example, [if] there were a eulogy of the great sages of that city for which all the people would gather together and come. - From Megillah 28b, it appears that this refers to a eulogy recited over a great sage, by a great sage, or attended by a great sage.
Commentary Halacha 8
If a synagogue or a house of study has two entrances, one should not use it for a shortcut - Note Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 7:2, which mentions a similar prohibition with regard to the Temple Mount.
i.e., to enter through one entrance and leave through the other to reduce [the distance one] travels, because it is forbidden to enter [these buildings] except for a mitzvah. - Note Halachah 10, which states that if one enters a synagogue for the sake of a mitzvah, one may afterwards leave from the other entrance to shorten his way.
The Be'ur Halachah (151) questions whether a person who is going to do a mitzvah may take a shortcut through a synagogue. Though the Pri Megadimstates that this might be permissible, the Be'ur Halachah maintains that the wording the Rambam chose implies that one must enter the synagogue to do a mitzvah within, and not to pass through for the sake of a mitzvah.
Commentary Halacha 9
A person who has to enter a synagogue to call a child or his friend, should enter and read [a portion of the written law] or relate a teaching [of the oral law] and then call his friend - The Lechem Mishneh explains that the person should study first and then call his friend, so that it will not appear that he entered the synagogue only to serve his personal concerns.
so that he will not have entered [a synagogue] for his personal reasons alone - which is forbidden, as mentioned above.
If he does not know [how to study], he should ask one of the children -This suggestion is quoted from Megillah 28b, the source for this halachah. As obvious from Gittin 58a and other sources throughout the Talmud, synagogues were often used as classrooms for younger children.
[to] tell him the verse he is studying - for listening to the words of Torah recited by another person is also considered as Torah study.
or, [at the very least,] wait a while in the synagogue - The Ramah (Orach Chayim 151:8) states that one must wait at least the length of time it takes to walk eight handbreadths (slightly less than five feet).
and then leave, since spending time [in the synagogue] is one of the aspects of the mitzvah as implied by [Psalms 84:5]: "Happy are those who dwell in Your house." - The Bayit Chadash (Orach Chayim 151) points out that the emphasis is not on sitting, but on spending time, whether one stands or sits. To clarify this point, the Rambam does not quote the Talmudic source (Megillah, loc. cit.) exactly. That passage reads, "[he should] wait a while, get up, and leave." The Rambam omits the expression, "get up," to indicate that one need not actually sit.
Commentary Halacha 10
A person who enters [a synagogue] to pray or to study is permitted to leave by the opposite door to shorten his way. -Megillah 29a bases this law on Ezekiel 46:9 which states that in the Messianic age, after the people complete their service in the Temple, they will not leave through the same gate through which they entered. If this will be permitted in the Temple, it is surely permitted in a synagogue.
The Kessef Mishneh questions the order of the halachot chosen by the Rambam, noting that it would have seemed more logical to mention this law directly after Halachah 8, which forbids taking a shortcut through a synagogue. The Or Sameach points out a possible resolution of this difficulty, noting that in teaching this law after Halachah 9, the Rambam implies that leniency is granted only for the sake of calling a friend. However, it is forbidden to enter a synagogue and study Torah in order to leave by the opposite door.
A person is permitted to enter a synagogue - The Mishnah (Berachot 9:6) forbids the following four activities on the Temple Mount, considering them as irreverent. See also Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 7:2.
[holding] his staff, [wearing] his shoes, - Though there is no obligation to remove one's shoes before entering a synagogue, we find the practice mentioned in various sources. The Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia 2:8) relates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's son removed his sandals before entering a synagogue. When he left, he discovered that they had been stolen. He said, "If I had not entered the synagogue, my sandals wouldn't have been stolen."
wearing [only] lower garments, - In his commentary on the above mishnah, the Rambam defines אפונדתו as "a garment which one wears against his flesh to collect perspiration, so that... he will not spoil his dress clothing." Others render אפונדתו as "money-belt."
or with dust on his feet. - Berachot 63a compares a synagogue to one's house. Since these activities are accepted in one's home, they are also acceptable in the synagogue.
It must be noted that many authoritative manuscripts of theMishneh Torah omit the phrases "wearing [only] lower garments" and "with dust on his feet." Note also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 151:8) which states that a person should clean mud from his shoes before entering a synagogue.
If it is necessary for him to spit, he may spit in the synagogue. - Rabbenu Manoach cites the following statement from the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachot3:5):
A person who spits in the synagogue is considered like one who spits in [God's] eye. Rabbi Yonah would spit and wipe it with his foot.
Rabbenu Manoach explains that this passage does not contradict the Babylonian Talmud (Berachot, loc. cit.) which allows one to spit in the synagogue. As long as Rabbi Yonah's practice is followed, there is no prohibition.
Though some authorities disagree, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 151:7) accepts Rabbenu Manoach's decision. However, while reciting the Shemoneh Esreh, spitting is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 97:2). The Magen Avraham 151:9 mentions that the Ari zal would refrain from spitting within a synagogue.
Commentary Halacha 11
Synagogues and houses of study that have been destroyed remain holy [as can be inferred from Leviticus 26:31]: "I will destroy your sanctuaries." - The commentaries explain that since the verse states והשמותי את מקדשיכם, with the noun "sanctuaries" following the verb "I will destroy," rather than 18םכישדקמáתאו םמישא, one may draw the following inference.
[Our Sages explained]: Even though they are destroyed, they remain -sanctuaries and therefore, must be regarded as
holy. - Therefore,
Just as one must treat them with respect while they are standing, - as explained in Halachot 5-10.
so must they be treated [with respect] when they are destroyed - Megillah28b mentions that if one constructed a synagogue with the condition that it can be used for mundane purposes, one may do so. As mentioned in the commentary to Halachah 6, the Ramban and other authorities maintain that if a synagogue was constructed with such a condition, guests may eat inside and it may be used for other mundane purposes.
Tosafot disagrees, maintaining that the condition has no effect while the synagogue is standing and applies only after it has been destroyed. Thus, were a synagogue to be built with such a condition, as were the synagogues in Babylonia in Talmudic times, mundane activities could be carried on within its premises after it was destroyed. However, even then, activities directly opposed to the sanctity of the synagogue, e.g., sowing crops on the land, are forbidden.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 151:11) quotes Tosafot's opinion. Interestingly, the Rambam does not mention either the Ramban's or Tosafot'sinterpretation of the possibility of making the condition mentioned in Megillah(loc. cit.).
with the exception of sweeping and mopping them. [When destroyed], they need not be swept or mopped - for there would be no benefit in doing so.
If grass grows in them, it should be pulled out and left there - The Mishnah (Megillah 28b) states, "If grass grow in it, it should not be pulled out." The Talmud comments that one is not allowed to pull out the grass to use as fodder for animals, but one may pull out the grass and leave it there.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam writes that one is permitted to pull the grass out and leave it in its place. The published text of the Mishneh Torah (which we have quoted) appears to imply that one should pull them out (i.e., it is imperative to do so). However, the version of the halachah found in authoritative manuscripts is closer to the understanding in the Commentary to the Mishnah.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:10) quotes the version of the halachah in the published texts of the Mishneh Torah. However, the Mishnah Berurah (151:29) quotes the Commentary to the Mishnah.
so that it will be seen by the people [in the hope that] it will rouse their spirits and rebuild them. - In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam adds that if it is impossible for the synagogues to be rebuilt, the grass should be left there since seeing it will motivate the people to Teshuvah.
Commentary Halacha 12
One should not tear down a synagogue in order to build another in its place or in another place. - Note Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 65), which states that destroying a synagogue is a transgression of a Torah commandment. Nonetheless, if one's intention is to build a new synagogue, the destruction of the old one is permitted (See also Ramah, Orach Chayim 152:2).
Instead, one should build the [new synagogue] and then, one [may] tear down the [previous] one - This law is quoted from Bava Batra 3b. Two reasons are mentioned by the Talmud. The Rambam quotes one:
lest unforeseen difficulties arise [which prevent it] from being built. - The second reason mentioned in the Talmud is so that people will have a place to pray in the interim. The Talmud notes that different corollaries result from these two explanations. If there is another synagogue in the city, according to the second explanation (not mentioned by the Rambam), one could tear down the first synagogue while building a new one, since people would be able to pray in the other synagogue in the interim. However, according to the explanation quoted by the Rambam, it would be improper to destroy the synagogue lest the new synagogue never be built.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 152:1) quotes the Rambam's decision. The Mishnah Berurah 152:4 states that this law applies even if all the money necessary to build the new synagogue has been collected.
This applies even to a single wall of [a synagogue]. One should build the new wall next to the old wall and then, tear down the old wall. - The Be'ur Halachah (152) mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who permits a community to enlarge a synagogue by tearing down an existing wall before building a new one if there is no other alternative. He maintains that the Rambam might also agree to this decision. However, most authorities interpret the Rambam's words as forbidding such a practice.
Commentary Halacha 13
When does the above apply? When its foundations are not ruined or its walls are not leaning perilously - so that there is no danger in continuing to pray within.
However, if its foundation is destroyed or its walls are leaning perilously, - and there is a danger that it may collapse
it should be destroyed immediately - The Be'ur Halachah (152) states that this applies even if the community does not have another place to pray.
and [then, efforts to] rebuild it should be begun immediately throughout the day and night lest times become difficult and it remain destroyed. -Bava Batra 3b relates that Rav Ashi saw a dangerous flaw in the synagogue of Mata Machsia. He ordered the building destroyed and then took his bed into the ruins to make sure that the community would rebuild it quickly. He did not remove his bed until the final fixtures of the building were completed.
Commentary Halacha 14
It is permitted to transform a synagogue into a house of study. - Megillah27a describes a house of study as "a great house," "a house where Torah is developed."
However, it is forbidden to transform a house of study into a synagogue because the sanctity of a house of study exceeds that of a synagogue -since Torah study takes precedence over the performance of all other mitzvot (See Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:3). See also Chapter 8, Halachah 3; Hilchot Talmud Torah 4:9.
and one must proceed to a higher rung of holiness, - Our translation is based on the opinion of Rabbenu Nissim who maintains that it is forbidden to exchange a sacred article for another of an equal level of holiness. There are other opinions who maintain that it is permitted to do so. The Mishnah Berurah153:11 states that even according to those opinions, the permission to do so is after the fact (בדיעבד), but not a priori.
but not descend to a lower rung. - This principle applies in a number of different halachic contexts, for example, the practice of adding a new Chanukah candle each night (Shabbat 21a).
Similarly, the inhabitants of a city - Megillah 26b explains that this only applies to a synagogue in a village as explained in Halachah 16.
who sold a synagogue - The Rambam's use of the past tense appears to imply that this is a only question בדיעבד. TheMishnah Berurah 153:3, however, presents as להתחילה (a priori), the possibility of selling an article of lesser sanctity in order to purchase an article of greater sanctity.
The sale of a synagogue is a complicated matter. See Halachot 16-20 and also the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 153:7 and commentaries.
may purchase an ark - See Halachah 3.
with the proceeds. - The Lechem Mishneh emphasizes that a synagogue may only be sold for such a purchase if there is another synagogue in the city.
