Today in Jewish History:
• Flight from Liadi (1812)
On this date, Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, who supported and aided the Czar's army during the Napoleonic wars, was forced to flee his hometown from Napoleon's forces which were advancing through White Russia in their push toward Moscow. After five months of wanderings he arrived in the town of Pyena. There he fell ill and, weakened by the tribulations of his flight and the harsh Russian winter, passed away on the 24th of Tevet, 5573 (1812).
Links: The Rebbe vs Napoleon
Daily Quote:
G-d does not deprive any creature of its just reward[Midrash Mechilta]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Re'eh, 6th Portion Deuteronomy 15:1-15:18 with Rashi
• Chapter 15
1At the end of seven years you will make a release. אמִקֵּץ שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים תַּעֲשֶׂה שְׁמִטָּה:
At the end of seven years [you shall make a release]: One might think that this means seven years [starting from the transaction] of each loan. Scripture, therefore, states, “The seventh year [i.e., the year of release] has approached…” (verse 9). But if you say [that] “seven years” [means] for each loan, after each individual loan, how has it approached? [No loan was yet transacted.] Consequently, you learn [that Scripture means] seven years according to the counting of the Shemitha [cycle]. — [Sifrei] מקץ שבע שנים: יכול שבע שנים לכל מלוה ומלוה, תלמוד לומר (פסוק ט) קרבה שנת השבע. ואם אתה אומר שבע שנים לכל מלוה ומלוה להלואת כל אחד ואחד, היאך היא קרבה, הא למדת שבע שנים למנין השמיטות:
2And this is the manner of the release; to release the hand of every creditor from what he lent his friend; he shall not exact from his friend or his brother, because time of the release for the Lord has arrived. בוְזֶה דְּבַר הַשְּׁמִטָּה שָׁמוֹט כָּל בַּעַל מַשֵּׁה יָדוֹ אֲשֶׁר יַשֶּׁה בְּרֵעֵהוּ לֹא יִגֹּשׂ אֶת רֵעֵהוּ וְאֶת אָחִיו כִּי קָרָא שְׁמִטָּה לַיהֹוָה:
to release the hand of every creditor: Heb. שָׁמוֹט כָּל-בַּעַל מַשֵּׁה יָדוֹ, [lit. to release every master the loan of his hand, which makes no sense. Therefore, Rashi interprets the verse to mean] to release the hand of every creditor [from reclaiming the loan]. שמוט כל בעל משה ידו: שמוט את ידו של כל בעל משה:
3From the foreigner you may exact; but what is yours with your brother, your hand shall release. גאֶת הַנָּכְרִי תִּגֹּשׂ וַאֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה לְךָ אֶת אָחִיךָ תַּשְׁמֵט יָדֶךָ:
From the foreigner you may exact: This is a positive command (See Ramban.). - [Sifrei] את הנכרי תיגוש: זו מצות עשה:
4However, there will be no needy among you, for the Lord will surely bless you in the land the Lord, your God, is giving you for an inheritance to possess. דאֶפֶס כִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה בְּךָ אֶבְיוֹן כִּי בָרֵךְ יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהֹוָה בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ נַחֲלָה לְרִשְׁתָּהּ:
However, there will be no needy among you: But further on it says,“For there will never cease to be needy [within the land]” (verse 11). [These two verses seem to contradict each other. However, the explanation is:] When you perform the will of the Omnipresent, there will be needy among others but not among you. If, however, you do not perform the will of the Omnipresent, there will be needy among you. - [Sifrei] אפס כי לא יהיה בך אביון: ולהלן הוא אומר (פסוק יא) כי לא יחדל אביון, אלא בזמן שאתם עושים רצונו של מקום, אביונים באחרים ולא בכם, וכשאין אתם עושים רצונו של מקום אביונים בכם:
needy: Heb. אֶבְיוֹן, [denoting someone who is] poorer than an ע ָנִי. The term אֶבְיוֹן means“to yearn for” (תָּאֵב) , i.e., one who yearns for everything [because he has nothing]. — [Vayikra Rabbah 34:6, see B.M. 111b] אביון: דל מעני, ולשון אביון שהוא תאב לכל דבר:
5However, if you hearken to the voice of the Lord, your God, to be careful to do all this commandment, which I am commanding you today. הרַק אִם שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לִשְׁמֹר לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת כָּל הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם:
However, if you hearken [to the voice of the Lord, your God]: then “there will be no needy among you” (verse 4). רק אם שמוע תשמע: אז לא יהיה בך אביון:
you hearken: Heb. שָׁמֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע. [The repetition of the verb form suggests:] If one listens a little, he will be granted the opportunity to listen much [i.e., he will be taught much Torah as a reward]. — [Sifrei] שמוע תשמע: שמע קמעא משמיעין אותו הרבה:
6For the Lord, your God, has blessed you, as He spoke to you, and you will lend to many nations, but you will not borrow; and you will rule over many nations, but they will not rule over you. וכִּי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בֵּרַכְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ וְהַעֲבַטְתָּ גּוֹיִם רַבִּים וְאַתָּה לֹא תַעֲבֹט וּמָשַׁלְתָּ בְּגוֹיִם רַבִּים וּבְךָ לֹא יִמְשֹׁלוּ:
[For the Lord, your God, has blessed you,] as He has spoken to you:And where did He speak about this?“Blessed are you in the city…” (Deut. 28:3). - [Sifrei] כאשר דבר לך: והיכן דבר, (דברים כח, ג) ברוך אתה בעיר:
and you will lend: Heb. וְהַעֲבַטְתָּ. Whenever an expression denoting lending refers to a lender [of money], it adopts the hiph’il [causative] form. For example, וְהִלְוִיתָ, or וְהַעֲבַטְתָּ, you will lend. However, if it would have said וְעָבַטְתָּ,[in the kal, simple conjugation,] it would be referring to the borrower, like וְלָוִיתָ, you will borrow . והעבטת: כל לשון הלואה כשנופל על המלוה, נופל בלשון מפעיל. כגון והלוית, והעבטת. ואם היה אומר ועבטת היה נופל על הלוה, כמו ולוית:
and you will lend to [many] nations: One might think that you will borrow from this one and lend that one. Therefore, Scripture states, “but you will not borrow.” והעבטת גוים: יכול שתהא לוה מזה ומלוה לזה, תלמוד לומר ואתה לא תעבוט:
and you will rule over many nations: One might think that [at the same time] other nations will rule over you. Therefore, Scripture states, “but they will not rule over you.” - [Sifrei] ומשלת בגוים רבים: יכול גוים אחרים מושלים עליך, תלמוד לומר ובך לא ימשולו:
7If there will be among you a needy person, from one of your brothers in one of your cities, in your land the Lord, your God, is giving you, you shall not harden your heart, and you shall not close your hand from your needy brother. זכִּי יִהְיֶה בְךָ אֶבְיוֹן מֵאַחַד אַחֶיךָ בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ בְּאַרְצְךָ אֲשֶׁר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ לֹא תְאַמֵּץ אֶת לְבָבְךָ וְלֹא תִקְפֹּץ אֶת יָדְךָ מֵאָחִיךָ הָאֶבְיוֹן:
If there will be among you a needy person: The most needy person has priority. - [Sifrei] כי יהיה בך אביון: התאב תאב קודם:
from one of your brothers: Your brother on your father’s side has priority over your brother on your mother’s side. — [Sifrei] מאחד אחיך: אחיך מאביך, קודם לאחיך מאמך:
[in one of] your cities: The poor of your city have priority over the poor of another city. - [Sifrei] שעריך: עניי עירך קודמים לעניי עיר אחרת:
you shall not harden [your heart]: Some people suffer [as they deliberate] whether they should give [to the needy] or they should not give; therefore it says: “you shall not harden [your heart].” Some people stretch out their hand [to give], but then close it; therefore it says: “nor close your hand.” - [Sifrei] לא תאמץ: יש לך אדם שמצטער אם יתן אם לא יתן, לכך נאמר לא תאמץ. יש לך אדם שפושט את ידו וקופצה, לכך נאמר ולא תקפוץ:
[nor close your hand] from your needy brother: If you do not give him, you will ultimately become a“brother of the needy” [i.e., becoming needy yourself]. — [Sifrei] מאחיך האביון: אם לא תתן לו, סופך להיות אחיו של אביון [בעניות]:
8Rather, you shall open your hand to him, and you shall lend him sufficient for his needs, which he is lacking. חכִּי פָתֹחַ תִּפְתַּח אֶת יָדְךָ לוֹ וְהַעֲבֵט תַּעֲבִיטֶנּוּ דֵּי מַחְסֹרוֹ אֲשֶׁר יֶחְסַר לוֹ:
[Rather] you shall open [your hand]: Even many times. פתח תפתח: אפילו כמה פעמים:
[Rather] you shall open [your hand]: Heb. כִּי-פָתֹחַ תִּפְתַּח. Here, the word כִּי has the meaning of “rather” [whereas in verse 7 it means “if,” and in verse 10, “because”]. כי פתח תפתח: הרי כי משמש בלשון אלא:
and you shall lend: If he does not want [your money] as a [charitable] gift, give it to him as a loan. — [Sifrei ; Keth. 67b] והעבט תעביטנו: אם לא רצה במתנה, תן לו בהלואה:
[lend him] sufficient for his needs: However, you are not commanded to make him wealthy. — [Sifrei] די מחסורו: ואי אתה מצווה להעשירו:
[sufficient for his needs,] what he is lacking: Even a horse to ride on and a servant to run before him [if he is accustomed to this type of lifestyle]. - [Sifrei; Keth. 67b] אשר יחסר לו: אפילו סוס לרכוב עליו ועבד לרוץ לפניו:
he [is lacking]: Heb. יֶחְסַר לוֹ, lit. what is lacking for him. This refers to a wife [i.e., you should help him marry a wife]. Similarly, it is stated: “I shall make for him (לוֹ) a helpmate opposite him” (Gen. 2:18). - [Keth. 66b] לו: זו אשה. וכן הוא אומר (בראשית ב, יח) אעשה לו עזר כנגדו:
9Beware, lest there be in your heart an unfaithful thought, saying, "The seventh year, the year of release has approached," and you will begrudge your needy brother and not give him, and he will cry out to the Lord against you, and it will be a sin to you. טהִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן יִהְיֶה דָבָר עִם לְבָבְךָ בְלִיַּעַל לֵאמֹר קָרְבָה שְׁנַת הַשֶּׁבַע שְׁנַת הַשְּׁמִטָּה וְרָעָה עֵינְךָ בְּאָחִיךָ הָאֶבְיוֹן וְלֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ וְקָרָא עָלֶיךָ אֶל יְהֹוָה וְהָיָה בְךָ חֵטְא:
and he will cry out [to the Lord] against you: One might think this is a requirement [namely, that this poor man is obliged to “cry out… against you”]. Therefore, Scripture says, “[On his day you shall give him his payment…] so that he will not cry against you [to the Lord]” (Deut. 24:15). - [Sifrei 15:138] וקרא עליך: יכול מצוה, תלמוד לומר (דברים כד, טו) ולא יקרא:
and it will be a sin to you: in any case, even if he does not cry [against you]. If so, why does it say,“and he will cry out… against you?” [It means that God says:] I hasten to punish in response to the one who cries out more than to the one who does not cry out. — [Sifrei] והיה בך חטא: מכל מקום, אפילו לא יקרא. אם כן למה נאמר וקרא עליך, ממהר אני ליפרע על ידי הקורא יותר ממי שאינו קורא:
10You shall surely give him, and your heart shall not be grieved when you give to him; for because of this thing the Lord, your God, will bless you in all your work and in all your endeavors. ינָתוֹן תִּתֵּן לוֹ וְלֹא יֵרַע לְבָבְךָ בְּתִתְּךָ לוֹ כִּי בִּגְלַל | הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל מַעֲשֶׂךָ וּבְכֹל מִשְׁלַח יָדֶךָ:
You shall surely give him: Even a hundred times. — [Sifrei] נתון תתן לו: אפילו מאה פעמים:
him: [meaning] between him and you [i.e., privately]. - [Sifrei] לו: בינו ובינך:
for because of this thing: Heb. דָּבָר, lit. word. Even if you said [i.e., gave him your“word”] that you would give, you will receive a reward for the saying along with the reward for the deed. — [Sifrei] כי בגלל הדבר: אפילו אמרת ליתן, אתה נוטל שכר האמירה עם שכר המעשה:
11For there will never cease to be needy within the land. Therefore, I command you, saying, you shall surely open your hand to your brother, to your poor one, and to your needy one in your land. יאכִּי לֹא יֶחְדַּל אֶבְיוֹן מִקֶּרֶב הָאָרֶץ עַל כֵּן אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ לֵאמֹר פָּתֹחַ תִּפְתַּח אֶת יָדְךָ לְאָחִיךָ לַּעֲנִיֶּךָ וּלְאֶבְיֹנְךָ בְּאַרְצֶךָ:
Therefore: Heb. עַל-כֵּן, here meaning מִפְּנֵי כֵן, [i.e.,] “because of this,” or“therefore.” על כן: מפני כן:
saying: I offer you advice for your own good. — [Sifrei] לאמר: עצה לטובתך אני משיאך:
[You shall surely open your hand] to your brother, to your poor one:To which brother? To your poor one. לאחיך לעניך: לאיזה אח, לעני:
to your poor one: Heb. לַעֲנִיֶּךָ, [spelled] with one“yud,” [singular form,] means one poor person, but עֲנִיֶּיךָ with two “yud”s [the second “yud” denoting the plural form,] means two poor people. [Here, since it is written with one “yud,” meaning one poor person, thus modifying אָחִיךָ, your brother, which is in the singular]. See Yosef Hallel, Leket Bahir, Chavel. לעניך: ביו"ד אחד, לשון עני אחד הוא. אבל ענייך בשני יודי"ן, שני עניים:
12If your brother, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you, he shall serve you for six years, and in the seventh year you shall send him forth free from you. יבכִּי יִמָּכֵר לְךָ אָחִיךָ הָעִבְרִי אוֹ הָעִבְרִיָּה וַעֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים וּבַשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת תְּשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ חָפְשִׁי מֵעִמָּךְ:
If [your brother…] is sold to you: By others [but not one who sells himself because of poverty]. Scripture is speaking here of one whom the court sold [for a theft that he had committed]. But has it not already been stated, “If you buy a Hebrew servant” (Exod. 21:2) and there, too, Scripture is referring to one whom the court sold (Mechilta)? Nevertheless, [it is repeated here] because of two points which are new here: The first is that it is written [here] “or a Hebrew woman,” that she, too, [like a manservant,] goes free at the end of six [years]. This does not mean a woman whom the court has sold, for a woman is not sold [by the court] on account of a theft, since it is stated [that the thief will be sold] “for his theft” (Exod. 22:2), not for her theft. Thus, [we are referring here to] a minor whom her father sold [as a handmaid], and it teaches you here that if six years terminate before she shows signs [of puberty], she goes free (Exod. 21:7-11). The second new point here is:“You shall surely provide him.” כי ימכר לך: על ידי אחרים, שמכרוהו בית דין בגנבתו הכתוב מדבר. והרי כבר נאמר (שמות כא, ב) כי תקנה עבד עברי, ובמכרוהו בית דין הכתוב מדבר. אלא מפני שני דברים שנתחדשו כאן. אחד שכתוב או העבריה, אף היא תצא בשש. ולא שמכרוה בית דין, שאין האשה נמכרת בגנבתה, שנאמר בגנבתו ולא בגנבתה, אלא בקטנה שמכרה אביה, ולמד כאן שאם יצאו שש שנים קודם שתביא סימנין תצא. ועוד חידש כאן (פסוק יד) העניק תעניק:
13And when you send him forth free from you, you shall not send him forth empty-handed. יגוְכִי תְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ חָפְשִׁי מֵעִמָּךְ לֹא תְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ רֵיקָם:
14You shall surely provide him from your flock, from your threshing floor, and from your vat, you shall give him from what the Lord, your God, has blessed you ידהַעֲנֵיק תַּעֲנִיק לוֹ מִצֹּאנְךָ וּמִגָּרְנְךָ וּמִיִּקְבֶךָ אֲשֶׁר בֵּרַכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּתֶּן לוֹ:
You shall surely provide him: Heb. הַעֲנֵיק תַּעֲנִיק. [The root ענק] denotes an ornament worn high [on the upper portion of the body] within view of the eye. [Thus, this verse means that you should give him] something through which it will be recognized that you have benefited him. Others explain [the word הַעֲנֵיק] as an expression of loading on his neck [meaning that you should load him with gifts]. העניק תעניק: לשון עדי בגובה ובמראית העין, שיהא ניכר שהטיבות לו. ויש מפרשים לשון הטענה על צוארו:
[You shall surely provide him] from your flock, from your threshing floor, and from your vat: One might think that I must [give him] only these things [listed in the verse here]. Therefore, Scripture states,“from what the Lord, your God, has blessed you,” meaning, from everything with which your Creator has blessed you. Then why are these mentioned? Just as these particular things are within the realm of blessing, so too, you should provide him only with what falls within the realm of blessing. This [therefore] excludes mules, [which are sterile, and are thus not considered within the realm of blessing] (Kid. 17a). In tractate Kiddushin (17a)our Rabbis derived by means of a gezerah shavah how much one must give the servant of each kind. מצאנך ומגרנך ומיקבך: יכול אין לי אלא אלו בלבד, תלמוד לומר אשר ברכך, מכל מה שברכך בוראך. ולמה נאמרו אלו, מה אלו מיוחדים שהם בכלל ברכה אף כל שהוא בכלל ברכה, יצאו פרדות. ולמדו רבותינו במסכת קידושין (יז א) בגזרה שוה כמה נותן לו מכל מין ומין:
15And you shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord, your God, redeemed you; therefore, I am commanding you this thing today. טווְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי עֶבֶד הָיִיתָ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וַיִּפְדְּךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ עַל כֵּן אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ אֶת הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה הַיּוֹם:
And you shall remember that you were a slave [in the land of Egypt]:And I loaded you up [with booty], and then did so a second time, from the spoil of Egypt and from the spoil at the Sea [of Reeds]; so too should you load him up, and then do so a second time. — [Sifrei] וזכרת כי עבד היית: והענקתי ושניתי לך מביזת מצרים וביזת הים, אף אתה הענק ושנה לו:
16And it will be, if he says to you, "I will not leave you," because he loves you and your household, for it is good for him with you, טזוְהָיָה כִּי יֹאמַר אֵלֶיךָ לֹא אֵצֵא מֵעִמָּךְ כִּי אֲהֵבְךָ וְאֶת בֵּיתֶךָ כִּי טוֹב לוֹ עִמָּךְ:
17Then you shall take an awl and put it through his ear and into the door, and he shall be a servant to you forever; and also to your maidservant you shall do likewise. יזוְלָקַחְתָּ אֶת הַמַּרְצֵעַ וְנָתַתָּה בְאָזְנוֹ וּבַדֶּלֶת וְהָיָה לְךָ עֶבֶד עוֹלָם וְאַף לַאֲמָתְךָ תַּעֲשֶׂה כֵּן:
[And he shall be] a servant [to you] forever: Heb. לְעוֹלָם. One might think that [לְעוֹלָם, “forever”] is to be interpreted literally. Therefore, Scripture states:“[And you shall sanctify the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It will be a Jubilee for you;] and you shall return, every man to his property, and you shall return, every man to his family” (Lev. 25:10). Consequently, you learn that the term לְעוֹלָם here can mean only the period until the Jubilee. [This period is also called לְעוֹלָם.]- [Mechilta 21:6] עבד עולם: יכול כמשמעו, תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כה, י) ושבתם איש אל אחזתו ואיש אל משפחתו תשובו, הא למדת שאין זה, אלא עולמו של יובל:
and also to your maidservant you will do likewise: to provide her. One might think that Scripture includes her concerning the piercing [of the ear] as well. Therefore, it states,“And if the manservant (הָעֶבֶד) will clearly say, [I love my master…then…his master shall bore his ear with an awl]” (Exod. 21:5-6); [i.e.,] a manservant (עֶבֶד) must have his ear pierced, but not a maidservant. — [Sifrei] ואף לאמתך תעשה כן: הענק לה. יכול אף לרציעה השוה הכתוב אותה, תלמוד לומר (שמות כא, ה) ואם אמור יאמר העבד, עבד נרצע, ואין אמה נרצעת:
18You shall not be troubled when you send him free from you, for twice as much as a hired servant, he has served you six years, and the Lord, your God, will bless you in all that you shall do. יחלֹא יִקְשֶׁה בְעֵינֶךָ בְּשַׁלֵּחֲךָ אֹתוֹ חָפְשִׁי מֵעִמָּךְ כִּי מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר עֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים וּבֵרַכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה:
for twice as much as a hired servant: From here our Rabbis said: A Hebrew slave serves both by day and by night, and that is double the amount of labor of a man hired only for day work. And what is his service during the night? That his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant [as a wife], and the [resultant] children [belong] to the master. — [Sifrei , Kid. 15a] כי משנה שכר שכיר: מכאן אמרו עבד עברי עובד בין ביום ובין בלילה. וזהו כפלים שבעבודת שכירי יום. ומהו עבודתו בלילה, רבו מוסר לו שפחה כנענית והולדות לאדון:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 140 - 144
• Chapter 140
David composed this psalm against his slanderers, especially the chief conspirator Doeg. Anyone confronted by slanderers should recite this psalm.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. Rescue me from the evil man, protect me from the man of violence,
3. who devise evil schemes in their heart; every day they gather for wars.
4. They sharpen their tongues like a serpent; the spider's venom is forever under their lips.
5. Guard me, Lord, from the hands of the wicked, protect me from the man of violence-those who plot to cause my steps to slip.
6. Arrogant ones have hidden a snare for me, and ropes; they spread a net by my path, they set traps for me continually.
7. I said to the Lord, "You are my God!" Listen, O Lord, to the voice of my pleas.
8. God, my Lord, the strength of my deliverance, You sheltered my head on the day of armed battle.
9. Grant not, O Lord, the desires of the wicked; fulfill not his scheme, make it unattainable forever.
10. As for the head of my besiegers, let the deceit of their own lips bury them.
11. Let burning coals fall upon them; let it cast them down into the fire, into deep pits, never to rise again.
12. Let not the slanderous man be established in the land; let the evil of the man of violence trap him until he is overthrown.
13. I know that the Lord will execute judgement for the poor, justice for the needy.
14. Indeed, the righteous will extol Your Name; the upright will dwell in Your presence.
Chapter 141
This psalm teaches an important lesson: One should pray for Divine assistance that his mouth not speak that which is not in his heart. The gatekeeper only allows the gate to be opened for a purpose; let it be the same with one's lips.
1. A psalm by David. O Lord, I have called You, hasten to me; listen to my voice when I call to You.
2. Let my prayer be set forth as incense before You, the raising of my hands as an afternoon offering.
3. O Lord, place a guard for my mouth, keep watch over the door of my lips.
4. Do not incline my heart to a bad thing-to perform deeds in wickedness, with men, doers of evil; let me not partake of their delicacies.
5. Let the righteous one strike me with kindness and let him rebuke me; like the finest oil, let my head not refuse it. For as long [as I live], my prayer is [to preserve me] from their harm.
6. For their judges have slipped because of their [hearts of] rock, though they heard my words and they were pleasant.
7. As one who chops and splinters [wood] on the ground, so have our bones been scattered to the mouth of the grave.
8. For to You, God, my Lord, are my eyes; in You I take shelter; do not pour out my soul.
9. Protect me from the hands of the snare they laid for me, and from the traps of the evildoers.
10. Let the wicked fall into their own nets together, until I pass over.
Chapter 142
David composed this psalm while hiding from Saul in a cave, at which time he had cut off the corner of Saul's garment (to prove that he was able to kill him but did not wish to do so). He declared, "Where can I turn, and where can I run? All I have is to cry out to You!"
