Today's Laws & Customs:
• Elul Observances
As the last month of the Jewish year, Elul is traditionaly a time of introspection and stocktaking -- a time to review one's deeds and spiritual progress over the past year and prepare for the upcoming "Days of Awe" of Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur.
As the month of Divine Mercy and Forgiveness (see "Today in Jewish History" for Elul 1) it is a most opportune time for teshuvah ("return" to G-d), prayer, charity, and increased Ahavat Yisrael (love for a fellow Jew) in the quest for self-improvement and coming closer to G-d. Chassidic master Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi likens the month of Elul to a time when "the king is in the field" and, in contrast to when he is in the royal palace, "everyone who so desires is permitted to meet him, and he receives them all with a cheerful countenance and shows a smiling face to them all."
Specific Elul customs include the daily sounding of the shofar (ram's horn) as a call to repentance. The Baal Shem Tov instituted the custom of reciting three additional chapters ofPsalms each day, from the 1st of Elul until Yom Kippur (on Yom Kippur the remaining 36 chapters are recited, thereby completing the entire book of Psalms). Click below to view today's Psalms.
Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6
Psalm 4:(0) For the leader. With stringed instruments. A psalm of David:
2 (1) O God, my vindicator!
Answer me when I call!
When I was distressed, you set me free;
now have mercy on me, and hear my prayer.
3 (2) Men of rank, how long will you shame my honor,
love what is vain, chase after lies? (Selah)
4 (3) Understand that Adonai sets apart
the godly person for himself;
Adonai will hear when I call to him.
5 (4) You can be angry, but do not sin!
Think about this as you lie in bed,
and calm down. (Selah)
6 (5) Offer sacrifices rightly,
and put your trust in Adonai.
7 (6) Many ask, “Who can show us some good?”
Adonai, lift the light of your face over us!
8 (7) You have filled my heart with more joy
than all their grain and new wine.
9 (8) I will lie down and sleep in peace;
for, Adonai, you alone make me live securely.
5:(0) For the leader. On wind instruments. A psalm of David:
2 (1) Give ear to my words, Adonai,
consider my inmost thoughts.
3 (2) Listen to my cry for help,
my king and my God, for I pray to you.
4 (3) Adonai, in the morning you will hear my voice;
in the morning I lay my needs before you
and wait expectantly.
5 (4) For you are not a God
who takes pleasure in wickedness;
evil cannot remain with you.
6 (5) Those who brag cannot stand before your eyes,
you hate all who do evil,
7 (6) you destroy those who tell lies,
Adonai detests men of blood and deceivers.
8 (7) But I can enter your house
because of your great grace and love;
I will bow down toward your holy temple
in reverence for you.
9 (8) Lead me, Adonai, in your righteousness
because of those lying in wait for me;
make your way straight before me.
10 (9) For in their mouths there is nothing sincere,
within them are calamities,
their throats are open tombs,
they flatter with their tongues.
11 (10) God, declare them guilty!
Let them fall through their own intrigues,
For their many crimes, throw them down;
since they have rebelled against you.
12 (11) But let all who take refuge in you rejoice,
let them forever shout for joy!
Shelter them; and they will be glad,
those who love your name.
13 (12) For you, Adonai, bless the righteous;
you surround them with favor like a shield.
6:(0) For the leader. With stringed instruments. On sh’minit [low-pitched musical instruments?]. A psalm of David:
2 (1) Adonai, don’t rebuke me in your anger,
don’t discipline me in the heat of your fury.
3 (2) Be gracious to me, Adonai,
because I am withering away;
heal me, Adonai,
because my bones are shaking;
4 (3) I am completely terrified;
and you, Adonai — how long?
5 (4) Come back, Adonai, and rescue me!
Save me for the sake of your grace;
6 (5) for in death, no one remembers you;
in Sh’ol, who will praise you?
7 (6) I am worn out with groaning;
all night I drench my bed with tears,
flooding my couch till it swims.
8 (7) My vision is darkened with anger;
it grows weak because of all my foes.
9 (8) Get away from me, all you workers of evil!
For Adonai has heard the sound of my weeping,
10 (9) Adonai has heard my pleading,
Adonai will accept my prayer.
11 (10) All my enemies will be confounded,
completely terrified;
they will turn back
and be suddenly put to shame.
Elul is also the time to have one's tefillin and mezuzot checked by an accredited scribe to ensure that they are in good condition and fit for use.Links: More on Elul
Today in Jewish History:
• Shulchan Aruch Completed (Orech Chaim) (1555)
The first section of the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law) authored by Rabbi Joseph Caro(1488-1575) was completed in the Holy Land on this date in 1555.
Daily Quote:
Like a burning candle from which many candles are lit yet its own light is not diminished, so, too, Moses lost nothing that was his[Midrash rabbah]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Shoftim, 2nd Portion Deuteronomy 17:14-17:20 with Rashi
• Chapter 17
14When you come to the land the Lord, your God, is giving you, and you possess it and live therein, and you say, "I will set a king over myself, like all the nations around me," ידכִּי תָבֹא אֶל הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ וִירִשְׁתָּהּ וְיָשַׁבְתָּה בָּהּ וְאָמַרְתָּ אָשִׂימָה עָלַי מֶלֶךְ כְּכָל הַגּוֹיִם אֲשֶׁר סְבִיבֹתָי:
15you shall set a king over you, one whom the Lord, your God, chooses; from among your brothers, you shall set a king over yourself; you shall not appoint a foreigner over yourself, one who is not your brother. טושׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ לֹא תוּכַל לָתֵת עָלֶיךָ אִישׁ נָכְרִי אֲשֶׁר לֹא אָחִיךָ הוּא:
16Only, he may not acquire many horses for himself, so that he will not bring the people back to Egypt in order to acquire many horses, for the Lord said to you, "You shall not return that way any more." טזרַק לֹא יַרְבֶּה לּוֹ סוּסִים וְלֹא יָשִׁיב אֶת הָעָם מִצְרַיְמָה לְמַעַן הַרְבּוֹת סוּס וַיהֹוָה אָמַר לָכֶם לֹא תֹסִפוּן לָשׁוּב בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֶּה עוֹד:
he may not acquire many horses for himself: But, only what he needs for his chariots, “so that he will not cause the people to return to Egypt” [to purchase the horses], because horses come from there, as it is said of Solomon (I Kings 10: 29), “And a chariot that went up and left Egypt sold for six hundred shekels of silver, and a horse for one hundred fifty.” - [San. 21b] לא ירבה לו סוסים: אלא כדי מרכבתו, שלא ישיב את העם מצרימה, שהסוסים באים משם. כמה שנאמר בשלמה, ותעלה ותצא מרכבה ממצרים בשש מאות כסף וסוס בחמשים ומאה (מלכים א' י כט):
17And he shall not take many wives for himself, and his heart must not turn away, and he shall not acquire much silver and gold for himself. יזוְלֹא יַרְבֶּה לּוֹ נָשִׁים וְלֹא יָסוּר לְבָבוֹ וְכֶסֶף וְזָהָב לֹא יַרְבֶּה לּוֹ מְאֹד:
And he shall not take many wives for himself: Only eighteen, for we find that David had six wives, and it was told to him [by Nathan the prophet] (II Sam. 12:8):“and if this is too little, I would add for you like them and like them” [totaling eighteen]. — [San. 21a and Sifrei] ולא ירבה לו נשים: אלא שמונה עשרה, שמצינו שהיו לו לדוד שש נשים, ונאמר לו ואם מעט ואוסיפה לך כהנה וכהנה (שמואל ב' יב ח):
and he shall not acquire much silver and gold for himself: However, he may have what is required to provide for his troops. — [San. 21b] וכסף וזהב לא ירבה לו מאד: אלא כדי ליתן לאכסניא [לאפסניא]:
18And it will be, when he sits upon his royal throne, that he shall write for himself two copies of this Torah on a scroll from [that Torah which is] before the Levitic kohanim. יחוְהָיָה כְשִׁבְתּוֹ עַל כִּסֵּא מַמְלַכְתּוֹ וְכָתַב לוֹ אֶת מִשְׁנֵה הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת עַל סֵפֶר מִלִּפְנֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם:
And it will be, when he sits [upon his royal throne]: If he does this, he merits that his kingdom will remain established. — [Sifrei] והיה כשבתו: אם עשה כן כדאי הוא שתתקיים מלכותו:
two copies of this Torah-: Heb. מִשְׁנֵה הַתּוֹרָה i.e., two Torah scrolls, one that is placed in his treasury, and the other that comes and goes with him (San. 21b). [I.e., a small scroll, which the king carries with him. Thus the Talmud derives מִשְׁנֵה from שְׁנַיִם, two.] Onkelos, however, renders פַּתְשֶׁגֶן, copy. He interprets [the word] מִשְׁנֵה in the sense of repeating and uttering. [I.e., one copy of the Torah, which the scribe would write while uttering the words before he writes them, deriving מִשְׁנֵה from שִׁנּוּן, studying .] את משנה התורה: שתי ספרי תורה. אחת שהיא מונחת בבית גנזיו ואחת שנכנסת ויוצאת עמו. ואונקלוס תרגם פתשגן, פתר משנה לשון שנון ודבור:
19And it shall be with him, and he shall read it all the days of his life, so that he may learn to fear the Lord, his God, to keep all the words of this Torah and these statutes, to perform them, יטוְהָיְתָה עִמּוֹ וְקָרָא בוֹ כָּל יְמֵי חַיָּיו לְמַעַן יִלְמַד לְיִרְאָה אֶת יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהָיו לִשְׁמֹר אֶת כָּל דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת וְאֶת הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה לַעֲשׂתָם:
the words of [this] Torah: [This is to be understood] according to its apparent meaning [namely a commandment written in the Torah]. דברי התורה: כמשמעו:
20so that his heart will not be haughty over his brothers, and so that he will not turn away from the commandment, either to the right or to the left, in order that he may prolong [his] days in his kingdom, he and his sons, among Israel. כלְבִלְתִּי רוּם לְבָבוֹ מֵאֶחָיו וּלְבִלְתִּי סוּר מִן הַמִּצְוָה יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאול לְמַעַן יַאֲרִיךְ יָמִים עַל מַמְלַכְתּוֹ הוּא וּבָנָיו בְּקֶרֶב יִשְׂרָאֵל:
and so that he will not turn away from the commandment: Not even from a minor commandment of a prophet. ולבלתי סור מן המצוה: אפילו מצוה קלה של נביא:
in order that he may prolong [his] days [in his kingdom]: From this positive statement, one may understand the negative inference [i.e., if he does not fulfill the commandments, his kingdom will not endure]. And so we find in the case of Saul, that Samuel said to him, “Seven days shall you wait until I come to you to offer up burnt-offerings” (I Sam. 10:8), and it is stated, “And he waited seven days” (I Sam. 13:8), but Saul did not keep his promise and neglected to wait the entire [last] day. He had not quite finished sacrificing the burnt-offering, when Samuel arrived and said to him (I Sam 13:13-14),“You have acted foolishly; you have not kept [the commandment of the Lord your God, which He commanded you…] so now your kingdom will not continue” (I Sam 13:13-14). Thus we learn, that for [transgressing] a minor commandment of a prophet, he was punished. למען יאריך ימים: מכלל הן אתה שומע לאו. וכן מצינו בשאול שאמר לו שמואל שבעת ימים תוחל עד בואי אליך (שמואל א' י, ח) להעלות עולות וכתיב ויוחל שבעת ימים (שמואל א' יג, ח) ולא שמר הבטחתו לשמור כל היום, ולא הספיק להעלות העולה עד שבא שמואל ואמר לו נסכלת לא שמרת וגו' ועתה ממלכתך לא תקום (שם יג ז - יד). הא למדת, שבשביל מצוה קלה של נביא נענש:
he and his sons: [This] tells [us] that if his son is worthy of becoming king, he is given preference over any [other] person. — [Hor. 11b] הוא ובניו: מגיד שאם בנו הגון למלכות הוא קודם לכל אדם:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 10 - 17
• Special Custom for the Month of Elul and High Holidays
The Baal Shem Tov instituted a custom of reciting three additional chapters of Psalms each day, from the 1st of Elul until Yom Kippur (on Yom Kippur the remaining 36 chapters are recited, thereby completing the entire book of Psalms).
See below for today's additional chapters.
Chapter 10
This psalm tells of the wicked one’s prosperity and his boasting of it, until he says: “There is neither law nor judge. God pays no attention to the actions of mere mortals.”
1. Why, O Lord, do You stand afar, do You hide Yourself in times of distress?
2. The wicked man in his arrogance pursues the poor; they are caught by the schemes they have contrived.
3. For the wicked man glories in the desire of his heart, and the robber boasts that he has scorned the Lord.
4. The wicked one in his insolence [thinks], “He does not avenge”; all his thoughts are, “There is no God.”
5. His ways always succeed; Your retribution is far removed from before him; he puffs at all his foes.
6. He says in his heart, “I shall not falter; for all generations no evil will befall me.”
7. His mouth is full of oaths, deceit and malice; mischief and iniquity are under his tongue.
8. He sits in ambush near open cities; in hidden places he murders the innocent; his eyes stealthily watch for the helpless.
9. He lurks in hiding like a lion in his lair; he lurks to seize the poor, then seizes the poor when he draws his net.
10. He crouches and stoops, then the helpless fall prey to his might.
11. He says in his heart, “God has forgotten, He conceals His countenance, He will never see.”
12. Arise, O Lord! O God, lift Your hand! Do not forget the lowly.
13. Why does the wicked man scorn God? Because he says in his heart, “You do not avenge.”
14. Indeed, You do see! For You behold the mischief and vexation. To recompense is in Your power; the helpless place their trust in You; You have [always] helped the orphan.
15. Break the strength of the wicked; then search for the wickedness of the evil one and You will not find it.
16. The Lord reigns for all eternity; the nations have vanished from His land.
17. Lord, You have heard the desire of the humble; direct their hearts, let Your ear listen,
18. to bring justice to the orphan and the downtrodden, so that [the wicked] shall no longer crush the frail of the earth.
Chapter 11
This psalm declares that the suffering of the righteous one is for his own benefit, to cleanse him of his sins; whereas the wicked one is granted prosperity in this world-similar to the verse, "Wealth remains with its owner, to his detriment."
1. For the Conductor, by David. I have placed my trust in the Lord; [thus] how can you say of my soul, your mountain,1 that it flees like a bird?2
2. For behold, the wicked bend the bow, they have readied their arrow upon the bowstring, to shoot in darkness at the upright of heart.
3. They destroyed the foundations; 3 what [wrong] has the righteous man done?
4. The Lord is in His holy Sanctuary, the Lord's throne is in heaven, [yet] His eyes behold, His pupils probe [the deeds of] mankind.