If they sold an ark, they may purchase a mantle - In Ashkenazic communities, it is customary to hold a Torah scroll in a mantle.
or a case - as is customary in Sephardic communities. Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:4 describes the sanctity of these ritual articles.
for a Torah scroll with the proceeds. If they sold a mantle or a case, they may buy chumashim - In Talmudic times, the expression chumash referred to a scroll on which only one of the five books of Moses was written. Since it contained only one book, its holiness was on a lower level than that of a complete Torah scroll.
with the proceeds. If they sold chumashim, they may buy a Torah scroll with the proceeds. If they sold a Torah scroll, the proceeds may only be used to purchase another Torah scroll, - There is a some difficulty with the Rambam's statements when compared to Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:2, where the Rambam writes:
It is forbidden for a person to sell a Torah scroll even if he has nothing to eat. [It is even forbidden] to sell an old scroll in order to purchase a new one. A Torah scroll should never be sold except for [one of] two purposes, so that one can use the money to study Torah or in order to marry.
Perhaps here the Rambam is speaking about a question that arose after the fact, once the Torah scroll has already been sold, while in Hilchot Sefer Torah, he is describing an a priori condition. Alternatively, he may be referring to circumstances where the new Torah scroll has already been written and all that is necessary is to pay for it. In such a case, one may sell an old Torah scroll (Rabbenu Manoach, Hilchot Sefer Torah).
for there is no level of holiness above that of a Torah scroll. - In Hilchot Sefer Torah (loc. cit.), the Rambam writes, "A kosher Torah scroll should be treated with special holiness and great honor."
The same [laws apply] to [any money] which remains - i.e., if one sold many chumashim to purchase a Torah scroll and some of the proceeds from the sale remained, those monies should not be used to purchase anything on a lower level of holiness.
Commentary Halacha 15
Similar [principles apply] if a congregation collected money to build a house of study or a synagogue or to purchase an ark, a mantle or a case [for a Torah scroll], or a Torah scroll, and desired to change [the purpose for which] all the [funds] had been [originally] collected. - Just as it is forbidden to sell sacred articles in order to purchase articles of lesser sanctity...
It is forbidden to change [the purpose for which the funds will be used] -Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 8:11 mentions an exception to this principle:
If the inhabitants of a city collected money for the construction of a synagogue and a matter involving a mitzvah arises, they may use the money for it. If they already bought stones and beams, they should not sell them for the sake of another mitzvah, except for the redemption of captives.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 153:6) states that a synagogue - and even a Torah scroll - may be sold for the purpose of supporting Torah studies or for other needs associated with mitzvot. Nevertheless, this measure should only be taken when there is no other way to cover these expenses (Mishnah Berurah153:24). See also Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De'ah 252:1) which explains that one is only allowed to sell a synagogue for such purposes if the buyer will continue to have it used as a synagogue.
except from a matter of lesser sanctity to one of greater sanctity. - Rav Moshe Cohen questions the Rambam's decision, asking why it is forbidden to make a change of this nature. Even bricks intended for use in constructing a synagogue can be used for other purposes as long as they have not been actually built into the synagogue (See Megillah 26b).
The Turei Zahav (Orach Chayim 153:2) explains that money collected for the purchase of religious articles does not possess the sanctity of those articles. However, since the donors intended that the money be used to purchase religious articles, its use is constrained by the terms of an implicit vow that it be used for this purpose. Despite this limitation, the congregation may use these funds for another purpose associated with a mitzvah and substitute other funds to accomplish the purpose for which these funds were originally collected. (Note the Magen Avraham 153:5, who does not accept the latter conclusion.)
The Be'ur Halachah (153) supports the Turei Zahav's position based on Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:20, which states that a sacred utensil made with the intent that it be used in the Temple is not considered as "sacred" until it has actually been used for its intended purpose.
However, if [the congregation accomplished the purpose for which they had [originally] collected [the funds], - e.g., they collected funds to purchase a Torah scroll and were able to purchase it for less money than they had collected.
they may use the remainder for whatever they desire. -Megillah 27a mentions this leniency based on the principle that the money itself does not have the sanctity of the religious articles for whose purchase it was donated, but is merely designated to be used for their purchase.
Once the religious articles have been purchased, the Mishnah Berurah(153:14) states that these funds can be used for any purpose of benefit to the community, even if it has no association with a sacred article. However, there are authorities who require the money to be used to purchase an article which has some degree of sanctity.
All the components of a synagogue - e.g., the platform from which the Torah is read or its benches (Jerusalem Talmud, Megillah 3:1)
are considered - to be on the same level of holiness
like the synagogue itself - and can only be sold for similar purposes.
Our Sages placed certain restrictions on the sale of the components of a synagogue. In Hilchot Matnot Ani'im 8:6, the Rambam writes:
If someone donates a light or a candle to a synagogue, it is forbidden to exchange it [for something else]. If [the sale] concerns a matter which is a mitzvah, it may be exchanged.... If the name of the donor has been forgotten, it is permitted to exchange [the object] even for a mundane matter.
In Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:4, the Rambam states that the platform "has no sanctity at all." However, this statement should be interpreted to mean that the platform is not considered a "sacred article" like the others mentioned in that halachah.
The curtain hanging before the ark - it is not clear whether the Rambam is referring to the tevah (the movable ark) or the heichal (the fixed ark). Rabbenu Nissim interprets the reference as to be to the tevah.
is considered like the mantle of a Torah scroll - since from time to time, it is placed under the Torah scroll (Megillah 26b).
If a condition - allowing the use of the curtains for mundane purposes
was made concerning them, - when they were originally purchased
the terms of the condition are binding - and there is no prohibition against using them for such purposes.
Commentary Halacha 16
When do the above statements permitting the sale of a synagogue apply? In regard to a synagogue in a village. Since it was constructed for the sake of the inhabitants of that village alone, - even if the money for its construction was donated by people from outside the city (Ramah, Orach Chayim 153:7).
so that they can pray inside it, - Based on this statement, the Mishnah Berurah 153:25 explains that the main determinant is not the size of the village, but whether the synagogue is also frequented by people from the outside. According to this understanding, a synagogue in a small village where large trade fairs are held is bound by the same laws as the synagogues of a large city. By the same token, a synagogue used by a private group of people in a large city may be comparable to a village synagogue. An example of such a case, cited by the Mishnah Berurah, is the custom once common that craftsmen of different professions would build synagogues for themselves.
they are permitted to sell it if they all desire to do so. - The Ramban states that the consent of the majority of the village's inhabitants is sufficient. His opinion is accepted as halachah by the Mishnah Berurah 153:24.
In contrast, a synagogue in a metropolis, since it was constructed for the sake of all the people in the world, [i.e.,] so that anyone who comes to that country can come and pray in it, - For this reason, even if the money to build the synagogue was donated by the inhabitants of the city alone, they do not have the authority to sell the synagogue (Rabbenu Asher, Megillah 26a).
it is considered as [the property] of [the entire] Jewish people and it can never be sold. - Halachah 19 mentions an exception to this principle. Also, theMagen Avraham 153:12 relates that if a synagogue in a city is no longer used for prayer, it may be sold. Based on this decision, the Rabbis (See Iggeret Moshe, Orach Chayim, Vol. I, 50) have permitted the sale of synagogues located in neighborhoods no longer inhabited by Jews.
Commentary Halacha 17
The inhabitants of a village - See the previous Halachah.
who desire to sell their synagogue in order to build another synagogue with the money, or to buy an ark or Torah scroll with the money, - in keeping with Halachah 15
must establish as a condition [of the sale] that the purchaser not use the building for a bathhouse, a leatherworks, a mikveh, or a laundry. - The translation of the Hebrew, בית המים, is based on Rashi's commentary to Megillah27b. He also offers an alternate translation, "a latrine." The Kessef Mishnehfavors the translation "laundry" since the prohibition against using the synagogue as a latrine is self-evident. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 153:9), Rav Yosef Karo mentions a latrine, but not a laundry.
The sanctity of the synagogue is transferred to the money received from its sale and the building itself is no longer considered as "holy." Nonetheless, using the premises for such purposes is considered degrading.
As support for the prohibition against using premises that had previously served as a synagogue for such purposes, the Or Sameach cites II Chronicles 8:11: "I will not have a woman dwelling in the house of David... for the [places] where the ark of God has come are holy." Although the ark had already been placed in the Temple, it was not becoming to the ark for Pharaoh's daughter to be allowed to live in a place where it had been kept.
If, at the time of the sale, the seven officials of the community - In a responsum, the Rambam explains that there is no obligation to appoint seven officials to lead the community. Our Sages' use of that term merely implies that the governing communal body should not be a small group. Since the number seven is often used in the Bible, our sages employed it in this context.
In the same responsum, the Rambam defines the expression 18יבוט ריעה to mean "sages, men of Torah and good deeds, [people of whom it can be said] 'pleasant are the words spoken by those who fulfill them.'
made a condition in the presence of the entire community - The Ramah (Orach Chayim 153:7) states that a public announcement of the sale is sufficient for it to be considered as if all the inhabitants of the city were present.
that the purchaser be allowed to use the building for the above purposes, he may. - Megillah 26a,b states that the restriction against selling a synagogue for an unbecoming purpose does not apply when the building was sold by the communal officials in the presence of the community. When it is sold in this manner, it can be "used even as a tavern."
The Meiri explains the rationale for this decision as follows: Even if an explicit statement was not made to the effect that the synagogue could be used for an unbecoming purpose, it is understood that the village's inhabitants consecrated the synagogue with the understanding that it be subject to the decisions of the community's officials. Therefore, they have the right to sell the synagogue for whatever purposes they wish.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision and maintains that the license granted by Megillah (loc. cit.) only applies to the money received from the sale, while the building that was used as a synagogue can never be used for a purpose which is unbecoming. Though the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam's view, the Be'ur Halachah suggests following the Ra'avad's decision, quoting the law (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 21:2), which forbids using atallit for an unbecoming purpose even after its tzitzit have been removed.
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Responsa, Orach Chayim, Vol. II, 45) mentions this halachah in regard to the sale of synagogues in neighborhoods where Jews no longer live. Unfortunately, the natural clients for the purchase of an abandoned synagogue are churches. Rav Moshe states that selling a synagogue for use as a church is definitely forbidden. Using a synagogue for such purposes is more demeaning than using it for the purposes mentioned by the Talmud. He maintains that even according to the Rambam, selling a synagogue for this purpose could not be permitted.
Commentary Halacha 18
Similarly, if the seven officials of the community made a condition in the presence of the entire community that [after the community accomplished the purpose for which they sold the synagogue], - as explained below.
the remainder of the funds could be used for mundane purposes, they may be used for such purposes. - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim153:7) accepts the opinion of Rashi, the Ra'avad, and Rabbenu Asher, who differ with the Rambam and maintain that the entire proceeds from the sale of a synagogue can be used for mundane purposes if the sale was carried out in the above manner.
In his Kessef Mishnah, Rav Yosef Karo explains the difference between these positions as follows. These authorities do not accept the Rambam's interpretation of Megillah 26a-b mentioned in the previous Halachah, and maintain that a certain measure of sanctity always remains in the synagogue. The Rambam maintains that the sanctity is transferred to the money received for the synagogue. Therefore, the condition made by the city officials can never effect the entire sum of money. Rather, the major portion must always be used for a sacred object.
