Sunday, February 28, 2016

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Sunday, February 28, 2016 - Today is: Sunday, Adar I 19, 5776 · February 28, 2016

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Sunday, February 28, 2016 - Today is: Sunday, Adar I 19, 5776 · February 28, 2016
Daily Quote:
Throw a branch into the air, and it will fall back on its root[Midrash Rabbah on Genesis 21:21]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Vayak'hel, 1st Portion Exodus 35:1-35:20 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Exodus Chapter 35
1Moses called the whole community of the children of Israel to assemble, and he said to them: "These are the things that the Lord commanded to make. אוַיַּקְהֵ֣ל משֶׁ֗ה אֶת־כָּל־עֲדַ֛ת בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אֲלֵהֶ֑ם אֵ֚לֶּה הַדְּבָרִ֔ים אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּ֥ה יְהֹוָ֖ה לַֽעֲשׂ֥ת אֹתָֽם:
Moses called… to assemble: Heb. וַיַּקְהֵל. [He assembled them] on the day after Yom Kippur, when he came down from the mountain. This [word] is a hiph’il [causative] expression [i.e., causing someone to do something], because one does not assemble people with [one’s] hands [i.e., directly], but they are assembled through one’s speech. Its Aramaic translation is וְאַכְנֵשׁ. ויקהל משה: למחרת יום הכפורים כשירד מן ההר, והוא לשון הפעיל, שאינו אוסף אנשים בידים, אלא הן נאספים על פי דבורו, ותרגומו ואכניש:
2Six days work may be done, but on the seventh day you shall have sanctity, a day of complete rest to the Lord; whoever performs work thereon [on this day] shall be put to death. בשֵׁ֣שֶׁת יָמִים֘ תֵּֽעָשֶׂ֣ה מְלָאכָה֒ וּבַיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִ֗י יִֽהְיֶ֨ה לָכֶ֥ם קֹ֛דֶשׁ שַׁבַּ֥ת שַׁבָּת֖וֹן לַֽיהֹוָ֑ה כָּל־הָֽעֹשֶׂ֥ה ב֛וֹ מְלָאכָ֖ה יוּמָֽת:
Six days: He [Moses] prefaced [the discussion of the details of] the work of the Mishkan with the warning to keep the Sabbath, denoting that it [i.e., the work of the Mishkan] does not supersede the Sabbath. -[from Mechilta] ששת ימים: הקדים להם אזהרת שבת לצווי מלאכת המשכן לומר שאינה דוחה את השבת:
3You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwelling places on the Sabbath day." גלֹֽא־תְבַֽעֲר֣וּ אֵ֔שׁ בְּכֹ֖ל מֽשְׁבֹֽתֵיכֶ֑ם בְּי֖וֹם הַשַּׁבָּֽת:
You shall not kindle fire: Some of our Rabbis say that [the prohibition of] kindling was singled out for a [mere] negative commandment, while others say that it was singled out to separate [all types of labor]. -[from Shab. 70a] לא תבערו אש: יש מרבותינו אומרים הבערה ללאו יצאת, ויש אומרים לחלק יצאת:
4And Moses spoke to the entire community of the children of Israel, saying: "This is the word that the Lord has commanded to say: דוַיֹּ֣אמֶר משֶׁ֔ה אֶל־כָּל־עֲדַ֥ת בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל לֵאמֹ֑ר זֶ֣ה הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּ֥ה יְהֹוָ֖ה לֵאמֹֽר:
This is the word that the Lord has commanded: me to say to you. זה הדבר אשר צוה ה': לי לאמר לכם:
5'Take from yourselves an offering for the Lord; every generous hearted person shall bring it, [namely] the Lord's offering: gold, silver, and copper; הקְח֨וּ מֵֽאִתְּכֶ֤ם תְּרוּמָה֙ לַֽיהֹוָ֔ה כֹּ֚ל נְדִ֣יב לִבּ֔וֹ יְבִיאֶ֕הָ אֵ֖ת תְּרוּמַ֣ת יְהֹוָ֑ה זָהָ֥ב וָכֶ֖סֶף וּנְחֽשֶׁת:
generous-hearted person: Heb. נְדִיב לִבּוֹ. Since his heart moved him to generosity, he is called “generous-hearted” (נְדִיב לֵב). I already explained the offering for the Mishkan and its work in the place of their command [Exod. 25 through 34]. נדיב לבו: על שם שלבו נדבו קרוי נדיב לב. כבר פירשתי נדבת המשכן ומלאכתו במקום צואתן:
6and blue, purple, and crimson wool; and linen and goat hair; ווּתְכֵ֧לֶת וְאַרְגָּמָ֛ן וְתוֹלַ֥עַת שָׁנִ֖י וְשֵׁ֥שׁ וְעִזִּֽים:
7and ram skins dyed red, tachash skins, and acacia wood; זוְעֹרֹ֨ת אֵילִ֧ם מְאָדָּמִ֛ים וְעֹרֹ֥ת תְּחָשִׁ֖ים וַֽעֲצֵ֥י שִׁטִּֽים:
8and oil for lighting, and spices for the anointing oil and for the incense; חוְשֶׁ֖מֶן לַמָּא֑וֹר וּבְשָׂמִים֙ לְשֶׁ֣מֶן הַמִּשְׁחָ֔ה וְלִקְטֹ֖רֶת הַסַּמִּֽים:
9and shoham stones and filling stones for the ephod and for the choshen. טוְאַ֨בְנֵי־שֹׁ֔הַם וְאַבְנֵ֖י מִלֻּאִ֑ים לָֽאֵפ֖וֹד וְלַחֽשֶׁן:
10And every wise hearted person among you shall come and make everything that the Lord has commanded: יוְכָל־חֲכַם־לֵ֖ב בָּכֶ֑ם יָבֹ֣אוּ וְיַֽעֲשׂ֔וּ אֵ֛ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוָּ֖ה יְהֹוָֽה:
11The Mishkan, its tent and its cover, its clasps and its planks, its bars, its pillars, and its sockets; יאאֶ֨ת־הַמִּשְׁכָּ֔ן אֶת־אָֽהֳל֖וֹ וְאֶת־מִכְסֵ֑הוּ אֶת־קְרָסָיו֙ וְאֶת־קְרָשָׁ֔יו אֶת־בְּרִיחָ֕ו אֶת־עַמֻּדָ֖יו וְאֶת־אֲדָנָֽיו:
The Mishkan: The bottom curtains, which appear inside it [the Mishkan], are called Mishkan. את המשכן: יריעות התחתונות הנראות בתוכו קרויים משכן:
its tent: That is the tent [made] of the curtains of goat hair, made for a roof. את אהלו: הוא אהל יריעות עזים העשוי לגג:
and its cover: The cover of ram skins and tachash skins. ואת מכסהו: מכסה עורות האילים והתחשים:
12the ark and its poles, the ark cover and the screening dividing curtain; יבאֶת־הָֽאָרֹ֥ן וְאֶת־בַּדָּ֖יו אֶת־הַכַּפֹּ֑רֶת וְאֵ֖ת פָּרֹ֥כֶת הַמָּסָֽךְ:
and the screening dividing curtain: Heb. הַמָּסָ פָּרֹכֶת. The dividing curtain, [which serves as a] screen. Anything that protects, whether from above or from the front, is called a screen (מָסָ) or a cover (סְכָ). Similarly, “You made a hedge (שַׂכְךְתָּ) about him” (Job 1: 10); “behold I will close off (שָׂ) your way” (Hos. 2:8). ואת פרכת המסך: פרוכת המחיצה. כל דבר המגין, בין מלמעלה בין מכנגד, קרוי מסך וסכך, וכן (איוב א י) שכת בעדו, (הושע ב ח) הנני שך את דרכך:
13the table and its poles and all its implements, and the showbread; יגאֶת־הַשֻּׁלְחָ֥ן וְאֶת־בַּדָּ֖יו וְאֶת־כָּל־כֵּלָ֑יו וְאֵ֖ת לֶ֥חֶם הַפָּנִֽים:
the showbread: I already explained (Exod. 25:29) that it was called לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים because it had faces [i.e., surfaces] looking in both directions, for it was made like a type of box, without a cover. לחם הפנים: כבר פירשתי (שמות כה כח) על שם שהיו לו פנים לכאן ולכאן, שהוא עשוי כמין תיבה פרוצה:
14and the menorah for lighting and its implements and its lamps, and the oil for lighting; ידוְאֶת־מְנֹרַ֧ת הַמָּא֛וֹר וְאֶת־כֵּלֶ֖יהָ וְאֶת־נֵֽרֹתֶ֑יהָ וְאֵ֖ת שֶׁ֥מֶן הַמָּאֽוֹר:
and its implements: Its tongs and its scoops. ואת כליה: מלקחים ומחתות:
its lamps: Ses luzes, lozes in Old French, spoons in which the oil and the wicks are placed. נרתיה: לוציי"ש בלעז [מנורות] בזיכים שהשמן והפתילות נתונין בהן:
and the oil for lighting: That too required wise-hearted [people] because it was different from other oils, as is explained in Menachoth (86a): he picks it [the olives] at the top of the olive tree, and it is crushed and pure. ואת שמן המאור: אף הוא צריך חכמי לב, שהוא משונה משאר שמנים, כמו שמפורש במנחות (דף פו א) מגרגרו בראש הזית, והוא כתית וזך:
15and the altar for incense and its poles, and the anointing oil and the incense and the screen of the entrance for the entrance of the Mishkan; טווְאֶת־מִזְבַּ֤ח הַקְּטֹ֨רֶת֙ וְאֶת־בַּדָּ֔יו וְאֵת֙ שֶׁ֣מֶן הַמִּשְׁחָ֔ה וְאֵ֖ת קְטֹ֣רֶת הַסַּמִּ֑ים וְאֶת־מָסַ֥ךְ הַפֶּ֖תַח לְפֶ֥תַח הַמִּשְׁכָּֽן:
and the screen of the entrance: The screen in front of the eastern side, for there were no planks or curtains there. מסך הפתח: וילון שלפני המזרח שלא היו שם לא קרשים ולא יריעות:
16the altar for the burnt offering, its copper grating, its poles and all its implements, the washstand and its base; טזאֵ֣ת | מִזְבַּ֣ח הָֽעֹלָ֗ה וְאֶת־מִכְבַּ֤ר הַנְּח֨שֶׁת֙ אֲשֶׁר־ל֔וֹ אֶת־בַּדָּ֖יו וְאֶת־כָּל־כֵּלָ֑יו אֶת־הַכִּיֹּ֖ר וְאֶת־כַּנּֽוֹ:
17the hangings of the courtyard, its pillars, and its sockets, and the screen of the gate of the courtyard; יזאֵ֚ת קַלְעֵ֣י הֶֽחָצֵ֔ר אֶת־עַמֻּדָ֖יו וְאֶת־אֲדָנֶ֑יהָ וְאֵ֕ת מָסַ֖ךְ שַׁ֥עַר הֶֽחָצֵֽר:
its pillars, and its sockets: Heb. אֶת-עַמֻּדָיו וְאֶת-אִדָנֶיהָ. Thus “courtyard” (חָצֵר) is referred to here both as masculine and feminine [since עַמֻּדָיו is a masculine possessive and אִדָנֶיהָ is a feminine possessive], and so are many [other] nouns. את עמודיו ואת א-דניה: הרי חצר קרוי כאן לשון זכר ולשון נקבה, וכן דברים הרבה:
and the screen of the gate of the courtyard: The screen spread out on the eastern side, [covering] the middle twenty cubits of the width of the courtyard, for it [the courtyard] was fifty cubits wide, and fifteen cubits of it toward the northern side were closed off, and similarly toward the south. As it is said: “The hangings on the shoulder [shall be] fifteen cubits” (Exod. 27:14). ואת מסך שער החצר: וילון פרוש לצד המזרח עשרים אמה אמצעיות של רוחב החצר, שהיה חמשים רחב, וסתומין הימנו לצד צפון חמש עשרה אמה וכן לדרום, שנאמר (שמות כז יד) וחמש עשרה אמה קלעים לכתף:
18the pegs of the Mishkan and the pegs of the courtyard, and their ropes; יחאֶת־יִתְדֹ֧ת הַמִּשְׁכָּ֛ן וְאֶת־יִתְדֹ֥ת הֶֽחָצֵ֖ר וְאֶת־מֵֽיתְרֵיהֶֽם:
the pegs: [used] to drive [into the ground] and to tie the ends of the curtains with them into the ground, so that they [the curtains] would not move with the wind. יתדת: לתקוע ולקשור בהם סופי היריעות בארץ שלא ינועו ברוח:
and their ropes: Heb. מֵיתְרֵיהֶם, ropes [used] to tie [the curtains]. מיתריהם: חבלים לקשור:
19the meshwork garments to serve in the Holy, the holy garments for Aaron the Kohen [Gadol], and the garments of his sons [in which] to serve [as kohanim].' " יטאֶת־בִּגְדֵ֥י הַשְּׂרָ֖ד לְשָׁרֵ֣ת בַּקֹּ֑דֶשׁ אֶת־בִּגְדֵ֤י הַקֹּ֨דֶשׁ֙ לְאַֽהֲרֹ֣ן הַכֹּהֵ֔ן וְאֶת־בִּגְדֵ֥י בָנָ֖יו לְכַהֵֽן:
the meshwork garments: to cover the ark, the table, the menorah, and the altars when they [the Israelites] would leave for their travels. בגדי השרד: לכסות הארון והשלחן, והמנורה והמזבחות בשעת סילוק מסעות:
20The entire community departed from before Moses. כוַיֵּֽצְא֛וּ כָּל־עֲדַ֥ת בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מִלִּפְנֵ֥י משֶֽׁה:

---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 90 - 96
Hebrew text
English text

• Chapter 90
David found this prayer in its present form-receiving a tradition attributing it to MosesThe Midrash attributes the next eleven psalms to Moses (Rashi).-and incorporated it into the Tehillim. It speaks of the brevity of human life, and inspires man to repent and avoid pride in this world.
1. A prayer by Moses, the man of God. My Lord, You have been a shelter for us in every generation.
2. Before the mountains came into being, before You created the earth and the world-for ever and ever You are Almighty God.
3. You diminish man until he is crushed, and You say, "Return, you children of man.”
4. Indeed, a thousand years are in Your eyes like yesterday that has passed, like a watch of the night.
5. The stream of their life is as but a slumber; in the morning they are like grass that sprouts anew.
6. In the morning it thrives and sprouts anew; in the evening it withers and dries.
7. For we are consumed by Your anger, and destroyed by Your wrath.
8. You have set our wrongdoings before You, our hidden sins before the light of Your countenance.
9. For all our days have vanished in Your wrath; we cause our years to pass like a fleeting sound.
10. The days of our lives number seventy years, and if in great vigor, eighty years; most of them are but travail and futility, passing quickly and flying away.
11. Who can know the intensity of Your anger? Your wrath is commensurate with one's fear of You.
12. Teach us, then, to reckon our days, that we may acquire a wise heart.
13. Relent, O Lord; how long [will Your anger last]? Have compassion upon Your servants.
14. Satiate us in the morning with Your kindness, then we shall sing and rejoice throughout our days.
15. Give us joy corresponding to the days You afflicted us, the years we have seen adversity.
16. Let Your work be revealed to Your servants, and Your splendor be upon their children.
17. May the pleasantness of the Lord our God be upon us; establish for us the work of our hands; establish the work of our hands.
Chapter 91
This psalm inspires the hearts of the people to seek shelter under the wings of the Divine Presence. It also speaks of the four seasons of the year, and their respective ministering powers, instructing those who safeguard their souls to avoid them.
1. You who dwells in the shelter of the Most High, who abides in the shadow of the Omnipotent:
2. I say of the Lord who is my refuge and my stronghold, my God in whom I trust,
3. that He will save you from the ensnaring trap, from the destructive pestilence.
4. He will cover you with His pinions and you will find refuge under His wings; His truth is a shield and an armor.
5. You will not fear the terror of the night, nor the arrow that flies by day;
6. the pestilence that prowls in the darkness, nor the destruction that ravages at noon.
7. A thousand may fall at your [left] side, and ten thousand at your right, but it shall not reach you.
8. You need only look with your eyes, and you will see the retribution of the wicked.
9. Because you [have said,] "The Lord is my shelter," and you have made the Most High your haven,
10. no evil will befall you, no plague will come near your tent.
11. For He will instruct His angels in your behalf, to guard you in all your ways.
12. They will carry you in their hands, lest you injure your foot upon a rock.
13. You will tread upon the lion and the viper; you will trample upon the young lion and the serpent.
14. Because he desires Me, I will deliver him; I will fortify him, for he knows My Name.
15. When he calls on Me, I will answer him; I am with him in distress. I will deliver him and honor him.
16. I will satiate him with long life, and show him My deliverance.
Chapter 92
Sung every Shabbat by the Levites in the Holy Temple, this psalm speaks of the World to Come, and comforts the hearts of those crushed by suffering.
1. A psalm, a song for the Shabbat day.
2. It is good to praise the Lord, and to sing to Your Name, O Most High;
3. to proclaim Your kindness in the morning, and Your faithfulness in the nights,
4. with a ten-stringed instrument and lyre, to the melody of a harp.
5. For You, Lord, have gladdened me with Your deeds; I sing for joy at the works of Your hand.
6. How great are Your works, O Lord; how very profound Your thoughts!
7. A brutish man cannot know, a fool cannot comprehend this:
8. When the wicked thrive like grass, and all evildoers flourish-it is in order that they may be destroyed forever.
9. But You, Lord, are exalted forever.
10. Indeed, Your enemies, O Lord, indeed Your enemies shall perish; all evildoers shall be scattered.
11. But You have increased my might like that of a wild ox; I am anointed with fresh oil.
12. My eyes have seen [the downfall of] my watchful enemies; my ears have heard [the doom of] the wicked who rise against me.
13. The righteous will flourish like a palm tree, grow tall like a cedar in Lebanon.
14. Planted in the House of the Lord, they shall blossom in the courtyards of our God.
15. They shall be fruitful even in old age; they shall be full of sap and freshness-
16. to declare that the Lord is just; He is my Strength, and there is no injustice in Him.
Chapter 93
This psalm speaks of the Messianic era, when God will don grandeur-allowing no room for man to boast before Him as did Nebuchadnezzar, Pharaoh, and Sennacherib.
1. The Lord is King; He has garbed Himself with grandeur; the Lord has robed Himself, He has girded Himself with strength; He has also established the world firmly that it shall not falter.
2. Your throne stands firm from of old; You have existed forever.
3. The rivers have raised, O Lord, the rivers have raised their voice; the rivers raise their raging waves.
4. More than the sound of many waters, than the mighty breakers of the sea, is the Lord mighty on High.
5. Your testimonies are most trustworthy; Your House will be resplendent in holiness, O Lord, forever.
Chapter 94
An awe-inspiring and wondrous prayer with which every individual can pray for the redemption. It is also an important moral teaching.
1. The Lord is a God of retribution; O God of retribution, reveal Yourself!
2. Judge of the earth, arise; render to the arrogant their recompense.
3. How long shall the wicked, O Lord, how long shall the wicked exult?
4. They continuously speak insolently; all the evildoers act arrogantly.
5. They crush Your people, O Lord, and oppress Your heritage.
6. They kill the widow and the stranger, and murder the orphans.
7. And they say, "The Lord does not see, the God of Jacob does not perceive.”
8. Understand, you senseless among the people; you fools, when will you become wise?
9. Shall He who implants the ear not hear? Shall He who forms the eye not see?
10. Shall He who chastises nations not punish? Shall He who imparts knowledge to man [not know]?
11. The Lord knows the thoughts of man, that they are naught.
12. Fortunate is the man whom You chastise, O Lord, and instruct him in Your Torah,
13. bestowing upon him tranquillity in times of adversity, until the pit is dug for the wicked.
14. For the Lord will not abandon His people, nor forsake His heritage.
15. For judgment shall again be consonant with justice, and all the upright in heart will pursue it.
16. Who would rise up for me against the wicked ones; who would stand up for me against the evildoers?
17. Had the Lord not been a help to me, my soul would have soon dwelt in the silence [of the grave].
18. When I thought that my foot was slipping, Your kindness, O Lord, supported me.
19. When my [worrisome] thoughts multiply within me, Your consolation delights my soul.
20. Can one in the seat of evil, one who makes iniquity into law, consort with You?
21. They band together against the life of the righteous, and condemn innocent blood.
22. The Lord has been my stronghold; my God, the strength of my refuge.
23. He will turn their violence against them and destroy them through their own wickedness; the Lord, our God, will destroy them.
Chapter 95
This psalm speaks of the future, when man will say to his fellow, "Come, let us sing and offer praise to God for the miracles He has performed for us!"
1. Come, let us sing to the Lord; let us raise our voices in jubilation to the Rock of our deliverance.
2. Let us approach Him with thanksgiving; let us raise our voices to Him in song.
3. For the Lord is a great God, and a great King over all supernal beings;
4. in His hands are the depths of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are His.
5. Indeed, the sea is His, for He made it; His hands formed the dry land.
6. Come, let us prostrate ourselves and bow down; let us bend the knee before the Lord, our Maker.
7. For He is our God, and we are the people that He tends, the flock under His [guiding] hand-even this very day, if you would but hearken to His voice!
8. Do not harden your heart as at Merivah, as on the day at Massah in the wilderness,
9. where your fathers tested Me; they tried Me, though they had seen My deeds.
10. For forty years I quarreled with that generation; and I said, "They are a people of erring hearts, they do not know My ways.”
11. So I vowed in My anger that they would not enter My resting place.
Chapter 96
The time will yet come when man will say to his fellow: "Come, let us sing to God!"
1. Sing to the Lord a new song; sing to the Lord, all the earth.
2. Sing to the Lord, bless His Name; proclaim His deliverance from day to day.
3. Recount His glory among the nations, His wonders among all the peoples.
4. For the Lord is great and highly praised; He is awesome above all gods.
5. For all the gods of the nations are naught, but the Lord made the heavens.
6. Majesty and splendor are before Him, might and beauty in His Sanctuary.
7. Render to the Lord, O families of nations, render to the Lord honor and might.
8. Render to the Lord honor due to His Name; bring an offering and come to His courtyards.
9. Bow down to the Lord in resplendent holiness; tremble before Him, all the earth.
10. Proclaim among the nations, "The Lord reigns"; indeed, the world is firmly established that it shall not falter; He will judge the peoples with righteousness.
11. The heavens will rejoice, the earth will exult; the sea and its fullness will roar.
12. The fields and everything therein will jubilate; then all the trees of the forest will sing.
13. Before the Lord [they shall rejoice], for He has come, for He has come to judge the earth; He will judge the world with justice, and the nations with His truth.
---------------------
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 30
Lessons in Tanya
• English Text
Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
Video Class
• 
• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Sunday, Adar I 19, 5776 · February 28, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 30
וכל שלא הגיע לידי מדה זו להלחם עם גופו מלחמה עצומה כזו
Anyone who has not attained this standard of waging such a strenuous war against his body,
עדיין לא הגיע לבחינת וערך מלחמת היצר הבוער כאש להבה
has not yet measured up to the quality and dimension of the war waged daily within the kal shebekalim against the evil nature which burns like a fiery flame,
להיות נכנע ונשבר מפני פחד ה׳
so that it (this powerful evil impulse) be humbled and broken through the fear of G‑d.
This, then, is the standard by which everyone must judge himself: Does he battle against his evil impulse (during prayer, and similarly in the other areas of divine service that the Alter Rebbe will soon discuss), as intensely as the kal shebekalimmust battle against his?
וכן בענין ברכת המזון וכל ברכות הנהנין והמצות בכונה
So, too, with one’s kavanah in the Grace after Meals and in the benedictions, whether those said prior to eating, or those recited before performing a mitzvah, all of which requires a battle with one’s evil impulse;
ואין צורך לומר כונת המצות לשמן
not to mention one’s intention in performing a mitzvah — that it be done (solely) for the sake of a mitzvah,i.e., for G‑d’s sake; this requires a still greater effort, and in this one will surely find himself wanting.
וכן בענין עסק לימוד התורה, ללמוד הרבה יותר מחפצו ורצונו לפי טבעו ורגילותו על ידי מלחמה עצומה עם גופו
Similarly with regard to the battle required in the matter of one’s occupation in Torah study, one must struggle to study far more than what is demanded by his innate or accustomed desire, by means of a mighty battle with his body.
When one studies Torah only as much as his natural inclination or habituated diligence dictates, he requires no effort or struggle at all. But in order to match the struggle of the kal shebekalim one must study far, far more than he would by nature or habit, as the Alter Rebbe continues:
כי הלומד מעט יותר מטבעו הרי זו מלחמה קטנה, ואין לה ערך ודמיון עם מלחמת היצר הבוער כאש
For to study a fraction more than is one’s wont entails but a minor tussle. It neither parallels nor bears comparison with the war of the kal shebekalim against his evil impulse which burns like fire,
דמקרי רשע גמור אם אינו מנצח יצרו, להיות נכנע ונשבר מפני ה׳
for which he is nonetheless called utterly wicked (rasha gamur), if he does not conquer his impulse so that it be subdued and crushed before G‑d.
Similarly, unless one struggles with his evil impulse to study much more than his nature or habit demands, he is no less wicked than the kal shebekalim.
But one may object to this reasoning. How, one may say, can I in all honesty compare my shortcomings to those of the kal shebekalim? I am lacking merely in the quality of the good that I do, whilst he actually and actively violates prohibitions enumerated in the Torah. To this the Alter Rebbe counters:
ומה לי בחינת סור מרע ומה לי בחינת ועשה טוב
What difference is there between the category of “turn away from evil” — in which the kal shebekalim fails, by active violation, and the category of “do good” — in which he fails, by neglecting to exert himself in prayer, Torah study and the like?
To be sure, there are differences between the two categories. Each has its own unique spiritual effects, its own specific intentions. But these differences pertain only to the person performing the mitzvah. The essential point in a mitzvah, however, is that it is an expression of the Will of the Only and Unique G‑d, and in this there is no difference whatsoever between the two categories, as the Alter Rebbe continues.
הכל היא מצות המלך הקדוש, יחיד ומיוחד, ברוך הוא
Both are the commandments of the Holy King, the Only and Unique One, blessed be He.
The failings of the observant individual in the quality of his prayer, Torah study, and so on, are therefore comparable to the transgressions of the kal shebekalim.
וכן בשאר מצות, ובפרט בדבר שבממון
So, too, with other commandments requiring a struggle, one may find that he does not wage war adequately against his evil impulse, especially in matters involving money,
כמו עבודת הצדקה, וכהאי גוונא

such as the service (“labor”) of charity, i.e., giving charity in a manner involving “labor” — far more than in his wont, and the like.
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Sunday, Adar I 19, 5776 · February 28, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 147
Covering Blood
"...and spills its blood, and he shall cover it with earth"—Leviticus 17:13.
We are commanded to cover the blood of a ritually slaughtered bird or non-domesticated animal.
Full text of this Mitzvah »

overing Blood
Positive Commandment 147
Translated by Berel Bell
The 147nd mitzvah is that we are commanded to cover the blood when slaughtering a bird or a chaya.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "When he spills its blood, he must cover [the blood] with earth."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 6th chapter of tractate Chulin.
FOOTNOTES
1.An animal with antlers, such as a deer.
2.Lev. 17:13.
     ---------------------------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Beit Habechirah Beit Habechirah - Chapter 1 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Beit Habechirah - Chapter 1

