Torah Reading
Beshalach (Shemot/Exodus 13:17 And it came to pass, when Pharaoh had let the people go, that Elohim led them not through the derech of the eretz of the Pelishtim (Philistines), although that was near; for Elohim said, Lest perhaps the people change their mind when they see milchamah, and they return to Mitzrayim;
18 So Elohim led HaAm about, through the derech of the midbar of the Yam Suf; and the Bnei Yisroel went up out of Eretz Mitzrayim ready for battle.
19 And Moshe took the atzmot Yosef with him; for Yosef had made the Bnei Yisroel swear unconditionally, saying, Elohim will surely visit you; and ye shall carry up my atzmot away from here with you.
20 And they took their journey from Sukkot, and encamped in Etam, at the edge of the midbar.
21 And Hashem went before them by day in an ammud anan, to guide them haderech; and by lailah in an ammud eish, to give them ohr; so they could travel yomam valailah (day or night);
22 He took not away the amud heanan by day, nor the ammud haeish by night, from before HaAm.
14;1 Then Hashem spoke unto Moshe, saying,
2 Speak unto the Bnei Yisroel, that they turn back and encamp before Pi-Hachirot, between Migdol and the yam, in front of Baal Zephon; opposite it shall ye encamp by the yam.
3 For Pharaoh will think of the Bnei Yisroel, They are entangled in the land [wandering in confusion], the midbar hath shut them in [from making their exodus].
4 And I will harden lev Pharaoh, that he shall pursue after them; and I will be glorified over Pharaoh, and upon all his army; so that the Egyptians may have da’as that I am Hashem. And they did accordingly.
5 And it was told the melech Mitzrayim that HaAm had fled; and the lev Pharaoh and of his avadim was turned against HaAm, and they said, Why have we done this, that we have let Yisroel go from slaving for us?
6 And he made ready his merkavah, and took his army with him;
7 And he took six hundred select chariots, and all the chariots of Mitzrayim, and commanders over every one of them.
8 And Hashem hardened the lev Pharaoh Melech Mitzrayim, so that he pursued after the Bnei Yisroel; and the Bnei Yisroel went out with a high hand [deliberately with assurance].
9 But the Mitzrayim pursued after them, all the susim and chariots of Pharaoh, and his parash, and his army, and overtook them encamping by the yam, by Pi- Hachirot, in front of Baal Zephon.
10 And when Pharaoh drew near, the Bnei Yisroel lifted up their eyes, and, hinei, the Egyptians marched after them; and they were very terrified; and the Bnei Yisroel cried out unto Hashem.
11 And they said unto Moshe, Because there were no kevarim in Mitzrayim, hast thou taken us away to die in the midbar? What hast thou done to us, in bringing us forth out of Mitzrayim?
12 Is not this the very thing that we did tell thee in Mitzrayim, saying, Let us alone, that we may slave for the Egyptians? For it had been better for us to slave for the Egyptians, than that we should die in the midbar.
13 And Moshe said unto HaAm, Fear ye not, stand still, and see the Yeshuat Hashem, which He will bring to you today; for the Egyptians whom ye have seen today, ye shall see them again no more ad olam.
14 Hashem shall fight for you, and ye shall keep still.
15 And Hashem said unto Moshe, Why criest thou unto Me? Speak unto the Bnei Yisroel, so that they move on;
16 But lift thou up thy staff, and stretch out thine yad over the yam, and divide it; and the Bnei Yisroel shall go on yabashah (dry land [see Genesis 1:9]) through the midst of the yam.
17 And I, hineni, I will harden the lev Mitzrayim, and they shall go after them; and I will get Me glory over Pharaoh, and over all his army, over his chariots, and upon his parash (horsemen).
18 And the Egyptians shall know that I am Hashem, when I have gotten Me glory over Pharaoh, over his chariots, and over his parash.
19 And the Malach HaElohim, which goes in front of the Machaneh Yisroel, moved and went behind them; and the pillar of cloud moved from before their face, and stood behind them;
20 And it came between the machaneh Mitzrayim and the Machaneh Yisroel; there was the anan bringing choshech to the Egyptians, but bringing light by night to Yisroel; so that none came near the other, kol halailah.
21 Then Moshe stretched out his yad over the yam; and Hashem caused the yam to go back by a strong east wind all that night, so that the yam was made dry land, and the mayim were divided.
22 And the Bnei Yisroel then went into the middle of the yam upon the yabashah (dry land); and the mayim were a chomah (wall) unto them on their right, and on their left.
23 And the Egyptians pursued, and went in after them into the middle of the yam, even kol sus Pharaoh, his chariots, and his parash.
24 So it came to pass, that when came the watch of the boker, Hashem looked down on the machaneh Mitzrayim through the ammud eish (pillar of fire) and of the anan, and caused confusion over the machaneh Mitzrayim,
25 And turned awry their chariot wheels, that they drove them with difficulty; so that the Egyptians said, Let us flee from the presence of Yisroel; because Hashem fighteth for them against the Egyptians.
26 And Hashem said unto Moshe, Stretch out thine yad over the yam, that the mayim may come again upon the Egyptians, upon their chariots, and upon their parash.
27 And Moshe stretched forth his yad over the yam, and the yam rushed back to its place as dawn of the boker appeared; and the Egyptians tried to flee away from meeting it; but Hashem swept the Egyptians into the middle of the yam.
28 And the mayim rushed back, and covered the chariots, and the parashim, and all the army of Pharaoh that came into the yam after them; there remained as survivors not so much as one of them.
29 But the Bnei Yisroel walked upon yabashah through the yam; and the mayim were a chomah unto them on their right, and on their left.
30 Thus Hashem saved Yisroel yom hahu out of the hand of Mitzrayim; and Yisroel saw the Egyptians dead upon the seashore.
31 And Yisroel saw the yad hagedolah which Hashem did upon the Egyptians; and HaAm feared Hashem, and put their trust in Hashem, and in His eved Moshe.
15:1 Then sang Moshe and the Bnei Yisroel this shirah (song) to Hashem, and spoke, saying, I will sing unto Hashem, for He hath triumphed gloriously: the sus and its rider hath He cast into the yam.
2 Hashem is my oz and zimrah (song of praise), and He is become to me Yeshuah (salvation); He is Eli (my G-d), and I will praise Him; Elohei Avi, and I will exalt Him.
3 Hashem is an Ish Milchamah; Hashem shmo.
4 Markevot Pharaoh and his army hath He cast into the yam; his select commanders also are drowned in Yam Suf.
5 The tehomot (depths) have covered them; they sank into the bottom like an even (stone).
6 Thy right hand, Hashem, is become glorious in ko’ach; Thy right hand, Hashem, hath dashed into pieces the oyev.
7 And in the greatness of Thine majesty Thou hast overthrown them that rose up against Thee; Thou sentest forth Thy charon (wrath), which consumed them as stubble.
8 And with the blast of Thy nostrils the mayim were gathered together, the floods stood upright like a stack, and the tehomot were congealed in the lev yam (heart of the sea).
9 The oyev said, I will pursue, I will overtake, I will share the plunder; my battlelust shall be satisfied upon them; I will draw my cherev, my yad shall take possession of them.
10 Thou didst blow with Thy ruach, the yam covered them; they sank like lead in the mighty waters.
11 Mi chamochah ba’elim, Adonoi (Who is like unto Thee, Hashem, among the elim [g-ds])? Who is like Thee, glorious in kodesh (holiness), awesome in praiseworthy acts, doing wonders?
12 Thou didst stretch out Thy right hand, eretz swallowed them.
13 Thou in Thy chesed hast led forth the people which Thou hast redeemed (acquired back); Thou hast guided them in Thy oz unto Thy neveh kodesh (holy habitation, i.e., a neveh is the abode of a shepherd).
14 The nations shall hear, and be afraid; anguish shall take hold on the inhabitants of Peleshet (Philistia).
15 Then the chief men of Edom shall be amazed; the mighty men of Moav, trembling shall take hold upon them; all the inhabitants of Kena’an shall melt away with weakness.
16 Terror and pachad shall fall upon them; by the greatness of Thine zero’a they shall be struck dumb as an even (stone); till Thy people pass by, Hashem, till the people pass by, which Thou hast purchased.
17 Thou shalt bring them in, and plant them in the har of Thine nachalah, in the place, Hashem, which Thou hast made for Thee to dwell in, in the Mikdash, Adonoi, which Thy hands have established.
18 Hashem shall reign l’olam va’ed.
19 For the sus Pharaoh went in with his chariots and with his parash into the yam, and Hashem brought again the waters of the yam upon them; but the Bnei Yisroel went on yabashah (dry land) in the middle of the yam.
20 And Miryam the neviah, the achot Aharon, took the tof (hand drum) in her yad; and all the nashim went out after her with hand-drums and with dancing.
21 And Miryam sang to them, Sing ye to Hashem, for He hath triumphed gloriously; the sus and its rider hath He thrown into the yam.
22 So Moshe brought Yisroel from the Yam Suf, and they went out into the midbar of Shur; and they went shloshet yamim in the midbar, and found no mayim.
23 And when they came to Marah (Bitter Place), they could not drink of the mayim from Marah, for they were marim; therefore the shem of it was called Marah.
24 So the people murmured against Moshe, saying, Mah nishteh (what shall we drink)?
25 And he cried unto Hashem; and Hashem showed him an etz (tree) which when he had cast into the mayim, the waters were made sweet (i.e., potable, fit for drinking); at that place He made for them a chok (statute, requirement, obligation) and a mishpat (divine judgment), and there He tested them,
26 And said, If thou wilt diligently pay heed to the voice of Hashem Eloheicha, and will do that which is yashar in His sight, and will give ear to do His mitzvot, and be shomer over all His chok, I will put none of these machalah (diseases) upon thee, which I put upon the Egyptians; for Ani Adonoi rofecha (I am Hashem that healeth thee). [2Kgs15:5;Amos 4:10]
27 And they came to Elim (Great Trees). There were twelve springs of mayim, and threescore and ten date-palm trees; and they encamped there by the mayim.
16:1 And they took their journey from Elim, and kol Adat Bnei Yisroel came unto the midbar of Siyn (pronounced "Seen"), which is between Elim and Sinai, on the fifteenth day of the second month after their departing out of Eretz Mitzrayim.
2 And kol Adat Bnei Yisroel murmured against Moshe and Aharon in the midbar;
3 And the Bnei Yisroel said unto them, If only G-d would have made us die by the yad Hashem in Eretz Mitzrayim, when we sat by the sir habasar (pot of meat), and when we did eat lechem to the full; for ye have brought us forth into this midbar, to kill this kol hakahal with ra’av (hunger).
4 Then said Hashem unto Moshe, Hineni, I will rain lechem from Shomayim upon you; and HaAm shall go out and gather a certain daily provision, that I may test them, whether they will walk in My torah, or no.
5 And it shall come to pass, that on the yom hashishi (sixth day) they shall prepare that which they bring in; and it shall be twice as much as they gather daily.
6 And Moshe and Aharon said unto kol Bnei Yisroel, At erev, then ye shall know that Hashem hath brought you out from Eretz Mitzrayim;
7 And in the boker, then ye shall see the kevod Hashem; because He heareth your telunnot (murmurings, grumblings) against Hashem; and who are we, that ye murmur against us?
8 And Moshe said, This shall be, when Hashem shall give you basar in the erev to eat, and in the boker lechem to the full; because Hashem heareth your telunnot which ye murmur against Him; and who are we? Your telunnot are not against us, but against Hashem.
9 And Moshe spoke unto Aharon, Say unto kol Adat Bnei Yisroel, Come near before Hashem; for He hath heard your telunnot.
10 And it came to pass, as Aharon spoke unto kol Adat Bnei Yisroel, that they looked toward the midbar, and, hinei, the kevod Hashem appeared in the anan.
11 And Hashem spoke unto Moshe, saying,
12 I have heard the telunnot Bnei Yisroel; speak unto them, saying, At twilight ye shall eat basar, and in the boker ye shall be glutted with lechem; and ye shall know [by experience] that I am Hashem Eloheichem.
13 And it came to pass, that at erev the quails came up, and covered the machaneh; and in the boker there was a layer of tal (dew) about the machaneh.
14 And when the layer of tal evaporated, hinei, upon the surface of the midbar there lay thin flakes, as thin as a layer of kfor (frost) upon ha’aretz.
15 And when the Bnei Yisroel saw it, they said one to another, Mahn hu (What is it?) For they knew not mah hu (what [is] this). And Moshe said unto them, This is the lechem which Hashem hath given you to eat.
16 This is the thing which Hashem hath commanded, Gather of it every man according to his eating [need], an omer per person, according to the number of your nefashot; take ye every man for them which are in his ohel.
17 And the Bnei Yisroel did so, and gathered, some more, some less.
18 And when they did measure it by the omer, he that gathered much had nothing extra, and he that gathered little had no lack; they gathered every man according to his eating [need].
19 And Moshe said, Let no ish leave of it until boker.
20 Notwithstanding, they paid heed not unto Moshe; but some left part of it until boker, and [the leftovers] bred tola’im (worms), and stank; and Moshe was angry with them.
21 And they gathered it every boker, every man according to his eating [need]; and when the shemesh grew hot, it melted.
22 And it came to pass, that on yom hashishi they gathered twice as much lechem, two omers for one man; and all the nesi’im of the Edah came and told Moshe.
23 And he said unto them, This is that which Hashem hath said, Tomorrow is a Shabbaton (day of rest), Shabbos Kodesh unto Hashem; bake that which ye will bake today, and boil that ye will boil; and that which remaineth over lay up for you for mishmeret (for keeping) until boker.
24 And they laid it up, saving it until boker, as Moshe commanded; and it did not stink, neither was there any infestation therein.
25 And Moshe said, Eat that today; for today is a Shabbos unto Hashem; today ye shall not find it in the sadeh.
26 Sheshet yamim ye shall gather it; but on the yom hashevi’i, which is Shabbos, in it there shall be none.
27 And it came to pass, that there went out some from HaAm on the yom hashevi’i to gather, and they found none.
28 And Hashem said unto Moshe, How long refuse ye to be shomer over My mitzvot and My torot?
29 See, that Hashem hath given you the Shabbos, therefore He giveth you on yom hashishi lechem for two days; abide ye every man in his place, let no man go out from his place on yom hashevi’i.
30 So HaAm rested on yom hashevi’i.
31 And Bais Yisroel called the shem thereof Manna; and it was like coriander seed, lavan (white); and the taste of it was like flat cakes fried in devash.
32 And Moshe said, This is the thing which Hashem commandeth, Fill an omer of it to be mishmeret (kept) for your dorot; that they may see the lechem wherewith I have fed you in the midbar, when I brought you forth from Eretz Mitzrayim.
33 And Moshe said unto Aharon, Take a jar, and put an omer full of manna therein, and lay it up before Hashem, to be kept for your dorot.
34 As Hashem commanded Moshe, so Aharon laid it up before the Edut (the [Ark] of the Testimony), for mishmeret (to be kept).
35 And the Bnei Yisroel did eat manna arba’im shanah, until they came to an eretz noshavet (an inhabited land); they did eat manna, until they came unto the borders of Eretz Kena’an.
36 Now an omer [i.e., two quarts dry measure] is the tenth part of an ephah [T.N. an ephah is about one-half bushel].
17:1 And kol Adat Bnei Yisroel journeyed from the midbar of Siyn, setting out, according to the commandment of Hashem, and encamped in Rephidim; and there was no mayim for HaAm to drink.
2 Wherefore the people did chide (quarrel, become dissatisfied with) Moshe, and said, Give us mayim that we may drink. And Moshe said unto them, Why chide ye with me? Why do ye put Hashem to the test?
3 And HaAm thirsted there for mayim; and the people murmured against Moshe, and said, Why is this that thou hast brought us up out of Mitzrayim, to kill me and my banim and my livestock with tzama (thirst)?
4 And Moshe cried unto Hashem, saying, What shall I do with this people? They are almost ready to stone me.
5 And Hashem said unto Moshe, Go on ahead of HaAm, and take with thee Ziknei Yisroel; and thy matteh (staff) wherewith thou struck the Nile, take in thine yad, and go.
6 Hineni, I will stand before thee there upon the tzur in Chorev; thou shalt strike the tzur, and there shall come mayim out of it, that HaAm may drink. Moshe did so in the sight of the Ziknei Yisroel.
7 And he called the shem of the place Massah (Testing), and Merivah (Dissatisfaction), because of the riv (chiding, quarreling) of the Bnei Yisroel, and because they put Hashem to the test, saying, Is Hashem among us, or not?
8 Then came Amalek, and did battle against Yisroel in Rephidim.
9 And Moshe said unto Yehoshua, Choose for us anashim, and go out, do battle with Amalek; tomorrow I will station myself on the top of the hill with the matteh HaElohim in mine yad.
10 So Yehoshua did as Moshe had said to him, and did battle with Amalek; and Moshe, Aharon, and Chur went up to the top of the hill.
11 And it came to pass, as long as Moshe held up his yad, that Yisroel prevailed; and when he let down his yad, Amalek prevailed.
12 When the hands of Moshe grew heavy, they took an even (stone), and put it under him, and he sat thereon; and Aharon and Chur supported his hands, the one on the one side, and the other on the other side; and his hands held emunah (steady) until bo hashemesh (sunset).
13 And Yehoshua disabled Amalek and his army with the edge of the cherev.
14 And Hashem said unto Moshe, Write this for a zikaron (memorial, remembering) in a sefer, and rehearse it in the ears of Yehoshua; for I will utterly efface the memory of Amalek from under Shomayim.
15 And Moshe built a Mizbe’ach, and called the shem of it Hashem Nissi (Hashem is my Standard [rallying point]);
16 For he said, Because a yad has been against the kes Hashem (throne of Hashem), Hashem hath milchamah against Amalek from dor to dor.)
Today's Laws & Customs:
Shabbat of Song
This week's Torah reading contains the "song at the sea" sung by the Children of Israel upon their deliverance from the Egyptians, when the Red Sea split to allow them to pass and then drowned their pursuers. Hence this Shabbat is designated as Shabbat Shirah, "Shabbat of song."
Our sages tell us that the birds in the sky joined our ancestors in their singing; for this reason it is customary to put out food for the birds for this Shabbat (to avoid the possibility of transgressing the laws of Shabbat, the food should be put out before Shabbat).
Links: The Chassidic Masters on song; Miriam's song
Today in Jewish History:
Jews of Colmar Expelled (1510)
Three years after the request by the Council of Colmar, Emperor Maximilian I granted permission to expel the Jews of Colmar, Germany. The community exerted every effort to secure the repeal of the decree of banishment. With the help of Rabbi Joselman of Rosheim, the leader of the Alsatian Jews, the enforcement of the decree was postponed until S. George's Day of 1512.
Birth of the "Chafetz Chaim" (1838)
Birth of the revered Torah scholar, pietist and Jewish leader Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan (1838-1933) of Radin (Poland), author of Chafetz Chaim (a work on the evils of gossip and slander and the guidelines of proper speech) and Mishnah Berurah (a codification of Torah law).
Link: A Tzaddik's Tear
DAILY QUOTE:
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:Jews of Colmar Expelled (1510)
Three years after the request by the Council of Colmar, Emperor Maximilian I granted permission to expel the Jews of Colmar, Germany. The community exerted every effort to secure the repeal of the decree of banishment. With the help of Rabbi Joselman of Rosheim, the leader of the Alsatian Jews, the enforcement of the decree was postponed until S. George's Day of 1512.
Birth of the "Chafetz Chaim" (1838)
Birth of the revered Torah scholar, pietist and Jewish leader Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan (1838-1933) of Radin (Poland), author of Chafetz Chaim (a work on the evils of gossip and slander and the guidelines of proper speech) and Mishnah Berurah (a codification of Torah law).
Link: A Tzaddik's Tear
DAILY QUOTE:
DAILY STUDY:
Chumash Parshat Beshalach, 7th Portion (Exodus 17:1-17:16) with Rashi
• Chapter 17
1. The entire community of the children of Israel journeyed from the desert of Sin to their travels by the mandate of the Lord. They encamped in Rephidim, and there was no water for the people to drink. א. וַיִּסְעוּ כָּל עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּדְבַּר סִין לְמַסְעֵיהֶם עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה וַיַּחֲנוּ בִּרְפִידִים וְאֵין מַיִם לִשְׁתֹּת הָעָם:
2. So the people quarreled with Moses, and they said, Give us water that we may drink Moses said to them, Why do you quarrel with me? Why do you test the Lord? ב. וַיָּרֶב הָעָם עִם משֶׁה וַיֹּאמְרוּ תְּנוּ לָנוּ מַיִם וְנִשְׁתֶּה וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם משֶׁה מַה תְּרִיבוּן עִמָּדִי מַה תְּנַסּוּן אֶת יְהֹוָה:
Why do you test the Lord: saying, “Can He give water in an arid land?”
מה תנסון: לומר היוכל לתת מים בארץ ציה:
3. The people thirsted there for water, and the people complained against Moses, and they said, Why have you brought us up from Egypt to make me and my children and my livestock die of thirst? ג. וַיִּצְמָא שָׁם הָעָם לַמַּיִם וַיָּלֶן הָעָם עַל משֶׁה וַיֹּאמֶר לָמָּה זֶּה הֶעֱלִיתָנוּ מִמִּצְרַיִם לְהָמִית אֹתִי וְאֶת בָּנַי וְאֶת מִקְנַי בַּצָּמָא:
4. Moses cried out to the Lord, saying, What shall I do for this people? Just a little longer and they will stone me! ד. וַיִּצְעַק משֶׁה אֶל יְהֹוָה לֵאמֹר מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לָעָם הַזֶּה עוֹד מְעַט וּסְקָלֻנִי:
Just a little longer: If I wait just a little longer, they will stone me.
