Daily Quote:
Remember the days of old; reflect upon the years of the generations. Ask your father, and he will tell you; your elders, and they will inform you...[Deuteronomy 32:7]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Re'eh, 5th Portion Deuteronomy 14:22-14:29 with Rashi
• Chapter 14
22You shall tithe all the seed crop that the field gives forth, year by year. כבעַשֵּׂר תְּעַשֵּׂר אֵת כָּל תְּבוּאַת זַרְעֶךָ הַיֹּצֵא הַשָּׂדֶה שָׁנָה שָׁנָה:
You shall tithe [all the seed crop]: What has one matter to do with the other [i.e., the prohibition of cooking a kid, and tithing]? The Holy One, blessed is He, said to Israel: Do not cause Me to destroy the [developing] kernels (גְּדָיִים) of grain, while they are yet in their “mother’s womb” [i.e., in the husks], for if you do not tithe your produce properly, when it is near ripening I will bring forth an easterly wind, which will blast them, as it is said, “and blast before becoming standing grain” (II Kings 19:26) (Tanchuma). [And just as cooking the kid in its mother’s milk and the tithes are juxtaposed,] so is the topic of the first fruits (בִּכּוּרִים) [juxtaposed to cooking the kid in its mother’s milk (see Exod. 23:19, 34:26), to teach us that, if you do not bring your first fruits to the Temple as commanded, your fruit produce will wither]. עשר תעשר: מה ענין זה אצל זה, אמר להם הקב"ה לישראל, לא תגרמו לי לבשל גדיים של תבואה עד שהן במעי אמותיהן, שאם אין אתם מעשרים מעשרות כראוי, כשהוא סמוך להתבשל אני מוציא רוח קדים והיא משדפתן. שנאמר (מלכים ב' יט, כא) ושדפה לפני קמה, וכן לענין בכורים:
[You shall tithe…] year by year: From here, we derive [the ruling] that one may not give tithes from the new [crop] for the old [i.e., from this year’s crop for last year’s]. — [Sifrei] שנה שנה: מכאן שאין מעשרין מן החדש על הישן:
23And you shall eat before the Lord, your God, in the place He chooses to establish His Name therein, the tithes of your grain, your wine, and your oil, and the firstborn of your cattle and of your sheep, so that you may learn to fear the Lord, your God, all the days. כגוְאָכַלְתָּ לִפְנֵי | יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר לְשַׁכֵּן שְׁמוֹ שָׁם מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ תִּירשְׁךָ וְיִצְהָרֶךָ וּבְכֹרֹת בְּקָרְךָ וְצֹאנֶךָ לְמַעַן תִּלְמַד לְיִרְאָה אֶת יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ כָּל הַיָּמִים:
And you shall eat [before the Lord your God, in the place He chooses… the tithes of your grain…]: This refers to ma’aser sheini , “the second tithe,” for we have already learned to give ma’aser rishon , “the first tithe,” to the Levites, as it is said, “[Speak to the Levites…] when you take from the children of Israel [the tithe]… ” (Num. 18:26), and it gives them permission to eat it anywhere [not only in Jerusalem], as it is said,“and you may eat it in any place” (Num. 18:31). Thus you must conclude that this one [which may be eaten by its owners and must be eaten in Jerusalem,] is another tithe [namely, the second tithe]. ואכלת וגו': זה מעשר שני. שכבר למדנו ליתן מעשר ראשון ללוים, שנאמר (במדבר יח, כו) כי תקחו מאת בני ישראל וגו', ונתן להם רשות לאכלו בכל מקום, שנאמר (שם יח, לא) ואכלתם אותו בכל מקום, על כרחך זה מעשר אחר הוא:
24And if the way be too long for you, that you are unable to carry it, for the place which the Lord, your God, will choose to establish His Name therein, is too far from you, for the Lord, your God, will bless you כדוְכִי יִרְבֶּה מִמְּךָ הַדֶּרֶךְ כִּי לֹא תוּכַל שְׂאֵתוֹ כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָשׂוּם שְׁמוֹ שָׁם כִּי יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ:
For [the Lord your God] will bless you: so that your produce will be too much to carry. כי יברכך: שתהא התבואה מרובה לשאת:
25Then you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and you shall go to the place the Lord, your God, will choose. כהוְנָתַתָּה בַּכָּסֶף וְצַרְתָּ הַכֶּסֶף בְּיָדְךָ וְהָלַכְתָּ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ:
26And you shall turn that money into whatever your soul desires; cattle, sheep, new wine or old wine, or whatever your soul desires, and you shall eat there before the Lord, your God, and you shall rejoice, you and your household. כווְנָתַתָּה הַכֶּסֶף בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תְּאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ בַּבָּקָר וּבַצֹּאן וּבַיַּיִן וּבַשֵּׁכָר וּבְכֹל אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁאָלְךָ נַפְשֶׁךָ וְאָכַלְתָּ שָּׁם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְשָׂמַחְתָּ אַתָּה וּבֵיתֶךָ:
[And you will turn that money] into whatever your soul desires: This is a כְּלָל, a general statement [not limited to anything in particular. Whereas the next expression,] בכל אשר תאוה נפשך: כלל:
cattle, or sheep, new wine or old wine: [represents a] פְּרָט, a“specification” [that is, it details particular things, limiting the matter to those things. After this, the verse continues,] בבקר ובצאן וביין ובשכר: פרט:
or whatever your soul desires: [The verse] again reverts to a כְּלָל, a“general statement.” [Now we have learned that when a verse expresses a כְּלָל, a פְּרָט, and then a כְּלָל again, as in this case, we apply the characteristics of the פְּרָט to the whole matter. That is,] just as the items listed in the פְּרָט 1) are products of things themselves produced by the earth [e.g., wine comes from grapes], and 2) are fitting to be food for man, [so must the money replacing them be used to purchase such products]. — [Eruvin 27a] ובכל אשר תשאלך נפשך: חזר וכלל. מה הפרט מפורש ולד ולדות הארץ וראוי למאכל אדם וכו':
27And [as for] the Levite who is in your cities you shall not forsake him, for he has neither portion nor inheritance with you. כזוְהַלֵּוִי אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ לֹא תַעַזְבֶנּוּ כִּי אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק וְנַחֲלָה עִמָּךְ:
And [as for] the Levite… - you shall not forsake him: By not giving him the first tithe. והלוי וגו' לא תעזבנו: מליתן לו מעשר ראשון:
for he has neither portion nor inheritance with you: This excludes gleanings (Lev. 19:9), forgotten sheaves (Deut. 24:19), the end of the field (Lev. 19:9), [all of which are left for the poor,] and ownerless things, for the Levite does have a portion in these things, just as you do, and [consequently,] they are not subject to tithing. כי אין לו חלק ונחלה עמך: יצאו לקט שכחה ופאה והפקר, שאף הוא יש לו חלק עמך בהן כמוך, ואינן חייבין במעשר:
28At the end of three years, you shall take out all the tithe of your crop in that year and place it in your cities. כחמִקְצֵה | שָׁלשׁ שָׁנִים תּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל מַעְשַׂר תְּבוּאָתְךָ בַּשָּׁנָה הַהִוא וְהִנַּחְתָּ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ:
At the end of three years [you shall take out all the tithe of your crop in that year]: This comes to teach us that if one kept his tithes from the first and the second year of the shemitah [cycle], he has to remove them from his house in the third [year]. מקצה שלש שנים: בא ולמד שאם השהה מעשרותיו של שנה ראשונה ושנייה לשמטה, שיבערם מן הבית בשלישית:
29And the Levite because he has no portion or inheritance with you and the stranger, and the orphan, and the widow, who are in your cities, will come and eat and be satisfied; so that the Lord, your God, will bless you in all the work of your hand that you will do. כטוּבָא הַלֵּוִי כִּי אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק וְנַחֲלָה עִמָּךְ וְהַגֵּר וְהַיָּתוֹם וְהָאַלְמָנָה אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְאָכְלוּ וְשָׂבֵעוּ לְמַעַן יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל מַעֲשֵׂה יָדְךָ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה:
And the Levite… will come: And take the first tithe. ובא הלוי: ויטול מעשר ראשון:
and the stranger, and the orphan… [will come]: And take the second tithe, which this year [the third in the seven year cycle], belongs to the poor, and you [yourself] may not eat it in Jerusalem, in the manner you were required to eat the second tithe in the [first] two years [of this cycle]. והגר והיתום: ויטלו מעשר שני, שהוא של עני של שנה זו, ולא תאכלנו אתה בירושלים כדרך שנזקקת לאכול מעשר שני של שתי שנים:
will come and eat and be satisfied: Give them enough to satisfy them. From here [our Rabbis] said: One must not give the poor from the threshing floor less [than half a kav of wheat, or a kav of barley] (Sifrei). And you go up to Jerusalem with the [second] tithe of the first and the second years which you have delayed [to bring], and you shall confess: “I have removed the sanctified things from the house” (see Deut. 26:13), as is stated in [the section beginning with]“When you have finished tithing…” (Deut. 26:12). ואכלו ושבעו: תן להם כדי שביעה. מכאן אמרו אין פוחתין לעני בגורן וכו'. ואתה הולך לירושלים למעשר של שנה ראשונה ושנייה שהשהית ומתודה (דברים כו, יג) בערתי הקדש מן הבית, כמו שמפורש (שם כו, יב) בכי תכלה לעשר:Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 135 - 139
• Chapter 135
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Name of the Lord; offer praise, you servants of the Lord-
2. who stand in the House of the Lord, in the courtyards of the House of our God.
3. Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good; sing to His Name, for He is pleasant.
4. For God has chosen Jacob for Himself, Israel as His beloved treasure.
5. For I know that the Lord is great, our Master is greater than all supernal beings.
6. All that the Lord desired He has done, in the heavens and on earth, in the seas and the depths.
7. He causes mists to rise from the ends of the earth; He makes lightning for the rain; He brings forth the wind from His vaults.
8. It was He who struck down the firstborn of Egypt, of man and beast.
9. He sent signs and wonders into the midst of Egypt, on Pharaoh and on all his servants.
10. It was He who struck down many nations, and slew mighty kings:
11. Sichon, king of the Amorites; Og, king of Bashan; and all the kingdoms of Canaan.
12. And He gave their lands as a heritage, a heritage to His people Israel.
13. Lord, Your Name is forever; Lord, Your remembrance is throughout all generations.
14. Indeed, the Lord will judge on behalf of His people, and have compassion on His servants.
15. The idols of the nations are silver and gold, the product of human hands.
16. They have a mouth, but cannot speak; they have eyes, but cannot see;
17. they have ears, but cannot hear; nor is there breath in their mouth.
18. Like them will their makers become-all who trust in them.
19. House of Israel, bless the Lord; House of Aaron, bless the Lord;
20. House of Levi, bless the Lord; you who fear the Lord, bless the Lord.
21. Blessed is the Lord from Zion, who dwells in Jerusalem. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 136
This psalm contains twenty-six verses, corresponding to the twenty-six generations between the creation of the world and the giving of the Torah.
