Tuesday, January 3, 2017

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Wednesday, 4 January 2017 - Today is: Wednesday, 6 Tevet, 5777 · 4 January 2017.

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Wednesday, 4 January 2017 - Today is: Wednesday, 6 Tevet, 5777 · 4 January 2017.
Daily Quote:
A small hole in the body makes for a big hole in the soul[Chassidic master Rabbi DovBer, the Maggid of Mezeritch (?-1772)]
Today's Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Parshat Vayigash, 4th Portion (Genesis 45:28-46:7) with Rashi

• Genesis Chapter 45
28And Israel said, "Enough! My son Joseph is still alive. I will go and see him before I die." כחוַיֹּ֨אמֶר֙ יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל רַ֛ב עֽוֹד־יוֹסֵ֥ף בְּנִ֖י חָ֑י אֵֽלְכָ֥ה וְאֶרְאֶ֖נּוּ בְּטֶ֥רֶם אָמֽוּת:
Enough! My son Joseph is still alive: I have enough happiness and joy, since my son Joseph is still alive. [From Targum Onkelos, Targum Jonathan] רב עוד : רב לי עוד שמחה וחדוה, הואיל ועוד יוסף בני חי:
Genesis Chapter 46
1And Israel and all that was his set out and came to Beer sheba, and he slaughtered sacrifices to the God of his father Isaac. אוַיִּסַּ֤ע יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ וְכָל־אֲשֶׁר־ל֔וֹ וַיָּבֹ֖א בְּאֵ֣רָה שָּׁ֑בַע וַיִּזְבַּ֣ח זְבָחִ֔ים לֵֽאלֹהֵ֖י אָבִ֥יו יִצְחָֽק:
to Beer-sheba: Heb. בְּאֵרָה שָׁבַע, like לִבְאֵר שָׁבַע, to Beer-sheba. The “hey” at the end of the word takes the place of the “lammed” at its beginning. [From Yeb. 13b] בארה שבע : כמו לבאר שבע, ה"א בסוף תיבה במקום למ"ד בתחלתה:
to the God of his father Isaac: One is required to honor his father more than he is required to honor his grandfather. Therefore, the sacrifices are associated with Isaac and not with Abraham. [From Gen. Rabbah 94:5] לאלהי אביו יצחק : חייב אדם בכבוד אביו יותר מבכבוד זקנו לפיכך תלה ביצחק ולא באברהם:
2And God said to Israel in visions of the night, and He said, "Jacob, Jacob!" And he said, "Here I am." בוַיֹּ֨אמֶר אֱלֹהִ֤ים | לְיִשְׂרָאֵ֙ל בְּמַרְאֹ֣ת הַלַּ֔יְלָה וַיֹּ֖אמֶר יַֽעֲקֹ֣ב | יַֽעֲקֹ֑ב וַיֹּ֖אמֶר הִנֵּֽנִי:
“Jacob, Jacob!”: An expression of affection. [From Sifra, Vayikra 1, Toseftas Ber. 1:15] [The repetition of his name is an expression of affection.] יעקב יעקב : לשון חיבה:
3And He said, "I am God, the God of your father. Do not be afraid of going down to Egypt, for there I will make you into a great nation. גוַיֹּ֕אמֶר אָֽנֹכִ֥י הָאֵ֖ל אֱלֹהֵ֣י אָבִ֑יךָ אַל־תִּירָא֙ מֵֽרְדָ֣ה מִצְרַ֔יְמָה כִּֽי־לְג֥וֹי גָּד֖וֹל אֲשִֽׂימְךָ֥ שָֽׁם:
Do not be afraid of going down to Egypt: [God encouraged him] because he was troubled at being compelled to leave the Holy Land. אל תירא מרדה מצרימה : לפי שהיה מיצר על שנזקק לצאת לחוצה לארץ:
4I will go down with you to Egypt, and I will also bring you up, and Joseph will place his hand on your eyes. דאָֽנֹכִ֗י אֵרֵ֤ד עִמְּךָ֙ מִצְרַ֔יְמָה וְאָֽנֹכִ֖י אַֽעַלְךָ֣ גַם־עָלֹ֑ה וְיוֹסֵ֕ף יָשִׁ֥ית יָד֖וֹ עַל־עֵינֶֽיךָ:
and I will also bring you up: He promised him (Jacob) that he would be interred in the [Holy] Land. — [from Yerushalmi Sotah 1:10] ואנכי אעלך : הבטיחו להיות נקבר בארץ:
5And Jacob arose from Beer sheba, and the sons of Israel carried their father Jacob and their young children and their wives, in the wagons Pharaoh had sent to carry him. הוַיָּ֥קָם יַֽעֲקֹ֖ב מִבְּאֵ֣ר שָׁ֑בַע וַיִּשְׂא֨וּ בְנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֜ל אֶת־יַֽעֲקֹ֣ב אֲבִיהֶ֗ם וְאֶת־טַפָּם֙ וְאֶת־נְשֵׁיהֶ֔ם בָּֽעֲגָל֕וֹת אֲשֶׁר־שָׁלַ֥ח פַּרְעֹ֖ה לָשֵׂ֥את אֹתֽוֹ:
6And they took their livestock and their possessions that they had acquired in the land of Canaan, and they came to Egypt, Jacob and all his descendants with him. ווַיִּקְח֣וּ אֶת־מִקְנֵיהֶ֗ם וְאֶת־רְכוּשָׁם֙ אֲשֶׁ֤ר רָֽכְשׁוּ֙ בְּאֶ֣רֶץ כְּנַ֔עַן וַיָּבֹ֖אוּ מִצְרָ֑יְמָה יַֽעֲקֹ֖ב וְכָל־זַרְע֥וֹ אִתּֽוֹ:
that they had acquired in the land of Canaan: But of what he had acquired in Padan-Aram he gave everything to Esau [in payment] for his share in the Cave of Machpelah. He said, “Possessions [acquired] outside the Land (of Israel) are inappropriate for me.” This is the meaning of“which I acquired for myself with heaps (כָּרִיתִי)” (Gen. 50:5). He placed before him stacks of gold and silver like a heap [of grain] (כְּרִי) and said to him,“Take these.” [from Tanchuma Buber, Vayishlach 11] אשר רכשו בארץ כנען : אבל מה שרכש בפדן ארם נתן הכל לעשו בשביל חלקו במערת המכפלה, אמר נכסי חוצה לארץ אינן כדאי לי, וזהו (להלן נ ה) אשר כריתי לי, העמיד לו צבורין של זהב וכסף כמין כרי ואמר לו טול את אלו:
7His sons and his sons' sons with him, his daughters and his sons' daughters and all his descendants he brought with him to Egypt. זבָּנָ֞יו וּבְנֵ֤י בָנָיו֙ אִתּ֔וֹ בְּנֹתָ֛יו וּבְנ֥וֹת בָּנָ֖יו וְכָל־זַרְע֑וֹ הֵבִ֥יא אִתּ֖וֹ מִצְרָֽיְמָה:
his sons’ daughters: Serah the daughter of Asher and Jochebed the daughter of Levi. ובנות בניו : סרח בת אשר, ויוכבד בת לוי:
• Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 35-38
• 
Chapter 35

This psalm is an awe-inspiring and wondrous prayer about David's enemies-that they be as chaff before the wind, chased by the angel of God. It also declares that everything comes about through God's help.
1. By David. Fight my antagonists, O Lord, battle those who battle against me.
2. Take hold of shield and armor and arise to help me.
3. Draw a spear, and bar the way before my pursuers; say to my soul, "I am your deliverance.”
4. Let those who seek my life be shamed and disgraced; let those who devise my harm retreat and be humiliated.
5. Let them be as chaff before the wind; let the angel of the Lord thrust them away.
6. Let their path be dark and slippery; let them be chased by the angel of the Lord.
7. For without cause have they laid their nets in the pit for me; without cause have they dug [pits] for my soul.
8. Let darkness come upon him unawares; let the very snare that he hid trap him, in darkness he will fall in it.
9. And my soul shall exult in the Lord, rejoice in His deliverance.
10. My entire being shall declare: Lord, who is like You? Who saves the poor from one stronger than he, the poor and the destitute from one who would rob him.
11. Corrupt witnesses rise up [against me], they demand of me things of which I do not know.
12. They repay me evil for good, death for my soul.
13. But I wore sackcloth when they were ill; I afflicted my soul with fasting. Let my prayer return upon my own bosom.
14. As if it were my friend, my brother, I went about; like a mother in mourning, I was bent over in gloom.
15. But when I limped, they rejoiced and gathered; the lowly gathered against me-even those whom I do not know; they laugh and cannot be quiet.
16. With flattery and scorn, for the sake of a meal,1 they gnash their teeth at me.
17. My Lord, how long will You look on? Restore my life from their darkness; from young lions, my soul.
18. I will thank You in a great congregation, amidst a mighty nation I will praise You.
19. Let not those who hate me without cause rejoice over me; [let not] those who despise me without reason wink their eye.
20. For they speak not of peace, rather they scheme deceitful matters against the broken of the land.
21. They opened their mouths wide against me, they said, "Aha! Aha! Our eyes have seen [his misfortune].”
22. You saw, Lord, be not silent; my Lord, be not distant from me.
23. Rouse and awaken Yourself to my judgement, to my cause, my God and my Lord.
24. Judge me according to your righteousness, Lord my God; let them not rejoice over me.
25. Let them not say in their hearts, "Aha! We have our desire!" Let them not say, "We have swallowed him!”
26. Let them be shamed and disgraced together, those who rejoice at my trouble; let them be clothed in shame and humiliation, those who raise themselves arrogantly over me.
27. Let those who desire my vindication sing joyously and be glad; let them say always, "Let the Lord be exalted, Who desires the peace of His servant.”
28. My tongue will speak of Your righteousness, Your praise, all day long.
FOOTNOTES
1.These men flatter Saul in order to obtain free meals (Rashi).
Chapter 36
This psalm is a message to those who follow their evil inclination, that tells them, "Do not place the fear of God before you," and brings them to sin by beautifying evil deeds in their eyes. For so is his way: "He descends (to earth) and corrupts, then goes up (to the Heavenly Court) and prosecutes."
1. For the Conductor, by the servant of the Lord, by David.
2. [I think] in my heart: Sin says to the wicked, "There is none [who need place] the fear of God before his eyes.”
3. For Sin makes itself appealing to him, until his iniquity be found and he is hated.
4. The speech of his mouth is evil and deceit; he fails to reason, to improve.
5. On his bed he contemplates evil, he stands in a path that is not good; he does not despise evil.
6. O Lord, Your kindness is in the heavens; Your faithfulness is till the skies.
7. Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains, Your judgements extend to the great deep; man and beast You deliver, O Lord.
8. How precious is Your kindness, O God; man takes shelter in the shadow of Your wings.
9. They will be filled by the abundance of Your house; from the stream of Your Eden, You will give them to drink.
10. For the source of life is with You; in Your Light do we see light.
11. Extend Your kindness to those who know You, and Your righteousness to the upright of heart.
12. Let not the foot of the arrogant overtake me; let not the hand of the wicked drive me away.
13. There1 the doers of evil fell, thrust down, unable to rise.
FOOTNOTES
1.In the very place they intended to persecute me (Metzudot).
Chapter 37
King David exhorts his generation not to be jealous of the prosperity of the wicked, for it may lead to falling into their ways. Rather, put your trust in God, conduct yourselves with integrity, and God will take care of everything.
1. By David. Do not compete with the wicked; do not envy doers of injustice.
2. For like grass they will be swiftly cut down; like green vegetation they will wither.
3. Trust in the Lord and do good; then will you abide in the land and be nourished by faith.
4. Delight in the Lord, and He will grant you the desires of your heart.
5. Cast your needs upon the Lord; rely on Him, and He will take care.
6. He will reveal your righteousness like the light, your justness like the high noon.
7. Depend on the Lord and hope in Him. Compete not with the prosperous, with the man who invents evil schemes.
8. Let go of anger, abandon rage; do not compete with [one who intends] only to harm.
9. For the evildoers will be cut down; but those who hope in the Lord, they will inherit the earth.
10. For soon the wicked one will not be; you will gaze at his place and he will be gone.
11. But the humble shall inherit the earth, and delight in abundant peace.
12. The wicked one plots against the righteous, and gnashes his teeth at him.
13. My Lord laughs at him, for He sees that his day will come.
14. The wicked have drawn a sword and bent their bow to fell the poor and destitute, to slaughter those of upright ways.
15. But their sword shall enter their own hearts, and their bows shall break.
16. Better the little of the righteous, than the abundant wealth of the wicked.
17. For the strength of the wicked will be broken, but the Lord supports the righteous.
18. The Lord appreciates the days of the innocent; their inheritance will last forever.
19. They will not be shamed in times of calamity, and in days of famine they will be satisfied.
20. For the wicked shall perish, and the enemies of the Lord are as fattened sheep: consumed, consumed in smoke.
21. The wicked man borrows and does not repay; but the righteous man is gracious and gives.
22. For those blessed by Him will inherit the earth, and those cursed by Him will be cut off.
23. The steps of man are directed by God; He desires his way.
24. When he totters he shall not be thrown down, for the Lord supports his hand.
25. I have been a youth, I have also aged; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his offspring begging bread.
26. All day he is kind and lends; his offspring are a blessing.
27. Turn away from evil and do good, and you will dwell [in peace] forever.
28. For the Lord loves justice, he will not abandon his pious ones-they are protected forever; but the offspring of the wicked are cut off.
29. The righteous shall inherit the earth and dwell upon it forever.
30. The mouth of the righteous one utters wisdom, and his tongue speaks justice.
31. The Torah of his God is in his heart; his steps shall not falter.
32. The wicked one watches for the righteous man, and seeks to kill him.
33. But the Lord will not abandon him in his hand, nor condemn him when he is judged.
34. Hope in the Lord and keep His way; then He will raise you high to inherit the earth. When the wicked are cut off, you shall see it.
35. I saw a powerful wicked man, well-rooted like a vibrant, native tree.
36. Yet he vanished, behold he was gone; I searched for him, but he could not be found.
37. Watch the innocent, and observe the upright, for the future of such a man is peace.
38. But sinners shall be destroyed together; the future of the wicked is cut off.
39. The deliverance of the righteous is from the Lord; He is their strength in time of distress.
40. The Lord helps them and delivers them; He delivers them from the wicked and saves them, because they have put their trust in Him.
Chapter 38
A prayer for every individual, bewailing the length of the exile. One who is in distress should recite this psalm, hence its introduction, "A psalm... to remind" (to remind us to recite it in times of distress). One can also derive many lessons from it.
1. A psalm by David, to remind.
2. O Lord, do not rebuke me in Your anger, nor chastise me in Your wrath.
3. For Your arrows have landed in me, Your hand descended upon me.
4. There is no soundness in my flesh because of Your rage, no peace in my bones because of my sin.
5. For my iniquities have flooded over my head; like a heavy load, they are too heavy for me.
6. My wounds are rotted; they reek because of my foolishness.
7. I am bent and extremely bowed; all day I go about in gloom.
8. My sides are inflamed; there is no soundness in my flesh.
9. I am weakened and extremely depressed; I howl from the moaning of my heart.
10. My Lord, all that I desire is before You; my sighing is not hidden from You.
11. My heart is engulfed, my strength has left me; the light of my eyes they, too, are not with me.
12. My friends and companions stand aloof from my affliction; my intimates stand afar.
13. The seekers of my life have laid traps; those who seek my harm speak destructiveness; they utter deceits all day long.
14. But I am like a deaf man, I do not hear; like a mute that does not open his mouth.
15. I was like a man that does not perceive, and in whose mouth there are no rebuttals.
16. Because for You, O Lord, I wait; You will answer, my Lord, my God.
17. For I said, "Lest they rejoice over me; when my foot falters they will gloat over me.”
18. For I am accustomed to limping, and my pain is constantly before me.
19. For I admit my iniquity; I worry because of my sin.
20. But my enemies abound with life; those who hate me without cause flourish.
21. Those who repay evil for good resent me for my pursuit of good.
22. Do not forsake me, O Lord; do not be distant from me, my God.
23. Hurry to my aid, O my Lord, my Salvation..
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 7
• Lessons in Tanya

• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Wednesday, 
6 Tevet, 5777 · 4 January 2017
• Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 7
• 
אך החיות שבטפות זרע שיצאו ממנו לבטלה, אף שירדה ונכללה בשלש קליפות הטמאות, הרי זו עולה משם בתשובה נכונה ובכוונה עצומה בקריאת שמע שעל המטה, כנודע מהאריז״ל

However, the vitality in the drops of semen that one issued wastefully, even though it has been degraded and incorporated in the three unclean kelipot, can nevertheless ascend from there by means of true repentance and intense concentration and devotion (kavanah) during the recital of the Shema at bedtime, as is known from the teachings of our master, Rabbi Isaac Luria, of blessed memory.
ומרומז בגמרא: כל הקורא קריאת שמע על מטתו כאילו אוחז חרב של שתי פיות כו׳
This is implied in the Talmudic saying:1 “He who recites the Shema at bedtime is as if he held a double-edged sword…,”
כדי להרוג גופות החיצונים שנעשו לבוש לחיות שבטפות, ועולה החיות מהם, כידוע ליודעי ח״ן
meaning, one edge wherewith to slay the bodies of the “extraneous forces” (the kelipot) that have become garments for the vitality in the drops of semen, and another edge by which the vitality ascends from them (from the kelipot), as is known to those familiar with the Esoteric Wisdom (the Kabbalah).