עוד מעט: אם אמתין עוד מעט וסקלוני:
5. And the Lord said to Moses, Pass before the people and take with you [some] of the elders of Israel, and take into your hand your staff, with which you struck the Nile, and go. ה. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה עֲבֹר לִפְנֵי הָעָם וְקַח אִתְּךָ מִזִּקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמַטְּךָ אֲשֶׁר הִכִּיתָ בּוֹ אֶת הַיְאֹר קַח בְּיָדְךָ וְהָלָכְתָּ:
Pass before the people: And see whether they stone you. Why have you slandered My children?-[from Tanchuma Beshallach 22]
עבר לפני העם: וראה אם יסקלוך, למה הוצאת לעז על בני:
and take with you [some] of the elders of Israel: for testimony, so that they shall witness that through you the water comes out of the rock, and they [the Israelites] will not say that there were water fountains there from days of yore. — [from Mechilta]
וקח אתך מזקני ישראל: לעדות שיראו שעל ידך המים יוצאים מן הצור, ולא יאמרו מעיינות היו שם מימי קדם:
your staff, with which you struck the Nile: Why must Scripture state "with which you struck the Nile"? [To point out what] the Israelites were saying about the staff, [namely] that it was ready only for retribution. With it, Pharaoh and the Egyptians were smitten with many plagues, both in Egypt and by the sea. Therefore, it is stated: “with which you struck the Nile.” Now they will see that it [the staff] is ready for good as well. — [from Mechilta, Exod. Rabbah 26:2]
ומטך אשר הכית בו את היאר: מה תלמוד לומר אשר הכית בו את היאור, אלא שהיו ישראל אומרים על המטה שאינו מוכן אלא לפורעניות, בו לקה פרעה ומצרים כמה מכות במצרים ועל הים, לכן נאמר אשר הכית בו את היאר, יראו עתה שאף לטובה הוא מוכן:
6. Behold, I shall stand there before you on the rock in Horeb, and you shall strike the rock, and water will come out of it, and the people will drink Moses did so before the eyes of the elders of Israel. ו. הִנְנִי עֹמֵד לְפָנֶיךָ שָּׁם | עַל הַצּוּר בְּחֹרֵב וְהִכִּיתָ בַצּוּר וְיָצְאוּ מִמֶּנּוּ מַיִם וְשָׁתָה הָעָם וַיַּעַשׂ כֵּן משֶׁה לְעֵינֵי זִקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
and you shall strike the rock: Heb. וְהִכִּיתָ בַצּוּר. It does not say עַל-הַצּוּר, upon the rock, but בַצּוּר, [lit., into the rock]. From here [we deduce] that the staff was of a hard substance called sapphire, and the rock was split by it. — [from Mechilta]
והכית בצור: על הצור לא נאמר אלא בצור, מכאן שהמטה היה של מין דבר חזק ושמו סנפרינון והצור נבקע מפניו:
7. He named the place Massah [testing] and Meribah [quarreling] because of the quarrel of the children of Israel and because of their testing the Lord, saying, Is the Lord in our midst or not? ז. וַיִּקְרָא שֵׁם הַמָּקוֹם מַסָּה וּמְרִיבָה עַל רִיב | בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל נַסֹּתָם אֶת יְהֹוָה לֵאמֹר הֲיֵשׁ יְהֹוָה בְּקִרְבֵּנוּ אִם אָיִן:
8. Amalek came and fought with Israel in Rephidim. ח. וַיָּבֹא עֲמָלֵק וַיִּלָּחֶם עִם יִשְׂרָאֵל בִּרְפִידִם:
Amalek came, etc.: He [God] juxtaposed this section to this verse, ["Is the Lord in our midst or not? "] implying: “I am always among you, and [I am] always prepared for all your necessities, but you say, Is the Lord in our midst or not?’ By your life, the dog will come and bite you, and you will cry out to Me, and [then] you will know where I am ” This can be compared to a man who mounted his son on his shoulder and set out on the road. Whenever his son saw something, he would say, “Father, take that thing and give it to me,” and he [the father] would give it to him. They met a man, and the son said to him, “Have you seen my father?” So his father said to him, “You don’t know where I am?” He threw him [his son] down off him, and a dog came and bit him [the son]. — [from Tanchuma, Yithro 3; Exod. Rabbah 26:2]
ויבא עמלק וגו': סמך פרשה זו למקרא זה, לומר תמיד אני ביניכם ומזומן לכל צרכיכם, ואתם אומרים (פסוק ז) היש ה' בקרבנו אם אין, חייכם שהכלב בא ונושך אתכם ואתם צועקים אלי ותדעון היכן אני. משל לאדם שהרכיב בנו על כתפו ויצא לדרך, היה אותו הבן רואה חפץ ואומר, אבא טול חפץ זה ותן לי, והוא נותן לו, וכן שניה וכן שלישית, פגעו באדם אחד, אמר לו אותו הבן ראית את אבא. אמר לו אביו אינך יודע היכן אני, השליכו מעליו ובא הכלב ונשכו:
9. So Moses said to Joshua, Pick men for us, and go out and fight against Amalek. Tomorrow I will stand on top of the hill with the staff of God in my hand ט. וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה אֶל יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּחַר לָנוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְצֵא הִלָּחֵם בַּעֲמָלֵק מָחָר אָנֹכִי נִצָּב עַל רֹאשׁ הַגִּבְעָה וּמַטֵּה הָאֱלֹהִים בְּיָדִי:
Pick…for us: For me and for you. From here the Sages stated: “Your disciple’s honor shall be as dear to you as your own honor” (Avoth 4:12). How do we know that you should honor your peer as you revere your mentor? For it is said: “Aaron said to Moses, I beseech you, my lord’ ” (Num. 12:11). Now was Aaron not older than Moses? Yet he [Aaron] considers his peer as his mentor. And how do we know that one must revere his mentor as he reveres Heaven? For it is said: “My lord, Moses, destroy them” (Num. 11:28). Destroy them [Eldad and Medad] from the world. They deserve to be annihilated because they are rebelling against you, [which is] tantamount to having rebelled against the Holy One, blessed be He. — [from Mechilta; Tanchuma, Beshallach 26]
בחר לנו: לי ולך, השוהו לו, מכאן אמרו יהי כבוד תלמידך חביב עליך כשלך וכבוד חבירך כמורא רבך, מנין שנאמר (במדבר יב יא) ויאמר אהרן אל משה בי א-דני והלא אהרן גדול מאחיו היה ועושה את חבירו כרבו. ומורא רבך כמורא שמים מנין, שנאמר (שם יא כח) אדוני משה כלאם, כלם מן העולם, חייבין הם כלייה, המורדים בך, כאלו מרדו בהקב"ה:
and go out and fight: Go out of the cloud and fight with them. — [from Mechilta and Exod. Rabbah, end of Beshallach]
וצא הלחם: צא מן הענן והלחם בו:
Tomorrow: At the time of the battle, I will stand.
מחר: בעת המלחמה אנכי נצב:
Pick men for us: Heb. אִנָשִׁים, mighty men, and God-fearing [men] so that their merit will help us (Mechilta d’Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer ch. 44, Yalkut Shimoni, Jonathan). Another explanation: who know how to counteract witchcraft, because the Amalekites were sorcerers.
בחר לנו אנשים: גבורים ויראי חטא שתהא זכותן מסייעתן. דבר אחר בחר לנו אנשים שיודעין לבטל כשפים לפי שבני עמלק מכשפין היו:
10. Joshua did as Moses had told him, to fight against Amalek; and Moses, Aaron, and Hur ascended to the top of the hill. י. וַיַּעַשׂ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כַּאֲשֶׁר אָמַר לוֹ משֶׁה לְהִלָּחֵם בַּעֲמָלֵק וּמשֶׁה אַהֲרֹן וְחוּר עָלוּ רֹאשׁ הַגִּבְעָה:
and Moses, Aaron, and Hur: From here [we deduce] that on a fast day, three people are required to go before the ark [to lead the prayers], for they were fasting. — [from Mechilta]
ומשה אהרן וחור: מכאן לתענית שצריכים שלשה לעבור לפני התיבה, שבתענית היו שרויים:
Hur: He was the son of Miriam, and Caleb, her husband. — [from Sotah 11b]
חור: בנה של מרים היה וכלב בעלה:
11. It came to pass that when Moses would raise his hand, Israel would prevail, and when he would lay down his hand, Amalek would prevail. יא. וְהָיָה כַּאֲשֶׁר יָרִים משֶׁה יָדוֹ וְגָבַר יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכַאֲשֶׁר יָנִיחַ יָדוֹ וְגָבַר עֲמָלֵק:
when Moses would raise his hand: Did Moses’ hands then make them victorious in battle, etc.? [Rather this is to tell you that when the Israelites looked up and subjugated their hearts to their Father in heaven, they would prevail, and if not, they would fall,] as is found in Rosh Hashanah (29a).
כאשר ירים משה ידו: וכי ידיו של משה נוצחות היו המלחמה וכו' כדאיתא בראש השנה (כט א):
12. Now Moses hands were heavy; so they took a stone and placed it under him, and he sat on it. Aaron and Hur supported his hands, one from this [side], and one from that [side]; so he was with his hands in faith until sunset. יב. וִידֵי משֶׁה כְּבֵדִים וַיִּקְחוּ אֶבֶן וַיָּשִׂימוּ תַחְתָּיו וַיֵּשֶׁב עָלֶיהָ וְאַהֲרֹן וְחוּר תָּמְכוּ בְיָדָיו מִזֶּה אֶחָד וּמִזֶּה אֶחָד וַיְהִי יָדָיו אֱמוּנָה עַד בֹּא הַשָּׁמֶשׁ:
Now Moses’ hands were heavy: Since he had been lax in [the performance of] the commandment [of warring against Amalek] and had appointed someone else in his stead, his hands became heavy. — [from Mechilta]
וידי משה כבדים: בשביל שנתעצל במצוה ומנה אחר תחתיו, נתייקרו ידיו:
so they took: [I.e.,] Aaron and Hur.
ויקחו: אהרן וחור:
a stone and placed it under him: But he [Moses] did not sit on a mattress or on a pillow, [because] he said, "Israel is in a state of pain. I too will be with them in pain."-[from Ta’anith 11a]
אבן וישימו תחתיו: ולא ישב לו על כר וכסת. אמר ישראל שרויין בצער, אף אני אהיה עמהם בצער:
so he was with his hands in faith: And Moses was with his hands in faith, spread out toward heaven in a faithful and proper prayer.
ויהי ידיו אמונה: ויהי משה ידיו באמונה פרושות השמים בתפלה נאמנה ונכונה:
until sunset: For the Amalekites calculated the hours [i.e., the time] with their astrology [to determine] in what hour they would be victorious, but Moses caused the sun to stand still and confused the hours. — [from Tanchuma 28]
עד בא השמש: שהיו עמלקים מחשבין את השעות באצטרולוגיאה באיזו שעה הם נוצחים, והעמיד להם משה חמה וערבב את השעות:
13. Joshua weakened Amalek and his people with the edge of the sword. יג. וַיַּחֲלשׁ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אֶת עֲמָלֵק וְאֶת עַמּוֹ לְפִי חָרֶב:
Joshua weakened: He decapitated their [the Amalekites’] strongest warriors, and he left over only the weak among them, but he did not slay them all. From here we learn that he did this according to the mandate of the Shechinah. — [from Mechilta]
ויחלש יהושע: חתך ראשי גבוריו ולא השאיר אלא חלשים שבהם ולא הרגם כולם, מכאן אנו למדין שעשה על פי הדבור של שכינה:
14. The Lord said to Moses, Inscribe this [as] a memorial in the book, and recite it into Joshua's ears, that I will surely obliterate the remembrance of Amalek from beneath the heavens יד. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה כְּתֹב זֹאת זִכָּרוֹן בַּסֵּפֶר וְשִׂים בְּאָזְנֵי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כִּי מָחֹה אֶמְחֶה אֶת זֵכֶר עֲמָלֵק מִתַּחַת הַשָּׁמָיִם:
Inscribe this [as] a memorial: namely that Amalek came to attack the Israelites before all [other] nations [dared to do so].
כתב זאת זכרון: שבא עמלק להזדווג לישראל קודם לכל האומות:
and recite it into Joshua’s ears: [Joshua] was destined to bring Israel into the land [of Israel and] to pay him [Amalek] his recompense. Here it was hinted to Moses that Joshua would bring Israel into the land. — [from Tanchuma 28, Mechilta]
ושים באזני יהושע: המכניס את ישראל לארץ, שיצוה את ישראל לשלם לו את גמולו, כאן נרמז לו למשה שיהושע מכניס את ישראל לארץ:
I will surely obliterate the remembrance of Amalek: Therefore, I admonish you in this manner, because I want to obliterate him.
כי מחה אמחה: לכך אני מזהירך כן, כי חפץ אני למחותו:
15. Then Moses built an altar, and he named it The Lord is my miracle טו. וַיִּבֶן משֶׁה מִזְבֵּחַ וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ יְהֹוָה | נִסִּי:
and he named it: The altar. —
ויקרא שמו: של מזבח:
“The Lord is my miracle”: Heb. ה נִסִּי. The Holy One, blessed be He, wrought a great miracle for us here. Not that the altar is called “The Lord,” but whoever mentions the name of the altar remembers the miracle that the Omnipresent performed: The Lord is our miracle. — [from Mechilta]
ה' נסי: הקב"ה עשה לנו כאן נס גדול, לא שהמזבח קרוי ה', אלא המזכיר שמו של מזבח זוכר את הנס שעשה המקום, ה' הוא נס שלנו:
16. And he said, For there is a hand on the throne of the Eternal, [that there shall be] a war for the Lord against Amalek from generation to generation. טז. וַיֹּאמֶר כִּי יָד עַל כֵּס יָהּ מִלְחָמָה לַיהֹוָה בַּעֲמָלֵק מִדֹּר דֹּר:
And he said: [I.e.,] Moses [said].
ויאמר: משה:
For there is a hand on the throne of the Eternal: Heb. כִּי-יָד עַל כֵּס יָ-הּ. The hand of the Holy One, blessed be He, was raised to swear by His throne, to have a war and [bear] hatred against Amalek for eternity. Now what is the meaning of כֵּס [as opposed to כִּסֵא and also [why is] the Divine Name divided in half? [I.e., why is the Name יָ-הּ used instead of י-ה-ו-ה ?] [The answer is that] the Holy One, blessed be He, swore that His Name will not be complete and His throne will not be complete until the name of Amalek is completely obliterated. And when his name is obliterated, the Divine Name will be complete, and the throne will be complete, as it is said: “The enemy has been destroyed; swords exist forever (לָנֶצַח)” (Ps. 9:7); this [who they are referring to] is Amalek, about whom it is written: “and kept their fury forever (נֶצַח)” (Amos 1:11). "And You have uprooted the cities-their remembrance is lost" (Ps. 9:7) [i.e., Amalek’s obliteration]. What does it say afterwards? “And the Lord (וַיהוה) shall sit forever” (Ps. 9:8); thus [after Amalek is obliterated] the Name is complete. "He has established His throne (כִּסְאוֹ) for judgment" (Ps. 9:8). Thus the throne is complete [i.e., thus the throne, here spelled with an “aleph,” is now complete]. — [from Midrash Tanchuma, end of Ki Theitzei]
כי יד על כס יה: ידו של הקב"ה הורמה לישבע בכסאו להיות לו מלחמה ואיבה בעמלק עולמית, ומהו כס, ולא נאמר כסא, ואף השם נחלק לחציו, נשבע הקב"ה שאין שמו שלם ואין כסאו שלם עד שימחה שמו של עמלק כולו, וכשימחה שמו יהיה השם שלם והכסא שלם, שנאמר (תהלים ט ז) האויב תמו חרבות לנצח, זהו עמלק שכתוב בו (עמוס א יא) ועברתו שמרה נצח, (תהלים שם) וערים נתשת אבד זכרם המה, מהו אומר אחריו (תהלים ט ח) וה' לעולם ישב, הרי השם שלם, (תהלים שם) כונן למשפט כסאו, הרי כסאו שלם:
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Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 60-65
• Chapter 60
This psalm tells of when Joab, David's general, came to Aram Naharayim for war and was asked by the people: "Are you not from the children of Jacob? What of the pact he made with Laban?" Not knowing what to answer, Joab asked the Sanhedrin. The psalm includes David's prayer for success in this war.
1. For the Conductor, on the shushan eidut. A michtam by David, to instruct,
2. when he battled with Aram Naharayim and Aram Tzovah, and Joab returned and smote Edom in the Valley of Salt, twelve thousand [men].
3. O God, You forsook us, You have breached us! You grew furious-restore us!
4. You made the earth quake, You split it apart-heal its fragments, for it totters!
5. You showed Your nation harshness, You gave us benumbing wine to drink.
6. [Now] give those who fear You a banner to raise themselves, for the sake of truth, Selah.
7. That Your beloved ones may be delivered, help with Your right hand and answer me.
8. God said with His Holy [Spirit] that I would exult; I would divide Shechem, and measure out the Valley of Succot.
9. Mine is Gilead, mine is Menasseh, and Ephraim is the stronghold of my head; Judah is my prince.
10. Moab is my washbasin, and upon Edom I will cast my shoe; for me, Philistia will sound a blast [of coronation].
11. Who will bring me into the fortified city? Who will lead me unto Edom?
12. Is it not You, God, Who has [until now] forsaken us, and did not go forth with our legions?
13. Grant us relief from the oppressor; futile is the salvation of man.
14. With God we will do valiantly, and He will trample our oppressors.
Chapter 61
David composed this prayer while fleeing from Saul. The object of all his thoughts and his entreaty is that God grant him long life-not for the sake of pursuing the pleasures of the world, but rather to serve God in awe, all of his days.
1. For the Conductor, on the neginat, by David.
2. Hear my cry, O God, listen to my prayer.
3. From the end of the earth I call to You, when my heart is faint [with trouble]: Lead me upon the rock that surpasses me!
4. For You have been a refuge for me, a tower of strength in the face of the enemy.
5. I will dwell in Your tent forever; I will take refuge in the shelter of Your wings, Selah.
6. For You, God, heard my vows; You granted the inheritance of those who fear Your Name.
7. Add days to the days of the king; may his years equal those of every generation.
8. May he sit always before God; appoint kindness and truth to preserve him.
9. Thus will I sing the praise of Your Name forever, as I fulfill my vows each day.
Chapter 62
David prays for the downfall of his enemies. He also exhorts his generation that their faith should not rest in riches, telling them that the accumulation of wealth is utter futility.
1. For the Conductor, on the yedutun,1 a psalm by David.
2. To God alone does my soul hope; my salvation is from Him.
3. He alone is my rock and salvation, my stronghold; I shall not falter greatly.
4. Until when will you plot disaster for man? May you all be killed-like a leaning wall, a toppled fence.
5. Out of their arrogance alone they scheme to topple me, they favor falsehood; with their mouths they bless, and in their hearts they curse, Selah.
6. To God alone does my soul hope, for my hope is from Him.
7. He alone is my rock and salvation, my stronghold; I shall not falter.
8. My salvation and honor is upon God; the rock of my strength-my refuge is in God.
9. Trust in Him at all times, O nation, pour out your hearts before Him; God is a refuge for us forever.
10. Men are but vanity; people [but] transients. Were they to be raised upon the scale, they would be lighter than vanity.
11. Put not your trust in exploitation, nor place futile hope in robbery. If [corrupt] wealth flourishes, pay it no heed.
12. God spoke one thing, from which I perceived two: That strength belongs to God;
13. and that Yours, my Lord, is kindness. For You repay each man according to his deeds.
Chapter 63
Hiding from Saul, and yearning to approach the place of the Holy Ark like one thirsting for water, David composed this prayer on his behalf and against his enemy.
1. A psalm by David, when he was in the Judean desert.
2. O God, You are my Almighty, I seek You! My soul thirsts for You, my flesh longs for You; [like one] in a desolate and dry land, without water,
3. so [I thirst] to see You in the Sanctuary, to behold Your might and glory.
4. For Your kindness is better than life; my lips shall praise You.
5. Thus will I bless you all my life, in Your Name I will raise my hands [in prayer].
6. As with fat and abundance my soul is sated, when my mouth offers praise with expressions of joy.
7. Indeed, I remember You upon my bed; during the watches of the night I meditate upon You.
8. For You were a help for me; I sing in the shadow of Your wings.
9. My soul cleaved to You; Your right hand supported me.
10. But they seek desolation for my soul; they will enter the depths of the earth.
11. They will drag them by the sword; they will be the portion of foxes.
12. And the king will rejoice in God, and all who swear by Him will take pride, when the mouths of liars are blocked up.
Chapter 64
The masters of homiletics interpret this psalm as alluding to Daniel, who was thrown into the lion's den. With divine inspiration, David foresaw the event and prayed for him. Daniel was a descendant of David, as can be inferred from God's statement to Hezekiah (himself of Davidic lineage), "And from your children, who will issue forth from you, they will take, and they (referring to, amongst others, Daniel) will be minesters in the palace of the king of Babylon."
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. Hear my voice, O God, as I recount [my woes]; preserve my life from the terror of the enemy.
3. Shelter me from the schemes of the wicked, from the conspiracy of evildoers,
4. who have sharpened their tongue like the sword, aimed their arrow-a bitter word-
5. to shoot at the innocent from hidden places; suddenly they shoot at him, they are not afraid.
6. They encourage themselves in an evil thing, they speak of laying traps; they say: "Who will see them?”
7. They sought pretexts; [and when] they completed a diligent search, each man [kept the plot] inside, deep in the heart.
8. But God shot at them; [like] a sudden arrow were their blows.
9. Their own tongues caused them to stumble; all who see them shake their heads [derisively].
10. Then all men feared, and recounted the work of God; they perceived His deed.
11. Let the righteous one rejoice in the Lord and take refuge in Him, and let them take pride-all upright of heart.
Chapter 65
This psalm contains awe-inspiring and glorious praises to God, as well as entreaties and prayers concerning our sins. It declares it impossible to recount God's greatness, for who can recount His mighty acts? Hence, silence is His praise.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David, a song.
2. Silence is praise for You, O God [Who dwells in] Zion; and to You vows will be paid.
3. O Heeder of prayer, to You does all flesh come.
4. Matters of sin overwhelm me; You will pardon our transgressions.
5. Fortunate is [the nation] whom You choose and draw near, to dwell in Your courtyards; may we be sated with the goodness of Your House, with the holiness of Your Sanctuary.