1. Praise the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is forever.
2. Praise the God of the supernal beings, for His kindness is forever.
3. Praise the Master of the heavenly hosts, for His kindness is forever.
4. Who alone performs great wonders, for His kindness is forever.
5. Who makes the heavens with understanding, for His kindness is forever.
6. Who spreads forth the earth above the waters, for His kindness is forever.
7. Who makes the great lights, for His kindness is forever.
8. The sun to rule by day, for His kindness is forever.
9. The moon and stars to rule by night, for His kindness is forever.
10. Who struck Egypt through its firstborn, for His kindness is forever.
11. And brought Israel out of their midst, for His kindness is forever.
12. With a strong hand and with an outstretched arm, for His kindness is forever.
13. Who split the Sea of Reeds into sections, for His kindness is forever.
14. And brought Israel across it, for His kindness is forever.
15. And cast Pharaoh and his army into the Sea of Reeds, for His kindness is forever.
16. Who led His people through the desert, for His kindness is forever;
17. Who struck down great kings, for His kindness is forever.
18. And slew mighty kings, for His kindness is forever.
19. Sichon, king of the Amorites, for His kindness is forever.
20. And Og, king of Bashan, for His kindness is forever.
21. And gave their land as a heritage, for His kindness is forever.
22. A heritage to Israel His servant, for His kindness is forever.
23. Who remembered us in our humiliation, for His kindness is forever.
24. And redeemed us from our oppressors, for His kindness is forever.
25. Who gives food to all flesh, for His kindness is forever.
26. Praise the God of heaven, for His kindness is forever.
Chapter 137
Referring to the time of the destruction of the Temple, this psalm tells of when Nebuchadnezzar would ask the Levites to sing in captivity as they had in the Temple, to which they would reply, "How can we sing the song of God upon alien soil?" They were then comforted by Divine inspiration.
1. By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat and wept as we remembered Zion.
2. There, upon the willows, we hung our harps.
3. For there our captors demanded of us songs, and those who scorned us-rejoicing, [saying,] "Sing to us of the songs of Zion.”
4. How can we sing the song of the Lord on alien soil?
5. If I forget you, Jerusalem, let my right hand forget [its dexterity].
6. Let my tongue cleave to my palate if I will not remember you, if I will not bring to mind Jerusalem during my greatest joy!
7. Remember, O Lord, against the Edomites the day of [the destruction of] Jerusalem, when they said, "Raze it, raze it to its very foundation!”
8. O Babylon, who is destined to be laid waste, happy is he who will repay you in retribution for what you have inflicted on us.
9. Happy is he who will seize and crush your infants against the rock!
Chapter 138
David offers awesome praises to God for His kindness to him, and for fulfilling His promise to grant him kingship.
1. By David. I will thank You with all my heart, in the presence of princes I shall praise You.
2. I will bow toward Your Holy Sanctuary, and praise Your Name for Your kindness and for Your truth; for You have exalted Your word above all Your Names.
3. On the day that I called out You answered me, You emboldened me, [You put] strength in my soul.
4. Lord, all the kings of the land will give thanks to You when they hear the words of Your mouth.
5. And they will sing of the Lord's ways, for the glory of the Lord is great.
6. For though the Lord is exalted, He sees the lowly; the High One castigates from afar.
7. If I walk in the midst of distress, keep me alive; against the wrath of my enemies stretch out Your hand, and let Your right hand deliver me.
8. Lord, complete [Your kindness] on my behalf. Lord, Your kindness is forever, do not forsake the work of Your hands.
Chapter 139
A most prominent psalm that guides man in the ways of God as no other in all of the five books of Tehillim. Fortunate is he who recites it daily.
1. For the Conductor, by David, a psalm. O Lord, You have probed me, and You know.
2. You know my sitting down and my standing up; You perceive my thought from afar.
3. You encircle my going about and my lying down; You are familiar with all my paths.
4. For there was not yet a word on my tongue-and behold, Lord, You knew it all.
5. You have besieged me front and back, You have laid Your hand upon me.
6. Knowledge [to escape You] is beyond me; it is exalted, I cannot know it.
7. Where can I go [to escape] Your spirit? And where can I flee from Your presence?
8. If I ascend to the heavens, You are there; if I make my bed in the grave, behold, You are there.
9. Were I to take up wings as the dawn and dwell in the furthest part of the sea,
10. there, too, Your hand would guide me; Your right hand would hold me.
11. Were I to say, "Surely the darkness will shadow me," then the night would be as light around me.
12. Even the darkness obscures nothing from You; and the night shines like the day-the darkness is as light.
13. For You created my mind; You covered me in my mother's womb.
14. I will thank You, for I was formed in an awesome and wondrous way; unfathomable are Your works, though my soul perceives much.
15. My essence was not hidden from You even while I was born in concealment, formed in the depths of the earth.
16. Your eyes beheld my raw form; all [happenings] are inscribed in Your book, even those to be formed in future days-to Him they are the same.
17. How precious are Your thoughts to me, O God! How overwhelming, [even] their beginnings!
18. Were I to count them, they would outnumber the sand, even if I were to remain awake and always with You.
19. O that You would slay the wicked, O God, and men of blood [to whom I say], "Depart from me!”
20. They exalt You for wicked schemes, Your enemies raise [You] for falsehood.
21. Indeed, I hate those who hate You, Lord; I contend with those who rise up against You.
22. I hate them with the utmost hatred; I regard them as my own enemies.
23. Search me, Lord, and know my heart; test me and know my thoughts.
24. See if there is a vexing way in me, then lead me in the way of the world.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, end of Epistle 8• Lessons in Tanya
• Thursday, Menachem Av 28, 5775 · August 13, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, end of Epistle 8
At any rate, it is clear from the above that vegetative growth entails producing something far superior to that which was sown in the ground.
Reverting to the analogue, the Alter Rebbe will now explain how man’s tzedakah and kindness effect a Divine manifestation that utterly transcends man’s service. This results in his receiving as a reward for his actions not only a share in the World to Come — a corresponding measure, albeit quantitatively superior, for both this world and the World to Come are categorized as “worlds” — but also the qualitatively superior revelation of teshuvah ilaah, that transcends by far any state that could be called a “world”.
וככה ממש, על דרך משל, כל מעשה הצדקה שעושין ישראל
Now precisely like this, metaphorically speaking, every act of charity that Jews perform
עולה למעלה בבחינת העלאת מ״נ, לשורש נשמותיהן למעלה
ascends, like an “elevation of mayin nukvin,” to the Root of their souls Above,
Just as in the analogy, planting a seed will unveil the earth’s vegetative power, so, too, the Jew’s act of charity will elicit the Divine attribute of Chesed, since this act serves as the mayin nukvin to its spiritual counterpart Above,
הנקרא בשם כנסת ישראל
which is referred to1 as Knesset Yisrael (lit., “the Congregation of Israel”),
(a) because it is the source of Jewish souls, and (b) because within it congregate the lights and revelations of the emotive attributes (the middot) that derive from ישראל דלעילא (“Supernal Israel”), i.e., the bracket of six Sefirot known as ז״א of the World of Atzilut.
ואימא תתאה, בלשון הזהר
and in the terminology of the Zohar [the source of Jewish souls is known as] imma tataah, the “lower-level mother,”
Binah, by contrast, is termed imma ilaah, the “higher-level mother” (inasmuch as it is the “mother” of the attributes of ז״א), while Malchut is referred to as the “lower-level mother” (since it is the “mother” of the world that follows it).
ושכינה, בלשון הגמרא
and in the phraseology of the Talmud [the source of the souls of Israel is known as] the Shechinah,
It is so called because it “rests” (from the root שכן; i.e., it descends and is present) in lowly levels.2
הכלולה מכל מדותיו של הקב״ה, ומיוחדת בהן בתכלית
which comprises, and is utterly united with, all the attributes of the Holy One, blessed is He,
וראשיתן היא מדת החסד
the first of which is the attribute of Chesed.
Man’s neighborly acts of Chesed ascend, as a form of mayin nukvin, to this Divine attribute of Chesed, for it is the source of the attribute of Chesed within his own soul.
ועל ידי העלאה זו, מתעורר חסד ה׳ ממש
Now, through this elevation, the actual “Chesed of G‑d” — which is immeasurably superior to man’s Chesed and to worlds in general — is aroused,
שהוא גילוי אורו יתברך, לירד ולהאיר למטה לנשמות ישראל, בבחינת גילוי רב ועצום
so that a great and intense revelation of His light descends into this lowly [world], where it lights up the souls of Israel,
בשעת התפלה, על כל פנים
at least during the time of prayer, even if not permanently.
כי אף שלגדולתו אין חקר
For though3 “His greatness is unfathomable,” and גדולה (“greatness”) denotes the Divine attribute of Chesed,4
עד דכולא קמיה כלא חשיבי
to the extent that5 “all are esteemed as naught before Him,”
How, then, does it descend below and become capable of being fathomed by the Jewish soul?
הרי במקום שאתה מוצא גדולתו, שם אתה מוצא ענותנותו
even so,6 “Where you find His greatness, there you find His humility,”
Hence, the very greatness and Chesed of G‑d always find expression in His “humility”, i.e., in His ability to descend and reveal Himself to the nethermost levels,
כמים שיורדין כו׳
like “water, which descends [from above to below].”
G‑d’s kindness may thus be likened to water in its ability to manifest itself within a Jew’s soul in this lowly world.
וזהו שכתוב: זרח בחשך אור לישרים, חנון ורחום וצדיק
And this is [implied] in the verse:7 “He shone in the darkness as a light unto the upright, [He] that is gracious, and merciful, and tzaddik.”
דעל ידי שהאדם חנון ורחום וצדיק, צדקות אהב
For, by being gracious and merciful, and8 “tzaddik — fond of tzedakot,” i.e., by performing acts oftzedakah with kindness and love, man
גורם לאור ה׳ שיזרח לנשמתו המלובשת בגופו, העומד בחשך
causes the light of G‑d to shine into his soul which is vested in his body — which stands in darkness,
שהוא משכא דחויא
since it is the “hide of the snake.”9
G‑d nevertheless causes His light to shine into the soul, even as the soul finds itself within the gloom of the unenlightened body.
וזה נקרא בשם ישועה, כד אתהפכא חשוכא לנהורא
And this state, when10 “darkness is converted to light,” is referred to as “deliverance”, as when a man, delivered from danger, is transported from darkness to radiance.
וזהו מצמיח ישועות
This, then, is the meaning [of the above-quoted phrase], “and causes deliverance to sprout forth,” as a result of one’s having “sown tzedakah.”
שישועה זו צומחת מזריעת הצדקה שזורעין בארץ העליונה
For this salvation sprouts from the charity that is sown in the “Supernal Land,”
ארץ חפץ, היא השכינה וכנסת ישראל, שנקראת כן על שם שמתלבשת בתחתונים להחיותם
the “Desired Land,” which is the Shechinah, and Knesset Yisrael, the source of Jewish souls, so called because it vests itself in the lower worlds to animate them.