5. The Lord tests the righteous, but He hates the wicked and the lover of violence.
6. He will rain down upon the wicked fiery coals and brimstone; a scorching wind will be their allotted portion.
7. For the Lord is righteous, He loves [the man of] righteous deeds; the upright will behold His countenance.
Chapter 12
This psalm admonishes informers, slanderers, and flatterers.
1. For the Conductor, upon the eight-stringed instrument, a psalm by David.
2. Help us, Lord, for the pious are no more; for the faithful have vanished from among men.
3. Men speak falsehood to one another; with flattering lips, with a duplicitous heart do they speak.
4. May the Lord cut off all flattering lips, the tongue that speaks boastfully-
5. those who have said, "With our tongues we shall prevail, our lips are with us, who is master over us!”
6. Because of the plundering of the poor, because of the moaning of the needy, the Lord says, "Now I will arise!" "I will grant deliverance," He says to him.
7. The words of the Lord are pure words, like silver refined in the finest earthen crucible, purified seven times.
8. May You, O Lord, watch over them; may You forever guard them from this generation,
9. [in which] the wicked walk on every side; when they are exalted it is a disgrace to mankind.
Chapter 13
A prayer for an end to the long exile. One in distress should offer this prayer for his troubles and for the length of the exile.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. How long, O Lord, will You forget me, forever? How long will You hide Your countenance from me?
3. How long must I seek counsel within my soul, [to escape] the grief in my heart all day? How long will my enemy be exalted over me?
4. Look! Answer me, O Lord, my God; give light to my eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death.
5. Lest my enemy say, "I have overcome him," [and] my oppressors rejoice when I falter.
6. I have placed my trust in Your kindness, my heart will rejoice in Your deliverance. I will sing to the Lord, for He has dealt kindly with me.
Chapter 14
This psalm speaks of the destruction of the two Holy Temples-the first by Nebuchadnezzar, and the second by Titus.
1. For the Conductor, by David. The fool says in his heart, "There is no God!" [Man's] deeds have become corrupt and abominable, no one does good.
2. The Lord looked down from heaven upon mankind, to see if there was any wise man who searches for God.
3. They have all gone astray together, they have become corrupt; there is none who does good, not even one.
4. Indeed, all the evildoers, who devour My people as they devour bread, who do not call upon the Lord, will [ultimately] come to know [the consequences of their actions].
5. There they will be seized with fright, for God is with the righteous generation.
6. You scorn the counsel of the lowly, that he puts his trust in the Lord.
7. O that out of Zion would come Israel's deliverance! When the Lord returns the captivity of His people, Jacob will exult, Israel will rejoice.
Chapter 15
This psalm speaks of several virtues and attributes with which one should conduct oneself. He is then assured that his soul will rest in Gan Eden.
1. A psalm by David. Who may abide in Your tent, O Lord? Who may dwell on Your holy Mountain?
2. He who walks blamelessly, acts justly, and speaks truth in his heart;
3. who has no slander on his tongue, who has done his fellowman no evil, and who has brought no disgrace upon his relative;
4. in whose eyes a despicable person is abhorrent, but who honors those who are God-fearing; who does not change his oath even if it is to his own detriment;
5. who does not lend his money at interest, nor accept a bribe against the innocent. He who does these things shall never falter.
Chapter 16
When one is in need, he should not implore God in his own merit, for he must leave his merits for his children.
1. A michtam,1 by David. Watch over me, O God, for I have put my trust in You.
2. You, [my soul,] have said to God, "You are my Master; You are not obligated to benefit me.”
3. For the sake of the holy ones who lie in the earth, and for the mighty-all my desires are fulfilled in their merit.
4. Those who hasten after other [gods], their sorrows shall increase; I will not offer their libations of blood, nor take their names upon my lips.
5. The Lord is my allotted portion and my share; You guide my destiny.
6. Portions have fallen to me in pleasant places; indeed, a beautiful inheritance is mine.
7. I bless the Lord Who has advised me; even in the nights my intellect admonishes me.2
8. I have set the Lord before me at all times; because He is at my right hand, I shall not falter.
9. Therefore my heart rejoices and my soul exults; my flesh, too, rests secure.
10. For You will not abandon my soul to the grave, You will not allow Your pious one to see purgatory.
11. Make known to me the path of life, that I may be satiated with the joy of Your presence, with the bliss of Your right hand forever.
Chapter 17
A loftily person should not ask God to test him with some sinful matter, or other things. If one has sinned, he should see to reform himself, and to save many others from sin.
1. A prayer by David. Hear my sincere [plea], O Lord; listen to my cry; give ear to my prayer, expressed by guileless lips.
2. Let my verdict come forth from before You; let Your eyes behold uprightness.
3. You have probed my heart, examined it in the night, tested me and found nothing; no evil thought crossed my mind; as are my words so are my thoughts.
4. So that [my] human deeds conform with the words of Your lips, I guard myself from the paths of the lawbreakers.
5. Support my steps in Your paths, so that my feet shall not falter.
6. I have called upon You, for You, O Lord, will answer me; incline Your ear to me, hear what I say.
7. Withhold Your kindness-O You who delivers with Your right hand those who put their trust in You-from those who rise up against [You].
8. Guard me like the apple of the eye; hide me in the shadow of Your wings
9. from the wicked who despoil me, [from] my mortal enemies who surround me.
10. Their fat has closed [their hearts]; their mouths speak arrogantly.
11. They encircle our footsteps; they set their eyes to make us stray from the earth.
12. His appearance is like a lion longing to devour, like a young lion lurking in hiding.
13. Arise, O Lord! Confront him, bring him to his knees; rescue my soul from the wicked [who serves as] Your sword.
14. Let me be among those whose death is by Your hand, O Lord, among those who die of old age, whose portion is eternal life and whose innards are filled with Your concealed goodness; who are sated with sons and leave their abundance to their offspring.
15. Because of my righteousness, I shall behold Your countenance; in the time of resurrection, I will be sated by Your image.
Additional Three Chapters
The Baal Shem Tov instituted a custom of reciting three additional chapters of Psalms each day, from the 1st of Elul until Yom Kippur (on Yom Kippur the remaining 36 chapters are recited, thereby completing the entire book of Psalms).
Today's Chapters are 4, 5 and 6.
Chapter 4
This psalm exhorts man not to shame his fellow, and to neither speak nor listen to gossip and slander. Envy not the prosperity of the wicked in this world, rather rejoice and say: “If it is so for those who anger Him . . . [how much better it will be for those who serve Him!”]
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music, a psalm by David.
2. Answer me when I call, O God [Who knows] my righteousness. You have relieved me in my distress; be gracious to me and hear my prayer.
3. Sons of men, how long will you turn my honor to shame, will you love vanity, and endlessly seek falsehood?
4. Know that the Lord has set apart His devout one; the Lord will hear when I call to Him.
5. Tremble and do not sin; reflect in your hearts upon your beds, and be silent forever.
6. Offer sacrifices in righteousness, and trust in the Lord.
7. Many say: “Who will show us good?” Raise the light of Your countenance upon us, O Lord.
8. You put joy in my heart, greater than [their joy] when their grain and wine abound.
9. In peace and harmony I will lie down and sleep, for You, Lord, will make me dwell alone, in security.
Chapter 5
A prayer for every individual, requesting that the wicked perish for their deeds, and the righteous rejoice for their good deeds.
1. For the Conductor, on the nechilot,1 a psalm by David.
2. Give ear to my words, O Lord, consider my thoughts.
3. Listen to the voice of my cry, my King and my God, for to You I pray.
4. Lord, hear my voice in the morning; in the morning I set [my prayers] before you and hope.
5. For You are not a God Who desires wickedness; evil does not abide with You.
6. The boastful cannot stand before Your eyes; You hate all evildoers.
7. You destroy the speakers of falsehood; the Lord despises the man of blood and deceit.
8. And I, through Your abundant kindness, come into Your house; I bow toward Your holy Sanctuary, in awe of You.
9. Lead me, O Lord, in Your righteousness, because of my watchful enemies; straighten Your path before me.
10. For there is no sincerity in their mouths, their heart is treacherous; their throat is an open grave, [though] their tongue flatters.
11. Find them guilty, O God, let them fall by their schemes; banish them for their many sins, for they have rebelled against You.
12. But all who trust in You will rejoice, they will sing joyously forever; You will shelter them, and those who love Your Name will exult in You.
13. For You, Lord, will bless the righteous one; You will envelop him with favor as with a shield.
Chapter 6
This is an awe-inspiring prayer for one who is ill, to pray that God heal him, body and soul. An ailing person who offers this prayer devoutly and with a broken heart is assured that God will accept his prayer.
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music for the eight-stringed harp, a psalm by David.
2. Lord, do not punish me in Your anger, nor chastise me in Your wrath.
3. Be gracious to me, O Lord, for I languish away; heal me, O Lord, for my bones tremble in fear.
4. My soul is panic-stricken; and You, O Lord, how long [before You help]?
5. Relent, O Lord, deliver my soul; save me for the sake of Your kindness.
6. For there is no remembrance of You in death; who will praise You in the grave?
7. I am weary from sighing; each night I drench my bed, I melt my couch with my tears.
8. My eye has grown dim from vexation, worn out by all my oppressors.
9. Depart from me, all you evildoers, for the Lord has heard the sound of my weeping.
10. The Lord has heard my supplication; the Lord accepts my prayer.
11. All my enemies will be shamed and utterly terrified; they will then repent and be shamed for a moment.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 10• Lessons in Tanya
• Monday, Elul 2, 5775 · August 17, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 10
והנה, לפי שהמצות ניתנו לנו על ידי התלבשות במדת גבורה וצמצום ההארה כו׳
Now, because the commandments were given to us by being vested in the attribute of Gevurah and by the contraction of the [Divine] radiation...,
לכן רוב המצות יש להן שיעור מצומצם
most commandments have a delimited measure.1
כמו אורך הציצית: י״ב גודלין
For instance, the length of the tzitzit must be twelve times the width of the thumb;2
והתפילין: אצבעים על אצבעים, ומרובעות דוקא
the tefillin — two fingerbreadths by two fingerbreadths, according to the opinion of the Geonim quoted in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch,3 and necessarily square;4
והלולב: ד׳ טפחים, והסוכה: ז׳ טפחים
והשופר: טפח, והמקוה: מ׳ סאה
וכן בקרבנות, יש להן שיעור מצומצם לזמן
The sacrifices, too, have a delimited measure as regards age,
כמו כבשים בני שנה, ואילים בני שתים, ופרים כו׳
וכן במעשה הצדקה וגמילות חסדים בממונו
The same applies to the act of charity and to the practice of kindness with one’s money;
אף שהיא מהעמודים שהעולם עומד עליהם
even though that is one of the pillars upon which the world stands,12
וכדכתיב: עולם חסד יבנה
as it is written:13 “The world is built by Chesed,”
אפילו הכי, יש לה שיעור קצוב: חומש למצוה מן המובחר
nevertheless, it has a set measure of preferably one fifth [of one’s income],14 if one desires to perform the commandment in the best possible manner,
ומעשר למדה בינונית כו׳
and of one tenth for an average measure15....
וזה נקרא חסד עולם
This is what is called “the Chesed of the world.”
I.e., the Supernal degree of Chesed that is drawn down through this manner of measured charity is termed Chesed olam, “the Chesed of the world.”
פירוש: חסד אל כל היום, המתלבש בעולמות עליונים ותחתונים
This means16 “the Chesed of G‑d that endures throughout the day,” which is vested in the higher and lower worlds
על ידי אתערותא דלתתא
through the arousal from below that is generated by man’s service,
היא מצות הצדקה וחסד שעושים בני אדם זה עם זה
i.e., by the precepts of charity and kindness that people practice for each other.
Kindness between man and his fellow draws down Divine kindness into the higher and lower worlds.
ולפי שהעולם הוא בבחינת גבול ומדה
But because the world is finite and measured —
מהארץ עד לרקיע ת״ק שנה, וכן מרקיע לרקיע כו׳
“From the earth to the heavens there is a distance of 500 years and likewise from one heaven to another [there is a distance of 500 years],”17
ושית אלפי שני הוי עלמא כו׳
and “Six thousand years shall the world exist...”18 —
לכן ניתן שיעור ומדה גם כן למצות הצדקה והחסד שבתורה
the Torah’s commandment of charity and kindness is also given a limit and measure,
כמו לשאר מצות התורה
as are the other commandments of the Torah.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Note of the Rebbe: “It would appear that this phrase (‘most commandments have a delimited measure’) seeks to highlight their maximal limits, especially since the Alter Rebbe qualifies the noun ‘measure’ (shiur) with the adjective ‘delimited’ (metzumtzam). (The commandments that follow would then be instances of Chesed olam, being no higher than the finitude of a worldlike Chesed). Paradoxically, however, the examples that the Alter Rebbe then gives all indicate theminimal limits of each mitzvah! [...] Indeed, even when the mitzvah of tzedakah is carried out at the [boundless] level ofChasdei Havayah it has a minimal limit — i.e., [the obligation obtains only when the donor owns at least] a perutah(whereas from the finite perspective of Chesed olam he would be exempt from it, as is discussed at the very end of the present Epistle).“ By way of resolving this anomaly, it could be suggested that the Alter Rebbe seeks to point out [...] that tzitzit which are thirteen thumbbreadths long are in no way superior to tzitzit of twelve; hence the measure of the mitzvah of tzitzit has amaximal delimitation. The same may be said of the other examples, such as the dimensions of tefillin, and so on.” |
| 2. | Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 11:4. |
| 3. | Ibid. 32:33. |
| 4. | Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 32:39. Note of the Rebbe: “At first glance, this requirement would appear to be out of place in a list of dimensions; rather, it would appear to be merely a restriction (disqualifying round ones, for example), though no mention is made of the many comparable restrictions that pertain to tzitzit or to tefillin.“ It may be suggested by way of explanation that this phrase [does indeed relate to a dimension, inasmuch as it] seeks to exclude a shape of five (or six or more) sides that encompasses (and is greater than) a square. This exclusion does not apply to tzitzit (cf. the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 10:1). This gives significance to the word ‘necessarily’, which might otherwise appear superfluous.” |
| 5. | Ibid., beginning of sec. 650. |
| 6. | Ibid., beginning of sec. 634. |
| 7. | Ibid., 586:9. |
| 8. | Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 201. |
| 9. | Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Maaseh HaKorbanot 1:14. |
| 10. | Ibid. |
| 11. | Ibid.; Tractate Parah 1:2. |
| 12. | Avot 1:2. |
| 13. | Tehillim 89:3. |
| 14. | Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 249:1. |
| 15. | Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 249:1. |
| 16. | Tehillim 52:3. |
| 17. | Chagigah 13a. |
| 18. | Rosh HaShanah 31a. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:Monday, Elul 2, 5775 · August 17, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 241
Damage Caused by Arson
"If a fire breaks out and spreads through thorns..."—Exodus 22:5.