ולכן לא הוזכר עון זרע לבטלה בתורה בכלל ביאות אסורות
Therefore the sin of wasteful emission of semen is not mentioned in the Torah among the list of forbidden coitions,
אף שחמור מהן וגדול עונו בבחינת הגדלות וריבוי הטומאה והקליפות שמוליד ומרבה במאד מאד בהוצאת זרע לבטלה יותר מביאות אסורות
even though in one respect it is more heinous than they, and [the individual’s] sin is greater with regard to the enormity and abundance of the impurity and of the kelipot; he begets and multiplies them to an exceedingly great extent through wasteful emission of semen, even more so than through forbidden coitions. I.e., when measured by the “quantity” of kelipot that sin creates, this sin is graver than the forbidden coitions.
רק, שבביאות אסורות מוסיף כח וחיות בקליפה טמאה ביותר, עד שאינו יכול להעלות משם החיות בתשובה
It is only that when measured qualitatively this sin is different. For in the case of forbidden coitions one contributes additional strength and vitality to a most unclean kelipah, from which he is powerless to raise up the vitality by means of ordinary repentance,
אלא אם כן יעשה תשובה מאהבה רבה כל כך, עד שזדונות נעשו לו כזכיות
unless he repents with such great love that his willful wrongs are transformed into merits.
Since the sin of wasteful emission of semen can be rectified even without “repentance out of love,” the Torah does not include this sin with the related sins of forbidden coition. Concerning this sin, all that is necessary to elevate the degraded vitality to holiness is proper repentance with true intent and devotion, during the recitation of the bedtime Shema.
In the note which follows the Alter Rebbe explains why forbidden coition requires greater repentance than wasteful emission.
הגהה
מפני שנקלטה ביסוד דנוקבא דקליפה, המקבלת וקולטת החיות מהקדושה
NOTE
The reason is that through forbidden coitions this vitality has been absorbed by the level of Yesod in the “female” element of kelipah, which receives and absorbs the vitality from holiness — just as the physical semen is absorbed within the female, in the case of these sins.
מה שאין כן בזרע לבטלה שאין שם בחינת נוקבא דקליפא
Not so with wasteful emission of semen, where there is no “female” element of kelipah;
רק שכחותיה וחיילותיה מלבישים לחיות שבטפות, כידוע ליודעי ח"ן
Only its (the kelipah’s) power and forces garb (i.e., encompass) the vitality of the semen, as is known to those familiar with the Esoteric Wisdom.
END OF NOTE
ובזה יובן מאמר רבותינו ז״ל: איזהו מעוות שלא יוכל לתקון, זה שבא על הערוה והוליד ממזר
From the above explanation, that the vitality of the forbidden coitions can be released through “repentance out of love,” we will understand that which our Sages say:2 “Which is3 ‘a fault that cannot be rectified’? — Having incestuous intercourse and giving birth to a bastard.”
שאז גם אם יעשה תשובה גדולה כל כך, אי אפשר לו להעלות החיות לקדושה
For then, once the bastard is born, though the sinner undertakes such great repentance as “repentance of great love,” he cannot cause the vitality to ascend to Sanctity,
מאחר שכבר ירדה לעולם הזה ונתלבשה בגוף בשר ודם
since it has already descended into this world and has been clothed in a body of flesh and blood.
Even “repentance of great love” cannot rectify this. Still, it is explained elsewhere that if the repentance is powerful enough it can actually effect the death of the bastard; and once it ceases to be a body of flesh and blood its vitality can ascend to holiness.
——— ● ———
FOOTNOTES
1.Berachot 5a.
2.Chagigah 9a.
3.Kohelet 1:15.
• Rambam - Wednesday, 6 Tevet, 5777 · 4 January 2017
• Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
• 
Negative Commandment 262
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
"He shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or conjugal rights"—Exodus 21:10.
The Torah tells us that if a man marries a Jewish slave-girl, he may not torment her by denying her appropriate food, clothing, or conjugal rights. Rather, he must accord her the rights due to all "the daughters [of Israel]." Thus it is clear that this precept applies to all wives.
Full text of this Mitzvah »

• A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
Negative Commandment 262
Translated by Berel Bell
The 262nd prohibition is that one who purchases a Jewish maidservant and then marries her is forbidden from afflicting her. When I say "from afflicting her," I mean that he may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights (sh'eirah, k'susah, onasah) with the intention of afflicting her and causing her anguish.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights."
This same prohibition also applies to one who has married any Jewish woman; he also is prohibited from afflicting her in any of these three areas, with the intention of causing her anguish and distress.
The source for this is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) regarding the Jewish maidservant [whose master marries her and] whose food, clothing, and conjugal rights may not be withheld, "She must be treated exactly as other [married] women." From here we learn that the [proper] treatment of all married women is that one may not diminish their food, clothing, and conjugal rights.
Our Sages explained this in the Mechilta: "What does the verse, '[She must be treated] exactly as other [married] women' teach us [about the treatment of the maidservant]? It appears to come here to teach us something; but rather it ends up being taught about."3
There it is also explained that sh'eirah refers to food; k'susah is meant literally [i.e. clothing], and onasah refers to conjugal rights.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 21:10.
2.Ex. 21:9.
3.By saying that a maidservant must be treated like a regular married woman, it would seem that we know something about the regular woman that we don't know about the maidservant. In reality, however, the opposite is true: we learn from verse 10 that a maidservant's food, clothing, and conjugal relations may not be diminished. By saying in verse 9 that the maidservant is treated like a regular woman, we learn that the same applies to a regular woman.
• Rambam -  Chapter: Gezelah va'Avedah Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Five
• Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Five
1
It is forbidden to purchase an object obtained by robbery from the robber. Similarly, it is forbidden to assist him in changing its nature, so that the robber will acquire it.
Whoever acts in this manner or the like assists transgressors and violates the prohibition Leviticus 19:14: "Do not place a stumbling block before the blind."
א
אסור לקנות דבר הגזול מן הגזלן ואסור לסעדו על שינויו כדי שיקנהו שכל העושה דברים אלו וכיוצא בהן מחזק ידי עוברי עבירה ועובר על ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול:
2
It is forbidden for anyone to benefit from an article obtained by robbery even after its rightful owner has despaired of its return, if one knows for certain that this object was obtained through robbery.
What is implied? If one knows for certain that a particular animal was obtained by robbery, it is forbidden to ride on it or plow with it.
ב
אסור ליהנות בדבר הגזול ואפילו לאחר יאוש והוא שידע בודאי שדבר זה הוא הגזלה עצמה. כיצד ידע בודאי שבהמה זו גזולה אסור לרכוב עליה או לחרוש בה:
3
When a person obtains a house or a field by robbery, it is forbidden to pass through it or enter it. This applies even merely to seek shade or shelter from the rain. If he lives in another person's home, he must pay rent to the legal owners, as mentioned above with regard to a person who lives in a colleague's courtyard without the owner's knowledge.
If a person cuts down palm trees and constructs a bridge from them, it is forbidden for anyone to pass over it. The same applies with regard to other similar situations.
ג
גזל בית או שדה אסור לעבור בתוכה או ליכנס בה בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים. ואם דר בתוכה חייב להעלות שכר לבעלים כדין הדר בחצר חבירו שלא מדעתו. גזל דקלים ועשה מהן גשר אסור לעבור עליו וכן כל כיוצא בזה:
4
If a person transgressed and ate an object obtained by robbery after the owners despaired of its return, he is not liable to compensate the owners.
If he ate the article before the owners despaired of its return the owners must be compensated. They may collect from the person who ate the article, for it is still in their possession. Or if they desire, they may collect from the robber.
ד
מי שעבר ואכל הגזלה אחר יאוש פטור [א] מלשלם. ואם אכל קודם יאוש ורצו הבעלים לגבות מן האוכל גובין שעדיין ברשותן היא. ואם רצו גובין מן הגזלן:
5
The following rules apply when a person commits robbery and dies. There is no difference if he fed the object he obtained by robbery to his sons after the owner despaired of its return, or rather than feed it to them he sold it or it was lost.
If the robber left landed property, his heirs must reimburse the original owner. According to Talmudic law, they need not, by contrast, reimburse him if he left only movable property. For the value of the object obtained by robbery is considered to be a debt owed by the robber, and movable property is not placed on lien to a creditor after the principal's death.
ה
[ב] הגוזל ומת בין שהאכיל את הגזלה לבנים אחר יאוש בין שלא האכילם אלא מכרה או אבדה. אם הניח קרקע חייבין לשלם. אבל מן המטלטלין אינן חייבין לשלם. שדמי הגזלה חוב הן על הגזלן ואין המטלטלין משתעבדין לבעל חוב:
6
The Geonim have already ordained that a debt owed a creditor can be expropriated from the movable property in the estate. This applies even to a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone. Therefore, in the above instance, the heirs are liable to reimburse the owners from either the landed property or the movable property in the robber's estate, regardless of whether or not the heirs ate the article obtained by robbery, and whether or not the owners despaired of its return.
ו
כבר תקנו [ג] הגאונים לגבות בעל חוב מן המטלטלין ואפילו במלוה על פה. לפיכך חייבין לשלם בין אכלו בין לא אכלו. בין נתייאשו בין לא נתייאשו. בין מן הקרקע בין מן המטלטלין שהניח:
7
The laws applying to a person who purchases movable property from a robber are the same as those applying to one who purchases from a thief. If the reputation of the robber was a matter of public knowledge, our Sages did not grant any leniency. If the robber's reputation was not public knowledge, our Sages ordained leniency to enable uninhibited trade in the marketplace, and required the original owner to pay a purchaser the price he paid for the article taken by robbery. He may then take the article and sue the robber for the price of the article.
If the owner already despaired of the article's return, the purchaser is considered to have acquired the article itself and is not required to return it.
ז
דין הלוקח מטלטלין מן הגזלן כלוקח מן הגנב. אם גזלן מפורסם הוא לא עשו בו תקנת השוק. ואם אינו מפורסם עשו בו תקנת השוק ונותן הנגזל דמים שנתן ולוקח גזילתו וחוזר ותובע הגזלן בדמי הגזלה. ואם כבר נתייאשו הבעלים קנה לוקח עצמה של גזילה ואינו מחזירה:
8
It is forbidden to benefit from a robber's property.If even a minor portion of his property was legitimately his, one is allowed to benefit from his property, unless one is certain that the article from which one is benefiting was obtained by robbery.
ח
אסור ליהנות מן הגזלן ואם היה מיעוט שלו אע"פ שרוב [ד] ממונו גזול מותר ליהנות ממנו עד שידע בודאי שדבר זה גזול בידו:
9
It is forbidden to benefit from the property of people whom we can assume to be robbers, when all of their property can be assumed to have come from robbery, for their profession is based on robbery - e.g., customs-collectors and highwaymen.
We may not change money from their cash-box, for all their money can be assumed to have come from robbery.
ט
בני אדם שחזקתן גזלנין וחזקת כל ממונן מן הגזל מפני שמלאכתן מלאכת גזלנין כגון המוכסין ג והליסטים אסור ליהנות מהן שחזקת מלאכה זו שהוא גזול ואין מצטרפים דינרים מן התיבה שלהן שהכל בחזקת גזלה:
10
If a customs-collector takes a person's garment and then returns another one to him, or he takes a person's donkey and returns another one to him, the person may keep the one returned. This is considered to be a transaction, and we can assume that the original owner despaired of its return. Moreover, we do not know for certain that this object was obtained by robbery. If the recipient is diligent and is wont to be stringent concerning his personal gain, he should return the object to its original owner.
י
נטלו מוכסים כסותו והחזירו לו אחרת (נטלו חמורו והחזירו לו חמור אחר) הרי [ה] אלו שלו מפני שזו כמכירה היא וחזקתה שנתייאשו הבעלים ממנה ואינו יודע בודאי שזו גזילה. ואם היה ותיק ומחמיר על עצמו מחזירן לבעלים הראשונים:
11
When does the statement that a customs-collector is considered to be a highwayman apply? When the customs collector is a gentile, is self-appointed, or was appointed by the king but is given unlimited jurisdiction and takes whatever he wants and leaves whatever he wants.
If, however, the customs-collector was appointed by the king to take a third, a fourth or any fixed amount of the subjects' goods or their value, the customs collector appoints a Jew to collect this sum for the king, and it is known that this person is faithful and does not add anything beyond what the king decreed, this person is not considered a robber. For the law established by the king is binding law. Indeed, anyone who does not pay this tax transgresses, for he is taking what is due the king. This applies whether the king is Jewish or gentile.
יא
במה דברים אמורים ד שהמוכס כליסטים בזמן שהמוכס עכו"ם או מוכס העומד מאליו או מוכס העומד מחמת המלך ואין לו קצבה אלא לוקח מה [ו] שירצה ומניח מה שירצה. אבל מכס שפסקו המלך ואמר שיקח שליש או רביע או דבר קצוב והעמיד מוכס ישראל לגבות חלק זה למלך ונודע שאדם זה נאמן ואינו מוסיף כלום על מה שגזר המלך אינו בחזקת גזלן לפי שדין המלך דין הוא. ולא עוד אלא שהוא עובר המבריח ממכס זה מפני שהוא גוזל מנת המלך בין שהיה המלך עכו"ם בין שהיה המלך ישראל:
12
Similarly, if a king imposes a tax on all the inhabitants of a city, a fixed annual head tax or a fixed annual property tax, or decrees that anyone who violates a particular law will have all his property confiscated by the king, or decrees that anyone who is found in a field at the harvest time must pay the tax on it whether or not he is the owner of the field, or any similar decree, it is not considered to be robbery.
A Jew who collects these duties on behalf of the king is not considered to be a robber. On the contrary, he is considered of upright character, provided he does not add to or change the king's levy in any way, nor take any for himself.
יב
וכן מלך שמשים מס על בני העיר או על כל איש ואיש דבר קצוב משנה לשנה או על שדה ושדה דבר קצוב. או שגזר שכל מי שיעבור על דבר זה ילקחו כל נכסיו לבית המלך. או כל מי שימצא בשדה בשעת הגורן הוא יתן [ז] המס שעליה בין שהיה הוא בעל השדה בין שאינו בעל השדה. וכל כיוצא מדברים אלו אינו גזל וישראל שגבה אותן למלך אינו בחזקת גזלן והרי הוא כשר. והוא שלא יוסיף ולא ישנה ולא יקח לעצמו כלום:
13
Similarly, if a king becomes angered with a servant or an attendant who is one of his subjects and confiscates his field or his courtyard, it is not considered to be robbery, and one is permitted to benefit from it. If a person purchases it from the king, it becomes his and the original owners cannot expropriate it from him. For this is the law exercised by all kings: to confiscate all the property of their attendants if they become angered by them.
Thus, it is the king who annulled the ownership over this courtyard or field, making it ownerless. Therefore, the person buying it from the king legally acquires it.
If, however, a king confiscates a courtyard or a field from one of the subjects of his country in a manner that is not in accordance with the laws that he enacted, he is considered to be a robber, and the owners may expropriate the property from the person who purchased it from the king.
יג
וכן מלך שכעס על אחד מעבדיו ושמשיו מבני המדינה ולקח שדהו או חצירו אינה גזל ומותר ליהנות בה והלוקחה מן המלך הרי היא שלו ואין הבעלים מוציאין אותה מידו. שזה דין המלכים כולם ליקח כל ממון שמשיהם כשכועסין עליהם והרי המלך הפקיע שעבודן ונעשית חצר זו או שדה זו כהפקר וכל הקונה אותה מן המלך זכה בה. ב אבל מלך שלקח חצר או שדה של אחד מבני המדינה שלא בדינין שחקק הרי זה [ח] גזלן והלוקח ממנו מוציאין הבעלים מידו:
14
The general principle is: Any law that a king decrees to be universally applicable, and not merely applying to one person, is not considered robbery. But whenever he takes from one person alone in a manner that does not conform to a known law, but rather seizes the property from the person arbitrarily, it is considered to be robbery.
Therefore, when the king's tax collectors and enforcement officers sell fields because the owner did not pay the fixed tax for the field, the sale is binding. A head tax, however, is the personal responsibility of each person and it may not be collected from his property. Thus, if a field was sold because an individual was delinquent in paying the head tax, the sale is not binding, unless this is the law enacted by this particular king.
יד
כללו של דבר כל דין שיחקוק אותו המלך לכל ולא [ט] יהיה לאדם אחד בפני עצמו אינו גזל. וכל שיקח מאיש זה בלבד שלא כדת הידועה לכל אלא חמס את זה הרי זה גזל. ג לפיכך גבאי המלך ושוטריו שמוכרים השדות במס [י] הקצוב על השדות ממכרן ממכר. אבל מס שעל כל איש ואיש אינו גובה אלא מן האדם עצמו ואם מכרו השדה במס שעל הראש הרי זה אינו ממכר אלא אם כן היה דין המלך כך:
15
The following rules apply when the law of a king is that whoever pays the tax for a particular field acquires ownership of that field. If the owner of a field flees to avoid paying the property tax, and another person pays this tax to the king and derives benefit from that field, it is not considered to be robbery.
The one who paid the taxes may reap the benefit of the field provided he continues to pay the taxes until the owners return and pay this duty. For the law of a king is binding, as stated above.
טו
מלך שהיו דיניו שכל שלא יתן המס שעל השדה תהיה השדה לנותן המס וברח בעל השדה מפני המס ובא זה ונתן מס שעליה למלך ואכל פירותיה אין זה גזל אלא [כ] אוכל פירות ונותן המס עד שיחזרו הבעלים שדין המלך דין הוא כמו שאמרנו:
16
Similarly, if a king decrees that whoever pays a head tax for a person who has not paid acquires the delinquent person as a servant the decree is binding. If one Jew comes and pays a head tax for another indigent, he may compel him to work beyond ordinary limits, for the laws of a king are binding. He may not, however, have him toil as a slave.