1. A maskil1 by David, when he was in the cave, a prayer.
2. With my voice I will cry out to the Lord; with my voice I will call to the Lord in supplication.
3. I will pour out my plea before Him; I will declare my distress in His presence.
4. When my spirit is faint within me, You know my path. In the way in which I walk, they have hidden a snare for me.
5. Look to my right and see, there is none that will know me; every escape is lost to me. No man cares for my soul.
6. I cried out to You, O Lord; I said, "You are my refuge, my portion in the land of the living.”
7. Listen to my song of prayer, for I have been brought very low. Deliver me from my pursuers, for they are too mighty for me.
8. Release my soul from confinement, so that it may acknowledge Your Name. Because of me, the righteous will crown [You] when You will deal graciously with me.
Chapter 143
1. A psalm by David. O Lord, hear my prayer, lend Your ear to my supplications. With Your faithfulness answer me, and with Your righteousness.
2. Do not enter into judgment with Your servant, for no living being would be vindicated before You.
3. For the enemy has pursued my soul; he has crushed my life to the ground; he has set me down in dark places, like those who are eternally dead.
4. Then my spirit became faint within me; my heart was dismayed within me.
5. I remembered the days of old; I meditated on all Your deeds; I spoke of Your handiwork.
6. I spread out my hands to You; like a languishing land my soul yearns after You, Selah.
7. Answer me soon, O Lord, my spirit is spent; hide not Your face from me, lest I become like those who descend into the pit.
8. Let me hear Your kindness in the morning, for have I trusted in You. Let me know the way in which I should walk, for to You I have lifted my soul.
9. Deliver me from my enemies, O Lord. I have concealed [my troubles from all, save] You.
10. Teach me to do Your will, for You are my God. Let Your good spirit lead me in an even path.
11. For the sake of Your Name, O Lord, give me life; in Your righteousness, take my soul out of distress.
12. And in Your kindness, cut off my enemies and obliterate all those who oppress my soul, for I am Your servant.
Chapter 144
After triumphing in all his wars, David composed this psalm in praise of God.
1. By David. Blessed be the Lord, my Rock, Who trains my hands for battle and my fingers for war.
2. My source of kindness and my fortress, my high tower and my rescuer, my shield, in Whom I take refuge; it is He Who makes my people submit to me.
3. O Lord, what is man that You have recognized him; the son of a mortal, that You are mindful of him?
4. Man is like a breath; his days are like a passing shadow.
5. O Lord, incline Your heavens and descend; touch the mountains and they will become vapor.
6. Flash one bolt of lightning and You will scatter them; send out Your arrows and You will confound them.
7. Stretch forth Your hands from on high, rescue me and deliver me out of many waters, from the hand of strangers,
8. whose mouth speaks deceit and whose right hand is a right hand of falsehood.
9. God, I will sing a new song to You, I will play to You upon a harp of ten strings.
10. He who gives victory to kings, He will rescue David, His servant, from the evil sword.
11. Rescue me and deliver me from the hand of strangers, whose mouth speaks deceit and whose right hand is a right hand of falsehood.
12. For our sons are like plants, brought up to manliness in their youth; our daughters are like cornerstones, fashioned after the fashion of a palace.
13. Our storehouses are full, overflowing with all manner of food; our sheep increase by the thousands, growing by the tens of thousands in our open fields.
14. Our leaders bear the heaviest burden; there is none who break through, nor is there bad report, nor outcry in our streets.
15. Happy is the nation for whom this is so. Happy is that nation whose God is the Lord.
Daily Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 9• Lessons in Tanya
• Friday, Menachem Av 29, 5775 · August 14, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 9
Like the preceding Epistle, the present one too centers on the theme of tzedakah.
If it is to be performed properly, tzedakah ought to be given unstintingly, and not only after all one’s own needs and desires have been satisfied. Ideally, it should be given in the spirit of an aphorism that was current among the chassidim of the Alter Rebbe:1 “Inside my slice of bread there is your share too; G‑d is providing for you through me.”
A man should thus feel obligated to share with others and provide for their needs to the very same degree that he provides for his own wife and children. Performing tzedakah in this manner can only be achieved when one distributes one’s earnings in an utterly selfless manner, doing so entirely for G‑d’s sake. Then, even when one provides for his own family’s needs he will do so because they are Jewish souls who are part of G‑d Above,2 and as such he bears a responsibility towards them.
When one acts in this way, he will realize that all needy folk are also Jewish souls and part of G‑d Above; he must therefore concern himself with their needs as well. Though the Torah rules that providing for one’s own wife and children takes precedence over providing for the needs of others, the essential sense of obligation remains the same.
אהוביי אחיי ורעיי אשר כנפשי
My beloved ones,3 my brethren and friends, who are unto me like my soul:
The previous Lubavitcher Rebbe explains in one of his talks, that when the Alter Rebbe seeks to imbue his followers with the love of their fellow Jews he addresses them as “my beloved friends,” for by befriending a fellow Jew one becomes a “beloved friend” of the Alter Rebbe.
Accordingly, it may be said that by heeding the Alter Rebbe’s instructions with regard to tzedakah one becomes one of the Alter Rebbe’s “beloved brethren.”
באתי כמזכיר ומעורר ישנים בתרדמת הבלי הבלים
I come [herewith] as one who reminds and awakens those who sleep the slumber of “vanities of vanities,”
Physical things at any time are deemed hevel: being airy and insubstantial, they have no true existence. When they serve no loftier purpose than themselves, they may be given the double epithet used above — havlei havalim,4 airy and foolish trivialities.
ולפקוח עיני העורים
and to open the eyes of the blind.
When the soul finds itself within the body and allows itself to be led by it, it resembles a sighted person whose eyes are bound, and who, intelligent though he may be, is then led about like an imbecile. If the soul, a part of G‑d Above, descends within a body but cannot restrict it from fulfilling its desires, it is considered to be blinded by the body, as the TzemachTzedek writes in Or HaTorah, at the conclusion of Parshat Behar.5 The “blindness” caused by the body must be healed, so that the soul may once again behold the truth.
יביטו לראות, להיות כל ישעם וחפצם ומגמתם, לכל בהם חיי רוחם
6Let them look and see to it that all their striving, longing and aiming, in7 everything on which the life of their spirit depends,8 should be bound up
במקור מים חיים, חיי החיים
כל ימי חייהם, מנפש ועד בשר
throughout all the days of their lives, with respect11 to the soul as well as to the flesh.
Not only during prayer or Torah study or while performing mitzvot is a Jew to be bound to G‑d, but even while going about his mundane affairs he should be attached to Him as well.
דהיינו, כל מילי דעלמא ועסקי פרנסה לא יהיה כאלו דעבדין לגרמייהו
I.e., in all mundane matters and in the means by which one earns one’s livelihood, one should not be like those who do everything for their own sake, acting only out of their desire to satisfy themselves and their families, rather than for G‑d’s sake.
ולא יהיה בית ישראל ככל הגוים
Let not the House of Israel be like all the gentiles,12
דזנין ומפרנסין ומוקרין לנשייהו ובנייהו מאהבה
who13 feed, provide for and esteem their wives and children out of [self-] love.
I.e., since one loves himself he also loves his wife and children, who are a part of him. Rather, his love should be holy in its selflessness.
כי מי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ, כתיב
For it is written:14 “Who is like Your people Israel, a unique nation on earth?”
דהיינו שגם בעניני ארץ לא יפרידו מאחד האמת, חס ושלום
This means that even in mundane (“earthly”) matters they will not, heaven forfend, separate15 [them] from G‑d’s true Unity,
The concept of the Unity of G‑d signifies that apart from Him nothing truly exists.
להעיד עדות שקר, חס ושלום, בקריאת שמע ערב ובוקר, בעינים סגורות
to bear false witness, heaven forfend, while reciting the Shema every evening and morning with closed eyes,
ה׳ אחד, בד׳ רוחות ובשמים ממעל ובארץ מתחת
[saying,]16 “G‑d is One” — in the four directions, and in the heavens above and on earth below,17 thus attesting to G‑d’s Unity even in the mundane realm,
ובפקוח עיני העורים
while as the eyes of the blind are opened, and here the Alter Rebbe addresses those whose eyes are blinded by corporeal matters:
התעיף עיניך בו ואיננו, חס ושלום
“Can you close your eyes upon Him, as if He is no more?”18 (heaven forfend).
This means to say that immediately upon opening his eyes after reciting the Shema, such a person can view the world as if it were a self-sufficient entity, separate and distinct from its Creator; accordingly, moreover, he conducts his affairs in a selfish manner rather than for the sake of heaven.
אך בזאת יאות לנו
Rather, this [approach] shall be befitting us —
להיות כל עסקינו במילי דעלמא לא לגרמייהו
that19 all our involvement with mundane affairs should be [conducted] not for its own sake,
כי אם להחיות נפשות, חלקי אלוה
but in order to animate souls, (i.e., to provide sustenance for fellow Jews, whose souls are veritably, so to speak,)portions of G‑d,
ולמלאות מחסוריהם בחסד חנם
and to supply what they lack, out of gratuitous kindness.
שבזה אנו מדמין הצורה ליוצרה, ה׳ אחד
In this way we make the form (the soul) resemble Him Who formed it, viz., “G‑d [Who] is One”;
אשר חסד אל כל היום, חסד של אמת
for20 “the Chesed of G‑d endures throughout the day,” i.e., at all times — a21 true Chesed, without thought of reward,
להחיות העולם ומלואו בכל רגע ורגע
that animates the universe and all that fills it, at every single moment.
In imitation of G‑d, Who thus dispenses kindness and ani-mates all created beings, man too should act kindly toward others and sustain those in need. Indeed, this should be his ultimate purpose when engaging in his work or in commerce: to be able to provide sustenance for the souls of his fellow Jews.
According to the above, however, one should provide for the needs of others to the very same degree that he provides for his own family. Why, then, should the needs of one’s own family take precedence over the needs of others? The Alter Rebbe answers this by saying:
רק שאשתו ובניו של אדם קודמין לכל, על פי התורה
It is only that according to the Torah22 a man’s wife and children take precedence over all others,
The Alter Rebbe wrote this Epistle in connection with the tzaddikim, R. Mendele Vitebsker and R. Avraham Kalisker, as well as their colleagues and disciples, who at the time of writing had already left the diaspora and were living in the Holy Land. The Alter Rebbe therefore goes on to say:
חוץ מצדיקים שבדור, שהן קודמין לבניו
except23 for the tzaddikim of the generation, who take precedence over one’s children;
וצדיקים שבארץ ישראל קודמין לצדיקים שבחוץ לארץ
moreover, the tzaddikim in the Land of Israel take precedence over the tzaddikim in the diaspora,
לבד מזאת שלא הניחו כמותם בחוץ לארץ
apart from the fact that they did not leave anyone in the diaspora comparable to themselves.
ודי למבין
This will suffice for the discerning.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | See Igrot Kodesh (Letters of the Previous Lubavitcher Rebbe), Vol. VIII, p. 606, and references cited there. |
| 2. | Likkutei Amarim, Part I, beginning of ch. 2. |
| 3. | Note of the Rebbe: “Cf. Iggeret HaKodesh, Epistles 16, 22 (Parts a & b), 24.” |
| 4. | Cf. Kohelet 1:2. |
| 5. | Or HaTorah, Vayikra, Vol. I, p. 191. |
| 6. | Cf. Yeshayahu 42:18. |
| 7. | This clause has been translated according to Rashi on Yeshayahu 38:16. |
| 8. | Note of the Rebbe: “See Part I, conclusion of ch. 31.” |
| 9. | Cf. Yirmeyahu 2:13. |
| 10. | Lit., “the Life of life.” |
| 11. | Cf. Yeshayahu 10:18. |
| 12. | The standard text of the Tanya has כעוע״ג (“like heathens”), which has been emended here according to its LuachHaTikkun (“Table of Corrections”). |
| 13. | The remainder of this sentence is paraphrased from the Ketubbah (the marriage contract), though the emphasis here, of course, is on a possibly selfish motivation. |
| 14. | I Divrei HaYamim 17:21. |
| 15. | V.L.: לא יפרדו (“they will not become separated”). |
| 16. | Devarim 6:4. |
| 17. | Cf. Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim, sec. 61, citing the Sefer Mitzvot Katan. |
| 18. | Cf. Mishlei 23:5. |
| 19. | V.L.: בהיות (“when all our involvement...is [conducted]”). |
| 20. | Tehillim 52:3. |
| 21. | Rashi on Bereishit 47:29. |
| 22. | See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, sec. 251, and references indicated there. |
| 23. | The passage beginning “Except for the tzadikkim...” and concluding “...for the discerning,” is added above to the standard printed text according to its Luach HaTikkun (“Table of Corrections”). |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Friday, Menachem Av 29, 5775 · August 14, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 240
Damage Caused by a Grazing Animal
"If a man shall cause his livestock to eat in a field..."—Exodus 22:4.