6. Answer us with awesome deeds as befits Your righteousness, O God of our salvation, the security of all [who inhabit] the ends of the earth and distant seas.
7. With His strength He prepares [rain for] the mountains; He is girded with might.
8. He quiets the roar of the seas, the roar of their waves and the tumult of nations.
9. Those who inhabit the ends [of the earth] fear [You] because of Your signs; the emergences of morning and evening cause [man] to sing praise.
10. You remember the earth and water it, you enrich it abundantly [from] God's stream filled with water. You prepare their grain, for so do You prepare it.
11. You saturate its furrows, gratifying its legions; with showers You soften it and bless its growth.
12. You crown the year of Your goodness [with rain], and Your clouds drip abundance.
13. They drip on pastures of wilderness, and the hills gird themselves with joy.
14. The meadows don sheep, and the valleys cloak themselves with grain; they sound blasts, indeed they sing.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 23
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Shabbat, 11 Shevat, 5775 • 31 January 2015
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 23
In the previous chapters the Alter Rebbe explained that from G‑d’s perspective nothing is ever separate from Him. For the Divine “Word” which creates everything is unlike a word spoken by a human being. The latter becomes separated from the speaker, while the former remains always within its source — G‑d. It is only from the subjective viewpoint of the created beings that they are considered as separate, independent entities. They are able to regard themselves as such because they receive the Divine life-force which animates them by way of many tzimtzumim and through the concealment of the Divine “Countenance”, i.e., the concealment of the inner, ultimate aspect of G‑d’s Will.
The logical corollary to this idea is that anything in which the Divine Will stands revealed, is completely nullified before G‑d, and absolutely one with Him. In this chapter the Alter Rebbe applies this idea to the Torah and the mitzvot, in which G‑d’s Will is manifest. He demonstrates how one can unite with G‑d’s Will and wisdom, and thereby with G‑d Himself, through study of the Torah and observance of the mitzvot.
ועם כל הנ״ל יובן ויבואר היטב בתוספת ביאור מה שאמרו בזהר, דאורייתא וקודשא בריך הוא כולא חד
In light of all that has been said above, we can better understand and more fully and clearly elucidate the statement in the Zohar1 that “The Torah and G‑d are entirely one,”
ובתיקונים פירשו דרמ״ח פיקודין אינון רמ״ח אברין דמלכא
and the commentary in the Tikkunei Zohar2 that “The 248 commandments are the 248 ‘organs’ of the [Divine] King.”
Just as every organ in the human body is a repository for the particular faculty of the soul that is vested in that organ (e.g., the eye is the receptacle for the faculty of sight, and the ear for the faculty of hearing), so too is every commandment a channel and a repository for the Divine Will that is vested and expressed in that particular commandment. (The commandments in general represent G‑d’s Will, and each individual mitzvah is an expression of a particular aspect of this Will.)
It should be noted, however, that according to this analogy the mitzvot are no more than G‑d’s “organs”. An organ of the body is not one with the soul. True, when any particular soul-power is vested in its corresponding organ, they function together as one. But they remain two separate entities that have been joined together. By the same token, the mitzvot are not actually one with G‑d: they are merely (as it were) joined to Him. Yet the Torah, whose whole purpose is to explain the mitzvot, is “entirely one with G‑d,” as quoted earlier from the Zohar. What is the meaning of this greater unity with G‑d found in the Torah (and in the act of Torah study), that surpasses even the unity in the mitzvot and in their fulfillment? This the Alter Rebbe now goes on to explain.
לפי שהמצות הן פנימיות רצון העליון וחפצו האמיתי, המלובש בכל העולמות העליונים ותחתונים להחיותם
For the mitzvot constitute G‑d’s innermost Will and His true desire, which is clothed in all the upper and lower worlds, thereby giving them life.
All the worlds are a product of G‑d’s Will. He desired that they exist, and this desire is what brought them into being. However, this desire is but an external manifestation of His underlying, internal Will — the desire for mitzvot. Why, in fact, does G‑d desire that the worlds exist? Because He desires that the mitzvot be performed — and this is possible only when there is someone to perform them, and when there are objects with which to perform them. To this end G‑d created all the worlds.
This can be illustrated by the analogy of a man who travels abroad on business. Naturally, he travels because he wishes to do so. But his “internal” (i.e., ultimate) desire in the journey, his underlying motive, lies in the profit he expects to reap. When we probe still deeper, we find that the desire for profit is itself an external expression of an even more “internal” desire — the desire for the things which he will be able to buy with the proceeds of his business. Here lies the true object of his pleasure. It is this desire which creates the desire for profit, which leads in turn to his desire to travel. So too in the case of the worlds and the mitzvot. G‑d’s external Will, His desire that the worlds exist, is motivated by His desire for the true object of His pleasure — the mitzvot. Thus, the mitzvot represent His innermost will. It is for their sake that G‑d gives life to all the worlds.
כי כל חיותם ושפעם תלוי במעשה המצות של התחתונים כנודע
The very life and sustenance of all the worlds is dependent upon the performance of the mitzvot by the creatures of the lower worlds, as is known — that performing a mitzvah draws G‑dly life and sustenance into all the worlds.
ונמצא שמעשה המצות וקיומן הוא לבוש הפנימי לפנימית רצון העליון
It follows that the performance and fulfillment of the mitzvot is the innermost garment for the innermost aspect of G‑d’s Will,
שממעשה זה נמשך אור וחיות רצון העליון להתלבש בעולמות
since it is due to this performance of the mitzvot that the light and life of the worlds issues forth from the Divine Will, to be clothed in them —
I.e., since G‑d desires the worlds only as a vehicle for the performance of the mitzvot, as explained above, and it is only for this reason that He animates the worlds.
ולכן נקראות אברי דמלכא, דרך משל, כמו שאברי גוף האדם הם לבוש לנפשו, ובטלים לגמרי אליה מכל וכל
Hence the mitzvot are figuratively described as “organs of the King.” For just as the organs of the human body are a garment for its soul, and are completely and utterly surrendered to it,
כי מיד שעולה ברצונו של אדם לפשוט ידו או רגלו הן נשמעות לרצונו תכף ומיד, בלי שום צווי ואמירה להן, ובלי שום שהייה כלל
as is evident from the fact that as soon as a person desires to stretch out his hand or foot, they obey his will immediately, without any command or instruction to them and with no delay whatever,
אלא כרגע ממש כשעלה ברצונו
but at the very instant that it entered his will.
The response of his organs is automatic; one need not consciously occupy himself with activating his hand. As to the phrase, “without any command or instruction”: When one must exert effort in activating his faculties (e.g., when one dislikes a particular task, but forces himself to do it on the strength of logic) this effort is spoken of as an internal command from one faculty to another. However, when one’s will activates the organs of his body, there is no such command involved.
כך דרך משל החיות של מעשה המצות וקיומן הוא בטל לגמרי לגבי רצון העליון המלובש בו, ונעשה לו ממש כגוף לנשמה
Just as the organs of the human body are completely united with one’s soul and are surrendered to it, so too is the life-force animating the performance and fulfillment of the commandments completely surrendered to the Divine Will which is clothed therein, and this life-force becomes, in relation to the Divine Will, like a body to a soul.
וכן הלבוש החיצון של נפש האלקית שבאדם המקיים ועושה המצוה, שהוא כח ובחינת המעשה שלה
Likewise the external garment of the divine soul, i.e., its faculty of action which is external compared to the faculties of speech and thought, since it functions outside oneself, of the person fulfilling and practicing the commandment,
הוא מתלבש בחיות של מעשה המצוה, ונעשה גם כן כגוף לנשמה לרצון העליון, ובטל אליו לגמרי
clothes itself in the vitality of the performance of the mitzvah, and thus it, too, becomes like a body to a soul in relation to the Divine Will; i.e., the soul’s power of action becomes united with the Divine Will in the same way as one’s body is united with his soul, and is completely surrendered to the Divine Will.
ועל כן גם אברי גוף האדם המקיימים המצוה, שכח ובחינת המעשה של נפש האלקית מלובש בהם בשעת מעשה וקיום המצוה, הם נעשו מרכבה ממש לרצון העליון
In this way, those organs of the human body which perform the mitzvah — i.e., those organs in which the divine soul’s faculty of action is clothed during the performance and fulfillment of the mitzvah — they, too, become a veritable vehicle (lit., merkavah — a “chariot”) for the Divine Will.
כגון היד המחלקת צדקה לעניים או עושה מצוה אחרת
For example, the hand which distributes charity to the poor, or performs another commandment becomes, in the act of performing the mitzvah, a “chariot” for the Divine Will.
ורגלים המהלכות לדבר מצוה, וכן הפה ולשון שמדברים דברי תורה, והמוח שמהרהר בדברי תורה ויראת שמים ובגדולת ה‘ ברוך הוא
Similarly the feet which walk for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah, or the mouth and tongue which speak words of Torah, or the brain reflecting on the Torah or on the fear of heaven, or on the greatness of G‑d, blessed be He.
When these organs are occupied with the mitzvot they are totally surrendered, like a chariot, to the Divine Will clothed in these mitzvot.
Note that a physical organ becomes merely a chariot for the Divine Will. It does not become surrendered to and unified with the Divine Will to the same extent as the divine soul’s faculty of action, whose unity the Alter Rebbe previously compared to the unity of body and soul. The unity of body and soul surpasses that of the chariot with its rider. Body and soul, although originally two separate, disparate entities, one physical and the other spiritual, become one entity when united. No part of the body is devoid of the soul; conversely, the soul completely adapts itself to the body, becoming transformed into a corporeal life-force. The divine soul’s faculty of action, being a G‑dly power, can achieve this level of unity with G‑d when it is employed in the performance of a mitzvah.
The organs of the body, on the other hand, although they too are involved in fulfilling the mitzvah, can reach no higher than the level illustrated in the analogy of the chariot. A chariot, having no will of its own, is indeed completely subservient to its rider — yet it is not united with him.
וזהו שאמרו רז״ל: האבות הן הן המרכבה
This is what the Sages meant when they said that3 “The Patriarchs are truly the [Divine] chariot,”
שכל אבריהם כולם היו קדושים ומובדלים מענייני עולם הזה, ולא נעשו מרכבה רק לרצון העליון לבדו כל ימיהם
for all their organs were completely holy and detached from mundane matters, and throughout their lives they served as a vehicle for nothing but the Divine Will.
The reason for the Sages’ designating specifically the Patriarchs as G‑d’s chariot, although every Jew’s body becomes a “chariot” when he performs a mitzvah, is that the Patriarchs‘ submission to the Divine Will was unique in its power, its scope, and its consistency. All their organs were totally surrendered to the Divine Will throughout their lives — whereas with other Jews, only those organs which perform a mitzvah are a “chariot”, and then only during the act. In fact, the same organ which today served as a “chariot” to G‑d’s Will might conceivably serve the opposite purpose tomorrow.
* * *
FOOTNOTES
1. Cf. I, 24a; II, 60a; Tikkunei Zohar 21b.
2. Tikkun 30.
3. Bereishit Rabbah 47:6.
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Rambam:
Daily Mitzvah N320 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Shabbat, 11 Shevat, 5775 • 31 January 2015
Daily Mitzvah N320 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Shabbat, 11 Shevat, 5775 • 31 January 2015
Negative Commandment 320 (Digest)
Working on Shabbat
"You shall not do any manner of work"—Exodus 20:10.
We are forbidden from performing work on Shabbat.
The 320th prohibition is that we are forbidden to do melachah1 on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2, ["It is Shabbos to the L‑rd, your G‑d;] do not do any melachah."
If the act was intentional, but the court has insufficient proof, Scripture3 specifies the punishment as kores.4 If the act was intentional, and there is sufficient proof,5 the punishment is execution by s'kilah.6 If the act was unintentional, he must bring a sin-offering.7
The details of this commandment are discussed in the tractate Shabbos.
Rabbi Berel Bell is a well-known educator, author and lecturer. He and his family reside in Montreal, Canada.
From "Sefer Hamitzvot in English," published by Sichos in English.
FOOTNOTES
1.Although melachah is commonly translated as "work," it actually indicates any one of 39 specific activities singled out by Torah tradition. Included among the 39 are such actions as writing, carrying outside, and tying a knot, even though they do not correspond to the English word "work."
2.Shmos 20:1. Devarim 5:14.
3.Ex. 31:14.
4.See Principle 14, where the Rambam defines kores as losing one's portion in the World to Come (unless the person does teshuvah before death). See also Hilchos Teshuvah, Chapter 8, Halachah. 1.
5.Literally, "the testimony was accepted." This phrase includes such requirements as prior warning of the defendant (hasra'a), testimony of at least 2 witnesses, etc. See N352.
6.Commonly translated as "stoning," it actually consisted of being thrown from a high platform. Only if the person did not die from the fall were actual stones used. See P229.
7.See P69. This offering is called a "fixed sin-offering" to distinguish it from the offering of adjustable value. See P72.
Translation of (the unabridged text of) Sefer Hamitzvot by Rabbi Berel Bell, member of the Rabbinical Court of Montreal and director of Teacher Training for the Jewish Learning Institute.
________________________________________
Working on Shabbat
"You shall not do any manner of work"—Exodus 20:10.
We are forbidden from performing work on Shabbat.
The 320th prohibition is that we are forbidden to do melachah1 on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2, ["It is Shabbos to the L‑rd, your G‑d;] do not do any melachah."
If the act was intentional, but the court has insufficient proof, Scripture3 specifies the punishment as kores.4 If the act was intentional, and there is sufficient proof,5 the punishment is execution by s'kilah.6 If the act was unintentional, he must bring a sin-offering.7
The details of this commandment are discussed in the tractate Shabbos.
Rabbi Berel Bell is a well-known educator, author and lecturer. He and his family reside in Montreal, Canada.
From "Sefer Hamitzvot in English," published by Sichos in English.
FOOTNOTES
1.Although melachah is commonly translated as "work," it actually indicates any one of 39 specific activities singled out by Torah tradition. Included among the 39 are such actions as writing, carrying outside, and tying a knot, even though they do not correspond to the English word "work."
2.Shmos 20:1. Devarim 5:14.
3.Ex. 31:14.
4.See Principle 14, where the Rambam defines kores as losing one's portion in the World to Come (unless the person does teshuvah before death). See also Hilchos Teshuvah, Chapter 8, Halachah. 1.
5.Literally, "the testimony was accepted." This phrase includes such requirements as prior warning of the defendant (hasra'a), testimony of at least 2 witnesses, etc. See N352.
6.Commonly translated as "stoning," it actually consisted of being thrown from a high platform. Only if the person did not die from the fall were actual stones used. See P229.
7.See P69. This offering is called a "fixed sin-offering" to distinguish it from the offering of adjustable value. See P72.
Translation of (the unabridged text of) Sefer Hamitzvot by Rabbi Berel Bell, member of the Rabbinical Court of Montreal and director of Teacher Training for the Jewish Learning Institute.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter a Day: Avodah Kochavim - Chapter TwelveAvodah Kochavim - Chapter Twelve
Halacha 1
We may not shave the corners of our heads as the idolaters and their priests do, as [Leviticus 19:27] states: "Do not cut off the corners of your heads."
One is liable for each corner. Therefore, a person who shaves both his temples - even if he were to do so simultaneously and had received only a single warning – is [liable for] two measures of lashes.
[This prohibition applies equally to] one who shaves off only the corners of his head and leaves the remainder of his hair, and to one who shaves his entire head at once. Since he has shaved the corners, he is [liable for] lashes.
To whom does the above apply? To the person who shaves. The person [whose head] is shaven is not lashed unless he assists the one who is shaving him. One who shaves [the corners of] a child's [head] should be [liable for] lashes.
Halacha 2
A woman is exempt if she shaves the head of a man or has her own head shaven. [Since Leviticus 19:27] states: "Do not cut off the corners of your heads and do not destroy the corners of your beards," [an association between the two prohibitions is established]. Whoever is liable for shaving is liable for cutting off the corners. Therefore, because women are not liable for shaving - since they do not have beards - they are not liable for cutting off the corners [of their heads]. Accordingly, slaves are forbidden to cut off the corners of their heads, since they do possess beards.
Halacha 3
All the Torah's prohibitions apply equally to men and women, with the exception of the prohibition against shaving, cutting off the corners of one's head, and the prohibition against priests contracting impurity through contact with a dead body.
Women are not obligated with regard to all positive commandments which apply from time to time and are not constant obligations, with the exception of the sanctification of [the Sabbath] day, eating matzah on Pesach night, eating and offering the Paschal sacrifice, hakhel, and the festive peace-offering for which they are obligated.
Halacha 4
The status of a tumtum and an androgynous is doubtful. Therefore, the stringencies applying to both a man and a woman are applied to them, and they are obligated by all [the mitzvot]. If, however, they transgress, they are not [liable for] lashes.
Halacha 5
Although a woman is permitted to shave the corners of her own head, she is forbidden to shave the corners of a man's head. She is even forbidden to shave the corners of a child's [head].
Halacha 6
The Sages did not determine the amount [of hair] which must be left in the corners of our temples. We have, however, heard from our elders that one must leave at least forty hairs.
One may remove the [hairs from] the corners [of our heads] with scissors. The prohibition applies only to total removal with a razor.
Halacha 8
It is customary for pagan priests to remove their beards. Therefore, the Torah forbade the removal of one's beard.
The beard has five "corners": the upper and lower cheek on both the right and left sides, and the hair on the chin. One is [liable for] lashes for the removal of each "corner." A person who removes them all at the same time is [liable for] five measures of lashes.
One is liable only when one shaves with a razor, as [implied by Leviticus 19:27]: "Do not destroy the corners of your beard." [We can infer that this applies only] to shaving which utterly destroys [one's facial hair]. Therefore, a person who removes his beard with scissors is exempt.
A person who allows himself to be shaved is not [liable for] lashes unless he provides assistance. A woman who has facial hair is allowed to shave it. If she shaves a man's beard, she is exempt.
Halacha 8
It is permitted to shave one's mustache - i.e., the hair on the upper lip, and, similarly, the hair which hangs from the lower lip. Even though the removal [of this hair] is permitted, it is customary for the Jews not to destroy it entirely. Rather, its ends may be removed so that it will not interfere with eating or drinking.
Halacha 9
The Torah does not forbid the removal of hair from other portions of the body - e.g., the armpits or the genitalia. This is, however, prohibited by the Rabbis. A man who removes [such hair] is given stripes for rebelliousness.
Where does the above apply? In places where it is customary only for women to remove such hair, so that one will not beautify himself as women do. In places where it is customary for both men and women to remove such hair, one is not given stripes. It is permitted to remove hair from our other limbs with scissors in all communities.
Halacha 10
A woman should not adorn herself as a man does - e.g., she may not place a turban or a hat on her head or wear armor or the like. She may not cut [the hair of] her head as men do.
A man should not adorn himself as a woman does - e.g., he should not wear colored garments or golden bracelets in a place where such garments and such bracelets are worn only by women. Everything follows local custom.
A man who adorns himself as a woman does, and a woman who adorns herself as a man does, are [liable for] lashes. When a man removes white hairs from among the dark hairs of his head or beard, he should be lashed as soon as he removes a single hair, because he has beautified himself as a woman does. Similarly, if he dyes his hair dark, he is given lashes after dyeing a single hair.
A tumtum and an androgynous may not wrap their heads [in a veil] as women do, or cut [the hair of] their head as men do. If they do [either of the above], they are not [liable for] lashes.
Halacha 11
The tattooing which the Torah forbids involves making a cut in one's flesh and filling the slit with eye-color, ink, or with any other dye that leaves an imprint. This was the custom of the idolaters, who would make marks on their bodies for the sake of their idols, as if to say that they are like servants sold to the idol and designated for its service.
When a person makes a mark with one of the substances that leave an imprint after making a slit in any place on his body, he is [liable for] lashes. [This prohibition is binding on] both men and women.
If a person wrote and did not dye, or dyed without writing by cutting [into his flesh], he is not liable. [Punishment is administered] only when he writes and dyes, as [Leviticus 19:28] states: "[Do not make] a dyed inscription [on yourselves]."
To whom does this apply? To the person doing the tattooing. A person who is tattooed [by others], however, is not liable unless he assisted the tattooer to the extent that it is considered that he performed a deed. If he did not perform a deed, he is not lashed.
Halacha 12
A person who gouges himself for the dead is lashed, as [Leviticus 19:28] states: "Do not gouge your flesh for the dead." This [prohibition] applies both to priests and to Israelites.
A person who makes a single gouge for five dead people or five gouges for a single dead person is [liable for] five measures of lashes, provided he is given a warning for each individual matter.
Halacha 13
Gashing and gouging oneself are [governed by] a single [prohibition]. Just as the pagans would gouge their flesh in grief over their dead, they would mutilate themselves for their idols, as [I Kings 18:28] states: "And they mutilated themselves according to their custom."
This is also forbidden by the Torah, as [Deuteronomy 14:1] states: "Do not mutilate yourselves." [The difference between the two is that if one gouges himself in grief over] the dead, whether he did so with his bare hands or with an instrument, he is [liable for] lashes; for the sake of idols, if one uses an instrument, one is liable for lashes. If one does so with one's bare hands, one is exempt.
Halacha 14
This commandment also includes [a prohibition] against there being two courts which follow different customs in a single city, since this can cause great strife. [Because of the similarity in the Hebrew roots,] the prohibition against gashing ourselves [can be interpreted] to mean: "Do not separate into various different groupings."
Halacha 15
A person who creates a bald spot [on his head] for a dead person is [liable for] lashes, as [Deuteronomy 14:1] states: "Do not make a bald spot between your eyes for a dead person." When either a priest or an Israelite makes a bald spot [on his head] for a dead person, he is [liable for] only a single measure of lashes.
A person who makes four or five bald spots for a single dead person is [liable for] a measure of lashes equivalent to the number of bald spots he made, provided he received a separate warning for each bald spot. There is no difference whether one created the bald spot with his hands or with a potion. If a person dipped his fingers into a potion and positioned them in five places on his head at the same time, since he created five bald spots, he is [liable for] five measures of lashes even though only a single warning was given, for they were all created at the same time.