טז
וכן מלך שגזר שכל מי שיתן מס הקצוב על האיש ישתעבד בזה שלא נתן ובא ישראל ונתן המס שעל ישראל זה העני הרי זה עובד בו [ל] יותר מדאי שדין המלך דין אבל אינו עובד בו כעבד:
17
When a king cuts down trees belonging to private people and uses them for a bridge, one is permitted to cross over it. Similarly, if he destroys homes in order to construct a road or a wall, it is permitted to benefit from it. The same principle applies in all analogous situations, because the laws of a king are binding.
יז
מלך שכרת אילנות של בעלי בתים ועשה מהן גשר מותר לעבור עליו. וכן אם הרס בתים ועשאן דרך או חומה מותר ליהנות בה וכן כל כיוצא בזה שדין המלך דין:
18
When does the above apply? When the coins issued by a king are the tender of the land. This indicates that the inhabitants of that land have accepted him and consider him to be their leader and themselves to be his subjects.
If, however, the coins he issues are not the tender of the land, he is considered to be a robber who takes by the force of arms. He and his servants are like a band of armed thieves, whose laws are not binding. Such a king and his servants are considered to be robbers in all respects.
יח
במה דברים אמורים במלך שמטבעו יוצא באותן הארצות שהרי הסכימו עליו בני אותה הארץ וסמכה דעתן שהוא אדוניהם והם לו עבדים. אבל אם אין מטבעו יוצא הרי הוא כגזלן בעל זרוע וכמו חבורת ליסטים המזויינין שאין דיניהם דין וכן מלך זה וכל עבדיו גזלנין לכל דבר:
• Rambam - 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Fourteen, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Fifteen, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Sixteen
• 
Ishut - Chapter Fourteen

1
The [obligation of] conjugal rights1 as prescribed by the Torah [is individual in nature], depending on the strength of each particular man and the [type of] work that he performs.
What is implied? Healthy men who are pampered and indulged, and who are not employed in labor that weakens their strength - but rather eat, drink and spend [the majority of their day] at home - should fulfill their conjugal duties every night.
[The following rules apply to] workers - e.g., tailors, weavers, construction workers and the like. If they work in the city [in which they live], they should fulfill their conjugal duties twice a week. If they work in another city, they should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week.
Donkey-drivers should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. Camel-drivers should fulfill their conjugal duties once every thirty days. Seamen should fulfill their conjugal duties once every six months.
Students of the Torah should fulfill their conjugal duties once a week. [Their obligation is limited,] because the Torah weakens their strength. It is the practice of Torah scholars to engage in marital relations on Friday night.2
א
עונה האמורה בתורה. לכל איש ואיש כפי כחו וכפי מלאכתו. כיצד בני אדם הבריאים והרכים והענוגים שאין להם מלאכה שמכשלת כחן אלא אוכלין ושותין ויושבין בבתיהן עונתן בכל לילה. הפועלין כגון החייטין והאורגין והבונים וכיוצא בהן. אם היתה מלאכתן בעיר עונתן פעמים בשבת. ואם היתה מלאכתן בעיר אחרת עונתן פעם אחת בשבת. החמרים פעם אחת בשבת. והגמלים אחת לשלשים יום. והמלחין אחת לששה חדשים. תלמידי חכמים עונתן פעם אחת בשבת מפני שתלמוד תורה מתיש כחן ודרך תלמידי חכמים לשמש מטתן מלילי שבת ללילי שבת:
2
A wife has the right to prevent her husband from making business trips except to close places, so that he will not be prevented from fulfilling his conjugal duties. He may make such journeys only with her permission.
Similarly, she has the prerogative of preventing him from changing from a profession that grants her more frequent conjugal rights to one that grants her less frequent rights - e.g., a donkey-driver who wishes to become a camel-driver, or a camel-driver who wishes to become a seaman.3
Students of the Torah may, however, depart for Torah study for two or three years without their wives' permission. Similarly, a wife cannot prevent a husband who is pampered and indulged from becoming a student of the Torah.
ב
יש לאשה לעכב על בעלה שלא יצא לסחורה אלא למקום קרוב שלא ימנע מעונתה ולא יצא אלא ברשותה. וכן יש לה למונעו לצאת ממלאכה שעונתה קרובה למלאכה שעונתה רחוקה. כגון חמר שביקש להעשות גמל או גמל להעשות מלח. ותלמידי חכמים יוצאין לת"ת שלא ברשות נשותיהן שתים ושלש שנים. וכן רך וענוג שנעשה ת"ח אין אשתו יכולה לעכב:
3
A man [has the prerogative of] marrying several wives4 - even 100, whether at one time or one after the other. His wife may not object to this, provided he has the means to provide each [wife] with her subsistence, clothing and conjugal rights as befits her. He may not, however, compel his wives to live in the same courtyard. Instead, each one is entitled to her own household.5
ג
נושא אדם כמה נשים אפילו מאה בין בבת אחת בין בזו אחר זו ואין אשתו יכולה לעכב. והוא שיהיה יכול ליתן שאר כסות ועונה כראוי לכל אחת ואחת. ואינו יכול לכוף אותן לשכון בחצר אחת. אלא כל אחת ואחת לעצמה:
4
What are [his obligations with regard to his wives'] conjugal rights? [They are determined according to] the number [of wives he has.]
What is implied? If a worker has two wives, he is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once a week. If he has four wives, he is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once every two weeks. Similarly, a seaman who has four wives is obligated to fulfill his duties towards each one once every two years.
Therefore, our Sages6 commanded that a person should not marry more than four wives, although he has ample financial resources, so that he will be able to fulfill his conjugal obligations towards each one once a month.7
ד
וכמה היא עונתן לפי מנין. כיצד פועל שהיו לו שתי נשים יש לזו עונה אחת בשבת ויש לזו עונה אחת בשבת. היו לו ד' נשים נמצא עונת כל אחת מהן פעם אחת בשתי שבתות. וכן אם היה מלח ויש לו ארבע נשים תהיה עונת כל אחת מהן פעם אחת בשתי שנים. לפיכך צוו חכמים שלא ישא אדם יותר על ארבע נשים אף ע"פ שיש לו ממון הרבה כדי שתגיע להן עונה פעם אחת בחדש:
5
When a man makes a vow requiring his wife to tell other people what he told her - or what she told him - of the jests and frivolities that a man and his wife will [occasionally] speak [in preparation for] marital relations, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. For a woman may not [be compelled] to speak brazenly and tell others lascivious things.
Similarly, if a man makes a vow requiring his wife to take actions during marital relations to prevent conception, or if he makes a vow requiring her to act foolishly, [performing] acts that have no meaning and are merely foolishness,8 he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
ה
המדיר את אשתו שתאמר לאחרים מה שאמר לה או מה שאמרה לו מדברי שחוק וקלות ראש שמדבר אדם עם אשתו על עסקי תשמיש הרי זה יוציא ויתן כתובה שאין זו יכולה להעיז פניה ולומר לאחרים דברי קלון. וכן אם הדירה שתהיה פועלת בעת תשמיש שלא תתעבר. או שהדירה שתעשה מעשה שוטים ודברים שאין בהן ממש אלא כשטות הרי זה יוציא ויתן כתובה:
6
When a man makes a vow causing marital relations with his wife to be forbidden, he is given a respite of one week.9 After that time, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, or absolve his vow. [This ruling applies even if the man] is a seaman whose obligation towards conjugal duties is once every six months. [The rationale is that] since he took a vow, he has caused his wife distress, and she despairs [of ever resuming intimacy].
How can such a vow be effective? If he tells her: "Marital relations with me are forbidden for you," or he takes an oath not to engage in marital relations, his vow is of no consequence, and by taking an oath he violates the prohibition against taking a false oath, for he is obligated [by the Torah to engage in relations with her].10 If, however, he tells her, "The satisfaction of engaging in relations with you is forbidden to me," it is a [binding] vow, and he is forbidden to engage in relations with her.11 For a person should not be fed food that is forbidden to him.
ו
המדיר את אשתו מתשמיש המטה שבת אחת ממתינין לו יתר על כן יוציא ויתן כתובה או יפר נדרו. אפילו היה מלח שעונתו לששה חדשים שכיון שנדר הרי צערה ונתיאשה. וכיצד מדירה אם אמר לה תשמישי אסור עליך או שנשבע שלא ישמש מטתו לא נדר כלום. ואם נשבע נשבע לשוא מפני שהוא משועבד לה. אמר לה הנאת תשמישך אסורה עלי הרי זה נדר ואסור לשמש שאין מאכילין לאדם דבר האסור לו:
7
It is forbidden for a man to deprive his wife of her conjugal rights. If he transgresses and deprives her of these rights in order to cause her distress, he violates one of the Torah's negative commandments, as [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her] of her sustenance, garments or conjugal rights."12
If he becomes sick or his virility is weakened, and he is unable to engage in sexual relations, he is given a period of six months13- for [a woman is never required to wait] longer for her conjugal rights than this - in the hope that he recovers. Afterwards, the prerogative is hers [whether to remain married] or whether he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
ז
אסור לאדם למנוע אשתו מעונתה ואם עבר ומנע כדי לצערה עבר בלא תעשה שבתורה שנאמר שארה כסותה ועונתה לא יגרע. ואם חלה או תשש כחו ואינו יכול לבעול ימתין ששה חדשים שמא יבריא שאין לך עונה גדולה מזו. ואח"כ או יטול ממנה רשות או יוציא ויתן כתובה:
8
A woman who withholds marital intimacy from her husband is called a moredet ("a rebel"). She is asked why she has rebelled. If she answers: "Because I am repulsed by him and I cannot voluntarily engage in relations with him," her husband should be compelled to divorce her immediately. For she is not like a captive, [to be forced] to engage in relations with one she loathes.14
[In such an instance, as part of] the divorce [settlement], she does not receive any of the money promised her in her ketubah.15 She is entitled to whatever remains of the possessions she brought into the marriage arrangement, both those for which her husband assumed responsibility and those for which he did not assume responsibility - i.e., nichsei m'log.16
She is not entitled to anything that belongs to her husband. She should remove even the shoe on her foot and her head-covering that he gave her and return them to him. [Similarly,] she should return to him any presents that he gave her. For he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and [leave his home].
ח
האשה שמנעה בעלה מתשמיש המטה היא הנקראת מורדת ושואלין אותה מפני מה מרדה. אם אמרה מאסתיהו ואיני יכולה להבעל לו מדעתי כופין אותו לשעתו לגרשה לפי שאינה כשבויה שתבעל לשנוא לה ותצא בלא כתובה כלל ותטול בלאותיה הקיימין בין מנכסים שהכניסה לבעלה ונתחייב באחריותן בין מנכסי מלוג שלא נתחייב באחריותן. ואינה נוטלת בשל בעל כלום ואפילו מנעל שברגליה ומטפחת שבראשה שלקחן לה פושטת ונותנת לו וכל מה שנתן לה מתנה מחזרת אותו שלא נתן לה על מנת שתטול ותצא:
9
[Different rules apply, however,] if she rebelled against her husband with the intent of causing him distress,17 saying: "I intend to cause him distress this way, because he did this or this to me," "...because he cursed me," "...because he has caused me strife," or the like, she is sent a messenger from the court, [who] tells her: "Take note. If you continue your rebellious conduct, you will forfeit your ketubah, even if it is worth one hundred maneh."18
Afterwards, announcements are made concerning her in the synagogues and the houses of study each day for four consecutive weeks,19 saying: "So and so has rebelled against her husband."20
ט
ואם מרדה מתחת בעלה כדי לצערו ואמרה הריני מצערת אותו בכך מפני שעשה לי כך וכך או מפני שקללני או מפני שעשה עמי מריבה וכיוצא בדברים אלו. שולחים לה מבית דין ואומרין לה הוי יודעת שאם את עומדת במרדך אפילו כתובתך מאה מנה הפסדת אותה. ואחר כך מכריזין עליה בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות בכל יום ארבע שבתות זו אחר זו ואומרים פלונית מרדה על בעלה:
10
After the announcement has been made, the court sends her a messenger a second time. He tells her: "If you continue your rebellious conduct, you have forfeited your ketubah." If, nevertheless, she continues this conduct and does not retract, she is consulted by the court. [If she does not change her mind,] she then forfeits her ketubah and has no rights to a ketubah at all.21
She is not given a divorce until twelve months pass.22 During these twelve months, [her husband is] not [required] to provide for her subsistence. If she dies before being divorced, her husband inherits her [property].
י
ואחר ההכרזה שולחין לה ב"ד פעם שנייה ואומרים לה אם את עומדת במרדך הפסדת כתובתיך. אם עמדה במרדה ולא חזרה נמלכין בה ותאבד כתובתה ולא יהיה לה כתובה כלל. ואין נותנין לה גט עד י"ב חדש ואין לה מזונות כל י"ב חדש. ואם מתה קודם הגט בעלה יורשה:
11
This is the sequence followed with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband] in order to cause him distress. These laws apply even when the woman is in the niddah state or when she is ill and is not fit to engage in sexual relations. Similarly, they apply even when her husband is a seaman whose conjugal duties are only once in six months, and even when [her husband] has another wife.23
יא
כסדר הזה עושין לה אם מרדה כדי לצערו. ואפילו היתה נדה או חולה שאינה ראויה לתשמיש ואפילו היה בעלה מלח שעונתו לששה חדשים ואפילו יש לו אשה אחרת:
12
Similarly, when the time comes for an arusah to enter nisu'in,24 and she refuses to do so, rebelling in order to cause [her husband] distress, she is considered to be one who rebels [and refuses to engage] in marital relations. Similarly, the above sequence is followed when a yevamah refuses to undergo yibbum in order to cause [her yavam] distress.25
יב
וכן ארוסה שהגיע זמנה להנשא ומרדה כדי לצערו ולא נשאת הרי זו מורדת מתשמיש. וכן יבמה שלא רצתה להתיבם כדי לצערו כסדר הזה עושין לה:
13
When this woman who rebels is divorced after twelve months without receiving [any of the money due her because of] her ketubah, she must also return everything that belongs to her husband.
With regard to the property that she brought to [the marriage arrangement] and what remains [of her trousseau, different rules apply].26 If she takes physical possession of these articles, they are not taken from her, but if her husband takes physical possession of them,27 they are not taken from him. Similarly, her husband is not held liable for anything that has been lost from her possessions for which he accepted responsibility.28 This is the law prescribed by the Talmud with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband].
יג
המורדת הזאת כשהיא יוצאת אחר י"ב חדש בלא כתובה תחזיר כל דבר שהוא של בעל. אבל נכסים שהכניסה לו ובלאותיהן קיימים אם תפסה אין מוציאים מידה ואם תפסן הבעל אין מוציאין מידו. וכן כל מה שאבד מנכסיה שקיבל הבעל אחריותן עליו אינו משלם לה כלום. זה הוא דין הגמרא במורדת:
14
There are geonim who say that in Babylonia different customs were followed with regard to a woman who rebels [against her husband].29These customs have not, however, spread throughout the majority of the Jewish community, and in most places within the Jewish community, there are many sages of stature who differ with them. [Therefore,] it is proper to follow the laws prescribed by the Talmud.
יד
ואמרו הגאונים שיש להם בבבל מנהגות אחרות במורדת. ולא פשטו אותן המנהגות ברוב ישראל ורבים וגדולים חולקין עליהם ברוב המקומות וכדין הגמרא ראוי לתפוס ולדון:
15
[The following ruling applies when] a man rebels against his wife and says, "I will support her and provide her with her subsistence, but I will not be intimate with her, because she has become loathsome to me." He must increase her ketubah by the equivalent of 36 barleycorns worth of [pure] silver30 each week. They may remain married without engaging in relations for as long as she desires.31
Although her ketubah continues to increase, [her husband] also transgresses a negative commandment, for [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her of her... conjugal rights]." If the husband hates her, let him divorce her; causing her anguish, however, is forbidden.
Why is he not punished by lashes for [violating] this negative commandment? Because its [violation] does not involve a deed.32
טו
המורד על אשתו ואמר הריני זן ומפרנס אותה אבל איני בא עליה מפני ששנאתיה מוסיפין לה על כתובתה משקל שש ושלשים שעורות של כסף בכל שבת ושבת. וישב ולא ישמש כל זמן שתרצה היא לישב. ואף על פי שכתובתה הולכת ונוספת הרי הוא עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא יגרע. שאם שנאה ישלחה אבל לענות אסור. ולמה לא ילקה על לאו זה מפני שאין בו מעשה:
16
[The following rules apply when] a man and his wife come to court and he claims that his wife refuses to engage in marital relations, and she replies: "I follow the way of the world with him," or if she claims that he deprives her of her conjugal rights, and he replies that he "follows the way of the world with her." At first, a ban of ostracism is issued against anyone who denies his or her spouse marital intimacy and refuses to acknowledge the matter before the court.33
Afterwards, if acknowledgement is [still] not made, the couple are asked to enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses. If they do this, and yet the claims continue as before, a request is made of the defendant, and a compromise is made [as just] as the judge can make. It is, however, forbidden to engage in relations in the presence of others. For it is forbidden to engage in relations in the presence of any living being.