כמו שכתוב: מלכותך מלכות כל עולמים
As it is written,11 “Your sovereignty (an allusion to the Sefirah of Malchut) is the sovereignty (i.e., it serves as the source) of all worlds.”
It is this Supernal “Land” that is sown with a Jew’s tzedakah, with the result that Divine revelation sprouts forth during prayer.
ובפרט מן הפרט, כשזורעין בארץ הקודש התחתונה
This applies most particularly when one sows in the nether Holy Land,
The above applies to mitzvot in general, all of them being called tzedakah, as Scripture states,12 “Our performance of all the commandments will be accounted for us as tzedakah.” Particu-larly so, through the actual performance of tzedakah, in the sense of charity. It applies even more particularly when the tzedakah is planted in the Holy Land, maintaining those who study Torah and serve G‑d there.
המכוונת כנגדה ממש
which truly corresponds to it (i.e., the Holy Land below is truly located “opposite” the Holy Land in heaven).
שהזריעה נקלטת תיכף ומיד ממש בארץ העליונה
For (when such charity is given) the seed [of tzedakah] is immediately absorbed in the Supernal Land,
בלי שום מניעה ועיכוב בעולם
without any obstacle and hindrance whatever,
מאחר שאין שום דבר חוצץ ומפסיק כלל בין ארצות החיים
because there is nothing whatsoever that intervenes and intercepts between the “Lands of Life,” i.e,., between the Supernal “Land of Life,” which is the source of Jewish souls, and the “Land of Life” below, the physical Holy Land;
כי זה שער השמים
for13 “it is the gate of Heaven,” referring to the location of the Holy Temple in the Holy Land.
מה שאין כן בחוץ לארץ
This is not so, however, outside the Holy Land, where various factors may hinder the implantation of tzedakah in the “Land of Life” Above.
ודי למבין
This will suffice for the discerning.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Note of the Rebbe: “Cf. Part I beginning of ch. 52: ‘And this source...’ Here is not the place to elaborate upon the differences.” |
| 2. | See also later in the present Epistle; and see Likkutei Amarim, Part I, ch. 41. |
| 3. | Tehillim 145:3. |
| 4. | Cf. Likkutei Amarim, Part II, ch. 4. |
| 5. | Zohar I, 11b. |
| 6. | Megillah 31a (according to the text of Ein Yaakov). |
| 7. | Tehillim 112:4. |
| 8. | Cf. ibid. 11:7. |
| 9. | Introduction to Tikkunei Zohar 10b, et al. |
| 10. | Cf. Likkutei Amarim, Part I, ch. 27. |
| 11. | Tehillim 145:13. |
| 12. | Devarim 6:25. |
| 13. | Bereishit 28:17, and commentaries of Rashi and Targum, loc. cit. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:Thursday, Menachem Av 28, 5775 · August 13, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 109
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
"He shall bathe all his body in water"—Leviticus 15:16.
A person who chooses to become cleansed of any ritual impurity is commanded to immerse in a mikvah [a natural pool of water]. According to the tradition of the Oral Law, for a mikvah to be kosher it must contain enough water for [an average] person to submerge himself within them—unless it is a moving stream of water, in which case even the smallest amount of water suffices [for a smaller than average individual, or for immersing a ritually impure utensil].
Some details:
Of all the types of ritually impure people, only the zav requires immersion in a moving stream of water.
This mitzvah is not obligatory. As long as an individual has no intention of entering the Temple Mount, he may remain in his ritually impure state.
An individual's purification process is not finalized until the sun sets on the day he immerses.
There may not be anything separating between the person's body and the waters of the mikvah.
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
Positive Commandment 109
Translated by Berel Bell
The 109th mitzvah is that we are commanded to immerse in the waters of a mikvah and thereby be purified from whichever form of tumah previously existed.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He must immerse his entire body in water." The Oral Tradition2 explains that [the phrase "his entire body" also teaches that] there must be enough water to cover his entire body.3 This is the minimum size of a mikvah unless the water is from a spring, in which case there is no minimum amount,4 as explained in the laws which deal with this mitzvah.
Among the conditions [governing the mikvah] is that only in the case of a zav is spring water required,5 as the verse6 states, "mayim chaim."
When we say that immersion is a mitzvah, this does not mean that any person who is tameh is required to immerse himself — as one who wears a four-cornered garment must put tzitzis on it, or that anyone with a house must build a fence around the roof. [When I say, "it is a mitzvah,"] I refer to the laws of immersion — that we are commanded that anyone who wants purification from tumah can do so only through immersion in water, after which he becomes tahor.
The Sifra7 says, "One might think that the phrase8 'He must immerse in water' is a Divine decree [and that it is an absolute requirement to immerse]. The verse therefore says, 'then he can return to the camp' [after being purified] from tumah." This hints to the principle I just explained, i.e. that the mitzvah is just the law, i.e. that one who wants to be purified should take certain steps. This law is itself the mitzvah. This does not mean however, that there is an independent requirement to immerse — should he want to remain tameh and not enter the machaneh Shechinah9 for any period of time, he may do so.
The Book of Truth (i.e. the Torah) explains that even though after the person immerses he becomes tahor, his purification is incomplete until sunset.10 The Oral Tradition also explains that during immersion he must be naked and that his entire body must come in contact with the water. As our Sages put it,11 "The phrase, 'his entire body' teaches that there can be nothing intervening between his body and the water."
We have therefore explained that this mitzvah of immersion includes the laws of mikvah, of intervening substances, and t'vul yom.12 This mitzvah is explained in tractates Mikva'os and T'vul Yom.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 15:16.
2.Sifra.
3.This is 40 se'ah of water.
4.In practice, even a mikvah of spring water must contain 40 se'ah.
5.In other cases, even for a zavah, rain water is sufficient.
6.Lev. 15:13.
7.Ibid., 16:26.
8.Ibid., 14:8.
9.Corresponding to the Temple courtyard.
10.See Lev. 22:6. A person in this state is called a t'vul yom.
11.Eruvin 4b.
12.One who has immersed and is awaiting sunset, as mentioned above
Positive Commandment 237
Damage Caused by Goring
"If an ox gores..."—Exodus 21:28.
We are commanded regarding the laws [of liability] that apply if a person's ox [gores another's animal, or any other malicious damage cause by any animal belonging to an individual].
Damage Caused by Goring
Positive Commandment 237
Translated by Berel Bell
The 237th mitzvah is that we are commanded to follow the laws regarding [damage caused by] an ox.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "If an ox gores [a man or woman...]", and the verse,2 "If one person's ox injures the ox of another person...."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the first six chapters of tractate Bava Kama.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 21:28.
2.Ibid., 21:35.
Gerushin - Chapter Eleven
Halacha 1
One should not marry a girl below the age of majority.1 When a man marries an orphan girl below the age of majority, and [before she attains majority] she [decides that] she does not desire [to remain married to] this husband, she rejects [the marriage] and departs; a get is not required, because a consecration effected by a minor does not establish a marriage bond in the full sense, as explained.2 [The annulment of a marriage in this manner is referred to as mi'un.]
Similarly, when a girl below majority was married at her father's initiative,3 but was then widowed or divorced while still a minor, she is considered to be an orphan, although her father is alive.4 If she marries again while she is below the age of majority, she may annul her marriage through mi'un.
Halacha 2
Although the marriage of a woman who is a deaf-mute is a Rabbinic institution like that of a minor, our Sages did not give her the right to annul it throughmi'un, so that men would not refrain from marrying her.5
Halacha 3
A minor can annul her marriage via mi'un whether she has been merely consecrated or [even if] the marriage has been consummated. [She can exercise this privilege] in her husband's presence, or outside his presence. Just as she can annul her marriage to her husband, she can annul her relationship to a yavam.6
Just as she can annul one marriage through mi'un, so too, she can annul a second marriage or a third marriage. Indeed, [she can exercise this privilege] any number of times.7
As long as she is a minor, she has the right to annul her marriage throughmi'un. When a minor does not exercise the right of mi'un and becomes consecrated to another man despite the fact that she was married, [the consecration is binding]. Becoming consecrated is [obviously] a rejection [- and thus an annulment - of her previous marriage].
Halacha 4
Until when may a girl annul her marriage through mi'un? Throughout the entire time she is a minor, until she becomes a na'arah,8 or until it is known that she becomes classified as an aylonit.9
When does the above10 apply? When her husband did not engage in marital relations with her after she became twelve years and one day old. If, however, the couple engaged in relations after she reached this age, since these relations consecrate her according to Scriptural law, as explained,11 she no longer has the right to annul her marriage through mi'un.
Similarly, [when the woman reaches this age, we assume that she has lost her right to annul her marriage through mi'un]. She need not be checked for signs of physical maturity, for it is assumed that she has manifested them.12
Halacha 5
If she has undergone a physical inspection, and no signs of maturity were discovered, but she engaged in marital relations after the age when she could have manifested signs of maturity, we suspect that pubic hairs had grown and later fell off. Because of the doubt, the marriage must be dissolved with a get.
If a woman [who engaged in marital relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve attempts to] annul her marriage through mi'un after undergoing a physical examination,13 and then is consecrated by another person, [her second husband also] must dissolve their relationship with a get, because of the doubt involved.14 If she married [the second husband], she must be divorced by both husbands and there is a doubt concerning the legitimacy of a child born to either of them [after her consecration to her second husband].15
Halacha 6
When a minor does not exercise her right to mi'un and attains majority, she no longer has this privilege. [This applies] even when she did not engage in marital relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve years and one day. Since she has attained majority, it is a Rabbinic decree that a divorce is required [if the marriage must be dissolved].
[The rationale for this ruling is as follows:] The couple did not engage in marital relations after she reached the age of na'arut, in which instance it would be necessary to suspect that she manifested signs of physical maturity, and accordinly, there would be a doubt whether or not a marriage bond had been established. Nor did they engage in relations after she attained majority, in which instance she would become a married woman in all regards. Accordingly, the only reason she requires a get is the fact of her marriage as a minor, which is a Rabbinic institution.
Based on the above, if another man consecrated her after she attained majority, [when she had not engaged in marital relations with her first husband from the age of twelve onward,] the second man's consecration is binding.16 As such, if her first husband divorces her, her second husband may consummate the marriage. If, however, her second husband divorces her, her first husband may not continue his marriage with her. [This is a decree, instituted] lest people say: "He remarried his divorcee after she was consecrated."17
If her second husband engaged in marital relations with her before her first husband divorced her, she must be divorced by both men. [This is a decree instituted] because [the situation] resembles an instance in which a woman heard that her husband died, she married, and then her first husband returned.18 [The laws governing the two situations are not entirely analogous. In this instance,] a child fathered by the second husband is not illegitimate.19 But if her first husband engages in relations with her before her second husband divorces her, any child born is illegitimate.20
Halacha 7
In which instances must a minor perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]? [Our Sages established the following guidelines.] If she was between six and ten [when she was consecrated], we investigate the extent of her sagacity.
If she knows to guard [the money given to her to effect] the kiddushin,appreciates that it was given for that purpose and will guard it differently from the way in which she would guard a nut, a date or the like, she must perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage].