One is liable [for creating a bald spot] on any part of the head, [not only] "between the eyes" [as is inferred from Leviticus 21:5]: "Do not make a bald spot on your heads."
What is the measure of a bald spot? An area on one's head the size of a griswhich is free of hair.
Halacha 16
16. A person who makes a bald spot on his head or gouges his flesh because his house falls or because his ship sinks at sea is exempt. One is lashed only [if he carries out these acts] for the sake of a deceased person or if he gashes his flesh for the sake of an idol.
[The following laws apply] when a person creates a bald spot on a colleague's head, makes a gash on a colleague's flesh, or tattoos his colleague's flesh while his colleague assists him. If they both intended to violate the prohibition, both receive lashes. If one violated the prohibition inadvertently and the other did so intentionally, the one who performed the act intentionally is [liable for] lashes, and his colleague is exempt.
Commentary Halacha 1
In this chapter, the Rambam describes several prohibitions which comprise rites that do not involve the actual worship of idols. The Torah forbids them, however, because they are connected with ceremonial practices performed by idolaters. Note also the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 37, where the Rambam mentions this concept.
The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 181) takes issue with the Rambam's statements, noting that there is no statement in the Bible, the Mishnah, or the Talmud, which mentions this point. He objects to the association of the mitzvot with any particular rationale. From a halachic perspective, the mitzvot should be fulfilled because they are God's decrees, independent of any rational explanation.
The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah, ibid.) defends the Rambam's statements, based on the ending of Hilchot Me'ilah, where the Rambam states:
It is proper for a person to meditate on the judgments of the holy Torah and know their ultimate rationale to the extent of his capacity.
There are other authorities who draw out halachic concepts from the association of these prohibitions with idol worship. For example, based on this connection, the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 251) and Sefer HaKovetz forbid the removal of facial hair even when the prohibition against shaving is not violated, as mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 7.
We may not shave - The Torah's prohibition applies only to shaving. One may cut this hair with scissors, as explained in Halachah 6.
the corners of our heads - The definition of this term is found in Halachah 6.
as the idolaters and their priests do - Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 251) explains that this is a particularly severe prohibition, since its violation involves making a sign for idolatry on our own bodies.
as [Leviticus 19:27] states: "Do not cut off the corners of your heads." -Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 43) and Sefer HaChinuch (ibid.) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
One is liable for each corner. Therefore, a person who shaves both his temples - even if he were to do so simultaneously and had received only a single warning - is [liable for] two measures of lashes. - In Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.), the Rambam explains that although this prohibition involves two different activities (shaving the right corner and shaving the left corner), it is not considered to be two mitzvot, because the Torah's expression forbidding such shaving includes both sides in the same phrase. Had the Torah mentioned both the right and left sides, it would be considered to be two mitzvot.
[This prohibition applies equally to] one who shaves off only the corners of his head and leaves the remainder of his hair - As mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 1, this style of cutting hair is referred to as a blorit and was practiced by the gentiles.
and to one who shaves his entire head at once - in which case, he does not resemble the gentiles (Sefer HaMitzvot, ibid.).
Since he has shaved the corners, he is [liable for] lashes. - From this, we see that the mitzvah is not dependent on the rationale mentioned above.
To whom does the above apply? To the person who shaves - either his own head or a colleague's head. When, however, a person shaves a colleague's head,
The person [whose head] is shaven is not lashed - The Ra'avad maintains that this person is not punished because he did not perform a deed. He is, however, considered to have transgressed the Torah's prohibition. The Kessef Mishneh disagrees and maintains that since he did not perform the deed of shaving, he is not considered to have violated the prohibition at all. This applies even when he specifically ordered the person who shaved him to do so. The Ra'avad's opinion is, however, supported by the Lechem Mishneh and other authorities.
unless he assists the one who is shaving him - by moving his head so that it is easier to shave.
One who shaves [the corners of] a child's - a minor below the age of 13
[head] should be [liable for] lashes. - A child would not be held responsible if he shaved himself, because a child is not held liable for the violation of any of the Torah's prohibitions until he reaches majority. Nevertheless, an adult is responsible for shaving the child's head (Nazir 57b).
This point is not, however, accepted by all authorities. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah, ibid.) mentions other opinions which do not hold a person liable for shaving a child's head.
Commentary Halacha 2
A woman is exempt if she shaves the head of a man - who would be liable if he shaved his own head
or - assists the shaver while she
has her own head shaven. - The Kessef Mishneh differentiates between these two instances. With regard to shaving a man's head, he explains that although a woman is exempt, she is, nevertheless, forbidden to do so (Halachah 5). With regard to shaving her own head, there is no prohibition whatsoever.
[Since Leviticus 19:27] states: "Do not cut off the corners of your heads and do not destroy the corners of your beards," [an association between the two prohibitions is established]. - This association also teaches other concepts - among them, that one is liable only when one removes the hair with a razor.
Whoever is liable for shaving is liable for cutting off the corners. Therefore, because women are not liable for shaving - since they -generally
do not have beards - Although Kiddushin 35b mentions several ways to derive this concept through Biblical exegesis, the Rambam chooses to rely on the simple fact of the matter.
they are not liable for cutting off the corners [of their heads]. Accordingly, slaves - whose performance of mitzvot is generally equated with that of women (Chaggigah 4a)
are forbidden to cut off the corners of their heads, since they do possess beards. - Had the Rambam derived the above point from the exegesis of a Biblical verse, this conclusion would not be acceptable. Since, however, he derives the concept from logic, the same logic leads to the conclusion that slaves be held liable for this act (Kessef Mishneh).
Commentary Halacha 3
This halachah can be understood within the context of the Rambam's conception of the Mishneh Torah as a guide to the Oral Law in its entirety, as he states in his introduction to that text:
Directly after reading the Written Law, one will read this text and understand from it the entire Oral Law, without requiring to read any other text.
Thus, although the subject matter of this and the following halachah are of a far greater scope than the particular prohibition discussed previously, the Rambam mentions these principles for the sake of the text's more encompassing goal.
All the Torah's prohibitions apply equally to men and women - Kiddushin35a derives this concept from Numbers 5:6, "When a man or a woman commits any of the transgressions that men commit...."
with the exception of the prohibition against shaving, cutting off the corners of one's head - as mentioned in the previous halachah,
and the prohibition against priests contracting impurity through contact with a dead body. - The verse prohibiting such contact, Leviticus 21:1, begins, "Speak unto the sons of Aharon...."Kiddushin 35b explains that this expression excludes women.
Women are not obligated with regard to all positive commandments which apply from time to time and are not constant obligations - This refers to mitzvot which are applicable only on certain days - e.g., the blowing of the shofar and the taking of the lulav and etrog - and also mitzvot that are applicable during the day and not the night - e.g., Tefillin.
with the exception of the sanctification of [the Sabbath] day - through the recitation of kiddush. Since women are obligated by the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, they are also obligated by the positive commandment of sanctifying its holiness (Berachot 20b).
The restriction of this mitzvah to the Sabbath follows the opinion of the Lechem Mishnah, who maintains that the sanctification of the festivals is a Rabbinic injunction. There are, however, other opinions, which consider the mitzvah as applying to the festivals as well.
eating matzah on Pesach night - Since women are obligated by the prohibition against eating chametz, they are also obligated by the positive commandment of eating matzah (Pesachim 43b).
eating and offering the Paschal sacrifice - Pesachim 91b explains that the Torah uses the expression (Exodus 12:4): "According to the number of souls [in a household]... individuals should be designated for the lamb," to include women in the observance of this mitzvah.
hakhel - The gathering of the entire Jewish people to hear the reading of the Torah by the king which is held every seven years. (See Deuteronomy 31:10-13.) Here, the Torah explicitly mentions that women should attend.
and celebration of the festivals - Though in a larger sense this refers to all forms of celebration, in particular it refers to the offering of peace sacrifices in connection with the festival. (See Hilchot Chaggigah 1:1.)
In this instance as well, the Torah specifically mentions the obligation of women to participate in the celebrations, as Deuteronomy 16:14 states: "And you shall rejoice, you, your son, your daughter, your male and female servants...."
for which they are obligated. - Similarly, women are obligated to fulfill most positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time - e.g., the belief in God, mezuzah, and Tzedakah. There are, however, several positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time which women are not obligated to fulfill - e.g., Torah study, the redemption of the first born, and the remembrance of Amalek. (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:7.)
Commentary Halacha 4
The status of a tumtum - The word tumtum has its roots in the word atum, which means "a solid block." It refers to a person whose genitalia are covered by skin, and it is impossible to determine whether he is male or female. (See also Hilchot Ishut 2:25.)
Should a tumtum undergo an operation and it be revealed that he is either male or female, he is bound by the laws which apply to that gender.
and an androgynous - Androgynous is a combination of the Greek words meaning "man" and "woman." It refers to a person who possesses the sexual organs of both genders. (See also Hilchot Ishut 2:24.)
is doubtful - i.e., it is doubtful whether they are governed by the laws applying to a man or those applying to a woman. The doubts are, however, different in nature. With regard to a tumtum, we are doubtful what is his true gender. With regard to an androgynous, however, the question revolves around the Sages' failure to define his status.
Therefore, the stringencies applying to both a man - The obligation to perform all the positive commandments that are associated with time, and the various other commandments which men are obligated to perform, but women are not.
and a woman - Bikkurim 4:3 explains that this refers to the prohibition against being alone with men (yichud), and the laws of ritual impurity that apply to women.
are applied to them, and they are obligated by all [the mitzvot]. If, however, they transgress - any of the three commandments for which men are held liable and women are not
they are not [liable for] lashes. - Punishment is not administered when we are in doubt of the person's obligation.
Commentary Halacha 5
Although a woman is permitted to shave the corners of her own head - as mentioned in Halachah 2
she is forbidden to shave the corners of a man's head. - As stated in that halachah, she is not punished for doing so. The Ra'avad and the Kessef Mishneh maintain that this prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. Other authorities, however, state that the prohibition stems from the Torah itself.
She is even forbidden to shave the corners of a child's [head]. - Though the child himself would not be held liable, an adult is liable for shaving the corners of his head, as stated in Halachah 1. Therefore, even a woman is forbidden to shave the corners of his head. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, based onNazir 57b, does not accept the Rambam's view, and maintains that a woman may shave a child's head.
Commentary Halacha 6
The Sages did not determine the amount [of hair] which must be left in the corners of our temples. - The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 181:1, defines "corners" as referring to the place where the skull is joined to the jaw. The Beit Lechem Yehudah writes that the area which the Ari zal would leave uncut extended slightly above his ears.
We have, however, heard from our elders that one must leave at least forty - The Tur's text of the Rambam stated "four" instead of "forty."
hairs. - In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that the forbidden area is about the size of a thumb.
One may remove the [hairs from] the corners [of our heads] with scissors. - In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that he would trim the corners of his head. He explains that - in contrast to the law applying to a Nazarite's hair - there is no positive commandment to allow this hair to grow and no need to do so. In many Jewish communities, however, it is customary to allow this hair to grow. Since its removal involves the violation of a Torah prohibition, they consider the growth of this hair as a sign of Jewish identity.
The prohibition applies only to total removal with a razor. - As is explained in the commentary on the following halachah, there is a debate among the Rabbinic authorities if it is permissible to remove this hair using scissors or even using implements whose effectiveness is equivalent to that of a razor.
Commentary Halacha 7
It is customary for pagan priests to remove their beards. - Note our commentary on Halachah 1. In Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 44), the Rambam notes that even in his time, it was customary for Christian monks to shave their faces.
Therefore, the Torah forbade the removal of one's beard. - Sefer HaMitzvot(ibid.) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 252) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The beard has five "corners": the upper and lower cheek on both the right and left sides, and the hair on the chin. - The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 181:11) writes that there are many opinions with regard to the definition of these five "corners." There, "anyone who fears heaven should fulfill all the opinions and not shave any portion of his beard with a razor."
One is [liable for] lashes for the removal of each "corner." - As implied by the verse's mention of "the corners of your beard," and not merely "your beard" (Sefer HaMitzvot, ibid.).
A person who removes them all at the same time is [liable for] five measures of lashes. - Nevertheless, as explained in the commentary on Halachah 1, the prohibition is considered to be a single mitzvah, and not five.
One is liable only when one shaves with a razor, as [implied by Leviticus 19:27]: "Do not destroy the corners of your beard." [We can infer that this applies only] to shaving which utterly destroys [one's facial hair]. Therefore, a person who removes his beard with scissors is exempt. - From the Rambam's expression, it appears that the removal of facial hair with scissors is forbidden. One is not, however, punished for such an act (Sefer HaChinuch, ibid.; Ma'aseh Rokeach). The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 181) differs, and maintains that it is permitted to remove one's facial hair as long as one does not use a razor.
In addition, as mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 1, the Minchat Chinuch and Sefer HaKovetz explain that by mentioning the fact that gentile priests remove their facial hair, the Rambam implies that removing such hair violates the prohibition of following "the paths of the gentiles." (See Chapter 11, Halachah 1.) In the context of this prohibition, the means used to remove the facial hair are of no consequence.
Other authorities (Rashba, Vol. IV, Responsum 90; Shibbolei Leket; Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, Responsum 93) forbid the removal of one's facial hair within the context of the prohibition against a man's adorning himself in the same manner as a woman. (See Halachot 9 and 10.) In this context as well, it makes no difference how one removes the hair.
Many contemporary authorities have explained that in addition to all these points, growing a beard has been accepted as a sign that a person is God-fearing and precise in his observance of the mitzvot. Accordingly, anyone who desires to be viewed as such should not remove his beard even if he does not use a razor.
A person who allows himself to be shaved is not [liable for] lashes unless he provides assistance. - Note our commentary on Halachah 1.
A woman who has facial hair is allowed to shave it - since this is not the norm. Kiddushin 35b derives this concept from the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus quoted above.
If she shaves a man's beard, she is exempt. - It is, however, forbidden for her to do so, as explained in Halachah 1.
Commentary Halacha 8
It is permitted to shave one's mustache - i.e., the hair on the upper lip, and, similarly, the hair which hangs from the lower lip. - Mo'ed Katan 18a allows the shaving of this hair because it is not one of the five "corners" of the beard.
Even though the removal [of this hair] is permitted, it is customary for the Jews not to destroy it entirely. - This statement reinforces the interpretation mentioned in the previous halachah, that maintains which the Rambam did not allow one's facial hair to be removed by means other than shaving.
It must be noted that there are authorities who object to the shaving of the mustache. Rabbenu Chanan'el explained that the corners of the mustache are the two lower "corners" of the beard. Others (among them Rabbenu Yonah and the Bayit Chadash) associate its removal with the prohibitions against following the "ways of gentiles" and adorning oneself as does a woman.
Rather, its ends may be removed so that it will not interfere with eating or drinking. - The Rabbis have explained that it is proper manners to remove the hair which interferes with eating. Even the Kabbalists who would not touch their beards at all would trim their mustaches (Ben Ish Chai).
Commentary Halacha 9
The Torah does not forbid the removal of hair from other portions of the body - e.g., the armpits or the genitalia - which are often shaved by women.
This is, however, prohibited by the Rabbis - as an extension of the prohibition against a man beautifying himself in the same manner as a woman does. The classification of the removal of such hair as a Rabbinic prohibition is not agreed upon by all authorities. The Tzemach Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah, Responsum 93) brings opinions which maintain that shaving this hair is within the scope of the Torah prohibition.
The Kessef Mishneh explains the distinction between the Torah prohibition and the Rabbis' decree as follows: The Torah prohibition involves any adornment which is openly detectable. The Rabbis extended the scope of the prohibition and included even acts of beautification which are private.
A man who removes [such hair] is given stripes for rebelliousness. - The punishment given for violating any Rabbinic ordinance.
Where does the above apply? In places where it is customary only for women to remove such hair, so that one will not beautify himself as women do. - Which is prohibited, as mentioned in the following halachah.
In places where it is customary for both men - The Prisha (Yoreh De'ah182) states that the word "men" refers even to gentiles. Even if gentile men follow this practice, a Jew is not punished for doing so.
and women to remove such hair, one is not given stripes. It is permitted -The expression, "one is not given stripes," and the contrasting statement, "It is permitted," lead to the conclusion that, even in these communities, it is forbidden for men to remove this hair. The Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 182:1) differs, and grants permission for men to remove such hair in these communities.
When there are medical reasons requiring the removal of such hair, even the more stringent views allow it to be shaved off (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah182:4).
to remove hair from our other limbs with scissors - but not with a razor (Siftei Cohen 182:3).
in all communities.
Commentary Halacha 10
A woman should not adorn herself as a man does - Sefer HaMitzvot(Negative Commandment 39) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 542) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Curiously, with regard to this and the following prohibition, the Rambam departs from his usual custom and does not mention the Biblical proof-text, Deuteronomy 22:5, for these prohibitions.
e.g., she may not place a turban or a hat on her head - Needless to say, a hat that was styled for women is permitted. As the Rambam states later in the halachah, everything depends on local custom.
or wear armor - Many sources (e.g., Nazir 59a; Targum Onkelos on Deuteronomy, ibid.) directly associate this prohibition with a woman's donning armor or carrying weapons. Significantly, in the listing of mitzvot which precedes these halachot, the Rambam defines the mitzvah as prohibiting a woman from wearing "armament or a man's apparel."
or the like. She may not cut [the hair of] her head as men do - i.e., a woman's coiffure may not resemble a man's. The Yemenite manuscripts of theMishneh Torah read יגלה, "reveal," instead of יגלח, "cut." According to that version, the Rambam is saying that when a woman goes out without covering her head, in addition to violating the basic laws of modesty (see Hilchot Ishut24:11-12; Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:17), she is also transgressing this Torah prohibition.
A man should not adorn himself as a woman does - Sefer HaMitzvot(Negative Commandment 40) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 543) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.), the Rambam mentions two rationales for this and the previous prohibition:
a) Such behavior would lead to licentiousness;
b) The pagans would often dress in this manner for their rituals.
a) Such behavior would lead to licentiousness;
b) The pagans would often dress in this manner for their rituals.
e.g., he should not wear colored garments or golden bracelets in a place where such garments and such bracelets are worn only by women. Everything follows local custom. - Accordingly, the definition of the pertinent rulings changes according to the norms of the society. Garments which might have been forbidden for men or women in one era may be permitted in another, depending on the standards set by the particular society.
A man who adorns himself as a woman does, and a woman who adorns herself as a man does, are [liable for] lashes. - Note the Ramah's statements, Orach Chayim 696:8, which state that on Purim or at a wedding, this prohibition may be waived for the sake of adding to the festive mood of the celebration. TheBayit Chadash and others, however, do not accept this leniency.
When a man removes white hairs from among the dark hairs of his head or beard - to prevent the process of aging from being detected
he should be lashed - for violating this prohibition. The Ra'avad (see alsoSho'el UMeshiv, Vol. I, Responsum 210) differs, and maintains that such an act violates only a Rabbinic prohibition. His opinion, however, is not accepted by the later authorities (Darchei Teshuvah 182:15).
as soon as he removes a single hair, because he has beautified himself as a woman does. - Women are accustomed - and therefore, allowed - to hide their age, but not men.
Similarly, if he dyes his hair dark, he is given lashes after dyeing a single hair. - The prohibition applies only when one attempts to look younger. Dyeing one's hair grey is not forbidden (Turei Zahav 182:7).
A tumtum and an androgynous - whose status with regard to gender is doubtful, as explained in Halachah 4.
may not wrap their heads [in a veil] as women do, or cut [the hair of] their head as men do. - As the Rambam states in that halachah, "the stringencies of both a man and a woman are applied to them." Hence, they are not allowed to clothe themselves in a manner which is distinct to either a man or a woman.
According to the Yemenite manuscripts mentioned above which substitute יגלה, "reveal," for יגלח, "cut," this clause also must be amended accordingly.
If they do [either of the above],they are not [liable for] lashes - because we are unsure of their gender. Accordingly, it cannot be definitely said that a prohibition has been violated.
Commentary Halacha 11
The tattooing which the Torah forbids - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 41) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 253) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
involves making a cut in one's flesh and filling the slit with eye-color, ink, or with any other dye that leaves an imprint. - The Minchat Chinuch(Mitzvah 253) states that the order mentioned by the Rambam is significant. If it is reversed and the ink is placed on the skin before an incision is made, one is exempt. TheSiftei Cohen (Yoreh De'ah 180:1), however, does not accept this view.
This was the custom of the idolaters, who would make marks on their bodies for the sake of their idols - branding themselves
as if to say that they are like servants sold to the idol and designated for its service. - In Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.), the Rambam states that certain sects in Egypt followed these practices in his time as well.
When a person makes a mark with one of the substances that leave an imprint after making a slit in any place on his body, he is [liable for] lashes. - TheTosefta (Makkot 3:9) adds that one must have the intent that the inscription is made for the sake of idol worship. This point, however, is not accepted by the halachic authorities.
[This prohibition is binding on] both men and women. - The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 180:4, states that one is exempt for branding a servant. The Ramah, however, explains that it is, nevertheless, forbidden to do so.
If a person wrote - by cutting into his flesh
and did not dye, or dyed without writing by cutting [into his flesh], he is not liable - for punishment. The Rambam's expression implies that although the person is not lashed, both of these acts are forbidden.
The Minchat Chinuch (ibid.) explains that the prohibition against writing on one's flesh applies only when the imprint left by the ink or dye is permanent. If it is removable, it is not forbidden. In this manner, he justifies the acts of people who jot down notes on their flesh when they have no paper available.
[Punishment is administered] only when he writes and dyes, as [Leviticus 19:28] states: "[Do not make] a dyed inscription [on yourselves]." - The two words "dyed inscription" imply that both activities must be performed for the person to be held liable.
To whom does this apply? To the person doing the tattooing - on himself or on a colleague.
A person who is tattooed [by others], however, is not liable unless he assisted the tattooer to the extent that it is considered that he performed a deed. If he did not perform a deed, he is not lashed. - The Kessef Mishneh compares this to the prohibition against shaving the corners of one's head (Halachah 1). Based on this comparison, there are authorities who maintain that although punishment is not administered - because punishment is administered only when a person commits a deed which violates a prohibition - the person who is tattooed is still considered to have transgressed this Torah prohibition.