טז
איש ואשתו שבאו לבית דין הוא אומר זו מורדת מתשמיש והיא אומרת לא כי אלא כדרך כל הארץ אני עמו. וכן אם טענה היא ואמרה שהוא מורד מתשמיש והוא אומר לא כי אלא כדרך כל הארץ אני עמה. מחרימין בתחלה על מי שהוא מורד ולא יודה בבית דין. ואחר כך אם לא הודו אומרין להם התיחדו בפני עדים. נתיחדו ועדיין הם טוענין מבקשין מן הנטען ועושין פשרה כפי כח הדיין. אבל לבעול בפני בני אדם א"א לפי שאסור לבעול בפני כל בריה:
17
When a woman becomes ill, [her husband] is obligated [to provide] medical treatment for her until she recovers. If the husband sees that her illness is prolonged, and he will be forced to spend much money treating her, he may tell her: "Here is the money due you by virtue of your ketubah. Either pay for your treatment from this money, or I will divorce you and pay you what is due you and abandon you." [Although] he is given this prerogative, it is not ethical to act in this manner.34
יז
האשה שחלתה חייב לרפאות אותה עד שתבריא. ראה שהחולי ארוך ויפסיד ממון הרבה לרפואה ואמר לה הרי כתובתיך מונחת או רפאי עצמך מכתובתיך או הריני מגרשך ונותן כתובה והולך שומעין לו. ואין ראוי לעשות כן מפני דרך ארץ:
18
[When a man's wife] is taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her. If he is a priest, [although] she has become forbidden to him,35 he must redeem her and have her returned to her father's home. If he was in another city, he must still provide for her until she is returned to her native locale. [Then] he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
If her husband was an Israelite - who is permitted to remain married to a woman who was held captive36 - he must return her to her station as his wife, as she was previously.37 Afterwards, if he desires,38 he may divorce her, [provided] he pays her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
יח
נשבית חייב לפדותה. ואם היה כהן שכבר נאסרה עליו פודה אותה ומחזירה לבית אביה. אפילו היה בעיר אחרת מטפל לה עד שמחזירה למדינתה ומגרשה ונותן לה כל כתובתה. היה בעלה ישראל שהשבויה מותרת לו מחזירה לו לאשה כמו שהיתה ואם רצה אח"כ מגרשה ונותן לה כתובתה:
19
A husband is not obligated to redeem his wife for more than her worth. Instead, [the laws applying] to her [redemption] are the same as with regard to others held captive.39
When her ransom exceeds [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, her husband is not given the prerogative of saying: "I will divorce her. Here is [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Let her redeem herself." Instead, [if necessary,] he should be compelled to redeem her, even if her ransom is ten times [the value of] her ketubah - even if it is equivalent to all of his assets.
When does the above apply? On the first occasion [that she is held captive]. If, however, he redeems her and she is taken captive again, if he desires to divorce her he may divorce her, pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and [then] she must redeem herself.40
יט
אין מחייבין את הבעל לפדות את אשתו יותר על דמיה אלא כמה שהיא שוה כשאר השבויות. היו דמיה יותר על כדי כתובתה ואמר הריני מגרשה וזו כתובתה ותלך ותפדה את עצמה אין שומעין לו אלא כופין אותו ופודה אותה אפילו היו דמיה עד עשרה בכתובתה ואפילו אין לו אלא כדי פדיונה. בד"א בפעם ראשונה אבל אם פדאה ונשבית פעם שנייה ורצה לגרשה הרי זה מגרשה ונותן כתובה והיא תפדה את עצמה:
20
When a man's wife is taken captive and he is abroad, the court expropriates his assets and sells them after announcements have been made,41 and redeems his wife as he would be required to.
כ
מי שנשבית אשתו והוא במדינת הים בית דין יורדין לנכסיו ומוכרין בהכרזה ופודין אותה כדרך שהבעל פודה:
21
When a person causes his wife to be bound by a vow that requires him to divorce her42 and pay her [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and she is taken captive after he causes her to be bound by this vow, he is not required to redeem her. For from the time he caused her to be bound by the vow, he was obligated to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.43
כא
המדיר את אשתו נדר שהוא חייב בגללו לגרשה וליתן כתובה ונשבית אחר שהדירה אינו חייב לפדותה. שמשעה שהדירה נתחייב לגרשה וליתן לה כתובה:
22
When a woman who is forbidden to [engage in relations] with her husband because of one of the Torah's prohibitions is taken captive, he is not obligated to redeem her.44Instead, he must provide her with [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, and she must redeem herself.
[One might ask: Why is this instance different from the wife of a priest who is taken captive?] A woman who has been taken captive is forbidden to a priest, and yet he is obligated to redeem [his wife in such an instance]. [There is, however, a difference between the two instances. The priest's wife] was not forbidden to him beforehand. It is the prohibition stemming from her being taken captive that causes [their relationship to be forbidden].45
כב
האשה שהיתה אסורה על בעלה מאיסורי לאוין ונשבית אינו חייב לפדותה אלא נותן לה כתובתה והיא תפדה את עצמה. והלא השבויה אסורה לכהן והרי הוא פודה אותה מפני שלא היתה אסורה מקודם ואיסור השביה הוא שגרם לה:
23
When a man's wife dies, he is obligated to bury her and to have eulogies and lamentations performed as is the local custom. Even a poor Jewish man should provide at least two flutes46 and one woman to lament. If [her husband] is rich, [the funeral should be carried out] in a manner appropriate to his wealth.
If the social standing of [a man's wife] exceeded his own, he must have her buried in a manner appropriate to her social standing. For [when she marries,] a woman ascends to her husband's social standing [if his is higher than hers], but does not descend [to his, if her social standing surpasses his].47 [This principle applies] even after death.
כג
מתה אשתו חייב בקבורתה ולעשות לה מספד וקינים כדרך כל המדינה. ואפילו עני שבישראל לא יפחתו לו משני חלילין ומקוננת. אם היה עשיר הכל לפי כבודו. ואם היה כבודה יותר מכבודו קוברין אותה לפי כבודה שהאשה עולה עם בעלה ואינה יורדת אפילו לאחר מיתה:
24
If a husband does not desire [to pay for] the burial of his wife, and another person voluntarily takes the initiative and has her buried, [the costs of the burial] should be expropriated from her husband against his will and given to the person [who arranged the burial].48 [The rationale is to prevent the body of a Jew] from being thrown to the dogs.
If a man is in another city when his wife dies, the court should expropriate his property and sell it without an announcement.49 The woman should be buried as appropriate to her husband's financial resources and his social standing or her social standing.
כד
לא רצה לקבור את אשתו ועמד אחד מדעת עצמו וקברה מוציאין מבעלה על כרחו ונותנין לזה כדי שלא תהיה זו מושלכת לכלבים. היה במדינה אחרת כשמתה אשתו ב"ד יורדין לנכסיו ומוכרין בלא הכרזה וקוברין אותה לפי ממון הבעל ולפי כבודו או לפי כבודה:
FOOTNOTES
1.
The very word onah - and its translation as "conjugal rights" - conveys a fundamental conception with regard to the Torah's conception of marital intimacy. Marital intimacy is not for the husband's sake, but rather for his wife's. Onah also means "respond." A man should be responding to his wife's desires and satisfying her wishes for closeness.
2.
See Hilchot Shabbat 30:14, where the Rambam states that marital relations are one of the expressions of oneg Shabbat, "Sabbath delight." (See also Hilchot De'ot 4:19, 5:4.)
3.
Ketubot 62b states that even if the other profession is more profitable, the prerogative is granted to the woman, for a woman values intimacy with her husband more than financial advancement.
4.
Yevamot 65a states that if it is the local custom for a man to have only one wife, a man may not deviate from that custom. In the Ashkenazic community, as ordained by the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, it is forbidden for a man to marry more than one wife. (See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:9-10).)
5.
The commentaries draw support for this law from the Biblical narrative (Genesis 31:33), which mentions that Jacob had separate tents for Leah, Rachel, Bilhah and Zilpah. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 14.)
6.
Yevamot 65a.
7.
From this, it appears that the custom of engaging in sexual relations once a week was not the practice of Torah scholars alone.
8.
To fill up pitchers of water and dump them down the drain (Ketubot 7:3; Even HaEzer 76:12).
9.
In this time, it is hoped that he will change his mind and retract his vow.
10.
As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 2, a husband is obligated by the Torah to give his wife conjugal rights. Once an obligation is imposed on a person by the Torah, he may not free himself of it by taking a vow or an oath.
11.
Since this vow does not forbid anything to the woman, but states instead, that her husband is prohibited from appreciating pleasure that results from relations with her, it can be effective.
12.
Rav Kapach notes that although this prohibition involves three rights, the Rambam mentions its violation only with regard to the denial of conjugal rights. He explains that with regard to her sustenance and garments, a woman can take legal recourse and sue for the money due. This, however, is not possible with regard to conjugal rights.
13.
The later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 76:18; Beit Shmuel 76:17) quote the opinion in the Shiltei HaGiborim that states that if a man is afflicted with an ailment that will heal, his wife is required to remain married to him, despite the fact that the treatment will last longer than six months.
14.
The Maggid Mishneh and many other authorities differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that a man should not be forced to divorce his wife even in such a situation. This view is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2). Even those opinions that favor the Rambam's ruling emphasize that the court should seek to clarify that the woman is not making her statements because she fell in love with another man and seeks to end her previous marriage because of him.
15.
For, as implied by the Rambam's statements below, this money was promised to her only on the condition that she maintain the marriage relationship.
16.
Those authorities who differ with the Rambam regarding whether the husband is compelled to divorce his wife also differ with regard to this point. They maintain that even with regard to the possessions for which her husband accepted responsibility, the woman is granted only what she takes possession of. (See Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Even HaEzer, loc. cit.).
17.
I.e., she is not necessarily interested in terminating the marriage, but rather in withholding marital relations as a means to communicate her position to her husband.
18.
maneh is equivalent to 100 dinarim.
19.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) quotes the Rambam's wording. The Ramah, however, differs, stating that the announcement need be made only on four consecutive Sabbaths.
20.
The purpose of these announcements is obviously to shame her and to cause her to reconsider her course of behavior.
21.
I.e., she does not receive the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, nor any additional amount that her husband promised her (tos'fot ketubah).
22.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that, as a favor, the court requests the husband not to divorce his wife until this time has passed, for it is disgraceful for a Jewish couple to part because of strife. It is hoped that during the twelve months they are required to wait, they will resolve their differences.
There are opinions that state that in the present age, the husband is not required to wait an entire year and may instead divorce his wife immediately. Nevertheless, the majority of authorities do not accept this view (Ramah, loc. cit.).
According to the Rambam, during these twelve months, the husband has no financial responsibilities to his wife whatsoever. If she is held captive, he is not required to redeem her, and if he dies, she does not inherit her ketubah from his estate. Rabbenu Asher (as interpreted by the Tur, Even HaEzer 77) differs and maintains that during these twelve months, the woman's ketubah is still in effect. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) cites the Rambam's view, while the Ramah follows that of Rabbenu Asher.
23.
In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the governing principle is that the fact that a woman makes a categorical statement refusing to engage in marital relations in the future is sufficient to warrant her being placed in this category, despite the fact that her conduct is of no immediate consequence.
24.
One year, for a na'arah, one month for a bogeret, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 17.
25.
Yibbum refers to the marriage of the widow (the yevamah) of a childless man by his brother (the yavam). The Rambam's ruling is dependent on his decision that even in the present age, the mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah (Hilchot Yibbum 1:2). The latter decision is not accepted in the Ashkenazic community, and therefore, the ruling in our halachah is also a matter of dispute. (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 165:1.)
26.
I.e., the laws governing a woman who rebels against her husband differ from those governing a woman who claims that she is repulsed by her husband, as described in Halachah 8.
27.
In both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:3), Rav Yosef Karo states that the husband does not have to take physical possession of this property. As long as the wife does not take possession of it, it is considered to be his.
28.
This refers to nichsei tzon barzel, property whose full value must ordinarily be returned to the woman. In contrast, nichsei m'log - property for which the husband did not accept responsibility and is returned to the woman in whatever condition it is, regardless of its worth - must be returned to her, even if she rebels against him. (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 77:2.)
The rationale for this distinction is that since he takes responsibility for the nichsei tzon barzel, these articles are considered to be possessed by him unless she takes physical possession of them. With regard to the nichsei m'log, by contrast, since the husband does not take responsibility, they are not considered to be in his possession.
29.
The customs of these geonim are quoted in the Halachot of Rav Yitzchak Alfasi. They are far more considerate of the woman's position and interests. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 77:3) states that if the woman gives a reasonable explanation for her conduct, these customs should be followed.
30.
I.e., three dinarim of the currency employed during the Talmudic period.
31.
If she does not desire to remain married, she may ask the court to compel him to grant her a divorce, as stated in Halachah 7.
32.
And lashes are given only for a transgression that involves a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2).
33.
Although the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:4).
34.
As mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, there are authorities who maintain that there is an explicit prohibition preventing a husband from divorcing a wife who is too ill to care for herself. The later authorities, however, follow the Rambam's view.
In the Ashkenazic community, there is a question if the Rambam's ruling applies in the present age, after the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, which prevents divorcing a woman against her will. (See the Chelkat Mechokek 79:3, which quotes an opinion that states that as long as the husband is prepared to meet all the financial obligations of the divorce, he has the prerogative to divorce a woman against her will, even when she is ill.)
35.
As mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 21, a priest is forbidden to have relations with a woman who engaged in sexual relations with a gentile, even when she was raped. Our Sages assumed that women taken captive by gentiles were raped by them, and therefore prohibited a priest from remaining married to such a woman. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:17-30.)
36.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 78:6) notes that even an Israelite is forbidden to remain married to a woman who is held captive by gentiles if she willingly engaged in relations with one of them. In such instances, he is not obligated to redeem her.
37.
I.e., he may not merely redeem her and send her a divorce.
38.
I.e., out of suspicion that she willingly engaged in relations with her captors, or because he does not want to live with a woman who had relations with others (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
39.
As explained in Hilchot Matnot Ani'yim 8:12, our Sages decreed that captives should not be redeemed for more than their worth, so that the gentiles will not be overwhelmingly encouraged to seize Jews as captives.
The Rambam's wording has aroused the attention of the later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 78:2; Beit Shmuel 78:2), for it implies that if the husband desires to redeem her for more than her worth, he may, while with regard to other captives it is forbidden to do so. They interpret the Rambam's words as applying this prohibition to the husband as well. The Beit Shmuel interprets the ruling of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 78:2) as meaning that a husband is required to redeem his wife even though her captors demand more than her worth.
40.
In both the Kessef Mishneh and in the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 78), Rav Yosef Karo states that the husband is not obligated to redeem his wife a second time. If he desires, he may remain married to her without redeeming her. Many, however, differ with this as the interpretation of the Rambam's words. (See Chelkat Mechokek 78:4; Beit Shmuel 78:4.)
41.
See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 12:8-11, which states that an announcement is made regarding the sale of the person's property so that he will receive the best price.
42.
E.g., the vows mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 8ff.
43.
The obligation for a husband to redeem his wife stems from her ketubah, which states: "If you are taken captive, I will redeem you and take you back as my wife." Since he is already obligated to divorce her, he is not bound by this clause.
44.
The rationale for this ruling is that the obligation to redeem one's wife involves returning her to her status as a wife, and this is forbidden in this instance. Nevertheless, although this is the rationale, the same ruling applies with regard to a High Priest who married a widow, or an ordinary priest who married a divorcee.
In these instances, the obligation of the woman's ketubah - that she be redeemed and returned to her native land - could be fulfilled without transgressing a prohibition of the Torah. Nevertheless, since relations with her were forbidden previously, her husband is not obligated to redeem her (Ketubot 52a).
45.
With regard to a woman forbidden to her husband by virtue of a Torah prohibition, by contrast, the prohibition existed before she was taken captive.
46.
Flutes have a mournful tone that arouses tears (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 23:4).
47.
This principle applies to many aspects of the financial relationship of the marriage bond - e.g., the woman's subsistence, her garments and her lodging. It is curious that this instance is the first time the Rambam mentions it explicitly.
48.
Although the Rambam makes a distinction between this instance and a similar situation mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 19, the Rashba and others do not. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 89:2) quotes the Rambam's view, but the Beit Shmuel 89:2 states that because of the other views, the husband's property may not be expropriated against his will.
49.
Although usually announcements are made for 30 days prior to the sale of property by the court, an exception is made in this instance, so that the woman's burial will not be delayed (Ketubot 100b).

Ishut - Chapter Fifteen

1
It is permissible for a woman to authorize her husband to ignore her conjugal rights. When does this apply? When he has children already and has fulfilled the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply. If, however, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is obligated to engage in sexual relations whenever his conjugal duties require, until he fathers children.1 For this is a positive commandment of the Torah, as [Genesis 1:28] states: "Be fruitful and multiply."2
א
האשה שהרשת את בעלה אחר הנישואין שימנע עונתה הרי זה מותר. בד"א בשהיו לו בנים שכבר קיים מצות פריה ורביה אבל לא קיים חייב לבעול בכל עונה עד שיהיו לו בנים. מפני שהיא מצות עשה של תורה שנאמר פרו ורבו:
2
The mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying is incumbent on the husband and not on his wife. When does a man become obligated to fulfill this mitzvah? From the time he reaches seventeen. If he reaches twenty and has not married, he is considered to have transgressed and negated the observance of this positive commandment. If, however, he is occupied with the study of Torah and absorbed in this endeavor and is hesitant of marrying, lest he be forced to work to support his wife and thus be prevented from studying Torah, he is permitted to delay marriage. For a person who is occupied in the performance of one mitzvah is freed from the obligation to perform another. Surely this applies with regard to the study of Torah.
