Sunday, January 1, 2017

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Sunday, 1 January 2017 - Today is: Sunday, 3 Tevet, 5777 · 1 January 2017 - Chanukah Day 8.

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Sunday, 1 January 2017 - Today is: Sunday, 3 Tevet, 5777 · 1 January 2017 - Chanukah Day 8.
Torah Reading
Chanukah 8: Numbers 7:54 On the eighth day was Gamli’el the son of P’dahtzur, leader of the descendants of M’nasheh. 55 He offered one silver dish weighing 130 shekels [three-and-a-quarter pounds] and one silver basin of seventy shekels (using the sanctuary shekel) [one-and-three-quarters pounds], both full of fine flour mixed with olive oil for a grain offering; 56 one gold pan of ten shekels [one-quarter pound], full of incense; 57 one young bull, one ram, one male lamb in its first year as a burnt offering, 58 one male goat as a sin offering, 59 and, for the sacrifice of peace offerings, two oxen, five rams, five male goats and five male lambs in their first year. This was the offering of Gamli’el the son of P’dahtzur.
60 On the ninth day was Avidan the son of Gid‘oni, leader of the descendants of Binyamin. 61 He offered one silver dish weighing 130 shekels [three-and-a-quarter pounds] and one silver basin of seventy shekels (using the sanctuary shekel) [one-and-three-quarters pounds], both full of fine flour mixed with olive oil for a grain offering; 62 one gold pan of ten shekels [one-quarter pound], full of incense; 63 one young bull, one ram, one male lamb in its first year as a burnt offering, 64 one male goat as a sin offering, 65 and, for the sacrifice of peace offerings, two oxen, five rams, five male goats and five male lambs in their first year. This was the offering of Avidan the son of Gid‘oni.
66 On the tenth day was Achi‘ezer the son of ‘Ammishaddai, leader of the descendants of Dan. 67 He offered one silver dish weighing 130 shekels [three-and-a-quarter pounds] and one silver basin of seventy shekels (using the sanctuary shekel) [one-and-three-quarters pounds], both full of fine flour mixed with olive oil for a grain offering; 68 one gold pan of ten shekels [one-quarter pound], full of incense; 69 one young bull, one ram, one male lamb in its first year as a burnt offering, 70 one male goat as a sin offering, 71 and, for the sacrifice of peace offerings, two oxen, five rams, five male goats and five male lambs in their first year. This was the offering of Achi‘ezer the son of ‘Ammishaddai.
(vii) 72 On the eleventh day was Pag‘i’el the son of ‘Okhran, leader of the descendants of Asher. 73 He offered one silver dish weighing 130 shekels [three-and-a-quarter pounds] and one silver basin of seventy shekels (using the sanctuary shekel) [one-and-three-quarters pounds], both full of fine flour mixed with olive oil for a grain offering; 74 one gold pan of ten shekels [one-quarter pound], full of incense; 75 one young bull, one ram, one male lamb in its first year as a burnt offering, 76 one male goat as a sin offering, 77 and, for the sacrifice of peace offerings, two oxen, five rams, five male goats and five male lambs in their first year. This was the offering of Pag‘i’el the son of ‘Okhran.
78 On the twelfth day was Achira the son of ‘Enan, leader of the descendants of Naftali. 79 He offered one silver dish weighing 130 shekels [three-and-a-quarter pounds] and one silver basin of seventy shekels (using the sanctuary shekel) [one-and-three-quarters pounds], both full of fine flour mixed with olive oil for a grain offering; 80 one gold pan of ten shekels [one-quarter pound], full of incense; 81 one young bull, one ram, one male lamb in its first year as a burnt offering, 82 one male goat as a sin offering, 83 and, for the sacrifice of peace offerings, two oxen, five rams, five male goats and five male lambs in their first year. This was the offering of Achira the son of ‘Enan.
84 This was the offering for dedicating the altar which was given by the leaders of Isra’el on the day of its anointing: twelve silver dishes, twelve silver basins and twelve gold pans. 85 Each silver dish weighed 130 shekels [three-and-a-quarter pounds] and each basin seventy shekels [one-and-three-quarters pounds]; all the silver of the vessels weighed 2,400 shekels (using the sanctuary shekel) [just over sixty pounds]. 86 The twelve gold pans, full of incense, weighed ten shekels apiece (using the sanctuary shekel) [one-quarter pound]; all the gold of the pans weighed 120 shekels [three pounds]. (Maftir) 87 The livestock for the burnt offering consisted of twelve bulls, twelve rams and twelve male lambs in their first year, with their grain offering. There were twelve male goats for a sin offering. 88 The livestock for the sacrifice of peace offerings consisted of twenty-four bulls, sixty rams, sixty male goats and sixty male lambs in their first year. This was the offering for dedicating the altar after it had been anointed.
89 When Moshe went into the tent of meeting in order to speak with Adonai, he heard the voice speaking to him from above the ark-cover on the ark for the testimony, from between the two k’ruvim; and he spoke to him.
8:1 Adonai said to Moshe, 2 “Tell Aharon, ‘When you set up the lamps, the seven lamps are to cast their light forward, in front of the menorah.’” 3 Aharon did this: he lit its lamps so as to give light in front of the menorah, as Adonai had ordered Moshe. 4 Here is how the menorah was made: it was hammered gold from its base to its flowers, hammered work, following the pattern Adonai had shown Moshe. This is how he made the menorah.
Today's Laws & Customs:
• "Zot Chanukah"The eighth day of Chanukah is also known as Zot Chanukah (lit., "this is Chanukah"), after a key phrase in the special Chanukah Torah reading for this day (Numbers 7:54-8:4). For the deeper significance of this name, see link to "Accumulating Lights" below.
In the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall; thus, the last kindling of the Chanukah lights is held on the evening preceding the 8th day of Chanukah, when eight lights are lit (see "Laws & Customs" for yesterday's date). The festival of Chanukah concludes at nightfall this evening.
It is customary, however, to light candles during the daytime as well, in synagogues, in public spaces, and at gatherings held in honor of the festival. These lightings are done without recitation of the blessings as they do not constitute an observance of the mitzvah of kindling the Chanukah lights.
Other Chanukah observances include the inclusion of Hallel and Al Hanissim in the daily prayers, eating food fried in oil and dairy foods, playing with the "dreidel" and giving gifts of money ("Chanukah gelt") to children.
Links: Accumulating Lights
Today in Jewish History:
• 8th Day of Chanukah Miracle (139 BCE)
On the 25th of Kislev in the year 3622 from creation, the Maccabees liberated the Holy Temple in Jerusalem, after defeating the vastly more numerous and powerful armies of the Syrian-Greek king Antiochus IV, who had tried to forcefully uproot the beliefs and practices of Judaism from the people of Israel. The victorious Jews repaired, cleansed and rededicated the Temple to the service of G-d. But all the Temple's oil had been defiled by the pagan invaders; when the Jews sought to light the Temple's menorah (candelabra), they found only one small cruse of ritually pure olive oil. Miraculously, the one-day supply burned for eight days, until new, pure oil could be obtained. In commemoration, the Sages instituted the 8-day festival of Chanukah, on which lights are kindled nightly to recall and publicize the miracle.
Link: The Story of Chanukah

Daily Quote:
A man of wisdom holds his peace[Proverbs 11:12]
Today's Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Parshat Vayigash, 1st Portion (Genesis 44:18-44:30) with Rashi

• Genesis Chapter 44
18Then Judah approached him and said, "Please, my lord, let now your servant speak somethi

ng into my lord's ears, and let not your wrath be kindled against your servant, for you are like Pharaoh. יחוַיִּגַּ֨שׁ אֵלָ֜יו יְהוּדָ֗ה וַיֹּ֘אמֶר֘ בִּ֣י אֲדֹנִי֒ יְדַבֶּר־נָ֨א עַבְדְּךָ֤ דָבָר֙ בְּאָזְנֵ֣י אֲדֹנִ֔י וְאַל־יִ֥חַר אַפְּךָ֖ בְּעַבְדֶּ֑ךָ כִּ֥י כָמ֖וֹךָ כְּפַרְעֹֽה:
Then…approached him… something into my lord’s ears: Let my words enter your ears. [From Gen. Rabbah 83:6] ויגש אליו וגו'. דבר באזני א-דני: יכנסו דברי באזניך:
and let your wrath not be kindled: From here you learn that he spoke to him harshly. ואל יחר אפך: מכאן אתה למד שדבר אליו קשות:
for you are like Pharaoh: This is its simple meaning. Its midrashic meaning is, however: You will ultimately be punished with צָרַעַת because of him, just as Pharaoh was punished because of my great-grandmother Sarah for the one night that he detained her (Gen. 12:17). Another explanation: Just as Pharaoh issues decrees and does not carry them out, makes promises and does not fulfill them, so do you. Now, is this the “setting of an eye,” concerning which you said [that you wanted] “to set your eye upon him” ? [See verse 21.] Another explanation: For like you, so is Pharaoh-if you provoke me, I will kill you and your master. [From Gen. Rabbah 93:6] כי כמוך כפרעה: חשוב אתה בעיני כמלך זה פשוטו. ומדרשו, סופך ללקות עליו בצרעת כמו שלקה פרעה על ידי זקנתי שרה על לילה אחת שעכבה. דבר אחר מה פרעה גוזר ואינו מקיים, מבטיח ואינו עושה, אף אתה כן, וכי זו היא שימת עין שאמרת לשום עינך עליו. דבר אחר כי כמוך כפרעה אם תקניטני אהרוג אותך ואת אדוניך:
19My lord asked his servants, saying, 'Have you a father or a brother?' יטאֲדֹנִ֣י שָׁאַ֔ל אֶת־עֲבָדָ֖יו לֵאמֹ֑ר הֲיֵשׁ־לָכֶ֥ם אָ֖ב אוֹ־אָֽח:
My lord asked his servants: From the beginning, you came upon us with a pretext. Why did you have to ask all these [questions]? Were we looking to [marry] your daughter, or were you looking to [marry] our sister? Nonetheless, “we said to my lord” (verse 20). We did not conceal anything. [From Gen. Rabbah 93:8] א-דני שאל את עבדיו: מתחלה בעלילה באת עלינו, למה היה לך לשאול כל אלה, בתך היינו מבקשים, או אחותנו אתה מבקש, ואף על פי כן ונאמר אל אדוני, לא כחדנו ממך דבר:
20And we said to my lord, 'We have an old father and a young child of his old age, and his brother is dead, and he is left alone of his mother, and his father loves him.' כוַנֹּ֨אמֶר֙ אֶל־אֲדֹנִ֔י יֶשׁ־לָ֨נוּ֙ אָ֣ב זָקֵ֔ן וְיֶ֥לֶד זְקֻנִ֖ים קָטָ֑ן וְאָחִ֣יו מֵ֔ת וַיִּוָּתֵ֨ר ה֧וּא לְבַדּ֛וֹ לְאִמּ֖וֹ וְאָבִ֥יו אֲהֵבֽוֹ:
and his brother is dead: Out of fear, he made a false statement. He said [to himself], “If I tell him that he is alive, he will say, ‘Bring him to me.’” [from Gen. Rabbah 93:8] ואחיו מת: מפני היראה היה מוציא דבר שקר מפיו. אמר אם אומר לו שהוא קיים, יאמר הביאוהו אצלי:
alone of his mother: From that mother, he has no other brother. [From Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel] לבדו לאמו: מאותו האם אין לו עוד אח:
21And you said to your servants, 'Bring him down to me, and I will set my eye[s] upon him.' כאוַתֹּ֨אמֶר֙ אֶל־עֲבָדֶ֔יךָ הֽוֹרִדֻ֖הוּ אֵלָ֑י וְאָשִׂ֥ימָה עֵינִ֖י עָלָֽיו:
22And we said to my lord, 'The boy cannot leave his father, for if he leaves his father, he will die.' כבוַנֹּ֨אמֶר֙ אֶל־אֲדֹנִ֔י לֹֽא־יוּכַ֥ל הַנַּ֖עַר לַֽעֲזֹ֣ב אֶת־אָבִ֑יו וְעָזַ֥ב אֶת־אָבִ֖יו וָמֵֽת:
for if he leaves his father, he will die: If he leaves his father, we are worried lest he die on the way, for his mother died on the way. [after Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel] ועזב את אביו ומת: אם יעזוב את אביו דואגים אנו שמא ימות בדרך, שהרי אמו מתה בדרך:
23And you said to your servants, 'If your youngest brother does not come down with you, you will not see my face again.' כגוַתֹּ֨אמֶר֙ אֶל־עֲבָדֶ֔יךָ אִם־לֹ֥א יֵרֵ֛ד אֲחִיכֶ֥ם הַקָּטֹ֖ן אִתְּכֶ֑ם לֹ֥א תֹֽסִפ֖וּן לִרְא֥וֹת פָּנָֽי:
24And it came to pass when we went up to your servant, my father, and we told him the words of my lord, כדוַֽיְהִי֙ כִּ֣י עָלִ֔ינוּ אֶל־עַבְדְּךָ֖ אָבִ֑י וַנַּ֨גֶּד־ל֔וֹ אֵ֖ת דִּבְרֵ֥י אֲדֹנִֽי:
25that our father said, 'Go back, buy us a little food.' כהוַיֹּ֖אמֶר אָבִ֑ינוּ שֻׁ֖בוּ שִׁבְרוּ־לָ֥נוּ מְעַט־אֹֽכֶל:
26But we said, 'We cannot go down; [only] if our youngest brother is with us will we go down, for we cannot see the man's face if our youngest brother is not with us.' כווַנֹּ֕אמֶר לֹ֥א נוּכַ֖ל לָרֶ֑דֶת אִם־יֵשׁ֩ אָחִ֨ינוּ הַקָּטֹ֤ן אִתָּ֨נוּ֙ וְיָרַ֔דְנוּ כִּי־לֹ֣א נוּכַ֗ל לִרְאוֹת֙ פְּנֵ֣י הָאִ֔ישׁ וְאָחִ֥ינוּ הַקָּטֹ֖ן אֵינֶ֥נּוּ אִתָּֽנוּ:
27And your servant, my father, said to us, 'You know that my wife bore me two [children]. כזוַיֹּ֛אמֶר עַבְדְּךָ֥ אָבִ֖י אֵלֵ֑ינוּ אַתֶּ֣ם יְדַעְתֶּ֔ם כִּ֥י שְׁנַ֖יִם יָֽלְדָה־לִּ֥י אִשְׁתִּֽי:
28The one went away from me, and I said, "He has surely been torn to pieces, and I have not seen him since." כחוַיֵּצֵ֤א הָֽאֶחָד֙ מֵֽאִתִּ֔י וָֽאֹמַ֕ר אַ֖ךְ טָרֹ֣ף טֹרָ֑ף וְלֹ֥א רְאִיתִ֖יו עַד־הֵֽנָּה:
29Now if you take this one too away from me, and misfortune befalls him, you will bring down my hoary head in misery to the grave.' כטוּלְקַחְתֶּ֧ם גַּם־אֶת־זֶ֛ה מֵעִ֥ם פָּנַ֖י וְקָרָ֣הוּ אָס֑וֹן וְהֽוֹרַדְתֶּ֧ם אֶת־שֵֽׂיבָתִ֛י בְּרָעָ֖ה שְׁאֹֽלָה:
and misfortune befalls him: For Satan accuses at the time of danger. [From Gen. Rabbah 91:9] וקרהו אסון: שהשטן מקטרג בשעת הסכנה:
you will bring down my hoary head in misery, etc.: Now that he is with me, I comfort myself over [the loss of] his mother and over [the loss of] his brother, but if this one [too] dies, it will seem to me as if the three of them died in one day. [From Gen. Rabbah ff. 93:8] והורדתם את שיבתי וגו': עכשיו כשהוא אצלי אני מתנחם בו על אמו ועל אחיו, ואם ימות זה דומה עלי ששלשתן מתו ביום אחד:
30And now, when I come to your servant, my father, and the boy is not with us [since] his soul is attached to his (the boy's) soul, לוְעַתָּ֗ה כְּבֹאִי֙ אֶל־עַבְדְּךָ֣ אָבִ֔י וְהַנַּ֖עַר אֵינֶ֣נּוּ אִתָּ֑נוּ וְנַפְשׁ֖וֹ קְשׁוּרָ֥ה בְנַפְשֽׁוֹ:

• Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 18-22
• 
Chapter 18
If one merits a public miracle, he should offer a song to God, including in his song all the miracles that have occurred since the day the world was created, as well as the good that God wrought for Israel at the giving of the Torah. And he should say: "He Who has performed these miracles, may He do with me likewise."
1. For the Conductor. By the servant of the Lord, by David, who chanted the words of this song to the Lord on the day the Lord delivered him from the hand of all his enemies, and from the hand of Saul.
2. He said, "I love You, Lord, my strength.
3. The Lord is my rock, my fortress, and my rescuer. My God is my strength in Whom I take shelter, my shield, the horn of my salvation, my stronghold.
4. With praises I call upon the Lord, and I am saved from my enemies.
5. For the pangs of death surrounded me, and torrents of evil people terrified me.
6. Pangs of the grave encompassed me; snares of death confronted me.
7. In my distress I called upon the Lord, I cried out to my God; and from His Sanctuary He heard my voice, and my supplication before Him reached His ears.
8. The earth trembled and quaked; the foundations of the mountains shook-they trembled when His wrath flared.
9. Smoke rose in His nostrils, devouring fire blazed from His mouth, and burning coals flamed forth from Him.
10. He inclined the heavens and descended, a thick cloud was beneath His feet.
11. He rode on a cherub and flew; He soared on the wings of the wind.
12. He made darkness His concealment, His surroundings His shelter-of the dense clouds with their dark waters.
13. Out of the brightness before Him, His clouds passed over, with hailstones and fiery coals.
14. The Lord thundered in heaven, the Most High gave forth His voice-hailstones and fiery coals.
15. He sent forth His arrows and scattered them; many lightnings, and confounded them.
16. The channels of water became visible, the foundations of the world were exposed-at Your rebuke, O Lord, at the blast of the breath of Your nostrils.
17. He sent from heaven and took me; He brought me out of surging waters.
18. He rescued me from my fierce enemy, and from my foes when they had become too strong for me.
19. They confronted me on the day of my misfortune, but the Lord was my support.
20. He brought me into spaciousness; He delivered me because He desires me.
21. The Lord rewar-ded me in accordance with my righteousness; He repaid me according to the cleanliness of my hands.
22. For I have kept the ways of the Lord, and have not transgressed against my God;
23. for all His laws are before me, I have not removed His statutes from me.
24. I was perfect with Him, and have guarded myself from sin.
25. The Lord repaid me in accordance with my righteousness, according to the cleanliness of my hands before His eyes.
26. With the kindhearted You act kindly, with the upright man You act uprightly.
27. With the pure You act purely, but with the crooked You act cun- ningly.
28. For the destitute nation You save, but haughty eyes You humble.
29. Indeed, You light my lamp; the Lord, my God, illuminates my darkness.
30. For with You I run against a troop; with my God I scale a wall.
31. The way of God is perfect; the word of the Lord is pure; He is a shield to all who take refuge in Him.
32. For who is God except the Lord, and who is a rock except our God!
33. The God Who girds me with strength, and makes my path perfect.
34. He makes my feet like deers', and stands me firmly on my high places.
35. He trains my hands for battle, my arms to bend a bow of bronze.
36. You have given me the shield of Your deliverance, Your right hand upheld me; Your humility made me great.
37. You have widened my steps beneath me, and my knees have not faltered.
38. I pursued my enemies and overtook them; I did not turn back until I destroyed them.
39. I crushed them so that they were unable to rise; they are fallen beneath my feet.
40. You have girded me with strength for battle; You have subdued my adversaries beneath me.
41. You have made my enemies turn their backs to me, and my foes I cut down.
42. They cried out, but there was none to deliver them; to the Lord, but He did not answer them.
43. I ground them as the dust before the wind, I poured them out like the mud in the streets.
44. You have rescued me from the quarrelsome ones of the people, You have made me the head of nations; a nation I did not know became subservient to me.
45. As soon as they hear of me they obey me; strangers deny to me [their disloyalty].
46. Strangers wither away, they are terrified in their strongholds.
47. The Lord lives; blessed is my Rock; exalted is the God of my deliverance.
48. You are the God Who executes retribution for me, and subjugates nations under me.
49. Who rescues me from my enemies, Who exalts me above my adversaries, Who delivers me from the man of violence.
50. Therefore I will laud You, Lord, among the nations, and sing to Your Name.
51. He grants His king great salvations, and bestows kindness upon His anointed, to David and his descendants forever."
Chapter 19
To behold God's might one should look to the heavens, to the sun, and to the Torah, from which awesome miracles and wonders can be perceived--wonders that lead the creations to tell of God's glory.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. The heavens recount the glory of the Almighty; the sky proclaims His handiwork.
3. Day to day speech streams forth; night to night expresses knowledge.
4. There is no utterance, there are no words; their voice is inaudible.
5. Their arc extends throughout the world; their message to the end of the earth. He set in them [the heavens] a tent for the sun,
6. which is like a groom coming forth from his bridal canopy, like a strong man rejoicing to run the course.
7. Its rising is at one end of the heavens, and its orbit encompasses the other ends; nothing is hidden from its heat.
8. The Torah of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul; the testimony of the Lord is trustworthy, making wise the simpleton.
9. The precepts of the Lord are just, rejoicing the heart; the command of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes.
10. The fear of the Lord is pure, abiding forever; the judgments of the Lord are true, they are all righteous together.
11. They are more desirable than gold, than much fine gold; sweeter than honey or the drippings of honeycomb.
12. Indeed, Your servant is scrupulous with them; in observing them there is abundant reward.
13. Yet who can discern inadvertent wrongs? Purge me of hidden sins.
14. Also hold back Your servant from willful sins; let them not prevail over me; then I will be unblemished and keep myself clean of gross transgression.
15. May the words of my mouth and the meditation of my heart be acceptable before You, Lord, my Strength and my Redeemer.
Chapter 20
If a loved one or relative is suffering-even in a distant place, where one is unable to help-offer this prayer on their behalf.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. May the Lord answer you on the day of distress; may the Name of the God of Jacob fortify you.
3. May He send your help from the Sanctuary, and support you from Zion.
4. May He remember all your offerings, and always accept favorably your sacrifices.
5. May He grant you your heart's desire, and fulfill your every counsel.
6. We will rejoice in your deliverance, and raise our banners in the name of our God; may the Lord fulfill all your wishes.
7. Now I know that the Lord has delivered His anointed one, answering him from His holy heavens with the mighty saving power of His right hand.
8. Some [rely] upon chariots and some upon horses, but we [rely upon and] invoke the Name of the Lord our God.
9. They bend and fall, but we rise and stand firm.
10. Lord, deliver us; may the King answer us on the day we call.