Commentary Halacha 12
A person who gouges himself for the dead - The prohibition applies only when a person makes such gouges as a sign of bereavement over the dead. Even when he gouges himself as an expression of grief for other matters, he is not liable, as stated in Halachah 16. Nevertheless, as stated in the following halachah, one is also liable for gashing or gouging oneself for idols.
is lashed, as [Leviticus 19:28] states: "Do not gouge your flesh for the dead." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 45) and Sefer HaChinuch(Mitzvah 467) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
This [prohibition] applies both to priests and to Israelites. - ThoughLeviticus 21:5 specifically forbids the priests from expressing their grief in this manner, that injunction is not considered to be a separate commandment. This prohibition applies to both men and women.
A person who makes a single gouge for five dead people -Makkot 20b and theSifra derive this concept through the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus cited above. Although he performs only a single activity, the verse teaches us that he is held responsible for each person he has in mind.
or five gouges for a single dead person is [liable for] five measures of lashes - Each separate act warrants retribution.
provided he is given a warning for each individual matter. - Note Halachah 15, which explains an instance where one is liable for five measures of lashes even though only a single warning is given, Seemingly, the same law would apply in this instance (Turei Even).
Commentary Halacha 13
Gashing and gouging oneself - Based on Makkot 21a, it appears that gashing is done with an instrument, and gouging with one's bare hands. Nevertheless, they
are [governed by] a single [prohibition]. - Thus, regardless of how one performs the act, if one mutilates oneself in grief over the dead, one is held liable. There are opinions (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 180:7), however, which allow one to beat one's flesh in grief until blood flows.
Just as the pagans would gouge their flesh in grief over their dead, they would mutilate themselves for their idols - TheKessef Mishneh explains that this mutilation was not part of the rites used to worship the false deity - for if so, a violator would be executed - but rather a voluntary act, intended to attract the deity's attention.
as [I Kings 18:28] states - regarding the prophets of the Baal who engaged in the confrontation with the prophet Elijah at Mount Carmel:
"And they mutilated themselves according to their custom." - This implies that this was not an isolated occurrence, but rather the routine followed by the Baal's priests.
This is also forbidden by the Torah, as [Deuteronomy 14:1] states: "Do not mutilate yourselves." - This injunction is not considered to be a separate commandment, but rather a further explanation of the mitzvah stated previously.
[The difference between the two is that if one gouges himself in grief over] the dead, whether he did so with his bare hands or with an instrument, he is [liable for] lashes; - Since the verse from Deuteronomy also concludes "for the dead," it appears that both gashing and gouging are forbidden essentially as mourning rites. There is, however, an added dimension to the prohibition against gashing; doing so
for the sake of idols - In such an instance
if one uses an instrument, one is liable for lashes. - Since that is the normal practice, as the verse from Kings continues: "With their swords and lances."
If one does so with one's bare hands, one is exempt. - Doing so is, nevertheless, forbidden (Tzemach Tzedek).
Commentary Halacha 14
This commandment also includes [a prohibition] - In Sefer HaMitzvot(Negative Commandment 45), the Rambam explains that the interpretation which follows is an allegory, and the simple meaning of the verse is to prohibit gashing oneself in grief. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Rambam includes this "allegory" in a text which is, as he states in his introduction, "halachot, halachot." Thus, he emphasizes how important unity is to the Jewish people.
There is an important halachic dimension to the Rambam's explanation in Sefer HaMitzvot. One of the principles of Torah law is that punishment is never administered for the violation of a לאו שבכללות ("a prohibition which includes within it several different injunctions;" see Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3). If this allegorical interpretation of the mitzvah were considered to be included in the simple meaning of the mitzvah, this principle would also apply regarding this mitzvah, and lashes might not be administered when one gashed oneself in mourning (Kessef Mishneh).
against there being two courts which follow different customs in a single city, since this can cause great strife. - This decision has been the subject of much discussion among the Rabbis, because it appears to run contrary to one of the accepted principles of halachah.
The Rabbis concluded that whenever there is a difference in opinion between Abbaye and Ravva, the halachah follows Ravva, with the exception of six specific instances (יעל קגם). In the present case, the Rambam quotes Abbaye's opinion even though Ravva differs, stating that the prohibition applies only when one follows a divergent opinion without the support of a formal Rabbinical court (Yevamot 14a). When, however, there is a Rabbinical court which advocates each of the differing opinions - e.g., the differences of opinion between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel - there is no prohibition against following either view until the halachah is determined by the supremeSanhedrin.
Many authorities have advanced different explanations for the Rambam's decision. The most straightforward is that of the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1384), who explains that the Rambam favored Abbaye's view because of the emphasis on unity. Furthermore, selecting it over Ravva's in this instance does not represent a break with the accepted tradition, since the difference of opinion here does not center on positions adopted by Abbaye and Ravva independently, but rather on their interpretation of Resh Lakish's statements.
[Because of the similarity in the Hebrew roots,] - The Hebrew גדד means both "gash" and "group."
the prohibition against gashing ourselves [can be interpreted] to mean: "Do not separate into various different groupings." - It must be noted that the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this halachah as law. It would appear that while many of the subsequent Rabbis appreciate the ideal of unity this halachah espouses, they felt that compelling people to conform to a uniform standard would create more strife than would result from the existence of different views.
One of the practical applications of the issues under discussion is the issue of differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazic religious practices (and similarly, the variety of different approaches that exist within these two major groupings). All of the contemporary authorities agree that it is desirable for each group to adhere to its native customs without change. This plurality of halachic perspectives is an expression - and not a negation - of the all-encompassing unity that permeates Torah Judaism. (See Ezrat Cohen, Responsum 103.)
Commentary Halacha 15
A person who creates a bald spot [on his head] for a dead person - Even today, we find the colloquialism, "tear out his hair in grief."
is [liable for] lashes - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 171) andSefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 468) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. It is significant that the Rambam did not list this prohibition together with the previous ones in Sefer HaMitzvot.
as [Deuteronomy 14:1] states: "Do not make a bald spot between your eyes - Menachot 37b explains that here the intent is not the area which is literally "between the eyes," but rather the center of the head.
for a dead person." When either a priest or an Israelite makes a bald spot [on his head] for a dead person, he is [liable for] only a single measure of lashes. - Although, as the Rambam quotes below, Leviticus 21:5 states specifically that a priest may not create a bald spot on his head, that verse should not be understood to be a separate commandment, but rather a further elaboration of this prohibition.
In Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 171), the Rambam elaborates on this subject, explaining that since the mitzvah cannot be derived in its entirety from the verse in Deuteronomy, the verse in Leviticus is not considered to be a second mitzvah applying to priests alone, but rather a further definition of that same command.
A person who makes four or five bald spots for a single dead person is [liable for] a measure of lashes equivalent to the number of bald spots he made, provided he received a separate warning for each bald spot - as explained in Halachah 12. If, however, he creates a single bald spot for five individuals, he is [liable for] only a single measure of lashes. In contrast, were he to gouge himself once for each of these individuals he would receive a commensurate number of measures of lashes.
There is no difference whether one created the bald spot with his hands -pulling his hair out
or with a potion - that removes the hair chemically.
If a person dipped his fingers into a potion and positioned them in five places on his head at the same time, since he created five bald spots, he is [liable for] five measures of lashes - because it is considered as if he performed five different activities.
even though only a single warning was given - That warning can be applied to each of the bald spots he created
for they were all created at the same time.
One is liable [for creating a bald spot] on any part of the head, [not only] "between the eyes" - as mentioned in the verse from Deuteronomy quoted above.
[as is inferred from Leviticus 21:5]: "Do not make a bald spot on your heads." - Makkot 20b explains that this verse is used to define the scope of the prohibition for everyone, both priests and Israelites.
What is the measure of a bald spot? An area on one's head the size of a gris - Nega'im 6:1 defines a gris as an area which encompasses 36 hairs as they stand naturally on one's head. Contemporary authorities explain that this is approximately the size of an American dime or slightly smaller than an Israeli telephone token.
which is free of hair. - Rabbenu Asher disagrees and maintains that one is liable even if he removes two hairs. Furthermore, even the removal of a single hair is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 180:9; Gilyon HaMaharsha.)
Commentary Halacha 16
A person who makes a bald spot on his head or gouges his flesh - for sources of grief other than a person's death - e.g.,
because his house falls or because his ship sinks at sea is exempt. -Though it is forbidden to do, punishment is not administered.
One is lashed only [if he carries out these acts] for the sake of a deceased person - as mentioned in the Biblical proof-texts
or if he gashes his flesh - with a utensil
for the sake of an idol - as explained in Halachah 13.
[The following laws apply] when a person creates a bald spot on a colleague's head, makes a gash on a colleague's flesh, or tattoos his colleague's flesh while his colleague assists him. - As explained above, the person who performs these activities is held liable. In contrast, the person to whom these acts are done is held liable only if he assists in the performance of the deed.
If they both intended to violate the prohibition, both receive lashes. -Each is held liable as if he performed the prohibition himself in its entirety.
If one violated the prohibition inadvertently and one did so intentionally, the one who performed the act intentionally is [liable for] lashes, and his colleague is exempt. - Apparently, he is not required even to bring a sacrifice. The obligation to bring a sacrifice is a sign of Divine mercy, intended to allow a person to gain atonement. Since his colleague is [liable for] lashes for the transgression, he is not given the opportunity to atone for his part in the sin merely through offering a sacrifice.
Rambam:
• 3 Chapters a Day: Eruvin - Chapter Three, Eruvin - Chapter Four, Eruvin - Chapter Five
Eruvin - Chapter Three
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] there is a window between two courtyards: If the window is four handbreadths by four handbreadths1 or larger and it is within ten handbreadths of the ground - whether it is [almost] entirely above ten handbreadths and only a [small] portion is within ten handbreadths, or it is [almost] entirely within ten handbreadths and only a [small] portion is above ten handbreadths - [an option is granted to] the inhabitants of the courtyards.2
If they desire to join in a single eruv, they may. This causes [the entire area] to be considered a single courtyard, and carrying is permitted from one [courtyard] to the other.3 If they desire, they may make two eruvim, each for [the inhabitants of their respective courtyards]. [It is then forbidden] to carry from one courtyard to the other.]
If the windows are smaller than four [handbreadths by four handbreadths] or the entire window is above ten handbreadths from the ground,4 they may make two eruvim, each for [the inhabitants of the respective courtyard].
Halacha 2
When does the above apply? To a window between two courtyards. When, by contrast, the window lies between two houses,5 [they are permitted to make aneruv] even if the window is above ten handbreadths from the ground.6
Similarly, when there is a window between a house and a loft, if the inhabitants desire to establish a single eruv they may, even if there is not a ladder [leading to the window], provided [the window] is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths]. If the window is round and it can circumscribe a square that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], it is considered as if it were square.
Halacha 3
When there is a wall or a mound of hay that is less than ten handbreadths high7between two courtyards, they must make a single eruv and may not make twoeruvim. If [the wall or the mound] is ten or more handbreadths high, they must make two eruvim, each for the respective courtyard.
If there is a ladder8 on either side of the wall,9 it is considered to be an entrance, and if they desire, they may establish a single eruv. Even if the ladder is standing upright, next to the wall, and it is impossible to ascend it without moving its lower portion away from the wall, it permits [them to participate in a single eruv]. [Moreover,] even if the top of the ladder does not reach the top of the wall, if there are less than three handbreadths between them,10 it permits them to participate in a single eruv if they desire.
Halacha 4
If the wall is four [handbreadths] wide and a ladder is positioned on either side of the wall, they may make a single eruv, if they desire.11 If the wall is not four [handbreadths] wide, and there are less than three handbreadths between the [two] ladders, they may make a single eruv.12 If there are more than three handbreadths between [the ladders], they must make two eruvim.13
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] one builds a bench14 above a bench at the side of a wall [separating two courtyards]: If the lower bench is four handbreadths [high], [we consider it as if the height of the wall] were reduced.15If the lower [bench] is not four handbreadths [high], but there are less than three handbreadths between it and the upper [bench], [we consider it as if the height of the wall] were reduced.
[In such situations,] if [the inhabitants of the courtyards] desire, they may make a single eruv. Similar [principles apply] regarding wooden steps placed close to a wall.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] there is a high wall separating two courtyards, and a projection16 protrudes from the middle of the wall: If less than ten cubits remain from the projection to the top of the wall, one may lean a ladder in front of the projection,17 and [this grants the inhabitants] the option of making a single eruv. If, however, one stands the ladder [against the wall] at the side of the projection, [we do] not [consider it as if the height of the wall were] reduced.18
If the wall is nineteen handbreadths high, [it is sufficient] to have a projection protrude for the inhabitants to have the option of making a single eruv. For there are less than ten handbreadths from the earth to the projection, and less than ten handbreadths from the projection to the top of the wall.19
Were the wall to be twenty handbreadths high, two projections are required for the inhabitants to have the option of establishing a single eruv. [Moreover, the projections] may not be parallel to each other:20 [In this way,] there will be less than ten handbreadths between the lower projection and the ground, and less than ten handbreadths between the upper projection and the top of the wall.
Halacha 7
If a date palm is chopped down and inclined from the earth to the top of a wall, the inhabitants have the option of establishing a single eruv.21 It is not necessary for them to make it a permanent part of the structure. Similarly, the [very] weight of a ladder22 causes it to be considered as having been placed permanently; it is not necessary to affix it to the structure.
If [the divider] separating two courtyards is made of straw,23 [the inhabitants] may not make a single eruv although there are ladders on either side. A person will not ascend the ladder, because nothing is supporting it.24 If the ladders are in the center, [leaning on a firm support,] and there is straw on either side, [the inhabitants] have the option of making two eruvim.25
Halacha 8
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] a wall is ten handbreadths high, and [the inhabitants] desire [to tear down a portion of the wall] to reduce itsheight so that they will be able to establish a single eruv. They have the option of establishing a single eruv, provided the portion whose height they reduce is [at least] four handbreadths long.30
If [the inhabitants of one of the adjoining courtyards] tear down a portion [of their side] of the wall so that it is less than ten [handbreadths high], they are granted [permission to use] the shorter portion of the wall.31 The remainder of the wall that is high is divided between [the inhabitants of] both courtyards.
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a high wall between [two] courtyards is breached: If the breach is ten cubits [wide] or less, they [still may] establish twoeruvin.32 They do, however, have the option of establishing a single eruv, because [the breach] can be considered to be an opening. If [the breach] is more than ten [cubits wide], their only option is to establish a single eruv; they may not establish two eruvin.33
Halacha 11
If the breach is less than ten [cubits wide], and one [desires to] make it more than ten cubits, it is necessary to hollow out34a portion of the wall ten handbreadths high.35 [When this is done, the only option remaining is to] establish a single eruv.
At the outset, if one desires to open a breach larger than ten [cubits] in the wall, it is necessary that the height of the breach be equivalent to that of [an ordinary] person.36
Halacha 12
When there is a trench at least ten handbreadths deep and at least four handbreadths wide between two courtyards, it is necessary for [the inhabitants] to establish two eruvin.37 If its dimensions are less than this, [the inhabitants] must establish a single eruv; [they] do not [have the option of] establishing twoeruvin.38
If the depth of the trench is reduced by [adding] earth or pebbles, [the inhabitants] must establish a single eruv; [they] do not [have the option of] establishing two eruvin.39 For it can be assumed that the earth and the stones were intended to become a permanent part of the trench.40 If, by contrast, one reduced [the depth of the trench] by adding straw or hay, the reduction is not [significant] unless one intends41 that they become a permanent part [of the trench].
Halacha 13
Similarly, if one reduces the width [of the trench] with a board or with reeds42 by placing them across the entire length of the trench, [the inhabitants] must establish a single eruv; [they] do not [have the option of] establishing twoeruvin.
Any entity that may be carried on the Sabbath43 - e.g., a basket or a cup - is not considered to reduce its depth, unless one affixes it to the earth [firmly], in such a manner that one must dig with a spade to dislodge it.
Halacha 14
When one places a board that is [at least] four handbreadths wide across the trench, [the board is considered to be an entrance]. [Therefore, the inhabitants] may establish a single eruv. They also have the option of establishing twoeruvin.
Similar [rules apply when] two balconies are positioned opposite each other [across the public domain], and a board is extended from one balcony to the other.44 [The inhabitants] may establish a single eruv. They also have the option of establishing two eruvin, each one for his own balcony.
If the two balconies are on the same side [of the public domain], but are not at the same height - instead, one is higher than the other [the following rules apply]: If they are within three handbreadths of each other, they are considered to be a single balcony45 and [the inhabitants] may establish only a single eruv. If they are more than three [handbreadths] apart, they must establish twoeruvin,46 each one for his own balcony.
Halacha 15
[The following rule applies when] between two courtyards, there is a wall four handbreadths wide,47 which is ten handbreadths high from one courtyard, and at ground level48 at the second courtyard: The width of the wall is granted to the inhabitants of the courtyard at which it is at ground level, and it is considered to be an extension of their courtyard. [The rationale is] that since it is easily accessible to the inhabitants [of this courtyard], and more difficult to use for [the inhabitants of the other], it is granted to those for whom it is easily accessible.
Similarly, if there is a trench between the two courtyards that is ten handbreadths deep for the courtyard on one side and at ground level for the courtyard on the other side, the width of the trench is granted to the inhabitants of the courtyard at which it is at ground level. [The rationale is] that since it is easily accessible to the inhabitants [of this courtyard], and more difficult to use for [the inhabitants of the other], it is granted to those for whom it is easily accessible.
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when] there is a wall between two courtyards that is lower than the upper courtyard, but higher than the lower courtyard:49 [During the week,] the inhabitants of the upper courtyard may make use of the breadth of the wall by lowering articles to it, and the inhabitants of the lower courtyard may make use of it by throwing articles onto it.
On the Sabbath, the inhabitants of both courtyards are forbidden to use the wall unless they establish a single eruv. If they do not establish an eruv, it is forbidden to bring articles that were left on the breadth of this wall into the homes,50 nor may one bring articles from the homes to the breadth of the wall.
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when there is] a ruin that is a private domain between two houses: If [the inhabitants of] both houses can use the ruin by throwing objects into it,51 each one causes the other to be forbidden to use it [unless they establish an eruv].
If it is easy for [the inhabitants of] one [of the houses] to use [the ruin], while [the inhabitants of] the other may not throw articles into it [easily], because it is deeper than [their domain], it is granted to those who can use it [more] easily.52They may use it by throwing articles into it.
Halacha 18
All the following are considered to be [parts of] a single private domain:53 all the roofs of the city - despite the fact that some are high and some are low - all the courtyards, all the enclosures that were enclosed for purposes other than dwelling and are each less in area than that required to sow two se'ah,54 the breadths of all the walls, and all the lanes [in which one may carry because] either a post or a beam has been erected.
One may carry articles left in one [of these areas] at the commencement of the Sabbath to another without an eruv. One may not, however, transfer articles left in the homes to these areas unless an eruv is made.
Halacha 19
What is implied? When an article was left in a courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath, whether the inhabitants of the courtyards established an eruvfor themselves or whether they failed to do so, it is permitted to take the article from the courtyard to the roof or to the top of the wall. Afterwards, it may be taken from the roof to another roof adjacent to it, even if [the second roof] is higher or lower than it.
From the second roof, it may be taken to another courtyard, and from the other courtyard to a third roof in a third courtyard. From this courtyard, it may be taken to a lane, and from the lane to a fourth roof. Indeed, one may carry throughout the entire city through the courtyards and roofs, through the enclosed areas and roofs, or through the courtyards and the enclosed areas, or through [any combination] of these three types of areas, provided one does not bring this article into any of the houses [in the city].55 [The latter is forbidden] unless all [the inhabitants of] these different areas join together in a single eruv.
Halacha 20
[Conversely,] if an article was located in a house at the beginning of the Sabbath, and it was later taken out to a courtyard,56 it may not be taken to another courtyard, to another roof, to the top of a wall, or to an enclosed area unless the inhabitants of all the areas through which the article passes join together in a single eruv.
Halacha 21
When a cistern is located between two courtyards,57 it is forbidden to draw water from it on the Sabbath unless a partition ten handbreadths high has been erected58 so that everyone would be drawing water from his own property.
Where should the partition be erected? If the partition is above the water, it is necessary that at least one handbreadth of the partition descend into the water.59 If the partition was constructed within the water, it must project a handbreadth outside the water, so that one domain will be distinct from the other.
Halacha 22
Similarly, if a beam four handbreadths wide60 has been placed over the mouth of the cistern, one may fill [his bucket] from this side of the beam, and the other may fill [his bucket] from the other side of the beam. Although the water is not divided below [the beam], it is considered as if one portion [of the cistern] were separated from the other. This is a leniency enacted by the Sages with regard to water.
Halacha 23
When a well lies in the midst of a path61 between the walls of two courtyards, [the inhabitants of] both courtyards may draw water from it; there is no necessity for them to extend projections to the well.62 [This ruling applies] even though the well is more than four handbreadths from each of the walls. [The rationale is] that [the presence of] a colleague's [domain] does not cause a person to be forbidden to carry [when he is lifting an entity] through the air.63
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when the wall of] a small courtyard is broken down, opening [the courtyard] entirely to a large courtyard before the commencement of the Sabbath:64 The inhabitants of the large courtyard may establish an eruvfor themselves and they are permitted to carry, for portions of their wall still remain [standing] on each side.65
The inhabitants of the small courtyard, by contrast, are forbidden to remove articles from their homes to the courtyard until they establish a single eruvtogether with the inhabitants of the larger courtyard. [The governing principle is that] the dwellings of the larger courtyard are considered to be [part of] the smaller courtyard, while the dwellings of the smaller courtyard are not considered to be [part of] the larger courtyard.66
Halacha 25
When two courtyards have established a single eruv together through a shared opening or window, and that opening or window was closed on the Sabbath,67[the inhabitants of] each of the courtyards may carry within [their own courtyard].68 Since [carrying] was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath.
