Today in Jewish History:
• First Property Purchase in the US by Jewish Congregation (1677)
In 1658, fifteen Jewish families emigrated from South America to (what was to become) the United States. These families were of Sephardic lineage and settled together in Newport, Rhode Island, where they established a Jewish congregation. For many years they held weekly prayer services in private homes.
When the need arose for a Jewish cemetery, the community purchased a piece of land on Wednesday, February 28, 1677.
This was the very first piece of land in the colonies which was owned by a Jewish congregation. In this cemetery are buried many of the early members of this congregation, and it is still maintained by the Jewish community today.
For more about the Newport Jewish community, see entry for the 8th of Elul.
Daily Quote:
The ultimate knowledge is to truly know that You cannot be known.[Maimonides]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Pekudei, 1st Portion Exodus 38:21-39:1 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 38
21These are the numbers of the Mishkan, the Mishkan of the Testimony, which were counted at Moses' command; [this was] the work of the Levites under the direction of Ithamar, the son of Aaron the Kohen. כאאֵ֣לֶּה פְקוּדֵ֤י הַמִּשְׁכָּן֙ מִשְׁכַּ֣ן הָֽעֵדֻ֔ת אֲשֶׁ֥ר פֻּקַּ֖ד עַל־פִּ֣י משֶׁ֑ה עֲבֹדַת֙ הַֽלְוִיִּ֔ם בְּיַד֙ אִֽיתָמָ֔ר בֶּן־אַֽהֲרֹ֖ן הַכֹּהֵֽן:
These are the numbers: In this parsha, all the weights of the donations for the Mishkan were counted -[that] of silver, of gold, and of copper. And all its implements for all its work were [also] counted. אלה פקודי: בפרשה זו נמנו כל משקלי נדבת המשכן, לכסף ולזהב ולנחשת, ונמנו כל כליו לכל עבודתו:
the Mishkan, the Mishkan: Heb. הַמִּשְׁכָּן מִשְׁכַּן [The word מִשְׁכָּן is written] twice. This alludes to the Temple, which was taken as security (מַשְׁכּוֹן) by the two destructions, for Israel’s iniquities [The Temples were taken as a collateral for Israel’s sins. When Israel fully repents, the Third Temple will be built]. -[from Midrash Tanchuma 2, Exod. Rabbah 51:3] המשכן משכן: שני פעמים, רמז למקדש שנתמשכן בשני חורבנין על עונותיהן של ישראל:
the Mishkan of the Testimony: [The Mishkan] was testimony for Israel that the Holy One, blessed is He, forgave them for the incident of the calf, for He caused His Shechinah to rest among them [in the Mishkan]. -[from Midrash Tanchuma 2] משכן העדת: עדות לישראל שויתר להם הקדוש ברוך הוא על מעשה העגל, שהרי השרה שכינתו ביניהם:
the work of the Levites: The numbers [i.e., the accountings] of the Mishkan and its furnishings [which] is the work given over to the Levites in the desert-to carry, to dismantle, and to set up, each person on his burden upon which he is assigned, as is stated in parshath Nasso (Num. 4:24-28, 31-33). עבדת הלוים: פקודי המשכן וכליו היא עבודה המסורה ללוים במדבר, לשאת ולהוריד להקים איש איש למשאו המופקד עליו, כמו שאמרו בפרשת נשא (במדבר ד):
under the direction of Ithamar: He was appointed over them, to deliver to each paternal family the work incumbent upon it. [Each Levite family was assigned a specific job in the sanctuary.] ביד איתמר: הוא היה פקיד עליהם למסור לכל בית אב עבודה שעליו:
22Bezalel, son of Uri, son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah, had made all that the Lord had commanded Moses. כבוּבְצַלְאֵ֛ל בֶּן־אוּרִ֥י בֶן־ח֖וּר לְמַטֵּ֣ה יְהוּדָ֑ה עָשָׂ֕ה אֵ֛ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּ֥ה יְהֹוָ֖ה אֶת־משֶֽׁה:
Bezalel, the son of Uri… had made all that the Lord had commanded Moses: “That Moses had commanded him is not written here, but all that the Lord had commanded Moses,” [meaning that] even [in] things that his master [Moses] had not said to him, his [Bezalel’s] view coincided with what was said to Moses on Sinai. For Moses commanded Bezalel to first make the furnishings and afterwards the Mishkan. (Rashi is not referring to the command to donate [the materials for the Mishkan and its furnishings], since, on the contrary, the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded the opposite in parshath Terumah. [I.e.,] first [God commanded them to make] the furnishings: the table, the menorah, the curtains, and afterwards [He gave] the command to make the planks [i.e., the Mishkan, whereas] the command of our teacher, Moses, may he rest in peace, at the beginning of Vayakhel (Exod. 35:11-19) lists first the Mishkan and its tent, and afterwards the furnishings. Rather, Rashi is referring to the command to the worker, [i.e.,] in what order he should work. You will find in the parsha of Ki Thissa [where God commanded concerning the order of the Mishkan’s construction]: “See, I have called by name Bezalel…” (Exod. 31:2-11), that first the Tent of Meeting is mentioned and afterwards the furnishings. As far as [the command in Terumah] to donate, to prepare what they would require [for the Mishkan and its furnishings], what difference does it make what they donated first? [Thus the order of the furnishings listed there is irrelevant.] See Tosafoth in the chapter entitled הָרוֹאֶה (Ber. 55a): If you ask, how do we know that our teacher, Moses, may he rest in peace, commanded Bezalel to do the opposite [of what God had commanded him? Since it is not found in the text that Moses commanded Bezalel to construct first the furnishings and then the Mishkan], we may reply that it is written in parshath Vayakhel (Exod. 36:2): “And Moses called Bezalel and Oholiab…”. [There] the Torah is very brief in explaining what he [Moses] said to them. From this verse (38:22), which is worded, “all that the Lord commanded Moses,” we see that he [Moses] commanded them in the opposite manner. [Therefore the text here does not state “that Moses had commanded him.”] Study this well.) Bezalel responded, “It is common practice to first make a house and then to put furniture into it.” He said to him, “This is what I heard from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed is He.” Moses said to him [Bezalel], “You were in the shadow of God [בְּצֵל אֵל, which is the meaning of Bezalel’s name. I.e., you are right], for surely that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded me.” And so he did: [Bezalel] first [made] the Mishkan, and afterwards he made the furnishings. -[from Ber. 55a] ובצלאל בן אורי וגו' עשה את כל אשר צוה ה' את משה: אשר צוה משה אין כתיב כאן, אלא כל אשר צוה ה' את משה, אפילו דברים שלא אמר לו רבו, הסכימה דעתו למה שנאמר למשה בסיני, כי משה צוה לבצלאל לעשות תחלה כלים ואחר כך משכן, אמר לו בצלאל מנהג עולם לעשות תחלה בית ואחר כך משים כלים בתוכו. אמר לו כך שמעתי מפי הקב"ה. אמר לו משה בצל אל היית, כי בוודאי כך צוה לי הקב"ה, וכן עשה המשכן תחלה ואחר כך עשה הכלים:
23With him was Oholiab, son of Ahisamach, of the tribe of Dan, a craftsman and master weaver, and an embroiderer in blue, purple, and crimson wool and in linen. כגוְאִתּ֗וֹ אָֽהֳלִיאָ֞ב בֶּן־אֲחִֽיסָמָ֛ךְ לְמַטֵּה־דָ֖ן חָרָ֣שׁ וְחשֵׁ֑ב וְרֹקֵ֗ם בַּתְּכֵ֨לֶת֙ וּבָ֣אַרְגָּמָ֔ן וּבְתוֹלַ֥עַת הַשָּׁנִ֖י וּבַשֵּֽׁשׁ:
24All the gold that had been used for the work in all the work of the Holy the gold of the waving was twenty nine talents, seven hundred and thirty shekels, accord ing to the holy shekel. כדכָּל־הַזָּהָ֗ב הֶֽעָשׂוּי֙ לַמְּלָאכָ֔ה בְּכֹ֖ל מְלֶ֣אכֶת הַקֹּ֑דֶשׁ וַיְהִ֣י | זְהַ֣ב הַתְּנוּפָ֗ה תֵּ֤שַׁע וְעֶשְׂרִים֙ כִּכָּ֔ר וּשְׁבַ֨ע מֵא֧וֹת וּשְׁלשִׁ֛ים שֶׁ֖קֶל בְּשֶׁ֥קֶל הַקֹּֽדֶשׁ:
talents: Heb. כִּכָּר, sixty manehs. The maneh of the Holy was double [the normal maneh]. Hence, the talent [mentioned here] was [i.e., equaled] one hundred twenty [ordinary] manehs [twice the normal talent], and the maneh was twenty-five selas. Thus, a talent of the Holy was three thousand shekels. Therefore, [the text] counted out in detail all the shekels that were less than three thousand, since they did not amount to a talent [and thus they had to be enumerated separately]. -[from Bech. 5a] ככר: ששים מנה, ומנה של קדש כפול היה, הרי הככר מאה ועשרים מנה, והמנה עשרים וחמשה סלעים, הרי ככר של קדש שלושת אלפים שקלים, לפיכך מנה בפרוטרוט כל השקלים שפחותין במנינם משלושת אלפים שאין מגיעין לככר:
25The silver of the community numbers was one hundred talents and one thousand seven hundred and seventy five shekels, according to the holy shekel. כהוְכֶ֛סֶף פְּקוּדֵ֥י הָֽעֵדָ֖ה מְאַ֣ת כִּכָּ֑ר וְאֶ֩לֶף֩ וּשְׁבַ֨ע מֵא֜וֹת וַֽחֲמִשָּׁ֧ה וְשִׁבְעִ֛ים שֶׁ֖קֶל בְּשֶׁ֥קֶל הַקֹּֽדֶשׁ:
26One bekka per head; [that is,] half a shekel according to the holy shekel for each one who goes through the counting, from twenty years old and upward, for six hundred three thousand, five hundred and fifty [people]. כובֶּ֚קַע לַגֻּלְגֹּ֔לֶת מַֽחֲצִ֥ית הַשֶּׁ֖קֶל בְּשֶׁ֣קֶל הַקֹּ֑דֶשׁ לְכֹ֨ל הָֽעֹבֵ֜ר עַל־הַפְּקֻדִ֗ים מִבֶּ֨ן עֶשְׂרִ֤ים שָׁנָה֙ וָמַ֔עְלָה לְשֵֽׁשׁ־מֵא֥וֹת אֶ֨לֶף֙ וּשְׁל֣שֶׁת אֲלָפִ֔ים וַֽחֲמֵ֥שׁ מֵא֖וֹת וַֽחֲמִשִּֽׁים:
bekka: Heb. בֶּקַע, lit., a split. This is the name of the weight of a half-shekel. בקע: הוא שם משקל של מחצית השקל:
for six hundred three thousand, etc.: This is how many the Israelites were. Their number equaled this [too] after the Mishkan was erected, [as appears] in the Book of Numbers [Num. 1:4]. Now too, when they donated to the Mishkan, this is how many they were. The number of the half-shekels of 600,000 [people] equals one hundred talents, each one the equivalent of three thousand shekels. How so? Six hundred thousand halves [of a shekel] equal three hundred thousand wholes, which equal one hundred talents. The [additional] 3,550 halves equal 1,775 shekels. לשש מאות אלף וגו': כך היו ישראל, וכך עלה מניינם אחר שהוקם המשכן בספר במדבר. ואף עתה בנדבת המשכן כך היו. ומנין חצאי השקלים של שש מאות אלף עולה מאת ככר, כל אחד של שלשת אלפים שקלים, כיצד, שש מאות אלף חצאין הרי הן שלש מאות אלף שלמים, הרי מאת ככר, והשלשת אלפים וחמש מאות וחמשים חצאין עולין אלף ושבע מאות וחמשה ושבעים שקלים:
27One hundred talents of the silver were used for casting the sockets of the Holy and the sockets of the dividing curtain; one hundred sockets out of one hundred talents, one talent for each socket. כזוַיְהִ֗י מְאַת֙ כִּכַּ֣ר הַכֶּ֔סֶף לָצֶ֗קֶת אֵ֚ת אַדְנֵ֣י הַקֹּ֔דֶשׁ וְאֵ֖ת אַדְנֵ֣י הַפָּרֹ֑כֶת מְאַ֧ת אֲדָנִ֛ים לִמְאַ֥ת הַכִּכָּ֖ר כִּכָּ֥ר לָאָֽדֶן:
for casting: Heb. לָצֶקֶת, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: לְאַךְתָּכָא, lit., to pour. לצקת: כתרגומו לאתכא:
the sockets of the Holy: [I.e., the sockets] of the planks of the Mishkan, which were forty-eight planks, which had ninety-six sockets, in addition to the four sockets of the dividing curtain, equaling one hundred [were silver]. But for all the rest of the sockets, the Torah prescribed that they be made of copper. את אדני הקדש: של קרשי המשכן, שהם ארבעים ושמנה קרשים ולהם תשעים וששה אדנים, ואדני פרכת ארבעה, הרי מאה, וכל שאר האדנים נחשת כתיב בהם:
28And out of the one thousand seven hundred and seventy five [shekels] he made hooks for the pillars, and he covered their tops and banded them. כחוְאֶת־הָאֶ֜לֶף וּשְׁבַ֤ע הַמֵּאוֹת֙ וַֽחֲמִשָּׁ֣ה וְשִׁבְעִ֔ים עָשָׂ֥ה וָוִ֖ים לָֽעַמּוּדִ֑ים וְצִפָּ֥ה רָֽאשֵׁיהֶ֖ם וְחִשַּׁ֥ק אֹתָֽם:
and he covered their tops: [i.e., the tops] of the pillars with them [i.e., with the remaining shekels], for concerning all of them, it is written: “And he covered their tops, and their bands were silver.” וצפה ראשיהם: של עמודים מהן, שבכולן כתיב וצפה ראשיהם וחשוקיהם כסף:
29The copper of the waving was seventy talents and two thousand four hundred shekels. כטוּנְח֥שֶׁת הַתְּנוּפָ֖ה שִׁבְעִ֣ים כִּכָּ֑ר וְאַלְפַּ֥יִם וְאַרְבַּע־מֵא֖וֹת שָֽׁקֶל:
30From that he made the sockets of the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, the copper altar, the copper grating upon it, and all the implements of the altar, לוַיַּ֣עַשׂ בָּ֗הּ אֶת־אַדְנֵי֙ פֶּ֚תַח אֹ֣הֶל מוֹעֵ֔ד וְאֵת֙ מִזְבַּ֣ח הַנְּח֔שֶׁת וְאֶת־מִכְבַּ֥ר הַנְּח֖שֶׁת אֲשֶׁר־ל֑וֹ וְאֵ֖ת כָּל־כְּלֵ֥י הַמִּזְבֵּֽחַ:
31and the sockets of the courtyard all around and the sockets of the gate to the courtyard, all the pegs of the Mishkan and all the pegs of the courtyard all around. לאוְאֶת־אַדְנֵ֤י הֶֽחָצֵר֙ סָבִ֔יב וְאֶת־אַדְנֵ֖י שַׁ֣עַר הֶֽחָצֵ֑ר וְאֵ֨ת כָּל־יִתְדֹ֧ת הַמִּשְׁכָּ֛ן וְאֶת־כָּל־יִתְדֹ֥ת הֶֽחָצֵ֖ר סָבִֽיב:
Exodus Chapter 39
1And out of the blue, purple, and crimson wool they made the meshwork garments to serve in the Holy, and they made Aaron's holy garments, as the Lord had commanded Moses. אוּמִן־הַתְּכֵ֤לֶת וְהָֽאַרְגָּמָן֙ וְתוֹלַ֣עַת הַשָּׁנִ֔י עָשׂ֥וּ בִגְדֵֽי־שְׂרָ֖ד לְשָׁרֵ֣ת בַּקֹּ֑דֶשׁ וַיַּֽעֲשׂ֞וּ אֶת־בִּגְדֵ֤י הַקֹּ֨דֶשׁ֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר לְאַֽהֲרֹ֔ן כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֛ר צִוָּ֥ה יְהֹוָ֖ה אֶת־משֶֽׁה:
And out of the blue, purple…: [Since] linen is not mentioned here, I conclude from here that these בִגְדֵי-שְׂרָד were not the garments of the kehunah, for in [all] the kohanim’s garments there was linen [used]. Instead I believe they were the garments with which they [the kohanim] covered the holy furnishings at the time they withdrew [these furnishings] to [take on their] journeys, [garments] in which there was no linen. ומן התכלת והארגמן וגו': שש לא נאמר כאן, ומכאן אני אומר, שאין בגדי שרד הללו בגדי כהונה, שבבגדי כהונה היה שש, אלא הם בגדים שמכסים בהם כלי הקדש בשעת סלוק מסעות, שלא היה בהם שש:
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Daily Tehillim: Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
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Verses 97-176
97. O how I love Your Torah! All day it is my discussion.
98. Your commandments make me wiser than my enemies, for they are ever with me.
99. From all my teachers I have gained wisdom, for Your testimonies are my discussion.
100. I will be more perceptive than elders, because I have guarded Your precepts.
101. I have restrained my feet from every evil path, that I might keep Your word.
102. I have not turned away from Your judgments, for You have instructed me.
103. How sweet are Your words to my palate, [sweeter] than honey to my mouth!
104. From Your precepts I gain understanding, therefore I hate every path of falsehood.
105. Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.
106. I have sworn-and I will fulfill it-to keep Your righteous judgments.
107. I am afflicted to the extreme; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your promise.
108. Accept with favor, O Lord, the offerings of my lips, and teach me Your laws.
109. My soul is in danger always, yet I have not forgotten Your Torah.
110. The wicked laid a snare for me, yet I have not strayed from Your precepts.
111. I have taken Your testimonies as an eternal heritage, for they are the joy of my heart.
112. I have inclined my heart to perform Your statutes, forever, to the last.
113. I despise vain thoughts, but I love Your Torah.
114. You are my refuge and my shield; I place hope in Your promise.
115. Turn away from me, you evildoers, and I will keep the commandments of my God.
116. Support me according to Your promise, and I will live; let me not be shamed because of my hope.
117. Sustain me, and I will be saved, and I will be engrossed in Your statutes always.
118. You trample all who stray from Your statutes, for their ploy is a lie.
119. You have purged all the wicked of the earth like dross, therefore I love Your testimonies.
120. My flesh bristles from fear of You, and I am in awe of Your judgments.
121. I practiced justice and righteousness; leave me not to my oppressors.
122. Guarantee Your servant goodness; let not the wicked exploit me.
123. My eyes long for Your salvation, and for the word of Your righteousness.
124. Treat Your servant according to Your kindness, and teach me Your statutes.
125. I am Your servant; grant me understanding, that I may know Your testimonies.
126. It is time to act for the Lord; they have abrogated Your Torah.
127. Therefore I love Your commandments more than gold, even fine gold.
128. Therefore I affirmed all Your precepts; I have hated every path of falsehood.
129. Your testimonies are wondrous, therefore does my soul guard them.
130. Your opening words illuminate, enlightening the simple.
131. I opened my mouth and swallowed, because I craved Your commandments.
132. Turn to me and favor me, as is [Your] law for those who love Your Name.
133. Set my steps in Your word, and let no iniquity rule over me.
134. Deliver me from the oppression of man, and I will keep Your precepts.
135. Let Your face shine upon Your servant, and teach me Your statutes.
136. My eyes shed streams of water, because they do not keep Your Torah.
137. Righteous are you, O Lord, and Your judgments are upright.
138. You commanded Your testimonies in righteousness and great faithfulness.
139. My zeal consumes me, because my enemies have forgotten Your words.
140. Your word is very pure, and Your servant cherishes it.
141. I am young and despised, yet I do not forget Your precepts.
142. Your righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and Your Torah is truth.
143. Trouble and anguish have taken hold of me, yet Your commandments are my delight.
144. Your testimonies are righteous forever; give me understanding, that I may live.
145. I call out with all my heart; answer me, O Lord; I will keep Your statutes.
146. I call out to You; save me, and I will observe Your testimonies.
147. I rose before dawn and cried out; my hope is in Your word.
148. My eyes preceded the night watches, that I may discuss Your word.
149. Hear my voice in keeping with Your kindness; O Lord, grant me life as is Your practice.
150. Those who pursue mischief draw near; they are far from Your Torah.
151. You are near, O Lord, and all Your commandments are truth.
152. From the beginning I discerned from Your testimonies that You had established them forever.
153. Behold my affliction and deliver me, for I have not forgotten Your Torah.
154. Wage my battle and redeem me; grant me life for the sake of Your word.
155. Salvation is far from the wicked, for they seek not Your statutes.
156. Your mercies are great, O Lord; grant me life as is Your practice.
157. My pursuers and my enemies are many, yet I did not turn away from Your testimonies.
158. I saw traitors and I quarreled with them, because they do not keep Your words.
159. Behold how I love Your precepts; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your kindness.
160. The beginning of Your word is truth, and forever are all Your righteous judgements.
161. Princes have pursued me without cause, but it is Your word my heart fears.
162. I rejoice at Your word, like one who finds abundant spoil.
163. I hate falsehood and abhor it, but Your Torah I love.
164. Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous judgments.
165. There is abundant peace for those who love Your Torah, and there is no stumbling for them.
166. I hoped for Your salvation, O Lord, and I performed Your commandments.
167. My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them intensely.
168. I have kept Your precepts and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You
169. Let my prayer approach Your presence, O Lord; grant me understanding according to Your word.
170. Let my supplication come before You; save me according to Your promise.
171. My lips will utter praise, for You have taught me Your statutes.
172. My tongue will echo Your word, for all Your commandments are just.
173. Let Your hand be ready to help me, for I have chosen Your precepts.
174. I long for Your salvation, O Lord, and Your Torah is my delight.
175. Let my soul live, and it will praise You, and let Your judgment help me.
176. I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out Your servant, for I have not forgotten Your commandments.
• Sunday, Adar I 26, 5776 · March 6, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 32
ומה שכתוב בגמרא שמי שרואה בחבירו שחטא, מצוה לשנאותו, וגם לומר לרבו שישנאהו
As for the Talmudic statement 1 that if one sees his friend sinning, he should hate him, and should also relate the fact to his teacher so that he too will hate him, — how does this conform with what was said above?