ב
האיש מצווה על פריה ורביה אבל לא האשה. ואימתי האיש נתחייב במצוה זו מבן שבע עשרה. וכיון שעברו עשרים שנה ולא נשא אשה הרי זה עובר ומבטל מצות עשה. ואם היה עוסק בתורה וטרוד בה והיה מתירא מלישא אשה כדי שלא יטרח במזונות בעבור אשתו ויבטל מן התורה הרי זה מותר להתאחר. שהעוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה וכל שכן בתלמוד תורה:
3
When a person's soul desires [to study] Torah at all times and is obsessed with its [study] as was ben Azzai,3 and clings to it throughout his life, without marrying, he is not considered to have transgressed.4
[This applies] provided a man's natural inclination does not overcome him.5 If, however, his natural inclination overcomes him, he is obligated to marry, even if he has already fathered children, lest he be prompted to [sexual] thoughts.6
ג
מי שחשקה נפשו בתורה תמיד ושוגה בה כבן עזאי ודבק בה כל ימיו ולא נשא אשה אין בידו עון. והוא שלא יהיה יצרו מתגבר עליו אבל אם היה יצרו מתגבר עליו חייב לישא אשה ואפילו היו לו בנים שמא יבוא לידי הרהור:
4
How many children is it necessary for a man to have fathered to be considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah? One boy and one girl,7 as [implied by Genesis 5:2]: "He created them, a male and a female." If the son was a saris or the daughter an aylonit, he is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah.8
ד
כמה בנים יהיו לאיש ותתקיים מצוה זו בידו זכר ונקבה. שנאמר זכר ונקבה בראם. היה הבן סריס או שהיתה הבת אילונית לא קיים מצוה זו:
5
A man is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying [even when] he fathers [children] and they die, so long as [his children] have left behind children [of their own]. For grandchildren are considered to be children.
When does the above apply? When the person's grandchildren are both male and female, and they are descended from a male and a female, even though the male grandchild is the son of the man's daughter, and the female grandchild is the daughter of the man's son.9 Since they come from two of his children, he is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying. If, however, he had a son and a daughter who both died, and [one did not leave any children, while] one left a son and a daughter, the grandfather is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah.
ה
נולדו לו ומתו והניחו בנים הרי זה קיים מצות פריה ורביה. בני בנים הרי הם כבנים. בד"א בשהיו בני הבנים זכר ונקבה והיו באים מזכר ונקבה אעפ"י שהזכר בן בתו והנקבה בת בנו הואיל והם משני בניו הן באים הרי קיים מצות פריה ורביה. אבל אם היו לו בן ובת ומתו והניח אחד מהן זכר ונקבה עדיין לא קיים המצוה:
6
When [a convert] had fathered children as a gentile, and both he and they convert,10 he is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. By contrast, a freed slave who had fathered children as a slave is not considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah, although his children were also freed. Instead, he must father children after he has been freed. [The rationale is that] a slave is not considered to have any paternal lineage.
ו
היו לו בנים בגיותו ונתגייר הוא והם הרי זה קיים מצוה זו. היו לו בנים והוא עבד ונשתחרר הוא והם לא קיים מצות פריה ורביה עד שיוליד אחר שנשתחרר שהעבד אין לו יחוס:
7
A man should not marry a barren women, an elderly woman, an aylonit or a minor who is not fit to bear a child11 unless he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying,12or he has another wife with whom he can father children.13
When a man has married a woman and remained married to her for ten years14 without her bearing children,15 he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, or marry a woman who is fit to bear children.
If he does not desire to divorce her, he should be compelled to do so; he should be beaten with a rod until he divorces her.16 Even when he says, "I will not engage in marital relations with her. Instead, we will dwell together with witnesses so that we will not ever be in private," regardless of whether it is he or she who offers this proposition,17 it is not accepted. Rather, he is required to divorce [his wife] or marry another woman who is fit to bear children.
ז
לא ישא אדם עקרה וזקנה ואילונית וקטנה שאינה ראויה לילד אלא אם כן קיים מצות פריה ורביה או שהיתה לו אשה אחרת לפרות ולרבות ממנה. נשא אשה ושהתה עמו עשר שנים ולא ילדה הרי זה יוציא ויתן כתובה או ישא אשה הראויה לילד. ואם לא רצה להוציא כופין אותו ומכין אותו בשוט עד שיוציא. ואם אמר איני בועלה והריני שוכן עמה בפני עדים כדי שלא אתיחד עמה בין שאמרה היא בין שאמר הוא אין שומעין אלא יוציא או ישא אשה הראויה לילד:
8
When a man has lived [together with his wife] for ten years without her bearing children, and he releases semen as one shoots an arrow,18 it can be assumed that the affliction comes from her.19 Therefore, he should divorce her without paying her [the essential requirement of] the ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the additional sum [by which the ketubah was increased]. [The rationale is that] such a woman should not be judged more severely than an aylonit whose husband did not recognize her condition, who is granted the additional amount, as will be explained.20
If [the husband] does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow, it can be assumed that the affliction comes from him alone. When he divorces her, he must pay her [the entire sum due her by virtue of her] ketubah: the essential requirement and the additional sum.
ח
שהתה עשר שנים ולא ילדה והרי הוא יורה כחץ שכבת זרע. חזקת החולי ממנה ותצא שלא בכתובה ויש לה תוספת לא תהיה זו פחותה מאיילונית שלא הכיר בה שיש לה תוספת כמו שיתבאר. ואם אינו יורה כחץ חזקת החולי ממנו בלבד ויוציא ויתן הכתובה כולה עיקר ותוספת:
9
[The following rules apply when there is a dispute with regard to which of the couple it is whose affliction prevents the couple from having children. The husband] claims: "It is she who cannot bear children," and she claims "He cannot conceive children, for he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow." Her word is accepted. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally against anyone who makes a claim that she does not definitely know to be true. Afterwards, he must pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
If she says, "I do not know if the difficulty stems from me or from him," she is not entitled to the essential requirement of the ketubah, as explained. [The rationale is that] the money should stay in the possession of its owner until she makes a definite claim21 that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow.
Why is the woman's word accepted when she makes such a claim? Because she can feel whether or not he [releases semen] as one shoots an arrow, and he cannot make such a distinction.
ט
הוא אומר ממנה נמנע הולדה והיא אומרת ממנו נמנע מפני שאינו יורה כחץ נאמנת. ויש לו להחרים סתם על מי שטוענת דבר שאינה יודעת בו בודאי ואחר כך יתן כתובה. ואם אמרה איני יודעת אם ממני אם ממנו אין לה עיקר כתובה כמו שאמרנו העמד ממון בחזקת בעליו עד שתטעון בודאי שאינו יורה כחץ. ולמה נאמנת היא בטענה זו מפני שהיא מרגשת אם יורה כחץ אם לא יורה כחץ והוא אינו מרגיש:
10
When a woman demands of her husband to divorce her after ten years [of marriage], because she has not given birth,22 and she claims that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow, her request is accepted.23 Although she is not commanded to fulfill the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, she needs sons [to assist] her in her old age.24 [Therefore,] he should be compelled to divorce her.
He is required to give her only the essential requirement of the ketubah. [He is not required to give her the additional amount,] because he did not promise her this additional amount with the intent that she leave him at her will and take this money.
י
האשה שבאה לתבוע מבעלה לגרשה אחר עשר שנים מפני שלא ילדה והיא אומרת שאינו יורה כחץ שומעין לה. אע"פ שאינה מצווה על פריה ורביה צריכה היא לבנים לזקנותה. וכופין אותו להוציא ויתן עיקר כתובה בלבד שלא כתב לה התוספת ע"מ שתצא לרצונה ותטול:
11
If [a husband] travels on an [extended] business trip during these ten years, or either the husband or the wife were ill or confined in prison, [the time that the couple did not share together] is not included in the calculation [of the ten years].25
יא
הלך בסחורה בתוך עשר שנים או שהיה הבעל חולה או שהיתה היא חולה או שהיו חבושין בבית האסורין אין עולה להן אותו זמן מן המנין:
12
If a woman miscarries, [the ten years are] recalculated from the day of the miscarriage.
If a woman has three successive miscarriages,26 we can presume that she will continue to miscarry, and there is the possibility that [her husband] will not merit to have children from her. Therefore, he should divorce her,27 and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.
יב
הפילה מונה מיום שהפילה. אם הפילה וחזרה והפילה שלש פעמים הוחזקה לנפלים ושמא לא זכה להבנות ממנה ויוציא ויתן כתובה:
13
[The following rules apply when there is a difference between the information stemming from the claims of a husband and his wife.] He claims that she has miscarried within the ten years so that they can continue [their marriage], and she denies the miscarriage. [Her claim] is believed; [if it were not true,] she would not cause herself to be considered barren.28
If he claims that she has miscarried twice, and she claims to have miscarried three times, [her claim] is believed. [If it were not true,] she would not cause herself to be considered a woman who [continually] miscarries.
[Therefore, in both instances,] he should divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. With regard to the above situations, he may require her to take a Rabbinic oath that she did not miscarry or that she miscarried three times. For this claim obligates him to pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.29
יג
הוא אומר הפילה בתוך עשר כדי שישהה עמה והיא אומרת לא הפלתי נאמנת שאינה מחזקת עצמה בעקרות. הוא אומר הפילה שנים והיא אומרת הפלתי שלשה נאמנת שאינה מחזקת עצמה במפלת ויוציא ויתן כתובה. ובכל זה משביעה שבועת היסת שלא הפילה או שהפילה שלשה שבטענה זו יתחייב ליתן כתובה:
14
[When a woman] marries one man, remains married to him for ten years without bearing a child and is divorced [for that reason], she is permitted to marry a second husband.30 If she remained married to the second husband for ten years without bearing a child, she should not marry a third husband.31
If she marries a third husband, she should be divorced; [he is] not [required to pay her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.32[This applies] unless he has another wife, or he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying.
יד
נשאת לראשון ושהתה עמו עשר שנים ולא ילדה והוציאה מותרת להנשא לשני. שהתה עם השני עשר שנים ולא ילדה לא תנשא לשלישי. ואם נשאת לשלישי תצא שלא בכתובה אלא אם כן יש לו אשה אחרת או שקיים מצות פריה ורביה:
15
[The following laws apply when] a woman comes to court and claims that her husband cannot perform sexually in an ordinary way that will lead to the conception of children, or that he does not [release semen] as one shoots an arrow.33 The judges should try to arrange a compromise,34 telling the woman: "It is proper for you to conduct yourself with your husband [as follows]: Remain [married] for ten years. [If] you do not give birth, come to him with a claim at that time."
We protract the negotiations of this matter with her; we do not require her to continue living with him, nor do we judge her as a woman who rebels against her husband. Instead, the dealings are prolonged until the two parties reach a compromise.
טו
האשה שבאה לבית דין ואמרה בעלי אינו יכול לשמש כדרך כל הארץ שמוש שמוליד או שאינו יורה כחץ יעשו הדיינין פשרה ואומרים לה ראוי ליך שתנהגי עם בעליך עד שתשהי עשר שנים ולא תולידי ואח"כ תתבעי. ומגלגלין עמה בדבר זה ואין כופין אותה לישב ולא דנין אותה כדין המורדת אלא מאריכין בדבר זה עד שיעשו פשרה:
16
Although a man has fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is bound by a Rabbinic commandment not to refrain from being fruitful and multiplying as long as he is physically potent.35 For anyone who adds a soul to the Jewish people is considered as if he built an entire world.36
Similarly, it is a mitzvah of our Sages that a man should not live without a wife,37 so that he will not be prompted to [sexual] thoughts.38 Similarly, a woman should not live without a man,39 so that she will not be suspected [of immoral conduct].
טז
אף ע"פ שקיים אדם מצות פריה ורביה הרי הוא מצווה מדברי סופרים שלא יבטל מלפרות ולרבות כל זמן שיש בו כח. שכל המוסיף נפש אחת בישראל כאילו בנה עולם. וכן מצות חכמים היא שלא ישב אדם בלא אשה שלא יבא לידי הרהור. ולא תשב אשה בלא איש שלא תחשד:
17
It is an obligation for a man to admonish40 his wife. Our Sages declared:41 "A man will not admonish his wife unless a spirit of purity enters his being." [Nevertheless,] he should not admonish her more than necessary.42
[A man] should never compel [his wife] to engage in sexual relations against her will. Instead, [relations] should be with her agreement, [preceded by] conversation and a spirit of joy.43
יז
וחובה על כל איש לקנאות לאשתו. אמרו חכמים אין אדם מקנא לאשתו אלא אם כן נכנסה בו רוח טהרה. ולא יקנא לה ביותר מדאי ולא יאנוס אותה ויבעול בעל כרחה אלא בדעתה ומתוך שיחה ושמחה:
18
Similarly, our Sages commanded a woman to conduct herself modestly at home, not to proliferate levity or frivolity before her husband, not to request intimacy verbally,44 nor to speak about this matter.
She should not deny her husband [intimacy] to cause him anguish, so that he should increase his love for her. Instead, she should oblige him whenever he desires. She should keep her distance from his relatives and the members of his household so that he will not be provoked by jealousy and should avoid scandalous situations - indeed, any trace of scandal.45
יח
וכן צוו חכמים על האשה שתהיה צנועה בתוך ביתה. ולא תרבה שחוק וקלות ראש בפני בעלה. ולא תתבע תשמיש המטה בפיה. ולא תהיה מדברת בעסק זה. ולא תמנע מבעלה כדי לצערו עד שיוסיף באהבתה אלא נשמעת לו בכל עת שירצה. ותזהר מקרוביו ובני ביתו כדי שלא יעבור עליו רוח קנאה ותתרחק מן הכיעור ומן הדומה לכיעור:
19
Similarly, our Sages commanded that a man honor his wife more than his own person, and love her as he loves his own person. If he has financial resources, he should offer her benefits in accordance with his resources. He should not cast a superfluous measure of fear over her. He should talk with her gently, being neither sad nor angry.
יט
וכן צוו חכמים שיהא אדם מכבד את אשתו יותר מגופו ואוהבה כגופו. ואם יש לו ממון מרבה בטובתה כפי ממונו. ולא יטיל עליה אימה יתירה ויהיה דבורו עמה בנחת ולא יהיה עצב ולא רגזן:
20
And similarly, they commanded a woman to honor her husband exceedingly and to be in awe of him. She should carry out all her deeds according to his directives, considering him to be an officer or a king. She should follow the desires of his heart and shun everything that he disdains.
This is the custom of holy and pure Jewish women and men in their marriages. And these ways will make their marriage pleasant and praiseworthy.
כ
וכן צוו על האשה שתהיה מכבדת את בעלה ביותר מדאי ויהיה עליה מורא ממנו ותעשה כל מעשיה על פיו. ויהיה בעיניה כמו שר או מלך מהלכת בתאות לבו ומרחקת כל מה שישנא. וזה דרך בנות ישראל ובני ישראל הקדושים והטהורים בזיווגן. ובדרכים אלו יהיה ישובן נאה ומשובח:
FOOTNOTES
1.
Conjugal rights are a privilege granted to a wife, and she has the right to forego them if she and her husband consent. Fathering children, by contrast, is one of the Torah's commandments, and a woman may not prevent her husband from fulfilling his obligation. See Yevamot 65b.
The Turei Zahav (Even HaEzer 1:1) and the Beit Shmuel 1:1 question the Rambam's decision. For, as stated in Halachah 16, even after the person has fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is obligated by rabbinic law to continue to father children. Seemingly, just as a man's wife may not prevent him from fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by the Torah, so too, she may not prevent him from fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by our Sages.
The Pitchei Teshuvah 1:1 resolves this difficulty by quoting the Chidah, who explains that our Sages did not equate the obligation to continue to father children with the Torah's obligation to be fruitful and multiply. As long as a man endeavors to continue to father children from time to time, it is acceptable. There is no need to persist with the same perseverance as one who has not yet fulfilled this mitzvah. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
2.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 212) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 1) include this as one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot.
3.
See Yevamot 63b.
4.
The Turei Zahav 1:6 interprets this expression as meaning that, at the outset, this is not a desirable course of action to follow.
5.
This condition applies also to the license to delay marriage mentioned in the previous halachah.
6.
In connection with this law, the commentaries cite Yoma 29a, which states: "Thoughts of sin are more damaging than sin itself." Instead of pointing his life to spiritual refinement, the individual is directing himself to sinful thoughts.
7.
But if a man has only several sons or only several daughters, he is not considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah.
8.
See Chapter 2 for a definition of these terms. Since this child is incapable of conceiving children, the child's father is not considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah.
9.
Tosafot (Yevamot 62b) states that even if the grandchildren are two males or two females, one is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:6), however, quotes the Rambam's view.
10.
Tosafot states that even if the convert's children did not themselves convert, the convert is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. (See Beit Shmuel 1:12.)
11.
From the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 23:1), one can infer that sexual relations with a minor are considered as emitting wasted seed, one of the more severe prohibitions of the Torah. The Ramah (loc. cit.:5) and other authorities, however, differ and explain that as long as relations are carried out in an ordinary manner, having relations with a minor or an aylonit does not violate this prohibition.
12.
Rav Moshe Cohen states that since, as mentioned in Halachah 16, a person is obligated to continue fathering children, a man is obligated to marry a woman who can bear children even after fulfilling the mitzvah. The Maggid Mishneh states that in principle the Rambam also accepts this ruling, as indicated by his wording in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:26. In this instance, he was merely stating the law required by the Torah.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 1:3) states although it would be proper to rebuke a person for marrying such a woman, this is not done in the present age.
13.
As mentioned previously, in the Ashkenazic community it is customary not to marry more than one wife. All the laws mentioned in this halachah must be viewed with that principle in mind.