We are commanded regarding the laws [of liability] that apply if a person sets a fire [that damages another's property].
Damage Caused by Arson
Damage Caused by Arson
Positive Commandment 241
Translated by Berel Bell
The 241st mitzvah is that we are commanded to follow the laws regarding damage caused by fire.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "If fire gets out of control and spreads through weeds [...the one who started the fire must pay for the damage.]"
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 2nd and 6th chapters of tractate Bava Kama.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid. 22:5.
Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Two
Halacha 1
It is a Rabbinic ordinance that a yavam should not enter into marital relations with his yevamah until he consecrates her in the presence of two witnesses, with a p'rutah or an article worth a p'rutah.1 This [act] is called a ma'amar.2
A ma'amar does not complete the acquisition of a yevamah, as will be explained.3
Halacha 2
Just as [the yavam] must consecrate his yevamah, so too, he should recite the marriage blessings in the presence of ten men6 and compose a ketubah("marriage contract"), as is required of any man who marries a woman.7
When [a yavam] enters into marital relations with his yevamah without previously performing a ma'amar with her, he acquires her in a binding manner;8 he does not have to consecrate her after engaging in marital relations with her. He should be given stripes for rebellious conduct9 and should write aketubah for her.
Halacha 3
When [a yavam] engages in marital relations with his yevamah, he acquires her [as his wife]. [This applies] regardless of whether he entered into these relations unintentionally10 or with a licentious intent,11 under duress or willingly, whether he acted with a licentious intent and she acted unintentionally or under duress, or she acted with a licentious intent and he acted unintentionally or under duress, whether she was asleep12 or awake, whether he performed vaginal or anal intercourse,13 whether he inserted merely the head of his penis or the entire organ.14
Halacha 4
When does the above apply? When [the yavam] intends to perform a sexual act. If, however, he fell from the roof [with an erection] and [accidentally] inserted his organ into his yevamah, had relations with her when he was so intoxicated that he was not conscious of anything,15 or when he was asleep, he does not acquire her [as his wife].
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when a yavam takes] his yevamah [home to] performyibbum, and within 30 days she claims that they did not engage in sexual relations. [The yavam] claims that they did engage in relations and then divorces her. Since he already took the initiative and divorced her, we compel him to perform chalitzah with her.18
If he did not divorce her, we compel him to engage in relations with her,19 or to perform chalitzah and also to divorce her, giving her a get.20
If he divorced her after thirty days had passed, and she claims that they did not engage in sexual relations, we request that he perform chalitzah with her.21 If, however, he admits that he had not entered into relations with her, we compel him to perform chalitzah with her.22
If she claims that they engaged in sexual relations, and he denies engaging in relations, she is not required to engage in chalitzah, for his word is not accepted [when he desires] to cause her to be forbidden to all other men, once he brings her to his home as his wife.
Halacha 6
When a man dies [childless], and he is survived by many brothers, the mitzvah is incumbent on the eldest brother to perform either yibbum or chalitzah, as [implied by Deuteronomy 25:6]: "The firstborn son whom she bears [will perpetuate the name of the deceased brother]." The Oral Tradition interprets the verse as referring to the eldest of the surviving brothers, causing the verse to be rendered: "The eldest brother will perpetuate the name of the deceased brother." The subject of the phrase "whom she bears" is the mother of the brothers and not the yevamah.23
Halacha 7
If the eldest brother does not desire to perform yibbum, all the other brothers are given that option.24 If they also do not desire, we return to the eldest brother and tell him: "The mitzvah is incumbent on you. Perform either yibbumor chalitzah." We do not compel the yavam to perform yibbum;25 we do, however, compel him to perform chalitzah.26
Halacha 8
If the eldest brother says: "Give me a respite until [a brother] who is a minor attains majority," "... until [a brother] who is on a journey returns," or "... until [a brother] who has [temporarily] lost his powers of speech and hearing recovers; if he refuses, I will perform yibbum or chalitzah" - his request is not accepted. He is told: "The mitzvah is incumbent on you. Perform either yibbum orchalitzah."27
Halacha 9
Similarly, if the eldest brother is in another country,28[the obligation is transferred to his younger brother]. The younger brother does not have the option of saying: "The mitzvah is incumbent on my older brother. Wait until he comes." Instead, we tell the brother that is present: "Perform either yibbum orchalitzah."29
Halacha 10
The laws pertaining to a yevamah who is fit to perform yibbum30 and refuses to do so are the same as those governing a woman who rebels against her husband.31 We compel her yavam to perform chalitzah with her,32 and she forfeits [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract.
When the deceased is survived by many wives, the one that the yavam asks to perform yibbum and refuses is considered to have "rebelled." He should perform chalitzah with her, and she forfeits [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract.33The other wives who were not asked [to perform yibbum] receive [the money due them by virtue of their] marriage contracts, as other widows do.
Halacha 11
If [the deceased was survived by] many [brothers], and the eldest brother states that he wants to perform yibbum with [one of the deceased's wives], [she is under obligation to him].34 Even if she does not desire [to marry] him, but is willing to marry one of his brothers, her desire is not considered. For the mitzvah is that the eldest brother perform yibbum.
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when] the eldest brother says: "I do not want to perform either yibbum or chalitzah. Behold, my brother is present." If one of the brothers asks her to perform yibbum, and she does not desire [to marry] him, but she does desire [to marry] another brother, and he desires [to marry] her, she is not considered to have "rebelled." Once the eldest brother upon whom the mitzvah is incumbent demurs, all the brothers are equal.35 Since she desires [to marry] one of [the brothers], and he desires [to marry] her, she is not considered to have "rebelled."36
Moreover, if one of the brothers was in another country, and the woman says: "I would prefer to wait for him to come and perform yibbum with me. I do not want [to marry] this one," she is not considered to have "rebelled." [Since] the brother who asks [to marry her] is not the eldest, we tell him: "If you desire to performchalitzah and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract, you may.37 If not, she wants to wait until your brother comes. Since you do not have a prior claim, [she is granted that prerogative].38
Halacha 13
If the brother [whom the yevamah desired to marry] returned and did not desire [to marry] her, we turn again to the brother who desired to perform yibbum, but was not desired by the woman. We tell the woman: "There is no one who desires to perform yibbum with you except this one, and the mitzvah of yibbumis given priority. Either perform yibbum with this one, or leave without receiving [the money due because of your] marriage contract, as is the law with regard to all women who rebel."
Halacha 14
Whenever the law is that a woman should perform chalitzah and not yibbum, as we have mentioned,39 if she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her marriage contract,40she may collect that money in the same way as other widows.
Similarly, if the yavam was a leper or he has other blemishes [for which] men [are required to divorce],41 he must perform chalitzah for her, and she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her marriage contract.
If a yevamah suffered blemishes while she was waiting for yibbum, it is theyavam's lack of fortune.42 If he does not desire to perform yibbum, he must perform chalitzah and give her [the money due her by virtue of] her marriage contract.
Halacha 15
When, during her [first] husband's lifetime, a yevamah takes a vow prohibiting her from deriving benefit from her yavam,43 or from all Jews,44 [her yavam] should be compelled to perform chalitzah for her, and she is entitled to collect [the money due by virtue of] her marriage contract.45
If she takes such a vow after her [first] husband's death, we request46 [heryavam] to perform chalitzah for her.47 If he does not desire to do so, she is considered to have "rebelled."48Similarly, even if she took such a vow in her husband's lifetime, if her intent was that he should not perform yibbum with her,49 he is not compelled to perform chalitzah, unless she [accepts the status of] one who rebels and forfeits [payment of] her marriage contract.
Halacha 16
No heed is paid to the words of a yevamah, when her yavam asks her to perform chalitzah, and she says: "I do not want to perform chalitzah, nor do I want to collect [the money due me by virtue of my] marriage contract. Instead, I will remain in my husband's house like other widows."50 For she was given over to [the yavam] from heaven, and the choice [is his whether] to perform yibbumor to perform chalitzah51 and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract.
Moreover, even if she says "I will provide for my sustenance from my own means, and I will remain without a husband for the rest of my life,"52 her words are not heeded. For the yavam will tell her: "As long as you are under obligation to me, no one else will want to marry me."53 Even if he is already married [this argument still holds weight], for it is possible for him [to desire] to marry another wife, or that [his obligation to] the yevamah will cause strife within his marriage.54
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when] a yevamah had no right to the privileges of a marriage contract from her [deceased] husband, because she was forbidden to him, but she is permitted to marry the yavam, as will be explained.55 If theyavam desires to perform yibbum, he may. He is not obligated to the woman [for the privileges of her] marriage contract, just as her [previous] husband was not.56 The laws regarding the yavam's obligation for the additional amount to be paid the woman are the same as those that applied with regard to her husband.57
If, however, a husband did not write his wife a marriage contract, or she sold him or waived to him the rights to her marriage contract, the yavam is obligated to write a new marriage contract for her as he would be required for another widow.58
Halacha 18
Before the yavam performs yibbum or chalitzah with the yevamah, she is forbidden to marry another man,59 as [Deuteronomy 25:5] states: "the wife of the deceased should not be allowed to [marry] an outsider."
If she marries another person,60 and they engage in sexual relations, they are both punished by lashes,61 and he must divorce her with a get. [This applies] even if she has borne him several children.62 She is forbidden to him and to heryavam.63Her yavam should perform chalitzah with her; this causes her to be permitted to marry other men.
Halacha 19
If she was consecrated by another man, she does not become forbidden to heryavam. Instead, the man who consecrated her should divorce her, and heryavam may perform either yibbum or chalitzah.64
If her yavam was a priest who is forbidden to marry a divorcee, she should be divorced by the man who consecrated her, so that the sinner should not benefit, and her yavam should perform chalitzah with her.65
Halacha 20
If the man who consecrated [the yevamah] and then divorced her, marries her [after] her yavam performs chalitzah with her, they are not forced to separate.66If, by contrast, a man divorced [a yevamah] after being married to her and then remarried her again, the couple are forced to separate. For this resembles the case of a married woman who [thought that her husband had died and] remarried, who is forbidden to both her first and second husbands, as has been explained.67
A yevamah who engages in licentious sexual relations does not become forbidden to her yavam.68 If he desires, he may perform chalitzah; if he desires, he may perform yibbum.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply to] any yevamah concerning whom there is a question according to Rabbinic law whether or not she is under obligation to ayavam - e.g., a yevamah bore a child who died within thirty days, after a pregnancy that was not full term. In this instance, she is required by Rabbinic law to perform chalitzah, because of the doubt [that exists whether the birth was viable], as explained above.69 If such a woman was consecrated by another man before performing chalitzah, her yavam should perform chalitzah with her, and she may remain married to her husband.70
If she was consecrated by a priest - who is forbidden to be married to a woman who performed chalitzah - [her yavam] should not perform chalitzah for her.71[This leniency was instituted] since we do not cause a man's wife to be forbidden because of a Rabbinic decree instituted on account of doubt.72
If the priest divorces [the woman] or dies, she should perform chalitzah.73Afterwards, she is permitted, a priori, to marry other men.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
A ma'amar can also be effected with a sh'tar, a legal document (Maggid Mishneh).
From Yevamot 52a it would appear that this practice was instituted as an expression of modesty. Just as with regard to marriage, although it is acceptable to consecrate a woman through sexual relations according to Scriptural law, our Rabbis ordered a ban of ostracism to be placed on a person who does so; so too, with regard to yibbum, they required that the man designate the woman as his wife before entering into marital relations with her.
|
| 2. |
The word ma'amar means "statement." The Tosefot Yom Tov explains that the term was chosen because the yavam must make a statement of intent. Rav Kapach offers an alternative interpretation, citing Deuteronomy 26:17,18, which uses the root אמר to mean "designate," or "declare allegiance to."
|
| 3. |
See Chapter 5, Halachot 2-3.
The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah continues "as does sexual relations." Nevertheless, authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah do not contain this addition. Based on that version, Rav Kapach explains that the comparison may be, not to sexual relations with a yevamah, but rather to the effectiveness of the transfer of money in ordinary kiddushin.
|
| 4. |
See Hilchot Ishut 4:1.
|
| 5. |
If the minor's marriage is consummated, she leaves her father's authority and acts independently. As long as she is merely consecrated, however, she is under her father's authority. See Hilchot Ishut 3:11-12.
|
| 6. |
See Hilchot Ishut 10:3 for the text of these blessings. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 166:2) states that the ceremony of chuppah should also be performed, and the Ma'aseh Rokeach adds thatBirkat Erusin (Hilchot Ishut 3:23) should be recited.
|
| 7. |
The text of the ketubah to be composed by the yavam appears in Chapter 4, Halachah 32.
|
| 8. |
The fact that he disobeyed our Sages' wishes does not cause his deed to lose its effectiveness.
|
| 9. |
The punishment given for disobeying a Rabbinic ordinance. See Hilchot Ishut 3:21.
|
| 10. |
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 166:9), which cites a minority opinion that differentiates between whether the yevamah had been married to her first husband or merely consecrated by him. In the latter instance, she must be consecrated a second time.
|
| 11. |
Our translation is based on Rashi's gloss, Yevamot 53b.
|
| 12. |
Although it is improper for a husband to engage in relations with his wife when she is asleep, this does not negate the effectiveness of the yavam's act.
|
| 13. |
The purpose of yibbum is to "perpetuate the name of his brother" (Deuteronomy 25:7) - i.e., to conceive progeny. Although this objective cannot be achieved through anal intercourse, it is still an effective means of acquisition. Since both the man and the woman are capable of conceiving children, the fact that they cannot accomplish that through this sexual act does not detract from its effectiveness (Beit Shmuel 166:6).
|
| 14. |
Our translation is based on Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 1:10.
|
| 15. |
Note the Or Sameach, who questions this ruling based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 6:1, quoted by the Rambam in Chapter 6, Halachah 3), which states that when a mentally incompetent person performs yibbum, his act is binding. The Or Sameach explains that a mentally incompetent person may have the intent to engage in sexual relations. In this instance, however, the person has lost control of his faculties to the extent that he has no intent whatsoever.
|
| 16. |
For masturbation is not considered to be sexual relations.
|
| 17. |
For sodomy is considered to be a forbidden form of relations.
|
| 18. |
Since it is within 30 days, we accept the possibility that the yavam did not engage in relations with her, and compel him to perform chalitzah so the yevamah can remarry another man (Yevamot111b).
|
| 19. |
And remain married to her.
|
| 20. |
Since he brought her home as his wife, even if he agrees that they did not engage in relations, he is required to divorce her, because it is likely that they did engage in relations (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 167:6). Nevertheless, since she claims that they did not, and there is plausibility to her claim, he is also required to perform chalitzah.