היינו בחבירו בתורה ומצות
This applies only to one’s companion — one’s equal— in the study of Torah and the observance of themitzvot.
The sinner in question is a Torah-observant scholar, but has lapsed in this one instance. In this case his sin is much more severe than usual, since it is written that even the inadvertent misdeeds of a scholar are as grave as deliberate sins. 2 But even this general assumption of the gravity of his conduct is not sufficient cause to hate him, as the Alter Rebbe continues. Yet another condition must first be satisfied:
וכבר קיים בו מצות הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך, עם שאתך בתורה ובמצות, ואף על פי כן לא שב מחטאו, כמו שכתוב בספר חרדים
He has also fulfilled with him — with the sinner — the injunction, 3 “You shall repeatedly rebuke your friend.” The word used here for “your friend” (עמיתך) also indicates, as the Talmud points out4 עם שאתך - “him who is on a par with you in the Torah and the mitzvot,” as it is written in Sefer Charedim.
At this point there is no need to exaggerate the gravity of his sin: it is clearly a deliberate transgression.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Cf. Pesachim 113b. |
| 2. | From a note by the Rebbe. Apparently, the Rebbe is addressing the difficulty inherent in the requirement to hate a pious and scholarly Jew who lapses on occasion, but to love one who is far removed from study and observance of the Torah. The reason for this differentiation cannot be, says the Rebbe, that one might learn from the lapses of the pious Jew, who is on a level similar to one's own, but is less likely to learn from the behavior of the non-observant Jew, who in any case lives differently in general. The Rebbe rejects this on several grounds: (1) If the requirement to hate the sinner were based in the fear that one might come to learn from him, then this hatred should be directed at a sinner who is in contact with oneself at any level, not necessarily one's peer in Torah observance or scholarship. (2) To avoid imitation of the sinner, it would be enough to keep one's distance from him; why the need to hate him? (3) The whole concept that someone is to be hated, not because of something hateful about him, but to protect the hater, is most difficult to accept. Chassidut requires one to actually suffer harm himself if failure to do so might lead to the remote possibility of his harming his fellow. Such a doctrine would certainly not countenance the suggestion of definitely harming one's fellow (by hating him) in order to forestall possibleharm to oneself; and, at that, to forestall a harm that could befall one only if he failed to resist his own evil inclination! Clearly, then, the requirement to hate the sinner is not intended to solve one's own problem of learning from his sinful ways. This problem is in any event solved by the exhortation of the Mishnah, "Do not consort with a rasha" Avot 1:7. The Alter Rebbe's differentiation between one's peer in Torah and Mitzvot and others is thus grounded in the reason given in the text. |
| 3. | Vayikra 19:17. |
| 4. | Shevuot 30a. |
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Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Sunday, Adar I 26, 5776 · March 6, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 94
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
"That which issues from your lips you shall keep and perform"—Deuteronomy 23:24.
We are commanded to carry through that which we pledge to do [or not to do].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Sunday, Adar I 26, 5776 · March 6, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 94
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
"That which issues from your lips you shall keep and perform"—Deuteronomy 23:24.
We are commanded to carry through that which we pledge to do [or not to do].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
Positive Commandment 94
Translated by Berel Bell
The 94th mitzvah is that we are commanded to fulfill every verbal obligation we have taken upon ourselves, whether an oath, a vow, a korban,1 etc.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "You shall be careful to carry out whatever you say."
Although our Sages have split up this verse and explained each word separately as referring to something different, the general meaning of everything they say is: it is a positive commandment for a person to fulfill every verbal obligation he has taken upon himself, and a prohibition not to do so. This will be explained in our discussion of the prohibitions.3
The Sifri says, "The verse, 'Whatever you say,' constitutes a positive commandment." You find it obvious that the words, "whatever you say" by themselves have no meaning whatsoever. The intention [of the Sifri] is therefore as I explained above — that the plain meaning of the verse is that a person is obligated to carry out his verbal commitments.
This commandment is stated a second time in G‑d's statement,4 "A person must fulfill all he has verbally said."
The details of this mitzvah — i.e. how exactly the person must fulfill his obligation, and how he can be released [from his obligation] when in doubt regarding his statement — are explained in a number of passages in Sh'vuos, Nedarim, the end of Menachos, as well as in Kinim.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, a sacrifice. When a person says, "a sacrifice that I won't eat something of yours," he means to say that he considers that person's food to be forbidden for him to eat just as a sacrifice is forbidden to him. This constitutes a vow not to eat that person's food.
2.Deut. 23:24.
3.N157.
4.Num. 30:3.
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• 1 Chapter: Beit Habechirah Beit Habechirah - Chapter 8 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Beit Habechirah - Chapter 8
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Beit Habechirah - Chapter 8
Halacha 1
Halacha 2
The mitzvah of guarding [the Temple] applies throughout the night.3
The priests and Levites shall serve as guards,4 as [Numbers 18:2] states: "And you and your sons [shall be] before the tent of the testimony,"5 i.e., you shall keep watch over it. Also, [ibid. 18:4] states: "And they [the Levites] shall watch over the Tent of Meeting,"6 and [ibid. 3:38] states: "And Moses,7Aharon, and his sons8 shall camp before the Sanctuary towards the east, and they will be the guardians of the holy watch."9
Halacha 3
Anyone who nullifies this watch transgress a negative commandment,10 as [Numbers 18:5] states: "And you shall take care to keep the Holy Watch." Any form of the verb, shemar, "take care," implies a warning against transgressing a negative command.11
Thus, guarding [the Temple fulfills] a positive command and nullifying its watch [represents the violation of] a negative command.
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
Where did they keep watch? The priests kept watch in the Chamber of Avtinas, the Chamber of the Spark, and the Chamber of the Hearth.16
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
Halacha 8
Where would the Levites stand watch?35
Inside the five gates to the Temple Mount;36
At its four corners [of the wall surrounding the Temple Mount] from the inside;
At the outside of four corners of the Temple Courtyard, for it is forbidden to sit in the Temple Courtyard;37
At the outside of five [of the seven] gates to the Temple Courtyard, for the priests stood watch at [the remaining two gates], the Chamber of the Hearth and the Gate of the Spark;38
a total of eighteen locations.
Halacha 9
Halacha 10
An overseer was appointed over all the watches of guards. He was called: "The officer of the Temple Mount."42
Throughout the night, he checked on all the watches. Torches were lit before him.43 If a guard did not stand before him and greet him: "Peace be unto you, officer of the Temple Mount," he would assume that he was sleeping, and would strike him with his staff.44 He was even granted permission to burn [a sleeping guard's] clothing.45
Thus, it was commonly said in Jerusalem: "What is the noise in the Temple Courtyard [at night]? It must be the voice of a Levite being beaten and his clothes burned because he slept on his watch."46
Halacha 11
In the morning, shortly before dawn,47 the overseer of the Sanctuary48 came49and tapped50 to awaken the priests sleeping in the Chamber of the Hearth.51[When] they opened [the gate] for him, he took the keys52 and opened the small gate leading from the Chamber of the Hearth to the Temple Courtyard.53
[Then] he entered the Courtyard, and the priests followed him. They held two torches of fire in their hands and divided into two groups. One proceeded eastward and the other, westward.54
They walked on, checking the entire Temple Courtyard.55 Both groups [met when they] reached the Chamber of the Bakers of the Chavitin.56 When both groups reached [that point], they declared: "Peace be unto you. Everything is at peace."57 [Afterwards,] they prompted the bakers of the Chavitin to begin their work.58
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 22) and the Sefer HaChinuch(mitzvah 388) list this as one of the 613 commandments.
2.
The Kessef Mishneh mentions another reason for guarding the Temple: to prevent those who are forbidden to enter from entering.
The place where both the Mishnah and the Rambam describe the watch which the priests and the Levites kept over the Temple has aroused the attention of the commentaries: The Mishnah repeats its description of the watch in two places: at the beginning of the tractate of Tamid, which relates the order of the priests' service, and the beginning of the tractate of Middot, which defines the structure of the Temple. The Rambam describes this mitzvah in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah, which describes the construction of the Temple, but not the details of the priests' service.
On this basis, the commentaries explain, we can understand two dimensions implicit in this mitzvah:
a) The priests' responsibility to prevent those forbidden to enter from entering; and
b) The responsibility incumbent on the entire Jewish people to construct and maintain the Temple in the most fitting manner.
Since the presence of guards enhances the glory of the Sanctuary, the mitzvah of guarding the Sanctuary can be seen as an aspect of its very structure. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 13, p. 56-65.
3.
In his commentary to Tamid, the Ra'avad states that the priests and Levites also stood watch during the day. The Minchat Chinuch mentions that view, explaining that the Rambam explained that the reason for the priestly watch was to show deference to the Temple during the day as well. Just as a palace of an earthly king is guarded both at day and at night, so too, it is proper to keep watch over the Temple in this manner.
Nevertheless, the Tifferet Yisrael (Middot1:1) explains that since the priests were involved in the Temple service throughout the entire day, that in itself is a clear sign of honor and respect to the Temple, and no further measures were necessary.
This view is supported by the commentary of the Rabbenu Asher at the beginning of the tractate of Tamid. He explains that the reason for keeping watch over the Temple was to have our attention focused on it at all times. That purpose is surely accomplished by the Temple service, and hence, watchmen are not required then.
Accordingly, it appears that the watch would be maintained until the service in the Temple began, with the removal of the Altar's ashes at dawn. Thus, we can understand the last halachah of this chapter, which deals with the preparation of the Sanctuary for the service of the following day, as describing the final aspects of the nightly watch. SeeLikkutei Sichot, loc. cit.
4.
The places where the priests and Levites kept watch are described in Halachot 4-9.
5.
This verse begins: "And the Lord said to Aaron," thus, indicating the responsibility of Aaron and his sons, the priests, to keep watch over the Sanctuary.
6.
Indicating that the Levites were also charged with that responsibility.
7.
A Levite.
8.
Priests.
9.
Thus, this verse indicates that the task was shared by the Priests and Levites together (Tamid 26a).
16It must be noted that, in order to emphasize the concept he wishes to communicate, the Rambam does not quote the latter verse exactly.
10.
T(Sefer HaMitzvot (negattive commandment 67) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 331) list this as one of the 613 commandments.
11.
See Menachot 36b.
12.
According to the simple meaning "inside" and "outside" refer to the Temple Courtyard. The Levites stood guard outside the Courtyard and the priests, inside. However, the Minchat Chinuch renders "inside" as within a building, and "outside" as in the open.
13.
Tamid 27a explains the derivation of this practice as I Chronicles (26:17-18), which states:
To the east there were six Levites, to the north, four..., to the south, four..., towards Assupin, two and two. At Parber to the west, there were four at the winding stairway and two at the Parber.
Thus, there were a total of twenty-four guard positions. Even though this verse describes the watch over the Sanctuary constructed in David's time, and not the Temple itself, the same basic pattern was followed in the later structure.
14.
As described in the following three Halachot.