We are commanded regarding the laws [of liability] that apply if a person's animal causes financial loss by grazing [in another's field].
Damage Caused by a Grazing Animal
Positive Commandment 240
Translated by Berel Bell
The 240th mitzvah is that we are commanded to follow the laws regarding damage caused by grazing [hever].
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "If a person allows his animal to graze in a field or a vineyard, [... he must pay for the damage]."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 2nd and 6th chapters of tractate Bava Kama and the 5th chapter of Gittin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid., 22:4.
Gerushin - Chapter Twelve
Halacha 1
When a woman comes and says, "I was married, and now I am divorced," her word is accepted, because the source for the statements [on which basis the woman was] forbidden [states that she is] permitted.1
If the prevailing assumption is that a woman was married,2 and she comes and says, "My husband divorced me," her word is not accepted [as a basis] for her to be allowed to be remarried.3 She has, however, disqualified herself [from marrying into] the priesthood forever.4If her husband dies [childless], we suspect that there might have been truth to her words, and she performs the rite of chalitzah, rather than the rite of yibbum.5
Halacha 2
When a woman has two witnesses who state that she has been divorced, she is permitted to marry a priori, although she does not possess her get. If she produces a get that was in her possession and says: "My husband divorced me with this," her word is accepted, and she is permitted to marry, even though [the signatures of the witnesses to the get] have not been verified as we have explained.6
Halacha 3
[The following laws apply] when the husband comes and protests. If he states, "I never gave it to her. It fell from me and she found it," his statements are not accepted, because he admits that he wrote it for her sake, and it is now in her possession. If, however, the husband says: "[The get] was given conditionally," "It was entrusted to her for safekeeping," or "I never wrote such [a document]; it is a forgery,"7 [the woman] must have the signatures of the witnesses verified or have the witnesses to its transfer testify, as explained.8
If the signatures of the witnesses are not verified, she is not considered to be divorced with regard to the right to marry others. She has, however, disqualified herself [from marrying into] the priesthood, as stated.9 For she has disqualified herself by virtue of her own statements and caused herself to be considered as a forbidden object.10
Halacha 4
If she comes together with her husband and says, "My husband divorced me, but I lost my get," and the husband says, "I did not divorce her," her word is accepted, even though it has been assumed that she is his wife. [The rationale is:] it can be assumed that a woman would not make such brazen statements in the presence of her husband [if they were not true].11
Halacha 5
If a husband says: "I divorced my wife," his word is not accepted. Nevertheless, we suspect that it might be true, and therefore, the woman is considered to be one whose divorce is of doubtful status.12 Even when the woman also admits that she was divorced, his word is not accepted.
We fear that he is seeking to create difficulties for her,13 or that he divorced her with a get that was void, and she is not aware of the fact, or perhaps she will brazenly [state that she has been divorced, although that is not the case,] because he accepts her word, or because she is not aware of the seriousness of the prohibition. Therefore, we tell the husband: "If it is true [that you divorced her,] you are both here, divorce her again in our presence."
Halacha 6
When two [individuals] say [that a woman] was divorced, and two others say14[that] she was not divorced, she is still presumed to be married. [This ruling applies] even if her husband is present, and she tells him, "You divorced me." Since the witnesses support her, it is possible that she will speak brazenly [to her husband]. Therefore, if she remarries [in such a situation], she is compelled to leave [her second husband], and a child [born to them] is considered illegitimate.
Halacha 7
When does the above apply? When the witnesses say: "She was divorced in the immediate past." For in such a situation, we tell her, "If it is true that you were divorced, produce your get."
If, however, the witnesses say: "She was divorced several days ago," there is the possibility that the get was lost. [Therefore, different laws apply.] Since she claims that she was definitely divorced, and two witnesses support her claim, although there are two witnesses who deny it, if she marries one of the witnesses, she is not compelled to leave [her second husband]. [The rationale is] that she and her husband, [the witness,] certainly know whether she is permitted [or not], and we assume that they would not create difficulties for themselves.15
Accordingly, [different rules apply] if she marries another person. Since he cannot be certain concerning the matter - and similarly, if she herself is uncertain about the matter, even if she marries one of her witnesses - she should be compelled to leave [her second husband]. The legitimacy of a child born to them is a matter of question.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when] two [individuals] say, "We saw that she was divorced," and two others say, "We did not see this." If they all lived in a single courtyard,16 she should not marry.17 If, however, she marries, she need not leave [her second husband], and we do not doubt the legitimacy of a child born to them. [The rationale is that] people often divorce in privacy.
Halacha 9
[The following rule applies when] we there is no existing presumption that a woman was married, one witness comes and says, "She was married, but divorced," and another witness states, "She was not divorced." Since they both are testifying that she was married, and [only] one witness says she was divorced, she should not marry [a second man]. [The rationale is that] the statements of one [witness] are of no consequence [when they must counteract a definition of status established] on the basis of the testimony of two [witnesses].18 If she remarries, she should be compelled to leave [her second husband].
Halacha 10
[The following ruling is rendered when] a woman and two men come from another country. One [of the men] says: "This is my wife, and this is my servant," the other says: "This is my wife, and this is my servant," and the woman says: "They are both my servants." The woman is free to marry anyone. For although two witnesses testified to her being married, since each one of them gave testimony that concerns himself, their statements are not accepted.
Halacha 11
When an agent charged by the woman with receiving her get takes out a getthat was in his possession, and the husband states that the get is a forgery, the authenticity of the get should be verified via the signatures of the witnesses, or via the witnesses who observed the transfer, as we have explained.19
If the husband says: "I gave him [the get] for safekeeping," and the agent says, "He gave it to me for the sake of divorce," the agent's word is accepted.20 A similar rule applies if the woman is in possession of the get21 and she says, "This agent gave it to me," the agent corroborates her statements and says that it was given to him by the husband for the purpose of divorce. The agent's word is accepted,22 even if the husband protests that he gave it to him for safekeeping, and the woman is considered to be divorced.
Halacha 12
When the get is lost,23 [more stringent rules apply]. Even if the husband says that he gave it to an agent24 for the sake of divorce, and the agent says that he gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is a matter of question.25 For our prevailing assumption is that the woman is married, and it is only [the statements of] one witness26 and her husband [who are contradicting that].
Even if the woman herself says, "In my presence, [my husband] gave the get to the agent for the purpose of divorce, and he divorced me," [the ruling remains unchanged]. Since her husband and the agent support her, it is possible that she will speak brazenly27 and in fact, she was not divorced.
Halacha 13
[The following rule applies when] an agent appointed by the woman to receive her get receives it from [her husband] and sends it to her, [giving it to an agent to give to her] in the presence of two witnesses. Although the woman does not know whether [the get] was sent to her by her husband, her agent or her husband's agent, she is divorced, as has been explained.28
Halacha 14
[In the above situation,] if the husband comes and protests that he did not write [the get], or that the get is void, the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified. [This is sufficient to counter the husband's protest, the rationale being that] there are witnesses that [the get] was in the possession of the agent of the woman, and his aegis is considered to be equivalent to her own.29 Although she did not know [the purpose for which the get was given to the original agent], the witnesses knew.
If, however, the signatures [of the witnesses] cannot be verified, the divorce is not effective.
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] the prevailing presumption is that a woman is married, and she and her husband travel overseas at a time when their relationship is peaceful, and peace abides in the world at large.30 If she comes and says, "My husband died," her word is accepted and she is granted permission to marry or to perform the rite of yibbum on this basis.
[The rationale is that] we assume that a woman will not bring difficulties upon herself, causing herself to be forbidden to both her first and her second husbands, causing herself to lose the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from both husbands and causing her children to be deemed illegitimate when the matter is likely to become openly revealed, and when she will not be able to deny the matter or offer any argument in her defense. For if her husband is alive, he will ultimately return, or [at least,] it will become known that he is alive.
Similarly, if one witness comes and testifies that the woman's husband died, she is granted permission to marry by virtue of his testimony, because [the truth of] the matter will ultimately be revealed.31 Similarly, the testimony of a servant, a woman, a maid-servant or a witness testifying on the basis of statements he heard from others is accepted regarding a person's death.32 On the basis of such testimony, the man's wife is granted permission to remarry or perform the rite of yibbum.
Halacha 16
Any person who offers testimony is believed with regard to matters of this nature, with the exception of five women, who are presumed to hate each other. Their testimony is not [accepted] with regard to the death of the other's husband,33 lest they intend to cause her to be forbidden to him, although he is still alive.34They are the woman's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law,35[her husband's] other wife, her yevamah,36 her husband's daughter [from another marriage].37
[Indeed, with regard to such testimony,] a gentile's statements delivered in the course of conversation are accepted and can serve as the basis for a woman to remarry, as will be explained.38 If the gentile makes his statements with the intent that they serve as testimony, his word is not accepted.
Halacha 17
Similar laws apply to a person who is disqualified [from serving as a witness] by Scriptural law, because of the commission of a sin.39 If he comes to give testimony on behalf of a woman, [saying] that her husband died, his word is not accepted.40 If he makes these statements in the course of conversation, his word is accepted, for he is not regarded as less than a gentile.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply if] one witness came and testified that a woman's husband has died, and she was granted permission to remarry on the basis of his testimony, and afterwards another witness came and contradicted the testimony of the first, saying that he did not die. The woman's status is not changed, and she is still permitted to remarry.43
[The rationale is that] the testimony of one witness is accepted with regard to [the death of] a woman's [husband] in the same way as is the testimony of two witnesses with regard to other matters. [This testimony is being challenged by the testimony of one witness,] and the words of one witness are not considered when there is [testimony from] two [witnesses].44
Halacha 19
If two [witnesses] come at the same time,45 one saying "he died," and the other saying, "he did not die," or a woman says, "he died," and another woman says, "he did not die," she should not marry. And if she marries, she should leave her second husband,46 for the matter is one of doubt.47
If, however, she marries the witness who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died,"48 she need not leave her second husband.49 If two witnesses come and say that her first husband did not die, [a more stringent ruling is delivered]. Even though she married, she must leave her second husband.
Halacha 20
When does the above50 apply? When the one witness upon whose testimony [the woman was granted permission to] marry was equivalent to the two witnesses who contradicted his testimony. For example, she married based on the testimony of one man, and two men came and said that her husband did not die. Or she married based on the testimony of one woman or on the basis of her own testimony, and two women or two men who were disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law testified that her husband did not die.
If, however, one acceptable witness says that her husband died, and many51women or men who were disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law testify that her husband did not die, the situation is considered to be equally balanced.52 Thus, if she marries one of the witnesses53 who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband.
Halacha 21
When one woman testifies that [her husband] died, or she herself says that [her husband] died, and afterwards,54 one acceptable witness comes and says that he did not die, [the woman] should not remarry; and if she remarried, she should leave her second husband.
Halacha 22
When one woman says that [a man] did not die, and two women say that he did die, [his wife] may remarry. Similarly, if ten women say that [a man] did not die, and eleven women say that he did die, [his wife] may remarry. For we say, "two [witnesses] are considered as 100," only with regard to acceptable witnesses.55With regard to witnesses whose testimony would ordinarily be disqualified, by contrast, [the law is that we] follow the majority, whether this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent ruling.
Halacha 23
When two [witnesses] say that [a man] died, and two other witnesses say that he did not die, [his wife] may not remarry. If she has remarried, she should leave [her second husband],56 because the matter is one of doubt.
If she marries one of the witnesses who testified on her behalf, and she herself says, "I am certain that he died," she need not leave her second husband.
Halacha 24
[The following laws apply when] a person has two wives and one of them comes and says, "My husband died." She may marry on the basis of her own testimony, as we have explained.57 Her husband's other wife is forbidden to marry, for one of a man's wives may not testify on behalf of the other.