If she does not know to guard [the money given to her to effect] the kiddushin, she need not perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage]. Instead, she returns to her mother's home as if she had never been consecrated. If she is less than six, even if she knows [how to guard the money given her,] she need not perform the rite of mi'un. If she is more than ten, even if she is very inept, she must perform the rite of mi'un.21
Whenever a girl's brother, mother or relatives arranged for her marriage without telling her of the identity of the groom, she need not perform the rite of mi'un [to nullify her marriage].22
Halacha 8
What does the rite of mi'un entail? She tells two witnesses:23 "I no longer desire my husband so and so," "I no longer desire to be consecrated [to the man] to whom my mother - or my brother - consecrated me," or the like.
[The above applies] even if the two individuals are guests dining in her husband's home and she is serving them. If she tells them, "I no longer desire my husband so and so," she has performed mi'un.
Halacha 9
The two individuals in whose presence the minor performs the rite of mi'unshould write the following for her: "On this and this day, _______________the daughter of _____________ rejected her husband." They sign the document and give it to her. This is the essential portion of a deed of mi'un.
A deed of mi'un does not resemble a bill of divorce, in which the giving of the bill effects the divorce.24 It need not be written with the proper intent, nor must it be transferred, nor do any of the laws required for a bill of divorce apply with regard to it. The wording used for a get is not used for it, lest it appear to be aget.25 It is merely a legal record.
Halacha 10
The two individuals before whom a girl makes a statement of mi'un must know the identity of the girl and her husband. Therefore, whoever sees [a girl] make a statement of mi'un [in the presence of two other people] and hears that statement, is entitled to write a legal record of this statement, even though he was not aware of [the girl's] identity beforehand.26
It has become customary for the Jewish people to write a legal record of a statement of mi'un, employing the following text.
Halacha 11
A legal record of a statement of mi'un:
On this day of the week, and on this day of the month, in this year according to the following reckoning,27 so and so, the daughter of so and so (her father's name) issued a protest in our presence, saying: "My mother or my brother misled me and had me married - or consecrated - to so and so, the son of so and so (his father's name) while I was a minor. I am now making a statement in your presence that I do not desire him, nor can I live with him." We have had so and so undergo a physical examination,28 and it has been established that she is still a minor. [Hence,] we have written and signed this [legal document] and have given it to her to serve as support and clear evidence.So and so, the son of so and so (his father's name), a witness;So and so, the son of so and so (his father's name), a witness.
Halacha 12
When a man divorces his wife, and she becomes consecrated to another man, she is forbidden to her first [husband], even though she has not engaged in marital relations [with her second husband]. If her first [husband] remarries her and engages in sexual relations with her,29 he [transgresses a negative commandment,30 and] is punished by lashes. He is forced to divorce her, as [implied by Deuteronomy 24:4]: "Her first husband, who sent her away, may not [return and remarry her]."
Halacha 13
If she engaged in promiscuous relations with another man while she was divorced, she is permitted to remarry her husband, for it is written [Deuteronomy 24:2]: "And she departed from his home and went and became another man's [wife]." It is "becom[ing] another man's [wife]" - i.e., being consecrated - which causes her to become forbidden to remarry her [first] husband.
Halacha 14
Included in this prohibition is that every woman who engaged in adulterous relations becomes forbidden to her husband. He is punished by lashes [for engaging in marital relations with her],31as [implied by the inclusion of the phrase] "after she has become tainted" in [Deuteronomy 24:4]: "And [an adulterous woman] has been tainted." There is one exception: the wife of an Israelite32 who was raped.33
Therefore, whenever a woman becomes forbidden to her husband, because she violated his warning against entering into privacy with another man,34 and he engages in relations with her, he is punished by stripes of rebellion.35 If after divorcing his wife [for such reasons], the husband transgresses and remarries her, he must divorce her.
Halacha 15
A deaf-mute may divorce his wife with signals, as explained.36 [If such a woman] went and became consecrated to another deaf-mute [and is then divorced], she is forbidden to be remarried to her first husband. Needless to say, [this applies if her second husband] was a mentally competent individual.
If, however, a woman who had been married to a mentally competent individual and was divorced, married a deaf-mute and was divorced, she is permitted to remarry her first husband.37
Halacha 16
A girl who leaves her husband by virtue of the rite of mi'un is not considered to be divorced by him.38 The laws applying to her relations with her husband whom she rejected are the same as those applying to a man who has never consecrated her. She is permitted to marry his relatives. He is permitted to marry her relatives. Nor is she disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
If she married another man and was divorced or widowed, or she nullified her relationship with him through mi'un, she is permitted to remarry him. Moreover, even if her first husband divorced her [while she was still a minor], remarried her, she then nullified their relationship via mi'un and married another man and was divorced by him, she may remarry her first husband.39
[The rationale is that] whenever a girl leaves a marriage via the rite of mi'un, it is considered as if she had never been divorced via a get, and she may remarry her first husband. [This applies] even if she was once divorced [by this man] before mi'un.
When, by contrast, a man divorces his wife - who is a minor - with a get, she marries another man and then nullifies the marriage through mi'un, she may not remarry her first husband, because although her final marriage was terminated by mi'un, her marriage [to her first husband] was terminated by a divorce.40 Needless to say, this applies if the second husband divorced her or he died.
Similarly, she is forbidden to the father of her first husband, his son and his brothers, as are other divorced women. [This applies despite the fact that] she terminates her marriage to her second husband via mi'un.
Halacha 17
When a girl nullifies her connection to a yavam through mi'un, she remains forbidden to his father, for she appears to be his daughter-in-law, since [that was her status] when his son died. She is, however, permitted to marry [her late husband's] other relatives.41 Thus, although she rejected a potential yavam withmi'un, she is permitted to marry his brother.
Halacha 18
Whenever a woman is divorced or widowed, she should neither marry nor be consecrated42 until 90 days pass between the day she was divorced or her husband died and the day on which she became consecrated. [This interval was required] to see whether or not she is pregnant, and thus to differentiate between the seed of the first husband and the seed of the second husband.43
Halacha 19
We count [these 90 days] from the day the get is written; [this applies] even when it was written on a conditional basis, or it did not reach the woman until years afterwards. [The rationale is] that from the time [a get] is written, [a woman's husband] no longer enters into privacy with her.44
Halacha 20
[Included] in this decree of our Sages is that even a woman who is not fit to give birth, and even one who was divorced or widowed after merely being consecrated, must wait 90 days. I.e., even a minor, an elderly woman, a barren woman or an aylonit, even a woman whose husband was overseas, sick or imprisoned, and indeed, even a woman who is a virgin despite being consecrated, must wait 90 days.45
Halacha 21
A maidservant who was freed and a non-Jewish woman who was converted are required to wait 90 days [before they marry].46 Even a gentile and his wife who convert together are required to separate for 90 days to differentiate between seed that was conceived in holiness and seed that was not conceived in holiness.
Halacha 22
A girl who annuls her marriage through mi'un need not wait [before remarrying]; our Sages' decree applied only to a divorcee. Similarly, a woman who has promiscuous relations need not wait, for she guards herself against becoming pregnant. Similarly, a woman who was raped or seduced need not wait.
Halacha 23
[The following rule applies when] a girl below the age of majority who is not fit to give birth was married under a mistaken conception, discovered that she is forbidden to remain married to her husband and was forced to separate by the court. She need not wait, for this is an unlikely occurrence, and our Sages did not apply their decrees to situations that are out of the ordinary.49
Halacha 24
When, within this 90-day period, [a man] consecrates [a woman who is required to wait], he is placed under a ban of ostracism.50 If he consecrates the woman and then temporarily flees [to a distant country], he is not placed under a ban of ostracism.51 If he consummates the marriage within the 90-day period, the couple are forced to separate until the conclusion of the interval, at which time they are allowed to live together as man and wife.
Halacha 25
Similarly, our Sages decreed that a man should not marry a woman who is pregnant with a child conceived by another man, or a woman who is nursing a child conceived by another man, even though the parentage of the fetus is known.52
[The restriction concerning] a pregnant woman [was instituted,] lest [the other man] harm the fetus during sexual relations, for he is not concerned about his colleague's child. [And the decree concerning] a nursing mother [was instituted], lest the woman's milk spoil and her second husband fail to show concern for restoring her ability to nurse, by providing her with a diet that will remedy her difficulty.
Halacha 26
For how long is the woman considered to be a nursing mother? For twenty-four months.53 This does not include the day the child was born, nor the day the woman becomes consecrated.
Halacha 27
Just as it is forbidden to marry such a woman, it is forbidden to consecrate her until this time period passes. Even if [a woman] gives her child to a nursemaid or weans him during these 24 months, she should not marry.54 If her son dies, she is permitted to marry. We do not fear that perhaps she will kill [her son for this reason].
Halacha 28
If a man transgresses and marries a pregnant or nursing woman during this period, he should divorce her,55 even if he is a priest.56 If the man is an Israelite, he may remarry her after the 24 months of nursing pass.
If [a man] marries [such a woman] and then flees and returns after [the prescribed] period and lives together with his wife, there is no difficulty.
[A man who] consecrates a pregnant or nursing woman is not forced to divorce her.57 He may not, however, consummate the marriage until the nursing period passes or until the child dies.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
I.e., even though a father has the right to consecrate his daughter before she reaches majority and arrange for her marriage, "it is not proper for him to act in this manner." Instead, our Sages enjoined that a person should not consecrate his daughter while she is a minor until she matures and says, "I would like [to marry] so and so" (Hilchot Ishut 3:19). Similarly, from the husband's point of view, he should not marry a girl until she is mature, lest she change her mind afterwards (Tosafot, Kiddushin 41a).
|
| 2. |
Our Sages ordained that an orphan girl below the age of majority could be married, so that someone would care for her and protect her. With regard to such a marriage, the Rambam writes in Hilchot Ishut 4:8: "The consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushin are finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term. There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mi'un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce."
|
| 3. |
In which instance, the marriage is binding according to Scriptural law and cannot be annulled through mi'un.
|
| 4. |
Once a girl is married, her father no longer has any authority over her, even though he is alive (Hilchot Ishut 3:12).
|
| 5. |
In the instance of a minor, her right to annul the marriage lasts only until she reaches majority. With regard to a deaf-mute, by contrast, there would be no limit to this privilege. This would be regarded unfavorably by a husband (Yevamot 113a).
|
| 6. |
I.e., if her husband dies without children and she does not desire to marry the yavam, she can dissolve the marriage by mi'un.
|
| 7. |
Although a girl has the right to marry and dissolve her marriage as often as she desires, our Rabbis did not approve of such conduct and counselled that the Jewish court should arrange a marriage of a minor only when it does not appear likely that she will seek to dissolve the marriage (Hagahot Maimoniot).
|
| 8. |
I.e., when she becomes twelve years old and manifests physical signs of maturity, as explained inHilchot Ishut 2:3.
|
| 9. |
A woman who does not manifest any female physical characteristics. If she shows clear signs of such a condition, she is placed in this category at age 20. If she does not show such signs, but also does not manifest signs of female physical maturity, she is not placed into this category until age 35 (Ibid.:4).