14.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:7), the Rambam writes that the source for this practice is Sarah's giving Hagar to Abraham: "After ten years in which Abram had lived in the Land of Canaan" (Genesis 16:3). Since this period passed without her bearing children, she provided him with another wife who could.
15.
The Rivash (Responsum 15, quoted by the Ramah 154:10) explains that if after having one child together, a couple do not have children for ten years, they are not forced to divorce.
16.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 1:3) states that in his time, it was no longer customary to compel a man to divorce a woman who has not borne children to her husband. (See also the Hagahot Maimoniot, which quote opinions that state that in this age, and particularly in the diaspora, there is no obligation to divorce a woman even though she has not borne children in this amount of time. At present, there are many Rabbis who have divorced their wives in such a situation, but at least an equal number who have not. Every person has the prerogative of making his own decision regarding this matter.)
17.
I.e., rather than bear the expense of paying her ketubah immediately, the man desires to remain married; or from the woman's perspective, rather than have to earn her own subsistence, she desires to remain married.
18.
Chaggigah 15a states that unless a man releases semen as one shoots an arrow, he will not be able to father children.
19.
As reflected in the following halachah, the Rambam maintains that unless the man's wife explicitly claims that he does not release semen as one shoots an arrow, it is assumed that the affliction is the woman's. Therefore, she is not entitled to the essential requirement of the ketubah.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that for the responsibility to be placed on the woman, she must have been married to two other men previously, and in both instances, divorced after ten years for not bearing children. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 154:6) accepts this opinion.
20.
See Chapter 23, Halachot 2 and 3.
21.
The husband keeps possession of the money he is required to pay his wife by virtue of her ketubah. Although our Sages accepted her word when she issues a claim against her husband, they did so only when that claim was definite. If she is in doubt, the money should remain in the possession of its immediate owner.
22.
The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 154) states that as long as a woman has given birth to one child, whether a son or a daughter, she is not given the prerogative of making such a claim.
The Ma'aseh Rokeach explains that this refers to an instance in which the man fathered children before marrying this woman, but then his physical condition deteriorated, and, according to the woman's claim, he is no longer able to release semen in an ordinary way. Were this not the case, he would be compelled to divorce her in order to fulfill the mitzvah of having children. Since he has, however, fulfilled that mitzvah, he is not compelled to divorce his wife. Therefore, it is the woman who must take the initiative.
23.
As reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:6), other authorities emphasize that the woman's request must be made solely for this reason. If the court feels that she desires [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah or to marry another man (Be'urei HaGra 154:25), her request is not accepted.
24.
Yevamot 65b states "she needs a staff for support and a spade for burial" - i.e., sons to support her in her old age and to take care of her funeral arrangements.
25.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:11) follows the understanding of Rabbenu Asher, who interprets this ruling as applying even when it was possible for the couple to engage in marital relations during the situations mentioned. It is possible that just as their conduct aroused negative spiritual influences resulting in illness or imprisonment, those negative influences - and not the physical condition of the man or woman - prevented them from having children. From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:7), it does not appear that he shares this understanding.
26.
Even within a period shorter than ten years (Rabbenu Asher).
27.
She is, however, permitted to marry another man (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154:12).
28.
The Beit Shmuel 154:29 emphasizes that this law and the following law apply only when the court does not suspect that the woman desires to marry another man. This is also reflected in the Rambam's wording, which indicates that her claim comes as a response to the court's initiative.
29.
Although the Ra'avad differs and does not require an oath in this situation, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's position. It is the Rambam's position that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:15).
30.
It is possible that the woman is not barren. It was merely that the two did not merit to conceive children together (Yevamot 64a).
31.
Although a factor must normally repeat itself three times for a chazakah (a presumption that can be relied on) to be established, an exception is made with regard to the laws of marriage. In this context, the opinion that considers a twofold occurrence to be a chazakah is followed.
32.
This ruling applies only if the husband had been unaware of the woman's condition previously. If he knew of her condition, he is obligated to pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah, as is the law with regard to an aylonit (Chapter 24:1-2).
33.
As reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (the conclusion of Nedarim), the Rambam does not interpret this as referring to an instance where the husband is sexually impotent entirely. Instead, it refers to a situation in which he can function, but it is the woman's belief that he will never conceive children. See the Lechem Mishneh and the interpretation of the Ralbach (Responsum 32). If, however, the woman were to claim that her husband is impotent, her word would be accepted.
Note, however, the Rashba (Vol. I, Responsum 628) and K'nesset HaGedolah (Even HaEzer 154:60), which interpret this halachah as speaking about an instance where the husband is sexually impotent.
34.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that, in theory, it would be proper to compel the husband to grant his wife a divorce immediately. This is not done, however, out of fear that her claim is untrue and she merely desires to marry another man.
He continues, stating that the court should try to develop communication between the couple. If those efforts fail, a compromise should be negotiated - e.g., in return for not compelling the woman to wait ten years for the divorce, the amount of money the husband is required to pay because of the ketubah should be reduced.
35.
Yevamot 62a states: "[Although a man] fathers children in his youth, he should continue to do so at an advanced age, as implied by [Ecclesiastes 11:6]: 'In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not withhold your hand.'"
As mentioned above, the Chidah explains that as long as a man endeavors to continue fathering children from time to time, it is acceptable. One need not attempt to conceive children at every opportunity. Based on this decision, there are authorities who permit the limited use of certain birth control devices. The matter is not, however, entirely clear cut and should be discussed with a competent Rabbinic authority with regard to one's actual conduct.
36.
Similarly, having children leads to the coming of the Redemption. Yevamot 63b states that the Mashiach will not come until all the souls destined to be conceived are born.
37.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:8) explains that this commandment applies when the husband cannot support a wife who can bear children and increase the size of his family.
38.
See Yevamot 62b, which states: "Any man who is unmarried is left without happiness, without good and without blessing."
Rav David Cohen quotes Rav Yitzchak Alfasi as maintaining that the requirement to marry stems from the Torah and not from our Sages, as the Rambam maintains.
39.
See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:26, which states that it is permissible for a woman never to marry.
40.
Here the term לקנאת, translated as "admonish," has a specific meaning: to warn one's wife not to enter into privacy with another man. If this warning is disobeyed, the woman must undergo the rites of a sotah to continue her marriage.
41.
Sotah 3a. Although this is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, the Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
42.
See the conclusion of Hilchot Sotah for a more detailed treatment of this subject.
43.
See Hilchot De'ot 5:4-5.
44.
Eruvin 100b states that a woman requests intimacy with her heart.
45.
See Chapter 24, Halachah 15ff.

Ishut - Chapter Sixteen

1
The property that a woman brings to her husband's [resources] - be it landed property, movable property or servants - is not referred to with the term ketubah, but rather with the term nedunyah.
[More particularly, there are two subdivisions within this category.] When the husband accepts responsibility for the nedunyah and it is considered to be his property1 - i.e., if it decreases in value he suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is his - the property is referred to as nichsei tzon barzel.2
If the husband did not accept responsibility for the nedunyah,3 and it instead remained the property of the woman4 - if it decreases in value she suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is hers - the property is referred to as nichsei m'log.5
א
הנכסים שמכנסת האשה לבעלה בין קרקע בין מטלטלין בין עבדים אע"פ שהן נכתבין בשטר הכתובה אין נקראין כתובה אלא נדוניא שמם. ואם קיבל הבעל אחריות הנדוניא עליו ונעשית ברשותו אם פחתה פחתה לו ואם הותירה הותירה לו הרי זו נקראת נכסי צאן ברזל. ואם לא קיבל אחריות הנדוניא עליו אלא הרי היא ברשות האשה אם פחתה פחתה לה ואם הותירה הותירה לה הרי זו נקראת נכסי מלוג:
2
Similarly, all the property that a woman owns that she did not bring to her husband's household, nor had written in her ketubah, but rather left as her own, or property that came to her as an inheritance, or that was given to her as a present - all of this is referred to as nichsei m'log, for it is all in her possession.
The term ketubah, by contrast, refers only to the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - i.e., 100 [zuz for a non-virgin] or 200 [zuz for a virgin] and the additional amount that [the husband promised].6
ב
וכן כל נכסים שיש לאשה שלא הכניסה אותן לבעלה ולא כתבו אותן בכתובה אלא נשארו לעצמה. או נפלו לה בירושה אחר שנתארסה או נתנו לה במתנה הכל נקראין נכסי מלוג שכולן ברשותה הן. ואין נקראין כתובה אלא עיקר כתובה שהוא מאה או מאתים עם התוספת בלבד:
3
We have already explained that our Sages established the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, and that the laws governing the additional amount [promised by the husband] are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement.7
[Our Sages] did not grant a woman the option of collecting [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah whenever she desired. Instead, it is like a debt, which is not payable until a given date. For a ketubah, the time when payment is due is not until after the woman's husband dies or divorces her.
Similarly, our Sages ordained that if a husband has fields [of varying quality] - good, bad and intermediate - when the woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from this property, she is entitled to collect only from the inferior fields.8They are referred to as ziboorit.9
ג
כבר הודענו שחכמים תקנו כתובה לאשה ודין התוספת כדין העיקר. ולא תקנו לגבותה כל זמן שתרצה אלא הרי היא כחוב שיש לו זמן ואין הכתובה נגבית אלא לאחר מיתת הבעל או אם גירשה. וכן התקינו שאם היו לבעל שדות טובות ורעות ובינוניות ובאה האשה לגבות כתובתה ממנו שלא תגבה אלא מן הרעה שבנכסיו והיא הנקראת זיבורית:
4
Similarly, our Sages ordained that when a woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah after her husband's death, she may not collect [this sum] until she takes an oath while holding a sacred article,10 that her husband did not leave any property in her possession,11 that she had not sold her ketubah to him, nor waived payment of it.12 [Her wardrobe, even] the garments she is wearing should be evaluated and the sum deducted from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.13
If, however, he voluntarily divorces her, she may collect [the money due her] without taking an oath,14 nor should [her wardrobe] be evaluated.15 [The rationale is that] he bought them for her, she acquired them, and it is he who desires to divorce her, and not the reverse.16
ד
וכן התקינו שכשתבוא לגבות כתובתה אחר מותו לא תגבה עד שתשבע בנקיטת חפץ שלא הניח אצלה כלום ולא מכרה לו כתובתה ולא מחלה אותה. ושמין לה כל מה שעליה ופוחתין אותו מכתובתה. אבל אם גירשה לרצונו גובה בלא שבועה ואין שמין כסות שעליה שהרי לקחן לה וזכתה בהן והוא רוצה להוציאה לא היא:
5
Similarly, [our Sages] ordained that a widow17 should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from landed property only.18 [Moreover,] she may not collect [her due] from the increment in the value of that property after the husband died.19Similarly, after their father's death, [the woman's] daughters do not receive their subsistence20 from the increment in the value of that property after his death.
Similarly, a woman may not collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the increment in the value of [landed] property accomplished through the efforts of a purchaser, although other creditors are entitled to collect their due from that increment.21These rulings are among the leniencies [granted with regard to the the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah.
ה
וכן התקינו שלא תגבה האלמנה כתובתה אלא מן הקרקע. ואינה גובה משבח ששבחו נכסים לאחר מיתת הבעל. ואין הבנות ניזונות לאחר מיתת אביהן משבח ששבחו נכסים לאחר מיתתו. ואינה טורפת בכתובתה בשבח שהשביח הלוקח אע"פ שבעל חוב גובה את השבח. ודברים אלו מקולי כתובה הם:
6
Similarly, among the leniencies [granted with regard to the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah is that a woman will collect the money due her from the coinage that is of least value.
What is implied? A man married a woman in one country and divorced her in another. If the coinage of the country in which the couple married is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they divorced, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they divorced. If, by contrast, the coinage of the country in which the couple divorced is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they married, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they married.22
When does the above apply? When her ketubah states a sum of coins without specification. If, however, a specific type of coin is explicitly mentioned, whether with regard to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, or with regard to the extra amount added by the husband, the law is the same as when a person lends a colleague a specific type of coin - he must return the loan in the coinage that he took, as will be explained in Hilchot Halva'ah.23
ו
וכן מקולי כתובה שתטול האשה בכתובתה מן הפחות שבמטבעות. כיצד נשא אשה במקום אחד וגירשה במקום אחר. אם היו מעות מקום הנישואין טובים ממעות מקום הגירושין נותן לה ממעות מקום הגירושין. ואם היו מעות מקום הגירושין טובים ממעות מקום הנישואין נותן לה ממעות מקום הנישואין. בד"א בשהיה בכתובתה מעות סתם. אבל אם פירש בה מטבע ידוע בין בעיקר בין בתוספת הרי היא כדין המלוה את חבירו מטבע ידוע שנותן לו כמה שהלוהו כמו שיתבאר בהלכות הלואה:
7
The geonim of all the yeshivot ordained that after the death of a man, a woman should be able to collect her [money due her by virtue of her] ketubah from movable property,24 just as they ordained that a creditor can collect the debt owed him from movable property.25 This mandate spread throughout the majority of the Jewish people.26
Similarly, the other conditions of a woman's ketubah are governed by the same rules as [the fundamental requirement of] the ketubah, and they are binding on the movable property of the deceased's estate, as well as on the landed property. There is, however, one exception - the right of the sons to inherit their mother's ketubah. Since the custom of granting them this inheritance was not universally accepted by all the yeshivot,27 I maintain that the law of the Talmud should be applied in this instance, and they should inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah only from the landed property [within the estate].28
ז
תקנו הגאונים בכל הישיבות שתהיה האשה גובה כתובתה אחרי מות בעלה אף מן המטלטלין כדרך שהתקינו לבעל חוב לגבות מן המטלטלין. ופשטה תקנה זו ברוב ישראל. וכן שאר תנאי כתובה כולן ככתובה הן וישנן במטלטלין כבקרקע. חוץ מכתובת בנין דכרין שלא מצאנו מנהג ירושתן פשוט בכל הישיבות. לפיכך אני אומר מעמידין אותה על דין הגמרא שאין יורשין כתובת אמן אלא מן הקרקע:
8
In all the [Jewish] communities of which I know and have heard reports from, it has already become the custom to write the ketubah so that [its obligations are binding] on both the landed property and the movable property [in the estate].29
[Making] this addition is a great asset; it was ordained by learned men of great stature. For it is a monetary stipulation, and thus a widow is entitled to collect [the money due her] from the movable property [in her husband's] estate by virtue of this stipulation, and not by virtue of the mandate of the later sages.30
ח
כבר נהגו בכל המקומות שידענו וששמענו שמען שיכתבו בכתובה בין ממקרקעי בין ממטלטלי. ודבר זה תיקון גדול הוא ואנשים גדולים ונבונים הנהיגו דבר זה שהרי זה תנאי שבממון ונמצא האלמנה גובה מן המטלטלין בתנאי זה לא בתקנת אחרונים:
9
[The following rules apply when] this stipulation was not included in the text of the ketubah, but instead [the couple] married without making an explicit statement [in this regard]. If the husband knew of this ordinance established by the geonim, the woman may collect [the money due her from the movable property in his estate].
If, however, he was not [aware of this ordinance], or we are unsure whether he knew of it, we deliberate at length concerning this matter. For an ordinance of the geonim does not have the power to be applied and to have money expropriated from the heirs because of it, when it was not explicitly stated, as is the law regarding the conditions of the ketubah.31 [The distinction between the two is that the conditions of the ketubah] are ordinances instituted by the Great Sanhedrin.
ט
הרי שלא כתב כך בשטר הכתובה אלא נשא סתם. אם היה יודע בתקנה זו של גאונים גובה. ואם לאו או שנסתפק לנו הדבר מתישבין בדבר הרבה שאין כח בתקנת הגאונים לדון בה אף ע"פ שלא נתפרשה כדין תנאי כתובה שהם תקנת הסנהדרין הגדולה עד שנוציא בה ממון מן היורשים:
10
Our Sages also ordained that all of a husband's property should be on lien for the woman's ketubah. Even if the woman's ketubah is [only 100 zuz] and [her husband] owns property worth several thousand gold pieces, it is all under lien to her ketubah.
[Her husband] is entitled to sell all his property if he desires, and his sale is binding. Nevertheless, all the property that he sells after his marriage can be expropriated [from the purchaser] by his widow [in lieu of payment for] her ketubah when he divorces her or when he dies, if he does not possess property that has not been sold.32
When a woman expropriates property [from a purchaser], she must take an oath holding a sacred article, as is taken by any of [a person's] creditors [who seek to expropriate property from its purchasers]. This provision was instituted so that he should not view [the obligation of] the ketubah lightly.