Chapter 21
One who is endowed with prosperity, and whose every desire is granted, ought not be ungrateful. He should praise and thank God, recognize Him as the cause of his prosperity, and trust in Him. For everything comes from the kindness of the One Above.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. The king rejoices in Your strength, Lord; how greatly he exults in Your deliverance!
3. You have given him his heart's desire, and You have never withheld the utterance of his lips.
4. You preceded him with blessings of good; You placed a crown of pure gold on his head.
5. He asked of You life, You gave it to him-long life, forever and ever.
6. His glory is great in Your deliverance; You have placed majesty and splendor upon him.
7. For You make him a blessing forever; You gladden him with the joy of Your countenance.
8. For the king trusts in the Lord, and in the kindness of the Most High-that he will not falter.
9. Your hand will suffice for all Your enemies; Your right hand will find those who hate You.
10. You will make them as a fiery furnace at the time of Your anger. May the Lord consume them in His wrath; let a fire devour them.
11. Destroy their offspring from the earth, their descendants from mankind.
12. For they intended evil against You, they devised evil plans which they cannot execute.
13. For You will set them as a portion apart; with Your bowstring You will aim at their faces.
14. Be exalted, O Lord, in Your strength; we will sing and chant the praise of Your might.
Chapter 22
Every person should pray in agony over the length of the exile, and our fall from prestige to lowliness. One should also take vows (for self-improvement) in his distress.
1. For the Conductor, on the ayelet hashachar, a psalm by David.
2. My God, my God, why have You forsaken me! So far from saving me, from the words of my outcry?
3. My God, I call out by day, and You do not answer; at night-but there is no respite for me.
4. Yet You, Holy One, are enthroned upon the praises of Israel.
5. In You our fathers trusted; they trusted and You saved them.
6. They cried to You and were rescued; they trusted in You and were not shamed.
7. And I am a worm and not a man; scorn of men, contempt of nations.
8. All who see me mock me; they open their lips, they shake their heads.
9. But one that casts [his burden] upon the Lord-He will save him; He will rescue him, for He desires him.
10. For You took me out of the womb, and made me secure on my mother's breasts.
11. I have been thrown upon You from birth; from my mother's womb You have been my God.
12. Be not distant from me, for trouble is near, for there is none to help.
13. Many bulls surround me, the mighty bulls of Bashan encircle me.
14. They open their mouths against me, like a lion that ravages and roars.
15. I am poured out like water, all my bones are disjointed; my heart has become like wax, melted within my innards.
16. My strength is dried up like a potsherd, and my tongue cleaves to my palate; You set me in the dust of death.
17. For dogs surround me, a pack of evildoers enclose me; my hands and feet are like a lion's prey.
18. I count all my limbs, while they watch and gloat over me.
19. They divide my garments amongst them; they cast lots upon my clothing.
20. But You, Lord, do not be distant; my Strength, hurry to my aid!
21. Save my life from the sword, my soul from the grip of dogs.
22. Save me from the lion's mouth, as You have answered me from the horns of wild beasts.
23. I will recount [the praises of] Your Name to my brothers; I will extol You amidst the congregation.
24. You that fear the Lord, praise Him! Glorify Him, all you progeny of Jacob! Stand in awe of Him, all you progeny of Israel!
25. For He has not despised nor abhorred the entreaty of the poor, nor has He concealed His face from him; rather He heard when he cried to Him.
26. My praise comes from You, in the great congregation; I will pay my vows before those that fear Him.
27. Let the humble eat and be satisfied; let those who seek the Lord praise Him-may your hearts live forever!
28. All the ends of the earth will remember and return to the Lord; all families of nations will bow down before You.
29. For sovereignty is the Lord's, and He rules over the nations.
30. All the fat ones of the earth will eat and bow down, all who descend to the dust shall kneel before Him, but He will not revive their soul.
31. The progeny of those who serve Him will tell of the Lord to the latter generations.
32. They will come and relate His righteousness-all that He has done-to a newborn nation.

Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 6
• Lessons in Tanya

• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Sunday, 
3 Tevet, 5777 · 1 January 2017
• Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 6

אבל כל מה שאינו בטל אצלו יתברך, אלא הוא דבר נפרד בפני עצמו, אינו • מקבל חיות מקדושתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא
Anything, however, that does not surrender itself to G‑d, but [considers itself as if it] is a thing separate unto itself, does not receive its life from the holiness of G‑d —
But where else would it receive its vitality? G‑dliness and holiness is the source of vitality for every existing being, as it is written, “You give life to them all” (Nechemiah 9:6). The Alter Rebbe goes on to qualify his previous remark, stating that those beings who do not surrender themselves to G‑d receive their vitality only from a superficial, external level of G‑dliness; and from this level, too, only when it descends degree by degree through numerous “contractions” of the life-force.
מבחינת פנימית הקדושה ומהותה ועצמותה בכבודה ובעצמה, אלא מבחינת אחוריים
To return to the Alter Rebbe’s words: The self-styled separate being does not receive its vitality from the pnimiyut, the inner aspect of holiness, from its every essence and core, but from its achorayim, its “hind-part”, so to speak.
To bestow from one’s “pnimiyut” (literally, one’s “face”) means, as explained in ch. 22, to give with a pleasurable will and desire; “achorayim” (literally, “behind one’s back”) means to bestow without desire or pleasure, out of some extenuating factor. The giver’s attitude will be apparent, in either case, in his manner of giving. If one gives something to his enemy, for example, he will avert his face from him, for one’s face represents his inner feelings; since the giver’s heart is not in his gift, he turns his face away, presenting his enemy with his rear. Thus, pnimiyut and achorayim in the sense of internal and external aspects (of one’s will) are related to their literal meanings of “face” and “rear”.
In our context, everything in the realm of holiness, whose existence and life G‑d desires, receives its life from the pnimiyut of G‑dliness; while the kelipot, in which G‑d has no desire (since He created them only for the reasons given in the paragraphs introducing this chapter), receive their life from the achorayim of G‑dliness.
שיורדים ממדרגה למדרגה רבבות מדרגות בהשתלשלות העולמות, דרך עלה ועלול
This limited form of life-force reaches the kelipot by descending degree by degree through myriads of levels, in the chain-like descent of the worlds, in the manner of cause and effect.
The higher level is the “cause” for the lower level which emerges from it. However, in a descent which is a sequence of cause and effect, the effect, although lower, is always comparable to the cause. Such descents, no matter how numerous, would be insufficient to produce the low level of vitality bestowed upon kelipot. This can be produced only by the descent of the vitality through tzimtzum, as the Alter Rebbe now continues:
וצמצומים רבים
The vitality descends also through many tzimtzumim, or contractions — and this process diminishes the vitality to the point where it is incomparably lower than in its original state.
עד שנתמעט כל כך האור והחיות, מיעוט אחר מיעוט, עד שיכול להתצמצם ולהתלבש בבחינת גלות
So greatly diminished does the light and life-force become, diminution after diminution, until it is able to become contracted and clothed in a manner of exile, meaning that instead of being surrendered to the Divine life-force, the object in which the vitality is clothed masters it; as, for example, a captive in exile is mastered by his captors.
תוך אותו דבר הנפרד, להחיותו ולקיימו מאין ליש
The vitality is thus in a state of exile within that object which is (i.e., which considers itself) separate from holiness, giving it vitality and existence, causing that object to pass from non-existence to existence,
שלא יחזור להיות אין ואפס כבתחלה מקודם שנברא
so that is does not return to its original state of non-existence, as it was before it was created by the vitality clothed in it.
In brief: All that is not surrendered to G‑d, but considers itself separate from Him, receives its vitality from the achorayim of G‑dliness by way of numerous descents and various contraction. The Divine life-force is concealed within it in a state of exile; thus it belongs to the realm of kelipah. It is now clear why any thought, word or action not directed toward [serving] G‑d — hence, not surrendered to G‑dliness — is a garment of the animal soul that derives from kelipah, even if that thought, word or deed is not actually evil.
ולכן נקרא עולם הזה ומלואו עולם הקליפות וסטרא אחרא
That is why this world with all it contains is called the world of kelipot and sitra achra — despite the fact that this world, too, receives its vitality from G‑d’s holiness.
Since the creatures of this physical world feel themselves to be independent, separate beings, and their surrender to G‑dliness is not apparent, they automatically belong to the realm of kelipah.
ולכן כל מעשה עולם הזה קשים ורעים והרשעים גוברים בו, כמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים, שער מ״ב סוף פרק ד׳
This is also why all affairs of this world are severe and evil, and the wicked prevail in it (as is written in Etz Chayim, Portal 42, end of ch. 4).
In the following note, referring to his previous statement that this is a world of kelipot, the Alter Rebbe writes that this is so notwithstanding the fact that G‑dliness pervades all existence; or, stated in the terminology of the Kabbalah, that G‑d’s infinite light (Or Ein Sof) clothes itself in the Sefirot of the four Worlds —Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, and thereby even this physical world is filled with the Or Ein Sof; yet, despite all this, it is still a world of kelipot.
הגהה
עם היות בתוכו עשר ספירות דעשיה דקדושה, וכמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים, שער מ״ג
NOTE
To be sure, this world contains the Ten Sefirot of [the World of] Asiyah, as is written in Etz Chayim, Portal 43.
(The World of Asiyah comprises both our physical world, and the spiritual World of Asiyah. The Sefirot of the spiritual Asiyah are, however, contained in the physical Asiyah as well.)
ובתוך עשר ספירות דעשיה אלו הן עשר ספירות דיצירה, ובתוכן עשר ספירות דבריאה, ובתוכן עשר ספירות דאצילות, שבתוכן אור אין סוף ברוך הוא
Now, within these Ten Sefirot of Asiyah are [contained] the Ten Sefirot of the World of Yetzirah, and within them the Ten Sefirot of the World of Beriah, and in them the Ten Sefirot of the World of Atzilut, in which abides the Or Ein Sof.
ונמצא אור אין סוף ברוך הוא מלא כל הארץ הלזו התחתונה, על ידי התלבשותו בעשר ספירות דארבע עולמות, אצילות בריה יצירה עשיה
Thus, the Or Ein Sof pervades this entire lowest world by being clothed in the Ten Sefirot of the four Worlds — Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah,
כמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים, שער מ״ז פרק ב׳, ובספר גלגולים פרק כ׳
as is written in Etz Chayim, Portal 47, ch. 2, and in Sefer Gilgulim, ch. 20.
END OF NOTE
Yet, because the creatures of this world are not openly surrendered to G‑d, this is a world of kelipot and sitra achra.
Until here it has been explained that all thoughts, utterances and actions that are not directed towards holiness are sitra achra, and that these are the garments by which the animal soul expresses itself.
But this merely places the garments on a par with the animal soul itself, which like them stems from the sitra achra. It was explained earlier, however, that the garments of the divine soul are of a higher spiritual level than the soul itself, and elevate it, and that the animal soul is structured as a mirror-image of the divine soul. It follows, then, that the animal soul’s garments are on an even lower level than the animal soul itself and that they degrade it.
The Alter Rebbe goes on to explain that this is indeed the case. After a discussion of the two categories of kelipah (mentioned in the introduction to this chapter), he concludes that there are those garments of the animal soul that drag down the soul from the level of kelipat nogah — the soul’s natural state — to the level of the three completely impure kelipot. These are: sinful thoughts, and forbidden words and actions.1
אלא שהקליפות הן נחלקות לשתי מדרגות, זו למטה מזו
However, the kelipot are divided into two categories, one lower than the other.
המדרגה התחתונה היא שלש קליפות הטמאות ורעות לגמרי, ואין בהם טוב כלל
The lower category consists of three completely unclean and evil kelipot, containing no good whatever.
ונקראו במרכבת יחזקאל: רוח סערה וענן גדול וגו׳
In the prophet Yechezkel’s vision of the Divine chariot in which he saw and described the forces that conceal G‑dliness they are described2 as “a stormwind,” “a great cloud” and “a flaring fire,” representing these three wholly unclean kelipot.
ומהן נשפעות ונמשכות נפשות כל אומות העולם וקיום גופם
From them flow and are derived the souls of all the nations of the world, and the sustaining force of their bodies which sustains their existence; apart from the soul, which animates them.
ונפשות כל בעלי חיים הטמאים ואסורים באכילה, וקיום גופם
Also derived from these kelipot are the souls of all living creatures that are unclean and forbidden to be eaten, and the sustaining force of their bodies.
וקיום וחיות כל מאכלות אסורות מהצומח, כמו ערלה וכלאי הכרם כו׳, וכמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים, שער מ״ט פרק ו׳
The existence and life of all forbidden vegetation, too, such as orlah (the first three years‘ fruit of a tree), and a mixture of grain seeds in a vineyard, and so forth, are derived from these kelipot, as is written in Etz Chayim, Portal 49, ch. 6.
וכן, קיום וחיות כל המעשה דבור ומחשבה של כל שס״ה לא תעשה וענפיהן, כמו שכתוב שם סוף פרק ה׳
Similarly, the existence and life of any act, utterance or thought in violation of any one of the 365 [Biblical] prohibitions, as well as their [Rabbinic] offshoots are all derived from these three impure kelipot, as is written there, end of ch. 5.
The animal soul, on the other hand, is of kelipat nogah, which contains an element of good (as mentioned in ch. 1). These sinful garments, belonging to the realm of wholly impure kelipot, are thus lower than the animal soul itself, and drag it down to their level; in exact opposition to the divine soul’s garments of the thought, speech and action of Torah and the mitzvot which are higher than the soul and elevate it.
——— ● ———
FOOTNOTES
1.The Rebbe notes: In the case of one who ate “neutrally” (neither “for the sake of heaven” nor to indulge his animal soul’s desire, but merely to sate his hunger), it is questionable whether this applies (i.e., whether this too degrades the animal soul). It would appear so from Kuntres Etz HaChayim, ch. 3 (where it is written that eating “neutrally” coarsens one at least to the point of leading him to self-indulgence). It is similarly written further in ch. 13 of Tanya that one’s animal soul gains strength by being exercised through eating and drinking. No proof to the contrary can be adduced from the expression in ch. 7 that such (“neutral”) actions are “no better” than the animal soul itself (and hence, they are apparently also no worse), for it is quite possible that the words “no better” indicate merely that they all belong to the same category: like the animal soul itself, such actions are of the realm of kelipat nogah, not of holiness. In his Kitzurei Tanya, the Tzemach Tzedek apparently takes these words in the same vein.
2.Yechezkel 1:4.
• Rambam - Sunday, 3 Tevet, 5777 · 1 January 2017
• Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
• 
Negative Commandment 355
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
"There shall be no indecent women among the daughters of Israel"—Deuteronomy 23:18.
It is forbidden for a man and woman to be intimate unless married to each other.
Full text of this Mitzvah »