Even if the woman [who said that her husband died] married first, [the other wife is still forbidden to marry]. We do not say that if her husband had not actually died, she would not cause herself to be forbidden to him. [Instead, we suspect that] perhaps her hatred for the other wife is so great that she desires for them both to become forbidden to him.58
If one says, "My husband died," and her husband's other wife denies this, saying that he did not die, [the wife who testifies that he has died] may remarry. Just as the other wife's testimony does not cause her to be permitted, it does not cause her to be forbidden.
If one says, "[My husband] died," and the other says, "He was killed," they both are granted permission to remarry, for they both are testifying that he is no longer alive.59
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
She is not contradicting her original statements, but rather adding information, and that information serves as the basis for changing her status. This ruling applies even if she makes her second statement after a significant time has passed since she made her first statement (Maggid Mishneh). Rav Moshe HaCohen objects, maintaining that her second statement must be made directly after her first statement. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 152:6) quotes both opinions, it appears that the Rambam's opinion is favored.
|
| 2. |
I.e., we do not know for certain that she has been married, but she and her husband have lived together as man and wife. See Sefer HaKovetz, which notes that the Rambam's wording deviates from his source (Ketubot 2:5), which mentions that witnesses say that the woman was married.
|
| 3. |
Instead, she is considered to be married to her husband until she brings proof to the contrary. If she remarries, she is forced to leave her second husband (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch,Even HaEzer 152:7). There is a difference of opinion among the authorities regarding whether her second husband is required to give her a formal divorce. (See Beit Shmuel 152:12.)
|
| 4. |
I.e., should her present husband die, she would not be allowed to marry a priest. (See Halachah 3.)
|
| 5. |
I.e., we do not accept her statements entirely, and therefore require her to undergo chalitzah. Nevertheless, because there is a possibility that her statements are true, we do not allow her to undergo yibbum, for if she had in fact been divorced, relations with her late husband's brother would be forbidden.
|
| 6. |
Chapter 7, Halachah 24. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam concerning this issue. Both opinions are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer142:13-14), but later (loc. cit. 152:9), the Shulchan Aruch mentions only the Rambam's view.
|
| 7. |
I.e., these two phrases are part of a single claim. This translation is based on manuscripts of theMishneh Torah that state ומזוייף, "And it is a forgery." The standard printed version omits the first vav leading to the conclusion that the Rambam is speaking about two claims. This conception is also reflected in the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 152:10).
|
| 8. |
See Chapter 7, Halachah 2.
|
| 9. |
See Halachah 1.
|
| 10. |
I.e., although we do not accept her statements, we require her to abide by all the stringencies they imply.
|
| 11. |
There are several qualifications to this principle: First, the woman must make this statement in the presence of her husband. If he is not present, we fear that she will speak brazenly (Hilchot Ishut4:13). And, as implied by Halachot 6 and 14 of this chapter, if there is one witness who supports the woman's statements, her word is not accepted. We fear that the support the witness gives her will encourage her to lie. Similarly, as reflected in the following halachah, if her husband supports her, her word is not accepted.
In Hilchot Ishut (loc. cit.), the Ra'avad states that the woman's word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive a get if she remarries. She is not given license to remarry, nor may she collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:2) quotes both views. He states, however, that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam's ruling rests is no longer a viable support.
|
| 12. |
See Chapter 10, Halachah 3.
|
| 13. |
I.e., that she will remarry and then he will prove that her second marriage is adulterous, in which case she will be bound by all the stringencies stated in Chapter 10, Halachot 4 and 7.
|
| 14. |
As reflected by Halachah 8, in this instance the testimony of the witnesses must be to the effect that the divorce was not carried out in an adequate manner.
|
| 15. |
This assumption has sufficient legal power to counterbalance the prevailing assumption that the woman is still married. (See Beit Shmuel 152:5.)
|
| 16. |
If they do not all live in such proximity, there is no question, and a priori, she is given permission to remarry (Beit Shmuel 152:6).
|
| 17. |
We assume that if in fact she had been divorced, the matter would have attracted the attention of all those dwelling in the courtyard.
|
| 18. |
I.e., both the witnesses say that she was married, and only one says that she was divorced. Note the contrast to the parallel situation with regard to kiddushin as mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 9:31.
|
| 19. |
See Halachah 3. In this respect, there is no difference between the woman's agent and herself.
|
| 20. |
The Rambam's ruling applies even when the husband, the wife and the agent are all in the same city. Even though one might think that in such an instance, if the husband's intent was to divorce his wife, he would have given the get to her directly and not to an agent, the agent's word is accepted.
There is another opinion in Gittin 64a, which maintains that in the same city, the agent's word is not accepted, and several Rishonim follow this view. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:55), but the Rambam's opinion appears to be favored. The Ramah states that the agent's word is accepted only while he is in possession of the get.
|
| 21. |
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) appears to favor an opinion that accepts the woman's corroboration of the agent's statement, even when she is not in possession of the get.
|
| 22. |
I.e., even though the agent is no longer in possession of the get, his word is accepted. Since the woman has the potential to return it to him, it is considered as if it is still in his possession (Beit Shmuel 141:83).
|
| 23. |
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:56) states that it applies when there are no witnesses who saw the get in the woman's possession.
|
| 24. |
This halachah is speaking about an agent who acts on behalf of the husband, giving the get to his wife.
|
| 25. |
On one hand, there is a legal principle: "One can assume that an agent has carried out his mission," and yet our Sages maintain that this construct should be accepted only with regard to the stringencies it implies (Gittin 64b). As such, with regard to marrying into the priesthood and the like, the woman is considered as if she has been divorced. Nevertheless, she is not given permission to remarry unless she has the signatures of the witnesses to the get verified, or if the witnesses to its transfer testify to that effect.
|
| 26. |
See Chapter 9, Halachah 32 and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.
|
| 27. |
See Halachot 4 and 6.
|
| 28. |
The reference is to Halachah 11. There is a slight difference in this instance, because the original agent is not necessarily making these statements to the court himself. Nevertheless, as long as witnesses saw the get in the possession of the original agent, the statements of the agent who gave the get to the woman are accepted.
|
| 29. |
As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, there are opinions that maintain that this applies only when the husband, the agent and the woman are located in different cities. If all three are located in the same city, these opinions maintain that the husband's word should be accepted if he states that he gave the agent the get for safekeeping. In this instance, as well, although both views are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:57), the Rambam's view is favored.
Moreover, as mentioned in those notes, the Ramah maintains that if the get is no longer in possession of the agent, his word is not accepted.
|
| 30. |
As will be explained, different rules apply if the couple is known to quarrel (Chapter 13, Halachah 1), or war prevails throughout the world (Chapter 13, Halachah 2).
|
| 31. |
As reflected by the Rambam's statements at the conclusion of Chapter 13, it appears that according to Scriptural law, the testimony of one witness is accepted in instances of this nature.
|
| 32. |
The testimony of such individuals is never accepted according to Scriptural law. The acceptance of such testimony in this instance is a leniency adopted by the Sages so that Jewish women will be able to remarry. (See the conclusion of Chapter 13.)
This halachah begins the discussion of the subject of agunot, women whose husbands are missing and presumed to have died. In previous generations, this was a recurrent difficulty, for business journeys were replete with danger, and moreover, pogroms and persecution were constant threats. Often, men disappeared and were presumed to have died or to have been killed, and yet there was no conclusive proof to that effect. Indeed, a significant amount of the Rabbinic literature of previous generations was devoted to questions of this nature.
In the present age, with the communications revolution and the advent of more highly developed means of identification, these problems have been minimized. But they still arise. After each of Israel's wars, lengthy investigations were necessary before permission to remarry was granted to the wives of the casualties. And when, heaven forbid, there are Jews killed in plane crashes and the like, Rabbis must make careful inquiries based on the principles reflected in the halachot that follow.
|
| 33. |
See Halachah 24, which states that the testimony of these women is not considered at all, regardless of whether they say that the woman's husband is alive or that he has died.
|
| 34. |
I.e., we fear that out of hatred, these women will testify that a woman's husband has died so that she will marry another person, and when her first husband returns she will be forced to leave both relationships.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the phrase "although he is still alive" is meant to exclude an instance in which a woman's husband died and she remarried. The five women who share these close family ties with her first husband are not disqualified from giving testimony with regard to the death of her second husband. The implication is that these women's hatred has a specific objective: to cause the woman to be divorced from her husband. Once she is no longer married to him, they no longer harbor such feelings.
The Beit Shmuel 17:13 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger question this ruling on the basis of the Rambam's wording in Chapter 7, Halachah 3, which states: "These are the women who we presume hate each other . . . another woman married to the same man - this applies even if this woman has since remarried." Nevertheless, this halachah can be interpreted to mean that although the other woman has remarried, she wants the woman who was married to her first husband also to be forbidden to him.
|
| 35. |
Who we assume would identify with her mother. Moreover, the daughter of the mother-in-law may have a personal grudge, because the other woman will enjoy the inheritance of her parents' estate.
|
| 36. |
I.e., the woman married to her husband's brother, whom her husband would have to marry if his brother died without children. Since it is possible that they will share the same husband, there may be enmity between them.
|
| 37. |
I.e., she is jealous of the woman who took her mother's place.
Because of the bad feelings that characterize the relationship between these pairs, testimony is also disqualified in the reverse of the above situations. For example, if the husband of the daughter of a woman's husband is missing, the woman may not testify about the matter, although she has no natural reason to hate the other woman.
|
| 38. |
See Chapter 13, Halachah 11, which explains that when the gentile makes statements casually, relating events that took place, his word is accepted.
|
| 39. |
This refers to two categories of individuals: a) one who transgresses a prohibition punishable by lashes, and b) one who violates a prohibition of the Torah that involves taking money unjustly. (See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 10.)
|
| 40. |
We fear that he is able to be bribed to give false testimony.
|
| 41. |
E.g., a person who takes interest forbidden by Rabbinic law, or a gambler (Hilchot Edut 10:3). (See also Hilchot Edut 11:1-5, which mentions other base individuals whose testimony was disqualified.)
|
| 42. |
Although our Sages disqualified the testimony of such individuals in other instances, they relaxed this restriction in this regard, so that the woman would be granted the opportunity to remarry.
|
| 43. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:37) follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the woman should not remarry because of the gossip that might ensue.
|
| 44. |
Or, as in the case at hand, the testimony of one witness that is considered to be equivalent to that of two.
|
| 45. |
When the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:37) quotes this law, it states that the witness who says that the husband did not die came before the woman was granted license to remarry. SeeBeit Shmuel 17:110.
|
| 46. |
In the previous instance, a ruling was already delivered, and the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to detract from that ruling. In this halachah, by contrast, a ruling has not been issued, and one witness has no more halachic power than the other.
|
| 47. |
See Hilchot Shegagot 8:3, where the Rambam states that the woman and her second husband are obligated to bring the guilt offering sacrificed to bring atonement when one is in doubt of whether or not one committed a transgression.
|
| 48. |
This is interpreted by most commentaries to mean: "I know that he died." Rashi (Ketubot 22b) states that it means: "I know that if he were alive, he would have returned by now," but this interpretation is not accepted by the later authorities.
|
| 49. |
The rationale for this decision is stated above in Halachah 7. At the outset, however, she should not remarry, not even to this witness (Beit Shmuel 17:113). There are, moreover, significant halachic authorities who rule that she must leave her second husband. Their opinion is also mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but the Rambam's opinion appears to be favored.
|
| 50. |
I.e., the stringency mentioned at the conclusion of the previous halachah.
|
| 51. |
I.e., the number is not significant. The same law applies whether two or 200 come.
|
| 52. |
Thus, she may not marry at all (and if she marries, may not remain married to her second husband unless she marries the witness, as the Rambam continues in Halachah 19). The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:37) emphasize that this applies only when the women or the witnesses who are usually disqualified come before the woman is granted permission to marry. If, however, she is granted permission to marry on the basis of the testimony of an acceptable witness, the testimony of these individuals does not cause that license to be rescinded.
|
| 53. |
The wording used by the Rambam is slightly confusing, for we are speaking about an instance when only one acceptable witness testifies on her behalf. (See Beit Shmuel 17:118.)
|
| 54. |
According to the Maggid Mishneh, this applies even if the woman was granted license to remarry before the other witness came. This opinion is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:38). If, however, two women testify that a woman's husband has died, and permission is granted for the woman to remarry, the testimony of a single acceptable witness is not sufficient for that license to be revoked (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 17:38).
|
| 55. |
I.e., if the same situation occurred with regard to acceptable witnesses, the laws stated in the following halachah would apply. With regard to acceptable witnesses, as long as two witnesses dissent, it makes no difference how many witnesses support the other opinion.
|
| 56. |
This applies even when the woman married after receiving license from a Rabbinic court. If two witnesses come afterwards and testify that her first husband is still alive, we give credence to their statements (Beit Shmuel 17:128).
|
| 57. |
See Halachah 15.
|
| 58. |
I.e., she is marrying with the intent that the other wife will follow suit and also marry. Then her first husband will return, and they will both become forbidden to him. In describing this sequence,Yevamot 120a recalls Samson's prayer (Judges 16:30): "May I die together with the Philistines" - i.e., she will harm herself in order to harm her rival.
|
| 59. |
The fact that their testimonies contradict each other is not significant.
|
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Three
1. It is taken for granted that an animal is prone to eat fruit, vegetables or the like. Therefore, if [an animal] enters a domain belonging to another person and eats produce that it would normally eat, [the owner of the animal] is liable for the entire amount of the damages, as stated [in Exodus 22:4]: "And if he shall send forth his animals, and they shall pasture in another's field, payment should be exacted from his choice field."