Similarly, if [the inhabitants of] two courtyards have each established a separateeruv and the wall between them fell on the Sabbath, [the inhabitants of each courtyard] are still permitted [to carry] within their original area.69 They may each take articles from their homes and carry them to the point where they could originally.
[The rationale is that] since [carrying] was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath.70 Although the number of people [within the courtyard] was increased, an increase of people on the Sabbath itself does not cause carrying to be forbidden.
[In the instance mentioned in the first clause, if after the opening or window was closed on the Sabbath,]71 the window was opened inadvertently, or an entrance was made, or gentiles made [an opening] on their own volition, it is again permitted [to carry from one to the other].
Similarly, if two ships were tied to each other and an eruv was established between them, it becomes forbidden to carry from one to the other if the connection between them is severed.72 [This ruling applies] even if they are surrounded by a partition. If the connection was reestablished inadvertently, it is again permitted [to carry from one to the other].
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
As reflected by the Rambam's ruling, Hilchot Tum'at Meit 7:1, this is the minimum size that a human being can squeeze through. For this reason, it is necessary that it be at least four handbreadths on each side; a total area of 16 square handbreadths is not sufficient (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:5; Mishnah Berurah 372:30). (See also the following halachah.)
|
| 2. |
Since the window is of sufficient size and it is close to the ground, the inhabitants of the courtyards are granted the option of considering it an entrance. If this option is taken, it causes the two courtyards to be considered a single entity.
|
| 3. |
The Mishnah Berurah 372:27 emphasizes that this ruling applies only when the courtyards did not join together in a shituf to permit carrying in the entire lane.
|
| 4. |
The window cannot be considered to be an entrance. Hence, the courtyards are considered to be separate.
|
| 5. |
This refers to an instance when an eruv was not established in the courtyard. Were that the case, it would be possible to transfer articles from house to house through the window, even without a separate eruv.
|
| 6. |
Eruvin 76b explains that a house is considered as if it is full, and thus it is as if there were less than ten handbreadths between the window and the ground.
|
| 7. |
A divider that is less than ten handbreadths high is not significant. Therefore, the entire area is considered to be a single domain, and all the inhabitants must join in one eruv.
|
| 8. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:8) states that the ladder must be at least four handbreadths wide and have four rungs. The commentaries question why the Rambam does not include these restrictions.
|
| 9. |
How close the ladders must be to each other is explained in the following halachah.
|
| 10. |
Based on the principle of l'vud, when there is a distance of less than three handbreadths between two entities, it is considered as though they were adjacent.
|
| 11. |
Since the wall is more than four handbreadths wide, it is possible to walk from one ladder to the other ladder on the wall.
|
| 12. |
Based on the principle of l'vud, it is considered as though the ladders were adjacent.
|
| 13. |
Because the ladders are distant from each other, the two courtyards are considered to be separate entities.
|
| 14. |
Our translation is based on Eruvin 77b, the apparent source for the halachah.
|
| 15. |
Since one can climb over the wall easily by ascending onto the bench, the wall is no longer considered an absolute division between the courtyards, and it is possible to establish an eruv, joining both courtyards.
This is the conception of the Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:9,11) follows the view of Rabbenu Asher which is more stringent and which maintains that a bench does not create the option of fusing the two courtyards into a single entity. The only leniency which is permitted is that the inhabitants of the courtyard where the bench is located may use the top of the wall.
|
| 16. |
The projection must be at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 372:12).
|
| 17. |
In this way, the inhabitants can easily cross over the wall by climbing from the ground to the projection and from the projection to the top of the wall.
|
| 18. |
When the ladder is leaning on the projection, they are considered to be a single unit. When, by contrast, the ladder is leaning against the wall, even if it is in within three handbreadths of the projection, they are not considered to be a single unit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:15; Mishnah Berurah 372:98-99).
|
| 19. |
Thus, they can climb over the wall easily in this fashion.
|
| 20. |
In this way, a ladder can be extended from one projection to another. Also, these projections must lie within ten handbreadths of each other. Thus, the people can climb from the earth to the first projection, from the first projection to the second, and from the second to the top of the wall.
In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:12) follows the view of Rabbenu Asher which is more stringent and which maintains that the projections do not create the option of fusing the two courtyards into a single entity. The only leniency which is permitted is that the inhabitants of the courtyard where the projections are located may use the top of the wall.
|
| 21. |
I.e., the date palm is considered to be a ladder, enabling people to climb across the wall.
|
| 22. |
The Maggid Mishneh notes that Eruvin 78a mentions a Babylonian ladder, for these ladders were large and heavy. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this concept is intimated by the Rambam's words "the [very] weight of the ladder...." These rules do not apply to a light ladder that is easily carried from place to place.
|
| 23. |
Our additions to the text are based on the commentary of the Meiri on Eruvin, loc. cit. A similar approach is also reflected in the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on this halachah. Rashi offers a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage, and his understanding is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:13).
|
| 24. |
I.e., the straw divider will not support the weight of a person climbing on the ladder.
|
| 25. |
They also have the option of establishing a single eruv, if they so desire. Certain commentaries suggest amending the text of the Mishneh Torah to include this concept.
|
| 26. |
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 21:1, the Sages specified certain activities as forbidden as a safeguard to the observance of the Sabbath prohibitions. Each of the forbidden activities is referred to as a sh'vut. See also Hilchot Shabbat 21:6 which prohibits climbing trees.
|
| 27. |
For when a mitzvah is involved, we are not bound by the prohibitions in the category of sh'vutduring beyn hash'mashot (Hilchot Shabbat 24:10), and that is when the eruv takes effect (Chapter 1, Halachah 21). Since the eruv was acceptable beyn hash'mashot, it is acceptable for the entire Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:18).
|
| 28. |
A tree that is worshiped. The Torah prohibits deriving any benefit from such a tree. See Exodus 34:13; Deuteronomy 7:5 and 12:3; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:3.
|
| 29. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:15) notes that Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Eruvin78b) reverses the rulings and permits the establishment of a single eruv if an asherah is used as a ladder, but not if an ordinary tree is used for that purpose. The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.; Mishnah Berurah 372:116) favor the Rambam's interpretation.
|
| 30. |
If the portion of the wall that was torn down is at least four handbreadths wide, it can be considered to be an opening.
|
| 31. |
The interpretation of the passage in Eruvin 77a, the source for this halachah, is a matter of dispute among the commentaries. Our translation is based on the Lechem Mishneh's gloss on theMishneh Torah.
|
| 32. |
For the breach is not large enough to nullify the importance of the entire divider, provided the entire wall has not been destroyed.
|
| 33. |
An opening of that size causes the entire divider to be considered as having no significance. It is as if there were only one courtyard. (See Hilchot Shabbat 16:16.)
|
| 34. |
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 78b. The Ra'avad and others conceive of this passage in a different light. It is their view that is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim372:14).
|
| 35. |
This is sufficient, even though there is a portion of the wall that is higher than ten handbreadths.
|
| 36. |
Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh. Others explain this to mean the full height of the wall.
Making a breach of this height indicates that one desires to pass freely from one courtyard to another. If the breach is not this high, one might think that the opening was made solely for the purpose of transferring articles (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 37. |
For a trench of this size is not easy to cross and hence is considered to be a divider, and each of the courtyards a distinct entity. (See Hilchot Shabbat 14:23.)
|
| 38. |
A trench of this size can be crossed easily. Therefore, the entire area is considered to be a single courtyard.
|
| 39. |
This refers to a situation in which the depth of the trench is reduced across its entire length. If one reduces the portion in one area alone, that portion is considered to be an entrance from one courtyard to the other, and the inhabitants have the option of establishing either one or two eruvin(Mishnah Berurah 372:122).
|
| 40. |
Inside a dwelling, by contrast, different concepts apply. (See Hilchot Sukkah 4:13. Note, however,Hilchot Tum'at Meit 7:6.)
|
| 41. |
According to Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:19, one must make an explicit statement, specifying one's intent. The Mishnah Berurah 372:121 cites that view, but also quotes an opinion that maintains that it is sufficient to have such thoughts in one's heart.
|
| 42. |
The width of the board or the reeds themselves is not significant; what is important is that they cause the width of the trench to be reduced (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 43. |
I.e., which is not forbidden to be carried, because of the prohibitions of muktzeh.
|
| 44. |
Based on the rulings of the Rashba, the Maggid Mishneh states that the same rules apply if there are less than four handbreadths between the two balconies, for it is easy to step from one balcony to the other as mentioned in Halachah 12. The Maggid Mishneh allows only one eruv to be established. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 373:1) gives the people the option of establishing one or two.
|
| 45. |
Because of the principle of l'vud.
|
| 46. |
They do not have the option of extending a board from one balcony to the other, because: a) as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 16:20, an entrance is not made in a corner; b) since the balconies are at different heights, a person will be afraid to walk from one to the other.
|
| 47. |
If it is less than four handbreadths wide, it is a makom patur, and may be used freely by the inhabitants of both courtyards, as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 14:7.
|
| 48. |
Rashi (Eruvin 77a), the Maggid Mishneh, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:6) explain that this does not mean precisely ground level, but rather less than ten handbreadths high. Similar concepts apply regarding the trench mentioned in the second clause of the halachah.
|
| 49. |
This describes a situation in which both courtyards are situated on an incline.
|
| 50. |
The inhabitants of both courtyards may, however, transfer articles that had been left in their courtyards to the wall as reflected by Halachot 18 and 19 (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 51. |
I.e., there is not an entrance on either side of the ruin, but the inhabitants can throw articles into the ruin through its windows.
|
| 52. |
This follows the principle stated in Halachah 15. The inhabitants of the other house may not use the ruin at all unless they establish an eruv.
|
| 53. |
Our Sages decreed that although a walled city is a private domain, an eruv is necessary before one may carry freely within. They, nevertheless, restricted the scope of that decree to carrying articles from the houses outside, and from the areas outside the houses to the houses. The rationale for this leniency is that one does not usually leave articles outside. Hence, the Sages did not include this possibility in their original decree (Rashi, Eruvin 89a).
|
| 54. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 16:1 for more particulars.
|
| 55. |
Eruvin 91a gives several examples of how these principles were applied by the Sages.
|
| 56. |
The rule that follows applies even when an eruv was established in this particular courtyard, and it was permitted to bring the article there from the house.
|
| 57. |
Which did not establish an eruv together. Note the accompanying diagram.
|
| 58. |
Separating a portion of the cistern for each individual courtyard. Although there is no prohibition from the Torah against drawing water from such a cistern, the Sages forbade using the cistern, just as they forbade using other property that is jointly owned.
|
| 59. |
A partition that is suspended in the air is not normally acceptable. In this instance, however, additional leniency is granted, because the entire concept of forbidding carrying within water is Rabbinic in origin. (See also Hilchot Shabbat 15:13.)
|
| 60. |
This width is required so that one person will not be drawing water from his colleague's side of the cistern. Eruvin 86b states that the Sages estimated that a bucket would not travel more than four handbreadths under water.
|
| 61. |
The Maggid Mishneh notes that the word "path" implies a private walk and not a public thoroughfare. See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9. With this, he counters the objections of the Ra'avad, who maintains that it is necessary for the well to be surrounded by a partition ten handbreadths high in order to draw water from it.
|
| 62. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:14, where such projections are required.
|
| 63. |
I.e., the inhabitants are not carrying the water from the well, but lifting it up through windows that open to the path.
Some commentaries interpret the Rambam's wording as extending the application of this ruling even to an instance where there is an opening from the courtyards to the path. Other authorities (Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh; Tur, Orach Chayim 376), by contrast, maintain that if there are entrances from the courtyards to the path, a projection is required. The difference between these two approaches is reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 376:2).
|
| 64. |
If, however, the wall is broken on the Sabbath itself, the inhabitants of the smaller courtyard may continue to carry since they were permitted to do so at the commencement of the Sabbath (the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 9:2).
|
| 65. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 374:3) states that portions of the wall of the small courtyard must jut into the large courtyard. If that is not the case, it is permitted to carry in the small courtyard as well. From the Rambam's wording and the drawings attributed to him that accompany his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:2), it does not appear that he considers this to be a necessity.
|
| 66. |
See also similar statements in Hilchot Tefillah 8:7 and Hilchot Kilayim 7:19.
|
| 67. |
This refers to a situation in which the window or the opening was buried under an avalanche or the like and could not be opened without violating the Sabbath laws (Rashi, Eruvin 93b).
|
| 68. |
The Ra'avad extends the leniency even further and maintains that the inhabitants of the courtyards may also pass articles from one courtyard to the other - e.g., by passing them over the wall. His opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 374:1).
|
| 69. |
We do not say that the entire area should now be considered a single courtyard, and since aneruv was not established before the Sabbath, carrying is forbidden.
|
| 70. |
When citing this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:2) makes a point of emphasizing that if the wall between a courtyard and a public domain or a carmelit falls on the Sabbath, carrying is no longer permitted within the courtyard.
|
| 71. |
In this instance, as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) mentions a further leniency. If an eruv has been established for an entire year between two courtyards, the opening between them was closed during the week (and thus at the commencement of the Sabbath it was not permitted to carry from one to the other), if an opening were made on the Sabbath, it would be permitted to carry from one to the other.
|
| 72. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on his interpretation of Eruvin 101b. Other authorities have different conceptions of that Talmudic passage.
|
Eruvin - Chapter Four
Halacha 1
When the inhabitants of a courtyard eat at the same table1 - even though they have their own individual dwellings - they are not required to establish an eruv; they are considered to be the inhabitants of a single household.
Just as the presence of a person's wife, the members of his household, or his servants does not cause him to be forbidden [to carry], nor does their presence make an eruv necessary, so too, these individuals are considered to be the members of a single household, for they all eat at the same table.2
Halacha 2
Similarly, if [the inhabitants of this courtyard] must establish an eruv together with the inhabitants of another courtyard, they are required to bring only one loaf to the place where the eruv is established.3
Similarly, if the eruv is established in their [house], they do not have to contribute to the eruv, just as the house in which an eruv is placed does not have to contribute a loaf of bread. [The rationale for both these laws is] that all these dwellings are considered to be a single dwelling.
Halacha 3
Similarly, the inhabitants of a courtyard who established an eruv together are considered to be [the members of] a single household.4 If it is necessary for them to establish an eruv together with the inhabitants of another courtyard, they are required to bring only one loaf to the place where the eruv is established. Similarly, if the eruv is established in their [house], they do not have to contribute a loaf of bread.
Halacha 4
When five people collect an eruv5 [for one courtyard] with the intent of bringing it to the place where an eruv will be established [together with the inhabitants of another courtyard],6 it is not necessary for all five to bring the bread there. Moreover, all th at is necessary is to bring a single loaf of bread. Since the eruvwas collected, all [the inhabitants of the courtyard] are considered to be the members of a single household.
Halacha 5
When a father and his son, or a teacher and his student7are dwelling in the same courtyard, it is not necessary for them to establish an eruv; they are considered to be a single household. Although at times they eat at a single table and at times they do not eat [together], they are considered to be a single household.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply to] brothers, each of whom has a house of his own, and who do not eat at their father's table, and to wives and servants who do not eat at their husband's or master's table at all times, but rather they [occasionally] eat at his table in payment for the work they do for him,8 or as an expression of his favor for a specific amount of time, such as a person who enjoys a colleague's hospitality for a week or a month.9
If there are no other people dwelling together with them in the courtyard, they are not required to establish an eruv. If they establish an eruv with [the inhabitants of] another courtyard, a single eruv suffices for them. If the eruv is established in [one of] their [homes], they are not required to contribute a loaf of bread.
If there are other people living in the courtyard together with them, each of them is required to contribute a loaf of bread [for the eruv] like the other inhabitants of the courtyard. [The rationale is that] they do not eat at one table at all times.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] five groups spend the Sabbath together in a single large hall: If a partition that reaches the ceiling10 separates each of the groups [from the others], it is as if each group has a room of its own, or is in a loft of its own. In such an instance, every group must contribute a loaf of bread. If, however, the partition does not reach the ceiling, a single loaf11of bread is sufficient for all of them. For they are all considered to be the members of a single household.
Halacha 8
When a person owns one [of the following] structures12 - a gatehouse that people frequently walk through, an exedra,13a porch, a barn, a shed for straw, a shed for wood, or a storehouse - in a courtyard belonging to a colleague, he does not cause [his colleague] to be forbidden to carry. [Our Sages decreed that the presence of a person causes carrying] to be forbidden unless an eruvis established, only when the person possesses a dwelling in the courtyard in which he will [ordinarily] eat [a meal of] bread. The [possession of a] place to sleep, by contrast, does not cause carrying to be forbidden.
For this reason, even if a person decided to eat his meals consistently in a gatehouse or an exedra, his presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden, because this is not considered a dwelling.14
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] there are ten dwellings, one within the other:15[The inhabitants of] the innermost dwelling and the one before it are required to provide the eruv. The eight outer dwellings, by contrast, are not required to contribute to the eruv. [The rationale is that] since many people walk through them, they are regarded as a gatehouse. [As mentioned above,] a person who lives in a gatehouse [does not cause others to be forbidden to carry].16
[The person living in] the ninth [house] does not have many people passing through his property - only one. Therefore, his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden unless he contributes to the eruv.
Halacha 10
[The following rulings apply in the situation to be described:] There are two courtyards [each containing several houses] and three houses [in between them]. The houses have entrances to each other, and [the outer two houses]17have entrances to the courtyards.
The inhabitants of one courtyard brought their eruv through the house that had an entrance for them and placed it in the middle house. Similarly, the inhabitants of the other courtyard brought their eruv through the house that had an entrance for them and placed it in the middle house.
[The inhabitants of] these three houses do not have to contribute a loaf of bread [to the eruv [for the following reasons]: The middle house is the house in which the eruv was placed. The two houses on its side are each considered to be a gatehouse for the inhabitants of the courtyard.
Halacha 11
[Different rules apply, however, if the situation changes. For example,] there are two courtyards [each containing several houses] and two houses [in between them] with entrances to each other. [The inhabitants of one courtyard] bring their eruv through the house that is open to them and place it in the second house, which is adjacent to the other courtyard.
[The inhabitants of the other courtyard also] bring their eruv through the entrance that is open to them and place it in the other house [which is adjacent to the other courtyard]. In such a situation, [the inhabitants of] neither [of the courtyards are considered to have] established an eruv. For each of them has placed his eruv in the gatehouse of another courtyard.18
Halacha 12
Although one of the inhabitants of a courtyard is in the midst of his death throes,19 even when [it is obvious] that he will not survive the day, his presence causes the other inhabitants of the courtyard to be forbidden [to carry] until they grant him [by proxy]20 a share in a loaf of bread and include him in the eruv.
Similarly, when a minor [owns a house in the courtyard], although he is incapable of eating an amount of food the size of an olive, his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden until [the inhabitants of the courtyard] include him in the eruv. [The presence of] a guest, by contrast, does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden, as explained above.21
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when] one of the inhabitants of a courtyard leaves his home and spends the Sabbath in another courtyard, even in a courtyard adjacent [to the one in which his home is located]: If he had no thought of returning to his home on the Sabbath, he does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden.22
Halacha 14
When the owner of a courtyard rents houses in the courtyard to others and [stipulates that] he may [continue] to leave articles or types of merchandise in each of these homes, [the presence of the renters] does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. Since he still has authority in each of the houses, everyone is considered to be his guest.25
When does the above apply? When he left an article that may not be carried26on the Sabbath - e.g., tevel27 or slabs of metal,28 in these homes. When, by contrast, he leaves articles that may be carried in each of the homes, [the presence of the renters] causes [carrying] to be forbidden unless they establish an eruv. For it is possible that he will remove them [on the Sabbath], and then he will be left without any authority [in these dwellings].
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a courtyard forgot and did not establish an eruv. They may not remove articles from their homes to the courtyard, nor from the courtyard to their homes. However, concerning articles that were left in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath:29 [the inhabitants] may carry such articles throughout the courtyard and all its extensions.30
[The following rules apply when] there is a porch31 or an upper storey [that opens out to a courtyard],32 and the inhabitants of the courtyard have established an eruv for themselves and the inhabitants of the porch have established an eruv for themselves:33 Regarding articles that were left in their homes at the beginning of the Sabbath, the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey are permitted to carry them throughout the porch and all of its extensions or throughout the upper storey and all of its extensions. The inhabitants of the courtyard may carry within the courtyard and all its extensions, [but they are forbidden to carry from the courtyard to the upper storey or the porch, or from the upper storey or the porch to the courtyard unless an eruv is established].
Similarly, if one person lives in the courtyard, and another person lives in the upper storey, and they forgot to establish an eruv, the owner of the upper storey may carry within the upper storey and all of its extensions, and the owner of the courtyard may carry within the courtyard and all of its extensions. [They may not, however, carry from one domain to the other without an eruv].
Halacha 16
What is implied? When there is a rock or a mound within the courtyard that is less than ten handbreadths high, it is considered to be [important to] both the courtyard and the porch, and [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to bring articles there from their homes.
If [the rock or the mound] is ten handbreadths high and is less than four handbreadths removed from the porch, it is considered to be an extension of the porch, for they are of similar [height]. Therefore, the inhabitants of the porch may carry on it.
If it is four or more handbreadths removed from the porch, even when it is ten [handbreadths high] it is considered to be an extension of both the courtyard and the porch, since both can use it by throwing [objects onto it]. Therefore, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to bring articles there from their homes until they establish an eruv.
When there is a pillar four [or more] handbreadths wide in front of the porch [it is considered to be a divider]. [Therefore, the presence of] the porch does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden within the courtyard, for a separation has been made between [one domain and the other].
Halacha 17
When projections protrude from the walls [of the courtyard], all those that are below ten handbreadths high are considered to be extensions of the courtyard, and may be used by the inhabitants of the courtyard. All those that are within ten handbreadths of the upper storey may be used by the inhabitants of the upper storey.