|
| 10. |
That a girl can annul her marriage despite the fact that she has passed the age of twelve, when she has not manifested female physical characteristics.
|
| 11. |
Hilchot Ishut 1:2.
|
| 12. |
I.e., our ordinary assumption is that a woman has manifested signs of maturity. Therefore, if a woman wants to annul the marriage after she reaches the age of twelve, she must undergo a physical inspection to show that she has not manifested signs of physical maturity. If no signs are discovered, and she has not engaged in relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve, she may exercise the right of mi'un.
|
| 13. |
In which no signs of physical maturity were discovered.
|
| 14. |
Since no signs of physical maturity were discovered, it is possible that the girl is still a minor and that the annulment of her first marriage - and thus her subsequent consecration - is acceptable. But it is also possible that, as mentioned in the previous halachah, pubic hairs grew and fell off, and that through engaging in marital relations she had been consecrated by her first husband. Because of the doubt involved, she must be divorced by both men.
|
| 15. |
Since it is possible that her first marriage is binding, the legitimacy of a child fathered by her second husband is in doubt. And conversely, since it is possible that the marriage to her second husband is binding, there are also doubts concerning the legitimacy of a child fathered afterwards by the first husband.
|
| 16. |
I.e., even if she had not yet been divorced by her first husband. Since the second man's consecration has the power of Scriptural law, it takes priority.
|
| 17. |
Which is forbidden, as stated in Halachah 12.
|
| 18. |
The resemblance is that the woman married a second husband before her marriage with the first was severed.
|
| 19. |
Because her marriage to her first husband is not binding according to Scriptural law.
|
| 20. |
For her second marriage is binding according to Scriptural law.
|
| 21. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 155:2) quotes opinions that maintain that the above applies only when the girl's marriage was arranged by her brother or her mother. If she arranged the marriage herself, it is not binding, even according to Rabbinic law. The Ra'avad mentions a third opinion, which states that for a girl between the ages of six and ten, the marriage must be arranged by her family to be binding. After the age of ten, it is binding even if she arranged it herself.
|
| 22. |
Our translation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 13:2), which explains that this refers to an instance in which a girl's family members prepared her for marriage without informing her who her groom would be.
|
| 23. |
Rabbenu Chanan'el and other authorities maintain that, a priori, three individuals should be present. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:4) mentions this opinion, the Rambam's view appears to be favored.
|
| 24. |
I.e., a deed of mi'un is merely a legal record. The act of mi'un - i.e., the girl's statement that she no longer desires to live with her husband - is what nullifies their marriage. In contrast, it is the transfer of the get, the bill of divorce, that causes the divorce to take effect.
|
| 25. |
Yevamot 107b-108a relates that originally, the Sages would have a legal record of mi'un written using wording that somewhat resembled a bill of divorce. They saw, however, that this created the impression that the husband was forbidden to marry the girl's close relatives. Since this is not the case, as mentioned in Halachah 16, they altered the wording used for the legal record.
|
| 26. |
Our additions are made on the basis of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:8). We assume that the other witnesses were aware of the law and would have objected to the girl's making such statements if they did not know her identity and that of her husband. (See a parallel in Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:29. Note, however, the Beit Shmuel 155:11 who differs.)
|
| 27. |
I.e., from the creation or from the beginning of Alexander the Great's rule, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 27.
|
| 28. |
I.e., she was checked by women on whom the court can rely, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 2:20.
|
| 29. |
Needless to say, the Rambam is not speaking about an instance in which the woman is still married to her second husband. That would be adultery, a sin punishable by execution. Rather, this applies even if the first husband remarries his wife after she is divorced by her second husband.
The husband is punished by lashes only if he both remarries her and engages in sexual relations with her. Neither act alone incurs that punishment (Kiddushin 78a).
|
| 30. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 356) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 580) count this as one of the Torah's 613 commandments.
|
| 31. |
Note the Kessef Mishneh, which cites an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's statements here and those in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 1:22 and Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 19, from which it would appear that a man is not punished by lashes for engaging in relations with his wife in such a situation.
|
| 32. |
But not a priest. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:27.)
|
| 33. |
Or who engaged in adulterous relations unwittingly. (See Hilchot Ishut 24:19.)
|
| 34. |
I.e., a sotah.
|
| 35. |
Stripes of rebellion is the punishment given for the violation of a Rabbinic injunction. It refers to a less form of corporal punishment than lashes.
The husband is prohibited from engaging in relations with such a wife because it is possible that he will violate a prohibition of Scriptural law. Nevertheless, since it has not been definitely established that his wife committed adultery, he is not punished by lashes (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 36. |
Chapter 2, Halachah 17. This applies only when the person was a deaf-mute when he originally consecrated his wife.
|
| 37. |
Since the marriage to the deaf-mute is not binding according to Scriptural law, it is as if she had never married a second husband. Based on a difference in the version of the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 14:1) that was available to him, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling.
|
| 38. |
Divorce nullifies a marriage from the time of divorce onward. Mi'un, by contrast, voids the marriage entirely, causing it to be considered as if it had never taken place.
|
| 39. |
The mi'un that terminated the second marriage reveals that the first marriage was not binding according to Scriptural law, and that a get was not actually required. (See Rashi, Yevamot 108a.)
|
| 40. |
Yevamot 108b explains that she is not permitted to remarry her first husband because we are afraid that he will change his mind and influence her to nullify her marriage to her second husband via mi'un. We suspect that she will be able to be influenced by him, because she still is attracted to him - for it was he who divorced her, not she who nullified the marriage through mi'un. In the first instance, we do not harbor such suspicions, for it was she who rejected her first husband, nullifying the marriage through mi'un.
|
| 41. |
The Rashba and the Ramban differ, and maintain that the woman is forbidden to the other relatives of the deceased, with the exception of his brothers. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer155:11) mentions both opinions, but favors that of the Rambam.
|
| 42. |
She may, however, become engaged to be married during this time, provided she does not enter into privacy with her fiance (Ramah, Even HaEzer 13:1).
|
| 43. |
The laws governing forbidden marital relationships revolve around paternal relationships, as do the laws of yibbum. For these reasons, it is very important to determine who in fact is the father of a child.
|
| 44. |
And thus it is impossible that he be the father of the woman's child. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 5; Chapter 8, Halachah 2.)
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 13:1) differs and quotes Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the counting should begin from the day the get reached the woman for whom it was intended.
|
| 45. |
Yevamot 42b explains that this decree was applied universally lest people begin to search for loopholes.
|
| 46. |
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:5) interpret this to be referring to a woman who was married as a non-Jew, and not one who was unmarried. Note the Radbaz (Vol. I, Responsa 196), who differs and maintains that this applies even to an unmarried gentile woman.
|
| 47. |
A female captive who is taken as a wife by her captor, as described in Deuteronomy 21:11 andHilchot Melachim, Chapter 8.
|
| 48. |
This refers to the second time the captor has relations with her. It is possible for a child to be conceived during their first sexual encounter, in which instance the child also has the status of a convert.
|
| 49. |
If, however, the woman was old enough to conceive a child while married to the man with whom relations are forbidden, she is required to wait. For it is necessary to discern if a child was conceived in the forbidden relationship or not.
|
| 50. |
The Ra'avad states that the intent of the ban of ostracism should be to compel the man to divorce his wife. (See the Ramah, Even HaEzer 13:10, who quotes this opinion.)
|
| 51. |
The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that he is advised to flee.
|
| 52. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 13:11) mentions that leniency is often shown in instances where a pregnant woman would be likely to engage in sexual relations with the father of the child, or with other men during this interim period, with the hope that marriage will prevent her from unchaste conduct.
|
| 53. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:11) states that in a leap year, the extra month should be counted as one of the 24. The Ramah, however, states that, a priori, in such a situation, an additional month should be added to the restriction. (Note Beit Shmuel 13:22.)
|
| 54. |
Rashi (Ketubot 60b) states that the restriction is upheld lest women be encouraged to take these options rather than continue nursing their children.
If, however, the woman gave her child to a nursemaid in her first husband's lifetime or is physically incapable of nursing, there are no restrictions against her remarrying (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 13:11).
|
| 55. |
The Ra'avad states that he is placed under a ban of ostracism until he divorces her. This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:12).
|
| 56. |
Who may not remarry his divorcee.
|
| 57. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 13:12) is more stringent and equates consecration with marriage.
|
Mikvaot - Chapter 11
Halacha 1
We already explained that washing one's hands and/or immersing them is a Rabbinic requirement. Hands that must be immersed may be immersed solely in an acceptable mikveh that contains 40 se'ah. For only in a place where a person immerses his body may he immerse keilim and hands. When, however, hands need only to be washed, if they were immersed in the water of a mikveh, they are pure. If they were immersed in drawn water, whether in a container or on the earth, the person's hands are not purified. Instead, drawn water poured from a container must fall upon his hands. For hands may only be washed from containers and using human effort, as we explained in Hilchot Berachot.
Halacha 2
Any substance that intervenes for one's entire body when immersing also intervenes for one's hands, both when immersing then and when washing them. Any substance that is included in the measure of a mikveh, e.g., flowing mud, is also included in the measure of a revi'it required for the washing of hands. Everyone who washes his hands must rub them together.
Halacha 3
When a person washes both of his hands to partake of terumah, he must wash them a second time with other water to remove the water that is on his hands. For the water with which he washed them first - it is called the first water - contracted impurity from his hands. Therefore if a loaf of bread that wasterumah fell into the water with which one first washed his hands, it contracts impurity. If it fell into the water of the second washing, it does not contract impurity. If one poured the water of the first washing and the second washing into one place and a loaf that was terumah fell there, it contracts impurity.
If one washed one's hands with the first water, an intervening object was found on his hands, and he removed it and washed again, his hands are impure as they were before, because the second water imparts purity only to what remains of the first water on his hands.
Halacha 4
Hands contract impurity and are purified until the joint.
What is implied? One washed his hands the first time until the joint. The second time, he washed them, the water poured beyond the joint, his hands are pure. The rationale is that the second water is pure.
If, when he washed his hands the first time and the second time, the water poured beyond the joint and it returned to his hand, his hand contracts impurity. The rationale is that the first water that poured beyond the wrist contracted impurity because of his hand. The second water does not purify the water outside the joint. Hence, since the water that was beyond the joint returned to his hand, it imparts impurity to it.
Halacha 5
If the first time, he washed one hand and changed his mind and washed both his hands together the second time, they are impure. The rationale is that the second water contracts impurity because of the hand that was not washed the first time and then they impart impurity to the other hand.
If he washed both his hands the first time and washed only one hand the second time, that one is pure. If he washed one hand and then rubbed it against his other hand which was not washed at all, the water upon the washed hand contracts impurity because of the unwashed hand and then imparts impurity to the hand which was washed. If he rubs it on his head or against the wall, it is pure.
Halacha 6
If one washes both hands with one washing, they are pure. We do not say that it is like washing one hand with the water that descended from the other hand. Moreover, even four or five people, one next to each other or one on top of the other, may wash in this manner, as long as they hold their hands open so that the water can flow over the entire hand.