|
| 21. |
After a couple have lived together for thirty days, we assume that they have engaged in relations, for a man will not restrain himself any longer. Hence, the man cannot be compelled to performchalitzah (Yevamot, ibid.). Nevertheless, we ask him to perform this rite, for otherwise the woman will not be permitted to remarry.
|
| 22. |
He has nothing to lose in this concern, for since he divorced her without entering into relations with her, he is no longer permitted to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum. Therefore, he should fulfill the mitzvah of chalitzah so that she can remarry.
|
| 23. |
According to the simple meaning of the verse, the subject is - as reflected in our translation - theyevamah. Nevertheless, in a halachic context, it is possible for one verse to have several interpretations. Accordingly, Yevamot 2:8 (see the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah) interprets this verse to be referring to the deceased's mother. (See also Yevamot 24a, quoted in Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which considers the yevamah the subject of the phrase in a different halachic context.)
|
| 24. |
See Halachah 12.
|
| 25. |
Although the Rambam maintains that the mitzvah of yibbum takes priority over the mitzvah ofchalitzah, we cannot compel a man to wed a woman with whom he does not desire to live.
|
| 26. |
For until this mitzvah is performed, the yevamah may not remarry.
|
| 27. |
I.e., the yevamah should not be subjected to an unnecessary delay, if possible.
|
| 28. |
When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 161:5) uses the expression "an overseas country." The Beit Shmuel 161:6 cites the expression used by the Rambam and explains that it refers to a country in which a different language is spoken, even if it is relatively close. He cites a ruling of Mahari Mintz, which states that if the eldest brother is in another city, and the yevamah does not have the funds to pay for travel there, the younger brother can be compelled to perform the mitzvah. (Kin'at Eliyahu notes that the Rambam often uses the wordmedinah to mean metropolis. He questions whether that is the Rambam's intent here.)
|
| 29. |
Here also, the intent is not to subject the yevamah to an unnecessary delay.
|
| 30. |
I.e., there is no halachic reason preventing her from doing so.
|
| 31. |
See Hilchot Ishut 14:8, which states that a woman who refuses to engage in marital relations because she is repelled by her husband, should be divorced by her husband, because "she is not like a captive, [to be forced] to engage in relations with someone she loathes." She does, however, forfeit the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract and any presents that her husband gave her. As mentioned in the notes on Hilchot Ishut, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer77:2) follows a different perspective with regard to this ruling.
There is also a difference of opinion among the authorities whether a woman who refuses to engage in yibbum is considered to have "rebelled." As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 2, the Ashkenazic authorities maintain that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence over the mitzvah of yibbum. Therefore, they maintain that a woman has the right to refuse to engage in yibbum, and she is not judged to have "rebelled" for this reason.
|
| 32. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) differs with the Rambam and maintains that a husband should not be compelled to divorce a woman who "rebels." According to that perspective, ayavam should also not be compelled to perform chalitzah.
According to the Ramah (Even HaEzer 165:1), who favors chalitzah, when a yavam desires to perform yibbum and the yevamah refuses, the yavam cannot be compelled by force to performchalitzah. He should, however, be convinced to do so. Note the gloss of the Beit Shmuel 165:1, which discusses this ruling in detail.
All authorities agree that if the yavam is one of the individuals considered unfit to marry (see Halachah 14), he should be compelled to perform chalitzah.
|
| 33. |
This applies even if one of the other women would be willing to marry the yavam; the choice is his and not hers.
|
| 34. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the woman must either consent to yibbum or be considered to have "rebelled."
|
| 35. |
The Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that if the eldest brother demurs, the prerogative is given to the brother who is next in the order of age. This perspective is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 161:4).
|
| 36. |
If, however, the brother she desires to marry does not desire to marry her, she is considered to have "rebelled," as stated in the following halachah.
|
| 37. |
Although, according to the Rambam, the mitzvah of yibbum takes priority over the mitzvah ofchalitzah, this is the case only when yibbum can be performed immediately. In this instance, this brother is not forced to wait until his other brother returns, for having the obligation to performyibbum or chalitzah is a detriment to a man, as stated in Halachah 16 (Rav David Arameah).
|
| 38. |
Generally, the court makes an effort to have the mitzvah of yibbum or chalitzah performed as soon as possible, as reflected in Halachot 8 and 9. This, however, is a measure of consideration for the woman, so that she will not be forced to remain without a husband. In this instance, it is she who desires the delay. Hence, she is given that prerogative (Or Sameach).
|
| 39. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 5. (See also Chapter 3, Halachot 4, 13-14 and Chapter 6, Halachah 7.)
|
| 40. |
I.e., her first husband or his estate would have had to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract.
|
| 41. |
He has constant bad breath or a smell coming from his nose, or he works as a copper miner, a tanner, or a collector of dog feces, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 25:11.
|
| 42. |
A man is entitled to divorce his wife if he discovers that she possessed physical blemishes that mar her appeal before her marriage, and he is not required to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 7:8, 25:2. Nevertheless, in this instance this law does not apply, because the connection between the yavam and the yevamah begins directly after her first husband's death.
|
| 43. |
I.e., she took a vow not to benefit from the yavam in her husband's lifetime for other reasons, without the explicit intent that she would free herself from obligation to him.
|
| 44. |
I.e., the woman took a vow not to benefit from any Jews. Although that vow did not take effect with regard to her husband, once her husband died it takes effect with regard to the yavam.
|
| 45. |
She is not allowed to marry the yavam, because she will derive benefit from him and thus break her vow. Nor is she considered to be a woman who rebels, because her vow was not taken to free her from the obligation of yibbum. (See Yevamot 112a.)
|
| 46. |
Since the vow was taken specifically to free her from the obligation of yibbum, the yavam is not obligated to respect it.
|
| 47. |
If he agrees and performs chalitzah willingly, he is obligated to pay her the money due by virtue of her marriage contract.
|
| 48. |
In which case he is compelled to perform chalitzah with her, but is not required to pay her the money due by virtue of her marriage contract, as stated in Halachah 10.
|
| 49. |
Moreover, even if we are unsure of the woman's intent when taking the vow, we assume that she desired to free herself from the obligation of yibbum.
|
| 50. |
As stated in Hilchot Ishut 18:1-2, a widow is entitled to live in her deceased husband's home and derive her livelihood from his estate until she remarries.
|
| 51. |
The Kiryat Sefer explains that just as a man can divorce his wife against her will, so too, a yavamcan perform chalitzah with his yevamah against her will. Even if she desires yibbum, she can be compelled to perform chalitzah. The Maggid Mishneh cites certain authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that since the mitzvah of yibbum takes priority, the yevamah cannot be forced to perform chalitzah.
|
| 52. |
I.e., she is willing to forego the obligation of her husband's estate to her.
|
| 53. |
For as long as there is the possibility that the yavam will marry the yevamah, other women will hesitate to marry him, for no woman would like to share her husband with another woman.
|
| 54. |
Hence, the woman is compelled to perform chalitzah.
If neither the yevamah nor the yavam desires to perform chalitzah, the court is under no obligation to see that the mitzvah is performed. Although the Zohar, Volume III, page 180a, explains thatchalitzah brings about benefit for the deceased's soul, neither his brother nor his wife has a binding obligation to perform this act on his behalf. If they desire to, they may, but they cannot be compelled to do so. (See the Responsa of the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 85.)
|
| 55. |
See Chapter 6, Halachah 13.
|
| 56. |
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ramban and the Rashba as saying that if the yavam desires to divorce the yevamah immediately, he is not required to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract. If, however, he desires to remain married to the woman, he must write a marriage contract for her, for it is forbidden for a man to remain married to a woman without a marriage contract, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 10:10. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 168:9) quotes this interpretation.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that this interpretation does not fit the Rambam's wording. In that light, the Or Sameach offers the following interpretation: The yavam is never obligated to write a marriage contract for the yevamah. Why did our Sages require a man to write a marriage contract for his wife? So that there would be a financial responsibility attached to divorce, and hence a husband would not consider it to be a light matter. In this instance, the yavam is held responsible for the additional amount that the husband added to the marriage contract. Hence, there is financial responsibility attached to divorce, and there is no imperative for a further obligation.
|
| 57. |
As mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 24:2-3, although her husband is not obligated for the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, he is obligated for the additional amount that he promised her. This obligation is transferred to the yavam.
|
| 58. |
The yavam is not, however, obligated to write a marriage contract equivalent to the one that the woman's first husband gave her. It is sufficient that he write her a marriage contract for 100 zuz, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 22:14.
|
| 59. |
Both Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 357) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 596) include this as one of the Torah's 613 commandments.
|
| 60. |
This applies even if she married without knowing of the existence of the yavam (Shulchan Aruch,Even HaEzer 159:2).
|
| 61. |
If, however, the couple do not engage in relations, they are not punished with lashes.
|
| 62. |
The children are not, however, considered illegitimate. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:1-2.
|
| 63. |
I.e., she is compared to a woman who engages in relations with another man while married. SeeHilchot Gerushin 10:7.
She becomes forbidden to both men, even though she claims not to have engaged in sexual relations with her second husband (Kessef Mishneh; Ma'aseh Rokeach; see Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah19:3).
|
| 64. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 159:1) states that this law applies even when the man consecrates her without knowing of the existence of the yavam. The Beit Shmuel 159:1 differs and cites the opinion of the Rashba and the Ramban, who maintain that in such an instance, if theyavam desires to perform chalitzah, the woman may remain married to her second husband.
|
| 65. |
I.e., one might think that since the yavam cannot perform yibbum with her, she should be allowed to remain married to her second husband. If so, however, the man's transgression - marrying theyevamah - will have brought him benefit. Hence, he is required to divorce her (Yevamot 92b).
|
| 66. |
The rationale is that since the prohibition is merely a disciplinary measure, if the couple marry again they may remain married (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 159:1) states that if the second husband knew of the existence of theyavam and consecrated the woman anyway, he is forbidden to remain married to her, even if he remarried her after chalitzah.
|
| 67. |
See Hilchot Gerushin 10:5,7).
|
| 68. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 159:3) states that she does, however, become forbidden to the man with whom she engaged in relations. Even if her yavam performs chalitzah, the two may not marry.
|
| 69. |
This refers to an instance where the child's physical appearance indicates that the birth was viable. Therefore, the woman is not required to perform chalitzah according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, because the pregnancy was not full term, our Sages required chalitzah, as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 5.
|
| 70. |
I.e., we do not force the couple to divorce, as in the previous halachah.
|
| 71. |
In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 164:7), Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this leniency applies only when the priest consecrated the woman without knowing of her obligation to perform chalitzah. If he knew of her obligation and consecrated her nonetheless, the couple are not permitted to remain married.
|
| 72. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 164:7) states that similar laws apply when a yevamah was consecrated by an Israelite, and her yavam is abroad and cannot perform chalitzah for her.
|
| 73. |
I.e., the leniency is granted to the priest, because it is necessary and not to other men.
|
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Twelve
1. When a person digs a cistern1 in the public domain, and an ox or a donkey falls into it and dies,2 the owner of the cistern is liable and is required to pay the full amount of the damages, as [Exodus 21:34] states: "The owner of the cistern must pay." [This applies] even if the cistern was filled with wads of wool or the like.3
[The intent] is not only an ox or a donkey, but any animal, beast or fowl. An ox and a donkey are mentioned only because these are the commonplace [examples].
2. [The above applies] regardless of whether the person digs a cistern in the public domain,4 he digs it in his own property - but it is open to the public domain or to a domain belonging to a colleague5 - or he digs it in his own property with the opening to his own property, but afterwards, he declares the property - but not the cistern - ownerless.6 In all these instances, [the person who digs the cistern] is liable for the damages suffered.
If, however, he declared his domain and the cistern ownerless, or he declared the cistern ownerless [while retaining possession of] his domain, or he consecrated it, he is not liable.
[This is derived from the phrase:] "The owner of the cistern will pay." [Implied is that the cistern] must have an owner, while this cistern is ownerless. [Moreover, it cannot be compared to a cistern dug in the public domain,] since at the outset he was permitted to dig [the cistern], because it was on his property.
3. [The above applies whether the person] dug the cistern himself, it came into being [on his property] through natural means, or it was dug by an animal or a beast.7 Since he is required to fill it up or cover it, and he did not, he is liable for the damages.
[Similarly, the above applies] whether the person digs [the cistern himself] or purchases or receives as a present [a domain with a cistern]. This is derived from the phrase:] "The owner of the cistern will pay." [Implied is that if the cistern] has an owner [he is liable].
4. Just as a person who digs [a cistern is liable], so too, is one who opens a cistern that was covered, as [Exodus 21:33] states: "If a person opens a cistern, or if a person digs a cistern."
If [an owner] covered up a cistern in an appropriate manner and the cover decayed from within, and [because of this], an ox fell into the cistern and died, the owner is not liable. For the above verse continues: "And he did not cover it." And in this case, he covered it.8
[The following laws apply if the owner] covered [the cistern] with a covering that was strong enough to have oxen tread on it, but was not strong enough to have camels tread on it, camels trod on it and it became weakened, and then oxen trod on it and fell in. If camels are not [usually] found in such a place, [the owner] is not liable,9 for this is considered a factor beyond his control. If camels pass through this place, even infrequently, he is liable.10
5. If [the cover] decayed from within and oxen fell into [the cistern], [the owner] is not liable. [This applies even when] camels frequent this area, and [the owner] is consider negligent with regard to the camels. Nevertheless, since the oxen fell into [the cistern], because [the cover] decayed [it is considered to be a loss beyond the owner's control].11 The same applies in all similar situations.
6. When a person discovers a cistern and covers it, and afterwards uncovers it, the owner12 of the cistern is liable, and the person who [covered and uncovered it] is not liable.13
If, however, he filled [the cistern] with earth and then removed the earth, he [and not the original owner of the cistern] is liable. Since he filled the cistern with earth, the actions of the person who originally [dug the cistern] are considered to have been nullified.14
7. [The following rules apply when] a cistern is owned by two partners. If the first passed by and did not cover it, and then the second passed by and did not cover it, the first is liable15 until he gives his buckets16 to the second [partner]. Once he gives his buckets to the second partner to draw water from it, the first is freed of liability, and the second becomes liable.
If the first [partner] covered it, and the second partner passed by and saw it uncovered and left it so, he is liable.17
Until when does the second [partner] bear the sole responsibility of covering it? Until the first [partner] becomes aware18 that it is open and has the opportunity to hire workers to cut down trees and cover it. If any animal dies during this time, the second partner alone is liable. If an animal dies afterwards, both [partners] are liable, for they both were negligent.
8. When a person transfers [the responsibility for] his cistern to a watchman, [the watchman] is liable for the damages. If, however, the owner gave it to a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual or a minor to watch, the owner is liable. [This applies] even if he left it covered, because it is likely that a cistern will be uncovered, and these individuals are not mentally competent [to know that it must be covered at all times].19
9. When a person covers his cistern with buckets belonging to a colleague,20and then the owner of the buckets comes and takes them, the owner [of the cistern] is liable.21
10. [The above laws apply whether] one digs a cistern, a ditch, a cave or a trench. Why does the Torah mention a cistern? [To teach that its depth] must be sufficient to kill.