If [the animal] ate produce belonging to another person in the public domain, [the owner] is not liable.1 If [the animal] benefits [from eating the produce], the owner must pay for the benefit [his animal received], but not for the damages caused.
2. What is implied? If [an animal] entered another person's domain and ate sesame seeds, chestnuts or the like that were worth a dinar, [the owner] must pay a dinar. If [the animal ate these foods] in the public domain and derived benefit, we consider [these foods] as if they were barley or fodder, and [the owner is required to] pay the wholesale2 price of fodder3 or barley.4
3. If the animal ate foods that are harmful to it - e.g., it ate wheat - since it did not derive any benefit, [the owner] is not liable. If it ate substances that it would not usually eat - e.g., it ate a garment or a utensil - [the owner] should pay half the damages.5
[This applies] both in a private domain and in a public domain. [The rationale is that] this is a deviation. [Hence, the owner is liable for only half the damages. He is liable for damage caused in the public domain, however] because it is the ordinary practice of people to leave their utensils or garments in the public domain while they rest.
4. There is a doubt [regarding the liability of the owner when his] animal is standing in a private domain, but takes produce [belonging to the owner of the private domain] from the public domain and eats it in that private domain.6Therefore, [the owner] is liable only for the benefit [his animal] derived.7 If, however, the person whose property was damaged seizes possession of the full worth of the damage [caused by the animal], it should not be expropriated from him,8 for [the produce] was eaten in his domain.
5. When a dog entered a courtyard, took bread or meat, brought it into the public domain or to another courtyard9 and ate it there, [the owner] should pay for the benefit [the dog] received.10
If [the dog] ate [the food] in a field belonging to the owner of the courtyard, the [dog's owner] must pay the full extent of the damages as if it had been eaten in the courtyard, because it was eaten in a domain belonging to the person whose property was damaged.11 The same [laws] apply in all analogous situations.
6. [The following rules apply when] an animal eats foods that it would not ordinarily eat, but would eat under constraint: e.g., a cow that ate barley, a donkey that ate vetch12 or fish, a pig that ate a piece of meat, a dog that licked oil, a cat that ate dates and the like.
If the foods were eaten in a domain belonging to the person whose property was damaged, [the owner] must pay the entire amount of the damage.13 [If the foods were eaten] in the public domain, he is not liable. If [the animal] benefited, the owner must pay for that benefit.
7. When a beast enters a private domain and seizes an animal or meat14 and eats it, [its owner] must pay the full extent of the damages, for this is its ordinary course of behavior.
When, however, a dog eats small sheep,15 or a cat eats large cocks,16 this is considered to be a deviation,17 and [the owner] is liable for [only] half the damages.
8. When there is a basket of bread [in a private domain], and a donkey enters and breaks the basket and eats the bread, [the owner] is liable for the full extent of the damages, for this is [a donkey's] ordinary behavior.
Similarly, if a goat sees a turnip or the like on the opening of a jug, stumbles over the jug and eats the turnip and breaks the jug, [the owner] must pay the full damages for both, for it is the ordinary pattern [for such an animal] to hang on to utensils and climb on them in order to eat. The same applies in all analogous situations.
If, however, a donkey came in and ate bread and then broke a basket, [the owner] is liable for full damages for the bread, but only half damages for the basket.18 The same applies in all analogous situations.
9. When an animal eats [produce] in the marketplace, whether when walking or when standing, [its owner] must pay [only] for the benefit it received.19 This applies even if the animal turns [its head] to the corners of the marketplace and eats.20 If, however, the animal left the marketplace and went and stood at the corner of the marketplace and ate [produce], [its owner] must pay for the damages.21
If the animal ate from [produce in] the storefront, [the owner] must pay [only] for the benefit it received. If it ate from [produce] within the store, he must pay the full extent of the damages.
10. If an animal was walking in the public domain and stretched out its neck and ate from [produce] that was [loaded onto] another animal's back, [its owner] must pay [only] for the benefit it received, for it is common for animals to eat from [a load] being carried by another.22 [This law applies] even when [the animal] stands.
If it jumped23 to eat from the [produce] that was [loaded onto] another animal's back, [its owner] must pay the full extent of the damages,24 because the back of another animal is considered to be the private domain of the person who suffered the damage.
11. When an animal slips on a stone or on urine and falls onto fruit or vegetables or eats them, [the owner] is required to pay [only] for the benefit it receives. Even if it walks from one row to another row, and even if it stays there the entire day, he is required to pay [only] for the benefit it receives.25
What benefit could it receive from falling? That it fell on a soft place and did not crush its limbs.
If, by contrast, an animal descended [into private property] in an ordinary manner and ate produce, [the owner] must pay the full extent of the damages. Even if it soiled produce with its afterbirth, [the owner] must pay the full extent of the damages, because the first stage involved negligence.26
Similarly, if it was pushed by another animal and fell, [the owner] must pay the full extent of the damages, because he should have had them pass one by one so that they would not push each other.27
12. If it slipped and fell [into another person's garden], departed28 and then returned to that garden, [the owner] must pay the full extent of the damages, even if it returned without his knowledge. He was obligated to watch it, [and prevent it] from returning.29 For it is known that if an animal knows the way to a garden, it will return on its own initiative.
13. When a potter brings his wares into a person's courtyard without his permission, and an animal belonging to the owner [of the courtyard] broke the pottery, [the owner] is not liable.30 [Moreover,] if the animal is injured, the potter is liable.31
If he brought his wares in with [the owner's] permission, [the potter is not liable [for the animal's injury].32 If the owner made a commitment to guard the pottery, he is liable [for the damages].
14. Similarly, if [a person] brought produce into a courtyard belonging to another individual without his permission and the animal belonging to the owner [of the courtyard] ate it, [the owner of the courtyard] is not liable.33 If the animal slipped on it and suffered injuries, the owner of the produce is liable.34 If he brought the produce in with [the owner's] permission, [the owner of the produce] is not liable [for the animal's injury].35 If the owner [of the courtyard] made a commitment to guard the produce, he is liable [for the damages to the produce].36
If the person brought produce [into a courtyard] without permission, and an animal belonging to the owner of the courtyard ate it and suffered injury because it ate it, the owner of the produce is not liable. The animal should not have eaten it.37
When the owner of a courtyard allowed a person to bring his produce into [the courtyard] and left [the owner of the produce] to watch it, if an animal belonging to the owner of the courtyard ate from the produce and suffered damages, the owner of the produce is liable. Since he saw the animal eating produce that could damage it and took no action, he is liable. For the owner of the courtyard is not present to banish his animal from them.
An incident occurred when a woman entered to bake in the house of her neighbors.38 They left her alone, so that they would not see her while she was kneading and baking.39 A goat belonging to the owner came and ate from [her raw] dough and died. The Sages obligated her to reimburse [the owners] for the goat. These principles apply in all similar situations.
15. When a person made a grain heap in a field belonging to a colleague without the latter's permission, and an animal belonging to the owner of the field ate it, [the owner of the field] is not liable. If the animal slipped on it and suffered injuries, the owner of the produce is liable. If the animal ate it and suffered injury because it ate it, [the owner of the produce] is not liable.40
If he had permission to make the grain heap, the owner of the field is liable, even if he did not accept the responsibility to guard [the grain pile]. Once a watchman in the granaries says: "Make your grain heap here," it is as if he told him: "Make your grain heap and I will guard it for you."41
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The proof-text stated above explicitly states that the owner is liable when his animals pasture in another's field. This is understood as excluding the public domain.In Chapter 1, Halachah 8, the Rambam explains the rationale for this exclusion: It is the habit of an animal to go and eat as it proceeds - i.e., if a person leaves produce in the public domain, he should take it for granted that it will be eaten by the animals passing through. |
| 2. | Our translation is loose. The Hebrew b'zol literally means as they are cheap. Rashi (Bava Kama 20a) states that he should pay 2/3 of the market price of the fodder. The reason for this reduction is that the owner is being forced to pay against his will.Based on his interpretation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 2:2), the Shiltei Gibborim interpret b'zol as meaning when they are cheap - i.e., if they cost less than the substance eaten by the animal. |
| 3. | Here also we have used a loose translation, because as mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Kessef Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh, there are several different interpretations of the Hebrew term emir. |
| 4. | I.e., although the chestnuts or the sesame seeds are more valuable than the simple fodder, the owner is required to pay only the market price for the fodder, for that is what he would have fed his animal. |
| 5. | The commentaries explain that this damage is considered a derivative of goring. |
| 6. | There are two dimensions to the damage: the place from which the produce was taken, and the place where it was destroyed. One is not liable for produce taken from the public domain, but one is liable for produce eaten in a private domain. Hence the doubt mentioned by the Rambam. See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:12. |
| 7. | Because of the doubt, money cannot be exacted from its owner. |
| 8. | Since the money is now in possession of the person whose property was damaged, it can also not be exacted from him. See the notes to Chapter 1, Halachah 11. |
| 9. | Belonging to another person. |
| 10. | I.e., he does not pay the full price of the food. The rationale is, as in the previous halachah, that the food was eaten in the public domain. |
| 11. | The fact that it was taken away from the place from which it was originally taken is not significant, provided that it is eaten in a domain belonging to that owner. |
| 12. | A type of bean usually eaten by cows. |
| 13. | Despite the fact that this is not the animal's ordinary food, since it ate it, the owner is liable for the damages. If, however, an animal eats food that it would never eat - e.g., a cow ate meat - the owner must pay only half the damages Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:3). |
| 14. | The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:6) interpret this as referring to raw meat alone. |
| 15. | I.e., even small sheep; certainly this applies with regard to large sheep. |
| 16. | Eating small cocks, however, is not considered a deviation. See Ketubot 41b. |
| 17. | The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) clarifies that this refers only to living animals. Once an animal has died, however, it is natural for a dog or cat to eat from its corpse regardless of its size. |
| 18. | This is considered a derivative of goring. Hence the payment must be exacted from the body of the animal that caused the damage Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 391:4). |
| 19. | For the marketplace is considered to be part of the public domain. |
| 20. | For this is also the ordinary practice of an animal in the public domain. |
| 21. | The area on the side of the marketplace is considered to be a private domain, and considered like the private property of the person whose property was damaged (Tosafot, Bava Kama 21a). |
| 22. | Therefore, it is considered to be an ordinary instance of an animal's eating produce in the public domain. |
| 23. | And placed its forelegs on the other animal. By doing so, it is considered to have left the public domain and entered the domain of the person whose produce was damaged. |
| 24. | The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 391:11) differ and maintain that this ruling applies only when it is impossible for the animal to eat the produce without jumping on the other animal. |
| 25. | Since the animal entered the private domain by accident, its owner is not held responsible for the damage it caused. |
| 26. | Even if the owner did not know that the animal was about to give birth, and thus the damage can be considered to have come about by forces beyond his control. Since the animal's entry into the private domain came as a result of negligence, the owner is held liable. See Chapter 2, Halachah 15. |
| 27. | I.e., this is also considered negligence on the owner's part. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 394:1) consider this to be accidental, and free the owner of responsibility. |
| 28. | The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 394:2) state that this law applies when the owner is aware that the animal entered the garden and departed. |
| 29. | The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (ibid.) state that if the owner locked the animal in a stall in an ordinary manner, and the animal managed to escape and return to the garden, the owner is not liable, because he did everything necessary to prevent this from happening. |
| 30. | His animal has free rein within his own courtyard; it can be assumed that it will walk freely and trod on anything placed there. The potter brought his wares there at his own risk. |
| 31. | The pottery is considered to be a pit dug in someone's private property, because the potter should have taken the necessary precautions to ensure that the owner's animal would not be damaged. |
| 32. | For the owner knew of the pottery and should have taken care that his animal not be damaged. |
| 33. | For it can be assumed that his animal will eat any produce left in his courtyard. |
| 34. | For he created an obstacle in another person's domain. |
| 35. | Since the owner gave the person permission to place his produce there, he must take responsibility for his animal. |
| 36. | Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 393:1, 398:5), who maintain that if the owner of the courtyard gave the person permission to bring his wares in, he becomes liable for them. He does not have to make an explicit statement accepting responsibility. |
| 37. | I.e., the owner of the courtyard should take responsibility for making sure that his animal does not overeat (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 393:4). |
| 38. | Sefer Me'irat Einayim 393:5 explains that this incident teaches that even when the owner of the produce does not know that the owner of the courtyard has left, under certain circumstances, he should take responsibility for the animal belonging to the owner of the courtyard. |
| 39. | It is common for a woman to roll up her sleeves and bare her arms when she is kneading dough. Out of concern for modesty, the owners of the house left the room (Bava Kama 48a). |
| 40. | These laws are basically a restatement of those of the previous halachah. The new insight stated by the Rambam comes in the following paragraph. |
| 41. | Note the Lechem Mishneh and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 6:3), which indicate that the watchman is liable and not the owner of the field.See, however, Sefer Me'irat Einayim 393:7, which states that this is speaking about an instance in which the owner himself guards his fields. |
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Four
1. When a person gathers sheep in a corral and locks them in with a gate that can withstand an ordinary wind, and [yet the sheep were able to] leave and cause damage, the owner is not liable.1 If [the gate] cannot withstand an ordinary wind or if the walls of the corral are shaky, [the owner] is not considered to have enclosed [the sheep] in a proper manner. [Thus, if they are able to] leave and cause damage, he is liable.2
Even if [the sheep] dug beneath [the gate3 to] get out, [the gate] was broken at night,4 or thieves broke it down, the owner of the sheep is liable [for the damage his sheep cause].5
If, however, the gate was strong and it was broken at night or thieves broke in, and then [the sheep] departed and caused damage, [the owner] is not liable.6 If the thieves took the sheep out and then they caused damage, the thieves are liable.