Although the above verse specifically mentions Levites, the priests are sometimes (e.g., Ezekiel 44:15) referred to as Levites (Tamid, loc. cit.).
Tamid 26a offers two different explanations why the priests would be placed in three different positions. The first explains that the command to keep watch over the Sanctuary was originally given to Aharon and his sons, a total of three individuals. The second notes that the command to guard the Temple mentions the words "keep watch," three times in the same verse.
15.
As described in Halachot 8 and 9.
16.
See Tamid 1:1, Middot 1:1.
17.
This structure was located on the south side of the Temple Courtyard, adjacent to the Water Gate.
18.
This was the westernmost gate on the northern side of the Temple Courtyard. See Chapter 5, Halachah 4.
19.
The reason why these were two-floor structures can be explained in terms of the Rambam's words above, Chapter 6, Halachah 7. There, the Rambam writes that the roofs and upper floors of the structures in the Temple Courtyard were not consecrated. This is very significant, for were they to have been consecrated, it would have been forbidden for the priests to sit or lie there, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 6.
20.
According to Tamid 27a, the term, "young priests," refers to youth who were too young to participate in the Temple services. According to the Ra'avad, these youth were not even thirteen years of age.
The Mishneh LiMelech rejects that opinion, declaring that this Mitzvah would not be entrusted to children that young. He explains that until the age of twenty, priests were not granted the opportunity to take part in the Temple services. Thus, the "young priests" were youth below that age, but past majority. See also the Minchat Chinuch.
21.
13See Chapter 5, Halachot 10 and 11.
22.
As mentioned above, half of the Chamber of the Hearth was considered consecrated, while half was not. According to the principle that one could not lie or sit in the consecrated areas of the Courtyard, it would appear that only half of the chamber was surrounded by these projections.
23.
13As mentioned in the commentary to Chapter 7, Halachah 4, there were 24 priestly watches. Each served in the Temple for a week, and then another watch was given a chance to serve. There was a set pattern of rotation.
Within these watches, there were further subdivisions. Each weekly watch was broken down into six daily watches for each day of the week. On the Sabbath, all the priests of that watch served together.
24.
Tamid 26b explains that they slept on these protrusions, because it was disrespectful to bring beds into the Temple complex.
25.
The gates to the Temple Courtyard were locked at night.
26.
The Vilna Gaon renders this expression as "in their possession." This change is made on the basis of Middot 1:9, which states that the keys to the Temple Courtyard were kept on a special ring in the Chamber of the Hearth.
27.
From the Rambam's statements, it appears that the priests would be permitted to sleep while on guard duty. This is difficult to accept, for the following reasons:
a) The purpose for posting guards around the Temple was to show respect. That objective is not fulfilled by sleeping.
b) Halachah 10, which quotes Middot 1:2, states that the guards would be punished for sleeping while on duty. Although the Rambam and the Mishnah specifically mention "Levites," it is reasonable to assume that term was used because the majority of the guards were Levites.
For these reasons, the Mishneh LiMelechexplains that all of the guards were not required to remain awake the entire night. Rather, at any particular time, there would be one or two guards awake at each station and the others were permitted to sleep.
28.
This refers to the four priestly garments which an ordinary priest was required to wear while serving in the Temple.
29.
The priests could not place their priestly garments under their heads to serve as pillows, for they were forbidden to derive benefit from them. See Yoma 69a.
In his commentary to Tamid, Chapter 1, Mishnah 1, the Rambam explains that this prohibition was instituted because the priestly garments contained Sha'atnez, a mixture of linen and wool. Hence, though a priest was permitted to use them during the Temple service, once that service was concluded, he was forbidden to do so. See also the Kessef Mishneh.
30.
Leviticus 15:16 explains that a man who has a seminal emission becomes ritually impure. To purify himself, he must immerse his entire body in a mikveh and wait until the end of the day.
31.
Which lead to a natural mikveh positioned under the Temple Courtyard.
32.
As explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 7. This passageway passed below the Courtyard. However, since it opened up to the portion of the Chamber of the Hearth that was not consecrated, there was no prohibition in entering while ritually impure.
33.
There was no prohibition against remaining in the non-consecrated portion of the Chamber of the Hearth. As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 17, a person who has already immersed himself in the mikveh, but must wait for the day to pass before becoming ritually pure, may remain on the Temple Mount and proceed until the Women's Courtyard.
34.
Though there was no prohibition against him remaining in the Chamber of the Hearth, it was proper for him to leave so that no one would think that he was prepared to participate in the Temple services (Tifferet Yisrael, Tamid 1:1).
35.
This halachah is based on Middot 1:1.
36.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 2, for a description of the gates to the Temple Mount.
37.
See the commentary to Halachah 4.
38.
See the commentary to Chapter 5, Halachah 4.
39.
Tifferet Yisrael (Middot 1:1) explains that this refers to the Chamber of the Lambs, one of the four smaller chambers in the Chamber of the Hearth. See Chapter 5, Halachah 10.
40.
This chamber is not mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 17, as one of the chambers within the Temple Courtyard. Similarly, Tifferet Yisrael (op. cit.) states: "I do not know where it was located."
41.
As a sign of respect for the Shechinah.
42.
He was given the keys to all the gates of the Temple complex.
43.
Tifferet Yisrael (Middot 1:2) explains that the torches were not carried before him, but positioned as lights at the guard stations. Although there is no evidence that the Rambam accepts this view, a comparison with the following halachah indicates this possibility.
44.
Chapter 7, Halachah 2, states that it was forbidden to enter the Temple Mount with a staff. Nevertheless, an exception was made to allow "the officer of the Temple Mount" to perform his task (Yeriot Shlomo).
45.
Although generally, one may not destroy things of value (bal tashchit), an exception is made in this case to allow the Temple to be guarded properly.
The "officer of the Temple Mount" could be authorized to destroy private property on the basis of the principle: Hefker Beit Din, Hefker, i.e., a Jewish court may forfeit a person's ownership over an article (Rabbenu Asher, Commentary to Middot1:1).
The Ezrat Kohanim does not accept this explanation because the prohibition against destroying things of value applies even in regard to ownerless articles.
Another possible explanation is that this step is taken for the watchmen's own good. A father or a teacher is allowed to hit a student to shape his character. Similarly, in this instance, "the officer of the Temple Mount" was entitled to burn a watchman's clothing so that he will perform his task more effectively (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 18, p.465).
46.
As mentioned in the commentary to Halachah 6, there is a debate among the Rabbis if the priests were allowed to sleep on their watch or not. Rav Ovadiah of Bartinura (Shekalim 5:1) states that both priests and Levites would be beaten for sleeping. However, the Tosafot Yom Tovargues that this punishment was only administered to Levites.
It would appear that the Rambam subscribes to the latter view. In Hilchot Klei HaMikdash (7:4), he writes: "The officer of the Temple Mount walked around, [checking on] the Levites..."
47.
The Temple services began with the removal of the ashes from the Altar. Generally, this was done at dawn.
The term dawn, alot hashachar, refers to the time before sunrise when the first rays of the sun begin to illuminate the horizon. This is more than an hour before sunrise.
48.
This does not refer to the "officer of the Temple Mount" mentioned above. In Hilchot Temidim U'Musafim 6:1, the Rambam describes this entire procedure a second time. There, he ascribes the waking of the priests to the priest responsible for delegating different sacrificial functions. See also Tamid 26a.
49.
From the chayl.
50.
On the external gate of the Chamber of the Hearth,
51.
As explained in Halachot 5 and 6.
52.
Middot 1:7 mentions that the keys to the Courtyard were hung on a ring in the Chamber of the Hearth. See also the notes to Halachah 5.
53.
Tamid 28a relates that there was a small wicket next to the large gate leading from the Chamber of the Hearth to the Temple Courtyard. The large gate would not be opened until dawn. Therefore, the priests entered through the wicket to prepare the Courtyard for the service of the coming day.
54.
As explained in Chapter 5, the Chamber of the Hearth was positioned on the north side of the Temple Courtyard, slightly beyond the entrance of the Temple building. From this point, one group would proceed westward, towards the western end of the Courtyard. The other group walked towards the east, in the direction of the Gate of Nicanor, the major entrance to the Courtyard. Both groups walked near the walls, so that they would make a complete circuit around the Courtyard.
55.
To make sure all of the sacred utensils were in their proper places.
56.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 17, where this chamber is described.
The Chamber of the Bakers of the Chavitin was located on the southern side of the Courtyard's eastern wall. Thus, the group of priests who turned westward had a much longer route than those who proceeded to the east.
57.
The Ra'avad in his commentary to Tamid28a explains that each group would greet the other in this manner.
58.
The Chavitin was offered each day by the High Priest shortly after the morning sacrifice.
A general question may be asked concerning this and the following halachah: Why did the Rambam include them in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah which describes the construction of the Temple? It would appear more appropriate to mention them in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim, where the laws governing the daily service in the Temple are described. Indeed, we find that these laws are repeated there.
The reason is based on the explanation of Halachah 1. There, the Rambam states that the watch kept over the Temple was an act of deference, enhancing the glory of the Temple. Thus, maintaining that watch is part of the responsibility of the entire Jewish people to construct and maintain the Temple in the most fitting manner.
16A similar principle can be explained in regard to this inspection of the Courtyard. Over and above the need for checking to see that all the sacred utensils were in there appropriate positions, this inspection was an act of deference and honor which enhanced the importance of the Temple (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 18, p. 244-249).
59.
This is the final halachah of Hilchot Beit HaBechirah. There are a total of 7 halachot in the text. The latter figure matches the age of Levi when he passed away. Levi was the ancestor of the priests and the Levites who served in the Temple.
60.
Because it is forbidden to carry a flame on the Sabbath.
61.
The Kessef Mishnah, Tosafot Yom Tov, and other commentaries, question why they were not permitted to carry the torches with them. Although carrying fire is prohibited on the Sabbath, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in origin in the category of shvut. The Rambam states (Hilchot Shabbat 21:27) that all Rabbinic prohibitions of this nature were suspended in the Temple.
Among the explanations offered are: Since it was possible to use candles which were lit before the Sabbath, there is no need to violate even a Rabbinic prohibition. Alternatively, this inspection was carried out in preparation for the service of the entire day to follow and, as above, it was an act of deference to the Temple. Therefore, to emphasize the holiness of the Temple, it was proper that it be carried out without violating any prohibition whatsoever.
The structure of the final chapter of Hilchot Beit HaBechirah can be explained homiletically: It begins with the obligation to guard the Temple at night, and concludes with the preparations for the Temple services at dawn.
As mentioned above (Halachah 2), the commentaries explain that the mitzvah of guarding the Temple was instituted so that the Temple would be prominent in our minds at all times. Thus, during the day, there was no necessity to stand guard, for that purpose was accomplished by the Temple service. However, at night, when there was no service, we were required to keep a watch around the Temple.
The period of exile is often described as night and the advent of the Messianic era, as dawn. By guarding the Temple at night, and studying the laws of its construction during the exile, we will merit the coming of the dawn, the coming of Mashiach.