• Out of Wedlock Intimacy
Negative Commandment 355
Translated by Berel Bell
The 355th prohibition is that we are forbidden from having relations with a woman without [giving her] a Kesubah and acquiring her (kiddushin).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "There may not be any prostitutes among Jewish girls."
This same commandment is repeated, but using a different expression, in G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The Sifra says, " 'Do not defile your daughter' — this command is directed towards a man who hands over his unmarried daughter for sexual relations without marriage, as well as a girl who herself has sexual relations without marriage."
Now listen as I explain why the prohibition is repeated with this wording,3 and what the repetition adds. G‑d (exalted be He) has already instructed us in the Torah that a man who has relations with a virgin incurs none of the punishments4, regardless of whether he seduced or raped her. Rather, he must pay a monetary fine and marry the girl that he harmed, as explained in the Torah.5
Accordingly, a person might think that since the offender is only required to pay a fine, therefore this is looked upon as a purely financial case. Therefore, just as a person, if he wishes, is allowed to give away his money to another person, or to forgive a debt, so too, [he might think,] he may take his unmarried daughter and give her to a man to have relations with her. This would be like forgiving a debt due to him, since the 50 silver [shekels which the seducer or rapist must pay] go to the father. Alternatively, a person might think that [since this is purely a financial matter,] he may give his daughter on condition that the man pays a certain amount of money.
Therefore, the Torah prohibited this and said, "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The monetary fine only refers to a case where the seduction or rape actually occurred. But it is still completely forbidden for them to engage in sexual relations, even when they both agree.
The Torah also reveals the reason for this prohibition: ["Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations,] and you will then not make the land sexually immoral, and the land [will not] be filled with perversion." The explanation of this: seduction and rape occur very rarely, but if the Torah allowed premarital relations when both parties agree, it would occur often and become widespread throughout the world.
This is a fine and wondrous explanation of this verse, and fits all the sayings of our Sages and laws of the Torah.
This prohibition, i.e. the prohibition of [having relations with] an unmarried woman, is punishable by lashes.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in Kesubos and Kiddushin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 23:18.
2.Lev. 19:29.
3.Directed to the father, unlike the other verse, which is phrased as a general prohibition.
4.. Such as lashes or execution.
5.Ex. 22:15. Deut. 22:28. See P220, P218.
• Rambam - 1 Chapter: Gezelah va'Avedah Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Two 
• Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Two
1
When an object taken by robbery remains unchanged, it itself must be returned to its original owner. This applies even when the owner has despaired of its return, and even when the robber himself has died, and the article is in his children's possession.
If, however, the article underwent a change while in the robber's possession the robber acquires it because of the change and is required to pay its value at the time of the robbery. This applies even when the owners have not despaired of its recovery.
א
הגזלה שלא נשתנית אלא הרי היא כמו שהיתה אע"פ שנתייאשו ב הבעלים ממנה ואע"פ שמת הגזלן והרי היא ביד בניו הרי זו חוזרת לבעליה [א] בעצמה. ואם נשתנית ביד הגזלן אע"פ שעדיין לא נתייאשו הבעלים ממנה קנאה בשינוי ומשלם דמיה כשעת הגזלה:
2
This is the law as prescribed by the Torah, as Leviticus 5:23 states: "And he shall return the object he obtained by robbery." The Oral Tradition interprets that verse to mean: If the object is still as it was at the time of the robbery, it should be returned. If it has undergone a change, he should pay its value.
If the owner despaired of its return, but it did not undergo a change, the robber acquires the right to its increase in value from the time the owner despaired. He is required to pay only the value of the article at the time of the robbery. This is also a Rabbinic ordinance to encourage repentance.
In such an instance, when he returns the object he obtained by robbery, the increase in value is evaluated, and the robber is paid for it by the person he robbed.
ב
ודין זה דין תורה הוא שנאמר והשיב את הגזלה אשר גזל. מפי השמועה למדו אם היא כשגזלה משלם אותה ואם נשתנית בידו משלם דמיה. נתייאשו הבעלים ממנה ולא נשתנית א קנה הגזלן כל השבח שהשביחה אחר יאוש ואינו משלם אלא כשעת הגזלה  ודבר זה מדבריהם מפני  תקנת השבים. וכשמחזיר לו הגזלה שמין לו השבח ונוטל מן הנגזל:
3
If the robber sold the article obtained by robbery or gave it as a present and the owner despaired of its return, the purchaser is not required to return the article itself even though it did not undergo a change. Since the owner despaired of its return - regardless of whether that took place before the sale or afterwards - the purchaser acquires possession of it, because of the despair and because of the transfer from one domain to another.
ג
מכרה הגזלן או נתנה במתנה אע"פ שלא נשתנית הגזלה אינה חוזרת בעצמה מיד הלוקח הואיל ונתייאשו הבעלים בין לפני מכירה ונתינה בין לאחר מכירה ונתינה קנאה הלוקח ביאוש ושינוי רשות:
4
When a person obtains an article by robbery, causes it to increase in value, and then sells it or bequeaths it to another person, he bequeaths or sells the increase in value, and the purchaser or the heir acquires the right to this increase. Therefore, at the time of judgment, he should be reimbursed by the original owner for the increase in value, and then return to him the article obtained by robbery. The original owner may then collect the worth of the increase in value from the robber, for he did not despair of its return.
Similarly, if the purchaser or the heir caused the object to increase in value, the original owner should reimburse them for that increase.
ד
הגוזל והשביח ומכר או הוריש לפני יאוש מה שהשביח הוריש ומה שהשביח מכר וקנה לוקח או יורש את השבח ונוטל *דמי השבח מן הנגזל ומחזיר לו הגזלה וחוזר הנגזל ונוטל דמי השבח מן הגזלן שהרי לא נתייאש. וכן אם השביח הלוקח או היורש נוטל השבח ב מן הנגזל:
5
If the robber sold the object obtained by robbery to a gentile, and the gentile caused it to increase in value, at the time of judgment, the article and the increase must be returned to the original owner.
If the gentile sold it to a Jew after it increased in value, since the robber is a Jew and the person in possession of the article is a Jew, the purchaser is considered to have acquired the increase in value. If, however, the original owner seizes the increase in value without paying for it, it is not expropriated from his possession.
ה
מכר הגזלן לעכו"ם אע"פ שהשביח העכו"ם חוזרת לבעליה. מכרה העכו"ם לישראל אחר שהשביח הואיל והגזלן ישראל וזה שהיא בידו ישראל קנה השבח. ואם תפש הנגזל אין מוציאין מידו:
6
As explained, in order to encourage repentance our Sages ruled that when an article obtained by robbery increases in value after the owner despairs of its return or after it has undergone a change, the robber is entitled to the increase in value. This applies even when the change comes about as a matter of course.
What is implied? If a person obtained a cow by robbery and it became pregnant in his possession, whether or not it bore a calf before he was called to court because of the robbery - since the owner despaired of its return, he is required to pay only the value of the cow at the time of the robbery. Similarly, if he stole a sheep and it grew wool, whether he sheared it before he was called to court or it had not yet been shorn, he is required to pay only its value at the time of the robbery.
If it bore offspring or was shorn, the robber is entitled to the offspring or the shearings. If it had not borne offspring, nor was it shorn at that time, the animal's increase in value is evaluated and may be collected from the original owner. Then the animal itself is returned.
ו
כבר בארנו שהגזלה שהשביחה אחר יאוש או אחר שנשתנית השבח לגזלן מפני תקנת השבים אף על פי שהשביחה מאליה. כיצד גזל פרה ג ונתעברה אצלו בין שילדה קודם שתבעו בדין בין שעדיין לא ילדה [ב] גזל רחל ונטענה אצלו בין שגזזה קודם שתבעו בדין בין שעדיין לא גזזה הואיל ונתייאשו הבעלים משלם כשעת הגזלה. ואם ילדה וגזזה הגיזות והולדות של גזלן ואם עדיין לא ילדה ולא גזזה שמין לו ונוטל השבח מן הנגזל ומחזיר הבהמה עצמה:
7
If a person obtained a pregnant cow by robbery, the owner despaired of its return and then it bore offspring, or he obtained a sheep laden with wool by robbery, the owner despaired of its return and then it was shorn, the robber should pay the value of a cow ready to bear offspring and a sheep ready to be shorn.
If the animal bore offspring or was shorn before the owner despaired of its return, the shearings or the offspring belong to the original owner. This applies even if the animal became pregnant or grew wool while in the possession of the thief. Since the owner did not despair, and the animal did not undergo a change, the object obtained by robbery is still considered to belong to its original owner, although the robber is held responsible in cases of loss due to forces beyond his control.
ז
גזל פרה ד מעוברת ונתייאשו הבעלים ואחר כך ילדה. רחל טעונה ונתייאשו הבעלים ואחר כך גזזה. משלם דמי פרה העומדת לילד ודמי רחל העומדת ליגזז. ואם לפני יאוש או קודם שנשתנה ילדה או גזזה הרי הגיזות והולדות של בעלים. ואע"פ שנתעברה או נטענה ביד הגזלן הואיל ולא נתייאשו הבעלים ולא נשתנית הגזלה. ברשות בעליה היא עדיין אע"פ שהגזלן חייב באונסיה:
8
If a person stole or obtained an animal by robbery and consecrated or slaughtered it after its owner despaired of its return, it is considered to be the thief's property only from the time he consecrated it. This was enacted so that the sinner will not profit. All its offspring and its shearings from the time that it was stolen until the time it was consecrated belong to its original owner.
ח
גנב או גזל והקדיש וטבח אחר שנתייאשו הבעלים הרי היא ברשות הגזלן משעה שהקדישה בלבד כדי שלא יהא חוטא נשכר וכל ולדותיה וגיזותיה משעת גניבה עד שעת  הקדש של בעלים:
9
When does the above apply? To an increase in value that comes as a matter of course - e.g., an animal's shearing or its offspring. If, however, an animal was gaunt, and the robber fattened it, the robber may collect the increase in value due to the fattening from the original owner, even if it took place before the owner despaired. The same applies with regard to all instances where the increase in value comes about as a result of expense.
ט
במה דברים אמורים בשבח הבא מאליו כגון גיזות וולדות. אבל אם היתה כחושה ופטמה אפילו לפני יאוש נוטל מן הנגזל שבח הפטום. וכן כל כיוצא בזה משבח שיש בו הוצאה:
10
A change that can revert to its original state is not considered to be a change.
What is implied? When a person obtains boards by robbery and attaches them to each other with nails and makes a chest, this is not considered a change. For it is possible to separate them and make them simple boards, as they were previously.
י
שינוי החוזר לברייתו אינו שינוי. כיצד הגוזל עצים ודבקן במסמרים ועשה מהן תיבה אינו שינוי שהרי אפשר לפרקן וחוזרין לוחות כשהיו:
11
If a person obtained sand by robbery and made it into a brick, he does not acquire it, because one can crush the brick and return it to sand.
If he obtained a strip of metal by robbery and made it into a coin, he does not acquire it, because one can melt the coin and return it to a strip of metal, as it was beforehand. The same principles apply in other similar instances.
יא
גזל עפר ועשאהו לבינה לא קנה שאם ידוק הלבינה תחזור עפר כשהיתה. ג גזל לשון של מתכת ועשאהו מטבע לא קנה שאם יתיך המטבע יחזור לשון כשהיתה. וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