Halacha 1
1 It is a positive commandment2 to construct a House for God,3 prepared for sacrifices to be offered within.4 We [must] celebrate there three times a year,5as [Exodus 25:8] states: "And you shall make Me a sanctuary.6"
The sanctuary constructed by Moses is already described in the Torah.7 It was only temporary,8 as [Deuteronomy 12:9] states: "For at present, you have not come unto [the resting place and the inheritance]."9
Halacha 2
After [the Jews] entered The Land [of Israel],10 they erected the Sanctuary in Gilgal during the fourteen years in which they conquered and divided [the land].11From there, they came to Shiloh,12 built a house of stone, and spread the curtains of the Sanctuary over it. It did not have a roof. The sanctuary of Shiloh stood for 369 years. When Eli died, it was destroyed.13
[Afterwards,] they came to Nov14 and built a sanctuary.15 When Samuel died, it was destroyed.16 And they came to Givon17 and built a sanctuary. From Givon, they came to the eternal structure [in Jerusalem].18 The days [the sanctuary stood] in Nov and Givon were 57 years.
Halacha 3
Once the Temple was built in Jerusalem, it became forbidden to build a sanctuary for God or to offer sacrifices in any other place.19
There is no Sanctuary for all generations20 except in Jerusalem and [specifically,] on Mt. Moriah,21 as [I Chronicles 22:1] states: "And David declared: 'This is the House of the Lord, God, and this is the altar for the burnt offerings of Israel.'22 and [Psalms 132:14] states: "This is My resting place forever."23
Halacha 4
The [design of the] structure built by [King] Solomon is described explicitly in [the Book of] Kings.24 [In contrast, the design of] the Messianic Temple, though mentioned in [the Book of] Ezekiel, is not explicit or explained. Thus, the people [in the time] of Ezra built the Second Temple according to the structure of Solomon, [including] certain aspects which are explicitly stated in Ezekiel.25
Halacha 5
The followings elements are essential when constructing this House:26
a) the Sanctuary,27
b) the Holy of Holies,28
c) preceding the Sanctuary, there should be a place called the Entrance Hall.29
The three [together] are called the Temple.30
[In addition,] we must make another partition around the Temple, set off from it [slightly], resembling the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the [sanctuary in the] desert.31 Everything encompassed by this partition is similar to the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting and is called the Courtyard.32
The entire area is referred to as the Mikdash.
Halacha 6
The following utensils are required for the Sanctuary:33
a) an altar for the burnt offering and other sacrifices;34
b) a ramp to ascend to the altar. It was positioned before the Entrance Hall to the south.35
c) a wash basin36 with a pedestal where the priests would sanctify their hands and feet for the (Temple) service.37 It was positioned between the Entrance Hall and the altar, to the left when entering the Sanctuary.38
d) the altar for the incense offering,
e) the Menorah, and
f) the table [for the showbread].39
The [latter] three were placed within the Sanctuary, before the Holy of Holies.40
Halacha 7
The Menorah was in the south, to the left as one entered. The Table was to the right.41 The Showbread was placed upon it. Both of them were close to the Holy of Holies on the outside. The incense altar was positioned between these two, towards the outside.
Divisions are to be made within the Temple Courtyard to [indicate] the point to which the Israelites may proceed;42 the point to which the priests, [who were not able to participate in the Temple service,] may proceed.43
[Also,] within it, we must build structures for the various necessities of the Sanctuary. These structures were called chambers.44
Halacha 8
When we build the Temple and the courtyard, we must use large stones. If stones cannot be found, we may build with bricks.45
We may not split the stones used for the building on the Temple Mount.46Rather, we must split and chisel them outside, and [afterwards,] bring them in,47 as it is said (I Kings 5:31): "And they brought great stones, costly stones, to lay the foundation of the House with hewn stone." Furthermore, it is said (ibid. 6:7): "Neither hammer, nor axe, nor any tool of iron was heard in the House while it was being built."
Halacha 9
We must not build with any wood protruding at all,48 only stone, bricks, or cement.
[Similarly,] we must not make wooden chambers in the courtyard. Rather, [they were made] of stone or of brick. 49
Halacha 10
Costly stones were laid on the floor of the entire courtyard.50
Stones which were uprooted [from their fixture] are invalidated, even though they remained in place, since they were impaired. [Thus,] a priest is forbidden to stand upon them during the [Temple] service until they become fixed in the ground [again.]51
Halacha 11
The most preferable way to fulfill the mitzvah is by strengthening the building and raising it [to the utmost degree] within the potential of the community, as [implied by Ezra 9:9]: "to exalt the House of our Lord."52
They must make it beautiful and attractive according to their potential.53 If possible, it is a mitzvah to plate it with gold and to magnify all of its aspects.54
Halacha 12
We must not build the Temple at night, as [Numbers 9:15] states: "on the day in which the Sanctuary was raised up." [Our Sages55 interpret this phrase as implying:] We may raise it up by day and not by night.
We must be involved with its building from sunrise until the appearance of the stars.56
Everyone is obligated to build and to assist both personally and financially;57[both] men and women,58 as in the [construction of the] Sanctuary in the desert.59 [Nevertheless,] children are not to be interrupted from their [Torah] studies.60
The construction of the Temple does not supersede the [observance of the] festivals.61
Halacha 13
The Altar should only be made as a structure of stone.62 Though the Torah states, [Exodus 20:24]: "You shall make Me an altar of earth," [that verse is interpreted63 to mean that] the altar must be in contact with the earth and not built on an arch or on a cave.64
Though [ibid.:22] states: "If you shall make an Altar of stone...," the Oral Tradition explains that the matter is not left to [our] decision, but is an obligation [incumbent upon us].65
Halacha 14
Any stone which is damaged66 to the extent that a nail will become caught in it [when passing over it], as is the case regarding a slaughtering knife,67is disqualified for [use in the] Altar or the ramp, as [Deuteronomy 27:6] states: "You shall build the Altar of the Lord with whole stones."68
From where would they bring the stones of the Altar? From virgin earth. They would dig until they reach a point which was obviously never used for tilling or for building, and they would take the stones from there.69 Alternatively, [they would take them] from the Mediterranean Sea70 and build with them.
Similarly, the stones the Temple and the Courtyard were whole.71
Halacha 15
Damaged or split stones from the Temple and the Courtyard are invalid.72They can not be redeemed [and used for mundane purposes].73Rather, they must be entombed.74
Every stone which was touched by iron,75 even though it was not damaged, is disqualified [for use] in building the Altar or the ramp, as it is said (Exodus 20:25): "By lifting your sword against it, you will have profaned it."76
Anyone who builds the altar or the ramp with a stone that has been touched by iron [violates a negative command and] is [given] lashes,77 as it is said (ibid.): "Do not build them with hewn stone."
One who builds with a damaged stone violates a positive command.78
Halacha 16
[If] a stone was damaged or touched by iron once it had been built into the Altar or the ramp, that stone [alone] is invalidated, but the others are still fit for use.
They coated the altar [with cement] twice a year, [before] Pesach and [before] Sukkot.79 When they coated it, they used a cloth, rather than an iron lathe,80lest it touch a stone and invalidate [it.]
Halacha 17
We must not make steps for the Altar, as [Exodus 22:26] states: "Do not ascend on My Altar with steps."81 Rather, we must build an incline on the southern side of the Altar,82 diminishing [in height] as it declines from the top of the Altar until the earth.83 It was called the ramp.
Anyone who ascends the Altar with steps [violates a negative command and] is [given] lashes.
Similarly, anyone who demolishes84 a single stone from the Altar, any part of the Temple building, or [the floor of the Temple Courtyard] between the Entrance Hall and the Altar85 with a destructive intent is worthy of lashes, as [Deuteronomy 12:3-4] states: "And you shall destroy their altars.... Do not do so to God, your Lord."86
Halacha 18
The Menorah and its utensils,87 the Table and its utensils,88 the Incense Altar, and all the sacred utensils may be made only from metal. If they are made from wood, bone, stone, or glass, they are unacceptable.89
Halacha 19
If the nation is poor, it is permissible to make them of tin.90 If they [later] become wealthy, they should be made of gold.
If the nation possesses the means, they should even make the basins, the spits, and the rakes of the altar of the burnt offering and, [similarly,] the [Temple's] measuring vessels, out of gold.91 They should even coat the gates of the Courtyard with gold, if it is within their potential.92
Halacha 20
All the [Temple's] utensils must initially be made for sacred purposes.93If they were initially made for mundane uses,94 they may not be used for [the Temple's] sake.95
A vessel [intended to be used for the Temple], but which was never used for [the Temple] may be used for mundane purposes. Once it has been used for [the Temple], it may not be used for mundane purposes.96
Stones or boards which were originally hewn for use in a synagogue should not be used in the Temple Mount construction.97
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Rambam introduces each book of theMishneh Torah by quoting a verse from the Bible. In this case, the verse chosen does more than introduce the text to follow. It also emphasizes that we are commanded to "seek out the welfare of Jerusalem" and study the laws of the Temple's construction.
2.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 20) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 95) include this as one of 613 mitzvot. The mitzvah is incumbent on the Jewish community as a whole and must be undertaken by the nation as a collective entity. See Hilchot Melachim1:1 which speaks of "Israel being commanded to fulfill three mitzvot upon entering [the Promised] Land."
3.
There are two ways to understand this mitzvah:
a) to build the Temple,
b) to ensure that the Temple be built; the mitzvah is not fulfilled until that objective is accomplished.
The question is whether the command is to perform an activity or to see that an objective is completed. In his commentary on the Torah (Exodus 35:10), the Rogachover Gaon favors the latter explanation and explains a number of possible practical differences between these abstract concepts. Among them:
a) Must a blessing be recited before taking part in the construction of the Temple? If the mitzvah is the actual building, a blessing would be required. However, if the mitzvah is to ensure that the Temple be completed, no blessing is necessary.
b) Can a gentile participate in the building of the Temple? If the actual construction is the mitzvah, it would be improper for a gentile to participate. However, if the mitzvah is dependent on the completion of the objective, the construction of the Temple, there is no difference if a gentile's efforts also aided in the fulfillment of this goal.
c) If the Temple descends from heaven - as some maintain the Third Temple will - will it be considered as if the mitzvah has been fulfilled (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 18, p. 418).
From the Rambam' wording (Halachah 12 and elsewhere), it appears that he views the mitzvah as the activity of building.
4.
This phrase is the subject of much commentary. In Sefer HaMitzvot(loc. cit.) the Rambam describes the mitzvah to build a Sanctuary as : "the command... to make a house for service where sacrifices will be offered."
In contrast, the Ramban (Nachmanides) views the construction of the Temple as a command with a self-contained objective. Thus, he writes in his commentary to the Torah (Exodus 25:2): "[God's] essential desire in the Sanctuary was the [construction of] a resting place for theShechinah."
Some commentaries explain the disagreement between these giants simply: According to the Rambam, the Temple was built to allow for sacrifices to be offered, while the Ramban views the revelation of theShechinah as the Temple's purpose.
However, this interpretation can not be accepted because:
a) the Torah itself specifically refers to the Temple as (Deuteronomy 12:5): "The place which God has chosen to cause His Name to dwell there," emphasizing the revelation of Godliness.
b) when describing the mitzvah to build a Sanctuary, the Rambam himself writes that we are commanded "to construct a house for God," stressing that the main element of the Temple was the revelation of Godliness. It is after that statement, that he declares that the House must be "prepared for sacrifices to be offered within."
Therefore, it must be assumed that both sages recognized the two differing elements, and the debate between them involves the question of determining which aspect is more important. The Ramban considered the fundamental goal the revelation of Godliness and viewed man's service as a means toward that end. On the other hand, the Rambam saw man's service as the ultimate objective. However, that service could only be complete when carried out in a place where Godliness is revealed (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 4, p. 1346, Vol. 11, p. 116, Vol. 24, p. 84).
5.
The pilgrimage festivals; Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot. On these festivals, each Jew was obligated to come to the Temple and present himself before God. In particular, the term "celebrate" refers to bringing the festive peace-offerings (see Hilchot Chagigah 1:1).
6.
Even though this verse specifically refers to the construction of the sanctuary in the desert, the construction of the later sanctuaries and the building of the Temple were also implicit in that command (Kessef Mishneh).
In Hilchot Melachim (1:1), the Rambam writes "Israel was commanded to fulfill three mitzvot upon its entry into Eretz [Yisrael]: to appoint a king..., to annihilate the seed of Amalek.., and to build [God's] Chosen House as it is said: "You shall seek out His dwelling and come there." The commentaries offer different explanations why the Rambam quotes a different verse in either place.
7.
In the Book of Exodus, Chapters 25-40.
8.
And was replaced by other structures, as described in the following Halachah.
9.
Commenting on this verse, Zevachim 119a declares: "'the resting place' - this is Shiloh, [for Shiloh was also merely a temporary resting place for the Divine Presence]; 'the inheritance' - this is Jerusalem." (Just as an inheritance reflects an everlasting chain, so too, the Divine Presence will always remain in Jerusalem.)
10.
In the year 2488 after creation.
11.
The conquest of the Land took seven years, and the division took another seven years (Zevachim 118b).
12.
In the year 2502, built a house of stone and spread the curtains of the Sanctuary over it. It did not have a roof. The Talmud (ibid.) explains:
I Samuel 1:24 declares: "And she brought him to the House of God, Shiloh" implying that the Ark was enclosed with a permanent structure. Another verse (Psalms 78:60)states: "He has forsaken the tabernacle of Shiloh" from which it can be inferred that it was a tent-like structure resembling the Sanctuary in the desert. How can the two verses be reconciled?
There was no roof. Though there was a structure of stone, the curtains [of the Sanctuary] were spread over it.
13.
In the year 2871, when the Philistines captured the Holy Ark and slew Eli's two sons.
The Sanctuary of Shiloh had a greater degree of holiness than the structure which preceded it and those that followed immediately thereafter. The Sifri states that the verse (Deuteronomy 12:5): "The place which God has chosen to cause His name to dwell there" refers to "Shiloh and the Temple."
The uniqueness of Shiloh is further emphasized by the fact that while it stood, the Jews were forbidden to offer sacrifices in any other place. While the Ark was in Gilgal, and similarly, in Nov and Givon, the Jews were allowed to bring their individual sacrifices wherever they desired. However, during all the years the Sanctuary was in Shiloh, no sacrifices could be offered in any other location.
14.
When the Philistines returned the ark after the seven months of its captivity, they brought it to Kiryat Yearim (I Samuel, Chapters 6-7). During this time, a Sanctuary was constructed in Nov and afterwards, in Givon, to provide the Jews with a place for centralized worship. However, the ark was not kept there out of fear that it might again be captured by the Philistines (Meiri,Megillah, 9b).
15.
Of stone. Though the Rambam in his commentary on the Mishnah (Zevachim, ibid.) states that the Jews erected the Sanctuary that had stood in the desert in Nov, here he appears to follow the view mentioned by Rashi (Pesachim 38 a,b) which states that a stone structure was erected there. Similarly, Sotah 9a states that the sanctuary's structure was entombed when the Jews entered Eretz Yisrael. The Sanctuary of Nov stood for 44 years (Seder HaDorot).
16.
By King Saul.
17.
On the outskirts of Jerusalem (see II Samuel, ch. 6). The Sanctuary stood there for approximately 13 years.
18.
In the year 2928, as described in the beginning of I Kings.
19.
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbonot 18:3 which describes this prohibition. Zevachim 112b states: "When they came to Jerusalem [and erected the Temple], it became forbidden [to sacrifice in] the High Places and permission [to sacrifice] there was never granted [again]."
That prohibition was derived from the following verses (Deuteronomy 12:5-6):
Only at the place where the Lord, your God, shall choose to cause His Name to dwell, may you seek Him at his dwelling...There, you shall bring your burnt offerings and your sacrifices.
The preceding verses described how the pagans had sacrificed "upon the high mountains, upon the hills, under every lofty tree." In contrast, the service of God had to be centralized in one place alone, "the place which the Lord, your God shall choose to cause His Name to dwell." Nevertheless, until an abode for the Shechinah was constructed, there was no prohibition against sacrificing anywhere in Eretz Yisrael.
As mentioned above, this prohibition was in effect during the time of the Sanctuary of Shiloh. After Shiloh was destroyed, there were no restrictions until the Temple was built. However, once the Shechinah was revealed on Mount Moriah, the Jews were never allowed to offer their sacrifices at any other place.
Although Shiloh and the Temple were both considered "the place God chose...," there is a difference between the two. God's choice of Shiloh was for the benefit of the Jewish people. He wanted to offer them a centralized place of worship. However, the physical place of the Sanctuary did not itself become holy for all time.
In contrast, God chose Jerusalem as an eternal resting place for the Shechinah. The Divine Presence united with the place itself. After Shiloh was destroyed, no vestige of its former holiness remained. However, Mount Moriah remains "the gate to heaven" even after the Temple has been destroyed. Hence, permission was never granted to sacrifice in other places. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 24, p. 80-85.
20.
The above prohibition extends beyond the offering of sacrifices and includes the actual construction of a sanctuary. Megillah 10a records the construction of such a sanctuary in Alexandria by Ono, the son of Shimon HaTzaddik.
21.
The root of the name Moriah is the wordhora'ah, meaning instruction. The Temple was the seat of the Sanhedrin, Israel's highest court and the source of instruction for the entire Jewish nation. Others associate it with the word yirah, meaning "fear," for from this mountain, the fear of God radiated forth.
22.
As the Rambam explains in Chapter 2, in addition to God's choice of the site for the Temple at large, He also specifically chose the site of the Altar.
To emphasize this concept, the verse quoted by the Rambam contains two clauses. The first clause describes the choice of the Temple's site and the second, the choice of the site of the Altar.
23.
The Rambam views these verses as more than a statement of Jerusalem's uniqueness. They also exclude the possibility of constructing other sanctuaries.
24.
I Kings, chapter 6.
25.
The commentaries on the tractate of Middotcontrast Ezekiel's vision and the structure of the Second Temple in mishnayot 2:5, 3:1, 4:2.
26.
i.e. if they are lacking, we have not fulfilled the mitzvah of constructing a Sanctuary.
27.
The holy chamber containing the Golden Altar, the Menorah, and the table for the Showbread.
28.
The inner chamber containing the Holy Ark.
29.
This refers to a structure positioned before the Sanctuary.
The commentaries note that, in general, an equivalent to each of the structures of the Temple existed in the Sanctuary of the desert. Based on this principle, they question which structure in the Sanctuary corresponded to the Entrance Hall.
30.
Though the three represent various levels of holiness, they are on one rung of sanctity when compared to other areas (Zevachim2a).
The commentaries note that Jeremiah (7:4)states: "Trust not in lying words which say: 'The Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord... ' The threefold repetition alludes to the fact that the three chambers mentioned above share an equal measure of holiness.
31.
As described in Exodus, chapter 27.
32.
The commentaries explain that the root of the Hebrew term azarah is the word ezrameaning "help." In the Temple Courtyard, the Jewish people call to God and He responds, granting them assistance.
33.
As mentioned in the explanation to Halachah 1, the Rambam considers the purpose of the construction of the Temple the erection of "a house ...to offer sacrifices within." In this context, he views the fashioning of the Temple's utensils as an integral part of the mitzvah of building a sanctuary - for without them the sacrifices could not be offered. Thus, when enumerating the mitzvot, he considers the fashioning of the Sanctuary's utensils as part of the mitzvah to construct the Sanctuary and not as separate mitzvot in their own right.
As mentioned above, the Ramban, Nachmanides, disputes the Rambam's view and considers the revelation of Godliness as the primary intent of the Sanctuary's construction. He also disagrees with the Rambam in regard to the fashioning of the utensils and considers them as separate independent commands. See Hasagot Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive command 33.
There is a practicable application of the above concept. The Sanctuary could only be constructed during the daytime, (see Halachah 17). If the fashioning of the Sanctuary's utensils is to be considered as part of the mitzvah of constructing the Temple, that ruling may apply to them as well (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 21, p. 255).
34.
The Torah also refers to the outer altar as "the altar of the burnt offering" (Exodus 30:28, 35:16) for that was the most frequent sacrifice, offered twice daily.
35.
See Halachah 17.
36.
A large basin, with 12 taps. (Yoma 37a)
37.
Before taking part in any aspect of the Temple service, the priests had to wash their hands and feet. See Hilchot Biat HaMikdash 5:1.
38.
The entrance to the Sanctuary was from the east, facing the Holy of Holies which was in the west.
39.
These sacred objects are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
40.
The commentaries have asked why the Rambam does not consider the ark as one of the essential vessels of the Sanctuary. The commentary to Chapter 4, Halachah 1, addresses that issue.
41.
The Menorah was the source of spiritual inspiration, the Table of material wealth. Because of the position of these objects, our Sages declared (Bava Batra 25b): He who desires to become wise should face south (while praying). He who desires to become wealthy should face north.
42.
See Middot 2:6. There were steps dividing between the area set aside for Israelites and the area set aside for priests. An Israelite was not permitted to proceed beyond these steps, except:
a) to perform semichah, the placing of hands on an animal brought as a sacrifice. SeeHilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 3.
b) to recite confessional prayers, Vidui.
c) to slaughter an animal brought as a sacrifice,
d) to perform Tenufah, the waving of the peace offerings (Kellim 1:8. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 19, Tifferet Yisrael, Middot 2:6.)
43.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 20.
44.
Chapter 5, Halachah 17.
45.
On the verse (Exodus 20:22): "If you shall build an altar of stone...," the Mechiltacomments: "If you desire [to build it from] stone, you may. If you desire from bricks, you may."
46.
Regarding the altar, the Torah declares (ibid.): "Do not build it out of hewn stone. By lifting your sword against it, you will have profaned it." The Sages (Middot 3:4) explained that iron shortens man's life, and the altar prolongs it. Therefore, iron should not be used to build the Temple. As above, the Rambam draws a parallel between the altar and the entire sanctuary.
Sotah"b quotes the two abovementioned verses and records a debate among the Sages how to resolve the apparent contradiction between them. The Rambam quotes the opinion of Rabbi Nechemiah who resolves the discrepancy by explaining that the stones were hewn outside the Temple premises and then, brought in.
In contrast, Rabbi Yehudah explained that King Solomon employed a unique wormlike creature, the Shamir, which had the power to eat through stone. The Temple's builders drew lines on the stone and then placed theShamir upon them. The tiny creature ate through the rock, leaving the stones finely hewn without using iron.
According to most opinions, when the First Temple was destroyed, this unique species was lost, and it was impossible to build the Second Temple in this miraculous manner. Nevertheless, the stones were not hewn on the Temple Mount itself.
47.
Thus, at least, "in the House," on the Temple premises, no iron tool was used.
48.
Tamid 28b relates that this prohibition was enacted as a safeguard for the Scriptural commandment (Deuteronomy 16:21): "Do not plant an Asherah or any other tree near the altar that you shall make for the Lord." Though that prohibition only refers to a tree that grows in the ground and not to wood used for building purposes, the Sages instituted this measure as a "fence around the Torah."
Wood could be used for the substructure of the building. Indeed, I Kings 6:10 relates how Solomon used cedar trees for that purpose. However, they could not be used for the exterior surface of the building.
49.
The Ra'avad objects to this Halachah, noting that there were wooden structures on the Temple Mount. The High Priest's chamber was lined with wood. In addition, wooden balconies were built in the Women Courtyard on Sukkot to allow the women to observe the Simchat Beit Hashoevah celebrations. Thus, he concludes that the prohibition against building with any protruding wood applies only within within the Temple courtyard, from the area set off for the priests and beyond, and not elsewhere on the Temple Mount. Only that region could be described as "near the altar [of God]." Rav Yosef Corcus explains that the wooden balconies were not permanent structures. Hence, they were permitted.
50.
See the verse from I Kings quoted in Halachah 8.
The Torah (Leviticus 26:1), commands, "Do not make a stone pavement in your land to bow down upon it." The commentaries explain that this prohibition was ordained so that the Jews would refrain from making a copy of the Temple services outside of Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, according to strict Torah law, it was not necessary to lay a stone floor for the Temple courtyard. Zevachim 24a relates that in preparation for the construction of the Temple, King David sanctified the very ground of the Temple Courtyard.
51.
The Sages explained that it was not respectful to take part in the Temple services while standing on such a stone. Nevertheless, if a priest disobeyed this prohibition and did stand on such a stone, his service was not invalidated.
The logic of that decision can be explained as follows: There is a principle in Jewish law that a particular substance is not considered as interposing between one object and another if it and the object beneath it are of the same type. Thus, since the stone and the earth below it are considered to be of the same substance, the stone is not considered an interruption. Since, as mentioned above, the ground itself was sanctified by King David, the priest's service is not invalidated.
52.
Shabbat 11a interprets this verse in a very literal sense, explaining that a synagogue must be the tallest building in a city.
53.
Herod slaughtered many Sages. Bava Batra4a explains that the Sages advised him to expiate a certain measure of his sin by rebuilding the Temple and making it attractive. The Talmud declares: "Whoever has not seen Herod's building has not seen an attractive building in his life."
54.
Thus, Pesachim 57a relates that the Temple was covered with gold plates the thickness of a golden coin.
55.
Sh'vuot 15b.
56.
Generally, employees are not obligated to begin their work until the sun appears. However, in this case, due to the importance of their task, the workers were obligated to begin earlier. See Nechemiah 4:15Berachot2b.
57.
Thus there are two obligations: a) the actual building of the Temple, b) assisting in the work and supporting it financially.
58.
In particular, there is a difference in the obligations incumbent on men and women. Women are not obligated to fulfill most mitzvot which have a specific time limitation. The construction of the Temple also possesses a specific time restriction. As mentioned above, it may only by built by day and not by night. Therefore, women are not obligated to carry out the actual construction. However, in regard to the second aspect mentioned above, rendering personal and financial assistance, women are obligated as well as men.
59.
Note Exodus 35:22 and 25, which relate the role played by women in constructing the Sanctuary. Commenting on the first of those verses, Rashi states that the women displayed greater generosity than the men.
60.
Commenting on this law, Shabbat 119b declares: "The world is only maintained [through the merit] of the voice of school children [studying Torah]."
61.
Yevamot 6a states: "The construction of the Sanctuary does not supersede the observance of the Sabbath, as it is written (Leviticus 19:30): 53Observe My Sabbaths and revere My Sanctuaries, 54 i.e., the Sabbath is of primary importance, even in regard to the Sanctuary. The festivals are also called Sabbaths by the Torah, cf.Leviticus 23:24 and 39. Hence, the same ruling applies to them.
Though the construction of the Temple is forbidden on the Sabbaths and festivals, sacrifices may be offered on these days even though prohibited labors are involved in this service.
This apparent discrepancy can be explained as follows: Once the Temple is constructed and complete, the holiness of its service supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions. Nevertheless, while the Temple is being constructed, those prohibitions must be observed in order to establish the sacred nature of the place.
62.
Our text is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of theMishneh Torah. The standard printed text states "hewn stone." That is obviously an error. Note Halachah 8 which describes the manner of cutting the stones used for the Temple. Even such measures were insufficient for the stones used for the Altar, as explained in the following halachot.
63.
By the Mechilta, commenting on that verse.
64.
In his commentary on this Halachah, theMishneh LiMelech notes that it appears that this directive was violated in the construction of the Temple.
In Hilchot Parah Adumah 2:7 (see also Chapter 5, Halachah 1), the Rambam explains that the entire area beneath the Temple and its courtyard had been hollowed out to protect against the possibility of ritual impurity being contracted because of a grave which was buried there without anyone's knowledge.
To resolve this difficulty, the Mishneh LiMelech explains that the ground had indeed been hollowed out. However, there was a certain measure of earth that was left for support. The Altar was, therefore, considered to be in contact with the earth.
65.
Commenting on this verse, the Mechiltastates that on three occasions the Torah expresses a command using terminology which appears conditional: our verse, the verse (Exodus 22:24), "If you will lend money...," and the verse (Leviticus 2:14), "If you shall offer a meal offering of the first fruits."
66.
I.e., cracked, split, or broken in any way. Even if the breach in the stone was not made by iron, the stone is disqualified. SeeMiddot 3:4 and Halachah 16.
67.
See Hilchot Shechitah 1:23.
68.
Even though this verse describes the altar to be built by the Jews when they cross the Jordan, it teaches us fundamental principles regarding the Temple's altar.
69.
These lines are also taken from Middot, loc. cit. The Rambam quotes the mishnah here, rather than in the following halachah, to emphasize that even a breach which was not caused by contact with iron could disqualify a stone for use. To find stones of this nature, it was necessary to dig in the manner described.
70.
Zevachim 54a notes that whole stones could be found on the seashore. See also Tosefot, Sukkah 49a.
71.
As I Kings 6:7 states, "And the House...was built with whole stones as they were brought in." However, as explained in Halachah 8, the laws governing the stones of the Temple and the Courtyard were more lenient. They could be smoothed with iron tools outside the Temple Mount.
72.
The Rambam stated a measure: "to the extent that a nail passing over it will become caught in it" for disqualifying stones to be used in the Altar. However, in the present Halachah, he does not mention a measure for the cracks or splits which may disqualify a stone after it has been used for the Temple. Thus, a question arises: Does the previous measure apply in this case as well, or was no measure mentioned, because even the slightest crack would disqualify the stone?
This question can be resolved as follows: In Halachah 17, the Rambam states that a person "who destroys a single stone from the Altar, any part of the Temple building, or [the floor of the Temple Courtyard]," violates a negative command, "as it is said (Deuteronomy 12:3-4): 'And you shall destroy their altars...Do not do so to the Lord, your God. '
By mentioning the prohibition against the destruction or damage to the Altar's stones in the context of "their altars," the prohibition against idol worship, the Torah creates an association between the two. Even the slightest measure of property consecrated unto a false god is prohibited. So, too, even the smallest crack may disqualify one of the Temple's stones.
73.
Since they were used for the building of the Temple, it is not fitting for them to be used for mundane matters afterwards (Mishneh Limelech).
The Tosefta (Megillah, Chapter 2) discusses whether this principle applies to other sacred structures, such as a synagogue.
74.
Middot 1:6 describes that a special chamber just outside the Temple courtyard was set aside for entombing the stones of the Courtyard which were defiled by the Greeks before the Hasmoneans reconquered the Temple.
75.
As mentioned above, iron is often used for death and destruction. This stands in direct contradiction to the purpose of the Altar. Therefore, the Torah insisted that stones which had been prepared for building the Altar were forbidden to have any contact with that metal.
76.
The source for the Rambam's statements is Middot, Chapter 3, Mishnah 4.
However, the terminology used by the Mishnah and quoted by the Rambam is subject to debate. The Rosh interprets the Mishnah strictly and maintains that contact with iron disqualifies a stone even though no blemish was made in the stone.
77.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 79) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 40) include this as one of 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
78.
As it is written (Deuteronomy 27:6): "You shall build the Altar of the Lord with whole stones." It is interesting to note that though the Rambam uses this expression, he does not consider this command as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
79.
To clean it from the blood of the sacrifices.
80.
To apply and smooth the cement. The Ra'avad suggests that a wooden tool was employed for this purpose.
81.
The verse continues, explaining the reason for the command: "so that your nakedness not be revealed upon it."
The commentaries explain that spreading one's legs as when walking up steps does not show fitting deference to God's altar.
This command raises an obvious question: If walking up steps is not considered respectful, why were any steps allowed on the Temple Mount? It was necessary to ascend steps to enter the Temple building itself!
Among the answers given to this question is: The ramp possessed a degree of holiness comparable to that of the Altar itself (as obvious from Halachot 15 and 16). Thus, one's manner of ascent could be considered a sign of respect or disrespect to the Altar. In contrast, the steps leading to the Temple building have a lower level of sanctity (as obvious from Halachah 5). Thus, the way in which one approached is not as significant. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 21, p. 119).
82.
To the left when facing the Temple.
Zevachim 62b expounds this concept as follows: Leviticus 1:11 declares that "He shall slaughter it at the foot of the Altar, on its north side." If the north side was to be the Altar's foot, its head, i.e. the side from which we approach, would be at the south.
83.
The ramp began at a height of 8.83 cubits and was inclined over 32 cubits.
84.
One is only liable if his intent was to destroy. If he had intended to improve upon the building, there is no prohibition. Therefore, when King Herod desired to beautify the Temple, as mentioned in (Halachah 11), he was allowed to tear down the previous structure. See also Bava Batra 3b.
85.
The Rambam also mentions this prohibition in Hilchot Yesodai HaTorah (6:7). There, he does not restrict the scope of the prohibition, and states that it applies throughout the Temple Courtyard including the area outside the region specified here. Most commentaries view that opinion as more precise.
86.
Even though the command is stated in the positive, it is considered one of the 365 negative commands of the Torah. See Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 65) andSefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 437).
87.
I.e., the tongs and scoops used to clean out its wicks and ashes. See Exodus 25:38.
88.
I.e., the bread molds, incense bowls, frames, and dividers (ibid.:29).
89.
Menachot 28b derives this Halachah as follows: One of the thirteen principles of Biblical analysis expounded by Rabbi Yishmael (in the introduction to the Sifra, and included in our morning prayers) is as follows: "When a generalization is followed by a specific example and then, by a second generalization, the law is applicable to other cases similar to the specific example mentioned."
The command to fashion the Menorah was expressed as follows (Exodus 25:31): "You shall make a Menorah out of pure gold. You shall fashion it by hammering it out." The Sages commented, "You shall make a Menorah" is a generalization, "out of pure gold" is a specific example, and "You shall fashion it," a second generalization. Thus, the Menorah may be made from other substances similar to gold, i.e., any metal. The same principle is then expanded to include other utensils.
90.
Menachot 28b relates that when the Greeks controlled the Temple, they defiled all its utensils. When the Hasmoneans reconquered Jerusalem, they were very poor and constructed the Menorah of iron staves coated with tin. Afterwards, they acquired more means and made a Menorahof silver. Ultimately, they were able to make one of gold.
91.
Bereishit Rabbah declares: "Gold was created only for the sake of the Temple."
This metal is really too precious for our world, and was only given to us to be used for these sacred purposes. Therefore, fashioning even the Temple's most insignificant utensils from this metal is not an unnecessary extravagance, but rather the fulfillment of God's intent when He created gold.
92.
Middot 2:3 relates that the Second Temple's gates were originally built of other metals. Generations later, the people prospered, and plated them with gold.
93.
Before fashioning the utensil, the craftsman must have the intention that they be used for the Temple.
94.
Even if they were never used for those reasons
95.
The term translated as "the Temple,"gavohah, literally means "the Most High." Because of the departure from the literal meaning, it is set off with brackets.
96.
The sanctity of the Temple's utensils has two dimensions:
a) that conveyed by one's intention when fashioning the utensil,
b) that brought about by its use in the Temple services.
Without the proper intention, an object may never be used in Temple services. However, the intention alone is not sufficient to distinguish that object as holy and prevent its use for mundane purposes.
97.
Since the sanctity of a synagogue is not as great as that of the Temple, the building materials are not considered as prepared for that holy purpose.