[Interestingly, in his Kessef Mishnah, Rav Yosef Karo points out the advantages of the Rambam's position. However, in hisShulchan Aruch, he accepts the decisions of the other authorities.]
Thus, after the money has been used for building another synagogue, for purchasing an ark, a mantle or case [for a Torah scroll], chumashim, or a Torah scroll, - as mentioned in Halachah 14.
the remainder may be used for mundane purposes in accordance with their condition, and may be used for whatever they please. -Megillah 27a describes such a situation and states that the remainder of the funds may be used even to hire a messenger for the city.
Commentary Halacha 19
Similarly, if all the inhabitants of a city - The passage from Megillah 26a quoted below indicates that this law applies even to a synagogue in a metropolis. Though the Rambam's placement of this law in this context does not lead to this conclusion, it is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 153:7.
or a majority of them - accept [the authority of] a single individual, - Note the Mishnah Berurah 153:35 which states that this applies only when the inhabitants of the city donated the money for the synagogue's construction themselves and accepted the authority of the person involved from the beginning of the synagogue's construction.
whatever actions he takes [in regard to a synagogue] are binding. -Megillah 26a relates:
Rav Ashi said: "Even though people from all over the world come into the synagogue of Mata Machsia to pray, since the people donated the money for its construction subject to my decisions, allowing me to do what I want, I am permitted to sell it if I so desire."
He may sell [the synagogue] - as mentioned in the previous halachot
or give [it as a gift] - as mentioned in the following Halachah.
alone, - This expression appears to indicate that the sale may be conducted even without a public announcement as is required of the city officials in the previous halachot. Rabbenu Nissim (and the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.) disagree, stating that the sale must be made with the consent of the community.
as he sees fit, and establish whatever conditions he desires - in regard to the use of the premises or the proceeds from the sale.
Commentary Halacha 20
Just as it is permitted to sell a synagogue - in a village, and afterwards, use the premises for mundane purposes
it is permitted to give it away as a present - to an individual to use as he sees fit. The Magen Avraham 153:26 states that the gift must be made by the community officials in the presence of the inhabitants of the village. However, the Pri Megadim does not require these conditions. Since the Rambam equates giving the synagogue as a present to a sale, it is not likely that he would make such limitations.
Megillah 26b states, "a gift is like a sale," because
If the community had not received any benefit from giving it as a gift, it would not have given it. - This principle is also reflected in questions of business law, e.g., Hilchot Gezeilah 9:9.
The Ritbah states that even when the community has not yet received any benefit from a person, it may give him a synagogue in the expectation of receiving such benefit.
However, it cannot be rented or given as security. - In the Talmudic era, when property was given as security, the person who received the property would have the right to use it throughout the term of the loan. [This practice raises questions in regard to the prohibition against taking interest. See Hilchot Malveh U'Loveh, Chapters 6 and 7.]
When a synagogue is sold, its sanctity is transferred to the money received for it and does not remain within the building itself. However, if a synagogue was rented or given as security, there is nothing to which the sanctity is transferred. Hence, it remains within the building and the person who rents it or receives it as security is forbidden to use it for his own purposes.
Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 153:11) who states that the prohibition only applies when the person who receives the synagogue wants to use it for mundane purposes. If he continues to use it as a synagogue there is no difficulty.
Similarly, when a synagogue is being torn down so that it can be rebuilt, - Note Halachah 12 which states that the new synagogue must be built before the old one is torn down.
it is permitted to sell the bricks, timber, and soil, exchange them, - even if the articles given in return are received later (Mishnah Berurah 153:68)
or give them as gifts. - in return for benefit, as explained above.
However, it is forbidden to lend them, - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim153:11) states that this prohibition applies even when the loan is made by the community officials in the presence of the community.
Though the community officials have the power to nullify the sanctity of a synagogue as mentioned in Halachot 17 and 18, that provision only applies when they do so completely. In this instance, since the building materials have to be returned, their sanctity is not nullified. Hence, no one has the right to lend them to anyone for mundane use.
since their sanctity only departs in return for money or benefit which is equivalent to money. - Similar principles apply in regard to the redemption of other articles endowed with sanctity, e.g., Ma'aser Sheni (the second tithe) or articles dedicated to the Temple (הקדש).
Commentary Halacha 21
Although the people pray in a city's main street on fast days - Hilchot Ta'anit 4:1 states:
On each of the seven days of fasting for rain... the ark is taken out to the main street of the city and the entire populace gather together wearing sackcloth. Ashes are placed on the ark and the Torah scroll... and each person places [ashes] on his head.
and ma'amadot, - The mention of ma'amadot in this context in Megillah 26a (the source for this halachah), and here, in the Mishneh Torah, has raised questions. In Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 6:1-2, the Rambam describes thema'amadot as follows:
The early prophets ordained that honest people who fear sin should be chosen to stand over the sacrifices. They are called anshei ma'amad. They were divided into 24 different watches....
Each week, the anshei ma'amad of that watch would gather together. Those who lived in Jerusalem or close to it would come to the Temple.... Those who lived far away... would gather together in the synagogues of their locale.
Each week, the anshei ma'amad of that watch would gather together. Those who lived in Jerusalem or close to it would come to the Temple.... Those who lived far away... would gather together in the synagogues of their locale.
In no source other than Megillah (loc. cit.) is it mentioned that the anshei ma'amad would pray in the street.
because too many people gather to fit within a synagogue, - Note Ta'anit16a which states that the people would pray in the street as an expression of shame and embarrassment; alternatively, because leaving one's normal place of prayer is a form of exile which brings atonement. Interestingly, the Rambam ignores both these reasons and offers a reason which is not mentioned in previous sources.
[the street] does not possess any quality of sanctity, because [praying there is only a temporary measure] and it is not established as a place of prayer.
Similarly, buildings and courtyards where people gather to pray - even for communal prayer, e.g., a room in an office building where people gather for prayer.
do not possess any measure of sanctity, - Thus, it is also permitted to perform mundane activities (those mentioned in Halachah 6) in these buildings.
because they were not designated for prayer alone. Rather, [people] pray within them as a temporary measure, as a person prays within his home. -The Shulchan Aruch 153:8 mentions a situation in which a building is designated as a synagogue temporarily, for merely a limited period. During that time, it has the holiness of a synagogue. However, once it is no longer used as a synagogue, it has no holiness.
Ishut - Chapter Eleven
Halacha 1
[The following laws apply when a man] weds a virgin who was widowed or divorced or who underwent the rite of chalitzah.1If she was widowed or divorced or underwent the rite of chalitzah after erusin alone, the ketubah [to which she is entitled from her second husband] is 200 zuz. If, however, she had been wed, the ketubah [to which she is entitled from her second husband] is 100 zuz. Once she is wed, she is considered to be a non-virgin.2
Similar [rules apply when a man] weds a virgin [bride] who is [a Canaanite maidservant] who has been freed, who is a convert, or who was held captive [by gentiles and freed]. If the maidservant had been freed, the convert had converted, or the women held captive had been redeemed before they reached the age of three years and one day,3 they are entitled to a ketubah of 200 zuz. If [this took place after they reached that age, their ketubah is [only] 100 [zuz].
Halacha 2
Why did our Sages ordain that these women receive a ketubah of [only] 100 [zuz] even though they are virgins? Because it is a presumption that can be accepted as fact that a woman who is wed will engage in marital relations, and similarly, that a maidservant, a gentile woman and a woman held captive by gentiles will have engaged in relations. Hence, they ordained that such women would be entitled to [only] 100 [zuz],whether they engaged in relations or not. With regard to all matters, they are considered to be non-virgins.
Halacha 3
A mukat etz4 [is granted] a ketubah of 100 [zuz]. Even if [her husband] wed her under the presumption that she was a virgin and then he discovered that she was a mukat etz, she is entitled to a ketubah of 100 [zuz].5
When a girl of less than three years of age engages in sexual relations, even when her partner is an adult male, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz]. Ultimately, she will heal and be a virgin like all others.
Similarly, when a boy below the age of nine engages in sexual relations with an adult woman, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz], as if she had never engaged in relations.6 For it is only after a boy reaches the age of nine years and one day that relations with him are of consequence. Before that age, they are of no consequence.
Halacha 4
Whether a virgin is a bogeret,7, blind,8 or an aylonit,9 she [is entitled to] aketubah of 200 [zuz]. By contrast, no provision was made for a ketubah for a woman who is a deaf mute or mentally incompetent. [The rationale is] that no provision has been made for the marriage of a mentally incompetent woman at all.
With regard to a woman who is a deaf mute, although our Sages made provision for her marriage, they did not entitle her to a ketubah, so that a man would not refrain from marrying her. Just as she is not entitled to a ketubah, so too, [her husband] is not [obligated to provide] her with her livelihood or grant her any other [of the ordinary] conditions of the marriage contract.
If one wed a woman who was a deaf mute and her difficulty was remedied, she is entitled to a ketubah and to the other conditions of the marriage contract. [The amount of] her ketubah is 100 zuz.10
Halacha 5
When a man marries a woman who is a deaf mute or mentally incompetent and writes her a ketubah for 10,000 [zuz], the obligation is binding; it was he who desired to diminish his assets.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] a deaf mute or a mentally incompetent man married a woman who was mentally competent. Even if afterwards the deaf mute's disability disappears and the mentally incompetent person gains stability, they are under no obligation to their wives. If, however, [the men] desire to remain [married] to [the women] after their own wellbeing has been restored, [the wives] are entitled to a ketubah, and its value should be 100 zuz.
If the deaf mute's marriage was made by the court, and they write [his wife] aketubah against his assets, she is entitled to everything that the court has prescribed for her. A court will not arrange a marriage for a mentally incompetent person at all. Since the sages' injunction will not be maintained in his instance,11 they did not ordain marriage for him at all.
Similarly, our Sages did not ordain marriage for a male below the age of majority; [the rationale is that] ultimately he will gain the potential to enter into a comprehensive marriage bond.
Why then did they ordain marriage for a girl below the age of majority12although she too will ultimately gain the potential for a comprehensive marriage bond? So that she will not be treated in a wanton manner.13
A youth should not be [allowed to] marry until he has been examined, and it has been determined that he has manifested signs of physical maturity.