A similar idea can be seen in the last halachah, which deals with the priests' procedure on the Sabbath. The Sabbath is described as me'ein olam haba'ah, a microcosm of the world to come, and the time of the coming of the Mashiach. On the Sabbath, in the Messianic age, the preparations for the Temple service will be carried out with the light kindled on the Sabbath eve, representing the present age - and before the coming of the Mashiach. Our service at present generates spiritual light. We will use that light to prepare for the sacrifices to be offered in the Third Temple.
May we merit the Messianic redemption and the rebuilding of the Temple speedily, and in our days. 47Then, shall the offering of Judah and Jerusalem be pleasing to God, as in days of old and former years 48 (Malachi 3:4).
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Halacha 1
There are two categories of vows: The first is to forbid oneself [from benefiting] from entities permitted to him;1 e.g., he said: "The produce from this-and-this country is forbidden to me for 30 days" or "...forever." "This type of produce is forbidden to me" or "This produce is forbidden." Regardless of the language in which the prohibition is stated,2 they become forbidden to him, even though there is no oath at all, nor did it mention God's name or a term used to describe Him.3 Concerning this, the Torah [Numbers 30:3] states: "To cause a prohibition to take effect upon his soul," i.e., to cause permitted entities to become forbidden to him. Similarly, such a vow takes effect if he says: "They are forbidden to me." I call this category: "vows involving prohibitions."
Halacha 2
The second category is to obligate himself for a sacrifice that he is not required to bring. For example, he said: "I obligate myself [to bring] a burnt offering," "I obligate myself to bring a peace offering," "...a meal offering," or "This animal is a burnt offering," or "...a peace offering."
When he says: "I obligate myself [to bring]...", this is called a vow.4 When he says: "This is...", it is called a donation.5 Donations and vows are of the same type [of pledges], but [the one making the pledge] is responsible for a vow.6With regard to a donations, by contrast, he is not responsible.7Concerning these the Torah states [Deuteronomy 12:17]: "Your vows which you pledge and your donations...." This category, I refer to as "vows of sanctification."
Halacha 3
The laws concerning the first category and its relevant matters are [the subject] we will discuss in these halachot. The laws concerning vows of sanctification and their particulars will be discussed in their appropriate place in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot.8
Halacha 4
It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for a person to carry out his oath or vow9 whether it be a vow involving prohibitions or a vow of sanctification, as [Deuteronomy 12:23] states: "Heed the utterances of your mouth and do as you vowed." And [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth."10
Halacha 5
When a person forbids himself from partaking of a particular type of food, e.g., he said: "Figs are forbidden to me," "Figs from such-and-such a country are forbidden to me," "These figs are forbidden to me," or the like, if he partakes of any amount of them, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law,11 as [Numbers, Ibid.] states: "He shall not desecrate his word."
There is no minimum measure [for the desecration of] a vow, for by taking a vow [not to partake of] a substance, it is as if one explicitly stated that he would not partake of even the slightest amount.12 If one said: "It is forbidden for me to eat the produce of this-and-this country" or "...to eat these fruit," he does not receive lashes unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion.
Halacha 6
If a person forbade himself from eating figs and grapes - whether in two vows or in one - the two can be combined to make up the measure of an olive-sized portion.13 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
When a person says: "This produce is considered like a sacrifice," or he tells a colleague: "Everything that I partake of with you is a sacrifice,"14 "...like a sacrifice," "or considered like a sacrifice for me," they are forbidden to him. For it is possible that a person will make a vow for a sacrifice and make an animal that is ordinary a sacrifice and thus be forbidden for him.15
Halacha 8
If, however, a person says: "This produce is considered for me...", "This type of produce is considered for me...", "What I will eat with so-and-so will be considered as pig meat," "...as a false deity," "...as nevelot and trefot," or the like, they are permitted and no vow takes effect. [The rationale is that] it is impossible for a person to make something that is not pig meat as pig meat.16
Halacha 9
This is the general principle [that applies] whenever anyone attempts to have permitted entities considered as forbidden entities: If he could have endowed that forbidden entity with its status by taking a vow,17 [the permitted entities] are forbidden. If he cannot endow it with its status by taking a vow,18 [the permitted entities] remain permitted.
Halacha 10
Sin-offerings and guilt-offerings cannot be brought as vows or as donations, as will be explained in the appropriate place.19 Nevertheless, it is possible for a person making a vow to offer them as a result of his vow. For a person who takes a nazirite vow must bring a sin offering,20 and if he becomes impure,21he must bring a guilt offering, as will be stated.22 Accordingly, when one says: "This produce is considered for me like a sin-offering" or "...like a guilt-offering," or he says: "It is a sin-offering" or "It is a guilt-offering," it is forbidden. Needless to say, if he says: "It is a burnt-offering," "...a peace-offering," "...a meal-offering," or "...a thanksgiving-offering," it is forbidden, for all of these offerings can be brought as vows or as donations.23
Halacha 11
Halacha 12
Halacha 13
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like the tithe-sacrifice of an animal,"30 it is forbidden, for the sanctity [of the tithe-sacrifices] is conveyed upon them by mortals.31 If he says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a firstborn,"32it is permitted, for the sanctity [of the firstborn] is not conveyed by mortals.33It cannot be designated [for another sacred purpose] with a vow, as [Leviticus 27:26] states: "A man should not consecrate it."34
Halacha 14
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a devotion offering for Above,"35 it is forbidden, for the devotion offering for Above are [set aside] for improvements within the Temple.36
[A vow takes effect and produce] becomes forbidden although the person did not mention a sacrifice [if he makes any of the following statements]: "[This produce] is considered for me like the donations for the chamber,"37 "...like the daily sacrifices," "...like the storage rooms,"38 "...like the wood,"39 "...like the fire-offerings,"40 "...like the altar," or "...like any of the utensils of the altar," e.g., he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like the altar rakes,"41 "...like the ewers [for the blood of the sacrifices],"42 "...like the altar forks,"43 or the like. [This law also applies] if he says: "This produce] is considered for me like the Temple,"44 "...like Jerusalem."45 [The rationale is that] all of these statements are similar to saying: "[This produce] is considered for me like a sacrifice."
Halacha 15
[When there was] sacrificial meat - even meat from a peace offering whose blood had been poured [on the altar] which is permitted to non-priests - before a person and he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like this meat," it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] he attached [his vow] to the fundamental element of the meat, and that was forbidden.46
[Different rules apply if] the meat was from a firstborn sacrifice. If its blood had not been poured [on the altar], [the produce] is forbidden.47 If it had been poured, it is permitted.
Halacha 16
There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.
What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban. Cherek, cheref, and cherech are all terms referring to a cherem (dedication offering).
Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We follow the language used by people at large in that place and at that time.48
Halacha 17
Just as a person can make a vow forbidding entities to himself with such terms, so, too, if he consecrates an entity with such terms, the entity is consecrated. Nicknames for such terms,49 however, are not binding50whether for vows involving prohibitions or vows involving the consecration of property.
Halacha 18
If a person tells a colleague: "Whatever I eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food," "...will not be kosher," or "...will not be pure,"51 it is as if he told him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be like a sacrifice,"52which is forbidden. Similarly, if he tells him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be an impure [sacrifice]," "...notar," or piggul,"53 it is forbidden.
Halacha 19
When a person tells a colleague: "Not ordinary food will I not eat from your [property]," it is as if he told him:54 "What I will eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food, but instead, like a sacrifice."55
Similarly, if he tells him: "The sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," or "Like a sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden [to eat from his property].56 If, by contrast, he tells him: "The sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," "Like a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "For a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," or "Not a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted in all of these instances.57For all of these expressions do not have any implication other than he is taking an oath by a sacrifice that he will not eat from his [property] and taking an oath on a sacrifice is not binding. Alternatively, [his intent can be interpreted] as taking a vow that he will not partake of a sacrifice with him.
Halacha 20
[If he tells him:] "Ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Like ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat not with you," "Like ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," it is permitted for him [to eat from his property].58
Halacha 21
If, by contrast, he says: "No impure [sacrifices] will I eat from your [property]," "No notar, will I eat from your [property]," or "No piggul will I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden. [The vow takes effect, because] the intent of his statements appears to be: "What I will eat will be piggul or impure. Therefore, I will not eat from your [property]."59
Halacha 22
[If he says:] "By the Temple, I will eat from your [property]," "The Temple, I will eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will eat from your [property]," [the vow is effective,60 and] it is forbidden. "The Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," "Like the Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted.61 For this is like taking an oath by the Temple, that he will not eat from his [property]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 23
When a person tells a colleague, "I am taking a vow from you," his statement implies that he will not speak with him.62 "I am separate from you" implies that he will not do business with him. "I am distant from you" implies that he will not sit within four cubits of him. That same implication is conveyed by telling him: "I am ostracized from you" or "I am banned from you."63
If, however, says "I am taking a vow from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," "I am separate from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," or "I am distant from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he is forbidden to eat from his [property].64 If he eats an olivesized portion [of food] from any of his property, he is liable for lashes for [violating the prohibition]: "He shall not desecrate his word."
Halacha 24
Halacha 25
Halacha 26
If one says: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked..." or "...like the pledges of the upright73 that I will eat from your [property]," or "...if I eat from your property," he is forbidden [to do so], even if he did not make an explicit statement.74
If he said: "Like the vows of the upright," his statement is of no consequence, for the upright do not take vows to prohibit things out of anger. If he says: "I am like the vows of the wicked," and a nazirite was passing before him, he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow.75 If he says: "I am responsible, like the vows of the wicked," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice.76 "Like the vows of the wicked, I will not eat from it,"77 he is liable for an oath.78
Halacha 27
When a person takes a vow by the Torah, i.e., he says: "This produce is considered for me like this,"79 his statements are of no consequence80 and he need not ask a sage to release him from it.81 [An exception is made if] he is a common person so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.82
Halacha 28
Halacha 29
Halacha 30
When a person tells his wife: "You are considered to me as my mother," "...as my sister,"87 "...as orlah," or "...as mixed species in a vineyard,"88 it is as if one says concerning produce: "May it be like pig meat." Just as he is permitted to partake of that produce, as explained,89 so, too, he is permitted [to engage in relations] with his wife.
FOOTNOTES
1.
For the intent of a vow is not to forbid what the Torah has prohibited, and certainly not to permit what the Torah has prohibited (Radbaz).
2.
I.e., it need not be stated in Lashon HaKodesh (Biblical Hebrew).
3.
As stated in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:2, an oath must mention God's name or one of the terms used to describe Him.
4.
I.e., he is personally responsible to bring a sacrifice; there is no set animal designated for that purpose.
5.
I.e., the animal is designated to be offered as a sacrifice; there is no obligation on the person.
6.
I.e., if the animal which he originally intended to be sacrificed is lost, he must provide another one, because he accepted personal responsibility. See Halachot 25 and 26 with regard to the distinction between the two terms.
7.
For it was only the one animal that was designated as a sacrifice.
8.
See Chapters 6 and 9 of those halachot which explain the difference between these types of sacrifices. There are also occasional references to such vows in these halachot. See, for example, Halachah 17 of this chapter.
9.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 575) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
10.
Although there are two different verses which point to the same commandment, they are counted only as one mitzvah. For the verse from Deuteronomy could be interpreted as a reinforcement for the negative commandment mentioned in the following verse and the verse from Numbers can be interpreted as referring only to vows involving prohibitions (Radbaz). In hisHasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban considers these as two separate mitzvot.