---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Shechitah Shechitah - Chapter 6, Shechitah Shechitah - Chapter 7, Shechitah Shechitah - Chapter 8 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Shechitah - Chapter 6
Halacha 1
What is meant by nekuvah?1 There are eleven organs that if there is a perforation of the slightest size that reaches their inner cavity, [the animal] istrefe. They are:2 the entrance to the gullet,3 the membrane of the brain in the skull, the heart and its large arteries, the gall-bladder, the arteries leading to the liver, the maw,4 the stomach, the abdomen, the gut, the intestines, and the lung and the bronchia.
Halacha 2
We have already mentioned the definition of the entrance to the gullet.5 It refers to a portion of the esophagus above the gullet which is not fit for ritual slaughter. If there is a perforation of the slightest size that reaches its inner cavity, [the animal] is trefe.
Halacha 3
The brain in the skull has two membranes. If the outer one near the skull bone alone is perforated, [the animal] is permitted.6 If the lower one near the brain is perforated, it is trefe.7 With regard to the portion where the brain extends to the spinal cord, i.e., the portion below the glands where the neck begins, the laws governing [the perforation of] its membranes change.8 If they are perforated beyond the glands, [the animal] is permitted.
Halacha 4
When the brain itself is perforated9 or crushed, [the animal] is acceptable if its membrane is intact.10 If, however, [it has degenerated to the extent that] it can be poured like water or melts like wax, [the animal] is trefe.11
Halacha 5
When there is a perforation of the heart to its inner cavity - whether to the larger cavity on the left or the smaller cavity to the right - [the animal] is trefe. If, however, the flesh of the heart is perforated, but the perforation does not reach the inner cavity, [the animal] is permitted.12 The arteries leading from the heart to the lung is considered as the heart itself. If there is a perforation of the slightest size that reaches its inner cavity, [the animal] is trefe.
Halacha 6
When the gall-bladder is perforated and the liver seals it, [the animal] is permitted.13 If, however, the perforation is not sealed, it is trefe even if the perforation is located close to the liver.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] a kernel14 is found in the gall-bladder. If it was shaped like a date seed, i.e., its head is not pointed, [the animal] is permitted.15If, however, its head is pointed like an olive seed, it is forbidden, for we can assume that it perforated [the gall bladder] when it entered. [The reason that] the perforation cannot be seen is that a scab developed over the opening of the wound.16
Halacha 8
When there is a perforation of the slightest size in one of the arteries of the liver where the blood develops, [the animal] is trefe.17 Accordingly, [the following rules apply] if a needle is found in the lobes of the liver. If it was a large needle and its pointed edge was facing inward, it can be assumed that it perforated [the liver] when it entered. If its rounded edge was facing inward, we say that it entered through the blood vessels and [the animal] is permitted.18
Halacha 9
If it was a small needle, [the animal] is trefe, because both of its heads are sharp and it certainly perforated [the liver].19 If it is found in the large blood vessel, the wide artery through which food enters the liver,20 it is permitted.21If the flesh of the liver became wormridden, [the animal] is permitted.22
Halacha 10
When the maw is perforated and kosher fat23 seals [the perforation], [the animal] is permitted. Similarly, whenever a perforation is sealed by flesh or fat that is permitted to be eaten, [the animal] is permitted. The [only] exceptions are the fat of the heart,24 the membrane that is above the entire heart, the diaphragm in the midst of the belly that separates between the digestive organs and the respiratory organs, i.e., the one that when it is cut open, the lungs could be seen and which is called the membrane [above] the liver, the white place in the center [of the liver], and the fat of the colon. In these organs, we do not say that they shield [the perforation] because they are firm.25 A perforation that is sealed with one of these is not considered as sealed.
A portion of fat from a beast that corresponds to a portion of forbidden fat in a domesticated animal does not seal [a perforation] even though it is permitted to be eaten.26
Halacha 11
When the stomach is perforated, [the animal] is trefe. There is nothing that can seal it for the fat upon it is forbidden.27 Similarly, when there is a perforation of the abdomen or gut that extends to its outer periphery, [the animal] is trefe. If one of them was perforated and the perforation leads to the cavity of the other,28 [the animal] is permitted.29
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when] a needle is found in the folds of the gut: If it was from one side,30 [the animal] is permitted.31 If it caused a complete perforation extending [from the outer side] to the cavity of the gut and a drop of blood was found at the place of the perforation, [the animal] is trefe. For we are certain that the perforation occurred before the slaughter. If there is no blood at the place of the perforation,32 [the animal] is permitted. For we are certain that after the slaughter, under pressure the needle caused the perforation.33
Halacha 13
When an animal swallowed a substance that will perforate the intestines, e.g., the root of the asafetida34 plant or the like, it is trefe, for we can be certain that it perforated them. If there is a question whether or not a perforation was made,35 [the animal] must be inspected.36
When one of the organs of the digestive system through which the food waste passes, i.e., the intestines, are perforated, [the animal] is trefe. Among them are those which are curved and surrounded by each other like a snake that is coiled, they are referred to as the small intestines. If one of them was perforated [on the side where] another [is located], the animal is permitted, for the other [intestine] will shield [the perforation].
Halacha 14
When the digestive organs were perforated and viscous body fluids seal them, [the animal] is trefe for this seal will not endure.37
When a wolf, a dog, or the like, snatched [an animal's] intestines38 and they were perforated after they were abandoned, we surmise that [the predator caused the perforation and the slaughtered animal] is permitted. We do not say that perhaps [the predator] made a perforation in a place where one already existed.39
If [an intestine] was discovered to be perforated40 and it was not known whether it was perforated before [the animal's] slaughter41 or afterwards, we perforate it again and compare the two. If the first perforation resembles this one, [the animal] is kosher.42 If there was a difference between them, [we presume that the first] occurred before the slaughter and [the animal] is trefe. If the perforation in doubt was handled, the perforation to which it is being compared must also be handled before the comparison is made.
Halacha 15
When [an animal's] digestive organs protrude outside [its body] without having been perforated,43 [the animal] is permitted. If they were turned upside down,44 [the animal] is trefe even if they were not perforated. [The rationale is that] once [the digestive organs] have been turned upside down,45they will never return to their ordinary functioning and [the animal] will not live.
Halacha 16
The final digestive organ that is straight and not curved from which feces are excreted in the genital area and is joined [to the body] between the thighs is called the colon. If it is perforated even slightly, [the animal] is trefe,46 as applies with regard to the other digestive organs.
When does the above apply? When the perforation faced the cavity of the belly. When, however, it was perforated at the point where it is joined between the thighs, [the animal] is permitted.47 [Indeed,] even if the entire place where it is joined between the thighs is removed, [the animal] is permitted, provided a length of at least four fingerbreadths48 remains in an ox.49
Halacha 17
A fowl does not have a stomach, an abdomen, or a gut. Instead of them, it has a crop and a craw.50
All the factors that render an animal trefe apply equally to a domesticated animal, a wild beast, and a fowl.51
When the roof of the crop receives even the slightest perforation, [the animal] is trefe. What is meant by the roof of the crop? That which becomes extended with the gullet when the fowl extends its neck.52 If, however, the remainder of the crop becomes perforated, [the fowl] is permitted.
Halacha 18
The craw has two [membranes] covering it. The outer one is red like meat; the inner one is white like skin. If one was perforated and not the other, [the fowl] is permitted unless they are both perforated, even slightly. If they are both perforated, but in places that do not correspond, [the fowl] is permitted.53
Halacha 19
The spleen is not one of the limbs which is disqualified because of a perforation of even the slightest size. Therefore our Sages did not include it in that category. Instead, a perforation that disqualifies it has a measure which is not uniform throughout it.
What is implied? One of the ends of the spleen is thick and the other thin, like the shape of the tongue. If the thick end was perforated by a hole that extends from side to side, [the animal] is trefe. If the hole does not extend from side to side, [more lenient rules apply]: If a portion the thickness of a golden dinarremains,54 [the animal] is permitted. If less than that remains, [the perforation] is considered as if it extends from side to side and [the animal] is trefe. If the thin side is perforated, [the animal] is acceptable.55
Halacha 20
[The following principle applies with regard to] all of the organs concerning which our Sages said that even the slightest perforation [causes the animal to be considered] trefe. If [that organ] was removed entirely, [the animal] istrefe.56 This applies whether it was eliminated through sickness, removed by hand, or [the animal] was created lacking the organ.
The same laws also apply if it was created with two of that organ, for any extra limb or organ is considered as if it was lacking.57
What is implied? If one of an animal's or fowl's digestive organs, its gall-bladder,58 or the like was removed, it is trefe. Similarly if it was discovered to have two gall-bladders or two of a [particular digestive] organ, it is trefe. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If, however, the spleen was removed or two spleens were found, [the animal] is permitted, for [that organ] is not among those listed [by our Sages in this category].
Halacha 21
[The statement that] an extra digestive organ causes an animal to be considered trefe applies only when there is an entire extra organ from its beginning to its end and thus two digestive organs are found next to each other as is [sometimes found in] the digestive organs of a fowl59 or the extra organ projects outward like a branch from a bough and it is a separate entity.60 [The latter applies] whether in a fowl or in an animal. If, however, the extra organ returns and becomes combined with the main organ and they are fused at the two ends61 even though they are separate in the middle, [the animal] is permitted and the organ is not considered as extra.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term literally means "perforated."
2.
The Rambam explains the particular laws regarding the perforation of these organs in this chapter with the exception of those concerning the lung. The latter, because they are many and are of more common application, are given greater focus and an entire chapter, Chapter 7, is devoted to them.
3.
If the gullet itself is perforated, the animal is considered a nevelah as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 13.
4.
A kosher domesticated animal has four stomachs. If any one of them is perforated, the animal is trefe. This and the following three terms refer to those stomachs.
5.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.
6.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 31:1) quotes authorities who maintain that even if the upper membrane alone is perforated, the animal is trefe. He states that unless a significant loss is involved, this perspective should be followed. The Turei Zahav 31:1 and the Siftei Cohen 31:1 quote views that advocate stringency even if a significant loss is involved.
7.
There is a question among the commentaries with regard to the law if only the bottom membrane is perforated. ManyRishonim - and this is the ruling of theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 31:10) - rule that the animal is considered trefe in such a situation, for that membrane is the primary protection for the brain.
There are those who maintain that this is alluded to in the Rambam's wording: "If the lower one near the brain is perforated, it istrefe," i.e., its perforation alone causes the animal to be considered trefe. Others maintain that this is not the Rambam's intent and some even maintain that the proper version of the text is "If also the lower one...," which would imply that both membranes must be perforated.
[The more stringent ruling is also stated in the popular translation of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 3:1). However, Rav Kappach - while not disputing the ruling - maintains that the translation there is in error.]
8.
Instead, it is governed by the laws pertaining to the breach of the spinal cord, as described in Chapter 9, Law 1.
9.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro quotes a different version substituting nirkav("decayed") for nikeiv ("perforated"). He also quotes this version in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 31:2).
10.
For the animal will still be able to function.
11.
In Chapter 10, the Kessef Mishneh includes this - as the implication from the Rambam's order here - in the category of nekuvah. For in such a situation, ultimately, the brain's membrane will become perforated.
12.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 40:2) follows the opinion of the Tur who accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to a perforation stemming from sickness, but rules more stringently with regard to a perforation caused by a thorn or a needle. In such an instance, even if the perforation does not extend to the cavity of the heart, the animal is trefe.
13.
For flesh will cling to flesh .
14.
Needless to say, these laws apply when a needle or a thorn is found in the gall-bladder [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 42:9)].
15.
We assume that instead of perforating the gall bladder from the outside, it entered through the blood vessels and became lodged there.
16.
And as indicated by Chapter 3, Halachah 21, the sealing of a perforation by a scab is not significant in these contexts.
17.
The Ra'avad and other Rishonim take issue with the Rambam, maintaining that this ruling applies only with regard to the arteries leading to the liver, but not with regard to those within the liver itself. The Rivosh (Responsum 189) supports the challenge to the Rambam by citing the ruling (Chapter 8, Halachah 21) that if the liver is removed entirely except for a small portion, the animal is not trefe.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro explains the Rambam's position as follows: Even when the liver is removed, its blood vessels must remain intact. A parallel to that concept exists with regard to the lungs (see Chapter 7, Halachah 9). Nevertheless, in hisShulchan Aruch, he follows the position of the other Rishonim and does not mention a perforation in the liver as a factor that disqualifies an animal.
18.
Here also the Ra'avad and other Rishonimtake issue with the Rambam, maintaining that his understanding of Chullin 45b, the source for this halachah, is in error. The Turand the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 41:6) follow their understanding.
19.
I.e., regardless of the direction it entered.
20.
I.e., blood from the stomach; for food does not enter the liver.
21.
Since this blood vessel is large, it cannot be taken for granted that the needle perforated the blood vessel.
22.
We do not suspect that the blood vessels of the liver were perforated.
23.
See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot, ch. 7, for an explanation which fat is kosher and which is forbidden. Halachah 6, of that chapter speaks explicitly of the fat on the maw.
24.
Concerning this point, there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 40:1) follows the lenient view and permits the animal in such a situation, while the Rama follows the more stringent perspective.
25.
And thus they will not bend in a manner that will seal the perforation. Kosher fat and flesh, by contrast, are pliable and will seal any perforation over which they are located.
26.
All fat in a wild beast is permitted to be eaten. Hence, in this instance, the general principle stated above is not followed and we determine which fat can seal a perforation by comparing it to the corresponding situation in a domesticated animal.
With regard to a fowl, all its kosher fat will seal a perforation beneath it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 46:1)].
27.
The Turei Zahav 48:2 questions: Seemingly, the spleen should be able to seal it, for the spleen may be eaten and lies on the stomach. He explains that since the membrane covering the spleen is forbidden, it is not an effective seal.
28.
This is possible for some of these stomachs are located within each other.
29.
For the perforation will not reach beyond the digestive system.
30.
From the following clause, it appears that according to the Rambam, this refers to a needle lodged in the outer side of the gut. See the following note.
31.
There are other authorities (their perspective is reflected in the objections of the Ra'avad) who maintain that even in this instance, an examination is required. Moreover, they explain that we are speaking about a needle lodged in the inner side of the gut. If a needle is lodged in the outer side of the gut, according to this view, the animal istrefe.
According to the Rambam, as mentioned above, we are speaking about a needle that comes from the outside. As the Rambam states in Chapter 11, Halachah 4, in such an instance, all of the inner organs of the body must be checked (Kessef Mishneh). Thus this halachah is speaking only with regard to the gut. Since the perforation does not breach the digestive system, the animal is not considered trefe.
Both perspectives are based on a comparison of two Talmudic passages (Chullin 50b and 51a) that are difficult to reconcile. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah48:8,10) follows the perspective of the other authorities. The Rama cites the Rambam's perspective with regard to a hole made on the inside that does not pass from one side to the other and states we may rely on it in a situation where a severe financial loss is involved.
32.
The Ra'avad and the other authorities state that the drop of blood must be found on the outer side of the gut.
33.
Since the animal was slaughtered, it blood was not flowing and it is unlikely that there will be sufficient pressure to force it outside the gut.
34.
A yellow-brown, bitter, offensive-smelling resinous material used for medicinal purposes in the ancient Middle East.
35.
The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur (Yoreh De'ah51), and others quote a different version of the Mishneh Torah concerning which questions are raised. The Kessef Mishnehjustifies the version translated here and the Frankel edition of the Mishneh Torah states that it is followed by most of the authoritative manuscripts.
36.
The Ra'avad states that the inspection of the intestines is difficult. That position is reflected in the ruling of the Tur and theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 51:4) who rules that in such a situation, because of its questionable status, the animal is considered as trefe.
37.
When the digestive system is under pressure, the vicious fluids will not seal effectively. The Siftei Cohen 46:1 states that the same ruling applies even if a scab has developed over the wound.
38.
I.e., after the animal was slaughtered.
39.
Chullin 9a explains that, unless there is a known factor that certainly indicates otherwise, we assume that an animal that has been slaughtered is acceptable. In this instance, the perforation would lead us to rule stringently. Nevertheless, since the fact that it was snatched by a predator can serve as an explanation, we rely on the original assumption. Accordingly, for this ruling to apply, we must know that the animal was slaughtered properly [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 25:3)].
40.
As indicated by the Rambam's explanation, in this instance, we do not know how it was perforated.
41.
In which instance, the animal would be considered as trefe.
42.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 50:1) rules that in the present generation, we are not knowledgeable regarding the making of such a comparison and hence, forbid the animal because of the doubt.
43.
I.e., the animal's belly was cut open while it was alive. It could no longer support the digestive organs and they protruded beyond the skin. Nevertheless, the digestive organs themselves were not blemished.
44.
As might happen if a person was trying to reinsert them into the animal's belly.
45.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 46:2) rules that if an animal's digestive organs are discovered to have turned upside down, the animal is trefe, even if the organs did not fall out of its belly.
46.
Even though the fat upon it is kosher, it does not seal it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah46:1); see also Halachah 10].
47.
For the thighs will support it (Chullin 50a).
48.
The Rambam (based on Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi) considers this the meaning of the term "in order to grasp it" used by Chullin, loc. cit. Although there are more lenient views, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah46:5) follows the Rambam's ruling.
According to Shiurei Torah , a fingerbreadth is 2 cm, according to Chazon Ish 2.48 cm.
49.
For other animals, the minimum measure is calculated proportionately (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
50.
Unlike a domesticated animal that has four stomachs, a kosher fowl has two.
51.
I.e., though the laws above were stated with regard to a domesticated animal, they apply equally to a beast and to a fowl if they possess the same organs.
52.
Hence just as the perforation of the gullet disqualifies a fowl; so, too, the perforation of this portion of the crop (see Chullin 58b).
53.
Compare this entire halachah to Chapter 3, Halachah 20, concerning the gullet, noting the similarities and differences.
54.
This is less than half the thickness of the spleen (Rashba as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh).
55.
This applies with regard to an animal and a beast. More lenient rules apply with regard to a fowl and the perforation of its spleen never causes it to be considered as trefe, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 10.
56.
Since the perforation of an organ impairs its functioning to the point that the animal istrefe, the implication is that the organ must function excellently for the body to be maintained. Hence, we can certainly assume that an animal will be consideredtrefe when the organ does not exist at all.
57.
The commentaries explain that since the organ is duplicated, neither one of the two organs will be able to function satisfactorily. Thus it is as the animal is lacking that organ entirely.
58.
The Radbaz states that if we do not see a gall-bladder, we have the liver tasted. If its taste is bitter, we assume that the gall-bladder was absorbed by the liver. SeeShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 52:3).
59.
Thus this phenomenon does not render a fowl trefe, only an animal (Chullin 58b).
60.
The Siftei Cohen 47:1 rules that this applies only when the extra organ branches off from the stomach. If it branches off from the intestines, it is acceptable.
61.
If, however, each of the organs branches of from a different place in the animal's digestive system, the animal is trefe even if the organs merge at their end (Maggid Mishneh).

Shechitah - Chapter 7


Halacha 1
The lungs have two membranes. If only one of them is perforated, [the animal] is permitted.1 If they are both perforated, [the animal] is trefe.2 Even if the entire upper membrane3 is peeled off and dissolves, [the animal] is permitted. If there was even a slight perforation in the portion of windpipe in the chest4 or lower, [the animal] is trefe. For this is a place in the lower potion of the windpipe that is not fit for ritual slaughter.5
Halacha 2
If a person began slaughtering the animal and slit the windpipe entirely, then perforated the lung, and afterwards, completed the slaughter, [the animal] istrefe, for [the lung] was perforated before the completion of the slaughter.6Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
If one of the bronchioles7 was perforated, even if the perforation is covered by another bronchiole, [the animal] is trefe.8 If one saw that it was perforated and then it developed a scab, [the scab] is of no consequence.9
If the mass of the lung is perforated, [the animal] is trefe, even if one of the ribs seals the perforation.10 If it was perforated in a place where the lung breaks into lobes and the lobe lies on [a rib, the animal] is kosher.11
Halacha 4
When does the above apply? When the perforation in the lobes is sealed by flesh.12 If, however, the perforation is pressed against the bone, it does not protect it.13 If, however, the perforation in the lobes was clinging both to the bone and the flesh, [the animal] is permitted.
Halacha 5
When the body of the lung is found adhering to the ribs, we suspect that it was perforated. [This applies] whether or not growths14 appeared on it.
What do we [to check it]? We separate it from the rib while taking care not to perforate it. If it is discovered to be perforated and a bruise is discovered on the rib in the place where it was perforated, we assume that the perforation was caused by the bruise.15 If there was no bruise on the rib, it is clear that this perforation existed within the lung before the animal was slaughtered and it is trefe.16
Halacha 6
When it is discovered that there is a closed place in the lung which air does not enter and it does not inflate, it is as if it had been perforated and [the animal] is trefe.17
How do we inspect it? We cut off the portion [of the lung]18 that would not inflate when [air was] blown [into the lung]. If fluid was discovered within it,19 it is permitted, because it was due to the fluid that the air did not enter. If no fluid is found within, we put some saliva, a straw, a feather or the like over [the separated portion] and blow air into it. If they move, [the animal] is kosher.20If not, it is trefe, because air does not enter [that portion of the lung].
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] a sound is heard when a lung is inflated. If the place from which the sound emanates can be detected, saliva, a straw, or the like should be placed over it. If they flutter, it is apparent that the lung is perforated and [the animal] is trefe.
If the place [from which the sound emanates] cannot be detected, the lung should be placed in lukewarm21 water and blown. If the water bubbles, [the animal] is trefe.22 If not, it is apparent that only the lower membrane has been perforated, the air is moving between the two membranes. For this reason, it will be possible to hear a hushed sound when it is inflated.
Halacha 8
Keep this encompassing general principle in mind: Whenever air was blown into a lung that was placed in lukewarm water and the water did not bubble, [the lung] is intact, without a perforation.23
Halacha 9
[The following laws apply when the insides of] a lung24 can be poured out like [water from] a pitcher, but the outer membrane is intact, without a perforation. If the bronchioles remain in their place and have not degenerated, it is acceptable. If even one of the bronchioles have degenerated, it is trefe.25
What should be done? We perforate [the membrane of the lung] and pour it out into a container glazed with lead26 or the like. If white strands can be seen, it is apparent that the bronchioles have degenerated27 and it is trefe. If not, it is only the flesh of the lung that has degenerated and [the animal] is acceptable.28
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] boils29 are discovered on a lung. If they are filled with air, clear water, fluid that is viscous like honey or the like, dried fluid that is firm like a stone, [the animal] is permitted. If putrid fluid or putrid or murky liquid is found within it, it is trefe.30 When one removes the fluid and checks it, one should check the bronchiole below it. If it is discovered to be perforated, it is trefe.31
Halacha 11
When one discovers two boils on a lung close to each other, [the animal] istrefe,32 for it is very likely that there is a perforation between them33 and there is no way of checking the matter. If there is one which appears like two, one should perforate one, if the other flows into it, it is only one and [the animal] is permitted.34 If not, [the animal] is trefe.
Halacha 12
If the lung degenerated, [the animal] is trefe. What is implied? For example, it was discovered intact and when it is hung up, it will break apart and fall into separate pieces.
When a lung was discovered to be perforated in the place where it was handled by the butcher's hand, the animal is permitted. We assume that [it was blemished by his] hand and say: "It was perforated by the butcher's hand after slaughter."35
If the perforation was discovered in another place and it is not known whether it took place before ritual slaughter or afterwards, we make another perforation and compare the two as is done with regard to the digestive organs.36
Halacha 13
We do not compare the lung of a small domesticated animal to the lung of a large domesticated animal. Instead, [the lung of] a small animal [must be compared to that] of a small animal and that of a large animal to that of a large animal.37
If a perforation is found in one of the boils of a lung, [the animal] is trefe. We do not say: "Perforate another boil and compare them,"38 because the matter is not clearly apparent.39
Halacha 14
When a needle is found in the lung, we blow up the lung. If no air is released from it, it is apparent that this needle entered via the bronchioles and did not perforate [them].40 If the lung was cut open before it was blown up and a needle was found in it,41 [the animal] is forbidden. For there is a high probability that it perforated [the lung] when it entered.
Halacha 15
When there is a worm in the lung and it perforated the lung and emerged and we see the lung perforated by the worm, [the animal] is permitted. We rely on the prevailing assumption that it perforated [the lung] after ritual slaughter42and emerged [then].
There are ways that certain organs appear [that can disqualify the organ].43For if the appearance of the organ is changed to that undesirable appearance, it is considered as if it was perforated.44 For since the appearance of this flesh changed to the [undesirable] appearance, it is considered as if it was dead. It is as if the flesh whose appearance changed does not exist. Similarly, [Leviticus 13:10] states: "And there is a spot of living45 flesh in the blemish...," and [ibid. 13:10] states: "On the day when he will present living flesh...." Implied is that flesh whose appearance has changed is not "alive."
Halacha 16
[The following principles apply if] the color46 of a lung changes, whether part of its color changes or its entire color changes. If it changes to a permitted color, even if its entire color changes, it is permitted. If, however, even the slightest portion of it changes to a forbidden color, [the animal] is trefe. [The rationale is that] the forbidden color is considered equivalent to a perforation as explained [above].47
Halacha 17
There are five forbidden hues for the lung: black like ink, greenish-yellow48like hops, [yellow] like the yolk of an egg, or like safflower,49 or like the color of meat.50
Safflower is a color which clothes are dyed. It is comparable to hairs that are slightly red, leaning towards gold.
Halacha 18
If the lung is discovered to be the color of the branches of a date palm, we forbid it because of the doubt involved, because this is very close to a forbidden color. We do not forbid any of these colors until the lung is inflated and massaged by hand. If it changes to a permitted color, [the animal] is permitted.51 If it retains the [forbidden] color, it is forbidden.
Halacha 19
There are four permitted hues [for the lung]. They are: blackish blue, green like a leek, red, or the color of the liver. Even if the lung was entirely colored in these four hues patch by patch, spot by spot, [the animal] is permitted.
Halacha 20
When a fowl52 fell into a fire and its heart, its liver,53 or its craw turned green or its digestive organs turned red, [the fowl] is trefe.54 [This applies if] even the slightest portion of the organs [changed color]. For whenever a fire causes organs that were green to turn red or those which were red to turn green, it is considered as if the organ was removed and [the animal] is trefe. [This applies] provided they retain this color after they were cooked slightly and massaged.55
Halacha 21
Whenever the liver of a fowl appears like the digestive organs or [the appearance of] the other digestive organs change and the change remains after they were cooked slightly and massaged as explained [above], we can assume that the fowl fell into a fire,56 its digestive organs were burnt, and it istrefe.
Moreover, when there was no change detected in the digestive organs of a fowl, but when they were cooked slightly they changed color, those that were green turned -red or those that were red turned green, we can assume that the fowl fell into a fire, its digestive organs were burnt, and it is trefe.57
Similarly, if [the color of] the gullet [has changed] - the outer skin appears white and the inner red - it is considered as if the organ is not present, and it - either an animal or a fowl - is trefe.
FOOTNOTES
1.
For the other will protect the lung (Chullin46a).
2.
If both membranes are perforated, but the perforations do not correspond, theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 36:1) rules that the animal is kosher, but the Rama considers it trefe.
3.
The Radbaz states that if, by contrast, the lower membrane alone is peeled off, the animal is trefe, for certainly, part of the lung will be lacking.
4.
I.e., from the beginning of the ribcage.
5.
Chapter 1, Halachah 7 defines the portion of the windpipe acceptable for ritual slaughter. If, however, the windpipe is perforated in a such a place, the animal is kosher.
6.
Although the functioning of the lung is dependent on the windpipe, since a perforation in the lung causes an animal to be considered trefe, it is given that status (Chullin 32b).
7.
The small extensions of the windpipe that convey air within the lungs itself.
8.
Because the walls of the bronchioles are firm and not pliant. Hence, they will not serve as effective seals (Rashi, Chullin 48b).
In his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 36:6), Rav Yosef Caro rules that if a perforation in a bronchiole is sealed by flesh, the animal is acceptable. See also the comments of Siftei Cohen36:20. As the Rama states (Yoreh De'ah39:18), the custom in the Ashkenazic community is to rule that an animal is trefe if its lungs are perforated even if they are sealed closed by other inner organs.
9.
For ultimately it will open (Rashi, Chullin47b).
10.
Since this portion of the lung is located below the ribs, the perforation will never be sealed thoroughly.
11.
For the lobes lie on the ribs themselves and the seal will be maintained.
One of the issues related to the question of whether a lung is perforated or not issirchaot, adhesions, where the lung becomes attached to the ribs and/or other portions of the body. For a discussion of that matter, see the latter half of Chapter 11.
12.
It is not necessary to inspect the lung to see if air escapes (Tur, as quoted by Siftei Cohen 39:44).
13.
For the bone is firm and will not move when the lung expands and contracts. Even if one inspects the lung and no air escapes, the animal is still considered trefe (ibid.).
14.
Boils or carbuncles filled with pus. This heightens the probability that it could have been perforated.
15.
And we postulate that the animal was bruised after its slaughter. Hence it is acceptable. The Maggid Mishnehemphasizes that we are talking about a situation where the perforation is opposite the bruise. If they do not correspond, the animal is trefe.
16.
Here, also, even if one inspects the lung and no air escapes, the animal is still consideredtrefe [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 39:22)]. The Ra'avad states there is an apparent contradiction to the Rambam's ruling here and that in Chapter 11, Halachah 6. See the notes to that halachah for a discussion of this issue.
17.
I.e., unless it is checked as the Rambam continues to explain.
18.
According to the Rambam, the portion of the lung itself is cut off and we inspect it. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 36:9) offers a different interpretation. PAGE 239
19.
I.e., the feather is placed on the portion of the lung that was cut off. One blows throw the brochia. If the air passes through the bronchioles, the feather should flutter.
20.
The movement indicates that air flows through it.
21.
Chullin 47b states that hot water will cause the lung to contract and cold water will cause it to become firmer. If it was put in either hot or cold water first, it may not be checked in lukewarm water afterwards [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 36:4)].
22.
For obviously the lung has been perforated and the air is flowing out from it.
23.
This principle is significant with regard to the discussion concerning sirchaot, adhesions, in Chapter 11. The Ra'avad (whose interpretation is paralleled by that of Rashi and other Rishonim) maintain that blowing the lung represents a stringency: If air escapes, an animal is considered trefe even though there is reason to permit it. The same principle cannot be applied as a leniency. The Rambam - and his approach is shared by Rabbenu Tam, Rashba, Rabbenu Nissim, and others - maintains that this principle was instituted as a leniency.
24.
The Siftei Cohen 36:21 states that this leniency applies even if the entire lung has degenerated and can be poured out like water.
25.
As stated in Halachah 3, if one of the bronchioles is perforated, the animal is trefe. Certainly, that ruling applies if it has degenerated.
26.
Because it is glazed, one will be able to see the white strands clearly if they exist [Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 36)].
27.
And the white strands are the remnants of the bronchioles.
28.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 36:7) adds a concept stated in the following halachah: that the fluid poured out may not be putrid. (The commentaries to the Shulchan Aruch maintain that the Rambam would follow this stringency.) The Rama, however, rules leniently, maintaining that as long as the bronchioles are not visible, the animal is acceptable.
29.
Based on Chullin 48a, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 37:1) states that even if boils are very large, the animal may still be kosher.
30.
The Rambam's ruling is cited by theShulchan Aruch. The Tur and the Rama follow the opinion of many other Rishonimwho permit the animal even if the fluid in the boils is putrid.
31.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's ruling is based on his decision in the previous halachah. The Rambam maintains that the fluid indicates that there is a strong possibilility that a perforation exists. Other opinions maintain that the animal is permitted, for the fluid is not necessarily a sign that a perforation exists. According to those views (and they are accpeted by theShulchan Aruch, loc. cit.), there is no need for the inspection the Rambam requires.
32.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 37:3) state that even if the boils are filled with clear fluid, the animal is trefe. If, however, they are hard, it is acceptable.
33.
Rashi (Chullin 47a) explains that most likely the membrane was perforated and therefore the boils developed. Rabbenu Nissim explains that since the two boils are next to each other, it is likely that one perforated the other.
34.
The Maharil requires a further check: to see whether they share the same pocket (Turei Zahav 37:5; Siftei Cohen 37:7).
35.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 36:5) suggests that the shape of the perforations must indicate that they were made by the butcher.
36.
See Chapter 6, Halachah 14.
37.
This represents the Rambam's understanding of Chullin 50a. Rashi interprets the passage slightly differently. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 36:5) follows Rashi's understanding and states that we do not compare a lung from one animal to that of another one at all. And even within one animal, we do not compare a perforation in a large lobe to one in a small lobe.
38.
With the intent of seeing whether the perforation was made before or after the slaughter.
39.
I.e., in this instance, it is not easy to differentiate based on the comparison.
40.
In contrast to the liver where some authorities make a distinction in the ruling depending on the direction it is facing (see Chapter 6, Halachah 8), no such contrast is made with regard to a needle found in the lung. See also Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah36:16-17) which states that if a drop of blood is found on the exterior of the lung, the animal is considered trefe. the Rama rules that unles a significant los is involved, whenever a needle is found in the lungs, the animal is considered trefe.
41.
And thus it is impossible to check it by blowing air into it, for the air will be released through the portion cut off.
42.
For while the animal was alive, the lung was continually expanding and contracting and it would be very hard for the worm to perforate it (Turei Zahav 36:8).
43.
The remaining halachot in this chapter are expressions of this principle. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 48:5) rules that we are not knowledgeable with regard to the correct appearance of the lung. Hence, if its appearance changes and one might think it became unacceptable, we rule stringently.
44.
And as stated above, the perforation of a lung disqualifies it.
45.
We have translated the verses literally to convey the meaning mentioned by the Rambam. In its ordinary context, the terms would be translated as "healthy flesh."
46.
Our translation is dependent on the following halachah.
47.
And even the slightest perforation of the lung disqualifies the animal.
48.
This represents the translation the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 38:1) offers for the Talmudic term yerok quoted by the Rambam.
49.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 3:2). Rashi (Chullin 47b) renders the term as saffron. There is little difference between the two colors.
50.
Which is reddish [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.)].
51.
For during the animal's lifetime, the lung is repeatedly inflated.
52.
These laws do not apply with regard to an animal because its skin is tough and its ribs protect it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah52:7]. The Rama, however, does not accept this leniency. The Ra'avad (Chapter 10, Halachah 11) also accepts the Rama's view.
53.
In his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 52:1), Rav Yosef Caro qualifies the ruling with regard to the liver, stating that to disqualify a fowl, it must change color at its thin end, the portion next to the gall-bladder, or it the place where it derives its nurture.
54.
Significantly, if the lungs change color, the fowl is not disqualified, because its ribs protect it [Kessef MishnehShulchan Aruch(loc. cit.)].
55.
For it is possible that the cooking and/or the massage will restore the organ's natural color.
56.
I.e., even though we do not know that the fowl fell into a fire, the fact that these organs changed color serves as evidence of such [Kessef Mishneh; the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah 3:3)]. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 52:6) quotes this ruling, but the Rama rules leniently and states that we must see that the fowl actually fell into a fire.
57.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 52:3) does not accept this stringency, following the opinion of the Rashba who maintains that we do not disqualify an animal unless we definitely know that it fell into a fire.