Halacha 7
When a male below the age of majority marries a woman, she is not entitled to a ketubah, even if he is already nine years and one day old. If he attains majority and remains [married] to her, she is entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah.14
Similarly, when a man converts together with his wife, she is entitled to aketubah [of 100 zuz]. It was with this intent that he maintained their marriage.15
Halacha 8
Whenever a virgin bride is entitled to a ketubah of 200 [zuz], there is [the possibility of issuing] a claim against her, [denying] her virginity. Whenever, by contrast, a bride is entitled to a ketubah of [only] 100 [zuz],16 or the Sages did not entitle her to a ketubah at all,17 there is no [possibility of issuing] a claim against her [denying] her virginity. [Similarly,] if [a groom] enters into privacy with his arusah before their wedding, there is no [possibility of issuing] a claim against her [denying] her virginity.18
Halacha 9
What is meant by a claim [denying a woman's] virginity? [A man] married a woman on the assumption that she was a virgin, and [after the wedding] claims that he did not find signs of virginity. For there are two signs of virginity: a) [hymenal] bleeding at the conclusion of her first sexual experience; b) tightness that is felt during sexual relations at that time.19
Halacha 10
When [a man] weds a virgin who is granted a ketubah of 200 [zuz], and claims that he did not discover signs of her virginity, the woman is questioned [regarding the matter]. If she says, "It is true that he did not find me a virgin, but this is because I fell, and I was struck by a piece of wood or the ground, and my hymen was damaged," her word is accepted and she is entitled to a ketubah of [100 zuz].20
Halacha 11
If [the woman] says, "It is true that he did not find me a virgin, for another man raped me after I had been consecrated by him," her word is accepted, and she is entitled to a ketubah of 200 [zuz] as before.23
If [her husband] claims: "Perhaps you were raped before you were consecrated, and the agreement I entered was based on false premises. Or perhaps you willingly engaged in relations after you were consecrated" [his claim is not accepted]. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally against anyone who makes a false claim to have him incur a financial obligation for which he is not liable.
Halacha 12
If he claims, "I did not find her a virgin," and she claims, "He has not had intercourse with me and I am still a virgin," she should be examined. Alternatively, he should have relations with her under the surveillance of witnesses [and the truth will be clarified].24
If she claims, "He had relations with me and he found me a virgin like all others, and his claim is false," he is questioned [and asked to clarify his statements]. We ask him: "Why do you say that she was not a virgin?" If he answers: "Because she did not have hymenal bleeding," we check her family [history]. Perhaps [the women of] this [family] are known not to have [vaginal] bleeding at all: neither menstrual bleeding nor hymenal bleeding. If this was found to be true, we presume [that she was a virgin, and she is entitled to a ketubah of 200zuz].
If the women in her family are not known to have such a condition, we check her [physical state]; perhaps she is afflicted by a serious infirmity that has parched her body's natural fluids, or [perhaps] she was afflicted by hunger. Therefore, we have her bathe, eat and drink until she becomes healthy. At which point, [the couple] engage in relations again to see if she manifests hymenal bleeding or not.
If she is not hampered by sickness, hunger or the like, the [husband's] claim that she was not a virgin [is accepted]. [This applies] even if he felt tightness during relations. Since there was no hymenal bleeding, her hymen was not intact. For every virgin will manifest hymenal bleeding, whether she is a minor or above the age of majority, whether a na'arah or a bogeret, unless [this is prevented by an external factor,] illness or the like, as explained.
If [the husband] said: "[I claim that she was not a virgin,] because I did not feel tightness [during intercourse]. Instead, I found an open passageway," we inquire with regard to [the woman's] age. Perhaps she is a bogeret, and mostbogrot do not have tightness that can be felt substantially [during intercourse], for as she grew older [the adhesion of] her limbs lessened, and the virginal [tightness] disappeared.
If she had not become a bogeret yet, we ask him: "Perhaps you leaned on the side or [entered] gently25 during intercourse, and therefore you did not feel any tightness?" If he replies: "No. I found an open passageway," [his] claim that she was not a virgin [is accepted] with regard to any woman who has not reached the age of bagrut, regardless of whether she was a minor or a na'arah, or whether she was healthy or sick. For the vaginal channel of every virgin is closed. Even if she manifests hymenal bleeding, she is not considered to be a virgin, because the vaginal channel was open.26
Halacha 13
There are geonim who rule that for a bogeret, the claim that she did not have hymenal bleeding is not valid, but the claim that her vaginal channel was open is valid. This does not appear [to be based on the proper text of] the Talmud. They had inaccurate versions of the text. I have investigated many texts, including those of an early era,27 and I have discovered the version to be as I ruled. For a bogeret, the only valid claim is [that she did not manifest] hymenal bleeding.28
Halacha 14
Our Sages were those who instituted the fundamental requirement of a marriage contract for a woman and they also instituted [the following consideration]: Whenever [a man] makes a claim that his wife was not a virgin, and the woman disputes his claim, [the husband's claim] is accepted. It is the woman's responsibility to bring support for her claim, not the man's. [The rationale is] that we assume that a man will not labor to prepare a [wedding] feast and then mar it, turning his celebration into mourning.29
Halacha 15
Until when may a husband issue a claim denying his wife's virginity? If [the couple] went into privacy, only immediately [thereafter].30 If they did not enter into privacy, he has this option even after 30 days.
Halacha 16
All the geonim have ruled that our Sages' statement that the husband's statements are accepted even though his wife disputes his claim applies only with regard to nullifying the obligation for the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract. Nevertheless, the woman is entitled to the additional amount [to which her husband committed himself]31 unless there is clear proof that she was not a virgin, or she admitted that she was not a virgin before she was consecrated and that she deceived him.
Therefore, [the husband] may require her to take an oath while holding a sacred article,32 as must be done by all others who must take oaths before they collect [the money due them].33 Afterwards, she may collect the additional sum.
She, by contrast, does not have the option of requiring him to take an oath that he did not discover her to be a virgin, before she must forfeit the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, for it is a presumption accepted as fact that a person will not labor to prepare a [wedding] feast and then mar it. She may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally, applying to anyone who lodges false claims against her.
Halacha 17
If [the husband] desires to remain married to [his wife] after causing her to forfeit the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, he must write her [a new ketubah for] 100 [zuz]. For it is forbidden for a man to live with his wife for even one moment without a ketubah, as we have explained.34
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
I.e., the woman had been consecrated or wed, but before she and her husband engaged in marital relations, she was either widowed or divorced.
|
| 2. |
Even if there are witnesses to the fact that her husband died directly after they entered thechuppah (Ketubot 11a).
|
| 3. |
The rationale is that even if a woman engaged in sexual relations before the age of three, her hymen will grow back, as stated in Halachah 3, based on Ketubot 11b.
|
| 4. |
Literally, "one struck by a piece of wood," a woman who claims that she did not have hymenal bleeding at the time of her first sexual experience, because she had previously been "struck by a piece of wood" and caused to bleed at that time. As mentioned in Halachah 10, the term is used to refer to any woman who claims that her failure to have hymenal bleeding resulted from causes other than intercourse.
|
| 5. |
Although one might think that the marriage would be annulled, because the husband was operating under a misconception (מקח טעות), Ketubot 11b rules that this is not so. As long as she had not engaged in sexual relations previously, their marriage is binding.
|
| 6. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:4) follows the ruling of Tosafot, Ketubot 11b, who explain that this law applies only when the woman's hymen remains intact despite these relations.
|
| 7. |
This point is necessary to mention because of the factors stated in Halachah 12.
|
| 8. |
Ketubot 36b explains that we are afraid that such a woman might have suffered hymenal bleeding from causes other than intercourse, but will not have noticed the fact.
|
| 9. |
Rashi (Ketubot 36a) explains that since an aylonit is considered a bogeret, this point must be clarified, as it must with regard to a bogeret. The above ruling applies only when the husband was aware that the woman was an aylonit. If he was not aware of that fact, the woman is not entitled to a ketubah at all, as explained in Chapter 24, Halachah 2.
|
| 10. |
Even if she was a virgin at the time of their original marriage, at present she is not a virgin.
|
| 11. |
I.e., a marriage between a mentally incompetent man and an ordinary woman will constantly be pained by strife and will not last. In contrast, a deaf mute is more passive, and his household will not necessarily be characterized by friction (Yevamot 112b).
|
| 12. |
This refers to a girl who has been orphaned of her father, or who was divorced after being wed. The Torah - and not our Sages - gives a father the right to consecrate his daughter before she becomes a na'arah.
|
| 13. |
If the girl remains unmarried, the prohibitions against relations with her are not as severe, and the Sages feared that they would not be upheld. If she were allowed to marry, the prohibition against adultery would be respected, and she would be treated differently. Moreover, her husband will guard against her association with other men.
|
| 14. |
I.e., only the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, but not any additional amount that the youth added to the marriage contract, unless he renews that commitment after he reaches majority. Otherwise, that commitment - like any commitment made by a minor - is of no substance. Moreover, he is obligated for the fundamental requirement of the ketubah only when he engaged in marital relations with his wife after he attained majority. If not, the marriage - and thus the marriage contract - is of no consequence.
With regard to the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, the Rambam writes in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:8) that she is entitled to either 200 or 100 zuz, depending on her status at the time of the wedding.
|
| 15. |
Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the laws applying to a convert are the same as those applying to a minor. Both opinions are alluded to by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:11). (See the Beit Shmuel 67:12, which explains the Rambam's position: Even if a convert made a commitment of more than 100 zuz to his wife, any sum above 100 zuz is considered to be an addition to the ketubah and is therefore no longer binding when the convert accepts his new status as a Jew.)
|
| 16. |
I.e., even a woman who was widowed after the wedding, before engaging in relations with her husband. Even though her second husband marries her under the impression that she is a virgin, there is no possibility of issuing such a claim against her.
|
| 17. |
The obligation to grant a virgin bride a ketubah of 200 zuz is Rabbinic in origin. At the same time that our Sages instituted that obligation, they granted the husband a safeguard: that his word would be accepted with regard to a claim denying the woman's virginity. In these instances, since the woman was not granted the additional money, the safeguard provided by the Sages also does not apply (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 18. |
We suspect that the groom had relations with her and later forgot the matter (Rashi, Ketubot 9b). See also note 30.
|
| 19. |
As stated in the following halachot, unless there are other factors that support the woman's position, as will be explained, the husband's claim is accepted. We assume that the husband would not go to the time and expense of preparing a wedding feast and then mar the celebration by denying his wife's virginity unless the claim were true (Ketubot 10a).
|
| 20. |
Unless there are witnesses who can testify that the woman engaged in relations previously, the only question before the court is the amount of the woman's ketubah. She is permitted to remain married to her husband, because there is no proof that she willingly engaged in sexual relations with another person after she was consecrated. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:10.)