12
If, however, a person obtained boards by robbery and burned them, cut them or carved them, and in this way fashioned them into a utensil; he obtained wool by robbery and dyed it, spun it or whitened it; he obtained threads by robbery and made them into a garment; he obtained a brick by robbery and made it into dust; obtained stones by robbery and smoothed them; or he obtained coins by robbery and melted them - this is considered a change, for if he makes other coins - or similarly undoes the other changes mentioned above - they are considered to be new entities. The same principles apply in all similar situations.
יב
אבל הגוזל עצים ושרפן וקצצן או חקק בהן ועשאן כלים. או שגזל צמר וצבעו או נפצו ולבנו. או שגזל טווי ועשהו בגד. או שגזל לבינה ועשאה עפר או אבנים וסתתן או מעות והתיכן. הרי זה שינוי בידו שאם יעשם מעות אחרות פנים חדשות הן. וכן כל כיוצא בהן:
13
When a person robs old coins, polishes them and renews them, he is not considered to have acquired them, for they will age and return to their previous state. If, however, he obtains new coins by robbery and causes them to look old, he does acquire them. For if they were made to appear new again, that would be considered to be a new development.
A person who robs a date palm that is growing and cuts it down does not acquire it. This applies even if he cuts it into sections. If he makes it into boards, he does acquire it.
יג
הגוזל מעות ישנות ושפן וחדשן לא קנה שהרי מתיישנין וחוזרין כשהיו. גזל מעות חדשים וישנם קנה שאם יחדשם פנים חדשות הן. גזל דקל מחובר וקצצו לא קנה ואפילו כרתו חליות חליות. עשהו קורות קנה:
14
If a person obtains large beams by robbery and cuts them into small beams, he does not acquire them. If he cuts them into boards, causing them to be called by a different name, he does acquire them.
If one obtained a palm branch by robbery and separated its leaves, one acquires the leaves. If one obtained palm leaves by robbery and made them into a broom, one acquires the broom.
If one obtains a lamb by robbery and it becomes a ram, or one obtains a calf by robbery and it becomes an ox, it is considered to have undergone a change while in the robber's possession. Therefore, he is considered to have acquired it, and he is required to pay only the value of the article at the time of the robbery, despite the fact that the owner never despaired of the article's return.
יד
גזל קורות גדולות ועשאן קטנות לא קנה. עשאן לוחות עד שנשתנה שמם קנה. גזל לולב והפריד עליו קנה העלים. גזל עלים ועשאן חופייה קנה. גזל טלה ונעשה איל עגל ונעשה שור הרי זה שינוי בידו וקנהו ומשלם כשעת הגזלה. ואף על פי שלא נתייאשו הבעלים:
15
If a person obtains a utensil by robbery and breaks it, we do not evaluate its depreciation. Instead, the robber is obligated to pay its worth, and he is given the broken utensil.
If, however, the original owner desires to take the broken utensil, he is granted it, and the robber must pay for its depreciation. This ordinance was instituted for the sake of the owner, and if he does not desire it, he is granted that prerogative. Similar principles apply in other analogous situations.
טו
גזל כלי ושברו אין שמין לו הפחת [ג] אלא משלם דמיו והכלי השבור של גזלן. ואם רצו הבעלים ליטול הכלי השבור נוטלין ומשלם הפחת. שזו תקנה היא לבעלים ואם לא רצו הרשות בידן וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
16
When an object obtained by robbery does not undergo a change, but its value increases, it itself must be returned to its original owner, and the robber is not entitled to anything. This applies even if the owner has despaired of its return.
For the Sages granted the robber only the increase in value after the owner despaired of the object's return, in instances like the shearing of wool and the offspring. He is not, however, granted any increase in value that comes from the rise in article's worth when it is returned intact to its owner.
טז
גזלה שלא נשתנית והוקרה אף על פי שנתייאשו הבעלים ממנה הרי זו חוזרת לבעלים ואין לגזלן בה כלום. שלא תקנו לגזלן את השבח אחר יאוש אלא כגון גיזות וולדות אבל שבח היוקר אם היתה הגזלה חוזרת בעיניה אינו זוכה בה:
• Rambam - 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Five, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Six, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Seven
• 
Ishut - Chapter Five
1
When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated.1 [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin2 - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.
א
המקדש בדבר שהוא אסור בהנאה כגון חמץ בפסח או בשר בחלב וכיוצא בהן משאר איסורי הנאה אינה מקודשת. ואפילו היה אסור בהנאה מדבריהם כגון חמץ בשעה ששית מיום י"ד אינה מקודשת:
2
If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, the kiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."
If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned,4 the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.
ב
עבר ומכר דבר האסור בהנאה וקידש בדמיו הרי זו מקודשת חוץ מעכו"ם שאם קידש בדמיה אינה מקודשת מפני שדמי עכו"ם אסורין בהנאה כמוה. המקדש בפרש עגלי עכו"ם אינה מקודשת שהכל מעכו"ם אסור בהנאה שנאמר ולא ידבק בידך מאומה מן החרם. אבל המקדש בפרש שור הנסקל הרי זו מקודשת אע"פ ששור הנסקל אסור בהנאה פרשו אינו אסור בהנאה שאינו דבר חשוב לגבי השור:
3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year,5 with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer],6 the kiddushin are valid.
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple.7 If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.8
ג
המקדש בפירות שביעית או באפר פרה אדומה או במים שמילאן לעשותן מי נדה הרי זו מקודשת. המקדש בהקדש של בדק הבית בשוגג הרי זו מקודשת. והוא ישלם קרן וחומש להקדש ויביא אשמו כדין כל מועל בשגגה. ואם קידש בו אשה במזיד אינה מקודשת:
4
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's."9
ד
קידשה במעשר שני בין בשוגג בין במזיד אינה מקודשת. לפי שאין לו לעשות בו שאר חפציו עד שיתחלל שנאמר במעשר ליי' הוא:
5
When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.
When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, the terumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.10
ה
כהן שקידש בחלקו מקדשי קדשים או מקדשים קלים אינה מקודשת מפני שלא הותרו אלא לאכילה בלבד. אבל כהן שקידש בתרומה גדולה ובתרומת מעשר ובבכורים וכן לוי שקידש במעשר ראשון וישראל שקידש במעשר עני הרי זו מקודשת:
6
The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.
When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.
ו
מתנות שלא הורמו הרי הם כמו שהורמו. לפיכך ישראל שנפלו לו טבלים מבית אבי אמו כהן והפריש מהן תרומה ומעשרות הרי הן כתרומות ומעשרות שנפלו לו בירושה מאבי אמו. ואם קידש בהן אשה הרי זו מקודשת שאע"פ שאינן ראוין לו לאכילה יש לו למוכרן למי שהן ראוין לו. אבל ישראל שקידש בתרומה שהפריש מגרנו אינה מקודשת שהרי אין לו למוכרה ואין לו בה אלא טובת הנאה. לפי שנותנה לכל כהן שירצה וטובת הנאה אינה ממון:
7
[The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article,11and it is known12 that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.
ז
המקדש את האשה בגזל או בגניבה או בחמס. אם נתייאשו הבעלים ונודע שקנה אותו דבר בייאוש הרי זו מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת:
8
When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.
If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.13
ח
הנכנס לבית חבירו ולקח לו כלי או אוכל וכיוצא בהן וקידש בו אשה ובא בעל הבית אע"פ שאמר לו למה לא נתת לה דבר זה שהוא טוב ממה שנתת לה אינה מקודשת. שלא אמר לו דבר זה אלא כדי שלא להתבייש עמו. והואיל וקידש בממון חבירו שלא מדעת חבירו הרי זה גזל ואינה מקודשת. ואם קידשה בדבר שאין בעל הבית מקפיד עליו כגון תמרה או אגוז הרי זו מקודשת מספק:
9
When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].
ט
היתה סחורה בינו ובין חבירו וחלקה שלא מדעת חבירו וקידש בחלקו הואיל וצריכה שומת ב"ד אינה מקודשת שאין זה נוטל לעצמו מה שירצה ויניח מה שירצה:
10
[The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated.14If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin.15 If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the kiddushin], she is consecrated.
י
גזל את האשה או גנב ממנה או חמסה וחזר וקידשה בגזל ובגניבה ובחמס שלה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת בו. אם קדם ביניהן שידוכין ונטלה ושתקה הרי זו מקודשת. ואם לא שידך אותה מעולם אף ע"פ ששתקה כשנתן לה דברים אלו בתורת קידושין אינה מקודשת. ואם אמרה הן הרי זו מקודשת:
11
Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the kiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.16
יא
וכן אם נתן לה פקדון ואמר לה כנסי פקדון זה וחזר ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בו. אם אמר לה קודם שנטלתו ונטלתו ושתקה הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אחר שנטלתו בתורת פקדון אמר לה הרי את מקודשת בו ושתקה אין זה כלום שכל שתיקה שלאחר מתן מעות אינה מועלת. אבל אם אמרה הן אחר שנטלה הרי זו מקודשת:
12
[The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.
If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.
יב
החזיר לה חוב שהיה לה אצלו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת בו קודם שתטלנו ונטלתו ושתקה. אם היה ביניהן שידוכין הרי זו מקודשת. ואם לא שידך אינה מקודשת עד שתאמר הן. ואם אמר לה אחר שנטלה החוב שלה הרי את מקודשת בו אפילו אמרה הן אינה מקודשת. שהרי לא הגיע לידה ממנו כלום אלא שלה נטלה וכבר נפרע חובו משעה שנטלה ואינה יכולה לחזור ולתובעו בחוב פעם אחרת:
13
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note,17 she is not consecrated.
What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept as kiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ]18 already spent that dinar and has derived benefit from it already.
יג
המקדש במלוה אפילו היתה בשטר אינה מקודשת. כיצד כגון שהיה לו אצלה חוב דינר ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר שיש לי בידך אינה מקודשת. מפני שהמלוה להוצאה ניתנה ואין כאן שום דבר קיים ליהנות בו מעתה שכבר הוציאה אותו דינר ועברה הנאתו:
14
[A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral,19 she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.
יד
היה לו אצלה מלוה על המשכון וקידשה באותה המלוה והחזיר לה המשכון הרי זו מקודשת שהרי היא נהנית במשכון מעתה והרי הגיע הנאה לידה:
15
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.
What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.
It is forbidden to make [such a condition], because it is like taking interest.20 My teachers interpreted the expression "the benefit [derived from] a loan," in a way that is not worthy of mention.21
טו
המקדש בהנאת מלוה הרי זו מקודשת. כיצד כגון שהלוה אותה עתה מאתים זוז ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאת זמן שארויח לך במלוה זו שתהיה בידך כך וכך יום ואיני תובעה ממך עד זמן פלוני הרי זו מקודשת. שהרי יש לה הנאה מעתה להשתמש במלוה זו עד סוף זמן שקבע. ואסור לעשות כן מפני שהיא כרבית. ופירשו רבותי בהנאת מלוה דברים שאין ראוי לשומען:
16
If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this p'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.22
טז
אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בפרוטה זו ובחוב שיש לי אצלך הרי זו מקודשת. וכן אם אמר לה במלוה שיש לי אצלך ובפרוטה זו הרי זו מקודשת:
17
When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.23
יז
היה לו חוב ביד אחרים ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בחוב שיש לי ביד זה במעמד שלשתן הרי זו מקודשת:
18
[The following rule applies when a man] consecrates [a woman] with an object that he has entrusted to her for safekeeping or with an article that he has lent her: If the entrusted object or borrowed article is worth a p'rutah24 and it exists within her property, she is consecrated.25
יח
קידשה בפקדון שיש לו בידה או בשאלה שהשאילה. אם היה הפקדון והשאלה פרוטה או שוה פרוטה באחד מהן קיים ברשותה הרי זו מקודשת:
19
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan,26 and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
יט
אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בשכר שאדבר עליך לשלטון ודיבר עליה לשלטון והניח השלטון ולא תבעה אינה מקודשת אלא אם נתן לה פרוטה משלו שההנאה שבאה לה מדבריו הרי היא כמלוה והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת:
20
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him].27 And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
כ