2. [The following rules apply when] a person breaks down a fence in front of an animal belonging to a colleague. If the fence was strong and sturdy, he is liable.7 If the wall was shaky, he cannot be held liable according to mortal law,8but he has a moral obligation.
Similarly, if a person places poison in front of an animal belonging to a colleague, he cannot be held liable according to mortal law,9 but he has a moral obligation.10
3. When a person brings an animal belonging to a colleague to crops belonging to a third individual, the person who brought the animal there is liable.11
Similarly, if a colleague hit an animal with a switch until it walked to crops belonging to a third individual, the person who switched it is liable.
4. When a person entrusts his animal to an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman, a renter or a borrower, these individuals assume the owner's responsibilities. If [the animal] causes damages, the watchman is held liable.
When does the above apply? When he did not guard the animal at all. If, however, he guarded the animal in an excellent manner, as he should,12 and it got loose and caused damage, the watchman is not liable, and the owners are liable, even if the animal kills a human being.13
Should the watchman guard the animal in an inferior manner,14 he is not held liable if he is an unpaid watchman.15 If he is a paid watchman, a renter or a borrower, he is held liable.16
5. If [a person] leaves an animal in the sun and it gets loose and causes damage, even if it must dig [under the fence to do so], the one who left it in the sun is liable. [The rationale is that because of] the discomfort [the animal] feels, it will do anything it possibly can to flee.17
6. When [a person] gives his animal to a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual or a minor18 to watch, the owner is liable. [This applies] even if the ox is tied, for an ox - and similarly other [animals] - will break open the knot and go out and cause damage.19
Even if the animal was guarded in an excellent manner, and it dug [under the fence] and escaped and caused damage, the owners are liable.20
7. [The following rules apply when] a person entrusts his ox to five men, one of them was negligent, and the ox escaped and caused damage. If all five are required to guard the ox, the person who was negligent is liable.21 If the ox can still be watched by the others, they share in the liability.22
8. [The following rules apply if a person] borrowed an ox under the presumption that it was an ordinary ox, and it was discovered that it had already been classified as one that gores. If the borrower knew that it had a tendency to gore,23 the owners are required to pay half the damages, for wherever the ox goes, it remains the owner's property.24 The borrower is also required to pay half the damages, because even if it had been an ordinary ox, as he had thought, he would have been required to pay half the damages, for he knew that the ox had a tendency to gore.25
If, however, the borrower did not know of this tendency, he is not liable at all,26and the owners must pay the entire amount of the damages.
9. When a borrower borrows an ox that is classified as an ordinary ox, and it becomes classified as a goring ox when in the possession of the borrower, it is removed from that category when it is returned to its owner. Since the domain [under which the animal is] changes, its classification also changes. [If the ox gores,] the owners must pay half the damages, and the borrower is not held liable at all, for he returned it to its owners.
10. When a watchman accepts responsibility only for watching the body of an animal [entrusted to him], but [does not accept responsibility] for the damage it causes, if [the animal] causes damage the watchman is not held liable, and its owners are.27
If [the watchman] accepted responsibility [only] for the damages [the animal] causes, he is liable if it causes damage. If it is injured, the watchman is not liable, and the owners should sue the person who caused the injury.
11. When a watchman entrusts [an animal] to another watchman, [and it causes damage], the first watchman is liable to pay the person whose property was damaged. For whenever one watchman delegates [an entrusted object] to another watchman, he is liable.28 For the person whose property was damaged will tell him: "Why didn't you watch it yourself instead of delegating it to someone else? Pay me yourself, and sue the watchman to whom you delegated it."
If, however, the watchman entrusted [the animal] to his son, a member of his household or one of his helpers, they assume the responsibility that was the watchman's, and they are liable.29
12. [The following rule applies when] a watchman is liable to pay [for the damages an animal caused], but he is insolvent. If the animal that caused the damage is considered to be an ordinary animal, in which case half the damages must be paid from the body of the animal itself, the person whose property was damaged should take his due from the animal, and the sum that he collects should be considered to be a debt owed by the watchman to the owner of the animal.30
13. Whenever an animal causes damage to crops that are growing, the damage is assessed by comparison with a field sixty times the size of the crops that were damaged. The one who is liable - either the owner or the watchman - is obligated to pay that sum.31
What is implied? If [an animal] ate the amount of produce that would grow when a se'ah [of seeds] were sown in that field, we calculate the worth of an area in which sixty se'ah [of seeds] could be sown in that field, [evaluating] how much it would be worth [before the animal ate from it] and how much it is worth now. [The owner or the watchman] is liable for the remainder.
Similarly, if the animal ate an amount of produce that would grow when a kav or a quarter of a kav were sown - [or even if it ate] one stalk of grain - the damages are assessed by comparison with a field sixty times the size of the crops that were damaged.
14. When, [by contrast,] an animal ate fruit that ripened and no longer needed [the nurture of] the land, [the owner of the animal is required to] pay the full value of ripe produce. If [the animal ate] a se'ah, he must pay for a se'ah. If [it ate] two se'ah, he must pay for two se'ah.
[The following laws apply if an animal] ate the fruit of one date palm, or a person gathered the fruit of a colleague's date palm and ate it. If it was a Roman date palm, whose fruit is not of very high quality, it should be measured in comparison with a orchard of date palms sixty times the size of its land. If it was a Persian date palm or the like, whose fruit is of very high quality, the date palm should be evaluated individually. An assessment should be made of its worth before the fruit was eaten and its worth after the fruit was eaten.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | For he has done all that could be expected of him to watch his sheep. |
| 2. | For he is considered to be negligent. |
| 3. | If, however, they dug under another part of the corral, the owner is not liable, for their exit has nothing to do with his negligence (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 396:1). |
| 4. | If the walls were broken during the day, and the owner did not fix them, he is considered to be negligent. |
| 5. | Although the damage is considered to have been caused by forces beyond the owner's control, since this damage was preceded by acts of negligence on the part of the owner, he is liable. See Chapter 2, Halachah 15. |
| 6. | The damage is considered to have been caused by forces beyond the owner's control. Even if the owner is informed that the gate to his corral was broken at night, he is not obligated to fix it until the following day (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:2). |
| 7. | The Ra'avad and the Tur maintain that the person who broke the fence is not liable unless he leads the animal out. The Rambam's ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:3), while the Ramah cites the other views.See the Maggid Mishneh, who questions the difference between this law and the previous one, which states that thieves are not liable unless they actually take the animal out of the corral. |
| 8. | Since the owner is considered negligent in leaving the fence shaky, he is held liable for the damage the animal caused. Needless to say, the person who broke the wall down is liable for the damage to the wall, even though it was shaky. |
| 9. | He is considered to have been merely an indirect cause (grama). |
| 10. | See Chapter 2, Halachah 19. |
| 11. | He is considered to be a direct cause of the damage. |
| 12. | I.e., enclosing it behind a gate capable of withstanding winds of unusual force. |
| 13. | The wording of this halachah has raised questions for there is an obvious difficulty: If the watchmen guarded the animal in an excellent manner, why is the owner liable? The Maggid Mishneh explains that the liability refers only to damage caused by the animal by goring. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.) The Kessef Mishneh refers to a responsum purported to have been sent by the Rambam to the Sages of Lunil, which states that there was a printing error and the text should read: If, however, they guarded the animal in an excellent manner, as they should, and it got loose and caused damage, the watchman is not liable. If the watchman guarded the animal in an inferior manner, he is not held liable if he is an unpaid watchman. Instead, the owners are liable, even if the animal kills a human being. The watchman is held liable if he is a paid watchman, a renter or a borrower.In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:8), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh. The Sefer Me'irat Einayim 396:18 questions this, referring to Karo's Kessef Mishneh. |
| 14. | Enclosing it behind a gate capable of withstanding ordinary winds. |
| 15. | For an unpaid watchman is not expected to take as thorough care of an animal as a paid watchman. See, however, note 13. |
| 16. | Such watchmen are expected to watch the animal in a thorough manner. |
| 17. | The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 396:5) state that even if the person tied the animal with a strong rope, he is liable if it breaks loose in these circumstances. |
| 18. | All of these three types of people are considered mentally incompetent. They are not responsible for their actions, and the owner is considered negligent for charging them with watching his animal. |
| 19. | The owner is considered negligent because these individuals will frequently play with the rope, and by doing so loosen the knot, enabling the animal to break free. |
| 20. | Although escaping in this manner is considered to be a factor beyond the owner's control, since he was originally negligent in entrusting the animal to a mentally incompetent person, he must bear the consequences.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling. It is, however, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:6). |
| 21. | For the damage is due to his negligence. |
| 22. | For had they not been negligent as well, the ox would not have escaped. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:7) appears to favor the Rambam's ruling, it also quotes the opinion of the Tur, which states that the person who is negligent shares the liability only when the others tell him that because of his negligence, they are withdrawing their responsibility. Otherwise, it is they who are liable, and not he. |
| 23. | But did not know that it had been placed in the category of a goring ox. |
| 24. | I.e., when an animal is sold, its status is changed with the change in ownership. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 6.) This, however, does not apply when it is merely borrowed (Kessef Mishneh). |
| 25. | The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that it applies only when the court takes possession of the ox. |
| 26. | For it is more difficult to guard an ox that has a tendency to gore, and the borrower did not accept this responsibility. |
| 27. | The Rambam's statements imply that if the watchman makes no specific statement with regard to whether or not he is responsible for the damages the animal causes, he is liable for the damage it causes (Maggid Mishneh). The Ra'avad understands the Rambam as making such an implication, and he objects, maintaining that the watchman should not be held liable. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:8) follows the Maggid Mishneh's conception. They maintain that the principle followed by the Rambam should be accepted with the exception of a goring ox. |
| 28. | The first watchman is considered negligent in entrusting it to a second watchman (even if an unpaid watchman entrusts it to a paid watchman). Therefore, the first watchman is liable, even in an instance when the object was destroyed by forces beyond the second watchman's control. |
| 29. | The rationale is that a watchman will frequently delegate an entrusted article to these individuals. The owner should have taken this into account when he entrusted the article to the watchman at the outset. |
| 30. | If the animal was already classified as prone to cause damages, this law would not apply, because the obligation would rest solely on the watchman's person. When, however, the animal is not placed in that category, since its own body is on lien for the damages, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, it is expropriated in lieu of payment. |
| 31. | Since the produce was growing, it would be unfair for the person whose animal caused the damages to be required to pay for it as if it were harvested fruit that was damaged. Instead, one considers the damaged crops as a part in a larger whole, thus reducing the amount of the damages. A compromise is accepted that takes in consideration the positions of both the owner of the land and the owner of the animal.The produce is not evaluated individually, for this would inflate the amount of damages paid. Nor is its share evaluated in comparison with the entire field, for then the amount of damages would be unfairly low. Instead, it is evaluated when compared with an area sixty times its size as explained.A se'ah is six kabbin. A kab is 1.376 kilograms according to Shiurei Torah. Thus a se'ah is 8.256 kilograms. The area where a se'ah of seeds would be sown is 50 cubits by 50 cubits. |
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Five
1. [The following laws apply when] an animal was pasturing and entered fields and vineyards [belonging to others]. Even though it did not cause any damage,1a warning should be given to its owner on three occasions.2 [Afterwards,] if he does not watch his animal and prevent it from pasturing [in other people's fields], the owner of the field has the right to slaughter the animal in a ritually acceptable manner,3 and tell its owners: "Come and sell your meat." [The rationale is that] it is forbidden for a person to cause damages and then to pay for the damages he caused. Even being an [indirect] cause of damage is forbidden.