11.
As is the punishment prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment.Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 157) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 407) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
12.
As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, were the person to have mentioned "eating" in his vow, we would have interpreted the prohibition as involving an olive-sized portion, the minimum measure for eating that applies with regard to other prohibitions. Since he did not, the implication is that even the slightest amount is forbidden. Compare to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:1.
13.
This does not apply with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:8). Even with regard to vows, it applies only when one uses the expression "eating." The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the law applies only when the two are included in the same oath. Their difference of opinion revolves around the understanding ofSh'vuot 22a.
14.
I.e., the person wants to forbid himself from eating together with his colleague.
15.
Just as a person cannot partake of a sacrifice until it is offered, so, too, he cannot partake of an entity forbidden by a vow. Just as the consecration of a sacrifice comes about because of a person's vow and his vow is what causes the sacrifice to become forbidden, so too, a vow causes an entity to be forbidden.
See Hilchot Meilah 4:9-10 which explains that with regard to the person forbidden by the vow, the article becomes like consecrated property. Hence, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice in atonement if he benefits from the article.
16.
For these substances are inherently forbidden; they do not become prohibited because of man's statements. An animal consecrated as a sacrifice, by contrast, is inherently permitted. It is only man's statements that cause it to become forbidden.
17.
As a person can cause a sacrifice to become forbidden.
The Rambam is explaining a fundamental principle with regard to vows. A vow becomes effective when a person establishes an equation between an entity (e.g., produce) and another entity (e.g., a sacrifice), provided it is possible for him to cause the latter entity to become forbidden on the basis of his vow alone.
18.
I.e., objects which are inherently forbidden.
19.
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:8,Hilchot Shegagot 1:1. These sacrifices are required when a person transgresses a prohibition. If he does not transgress, he may not bring such a sacrifice and if he does transgress, he is compelled to do so. Offering it is not dependent on his vow.
20.
Hilchot Nazirut 6:11; 8:1.
21.
Due to contact with a human corpse (ibid.7:2).
22.
Ibid. 6:11; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:1.
23.
And thus bringing them is obviously dependent on his making a vow.
24.
Challah refers to a portion that must be separated from dough and given to a priest.Terumah refers to a portion of grain that must be separated and given to a priest. Since they may not be eaten by a non-priest, one might think that they could be the subject of a vow. Aaron is mentioned, because he is the progenitor of the priestly family.
25.
A person is required to separate these portions from his dough or grain. Although the amount he gives and the designation of the priest to whom he gives them is dependent on his will, he is obligated to make the gift. The Ra'avad offers a different rationale for this law.
26.
Sacrificial meat that was left after its prescribed time and hence, forbidden to be eaten.
27.
Sacrifices that were offered with the intent that they be eaten at a time when it was forbidden to do so and hence, become forbidden to be eaten.
28.
And is thus forbidden to be eaten.
29.
It is beyond his capacity to make the object concerning which he is taking a vow bound by any of the prohibitions mentioned. Nevertheless, all of these prohibitions involve sacrificial meat and sacrificial meat is forbidden to be eaten before it was offered in a proper way, because of his oath as above. Hence, the vow can take effect.
30.
As Leviticus 27:32 states, a person must bring every tenth animal born to his herd as a tithe offering. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
31.
Although we are required to separate these offerings, the tithing process through which the holiness is conveyed upon the animal is a result of man's actions.
It is possible to differentiate between such offerings and terumah, for even before theterumah was separated, the grain was not permitted to be eaten, because it was tevel. The animals, by contrast, could have been slaughtered, before the tithe was separated (see Radbaz, quoting Rabbenu Asher).
32.
Which is sanctified from birth and offered as a sacrifice.
33.
Instead, it is sanctified from birth.
34.
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham who addresses the following question that was posed to him: The prooftext from Leviticus has been interpreted by the Sifri as teaching that a firstborn may not be consecrated as another sacrifice (see Hilchot Temurah 4:11 where the Rambam quotes this concept). Moreover, although the firstborn is intrinsically holy, it is a mitzvah to consecrate it for that sacrifice (quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Bechorot 1:5), and thus seemingly, the holiness is conveyed upon it by a mortal's actions.
Rav Avraham replies that since the holiness of the firstborn is inherent and it cannot be changed to that of another sacrifice, that is a proof that a vow cannot affect it. With regard to using a first born as the basis for a vow, see also Halachah 15 and notes.
35.
See Hilchot Arachin V'Charamim 6:1 for a description of the nature of this pledge.
36.
And are forbidden to be used for mundane purposes. Thus they represent an entity that was forbidden by man's pledge.
37.
The Hebrew term terumat halishkah refers to the money collected from the half-shekeldonations collected from the Jewish people and used for the communal sacrifices offered in the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2.
38.
I.e., the chambers in the Temple. This and several of the following interpretations are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:3).
39.
For the altar.
40.
I.e., the portions of the sacrifices offered on the Temple altar.
41.
Used to rake the ashes on the altar.
42.
Used to collect the blood from the sacrifices and then pour it on the altar.
43.
Used to move portions of the sacrifices around on the altar's fire, so that they would be consumed by it.
44.
I.e., like the sacrifices offered in the Temple.
45.
Like the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem.
46.
Since fundamentally, before its blood was poured on the altar, the meat was forbidden, that is the factor that we consider. We do not take into consideration the fact that afterwards it became permitted. This ruling is the subject of an unresolved question inNedarim 11b. Hence, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
47.
For then it is forbidden to everyone. Hence one might say that just as his designation of the firstborn causes the meat to be forbidden, making a vow using a firstborn sacrifice as a basis is effective.
This ruling has created difficulty among the commentaries, because in Halachah 13 the Rambam ruled that a firstborn animal cannot be used as the basis of a vow. Similarly, as the Ra'avad points out, the Rambam's ruling does not appear to be consistent with either of the positions mentioned in Nedarim 12b, the source for this halachah. This leads theKessef Mishneh to conclude that there was a printing error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is "[the produce] is permitted." He states that he found an ancient text that reads this way. Similarly, the Yemenite manuscripts of theMishneh Torah read in that manner, omitting the last phrase entirely.
The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham defends the ruling in the existing text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining that there is a difference between a firstborn sacrifice and the meat of a firstborn sacrifice.
48.
For this is representative of the person's intent. Taking this concept further, the RamaYoreh De'ah 207:1) quotes opinions that maintain that this surely applies to vows made in gentile languages. And conversely, he also mentions views that maintain that if someone makes a vow using the wording of our Sages without understanding what he is saying, it does not take effect.
49.
Nedarim 10b gives examples: miknamna, miknachna, and miknasna.
50.
For they are very distant from the original wording [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah207:1)]. Kin'at Eliyahu states that apparently, they also would not have been recognized universally as having the desired intent.
51.
The Rambam states this expression twice: once in Aramaic and once in Lashon HaKodesh.
52.
I.e., the opposite of ordinary food is sacrificial food that is consecrated. Similarly with regard to his statement about impure food, we assume that his intent is an impure sacrifice in which instance, his vow is effective. Although it is possible that his intent is impure terumah (in which instance, his vow would not be binding), we follow the principle (Chapter 2, Halachah 7): Whenever there is a doubt concerning the effectiveness of a vow, we rule stringently (Rabbenu Nissim).
53.
See Halachah 11 for a definition of these terms.
54.
I.e., we interpret his statement as the Rambam explains.
55.
And hence, forbidden to be eaten (Nedarim11b).
56.
Even though none of these expressions is precise, they are still close enough to imply that his intent is that he is forbidding eating with his colleague like a sacrifice is forbidden.
57.
I.e., his oath is not binding, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain.
58.
Because he does not mention a sacrifice in any of these expressions. The Ra'avad mentions that from Nedarim 11a, it would appear that some of these expressions would involve a vow. The Radbaz and theKessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's rulings.
59.
Based on Nedarim 10b, the Lechem Mishneh explains that we offer this interpretation, because we assume that a person will not make statements unnecessarily. Hence, since his statements could be interpreted as implying a vow, we offer such an interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh struggles with the meaning of the Rambam's words and suggests that perhaps an error crept into the text.
60.
For he is forbidding himself from eating with his colleague, like he is forbidden to partake of the Temple's sacrifices.
61.
Concluding with a negative expression implies that this is his intent, as in Halachah 19 (Radbaz). In this instance as well, theKessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's wording.
62.
This and the subsequent statements of this clause do not imply that he is forbidden to partake of the other person's food.
63.
For this restriction applies when a person is under a ban of ostracism (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:4).
The Turei Zahav 206:1 mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that these vows are not effective at all.
64.
He may, however, speak to him (Radbaz).
Although the person does not mention the terms "prohibition" or "sacrifice" in his vow, since his intent is obviously to prohibit himself from benefiting from the other person, that prohibition takes effect. This reflects the principle (Nedarim 3a): "The handles of vows are as vows." The intent is that even a statement that, like a handle to a cup, is merely an auxiliary to a vow is binding like a vow itself. See also a responsum authored by the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which explains that even when the intent of one's statements are not entirely clear, as in the present instance, they may constitute a vow, provided their intent is somewhat clear. This principle is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:1).
65.
From Nedarim 7a, it appears that this expression creates an unresolved question whether the one taking the vow was merely promising not to come within four cubits of the other person or whether he intended to forbid partaking of that person's property. Because of the doubt, he is forbidden to partake of the property, but is not given lashes.
66.
The term the Rambam uses relates to the Hebrew words na and nad which mean "wander" and "roam." Nevertheless,Nedarim 7a states that all authorities agree that this expression creates a binding commitment.
67.
Since he does not use the words "eat" or "partake," we assume that he intended to create a more encompassing prohibition.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the expression means that he is not allowed to partake of his property in his presence. That interpretation is also discussed by theKessef Mishneh.
68.
The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person (Halachah 2). See also Chapter 13, Halachah 25, which states that it is undesirable to make vows.
69.
I.e., he must accept a nazirite vow, bring a burnt offering, and is liable for lashes for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
70.
See Chapter 13, Halachah 23.
71.
The term the Rambam refers to "donations," i.e., animals which the person designates as a sacrifices, but if lost do not create a lien on his person (Halachah 2).
72.
To uphold a nazirite vow and to bring a sacrifice. He is not, however, liable for an oath, because he did not mention an oath in his statements, since the upright do not take oaths casually.
73.
In either case, his statement implies a binding commitment for the wicked make vows and the upright make pledges.
74.
I.e., he did not explicitly attach his vow to a sacrifice. This is another example of "the handles of vows" mentioned above (Radbaz).
75.
Since the nazirite was passing before him, we assume that this was his intent.
76.
This applies even when an animal is not in his sight, for this appears to be his intent (Radbaz).
77.
I.e., a loaf of bread [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:4)].
78.
I.e., if he partakes of the food, he is liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
79.
I.e., a Torah scroll.
80.
For the holiness of a Torah scroll is inherent. It is not established by man's actions.
81.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Sh'vuot, ch. 6, which describe this practice.
82.
I.e., the vow is not binding. Nevertheless, we make it appear that it is and require him to seek to be released for the reason stated by the Rambam. See the parallels in Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13 and Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:4-5.