Shechitah - Chapter 8


Halacha 1
What is meant by the term chasairah?1 There are two organs that render [an animal] trefe if it is lacking the proper number. They are the lungs and the feet.2
The lungs have five lobes. When a person will drape them over his hand with the inner portion of the lung facing his face,3 there will be three [lobes] on the right and two on the left. In addition, at the right of [the lung], there is a small ear-like attachment. It is not in the row of the lobes. It has a pocket of its own and it is located in the pocket. This [attachment] is called a rose, because that is what it looks like.4 It is not counted as one of the number of lobes.
Accordingly, if [an animal] does not possess this "rose," it is permitted.5 For this is the pattern with regard to [this organ], there are some animals in which it is found and some in which it is not found. If it is perforated, [the animal] istrefe even though its pocket seals it.6
Halacha 2
If the number of lobes was lacking and one was discovered on the left side or two on the right side, [the animal] is trefe. If, however, there were two on the right side and this "rose," [the animal] is permitted.7
Halacha 3
If the position of the lobes was switched and three were found on the left and two on the right without a "rose" or the "rose" was found together with three on the left side, it is trefe, for it is lacking on the right side.8
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply if] the number of lobes was increased. If the extra lobe was on the side of the [other] lobes9 or in front of the lungs10on the side of the heart, [the animal] is permitted. If [the extra lobe] is on its back, near the ribs, [the animal] is trefe for an extra [organ] is considered equivalent to one that is lacking. [This applies] provided it is [at least] the size of a myrtle leaf.11If it is smaller than this, it is not considered as a lobe and [the animal] is permitted.
Halacha 5
When one lobe is found clinging to the one next to it, [the animal] is permitted. If, however, [the lobes] became attached out of the ordinary order, e.g., the first lobe became attached to the third, [the animal] is trefe.12
Halacha 6
[The following laws apply if] there are two lobes [that appear] as one lobe and do not appear as two lobes joined together.13 If there was a space about the size of a myrtle leaf14 between them - whether at their root, in their center, or at their end - so that it is clear that they are two which are attached, [the animal] is permitted. If not, it is lacking [one of the lobes] and is trefe.
Halacha 7
If the entire lung appears like two rows and it is not divided into lobes, it istrefe. Similarly, if the body of the lung itself15 was lacking, even if it was not perforated, it is considered as if the required number of lobes were missing and [the animal] is trefe.16 Therefore if a dried portion that could be chipped away with one's nail of even the slightest size was discovered within it, it is considered as lacking17 and [the animal] is trefe.
Halacha 8
When a lung was discovered to be inflated like the leaves of a palm tree, we rule that it is forbidden because of the doubt involved. For this is an abnormal addition to its body and perhaps an addition to its body is considered as equivalent to a lack in its body, as stated with regard to the number of lobes.18
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] an animal became frightened and was terrified to the extent that her lung19 shriveled and came closer to becoming dried out: If it became frightened through the hand of heaven, e.g., it heard a thunderclap, saw lightening, or the like, it is permitted.20 If it became frightened through human activity, e.g., another animal was slaughtered in its presence or the like, it is considered as if it were lacking and it is trefe.
Halacha 10
How do we inspect it? We place the lung in water for an entire day. In the winter, we place it in lukewarm water, in a container which will not cause the water to condense on its back21 and flow so that they will not become cold rapidly. If the season was hot, we place it in cold water in a container on which the water will condense on its back so that the water will remain cold. If [the lung] returns to its natural state, [we assume that the animal was frightened] by the hand of heaven and it is permitted.22 If it does not return, we [we assume that] it happened due to mortal causes and [the animal] is trefe.
Halacha 11
An animal that was lacking a foot23 from the time it came into being is trefe. The same ruling applies if it possesses an extra foot, for an extra limb or organ is considered as if it was lacking. If, however, it has three forefeet or only one forefoot, [the animal] is permitted. Accordingly, if [an animal's] forefoot is cut off, [the animal] is permitted.24
If its leg is cut off from the joint and above,25 [the animal] is trefe. From the joint and below, it is permitted.26 Which joint are we speaking about? The joint that is at the end of the hip close to the body.
Halacha 12
When the bone27 is broken above the joint, if it emerges outward entirely or in its majority, it is considered as if it were cut and fell off,28 and [the animal] istrefe. If the flesh or the skin29 was covering both the majority of the thickness and the majority of the circumference of the broken bone, [the animal] is permitted.30 This applies even if part of the broken bone fell off and no longer is present. Soft sinews are not considered as flesh.
Halacha 13
The juncture of the sinews is a place in an animal and in a beast which is above the heel, at the place where the butchers hang the animal.31 There are three white sinews there, one thick and two thin. From the place where they begin and are firm and white until [the place] where the whiteness is removed from them and they begin to become red and soften is considered the juncture of the sinews. It is approximately sixteen fingerbreadths32 [long] in an ox.
Halacha 14
In a fowl, there are sixteen such sinews. They begin on the lowest bone, from the extra talon and [continue] until the conclusion of the foot which is [covered by a series of] crusted scales.33
Halacha 15
When an animal's feet are cut off at the juncture of the sinews, it is trefe. Do not be amazed and say: "How is it possible that [an animal] will be permitted if its [legs] are cut off above the juncture of the sinews - indeed, it is permitted unless its [legs] are cut off above the highest joint as we explained34- but forbidden if they are cut off at a lower point, at the juncture of the sinews?
[The resolution is as follows: With regard to the designation of an animal] astrefe, [there are times when] one will cut from this point and it will live, but if [one would cut] from this point, it would die. We have not forbidden this animal, because its feet were cut off at a particular point,35 but rather because its sinews were severed36 and this renders it trefe, as will be explained.37
Halacha 16
What is meant by the term Netulah?38 There are three limbs and organs which even though they do not [cause an animal to be deemed trefe] when they are perforated or if they are lacking [when the animal is born],39 cause the animal to be deemed trefe. They are: the juncture of the sinews,40 the liver, and the upper jaw-bone.
Halacha 17
We already explained41 that when an animal or a fowl has had its legs cut off at the place of the juncture of the sinews, it is deemed trefe only because the sinews were cut.42 Therefore if the sinews alone were severed even though the foot remains intact, the animal is trefe, because the juncture of the sinews has been removed.
Halacha 18
In an animal, if the thick sinew alone was severed, [the animal] is permitted, for the two [thin] ones remained. If both thin ones were severed, [the animal] is permitted, for the one thick one is larger than both of them. [In both cases,] the entire juncture was not removed, only its smaller portion.43 If the majority of each of them was severed, [the animal] is trefe. Needless to say, this applies if they were all severed or removed.
Halacha 19
With regard to a fowl, even if the majority of one of the sixteen were severed, [the animal] is trefe.44
Halacha 20
When a fowl's wings are broken, it is permitted like an animal whose forelegs have been cut off.45
Halacha 21
When the entire liver has been removed, [the animal] is trefe. If an olive-sized portion remains at the place from which it is suspended46 and there is an olive-sized portion at the place of the gall-bladder, it is permitted.47
If the liver slipped from its place and it is [in disarray,] connected with the diaphragm, [the animal] is permitted.48 If the place from which it is suspended and the portion at the place of the gall-bladder were removed, it is trefe49 even if the remainder is intact as it was previously.
Halacha 22
If there remained an olive-sized portion at the place of the gall-bladder and an olive-sized portion at the place from which it was suspended, [the animal] is kosher. If, however, the portions of the liver which remain intact were scattered, some here and some there, flattened, or elongated like a strap, there is a doubt concerning its status. It appears to me that it is forbidden.50
Halacha 23
When the upper jaw-bone is removed, [the animal] is trefe.51 If, however, the lower jaw-bone is removed,52 i.e., it was cut away until the place of the gullet and the windpipe, but they were not uprooted [from their connection to the throat, the animal] is permitted.
Halacha 24
Whenever it is said that an animal is trefe if a limb or organ is lacking,53 so, too, it is trefe if that organ is removed.54 If, however, it is said that an animal istrefe if an organ is removed, [the animal] is not forbidden unless that organ was cut off. If, however, the animal was created lacking that organ, it is permitted. For if not, the categories of chasairah and netulah would be identical.55 Whenever it is said that [an animal] is permitted if a limb is removed, it is certainly permitted56 if this organ was lacking from the beginning of the animal's existence and was never created.
Halacha 25
When the uterus of an animal, i.e., its womb, was removed or its kidneys were removed,57 it is permitted. There if it was created with only one kidney or with three kidneys58 it is permitted.59 Similarly, it is permitted if a kidney was perforated.
Halacha 26
Although [an animal] is permitted despite the fact that a kidney was removed or it was created without it, if its kidney is extremely undersized, it is trefe.60For a small animal, this means the size of a bean, for a large one, the size of a grape.61 Similarly, if a kidney became afflicted, i.e., its flesh became like the flesh of a dead [animal] that decayed after several days. Thus if one would take hold of a portion of it, it will decompose and fall apart. If this condition reached the white portion62 in the kidney, the animal is trefe. Similarly, if moisture - even if it is not putrid - is found in the kidney or murky or putrid fluid is found there, it is trefe. If, however, clear water is found there,63 [the animal] is permitted.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Chasairah means "lacking." This category disqualifies an animal if it lacks one of its fundamental organs.
2.
It is true that there are more organs that render an animal trefe if they are lacking. Nevertheless, the lack of these organs is not placed in this category. Instead, the organ is considered as nekuvah, "perforated." As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 20, if the perforation of these organs will disqualify an animal, surely, it will be disqualified when the organs are lacking entirely.
3.
I.e., he will be holding the animal from behind. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah35:2).
4.
I.e., it is small and red.
5.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 35:2 states that it is customary within the Ashkenazic community to declare an animal trefe, if it lacks this "rose" or if there is an extra "rose."
6.
For it does not seal it thoroughly.
7.
For the "rose" functions in place of the missing lobe. If, however, the "rose" is found on the left and there is only one lobe, the animal is not acceptable. Since it is not in its proper place, it cannot replace a lobe (Kessef Mishneh). The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 35:7) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but the Rama differs.
8.
In this instance, the "rose" does not compensate for the lack of the lobe, because it is not on the right side.
9.
"In the row of the lungs" to borrow the expression used by Chullin 47b. Generally, we follow the principle that every addition is considered as if it was lacking. In this instance, however, since the extra lobe is found in the row of the lobes, it will not disturb the lungs' ordinary functioning.
10.
In this instance as well, the Rambam maintains that the position of the extra lobe prevents it from disturbing the lungs' ordinary functioning. The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 35:3) accepts the Rambam's ruling.The Rama quotes more stringent views that state that any extra lobe that is not found in the row of the lungs is trefe. Nevertheless, the custom is to rule leniently.
11.
I.e., even when inflated.
12.
If the portions of the lungs that follow their natural pattern become attached to each other, all authorities agree that the animal is acceptable, for this attachment will not create any difficulties. And if the third lobe becomes attached to the first, all agree that it is unacceptable, because as the lungs inflate, the attached portions will separate, cause the attachment to tear, and in doing so, perforate the lobe.
The commentaries question - and theMaggid Mishneh actually maintains that the text of the Mishneh Torah reads in this manner - whether if the back of one lobe is attached to the back of the lobe next to it, the animal is also trefe. For in this instance as well, since the lobes are attached in an unnatural order, the attachment will tear and perforate the lungs. In his Kessef Mishnehmaintains that the Rambam's wording implies that as long as the attached lobes are next to each other, the lung is acceptable, even if they are attached back to back. He does note, however, that there are authorities who rule stringently. He concludes in his Kessef Mishneh and also rules accordingly in his Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 39:4), that the attachments do not disqualify an animal only when the lobes are attached side to side - and not back to back - in the natural order. If they are attached in such an order, however, the lungs need not be checked. The Rama differs, requiring an examination. He also states that there are authorities who maintain that we are not knowledgable regarding how to make such an examination and therefore such an animal should be considered as trefe. Nevertheless, his ruling also leaves room for leniency if less than half of the body of the lobes are attached. See Siftei Cohen 39:11.
13.
I.e., they appear as one flush mass, without differentiation. If they are distinct, but attached, they are governed by the laws stated in the previous halachah.
14.
From Halachah 4, it appears that this is the size of a lobe that is significant. Hence, just as it is significant in disqualifying an animal, it is significant in causing it to be deemed kosher (Maggid Mishneh).
The Rambam's ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 35:8). The Rama cites authorities that maintain that even if a smaller portion is distinct, the lobes are considered as separate and the animal, kosher. The Rama states that we may rely on these opinions if there is a significant loss involved.
15.
I.e., it is lacking part of its ordinary mass.
16.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Chapter 7, Halachah 9, the Rambam rules that if a lung has decayed, it is kosher as long as its bronchioles and outer membrane are intact despite the fact that it has lost a large amount of its substance. He explains that this is not necessarily a contradiction to the ruling here. In that instance, since the lung has decayed significantly and yet, the brochioles have not been perforated, we assume that they will not be perforated. In this instance, by contrast, we suspect that the lack within the lung will cause it to become perforated.
Many other Rishonim, however, do not make such a distinction and maintain that a lung is acceptable if it is lacking some of its inner substance. The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 36:8) quotes both views. The Rama states that certain circumstances call for leniency and others, for stringency.
17.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that others explain that it is considered as if the dried portion is perforated and therefore the animal is trefe.
18.
As stated in law 4, an extra lobe is considered as a missing lobe and disqualifies a lung. Similarly, there is reason to think that an increase in the size of a lung is equivalent to a decrease in its size and disqualifies it in a similar fashion.
19.
When quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 36:14) speaks of an "entire lung" shriveling.
20.
For in the near future, it will regain its natural size, as indicated by the following halachah.
21.
Chullin 55b states that earthern-ware utensils made of white clay will have water condense upon them easily.
22.
Chullin, loc. cit., also debates what the ruling would be if one animal is frightened by another animal. The Rambam does not discuss the issue for seemingly, it would be able to be resolved by the same test mentioned here. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 36:14 considers being frightened by other animals as equivalent to being frightened by the hand of heaven.
The Radbaz also states that if the lung returns to normal, it is acceptable even if the animal was frightened by human activity. Other authorities differ and maintain that if we know that the animal was frightened by human activity, this examination is not acceptable (Siftei Cohen 36:30).
See also Rama (Yoreh De'ah 36:15) who rules that in the present era, we are not knowledgeable with regard to the various inspections that our Sages spoke about and hence, should not employ them. If, however, it appears that an animal's lung shrunk due to the hand of heaven, it should not be permitted without undergoing this examination.
23.
The category of chasairah involves two organs: the lungs and the feet. Having discussed the lungs, the Rambam proceeds to discuss the feet. As the Rambam continues to explain, here the intent is the hindlegs.
24.
The severed foot itself, however, is forbidden.
25.
There are three segments of an animal's leg between its trunk and its hoofs. We are speaking about the joint between the highest and middle portions of the leg.
26.
Note, however, Halachah 15.
27.
I.e., the highest of the three bones of the animal's legs.
28.
For it will never heal.
29.
Even the covering of the skin alone is sufficient. This represents a revision of the Rambam's thinking. The initial text of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 8:13) stated "there was flesh and skin covering it" and he altered it to read "flesh or skin covering it."
30.
For the leg will heal. Not only is the animal permitted, the leg itself is permitted. We do not consider it as if it had been severed and removed during the animal's lifetime.
31.
I.e., it is customary for the butchers to make a hole in the lowest bone of the leg and hang the animal head downwards so that they can skin it and cut off its meat. The definition of "the juncture of the sinews" is important, as reflected in Halachot 15-18.
32.
A fingerbreadth is approximately 2 cm according to Shiurei Torah and 2.4 cm according to Chazon Ish.
Together with the Rambam's view, theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 56:5) also quotes Rashi's view that the juncture of the sinews is four fingerbreadths long.
33.
The Ra'avad takes issue with the Rambam's statements, admitting that the sinews of a fowl - as do those of an animal - begin in its actual feet. Nevertheless, he states, it is only from the joint between the second and third bone of the leg that they are considered halachically significant. For the laws of trefotthat govern a fowl parallel those which govern an animal.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro cites authorities that maintain that the text of the Mishneh Torah is in error and it should be amended to parallel the Ra'avad's comments. He cites a responsum attributed to the Rambam sent to the Sages of Provence which also follows this understanding. And in his Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 56:8), he rules in this manner.
34.
Halachah 11.
35.
Thus according to the Rambam - and his position is cited by the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 55:1) - if an animal's leg is severed in the top bone, it is trefe. If it is severed in the bottom bone, it is kosher, and if it is severed in the middle bone, the ruling depends on whether it was severed above the juncture of the sinews or not.
The Shulchan Aruch also cites a more stringent view - and the Rama states that it should be followed - that if the middle bone was severed, even above the juncture of the sinews, the animal is trefe. Moreover, even if it is severed at the lower joint, above the cartiledge called the irkum, the animal istrefe.
36.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam is explaining that a severed leg causes an animal to be considered trefe, because it is in the category of chasairah. When the juncture of its sinews is lacking, it is considered trefe, because it is in the category of netulah, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.
37.
See Halachot 16-17.
38.
Netulah is one of the eight types of trefotmentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 2. The term literally means "removed."
39.
I.e., there are many organs besides these three that cause an animal to be deemed lacking if they are removed. The disqualification of these other organs, however, is not included in the category ofnetulah, rather that of nekuvah, perforated, or chasairah, lacking, i.e., the organ's removal is the greatest perforation or lack that could be. See Chapter 6, Halachah 20.
40.
The Ra'avad notes that seemingly, the disqualification of an animal because the junction of its sinews was severed would cause it to be placed in the following category, pesukah (Chapter 9, Halachah 1). He and the Kessef Mishneh explan that since our Sages (Chullin 57a, 76a) uses the expression: "If the juncture of the sinews was removed," it should be placed in this category and not in the other. Note the Siftei Cohen 56:1 who interprets the Ra'avad slightly differently.
41.
Halachah 15.
42.
I.e., the fact that this portion of the leg is missing is not significant.
43.
As long as a majority - either a majority in number or the larger portion - remains intact, the animal is permitted (Chullin 76b).
44.
The Kessef Mishneh explains this ruling as follows. Since we are stringent with regard to a fowl and require that all sixteen be intact, we extend that stringency and disqualify it if the majority of one is impaired. For when the majority of a sinew is impaired, it is as if the entire sinew is impaired.
45.
As stated in Halachah 11. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 53:2-3) which explains details about this situation.
46.
I.e., near the kidneys. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin3:1) refers to it as the place attached to the blood vessels from which blood from the liver is dispersed throughout the body. Chullin 46a refers to this as "the place from which it derives its nurture." See the Siftei Cohen 41:1 and theTurei Zahav 41:1 which quote authorities that interpret this as meaning the place to which it is attached on the diaphragm.
47.
For these are fundamentally necessary for its functioning.
48.
Because it - and its two fundamentally necessary portions - are still intact.
49.
For these two portions are of primary necessity.
50.
Chullin 46a raises questions regarding these situations and does not resolve them. The commentaries question why the Rambam rules definitively that the animal is unacceptable. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this applies even if there is one olive-sized portion that is entirely intact.
51.
The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 33) objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating: "I am amazed at his prohibition [of the animal] when the upper jaw is removed since this is not explicitly stated. Are we to add to the trefot?"
To explain: Chullin 54a states that if the lower jaw is removed, the animal is permitted. The Rambam deduces that the implication is that if the upper jaw is removed, the animal is trefe. The Tur claims that this deduction is not explicitly stated and hence, we have no right to make this deduction on our own. The sages of Provence wrote to the Rambam, voicing similar objections and he replied to them, explaining that the upper jaw is necessary for an animal's breathing. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 33:2) states that it is proper to show respect for the Rambam's ruling.
Based on the gloss of the RogatchoverGaon, it is possible to explain why this defect is not mentioned by the Sages of the Talmud. This defect is not in and of itself a direct cause for an animal's death, it is only a side factor that will lead to its death. Hence our Sages did not mention it, for they mentioned only those factors whice are direct causes (Yayin Malchut).
52.
When quoting this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 33:1) adds that the animal must be able to continue to survive by being force-fed.
53.
I.e., the lungs and the hindlegs as stated in Halachah 1.
54.
As mentioned above (Chapter 6, Halachah 20), all the organs which render an animaltrefe if they are perforated, also render ittrefe when they are lacking or removed. Nevertheless, the Rambam places them in the category of nekuvah for that is the most inclusive classification.
55.
And our Sages listed them as separate categories, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 2.
The Rashba (as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh, Chapter 6, Halachah 20) differs and maintains that an animal is also trefe if it is lacking a liver from the beginning of its existence. Why then did our Sages mentionchasairah and netulah as two separate categories? Because if they were not listed so, one might argue that an animal is trefeonly when an organ is removed and not when it was lacking from the beginning of the animal's existence or vice versa. The Turfollows the Rashba's view. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 50:72 quotes both opinions, but appears to favor the Rashba's view. The Rama states that we may rely on the Rambam when a significant loss is involved.
56.
For the ruling is more lenient if at the outset, it was not created with this organ, as above.
57.
I.e., even if both kidneys were removed. Even though according to medical knowledge, there is no way such an animal can live, our Sages did not deem this condition trefe. See Chapter 10, Halachah 12.
58.
For we follow the principle that any extra organ is considered as if it was removed.
59.
It is, however, considered a blemish and the animal may not be offered as a sacrifice (Hilchot Issurei HaMizbe'ach 2:11).
60.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that many Rishonim disqualify an animal only when its kidneys shrank because of illness. If, however, it was born with an undersized kidney, it is acceptable. And in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah44:5), he accepts this ruling as law.
61.
The Turei Zahav 44:12 and the Siftei Cohen44:13 quote authorities who explain that the grapes of Eretz Yisrael were very large during the Talmudic period. At that time, a grape was significantly larger than a bean.
62.
The white fat from the loins enters the kidneys, because the different sinews are all interwoven there, causing a split to appear within the kidney. This is located in the midst of the kidney (Rashi, Rabenu Nissim, Chullin55b).
63.
Even if it reached the white portion [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 44:2)].