2. For this reason, our Sages forbade [our people] from raising small animals4and small beasts5 in Eretz Yisrael, where there are fields and vineyards.6 One may, however, raise these animals in the forests and deserts of Eretz Yisrael.7In Syria,8 it is permitted to raise these animals everywhere.
3. Joshua and his court established ten conditions at the time they divided the land [into ancestral plots]:
a) One may pasture a small animal in forests that are thick with trees;9 one may not, however, pasture a large animal there.10 In a forest that is not thick with trees, one may not pasture either a large animal or a small animal without the permission of the owners.
b) Any person is permitted to collect wood from a field belonging to a colleague. This refers to wood that is not valuable - comparable to thorns, brambles and prickly shrubs. Moreover, this refers to fresh twigs that are still connected to their source of nurture,11 and applies only when the person will not uproot them entirely.12 It is forbidden to take other types of wood.
c) Any person may collect grass that is growing on its own accord anywhere,13except for a field of fenugrec that was sown to be used as animal fodder.14
d) A person may cut off a branch from any tree in any place,15 except from the branches left in an old olive tree.16 One may not, however, cut off closer than the length of an egg from the place where the branches begin to spread from an olive tree. And one may cut only from the place where a shoot is joined to the trunk of a reed or a vine. With regard to other trees, one may cut from the center of the tree and not from its higher branches.
[Although] permission was granted to cut off a branch, this applies only to [cutting] from a new branch17 that does not yet produce fruit, but not from an old branch that produces fruit. One may cut off [a branch] only from a portion of the tree that is not exposed to the sun.18
e) When a new spring of water emerges, the inhabitants of the city in whose territory it emerges may make use of it,19 even though its source is elsewhere. No others may take water from it together with them.
f) Any person may catch fish in Lake Kinneret, provided he fishes with a small net. Only the tribe20 to which the lake was awarded as part of their ancestral portion may spread out large nets that will prevent the passage of other boats.21
g) Any person who needs to relieve himself may turn off the path, go behind any fence he sees and defecate there. [This applies] even with regard to a field of saffron.22 One may pick up a stone from there and clean oneself with it.
h) Any person who loses his way in a vineyard or the like may break through the vines and ascend, or break through the vines and descend until he is able to find his way.
i) When the public thoroughfare is filled with mud, or the ravines are filled with water, passersby may take side paths, even though they are private property.
j) A corpse that has no one to bury it23 acquires its place and should be buried there by the person who finds it. This applies provided the corpse is not lying lengthwise across the path,24 or within the Sabbath boundaries of a city. In those instances, the corpse should be transported to a cemetery.25
4. King Solomon ordained that passersby are permitted to walk on private paths in the fields during the summer months until the second phase of fall rains descend.26
5. These rules apply in all places, even in the diaspora.27
6. From the time dew descends in Babylonia, it is forbidden to walk through private pathways belonging to others.28
7. Although it is forbidden to raise a small animal in Eretz Yisrael, one may maintain possession of one for 30 days prior to a pilgrimage festival,29 or prior to the wedding of one's son.30
A butcher may buy an animal for slaughter and may leave it for a certain time until he slaughters it, as long as it does not pasture with the flock. Instead, whoever maintains possession of a small animal must keep it within his house, so that it does not cause damage.
8. [Our Sages] established an equation between Babylonia and Israel, prohibiting the raising of small animals and beasts there as well. For [in Talmudic times,] the majority of the fields and vineyards there belonged to Jews.31
9. Similarly, our Sages forbade raising pigs in all places.32 Also, [our Sages forbade raising] dogs unless they are tied by a chain. One may, however, raise dogs in a city near the border.33 During the day [the dogs] should be chained, and at night let loose.
Our Sages said:34 "Cursed be one who raises dogs and pigs, because they frequently cause a great degree of damage."
10. When a shepherd repents, he should not be obligated to sell [his entire herd] immediately. Instead, he should sell a bit at a time.35 Similarly, if a person has inherited dogs and pigs, he is not required to sell all of them immediately, but instead may sell them bit by bit.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher take issue with the Rambam on this point, explaining that the owner of the field generally does not have the right to slaughter an animal belonging to another person. Bava Kama 23b does speak of the owner of a field slaughtering goats belonging to someone else, but this was a special instance. He knew that the goats were being taken to the market to be slaughtered.The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam had a different interpretation of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 397:1-2) follows the Ra'avad's interpretation. |
| 2. | The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.) interpret this to be implying that if the owner of the animal says, Why come to me with a complaint? Let the owner of the field build a strong fence around his field to prevent animals from entering, his claim is not accepted. He is required to take responsibility for his animal. |
| 3. | This minimizes to the greatest degree possible the loss that the owner of the animal would suffer. |
| 4. | E.g., sheep and goats. |
| 5. | E.g., deer. |
| 6. | For they will harm the produce. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this law (and those that follow) were instituted as part of the provisions of yishuv Eretz Yisrael, the settlement of our Holy Land. (See also Hilchot Edut 10:4, which states that a shepherd of sheep or goats is not acceptable as a witness, because it is likely that he will pasture his flocks in fields belonging to others. See also Hilchot Bechorot 3:6.)It is, however, permissible to raise large animals like cows in Eretz Yisrael. |
| 7. | Where the damage is not significant. |
| 8. | See Hilchot Terumot 1:4,9, which defines the status of Syria as less than that of Eretz Yisrael, but greater than that of the diaspora as a whole. |
| 9. | I.e., the owner of the forest has no right to protest. |
| 10. | For it could damage the forest. |
| 11. | If they are dry and severed from the ground, they are fit to serve as firewood for the owners of the field. |
| 12. | Significantly, the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 274) does not mention this dimension. |
| 13. | This is beneficial for the owner of the field, because the grass detracts from the field's growth potential. |
| 14. | For grass and fenugrec make excellent fodder. For that reason, if the fenugrec is being grown for human consumption, one may pick the grass. Bava Kama 81a states that if the fenugrec is growing in rows, one may assume that it has been planted for human consumption. |
| 15. | This is allowed to enhance the settlement of Eretz Yisrael, for it will enable more trees to be grown there. |
| 16. | When an olive tree has become old, and it no longer produces a significant amount of fruit, all of its branches are cut off except two, so that its growth potential will become concentrated. Cutting off one of these remaining branches would damage the future of the tree. |
| 17. | One that is less than a year old. |
| 18. | For it is the branches that are exposed to the sun that provide a tree with its nurture. |
| 19. | Without payment. |
| 20. | I.e., the tribe of Naftali. |
| 21. | The Tur (loc. cit.) and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that even the owner of a lake may not fish with nets large enough to prevent the passage of a boat.Others interpret large nets as referring to nets that will catch large quantities of fish. Fishing privileges of that nature are not granted to another tribe. |
| 22. | A type of spice that will be damaged by the unpleasant odor of feces. |
| 23. | We have used a loose translation. The Hebrew term meit mitzvah, literally a corpse that we are commanded to bury, refers to a Jewish corpse lying on the road, that has no one to bury it (Hilchot Eivel 3:8). |
| 24. | Our translation is taken from Rashi's commentary on Bava Kama 81b. In these instances, the presence of a grave will be likely to impart impurity to a large number of people. |
| 25. | The commentaries question why the Rambam requires a corpse found in the road to be taken to the cemetery. In Hilchot Tum'at Meit 8:7, he states that in such an instance, a corpse may be buried in a nearby field. This indeed is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 364:3). |
| 26. | I.e., from the seventeenth of Cheshvan on. Until then, passersby will not do any damage to the fields. Once the rains descend, however, the seeds begin to take root, and treading on them would damage them. |
| 27. | The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 274) quotes this ruling. The Shulchan Aruch, however, does not mention these laws. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 274:1) quotes the Tur's view and questions why the Shulchan Aruch ignored these laws. He explains that it is possible that the Shulchan Aruch also maintains that these laws are applicable in the diaspora, but failed to mention them because it was uncommon for Jews to own land at that time.The concept that these laws apply in the diaspora is somewhat difficult according to the Maggid Mishneh (and Rashi), who explain that the motivating rationale for these laws is the concern for yishuv Eretz Yisrael, the settlement of our Holy Land. Others explain that these provisions are intended to avoid strife and friction. |
| 28. | For this will cause damage to the land there. |
| 29. | In the time of the Temple, these animals were offered as sacrifices. Even after the Temple's destruction, it is still a mitzvah to celebrate on the festivals by eating meat (Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:18). |
| 30. | For these feasts are also considered to be se'udot mitzvah (feasts associated with the performance of a mitzvah). |
| 31. | From this, we can assume that these laws would apply in any community where most of the lands are owned by Jews. |
| 32. | In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 7:7), the Rambam states that this law applies to all animals that are forbidden to be eaten. (See also The Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 48, which speaks of the unfavorable tendencies brought about by eating pork.)From the conclusion of this halachah, however, it appears that the Rambam is focusing on a different rationale: the material and not the spiritual damage that pigs can cause. |
| 33. | For they will serve as watchdogs and raise a clamor in the event of attack. |
| 34. | Bava Kama 82b, 83a. |
| 35. | If he were required to sell his entire herd immediately, it is possible that he would have to reduce the price of the animals. Our Sages feared that the possibility of this loss would intimidate the shepherd and prevent him from repenting. |
• Friday, Menachem Av 29, 5775 · 14 August 2015
"Today's Day"
Monday Menachem Av 29 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Shoftim, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 140-144.
Tanya: Therefore, my beloved, (p. 437) ...to Zion..." (p. 439).
There must be avoda by one's own efforts. Superior heights are attained when one is taken by the hand and led; it is more precious though, when it is by one's own strength.
Daily Thought:
A Year in a Day
As the entirety of the sun is reflected in every glistening droplet of water, so is the entirety of life reflected in your individual lifetime.
And in each of your years, you pass through the entirety of your life.
And in every day of your life you are born, live your life through, and pass on from this world.
All your life lies in the hands of today.[Torat Menachem 5748, page 573.]
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