How much is considered sufficient to kill? A depth of ten handbreadths.22 If a cistern was less than ten handbreadths deep23 and an ox or another animal, beast or fowl falls in and dies, [the one responsible for the obstruction] is not liable.24 If the animal is damaged, the one responsible for the obstruction must pay the full extent of the damages.
11. If a cistern was nine handbreadths deep, and one of those handbreadths was filled with water, [the owner] is liable [if an animal falls in and dies]. [The rationale is] that one handbreadth with water is considered equivalent to two handbreadths without water.25
If [the cistern] was eight [handbreadths] deep and two handbreadths [were filled with] water, or it was seven [handbreadths] deep and three handbreadths [were filled with] water, and an ox or the like fell in and died, [the owner of the cistern] is not held liable to pay [for the death of the animal]. If [the owner of the animal seized [compensation for his loss from the owner of the cistern's property],26[the property he seized] is not expropriated from him. [The rationale is] that there is a doubt regarding this issue.27
12. When one person digs a cistern ten handbreadths deep, a second person comes and [digs deeper], making it twenty handbreadths deep, and a third person comes and [digs deeper], making it thirty handbreadths deep, they all share in the liability.28
When the first digs even one handbreadth less than ten handbreadths, and another makes it ten handbreadths deep - either by digging another handbreadth deeper or building a rim of a handbreadth at its edge - the latter person [alone] is liable.29
If afterwards he filled up the handbreadth he added or destroyed the rim he built, it is unresolved whether the first person's deed is no longer considered of consequence30 [and therefore, he is not liable,] or whether his actions are still considered significant.31
13. [The following rules apply when a person] dug a deep cistern,32 another person came and made it wider, and an ox fell into it and died. If [it is obvious that33 the ox] died because of the air within the cistern, the second person is not liable, for [his act] improved [the quality of] the air.34 If [it is obvious that the ox] died because of the blow [it received], the second person is liable, for [his act] brought closer [the possibility] that this cistern would cause damage.35
Similarly, if the ox fell from the side that the person widened, [and died because of the air of the cistern],36 the second person is held liable despite the fact that [the ox] died from [the cistern's foul] air.37 If [the ox] fell from the side that was dug by the first person, the first person is liable, for the second person improved [the quality of] the air.38
14. The liability that the Torah imposed for [damages caused by falling into] a cistern applies even when the animal died merely because of the [foul] air within the cistern. Needless to say, it applies when the animal dies because of the blow it received.39
If the width of the cistern was the same as its depth, it will not have [foul] air. Thus, if the animal did not receive a blow [when it fell] and yet it died, [the owner of the cistern] is not liable.40 If the depth exceeds its width, it has [foul] air. If an animal dies [after falling in], [the owner] is liable, even though it did not receive a blow from the bottom [of the cistern].41
15. [The following rules apply when] a person erects a high mound in the public domain, and an animal receives a blow from it and dies.42If [the mound] was ten handbreadths high, he is liable to pay [for the damages]. If it was less than ten handbreadths high, he is not liable if the animal dies. If, however, an animal is merely injured, he is liable for the full extent of the damages.
Even if a mound is of minimal height, or one digs [a pit of] minimal depth, [and an animal is injured, one is liable]. For it is a frequent occurrence for injuries to be caused by a mound or a pit of minimal height or depth. For [an animal] to die because of such a mound or pit is not a frequent occurrence; it is considered to be an event beyond one's control.43
16. Similarly, a person is not liable for the death of an animal that [fell] into a cistern or that received a blow from a mound unless the animal was small, a deaf mute or mentally incompetent,44or it was blind, or it fell at night.45
If, however, the animal was mentally competent, and it fell into [the cistern] during the day, [the owner of the cistern] is not liable. This is considered like an event beyond a person's control. For it is the ordinary practice for an animal to see where it is going and to avoid obstacles.
Similarly, if a human fell into the pit and died, the owner is not liable.46 This applies even if he was blind or fell at night,47 and regardless of whether he was a free man or a servant. If a mentally competent human or animal suffered injury because of [the cistern], [the owner] is liable for the full extent of the damages,48 as explained [in the previous halachah].49
17. If an ox that had been consecrated as a sacrificial offering and then disqualified50 fell into [the cistern] and died, the owner is not liable.51
[This law is derived as follows. Exodus 21:34] states: "The dead body will belong to [its owner]." [The liability for the animal's death stated in the verse applies only] when the dead body belongs to [the owner].52 This excludes the case at hand, for it is forbidden to benefit from [the body of this animal], and it must be buried.53
18. [The following laws apply when] a person was digging a cistern and the noise of the digging caused an animal to fall into the pit and die. If [the animal] fell forwards, [the owner of the cistern] is liable. If it fell backwards - i.e., it was startled [by the sound] and retreated and then fell - [the owner] is not liable.
[The latter law is derived as follows. Exodus 21:33 states: "When an ox...] falls," [implied is that for the person to be liable], the ox must fall in an ordinary manner.54
If [the animal] fell forward outside the cistern because of the sound of the digging and died, the court does not hold the owner of the cistern liable.55 If the person [whose ox died] seizes property [belonging to the owner of the cistern], it is not expropriated from him. If [the animal] fell backward outside the cistern and died or was injured, the owner of the cistern is not liable.
19. [The following rules apply when] an ox pushes another animal into a cistern and it dies. If [the ox] is mu'ad,56 the owner of the cistern is required to pay half [the damages], and the owner of the ox the [other] half.57
If [the ox] is tam, the owner of the ox must pay one-fourth [of the damages] from the body of the ox,58 while the owner of the cistern must pay three-fourths of the damage from his most choice property. For the owner of the dead animal may say to the owner of the cistern: "You owe me for the depreciation in value of this dead animal. Although it was a mature animal and mentally competent, it is as if it fell at night.59 I will collect whatever I can from the owner of the ox. You are liable to pay me the remainder."60
20. Similarly, if a person places a stone at the edge of a cistern, and an ox stumbles over it and falls into the cistern and dies, the person who placed the stone there must pay [half the damages],61 and the owner of the cistern must pay the [other] half.
21. Similarly,62 [the following laws apply when] an ordinary ox and an ox that was consecrated as a sacrifice and then disqualified gored another ox together. If the ordinary ox is a tam, [its owner] should pay half the damages.
If it is mu'ad, [its owner] must pay the entire damages. [The entire burden falls on this person,] because the owner of the ox that suffered the damage will say to him: "I will collect all that I can from the other ox, and you are liable for the remainder. In this instance, since the other ox is consecrated and therefore [its owner is] not held liable,63 you must pay me the entire amount."
22. When a person was digging a cistern in the public domain, and an ox fell upon him and killed him, the owner of the ox is not liable.64 If the ox dies, the owner of the ox may collect the value of his ox from the heirs of the owner of the cistern.65
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The Rambam has completed his discussion of the first two general categories of damages: grazing and goring. He now goes on to the third category. The damages caused by a cistern.Payment of these damages is also considered one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 238, and Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 53). This mitzvah can be defined as compensating a person for the death or damage to animals he owns that came as a result of an object owned by another person, which serves as a stumbling block. |
| 2. | The Rambam's wording is taken from Exodus 21:33. |
| 3. | In which case the death of the animal was not caused by its fall, but by the foul air of the cistern. Even so, the owner of the cistern is held liable. |
| 4. | Although the cistern does not actually belong to him - for it is in the public domain - since he dug it without permission, the Torah holds him liable for the damages as if it were his own. |
| 5. | Since the opening of the cistern is accessible to others, its owner should have taken precautions and made certain that it was covered.The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 410) maintains that this applies only until the owner of the adjoining courtyard is made aware of the cistern's presence. Once the owner of the courtyard knows about the presence of the cistern, he is liable. |
| 6. | Since he declared the property ownerless, the cistern is accessible to others and therefore should be covered. |
| 7. | This applies even when the cistern was dug by an animal belonging to someone else. As long as a cistern accessible to the public exists within a person's domain, he is liable to cover it. Moreover, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:4) add that even if the cistern is dug by another human being, the owner of the cistern is liable for any damages caused as soon as he discovers it. |
| 8. | From this, Ki'nat Eliyahu draws the conclusion that the owner is not required to check the cover continually to see that it is strong enough to serve its purpose. |
| 9. | The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:23) state that if, however, a camel falls into the cistern, the owner is liable. This is not considered a factor beyond his control. |
| 10. | For he should have protected against such a possibility. |
| 11. | The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining as follows: As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 15, even though ultimately damage was caused because of forces beyond one's control, if one has been negligent at the outset, one is liable. Therefore, in this instance, although the decay of the cover is considered to be beyond the owner's control, since he had been negligent in not covering the cistern with a cover strong enough to support camels, he should be held liable.The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the above principle applies when the negligence can, at least to a certain extent, be considered a cause of the loss suffered by forces beyond one's control. In this instance, however, the fact that the cover was not sufficient to support camels can in no way be considered a cause of the decay of the cover.The Maggid Mishneh's resolution is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:24). Note the Tur and the Ramah, who develop the latter principle further. |
| 12. | I.e., the one who dug the cistern in the public domain, who is held responsible for its damages. |
| 13. | For he has merely returned the situation to its original state.Note the comments of the Maggid Mishneh, who - in response to the objections of the Ra'avad - explains that this law applies even when the owner saw the other person covering the cistern. The owner should know not to rely on a person who is not the cistern's owner (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 410:3). |
| 14. | It is as if the second person had dug the cistern himself (ibid.:4). |
| 15. | It appears that the Rambam's intent is that only the first partner is liable. Rabbenu Asher and his conception is quoted by the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:25) explains that since both partners saw the cistern uncovered, they are both liable. The Talmud's intent by saying the first is liable, is that he must share in the liability. He cannot excuse himself by saying: Since the other partner saw it after me, he must bear the entire responsibility. |
| 16. | Note the Lechem Mishneh who, based on Halachah 9, explains that the buckets were used as the covering for the cistern. See the commentaries of Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan'el on Bava Kama 51b. |
| 17. | The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:26) explain that the second partner is also given time to hire workers to cover the cistern. |
| 18. | The Ra'avad interprets the Rambam's words as meaning until he would ordinarily know, while the Maggid Mishneh explains that the intent is until he actually finds out. |
| 19. | The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that if the cistern is covered thoroughly, the owner is not held liable. The Maggid Mishneh upholds the Rambam's ruling, and Sefer Me'irat Einayim 410:45 explains that furthermore, we have reason to believe that the mentally incompetents opened the covering themselves. |
| 20. | That were taken without his colleague's permission. |
| 21. | For he should have taken into consideration the possibility that the owner of the buckets would take them back. The owner of the buckets is not obligated to notify him. |
| 22. | For a cistern is usually at least ten handbreadths deep, while the others may not be that deep.See parallels to this ruling in Hilchot Shechitah 9:8 and Hilchot Rotzeach 3:7. |
| 23. | Even if its depth is small, if it presents a difficulty that could cause an animal to stumble and suffer damage, the owner is liable (Maggid Mishneh). See Halachah 15. |
| 24. | For under ordinary circumstances, a fall of less than ten handbreadths will not cause an animal to die. |
| 25. | The rationale is that the water impairs the quality of the air in the cistern and hastens the animal's death. |
| 26. | See Chapter 1, Halachah 11 and notes. |
| 27. | Therefore, the money is allowed to remain in the possession of the litigant - either the owner of the pit or the owner of the animal - in whose possession it is at the time the matter is brought to court. |
| 28. | Since each of them dug an amount sufficient to cause death, the damages are equally divided among them. |
| 29. | He is solely liable both for damages and for death. The rationale is that the original cistern was not deep enough to cause death. Hence, when the second person deepened it, making it deep enough to cause death, he is considered to have brought into being a new entity for which he alone is liable if it causes damages. |
| 30. | According to this view, once the second person deepened the cistern, it is considered to be his handiwork entirely, as if the first person no longer had any connection to it. Therefore, the second person has the responsibility of covering the cistern, and paying for any damages that might be caused. |
| 31. | Therefore, neither of the people who dug the cistern can be held liable. According to the views that maintain that a person who seizes property when an unresolved doubt exists is allowed to maintain possession, if the person whose property was damaged seizes property from either or both of the persons who dug the cistern, he is entitled to maintain possession (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 410:33). |
| 32. | I.e., ten or more handbreadths deep. |
| 33. | This addition is made based on the comments of Sefer Me'irat Einayim 410:24. It helps reconcile the difficulties with the Rambam's interpretation mentioned in the notes that follow. |
| 34. | By widening the cistern, he enabled more fresh air to circulate. |
| 35. | By widening the cistern, he made it more likely that an animal would fall in. Therefore, he is considered to be the owner of the cistern and is held responsible for the damages, even when the animal fell from the other side. |
| 36. | This addition is made on the basis of the comments of Sefer Me'irat Einayim 410:25. |
| 37. | And the second person improved the quality of the air. Nevertheless, he is held liable, because had he not widened the cistern, it is possible that the ox would not have fallen in. |
| 38. | The Rambam's ruling has attracted the attention of the commentaries, because it appears to fuse together two dissenting Talmudic opinions (Bava Kama 51b). As the Maggid Mishneh explains, according to the first of the opinions mentioned in that passage, it appears that what is significant is whether the animal died because of the blow it received or because of the foul air in the cistern, while according to the second opinion, what is significant is the side from which the animal fell.The Kessef Mishneh reconciles the Rambam's interpretation, explaining that the Rambam did not see the two interpretations as being contradictory, for if that were the case, each one could be refuted by an obvious question. According to the first opinion: Why would the first person be held liable if the ox died because of the air in the cistern if the ox fell in from the side that the other person widened? Had he not widened it, the ox might not have fallen in.According to the second opinion, the question arises: Since the second person's action makes him liable if an ox falls in, what difference does it make from which side it fell.For these reasons, the Rambam maintains that the two opinions are complementary. See the D'rishah (Choshen Mishpat 410), which offers an alternate resolution of the Rambam's view. Rabbenu Asher, the Tur, and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:16) differ with the Rambam and follow the second opinion, which maintains that the liability depends on the side from which the ox fell. |
| 39. | This ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Talmud (Bava Kama 50b). The Rambam accepts the opinion of the sage Shmuel. |
| 40. | For the animal is considered to have died because of forces beyond the owner's control (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 410:28). |
| 41. | I.e., there were substances at the bottom of the cistern that cushioned the animal's fall (Tur, Choshen Mishpat 410). |
| 42. | The Rambam's wording is carefully chosen. As opposed to the owner of a cistern, who can be held liable whether the animal dies from the blow it receives or from the foul air, a person who erects a mound can be held liable only when the animal dies because of the blow it receives. |
| 43. | See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:18. |
| 44. | In all three of these instances, the person who dug the cistern or who erected the mound is liable, for the animal is considered to be mentally incompetent and unable to appreciate the danger that the cistern or mound could cause. |