---------------------
Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class
• "Today's Day"
Sunday, Adar I 19, 5776 · 28 February 2016
Wednesday 19 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Ki Tissa, Revi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 90-96.
Tanya: Anyone who has not (p. 135)...and the like (p. 137).
Even ordinary Chassidim were lucid in their knowledge of Tanach. They had a customary procedure: After davening Shacharit they studied Mishna; then while folding tallit and tefillin they would recite a certain set portion of Tanach, so apportioned that they concluded Tanach every three months.
---------------------
• Daily Thought:
Times Are Changing
The times in which we live are not ordinary times.
Everything is suddenly changing, rearranging itself. Technology leaps ahead daily, affecting the way we do things, how we communicate, our concept of life and the universe.
While an old world struggles to cling to its self-defeating patterns, the stage is set for a world as it is meant to be.
---------------------
CHABAD - 
TODAY IN JUDAISM: Sunday, February 7, 2016 - Today is: Sunday, Shvat 28, 5776 · February 7, 2016
Today in Jewish History:
• Hashmonean Holiday (2nd century BCE)
On Shevat 28 (134 BCE?), Antiochus V abandoned his siege of Jerusalem and his plans for the city's destruction. This day was observed as a holiday in Hashmonean times. (Megilat Taanit)
Daily Quote:
And the dove returned to him at eventide, and behold it had plucked an olive leaf in its mouth; so Noah knew that the water had abated from upon the earth.
[Genesis 8:11]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Terumah, 1st Portion Exodus 25:1-25:16 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Exodus Chapter 25
1"The Lord spoke to Moses saying: אוַיְדַבֵּ֥ר יְהֹוָ֖ה אֶל־משֶׁ֥ה לֵּאמֹֽר:
2"Speak to the children of Israel, and have them take for Me an offering; from every person whose heart inspires him to generosity, you shall take My offering. בדַּבֵּר֙ אֶל־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל וְיִקְחוּ־לִ֖י תְּרוּמָ֑ה מֵאֵ֤ת כָּל־אִישׁ֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יִדְּבֶ֣נּוּ לִבּ֔וֹ תִּקְח֖וּ אֶת־תְּרֽוּמָתִֽי:
and have them take for Me: Heb. לִי. [I.e.,] dedicated to My name. -[from Tan. 1] ויקחו לי תרומה: לי לשמי:
offering: Heb. תְּרוּמָה, separation. They shall set apart from their property an offering for Me. תרומה: הפרשה, יפרישו לי מממונם נדבה:
whose heart inspires him to generosity: Heb. יִדְּבֶנּוּ לִבּוֹ, an expression of נְדָבָה, which is an expression of good will, present in French, [a] gift. ידבנו לבו: לשון נדבה, והוא לשון רצון טוב, פרישנ"ט בלעז [מתנה]:
you shall take My offering: Our Rabbis said: [The word תְּרוּמָה, mentioned three times, denotes that] three offerings are mentioned here. One is the offering of a beka [half-shekel] per head, from which they made the sockets, as is delineated in [Exod. 38:26, 27, in the parsha] “ אֵלֶּה פְקוּדֵי, These are the accounts.” Another is the offering of a beka per head for the [community] coffers, from which to purchase the communal sacrifices, and another is the offering for the Mishkan, each one’s [Israelite’s] donation (Talmud Yerushalmi, Shekalim 1:1; Meg. 29b). The thirteen materials mentioned in this section [i.e., this chapter] were all required for the work of the Mishkan or for the garments of the kohanim, [as you will find] when you study them closely (Tan. 5, Song Rabbah 4:25). תקחו את תרומתי: אמרו רבותינו שלש תרומות אמורות כאן, אחת תרומת בקע לגלגלת, שנעשו מהם הא-דנים, כמו שמפורש באלה פקודי (שמות לח כו - כז), ואחת תרומת המזבח בקע לגלגלת לקופות לקנות מהן קרבנות צבור, ואחת תרומת המשכן נדבת כל אחד ואחד. שלשה עשר דברים האמורים בענין כולם הוצרכו למלאכת המשכן או לבגדי כהונה, כשתדקדק בהם:
3And this is the offering that you shall take from them: gold, silver, and copper; גוְזֹאת֙ הַתְּרוּמָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר תִּקְח֖וּ מֵֽאִתָּ֑ם זָהָ֥ב וָכֶ֖סֶף וּנְחֽשֶׁת:
gold, silver, and copper, etc.: They were all given voluntarily; each person [gave] what his heart inspired him to give, except [for] the silver, which they gave equally, a half-shekel for each individual. We do not find throughout the entire work of the Mishkan that more silver was required, as it is said: “The silver of the community census was…a beka per head…” (Exod. 38:25, 26). The rest of the silver, which was given there [in the work of the Mishkan] voluntarily, they [the workers] made into service utensils. זהב וכסף ונחשת וגו': כולם באו בנדבה, איש איש מה שנדבו לבו, חוץ מן הכסף שבא בשוה מחצית השקל לכל אחד, ולא מצינו בכל מלאכת המשכן, שהוצרך שם כסף יותר, שנאמר (שמות לח כו - כז) וכסף פקודי העדה וגו' בקע לגלגלת וגו', ושאר הכסף הבא שם בנדבה עשאוה לכלי שרת:
4blue, purple, and crimson wool; linen and goat hair; דוּתְכֵ֧לֶת וְאַרְגָּמָ֛ן וְתוֹלַ֥עַת שָׁנִ֖י וְשֵׁ֥שׁ וְעִזִּֽים:
blue…wool: Heb. תְכֵלֶת, wool dyed with the blood of the chillazon [animal], which bears a blue color. — [from Men. 44a, Tosefta Men. 9:6] ותכלת: צמר צבוע בדם חלזון, וצבעו ירוק:
purple…wool: Heb. וְאַרְגָּמָן, wool dyed with a kind of dye named אַרְגָּמָן. וארגמן: צמר צבוע ממין צבע ששמו ארגמן:
linen: Heb. שֵׁשׁ. This is linen. — [from Tosefta Men. 9:6] ושש: הוא פשתן:
and goat hair: Heb. וְעִזִים, the hair of goats. Therefore, Onkelos rendered: וּמְעַזֵי, [i.e.,] what comes from the goats, but not the goats themselves [i.e., not the goat skins], for Targum’s [Onkelos] translation of עִזִים [goats] is עִזַיָא (Gen. 30:32). ועזים: נוצה של עזים, לכך תרגם אונקלוס ומעזי, הבא מן העזים, ולא עזים עצמם, שתרגום של עזים עזיא:
5ram skins dyed red, tachash skins, and acacia wood; הוְעֹרֹ֨ת אֵילִ֧ם מְאָדָּמִ֛ים וְעֹרֹ֥ת תְּחָשִׁ֖ים וַֽעֲצֵ֥י שִׁטִּֽים:
dyed red: Heb. מְאֳָדָּמִים. They were dyed red after being tanned. מאדמים: צבועות היו אדום לאחר עבודן:
tachash skins: This was a species of animal that existed only for a [short] time, and it had many hues (גַּוָּנִים). Therefore, [Onkelos] renders [it] סַסְגּוֹנָא, because it rejoices (שֶׁשָׂשׂ) [ס and שׂ are often interchangeable] and boasts of its hues (גַּוָּנִים). -[from Shab. 28a, b] תחשים: מין חיה, ולא היתה אלא לשעה והרבה גוונים היו לה, לכך מתרגם ססגונא, ששש ומתפאר בגוונין שלו:
and acacia wood: Where did they get these [trees] in the desert? Rabbi Tanchuma explained that our father Jacob foresaw with the holy spirit that the Israelites were destined to build a Mishkan in the desert, so he brought cedars to Egypt and planted them. He commanded his sons to take them with them when they left Egypt. — [from Mid. Tanchuma 9] ועצי שטים: מאין היו להם במדבר, פירש רבי תנחומא יעקב אבינו צפה ברוח הקודש, שעתידין ישראל לבנות משכן במדבר, והביא ארזים למצרים ונטעם, וצוה לבניו ליטלם עמהם, כשיצאו ממצרים:
6oil for lighting, spices for the anointing oil and for the incense; ושֶׁ֖מֶן לַמָּאֹ֑ר בְּשָׂמִים֙ לְשֶׁ֣מֶן הַמִּשְׁחָ֔ה וְלִקְטֹ֖רֶת הַסַּמִּֽים:
oil for lighting: Pure olive oil to continually kindle the light. שמן למאור: שמן זית זך להעלות נר תמיד:
spices for the anointing oil: which was made to anoint the vessels of the Mishkan and [for] the Mishkan itself to sanctify them, and spices were required for it, as is delineated in [the parsha] כִּי תִשָׂא (Exod. 30:22-33). בשמים לשמן המשחה: שנעשה למשוח כלי המשכן והמשכן לקדשו, והוצרכו לו בשמים כמו שמפורש בכי תשא (שמות ל כג - כה):
and for the incense: Heb. וְלִקְטֹרֶת הַסַּמִּים, which they burned every evening and morning, as is explained in [the parsha] וְאַתָּה תְּצַוֶּה (Exod. 30:7, 8). The word קְטֹרֶת means the raising of smoke (קִיטוֹר) and columns of smoke ותִּמְרוֹת עָשָׁן. ולקטרת הסמים: שהיו מקטירין בכל ערב ובקר, כמו שמפורש בואתה תצוה (שמות ל ז - ח) ולשון קטרת העלאת קיטור ותמרות עשן:
7shoham stones and filling stones for the ephod and for the choshen. זאַבְנֵי־שֹׁ֕הַם וְאַבְנֵ֖י מִלֻּאִ֑ים לָֽאֵפֹ֖ד וְלַחֽשֶׁן:
shoham stones: Two were needed there [in the Mishkan] for the ephod, mentioned in [the parsha] וְאַתָּה תְּצַוֶּה (Exod. 28:9-12). אבני שהם: שתים הוצרכו שם לצורך האפוד האמור בואתה תצוה (שמות כח יב):
filling: Since they make for them a seat out of gold, like a sort of hole, and the stone is placed there to fill the hole, they are called filling stones. The place of the “seat” is called מִשְׁבֶּצֶת, a setting. מלאים: על שם שעושין להם בזהב מושב כמין גומא ונותנין האבן שם למלאות הגומא, קרויים אבני מלואים, ומקום המושב קרוי משבצות:
for the ephod and for the choshen: The shoham stones for the ephod and the filling stones for the choshen. The ephod and the choshen are explained in וְאַתָּה תְּצַוֶּה they are types of ornaments [worn by the kohanim]. לאפוד ולחשן: אבני השהם לאפוד, ואבני המלאוים לחשן, וחשן ואפוד מפורשים בואתה תצוה, והם מיני תכשיט:
8And they shall make Me a sanctuary and I will dwell in their midst חוְעָ֥שׂוּ לִ֖י מִקְדָּ֑שׁ וְשָֽׁכַנְתִּ֖י בְּתוֹכָֽם:
And they shall make Me a sanctuary: And they shall make in My name a house of sanctity. ועשו לי מקדש: ועשו לשמי בית קדושה:
9according to all that I show you, the pattern of the Mishkan and the pattern of all its vessels; and so shall you do. טכְּכֹ֗ל אֲשֶׁ֤ר אֲנִי֙ מַרְאֶ֣ה אֽוֹתְךָ֔ אֵ֚ת תַּבְנִ֣ית הַמִּשְׁכָּ֔ן וְאֵ֖ת תַּבְנִ֣ית כָּל־כֵּלָ֑יו וְכֵ֖ן תַּֽעֲשֽׂוּ:
according to all that I show you: here, the pattern of the Mishkan. This verse is connected to the verse above it: “And they shall make Me a sanctuary…” according to all that I show you. ככל אשר אני מראה אותך: כאן את תבנית המשכן. המקרא הזה מחובר למקרא שלמעלה הימנו ועשו לי מקדש ככל אשר אני מראה אותך:
and so shall you do: in future generations (Sanh. 16b, Shev. 14b, 15a). If one of the vessels is lost, or when you make the vessels of the Temple, such as [the] tables, menorahs, wash basins, and bases that Solomon made, you shall make them according to the pattern of these [that I will describe in the following verses]. If the verse was not connected to what was written before it, He would not have written, “and so shall you do,” but" so shall you do" [without the word “and”], and it would be speaking about the making of the Tent of Meeting and its vessels. וכן תעשו: לדורות אם יאבד אחד מן הכלים או כשתעשו לי כלי בית עולמים, כגון שולחנות ומנורות וכיורות ומכונות שעשה שלמה, כתבנית אלו תעשו אותם. ואם לא היה המקרא מחובר למעלה הימנו, לא היה לו לכתוב וכן תעשו אלא כן תעשו, והיה מדבר על עשיית אהל מועד וכליו:
10They shall make an ark of acacia wood, two and a half cubits its length, a cubit and a half its width, and a cubit and a half its height. יוְעָשׂ֥וּ אֲר֖וֹן עֲצֵ֣י שִׁטִּ֑ים אַמָּתַ֨יִם וָחֵ֜צִי אָרְכּ֗וֹ וְאַמָּ֤ה וָחֵ֨צִי֙ רָחְבּ֔וֹ וְאַמָּ֥ה וָחֵ֖צִי קֹֽמָתֽוֹ:
They shall make an ark: like the chests that are made without feet, made like a sort of chest called escrin [in Old French, ecrin in modern French], (i.e., a chest or box), which rests on its bottom [without being raised off the floor by the attachment of legs]. ועשו ארון: כמין ארונות שעושים בלא רגלים, עשויים כמין ארגז שקורין אישקרי"ן בלעז [ארגז] יושב על שוליו:
11And you shall overlay it with pure gold; from inside and from outside you shall overlay it, and you shall make upon it a golden crown all around. יאוְצִפִּיתָ֤ אֹתוֹ֙ זָהָ֣ב טָה֔וֹר מִבַּ֥יִת וּמִח֖וּץ תְּצַפֶּ֑נּוּ וְעָשִׂ֧יתָ עָלָ֛יו זֵ֥ר זָהָ֖ב סָבִֽיב:
from inside and from outside you shall overlay it: Bezalel made three arks, two of gold and one of wood. Each one had four walls and a bottom, and they were open on the top. He placed the wooden one inside the golden one and the [other] golden one inside the wooden one. He covered the upper rim with gold, thus it is found that [the wooden one] was overlaid from inside and from outside [with gold]. — [from Yoma 72b, Shek. 16b] מבית ומחוץ תצפנו: שלשה ארונות עשה בצלאל, שתים של זהב ואחד של עץ, וארבע כתלים ושולים לכל אחד ופתוחים מלמעלה, נתן של עץ בתוך של זהב ושל זהב בתוך של עץ, וחפה שפתו העליונה בזהב, נמצא מצופה מבית ומחוץ:
a golden crown: Like a sort of crown surrounding it above its rim. For he [Bezalel] made the outer ark higher than the inner one, until it extended upwards opposite the thickness of the ark cover and slightly higher than it, so that when the ark cover lies on the thickness of the walls, the crown extends slightly over the thickness of the ark cover (Yoma 72b). And that [the crown] is the symbol of the crown of the Torah (Tan. Vayakhel 8, Exod. Rabbah 34:2). זר זהב: כמין כתר מקיף לו סביב למעלה משפתו, שעשה הארון החיצון גבוה מן הפנימי עד שעלה למול עובי הכפורת ולמעלה הימנו משהו, וכשהכפורת שוכב על עובי הכתלים, עולה הזר למעלה מכל עובי הכפורת כל שהוא, והוא סימן לכתר תורה:
12And you shall cast four golden rings for it, and you shall place them upon its four corners, two rings on its one side, and two rings on its other side. יבוְיָצַ֣קְתָּ לּ֗וֹ אַרְבַּע֙ טַבְּעֹ֣ת זָהָ֔ב וְנָ֣תַתָּ֔ה עַ֖ל אַרְבַּ֣ע פַּֽעֲמֹתָ֑יו וּשְׁתֵּ֣י טַבָּעֹ֗ת עַל־צַלְעוֹ֙ הָֽאֶחָ֔ת וּשְׁתֵּי֙ טַבָּעֹ֔ת עַל־צַלְע֖וֹ הַשֵּׁנִֽית:
And you shall cast: Heb. וְיָצַקְךְתָּ, an expression of casting, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders. ויצקת: לשון התכה כתרגומו:
its…corners: Heb. פַּעִמֹתָיו. As the Targum [Onkelos] renders: זִיוְיָתֵיהּ, its corners. They were attached on the upper corners, close to the ark cover, two from here and two from there, across the width of the ark, and the poles were placed in them [the rings]. The length of the ark separated the poles, two and one-half cubits between [one] pole and [the other] pole, so that the two people carrying the ark would walk between them [the poles]. So it is explained in Men., in the chapter entitled שתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם (98b). פעמתיו: כתרגומו זויתיה. ובזויות העליונות סמוך לכפרת היו נתונות שתים מכאן ושתים מכאן לרחבו של ארון, והבדים נתונים בהם, וארכו של ארון מפסיק בין הבדים, אמתים וחצי בין בד לבד, שיהיו שני בני אדם, הנושאים את הארון, מהלכין ביניהם, וכן מפורש במנחות בפרק שתי הלחם (צח ב):
two rings on its one side: Heb. וּשְׁתֵּי טַבָּעֹת, lit., and two rings. These are the four rings [mentioned] in the beginning of the verse, and [Scripture now] explains to you where they were [to be placed]. This “vav” is superfluous, and it is to be interpreted as שְׁתֵּי טַבָּעֹת, two rings. But you can reconcile it [by interpreting it] in this way: and two of these rings [shall be] on its one side, [meaning, and two of the four rings mentioned in the beginning of this verse shall be on one side, etc.]. ושתי טבעות על צלעו האחת: הן הן הארבע טבעות שבתחלת המקרא, ופירש לך היכן היו, והוי"ו זו יתירה היא ופתרונו כמו שתי טבעות, ויש לך לישבה כן ושתיים מן הטבעות האלו על צלעו האחת:
its…side: Heb. צַלְעוֹ, its side. צלעו: צדו:
13And you shall make poles of acacia wood and you shall overlay them with gold. יגוְעָשִׂ֥יתָ בַדֵּ֖י עֲצֵ֣י שִׁטִּ֑ים וְצִפִּיתָ֥ אֹתָ֖ם זָהָֽב:
poles of: Heb. בַדֵּי, poles. בדי: מוטות:
14And you shall bring the poles into the rings on the sides of the ark, to carry the ark with them. ידוְהֵֽבֵאתָ֤ אֶת־הַבַּדִּים֙ בַּטַּבָּעֹ֔ת עַ֖ל צַלְעֹ֣ת הָֽאָרֹ֑ן לָשֵׂ֥את אֶת־הָֽאָרֹ֖ן בָּהֶֽם:
15The poles of the ark shall be in the rings; they shall not be removed from it. טובְּטַבְּעֹת֙ הָֽאָרֹ֔ן יִֽהְי֖וּ הַבַּדִּ֑ים לֹ֥א יָסֻ֖רוּ מִמֶּֽנּוּ:
they shall not be removed from it: forever. לא יסרו ממנו: לעולם:
16And you shall place into the ark the testimony, which I will give you. טזוְנָֽתַתָּ֖ אֶל־הָֽאָרֹ֑ן אֵ֚ת הָֽעֵדֻ֔ת אֲשֶׁ֥ר אֶתֵּ֖ן אֵלֶֽיךָ:
And you shall place into the ark: Heb. אֶל-הָאָרֹן, lit., to the ark, [meaning] into the ark. ונתת אל הארן: כמו בארון:
the testimony: [I.e.,] the Torah, which serves as testimony between Me and you [Israel] that I commanded you [to fulfill] the commandments written in it. — [from Mid. Tan. Pekudei 4, also Mid. Lekach Tov] העדות: התורה שהיא לעדות ביני וביניכם, שצויתי אתכם מצות הכתובות בה:

---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 135 - 139
Hebrew text
English text
• Chapter 135
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Name of the Lord; offer praise, you servants of the Lord-
2. who stand in the House of the Lord, in the courtyards of the House of our God.
3. Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good; sing to His Name, for He is pleasant.
4. For God has chosen Jacob for Himself, Israel as His beloved treasure.
5. For I know that the Lord is great, our Master is greater than all supernal beings.
6. All that the Lord desired He has done, in the heavens and on earth, in the seas and the depths.
7. He causes mists to rise from the ends of the earth; He makes lightning for the rain; He brings forth the wind from His vaults.
8. It was He who struck down the firstborn of Egypt, of man and beast.
9. He sent signs and wonders into the midst of Egypt, on Pharaoh and on all his servants.
10. It was He who struck down many nations, and slew mighty kings:
11. Sichon, king of the Amorites; Og, king of Bashan; and all the kingdoms of Canaan.
12. And He gave their lands as a heritage, a heritage to His people Israel.
13. Lord, Your Name is forever; Lord, Your remembrance is throughout all generations.
14. Indeed, the Lord will judge on behalf of His people, and have compassion on His servants.
15. The idols of the nations are silver and gold, the product of human hands.
16. They have a mouth, but cannot speak; they have eyes, but cannot see;
17. they have ears, but cannot hear; nor is there breath in their mouth.
18. Like them will their makers become-all who trust in them.
19. House of Israel, bless the Lord; House of Aaron, bless the Lord;
20. House of Levi, bless the Lord; you who fear the Lord, bless the Lord.
21. Blessed is the Lord from Zion, who dwells in Jerusalem. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 136
This psalm contains twenty-six verses, corresponding to the twenty-six generations between the creation of the world and the giving of the Torah.
1. Praise the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is forever.
2. Praise the God of the supernal beings, for His kindness is forever.
3. Praise the Master of the heavenly hosts, for His kindness is forever.
4. Who alone performs great wonders, for His kindness is forever.
5. Who makes the heavens with understanding, for His kindness is forever.
6. Who spreads forth the earth above the waters, for His kindness is forever.
7. Who makes the great lights, for His kindness is forever.
8. The sun to rule by day, for His kindness is forever.
9. The moon and stars to rule by night, for His kindness is forever.
10. Who struck Egypt through its firstborn, for His kindness is forever.
11. And brought Israel out of their midst, for His kindness is forever.
12. With a strong hand and with an outstretched arm, for His kindness is forever.
13. Who split the Sea of Reeds into sections, for His kindness is forever.
14. And brought Israel across it, for His kindness is forever.
15. And cast Pharaoh and his army into the Sea of Reeds, for His kindness is forever.
16. Who led His people through the desert, for His kindness is forever;
17. Who struck down great kings, for His kindness is forever.
18. And slew mighty kings, for His kindness is forever.
19. Sichon, king of the Amorites, for His kindness is forever.
20. And Og, king of Bashan, for His kindness is forever.
21. And gave their land as a heritage, for His kindness is forever.
22. A heritage to Israel His servant, for His kindness is forever.
23. Who remembered us in our humiliation, for His kindness is forever.
24. And redeemed us from our oppressors, for His kindness is forever.
25. Who gives food to all flesh, for His kindness is forever.
26. Praise the God of heaven, for His kindness is forever.
Chapter 137
Referring to the time of the destruction of the Temple, this psalm tells of when Nebuchadnezzar would ask the Levites to sing in captivity as they had in the Temple, to which they would reply, "How can we sing the song of God upon alien soil?" They were then comforted by Divine inspiration.
1. By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat and wept as we remembered Zion.
2. There, upon the willows, we hung our harps.
3. For there our captors demanded of us songs, and those who scorned us-rejoicing, [saying,] "Sing to us of the songs of Zion.”
4. How can we sing the song of the Lord on alien soil?
5. If I forget you, Jerusalem, let my right hand forget [its dexterity].
6. Let my tongue cleave to my palate if I will not remember you, if I will not bring to mind Jerusalem during my greatest joy!
7. Remember, O Lord, against the Edomites the day of [the destruction of] Jerusalem, when they said, "Raze it, raze it to its very foundation!”
8. O Babylon, who is destined to be laid waste, happy is he who will repay you in retribution for what you have inflicted on us.
9. Happy is he who will seize and crush your infants against the rock!
Chapter 138
David offers awesome praises to God for His kindness to him, and for fulfilling His promise to grant him kingship.
1. By David. I will thank You with all my heart, in the presence of princes I shall praise You.
2. I will bow toward Your Holy Sanctuary, and praise Your Name for Your kindness and for Your truth; for You have exalted Your word above all Your Names.
3. On the day that I called out You answered me, You emboldened me, [You put] strength in my soul.
4. Lord, all the kings of the land will give thanks to You when they hear the words of Your mouth.
5. And they will sing of the Lord's ways, for the glory of the Lord is great.
6. For though the Lord is exalted, He sees the lowly; the High One castigates from afar.
7. If I walk in the midst of distress, keep me alive; against the wrath of my enemies stretch out Your hand, and let Your right hand deliver me.
8. Lord, complete [Your kindness] on my behalf. Lord, Your kindness is forever, do not forsake the work of Your hands.
Chapter 139
A most prominent psalm that guides man in the ways of God as no other in all of the five books of Tehillim. Fortunate is he who recites it daily.
1. For the Conductor, by David, a psalm. O Lord, You have probed me, and You know.
2. You know my sitting down and my standing up; You perceive my thought from afar.
3. You encircle my going about and my lying down; You are familiar with all my paths.
4. For there was not yet a word on my tongue-and behold, Lord, You knew it all.
5. You have besieged me front and back, You have laid Your hand upon me.
6. Knowledge [to escape You] is beyond me; it is exalted, I cannot know it.
7. Where can I go [to escape] Your spirit? And where can I flee from Your presence?
8. If I ascend to the heavens, You are there; if I make my bed in the grave, behold, You are there.
9. Were I to take up wings as the dawn and dwell in the furthest part of the sea,
10. there, too, Your hand would guide me; Your right hand would hold me.
11. Were I to say, "Surely the darkness will shadow me," then the night would be as light around me.
12. Even the darkness obscures nothing from You; and the night shines like the day-the darkness is as light.
13. For You created my mind; You covered me in my mother's womb.
14. I will thank You, for I was formed in an awesome and wondrous way; unfathomable are Your works, though my soul perceives much.
15. My essence was not hidden from You even while I was born in concealment, formed in the depths of the earth.
16. Your eyes beheld my raw form; all [happenings] are inscribed in Your book, even those to be formed in future days-to Him they are the same.
17. How precious are Your thoughts to me, O God! How overwhelming, [even] their beginnings!
18. Were I to count them, they would outnumber the sand, even if I were to remain awake and always with You.
19. O that You would slay the wicked, O God, and men of blood [to whom I say], "Depart from me!”
20. They exalt You for wicked schemes, Your enemies raise [You] for falsehood.
21. Indeed, I hate those who hate You, Lord; I contend with those who rise up against You.
22. I hate them with the utmost hatred; I regard them as my own enemies.
23. Search me, Lord, and know my heart; test me and know my thoughts.
24. See if there is a vexing way in me, then lead me in the way of the world.
---------------------
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 25
Lessons in Tanya
• English Text

Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
Video Class
• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Sunday, Shevat 28, 5776 · February 7, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 25
וכיוצא באלו ממלחמות היצר ותחבולותיו, לקרר נפש האדם, שלא להפקיר ממונו ובריאות גופו
and in similar matters that entail great effort where one must struggle with the evil inclination and its wiles which seek to cool the ardor of a man’s soul, claiming that he ought not dissipate his money in the case of charity or his health in matters requiring physical exertion.
שלעמוד נגדו ולכבשו קרוב מאד אל האדם, כשישים אל לבו שלנצח היצר בכל זה ויותר מזה, ולעשות הפכו ממש, קל מאד מיסורי מיתה, ה‘ ישמרנו
It is very easy for a person to resist and subjugate his nature when he considers deeply that to conquer his nature in all the above and more, and in fact to do the very opposite, i.e., to exert himself strenuously, both bodily and financially, is much lighter suffering than death (May G‑d preserve us!).
ויסורי מיתה, ה’ ישמרנו, היה מקבל באהבה וברצון, שלא ליפרד מיחודו ואחדותו יתברך אפילו לפי שעה, להשתחוות לעבודה זרה, חס ושלום
Yet he would lovingly and willingly have accepted the pain of death (G‑d preserve us!) so as not to be separated from G‑d’s unity and oneness even for a moment by an act of idolatry, G‑d forbid.
For, as mentioned earlier, every Jew would sacrifice his life rather than practice idolatry, since he knows that it represents separation from G‑d.
וכל שכן שיש לו לקבל באהבה וברצון כדי לדבקה בו לעולם ועד
Certainly, then, he ought to accept lovingly and willingly the comparatively minor pain of exerting himself in the performance of the mitzvot in order to bind himself to G‑d with an eternal bond.
There is a twofold a fortiori argument here. Firstly, performing a mitzvah actively binds man to G‑d, as opposed to refraining from idolatry, which merely prevents separation from Him. Secondly, the bond effected by the mitzvah is an eternal one, as opposed to the temporary separation from G‑d caused by idolatry. Now if one would sacrifice his life to refrain from idolatry, how much more so ought he accept whatever hardships are entailed by fulfilling the mitzvot, since their performance has both these gains that are not found in the rejection of idolatry.
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to explain how mitzvot effect an eternal bond with G‑d.
דהיינו כשיעשה רצונו יתברך בעבודה זו, יתגלה בה פנימית רצון העליון בבחינת פנים וגילוי רב, ולא בהסתר כלל
For by fulfilling G‑d’s Will through this service despite the exertion involved, the innermost Divine Will will be revealed in it — internally as opposed to “surrounding” it or “hovering” over it from above, and very manifestly, without any obscurity whatever.
As explained in ch. 23, the mitzvot represent G‑d’s innermost Will, and when one performs them, this Will stands completely revealed.
וכשאין שום הסתר פנים ברצון העליון, אזי אין דבר נפרד כלל וכלל, להיות יש ודבר בפני עצמו
Now, when there is no “concealment of the Countenance” of the Divine Will, nothing is at all separate from G‑dliness, having an independent and separate identity of its own.
For, as explained in chs. 22 and 24, no created being can possibly consider itself separate from G‑d unless the Divine Will is concealed from it. Since the inner aspect of this Will stands revealed in one’s performance of a mitzvah, it does not permit any sense of separation.
ולזאת תהיינה נפשו האלקית והחיונית ולבושיהן כולן מיוחדות בתכלית היחוד ברצון העליון ואור אין סוף ברוך הוא כנ״ל
Thus his soul i.e., the soul of the person performing the mitzvah, both the divine and the animating souls, and their “garments” of thought, speech, and action, will be united in perfect unity with the Divine Will and with the infinite light of G‑d, blessed be He, as explained above.
This details how the mitzvot effect a bond between man and G‑d. The Alter Rebbe will now go on to explain why this bond is eternal.
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Sunday, Shevat 28, 5776 · February 7, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Negative Commandment 356
Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
"Her first husband who sent her away may not marry her again"—Deuteronomy 24:4.
It is forbidden for a man to remarry a woman he divorced if she has remarried [and subsequently been divorced again or widowed] in the interim.
Full text of this Mitzvah »


Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
Negative Commandment 356
Translated by Berel Bell
The 356th prohibition is that a man is forbidden from remarrying his divorced wife, if she was married to another man in the interim.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) [that if her second husband divorces her or dies,] "then her first husband who divorced her cannot remarry her."
The punishment for transgression of this prohibition is malkos (lashes).
The details of this mitzvah are explained in a number of passages in Yevamos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Even if the second husband passed away or divorced her.
2.Deut. 24:4.
     ----------------------------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 5 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Bikkurim - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment to separate a portion that is raised up1 from the dough [and given] to a priest,2 as [Numbers 15:20] states: "Raise up the first of your dough, the challah,3 as an offering...." According to Scriptural Law, this first portion does not have a minimum measure. Instead, even if one set aside a portion the size of a barley corn, he has absolved the entire dough. When a person designates his entire dough as challah, his deeds are of no consequence unless he leaves a portion of it [for himself].4
Halacha 2
According to Rabbinic Law, one should separate one twenty-fourth of the dough, so that there will be a [significant] present for the priest. [This is derived from Deuteronomy 14:4 which] states: "Give him," i.e., give him something that is fit to be called a gift.
A baker who makes a dough to be sold in the market place should separate one forty-eighth. [The rationale is that] since his dough is larger,5 this measure contains [enough] to be a [significant] present.
Halacha 3
Even when a private person makes dough for [the wedding] celebration of his son, he should separate one twenty-fourth even though it is large, so as not to make a distinction in [the requirements of] a dough made by a private person.6[Conversely,] when a baker makes a small dough, [he must separate only] one forty-eighth, so as not to make a distinction in [the requirements of] a dough made by a baker.
Halacha 4
If a dough became impure unknowingly or because of forces beyond one's control, one need not separate more than one forty-eighth.7 If he purposefully made it impure, he must separate a twenty-fourth, so that the sinner will not benefit.8
Impure challah is permitted to be used by a priest as kindling fuel like impureterumah.9
Halacha 5
According to Scriptural law, we are only obligated to separate challah in Eretz Yisrael, as [Numbers 15:19] states: "When you partake of the bread of the land...," and only when the entire Jewish people are located there, as [ibid.:18] states: "When you enter," i.e., when you all enter and not only when a portion of you enter. For this reason, in the present era - and even in the era of Ezra10in Eretz Yisrael - [the observance of] challah is only a Rabbinic decree, as we explained with regard to terumah.11
Halacha 6
When the produce of the Diaspora is brought to Eretz [Yisrael]challah must be separated from it.12 When produce from Eretz [Yisrael], are brought to the Diaspora, they are exempt.13 [This is derived from ibid.:] "to which I will bring you." [Implied is that in that land,] you are liable, whether for the produce of the land itself or for that of other lands.
Halacha 7
Challah should also be separated in the Diaspora by Rabbinic decree so that the Jewish people will not forget the laws of challah. Challah from the Diaspora should not be brought to Eretz Yisrael, just as terumah14and first fruits15 from there should not be brought [to Eretz Yisrael]. If one should bring [such challah], it should be left to the day before Pesach and burned16liketerumah.
Halacha 8
There are three different sets of laws that apply to challah in three different lands. In the entire area that was settled by those who returned from Babylonia until Kziv,17 one challah should be separated according to the appropriate measure18 and the priests may partake of it. In the remaining portions of Eretz Yisrael that were settled by the Jews who came out of Egypt, but not by those who returned from Babylonia - i.e., from Kziv until Amanah19 - two challot should be separated. One should be burnt and one should be eaten.
Why do we separate two challot there? Because the first challah is impure, because this land was not sanctified in the time of Ezra and the first sanctification was nullified after the Jews were exiled.20 [Nevertheless,] since [the land] is from Eretz Yisrael, a challah - one forty-eighth [of the dough] is separated and is burnt. A second challah is also separated and given to a priest to eat, so that people will not say that pure terumah should be burnt. For the first challah was burnt even though it did not contract impurity in a manner that was known to all.21 This second challah does not have a minimum measure. Instead, one may separate whatever he desires, because it is a Rabbinic ordinance.
In all of the lands from Amanah and beyond, whether in Syria22 or other lands, two challot should be separated: One is burnt so that people should not say we saw impure terumah being eaten23 and one is eaten so that the laws ofchallah will not be forgotten by the Jewish people. [Since] both of these are Rabbinic institutions, it is preferable to make the one that is eaten larger.24Accordingly, there is no minimum measure for the one that is burnt. Even the slightest amount [is acceptable]. The one which is eaten should be one forty-eighth [of the dough]. It is permitted to be eaten by zavim andzavot25- and needless to say, other people who are ritually impure.26
Halacha 9
In the present age when there is no pure dough,27 because of the impurity [imparted] by a human corpse,28 one challah - one forty-eighth [of the dough]29- is separated in all Eretz Yisrael [in the present era]. [This applies even though] it is burnt, because it is impure, since the fundamental obligation to separate it is Scriptural.30 As was the law in previous ages, from Kziv to Amanah, a second challah is also separated for a priest to eat.31 There is no mimimum measure for it.
Halacha 10
Although challah from the Diaspora is impure, since its fundamental requirement is a Rabbinic ordinance,32 it is forbidden to be eaten only by priests who are impure because of impurity that result from a physical condition.33 These include [priests] who had a seminal emission, zavim, zavot, niddot,34 women who give birth, and people afflicted bytzara'at.35Others who are impure because they have been in contact with other sources of impurity, even those who are impure because of contact with a corpse, are permitted to partake of it.
Accordingly, if there was a priest who was a minor in the Diaspora - whether in Syria or in other lands - and one desired to separate [only] one challah, he could separate one forty-eighth of the dough. It could be eaten by a priest who is a minor who never had a seminal emission or a female from the priestly family who never menstruated. The person need not separate a second [challah].36
Halacha 11
Similarly, if a priest who was an adult immersed himself [in a mikveh and thus purified himself from the impurity resulting from] the emission of semen orzivut may partake of this first challah. Then [the one who separated it] need not separate a second challah in the Diaspora. [This applies] even though the sun has not set [after he immersed himself]37 and although he remains ritual impure due to the impurity imparted by a corpse.38
Halacha 12
Anyone who separates challah should recite the blessing: "[Blessed are You...] Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to separate challah."39 [This applies both] in Eretz Yisrael and in the Diaspora.40Just as one recites a blessing when [separating challah that] is ritually pure, he should recite a blessing when separating the impure.
Therefore a naked man should not separate challah, because he may not recite the blessing.41 A naked woman who is sitting with her entire genital area covered by the ground may separate challah and recite a blessing.42
Halacha 13
niddah and the like43 may recite a blessing and separate challah in the Diaspora. For she is not cautioned against touching the challah,44 only against partaking of it. If there is a priest who was a minor or [an adult] priest who immersed himself who is permitted to partake of it as we explained,45 he may partake of it, [eating] together with a non-priest at the same table. [The rationale is that] it is does not create a forbidden mixture,46 even if there are equal quantities of it and ordinary food.47 It may be given to an unlearned priest48 because [the woman] is impure because of the air of the Diaspora, and the prohibition against a priest actively seeking to receive his presents49does not apply in this instance.
If a person desires to eat first and then separate the challah in the Diaspora, he is permitted, for the fundamental obligation is Rabbinic in origin.50
Halacha 14
Challah is called terumah. Therefore it may only be separated from [dough] in the same location51 like terumah.52 And as an initial preference, one may not separate pure [dough as challah] for impure dough.53
Halacha 15
All of those individuals concerning whom it was said they should not separateterumah and if they separate it, the separation is invalid,54 are governed by the same laws with regard to challah. In all situations concerning which it was said that terumah should not be separated from this type of produce for another,55 challah should also not be separated. Whoever may not partake ofterumah,56 may not partake of challah. Whoever may partake of terumah57may partake of challah.
Halacha 16
A blind person and an intoxicated person58 may separate challah as an initial preference. For with regard to dough, there is no inferior or superior portions that he must distinguish and separate from the superior portion.59
FOOTNOTES
1.
This phrase translates the Hebrew terumah, for that term is also applied to challah in certain contexts. For that reason several of the laws that apply to terumah also apply tochallah.
2.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 133) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 385) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Rambam considers separating the dough and giving it to the priests as two parts of the same mitzvah. The Ramban, by contrast, considers them as separate mitzvot.
3.
The heading of this set of halachot is "The Laws of the First Fruits and the Other Presents [Given] to Priests in the Outlying Areas." In the first four chapters, the Rambam discussed the first fruits. Now he proceeds to explain the other presents. He begins with challah because it also involves grain and is also called terumah. See Radbaz.
4.
By calling it "the first," the Torah is implying that there is a second, i.e., that something is left over [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 1:9), based on the Jerusalem Talmud]. See also Hilchot Terumah 3:5 and note the contrast to Chapter 2, Halachah 17.
5.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 2:7) gives another reason for the difference in measures. Ideally, the requirement would only be one forty-eighth. Nevertheless, generally, the one separating challah from the dough is a woman and women are by nature tightfisted. If they are told to give one twenty-fourth, they will ultimately give a forty-eighth. The Siftei Cohen 322:2 gives another reason for reducing the measure required of a baker. He is preparing the dough for profit and our Sages did not desire to cause him a loss.
6.
Our Sages desired that their laws be uniform out of fear that once distinctions were made, individuals would ultimately give less than the desired amount.
7.
Challah which is impure may not be eaten by a priest and may be used only as fuel. An ordinary person may, however, partake of a loaf made from impure dough. Hence, rather than waste the dough, it is preferable to give a smaller portion as challah.
8.
I.e. the person separating the dough would benefit from it becoming impure, because he will have to give a smaller portion to the priest.
9.
See Hilchot Terumah 11:1. At present, since all dough is impure, theoretically, this is the measure which should be given (Siftei Cohen 322:3). In practice, however, at present, even impure challah is not given to a priest.
10.
Who led the return to Zion after the Babylonian exile.
11.
See Hilchot Terumah 1:5, 26. Even the Ra'avad, who differs with the Rambam with regard to terumah, finds this position acceptable with regard to challah. See alsoHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 20:3.
12.
Provided the dough is made in Eretz Yisrael. The converse applies with regard to the following clause. The dough must be made in the Diaspora (Radbaz).
13.
The Ra'avad maintains that challah must be separated from such dough by Rabbinic decree. The Kessef Mishneh states that this is obvious from the following halachah.
14.
See Hilchot Terumah 2:17. Since the Diaspora is ritually impure by Rabbinic decree, any dough brought from there toEretz Yisrael would be consigned to destruction. However, it should not be burnt immediately, because we do not know that it definitely contracted ritual impurity in Eretz Yisrael, and it is forbidden to burn challahunnecessarily. Nor may it be returned to the Diaspora, lest people think it is permitted to take challah from Eretz Yisrael to the Diaspora [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 4:10)].
15.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
16.
Since the dough is chametz, "leavened," it must be destroyed before the onset of the Pesach holiday.
17.
See Hilchot Terumah 1:8.
18.
See Halachah 2.
19.
See Hilchot Terumah 1:7.
20.
Thus in a strict halachic sense, this land has the status of the Diaspora.
21.
Since this land was once Eretz Yisrael, not everyone knows that it is impure like the Diaspora.
22.
Where certain of the agricultural laws that must be observed in Eretz Yisrael are observed. See Hilchot Terumah 1:4.
23.
For everyone knows that the Diaspora is impure.
24.
So that food is not wasted.
25.
A man becomes a zav when he has an emission from his urinary tract similar, but not identical to that which results from gonorrhea. A woman becomes a zavahwhen she experiences vaginal bleeding at times other than would be expected due to her menstrual cycle. In both cases, the individuals are ritually impure. See Leviticus, ch. 15.
26.
In certain instances, a distinction is made between impurity that results from a physical condition in one's body - such as the above - and other types of impurity (see Halachah 10). However, no such distinction is made here.
The Ra'avad differs with this ruling and maintains that the challah is forbidden to any priest who is ritually impure, citing his statements in Hilchot Terumah 7:8.
The Rambam's ruling here appears to differ from his ruling in that source. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the leniency here applies only after the priests have immersed in a mikveh. The Radbaz explains that here we are speaking about two challot, with one being burnt. Hence the one given to the priest may be eaten.
27.
The shifting of this phrase from the previous halachah to this halachah is based on authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah and also makes from an easier reading of the text.
28.
Which affects everyone in the present age, for we do not have a red heifer to purify ourselves.
29.
As is the law with regard to challah that became impure because of factors beyond one's control (Halachah 4).
30.
At present the obligation to separate challahin Eretz Yisrael is Rabbinic in origin (Halachah 5). Nevertheless, since the original obligation there was Scriptural, thechallah that is separated must have a minimum measure even though it is burnt.
31.
Although at present, everyone knows that all the people living there are ritually impure, no deviation was made from the original ruling.
32.
For according to Scriptural Law, there is no need to separate it.
33.
Because there is a more serious dimension to their ritual impurity [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 4:8)]. See also Hilchot Terumot 7:8-9. As mentioned there, the Ra'avad differs with this ruling.
34.
A woman who is impure because of menstrual bleeding.
35.
A skin malady resembling - but not entirely similar to - leprosy which renders a person ritually impure.
36.
To be burnt. Since he is not separating a second challah, the law is more stringent than in Halachah 8, which can be eaten by priests with this level of impurity (Radbaz).
37.
And a priest who immersed himself to emerge from ritual impurity could not partake of terumahuntil sunset of the day he immersed himself (Hilchot Terumah 7:4).
The Rambam's ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 322:5). The Rama cites the opinion of Rabbenu Nissan who requires the priest to wait until sunset.
38.
For purification from such impurity requires the ashes of the Red Heifer and those were not available after the destruction of the Temple.
The Ra'avad differs with this ruling as well and maintains that even after immersing, such a priest may not partake of challah. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 322:3-5) quotes the Rambam's rulings in all the above matters. The Rama writes that since at present, it is not customary to partake ofchallah in any place, even in Eretz Yisrael, only one challah is separated. There is no minimum measure to it (although it is desirable that it be the size of an olive). Thischallah is burnt.
39.
The Ra'avad states that one should conclude "to separate terumah," for challahis also referred to as terumah. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 328:1) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling. The Rama states that the Rambam's version of the blessing is also acceptable. The Turei Zahav and the Siftei Cohen 328:1 speak of a conclusion that combines both terms "to separate terumah, challah."
40.
Even though the obligation to separatechallah in the Diaspora is only Rabbinic in origin, it is appropriate to recite a blessing, as it is appropriate to do so when fulfilling other Rabbinic commandments (Radbaz).
41.
And it is not fitting to observe a mitzvah without reciting a blessing.
42.
For her nakedness is covered by the ground. A man's, by contrast, projects outward.
43.
I.e., the individuals who are impure because of a physical condition mentioned in Halachah 10.
44.
Although her touch would render an article ritually impure, it is ritually impure regardless because we are all impure due to contact with a human corpse. Hence, there is no difficulty with her touching it.
45.
See Halachot 10-11.
46.
The term midama'at used by the Rambam refers to a mixture of terumah (or challah of Scriptural status) with other substances.
47.
I.e., according to Scriptural Law, the presence of a forbidden substance is nullified when it is mixed with a greater quantity of permitted substances (bittul berov). In this instance, it is not necessary to have a majority of permitted food, half and half is sufficient, for this challah is forbidden only as a Rabbinic injunction.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishnehexplain that although Bechorot 27a indicates that a majority is necessary, the Rambam's ruling is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 4:8), from which it is evident that half and half is acceptable. Moreover, theTur (Yoreh De'ah 323) states that according to the Rambam's understanding that at the outset, it is permitted to nullify a Rabbinic prohibition, one may intentionally make such a mixture.
The Rambam's ruling is cited by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 323:1). TheTur and the Rama cite Rabbenu Asher's view that, like terumah, there must be 101 times the forbidden amount before thechallah is nullified.
48.
As stated in Hilchot Terumah 6:2, an unlearned priest is unfamiliar with and/or careless in the observance of the laws of ritual purity. Hence, he is not given terumah, lest he cause it to become impure.
49.
Our translation is slightly loose. The literal meaning of the Rambam's words, quoted from Bechorot 27a is "[the decree against] a priest helping in the granary does not apply to him." As stated in Hilchot Terumah 12:19, our Sages forbade that because it would appear that he is working for the terumah. Instead, the terumah should be given him in a manner that connotes respect and reverence.
50.
When the obligation is Scriptural in origin, partaking of the food on the basis of a stipulation that one will separate challah (orterumah) afterwards is forbidden. As explained in Hilchot Terumah 1:21, the principle of bereirah - that retroactively, an action performed afterwards is considered as if it was performed at the outset - applies only with regard to matters of Rabbinic Law and not with regard to matters of Scriptural Law.
The Siftei Cohen 323:1 emphasizes that the leniencies in this halachah apply only with regard to challah from the Diaspora, for there never was an obligation to separate it according to Scriptural Law. Although, at present, separating challah in Eretz Yisraelis also a Rabbinic obligation, since originally the obligation was Scriptural, none of these leniencies are granted.
51.
Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 1:9).
52.
See Hilchot Terumah 3:17.
53.
See Hilchot Terumah 5:7. After the fact, however, the separation is effective.
54.
A deaf-mute, a mentally or emotionally unstable person, a minor, a gentile who separated terumah from produce belonging to a Jew, even with his permission, and a person who separate terumah from produce that does not belong to him without the owner's permission (Hilchot Terumah 4:2).
55.
See Hilchot Terumah, ch. 5.
56.
A non-priest and an impure person.
57.
A priest, his wife, and his servants.
58.
We are speaking of a person who is still in control of his faculties, but whose judgment is slightly blurred. If he loses control of his faculties entirely, he is considered as an emotionally unstable person. See Hilchot Mechirah 29:18.
59.
I.e., with regard to terumah, such individuals are told not to separate terumah as an initial preference, because terumah must be separated from the superior produce and they are incapable of making that distinction (Hilchot Terumah 4:4). Nevertheless, this rationale does not apply with regard tochallah.

---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Gerushin Gerushin - Chapter Ten, Gerushin Gerushin - Chapter Eleven, Gerushin Gerushin - Chapter Twelve • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Gerushin - Chapter Ten
Halacha 1
Whenever in this text1 we have used the terms "the get is void," or "the divorce is not effective," the intent is that the get is void according to Scriptural law. The woman is married in the full sense of the term. If she remarries, she must leave [her second husband]; any child she bears him is illegitimate.
If the husband [of a woman who receives such a get] is a priest, she is not forbidden to him as a divorced woman,2 with one exception: a person who divorces his wife and tells her: "You are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to marry anyone else."3 Although such a divorce is not binding, according to Rabbinic law4 such a woman is forbidden to marry a priest, as [implied by Leviticus 21:7]: "[They may not take] a woman divorced from her husband." Our Sages interpreted this to mean: "Even if she is divorced only from her husband and not permitted to marry any one else, she is forbidden to the priesthood. This is the "wisp of a get" that disqualifies [a woman] from [marrying a member of] the priesthood by Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 2
Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the get is unacceptable," the intent is that the get is unacceptable merely according to Rabbinic decree.5Thus, according to Scriptural law, the woman is forbidden to the priesthood.6
A priori, she should not remarry. If, however, she has remarried, she need not leave [her second husband].7 Children born [from her second marriage] are legitimate. A second get that is acceptable should be given to her, while she remains married to her [second] husband.
Should it be impossible to have a second [get] composed, if her second husband is scrupulous and voluntarily divorces her this is praiseworthy, provided she has not borne [him] children. If, however, she has borne him children, he should not divorce her because of [our Sages'] disqualification of her get, lest this cause his sons' reputation to be sullied.
Halacha 3
Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the status of the divorce is in doubt," the woman should not remarry. If she has remarried, she must leave her second husband, and there is a doubt regarding the legimitacy of any children that she bears [her second husband], for her own status is in doubt, and she may be forbidden to engage in marital relations.8
If [a man] divorces his wife with an unacceptable get, or the status of [their] divorce is in doubt, and he desires to remarry her, she is permitted to her husband. He does not have to renew the marriage,9 recite the seven marriage blessings,10 or write her a new marriage contract,11 unless she has been divorced in a manner that is binding.
Halacha 4
Our Sages ordained that whenever [a woman] who was given a get that is void remarries, she must be divorced by her second husband, lest people say: "A married woman has been allowed to remarry without [receiving] aget."12 And she must receive a [second] get from her first husband, so that she be permitted to marry anyone else.
She is forbidden to remarry both her first and second husband forever.13 [This applies] even if she entered into marital relations [with her second husband] without knowing of the prohibition involved. [This prohibition was instituted]14lest people say: "The man remarried his divorcee after she was married [to another man]." If one of the two transgressed and remarried her, he should be compelled to send her away.
Halacha 5
A similar law applies when a woman remarries [after] witnesses testified that her [first] husband died, and later her first husband returns. [This applies] regardless of whether her [first] husband was a mentally sound individual or a deaf-mute, or whether she remarried a mentally sound person or a deaf-mute, who cannot establish a marriage bond in a complete sense.15 She must be divorced by both of them; both must give her a get, and she is forbidden to engage in marital relations with either of them again.
Halacha 6
If [after witnesses testified that a woman's husband died or that she was given a get], she was consecrated [but the marriage bond was not yet consummated],16 and then her first husband returned, or it was discovered that the get was void, she is permitted to her first husband. Nor must she be divorced by the second husband, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman who is forbidden because of a severe prohibition.
[In this instance, we do not require a divorce out of fear that] someone say: "A married woman is being released without a get." Since the marriage was not consummated, the person will rationalize: "The consecration was made on condition, and that condition was not fulfilled."
Halacha 7
[The following laws apply when] a woman married, and afterwards it was discovered that her get was void, or [it had been reported that her first husband died,] and he returned. Neither her first nor her second husband is entitled to an ownerless object that she discovers17 nor to the profits from her work.18 Neither can he annul her vows.19 None of the benefits that either of them received after she married [her second husband] should be expropriated from them.20 Neither of them is obligated to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract,21 nor to fulfill any of the stipulations of the marriage contract.22
Neither of them is required to pay for her sustenance. If she took [money or property for this purpose] from either of them, she must return it. Neither of them is held responsible for any of the property she brought to the marriage that became worn out or was lost,23 even nichsei tzon barzel.24
A child born to [the second husband] is illegitimate. If the first husband engages in relations with her before she is divorced by the second husband, a child born of this union is illegitimate by virtue of Rabbinic decree.
If the second [husband] divorced her and she received the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, and afterwards her [first] husband came or it was discovered that the divorce was void, we do not expropriate the money she received for her sustenance or by virtue of her marriage contract.25
Halacha 8
Similar laws apply when one of two brothers consecrated a woman.26 The brother who consecrated the woman departed, and afterwards it was reported that he died. The other brother performed the rite of yibbum, marrying his brother's wife, and then the brother returned.
The woman must be divorced by both husbands, receiving a get from both of them, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to her. Similarly, if a man consecrated a woman, she journeyed to another country, the husband heard that she died and married her sister,27 and afterwards it was discovered that she had not died: he must divorce both women, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to both of them.
Halacha 9
[Different rules apply, however, if a man] married a woman who journeyed to another country, he heard that she died, he married her sister, and then it was discovered that his [first] wife was alive. The sister does not require a get, and his [first] wife is permitted to him.
Similar laws apply with regard to other women forbidden by severe prohibitions28 who were married under the assumption that the marriage was permitted,29 and it is discovered that the prohibition still applied. They do not require a divorce, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman forbidden by such a severe prohibition.
Halacha 10
Why did they require that the sister of the woman whom the man consecrated be given a get?30 Lest people say that the [first] kiddushin were given conditionally, [the condition was not fulfilled,] and thus the law would allow marriage to her sister. Since the [first] woman's sister was divorced with aget, she - i.e., the man's first arusah - is forbidden [to him], lest people think that he married his divorcee's sister.
Halacha 11
A scribe composed [a get], but erred and gave the get to the husband and the receipt [for the woman's marriage contract] to the woman, or the man and wife erred, and the husband took the get and the wife the receipt, and thus they thought they were divorced.31
[The following rules apply] if afterwards the get is discovered in the possession of the man. If the woman has not remarried, she is considered as if she has not been divorced; it [appears to] have been revealed that the divorce did not ever take place. The husband should give her the get in the presence [of witnesses], and the divorce takes effect from the time the get is given.
If, however, she had [already] remarried, and afterwards the husband produces the get, claiming that she has not been divorced, for he is in possession of the get and it never reached her, we do not accept his claim. She is not forbidden to her [second] husband.32 Instead, we operate under the presumption that she has been divorced, the get fell from her hand and was found by [her first husband], who desires to cause her to be forbidden to her second husband.33
Halacha 12
When a person divorces his wife because of unsavory reports,34 or because she is indiscriminate with regard to vows, he is told: "Inform her that you are divorcing her to chastise her, and know that you will never be able to remarry her."35
Why is [a man forbidden] to remarry such a woman? This is a decree, [instituted] lest she marry another man, repent and live chastely with him. Her first [husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, it resembles a divorce given on a condition that was not fulfilled,36 in which case, retroactively, the get would be void. Therefore, we tell him: "Make a firm resolve to divorce her, knowing that you will never remarry her."
If, however, he transgresses and remarries her before she is consecrated to another man,37 he need not divorce her.
Halacha 13
Similarly, if [a man] divorces his wife because she is an aylonit38 or because she always experiences menstrual bleeding in the midst of sexual relations,39he should never remarry her.
[This is a decree, instituted] lest she marry another man and have children if she was an aylonit, or her condition be healed if she suffered from menstrual bleeding. [Her first husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, [it would appear] that her getis void and her children illegitimate. If, however, he transgresses and remarries her [before she is consecrated to another man], he need not divorce her.
Halacha 14
When an agent brings a get from the diaspora and says, "It was written and signed in my presence" [to validate the signatures to the get],40 he should not marry her. We fear that perhaps he was attracted to her and therefore testified on her behalf.
[For this same reason,] when one witness testifies that a woman's husband died,41 and she [is given license to] marry on the basis of his testimony, he should not marry her. Similarly, a sage who ruled that a woman is forbidden to her husband because of a vow42 should not marry her.
Similarly, when a man is reputed to have had relations with a maid-servant, and afterwards she was granted her freedom, or when [a man is reputed to have had relations] with a gentile woman, and afterwards she converted, he should not marry her.43 Similarly, if a gentile or a servant had relations with a Jewish woman, and afterwards the gentile converted or the servant was freed, he should not marry this woman.44 In all these instances, if a couple transgress and marry,45 they should not be forced to separate46.
Halacha 15
In all the above instances, if these men had wives and their wives died, or they divorced their wives at their wives' initiative,47 they are permitted to marry [the women mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation.
Similarly if these women married other men and became widowed or were divorced, they are permitted to marry [the men mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation.
Halacha 16
All these women are permitted to marry [any relatives of the men involved]. [A woman may marry] the son of the witness who testified on her behalf, the son of the sage who declared that she was forbidden to her husband, the son of the man with whom she was reputed to have had relations, or any other relative of theirs. [The rationale for this leniency is that] a person will not commit a sin so that another person will benefit.
A woman is permitted to marry one of [the two witnesses] to her divorce or to her mi'un, or to marry one of the judges in whose presence she performed the rite of chalitzah. Our suspicions are aroused only when [the woman's license to marry depends on] the testimony of one witness.48
A person should always shy away from serving as a witness to mi'un,49 and make himself available [as a witness to enable] the rite of chalitzah [to be performed].
Halacha 17
When a man divorces his wife and then engages in relations with her in the the presence of witnesses before she marries another man,50 we assume that since she was [originally] his wife, he remarried her and engaged in relations with the intent of consecrating her, and not as a licentious act.
[The above rule applies] regardless of whether they were divorced after marriage, or only after consecration. And this applies even if we saw that he paid her money.51 For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not enter into sexual relations with his wife with a licentious intent, when he has the possibility of having these relations considered to be a mitzvah.
For this reason, this woman is definitely considered to be consecrated,52 and requires a second divorce [in order to marry another man].
Halacha 18
[There is an extension to the above principle.] If a man entered into privacy with his divorcee in the presence of witnesses, the two witnesses observed [their conduct] simultaneously,53 and [the couple] had been married previously, we suspect that they engaged in sexual relations.
The witnesses to their entrance into privacy are thus considered to be witnesses to sexual relations. For a person who consecrates his wife via sexual relations need not engage in relations in the presence of witnesses. [All that] is necessary that [the couple] enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses and engage in relations in privacy, as explained.54
Since [it is possible that the couple engaged in relations], the status of the woman is in doubt, because we suspect that she has been consecrated. Because of this suspicion, she requires a [second] get. If, however, the woman had merely been consecrated and was divorced [before she was married], we do not suspect [that they engaged in sexual relations], because they did not share such familiarity.55
Halacha 19
Several of the geonim have ruled that any woman with whom a man engaged in sexual relations in the presence of witnesses requires a get, [the rationale for their ruling being that] a person will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.
[Moreover,] they extended [the application of] this principle, until they decided to rule that when a man's maidservant bore him a son, we take the matter into account, and the man's wife is not [allowed to perform] the rite of yibbum [if he dies without children],56 lest he have freed his maidservant57 and afterwards engaged in relations with her [with the intent of consecrating her]. And there are those who ruled that we can definitely assume that he freed her [and consecrated her],58 for a man will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.
I considered these opinions to be far from the paths of the Torah judgment, and it is not fit for one to rely on them. Our Sages made such statements only with regard to [a man's] wife whom he divorced, or to a person who consecrated a woman conditionally and then entered into sexual relations without clarifying his intent.59 For in these instances the woman is the man's wife, and with regard to a man's wife we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent unless he explicitly states that this is his intent, or that he is entering into these relations with a condition in mind.60
With regard to other women, however, [we do not follow this assumption]. Instead, whenever [a man enters into relations with] a wanton woman, we assume that he had a licentious intent,61 unless he explicitly states that he intends to consecrate her. Needless to say, this applies with regard to a maidservant62 or to a gentile woman,63 for our marriage laws do not apply with regard to them at all, and we have no suspicions [with regard to marriage] at all. A son born by them is assumed to be a gentile or a servant until it is definitively substantiated that his mother was freed or converted.
Halacha 20
When it has been assumed that a woman is either married or consecrated, and a rumor is spread in [her] city that she has been divorced, [the rumor] is not given credence, and we continue to operate under the assumption [that there was no change in her status].64 [This applies] even if the majority, or even the entire city spread this rumor.
[Different rules apply, however, in the following instance.] A rumor was spread through the city that a woman was consecrated, and that rumor was reported in court, in which case we suspect that the woman was consecrated, as explained.65 Afterwards, a rumor was spread that she was divorced from those kiddushin; we consider her to be divorced.66 [Since] she was forbidden on the basis of a rumor, she is permitted on the basis of a rumor.
Halacha 21
[A man] should not marry a woman if he intends to divorce her.67 Nor should he maintain her as a wife68 and live with her, if he intends to divorce her.69
A man should not divorce his first wife unless he discovers an incident of sexual misconduct,70, as [Deuteronomy 24:1] states: "When he finds evidence of sexual misconduct...." One should not hurry to divorce one's first wife.71 With regard to a second wife, by contrast, if one hates her, one may send her away.72
Halacha 22
It is a mitzvah to divorce a woman who possesses unsavory character traits and does not conduct herself modestly73, as is the practice of proper daughters of Israel, as [implied by Proverbs 22:10]: "Drive away the scoffer, and contention will depart."
When a woman has been divorced for loose moral conduct,74 it is not fitting for a proper man to marry her, lest people say: "This one sent away this wicked woman, and this one brought her home."
Halacha 23
When a man's wife becomes a deaf-mute,75 he may divorce her, [by giving her] a get, and the divorce is effective. If, however, [his wife] loses control of her mental or emotional faculties,76 he may not divorce her until she regains stability.
This is a prescript ordained by our Sages so that she will not [be divorced and left] unattended, [and be violated] by immoral people, for she is unable to care for herself. Therefore, [her husband] should provide a place for her, provide her with food and drink from her own resources,77 and marry another woman. He is not obligated to provide her with her sustenance, garments and conjugal rights.78 [For although our Sages compelled the husband to remain married to such a woman, they did not compel him to live with her as man and wife,] because a mentally sound individual cannot endure living with a mentally incapable person in one dwelling.
[The husband] is not obligated to provide her with medical treatment,79 nor to redeem her if she is taken captive. If he divorces her, the divorce is binding.80He should remove her from his home, and he is not obligated to care for her.
FOOTNOTES
1.
In the Talmud, by contrast, the terms bateiland pasul do not have these specific meanings. There are times when pasul is used to connote a get that is unacceptable according to Scriptural law, and bateil to refer to a get that is unacceptable according to Rabbinic law (Maggid Mishneh). (See also the responsum of the Rambam quoted by the Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 8, Halachah 4.)
2.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the priest should be forbidden to remain married to a woman he divorced with such a get, lest the impression be created that the prohibition against a priest's marrying a divorcee can be waived. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 150:3), however, accepts the Rambam's ruling.
3.
See Chapter 8, Halachah 5.
4.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam considers the proof-text that he quotes as an asmachta - i.e., a support from the Torah invented by the Rabbis to uphold their decree. The Maggid Mishneh himself differs, noting that Gittin 82a appears to indicate that the prohibition is of Scriptural origin.
Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the Rambam's conception can be resolved based on his statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2), that any law that is not explicitly stated in the Torah, but rather derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical exegesis, is considered to be Rabbinic in origin (midivrei soferim). This classification does not, however, in any way diminish the status of this practice, and it is as though it were explicitly stated in the Torah. (See the commentaries on Hilchot Ishut 1:2.) Similarly, in this instance the prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, but rather derived through exegesis. Thus, it has the status of Scriptural law, but is considered to be Rabbinic in origin.
It must be emphasized that just as the woman is prohibited from remarrying a priest if divorced, she is also prohibited from remaining married to her husband, if he is a priest [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer150:3)].
5.
I.e., according to Scriptural law, the divorce is binding. Our Sages, however, disqualified the divorce and forbade the woman from remarrying until a get is given that presents no halachic difficulties.
6.
Similarly, if her first husband is a priest, he may no longer become impure while caring for her burial (Hilchot Eivel 2:13).
7.
Since her divorce is effective according to Scriptural law, our Sages did not abrogate her second marriage.
8.
I.e., in these instances, our Sages were unsure whether or not the get is valid according to Scriptural law. Because of the doubt, the woman is not allowed to engage in marital relations with anyone other than her first husband until an acceptable get is given. The first husband can no longer annul her vows, nor does he have the right to inherit her property if she dies in his lifetime.
9.
The Rambam's intent is somewhat questionable. The Maggid Mishneh and theKessef Mishneh explain that even in this situation, the husband must consecrate his wife a second time.
10.
For the marriage blessings should not be recited if there is a doubt whether they are necessary. Even with regard to a get that was disqualified by Rabbinic law, since the woman should not remarry, the blessings should not be recited (Maggid Mishneh).
11.
The marriage contract states: "When you [may] marry another person, you may collect the sum mentioned within." Since such a woman is not fit to remarry, and she could not collect the money due her by virtue of her original marriage contract, that contract remains in effect (Maggid Mishneh).
12.
Although her second marriage is void, and thus, according to Scriptural law there is no need for a get, our Sages established such a requirement because of the impression that might be created.
13.
When a woman commits adultery, she is forbidden to engage in marital relations both with her husband and with the adulterer (even after being divorced from her husband). In this instance, the woman's second marriage is an adulterous relationship. Therefore, she may not remain married to either of her husbands.
14.
I.e., the abovementioned prohibition stems from Scriptural law. It applies, however, only when the prohibition against adultery was willfully violated. Nevertheless, even when adultery was committed unwittingly, the woman is forbidden to both husbands: to her second husband, because her marriage to her first husband has not been terminated, and to her first husband, because of the Rabbinical decree mentioned by the Rambam.
15.
As explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:9, a deaf-mute's mental capacity is considered insufficient for him to establish a marriage bond. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that if a deaf-mute man or woman enters into a marriage relationship, that relationship is binding according to Rabbinic law, regardless of whether the mate is also a deaf-mute or is fully mentally competent.
Since a deaf-mute's marriage is not effective according to Torah law, there is room to suppose that the woman should be allowed to remarry her first husband, for the difference between a deaf-mute's marriage and an ordinary marriage is obvious. And conversely, one might assume that since a deaf-mute is not held responsible for his actions, if a woman's second husband were a deaf-mute, they would be allowed to remain married. For these reasons, it is necessary to state that the stringencies apply in these instances as well.
16.
Since the woman did not enter into forbidden marital relations, there is no reason to penalize her (Yevamot 89a).
17.
The second husband is not entitled to the article, because he is not truly her husband. The first husband is not entitled to it because our Sages granted a husband rights to ownerless articles his wife discovers to prevent friction from arising in the home, and in this instance, since he is required to divorce her, there is no need to prevent friction (Yevamot 90b).
18.
A husband is granted the profits from his wife's work in return for providing for her sustenance. Since neither of the husbands is required to provide for her, neither is entitled to this benefit (Ibid.).
19.
The Torah granted a husband the right to annul his wife's vows so that she will remain attractive to him. In this instance, the husband should not be attracted to the wife (Ibid.).
20.
Our Sages explained that the woman should have been entitled to be recompensed for these benefits. Nevertheless, they were withheld from her as a penalty for her actions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer17:56) does rule that the benefits that her second husband received after her first husband returned (or after the get was discovered void) should be returned to her.
21.
Our Sages instituted the requirement of a marriage contract so that a husband would be deterred by the financial burden he would have to bear, and would not consider divorce a light matter. In this instance, however, our Sages desire the divorce. Therefore, they did not impose a financial burden (Yevamot 89a).
22.
It is only when a woman is entitled to the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract that the stipulations apply (Ibid.).
23.
I.e., she is judged as a woman who was divorced because of adultery, who is penalized, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 24:10. She is, however, entitled to take all her property that remains intact [Shulchan Aruch(loc. cit.)].
24.
Property for which the husband takes financial responsibility (Hilchot Ishut 16:1).
25.
For when she received the funds, they were not aware of the prohibition (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 10:1).
26.
As reflected in the following halachot, based on Yevamot 94b, it appears that only when the woman has been merely consecrated is a get required from the second husband. For it is possible for an onlooker to think that perhaps the first kiddushin were given conditionally, and the marriage to the second brother is binding. Lest a misconception arise and one think that a married woman can be released without a get, the second husband is required to give a get.
If she was married to - not merely consecrated by - her first husband, a get is not required from the second husband, because when his brother returns, everyone will realize that his marriage to his brother's wife is not binding. Rabbenu Asher makes a further distinction and states that when the woman was married to - not merely consecrated by - the first brother, she and her first husband may continue living together as man and wife, despite the fact that she erred and performed the rite ofyibbum. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer159:4) follows the Rambam's ruling, while the Ramah follows that of Rabbenu Asher.
27.
It is forbidden to marry two sisters in each other's lifetime. Once a man's wife dies, however, he may marry her sister. (See also Hilchot Yibbum 3:11.)
28.
The intent is the Hebrew term arayot, a word with a specific meaning. As explained inHilchot Ishut 1:5, this refers to a woman with whom sexual relations are forbidden and punishable by karet.
29.
E.g., one was unaware of the family connection.
30.
For, as mentioned, a marriage bond cannot be established with one of the arayot.
If the man married the first sister, then there is no possibility of such a misconception arising. A man will never marry a woman conditionally, for if the condition is not fulfilled, their marital relations are considered to be sinful. We assume that a person will not take that risk (Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 15:27). (Note, however, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 2:10 and the gloss of the Ra'avad.)
31.
The wording used by the Rambam here is somewhat confusing. For the scribe should give the get to the husband, who should give it to his wife. The intent appears to be, as in the source for this halachah, Gittin 80a, that the scribe gave the man the receipt and the woman the get, and they exchanged them. Thus, the woman was never given the getby her husband.
32.
Indeed, we do not even require that, as a safeguard, the first husband give her the getwhile she is married to her second husband (Beit Shmuel 151:2).
The Beit Shmuel also states that this law applies even if the woman was merely consecrated by the second husband, but their marriage had not been consummated.
33.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin8:7), the Rambam explains that the husband is acting out of spite, seeking to prevent his divorcee from remarrying. Rashi (Gittin 80a) offers a different rationale.
34.
See Hilchot Ishut 24:16.
35.
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Gittin 45b, 46b. Other halachic authorities view this situation slightly differently. The various views are listed in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 10:3).
36.
I.e., it is as if he gave her the get on the condition that she remain unchaste, and, because of her repentance, that condition was not fulfilled. Most authorities maintain that since this condition was not actually stated, such a complaint would not be heeded by the court. Nevertheless, since the matter might become a subject for gossip, her first husband is bound by these restrictions (Tosafot, Gittin 46a). From one of the Rambam's responsa, however, it appears that he maintains that the get would actually be void in such an instance.
37.
If, however, she was consecrated by another man, even if she was divorced before their marriage was consummated, she may not remarry her first husband and must be divorced by him if they do remarry, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 12.
38.
A woman who suffers from physical disorders and lacks female physical characteristics. She is unable to bear children. (See Hilchot Ishut 2:6, 15:7, 24:1.)
39.
See Hilchot Ishut 25:8-9.
40.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 5. If, however, a person brings a get from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another, the permission granted to the woman to remarry does not depend on his statements. Therefore, he is permitted to marry her (Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer12:1).
41.
See Chapter 12, Halachah 15.
42.
I.e., a woman took a vow that caused her to be forbidden to derive benefit from her husband, in which case he is required to divorce her. She asked a sage to annul the vow, but he could not find a halachic basis to do so (Yevamot 25b).
43.
For this would substantiate the initial rumor and make the couple a subject of gossip (Yevamot 24b). On this basis, there are authorities who rule that if the rumor is substantiated - e.g., a couple are openly living together, or were married in a secular court - the woman should be encouraged to convert, and they should be married according to Jewish law.
Indeed, we find a responsum of the Rambam himself regarding a man who had an attractive female servant, and it was rumored that they had spent time together in private. The Rambam advises that the man be compelled to free the servant and either marry her or send her away. He acknowledges that doing so would violate the Rabbinic decree mentioned in this halachah, but states that because of the permissive state of morals prevalent in his society, there is no alternative.
44.
From Yevamot (loc. cit.), it would appear that the reason for this restriction is that people should not say that the man converted in order to marry. This is undesirable. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah13:14.) With regard to this prohibition as well, it has become customary in the present time to show leniency.
45.
There are opinions that state that if the woman has merely been consecrated, but the marriage bond has not been consummated, the couple should be forced to separate. (See Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 12:2). There are other opinions, however, that maintain that the consecration is equivalent to the consummation of the marriage. Rav David Arameah cites Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:31 as an indication that the Rambam follows the latter view.
46.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as maintaining that a witness who brought a getand said "It was written and signed in my presence," should be forced to divorce the woman if he marries her. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 12:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling. See Chelkat Mechokek12:1.
47.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 12:4) writes that if the man's wife was sick at the time that the woman became eligible for marriage, the prohibition remains in effect. For it possible that he was waiting for her to die.
The Chelkat Mechokek 12:2 extends this stringency to include a man and wife whose marriage was known to be plagued by strife. Even if the divorce came at the woman's initiative, it is possible that the man expected it and had planned another alternative.
48.
It is unlikely that two individuals will sin so that one may benefit (Jerusalem Talmud,Yevamot 2:12). The Hagahot Maimoniot, nevertheless, state that "a master of his soul" should avoid such a marriage.
49.
Lest the woman later regret her decision (Yevamot 109b).
50.
If the woman has remarried and divorced, however, the presumption stated does not apply, for it is forbidden for her first husband to remarry her (Beit Shmuel 149:2).
51.
Although this would make it appear more likely that the man was relating to her as a prostitute and not as a wife, it is not sufficient cause for us to negate our presumption (Gittin 73b).
52.
The Beit Shmuel 149:3 interprets this to mean that if another person consecrates her afterwards, we consider it as if he had consecrated a married woman, and he is not required to divorce her.
53.
It is not sufficient for one to have observed them in private at one time, and the other at a different time, for the two witnesses who observe the consecration of a woman must be together at that time.
54.
Hilchot Ishut 3:5; see also Hilchot Ishut14:16, which states that it is forbidden to engage in sexual relations in the presence of others.
55.
The previous halachah dealt with an instance in which relations were observed; hence, no distinction was made whether the couple was divorced before or after their first marriage was consummated. In this instance, they merely entered into privacy together. If, however, we know for a fact that a couple shared familiarity before the marriage bond was completed, a second getis required (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 149:2).
56.
A son borne by a maidservant is not considered to have any connection to his father. These authorities, however, suspect that the woman was freed and then married, and that the child thus shares a connection with his father. According to this opinion,chalitzah is, nevertheless, required.
57.
For until the maidservant is freed, she cannot be married.
58.
These authorities do not even requirechalitzah.
59.
See Hilchot Ishut 7:23.
60.
The Radbaz and others state that if the witnesses know that the woman is in theniddah state, we do not assume that the couple entered into relations for the sake of marriage. If they are prepared to violate the prohibition of niddah, we assume that they will have no hesitation to conduct relations outside marriage. [Some modern authorities consider taking this concept even further. Although a man and a woman claim that their intent is "marriage," if they violate the laws ofniddah, their conception of marriage is notkedat Moshe viYisrael, "according to the faith of Moses and Israel," and Torah law does not require a divorce. See the responsum of the Rivash cited below.]
61.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this matter and maintains that if a man is in general known to be moral and observant, we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent. This applies even if he entered into relations with a maidservant. If, however, the man has a reputation for wanton behavior, this assumption is not applied. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:5) follows the Rambam's view.
In the law that follows, the Shulchan Aruchexplains that if a Jewish man and woman marry according to gentile law, we do not consider them to be man and wife according to Torah law. This ruling is based on a ruling of the Rivash (Responsum 6), which explains that a Jewish marriage must be "according to the faith of Moses and Israel," and a couple who marry according to gentile law, regardless of their desire to live together, are not establishing their union on this foundation.
62.
See Hilchot Nachalot 4:6.
63.
In this instance, the Ra'avad accepts the Rambam's ruling, for it is impossible for a man to compel a woman to convert.
64.
Thus, if her husband was a priest (who may not marry a divorced woman), he may remain married to her. We do not suspect that he divorced her and remarried her. (SeeHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 17:20.)
65.
See Hilchot Ishut 9:22.
66.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and interprets Gittin 88b, the source for this halachah, as referring to an instance where there is one rumor that says that the woman was consecrated and then divorced. Although Rashi and others interpret the passage as the Rambam does, theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 46:7) appears to merge both views into a single understanding.
67.
If the man informs a woman that he intends to divorce her, he may marry her for a brief amount of time (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:28;Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 119:1).
68.
He did not intend to divorce her originally, made this decision after they married, but lives together with her as husband and wife with the thought of divorcing her in the future.
69.
Children conceived during this time will have severely tainted personalities, as stated inHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:12.
70.
There is somewhat of a difficulty with the Rambam's ruling. The opinion he cites is that of the School of Shammai, as mentioned at the conclusion of the tractate of Gittin. The School of Hillel differs and maintains that if a woman wrongs her husband, even with regard to as insignificant a matter as burning his meal, he may divorce her. Rabbi Akiva goes even further and maintains that even if a person finds a more attractive woman, he may divorce his wife.
Most authorities agree that in this, as in most other instances, the halachah follows the School of Hillel. Why then does the Rambam (and the Shulchan Aruch [Even HaEzer119:3]) follow the opinion of the School of Shammai?
Among the resolutions offered is that the difference of opinion between the Schools of Shammai and Hillel applies only with regard to a second marriage. With regard to a first marriage, by contrast, even the School of Hillel accepts the School of Shammai's stringency (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 119).
Note also the statements of the Ramah, who rules that the prohibition applied only during the Talmudic era, when a woman could be divorced against her will. In the present era, when a woman must willingly accept a divorce, this prohibition does not apply.
71.
See Gittin 90b, which states that whenever a man divorces his first wife, the altar itself cries.
On the surface, the wording used by the Rambam is problematic. First he says that it is forbidden to divorce one's first wife, and then he states that one should not hurry, implying that one may, but that it is ethical not to be impulsive about the matter. TheChelkat Mechokek 119:2 offers two resolutions: a) The prohibition exists only when, as was possible in the Talmudic era, the husband is divorcing his first wife against her will. If she is willing to accept the divorce, there is no prohibition; one should, however, proceed without haste. b) Even when one hears about improper sexual conduct, one should not be hasty about the matter. Instead, the incident should be investigated carefully to determine if in fact any wrongdoing occurred.
72.
Although divorce is undesirable, an unhealthy marriage is even more undesirable, and a marriage should be terminated if there are severe ill feelings between a couple.
73.
The implication is both that she is continually contending with her husband and that she is immodest. In such an instance, it is a mitzvah to divorce her, even if she is a man's first bride (Chelkat Mechokek 119:4).
74.
See Hilchot Ishut 24:12.
75.
This refers to a situation in which a woman married while fully capable and became a deaf-mute while married. Since a deaf-mute is considered to be mentally incapable, such a person is unable to establish a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law. Our Rabbis made certain provisions for the marriage of such individuals, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:9. In this instance, however, since the woman was not a deaf-mute at the time of marriage, the marriage is binding according to Scriptural law.
The law teaches us that since according to Scriptural and Talmudic law, a woman can be divorced against her will, the fact that the woman is mentally incapable does not prevent her husband from divorcing her. Since a woman who is a deaf-mute is not totally incapable of caring for herself, our Sages did not make provisions for her, as they did for a woman who becomes mentally unsound.
76.
This also refers to a situation in which the woman lost control of her faculties after marriage. If, however, she was mentally unstable at the outset, any marriage that she enters into is not binding at all (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).
77.
He must, however, put at the woman's disposal the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract and the money due from her dowry (Chelkat Mechokek 119:9).
78.
This ruling does not apply in the Ashkenazic community, nor in other places where the custom is to follow the ban of Rabbenu Gershom not to divorce one's wife against her will. In these communities, the husband is required to provide for his wife's sustenance and garments from his own resources. The rationale is that since he is not able to divorce her - for she is not capable of consenting to the divorce - he remains liable to bear the financial burden of supporting her (Chelkat Mechokek 119:9).
The husband is not, however, obligated to give her conjugal rights. The Bayit Chadash(Even HaEzer 119) and the Chelkat Mechokek 119:12 state that in such a situation, the husband may be granted license to marry a second wife by 100 rabbis.
79.
Even according to the law in Talmudic times, many differ with the Rambam's thesis and maintain that the husband is obligated for his wife's medical expenses.
The Ra'avad protests that in many instances, a person with mental disorders can be rehabilitated, and he maintains that the husband should be required to pay for such treatment. The Beit Shmuel 119:11 states that even the Rambam would agree to such an obligation.
In the Ashkenazic community today, just as a husband is required to supply his wife with her sustenance in such a situation, he is also held liable for all her medical expenses (Ramah, Even HaEzer 119:6, Chelkat Mechokek 119:12).
80.
As the Ra'avad mentions, in an instance when a woman has lost mental competence to the extent that she cannot safeguard theget she was given, all authorities agree that the divorce is not binding. Even when she has that degree of mental competence, there are many authorities that maintain that the divorce is not effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 119:6) quotes the Rambam's view, as interpreted by the Ra'avad. The Ramah follows the more stringent views.