An exception to the above is a woman married to a priest. Issuing a claim questioning her virginity places the entire foundation of their marriage in doubt.
|
| 21. |
I.e., the husband claims that he has entered into a mekach ta'ut, an agreement based on false premises. He had desired to marry a virgin, and he was not prepared to marry a woman who had had relations with another man. Therefore, he desires to have the marriage annulled entirely.
|
| 22. |
I.e., he is not certain that she had engaged in relations with another man. In all matters of Torah law, whenever one person has a claim that is absolute (bari, in this instance the woman's claim that her hymen was damaged by factors other than intercourse) and one that is not absolute (shema, the man's claim), the claim that is absolute is accepted.
|
| 23. |
Since she was raped against her will, she is not forced to suffer a loss and is entitled to the full amount of the ketubah.
|
| 24. |
The intent is not that witnesses should observe the couple engaging in relations. This is forbidden, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 16. Instead, the intent is that they should inspect the sheet before and after the couple engage in relations for signs of hymenal bleeding.
|
| 25. |
Other authorities (and their opinion is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:6) state: "Maybe you did not enter gently?" - i.e., because of the husband's hurry to complete the sexual act, he did not feel the tightness.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the claim: "I discovered an open passageway," can be made only by a man who has been married before. If he was not married before, he would not have the experience to know the difference between virginal tightness and a non-virgin's state.
|
| 26. |
The Ramban and the Rashba state that the claim that the woman's vaginal channel was open can be made only in an instance in which the sheet on which the couple had relations was lost. If, however, the sheet is available, it should be inspected. If it has signs of blood, she is considered a virgin; and if not, she is not. This opinion is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but does not appear to have been accepted.
|
| 27. |
See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 15:2, where the Rambam states that he had available texts of the Talmud that were almost 500 years old. These would have been written approximately 200 years after the time of the Talmud's composition.
|
| 28. |
The Rambam's ruling is substantiated by our text of the Talmud (Ketubot 36b) and the ruling of theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 68:3). The differing opinion mentioned by the Rambam is that of Rabbenu Chanan'el.
|
| 29. |
Based on this rationale, the Maggid Mishneh mentions opinions that state that the man's word is accepted only when he prepared the wedding feast. If he did not, the woman's word is accepted.
|
| 30. |
We assume that the couple had relations and he discovered her to be a virgin. The fact that he issued a claim against her afterwards stemmed from discontent for other reasons, without any connection to her personal state.
|
| 31. |
Although there are authorities (among them Rabbenu Asher) who offer reasons why the husband's word should be accepted in this instance as well, the prevailing view (and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:8) follows the Rambam's decision. The rationale is that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract is a Rabbinic injunction, and the same authority that obligated the husband to meet this requirement rescinded it when he lodged a claim denying her virginity. The additional amount, by contrast, is a present to which the husband voluntarily obligated himself, and that obligation may be nullified only if it is proven that it was made under false premises.
|
| 32. |
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:8, which states that such an oath is administered while the person is holding a Torah scroll. Significantly, the Rambam's ruling here represents a change of mind from his statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 1:3), where he states that in such a situation the woman is required to take merely a sh'vuat hesset, a less severe oath.
|
| 33. |
I.e., the situation is analogous to a person who holds a promissory note and may be asked to take an oath that it is valid before he can collect it, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:2-3.
|
| 34. |
Chapter 10, Halachah 10.
|
Ishut - Chapter Twelve
Halacha 1
When a man marries a woman, whether she is a virgin or a non-virgin, whether she is above the age of majority or a minor, and whether she was born Jewish, is a convert or a freed slave, he incurs ten responsibilities toward her and receives four privileges.1
Halacha 2
With regard to his ten responsibilities: three stem from the Torah. They includesha'arah, kesutah v'onatah.2 Sha'arah means providing her with subsistence.3Kesutah means supplying her with garments, and onatah refers to conjugal rights.
The seven responsibilities ordained by the Rabbis are all conditions [of the marriage contract] established by the court. The first is the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract. The others are referred to as t'na'ei ketubah, the conditions of the marriage contract. They are:
a) to provide medical treatment if she becomes sick;
b) to redeem her if she is held captive:
c) to bury her if she dies;
d) the right for her to continue living in his home after his death as long as she remains a widow;
e) the right for her daughters to receive their subsistence from his estate after his death until they become consecrated;
f) the right for her sons to inherit her ketubah in addition to their share in her husband's estate together with their brothers [borne by other wives, if she dies before her husband does].
Halacha 3
The four privileges that the husband is granted are all Rabbinic in origin. They are:
a) the right to the fruits of her labor;
b) the right to any ownerless object she discovers;
c) the right to benefit from the profits of her property during her lifetime;
d) the right to inherit her [property] if she dies during his lifetime. His rights to her property supersede [the rights of] all others.4
Halacha 4
Our Sages also ordained that the fruits of a wife's labor should parallel her subsistence, [the obligation to] redeem her should parallel [the right to] the benefit from her property, and [the obligation to] bury her should parallel [the right to] inherit [the property mentioned in] her ketubah.
Therefore, if a woman says: "I will not [hold you obligated for] my subsistence, but I will not work,"5 she is given this option, and she cannot be compelled to work.6 If, however, her husband says: "I will not provide for your subsistence, and I will not receive the right to the fruits of your labor," he is not given this option, lest the woman be unable to earn her subsistence.7 Because of this institution, [the obligation to provide for a woman's] subsistence is considered to be one of the t'na'ei ketubah.8
Halacha 5
Whether or not these matters were written in the marriage contract - indeed, even if a marriage contract was not written and the couple merely married - once they marry, the husband is granted the four privileges mentioned, and the woman is granted the ten rights mentioned. There is no need to state them explicitly.9
Halacha 6
If the husband made a stipulation that he would not be responsible for one of these obligations - or the wife made a stipulation that [her husband] would not be granted one of these privileges - [and the other party agreed,] the stipulation is binding,10 with the exception of three matters with regard to which it is impossible for a stipulation to be made. Indeed, if a stipulation is made with regard to these three matters, it is of no consequence. These [three] are: [the woman's] conjugal rights, the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract and [the husband's right] to inherit [his wife's property].
Halacha 7
What is implied? If [the groom] made a stipulation with his bride that he is not obligated to give her conjugal rights, his stipulation is of no substance. For he has made a stipulation against what is written in the Torah, and the stipulation does not concern financial matters.11
Halacha 8
When a man makes a stipulation to reduce the amount of the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - or he writes a ketubah for either 200 or 100 [zuz], but she writes that she has already received a portion of the sum, when in fact she did not12 - his stipulation is of no substance.13 For whenever a person establishes a marriage contract with a virgin for less than 200 [zuz] or with a non-virgin for less than 100 [zuz], the sexual relations [he conducts with his wife] are considered promiscuous.14
Halacha 9
If he makes a stipulation after he weds her15 that he will not inherit her property, his stipulation is of no consequence. Although the husband's [right to] inherit [his wife's property] is a rabbinic institution, [our Sages] reinforced their edict, [giving it the power of a statute of] the Torah.
With regard to [the Torah's statutes of] inheritance, all stipulations that are made are of no consequence, despite the fact that financial matters are concerned, as [derived from Numbers 27:11]: "the statutes of judgment."16
With regard to other [aspects of the marriage contract], a stipulation [made by the husband and accepted by his wife] is binding. For example, if he made a stipulation that he is not obligated to supply her with her subsistence or with clothing, or that he would not receive the benefits from her property, his stipulation is binding.
Halacha 10
What is the amount that is designated for a woman's subsistence? We allot her bread for two meals every day, according to the norm of the people of her town, for a person who is neither sick nor a glutton.
The allotment is also made according to the type of bread eaten as a staple in that locale, be it wheat or barley, or rice, millet, or other grains, as is customary [in that locale]. Similarly, she is allotted other foods that are eaten together with bread - i.e., legumes, vegetables and the like. [She is also allotted] oil for food and to light a lamp and also fruit. She is also [allotted] a small amount of wine, if it is the local custom for women to drink wine.
Halacha 11
To whom does the above apply? To a poor Jewish man. But if the husband is wealthy, [the support he is required to provide his wife is apportioned] according to his wealth. If he is wealthy enough to provide her with several dishes of meat each day, he is compelled to do so, and she is allotted [subsistence] commensurate with his wealth.
Halacha 12
Halacha 13
When a woman has been allotted subsistence, and [the entire allotment was not used], the remainder belongs to her husband.23
If her husband is a priest, he is not entitled to provide her with all her provisions from terumah. [He is not given this option] because it is very difficult for her to protect [the terumah] from contacting ritual impurity, and to eat it while ritually pure [herself].24 Instead, he should give her half her provisions from ordinary [food] and half from terumah.
Halacha 14
Just as a man is required to provide his wife with her subsistence, he is required to provide for the maintenance of his children, both male and female, until they reach the age of six.25Afterwards, he should continue to provide for their maintenance until they reach majority, as ordained by our Sages.26
If, however, he does not, he should be rebuked and embarrassed publicly, and appeals should be made to him. If he [persists in his] refusal, a public announcement is made with regard to him: "So and so is cruel and does not desire to provide for the maintenance of his children. He is worse than an impure bird, which does provide for its chicks." Nevertheless, he should not be compelled to provide for the maintenance [of children] six and older.
Halacha 15
To what does the above apply? To a person who is not known to have resources, and it is not known whether or not he is capable of giving charity. If, however, he has resources and he possesses the means to give an amount to charity that would provide for [his children's] needs, his property is expropriated against his will27 for the purposes of charity,28 and [his children's] needs are provided for until they reach majority.
Halacha 16
When a person travels to another country [and leaves his wife behind], [the following rules apply] should his wife come to court to place a claim [against her husband] for her subsistence. For the first three months from the day her husband departed, she is not given an allotment for her subsistence. [The rationale is that] it is an accepted assumption that a person does not depart without leaving provisions for his household.29
Afterwards,30 an allotment is made for her subsistence. If her husband owns property, the court expropriates his property and sells it to provide for his wife's subsistence. [When doing so,] no account is made for his wife's earnings until her husband comes.31 If it is discovered that she earned [money during the time that he was away], he is granted that sum.
Moreover, even if the matter is not taken to court, and instead the woman sells [her husband's property] on her own32 in order to pay for her subsistence, the sale is binding. There is no need for a public announcement [regarding the sale of the property].33 Similarly, the woman is not required to take an oath [that her husband did not leave her money] until her husband comes and lodges a claim [against her], or until she comes to claim [the money due her, as stated in her]ketubah in the event of her husband's death. [In the latter instance, together with the oaths she is required to take to collect her ketubah,]34 on the basis of the principle of gilgul shevu'ah,35 [she is also required to take an oath] that she did not sell [any more of her husband's property than] was necessary for her subsistence.
Halacha 17
Just as the court [expropriates and] sells [the property of] a husband who travelled [to another country to provide for] the subsistence of [his] wife, so too, it [expropriates and] sells property to provide for the subsistence of his sons and daughters who are six years old or less. If, however, they are more than six [years old], [the court] does not provide for their subsistence from his property when he is not present, even when he is reputed to have means.36
Similarly, when a person loses his mental faculties, the court expropriates his property and sells it to provide subsistence and other necessities for his wife and his children below the age of six.37
Halacha 18
Some geonim ruled that an assessment should not be made for the subsistence of a woman whose husband journeyed overseas, or who died, unless she evinces possession of her ketubah document. If she does not evince possession of her ketubah, she is not entitled to subsistence. Perhaps she has already received payment for her ketubah from her husband, or perhaps she forfeited her ketubah in his favor, as will be explained.38 Others maintain that an assessment is made on her behalf for her subsistence, for we accept it as a presumption that she neither received payment for nor forfeited [her ketubah]. Hence, she is not required to show her ketubah [when presenting her claim].
I favor [the latter view] with regard to [a woman] whose husband has departed,39 since her claim to her subsistence stems from the Torah itself.40With regard to a woman whose husband died, however, she is not entitled to her subsistence until she brings her ketubah, for she [derives her subsistence] by virtue of a rabbinic enactment. Furthermore, her subsistence is paid from property belonging to [her husband's] heirs, and [the court] always advances claims in support of the interests of an heir.41
Halacha 19
If [a woman's] husband departed on a journey, and she borrowed money for her subsistence, [her husband] is required to pay [the debt] when he returns.42
If a person voluntarily took the initiative of providing for her subsistence, when [her husband] returns the husband is not required to pay [that person]. The other person forfeited his money, [the rationale being] that [the husband] did not instruct him to provide for her, nor did she [request the assistance] as a loan.43
Halacha 20
When a husband [who plans to] depart on a journey tells his wife: "Use your earnings to purchase your subsistence," she has no [right to demand] her subsistence [from him afterwards]. For if she had not accepted this agreement, and she had not felt confident, she could have issued a claim against him, or told him, "My earnings are not sufficient for me."44
Halacha 21
[The following rule applies if] the woman took the matter to court and was awarded an assessment for her subsistence, the court sold [her husband's landed property] and gave her [the proceeds] - or she sold [the property] herself - and afterwards, the husband came and claimed that he left provisions for her. She is required to take an oath, while holding a sacred article, that he did not make provisions for her [and then she is not held liable].