הרי את מקודשת לי במלאכה זו שאעשה עמך ועשה אינה מקודשת אלא אם כן נתן לה פרוטה משלו. לפי שהשכירות יזכה בה הפועל מתחלה ועד סוף כל זמן שיעשה מקצת מן המלאכה זוכה במקצת מן השכר ונמצא השכר כולו מלוה אצלה והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת:
21
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," the kiddushin are binding.28 Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.
Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding29provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."
כא
האשה שאמרה תן דינר לפלוני מתנה ואתקדש אני לך ונתן ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאת מתנה זו שנתתי על פיך הרי זו מקודשת. אע"פ שלא הגיע לה כלום הרי נהנית ברצונה שנעשה ונהנה פלוני בגללה. וכן אם אמרה לו תן דינר לפלוני מתנה ואתקדש לו ונתן לו וקידשה אותו פלוני ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאת מתנה זו שקבלתי ברצונך הרי זו מקודשת:
22
[To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.30
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated.31 For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.
כב
אמר לה הילך דינר זה במתנה והתקדשי לפלוני וקידשה אותו פלוני ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאה זו הבאה ליך בגללי הרי זו מקודשת אע"פ שלא נתן לה המקדש כלום. אמרה לו הילך דינר זה מתנה ואתקדש לך ולקחו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאה זו שקבלתי ממך מתנה אם אדם חשוב הוא הרי זו מקודשת שהנאה יש לה בהיותו נהנה ממנה ובהנאה זו הקנת עצמה לו:
23
When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.32
If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.33
כג
האומר לאשה התקדשי לי בדינר והרי זה המשכון בידך עד שאתן הדינר אינה מקודשת לו. לפי שלא הגיע הדינר לידה ולא המשכון נתן להיותו שלה. היה בידו משכון על חוב שיש לו אצל אחרים וקידש בו אשה אע"פ שאינו שלו הרי זו מקודשת. לפי שבעל חוב יש לו מקצת קנין בגופו של משכון:
24
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.34
כד
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה על מנת שתחזירהו לי אינה מקודשת בין החזירה בין לא החזירה. שאם לא החזירתו לא נתקיים התנאי. ואם החזירתו הרי לא נהנית ולא הגיע לידה כלום:
25
[These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuz that are hidden in the wreath."
If she said yes, she is consecrated. If she remained silent, she is not consecrated with this money, for remaining silent after money has been given is of no consequence.35 There is nonetheless a doubt: perhaps the kiddushin are valid, lest the wreath be worth a p'rutah in another place.36
כה
נתן לה אגודה של הדס וכיוצא בה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בזו וקבלה אותו אמרו לו והלא אין בה שוה פרוטה ואמר תתקדש בד' זוזים המוחבאים בתוך האגודה אם אמרה הן הרי זו מקודשת. ואם שתקה אינה מקודשת במעות אלו שהשתיקה שלאחר מתן מעות אינה מועלת כלום ותהיה מקודשת בספק מפני האגודה שמא שוה פרוטה במקום אחר:
26
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status,37 [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.
כו
האומר לאשה התקדשי לי בתמרה זו התקדשי לי בזו התקדשי לי בזו אם יש באחת מהן שוה פרוטה הרי זו מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת אלא מספק שמא תשוה תמרה אחת פרוטה במקום אחר:
27
[Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful.
[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.
כז
אמר לה התקדשי לי בזו ובזו ובזו אם יש בכולם שוה פרוטה מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת אלא מספק. היתה אוכלת ראשונה ראשונה אם יש באחרונה שוה פרוטה מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת אלא מספק. שאותן תמרים שאכלה הרי הן כמלוה והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת ונמצא שאין הקידושין אלא בתמרה אחרונה:
28
If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.
כח
אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי באלו אם יש בכולן שוה פרוטה מקודשת אף ע"פ שהיא אוכלת ראשונה ראשונה שלה היא אוכלת ומקודשת:
29
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.38
Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.
כט
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בכוס זה אם היה מלא מים הרי זו מקודשת בו ובמה שבתוכו. ואם היה מלא יין הרי זו מקודשת בו ולא במה שבתוכו. ואם היה מלא שמן הרי זו מקודשת במה שבתוכו ולא בו. לפיכך אם לא היה בשמן שוה פרוטה הרי זו מקודשת בספק. ואם היה בשמן שוה פרוטה הרי זו מקודשת ודאי ואין משגיחין על הכוס:
FOOTNOTES
1.
Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to the Torah, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p'rutah.
2.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.
From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.
In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Karo follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it as kiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)
The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding.
Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam's perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.
Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p'rutah must be given. Since according to Scriptural law the article has intrinsic worth, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context.
3.
See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.
4.
For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.)
5.
Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman.
6.
As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10, based on Kiddushin 58a), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given.
7.
See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:3.
8.
For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person's private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me'ilah 6:3.)
9.
We are required to eat the produce of the second tithe in Jerusalem or redeem it and use the money to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Although one derives personal benefit from eating this produce, it is not considered to be one's own property.
10.
In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah's decree - and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity - once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.
11.
A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner's despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner's property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article - for she is a third party - the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh).
12.
The Rambam's intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushin are invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda Biy'hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77).
13.
The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam's own addition. The Noda Biy'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.
The Edut BiY'hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushin are valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person's taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.
The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. The Chatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object's worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of the kiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.
14.
We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi, Kiddushin 52b). There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not he is obligated to return the value of the stolen property to her. The Rashba maintains that he is not required, while Rabbenu Nissim states that he is. (See the Ramah and commentaries, Even HaEzer 28:2.)
15.
For she merely accepted her own property.
16.
Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.
17.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p'rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding.
18.
I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender's, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel 28:19.
19.
Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that the kiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it also quotes the other opinion.
20.
Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri, Ma'aseh Rokeach) explain that the Rambam's wording is precise. The expression "like interest" implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural law.
21.
The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin 6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra'avad. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam's interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushin are binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Ramah, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam's view.
22.
Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p'rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushin are binding (Kiddushin 46a).
23.
As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt. This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural law.
There are opinions that maintain that the woman is not consecrated. These opinions maintain that even after such a transfer has been made, the original creditor can nullify a debt that has been transferred through such a process. Since there is a possibility that the debt will be nullified, they maintain that the woman will not make the commitment required by kiddushin. (See Rabbenu Nissim and the Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 28:13 and commentaries.)
24.
Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: "If a p'rutah's worth of the article remains..." - i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p'rutah's worth remains - the consecration is binding. See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries.
25.
If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.
Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman's property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make the kiddushin effective.
26.
Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah.
27.
I.e., it is not as if the man's entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan.
28.
Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.
The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman's suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman's offer of kiddushin. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed the kiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear.
29.
Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two - because the servant's owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself - the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above.
30.
Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.
31.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by "an important person." Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21).
32.
Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.
33.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushin are not binding.
34.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemble chalifin (barter).
The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages' decree (Or Sameach).
35.
I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards to be consecrated she must explicitly express her consent. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs and maintains that in such an instance there is a doubt whether or not the kiddushin are binding, and the more stringent ruling must be followed in every instance. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:5).
36.
As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.
37.
In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, noting that Kiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10 and Hilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon's reasoning.
In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon's view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon's reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit.
38.
Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but - in the Talmudic era - it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil - in the Talmudic era - was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.