י
ועוד תקנו חכמים שיהיו כל נכסי הבעל אחראין וערבאין לכתובה אפילו כתובתה מנה ויש לו קרקע באלפים זהובים הכל תחת שיעבוד הכתובה. וכל שימכור אחר הנישואין מנכסיו אע"פ שממכרו קיים ויש לו למכור כל נכסיו אם ירצה יש לה לטרוף אותן בכתובתה כשיגרשנה או כשימות אם לא תמצא נכסים בני חורין. וכשתטרוף לא תטרוף אלא בשבועה בנקיטת חפץ כדין כל בעלי חובות. ותקנה זו כדי שלא תהיה כתובה קלה בעיניו:
11
When the court or the heirs require a widow to take an oath when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, the oath should be taken only outside the court.33 For the court would refrain from administering the oath, lest she not be precise with herself when making it.34
If the heirs desired that she make a vow [instead of an oath], she may make a vow linked to any object they desire.35 This vow may be administered in a court. Afterwards, she should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
יא
כשמשביעין ב"ד או היורשין את האלמנה כשתבוא לגבות כתובתה אין משביעין אותה אלא חוץ לב"ד. מפני שבתי דינין היו נמנעין מלהשביעה שחוששין לה שמא לא תדקדק על עצמה בשבועה. ואם רצו היתומים להדירה נודרת להן כל מה שירצו ומדירין אותה בב"ד ואחר כך נוטלת כתובתה:
12
If a widow dies before taking this oath, her heirs should not inherit her ketubah at all, for she does not have any rights to her ketubah until she takes an oath.36
If the woman marries [a second time] before taking an oath [with regard to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from her previous husband's estate], she may take an oath after her remarriage and collect her due whenever she desires. She does not, however, have the option of making a vow, lest her [second] husband annul it.37
יב
מתה האלמנה קודם שתשבע אין יורשיה יורשין מכתובתה כלום שאין לה כתובה עד שתשבע. ואם נשאת קודם שתשבע הרי זו נשבעת אחר הנישואין ונוטלת כל זמן שתרצה. אבל אינה נודרת ונוטלת שמא יפר לה הבעל:
13
If [a woman's husband] designated a plot of land for her in her ketubah, whether he specified [only] one of its borders or all four of its borders, she may collect her ketubah from this plot of land without taking an oath.
Similarly, if he specified movable property [in the ketubah] and this movable property exists, she may take it without taking an oath. [Moreover,] if the [movable property that was specified] was sold and other movable property purchased with the proceeds, it being known that these goods were purchased with the proceeds of [the movable property specified in the ketubah], she may take them without taking an oath.
יג
ייחד לה קרקע בכתובתה בין שייחד לה בארבעת המצרים בין במצר אחד גובה את כתובתה ממנה בלא שבועה. וכן אם כתב לה מטלטלין והן עצמן קיימין נוטלת אותן בלא שבועה. וכן אם נמכרו ונלקח בהן מטלטלין אחרים ונודע שאלו השניים מדמי המטלטלין הראשונים נוטלתן בלא שבועה:
14
A woman who diminishes [the amount of money due her by virtue of] her ketubah may collect her due only after taking an oath.38
What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims to have received only a portion of the amount. Even if there are witnesses who testify that she received the amount that she admits to having received,39 and even if she is extremely precise in accounting what she took, mentioning even [the last] half-p'rutah, she may collect the remainder only after taking an oath.40
יד
הפוגמת כתובתה לא תפרע אלא בשבועה. כיצד הוציאה שטר כתובה שיש בו אלף זוז הבעל אומר נתקבלת הכל והיא אומרת לא נתקבלתי אלא כך וכך. ואפילו יש עליה עדים במקצת שנטלה ואפילו דקדקה עצמה בחשבון מה שנטלה בחצי פרוטה לא תטול השאר אלא בשבועה:
15
[An oath is also required in the following instance.] The husband claims that [his wife] received all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah], while the woman claims not to have received the money, and one witness testifies that she received either the entire sum or a portion of it. [The woman] may collect the entire [sum mentioned in] the ketubah, but only after taking an oath.41
טו
אמר הבעל נתקבלת הכל והיא אומרת לא נתקבלתי כלום ועד אחד מעיד עליה שנתקבלה הכל או מקצת לא תפרע כל הכתובה אלא בשבועה:
16
[When a divorcee collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah] outside the presence of her husband, she must take an oath before doing so.
What is implied? A man divorced his wife and departed. After his wife takes an oath, the court should expropriate his property and give [the woman the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
The above applies when the husband is in a distant place, where there is difficulty in notifying him. If, however, he is in a nearby place [where it is possible] to notify him, a message should be sent to notify him [of the court's impending action]. If he does not come, the woman should take the oath and collect [her due].
טז
הנפרעת שלא בפניו לא תפרע אלא בשבועה. כיצד הרי שגירש את אשתו והלך לו. ב"ד יורדין לנכסיו אחר שתשבע ומגבין אותה כתובתה והוא שיהיה במקום רחוק שיש להן טורח להודיעו. אבל אם היה במקום קרוב להודיעו שולחין לו ומודיעין אותו. ואם לא יבוא תשבע ותטול:
17
A woman who reduces the value of her ketubah is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].42
What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims not to have received anything at all, but she admits: "I am owed only 500 zuz. Although he wrote 1000 for me [in the ketubah], there was an understanding between me and him [concerning this]." In this instance, she is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].
If, however, [in the above situation,] the woman says: "My ketubah states only 500 zuz," she may not collect with this document that says [she is due] 1000 zuz, for she has negated it. It is as if she has admitted that it is false. Therefore, [the husband] may take a rabbinic oath [to support his claim]; he is then freed [of all obligations].
יז
הפוחתת כתובתה נפרעת שלא בשבועה. כיצד הוציאה שטר כתובה באלף זוז הוא אומר נתקבלת הכל והיא אומרת לא נתקבלתי כלום ואין לי אלא ה' מאות זוז וזה שכתב לי אלף אמנה היתה ביני לבינו הרי זו נפרעת שלא בשבועה. אבל אם אמרה אין בשטר כתובתי אלא חמש מאות אינה נפרעת בשטר זה שיש בו אלף זוז כלום שהרי בטלה אותו וכאילו הודית שהוא שקר לפיכך נשבע שבועת היסת ונפטר:
18
Whenever we have stated that a woman may not collect [her due] unless she takes an oath, the court tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." Whenever we said that she may collect her due without an oath, [the court] tells the husband: "Give her [what is due her]. Your claim is not acceptable until you bring proof to support it."
יח
כל מקום שאמרנו לא תפרע אלא בשבועה אומרים לה ב"ד השבעי וטלי. ומקום שאמרנו תפרע שלא בשבועה אומרים לבעל עמוד ותן לה ואין אתה נאמן בטענה זו עד שתביא ראיה לדבריך:
19
If [in the latter instances], on his own initiative, the husband asks that [the woman] take an oath [denying] his claim, [the court] tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." She must take this oath holding a sacred article.
If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from him [in the event of a divorce] without taking any oath at all. [In the event of his death,] however, she must take an oath before collecting [her due] from his heirs.43
יט
אמר הבעל מעצמו תשבע לי על טענתי אומרין לה השבעי וטלי ותשבע בנקיטת חפץ. התנית עמו שתגבה כתובתה שלא בשבועה או שתהא נאמנת בכל מה שתטעון גובה ממנו בלא שבועה כלל. אבל אם באה לגבות מיורשיו תשבע ואחר כך תטול:
20
If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from his heirs without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted by his heirs regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from the heirs without taking any oath at all.44
If, however, she comes to collect [her due] from property that has been sold, she must take an oath before collecting. Although her husband was willing to accept her word, the stipulation he made is binding only on himself and [the estate he left to] his heirs. It does not have the power to cause others to incur a financial loss.45
כ
התנית עמו שתגבה כתובתה מיורשיו בלא שבועה או שתהיה נאמנת בכל מה שתטעון על יורשיו הרי זו נוטלת מהן בלא שבועה. אבל אם באה לטרוף מנכסים משועבדים לא תטרוף אלא בשבועה. ואע"פ שהאמינה הבעל שאין תנאי הבעל מועיל אלא עליו ועל יורשיו אבל להפסיד ממון אחרים אינו מועיל:
21
A widow who is in possession of her [the document recording her] ketubah may collect her due, after taking an oath, even though 100 years have passed since her husband's death.46 This applies regardless of whether she resides in her [deceased] husband's home or in her father's home.47
If, however, she does not have possession of her ketubah, she is not entitled to anything, even if she makes her claim on the day her husband dies.48 Similarly, a divorcee is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah.
כא
אלמנה שהיה שטר כתובה יוצא מתחת ידה נשבעת וגובה כתובתה לעולם אפילו אחר מאה שנה. בין שהיתה בבית בעלה בין שהיתה בבית אביה. ואם אין שטר כתובה יוצא מתחת ידה אין לה כלום ואפילו עיקר כתובה ואפי' תבעה ביום מיתת בעלה. וכן הגרושה אפילו עיקר כתובה אין לה עד שתוציא שטר כתובה:
22
When does the above apply? In a place where it is customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah. [Different rules apply,] however, in a place where it is not customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah, and instead, [the couple] rely on the conditions established by the Jewish court.49
[In such a situation, the woman is entitled to] collect the essential requirement of the ketubah50 even when she is not in possession of a document recording the ketubah, regardless of whether she was widowed or divorced, or whether she [continues to] reside in her husband's home or [has returned to] her father's home. She is not, however, given [anything she claims her husband promised her] in addition unless she has definite proof [of such an obligation].51
כב
במה דברים אמורים במקום שדרכן לכתוב כתובה. אבל במקום שאין דרכן לכתוב כתובה אלא סומכין על תנאי בית דין הרי זו גובה עיקר כתובה אע"פ שאין בידה שטר כתובה בין נתגרשה בין נתאלמנה בין שהיתה בבית בעלה בין שהיתה בבית אביה. אבל תוספת אין לה בכ"מ אלא בראיה ברורה:
23
Until when is a widow entitled to collect the essential requirement of the ketubah52 in a place where it is not customary to compose a ketubah? If she [continues to reside] in her husband's home, there is no limit on the time she is granted.53If she [resides] in her father's home,54 [she has this prerogative] for twenty-five years.
If, [however,] she comes to collect [the money due her because of her ketubah] after twenty-five years, she is not entitled to anything. [The rationale is that] had she not foregone [the money due her], she would not have remained silent for this long. Nor is she living together with the heirs, so that she could [excuse her silence,] explaining that she was embarrassed to sue them while she was living together with them in [one] home.
כג
ועד כמה תגבה האלמנה העיקר במקום שאין כותבין כתובה. אם היתה בבית בעלה גובה לעולם. ואם היתה בבית אביה עד עשרים וחמש שנה. ואם באה לתבוע אחר עשרים וחמש שנה אין לה כלום שאילו לא מחלה לא שתקה כל זמן זה. והרי אינה עם היורשים כדי שתאמר נכלמתי מלתבען והן עמי בבית:
24
For this reason, if [one of] the heirs was in the habit of bringing her subsistence while she was residing in her father's home and caring for her needs, she has the prerogative of demanding [her due] even after twenty-five years have passed. The reason why she remained silent and did not present her claim is that she was ashamed [to sue] the heir.
כד
לפיכך אם היה היורש עצמו מוליך מזונותיה לבית אביה ומטפל בה יש לה לתבוע כתובתה ואפילו אחר כ"ה שנה מפני שזו ששתקה ולא תבעה מפני שהיא בושה מן היורש:
25
[The following rules apply when there is a difference between the claims of a husband - or his heirs - and his wife regarding the size of the essential requirement of her ketubah.] She says, "I was a virgin when I married, and the essential requirement of my ketubah is 200 [zuz]." Her husband or his heirs claim, "She was not a virgin, and she is due only 100."
If there are witnesses who saw that the customs that people in that locale carry out when virgins are wed were carried out on her behalf - e.g., there were different types of celebrations, [she wore a] crown or a particular garment [designated for this purpose], or other rites that are performed only for the sake of virgins were performed [for her] - she is entitled to 200 [zuz]. If there are no witnesses to this, she is entitled to only 100 [zuz].
[In the latter instance,] if her husband is alive, she can require him to take an oath required by the Torah,55 for he has acknowledged a portion of a claim.
[In cases of this nature,] testimony is accepted [from a person]56once he became an adult, who says: "I remember that when I was a child, the rites performed for virgin brides were performed on behalf of such and such."57
As mentioned, all the above applies [only] in places where it is customary not to compose a document recording the ketubah.58
כה
היא אומרת בתולה נישאתי ועיקר כתובתי מאתים והבעל או יורשיו אומרים בעולה נשאת ואין לה אלא מאה. אם יש עדים שראו שעשו לה המנהגות שנהגו אנשי אותה העיר לעשותן לבתולה כגון מיני שמחה או כתרים או מלבוש ידוע או שאר דברים שאין עושין כך אלא לבתולה הרי זו נוטלת מאתים. ואם אין לה עדים בזה הרי זו נוטלת מנה. ואם היה הבעל קיים יש לה להשביעו שבועת התורה שהרי הודה במקצת הטענה. ונאמן הקטן להעיד בגדלו ולומר זוכר אני כשהייתי קטן שנעשה לפלונית מנהג הבתולות. וכל הדברים האלו במקום שאין כותבין כתובה כמו שאמרנו:
26
When a woman tells her husband, "You divorced me," her word is accepted. [The rationale is that if this were not the truth,] she would not speak so boldly to her husband.59
Accordingly, when a woman produces her ketubah, [even] without having a bill of divorce, and tells her husband: "You divorced me. I lost my bill of divorce. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," [her claim is accepted, and her husband] is obligated to pay her the essential requirement of the marriage contract, even though he claims that he never divorced her.60 He is not, however, [obligated to] give her the additional amount he promised,61 unless she brings proof that she has been divorced, or she manifests possession of both the bill of divorce and her ketubah.
כו
האשה שאמרה לבעלה גירשתני נאמנת שאינה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה. לפיכך האשה שהוציאה שטר כתובה ואין עמה גט ואמרה לבעלה גירשתני ואבד גיטי תן לי כתובתי והוא אומר לא גירשתיך חייב ליתן לה עיקר כתובה. אבל אינו נותן לה התוספת עד שתביא ראיה שגירשה או שיצא גט עם הכתובה מתחת ידה:
27
[In the above situation,] if [the woman's] husband said: "This is what happened. I divorced her and paid her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, both the essential requirement and the additional amount. She wrote me a receipt, but I lost it" [the following rules apply]. He requires her to take an oath while holding a sacred article [that he is liable to pay her] the essential requirement [of the ketubah], and then he must give her [that sum].62
With regard to the additional amount, his word is accepted. [The rationale is that] he could have claimed that he never divorced her, and in such an instance he would not be held liable for the additional amount. [We assume that had he desired to lie, he would have used that alternative.] He is, however, required to take a rabbinic oath with regard to the additional amount.
כז
אמר לה הבעל כך היה גירשתי ונתתי לה כל הכתובה עיקר ותוספת וכתבה לי שובר ואבד שוברי. מתוך שיכול לומר לא גירשתי ולא יתחייב בתוספת נאמן ומשביעה בנקיטת חפץ ונותן לה את העיקר ונשבע הוא שבועת היסת על התוספת:
28
[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce, but does not have her ketubah in her possession. If the local custom is not to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of] the bill of divorce she is holding. If, however, it is the local custom to compose a ketubah, she is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah, as was explained.63 Her husband must take a rabbinic oath denying her claim, and he is freed of liability.
כח
הוציאה גט ואין בידה שטר כתובה. אם דרך אותו מקום שלא יכתבו כתובה גובה עיקר כתובתה בגט שבידה. ואם דרכן לכתוב כתובה אפילו עיקר אין לה עד שתוציא שטר כתובה כמו שביארנו. ונשבע הבעל שבועת היסת על טענתה ונפטר:
29
[When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she is entitled to collect the amount due her by virtue of both ketubot.64 If she produces two ketubot and one bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect only [the money due her for] one ketubah.65
Which ketubah should she collect? If they are both for the same amount, the later ketubah negates the earlier one, and she is entitled to collect [property that was sold to others] from the date of the later [ketubah].66 If one of them is for a greater sum than the other, she may collect whichever she desires, and the other one is voided.67
כט
הוציאה שתי גיטין ושתי כתובות גובה שתי כתובות. הוציאה שתי כתובות וגט אחד אינה גובה אלא כתובה אחת. ואי זו מהן גובה אם שתיהן שוות בטלה האחרונה את הראשונה ואינה טורפת אלא מזמן האחרונה. ואם היה באחת משתיהן תוספת על חבירתה גובה באיזה מהן שתרצה ותבטל השניה:
30
[When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and one ketubah, she has [the right to collect] only [the amount due her by virtue of] one ketubah.68 For when a man divorces his wife and remarries her without specifying any conditions, [it can be assumed] that he remarried her with the intent that her original ketubah [become binding again].
[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce and a ketubah after the death of her husband: If the bill of divorce is dated prior to the ketubah,69 [in a place where] it is not customary to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of this] bill of divorce,70 and she is entitled to collect the entire sum [mentioned] in the second ketubah, for she acquires this sum by virtue of [her husband's] death.
If her ketubah is dated prior to the bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah only once. [We assume] that when he remarried her, his intent was that her original ketubah [become binding again].
ל
הוציאה שתי גיטין וכתובה אחת אין לה אלא כתובה אחת. שהמגרש את אשתו והחזירה סתם על כתובתה הראשונה החזירה. הוציאה גט וכתובה אחר מיתת הבעל אם גט קודם לכתובה גובה בגט זה עיקר כתובה אם אין דרכן לכתוב כתובה וגובה כל מה שיש בכתובתה זו שהרי זכתה בה במיתתו. ואם כתובה קדמה את הגט אין לה אלא כתובה אחת שעל כתובתה הראשונה החזירה:
31
A woman's word is accepted if she says: "My husband died," so that she [be granted permission to] remarry, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin.71 One of the conditions of the ketubah is that if a woman remarries after the death of her husband, she is entitled to collect the entire sum written in her ketubah.
Therefore, if she came to the court and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry," without mentioning [the collection of the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah at all, she is granted permission to remarry. [Afterwards,] she is required to take an oath,72 and then she is given [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
If she says, "My husband died. Give me the money due me by virtue of my ketubah," [not only is she not granted this money,] she is not even permitted to remarry. [We assume that] she came [only] because of the matter of the ketubah. Our presumption is that her husband has not died. Her intent is not to remarry, but merely to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah during [her husband's] lifetime.