[The following rule applies when a husband departed on a journey, and the woman] did not take the matter to court, nor sell his property, but instead waited until he returned. [If upon his return there is a dispute,] he claims: "I made [provisions for you]," while she claims, "You did not make provisions. Instead, I borrowed money from this person to provide for myself," he is required to take a rabbinic oath45 that he left provisions for her, and then he is not held liable. She remains responsible for the debt.46
Halacha 22
[In the above instance,] if she sold movable property, claiming that she sold it to provide for her subsistence, and her husband claimed that he had left provisions for her, she is required to take a rabbinic oath that he did not leave her any provisions.47
If she did not issue a claim against him, did not borrow money, and she did not sell his property, but instead strained herself during the day and during the night and earned her livelihood, she is not entitled to any recompense.48
Halacha 23
[The following rules apply when] a man takes a vow that his wife should not derive any benefit from him [or his property]. Whether he specified the span of the vow or did not specify the span of the vow, we grant him an interval of thirty days.49 If the span of his vow is concluded, or even though it is not concluded, but he has his vow annulled, this is acceptable. If not, he must divorce his wife,50 and pay her [the money due her because of] her ketubah.
During those thirty days, she should work and [attempt to] sustain herself [through her labor]. One of [her husband's] friends should provide her51 with those things she needs that she cannot purchase through the fruits of her labor, if the fruits of her labor are not sufficient for her.
Halacha 24
When a person makes a vow [preventing] his wife from tasting one of the species of produce,52 he should be given an interval of thirty days. [If he prolongs the situation] beyond this time, he is required to divorce [his wife] and pay [her the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [This ruling applies] even when his vow prevents her from eating undesirable food, or a species that she has never tasted in her life.
[The following rules apply when a woman] took a vow not to partake of a particular species of produce, and [her husband] allowed the vow to stand, or she took a Nazarite vow and he did not annul it.53 If he desires to remain married to her and for her not to partake of this species or to be a Nazarite, he may.54 If, however, he says: "I do not desire a woman with vows," he may divorce her, but he is required to pay her the money due her because of herketubah. [The rationale is that] he had the option to nullify [her vow], and instead, he willingly allowed the vow to stand.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
These ten responsibilities and four privileges are all explained in detail in the chapters that follow, through Chapter 23.
|
| 2. |
These requirements are mentioned in Exodus 21:10. The verse forbids a husband from denying his wife these rights. Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 262) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 46) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 3. |
Note the commentary of the Ramban on Exodus (loc. cit.), which interprets sha'arah and kesutahas also referring to conjugal rights and maintains that the obligation to provide a wife with her subsistence and with garments is Rabbinic. Most authorities, however, follow the Rambam's understanding.
|
| 4. |
The Ra'avad and others maintain that the husband's right to inherit his wife's property stems from the Torah itself. The matter is the subject of a difference of opinion between our Sages (Ketubot83b), and there is no explicit resolution of the question in the Talmud. Rav Kapach maintains that the early manuscripts of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:1; Bava Batra8:1) indicate that the Rambam himself originally subscribed to the view mentioned by the Ra'avad and changed his mind later in life. (See also Halachah 9.)
|
| 5. |
With regard to the other two matters that are linked the husband's obligation to redeem her and to bury her, the woman does not have this option. Although this arrangement was instituted for the woman's benefit, our Sages did not give her a choice regarding these matters, because they desired to ensure that the woman would not be forced to remain in captivity among the gentiles and that she would be buried (Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Even HaEzer 69:5).
|
| 6. |
Our Sages instituted this arrangement for the woman's benefit, since a woman's income could not ordinarily provide for her subsistence. Accordingly, the option of whether or not to forego the arrangement is in the woman's hands. If a woman can earn more than her subsistence, she is also entitled to forego the above arrangement.
Even in such a situation, the woman is still responsible for taking care of the household tasks (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 7. |
The husband may, however, tell his wife: "Endeavor to earn your subsistence, and I will compensate for whatever deficiency remains" (Ramah, Even HaEzer 69:4).
|
| 8. |
I.e., although the t'na'ei ketubah are rabbinic in origin, and the obligation to provide for the woman's subsistence is from the Torah, since the linkage of it with her wages is rabbinic, the obligation is considered to be part of the t'na'ei ketubah.
|
| 9. |
I.e., they are obligations that apply universally and are not dependent on the consent of a particular couple.
|
| 10. |
The principle upon which this statement is based is that any stipulation to which both parties agree that concerns monetary rights - even those that are granted to a person by the Torah - is binding (Kiddushin 19b). For a person has the option to waive his right to property or privileges that justly belong to him (Rashi, loc. cit.). Therefore, a woman may waive even the rights to her subsistence or clothing that the Torah itself grants her.
|
| 11. |
Instead, the failure to provide a woman with conjugal rights is considered to cause her physical anguish (Rashi, loc. cit.). Although the Mordechai maintains that conjugal rights can also be considered monetary matters, for it is possible to give a woman enough money that she would be willing to forego her rights, the Rambam's view is accepted by most authorities.
|
| 12. |
I.e., the woman writes a receipt for part of the sum on her ketubah.
With regard to this instance, the Tur (Even HaEzer 66) differs and maintains that the man is not obligated to pay her the full sum.
|
| 13. |
Although this is a situation that concerns financial matters, our Sages desired that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract be a binding institution, and therefore did not allow any modification of this obligation. Hence, the stipulation is nullified.
Note the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions views that differ with that of the Rambam and maintains that if the man desires to divorce the woman, he is not obligated to give her the sum for which the Sages obligated him. It is only when he wants to remain married to her that our Sages enforced their requirement.
|
| 14. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 66:9) states that even though the man's stipulations are of no consequence, the sexual relations he conducts with his wife are considered promiscuous, because she may be unaware of the law and not know the amount due her.
|
| 15. |
A different ruling applies if the stipulation is made between erusin and nisu'in, as explained in Chapter 23, Halachah 6.
|
| 16. |
See Hilchot Nachalot 6:1.
|
| 17. |
For a woman is obligated to eat three meals on the Sabbath as a man is (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 291:6).
Note the slight difference between the Rambam's statements here and those in Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 9:13.
|
| 18. |
A me'ah is one sixth of a dinar (Kiddushin 12a). Based on the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 1, it is evident that this is a coin of relatively small value, approximately 1.5 grams of pure silver.
|
| 19. |
The Beit Shmuel 70:7 states that if he can provide her with bread, even if he cannot provide her with other food, he is not obligated to divorce her. (See, however, Chelkat Mechokek 70:12.)
The Chatam Sofer (Even HaEzer, Responsum 131) states that the Rambam's words imply that if the husband cannot support his wife from his own earnings, he is compelled to divorce her, even if she herself has the means to provide herself with subsistence.
|
| 20. |
The rationale is that since he cannot provide her with subsistence, he is obligated to give her the opportunity to find another husband who can.
The Hagahot Maimoniot question whether the husband can be compelled to seek to hire himself out as a laborer, or the court's only resort is to compel him to divorce his wife. Although that text does not favor either approach, the latter opinion is quoted by the Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:3). The Ramah also mentions the opinion of Tosafot (Ketubot 63a), which states that a husband who has no resources is not compelled to divorce his wife.
|
| 21. |
I.e., even in a separate dwelling (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Ketubot 5:9).
|
| 22. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that this prerogative may in no way infringe on the husband's obligation to provide his wife with conjugal rights. In addition, he must share the Friday night meal with her, implying that this is for the sake of communication, not only as preparation for marital relations, as understood by some commentaries.
Note the Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:2), who objects to the Rambam's ruling, and states that a man is given this prerogative only if his wife consents.
|
| 23. |
Note Mishneh LaMelech and the Dagul MeRevavah (Even HaEzer 70), which state that this applies only when the woman purchased her food at a lower price than was originally estimated. If, however, she starved herself and consumed less than was allotted her, she, and not her husband, is entitled to the remainder.
|
| 24. |
Food that is terumah may not be eaten if it contracts ritual impurity, nor may it be eaten by a person who is himself ritually impure.
|
| 25. |
Rabbenu Nissim maintains that this obligation is incumbent on a father from the Torah itself, as an extension of his obligation to provide for his wife. Rabbenu Asher, however, maintains that the father's obligation is independent of the marriage bond. Even if he fathers children outside marriage, he is liable for their support.
|
| 26. |
The obligation to provide for one's children's subsistence until majority was one of the enactments instituted by the Sanhedrin after this body was relocated in Usha in the Galilee after the destruction of Jerusalem. At that time, several enactments were passed to direct the functioning of the Jewish community in this new phase. (See Ketubot 49b.)
Today, most rabbinic authorities maintain that because of changes in the socio-economic system, it is proper for a father to continue supporting his children well past the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah.
|
| 27. |
As evident from Halachah 17, this applies only when the father is present. The Rambam maintains that a person's property may not be expropriated for this purpose outside his presence.
|
| 28. |
See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 10:16, which states:
And Chapter 7, Halachah 10, of that source, states:
|
| 29. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:5) quotes opinions that state that this ruling applies only when the husband left home in an atmosphere of peace. In such a situation, we can be sure that he has provided for his family. If, however, he left home annoyed with his wife, it is plausible to assume that he did not provide for her needs.
|
| 30. |
I.e., after three months, or after she approaches the court. If she waits longer than three months, she is not given any payment for the previous period (Ramah, ibid.).
|
| 31. |
Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the court should consider the amount the woman can earn when deciding on the size of her allotment. His rationale is that before expropriating a person's property, we should try to act in his interests. Although many authorities speak in favor of Rabbenu Asher's logic, they rule according to the Rambam's decision. (See Chelkat Mechokek70:20.)