Gerushin - Chapter Eleven


Halacha 1
One should not marry a girl below the age of majority.1 When a man marries an orphan girl below the age of majority, and [before she attains majority] she [decides that] she does not desire [to remain married to] this husband, she rejects [the marriage] and departs; a get is not required, because a consecration effected by a minor does not establish a marriage bond in the full sense, as explained.2 [The annulment of a marriage in this manner is referred to as mi'un.]
Similarly, when a girl below majority was married at her father's initiative,3 but was then widowed or divorced while still a minor, she is considered to be an orphan, although her father is alive.4 If she marries again while she is below the age of majority, she may annul her marriage through mi'un.
Halacha 2
Although the marriage of a woman who is a deaf-mute is a Rabbinic institution like that of a minor, our Sages did not give her the right to annul it throughmi'un, so that men would not refrain from marrying her.5
Halacha 3
A minor can annul her marriage via mi'un whether she has been merely consecrated or [even if] the marriage has been consummated. [She can exercise this privilege] in her husband's presence, or outside his presence. Just as she can annul her marriage to her husband, she can annul her relationship to a yavam.6
Just as she can annul one marriage through mi'un, so too, she can annul a second marriage or a third marriage. Indeed, [she can exercise this privilege] any number of times.7
As long as she is a minor, she has the right to annul her marriage throughmi'un. When a minor does not exercise the right of mi'un and becomes consecrated to another man despite the fact that she was married, [the consecration is binding]. Becoming consecrated is [obviously] a rejection [- and thus an annulment - of her previous marriage].
Halacha 4
Until when may a girl annul her marriage through mi'un? Throughout the entire time she is a minor, until she becomes a na'arah,8 or until it is known that she becomes classified as an aylonit.9
When does the above10 apply? When her husband did not engage in marital relations with her after she became twelve years and one day old. If, however, the couple engaged in relations after she reached this age, since these relations consecrate her according to Scriptural law, as explained,11 she no longer has the right to annul her marriage through mi'un.
Similarly, [when the woman reaches this age, we assume that she has lost her right to annul her marriage through mi'un]. She need not be checked for signs of physical maturity, for it is assumed that she has manifested them.12
Halacha 5
If she has undergone a physical inspection, and no signs of maturity were discovered, but she engaged in marital relations after the age when she could have manifested signs of maturity, we suspect that pubic hairs had grown and later fell off. Because of the doubt, the marriage must be dissolved with a get.
If a woman [who engaged in marital relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve attempts to] annul her marriage through mi'un after undergoing a physical examination,13 and then is consecrated by another person, [her second husband also] must dissolve their relationship with a get, because of the doubt involved.14 If she married [the second husband], she must be divorced by both husbands and there is a doubt concerning the legitimacy of a child born to either of them [after her consecration to her second husband].15
Halacha 6
When a minor does not exercise her right to mi'un and attains majority, she no longer has this privilege. [This applies] even when she did not engage in marital relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve years and one day. Since she has attained majority, it is a Rabbinic decree that a divorce is required [if the marriage must be dissolved].
[The rationale for this ruling is as follows:] The couple did not engage in marital relations after she reached the age of na'arut, in which instance it would be necessary to suspect that she manifested signs of physical maturity, and accordinly, there would be a doubt whether or not a marriage bond had been established. Nor did they engage in relations after she attained majority, in which instance she would become a married woman in all regards. Accordingly, the only reason she requires a get is the fact of her marriage as a minor, which is a Rabbinic institution.
Based on the above, if another man consecrated her after she attained majority, [when she had not engaged in marital relations with her first husband from the age of twelve onward,] the second man's consecration is binding.16As such, if her first husband divorces her, her second husband may consummate the marriage. If, however, her second husband divorces her, her first husband may not continue his marriage with her. [This is a decree, instituted] lest people say: "He remarried his divorcee after she was consecrated."17
If her second husband engaged in marital relations with her before her first husband divorced her, she must be divorced by both men. [This is a decree instituted] because [the situation] resembles an instance in which a woman heard that her husband died, she married, and then her first husband returned.18 [The laws governing the two situations are not entirely analogous. In this instance,] a child fathered by the second husband is not illegitimate.19But if her first husband engages in relations with her before her second husband divorces her, any child born is illegitimate.20
Halacha 7
In which instances must a minor perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]? [Our Sages established the following guidelines.] If she was between six and ten [when she was consecrated], we investigate the extent of her sagacity.
If she knows to guard [the money given to her to effect] the kiddushin,appreciates that it was given for that purpose and will guard it differently from the way in which she would guard a nut, a date or the like, she must perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage].
If she does not know to guard [the money given to her to effect] the kiddushin, she need not perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]. Instead, she returns to her mother's home as if she had never been consecrated. If she is less than six, even if she knows [how to guard the money given her,] she need not perform the rite of mi'un. If she is more than ten, even if she is very inept, she must perform the rite of mi'un.21
Whenever a girl's brother, mother or relatives arranged for her marriage without telling her of the identity of the groom, she need not perform the rite ofmi'un [to nullify her marriage].22
Halacha 8
What does the rite of mi'un entail? She tells two witnesses:23 "I no longer desire my husband so and so," "I no longer desire to be consecrated [to the man] to whom my mother - or my brother - consecrated me," or the like.
[The above applies] even if the two individuals are guests dining in her husband's home and she is serving them. If she tells them, "I no longer desire my husband so and so," she has performed mi'un.
Halacha 9
The two individuals in whose presence the minor performs the rite of mi'unshould write the following for her: "On this and this day, _______________the daughter of _____________ rejected her husband." They sign the document and give it to her. This is the essential portion of a deed of mi'un.
A deed of mi'un does not resemble a bill of divorce, in which the giving of the bill effects the divorce.24 It need not be written with the proper intent, nor must it be transferred, nor do any of the laws required for a bill of divorce apply with regard to it. The wording used for a get is not used for it, lest it appear to be aget.25 It is merely a legal record.
Halacha 10
The two individuals before whom a girl makes a statement of mi'un must know the identity of the girl and her husband. Therefore, whoever sees [a girl] make a statement of mi'un [in the presence of two other people] and hears that statement, is entitled to write a legal record of this statement, even though he was not aware of [the girl's] identity beforehand.26
It has become customary for the Jewish people to write a legal record of a statement of mi'un, employing the following text.
Halacha 11
A legal record of a statement of mi'un:
On this day of the week, and on this day of the month, in this year according to the following reckoning,27 so and so, the daughter of so and so (her father's name) issued a protest in our presence, saying: "My mother or my brother misled me and had me married - or consecrated - to so and so, the son of so and so (his father's name) while I was a minor. I am now making a statement in your presence that I do not desire him, nor can I live with him." We have had so and so undergo a physical examination,28 and it has been established that she is still a minor. [Hence,] we have written and signed this [legal document] and have given it to her to serve as support and clear evidence.
So and so, the son of so and so (his father's name), a witness;
So and so, the son of so and so (his father's name), a witness.
Halacha 12
When a man divorces his wife, and she becomes consecrated to another man, she is forbidden to her first [husband], even though she has not engaged in marital relations [with her second husband]. If her first [husband] remarries her and engages in sexual relations with her,29 he [transgresses a negative commandment,30 and] is punished by lashes. He is forced to divorce her, as [implied by Deuteronomy 24:4]: "Her first husband, who sent her away, may not [return and remarry her]."
Halacha 13
If she engaged in promiscuous relations with another man while she was divorced, she is permitted to remarry her husband, for it is written [Deuteronomy 24:2]: "And she departed from his home and went and became another man's [wife]." It is "becom[ing] another man's [wife]" - i.e., being consecrated - which causes her to become forbidden to remarry her [first] husband.
Halacha 14
Included in this prohibition is that every woman who engaged in adulterous relations becomes forbidden to her husband. He is punished by lashes [for engaging in marital relations with her],31as [implied by the inclusion of the phrase] "after she has become tainted" in [Deuteronomy 24:4]: "And [an adulterous woman] has been tainted." There is one exception: the wife of an Israelite32 who was raped.33
Therefore, whenever a woman becomes forbidden to her husband, because she violated his warning against entering into privacy with another man,34 and he engages in relations with her, he is punished by stripes of rebellion.35 If after divorcing his wife [for such reasons], the husband transgresses and remarries her, he must divorce her.
Halacha 15
A deaf-mute may divorce his wife with signals, as explained.36 [If such a woman] went and became consecrated to another deaf-mute [and is then divorced], she is forbidden to be remarried to her first husband. Needless to say, [this applies if her second husband] was a mentally competent individual.
If, however, a woman who had been married to a mentally competent individual and was divorced, married a deaf-mute and was divorced, she is permitted to remarry her first husband.37
Halacha 16
A girl who leaves her husband by virtue of the rite of mi'un is not considered to be divorced by him.38 The laws applying to her relations with her husband whom she rejected are the same as those applying to a man who has never consecrated her. She is permitted to marry his relatives. He is permitted to marry her relatives. Nor is she disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
If she married another man and was divorced or widowed, or she nullified her relationship with him through mi'un, she is permitted to remarry him. Moreover, even if her first husband divorced her [while she was still a minor], remarried her, she then nullified their relationship via mi'un and married another man and was divorced by him, she may remarry her first husband.39
[The rationale is that] whenever a girl leaves a marriage via the rite of mi'un, it is considered as if she had never been divorced via a get, and she may remarry her first husband. [This applies] even if she was once divorced [by this man] before mi'un.
When, by contrast, a man divorces his wife - who is a minor - with a get, she marries another man and then nullifies the marriage through mi'un, she may not remarry her first husband, because although her final marriage was terminated by mi'un, her marriage [to her first husband] was terminated by a divorce.40 Needless to say, this applies if the second husband divorced her or he died.
Similarly, she is forbidden to the father of her first husband, his son and his brothers, as are other divorced women. [This applies despite the fact that] she terminates her marriage to her second husband via mi'un.
Halacha 17
When a girl nullifies her connection to a yavam through mi'un, she remains forbidden to his father, for she appears to be his daughter-in-law, since [that was her status] when his son died. She is, however, permitted to marry [her late husband's] other relatives.41 Thus, although she rejected a potentialyavam with mi'un, she is permitted to marry his brother.
Halacha 18
Whenever a woman is divorced or widowed, she should neither marry nor be consecrated42 until 90 days pass between the day she was divorced or her husband died and the day on which she became consecrated. [This interval was required] to see whether or not she is pregnant, and thus to differentiate between the seed of the first husband and the seed of the second husband.43
Halacha 19
We count [these 90 days] from the day the get is written; [this applies] even when it was written on a conditional basis, or it did not reach the woman until years afterwards. [The rationale is] that from the time [a get] is written, [a woman's husband] no longer enters into privacy with her.44
Halacha 20
[Included] in this decree of our Sages is that even a woman who is not fit to give birth, and even one who was divorced or widowed after merely being consecrated, must wait 90 days. I.e., even a minor, an elderly woman, a barren woman or an aylonit, even a woman whose husband was overseas, sick or imprisoned, and indeed, even a woman who is a virgin despite being consecrated, must wait 90 days.45
Halacha 21
A maidservant who was freed and a non-Jewish woman who was converted are required to wait 90 days [before they marry].46 Even a gentile and his wife who convert together are required to separate for 90 days to differentiate between seed that was conceived in holiness and seed that was not conceived in holiness.
Similarly, although the Torah prescribed only [an interim of] 30 days for her own sake, a yefat to'ar47 must wait 90 days [to marry her captor] for the sake of the definition of her child's [status].48 The 30 [days mentioned by the Torah] are included in the 90-day interim.
Halacha 22
A girl who annuls her marriage through mi'un need not wait [before remarrying]; our Sages' decree applied only to a divorcee. Similarly, a woman who has promiscuous relations need not wait, for she guards herself against becoming pregnant. Similarly, a woman who was raped or seduced need not wait.
Halacha 23
[The following rule applies when] a girl below the age of majority who is not fit to give birth was married under a mistaken conception, discovered that she is forbidden to remain married to her husband and was forced to separate by the court. She need not wait, for this is an unlikely occurrence, and our Sages did not apply their decrees to situations that are out of the ordinary.49
Halacha 24
When, within this 90-day period, [a man] consecrates [a woman who is required to wait], he is placed under a ban of ostracism.50 If he consecrates the woman and then temporarily flees [to a distant country], he is not placed under a ban of ostracism.51 If he consummates the marriage within the 90-day period, the couple are forced to separate until the conclusion of the interval, at which time they are allowed to live together as man and wife.
Halacha 25
Similarly, our Sages decreed that a man should not marry a woman who is pregnant with a child conceived by another man, or a woman who is nursing a child conceived by another man, even though the parentage of the fetus is known.52
[The restriction concerning] a pregnant woman [was instituted,] lest [the other man] harm the fetus during sexual relations, for he is not concerned about his colleague's child. [And the decree concerning] a nursing mother [was instituted], lest the woman's milk spoil and her second husband fail to show concern for restoring her ability to nurse, by providing her with a diet that will remedy her difficulty.
Halacha 26
For how long is the woman considered to be a nursing mother? For twenty-four months.53 This does not include the day the child was born, nor the day the woman becomes consecrated.
Halacha 27
Just as it is forbidden to marry such a woman, it is forbidden to consecrate her until this time period passes. Even if [a woman] gives her child to a nursemaid or weans him during these 24 months, she should not marry.54 If her son dies, she is permitted to marry. We do not fear that perhaps she will kill [her son for this reason].
Halacha 28
If a man transgresses and marries a pregnant or nursing woman during this period, he should divorce her,55 even if he is a priest.56 If the man is an Israelite, he may remarry her after the 24 months of nursing pass.
If [a man] marries [such a woman] and then flees and returns after [the prescribed] period and lives together with his wife, there is no difficulty.
[A man who] consecrates a pregnant or nursing woman is not forced to divorce her.57 He may not, however, consummate the marriage until the nursing period passes or until the child dies.
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., even though a father has the right to consecrate his daughter before she reaches majority and arrange for her marriage, "it is not proper for him to act in this manner." Instead, our Sages enjoined that a person should not consecrate his daughter while she is a minor until she matures and says, "I would like [to marry] so and so" (Hilchot Ishut 3:19). Similarly, from the husband's point of view, he should not marry a girl until she is mature, lest she change her mind afterwards (Tosafot, Kiddushin 41a).
2.
Our Sages ordained that an orphan girl below the age of majority could be married, so that someone would care for her and protect her. With regard to such a marriage, the Rambam writes in Hilchot Ishut 4:8: "The consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushinare finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term. There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mi'un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce."
3.
In which instance, the marriage is binding according to Scriptural law and cannot be annulled through mi'un.
4.
Once a girl is married, her father no longer has any authority over her, even though he is alive (Hilchot Ishut 3:12).
5.
In the instance of a minor, her right to annul the marriage lasts only until she reaches majority. With regard to a deaf-mute, by contrast, there would be no limit to this privilege. This would be regarded unfavorably by a husband (Yevamot 113a).
6.
I.e., if her husband dies without children and she does not desire to marry the yavam, she can dissolve the marriage by mi'un.
7.
Although a girl has the right to marry and dissolve her marriage as often as she desires, our Rabbis did not approve of such conduct and counselled that the Jewish court should arrange a marriage of a minor only when it does not appear likely that she will seek to dissolve the marriage (Hagahot Maimoniot).
8.
I.e., when she becomes twelve years old and manifests physical signs of maturity, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 2:3.
9.
A woman who does not manifest any female physical characteristics. If she shows clear signs of such a condition, she is placed in this category at age 20. If she does not show such signs, but also does not manifest signs of female physical maturity, she is not placed into this category until age 35 (Ibid.:4).
10.
That a girl can annul her marriage despite the fact that she has passed the age of twelve, when she has not manifested female physical characteristics.
11.
Hilchot Ishut 1:2.
12.
I.e., our ordinary assumption is that a woman has manifested signs of maturity. Therefore, if a woman wants to annul the marriage after she reaches the age of twelve, she must undergo a physical inspection to show that she has not manifested signs of physical maturity. If no signs are discovered, and she has not engaged in relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve, she may exercise the right of mi'un.
13.
In which no signs of physical maturity were discovered.
14.
Since no signs of physical maturity were discovered, it is possible that the girl is still a minor and that the annulment of her first marriage - and thus her subsequent consecration - is acceptable. But it is also possible that, as mentioned in the previous halachah, pubic hairs grew and fell off, and that through engaging in marital relations she had been consecrated by her first husband. Because of the doubt involved, she must be divorced by both men.
15.
Since it is possible that her first marriage is binding, the legitimacy of a child fathered by her second husband is in doubt. And conversely, since it is possible that the marriage to her second husband is binding, there are also doubts concerning the legitimacy of a child fathered afterwards by the first husband.
16.
I.e., even if she had not yet been divorced by her first husband. Since the second man's consecration has the power of Scriptural law, it takes priority.
17.
Which is forbidden, as stated in Halachah 12.
18.
The resemblance is that the woman married a second husband before her marriage with the first was severed.
19.
Because her marriage to her first husband is not binding according to Scriptural law.
20.
For her second marriage is binding according to Scriptural law.
21.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 155:2) quotes opinions that maintain that the above applies only when the girl's marriage was arranged by her brother or her mother. If she arranged the marriage herself, it is not binding, even according to Rabbinic law. The Ra'avad mentions a third opinion, which states that for a girl between the ages of six and ten, the marriage must be arranged by her family to be binding. After the age of ten, it is binding even if she arranged it herself.
22.
Our translation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 13:2), which explains that this refers to an instance in which a girl's family members prepared her for marriage without informing her who her groom would be.
23.
Rabbenu Chanan'el and other authorities maintain that, a priori, three individuals should be present. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:4) mentions this opinion, the Rambam's view appears to be favored.
24.
I.e., a deed of mi'un is merely a legal record. The act of mi'un - i.e., the girl's statement that she no longer desires to live with her husband - is what nullifies their marriage. In contrast, it is the transfer of the get, the bill of divorce, that causes the divorce to take effect.
25.
Yevamot 107b-108a relates that originally, the Sages would have a legal record of mi'unwritten using wording that somewhat resembled a bill of divorce. They saw, however, that this created the impression that the husband was forbidden to marry the girl's close relatives. Since this is not the case, as mentioned in Halachah 16, they altered the wording used for the legal record.
26.
Our additions are made on the basis of theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:8). We assume that the other witnesses were aware of the law and would have objected to the girl's making such statements if they did not know her identity and that of her husband. (See a parallel in Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:29. Note, however, the Beit Shmuel 155:11 who differs.)
27.
I.e., from the creation or from the beginning of Alexander the Great's rule, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 27.
28.
I.e., she was checked by women on whom the court can rely, as stated in Hilchot Ishut2:20.
29.
Needless to say, the Rambam is not speaking about an instance in which the woman is still married to her second husband. That would be adultery, a sin punishable by execution. Rather, this applies even if the first husband remarries his wife after she is divorced by her second husband.
The husband is punished by lashes only if he both remarries her and engages in sexual relations with her. Neither act alone incurs that punishment (Kiddushin 78a).
30.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 356) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 580) count this as one of the Torah's 613 commandments.
31.
Note the Kessef Mishneh, which cites an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's statements here and those inHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 1:22 and Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 19, from which it would appear that a man is not punished by lashes for engaging in relations with his wife in such a situation.
32.
But not a priest. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah18:27.)
33.
Or who engaged in adulterous relations unwittingly. (See Hilchot Ishut 24:19.)
34.
I.e., a sotah.
35.
Stripes of rebellion is the punishment given for the violation of a Rabbinic injunction. It refers to a less form of corporal punishment than lashes.
The husband is prohibited from engaging in relations with such a wife because it is possible that he will violate a prohibition of Scriptural law. Nevertheless, since it has not been definitely established that his wife committed adultery, he is not punished by lashes (Maggid Mishneh).
36.
Chapter 2, Halachah 17. This applies only when the person was a deaf-mute when he originally consecrated his wife.
37.
Since the marriage to the deaf-mute is not binding according to Scriptural law, it is as if she had never married a second husband. Based on a difference in the version of the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 14:1) that was available to him, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling.
38.
Divorce nullifies a marriage from the time of divorce onward. Mi'un, by contrast, voids the marriage entirely, causing it to be considered as if it had never taken place.
39.
The mi'un that terminated the second marriage reveals that the first marriage was not binding according to Scriptural law, and that a get was not actually required. (See Rashi, Yevamot 108a.)
40.
Yevamot 108b explains that she is not permitted to remarry her first husband because we are afraid that he will change his mind and influence her to nullify her marriage to her second husband via mi'un. We suspect that she will be able to be influenced by him, because she still is attracted to him - for it was he who divorced her, not she who nullified the marriage through mi'un. In the first instance, we do not harbor such suspicions, for it was she who rejected her first husband, nullifying the marriage through mi'un.
41.
The Rashba and the Ramban differ, and maintain that the woman is forbidden to the other relatives of the deceased, with the exception of his brothers. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:11) mentions both opinions, but favors that of the Rambam.
42.
She may, however, become engaged to be married during this time, provided she does not enter into privacy with her fiance (Ramah, Even HaEzer 13:1).
43.
The laws governing forbidden marital relationships revolve around paternal relationships, as do the laws of yibbum. For these reasons, it is very important to determine who in fact is the father of a child.
44.
And thus it is impossible that he be the father of the woman's child. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 5; Chapter 8, Halachah 2.)
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 13:1) differs and quotes Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the counting should begin from the day theget reached the woman for whom it was intended.
45.
Yevamot 42b explains that this decree was applied universally lest people begin to search for loopholes.
46.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:5) interpret this to be referring to a woman who was married as a non-Jew, and not one who was unmarried. Note the Radbaz (Vol. I, Responsa 196), who differs and maintains that this applies even to an unmarried gentile woman.
47.
A female captive who is taken as a wife by her captor, as described in Deuteronomy 21:11 and Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 8.
48.
This refers to the second time the captor has relations with her. It is possible for a child to be conceived during their first sexual encounter, in which instance the child also has the status of a convert.
49.
If, however, the woman was old enough to conceive a child while married to the man with whom relations are forbidden, she is required to wait. For it is necessary to discern if a child was conceived in the forbidden relationship or not.
50.
The Ra'avad states that the intent of the ban of ostracism should be to compel the man to divorce his wife. (See the Ramah, Even HaEzer 13:10, who quotes this opinion.)
51.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that he is advised to flee.
52.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 13:11) mentions that leniency is often shown in instances where a pregnant woman would be likely to engage in sexual relations with the father of the child, or with other men during this interim period, with the hope that marriage will prevent her from unchaste conduct.
53.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:11) states that in a leap year, the extra month should be counted as one of the 24. The Ramah, however, states that, a priori, in such a situation, an additional month should be added to the restriction. (Note Beit Shmuel 13:22.)
54.
Rashi (Ketubot 60b) states that the restriction is upheld lest women be encouraged to take these options rather than continue nursing their children.
If, however, the woman gave her child to a nursemaid in her first husband's lifetime or is physically incapable of nursing, there are no restrictions against her remarrying (Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 13:11).
55.
The Ra'avad states that he is placed under a ban of ostracism until he divorces her. This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 13:12).
56.
Who may not remarry his divorcee.
57.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 13:12) is more stringent and equates consecration with marriage.