| 45. | In these instances, although the animal was mentally competent, since it could not see the cistern or the mound, it was unable to appreciate the danger. |
| 46. | This is a decree of Torah law. Commenting on Exodus 21:33: If an ox or a donkey fall into it, Bava Kama 28b, 52a states: An ox' and not a man, a donkey,' and not utensils. |
| 47. | For the leniency is not a result of the fact that a person takes care while walking, but a result of the Torah's decree. |
| 48. | Although the owner must pay the full extent of the damages, he is not liable for the medical treatment, pain, embarrassment, and loss of employment suffered by the person, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 15. |
| 49. | With regard to an injury suffered by a human being, Tosafot, Bava Kama 27b explains that the Torah freed the owner of a cistern from liability only when a person died because of a fall (as is the case in the verse cited above), and not when he became injured. Even if the injury is suffered during the day, the person is liable, because it is not common for a person to look carefully at the road on which he is walking.With regard to an injury suffered by an animal, the Rambam's ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Rabbis. The Ra'avad maintains that just as the owner of the cistern is not liable for the death of a mentally competent animal that falls during the daytime, he is not liable for its injury.The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling, explaining that although an animal may act with caution with regard to obstacles that can cause more severe damages, it will not be as sensitive with regard to obstacles that can cause lesser damages. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:20) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Tur and the Ramah follow that of the Ra'avad. Note, however, the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 412:3), which appears to follow the approach of the Ra'avad. |
| 50. | E.g., an animal that suffered a disqualifying physical blemish after being consecrated. This law applies even in the present age, with regard to a firstborn animal. |
| 51. | In Hilchot Chovel UMazik 6:16, the Rambam states that this leniency applies even when the animal is merely injured. |
| 52. | And he is permitted to benefit from it. |
| 53. | Note the Ra'avad, who states that this leniency applies even when the disqualified animal has already been redeemed by its owner. Although the Rambam's wording does not appear to include such an instance (for then, it is permitted to benefit from the animal), the Maggid Mishneh states that he would accept the Ra'avad's ruling. |
| 54. | The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, because it appears to contradict the understanding of Bava Kama 52b-53a. First of all, the Talmud explains that this matter is dependent on a difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel. In Halachah 15, the Rambam rules according to Shmuel, while here his ruling appears closer to that of Rav. According to the Ra'avad, if the animal fell backwards into the cistern, the owner of the cistern is not held liable, but if the owner seizes property belonging to the other, it is not expropriated from him.The Rambam's interpretation of this passage is obviously problematic. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 5:6), his interpretation also appears to differ from this halachah. There he writes that if the ox falls backwards into the cistern, the owner of the cistern is liable. If he falls backwards outside the cistern, the owner of the cistern is not liable. This understanding is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:31). |
| 55. | For the animal died because of the blow it received from the land in the public domain, and not that of the cistern. The Ra'avad differs with regard to this clause as well and maintains that the property of the cistern's owner may not be seized. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:31) also follows that understanding. |
| 56. | In which case, its owner is ordinarily responsible for the full extent of the damages it causes. |
| 57. | The ox that pushes the animal and the cistern into which it fell are considered equally responsible for the damage. Had the ox not been pushed, it would not have fallen. Had the cistern not been uncovered in the public domain, the ox would also not have fallen. |
| 58. | For the owner of an ox that is tam is required to pay half of the damages (in this case, half of a half), and that payment can be expropriated only from the body of the ox that did the damage. If the ox is not worth that amount, the owner is not obligated to pay any more. |
| 59. | I.e., one cannot say that the animal should have avoided the obstacles. |
| 60. | For had the cistern not been there, the animal would not have died. |
| 61. | As explained in the following chapter, placing any obstacle in the public domain is a derivative of digging a cistern and causes one to be liable for the damages suffered. In this instance, the person who placed the stone and the one who dug the cistern are considered to be partners in this liability, for were it not for the stone, the animal would not have fallen. And were it not for the cistern, the fall would not have resulted in its death. |
| 62. | This is another example of a case where two people are considered to be partners in damage that is caused. Each is considered to be liable for the entire amount. Nevertheless, since the person whose property was damaged does not have to receive more than the amount he lost, the loss is divided between the two (Bava Kama 53a). In this instance, as in Halachah 19, the owner of the dead animal cannot collect from the owner of the ox that was disqualified as a sacrifice. Hence, he collects the entire amount from the owner of the other ox. |
| 63. | See Chapter 8, Halachah 1, from which it is evident that the present halachah refers to an ox that was consecrated, disqualified, but not redeemed as yet. |
| 64. | I.e., he does not have to pay an atonement fine, nor is the ox stoned, as reflected by the ruling in Chapter 10, Halachah 9. The person digging the cistern is considered to be negligent, and the fact that the ox fell is his responsibility. |
| 65. | See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 11:4. |
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Thirteen
1. When utensils fall into a cistern and break, the owner of the cistern is not liable.1 [This is derived from Exodus 21:33, which] states: "And an ox or a donkey fell there." The Oral Tradition interprets2 this as an exclusion: "'An ox' and not a man;3 'a donkey' and not utensils." Even when an ox fell [into a cistern] when carrying utensils and died and broke the utensils, the owner is liable for the ox, but not for the utensils.
2. A cistern is considered one of the general categories of causes of damage. Its derivatives, like it, are considered mu'adim from the outset. Whenever a person leaves an obstacle [in the path of other living beings], it is considered to be a derivative of a cistern.4 If a person or an animal is injured because of it, the person who caused the obstacle to exist is liable, whether or not he renounced ownership of it. If it caused damage to utensils, [the person responsible] is not held liable.
3. What is implied? When a person leaves his stone, his knife, his straw, his burden or the like in the public domain, and they cause injury to another human or to an animal, [the first person] is liable for the full amount of the damages.
Similarly, if he left such items on his property and declared his property - but not these items - ownerless, and a person stumbled on the ground5 and received a blow from such an item that caused him injury, the person who caused the obstacle to exist is liable. If the person's utensils became damaged or soiled in such a situation, [the person who caused the obstacle to exist] is not liable.
4. If a person brought his ox into a courtyard belonging to another person without permission, the ox defecated, and the feces soiled utensils belonging to the owner, [the owner of the ox] is not liable. For the feces are considered to be a derivative of a cistern, and [the owner of] a cistern is never liable for damage to utensils.
5. [The following laws apply when a person] leaves his jug in the public domain, and a passerby stumbles over it and breaks it. The passerby is not liable, because it is not the practice of people to look out on the way as they walk.
If [the passerby] was injured, the owner of the jug is liable for his injury. [This applies] even if he declared his jug ownerless. For whenever a person declares ownerless an obstacle that he has created in a domain in which he has no permission to place it at the outset,6 he is liable, as if he had never declared it ownerless.
6. If the person placed the jug down in a place where he had permission to place it - e.g., the marketplace before the wine vats or the like7 - and a passerby stumbles over it and breaks it, [the passerby] is liable. If the passerby was injured, the owner of the jug is not liable, because [the passerby] should have looked to see [if there was anything in his way].8
If it was dark or [if the owner of the jugs] filled the entire path with jugs, the passerby is not liable for breaking it. If he is injured, the owner of the jugs is liable.9 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
7. [The following rules apply when] a jug belonging to a person breaks [accidentally] in the public domain, and another person slips on the water [that spilled] or receives a blow from its shards. The owner cannot be held liable by an earthly court, because [the jug] was broken by accident.10 He has, however, a moral and a spiritual obligation, because he did not gather the shards.11 The shards and the water are like ownerless entities, [even though] he did not rescind his ownership until after the accident, he is not held liable. If he intended to take possession of the shards, and another person was damaged by them, he is liable.
Similar laws apply to a person whose camel fell and he did not raise it up, or the like.12 In all these situations, if utensils were damaged, the owner of the obstacle is not liable, whether he declared his object ownerless or not, as we have explained.13
8. [The following laws apply when] two potters were following each other on a path, the first tripped and fell, and the second tripped over the first. If the first could have stood up but failed to do so, he is liable for the damages suffered by the second. Although he accidentally fell, the accident did not [force him to remain] lying in the road. [Therefore,] since he could have stood up, [he is liable].14
If he was unable to have risen [before the second potter tripped over him], he is not liable. [This applies] even though he did not warn [the potter] who tripped over him. [The rationale is] that he is concerned with his own [difficulties].15
9. When do we say that he is liable for the damages to the second [potter]? When he suffers damage to his body. If, however, his utensils are damaged, [the first potter] is not liable. For [an owner of] a cistern is not liable for the damage to utensils, and any obstacle is considered to be a derivative of a cistern, as explained above.16
10. [The following rules apply when] potters, glass blowers and the like were walking one after the other, the first one tripped and fell, the second tripped over the first one, and the third tripped over the second. Each of them had time to stand up, but failed to do so.
The first is liable for the damages to the body of the second, regardless of whether he was injured by the body of the first person who is lying on the earth,17 or he was injured by his burden.18
The second is liable for the injuries suffered by the body of the third person if he was injured by the second person's body. If, however, he was injured by the second person's burden, [the second person] is not liable. For he will say: "I did not dig this cistern - i.e., my burden." For it was the first person who caused the second person and his burden to fall.19
In all cases, [if the person who fell] warned [the person who tripped over him or his burden], [the person who fell] is not liable.
11. If the first person fell and was lying lengthwise across the road and one person tripped over his head, another [tripped] over his legs and a third over his abdomen, he is liable for the injuries each suffered, for he had the potential to arise.
12. When a person pours water into the public domain, and another person is injured by it, [the one who poured out the water] is liable for the damages.20 If the other person's garments were soiled, [the one who poured out the water] is not liable, as we have explained.21
If the water was absorbed by the earth, but the earth remained slippery,22 and a person slipped and fell and was injured by the ground, [the one who poured out the water] is liable.23
13. All those who open their sewage vats and rake out their cesspools do not have permission to pour this water into the public domain during the summer months.24 In the rainy season, a person has permission [to release such sewage].25 Nevertheless, if a person or an animal is damaged by the water, the one who released it is responsible for the entire sum of the damages.26
14. A person should not take his straw and hay out to the public domain so that it will be trod upon and become fit to use as fertilizer. If he did take it out, our Sages penalized him and declared the straw to be ownerless. The first person to take possession of it acquires it as his own, once it has been trod upon and its value has increased.27 If a person took possession of it before that time - i.e., directly after it was taken out to the public domain - it should not be expropriated from him.28
Although the straw and the hay are ownerless, if [they cause damage to] a person or an animal, the person who brought it out [to the public domain] must compensate [for the damages].29
15. A person may take out compost and manure to the public domain at a time when everyone does so and amass them there for 30 days so that they will be trodden upon by people and animals. Although [permission is granted], if these substances cause damage the owner is liable for the damages.
[If another person takes] this manure,30 he is liable for theft. Since its value will not increase [appreciably] by being trodden upon, [our Sages] did not penalize him [by declaring it ownerless].31
16. Mortar may not be left to soak in the public domain, nor may bricks be fashioned there.32 One may, however, mix mortar33 in the public domain. One may not, however, mix bricks.
17. When a person constructs a building in the public domain, the one who brings stones may bring stones, and the one who builds may build. If any of them causes damage, they are obligated to pay for the entire sum of the damages.34
18. When a quarrier hews out a stone and gives it to a stonecutter, and it causes damage to a human or an animal, the stonecutter is liable.
If the stonecutter gives it to a donkey-driver35 [and it causes damage], the donkey-driver is liable. If the donkey-driver gives it to a porter36 [and it causes damage], the porter is liable. If the porter gives it to a builder [and it causes damage], the builder is liable. If the builder gives it to the person who positions it on the building [and it causes damage], the latter is liable.
If they were working as contractors [in a partnership], and after it was positioned in its place on the building it fell and caused damage, they all share in the liability.37 If they are hired laborers, the one [who positioned the stone in its place] is liable, and the others are not liable.38
19. When a wall or a tree falls into the public domain and causes damage,39 the owner is not required to compensate [for the damages].40 [This applies] even when he declared [the tree or the wall] ownerless.41 [The rationale is that these entities] do not resemble a cistern, for at the outset, [it is not likely] that they will cause damage.
If they were not sturdy, the court sets a time for the person by which he must cut down the tree and tear down the wall. How much time is granted him? Thirty days.42 If the tree or the wall falls within this time and causes damage, he is not liable. [If it falls] afterwards, he is liable, because he delayed [beyond the limits set].
20. When a person places thorns or glass [within a wall], or when a person makes a fence of thorns that project into the public domain, and it causes damage to another person,43 he is liable for the full extent of the damages.
If he makes a fence of thorns that are contained within his property,44 he is not held liable, for it is not ordinary for people to rub against a wall [in the public domain].
21. [The following laws apply when] a person hid his thorns and [fragments of] glass in a wall belonging to a colleague, the owner of the wall came and tore down his wall into the public domain, and [the thorns or glass] caused damage. If the wall was shaky,45 the person who hid [the thorns or glass] is liable. If the wall was strong, its owner is liable.46
22. The pious men47 of the early generations would bury thorns and [fragments of] glass in their fields [at least] three handbreadths below the ground, so they would not be lifted up by a plow. Others would burn them in fire. Still others would throw them to the sea or to the river so that other people would not be injured by them.
23. A person should not clear stones from his private property into the public domain.48
One should not dig a cavity, a cistern, a trench or a cave under the public domain.49 [This applies] even when [the covering of the cavity is so strong] that it can support a carriage laden with stones, for there is the possibility that [at a later date] it will open from below without his knowledge.
It is permitted for a person to dig a cistern for the needs of people at large.50
24. One should not build projections and balconies that protrude into the public domain unless it is possible for a camel and its rider51 to pass beneath, and provided it does not cast shadows on the people in the public domain.
If he desires, he can withdraw the walls [of his building into his own domain] and build [the projection].52 If he did withdraw the walls [of his building], but has not built [a projection], he may do so at any time he desires. Never, however, may he return the walls to their original place. Once people at large have been granted permission to pass through a particular property, it cannot be withdrawn.53
25. When a person purchased a courtyard with projections and balconies protruding into the public domain, we operate under the presumption [that they were built legally].54 If the building falls, he is allowed to rebuild it according to its original proportions.
26. When [the foliage of] a tree leans into the public domain, it should be trimmed so that a camel and its rider can pass under it.
An empty space should be left next to the banks on both sides of a river wide enough for the crewmen who descend and pull a boat.55 Any tree that is found in this space should be cut down immediately. A warning need not be given to its owner,56 for it blocks the crewmen from pulling ships.