The Avnei Milu'im 70:3 explains the Rambam's position, stating that the husband is granted the right to his wife's earnings only when he provides for her subsistence willingly. When he forces her to approach the court to receive her subsistence, he has no claim on her earnings.
|
| 32. |
There is a debate among the authorities whether or not she must consult experts with regard to the evaluation of the object. (See Chelkat Mechokek 70:21.)
|
| 33. |
Generally, when property is sold by the court, it is necessary that a public announcement be made informing people of the sale, to attract customers and assure competitive bidding. (SeeHilchot Malveh V'Loveh 22:6.) In this instance, no such requirement is made, in order that the woman will not have to wait to receive the funds she requires.
|
| 34. |
See Chapter 16, Halachah 4.
|
| 35. |
Whenever a person is required to take an oath, the plaintiff can obligate him to take an oath on another claim. In this instance, since the woman is obligated to take an oath to her husband's heirs to collect the money due her for her ketubah, she can be required to take an additional oath regarding the sale of his property for her subsistence.
|
| 36. |
We do not expropriate his property and provide for his children as an act of charity, because it is possible that he is giving charity in the place to which he has journeyed.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 71:2) states that if the person had supported his older children before leaving on his journey, provisions should be made for his children while he is away. It can be assumed that this would be his desire. The Ramah also mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Nissim, which states that if he possesses means, support should be provided for his children from his property as an act of charity. This view is not, however, accepted by most later authorities.
|
| 37. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's wording appears to imply that no provision is made for his older children, even when he has the means to support them. The Maggid Mishneh, however, refers to Hilchot Nachalot 11:11, which states that when a person who has means loses control of his faculties, the court levels an assessment for charity on his estate. Accordingly, it would appear that if the man has the means to give charity, his property is expropriated to pay for his children's subsistence, even if they are over six.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 71) states that in such an instance, the court should expropriate funds for the subsistence of the person's older children even if the person's estate is not large enough for an assessment for charity to be leveled against it. The rationale is that we assume that, like the majority of people, this person would also desire to support his children. The Chelkat Mechokek71:6 maintains that the Shulchan Aruch follows this view, and not that of the Rambam.
|
| 38. |
See Chapter 17, Halachah 19.
|
| 39. |
Rabbenu Asher and others do not accept the Rambam's distinction, and maintain that the court should also protect the interests of a person who is in another country and cannot defend himself. Nevertheless, in his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam's decision, explaining that in contrast to an heir, the husband has the potential to take his claim to court when he returns. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 70:5), he quotes the Rambam's ruling. This ruling is also accepted by the later authorities.
|
| 40. |
See Halachah 2.
|
| 41. |
Since the heir himself was not aware of the details of his benefactor's affairs, he cannot necessarily advance claims in his own interests. Therefore, the court acts to protect them. (SeeBava Batra 23a.)
|
| 42. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:8) states that the benefactor must lodge a claim against the wife, who in turn must lodge a claim against her husband.
|
| 43. |
Although the husband is obligated to pay for his wife's subsistence, our Sages rule that when a person pays a debt on behalf of a colleague without being instructed to do so, the debtor is not at all obligated to his patron.
|
| 44. |
Although our Sages associated a woman's earnings with her subsistence, they made this association for the woman's sake and gave her the prerogative of accepting or declining such a request. In a responsum, the Rambam writes that if it is not logical to assume that she could earn the funds required for her subsistence, for her to forfeit her rights, she must explicitly consent to her husband's stipulation.
|
| 45. |
I.e., a less severe oath instituted by the Rabbis. (See Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 1:3.)
|
| 46. |
She, however, does not have the opportunity of paying the debt until she is divorced or becomes widowed, because all her property is under lien to her husband, and he is entitled to her earnings.
|
| 47. |
Since it was movable property and not landed property that was sold, the oath that the woman is required to take is more lenient than that mentioned in the previous halachah. The rationale is that had she desired to lie, she could have claimed that the goods were stolen or lost.
|
| 48. |
I.e., she cannot demand reimbursement for the difference between her earnings and the amount she would ordinarily be entitled to for her subsistence (Chelkat Mechokek 70:41). If she earned more than her subsistence, the additional funds belong to her, not to her husband (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 70:11).
|
| 49. |
Based on Ketubot 59b, Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim object to the Rambam's ruling. Since the husband is liable to provide for his wife's subsistence, the vow he takes cannot override that obligation, except in specific instances. In both the Kessef Mishneh, and the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 235:2), Rav Yosef Karo follows these views.
|
| 50. |
After thirty days, the matter will become public knowledge and the woman will suffer ridicule. Therefore, her husband is obligated to divorce (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Ketubot7:1).
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| 51. |
The Mishnah (Ketubot, op. cit.) states that her husband should appoint a person to provide for her. As the Talmud explains (Ketubot 71a), this does not mean that he should appoint this person as an agent, for this is forbidden by his vow. Instead, he should say, "Whoever provides for my wife will not suffer a loss."
|
| 52. |
As the Maggid Mishneh explains, this refers to a situation in which the husband took a vow that if his wife partakes of a particular species of produce, she will be forbidden to benefit from his property (or according to the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 235:3, that sexual relations between them will be forbidden). If, however, the husband takes a vow that his wife may not eat a particular type of produce, that vow is nullified. For a person cannot take a vow to restrict the actions of another person.
|
| 53. |
For, as Numbers 30:8-9 relates, a husband has the right to nullify or uphold the vows his wife takes.
|
| 54. |
As Rav Yosef Karo mentions in both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), other opinions require the husband to divorce his wife in such a situation.
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Ishut - Chapter Thirteen
Halacha 1
To what extent is he required to provide her with garments? Annually, he must purchase for her clothes that were worth 50 zuz in the coinage prevalent [in the Talmudic period], these being worth six and one fourth dinarim of pure silver.1
He should provide her with new [garments] during the rainy season. After these garments become worn, she should wear them in the summer. Frayed garments - that which remains from her garments from the previous year - belong to her; she should wear them while she is in the niddah state.
She is granted a belt for her loins, a cap for her head and new shoes on each festival.
Halacha 2
When does the above apply? In [the Talmudic period,] and in Eretz Yisrael, but in other ages or in other countries, there is no fixed amount of money [determined for this purpose]. For there are some places where garments are very expensive, and others where they are inexpensive.
The fundamental principle is2 that he is obligated to provide her with appropriate clothes for the winter and the summer, the minimal that are worn by a married woman in that country.
Halacha 3
Included in the [obligation to provide her with] garments is the requirement to provide her with household goods and a dwelling place.3
With which household goods is he obligated to provide her? With a bed and its spreads, a reed or woven rug to sit on, and utensils with which to eat and drink - e.g., a pot, a plate, a cup, a bottle and the like.
With regard to her dwelling? He must rent a dwelling at least four cubits by four cubits. It must have a yard outside for her use and a latrine [nearby].
Halacha 4
Similarly, he is obligated to provide her with ornaments - e.g., colored cloths to wrap her head and forehead, eye-makeup, rouge and the like - so that she will not appear unattractive to him.
Halacha 5
When does the above apply? With regard to a poor Jewish man. Concerning a rich man, by contrast, all [of his obligations are judged] according to the extent of his wealth.4 If it would be appropriate for him to buy her silk and embroidered clothing and golden articles, he is compelled to provide her with these.
Similarly, the dwelling [he is required to give her] is judged according to his wealth, as are the ornaments and the household goods. If he does not have the means to provide her with the minimum required of a poor Jewish man, he is compelled to divorce her.5 The money due her by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a debt that he is required to pay when he gains the means.
Halacha 6
[A man] is obligated to provide the necessary clothing, dwelling and household goods, not only for his wife, but also for his sons and daughters who are six years old or less.6 He is not, however, required to provide for them according to his wealth; all that is necessary is that he provide for their needs.
This is the governing principle: whenever a husband [or his estate] is required to provide for a person's subsistence - whether the husband is alive or deceased - the husband [or his estate] is also obligated to provide for the person's clothing, household goods and dwelling. Whenever a court must sell [a person's property] to provide for [a dependent's] subsistence,7 they also sell [his property] to provide [the dependent] with clothing, household goods and a dwelling.
Halacha 7
When a woman's husband has departed on a journey, and the court allots [money from his property] for her subsistence, her clothes, her household goods and the renting of a dwelling, they do not allot her money for ornaments. For she does not have a husband [present] for whom to make herself attractive. If, by contrast, a woman's husband loses his mental faculties or becomes a deaf mute, she is granted an allotment for ornaments.8
The laws that apply to the claims and counterclaims between a woman and her husband with regard to garments, clothing and the rental of a dwelling [in the event of the husband's departure on an extended journey] are the same as those that apply with regard to her subsistence. If he claims to have provided for her and she denies [his claim], the same rulings apply to all claims.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply if a husband] takes a vow that prevents9 his wife from wearing any type of ornament. If the couple are poor, they may remain married for a year while the vow is in effect.10 If [it remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow, or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
If the couple are wealthy, they may remain married for a month while the vow is in effect. If [it remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply if a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to the bathhouse. [The couple may remain married for only] one week in a large city and two weeks in a village [if the vow remains in effect]. If he takes a vow that prevents his wife from wearing shoes [the couple may remain married for only] three days11 in a village and one day in a large city.12 If [the vow remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
Halacha 10
If [a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from borrowing or lending household goods that are frequently lent and borrowed between neighbors - e.g., a sifter, a sieve, a mill, an oven or the like - he must either absolve himself of the vow, or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.13 [The rationale is that his vow] causes her to have a bad reputation among her neighbors.
Similarly, if she takes an oath14 not to borrow or lend [neighbors] a sifter, a sieve, a mill, an oven or the like, or not to weave attractive garments for her sons in places where it is customary to do so, he may divorce her without paying her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that her vow] causes him to have a reputation as a miser among his neighbors.
Halacha 11
In a place where it is customary for a woman not to go out to the market place wearing merely a cap on her head, but also a veil that covers her entire body like a cloak, her husband must provide at least the least expensive type of veil for her. If he is wealthy, [he must provide her with a veil whose quality] is commensurate with his wealth.
[He must give her this veil] so that she can visit her father's home, a house of mourning or a wedding celebration. For every woman should be given the opportunity to visit her father and to go to a house of mourning or a wedding celebration as an expression of kindness to her friends and relatives, for [this will have a reciprocal effect], and they will return the visits. For a woman [at home] is not confined in a jail, from which she cannot come and go.
Nevertheless, it is uncouth for a woman always to leave home - this time to go out and another time to go on the street. Indeed, a husband should prevent a wife from doing this and not allow her to go out more than once or twice a month, as is necessary.15 For there is nothing more attractive for a woman than to sit in the corner of her home, as [implied by Psalms 45:14]: "All the glory of the king's daughter is within."
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to her father's home. If he lives in the same city, [the husband] is granted a respite of one month. [If he desires to maintain his vow at the beginning of] the second month, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If [the wife's father lives] in another city, [the husband] is granted respite until the first festival.16 [If he desires to maintain his vow until] the second [festival], he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to a house of mourning or to wedding celebrations. He must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. For this is like placing her in jail and locking her in.
If [the husband] claims: "[I forbade her from going] because of indecent people who were present at that house of mourning or wedding," and it was discovered that indeed, indecent people were present, he is given the prerogative [of making that vow].
Halacha 14
When a person tells his wife, "I do not desire that your father, your mother, your brothers and your sisters come into my domain," he is given that prerogative. Instead, she should visit them when an [unusual] event occurs to them. And she should visit her father's house once a month and on each festival. They, by contrast, should visit her only when an unusual event of great import occurs - e.g., sickness or birth. For a person should not be forced to have others enter his domain.
Similarly, if [the wife] says: "I do not want your mother and your sisters to visit, nor will I live together with them in one courtyard, because they cause me difficulties and distress," she is given that prerogative.17 For a person should not be forced to have others dwell with him in his domain.