The remainder, those that are located more than ten handbreadths above the ground and more than ten handbreadths below the upper storey, are forbidden to them both. Neither may use them for articles from the homes unless an eruvis established.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply to] a cistern located in [such] a courtyard: If it is filled with produce that was tevel - and hence is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath - or with objects of a similar kind, it and the enclosure around it,34 are regarded like a rock or a mound in a courtyard.35 If [the enclosure] is ten handbreadths high and close to the porch, it is considered to be an extension of the porch.
If, by contrast, it is filled with water,36 neither the inhabitants of the courtyard nor the inhabitants of the porch may bring [water] to their homes from it unless they establish an eruv.
Halacha 19
[The following rules apply when] there are two courtyards, one lying behind the other, and the inhabitants of the inner courtyard enter and exit by passing through the outer courtyard: When [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard have established an eruv, but [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard have not, [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard may carry [within their domain], but [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard may not.37
When [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard have established an eruv, but [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard have not, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to carry; [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard because they did not establish an eruv, and the inhabitants of the outer courtyard because the people who pass through [their domain] did not establish an eruv [even within their own domain].38
If [the inhabitants of] both domains have established separate eruvin,39 they may each carry within their own domain; they may not carry from one [domain] to the other.
Halacha 20
[If the inhabitants of both domains have established separate eruvin,] but one of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard forgot to join in the eruv [in his domain], the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are still permitted to carry.40
When, by contrast, one of the inhabitants of the inner courtyard forgot to join in the eruv [in his domain], [not only are the inhabitants of the inner courtyard forbidden to carry, the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard are also forbidden to do so. [This restriction is instituted] because the inhabitants of the inner courtyard whose eruv is not acceptable pass through their [domain].
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when] both courtyards establish a single eruv: If theeruv is placed in the outer courtyard, and one of the inhabitants - whether an inhabitant of the outer courtyard or of the inner courtyard - forgets to join in theeruv, [all] the inhabitants of both courtyards are forbidden [to carry]41 unless he subordinates [the ownership of] his domain to them. [This is possible for, as we explained,42 one may subordinate the ownership of a domain in one courtyard to [people dwelling in] another.
[Different rules apply when] the eruv is placed in the inner courtyard: If one of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard did not join in the eruv, [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard are forbidden to carry. [The inhabitants of] the inner courtyard, by contrast, are permitted to carry within their own [domain].43 If one of the inhabitants of the inner courtyard did not join in the eruv, [all the inhabitants of] both [courtyards] are forbidden [to carry]44 unless he subordinates [the ownership of] his domain to them.
Halacha 22
If [only] one person45 was dwelling in one [of these] courtyards and [only] one person was dwelling in the other, there is no need for them to establish aneruv;46 each one is permitted to carry in his courtyard.
If, however, a gentile dwells in the inner courtyard, even though he is merely a single [household], he is considered as many individuals, and [his presence] causes [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard to be forbidden to carry until his domain is rented.47
Halacha 23
[The following laws apply when there are] three courtyards with entrances to each other, and there are many people dwelling in each courtyard: When [the inhabitants of] the two outer courtyards have established an eruv together with [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard,48 [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard are permitted to carry within the outer courtyards, and [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyards are permitted to carry within the inner courtyard, but the inhabitants of the two outer courtyards may not carry in the other outer courtyard unless all three join in a single eruv.
If a single individual dwells in each courtyard, there is no need for them to establish an eruv, although many individuals pass through the outer courtyard.49 [The rationale is that] each of these individuals is permitted to carry in his own domain. If, however, there are two individuals living in the inner courtyard [different rules apply]. Since [these individuals] are forbidden to carry in their own domain until they establish an eruv, they cause the single individuals in the middle and in the outer domains to be forbidden [to carry] unless the two inhabitants of the inner domain establish an eruv.
This is the governing principle: When a person who is forbidden to carry in his own domain passes through another domain, his passage causes carrying to be forbidden there. When, by contrast, the person may carry in his own domain, his passage through another domain does not cause carrying to be forbidden there.
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when] there are two balconies positioned over a body of water, and one is positioned above the other: Although [the inhabitants of] each of them have constructed a partition ten handbreadths high descending [to the water],50 if the two balconies are within ten handbreadths of each other,51 it is forbidden for [their inhabitants] to draw water unless they establish a single eruv. [The rationale is that, because of their closeness] they are considered to be a single balcony.52
If the distance between the upper balcony and the lower balcony is more than ten handbreadths, and [the inhabitants of] each have established separateeruvin, they are both permitted to draw [water].
Halacha 25
If [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] did not make a partition, but the inhabitants of the lower [balcony] did, even [the inhabitants of] the lower balcony are forbidden to draw [water]. [The rationale is that] the buckets of the upper [balcony], which are forbidden, pass through their domain.53
If [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] have made a partition, but [the inhabitants of] the lower [balcony] have not, [the inhabitants of] the upper balcony are permitted to draw water,54 but [the inhabitants of] the lower balcony are forbidden.55
If the inhabitants of the lower [balcony] joined together with [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] in the construction of the partition, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to draw water56 until they establish a single eruv.
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply to a building] with three storeys, one above the other; the upper and the lower storeys belong to one individual, and the middle storey belongs to another: One may not lower articles from the top storey to the bottom storey through the middle storey.57 For we may not pass articles from one domain to another domain via a third domain. One may, however, lower articles from the top [storey] to the lower [storey] [if] they do not [pass] through the middle [storey].58
Halacha 27
[The following rules apply when] two buildings face each other and there is a courtyard below them into which water is poured.59 They should not pour water into the courtyard unless they join together in a single eruv.
If [the inhabitants of one building]60 dig a pit in the courtyard into which to pour water, while [the inhabitants of the other building] do not, those who dig the pit may pour water into it. The others are forbidden to pour water into the courtyard unless they join together in a single eruv.
If [the inhabitants of both buildings] each dig a pit, each may pour water into the pit they have dug, even though they did not establish an eruv.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's wording is not to be understood literally; if people eat in the same room, even if they eat at different tables - indeed, even if they eat their own food - they are not required to establish an eruv. These concepts are also reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:7) and quoted as halachah by the Ramah (Orach Chayim370:4).
The most common application of this concept today would be a hotel or a bungalow colony, where many people eat in the same dining room, and yet have their own private rooms or dwellings.
|
| 2. |
This highlights the principle that it is the place where a person eats, and not where he sleeps, that is most significant in defining his place of residence.
|
| 3. |
In Chapter 1, Halachah 15, the Rambam states that every household participating in the eruv is required to contribute a loaf of bread. Nevertheless, in this instance, since all the inhabitants of the courtyard are considered to be members of a single household, only one loaf is required.
|
| 4. |
Although they eat in separate places, joining together in the eruv causes them to be considered as if they share the same table.
|
| 5. |
I.e., they collected loaves of bread from each household in the courtyard.
|
| 6. |
The Shem Yosef explains that this latter phrase represents the new concept contributed in this halachah, as opposed to the previous one. Although the eruv was originally collected for the purpose of establishing an eruv with the inhabitants of another courtyard, the collection itself causes the inhabitants to be considered members of a single household.
|
| 7. |
Although the Rambam uses a singular term, the same law applies to many sons or many students.
|
| 8. |
The Rambam's comparison of these individuals to hired workers reflects his interpretation of the expression במקבלי פרס in Eruvin 73a. The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation, and his view is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 370:5- 6).
|
| 9. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is not that the presence of a guest causes carrying to be forbidden when there are others living in the same courtyard. For as explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, and in Halachah 12 of this chapter, a guest's presence makes no difference in this context. Rather, the point of the comparison above is to emphasize the intermediate status of these individuals. On one hand, like guests, they are at times considered to be members of the person's household. On the other hand, since they have their own dwellings and often eat there, there is reason to consider them as having separate households.
|
| 10. |
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba, who explains that it is sufficient for the partitions to reach within three handbreadths of the ceiling, since, based on the principle of l'vud, when they are that close it is considered as if they reached the ceiling itself. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim370:3) quotes this ruling.
|
| 11. |
I.e., they must make an eruv. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) differs and (following the interpretation of Tosafot, Eruvin 72a and Rabbenu Asher) does not require an eruv at all unless they want to join with others outside the hall.
The Shulchan Aruch, however, emphasizes that we are speaking about temporary partitions, either curtains or pieces of wood. If the partitions are permanent, they are considered as having separate dwellings, and an eruv is required.
|
| 12. |
All these structures have one thing in common - they are not ordinary dwellings where a person will eat his meals on a regular basis.
|
| 13. |
A Greek structure with two or three walls and a roof with a sky-light.
|
| 14. |
For these structures are not fit to serve as dwellings. In contrast, were a person to eat continually in a barn, a wood shed, or a shed for straw, these are considered to be dwellings, and an eruv is necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 370:1; see Chapter 1, Halachah 16).
|
| 15. |
I.e., to get to the inner dwellings, one must pass through the outer ones.
|
| 16. |
The Mishnah Berurah 370:52 extends this principle and applies it to people renting separate rooms in a single home. If the rooms lead through each other, the inhabitants of the outer rooms do not have to contribute to the eruv.
|
| 17. |
But not the middle house. See the accompanying diagram.
|
| 18. |
And an eruv that was placed in a gatehouse is not acceptable, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 16.
|
| 19. |
This reflects a general principle in Torah law. Until a person actually stops breathing, he is considered to be alive. There is no difference in his status regarding any of the Torah's laws.
|
| 20. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.
|
| 21. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
|
| 22. |
The rationale is that a dwelling without an owner is not considered to be a dwelling (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 371:1; Mishnah Berurah 371:1).
|
| 23. |
For it is unlikely that a Jew will return to his home on the Sabbath. Moreover, even if he did so, we apply the principle that since carrying was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 24. |
The Maggid Mishneh mentions a more lenient view, which states that if the gentile spends the Sabbath at a place that is more than a day's journey from home, the inhabitants are allowed to carry, because it is impossible for him to arrive on the Sabbath. This ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:1).
The Ramah grants a further leniency and permits the inhabitants to carry when the gentile stays in another courtyard in the same city. If the gentile returns to his home on the Sabbath, the Turei Zahav 371:2 permits the inhabitants to continue to carry. The Mishnah Berurah 371:8, by contrast, rules that this is forbidden.
|
| 25. |
Note the ruling of the Ramah (Orach Chayim 370:2), which states that this decision applies only when there are no other inhabitants in the courtyard besides the owner and the persons to whom he rented dwellings, or the eruv was brought into the house of the owner.
|
| 26. |
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) adds that this applies also when the articles are too heavy to be lifted on the Sabbath.
|
| 27. |
Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated. These tithes may not be separated on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 23:9,14), nor is it permitted to carry such produce on the Sabbath (loc. cit. 25:19).
|
| 28. |
Since this metal has not been fashioned into a useful article, it is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath (loc. cit.:6).
|
| 29. |
See the Be'ur Halachah 372, which explains there are authorities who differ with regard to whether one is permitted to carry an article within a courtyard when an eruv has not been established - if that article hads been placed in one of the homes at the commencement of the Sabbath, but was inadvertently taken from the home and placed in the courtyard. Although the Rambam would appear to forbid carrying the article, Rashi (Shabbat 130b) and Tosafot (Eruvin 91b) maintain that carrying it is permitted within the courtyard.
|
| 30. |
See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.
|
| 31. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:3), the Rambam describes a porch as an intermediate level, at least ten handbreadths high, through which stairs lead to the courtyard.
|
| 32. |
I.e., the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey descend through a stairwell into the courtyard, and from the courtyard they proceed to the public domain. The Rabbis consider the stairwell equivalent to an entrance. Hence, they liken the situation to one in which two courtyards are positioned adjacent to each other with an entrance between them.
|
| 33. |
I.e., unless an eruv is established, the inhabitants of these domains are forbidden to carry within the others' domains and within the property shared by both.
|
| 34. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9.
|
| 35. |
I.e., since the cistern is filled with objects that are forbidden to be carried, it is not given any special importance, and instead is considered like any other large, distinct object in the courtyard.
|
| 36. |
It is, by nature, fit to be used by the inhabitants of both domains. Therefore, neither is entitled to do so, unless they establish an eruv.
|
| 37. |
The rationale for these rulings is obvious; the concept is mentioned primarily to show the contrast with the subsequent clauses of the halachah. Unlike the inhabitants of the inner courtyard, who can reach their own dwelling only by passing through the outer courtyard, there is no reason for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.
|
| 38. |
This ruling reflects the principle stated in Halachah 23, that when people are forbidden to carry within their own domain, they cause carrying to be forbidden in the domain through which they pass. Had the inhabitants of the inner courtyard established an eruv for themselves, they would not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as reflected in the following clause.
|
| 39. |
Similarly, if the single courtyard belongs to a single individual, or the owners are considered to be members of a single household - e.g., a father and his children, their presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 40. |
For their eruv is still intact and there is no necessity for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.
|
| 41. |
The eruv is not acceptable for the inner courtyard, because it is not located within the courtyard itself, and it is not acceptable for the outer courtyard, because one of the inhabitants of the courtyard did not participate.
|
| 42. |
Chapter 2, Halachah 5.
|
| 43. |
For all the inhabitants of this courtyard have joined together in a single eruv. Although they had desired to join together with the inhabitants of the outer courtyard, the failure for this desire to be fulfilled does not cause them to forfeit their initial advantage as a domain joined by an eruv. (SeeEruvin 75b.)
|
| 44. |
In this instance, the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are forbidden to carry because one of their number has failed to join in the eruv. This in turn causes carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as explained above.
|
| 45. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:10), the Rambam explains that this can refer to members of an extended household - e.g., a father and his children.
|
| 46. |
Needless to say, to carry from one courtyard to the next, an eruv is necessary.
|
| 47. |
Our Sages explained that gentiles are less private about the details of their personal dwellings than the Jews. Thus many people will know of the gentile's presence and the fact that his domain was not rented, but they may not know that only one Jew lives in the outer courtyard. Therefore, they might not realize that this is an exception, and generally, when one courtyard leads to another, an eruv is required (Eruvin 75b). Although when one Jew lives in a courtyard together with a gentile, he is generally not required to rent his domain (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), an exception is made in this instance.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 382:17) mentions this as a singular opinion, and the Mishnah Berurah 382:59 states that it is not shared by most authorities. Some have noted that the Rambam himself uses a plural form of the word "rent," and they interpret this as referring to an instance where two Jews live in the outer courtyard.
|
| 48. |
I.e., the inhabitants of the inner courtyard have established two eruvin, one with each of the outer courtyards.
|
| 49. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that these two clauses refer to different situations. The first clause refers to a situation in which all three courtyards have entrances to the public domain, while this clause refers to a situation where only the outermost courtyard has an entrance to the public domain, and the inhabitants of this courtyard must pass through it.
Based on the Hagahot Maimoniot, Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the fundamental aspect of this ruling is the interpretation of Rabbi Shimeon's statements that the inhabitants of the middle courtyard are permitted to carry in either of the outer courtyards (Eruvin 45b, 48b). Although these statements were made regarding a situation in which only one courtyard opened up to the public domain, one can extrapolate that the same ruling would apply when all three open to the public domain.
|
| 50. |
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:15, which interprets this law as referring to a balcony with a hole in its floor, from which water is drawn and through which it is poured. The partition need not extend the full distance from the balcony to the water. As long as it extends either ten handbreadths below the balcony or ten handbreadths above the water, drawing water and pouring water through the hole in the balcony are permitted.
|
| 51. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains this as referring to two balconies positioned one on top of the other. Each balcony has a hole in it, and these holes are also aligned one on top of the other.
|
| 52. |
The Ra'avad states that, based on Eruvin 88a, this ruling would appear to apply only when the two balconies are not directly above each other. The Ra'avad's position is shared by Rashi and the Rashba, while the Rambam's interpretation appears to be shared by Rabbenu Chanan'el. Although the Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam's position, most authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 355:5) follow the Ra'avad's view.
|
| 53. |
I.e., the Rambam applies the principle stated in Halachah 23 - about people passing from one domain to another - to the buckets used to draw water that pass from domain to domain. In this instance, as well, the Ra'avad, Rashi, and others interpret Eruvin (loc. cit.), the source for this halachah, differently, and their interpretation is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
|
| 54. |
The fact that their buckets pass through the area of the lower domain is of no consequence.
|
| 55. |
For they have no partition.
|
| 56. |
Since they both have a share in the partition, they are considered as full partners in a single domain. Hence, it is necessary that they be joined together in an eruv.
|
| 57. |
I.e., through a hole in the building.
|
| 58. |
E.g, from a porch to a porch.
|
| 59. |
As evident from Hilchot Shabbat 15:16-17, this refers to a courtyard larger than four cubits by four cubits. It is forbidden to pour water into a smaller courtyard unless one digs a pit, as reflected in the second clause of this halachah.
|
| 60. |
The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:11).
|
Eruvin - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a lane join in a business partnership with regard to a particular food - i.e., they have bought wine, oil, honey, or the like [for sale]:1 They need not establish another shituf for the sake [of carrying on] the Sabbath. Instead, they may rely on the partnership they have established for business reasons.
[When does this leniency apply?] When their business partnership involves one type of produce, and [this produce] is stored in a single container. But if their partnership is such that one possesses wine and the other oil,2 or they both possess wine but hold it in two different containers, they are required to establish another shituf for the sake of the Sabbath.
Halacha 2
If one of the inhabitants of a lane asks another for wine or oil before the Sabbath, and the latter refuses to give it to him, the shituf is nullified.3 [The rationale is that this individual] revealed that his intent was that they are not all to be considered partners who do not object to each other's [use of the combined resources].
When one of the inhabitants of a lane who usually participates in a shituf fails to do so,4 the inhabitants of the lane may enter his home and take [his share for] the shituf against his will. If one of the inhabitants of a lane refuses5 to join with the others in the shituf, he may be compelled to do so.6
Halacha 3
When one of the inhabitants of a lane owns a storeroom of wine, oil, or the like, he may grant a small share to all the inhabitants of the lane and establish ashituf on their behalf. The shituf is acceptable even though he did not separate or designate [the wine he granted them, but rather left it] mixed together [with the remainder] in the storeroom.
Halacha 4
[When the inhabitants of] a courtyard that has two entrances, each leading to a different lane, establish a shituf with one of [the lanes] and not the other,7 [they] are forbidden to bring articles to and from the second lane.
Therefore, if a person [sets aside food for a shituf], grants a portion to all the inhabitants of the lane, and establishes a shituf on their behalf, he must notify the inhabitants of that courtyard. For they must make a conscious decision to join the shituf, since this is not [necessarily] to their benefit,8 because it is possible that they desire to join in a shituf with [the inhabitants of] the other lane, and not with this one.
Halacha 5
A person's wife may participate in an eruv on his behalf without his knowledge, provided he does not [intend to cause] his neighbors to be forbidden [to carry].9If he does [intend to cause] them to be forbidden [to carry], however, she may not join an eruv on his behalf, nor may she join a shituf on his behalf unless he consents.
What is meant by "[intend to cause] them to be forbidden [to carry]"? That he says, "I will not join in an eruv or a shituf with them."
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when a courtyard opens up to two lanes and] the inhabitants of the courtyard have established a shituf with [the inhabitants of] one of the lanes: If they had originally established the shituf with one type of produce, even if the produce in the shituf was consumed entirely, one may establish a second shituf and grant them a portion; there is no need to inform them a second time.10
If they have established the shituf with two types11 of produce,12 and the amount of food was reduced [from the minimum required],13 one may add to it and grant the others a share; there is no need to inform them. If [the produce] was consumed entirely, one may [establish a second shituf and] grant them a portion; it is, however, necessary to inform them.14
If the number of inhabitants within the courtyard is increased, one may grant [the newcomers] a portion in the shituf, but one must notify them.15
Halacha 7
If the inhabitants of this courtyard have established a shituf with the inhabitants of this lane from one entrance, and have established another shituf with the inhabitants of the other lane from the other entrance, they are permitted [to carry to and from] both [of these lanes]16, and [the inhabitants of] both [lanes] are permitted [to carry within the courtyard]. [The inhabitants of] both lanes are, however, forbidden [to carry] from one [lane] to the other.17
If [the inhabitants of the courtyard] have not established a shituf with either of them, they cause [the inhabitants of] both to be forbidden [to carry].18
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when the inhabitants of] this courtyard usually [pass] through one entrance [into one lane], but do not usually [pass] through a second entrance [into another lane]: They cause carrying to be forbidden [in the lane to which] the entrance through which they usually [pass opens].19 They do not cause carrying to be forbidden [in the lane to which] the entrance through which they do not usually [pass opens].20
If [the inhabitants of this courtyard] have established a shituf with [only] the lane through which they do not usually [pass], [the inhabitants of] the other lane are allowed [to carry];21 they do not have to establish a shituf with [the inhabitants of this courtyard].
Halacha 9
[A leniency is granted in the following situation.] The inhabitants of the lane [through] which [the inhabitants of] this courtyard usually pass established ashituf by themselves. [The inhabitants of the courtyard] did not joined in thisshituf, nor have they joined in a shituf with the inhabitants of the lane [through] which they do not usually pass. The inhabitants of the latter lane [also] did not established a shituf for themselves.
Since [the inhabitants of the courtyard] have not joined in a shituf at all, they are considered part of the lane [through] which they do not usually pass. Since both these groups of individuals have not established a shituf, they are classed together, so that they will not cause [the inhabitants of] the lane who established the shituf to be forbidden [to carry].22
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a courtyard has an entrance to a lane and another entrance to a valley or to an area enclosed for purposes other than habitation, which is larger than the area [needed] to sow two se'ah:23 Since it is forbidden to transfer articles from the courtyard to that enclosed area, [the inhabitants of the courtyard] rely only on the entrance to the lane. Therefore, they cause the inhabitants of the lane to be forbidden [to carry] unless they join together with them in a shituf.