27. [The following rules apply when] there was a path for people at large passing through a person's field, he expropriated the path and prepared a new path at the side of the field. What he granted them, they acquire possession of,57 but he does not acquire possession of [the land] he took.
How wide is a path for people at large? Not less than sixteen cubits.58
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Similarly, as stated in the following halachah, the owner of thecistern is not held liable if the utensils are damaged. With regard toa human, by contrast, the owner is liable for damages. (See Chapter12, Halachah 16; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 410:21.) |
| 2. | See Bava Kama 28b, 53b. |
| 3. | See Chapter 12, Halachah 16. |
| 4. | See the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 410), which defines thederivatives of a cistern as including any property that causesdamage in its place, which does not move. Although the Rambammentions a moving obstacle in Chapter 2, Halachah 19, the intentis that the obstacle is being moved by another force. |
| 5. | The person stumbled on the earth, and this is what caused theinjury. Nevertheless, since the earth is ownerless, he collects thedamages from the person who left the obstacle in its place. Were itnot for the obstacle, the damage would not have taken place. |
| 6. | If, however, he left a jug on his own property and then declared itownerless, he is not liable. At the outset, he had permission to leavethe jug there. See Chapter 12, Halachah 2. |
| 7. | I.e. a place in front of oil vats or beehives, where jugs of oil orhoney would be filled. |
| 8. | Although, as stated above, it is not the general practice forpeople to watch for obstacles as they walk, since jugs are often lefton the ground in places like these, a passerby should watch his step(Kessef Mishneh). |
| 9. | In the dark, the owner of the jugs should have removed them beforenightfall, for he knows that a passerby will not be able to see. If hefilled the path with jugs, he made it likely that a person would breaka jug as he passed by.Note the quotation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch(Choshen Mishpat 412:2). There a further category is added: aninstance where a person places so many jugs in the road that it isimpossible for people to pass without breaking some of the jugs: thepasserby is not liable even if he intentionally broke enough jugs toallow him to pass. |
| 10. | Since the jug broke accidentally, the owner is not considerednegligent with regard to the damages that were caused. For thisreason, the laws stated in Halachah 5 are not applied to him. |
| 11. | If he did not have time to gather the shards before the otherperson was injured, he does not have such a moral obligation(Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 412:4.) |
| 12. | For the camel, like the broken pitcher, fell accidentally as thepitcher broke, and is thus considered to be an obstacleunintentionally placed in the public domain. Bava Kama 29astates that this is speaking of an instance where the camel died, andits owner rescinded his ownership over its carcass. Otherwise, hewould be held liable. |
| 13. | Halachah 1. |
| 14. | I.e., his body is considered like an obstacle in the publicdomain. |
| 15. | Although one might think that he could have been held liable fornot warning his colleague, this presumption is not accepted. Hisconcern for his own welfare takes priority. Rabbenu Asher (and hisopinion is accepted by the Tur and the Ramah ChoshenMishpat 413:1) differs and maintains that if the first potterhad the opportunity to warn the second and failed to do so, he isliable. |
| 16. | Halachah 2. Implied by the Rambam's wording in this halachah (andthe following one) is that the body of the first potter is consideredto be an obstacle. He is not considered to have caused damage to hiscolleague with his person. |
| 17. | This reflects the concept mentioned in the previous note. Aperson's body is considered to be an obstacle. Therefore, the Rambammentions damage to the body of the second person, implying that if thesecond person's utensils were damaged, the first would not be heldliable. |
| 18. | From Halachah 7, it would appear that this ruling applies onlywhen the potter did not declare his wares ownerless. See the Ra'avad,the Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (ChoshenMishpat 413:2). |
| 19. | This argument does not apply, however, with regard to injurycaused by the body of the second person. Since he had time to rise, heis liable for the injuries suffered. |
| 20. | In this instance, there is no difference whether or not the persondeclared the water ownerless, as reflected in Halachot 2 and 7. |
| 21. | For the owner of a derivative of a cistern is not liable fordamages to property (Halachot 1 and 2). |
| 22. | The Ra'avad explains that this ruling applies only when the groundis still muddy because of the water. The Maggid Mishneh states that even when the water has been absorbed totally, if the ground is still slippery, the person is liable. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 412:5) appears to follow the Ra'avad's view. |
| 23. | Although the ground did not belong to him, since the fall wascaused by the water that he poured, he is liable. |
| 24. | During these months, the streets are clean and it is forbidden forsomeone to soil them. Moreover, in Eretz Yisrael it does notrain during these months, and the sewage will remain in the streetsfor months. |
| 25. | For the streets are muddy at that time, and there is water flowingto wash away the sewage. Needless to say, as our sewage and sidewalkshave become more sophisticated, the relevance of these laws hasfaded. |
| 26. | Although our Sages granted a person permission to release hissewage at this time, they did not absolve him of responsibility. |
| 27. | There is an unresolved difference of opinion among the Sages(Bava Kama 30b) if the penalty takes effect from the time thestraw was taken out, or from the time it became useful asfertilizer.Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 414:1), whostate that at the outset a person who asks whether he may take thestraw and the hay, should not be told that he may retain possession ofits initial value. Instead, he should be told that he may keep onlythe increment. After the fact, he is allowed to keep the initial valueas well. |
| 28. | The Tur and the Ramah differ with regard to this point as well and maintain that in this instance, the straw should be expropriated from the person who took possession of it. |
| 29. | Whenever damage is caused by an object that was declared ownerlessafter being placed in the public domain without permission, the personwho placed it there is liable. |
| 30. | As stated in Hilchot Gezelah 6:5, this applies even if aperson takes his compost out at a time when it is forbidden to do so.A person who takes it is liable for theft. |
| 31. | The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 414:2) statethat if the compost causes damage, it is considered to be ownerless,and it may be taken by another person. |
| 32. | For these will remain in the public domain for an extendedperiod. |
| 33. | To be used for building in the near future. |
| 34. | In this instance as well, the license to perform an activity inthe public domain does not absolve a person of liability. |
| 35. | To transport to a construction site. |
| 36. | To carry it to the builder. |
| 37. | If they were partners, once the task is completed they all sharein the responsibility. Until the entire task is completed, however,the person who is responsible for the activity at the time the damagewas caused must pay for the damages, even when they were allpartners. |
| 38. | I.e., each person is liable for the portion of the task that heperforms. |
| 39. | The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that this applies when damageis caused by the tree or the wall as it falls. After it falls and thetree or the stones are lying in the public domain, the owner is notliable, if he declares them ownerless. |
| 40. | This is considered an oness, a loss due to forces beyond hiscontrol. The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that this applies onlywhen the wall was constructed properly to begin with. When, however,it is built faultily, the owner is liable. |
| 41. | Generally, despite the fact that a person declares an obstacle that he created in the public domain as ownerless, he is liable. In this instance, however,since he had permission to plant the tree or build the wall, and itfell because of forces beyond his control, he is not heldresponsible.The Maggid Mishneh explains that the owner is liable, if he desires toestablish his possession over the entities which fell.The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) differ. |
| 42. | As Bava Metzia 118a states, this is the ordinary timegranted by the court to adjust difficulties. |
| 43. | The thorns or glass that projects is considered to be an obstacleplaced in the public domain. |
| 44. | Even if they project beyond the wall itself, as long as they arecontained within the owner's property, he is not liable. |
| 45. | And thus one could assume that it would be torn down in the nearfuture. |
| 46. | The owner of the thorns or glass is not liable, because he had noreason to think that someone would tear down a sturdy wall. If thedamage was done when the wall was being destroyed, the owner of thewall is liable, because he should have taken care that no passersbywere hurt. If the damage was done after the wall was destroyed, theowner of the wall is liable, because he was responsible for clearingthe debris remaining from his wall (Tur, Beit Yosef, ChoshenMishpat 415). |
| 47. | I.e., men who went beyond the measure of the law. This teaching isbased on the examples of sages cited by Bava Kama 30a. |
| 48. | Lest another person stumble over them and be injured. |
| 49. | The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 417:1) states that in his era, ithad already become customary to dig below the streets of the publicdomain. This is surely the case in our age, when engineering hasprogressed to the point that safety is not compromised by digging inthis manner. |
| 50. | E.g., to provide travelers with drinking water.This law is stated in a separate paragraph, because as is stated inthe Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat410:7, but see 417:1), it is a separate clause, and not a continuationof the previous idea. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch alsomention that the person must cover the cistern and entrust the coverto the trustees of the people at large, or at the very least informthe court that he has dug a cistern for people, but is expecting thecourt to arrange for its being covered. |
| 51. | A camel was the highest popular means of conveyance in Talmudictimes. Needless to say, in every era, the height should be adjusted to fit the highest contemporary means of conveyance, e.g., in the present era, allowances should be made for semi-trailers. |
| 52. | I.e., knock down the existing walls and build new walls furtherremoved from the public domain. |
| 53. | If, however, people do not frequently walk through this space(e.g., the person prevented that by building a platform there), he mayrebuild the walls in their original place when he desires RabbenuYerucham; Beit Yosef, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 417:2). |
| 54. | I.e., that the person who originally constructed the buildingbuilt its walls removed from the public domain, so that theprotrusions and balconies were permitted. |
| 55. | I.e., the rivers of Eretz Yisrael and Babylon were for themost part neither wide nor deep. When a ship wanted to dock, severalof its crewmen would descend and they would pull the ship to the riverbank by ropes. This halachah requires that enough empty space be leftalong the river banks to allow these crewmen to maneuver. FromHilchot Geneivah 8:2, it appears that we are speaking about fourcubits. |
| 56. | This can be derived by the conduct of Rabbah bar Rav Nachman(Bava Metzia 108a), who cleared space without informing theowner of the property. |
| 57. | See Halachah 24. |
| 58. | This is derived from the width of the public thoroughfare in thecamp of the Jews in the desert. |
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Fourteen
1. When a person kindles a fire in a field belonging to someone else1 and the fire spreads and causes damage, [the person who kindled it] is liable to pay the full extent of the damages,2 as [Exodus 22:5] states: "When a fire spreads through thorns and consumes bound or standing grain..., [the one who started the fire] must pay."
Kindling a fire is considered one of the major categories of sources of damage.3
2. When a person kindles [a fire] on his own property, he must retreat a sufficient distance from his boundary to ensure that the fire will not spread to a field belonging to a colleague.4
How far must he move? Everything depends on the height of the fire.5 If he did not retreat an adequate distance and the fire spread and caused damage, he is liable to pay the full extent of the damages. If he retreated an appropriate distance, and [the fire] nevertheless spread and caused damage, he is not liable. This is considered an act of heaven.
Similarly, if [the fire] crossed a stream6 or a pond of rainwater that was [at least] eight cubits wide, [the person who kindled the fire] is not liable.7
3. If the fire passed a wall, we measure the height of the wall and the height of the fire and the amount of foliage8 and bramble found there.9 If the fire was not of sufficient size to pass the wall ordinarily, he is not liable. If it is large enough, he is liable.
When does the above apply? To a piercing flame].10 If, however, the flame ascends upward and warps downward because of the height of the flame, and there were trees11 there, we do not make an estimation. Even if the fire spread for 1000 cubits, [the person who kindled it] is liable.12
4. [The following rules apply when] a fire breaks out in a person's domain,13and his wall falls from causes other than the fire.14 If he had had the opportunity to rebuild the wall that fell, and he neglected to do so, he is liable. To what can the matter be compared?15 To a person's ox that broke loose16 and caused damage. For [the owner] was responsible for guarding him, and he failed to do so.
5. A person who sends a fire in the hands of a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent person or a child is not held liable by an earthly court;17 he does, however, have a moral and a spiritual obligation [to make restitution for the damages].18
When does the above apply? When he gave them a coal and they fanned it into a flame, for it is normal for a coal to burn out before it causes a flame. If, however, [the person] gave them a flame, he is liable, for his deeds caused the damage.19
6. When a person sends a fire with a mentally competent individual, the agent who spread the flame is liable, and the principal is free of liability.20
Similarly, if he charged a watchman with guarding a fire, [and the fire nevertheless caused damage,] the watchman is liable.21
7. When one person brings a flame, and [then] another person brings the wood, [and a fire is started, which causes damage], the person who brought the wood is liable.22
When one person brings the wood, and [then] another person brings a flame, [and a fire is started, which causes damage,] the person who brought the flame is liable.23 If another person comes and fans the fire, he is liable.24
If the fire is fanned by an uncommon wind,25 none of them is held liable.26 If a person fanned a fire, but it was also fanned by the wind, the person is liable, for his [actions] caused damage.27 And whenever a person's [actions] cause damage, he is liable to pay for the full amount of the damages from the choicest property he owns, as if the damage was inflicted directly.
8. When a fire spread and consumed wood, stone or earth,28 [the person who kindled the fire] is obligated to make restitution, as it is written: "[When a fire] spreads through thorns [and consumes...] a field."
[The following rules apply when] a fire consumes a grain heap or the like and there were utensils hidden in the grain heap. If [the utensils include] a thresher, a yoke for cattle or other articles that it is likely for farmers to hide in their grain heaps, [the person who kindled the fire] is liable.29 If [the utensils include] clothes, glassware and the like, he is not liable for the damage to the utensils.30
9. When does the above apply? When a person kindles a fire in a field belonging to a colleague.31 If, however, he kindles the fire in his own [domain] and it spreads to a colleague's field, he is not liable for utensils hidden in a grain heap.32 He must, however, compensate [the owner] as if the space taken by the utensils had been filled with wheat or with barley.33
10. A person who kindles a fire in a field belonging to a colleague is also liable [in the following instance]. The fire spread and consumed a kid that was tied to the grain heap or a servant near the grain heap.34 For this is also the ordinary practice near a grain heap. If, however, the servant was tied [to the grain heap], or the goat was near the grain heap, [the person who kindled the fire is not liable].35
11. When a person lends a colleague space to make a grain heap, the colleague makes that grain heap and hides utensils in it, and then the person who lent him the space burns the grain heap, [the person who kindled the fire] is liable to pay [his colleague] only for the grain heap.36
If he lent him space to make a heap of wheat and he made a heap of barley,37or he lent him space to make a heap of barley and he made a heap of wheat,38or he made a heap of wheat and covered it with barley,39 or he made a heap of barley and covered it with wheat,40 [the person who kindled the fire] is not liable to pay any more than the value of a heap of barley.
12. When a person sets fire to a home belonging to a colleague, he must compensate for everything it contains,41 for it is the ordinary practice for people to keep all their utensils and possessions in their homes.
The person whose house [was burned] is entitled to collect everything he claims,42 provided he takes an oath while holding a [sacred] article.43 This oath is a Rabbinic institution, as will be explained.44 [The above applies] provided he claims articles that we can assume he owns45 or that it is customary for others to entrust to him.