Halacha 15
When a husband says: "I will not dwell in this home, because there are wicked or indecent people or gentiles in this neighborhood, and I fear them," he is given that prerogative. This applies even if it has not been established that there are indecent people living there. For our Sages ordained:18 "Keep away from a bad neighbor." Even if the dwelling belongs to the woman, she is forced to leave it, and they should establish their dwelling among worthy people.19
The same law applies if the woman makes such a demand. Although [the husband] says, "I do not object to them," her will is followed. [The rationale is that] she can say, "I do not want to get a bad reputation in these neighborhoods."
Halacha 16
All of the earth is divided into different lands - e.g., the Land of Canaan, the Land of Egypt, the Land of Yemen, the Land of Ethiopia, the Land of Babylonia and the like.20 Every land is subdivided into large cities21 and villages. With regard to the subject of marriage, the cities of Eretz Yisrael are considered to be divided into three different lands: Judea, Transjordan and the Galilee.
Halacha 17
When a man from one of these lands marries a woman in another land, she is compelled to follow him to his land, or to accept a divorce without receiving [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that,] although it was not specifically stated, [it can be assumed] that he married her on this condition.22
When, however, a person marries a woman in a particular land and he23 is from that land, he does not have the right to [compel] her to move to another land. He may, nevertheless, [compel] her to move from city to city and from village to village within that land.
He may not, however, [compel] her to move from a city to a village, or from a village to a city. For there are certain advantages to living in a city, and other advantages to living in a village.
Halacha 18
When he [compels] her to move from one city to another, or from one village to another within a particular land, he may not compel her to move from pleasant surroundings24 to unpleasant surroundings, nor from unpleasant [surroundings] to pleasant ones. [Although the latter move would seemingly be to her benefit, she still must consent,] because she must care for and check herself in the pleasant surroundings, so that she will not be considered inferior and unattractive.25
Similarly, [her husband] may not [compel] her to move from an area inhabited primarily by Jews to an area inhabited primarily by gentiles. Wherever [the couple lives], they should move26 from an area inhabited primarily by gentiles to an area inhabited primarily by Jews.
Halacha 19
When does the above apply? When moving from one place in the diaspora to another, or from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another. But if [the husband desires to move] from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael, the woman should be compelled to move.27 [This applies even when moving involves leaving] pleasant surroundings for unpleasant ones. Even [when it is necessary to leave] an area inhabited primarily by Jews for an area inhabited primarily by gentiles, one should [move to Eretz Yisrael].
One should not leave Eretz Yisrael for the diaspora,28 even if the move enables one to relocate from unpleasant [surroundings] to pleasant ones, and even when it enables one to move from an area inhabited primarily by gentiles to an area inhabited primarily by Jews.
Halacha 20
When a husband desires to move to Eretz Yisrael and [his wife] does not desire to do so, he may divorce her without paying her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If she desires to move [to Eretz Yisrael] and he does not desire to do so, he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her]ketubah.29
The same laws apply with regard to moving from other places in Eretz Yisrael to Jerusalem. [Just as] everyone should move to Eretz Yisrael, and no one should leave there, [so too,] everyone should move to Jerusalem, and no one should leave there.30
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
For a zuz was only one eighth pure silver.
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| 2. |
See Halachah 5.
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| 3. |
I.e., the obligation to provide one's wife with household goods and a dwelling stems from the Torah itself and is not merely a Rabbinic ordinance.
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| 4. |
I.e., a man is obligated to provide his wife with the clothes appropriate for a woman of her social standing (or his social standing, if he is of higher social standing than she) in the country in which they dwell.
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| 5. |
For she should be given the opportunity to marry a man who can provide her with her basic necessities. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 11 and notes.)
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| 6. |
Similarly, if he is capable of giving charity, he should provide for his sons and daughters above the age of six, as explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 15 (Chelkat Mechokek 73:5).
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| 7. |
See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.
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| 8. |
Rashi, Ketubot 48a, explains the difference between the two instances. When the husband left on the journey, he decided to leave his wife without adornments. Hence, we may not expropriate the money for them from his property. When, by contrast, a man loses his mental faculties, the court attempts to support the man's wife as her husband would have liked to. And we assume that he would have preferred that his wife have ornaments to adorn herself.
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| 9. |
See the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 24.
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| 10. |
A poor woman does not wear ornaments very frequently and will not feel deprived if she does not adorn herself for a year. A rich woman, by contrast, cannot bear not to wear ornaments for such an extended period.
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| 11. |
This law is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 7:4). The standard printed text of that source, however, has a slightly different version, stating "three months" instead of three days.
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| 12. |
These rulings were dependent on the socio-economic conditions prevalent in the Talmudic period. If the norms are different in other societies, the rulings also change.
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| 13. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that the husband is given thirty days to consider absolving his vow. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 74:3) states he must divorce her immediately. If the husband makes the vow dependent on marital relations, he is given a week to consider the matter (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 74:3).
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| 14. |
Note the slight deviation between the wording chosen by the Rambam and that employed by theTur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
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| 15. |
While the spirit of the Rambam's words is appreciated, in most communities the norm is for women to leave their homes far more frequently.
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| 16. |
For it is customary for a daughter to visit her parents during the festivals.
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| 17. |
Based on the views of the Ra'avad and others, the Ramah (Even HaEzer 74:10) explains that the woman's rights are different from her husband's. Since the dwelling belongs to him, he may invite his mother and sisters. Nevertheless, efforts should be made to mediate between them and his wife. If necessary, a man or a woman should be placed in the home to see who is the cause of the difficulty.
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| 18. |
Avot 1:7.
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| 19. |
See Hilchot De'ot 6:1, where the Rambam emphasizes the importance of eschewing an undesirable environment and dwelling in a favorable one.
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| 20. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 75:1) states that it is a difference in language that divides one land from another. The Rivash (Responsum 177) states that the determining factor is the government of the land. This matter is discussed by the later authorities, particularly in light of the emergence of large countries comprising many times the area of Eretz Yisrael in the Talmudic period. Many commentaries define a land as a place inhabited by people who speak the same language and are governed by the same authority. Even that is common today.
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| 21. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 13:10). The contemporary translation of מדינה as "state" or "country" is not appropriate in this context.
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| 22. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 75:1) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Tam (Ketubot 110b), which states that when the two come from different lands and the marriage is held in one of these lands, the place where the couple marries determines their future dwelling. If, however, they each come from a different land from that in which the marriage is held, the woman may compel her husband to live in her native land. See also the opinion of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 416, quoted by the Ramah, loc. cit.), which states that if the man cannot earn a livelihood in the locale in which he is living, he may compel his wife to follow him to any place where he can.
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| 23. |
Our text follows the version found in many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torahand that which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:1). The standard published version states "she" instead of "he."
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| 24. |
I.e., the neighborhood and its scenery. Our translation is based on the Ma'aseh Rokeach. Others translate נוה as "dwelling" - i.e., the home in which the couple reside.
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| 25. |
The Rambam appears to be saying that the woman must dress and present herself in an appropriate way in an attractive setting, and she might not desire to make such an effort. Rashi (Ketubot 110b) explains that the change in lifestyle may cause illness.
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| 26. |
Our translation is based on the Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 75), which states that the woman may compel her husband to make such a move. Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 75:12, which states that this interpretation need not be accepted.
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| 27. |
As reflected in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 5, the Rambam does not consider living in Eretz Yisraela mitzvah [in contrast to the view of the Ramban (Hosafot l'Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Mitzvah 4) and others, who do]. Nevertheless, he states (Hilchot Melachim 5:12): "At all times... a person should dwell in Eretz Yisrael... rather than in the diaspora."
The commentaries interpret the expression "At all times" to include even the present age. Tosafot, Ketubot 110b, explains that because we are unsure how to fulfill the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation to live there in the present age. Others explain that because of the dangers that exist in Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer75:5.) As reflected in this ruling and in one of his responsa, the Rambam negates those views and advocates living in Eretz Yisrael, even in the present age.
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| 28. |
See Hilchot Melachim 5:9, which states that it is forbidden to leave Eretz Yisrael for the purpose of settling in the diaspora, unless there is a famine of extreme severity. Even then, abandoning the land is not considered desirable. In Hilchot Melachim 5:12, he states: "Whoever leaves [Eretz Yisrael] for the diaspora is considered as though he worships idols."
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| 29. |
As mentioned above, there are opinions that maintain that in the present age, there is no obligation to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. According to these views, this ruling does not apply. Although theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:4-5) also mentions the opposing view, it appears to follow the opinion stated by the Rambam. Nevertheless, many Ashkenazic authorities maintain (see Ba'er Heteiv 75:19) that at present one may not divorce a woman without paying her the money due her for her ketubah because she does not desire to move to Eretz Yisrael. Although the Pitchei Teshuvah 75:7 speaks extensively about the positive value of living in Eretz Yisrael in the present age, it mentions another factor - the difficulty of earning a living in Eretz Yisrael - and states that unless one is assured of being able to sustain himself through work - as opposed to receiving charity - one may not compel one's family to relocate.
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| 30. |
There are opinions (Mordechai, at the conclusion of Ketubot) that maintain that in the present age, when there is no Temple, there is no difference between Jerusalem and other cities in Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, the fact that this law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:4), a text that deals only with laws applicable at present, appears to imply that the Rambam's ruling should be applied in the present age as well.
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• English Text | Video ClassAdar 6, 5775 · 02/25/2015
"Today's Day"
Thursday 6 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: T'ruma, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 35-38.
Tanya: Moreover, even in (p. 119)...to a great extent. (p. 119).
From my father's sichot: It is a magnificent gift of G-d to merit an innate sense - a "feel" - for doing kindness to another, to derive deep pleasure from it. This can develop to the point that one cherishes the other more than oneself. He may find many explanations as to why he deserves his own tribulations, G-d forbid, but to do so with regard to another's suffering - is absolutely impossible.
Shabbat Adar Sheini 6 5703
Haftora: Vatishlam kol ham'lacha. In the haftora b'rachot we always say ne'eman v'rachaman ata, and toshia ut'samach (p. 187).
Torah lessons: Chumash: Pekudei, Shevi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 35-38.
Tanya: The explanation of (p. 157)...Man will understand. (p. 163).
It is a tradition among the elders of anash1 that the Tanya is a compilation of words of counsel given by the Alter Rebbe to anash at yechidus during the years 5540-5550 (1780-1790). In the summer of 5552 (1792) he began arranging the Tanya in the form it now has. A year later, there were already numerous copies, and in time, there were corruptions of the text and even falsifications. For that reason the Rebbe then moved quickly to have it printed.
Another version: For twenty years the Rebbe wrote his work, the Tanya, painstakingly examining every last word. By the year 5555 (1795) the text was pure and clarified and he granted permission to copy it. When copies became numerous and corrupted he had it printed.
The Tzemach Tzedek related that on the first Rosh Hashana of his life (in 5550, 1789) the Alter Rebbe spoke on the statement in the Talmud, He is administered an oath, Be a tzadik... This discourse is in fact the first three chapters of Tanya.
FOOTNOTES
1. Members of the Chabad chassidic community.
Daily Thought:
Not an Angel, Not a Beast
If you believe you are an angel, prepare for disappointment.
If you believe you are a beast, you may well become depressed.
Best to know you are human. Stay away from situations you can‘t handle, and when you fail, pick yourself up, say you’re sorry, and keep on going.
That‘s yet higher than the angels.
____________________________
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