Ishut - Chapter Six

1
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the kiddushin are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman.
Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard to kiddushin, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules.1
א
המקדש על תנאי אם נתקיים התנאי מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת בין שיהיה התנאי מן האיש בין שיהיה מן האשה. וכל תנאי שבעולם בין בקידושין בין בגירושין בין במקח בין בממכר בין בשאר דיני ממון צריך להיות בתנאי ארבעה דברים:
2
These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements:2
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional;3
d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met.
ב
ואלו הן הד' דברים של כל תנאי. שיהיה כפול. ושיהיה הן שלו קודם ללאו. ושיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. ושיהיה התנאי דבר שאפשר לקיימו. ואם חסר התנאי אחד מהן הרי התנאי בטל וכאילו אין שם תנאי כלל אלא תהיה זו מקודשת או מגורשת מיד ויתקיים המקח או המתנה מיד וכאילו לא התנה כלל הואיל וחסר התנאי אחד מן הד':
3
What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the dinar, the condition is valid, and the kiddushin are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 zuz, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated.
ג
כיצד האומר לאשה אם תתני לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא תתני לי לא תהיה מקודשת ואחר שהתנה תנאי זה נתן לה הדינר. הרי התנאי קיים והרי זו מקודשת על תנאי. ואם נתנה לו מאתים זוז תהיה מקודשת ואם לא נתנה לו אינה מקודשת:
4
If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.
[The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time;4 she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all.
ד
אבל אם אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ונתן הדינר בידה והשלים התנאי ואמר אם תתני לי מאתים זוז תהיי מקודשת ואם לא תתני לי לא תהיי מקודשת הרי התנאי בטל מפני שהקדים המעשה ונתן בידה ואח"כ התנה. ואע"פ שהכל בתוך כדי דיבור הרי זו מקודשת מיד ואינה צריכה ליתן לו כלום:
5
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
ה
וכן אם אמר לה אם תתני לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואח"כ נתן הדינר בידה הרי התנאי בטל מפני שלא כפל תנאו. שהרי לא אמר לה ואם לא תתני לא תהיי מקודשת והרי זו מקודשת מיד ואינה צריכה ליתן לו כלום:
6
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
ו
וכן אם אמר לה אם לא תתני לי מאתים זוז לא תהיי מקודשת לי ואם תתני לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואח"כ נתן הדינר בידה הרי התנאי בטל לפי שהקדים לאו להן והרי זו מקודשת מיד ואינה צריכה ליתן לו כלום:
7
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the dinar in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the kiddushin are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner.
ז
וכן אם אמר לה אם תעלי לרקיע או תרדי לתהום הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא תעלי לרקיע ולא תרדי לתהום לא תהיי מקודשת ואח"כ נתן הדינר בידה הרי התנאי בטל והרי היא מקודשת מיד שהדבר ידוע שא"א לה לקיים תנאי זה ואין זה אלא כמפליגה בדברים דרך שחוק והיתול:
8
[The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your get. But if you do not eat it, the get is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the dinar or the get in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced.
ח
הרי שהתנה בדבר שאפשר לעשותו אלא שהתורה אסרה אותו כגון שאמר לאשה אם תאכלי חלב ודם הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא תאכלי לא תהיי מקודשת. אם תאכלי בשר חזיר הרי זה גיטיך ואם לא תאכלי לא יהא גט. ואחר שהתנה נתן הדינר או הגט בידה הרי התנאי קיים. ואם עברה ואכלה תהיה מקודשת או מגורשת. ואם לא אכלה אינה מקודשת ואינה מגורשת. ואין אומרים בזה הרי התנה על מה שכתוב בתורה שהרי בידה שלא תאכל ושלא תתקדש ולא תתגרש:
9
With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say:5"Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"?6
When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you."
ט
ובמה אמרו חכמים כל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל חוץ מדבר שבממון שתנאו קיים. כגון שקידש או גירש או נתן או מכר על תנאי שהוא רוצה בתנאו שיזכה עצמו בדבר שלא זיכתה לו תורה ומנעה ממנו או יפטור עצמו בתנאו מדבר שחייבה אותו בו התורה שאומרין לו תנאך בטל וכבר נתקיימו מעשיך ואין אתה נפטר מדבר שחייבה אותך בו התורה ולא תזכה בדבר שמנעה אותך ממנו:
10
What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding,7 for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations.
Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks,8 she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations.
י
כיצד כגון שקידש אשה על תנאי שאין לה עליו שאר כסות ועונה. שאומרין לו בכסות ושאר שהוא תנאי שבממון תנאך קיים אבל בעונה תנאך בטל שהתורה חייבה אותך בעונה והרי זו מקודשת ואתה חייב בעונתה ואין בידך לפטור עצמך בתנאך וכן כל כיוצא בזה. וכן המקדש יפת תואר על תנאי שיתעמר בה הרי זו מקודשת ואין לו להתעמר בה שהרי התורה מנעה אותו מלהשתעבד בה אחר שנבעלה. ולא מפני תנאו יזכה בדבר שמנעה אותו תורה אלא תנאו בטל וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
11
If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of kiddushin or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
יא
התנה על האשה בשעת קידושין או בשעת גירושין שתבעל לאביה ולאחיה או לבנה וכיוצא בזה הרי זה כמי שהתנה עליה שתעלה לרקיע או שתרד לתהום ותנאו בטל שאין בידה שיעברו אחרים ויבאו על הערוה ונמצא שהתנה עמה בדבר שאינו בידה לקיימו וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
12
If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
יב
אבל אם התנה עליה שיתן לי פלוני חצירו או שישיא בתו לבני וכיוצא בזה תנאו קיים שהרי אפשר בידה לקיימו ותתן לפלוני ממון רב עד שיתן לו חצירו ועד שישיא בתו לבנו שהרי אין כאן עבירה וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
13
Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence.
יג
שים כל אלו הדברים של תנאים לנגד עיניך תמיד. וכל מקום שאתה שומע המקדש על תנאי כך וכך או הנותן גט על תנאי כך וכך או המוכר או הנותן על תנאי תדע שהתנאי יש בו ד' דברים אלו שביארנו כדי שלא נהיה צריכין לפרש אותן בכל מקום. ואם חסר אחד מהן אין כאן תנאי:
14
Some of the later geonim9 maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to kiddushin and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made.
It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither kiddushin nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great geonim of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it.10
יד
יש מקצת גאונים אחרונים שאמרו שאין צריך אדם לכפול תנאו אלא בגיטין וקידושין בלבד אבל בדיני ממון אינו צריך לכפול. ואין ראוי לסמוך על דבר זה שכפילת התנאי עם שאר הארבעה דברים מתנאי בני גד ובני ראובן למדו אותן חכמים אם יעברו בני גד וגו' ואם לא יעברו ותנאי זה לא היה לא בגיטין ולא בקידושין. וכזה הורו גדולי הגאונים הראשונים וכן ראוי לעשות:
15
When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the kiddushin become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original] kiddushin.
What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 zuz this year, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her the dinar in Nisan, but gave her the 200 zuz that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second.
Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed.11
טו
המקדש על תנאי כשיתקיים התנאי תהיה מקודשת משעה שנתקיים התנאי לא משעה שנתקדשה. כיצד האומר לאשה אם אתן ליך מאתים זוז בשנה זו הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא אתן ליך לא תהיי מקודשת ונתן הדינר לידה בניסן ונתן לה המאתים זוז שהתנה עמה באלול הרי זו מקודשת מאלול. לפיכך אם קדשה אחר קודם שיתקיים התנאי של ראשון הרי זו מקודשת לשני. וכן הדין בגיטין ובממונות בשעה שיתקיים התנאי הוא שיהיה גט או יתקיים המקח או המתנה:
16
When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this dinar if I give you 200 zuz,"12 when at a later date he gives her the 200 zuz she is consecrated. Retroactively, the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law.
טז
בד"א בשהיה שם תנאי ולא אמר מעכשיו. אבל אם אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו בדינר זה אם אתן ליך מאתים זוז ולאחר זמן נתן לה מאתים זוז הרי זו מקודשת למפרע משעת הקידושין אע"פ שלא נעשה תנאו אלא לאחר זמן מרובה. לפיכך אם קידשה השני קודם שיעשה התנאי אינה מקודשת. וכן הדין בגיטין ובממון:
17
Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation,13 nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.14 Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation.
When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording al menat ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply.15 It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.
יז
כל האומר מעכשיו לא יצטרך לכפול תנאו ולא להקדים התנאי על המעשה אלא אף על פי שהקדים המעשה תנאו קיים. אבל צריך להתנות בדבר שאפשר לקיימו. ואם התנה בדבר שא"א לקיימו הרי זה כמפליג בדברים ואין שם תנאי. וכל האומר על מנת כאומר מעכשיו ואינו צריך לכפול התנאי ולא להקדימו למעשה:
18
What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 zuz," "here is your get on condition that you give me 200 zuz," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 zuz," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200 zuz. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field.
[The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the kiddushin or the get in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.16
יח
כיצד האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז. הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז. הרי חצר זו נתונה ליך במתנה על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז הרי תנאו קיים ונתקדשה או נתגרשה וזכתה זו בחצר והם יתנו המאתים זוז. ואם לא נתנו לא תהיה זו מקודשת ולא מגורשת ולא תזכה זו בחצר. ואע"פ שלא כפל תנאו ואע"פ שהקדים המעשה לתנאי ונתן הקידושין או הגט בידה והחזיקה זו בחצר ואח"כ השלים תנאו. שהרי כשיתקיים התנאי תזכה זו בחצר ותתקדש זו ותתגרש משעה ראשונה שבה נעשה המעשה כאילו לא היה שם תנאי כלל:
FOOTNOTES
1.
See Halachah 14 and notes.
2.
We find a conditional agreement in the Torah: Moses' granting the lands of Transjordan to the tribes of Reuven and Gad (Numbers 32:29-30). All these four rules were evident in Moses' phrasing of the stipulation. Accordingly, our Sages (Kiddushin 61a) consider this a prototype for all future conditional agreements.
3.
This is the Rambam's interpretation of the requirement that in its Hebrew original states: שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. The Ra'avad (in his gloss on Halachah 4) interprets the phrase differently. He states that in the wording of the person making the stipulation, the stipulation must be stated before the result of its completion: e.g., "If you give me 200 zuz, you will be consecrated..., and if you do not give me that sum, you will not be consecrated." The Beit Shmuel 38:2 accepts the Ra'avad's interpretation and not that of the Rambam.
4.
We have chosen a very loose translation. The Hebrew toch kedei dibbur has a precise connotation, meaning the amount of time it takes to say the words Shalom alecha rabbi umori.
5.
Kiddushin 19b.
6.
An exception is made with regard to financial matters, because with regard to these matters the Torah grants the person the right to waive monetary privileges that are due him. Privileges that are not monetary in nature may not be waived.
7.
Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia, the conclusion of Chapter 7), the Ritba (Kiddushin 19a) and the Mordechai (gloss on Bava Metzia 93a) maintain that even conjugal rights can be considered to be a financial consideration, for it is a matter of physical pleasure. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted as halachah. Instead, withholding conjugal relations is considered a matter of physical anguish. Hence a woman does not have the prerogative of waiving this right.
8.
Deuteronomy 21:11-14 describes the right of a soldier to have relations with a female captive of war whom he desires. Once he has relations with her, he may no longer treat her as a servant.
9.
The commentaries have pointed to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni HaCohen.
10.
The Ra'avad, the Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam's reasoning. According to the position of these authorities, it is only one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the rules regarding conditional agreements were derived from the agreement made between Moses and the tribes of Reuven and Gad. They maintain that the need to repeat the condition applies only with regard to kiddushin, and was instituted only because of the severity of the establishment and annulment of the marriage relationship. With regard to other matters, however, there is no such requirement. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:9) follow the Rambam's view.
11.
The above applies when the agreement is made verbally. If, however, a conditional sale or a present is recorded in a legal document, it is considered to be effective retroactively from the date stated in the document, although the stipulation is not carried out until much later.
Others maintain that the same principle applies with regard to a get, and if a date is included in a conditional bill of divorce, the divorce is retroactively effective from the date of the get, even though the stipulation is carried out much later. As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 8:1, the Rambam does not follow this approach. (See Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 143:2.)
12.
In such an instance, the stipulation need not be restated, as mentioned in the following halachah.
13.
Since the condition does not have to be restated, there is also no need for the positive statement to precede the negative.
14.
This follows the Rambam's interpretation of the Talmud's wording שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה, as explained in Halachah 2.
15.
Tosafot and many subsequent Ashkenazic authorities do not accept this ruling. The difference of opinion is noted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4).
16.
Among the other rationales offered are that the rules for a conditional agreement are derived from the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and in that instance that condition was phrased using the term "if," rather than "from this time onward" or "on condition that" (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The Ra'avad explains that stating a stipulation using the wording "if" nullifies the act the person performs. For a stipulation to have this power, it must be worded precisely. If, however, the wording "on condition that" or "from now onward" is used, the implication is that the act is not nullified, but is merely dependent on the fulfillment of the condition. Since the stipulation is not that powerful, its wording need not be as precise.