Gerushin - Chapter Twelve


Halacha 1
When a woman comes and says, "I was married, and now I am divorced," her word is accepted, because the source for the statements [on which basis the woman was] forbidden [states that she is] permitted.1
If the prevailing assumption is that a woman was married,2 and she comes and says, "My husband divorced me," her word is not accepted [as a basis] for her to be allowed to be remarried.3 She has, however, disqualified herself [from marrying into] the priesthood forever.4If her husband dies [childless], we suspect that there might have been truth to her words, and she performs the rite of chalitzah, rather than the rite of yibbum.5
Halacha 2
When a woman has two witnesses who state that she has been divorced, she is permitted to marry a priori, although she does not possess her get. If she produces a get that was in her possession and says: "My husband divorced me with this," her word is accepted, and she is permitted to marry, even though [the signatures of the witnesses to the get] have not been verified as we have explained.6
Halacha 3
[The following laws apply] when the husband comes and protests. If he states, "I never gave it to her. It fell from me and she found it," his statements are not accepted, because he admits that he wrote it for her sake, and it is now in her possession. If, however, the husband says: "[The get] was given conditionally," "It was entrusted to her for safekeeping," or "I never wrote such [a document]; it is a forgery,"7 [the woman] must have the signatures of the witnesses verified or have the witnesses to its transfer testify, as explained.8
If the signatures of the witnesses are not verified, she is not considered to be divorced with regard to the right to marry others. She has, however, disqualified herself [from marrying into] the priesthood, as stated.9 For she has disqualified herself by virtue of her own statements and caused herself to be considered as a forbidden object.10
Halacha 4
If she comes together with her husband and says, "My husband divorced me, but I lost my get," and the husband says, "I did not divorce her," her word is accepted, even though it has been assumed that she is his wife. [The rationale is:] it can be assumed that a woman would not make such brazen statements in the presence of her husband [if they were not true].11
Halacha 5
If a husband says: "I divorced my wife," his word is not accepted. Nevertheless, we suspect that it might be true, and therefore, the woman is considered to be one whose divorce is of doubtful status.12 Even when the woman also admits that she was divorced, his word is not accepted.
We fear that he is seeking to create difficulties for her,13 or that he divorced her with a get that was void, and she is not aware of the fact, or perhaps she will brazenly [state that she has been divorced, although that is not the case,] because he accepts her word, or because she is not aware of the seriousness of the prohibition. Therefore, we tell the husband: "If it is true [that you divorced her,] you are both here, divorce her again in our presence."
Halacha 6
When two [individuals] say [that a woman] was divorced, and two others say14 [that] she was not divorced, she is still presumed to be married. [This ruling applies] even if her husband is present, and she tells him, "You divorced me." Since the witnesses support her, it is possible that she will speak brazenly [to her husband]. Therefore, if she remarries [in such a situation], she is compelled to leave [her second husband], and a child [born to them] is considered illegitimate.
Halacha 7
When does the above apply? When the witnesses say: "She was divorced in the immediate past." For in such a situation, we tell her, "If it is true that you were divorced, produce your get."
If, however, the witnesses say: "She was divorced several days ago," there is the possibility that the get was lost. [Therefore, different laws apply.] Since she claims that she was definitely divorced, and two witnesses support her claim, although there are two witnesses who deny it, if she marries one of the witnesses, she is not compelled to leave [her second husband]. [The rationale is] that she and her husband, [the witness,] certainly know whether she is permitted [or not], and we assume that they would not create difficulties for themselves.15
Accordingly, [different rules apply] if she marries another person. Since he cannot be certain concerning the matter - and similarly, if she herself is uncertain about the matter, even if she marries one of her witnesses - she should be compelled to leave [her second husband]. The legitimacy of a child born to them is a matter of question.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when] two [individuals] say, "We saw that she was divorced," and two others say, "We did not see this." If they all lived in a single courtyard,16 she should not marry.17 If, however, she marries, she need not leave [her second husband], and we do not doubt the legitimacy of a child born to them. [The rationale is that] people often divorce in privacy.
Halacha 9
[The following rule applies when] we there is no existing presumption that a woman was married, one witness comes and says, "She was married, but divorced," and another witness states, "She was not divorced." Since they both are testifying that she was married, and [only] one witness says she was divorced, she should not marry [a second man]. [The rationale is that] the statements of one [witness] are of no consequence [when they must counteract a definition of status established] on the basis of the testimony of two [witnesses].18 If she remarries, she should be compelled to leave [her second husband].
Halacha 10
[The following ruling is rendered when] a woman and two men come from another country. One [of the men] says: "This is my wife, and this is my servant," the other says: "This is my wife, and this is my servant," and the woman says: "They are both my servants." The woman is free to marry anyone. For although two witnesses testified to her being married, since each one of them gave testimony that concerns himself, their statements are not accepted.
Halacha 11
When an agent charged by the woman with receiving her get takes out a getthat was in his possession, and the husband states that the get is a forgery, the authenticity of the get should be verified via the signatures of the witnesses, or via the witnesses who observed the transfer, as we have explained.19
If the husband says: "I gave him [the get] for safekeeping," and the agent says, "He gave it to me for the sake of divorce," the agent's word is accepted.20 A similar rule applies if the woman is in possession of the get21and she says, "This agent gave it to me," the agent corroborates her statements and says that it was given to him by the husband for the purpose of divorce. The agent's word is accepted,22 even if the husband protests that he gave it to him for safekeeping, and the woman is considered to be divorced.
Halacha 12
When the get is lost,23 [more stringent rules apply]. Even if the husband says that he gave it to an agent24 for the sake of divorce, and the agent says that he gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is a matter of question.25For our prevailing assumption is that the woman is married, and it is only [the statements of] one witness26 and her husband [who are contradicting that].
Even if the woman herself says, "In my presence, [my husband] gave the getto the agent for the purpose of divorce, and he divorced me," [the ruling remains unchanged]. Since her husband and the agent support her, it is possible that she will speak brazenly27 and in fact, she was not divorced.
Halacha 13
[The following rule applies when] an agent appointed by the woman to receive her get receives it from [her husband] and sends it to her, [giving it to an agent to give to her] in the presence of two witnesses. Although the woman does not know whether [the get] was sent to her by her husband, her agent or her husband's agent, she is divorced, as has been explained.28
Halacha 14
[In the above situation,] if the husband comes and protests that he did not write [the get], or that the get is void, the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified. [This is sufficient to counter the husband's protest, the rationale being that] there are witnesses that [the get] was in the possession of the agent of the woman, and his aegis is considered to be equivalent to her own.29 Although she did not know [the purpose for which the get was given to the original agent], the witnesses knew.
If, however, the signatures [of the witnesses] cannot be verified, the divorce is not effective.
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] the prevailing presumption is that a woman is married, and she and her husband travel overseas at a time when their relationship is peaceful, and peace abides in the world at large.30 If she comes and says, "My husband died," her word is accepted and she is granted permission to marry or to perform the rite of yibbum on this basis.
[The rationale is that] we assume that a woman will not bring difficulties upon herself, causing herself to be forbidden to both her first and her second husbands, causing herself to lose the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from both husbands and causing her children to be deemed illegitimate when the matter is likely to become openly revealed, and when she will not be able to deny the matter or offer any argument in her defense. For if her husband is alive, he will ultimately return, or [at least,] it will become known that he is alive.
Similarly, if one witness comes and testifies that the woman's husband died, she is granted permission to marry by virtue of his testimony, because [the truth of] the matter will ultimately be revealed.31 Similarly, the testimony of a servant, a woman, a maid-servant or a witness testifying on the basis of statements he heard from others is accepted regarding a person's death.32On the basis of such testimony, the man's wife is granted permission to remarry or perform the rite of yibbum.
Halacha 16
Any person who offers testimony is believed with regard to matters of this nature, with the exception of five women, who are presumed to hate each other. Their testimony is not [accepted] with regard to the death of the other's husband,33 lest they intend to cause her to be forbidden to him, although he is still alive.34They are the woman's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law,35[her husband's] other wife, her yevamah,36 her husband's daughter [from another marriage].37
[Indeed, with regard to such testimony,] a gentile's statements delivered in the course of conversation are accepted and can serve as the basis for a woman to remarry, as will be explained.38 If the gentile makes his statements with the intent that they serve as testimony, his word is not accepted.
Halacha 17
Similar laws apply to a person who is disqualified [from serving as a witness] by Scriptural law, because of the commission of a sin.39 If he comes to give testimony on behalf of a woman, [saying] that her husband died, his word is not accepted.40 If he makes these statements in the course of conversation, his word is accepted, for he is not regarded as less than a gentile.
A person who is disqualified [from serving as a witness] by Rabbinic law,41 by contrast, may give testimony regarding [the death of] a woman's [husband].42
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply if] one witness came and testified that a woman's husband has died, and she was granted permission to remarry on the basis of his testimony, and afterwards another witness came and contradicted the testimony of the first, saying that he did not die. The woman's status is not changed, and she is still permitted to remarry.43
[The rationale is that] the testimony of one witness is accepted with regard to [the death of] a woman's [husband] in the same way as is the testimony of two witnesses with regard to other matters. [This testimony is being challenged by the testimony of one witness,] and the words of one witness are not considered when there is [testimony from] two [witnesses].44
Halacha 19
If two [witnesses] come at the same time,45 one saying "he died," and the other saying, "he did not die," or a woman says, "he died," and another woman says, "he did not die," she should not marry. And if she marries, she should leave her second husband,46 for the matter is one of doubt.47
If, however, she marries the witness who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died,"48 she need not leave her second husband.49 If two witnesses come and say that her first husband did not die, [a more stringent ruling is delivered]. Even though she married, she must leave her second husband.
Halacha 20
When does the above50 apply? When the one witness upon whose testimony [the woman was granted permission to] marry was equivalent to the two witnesses who contradicted his testimony. For example, she married based on the testimony of one man, and two men came and said that her husband did not die. Or she married based on the testimony of one woman or on the basis of her own testimony, and two women or two men who were disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law testified that her husband did not die.
If, however, one acceptable witness says that her husband died, and many51women or men who were disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law testify that her husband did not die, the situation is considered to be equally balanced.52 Thus, if she marries one of the witnesses53 who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband.
Halacha 21
When one woman testifies that [her husband] died, or she herself says that [her husband] died, and afterwards,54 one acceptable witness comes and says that he did not die, [the woman] should not remarry; and if she remarried, she should leave her second husband.
Halacha 22
When one woman says that [a man] did not die, and two women say that he did die, [his wife] may remarry. Similarly, if ten women say that [a man] did not die, and eleven women say that he did die, [his wife] may remarry. For we say, "two [witnesses] are considered as 100," only with regard to acceptable witnesses.55 With regard to witnesses whose testimony would ordinarily be disqualified, by contrast, [the law is that we] follow the majority, whether this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent ruling.
Halacha 23
When two [witnesses] say that [a man] died, and two other witnesses say that he did not die, [his wife] may not remarry. If she has remarried, she should leave [her second husband],56 because the matter is one of doubt.
If she marries one of the witnesses who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband.
Halacha 24
[The following laws apply when] a person has two wives and one of them comes and says, "My husband died." She may marry on the basis of her own testimony, as we have explained.57 Her husband's other wife is forbidden to marry, for one of a man's wives may not testify on behalf of the other.
Even if the woman [who said that her husband died] married first, [the other wife is still forbidden to marry]. We do not say that if her husband had not actually died, she would not cause herself to be forbidden to him. [Instead, we suspect that] perhaps her hatred for the other wife is so great that she desires for them both to become forbidden to him.58
If one says, "My husband died," and her husband's other wife denies this, saying that he did not die, [the wife who testifies that he has died] may remarry. Just as the other wife's testimony does not cause her to be permitted, it does not cause her to be forbidden.
If one says, "[My husband] died," and the other says, "He was killed," they both are granted permission to remarry, for they both are testifying that he is no longer alive.59
FOOTNOTES
1.
She is not contradicting her original statements, but rather adding information, and that information serves as the basis for changing her status. This ruling applies even if she makes her second statement after a significant time has passed since she made her first statement (Maggid Mishneh). Rav Moshe HaCohen objects, maintaining that her second statement must be made directly after her first statement. Although theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 152:6) quotes both opinions, it appears that the Rambam's opinion is favored.
2.
I.e., we do not know for certain that she has been married, but she and her husband have lived together as man and wife. SeeSefer HaKovetz, which notes that the Rambam's wording deviates from his source (Ketubot 2:5), which mentions that witnesses say that the woman was married.
3.
Instead, she is considered to be married to her husband until she brings proof to the contrary. If she remarries, she is forced to leave her second husband (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer152:7). There is a difference of opinion among the authorities regarding whether her second husband is required to give her a formal divorce. (See Beit Shmuel 152:12.)
4.
I.e., should her present husband die, she would not be allowed to marry a priest. (See Halachah 3.)
5.
I.e., we do not accept her statements entirely, and therefore require her to undergo chalitzah. Nevertheless, because there is a possibility that her statements are true, we do not allow her to undergo yibbum, for if she had in fact been divorced, relations with her late husband's brother would be forbidden.
6.
Chapter 7, Halachah 24. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam concerning this issue. Both opinions are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:13-14), but later (loc. cit. 152:9), the Shulchan Aruchmentions only the Rambam's view.
7.
I.e., these two phrases are part of a single claim. This translation is based on manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state ומזוייף, "And it is a forgery." The standard printed version omits the first vav leading to the conclusion that the Rambam is speaking about two claims. This conception is also reflected in the statement of the law in theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 152:10).
8.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 2.
9.
See Halachah 1.
10.
I.e., although we do not accept her statements, we require her to abide by all the stringencies they imply.
11.
There are several qualifications to this principle: First, the woman must make this statement in the presence of her husband. If he is not present, we fear that she will speak brazenly (Hilchot Ishut 4:13). And, as implied by Halachot 6 and 14 of this chapter, if there is one witness who supports the woman's statements, her word is not accepted. We fear that the support the witness gives her will encourage her to lie. Similarly, as reflected in the following halachah, if her husband supports her, her word is not accepted.
In Hilchot Ishut (loc. cit.), the Ra'avad states that the woman's word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive aget if she remarries. She is not given license to remarry, nor may she collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:2) quotes both views. He states, however, that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam's ruling rests is no longer a viable support.
12.
See Chapter 10, Halachah 3.
13.
I.e., that she will remarry and then he will prove that her second marriage is adulterous, in which case she will be bound by all the stringencies stated in Chapter 10, Halachot 4 and 7.
14.
As reflected by Halachah 8, in this instance the testimony of the witnesses must be to the effect that the divorce was not carried out in an adequate manner.
15.
This assumption has sufficient legal power to counterbalance the prevailing assumption that the woman is still married. (See Beit Shmuel 152:5.)
16.
If they do not all live in such proximity, there is no question, and a priori, she is given permission to remarry (Beit Shmuel 152:6).
17.
We assume that if in fact she had been divorced, the matter would have attracted the attention of all those dwelling in the courtyard.
18.
I.e., both the witnesses say that she was married, and only one says that she was divorced. Note the contrast to the parallel situation with regard to kiddushin as mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 9:31.
19.
See Halachah 3. In this respect, there is no difference between the woman's agent and herself.
20.
The Rambam's ruling applies even when the husband, the wife and the agent are all in the same city. Even though one might think that in such an instance, if the husband's intent was to divorce his wife, he would have given the get to her directly and not to an agent, the agent's word is accepted.
There is another opinion in Gittin 64a, which maintains that in the same city, the agent's word is not accepted, and several Rishonimfollow this view. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer141:55), but the Rambam's opinion appears to be favored. The Ramah states that the agent's word is accepted only while he is in possession of the get.
21.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(loc. cit.) appears to favor an opinion that accepts the woman's corroboration of the agent's statement, even when she is not in possession of the get.
22.
I.e., even though the agent is no longer in possession of the get, his word is accepted. Since the woman has the potential to return it to him, it is considered as if it is still in his possession (Beit Shmuel 141:83).
23.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 141:56) states that it applies when there are no witnesses who saw theget in the woman's possession.
24.
This halachah is speaking about an agent who acts on behalf of the husband, giving the get to his wife.
25.
On one hand, there is a legal principle: "One can assume that an agent has carried out his mission," and yet our Sages maintain that this construct should be accepted only with regard to the stringencies it implies (Gittin 64b). As such, with regard to marrying into the priesthood and the like, the woman is considered as if she has been divorced. Nevertheless, she is not given permission to remarry unless she has the signatures of the witnesses to the getverified, or if the witnesses to its transfer testify to that effect.
26.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 32 and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.
27.
See Halachot 4 and 6.
28.
The reference is to Halachah 11. There is a slight difference in this instance, because the original agent is not necessarily making these statements to the court himself. Nevertheless, as long as witnesses saw theget in the possession of the original agent, the statements of the agent who gave theget to the woman are accepted.
29.
As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, there are opinions that maintain that this applies only when the husband, the agent and the woman are located in different cities. If all three are located in the same city, these opinions maintain that the husband's word should be accepted if he states that he gave the agent the get for safekeeping. In this instance, as well, although both views are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:57), the Rambam's view is favored.
Moreover, as mentioned in those notes, the Ramah maintains that if the get is no longer in possession of the agent, his word is not accepted.
30.
As will be explained, different rules apply if the couple is known to quarrel (Chapter 13, Halachah 1), or war prevails throughout the world (Chapter 13, Halachah 2).
31.
As reflected by the Rambam's statements at the conclusion of Chapter 13, it appears that according to Scriptural law, the testimony of one witness is accepted in instances of this nature.
32.
The testimony of such individuals is never accepted according to Scriptural law. The acceptance of such testimony in this instance is a leniency adopted by the Sages so that Jewish women will be able to remarry. (See the conclusion of Chapter 13.)
This halachah begins the discussion of the subject of agunot, women whose husbands are missing and presumed to have died. In previous generations, this was a recurrent difficulty, for business journeys were replete with danger, and moreover, pogroms and persecution were constant threats. Often, men disappeared and were presumed to have died or to have been killed, and yet there was no conclusive proof to that effect. Indeed, a significant amount of the Rabbinic literature of previous generations was devoted to questions of this nature.
In the present age, with the communications revolution and the advent of more highly developed means of identification, these problems have been minimized. But they still arise. After each of Israel's wars, lengthy investigations were necessary before permission to remarry was granted to the wives of the casualties. And when, heaven forbid, there are Jews killed in plane crashes and the like, Rabbis must make careful inquiries based on the principles reflected in the halachot that follow.
33.
See Halachah 24, which states that the testimony of these women is not considered at all, regardless of whether they say that the woman's husband is alive or that he has died.
34.
I.e., we fear that out of hatred, these women will testify that a woman's husband has died so that she will marry another person, and when her first husband returns she will be forced to leave both relationships.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the phrase "although he is still alive" is meant to exclude an instance in which a woman's husband died and she remarried. The five women who share these close family ties with her first husband are not disqualified from giving testimony with regard to the death of her second husband. The implication is that these women's hatred has a specific objective: to cause the woman to be divorced from her husband. Once she is no longer married to him, they no longer harbor such feelings.
The Beit Shmuel 17:13 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger question this ruling on the basis of the Rambam's wording in Chapter 7, Halachah 3, which states: "These are the women who we presume hate each other . . . another woman married to the same man - this applies even if this woman has since remarried." Nevertheless, this halachah can be interpreted to mean that although the other woman has remarried, she wants the woman who was married to her first husband also to be forbidden to him.
35.
Who we assume would identify with her mother. Moreover, the daughter of the mother-in-law may have a personal grudge, because the other woman will enjoy the inheritance of her parents' estate.
36.
I.e., the woman married to her husband's brother, whom her husband would have to marry if his brother died without children. Since it is possible that they will share the same husband, there may be enmity between them.
37.
I.e., she is jealous of the woman who took her mother's place.
Because of the bad feelings that characterize the relationship between these pairs, testimony is also disqualified in the reverse of the above situations. For example, if the husband of the daughter of a woman's husband is missing, the woman may not testify about the matter, although she has no natural reason to hate the other woman.
38.
See Chapter 13, Halachah 11, which explains that when the gentile makes statements casually, relating events that took place, his word is accepted.
39.
This refers to two categories of individuals: a) one who transgresses a prohibition punishable by lashes, and b) one who violates a prohibition of the Torah that involves taking money unjustly. (See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 10.)
40.
We fear that he is able to be bribed to give false testimony.
41.
E.g., a person who takes interest forbidden by Rabbinic law, or a gambler (Hilchot Edut10:3). (See also Hilchot Edut 11:1-5, which mentions other base individuals whose testimony was disqualified.)
42.
Although our Sages disqualified the testimony of such individuals in other instances, they relaxed this restriction in this regard, so that the woman would be granted the opportunity to remarry.
43.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:37) follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the woman should not remarry because of the gossip that might ensue.
44.
Or, as in the case at hand, the testimony of one witness that is considered to be equivalent to that of two.
45.
When the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer17:37) quotes this law, it states that the witness who says that the husband did not die came before the woman was granted license to remarry. See Beit Shmuel 17:110.
46.
In the previous instance, a ruling was already delivered, and the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to detract from that ruling. In this halachah, by contrast, a ruling has not been issued, and one witness has no more halachic power than the other.
47.
See Hilchot Shegagot 8:3, where the Rambam states that the woman and her second husband are obligated to bring the guilt offering sacrificed to bring atonement when one is in doubt of whether or not one committed a transgression.
48.
This is interpreted by most commentaries to mean: "I know that he died." Rashi (Ketubot22b) states that it means: "I know that if he were alive, he would have returned by now," but this interpretation is not accepted by the later authorities.
49.
The rationale for this decision is stated above in Halachah 7. At the outset, however, she should not remarry, not even to this witness (Beit Shmuel 17:113). There are, moreover, significant halachic authorities who rule that she must leave her second husband. Their opinion is also mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but the Rambam's opinion appears to be favored.
50.
I.e., the stringency mentioned at the conclusion of the previous halachah.
51.
I.e., the number is not significant. The same law applies whether two or 200 come.
52.
Thus, she may not marry at all (and if she marries, may not remain married to her second husband unless she marries the witness, as the Rambam continues in Halachah 19). The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:37) emphasize that this applies only when the women or the witnesses who are usually disqualified come before the woman is granted permission to marry. If, however, she is granted permission to marry on the basis of the testimony of an acceptable witness, the testimony of these individuals does not cause that license to be rescinded.
53.
The wording used by the Rambam is slightly confusing, for we are speaking about an instance when only one acceptable witness testifies on her behalf. (See Beit Shmuel17:118.)
54.
According to the Maggid Mishneh, this applies even if the woman was granted license to remarry before the other witness came. This opinion is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:38). If, however, two women testify that a woman's husband has died, and permission is granted for the woman to remarry, the testimony of a single acceptable witness is not sufficient for that license to be revoked (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer17:38).
55.
I.e., if the same situation occurred with regard to acceptable witnesses, the laws stated in the following halachah would apply. With regard to acceptable witnesses, as long as two witnesses dissent, it makes no difference how many witnesses support the other opinion.
56.
This applies even when the woman married after receiving license from a Rabbinic court. If two witnesses come afterwards and testify that her first husband is still alive, we give credence to their statements (Beit Shmuel17:128).
57.
See Halachah 15.
58.
I.e., she is marrying with the intent that the other wife will follow suit and also marry. Then her first husband will return, and they will both become forbidden to him. In describing this sequence, Yevamot 120a recalls Samson's prayer (Judges 16:30): "May I die together with the Philistines" - i.e., she will harm herself in order to harm her rival.
59.
The fact that their testimonies contradict each other is not significant.

---------------------
Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class
• Sunday, Shevat 28, 5776 · 07 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Wednesday Sh'vat 28 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Revi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 135-139.
Tanya: And the like (p. 107)...explained above. (p. 109).
One of the Baal Shem Tov's teachings:
"When you see chamor, a donkey"1 - when you carefully examine your chomer ("materiality"), your body, you will see...
..."your enemy" - meaning, that your chomer hates your Divine soul that longs for G-dliness and the spiritual, and furthermore, you will see that it is...
..."lying under its burden" placed upon it - (the body) by G-d, namely, that it should become refined through Torah and mitzvot; but the body is lazy to fulfill them. It may then occur to you that...
..."you will refrain from helping it" - to enable it to fulfill its mission, and instead you will follow the path of mortification2 of the flesh to break down the body's crass materiality. However, not in this approach will the light of Torah reside. Rather...
..."you must aid it" - purify the body, refine it, but do not break it by mortification.
FOOTNOTES
1. Sh'mot 23:5.
2. There was indeed a method of subordinating the body through afflicting it with ascetic practices, but the Baal Shem Tov rejected this path. He saw the body not as an obstacle to the spirit, something intrinsically evil and ungodly, but as a potential vehicle for the spiritual, a means for the soul to attain heights otherwise inaccessible. The "enemy" is to be transformed into an ally, an instrument. In great measure the Mitzvot employ gross physical matter to fulfill G-d's will, e.g. leather for tefillin thongs, wool for tzitzit, etc.
---------------------
• Daily Thought:
UnApocalypse
This world was not created for some apocalyptic finale; its magnificence was not formed to dissipate into ionized gas. Each thing was formed for the glory of its Maker, who stands forever.
Only the darkness must wind itself to its end, and it must be robbed of the treasures it holds. For the most precious things of this world are held in darkness.
That is why we must struggle with the darkness now and not run from it. All the torment it gives us, all our toil to overcome it, to tame it and to dig out the diamonds it conceals, all is with meaning and purpose.
For each obstacle that meets us on our uphill battle, each was made for the glory of its Maker.
---------------------

No comments:

Post a Comment