83.
The Rambam's explanation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:3). With regard to oaths, by contrast, his intent is focused on God's name.
84.
Since he knows what is written in the Torah and is holding it in a reverent manner, we assume that he is not making his statements in vain. Hence, we interpret them as referring to an option for which he would be liable.
85.
Nedarim 8a derives this concept fromEzekiel 3:22-23 which states: "And He said to me: "Arise and go out to the valley and there I will speak to you. I arose and I went out to the valley and there the glory of God was standing." Since God promised to reveal Himself to Ezekiel, He kept his word, appearing even before Ezekiel arrived there.
86.
From Nedarim 8a, it appears that although this statement establishes a binding commitment, it does not have the full power of a vow. The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 213:2) consider this statement as an actual vow.
The Rambam's perspective appears to be that a vow involves making an object forbidden. This instance where the person accepts a commitment upon himself bears a closer resemblance to the obligation incurred when making an oath. Nevertheless, since the person did not employ the wording associated with an oath, it is not binding as an oath. Nonetheless, since a mitzvah is involved, a binding commitment is established.
87.
With whom it is forbidden for him to engage in relations.
88.
Of which it is forbidden to partake. SeeLeviticus 19:23, Deuteronomy 22:9.
89.
Halachot 8-9. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 13.
90.
A man is obligated to give his wife conjugal rights. Hence, he is not allowed to forbid himself from engaging in relations with her. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the vow also involves satisfaction that he could forbid him, it also includes this form of satisfaction.
91.
For he did not forbid relations, but instead, the satisfaction relations bring him. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
Nedarim - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
[The same laws apply] whether one took the vow on his own [volition] or another person states a vow for him and he answers Amen or says something which like Amen implies that he accepts the matter.1
Halacha 2
A person who takes an oath is not forbidden [to partake of] the entity which he forbade to himself until he makes a verbal statement to that effect2 and his statements must match his intent, as we explained with regard to oaths.3
If, by contrast, one intended to take a nazirite vow and instead, vowed to bring a sacrifice, [intended to vow to bring] a sacrifice and instead, took a nazirite [vow], [intended to take] an oath and instead, [took] a vow, [intended to take] a vow and instead, [took] an oath, intended to say "figs" and instead, said "grapes," both are permitted to him.4 There is no vow.
Halacha 3
When a person takes a vow dependent on the intent of others, it is like he took an oath dependent on the intent of others.5 Similarly, if one takes a vow and retracts6 immediately thereafter or someone rebuked him immediately thereafter and he accepted their statement, he is permitted [to use the article mentioned].7 The laws applying to all these matters with regard to vows are the same as those applying to oaths.8
Halacha 4
[The following laws apply when] a person issued a stipulation before he made a vow, saying: "I am retracting from any vow that I will take from now until ten years in the future," "They are nullified," or other similar statements, and then took a vow: If he remembered the stipulation at the time he made the vow, the vow is effective, for by taking the vow, he nullified the stipulation.9 If, however, he did not remember the stipulation until after he made the vow, the vow is nullified10 even if [immediately after taking the vow], he brought the stipulation to mind and maintained it. Although he did not verbalize his retraction at the time [he made the vow], the retraction preceded the vow and he verbalized it beforehand.11 There is an authority who rules stringently and says that he must remember the stipulation immediately thereafter taking the vow.12
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] one made a stipulation [similar to that mentioned above]13 for a year or for ten years and afterwards took a vow, remembering at the time that he took the vow that he had made a stipulation, but forgetting the subject of that stipulation or what it involved. If [when taking the vow], he said:14 "I am acting according to my original intention,"15 his vow is not effective, for he has nullified it. If he does not make such a statement, he has nullified the stipulation and upheld the vow, for, at the time he took the vow, he remembered that there was a stipulation and, nevertheless, took the vow.16
Halacha 6
There are some of the Geonim who maintain that all of these statements are applicable only with regard to vows and not to oaths,17 but there is an authority who maintains that the laws pertaining to vows and oaths are the same in this regard. Thus one may issue a stipulation nullifying an oath [beforehand] in the same manner as was stated with regard to vows.18
Halacha 7
[When a person takes] a vow whose object is not clear,19 we rule stringently.20 If he interprets them, there is room for both leniency and stringency.
What does this imply? If one says: "Let this produce be considered as salted meat and as wine poured as a libation for me," we ask him what his intent was. If he explained himself, saying "My intent was that salted meat refers to sacrificial meat21 and wine poured as a libation refers to libations poured on the Temple altar," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].22 If, however, he says: "My intent was a sacrifice offered to a false deity23 and wine poured as a libation to it," he is permitted.24 If he took the vow without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 8
Similar principles apply when one says: "This produce is considered ascherem (a dedication offering) for me." If [his intent was] a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple, he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].25 If [his intent] was a dedication offering for the priests, he is permitted, because [these offerings] become [the priests'] personal possessions and are not forbidden [to others].26 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 9
[If he states:] "May they be considered like the tithes for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the tithe taken from animals, [it becomes] forbidden, because these are sacrifices that he consecrates through his actions, as we explained.27 [If his intent was] the tithe taken from grain, it is permitted.28 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 10
[If he states:] "May they be considered like terumah for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the money donated for the sacrificial offerings,29 it is forbidden. If his intent was terumah [separated from] the grain heap, it is permitted.30 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 11
When does the above31 apply? In a place where the terms used have these two possible meanings. In a place where the term cherem without any further definition is used only to refer to the dedication offerings for the upkeep of the Temple,32 if he says: "[This produce is considered] as cherem for me," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].33 Similarly, if their custom was to use the term cherem without any further definition to refer only to dedication offerings given the priests, he is permitted. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations, for with regard to vows, we follow the connotations understood by the people in that place in that era.34
Halacha 12
[The ensuing rules apply] in all situations analogous to those exemplified: i.e., situations when a person takes a vow which appears to everyone to involve a prohibition, but he says: "My intent was for this and this specific instance,"35for example, he takes a vow based on a cherem,36but [afterwards] said: "My intent was a sea cherem, i.e., a fishing net,"37 he took a vow based on an offering, but said: "My intent was an offering brought to the king," He told a colleague: "Myself is like a sacrifice for you," and then explained: "My intent was only to forbid him from [benefiting from] a bone38that I set aside so that I could take a vow as a lark," he took a vow that his wife could not benefit from him and then explained that his intent was his first wife whom he had divorced.
[In all the above situations,] if the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].39 If the one who took the vow is a common person, we make it appear to him that it is a vow, yet we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow.40 Whether he is a Torah scholar or a common person, we rebuke him and teach him not to conduct himself in this manner with regard to vows and not to take vows as a lark or a caper.
Halacha 13
Similarly, when a person tells his wife: "You are considered as my mother to me," or he says: "Let this produce be considered as pig meat for me," the vow is not effective, as we explained.41 If the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].42 If the one who took the vow is a common person, he must ask a sage [for the vow to be released]. We make it appear to him that his wife is forbidden to him and that the produce is forbidden,43 but we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow in order that people not act frivolously with regard to vows.44
Halacha 14
Although declaring property ownerless is not a vow,45 it resembles a vow, for the person is forbidden to retract.
What is meant by declaring property ownerless? A person says: "This property is free for everyone"46 to acquire. It applies to both movable property and landed property.
What is the law [applying to property] declared ownerless? Whoever comes first and acquires it,47 becomes the owner. He acquires it as his own and it becomes his. Even the person who declared the property ownerless has the same rights as others with regard to it. If he comes first and acquires it, it becomes his.48
Halacha 15
When a person declares his property ownerless [so that it can be acquired by] the poor, but not by the rich, it is not ownerless.49 He must declare it ownerless for everyone like the produce of the Sabbatical year.
Halacha 16
When a person declares landed property ownerless, whoever comes first and manifests his ownership52 over it acquires it.
According to Scriptural Law, even when a person declares his property ownerless in the presence of one person, it becomes ownerless and one is not required to tithe its produce,53 as will be explained in its place.54 According to Rabbinic decree, however, [property] is not ownerless until one declares as such in the presence of three people so that one can acquire it and two can act as witnesses.
Should one say: "This is ownerless and this," there is an unresolved doubt whether the second entity is ownerless.55 If he said: "...and this is like this" or "...and also this," he has associated the second entity [with the first], and it is definitely ownerless.
Halacha 17
When a person declares his field ownerless and no one else acquires it,56during the first three days, he may retract.57 After these three days, he may not retract unless he comes first and acquires it.58 He is like one acquiring ownerless property.59 [There is no difference] between him and another person.
Halacha 18
When a person says: "This field is declared ownerless for one day," "...for one week," "...for one month," "...for one year," or "...for one seven-year cycle," he may retract before he or another person acquires it.60 Once it is acquired, whether by the person himself or by someone else, he may not retract.
Why does he have the right to retract before it was acquired? Because this is an uncommon matter. [Generally,] a person will not declare [property] ownerless for a limited time.
Halacha 19
When a person comes and watches over ownerless property, looking at it so that another person will not take it, he does not acquire it by looking at it. Instead, he must lift it up if it were movable property61 or manifest ownership over it if it were landed property,62 as purchasers acquire property.63
FOOTNOTES
1.
See the parallels in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:1.
2.
I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions "the expression of her lips," implying that one must express his intent verbally.
3.
Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term "expression" implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one's thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one's thoughts, it is not an "expression" (Kiryat Sefer).
4.
The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them.
5.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:15.
6.
He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 210:3)].
7.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17-18. As mentioned there, the term "immediately thereafter" has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made.
8.
For Numbers 30:3 associates the two together (Kessef Mishneh). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:1).
9.
For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (see Nedarim 23b).
10.
Kiryat Sefer explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: "He shall not desecrate his word," that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect.
11.
Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz.
12.
Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:2) mentions the Rambam's view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority's view. The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it.
As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidrei prayer recited at the beginning of Yom Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De'ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.
13.
In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah211:3)].
14.
In one of his response, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart.
15.
I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement.
16.
I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.
17.
For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God's name must be invoked. (SeeHilchot Sh'vuot 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach.
18.
The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for the nullification of vows rite recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei prayer mention oaths as well as vows.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person's original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague's statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.
19.
I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi,Nedarim 18b).
20.
We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid.). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4.
21.
For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13).
22.
For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9).
23.
For the gentiles would also salt their offerings.
24.
For there is no way, he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9).
25.
For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed.
26.
Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden.
27.
Chapter 1, Halachah 13.
28.
For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people. Moreover, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir who rules that ordinary people may not partake of these tithes, they are not forbidden due to a vow. Instead, it was forbidden to partake of the grain before they were separated and once, they were separated, they remain forbidden (Ritba,Nedarim 18b).
29.
Terumat halishkah in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used.
30.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.
31.
That we explore the person's intention.
32.
Nedarim 18b explains that in the Galilee, it was not common for priests to live. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple.
33.
For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests.
34.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
35.
I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a permitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect.
36.
I.e., he said: "Let this produce be like acherem."
37.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15which employs such a term.
38.
The Hebrew word atzmi means "myself," but it can also mean "my bone." Initially, it was thought that the person's intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was "his bone."