If, however, the enclosed area is the size of the area [needed] to sow two se'ahor less, its presence does not cause the inhabitants of the lane to be forbidden [to carry]. Since carrying is permitted within the entire enclosed area, [the inhabitants of the courtyard] rely on the entrance that is exclusively theirs.24
Halacha 11
When one of the inhabitants of a lane goes away and spends the Sabbath in another place, [the fact that he owns a domain in the lane] does not cause carrying to be forbidden.25
Similarly, if one of the inhabitants of a lane builds a pillar that is four handbreadths wide [or more] before his entrance, [the fact that he owns a domain in the lane] does not cause carrying to be forbidden. For he has separated himself from [the other inhabitants], and has made his domain a distinct entity.26
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a lane have joined together in a shituf, but several of the inhabitants forgot and did not join: [Those who forgot] should subordinate the ownership of their domain to those who joined in the shituf. The laws governing the subordination of the ownership of their domain are the same as the laws governing the subordination of the ownership of a domain when one or more of the inhabitants of a courtyard forgot to join in an eruv.27
We have already explained28 that a person and [all] the members of his household who are dependent on him for meals are considered to be a single entity with regard to the establishment of an eruv for a courtyard and a shituf for a lane.
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when the inhabitants of] all the courtyards establishederuvin for each of the courtyards, and afterwards they all joined in a shituf for the lane: When one of the inhabitants of a lane forgot to join in the eruv with the other inhabitants of his courtyard, he does not lose any [privileges]. For all of them have joined together in a shituf, and it is on the shituf that they rely.
The only reason it was required to establish an eruv within the courtyards, together with the shituf, is so that the children will not forget the law of theeruv.29 [And in this instance, that requirement has been met,] for eruvin were established in the courtyards.
If, however, one of the inhabitants of the lane forgot to join in the shituf, carrying is forbidden in the lane.30 The inhabitants of the courtyards, however, may carry in their [respective] courtyards. [When a shituf is not established,] the relationship between courtyards and a lane is parallel to that between homes and a courtyard.31
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when the inhabitants of all the courtyards] have joined in a shituf, but all have forgotten to establish eruvin for their respective courtyards: If they do not stint on sharing their bread,32 they may rely on theshituf for one Sabbath alone. This leniency is granted, however, only because of the difficulty [of their immediate circumstance].33
Halacha 15
When eruvin have been established between the courtyards and the homes [of a lane], but a shituf has not been established, carrying [an article] more than four cubits [within the lane] is forbidden, as [would be the law] within a carmelit.
[The rationale is that] since eruvin were established between the courtyards and the homes, the lane is considered as though it opened only to homes, and not to courtyards. Therefore, we are not allowed to carry within its area at all.34
If the inhabitants of the courtyards have not established eruvin, they may carry articles left in the [lane] at the commencement of the Sabbath throughout its entire area, as is the law regarding a courtyard in which an eruv was not established.35
Halacha 16
The laws that the inhabitants of a lane must follow with regard to a gentile36 or a Sadducee37 who dwells in one of the courtyards of a lane are the same as must be followed by the inhabitants of the courtyard. They must rent the gentile's domain within the courtyard from him or from one of the members of his household, and the Sadducee must subordinate the ownership of his domain.
Halacha 17
When a gentile living in a lane has an opening40 from his courtyard to a valley, his presence does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden within the lane [although his courtyard also opens to the lane].41 Even if this entrance is small - merely four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] - and the gentile leads his camels and his wagons out through the other entrance, his presence does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. For he is concerned only with the entrance that is distinctly his own - i.e., [the one leading to] the valley.
Similarly, if he has an entrance leading to an area that was enclosed for purposes other than habitation, [and that entrance] is larger than the area needed to sow two se'ah [of grain], it is regarded like an entrance to a valley, and his presence does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. If, however, the enclosed area was the size needed to sow two se'ah of grain or less, [the gentile] is not concerned with [this area],42 and his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden,43 unless [his domain] is rented from him.
Halacha 18
[The following rule applies when] there is a lane that has gentiles living [in the courtyards] on one side and Jews living [in the courtyards] on the other side, and there are windows that open from each of the courtyards in which the Jews [live] to the other: Although they established eruvin via the windows, and thus are joined together as the members of a single household - and are, therefore, permitted to transfer [articles] to and from [one courtyard to another] via the windows - they are, nevertheless, forbidden to use the lane via its entrances44unless they rent the domains from the gentiles. For the principle that [because of an eruv] the many become considered a single entity does not apply when there are gentiles involved.45
Halacha 19
How is a shituf established in a city?46 Every courtyard should establish an eruvfor itself, so that the children will not forget [the laws of eruvin]. Afterwards, all the inhabitants of the city join together in a shituf in the same way as a shituf is established in a lane.
If the city had once been the property of a single individual, even if later it became the property of many individuals, it is possible for all [the inhabitants] to join in a single shituf and [be permitted] to carry throughout the entire city.47Similarly, although a city is owned by many, if it has only one entrance, all [the inhabitants] may join in a single shituf.48
Halacha 20
If, by contrast, [a city] was originally built as the property of many individuals,49and it has two openings used for entrance and egress, the entire [city] may not be included in the eruv. [This applies even if the city later] becomes the private property of one individual. Instead, one area - even one house in one courtyard - is set aside,50 and a shituf is established in the remainder [of the city].
All the individuals who participate in the shituf are permitted [to carry] throughout the entire city with the exception of the place that was set aside. If there are many people [living in] the place [that was set aside], they are permitted to carry in that place if they make a shituf for themselves. They are, however, forbidden to carry throughout the remainder of the city.
Halacha 21
This was instituted to make a distinction, so that [the inhabitants know that theeruv made carrying possible in this large city through which many people pass.51 [For they will see] the place that was set aside, which did not join in theshituf, in which carrying is forbidden. [Each group of individuals, the inhabitants of the city and the inhabitants of the area that was set aside] will have their separate [area].
Halacha 22
When a city belonging to many individuals has one entrance and has a ladder52[that could be used to enter or depart] at another place [in its wall], it [is possible to include] the entire [city] in the eruv; no portion need be set aside. For a ladder in the wall is not considered to be an entrance.53
The houses that are set aside [and are not included in the shituf] need not face the city. Even if they face the outside area, and their back is towards the city, they may be [designated as the houses that are] set aside, and then an eruvmay be established throughout the remainder [of the city].54
Halacha 23
Halacha 24
When all the inhabitants of a city with the exception of the inhabitants of a single lane join together in a shituf, [the presence of these individuals] causes [carrying] to be forbidden for all. [The inhabitants] should61 build a pillar62 at the entrance to the lane, so that [carrying] is not forbidden.
For this reason, a shituf is not established in half a city.63 Either the entire city joins in the shituf or [separate shitufim are made], each lane for itself. Each lane should build a pillar at its entrance to keep its domain distinct from the others, so that it will not cause [the inhabitants of] the other lanes to be forbidden [to carry].
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
A shituf established by the inhabitants of a lane is mentioned because it can be established with other types of food besides bread. In contrast, an eruv for a courtyard may be established only with bread (Chapter 1, Halachah 8). The Rashba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) states that the same principle would apply if the inhabitants of a courtyard established a business partnership for the sale of bread.
|
| 2. |
The Tur (Orach Chayim 366) states that even if the partnership involves several types of produce, as long as it is stored in a single container, the inhabitants may rely on it for the sake of the Sabbath. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 386:3) quotes this ruling.
|
| 3. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on Eruvin 68a. In his commentary on that passage, Rashi explains that this refers to the food set aside for the shituf. If the person asks for some of this food and it is not given to him, the eruv is nullified.
Although this does not appear to be the Rambam's intent, the Kessef Mishneh explains that his words can be interpreted in this manner. [And in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:5), Rav Yosef Karo rules according to his explanation in the Kessef Mishneh]. The Ra'avad goes further and explains that this law applies only when one person has granted others a share in his produce for the purpose of establishing a shituf. If, afterwards, he refuses to allow one of the members of the lane to take from the shituf, the shituf is nullified.
|
| 4. |
With the intent of nullifying the shituf.
|
| 5. |
I.e., in contrast to the previous law, this person was not a regular participant in the shituf.
|
| 6. |
I.e., the communal court may compel him to join the shituf. Nevertheless, in contrast to the previous law, the matter may not be dealt with by the inhabitants of the lane themselves (Maggid Mishneh). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 367:1).
The Noda BiY'hudah (Vol. II, Choshen Mishpat, Responsum 39) points to Hilchot Sh'chenim 5:12 (quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 162:1), which appears to contradict this interpretation, for it states that the members of the lane may compel each other to build a pole or a beam for a courtyard. The Noda BiY'hudah explains, however, that there is a difference between the structure of a courtyard (i.e., the pole or the beam) and participation in an eruv.
|
| 7. |
According to most authorities, the inhabitants of such a courtyard have the right to establish ashituf with the inhabitants of both lanes, if they desire. If they chose this option, they may bring articles to and from both lanes. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam accepts this view, as well.
There are opinions (see Rabbenu Yehonatan) that maintain that Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs with this view, and maintains that in such a situation, the inhabitants of the courtyard may join in ashituf with the inhabitants of only one lane. Some maintain that the Rambam also accepts this view. This is surely the opinion of the Ra'avad, who objects to the Rambam's ruling here.
This interpretation cannot be justified in light of the Rambam's ruling in Halachah 7. Accordingly,Merkevet HaMishneh offers a different interpretation of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view, as is explained in the following note.
|
| 8. |
In Chapter 1, Halachah 20, the Rambam states: "A person need not inform the inhabitants of a lane or a courtyard that he has granted them [a portion of food] and established an eruv for them, for these deeds are to their benefit, and a person may grant a colleague benefit without the latter's knowledge."
The rationale behind that ruling is that it is surely to the benefit of the inhabitants of a courtyard to be able to bring articles to and from areas outside their courtyard. In this instance, however, the establishment of a shituf is not necessarily to the benefit of the inhabitants of that courtyard, and they must therefore be notified beforehand.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the shituf is not necessarily to their benefit, because they have another alternative to transfer articles to and from the courtyard from outside. Hence, it is possible that the inhabitants of the courtyard do not desire to join in the shituf with this lane, lest doing so increase the amount of human traffic in their courtyard.
According to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view, the question facing the inhabitants of this courtyard is: If they do not join in a shituf with either of the lanes, they are allowed to transfer articles left in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath to and from both the lanes. Should they join in a shituf with only one of the lanes, although their opportunities are greatly increased with regard to transferring articles to and from the lane with which they established the shituf, they lose the opportunity to transfer articles to and from the other lane. Perhaps they would desire to maintain the situation as it was originally rather than forfeit this opportunity.
|
| 9. |
In this ruling, the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 80a (the source for this halachah) parallels that of Rabbenu Chanan'el. Rashi, the Ra'avad, and others offer a directly opposite interpretation of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 367:1) follows the latter view.
The Ra'avad's objection to the Rambam's ruling revolves around the interpretation of the passage cited above, which begins:
According to the Rambam, the law Rabbi Zeira cites as support is not entirely analogous to the situation regarding which he was asked. A Jew's wife may establish an eruv without his knowledge, but not against his will. A gentile's wife, by contrast, may rent out his domain even when he has already refused (Sefer HaKovetz).
|
| 10. |
Since they agreed to join in the shituf previously, we assume that they desire to continue the arrangement (Levush, Orach Chayim 368:1).
|
| 11. |
Rashi (Eruvin 80b) explains that this refers to establishing the second shituf with a different type of produce, rather than establishing the first eruv with two types of produce. His approach is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 368:1).
|
| 12. |
Note Chapter 1, Halachah 11, where the Rambam states that a shituf can be established using two types of produce. The Ra'avad objects both there and here.
|
| 13. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
|
| 14. |
Merkevet HaMishneh explains that, even according to the Rambam, using two types of produce for a shituf is undesirable. Therefore, if the shituf must be established anew, it is necessary to check whether the inhabitants of the lane consent.
|
| 15. |
For perhaps they would desire to establish the shituf with the inhabitants of the other lane.
|
| 16. |
See the notes on Halachah 4.
|
| 17. |
Unless they join together in a shituf.
|
| 18. |
Since there is a courtyard in their lane that has not joined in the shituf, all the inhabitants of the lane are forbidden to carry.
|
| 19. |
Unless they join in a shituf.
|
| 20. |
Even when they do not join in a shituf.
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| 21. |
Provided they establish an eruv for themselves.
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| 22. |
Based on the principles stated in the previous halachah, it would seem that the fact that the inhabitants of this courtyard have not joined in the shituf of the lane through which they usually pass would cause carrying to be forbidden in this lane. Nevertheless, since the inhabitants of this courtyard have another alternative, they are considered part of the courtyard through which they do not usually pass. The rationale is that through this decision, one group of people (the inhabitants of the lane who established a shituf) benefits (for their shituf is considered acceptable), and another group (the inhabitants of the courtyard in question) does not lose (for they are forbidden to carry regardless) [Eruvin 49a].
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| 23. |
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 16:3, this is an area of 5000 square cubits. The Sages forbade carrying in such an area, even when it is surrounded by a proper partition (loc. cit.:1-2).
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| 24. |
I.e., we assume that the entrance that is more important to them is the entrance to the enclosed area and not the entrance to the lane. Hence, the fact that they have an entrance to the lane is of no significance.
|
| 25. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 13.
|
| 26. |
See also Halachah 24 and Chapter 4, Halachah 16.
|
| 27. |
See Chapter 2, Halachot 1-5.
|
| 28. |
Chapter 4, Halachah 1.
|
| 29. |
I.e., an eruv established within a courtyard will be seen by the children, and they will know that it is only because of this eruv that the restrictions against carrying are relaxed. If, however, there is only a shituf in the lane, it is unlikely to be noticed by the children, and they will not know about the restrictions established by our Sages (Eruvin 73b). (See, however, the notes on the following halachah.)
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| 30. |
For the shituf requires the participation of all the inhabitants of the lane.
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| 31. |
See Halachah 15.
|
| 32. |
I.e., if one person will give a colleague bread - other than the bread of the shituf - when asked (Ra'avad, Maggid Mishneh, based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Eruvin 6:8).
|
| 33. |
Rav Moshe HaCohen notes an apparent contradiction between this halachah and Chapter 1, Halachah 19, which states that if a shituf was established with bread, there is no need for eruvinwithin the courtyards, because the children will be aware of the collection of loaves of bread. He maintains that this leniency may be accepted at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim387:1) accepts this view.
The Ramah mentions an even greater leniency. He maintains that we may rely on the shitufalthough eruvin were not established, even when the shituf was established with wine or other foods. His rationale is that in Talmudic times, the shituf was established by one member of each courtyard, who acted on behalf of all the inhabitants. At present, however, all the inhabitants of the lane contribute individually to the shituf.
This rationale is not accepted by the later authorities; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 387:1 and theMishnah Berurah 387:12 suggest following the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch.
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| 34. |
The Rambam's ruling is based on his conception [Hilchot Shabbat 17:8; Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:8)] that a lane must have several courtyards and several houses open to it.
The Ra'avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen, and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that it follows the opinion of Rav (Shabbat 131a). Nevertheless, the halachah ultimately follows the view of Shmuel (Eruvin 74a), who maintains that the lane and the courtyards are considered to be a single entity. According to this view, when a shituf has not been established, there is no difference whether or not eruvin have been established within the courtyards. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 388:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 388:4 rule according to this view.
The Mishnah Berurah adds that the stringency suggested by the Rambam applies only when the open side of the lane is adjusted with a pole or a beam. If, however, the open side is adjusted with a frame of an entrance, even the Rambam would agree that one is permitted to carry articles that were left in the lane at the beginning of the Sabbath.
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| 35. |
See Chapter 3, Halachot 18-19.
|
| 36. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 10.
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| 37. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 16.
|
| 38. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
|
| 39. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.
|
| 40. |
We have translated the Hebrew פתח as "opening," rather than "entrance," in light of the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 389:1) that a window is sufficient.
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| 41. |
As reflected by Halachah 10, when a person has one entrance that is semi-private and another that is more public, the entrance that is more private is considered to be the one he will prefer. Since the gentile has an alternative of this nature, his presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden within the lane.
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| 42. |
Because of its small size.
|
| 43. |
Significantly, these laws are directly opposite to those applying to a Jew, as mentioned in Halachah 10.
|
| 44. |
I.e., one might think that since they are joined together as a single entity, the leniency mentioned in the final clause of Halachah 16 would apply. This, however, is not the case, as the Rambam proceeds to state.
|
| 45. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 15.
|
| 46. |
This refers to a city surrounded by a wall that has gates, for in this way it is a private domain according to the Torah (Maggid Mishneh). Other authorities - and these are the views accepted by many today - accept the possibility of a city's being encompassed by an eruv consisting of wires or string that forms an imaginary wall. The acceptability of such an enclosure is discussed in Hilchot Shabbat 16:16 and notes.
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| 47. |
I.e., in contrast to the situation mentioned in the following halachah, there is no need to set a certain area outside the eruv.
|
| 48. |
Since the city has only one entrance, it does not resemble a public domain, and the chance that people will develop a misconception is far less. Hence, no additional measure is necessary (Mishnah Berurah 292:5).
|
| 49. |
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 59a,b. The Rashba and the Ritba offer similar, but slightly different interpretations of the passage. Significantly, Rashi interprets the Hebrew עיר של רבים as referring to a city populated by more than 600,000. His view is cited inShulchan Aruch HaRav 392:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 392:7 as an explanation for the reason that this law is not practiced at present.
|
| 50. |
For the reasons explained in the following halachah.
|
| 51. |
Since the city resembles a public domain, allowing people to carry might create a misconception. Unless a portion of the city were set aside, it is possible that some might entirely lose awareness of the prohibition against carrying.
|
| 52. |
Or even several ladders (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 392:2).
|
| 53. |
Although at times a ladder is considered to be an entrance (e.g., Chapter 3, Halachah 2), this instance is judged by different criteria.
|
| 54. |
These individuals are less likely to be upset about being excluded from the eruv of the city. (SeeEruvin 60a.)
|
| 55. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.
|
| 56. |
The Maggid Mishneh (cited also by the Mishnah Berurah 392:34) notes that the Rambam's wording implies that if only a portion of the inhabitants of a city join in the shituf, we do not automatically assume that a person would prefer to be part of them. Perhaps he would prefer to be associated with those who were not included.
|
| 57. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
|
| 58. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 13.
|
| 59. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9; Chapter 4, Halachah 13; and Halachah 16 of the present chapter.
|
| 60. |
Today, when eruvin are made in cities where Jews and gentiles live together, the gentiles' domains are usually rented through an arrangement negotiated with the municipal authorities. Since these authorities have a certain dimension of control over all land under their jurisdiction, and can enter all homes with a court order, they are entitled to rent the domain for all the gentiles living in this area.
|
| 61. |
Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the Rambam's wording implies that the inhabitants must either join in the shituf or erect a pillar.
|
| 62. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 16; and Halachah 11 of the present chapter.
|
| 63. |
The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss on Halachah 19) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim392:5) interpret this to be referring to a city that is surrounded by a wall with gates.
The Rambam's intent is interpreted to mean that if the pillar is erected in the middle of the public domain, it is not sufficient to divide one part of the city from the other.
If the city is not surrounded by a wall, it is not a private domain according to Torah law. It is possible to enclose a portion by using a Halachic conception of an enclosure, a tzurat hapetach, "a frame of an entrance," but the entire city may not be enclosed in this manner.
|
Hayom Yom:
Shabbat, 11 Shevat, 5775 • 31 January 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: B'shalach, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 60-65.
Tanya: Ch. 20. It is well known (p. 83)...null and void. (p. 85).
The routine of the day begins with saying modeh ani (Siddur Tehilat HaShem p. 6, "I acknowledge before You, living and eternal King etc..."). This is said before the morning laving of the hands, even while the hands are "impure." The reason is that all the impurites in the world do not defile a Jew's "I acknowledge." He might lack one thing or another, but his modeh ani1 remains intact.
Compiled and arranged by the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, of righteous memory, in 5703 (1943) from the talks and letters of the sixth Chabad Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, of righteous memory.
FOOTNOTES
1. See "On the Essence of Chassidus, Kehot.
Truth From the Ground Up
When the Creator came to create the human being, Truth said, "Do not create him, for he is full of lies.
Kindness said, "Create him, for he will do acts of kindness."
What did the Creator do? He cast Truth earthward, and created the human being.
That is why it says, "Truth will sprout from the earth."[Midrash Rabba]
Every argument in Torah can be reduced to the same crucial question:
Do we follow rigid, immutable truth, regardless? Or do we take into account the particulars of this situation? Do we look only from above-down, or do we take the view from below as well?
The debate is never easy, because truth is no longer truth once compromised. Rather, we need to find a way to hold both ends of the stick at once.
That is why the debate must occur among us human beings here on earth, and from there the resolution must sprout. For only in that way will Truth come down to earth, where it truly belongs.[Likutei Sichot, volume 17, page 114.]
____________________________
Torah lessons: Chumash: B'shalach, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 60-65.
Tanya: Ch. 20. It is well known (p. 83)...null and void. (p. 85).
The routine of the day begins with saying modeh ani (Siddur Tehilat HaShem p. 6, "I acknowledge before You, living and eternal King etc..."). This is said before the morning laving of the hands, even while the hands are "impure." The reason is that all the impurites in the world do not defile a Jew's "I acknowledge." He might lack one thing or another, but his modeh ani1 remains intact.
Compiled and arranged by the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, of righteous memory, in 5703 (1943) from the talks and letters of the sixth Chabad Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, of righteous memory.
FOOTNOTES
1. See "On the Essence of Chassidus, Kehot.
____________________________
Daily Thought:Truth From the Ground Up
When the Creator came to create the human being, Truth said, "Do not create him, for he is full of lies.
Kindness said, "Create him, for he will do acts of kindness."
What did the Creator do? He cast Truth earthward, and created the human being.
That is why it says, "Truth will sprout from the earth."[Midrash Rabba]
Every argument in Torah can be reduced to the same crucial question:
Do we follow rigid, immutable truth, regardless? Or do we take into account the particulars of this situation? Do we look only from above-down, or do we take the view from below as well?
The debate is never easy, because truth is no longer truth once compromised. Rather, we need to find a way to hold both ends of the stick at once.
That is why the debate must occur among us human beings here on earth, and from there the resolution must sprout. For only in that way will Truth come down to earth, where it truly belongs.[Likutei Sichot, volume 17, page 114.]
____________________________
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