Ishut - Chapter Seven

1
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated.1 If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated.2
[If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so the kiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.3
א
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי ע"מ שירצה אבי רצה האב מקודשת לא רצה או ששתק או שמת קודם שישמע הדבר אינה מקודשת. על מנת שלא ימחה אבי שמע ומיחה אינה מקודשת. לא מיחה או שמת הרי זו מקודשת. מת הבן ואחר כך שמע האב מלמדין האב שיאמר איני רוצה כדי שלא יהו קידושין ולא תפול לפני יבם:
2
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain."4 If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.5
ב
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שיש לי מאתים זוז או בית כור עפר אם יש שם עדים שיש לו הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אין לו הרי זו מקודשת מספק שמא יש לו והוא אומר אין לי כדי לקלקלה:
3
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.6
ג
הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שיש לי מאתים זוז או בית כור עפר במקום פלוני. אם יש לו באותו מקום הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אין לו באותו מקום שאומר הרי זו מקודשת מספק שמא יש לו שם והוא מתכוין לקלקלה:
4
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him.
If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."
ד
הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאראך מאתים זוז או בית כור עפר הרי זו מקודשת ויראנה. הראה הזוזים ביד אחרים או שהראה בית כור עפר בשדה אחרים אינה מקודשת עד שיראנה משלו. לקח המעות בהלואה או בשותפות או ששכר השדה או לקחה באריסות והראה אינה מקודשת עד שיראנה משלו. שמשמע שאראך שאראך משל עצמי דבר זה שאמרתי לך:
5
[The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown.7If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.
ה
היה לו בית כור עפר והיה בו נקעים עמוקים עשרה טפחים או סלעים גבוהים עשרה טפחים. אם היו הנקעים מלאים מים הרי הן כסלעים ואין נמדדין עמו מפני שאינן ראויין לזריעה ואם אינן מלאין מים נמדדין עמו מפני שהן ראויין לזריעה:
6
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments.8 If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these."
If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.
ו
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאין עליך נדרים ונמצא עליה אחד משלשה נדרים אלו שלא תאכל בשר או שלא תשתה יין או שלא תתקשט במיני צבעונין אינה מקודשת. נמצא עליה נדר חוץ מאלו אף ע"פ שהוא אומר מקפיד אני אפילו על זה הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אמר לה על מנת שאין עליך כל נדר אפילו נמצאת שנדרה שלא תאכל חרובין אינה מקודשת:
7
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these."
What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained.9 In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women,10 a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead.
This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as an isar11 even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.
ז
הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאין בך מומין ונמצא בה אחד מן המומין הפוסלין בנשים אינה מקודשת. נמצא בה מום אחר חוץ מאותן המומין אף ע"פ שאמר מקפיד אני אפילו על זה הרי זו מקודשת. ומה הן המומין הפוסלין בנשים כל המומין הפוסלין בכהנים פוסלין בנשים. ובהלכות ביאת מקדש יתבארו כל מומין של כהנים. ויותר עליהן בנשים. ריח רע. וזיעה. וריח הפה. וקול עבה. ודדין גסין מחברותיה טפח. וטפח בין דד לדד. ונשיכת כלב ונעשה המקום צלקת. ושומא שעל הפדחת. אפילו היתה קטנה ביותר ואפילו קרובה לשער ראשה ואף ע"פ שאין בה שיער. וזו היא השומא שיתרה אשה על הכהנים. אבל אם היתה שומא שיש בה שיער בשאר הפנים או שומא גדולה כאיסר אעפ"י שאין בה שיער הרי זה מום בין בכהנים בין בנשים:
8
When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.12
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her,13 she is consecrated.
ח
המקדש אשה סתם ונמצא עליה אחד מן המומין הפוסלין בנשים או נמצא עליה אחד משלשה נדרים הרי זו מקודשת מספק. קידשה על מנת שאין עליה נדרים והיו עליה נדרים והלכה אצל חכם והתיר לה הרי זו מקודשת:
9
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes.14
When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.15
ט
קידשה על מנת שאין בה מומין והיו בה מומין והלכה אצל רופא וריפא אותה אינה מקודשת. אבל אם התנה האיש שאין עליו נדרים ושאין בו מומין והיו עליו נדרים והיו בו מומין והלך אצל חכם והתירו אצל רופא וריפאו הרי זו מקודשת שאין גנאי לאיש במומין שכבר נרפאו והאשה אינה מקפדת על זאת:
10
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated.
[If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuz after 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.
י
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאתן ליך מאתים זוז מיכן ועד שלשים יום אם נתן לה בתוך שלשים יום מקודשת ואם עברו שלשים יום ולא נתן לה אינה מקודשת. הרי את מקודשת לי בזוזים אלו לאחר שלשים יום. אע"פ שנתאכלו המעות בתוך שלשים יום הרי זו מקודשת לאחר שלשים יום. ואם חזר בו בתוך השלשים או חזרה היא אינה מקודשת:
11
If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.16
יא
בא שני וקידשה בתוך שלשים יום הרי זו מקודשת לשני לעולם. לפי שבשעה שקידשה השני לא היתה מקודשת ותפסו בה קידושי שני ונעשת אשת איש ולאחר השלשים יום כשיבואו קידושי ראשון ימצאו אותה אשת איש ונמצא הראשון כמי שקידש אשת איש שאין הקידושין תופסין בה:
12
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter,17 and] both [men] are considered as having established kiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her.18 The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days19 or afterwards.
[Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.
יב
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר שלשים יום בדינר זה ובא אחר וקידשה בתוך השלשים יום הרי זו מקודשת מספק לשניהם. לפיכך שניהם נותנין גט בין בתוך השלשים יום בין לאחר השלשים יום. הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר שלשים יום. ובא אחר ואמר הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר עשרים יום. ובא אחר ואמר הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר עשרה ימים. אפילו הן מאה על הסדר הזה קידושי כולן תופסין בה וצריכה גט מכל אחד ואחד מפני שהיא ספק מקודשת לכולן:
13
When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and these kiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.20
If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.21
יג
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי חוץ מפלוני כלומר שלא תיאסר עליו אלא תהיה אשת איש על כל העולם ולפלוני כפנויה הרי זו מקודשת מספק. אבל אם אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שתהיי מותרת לפלוני הרי זו מקודשת ותהיה אסורה עליו כשאר העם מפני שהתנה בדבר שא"א לקיימו:
14
When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again22 until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin established by the second p'rutah.
If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude],"23 "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies,"24 she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.25
יד
הנותן שתי פרוטות לאשה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי היום באחת ובאחת לאחר שאגרשך הרי זו מקודשת. וכשיגרש אותה תהיה תקודשת עד שיגרש אותה פעם שנייה מן קידושי פרוטה שנייה. אבל אם אמר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה לאחר שאתגייר. לאחר שתתגיירי. לאחר שאשתחרר. לאחר שתשתחררי לאחר שימות בעליך. לאחר שתמות אחותיך אינה מקודשת לפי שאינו יכול עתה לקדשה:
15
When [a man] tells a yevamah: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after your yavam performs chalitzah for you,"26 she is consecrated. [The rationale is] that even if he consecrated her at present, the kiddushin would be [at least] of a doubtful status.27
טו
האומר ליבמה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה לאחר שיחלוץ ליך יבמיך הרי זו מקודשת הואיל ואילו קידשה עתה היו קידושין תופסין בה מספק:
16
When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence.28 If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated.29 [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.
טז
האומר לחבירו אם ילדה אשתך נקבה הרי היא מקודשת לי בזה לא אמר כלום. ואם היתה אשת חבירו מעוברת והוכר העובר הרי זו מקודשת. ויראה לי שצריך לחזור ולקדש אותה אחר שתלד ע"י אביה כדי שיכניס אותה בקידושין שאין בהן דופי:
17
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100 dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar].
When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100].30 Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given.
Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated.31 [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [the kiddushin are valid, provided]32 he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.
יז
האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי במאה דינרין ונתן לה אפילו דינר אחד הרי זו מקודשת משלקחה הדינר והוא שישלים לה השאר. שזה כמי שאמר הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה על מנת שאשלים ליך מאה דינרים שהיא מקודשת לו מעכשיו. בד"א כשאמר לה במאה דינרים סתם אבל אם פירש ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי במאה דינרין אלו והתחיל למנות לתוך ידה אינה מקודשת עד שישלים [לה מאה] ואפילו בדינר האחרון שניהם יכולים לחזור זה בזה. וכן אם נמצא מנה חסר דינר או נמצא מהן דינר נחשת אינה מקודשת. נמצא בהם דינר רע אם יכולה להוציאו על ידי הדחק יחליפנו ואם לאו אינה מקודשת:
18
[The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire,33 and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.
יח
אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בבגדים אלו שהן שוין חמשים דינרים והיו של משי וכיוצא בהן שהאשה מתאווה להן אם היו שוין חמשים הרי זו מקודשת משעת לקיחה. ואינן צריכין שומא בשוק ואחר כך תהיה מקודשת כדי שתסמוך דעתה אלא הואיל והן שוין כמו שאמר לה הרי זו מקודשת משעה ראשונה. ואם אינן שוין אינה מקודשת:
19
A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home.
[The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.
יט
איש ואשה שהיו עסוקין בדברי אירוסין הוא אומר במאה דינרים אקדש אותך והיא אומרת איני מתקדשת לך אלא במאתים והלך זה לביתו וזו לביתה ואחר כך תבעו זה את זה וקדשו סתם. אם האיש תבע את האשה יעשו דברי האשה ואם האשה תבעה את האיש יעשו דברי האיש:
20
When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid.34 Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.
כ
העושה שליח לקדש לו אשה והלך השליח וקדשה על תנאי אינה מקודשת. וכן אם אמר לו לקדשה על תנאי והלך וקדשה סתם או על תנאי אחר או ששינה את התנאי אינה מקודשת:
21
When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid.35 [If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found].
Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives the kiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].
כא
אמר לו קדשה לי במקום פלוני והלך וקידשה במקום אחר אינה מקודשת. קדשה לי והרי היא במקום פלוני והלך וקידשה במקום אחר הרי זו מקודשת מפני שמראה מקום הוא לו. וכן היא שאמרה לשלוחה קבל לי קידושי במקום פלוני וקבלם לה במקום אחר אינה מקודשת. הרי הבעל במקום פלוני וקבל לה במקום אחר הרי זו מקודשת מפני שמראה מקום היא לו:
22
When [a man] consecrates a woman, but he or she desires to retract immediately - even if the retraction is made within a very short amount of time36 - the retraction is of no consequence and the woman is consecrated.37
כב
המקדש את האשה וחזרו בו מיד הוא או היא אף ע"פ שחזרו בתוך כדי דיבור אין חזרתה כלום והרי היא מקודשת:
23
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to the kiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence.38
Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to the kiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]39 even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her.
Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than a p'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate.
[The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.40
כג
המקדש על תנאי וחזר אחר כמה ימים וביטל התנאי אף ע"פ שבטלו בינו לבינה שלא בפני עדים בטל התנאי והרי היא מקודשת סתם. וכן אם היה התנאי מן האשה ובטלה אותו (אח"כ) בינה ובינו בטל התנאי. לפיכך המקדש על תנאי וכנס סתם או בעל סתם הרי זו צריכה גט אע"פ שלא נתקיים התנאי שמא ביטל התנאי כשבעל או כשכנס. וכן המקדש בפחות משוה פרוטה או במלוה וחזר ובעל סתם בפני עדים צריכה גט שעל בעילה זו סמך ולא על אותן הקידושין הפסולין חזקה היא שאין אדם מישראל הכשרים עושה בעילתו בעילת זנות והרי בידו עתה לעשותה בעילת מצוה:
FOOTNOTES
1.
It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father's consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra'avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:8) quotes the Rambam's wording.
2.
There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of "consent": a) to say "yes," b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra'avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.
3.
Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband. Were the father to indeed consent, she would be under obligation either to marry the deceased's brother, or have the obligation removed through chalitzah.
4.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that the kiddushin would be void.
5.
I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her original kiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.
6.
Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people's knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present, or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:20) quotes the Rambam's decision.
7.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation, and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field.
8.
The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)
Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving ענוי נפש, "the oppression of the soul" (cf. Numbers 30:14). Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.
In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving ענוי נפש; it also includes those בינו לבינה, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17). (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, and Shulchan AruchYoreh De'ah, Chapter 234.)
9.
Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed.
10.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5).
11.
An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:1).
12.
She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.
This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.
13.
A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them. (See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 4.)
The kiddushin are binding only when the wise man nullifies the vows before the woman's intended husband discovers their existence. Once he discovers that she is bound by vows, the kiddushin are nullified even when she has the vows nullified afterwards (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:2).
14.
The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes," the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).
15.
The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason the kiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.
Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man's nullification and a physician's healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of the kiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of the kiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.
16.
From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man's kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin 59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman's acceptance of the second kiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah and TurEven HaEzer 40:2.)
17.
Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying the kiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying "after 30 days," the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man's kiddushin would be binding.
Significantly, if a person made a similar statement with regard to a sale, the Rambam rules (Hilchot Mechirah 2:9) that this is a conditional statement. Thus, it appears that his ruling here is a stringency, accepted because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce.
18.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this ruling, many later authorities do.
19.
Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce.
20.
The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond of kiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 38:68, there are authorities who maintain that the kiddushin are not binding at all.
21.
For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.
22.
In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Karo rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated.
23.
This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant.
24.
I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman's sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may.
25.
Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time the kiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is "something that has not come into the world," for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.
26.
I.e., when a woman's husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite of chalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed.
27.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since the kiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect, kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:6) rules that even when a conditional statement is made, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. There are some manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that indicate that the Rambam also shared that view.
28.
For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist.
29.
The Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage.
30.
Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a).
31.
For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushin would be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 29:7.)
32.
The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling.
33.
The Rambam's wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel 31:1.)
Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk: Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily - e.g., a precious stone - a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert's appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone.
34.
For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. As such he is acting on his own initiative, and not as the agent of the principal.
35.
Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.
36.
Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.
37.
Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person's retraction is of no consequence.)
38.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam's decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)
The Rashba accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to conditions involving money - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you give me 200 zuz." For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows" - he does not accept the Rambam's position. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam's ruling.
39.
I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establish kiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Ramah, Even HaEzer 38:35).
40.
In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)
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• "Today's Day"
• 
Friday, Tevet 3, Eighth Day of Chanuka, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mikeitz, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 18-22.
Tanya: Hence it has been said (p. 17)...chesed and water (p. 17).
(The notation for this day is a textual emendation of Torah Or, relevant only in Hebrew. Translator)
• Daily Thought:
Who's First?
If we had been here first and then set the criteria for a very perfect G‑d, certainly one of our requirements would be that He be understandable.
Too bad for us—He was here first. As for understanding, that came later.
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