13. [The following rules apply when] a camel that is loaded with flax passes through the public domain, the flax that enters the shop46 is ignited by the lamp belonging to the shopkeeper and then sets fire to the entire building. The owner of the camel is liable, because he overloaded [his beast].47 [This applies regardless of] whether or not the animal stood.48
If the shopkeeper had placed his lamp outside, the shopkeeper is liable and must reimburse the camel driver even for the flax that burned, because he placed his lamp outside.49 [This applies] even with regard to a Chanukah lamp,50 for he should have sat [there] to guard it [from causing damage].
14. [The following rule applies when] a person bends standing grain belonging to a colleague toward a fire until it ignites. If the fire would not reach the grain unless it was spread by an uncommon wind, [the person who bent the grain] is not held liable by a mortal court.51 He does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to make reimbursement.52
When a person buries standing grain belonging to a colleague in earth or straw,53 and then a fire passes and consumes it, the person who buried [the grain] is not held liable by a mortal court.54 He does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to make reimbursement, because the person who kindled the fire is not liable for [the destruction of property that was] hidden.55
15. When a fire spreads and harms a human being and injures him, the person who kindled the fire is liable for the damages, unemployment benefits, medical costs, pain and embarrassment suffered by the injured party,56 as if he had personally injured him. Although fire is one of a person's possessions, it is as if he caused him damage with his arrows.57 If, by contrast, injury to a man is caused by a person's animal or cistern, he is liable for the damages alone, as we have explained.58
16. [The laws pertaining to] all the derivatives of fire59are the same as [those pertaining to] fire itself.
What is implied? If a person placed a stone, a knife or a burden on his roof, and it fell because of an ordinary wind and caused damage, he must pay the full extent of the damages. All these are derivatives of fire.60 If it was an uncommon wind that caused them to fall and create damage, he is not liable.61
Blessed be God who grants assistance.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Without permission. |
| 2. | This is considered as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah by Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandments 241) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 56).As the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 418:2) pointout, this applies even when the person took the precautions mentionedin the following halachot. Since he kindled a fire on his colleague'sproperty without permission, he must bear the consequences. |
| 3. | As the Rambam states in Halachah 16, a major category hasderivatives. The derivatives of fire are any asset that one owns thatis transported further by the wind and causes damage. |
| 4. | This communicates a fundamental principle. Although he is actingwithin his own domain, a person must take the necessary precautions toensure that he will not cause damage to another person's property. |
| 5. | I.e., the higher the fire, the further he must retreat. |
| 6. | The Hebrew wording used by the Rambam leads to the inference that astream or irrigation ditch that is dried out is not considered to be asufficient fire barrier. |
| 7. | For it is not usual for a fire to spread across a body of waterthat size. |
| 8. | Or wood. The Hebrew term used by the Rambam could be translatedeither way. The intent is combustible fuel. |
| 9. | Here too, the assessment is simple. The higher the flame, thehigher the fence must must be. |
| 10. | We find this term in Deuteronomy 32:22: There is a piercingfire in My nostrils. From the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el(Bava Kama 61a), it appears that the intent is a very hot firethat burns powerfully, but does not produce a high flame. |
| 11. | Or wood. The Hebrew term used by the Rambam could be translatedeither way. The intent is combustible fuel. |
| 12. | When a flame is this high, there are no limits to the extent thefire may spread. |
| 13. | I.e., he kindled a fire, and the flame flew out of control. |
| 14. | Had the wall not fallen, it would ordinarily have been consideredsufficient to impede the spread of the fire. If the fire was so greatthat it toppled the wall, the person would be liable for the damagesthe fire caused. In the instance at hand, however, the question is: Ishe held responsible for the damages the fire caused, because he couldhave rebuilt the wall and thus prevented the fire from spreading. |
| 15. | The comparison is taken from (Bava Kama 23a). |
| 16. | I.e., the ox was placed in a corral that was not securely locked. (See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.) |
| 17. | These three individuals are not liable, because their incompetencecauses them to be freed of responsibility for their conduct. Theperson who gave them the fire is not held liable, for he did not setthe fire himself. |
| 18. | For he is an indirect cause of the damage. |
| 19. | In this instance, he is considered a direct cause of thedamage. |
| 20. | This follows the principle When a student's (the principal whocharged the agent with causing damage) words conflict with a master's(God's, who forbade causing damage), whose words should be heeded?Since the agent is mentally competent, he must accept responsibilityfor his conduct. |
| 21. | When he accepted the responsibility to guard the fire, he alsoaccepted the liability if he failed to do so adequately. See Chapter4, Halachah 4 and notes. |
| 22. | For were it not for the wood, the fire would not have spread. |
| 23. | Since the wood was already there, it is the person who kindled thefire who must accept responsibility. |
| 24. | Because it is the fanning that causes it to spread. |
| 25. | If, however, such winds are common, the persons who brought thewood and started the fire must accept responsibility. They should havetaken this factor into consideration.Note Maggid Mishneh and the gloss of Sefer Me'iratEinayim 418:9, who explain that the term an uncommon winddoes not refer to a storm wind that rarely comes, but rather to a windthat is an infrequent and out-of-the-ordinary matter, but still asomewhat recurrent meteorological occurrence. |
| 26. | For without the wind's influence, the fire would not havespread.If, however, the wind is blowing at the time a person is involvedwith the fire, and he ignores the possible danger, he is held liable(Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 418:9).The Ramah (based on the Tur) also maintains that if it is acommon wind that caused the fire to spread, the last person who hadanything to do with the fire is liable. |
| 27. | The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's statements, maintaining thatthe liability of the person who fanned the fire is dependent on theviability of his deeds. Were his fanning sufficient to have caused thefire to spread even if it had not been fanned by the wind, he isliable. If not, he is not held liable.The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling, citingseveral interpretations by the Sages in Bava Kama 60a. Henevertheless questions the Rambam's decision here, based on theRambam's own words in Hilchot Sh'chenim 11:1-2.The Kessef Mishneh resolves this difficulty, explaining thatin Hilchot Sh'chenim, the Rambam mentions a situation in which aperson winnows grain in his own domain, but the wind carries the chaffoutside his domain. There, even though an ordinary wind is involved,the person is not held liable. This appears to contradict the rulinghere. Nevertheless, as the Rambam himself states in HilchotSh'chenim, had it not been for the wind, the chaff would never havecaused damaged. In this instance, the person's fanning of the firewould have caused it to spread sufficiently to cause damage. |
| 28. | Wood is consumed entirely by fire. Stone and earth are notconsumed entirely. Nevertheless, a fire might cause them todeteriorate until they are no longer useful (or as useful as they hadbeen). The liability for both these types of substances is alluded toin the verse the Rambam cites: Thorns are consumed entirely byflames (as are standing and bound grain, which the verse alsomentions). Why does the verse also mention a field (for the liabilityfor standing grain is mentioned explicitly)? To teach that even whenthe field is lying fallow, but its value deteriorates because it ischarred, the person is held liable. See Bava Kama 60a. |
| 29. | Since it is the ordinary practice for such articles to be hiddenin a grain heap, the person who kindled the fire should haveconsidered this possibility. Therefore, he is liable for theirdestruction. |
| 30. | Since it is abnormal for such articles to be hidden in a grainheap, the person who kindled the fire is not held liable. As stated inthe notes on the following halachah, the place taken by the utensilsis considered as if filled with grain, and restitution for that mustbe made. |
| 31. | As in Halachah 1, since he kindled a fire in another person'sdomain without permission, stricter rules apply. |
| 32. | Bava Kama 60a derives this law from the above verse, whichmentions standing grain. It comments: Just as standing grain isopenly revealed, so too, a person is liable only for entitiesthat are openly revealed.Note the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat418:13), which state that this applies in an instance where the firewould have been stopped by a wall, the wall fell for reasons notdependent on the fire, and the person had the opportunity to repairthe wall. Although he is liable for the grain heap, he is not liablefor the articles hidden in it.The rationale is: If the fire were large enough to spread byitself, the person would be liable. If its spread was caused byfactors not dependent on the person who kindled the fire - e.g., anabnormal wind - he is also not liable for the grain heap. |
| 33. | I.e., if the utensils took up a cubic foot of space,the person who kindled the fire must pay for a cubic foot of grain. This also applies with regard to a person who burnsclothes or glassware hidden in a grain heap, as mentioned in theprevious halachah. |
| 34. | The Rambam's words are based on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 6:7).The Maggid Mishneh states that the intent is that the person isliable only for the kid. Since the kid is tied, it cannot flee. He isnot liable for the servant, because the servant is mentally competentand should have fled. |
| 35. | He is not held liable financially for the death of the servant,because he is considered to have murdered him, and is liable forcapital punishment for his death. Therefore, we follow the principlethat a person who is liable for capital punishment (even when thatsentence cannot be administered) is free of liability for monetaryloss.There is a question if he is liable for the loss of the kid in thisinstance even when a servant is not killed.. Some explain that he is not liable, because the kid should have fled. Others explain that a kid is not of sufficient mental competence to know whether or not to flee (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, these laws are not mentioned by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch. |
| 36. | For he gave him permission to store grain in his domain, notutensils. |
| 37. | Wheat is more valuable than barley. Nevertheless, since inactuality it was barley that was burned, the person who kindled thefire is liable only for the barley. |
| 38. | In this instance, he is liable to pay him only for barley, becausethat is what he gave him permission to store. |
| 39. | This applies even if he was granted permission to make a heap ofwheat. Since the person who kindled the fire saw only barley, he isliable only for that (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 418:20). |
| 40. | If he gave him permission to make a heap of barley, he is liableto pay him only for the barley. If he gave him permission to make aheap of wheat, he is liable to pay the value of the wheat that wasactually burned, and the value of remainder of the barley (SeferMe'irat Einayim 418:21). |
| 41. | I.e., all the personal goods the person claims. |
| 42. | Note the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which states that whenit is supported by an oath, the claim of the house owner is accepted,not only when the person who kindled the fire is uncertain about thevalue of the articles in the home he destroyed, but even when heclaims to be certain that they were not worth the money the houseowner demands. |
| 43. | A Torah scroll (Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:8). In certaincircumstances, tefillin are substituted for a Torah scroll(Ibid.:12). |
| 44. | See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:17; Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an1:2. (See also Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:6.) |
| 45. | I.e., that according to his standard of living, one might assumethat he owns. |
| 46. | In that era, retail outlets were usually stalls in the publicdomain, rather than enclosed edifices. The flax protruded into thestall, where it caught fire from the shopkeeper's oil lamp. |
| 47. | And caused the flax to protrude beyond the borders of the publicdomain and enter the confines of the shopkeeper's stall. |
| 48. | If the animal stands still, there is more reason to hold the cameldriver liable, for once the fire was kindled, he should move his beastto prevent it from spreading the blaze. Nevertheless, even when hedoes keep his animal moving, since he caused the fire to start, he isliable for all the damages. |
| 49. | This is considered an act of negligence on the part of theshopkeeper. For the camel drivers and wagon drivers in the publicdomain do not suspect that there are lamps hanging there. |
| 50. | Which we are commanded to place at the outside of our homes. |
| 51. | In and of themselves, the actions of the person who bent the grainwere not sufficient to cause the fire to reach the grain; theinfluence of the wind was also necessary. Since the fire was spread byan uncommon wind, it is considered a factor beyond the person'scontrol, and he is not liable. |
| 52. | For had he not bent the grain, the fire would not have reached it,even though an uncommon wind was blowing. As mentioned in the notes onHalachah 7, if the uncommon wind was blowing at the time the personbent the grain toward the fire, he is liable. |
| 53. | The two examples are carefully chosen. Earth reduces thelikelihood that the grain will be consumed by fire, while strawincreases it. Nevertheless, in either case the same laws apply. |
| 54. | For he himself did not set the fire. |
| 55. | See Halachot 8 and 9. |
| 56. | See Hilchot Chovel UMazik, ch. 1, for a detailed explanationof these five categories of compensation. |
| 57. | This is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages(Bava Kama 22a). Rabbi Yochanan maintains, as the Rambam rules,that kindling a fire is regarded like shooting an arrow. Resh Lakishdiffers and maintains that a fire is regarded no differently from aperson's cistern or his animals.To explain Rabbi Yochanan's opinion: When a person shoots an arrow,he is considered to have caused damage with his person although thedamage took place far from him. So too, when he kindles a fire,despite the fact that the damage occurs in a distant place, it is asif he caused the damage with his person.Note the Maggid Mishneh, who points to an apparentcontradiction in the Rambam's rulings. For Rabbi Yochanan does notfree a person of liability for articles that are buried. It is,however, possible to explain that the Rambam does not accept RabbiYochanan's perspective blindly. He accepts it in this instance, butfollows the other interpretations with regard to buried property. |
| 58. | Chapter 11, Halachah 6, and Chapter 13, Halachah 2. |
| 59. | The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 418:1) defines thederivatives of fire as referring to any property that one owns that istransported further by the wind and causes damage. |
| 60. | For just as a person is liable when an ordinary wind spreads afire, so too, he is liable for any other damage his property causesthat comes as a result of an ordinary wind. |
| 61. | Just as he is not liable when an uncommon wind causes a fire tospread (Halachah 7). |
• Monday, Elul 2, 5775 · 17 August 2015
"Today's Day"
Thursday Elul 2 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Shoftim, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 10-17. Also 4-6.
Tanya: Now the essence (p. 443) ...states Scripture. (p. 445).
The Children of Israel are called eretz cheifetz,1 for they possess numerous "precious articles"2 in the love and fear of G-d, and in fine character traits. Bringing these traits to the surface depends entirely upon the individual stimulating them. It is clear that throughout the earth are wellsprings of living water; the difference between them is only that some are near the surface, others far. Everything therefore depends on the well-digger, his patience and perseverance.
Now since ratzon ("will") is a superior faculty that "issues decrees," rules over all the other faculties,* and compels them to act according to its orders - it follows that the essential avoda is to arouse one's will to exercise its effect - both upon the person himself and upon others.
FOOTNOTES
1. "The desired land." Malachi 3:12; see Iyar 17.
2. Heb. chafeitzim, ("articles"), related to cheifetz in the phrase eretz cheifetz.
*. See Translator's Notes, p. 118.
Daily Thought:
Untraditional Life
And these words that I command you today should be upon your heart. (Deuteronomy 6:6.)
Every day, the words of the Torah must be new to you.—Sifri, Rashi. Tradition is not life. Tradition preserves life. But it does not give life. Goals are not life. Goals inspire life. But they are not life.
Life is here in this moment now. To be alive, every moment must be a moment that never happened before.
Which means that Torah must not be about tradition. It must be about who you are now. And for that to be so, it must engage the very core of your soul. For if it is not about the moment now, then it is not your life. And if it is not your life, then what is?[Maamar Tzion b’Mishpat, 5736.]
____________________________
No comments:
Post a Comment