If she came and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry and give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," she is permitted to remarry and is granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. The rationale is that her primary intent is remarriage. If, however, she comes and says: "My husband died. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah, and grant me permission to remarry," she is permitted to remarry, but she is not granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.73 If, however, she seizes possession [of this sum], the court should not expropriate it from her possession.
לא
האשה נאמנת לומר מת בעלי כדי שתנשא כמו שיתבאר בהלכות גירושין. ומתנאי הכתובה שאם תנשא לאחר אחר מותו תטול כל מה שכתב לה בכתובתה. לפיכך אם באה לבית דין ואמרה מת בעלי התירוני להנשא ולא הזכירה שם כתובה בעולם מתירין אותה להנשא ומשביעין אותה ונותנין לה כתובתה. באה ואמרה מת בעלי תנו לי את כתובתי אף להנשא אין מתירין אותה שעל עסקי הכתובה באה והרי זה בחזקת שלא מת. ואין דעתה להנשא אלא ליטול כתובה מחיים בלבד. באה ואמרה מת בעלי התירוני להנשא ותנו לי את כתובתי מתירין אותה להנשא ונותנין לה כתובתה מפני שעיקר דבריה על עסקי הנישואין באה. אבל אם באה ואמרה תנו לי את כתובתי והתירוני להנשא מתירין אותה ואין נותנין לה כתובה ואם תפשה אין מוציאין מידה:
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., the article or land that the woman brings to the household is evaluated, and the husband takes responsibility for the value of the article. From this time onward, it is as if the article were his, and he is obligated to pay his wife a fixed amount if he divorces her or she is widowed.
2.
This term literally means "property [that is like] iron sheep." The term iron is used to indicate that the husband's obligation is unchanging, like iron. The reference to sheep stems from the fact that during the Talmudic period in Eretz Yisrael, a similar agreement was frequently made with a shepherd with regard to the sheep entrusted to him. He was given a herd that was evaluated at a given price, and he was obligated to return either sheep of that value, or payment for them to their owner. (See the commentary of Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Yevamot 7:1.)
3.
With this statement, the Rambam indicates that - in contrast to the opinion of certain authorities - the property belonging to a woman does not automatically become nichsei tzon barzel. For it to be placed in that category, the husband must explicitly accept responsibility for it (Maggid Mishneh). (See Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 85:3.)
4.
With regard to this type of property as well, the husband has the privilege to manage the use of the property and reap its benefits during the time he remains married to the woman, but the property itself belongs to her.
5.
The term m'log means "to pull out hairs" (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 7:1). Just as a person pulls out the hairs from a head, leaving it uncovered, so too, the husband continues to use his wife's property even though its value depreciates.
6.
By making a distinction between the money due a woman by virtue of her ketubah and her nedunyah, the Rambam is emphasizing that they are governed by different laws. With regard to the money of the ketubah, the husband or his estate is granted certain leniencies. But with regard to the nedunyah, by contrast, the woman is considered the same as any other of her husband's creditors (Maggid Mishneh). The Beit Yosef and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 100:2) quote this explanation.
7.
See Chapter 10, Halachah 7.
8.
Although a creditor has the right to collect his due from the properties of intermediate value, the woman is given this disadvantage. The rationale is that a woman desires to marry and therefore is willing to accept this stipulation (Gittin 50a).
9.
The Aruch HaShalem interprets this term as being derived from an Arab word meaning "a rocky field." The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 101:5) states that it refers to a bee that stings and is therefore considered one of the lower forms of life.
10.
I.e., a Torah scroll, as mentioned in Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:8. An oath is required because the woman is seeking to collect money from an estate bequeathed to heirs, and whenever payment is to be collected from an estate, an oath is necessary (Ketubot 87a; Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1).
11.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) states that the woman must also take an oath that she did not seize any of her husband's property. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:2) quotes this view.
12.
In contrast to the opinion of the Tur (loc. cit.) and the Hagahot Maimoniot, the Rambam maintains that even if a woman is in possession of her ketubah, she is required to take these oaths. (See Halachah 21.) The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rambam's view, but appears to favor that of the Tur.
13.
This refers to a trousseau given to the woman by her husband. Although the husband gave his wife these clothes as a gift, he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and leave his household (Ketubot 54a).
14.
In the first half of this halachah, the oath is instituted by the court to protect the interests of the heirs. In this instance, however, unless the husband himself issues a claim requiring an oath (see Halachah 19), no oath is required.
15.
From Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 1:5, it appears that this does not apply to a woman's Sabbath and festival clothing, or to her jewelry. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 99:1) states that those articles should be evaluated and deducted from the sum due her by virtue of her ketubah.
16.
If, however, the husband is compelled to divorce his wife, her wardrobe should be evaluated and deducted from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; see Ketubot 77a).
17.
This restriction applies to a widow, but not to a divorcee. The Rashba and other authorities differ and maintain that the same ruling applies to a divorcee. It appears that it is their opinion that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:1).
18.
I.e., and not from movable property. This ruling also applies to other creditors, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:11. (See, however, Halachah 7 below.)
19.
E.g., a woman was owed 200 zuz by virtue of her ketubah. Her husband's property was worth 150 zuz at the time of his death. Although its value rose afterwards to 200, the woman is entitled to only 150, because that was its value at the time of her husband's death.
20.
This is one of the conditions of a woman's ketubah.
21.
Landed property that was owned by a man at the time of his marriage or acceptance of a financial obligation is considered to be on lien to his wife or to his creditor. Even if it is sold to another person, the debt can be collected from it, if the person or his estate has no other property, as stated in Halachah 10. (See also Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh, Chapter 19.)
As mentioned in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 21:1, a creditor is entitled to collect not only the property itself, but also any increment in its value, whether an increment that comes naturally, or even one that results because of effort on the part of the purchaser. A woman is not, however, given this privilege with regard to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
22.
I.e., the woman's ketubah mentioned 200 silver coins without specifying the type of coin, and there was a difference between the value of the silver coins used in the country where the ketubah was written and those used in the country where the divorce takes place. If this were a loan contract, we would say that the intent is the coins of the country in which the loan was given. As a leniency to the husband, however, the law is different with regard to a ketubah, and he is obligated to pay only the lesser of the two values.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:5) state that this law applies only when the value of the money the woman receives is not less than 100 zuz of the Talmudic period for a non-virgin, and 200 zuz for a virgin.
23.
Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 4:11.
24.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period, and hence a woman would not feel secure unless the obligation of her ketubah were supported by land. In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property, thus, rose in importance, and a woman would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property.
25.
See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:12.
26.
Since it was accepted by the majority of the Jewish people, it should be adhered to. See, however, the following halachot.
27.
I.e., in certain places this practice was not followed. Although the Rambam maintains that the sons should be granted that privilege, their rights should not be extended beyond their original scope.
28.
The Rambam's opinion is accepted by many authorities. Nevertheless, there are dissenting views. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:14) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one.
29.
See the Rambam's text of the ketubah, Hilchot Yibbum 4:33.
30.
A person has the license to bind his estate to a particular obligation, although he would not be required to pay it by law. Once he makes such a commitment, his estate is bound by it.
31.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that in the Rambam's era, the observance of this ordinance had not spread throughout the entire Jewish world. Note the introduction to the Mishneh Torah which states that, in contrast to the ordinances of the Sages of the Talmud, an ordinance instituted by the geonim is not binding unless its observance has spread throughout the entire Jewish people.
The Chelkat Mechokek 100:2 and the Beit Shmuel 100:2 emphasize that the observance of this ordinance spread in the subsequent generations, and it is now universal Jewish practice. Therefore, it is binding even when it was not explicitly stated in the ketubah, and the husband's heirs claim that he was unaware of it.
32.
If, however, the husband or his estate possesses property that has not been sold, neither the woman nor another creditor may expropriate property that has already been sold (Gittin 5:2).
33.
Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba state that when an oath is made outside the court, God's name is not mentioned, and a Torah scroll is not held. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:19) quotes this view. The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that the fact that the Rambam does not mention such a distinction indicates that he does not accept this concept.
34.
Gittin 35a explains that since a widow carries out certain activities on behalf of the heirs of her deceased husband's estate (who are, in most instances, her children), she feels free to take certain articles belonging to the estate, without taking this into consideration. Hence, she might be ready to take an oath that she did not benefit from the estate, when in fact she did.
Since the sin of - and the punishment for - taking a false oath is very harsh, our Sages wished to reduce this severity by having the oath administered outside the court.
35.
I.e., the woman will vow never to eat bread on the condition that she benefited from property belonging to the estate. Breaking a vow is considered a less severe transgression than taking a false oath.
36.
This principle applies universally: Whenever a person is entitled to property only after taking an oath, that property is not transferred to the person's heirs if the oath had not been taken (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 96:1).
37.
Since the woman's second husband has the option of annulling any vows made by his wife, it is possible that she will take a false vow, relying on her husband to nullify it (Gittin 35b).
38.
Our Sages required the woman to take an oath because they were not sure that she made a complete account of the money she received. Requiring her to take an oath insures that she will, in fact, be careful regarding this account (Ketubot 87b).
39.
The fact that witnesses were made to observe payment of one portion of the ketubah is no proof that a second payment was not made without being observed by witnesses.
40.
The fact that she appears precise in reporting what she admits to having received is not proof that she has made a totally precise accounting (Ketubot, loc. cit.).
Similar laws apply to a creditor who states that he is actually owed a lesser amount than is stated in the contract of loan (Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1).
41.
Since the husband has only one witness to support his claim, and the woman's claim is supported by her ketubah, she is entitled to collect her full claim. Nevertheless, because of the witness, an oath is required.
42.
In contrast to a woman who diminishes the amount of money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Halachah 14), this woman does not admit receiving any funds. Hence, there is no need to require an oath so that she will make a careful account (Bayit Chadash, Even HaEzer 96).
43.
Unless a specific statement was made to that effect, the stipulation that her husband accepted at the time of the composition of the ketubah applies only to himself and not to his heirs.
44.
The Rambam's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 98:6). The Ramah, however, cites the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and other Ashkenazic authorities, who maintain that the husband's stipulation is not binding upon his heirs.
45.
The Ra'avad maintains that the woman's claim should be accepted without an oath. Since the husband made such a stipulation, it would have become public knowledge. Any person who purchased the property knew about the matter and accepted the risk. It is, however, the Rambam's ruling that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
46.
The fact that she maintained possession of her ketubah indicates that her delay in presenting her claim does not indicate a willingness to forego it.
47.
This distinction is, however, relevant in Halachah 23.
48.
For perhaps she has already received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or she has waived payment of this debt.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:6) quotes the Rambam's rulings. The Ramah quotes rulings that allow the woman to collect the money due her even in such an instance. Nevertheless, he states that the prevailing custom is not to allow a woman to collect her claim unless she is in possession of her ketubah.
49.
In the Talmudic period, there were places where it was not customary to compose a written document spelling out the marriage contract. Nevertheless, it was understood by both the husband and the wife that the financial dimensions of their marriage would be governed by the rules expressed in our Sages' requirements for the ketubah.
50.
When the husband claims to have paid the woman her due, he must prove his assertion. Otherwise, the woman's claim is accepted (Maggid Mishneh).
51.
This amount is granted the woman voluntarily by her husband and is not required by Jewish law. Therefore, unless the woman has proof that the commitment was made, she is not entitled to collect anything from her husband (Maggid Mishneh).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 100) states that even if a woman can prove that her husband made a commitment for an additional amount to her at the time of the marriage, she must also prove that this commitment was not met.
52.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 101) maintains that the Rambam's wording indicates that even if she remains silent, she foregoes only the essential requirement of the ketubah, but not the additional commitment that her husband made. However, Rav Yosef Karo dismisses this interpretation in the Kessef Mishneh and does not mention it in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 101).
53.
As reflected in the conclusion of this halachah, although a widow has the right to continue dwelling in her deceased husband's home, the heirs also have the right to dwell there. Since she is deriving her subsistence from them, she is ashamed to demand payment of her due from them.
54.
Or she remarries (Ramah, Even HaEzer 101:1).
55.
Objections to this statement are raised by the Ra'avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen and others. The claim for which the husband is required to take an oath involves a liability for which landed property is under lien. In such instances, a Torah oath is never administered. The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) and others, therefore, maintain that a rabbinic oath (sh'vuat hesset) is administered.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to an instance in his time, when, as stated in Halachot 8-9, the lien of the ketubah applies to movable as well as landed property. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh's explanation is challenged by other authorities, and even the Maggid Mishneh himself raises questions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16) mentions both opinions.
56.
As in all cases of Torah law, the testimony of two witnesses is required in this instance. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, both of these witnesses may have witnessed the events under consideration when they were minors. In both the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo differs and states that it is acceptable if one of these witnesses observed the events as a minor, but the other must have been past majority at that time.
57.
Generally, a witness's testimony is not accepted unless he is past majority - not only at the time he testifies in court, but also at the time he sees the event under discussion. In this instance, however, leniency is granted, because we rely on the fact that, by and large, most women are virgins when they marry. Moreover, the obligation of the ketubah is a point of Rabbinic law (Ketubot 28a; Hilchot Edut 14:3).
58.
For if a ketubah was composed, the text of the ketubah will clarify the matter. There is, however, an instance where this ruling would be applicable in a place where it is customary to compose a ketubah: an instance where the woman brings witnesses who testify that her ketubah was lost (Maggid Mishneh).
59.
The simple meaning of the Rambam's words is that if a woman makes such a statement, she is free to marry another person. As in Chapter 4, Halachah 13, the Ra'avad differs, explaining that the woman's statements are accepted only after the fact - i.e., after she has already married another person - and only insomuch as to require that other person to divorce her.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:2) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ra'avad's position is quoted by the Ramah. The Ramah also mentions that in the present age, since brash conduct has become more widespread, this claim is no longer accepted when presented by a woman. The Beit Shmuel 17:4 mentions that, at present, since it is customary for a record of divorces to be kept by the rabbinical court that issues them, this claim is no longer accepted. This is particularly true in the present age, when record-keeping and communication have advanced.
60.
The Ra'avad and the Ramah differ, as above.
61.
The essential requirement of the ketubah is an obligation imposed by our Sages, granted so that she would have the means to marry another person in the case of divorce or widowhood. Hence, since she is granted the opportunity of remarrying in this instance, she is also entitled to the money due her by virtue of the ketubah. The additional amount, by contrast, is not an obligation, but rather a present promised by her husband. It is self-understood that he did not make this promise to enable her to marry another man, when he does not admit that a divorce took place (Maggid Mishneh).
62.
The authorities who free the husband of obligation in the previous halachah also free him of all liability in this instance (Chelkat Mechokek 100:40; Beit Shmuel 100:40).
63.
Halachot 21-22.
64.
We assume that the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, the couple remarried, and the husband subsequently divorced her a second time, without paying her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
65.
The laws that follow apply when the dates of both the ketubot precede the date of the bill of divorce, and thus it is apparent that the woman was divorced only once.
66.
As mentioned previously, all of a husband's property is under lien to the ketubah. Therefore, if he sells his landed property to others and he does not possess sufficient property after the divorce to give his wife her due, she may collect that money by expropriating property that was sold. In this instance, we say that the woman waived payment of her ketubah originally to free from the lien property that was sold. Afterwards, her husband wrote her a second ketubah for the same amount.
67.
In this instance, we assume that the husband wrote the woman a second ketubah that would preempt the first one. In this instance, the woman has the choice of selecting which ketubah she desires - the one with the greater sum, or the one that is dated first and thus gives her greater power with regard to the expropriation of property that has been sold.
68.
As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam's statements, this refers to a situation in which the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her without composing a second ketubah.
69.
We assume that her husband divorced her and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her and composed a ketubah.
70.
As explained in Halachah 28.
71.
Chapter 12, Halachah 15. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:2.)
72.
I.e., the oath made by all widows before collecting the money due them by virtue of their ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh), in contrast to the opinion of the Tur (Even HaEzer 100), who requires the woman to take an oath that her husband died. (See Chelkat Mechokek 17:83.)
73.
This is a question that is left unresolved by the Talmud (Yevamot 117a). The Rambam rules that since the matter is very severe - if the woman remarries, and it is discovered that she lied, she will be prohibited to remain married to both her first or second husbands, and her children from her second husband will be considered illegitimate - and if her first husband is alive, it is likely that the fact will be discovered - in theory, the woman should be allowed to remarry. Because she mentions her ketubah, however, there is a doubt, and because of the doubt, the money in question is allowed to remain in the hands of the party in whose possession it is at the time the question is raised - i.e., the heirs. That doubt, however, applies only to the financial dimension of the relationship, and not to the permission to remarry (Kessef Mishneh).
Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the doubt raised by the Talmud also applies with regard to the woman's permission to remarry. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:44), although it appears that the Rambam's approach is favored.
• Hayom Yom: Today's Hayom Yom
• Wednesday, 
6 Tevet, 5777 · 4 January 2017
• "Today's Day"
• 
Monday, Tevet 6, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayigash, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 35-38.
Tanya: So, too, are all (p. 23)...before it was created (p. 23).
"Know the G-d of your fathers and serve Him with a whole heart."1 Every sort of Torah knowledge and comprehension, even the most profound, must be expressed in avoda.2 I.e. the intellectual attainment must bring about an actual refinement and improvement of character traits, and must be translated into a deep-rooted inward attachment (to G-d) - all of which is what the Chassidic lexicon calls"avoda".
FOOTNOTES
1.Divrei Hayamim I, 28:9.
2."Serve Him" in the quotation uses the Hebrew word avoda.
• Daily Thought:
Un-change
That which can be grasped will change.
That which does not change cannot be grasped.[Maamar Tziyon B’Mishpat 5736.]
-------

No comments:

Post a Comment