Halacha 7
If one washed a portion of his hand and then washed the rest of his hand, his hand is impure as it was originally. If there is enough water to impart moisture to another substance on the portion of the hand washed first while the other part was being washed the hand] is pure.
When does the above apply? To the water of the first washing. With regard to the second washing, one may wash a portion of his hand and then wash again, adding to the portion washed.
Halacha 8
The minimum measure of water with which one may wash one's hands initially is a revi'it for each and every person for both their hands. No less than this measure is acceptable, as explained with regarding to washing before partaking of bread.
With regard to the second washing, by contrast, two people may wash their hands with a revi'it, and half a log may be used for three or four. And from alog, even 100 may wash. The rationale is that the second water does not come to purify, but merely to wash off the first water.
Halacha 9
When there was a container that held a revi'it of water that was acceptable for the washing of hands and one added to it a small amount of water that is not acceptable for that purpose, the mixture is acceptable. If one removed the amount of water he added from the container and there remained only a revi'itas there was originally, it is unacceptable. The rationale is that water that is unacceptable made up the measure of the revi'it.
Halacha 10
Any water that is deemed unacceptable for the first washing is unacceptable for the second washing. Any container that may not be used for the first washing is also unacceptable for the second washing. Just as the water of the first washing must be poured by human effort, so too, must the water of the second washing.
Halacha 11
We already explained in Hilchot Berachot all of the factors that could disqualify water for the washing of hands and what makes them acceptable, all of the containers that may be used for the washing of the hands and those that may not be used, Just as any doubt regarding the washing of hands is considered as pure with regard to partaking of ordinary food, as explained there, so too, with regard to terumah, any doubt regarding the washing of hands is considered as pure.
Halacha 12
It is a clear and apparent matter that the concepts of purity and impurity are Scriptural decrees and they are not matters determined by a person's understanding and they are included in the category of chukim. Similarly, immersion in a mikveh to ascend from impurity is included in the category ofchukim, because impurity is not mud or filth that can be washed away with water. Instead, the immersion is a Scriptural decree and requires the focusing the intent of one's heart. Therefore our Sages said: "When one immersed, but did not intend to purify himself," it is as if he did not immerse.
Although it is a Scriptural decree, there is an allusion involved: One who focuses his heart on purifying himself becomes purified once he immerses, even though there was no change in his body. Similarly, one who focuses his heart on purifying his soul from the impurities of the soul, which are wicked thoughts and bad character traits, becomes purified when he resolves within his heart to distance himself from such counsel and immerse his soul in the waters of knowledge. And Ezekiel 36:25 states: "I will pour over you pure water and you will be purified from all your impurities and from all your false deities, I will purify you."
Blessed be the Merciful One Who grants assistance.
This concludes the tenth book with the help of the Almighty.
There are 144 chapters in this book.
In Hilchot Tum'at Meit, there are 25 chapters.
In Hilchot Parah Adumah, there are 15 chapters.
In Hilchot Tum'at Tzara'at, there are 16 chapters.
In Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav, there are 13 chapters.
In Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah, there are 20 chapters.
In Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin, there are 16 chapters.
In Hilchot Keilim, there are 28 chapters.
In Hilchot Mikveot, there are 11 chapters.
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter One
1. Whenever a living animal owned by a person causes damages, the owner is required to pay, for the damage was caused by his property. [This is implied byExodus 21:35:] "When a person's ox will gore an ox belonging to a colleague...."1
These laws apply equally to an ox and to any other animal, beast or fowl. The verse mentions an ox only because that is a common instance.
2. How much must [the owner] pay? If [the animal] caused damage through the performance of an act that it performs frequently and that is its natural habit - e.g., an animal ate straw or fodder, or it caused damage by [treading on an object] with its feet while walking - [the owner] is obligated to pay the full amount of the damage, [giving up, if necessary,]2 his most choice property, as stated in [Exodus 22:4]: "Payment should be exacted from his choice field and his choice vineyard."3
If [the animal] deviated from its ordinary habit and performed acts that it does not usually perform and caused damage in this manner - e.g., a ox gored or bit [another animal] - the owner is obligated to pay half the damages caused. [The payment must be exacted] from the animal that caused the damage, as [Exodus 21:35] states: "And they shall sell the ox that is alive and divide the money."
3. What is implied? When an ox that is worth a maneh4gores an ox that is worth 20 zuz and kills it, [leaving] a corpse that is worth four zuz, the owner of the ox [that caused the damage] is liable to pay eight zuz, half of the loss [suffered by the owner of the ox that was killed].
The payment must be exacted from the body of the animal that caused the damage,5 as it is written: "And they shall sell the ox that is alive."6 Therefore, if an ox that was worth 20 zuz killed an ox that was worth 200 zuz and its carcass was worth [only] a maneh, the owner of the dead ox cannot compel the owner of the living ox to give him 50 [zuz]. Instead, he should tell him: "Here is the ox that caused the damage. Take it and depart."7[This applies] even if the [ox that gored] is worth only a dinar. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
4. [An animal] that performs a deed it is accustomed to performing by nature is called a mu'ad.8 [When an animal] deviates from its ordinary pattern and performs an act that its species does not usually perform - e.g., an ox gores or bites - it is called a tam.9
If the animal continues to follow the deviant pattern on several occasions, it is considered to be mu'ad with regard to the deviation to which it has become habituated, as [implied by Exodus 21:36]: "Or it is known that it is a goring ox."
5. Five types of activities are considered to be abnormal for an animal. If it repeatedly performs any of them, it is considered to be mu'ad with regard to that activity.10 An animal is not considered to be prone to gore, to butt,11 to bite, to lie down on large utensils or to kick. If it becomes accustomed to such an activity, its owner should be forewarned.
At the outset, [an animal] is, however, considered prone to eat foods that are appropriate for it and to break utensils [on which it treads] as it walks. Similarly, an animal is considered prone to lie down on small utensils and crush them.
6. Five species of animals are considered prone to cause damage from the beginning of their existence. [This applies] even if they have become domesticated.12 Therefore, if they cause damage or death by goring, biting, treading, lying down upon, or the like, [the owner] is liable for the entire amount of the damages.
They are a wolf, a lion, a bear, a tiger and a leopard. Similarly, a snake that bites is considered to be mu'ad, even if it has been domesticated.
7. Whenever [an animal] is mu'ad, [the owner] must pay the entire amount of the damage, [even if this requires expropriating] his most choice property. Whenever, by contrast, an animal is considered a tam, [the owner] is required to pay [only] half the amount of the damages. [Moreover,] that half is taken only from the animal itself.
When does the above apply? When the animal entered into the domain belonging to the person to whom damage was caused, and caused damage. When, however, the person to whom damage was caused entered into the domain of the person [whose animal] caused the damage, [the owner] is not liable for anything. For he can tell [the party who suffered the damages]: "If you had not entered my domain, you would not have suffered any damages." Indeed, this is explicitly stated in the Torah, as [Exodus 22:4] states: "And if he shall send forth his animals, and they pasture in another's field."13
8. [The following rules apply when a person's] animal causes damage in the public domain or in a courtyard that belongs neither to the owner of [the animal that] caused the damage nor to the party who suffered the damages,14 or in a courtyard owned jointly by both parties that is set aside to leave produce there and/or to harbor an animal - e.g., a valley.
If [the animal] caused damage by eating or treading in its ordinary manner, the owner is not liable. For [the animal] has permission to go from here to there, and it is the habit of an animal to go and eat as it proceeds and to break [anything lying in its way] as it proceeds.15
[Different rules apply if] it [caused damage by] goring, butting, kicking or biting.16 If its status is tam, [the owner] must pay for half the damages. If its status is mu'ad, [the owner] must pay the entire amount of the damages.17
9. When a courtyard owned jointly by both parties18 is designated for produce and not for harboring an animal, and one of the parties lets his animal in and it causes damage, [the owner] is liable even for damage caused by eating or treading.19
Similarly, if both of them had the right to harbor an animal there, but only one had the right to keep produce there, if [an animal belonging to the other] damaged [that person's] produce, [its owner] is liable even for damage caused by eating or treading.20
10. There are three categories of damages [caused by] an ox:
a) goring, b) eating and c) treading.
The derivatives of eating are23 causing damage when scratching itself on a wall for its benefit, and soiling produce24 for its benefit.
The derivatives of treading are25 causing damage with its body while walking; causing damage with its hair while walking or by swishing its tail, or with its saddle, the bit in its mouth or the bell around its neck. Similarly, a donkey that causes damage with its burden while walking or a calf that is pulling a cart that causes damage while pulling it.
All of these are derivatives of treading. In a public domain [the owner] is not liable, and in a domain belonging to the party who suffered the damages, he must pay for the entire amount of the damages.
11. When [an animal] swishes its tail repeatedly in an abnormal manner and causes damage in the public domain, or when it swishes its sexual organ and causes damage in the public domain, [the owner] is not held liable.