39.
His word can be accepted when he says: "This was my intent." Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5.
40.
I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required.
41.
Chapter 1, Halachah 30.
42.
For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters.
43.
The Rama (loc. cit.) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters.
44.
If the common person was allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.
45.
This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz, Ketzot HaChoshen273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances.
Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one's own ownership over or does it involves transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless.
46.
Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim 7a). See the following halachah.
47.
Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19.
48.
I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).
See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.
49.
This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit.).
50.
I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:13).
51.
Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.
52.
Through a formal kinyan, e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence.
53.
Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 273:7) states that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law.
54.
See Hilchot Terumah 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one's own, not those acquired from ownerless property.
55.
Nedarim 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim273:12).
56.
If, however, another person acquires, it becomes that person's property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh).
57.
According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding.
58.
Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:13).
59.
And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh).
60.
I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz).
61.
Performing the kinyan of hagba'ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective.
62.
Performing the kinyan of chazzakah.
63.
See Hilchot Mechirah 1:3, 3:1.
Nedarim - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
There are four differences between a vow and a sh'vuat bitui:
a) With regard to a sh'vuat bitui, one oath cannot take effect while another is already in effect,1 and with regard to vows, a vow can take effect while another is already in effect.
b) When one attempts to extend the scope of an oath taken previously, he is not liable,2 and with regard to vows, one is.
c) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect only with regard to actions that are left to one's choice,3 while vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice.
d) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect with regard to entity of substance and an entity that is not of substance, 4 while vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance.
Halacha 2
What is meant by the statement that a vow can take effect while another is already in effect? If a person says: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat this loaf [of bread]," [repeats]: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat it," he is liable [to bring a sacrifice] for every oath that he takes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
What is meant by the statement that one who extends the scope of a vow taken previously is liable? He heard his colleague take a vow and said: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter,5 he is forbidden [to partake of] the substance that his colleague deemed forbidden.6 If a third person heard the second person say: "And I am like you," and he also said: "I am like you," [he is also forbidden]. Even if there are one hundred and each one says: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter the statements of the previous one," they are all forbidden.
Halacha 4
Similarly, when one says: "This meat is considered forbidden to me,' and even after several days7 says: "This bread is like this meat," [the prohibition] is extended to the bread and it becomes forbidden. If afterwards, he said: "And this honey is like this bread, and this wine is like this honey," even if he mentions 100 [substances], they are all forbidden.
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when a person's] father or teacher died on a particular day and he took a vow to fast that day8 and [actually] fasted.9 If after years past, he said: "Let this day10 be considered as the day on which my father - or my teacher - died," he is forbidden to eat on that day. For he attached this day [to his existing vow] and caused it to be forbidden as the day which is forbidden for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 6
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice? When a person says: "Matzahis forbidden to me on Pesach night," "Dwelling in a sukkah on that holiday is forbidden to me," or "I am forbidden to take hold of tefillin," they are forbidden to him. If he ate matzah, dwelled in a sukkah, or took tefillin, he is liable for lashes.11 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: "I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat matzah on Pesach night," is obligated to bring a sacrifice.12 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath.13 When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him.14 Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai.
Halacha 8
When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a sh'vuat bitui, [Leviticus 5:4] states: "Whether he will do harm or do good," i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained,15 e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall do everything uttered by his mouth," without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition.
Halacha 9
When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast16 for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained.17 Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur18 falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary.19 Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 10
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance? If one says: "My speech is like a sacrifice for you,"20 he is not forbidden to speak to him, because speech is not an entity of substance. Similarly, if he tells him: "My speech is forbidden to you," it is not like his saying: "my produce is forbidden to you," or "My produce is like a sacrifice for you," in which instance, [the produce] would be forbidden.
Therefore, if a person tells a colleague: "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not speak with you," "...that I will not act on your behalf," or "...that I will not go with you," or he told his wife, "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not be intimate with you," his vow does not take effect in all these instances. For this is as if he is saying: "My speech, going, actions, or intimacy is like a sacrifice, and none [of these are] entities of substance.21
Halacha 11
When, by contrast, a person says: "Let my mouth be forbidden to speak, my hands to act, my feet to walk, and my eyes to sleep," his vow is effective with regard to them.22 Therefore if a person tells a colleague: "My mouth is like a sacrifice with regard to speaking with you, my hands [are so] with regard to acting on your behalf, and my feet [are so] with regard to going with you," he becomes forbidden.
Similarly, one who tells a colleague: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I speak to so-and-so" or "...if I don't speak to so-and-so," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice if he violates this commitment. Similarly, if he took a vow in which he said: "[If] I spoke [to so-and-so, I must bring a sacrifice]" or "[If] I did not speak..." or the like, [he is liable]. For these are not vows in which he accepts prohibitions upon himself23 whose ground rules we are explaining here, but vows of dedication.24
Halacha 12
Although when a person takes a vow concerning entities that are not of substance and forbids them, the vow does not take effect with regard to them, we do not rule that he should act as if they are permitted. [Instead,] since he willingly [took a vow] forbidding them to him, [according to Rabbinic decree]25the vow took effect with regard to them. Although they are not forbidden, we give him an opportunity [to ask for the vow's release] from another vantage point and then release the vow, so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.26
FOOTNOTES
1.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:9-10. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachah 2.
2.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:8-9. The reverse rulings with regard to vows are described in Halachot 3-5.
3.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:14-16. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachot 6-9.
4.
This concept can be explained as follows: As stated in Halachah 6, an oath creates a prohibition on the person taking the oath (thegavra), i.e., the article is essentially permitted, he has accepted a prohibition on himself not to partake of it. Hence, it is not significant whether the article is of substance or not. With regard to vows, by contrast, the article itself (the cheftzah) becomes forbidden. Hence, for that prohibition to take effect, the article must be of substance (Radbaz). See Halachah 10 for an illustration of how this principle is effective with regard to vows.
5.
This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Elecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
6.
I.e., he is extending the scope of his colleague's vow, so that it includes not only his colleague, but he himself.
Here also the concept can be explained according to the above difference. Since an oath involves an obligation on the person taking the oath (gavra), it cannot be extended to include another individual, for each person must take his own oath. With regard to a vow, by contrast, since the prohibition caused by the vow is associated with a substance (cheftzah), another person can also extend the prohibition to himself (Rabbenu Nissim).
7.
In this instance, it is not necessary to make the statement immediately thereafter the first vow. Since the meat is visible before us, one can attach a vow to it. With regard to the previous halachah, by contrast, we are speaking about a subject that cannot be seen. Hence, unless the statements are made immediately after each other, there is no way we can be certain of the meaning of the statement: "And I am like you" (Radbaz).
8.
This is a common practice in many communities.
9.
If, however, he never fasted on that day, he cannot attach another day to this vow (Chazon Yechezkel).
10.
I.e., any given day.
11.
For breaking his vow. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 215:1) mentions a view that maintains that the person should be given corporal punishment for taking such a vow and should be compelled to ask to have the vow released.
12.
For he can fulfill the mitzvah and bring the sacrifice (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 2:2).
13.
I.e., the prohibition involves the gavra, the person himself. It cannot take effect if he is already bound to act otherwise.
14.
I.e., the prohibition involves the cheftzah, the article. Once it is forbidden, it is forbidden to fulfill the mitzvah by partaking of it or using it, for a positive commandment does not supercede a negative commandment. It would be a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression which is a forbidden act (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
15.
Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:16.
16.
Despite the fact that by doing so he negates the mitzvah of taking pleasure in the Sabbath and festivals. The Ra'avad clarifies that the matter is dependent on the wording he used in his oath. If on the Sabbath, he said: "I will fast today," he is forbidden to keep his vow.
17.
In the three preceding halachot.
18.
When it is a mitzvah to eat in preparation for the fast (Rosh HaShanah 9a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 604:1).
19.
In contrast to the Sabbath and festivals where the obligation to eat is of Scriptural origin. This is a general principle in Talmudic Law. There are times when our Sages gave their decrees greater power than Scriptural Law, for Scriptural Law is revered by the people at large and does not require reinforcement. If, by contrast, Rabbinic Law was abrogated in such instances, it might lead people to take leniencies even when uncalled for (see Ta'anis 17b; Kessef Mishneh). The Radbaz explains that if keeping one's vow was allowed to override a Rabbinic decree, then there would be no point in making such decrees. For people could nullify them by taking vows. For example, a person could take a vow to drink ordinary gentile wine.
The Kessef Mishneh also explains that although the obligation to eat on Rosh Chodesh and the day preceding Yom Kippur is also of Rabbinic origin, since our Sages found an allusion to it in the Torah, it is less likely that people will treat it lightly.
20.
I.e., he takes a vow against the other person listening to his speech.
21.
If, however, he states: "The satisfaction that I receive from any of the above is forbidden," his vow is effective, for the satisfaction is considered substantial. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
22.
For these organs are objects of substance (Nedarim 13b).
23.
And apply only to entities of substance.
24.
Which are described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, chs. 6 and 9. See also Chapter 1 where the Rambam makes a distinction between these two types of vows.
25.
See Nedarim 15a. Similarly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:1), the Rambam writes that the prohibition against desecrating one's word applies with regard to these vows. Compare to Chapter 4, Halachah 4.
26.
See Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13.
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Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• "Today's Day"
Sunday, Adar I 26, 5776 · 6 March 2016
Wednesday 26 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayakheil, Revi'i.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: As for the (p. 145)...Sefer Charedim (p. 147).
With three instruments of service - love of G-d, love of Torah and love of Israel - must young students of Torah approach their Avoda in the vineyard of the L-rd of Hosts,1 to bring the hearts of their brothers closer to observing practical mitzvot and to designating regular time for Torah study. They must do this without paying any attention to the affliction of factions. The absolute truth is that the heart of Israel is a wellspring, a source of living waters,2 and there is a "covenant"3 with effort4 and publicity - that they shall never be fruitless.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Yeshayahu 5:7.
2. See Yirmiyahu 2:13.
3. See Tishrei 12, p. 95.
4. To reach the hearts of brother-Jews.---------------------• Daily Thought:
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• "Today's Day"
Sunday, Adar I 26, 5776 · 6 March 2016
Wednesday 26 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayakheil, Revi'i.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: As for the (p. 145)...Sefer Charedim (p. 147).
With three instruments of service - love of G-d, love of Torah and love of Israel - must young students of Torah approach their Avoda in the vineyard of the L-rd of Hosts,1 to bring the hearts of their brothers closer to observing practical mitzvot and to designating regular time for Torah study. They must do this without paying any attention to the affliction of factions. The absolute truth is that the heart of Israel is a wellspring, a source of living waters,2 and there is a "covenant"3 with effort4 and publicity - that they shall never be fruitless.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Yeshayahu 5:7.
2. See Yirmiyahu 2:13.
3. See Tishrei 12, p. 95.
4. To reach the hearts of brother-Jews.---------------------• Daily Thought:
Learning Freedom
Moses first fought the oppressor and only then taught his people to be free.
Today, the oppressor hides behind a smile, a luxury, a social norm. Quite often, your worst oppressor is you yourself.
That is why today we first need to teach people to be free so that they can recognize their oppression.
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