If the person whose property was damaged seizes possession [of property belonging to the owner], he may take payment for half of the damages.26 [The rationale for that ruling is that] there is an unresolved question whether these acts are derivatives of goring, in which case [the owner] is liable [for damage caused] in the public domain, or whether they are derivatives of treading, in which case [the owner] is not liable [for damage caused] in the public domain, as has been explained.27
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 237) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 51) consider this to be one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot. This mitzvah can be defined as compensating an owner for damages caused by one's animals through an action that they would not ordinarily perform. |
| 2. | I.e., the owner is obligated to reimburse the person whose property was damaged for his loss. If the owner does not have cash readily available, his most valuable landed property should be expropriated and sold to pay the damages his animal caused. |
| 3. | Payment of these damages is also considered one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 240) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 55). This mitzvah can be defined as compensating an owner for damages caused by one's animals through an action that they would ordinarily perform. |
| 4. | 100 zuz. |
| 5. | As the Rambam proceeds to illustrate, the damages caused by the ox do not create a lien on all the property belonging to the owner of the ox. |
| 6. | The commentaries have cited the apparent redundancy in the citation of the proof-text. |
| 7. | Thus the owner of the dead ox receives only the worth of the ox which gored, 20 zuz, 30 zuz less than what would be due him. |
| 8. | Mu'ad literally means forewarned - i.e., the animal is prone to perform such acts, and the owner should be forewarned. |
| 9. | Tam literally means simple, implying that the animal is not habituated in the performance of the abnormal behavior. |
| 10. | I.e., for that activity alone, and not for any other abnormal activity (Maggid Mishneh). |
| 11. | I.e., to attack an animal with a part of its body other than its horns (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Kama 1:4). |
| 12. | Even when these animals have been raised in a home and do not outwardly show wild traits, their tendency to violence is considered part of their instinct, never to be eradicated fully.The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 389:8) states that these animals are considered mu'adim only with regard to the specific negative traits for which they are known. If they cause damage in other ways, they are considered as tamim. |
| 13. | This is the verse that describes the payment of damages caused by grazing. It emphasizes that the owner is liable for damages caused in another's field, and not in his own.The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 389:10) and others cite Bava Kama 21b, which interprets this verse in a more specific and somewhat different manner. It would appear, however, that the Rambam is not referring to the exegesis of the verse by the Talmud, but is instead presenting the simple meaning of the verse as a support for the premise stated previously. |
| 14. | This applies when the party who suffered the damages placed produce there without receiving permission from the owner. If, however, he received permission from the owner, it is considered as though it were his own courtyard. See Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 389:16). |
| 15. | In the Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 40, the Rambam explains that this law is based on a logical premise. Since this is an animal's natural habit, it is difficult for the owner to prevent his animal from causing such damage. Moreover, the person whose property was damaged should have foreseen the problem and not left anything of value in such places. |
| 16. | For this represents a departure from the animal's natural pattern, for which its owner is held responsible. |
| 17. | Although both types of animals have the right to proceed in the public domain, neither has the right to damage the other animal. Therefore, the owner of the animal that caused the damages must assume responsibility. |
| 18. | I.e., the owner of the animal that caused the damage and the party who suffered the damages. |
| 19. | Since he brought his animal into a place where an animal should not enter, he must bear responsibility. |
| 20. | Since only the other partner was allowed to bring his produce there, in this regard it is considered his courtyard, and the owner of the animal is liable. |
| 21. | When it has no desire to eat, i.e., biting for a violent and destructive intent (Maggid Mishneh). |
| 22. | All these are acts performed by an animal with a desire to harm the animal (or object) it strikes, without any intention to derive any benefit from it. |
| 23. | The acts that follow are damages caused by an animal when it follows its ordinary pattern and seeks its own benefit. |
| 24. | This refers to soiling produce by rolling upon it, not by defecating (Ibid.). Ruining an object by defecating is considered to be a derivative of kicking stones (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 390:8). See Chapter 2, Halachah 13. |
| 25. | All the acts that follow are damages caused by an animal without any intent, that are likely to be caused when it proceeds in an ordinary manner (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 390:1). |
| 26. | As the Rambam proceeds to explain, these instances are the subject of an unresolved Talmudic debate (Bava Kama 19b). Because of the doubt involved, payment is not exacted from the owner, and for this same reason the person whose property was damaged may not seize the owner's property. If, however, he did seize the owner's property, the same rationale is advanced on his behalf. Since the property may rightfully belong to him, because of the doubt, we do not expropriate the property and return it to its owner.In any case, all that is involved is half of the damages, because the reason why one might hold the owner liable is that these activities are derivatives of goring. And for goring, the owner is required to pay only half the value of the damages.The Rambam's opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 390:2). The Ramah cites the opinion of the Ramban and the Tur, who maintain that when a question of law is unresolved, and one party seizes the other's property, the property that was seized must be returned. |
| 27. | See Halachah 8. |
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter Two
1. [The following laws apply with regard to] the major categories of damages and their derivatives. [If a person's property is considered] mu'ad with regard to the major category, it is considered mu'ad with regard to its derivatives. [If it is considered] tam with regard to the major category, the same law applies with regard to its derivatives.
From the outset, [a person's property is considered] to be mu'ad with regard to all the major categories of damage and their derivatives, with the exception of goring and its derivatives. In that instance, [an animal is considered] tam until it has been deemed prone [to goring],1 as explained.2
2. All the derivatives of a category of damages are governed by the same laws as the major category, with the exception of stones that are propelled by an animal while walking.
This activity is considered a derivative of the category of treading,3 and one is therefore not liable for damage caused in the public domain. Nevertheless, if such stones cause damage in a person's private domain, [the owner of the animal] must pay [for the damages] from his most choice property,4 as he must pay for damages caused by treading, the major category. And yet, he is required to pay only half the amount of the damages.5
3. What is implied? When an animal enters a courtyard belonging to another person and proceeds to walk, and in doing so propels stones from under its feet that break utensils, [the owner of the animal] must pay half the amount of the damage from his most choice property. This matter is a law communicated by the Oral Tradition.6
4. Similarly, if [an animal] was proceeding in the public domain7 and stones were propelled from under its feet into a domain belonging to someone else, and they broke utensils there, [the owner of the animal] must pay half the damages.
If [an animal] treads on a utensil in a domain belonging to someone else and breaks it, and shards from the broken utensil fall on another utensil and break it, [the owner of the animal] must pay the entire [damages for the destruction of] the first utensil, and half [the damages for the destruction of] the second utensil.8
5. If an animal was walking in the public domain and it kicked9 [the ground] and propelled stones that caused damage in the public domain, [the owner] is not liable. If the person whose property was damaged seized a fourth [of the cost] of the damages, it should not be expropriated from him.10 [The rationale is that] there is a doubt regarding the matter: perhaps this is considered a deviation from the ordinary pattern and it is not a derivative of treading, for [the animal] kicked.11
6. If the animal kicked the earth in the domain belonging to another person and stones were propelled because of its kick and caused damages, [the owner] is liable to pay a fourth of the damages, for this is a deviation from the ordinary manner of propelling stones. If the person whose property was damaged seized half [of the cost] of the damages, it should not be expropriated from him.12
Even if an animal was walking in a place where it would be impossible for it not to propel stones, and it kicked [the earth] and propelled stones, [the owner] is liable to pay a fourth of the damages.13 If the person whose property was damaged seized half [of the cost] of the damages, it should not be expropriated from him.
7. Whenever a person must pay full damages, the payment is considered to be a monetary obligation that he is liable to pay, as if he had borrowed [money] from his colleague. When, by contrast, a person must pay half the damages, the monetary obligation is considered a fine, with the exception of the half damages liable from stones,14 which is a halachah [transmitted by the Oral Tradition], as we have explained.15
8. This is the operating principle: Whenever a person pays for the damage that he caused, it is considered a monetary obligation. Whenever he pays more or less - e.g., the double payment (for theft) or half the amount of damages - the amount that is greater or less than the principal is considered to be a fine.
A fine is required only when one is obligated through the testimony of witnesses. When a person admits that he is liable for a fine, he is absolved of the obligation.16
9. [The following rules apply when] a rooster sticks its head inside a glass container, crows while doing so and breaks it [as a result of the sound]. If there were spices or the like inside [the container, and the rooster] stuck its head in to eat them, [the owner] must pay full damages for the spices17 and half the damages for the container, as one pays half damages for stones [that are propelled].18 [The rationale is that this is the animal's] ordinary pattern.19
If, however, the container is empty, this is a deviation from the norm, and [the owner] is liable to pay half the damages, as in the case with other fines.20
10. Similarly, if a horse yelped or a donkey bellowed and utensils were broken as a result, the owner is obligated to pay only half the damages.21
Roosters are considered prone to break utensils as they proceed in their ordinary pattern. If there was a string or a strap tied to [a rooster's] legs22 and a utensil became entangled with the string and rolled and broke, [the owner] is required to pay half the damages.23
When does the above apply? When the string was tied to the rooster by a person.24 If, however, the string became ensnarled around the rooster's foot, its owner is not liable.25 If that string was owned by a given person,26 rather than being ownerless, the owner of the string is liable to pay half the damages, because the string is like a moving pit.27
11. If the owner of the string hid the string, and the roosters trod on it and took it out, and then it became ensnarled around their feet, and as a result utensils were broken, the owner of the string is also freed of liability,28 for [the damage] was beyond his control.29
12. [The following rules apply when] roosters flew from place to place and broke utensils. If they broke the utensils with their wings, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage.30 If the utensils were broken by the wind generated by [the roosters'] wings, [the owner] is liable for half the damages.31
13. [If roosters] were digging32 at dough or at produce and soiled it or pecked at it, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage.33 If they caused damages with the dust or stones that they raised with their feet or with their wings, [the owner] is liable for half the damages.34
14. If [roosters] were pecking at a rope [that held a bucket], the rope tore, and the bucket broke, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage. [This applies when] the bucket rolled until it fell and broke because of them.35
If there was food on the rope, and the rope tore while they were eating, they are liable to pay the entire amount of the damage to the rope as well.36
15. When a dog or a goat jumps from a roof downward and breaks utensils, [the owner] is liable for the entire damages, because they are prone to this.37
Similarly, if they fell and caused damages, [their owner is liable], because the fact that they climbed to the roof is considered negligence.38 [Therefore,] even if they fell because of forces beyond [the owner's] control, [he is liable], because whenever a person is negligent at the outset, and damage subsequently occurs because of forces beyond his control, he is liable.39
16. If [the animals] jump upward [and cause damage], [the owner] is liable for half.40 This applies when a goat climbs upward or a dog jumps. If, however, a dog climbed upward and a goat leaps, whether upward or downward, [the owner] is liable for the entire damage.41
Similarly, if a rooster jumps either upward or downward, [the owner] is liable to pay for the entire amount of the damage.
17. [The following laws apply when] a dog takes a cake [from a fire where it is cooking, a coal is stuck to the cake], and [the dog] takes [the cake] to a grain heap. If it places [the cake] down on the grain heap, eats the cake and kindles the grain heap, [the owner] is liable to pay the full damages for the cake and the place where it placed the cake [in the grain heap].42 For the remainder of the grain heap, he is required to pay only half the damages.43
If [the dog] dragged the cake all over the grain heap, burning it as it proceeded, [the owner] is liable to pay the entire damages for the cake. For the place of the coals,44 [the owner] is liable to pay half the damages,45 and for the remainder of the grain heap he is not liable at all.46
18. When does the above apply? When the owner of the coal guarded his fire and closed the door, and yet the dog dug underneath [until it could enter and] take the cake from the fire.47 If, however, he did not guard his fire, the owner of the fire is liable for the burning of the grain heap,48 and the owner of the dog is liable for the cake and the place where it was placed.49
19. When a person sets a dog belonging to a colleague on a [third] individual, he is not held liable by mortal courts;50 the laws of heaven, however, obligate him to pay.51
The owner of the dog is liable to pay half the damages.52 Since he knows that if his dog is set upon [a person] maliciously he will bite him, he should not have allowed [his dog to be left to do this].
If [a person] set a dog [belonging to a colleague] to bite the person himself, the owner of the dog is not liable. For when there is already a deviation from the norm,53 and a person brings about a further deviation,54 [the owner] is not liable.
20. When there are two cows in the public domain, one lying down and one walking, if the one walking kicks the one lying down, [the owner] is liable for half the damages.55 Even though it would be the ordinary practice for [the cow] to tread on the cow that is lying down, it is not its ordinary practice to kick it.56
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The Ra'avad emphasizes that when an animal has been deemed prone to cause damage through goring or one of its derivatives, it is deemed mu'ad only with regard to the particular activity that it performed repeatedly, but not with regard to any of the other derivatives of goring. |
| 2. | See Chapter 1, Halachah 4-5. |
| 3. | For like damages caused by treading, it involves damages caused accidentally by an animal when walking in its ordinary manner. |
| 4. | The Lechem Mishneh raises questions regarding this point, but the Rambam's ruling is justified by the later commentaries. |
| 5. | See Halachah 7, which clarifies the distinction between this and other instances where half payment is required. |
| 6. | I.e., it is a law that was communicated orally to Moses on Mount Sinai and then transmitted orally from generation to generation. Although such laws are usually not even alluded to in the Written Law, their authority is the same as that of a law stated in Scripture. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin, Chapter 6). |
| 7. | Despite the fact that the animal was walking in the public domain, since the damage took place in a private domain, the owner is liable. |
| 8. | The damage to the first utensil is an ordinary instance of treading, while the damage to the second utensil is a case of the law illustrated in the previous two halachot. |
| 9. | Intentionally. |
| 10. | See Chapter 1, Halachah 11 and notes. |
| 11. | This law is the subject of an unresolved question in Bava Kama 19a. The question is whether kicking the stone is considered like goring - for the kicking was done intentionally - in which case the owner would be liable for damage caused in the public domain, or it is considered to be an ordinary instance of stones that were propelled, and since the damage took place in the public domain, the owner is not held liable.Even according to the logic that maintains that the owner is liable, he is liable for only a fourth of the damage. This figure is arrived at as follows: When damage is caused by propelling stones, the owner is required to pay only half. Since the animal is considered to be a tam - i.e., it is not prone to cause such damages - the owner is required to pay only half of the amount for which he would be liable. Thus, one half of a half is a quarter.Since the question was not resolved by the Sages, the owner should not be held liable. Conversely, if the person whose property was damaged seized the money involved, it should not be expropriated from him.The Ra'avad raises objections to the Rambam's ruling, based on a different understanding of the Talmudic passage. The later authorities, however, follow the Rambam. |
| 12. | This law is an extension of the unresolved question mentioned in the previous halachah. Since the damage took place in a private domain, the owner is definitely held liable. The question is whether he is liable for half the damages or for only a quarter of the damages. According to the opinion that maintains that kicking is considered a deviation, he should be held liable for only a fourth. According to the opinion that maintains that a deviation is not significant with regard to this category of damages, he is liable to pay half the damages.Since the matter was left unresolved, the owner may be required to pay only one fourth. If, however, the person whose property was damaged seized the owner's property, he need not relinquish half the value of the damages. |
| 13. | The principles operating in this instance are the same as those operating in the first clause. The only reason for mentioning this law is that since it is impossible that the animal would not propel stones, one might not think that the deviation is significant, and the owner should be held liable for half the damages, as in an ordinary case of this nature. This premise is, nevertheless, not accepted. |
| 14. | In this instance, although the owner does not pay for the full extent of the damages, none of the leniencies stated below apply.With regard to the payment of half-damages, according to ordinary logic - and indeed, this was the practice of the secular laws at that time - since the animal was not mu'ad, prone to cause damage, one would not think to hold the owner liable. Nevertheless, to insure higher standards of respect for property, Torah law fined the owner of the animal for half the damages. |
| 15. | See Halachah 3. |
| 16. | This applies even if after a person admits that he is liable for a fine, witnesses testify to that effect (Hilchot Geneivah 3:8-9 and the Maggid Mishneh). There are also other distinctions between fines and monetary obligations; for example, cases involving fines were arbitrated only by judges who were given semichah. Thus, they are not arbitrated in the present era. |
| 17. | As is the case when one's animal eats produce belonging to someone else. |
| 18. | The parallel between this instance and stones that are propelled can be explained as follows: When an animal propels a stone and the stone causes damage, the damage is not caused directly by the animal's body, but indirectly by the power it generated. Similarly, when the rooster breaks the container by crowing, the damage is caused indirectly, as a result of the animal's energy. |
| 19. | I.e., a rooster is likely to stick its head into a container in order to eat food, and it is likely to crow while eating. |
| 20. | Since this is a deviation from the animal's ordinary pattern, one is liable only for half the damages. The Ra'avad raises the question: Since the first clause of the halachah draws an analogy between the rooster's crowing and an animal's propelling stones, how is this instance different from the law stated in Halachah 6, where the owner is held liable for only a quarter of the damages his animal caused?The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's rationale is difficult to understand, but offers the following explanation. When there are no spices in the container, crowing and breaking the container is considered to be a derivative of goring, not of propelling stones.The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 390:9) does not resolve the issue, explaining that since a deviation from the ordinary pattern is involved, the case is considered a fine and is not arbitrated in the present era. |
| 21. | These are not considered departures from the norm. Instead, they are considered derivatives of the category of propelling stones. Therefore, payment is required for only half the damages. |
| 22. | The Ra'avad raises many questions concerning the Rambam's decision, and similarly, Rabbenu Asher interprets the passage in Bava Kama 17a differently from the Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 390:10) quotes the Rambam's interpretation, while the Ramah refers to the Rambam's rulings as satum, closed to us, and follows the approach of Rabbenu Asher. |
| 23. | It appears that the Rambam considers the string to be like stones propelled by an animal's feet (tz'rurot). They are not considered as a pit, an inanimate object that causes damage, for as the Ra'avad notes, one is liable for the full damages caused by a pit and not half the damages. |
| 24. | I.e., by the rooster's owner. If it was tied by another person, the owner is not held liable, and the others are required to pay half the damages. |
| 25. | As mentioned, the string is considered to be a pit. With regard to that category of damages, Bava Kama 19b states that the pit must be brought into being by a person. If it is brought into being by an animal, the owner of the animal is not liable. In this case, since the owner did not tie the string to the rooster, he is not liable. |
| 26. | Other than the owner of the rooster. |
| 27. | As stated by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 411:4), when an object belonging to a person is left in the public domain, moved by an animal and then causes damage, the owner of the animal and the owner of the article must share the cost of the damages equally. |
| 28. | I.e., the owner of the rooster is freed of liability, because as above, he did not tie the string to the rooster. |
| 29. | I.e., he did everything he could to prevent the damage from occurring. |
| 30. | I.e., this is comparable to an animal's breaking a utensil by treading upon it. |
| 31. | The wind produced by the roosters' wings is comparable to an an animal's propelling stones. |
| 32. | Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 2:1). |
| 33. | I.e., since the roosters caused the damage in an ordinary fashion with their bodies, the owner is liable for the entire amount. |
| 34. | This is also comparable to an animal's propelling stones. |
| 35. | I.e., the roosters pushed the bucket until it fell and broke. They were thus the direct cause of its breaking, and this is considered as treading.If the bucket broke as a result of the rope's tearing, the ruling depends on whether the rope is new or worn. We assume that a rooster will peck at a rope slightly to sip its moisture. Thus, if the rope is worn, it is normal for it to snap. Hence, the owner is liable for the entire damages. If the rope is new, for the rope to tear from such pecking is not ordinary, and the owner is liable for only half the damages (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 390:11). |
| 36. | Since there is food on the rope, we assume that the roosters will peck on it exceedingly, and it will tear even if it is new. |
| 37. | This is considered to be a derivative of treading. |
| 38. | I.e., the animals' owner should have known that his animals are prone to climb to the roof, and he should have taken precautions against that happening. |
| 39. | Bava Metzia 42a explains that the logic is that, if not for the negligence, the damage would never have been caused by forces beyond their control. |
| 40. | For this is a departure from the norm. |
| 41. | For this is their ordinary pattern. The Rambam's ruling follows the version of Bava Kama 22a cited by Rabbenu Chanan'el and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard version of the Talmud we possess today differs.Our translation differs from that of Rashi and the Nimukei Yosef who translate as lowered itself while hanging. |
| 42. | This is the ordinary pattern of a dog, who will grab food from a fire in order to eat it. And since it is likely that a coal will remain attached to the cake, the owner of the dog is liable for the place where the cake is placed down as well. |
| 43. | The standard printed texts of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 2:3) offer the following rationale: This is a deviation from the ordinary pattern. This does not follow any of the explanations given in the Talmud. Rav Kapach's text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah explains that the burning of the rest of the grain heap is compared to stones that are kicked, for in both cases the damage is caused indirectly. This follows Rabbi Yochanan's position, Bava Kama 22a. |
| 44. | According to the Radbaz (Volume V, Responsum 1662), this refers to all the places over which the dog dragged the coals. |
| 45. | For this is considered comparable to stones that are kicked. |
| 46. | The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the owner is forced to pay one fourth of the damages, because he considers this case comparable to propelling stones, except that a deviation from the normal pattern is involved. The Tur also follows this approach. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 392:1) follows the opinion of the Rambam, while the Ramah mentions that of the Tur.The Rambam's opinion can be substantiated based on Hilchot Rotze'ach 6:15, which states that a person is not liable for ko'ach kocho, an activity that comes about as an indirect result of his exertion of energy. It appears that the Rambam considers the damage caused by propelling stones to be kocho, a direct result of the person's energy, and not ko'ach kocho (Kessef Mishneh, Radbaz). The Ra'avad, by contrast, considers propelling stones to be ko'ach kocho. |
| 47. | In which case, the owner of the dog is responsible for all the damages, for the fire took place because of his negligence. |
| 48. | For it is his negligence that made the fire possible. |
| 49. | For the dog caused this damage directly.The Ra'avad and the Tur, who in the previous law maintain that the owner of the dog must pay one fourth of the damages to the grain heap, maintain that he is liable for that amount in this instance as well. Hence, the owner of the fire is liable for only three fourths of the damages. In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the opinion of the Rambam, while the Ramah mentions that of the Tur. |
| 50. | This reflects a fundamental principle in the laws of damages. Grama, being an indirect cause, does not generate liability. |
| 51. | I.e., he has a moral and ethical obligation to pay for the damages. See Bava Kama 55b, which gives several instances of grama and states that the person who indirectly caused the damage has a moral obligation to compensate for it. |
| 52. | Dogs do not usually bite. Therefore, the fact that the person who set the dog on the third person provoked it to do so is considered a departure from the norm, and the owner is liable for only half the damages.The Ra'avad adds that if the dog is known to be prone to bite, the owner is liable for the entire amount of the damages. The Maggid Mishneh differs, maintaining that since the dog was provoked by the person who set it, this is considered a departure from the norm. (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 5.) Sefer Me'irat Einayim 395:2 quotes the Maggid Mishneh's view. |
| 53. | Causing the dog to bite. |
| 54. | Causing the dog to bite his own master. |
| 55. | This is considered a derivative of goring. Since the cow is not known to be prone to kick other animals, the owner is liable for only half the damages. |
| 56. | The owner would not have been liable if the cow had caused the damage by treading on the other cow. Since he did cause the damage by kicking, the owner is liable. |
• Thursday, Menachem Av 28, 5775 · 13 August 2015
"Today's Day"
Sunday Menachem Av 28 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Shoftim, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 135-139.
Tanya: IX. My beloved, (p. 435) ...for the initiated. (p. 437).
There are two general approaches in healing a bodily illness: a) To heal the particular organ or faculty that is defective, sick or weak; b) to strengthen the healthy organs and faculties so that they may overcome and heal the sick organ or faculty.
The parallel in illnesses of the soul are the two approaches in service of G-d - teshuva and good deeds.
Daily Thought:
Open Your Eyes
This goal, when will we reach it?
It was once far, but now it is near.
When will we hold it in our hands?
When we will open our eyes to see it is already here.[among the last teachings we heard from the Rebbe.]
____________________________
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