Tuesday, August 11, 2015

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Wednesday, August 12, 2015 - Today is: Wednesday, Av 27, 5775 · August 12, 2015

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Wednesday, August 12, 2015 - Today is: Wednesday, Av 27, 5775 · August 12, 2015
Daily Quote:
Think good, and it will be good[Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Lubavitch (1789-1866)]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Re'eh, 4th Portion Deuteronomy 14:1-14:21 with Rashi
• 
Chapter 14
1You are children of the Lord, your God. You shall neither cut yourselves nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead. אבָּנִים אַתֶּם לַיהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם לֹא תִתְגֹּדְדוּ וְלֹא תָשִׂימוּ קָרְחָה בֵּין עֵינֵיכֶם לָמֵת:
You shall neither cut yourselves: Do not make cuts and incisions in your flesh [to mourn] for the dead, in the manner that the Amorites do, because you are the children of the Omnipresent and it is appropriate for you to be handsome and not to be cut or have your hair torn out. לא תתגודדו: לא תתנו גדידה ושרט בבשרכם על מת כדרך שהאמוריים עושין, לפי שאתם בניו של מקום ואתם ראוין להיות נאים ולא גדודים ומקורחים:
[nor make any baldness] between your eyes: [i.e.,] near the forehead. Elsewhere, however, it says: “They shall not make their head bald” (Lev. 21: 5), to make the entire head like between the eyes (בֵּין עֵינַיִם) [i.e., one must not make bald spots on any part of the head]. — [Sifrei] בין עיניכם: אצל הפדחת. ובמקום אחר הוא אומר (ויקרא כא, ה) לא יקרחו קרחה בראשם, לעשות כל הראש כבין העינים:
2For you are a holy people to the Lord, your God, and the Lord has chosen you to be a treasured people for Him, out of all the nations that are upon the earth. בכִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַיהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וּבְךָ בָּחַר יְהֹוָה לִהְיוֹת לוֹ לְעַם סְגֻלָּה מִכֹּל הָעַמִּים אֲשֶׁר עַל פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה:
For you are a holy people: Your holiness stems from your forefathers, and, moreover, “the Lord has chosen you.” - [Sifrei] כי עם קדוש אתה: קדושת עצמך מאבותיך. ועוד, ובך בחר ה':
3You shall not eat any abomination. גלֹא תֹאכַל כָּל תּוֹעֵבָה:
[You shall not eat] any abomination: Anything that I have declared to be an abomination for you-for instance, if he made a slit in the ear of a firstborn [animal], in order to [be permitted to] slaughter it in the country [i.e., outside the Temple walls, where unblemished firstborns must be slaughtered]. This is a thing that I have declared to be an abomination for you, for“no blemish shall be in it” (Lev. 22:21) [meaning that one may not make a blemish on a firstborn or on any sacrificial animal. Our verse] comes to teach here that one may not slaughter [the firstborn] and eat it based on that [deliberately made] blemish. [Another example is] if one cooked meat in milk, which is a thing that I declared an abomination for you; and here Scripture admonishes against eating it. — [Chul. 114b] כל תועבה: כל שתעבתי לך, שאם צרם אוזן בכור כדי לשוחטו במדינה, הרי דבר שתעבתי לך כל מום לא יהיה בו, ובא ולמד כאן שלא ישחט ויאכל על אותו המום. בשל בשר בחלב הרי דבר שתעבתי לך, והזהיר כאן על אכילתו:
4These are the animals that you may eat: ox, lamb, and kid, דזֹאת הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכֵלוּ שׁוֹר שֵׂה כְשָׂבִים וְשֵׂה עִזִּים:
5gazelle, deer, and antelope, ibex, chamois, bison, and giraffe. האַיָּל וּצְבִי וְיַחְמוּר וְאַקּוֹ וְדִישֹׁן וּתְאוֹ וָזָמֶר:
This is the animal [which you may eat…] the gazelle, and the deer, and the antelope: [Since the verse begins with“This is the animal (בְּהֵמָה) …” and then goes on to enumerate types of wild beasts (חַיָּה),] we learn that the category of wild beasts (חַיָּה) is included in the category of (בְּהֵמָה) , [which usually refers only to domestic animals]. - [Sifrei ; Chul. 71a] We learn also that unclean domestic and wild animals are more numerous than clean [ones] since the less numerous are always enumerated. [Therefore, the clean animals are enumerated here.] - [Sifrei; Chul. 63a] זאת הבהמה וגו', איל וצבי ויחמור : למדנו שהחיה בכלל בהמה ולמדנו שבהמה וחיה טמאה, מרובה מן הטהורה, שבכל מקום פורט את המועט:
and the ibex: Heb. וְאַקּוֹ. This is rendered by Targum [Onkelos] as יַעִלָא, [like the Hebrew יָעֵל in the expression] יַעִלֵי סָלַע (Job 39:1). This is known as estainboc [in Old French, mountain goat. ואקו: מתורגם יעלא (איוב לט, א) יעלי סלע הוא אשטנבו"ק [יעל סלע]:
and the bison: Heb. וּתְאוֹ.[Onkelos renders this:] וְתוּרְבָּלָא, [which is the equivalent of] תּוֹר הַיַעַר,“the ox of the forest,” for בָּאלָא means“forest” in the Aramaic language. ותאו: תורבלא, שור היער. באלא יער, בלשון ארמי:
6And every animal that has a split hoof and has a hoof cloven into two hoof sections, [and] chews the cud among the animals that you may eat. ווְכָל בְּהֵמָה מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְשֹׁסַעַת שֶׁסַע שְׁתֵּי פְרָסוֹת מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה בַּבְּהֵמָה אֹתָהּ תֹּאכֵלוּ:
split: Heb. מַפְרֶסֶת, split, as the Targum [Onkelos renders it]. מפרסת: סדוקה כתרגומו:
hoof: Heb. פַּרְסָה, plante [in French]. פרסה: פלנט"א [כף רגל]:
[and has a hoof] cloven [into two hoof sections]: [Hooves] cloven into two“nails,” for there are [animals with hooves] split but not entirely cloven into [two] nails; such animals are unclean. ושסעת: חלוקה בשתי צפרנים שיש סדוקה ואינה חלוקה בצפרנים והיא טמאה:
among the animals - [that you may eat]: Heb. בַּבְּהֵמָה This [means literally“within the animal”], meaning that anything found inside the beast, you may eat. From here [our Rabbis] said that a fetus becomes permitted to be eaten through the [proper] slaughtering of its mother [without requiring its own slaughtering]. — [Chul. 69a] בבהמה: משמע מה שנמצא בבהמה אכול, מכאן אמרו שהשליל ניתר בשחיטת אמו:
7But you shall not eat of those that chew the cud, or of those that have the split hooves: the cloven one, the camel, the hyrax, and the hare, for they chew the cud, but do not have split hooves; they are unclean for you. זאַךְ אֶת זֶה לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִמַּעֲלֵי הַגֵּרָה וּמִמַּפְרִיסֵי הַפַּרְסָה הַשְּׁסוּעָה אֶת הַגָּמָל וְאֶת הָאַרְנֶבֶת וְאֶת הַשָּׁפָן כִּי מַעֲלֵה גֵרָה הֵמָּה וּפַרְסָה לֹא הִפְרִיסוּ טְמֵאִים הֵם לָכֶם:
the cloven one: This is a certain creature that has two backs and two spinal columns (Chul. 60b). Our Rabbis said: Why are [these animals and birds] repeated [here, since they are already mentioned in Lev. 11]? Because of the [animal called] שְׁסוּעָה, and in [the category of] fowl because of the רָאָה, both of which are not mentioned in Torath Kohanim [i.e., Lev.]. — [Chul. 63b] השסועה: בריה היא שיש לה שני גבין ושתי שדראות. אמרו רבותינו למה נשנו, בבהמות מפני השסועה, ובעופות מפני הראה, שלא נאמרו בתורת כהנים:
8And the pig, because it has a split hoof, but does not chew the cud; it is unclean for you. You shall neither eat of their flesh nor touch their carcass. חוְאֶת הַחֲזִיר כִּי מַפְרִיס פַּרְסָה הוּא וְלֹא גֵרָה טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם מִבְּשָׂרָם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ וּבְנִבְלָתָם לֹא תִגָּעוּ:
nor touch their carcass: Our Rabbis explained [that this refers only to] the Festival[s], for a person is obliged to purify himself for the Festival. One might think that [all Israelites] are prohibited [from touching a carcass] during the entire year. Therefore, Scripture states [in reference to the uncleanness of a corpse], “Say to the kohanim … [none shall be defiled for the dead…]” (Lev. 21:1). Now if in the case of the uncleanness caused by a [human] corpse, which is a stringent [kind of uncleanness, only] kohanim are prohibited regarding it but [ordinary] Israelites are not prohibited, then in the case of uncleanness caused by a carcass [of an animal], which is light [i.e., a less stringent uncleanness], how much more so [is the case that ordinary Israelites are permitted to touch these carcasses]! ובנבלתם לא תגעו: רבותינו פירשו, ברגל. שאדם חייב לטהר את עצמו ברגל. יכול יהיו מוזהרים בכל השנה, תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כא, א) אמור אל הכהנים וגו' ומה טומאת המת חמורה, כהנים מוזהרים ואין ישראל מוזהרים, טומאת נבלה קלה לא כל שכן:
9These you may eat of all that are in the waters; all that have fins and scales, you may eat. טאֶת זֶה תֹּאכְלוּ מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר בַּמָּיִם כֹּל אֲשֶׁר לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת תֹּאכֵלוּ:
10But whatever does not have fins and scales, you shall not eat; it is unclean for you. יוְכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֵין לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם:
11You may eat every clean bird. יאכָּל צִפּוֹר טְהֹרָה תֹּאכֵלוּ:
You may eat every clean bird: [“Every”] comes to include [as permissible to eat] the bird that is set free [in the purification rite] of a metzora (see Lev. 14:7). - [Sifrei ; Kid. 57a] כל צפור טהורה תאכלו: להתיר משולחת שבמצורע:
12But these are those from which you shall not eat: The eagle [or the griffin vulture], the ossifrage, the osprey; יבוְזֶה אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מֵהֶם הַנֶּשֶׁר וְהַפֶּרֶס וְהָעָזְנִיָּה:
But these are those from which you shall not eat: [The word “which” comes] to forbid [as food] the [bird that is] slaughtered [in the purification rite of a metzora]. — [Sifrei; Kid. 57a] וזה אשר לא תאכלו מהם: לאסור את השחוטה:
13and the white vulture, and the black vulture, and the kite after its species; יגוְהָרָאָה וְאֶת הָאַיָּה וְהַדַּיָּה לְמִינָהּ:
the white vulture and the black vulture: רָאָה, אַיָּה and דַּיָּה are [names for] the same [or similar] bird. Why is its name called רָאָה ? Because it sees (רוֹאֶה) very well. And why does [Scripture] admonish you with all its names? In order not to give an opponent any opportunity to disagree, so that the one who wishes to prohibit should not call it רָאָה, and the one who wishes to permit it will say,“This one is named דַּיָּה,” or “This one is named אַיָּה,” and Scripture did not prohibit this one!" And in the case of birds, [Scripture] enumerates the unclean species, to teach that the clean birds are more numerous than the unclean [in contrast with Rashi on verses 4-5, regarding animals]. Therefore, it enumerates the fewer ones. - [Chul. 63b] והראה ואת האיה וגו': היא ראה היא איה היא דיה. ולמה נקרא שמה ראה, שרואה ביותר. ולמה הזהיר בכל שמותיה, שלא ליתן פתחון פה לבעל דין לחלוק, שלא יהא האוסרה קורא אותה ראה והבא להתיר אומר, זו דיה שמה או איה שמה, וזו לא אסר הכתוב. ובעופות פרט לך הטמאים, ללמד שהעופות הטהורים מרובים על הטמאים, לפיכך פרט את המועט:
14And every raven after its species; ידוְאֵת כָּל עֹרֵב לְמִינוֹ:
15And the ostrich, and the owl, and the gull, and the hawk after its species; טווְאֵת בַּת הַיַּעֲנָה וְאֶת הַתַּחְמָס וְאֶת הַשָּׁחַף וְאֶת הַנֵּץ לְמִינֵהוּ:
16The falcon, and the ibis, and the bat; טזאֶת הַכּוֹס וְאֶת הַיַּנְשׁוּף וְהַתִּנְשָׁמֶת:
the bat: Heb. וְהַתִּנְשֶׁמֶת, calve-soriz [in Old French], bat, [chauve souris in modern French. Note that Rashi on Isa. 2:20 brings this laaz for עִטַלֵּף, whereas here and in Lev. 11:18, he brings it for תִּנְשֶׁמֶת and does not identify עִטַלֵּף. והתנשמת: קלב"א שורי"ץ [עטלף]:
17And the pelican, and the magpie, and the cormorant; יזוְהַקָּאָת וְאֶת הָרָחָמָה וְאֶת הַשָּׁלָךְ:
the cormorant: [or the gull] Heb. שָׁלָךְ, [a bird] that draws out (שׁוֹלֶה) fish from the sea. — [Chul. 63b] שלך: השולה דגים מן הים:
18And the stork, and the heron and its species, and the hoopoe, and the atalef. יחוְהַחֲסִידָה וְהָאֲנָפָה לְמִינָהּ וְהַדּוּכִיפַת וְהָעֲטַלֵּף:
and the hoopoe: וְהַדּוּכִיפַת. The wild rooster, [which is called] in Old French haruppe, and which has a double crest. — [Gittin 68] דוכיפת: הוא תרנגול הבר ובלע"ז הרופ"א [דוכיפת] וכרבלתו כפולה:
19And every flying insect is unclean for you; they may not be eaten. יטוְכֹל שֶׁרֶץ הָעוֹף טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם לֹא יֵאָכֵלוּ:
flying insects: שֶׁרֶץ. These are the lowly [creatures] that swarm on the ground: flies, hornets, and the unclean species of locusts. [All these] are called שֶׁרֶץ. שרץ העוף: הם הנמוכים הרוחשים על הארץ, כגון זבובין וצרעים וחגבים טמאים, הם קרויים שרץ:
20You may eat any clean fowl. ככָּל עוֹף טָהוֹר תֹּאכֵלוּ:
You may eat every clean fowl: But not the unclean ones. Here [Scripture] comes to attach a positive commandment to the negative commandment. Similarly, in the case of [clean] animals, it says:“that you may eat” (verse 6), [but] not the unclean ones. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment [is regarded as] a positive commandment, so that one [who eats such food] transgresses a positive and a negative commandment. כל עוף טהור תאכלו: ולא את הטמא. בא ליתן עשה על לא תעשה. וכן בבהמה, אותה תאכלו ולא בהמה טמאה, לאו הבא מכלל עשה עשה, לעבור עליהם בעשה ולא תעשה:
21You shall not eat any carcass. You may give it to the stranger who is in your cities, that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a holy people to the Lord, your God. You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk. כאלֹא תֹאכְלוּ כָל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכֹר לְנָכְרִי כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַיהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ:
You shall not eat any carcass. You may give it] to the stranger who is within your cities: [i.e.,] a resident alien (גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב), who has accepted upon himself not to worship idols, but he eats carcasses [animals not ritually slaughtered]. — [Sifrei] לגר אשר בשעריך: גר תושב שקבל עליו שלא לעבוד עבודה זרה ואוכל נבלות:
for you are a holy people to the Lord: Sanctify yourself with that which is permitted to you; i.e., there are things which are technically permissible, but which some people treat as forbidden. In the presence of these people, do not treat those things as permissible. — [Sifrei] כי עם קדוש אתה לה': קדש את עצמך במותר לך. דברים המותרים ואחרים נוהגים בהם איסור, אל תתירם בפניהם:
You shall not cook a kid [in its mother’s milk]: [This is stated] three times [here, in Exod. 23:19, and in Exod. 34:26], to exclude wild animals, fowl, and unclean animals [from the prohibition of cooking meat in milk]. — [Chul. 113a] ולא תבשל גדי: שלש פעמים. פרט לחיה ולעופות ולבהמה טמאה:לא תבשל גדי וגו':
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 120 - 134
• Chapter 120
This psalm rebukes slanderers, describing how the deadly effect of slander reaches even further than weapons.
1. A song of ascents. I have called out to the Lord in my distress, and He answered me.
2. O Lord, rescue my soul from the lips of falsehood, from a deceitful tongue.
3. What can He give you, and what [further restraint] can He add to you, O deceitful tongue?
4. [You resemble] the sharp arrows of a mighty one, and the coals of broom-wood.1
5. Woe unto me that I sojourned among Meshech, that I dwelt beside the tents of Kedar.
6. Too long has my soul dwelt among those who hate peace.
7. I am for peace, but when I speak, they are for war.
Chapter 121
This psalm alludes to the Lower Paradise, from which one ascends to the Higher Paradise. It also speaks of how God watches over us.
1. A song of ascents. I lift my eyes to the mountains-from where will my help come?
2. My help will come from the Lord, Maker of heaven and earth.
3. He will not let your foot falter; your guardian does not slumber.
4. Indeed, the Guardian of Israel neither slumbers nor sleeps.
5. The Lord is your guardian; the Lord is your protective shade at your right hand.
6. The sun will not harm you by day, nor the moon by night.
7. The Lord will guard you from all evil; He will guard your soul.
8. The Lord will guard your going and your coming from now and for all time.
Chapter 122
The psalmist sings the praises of Jerusalem and tells of the miracles that happened there.
1. A song of ascents by David. I rejoiced when they said to me, "Let us go to the House of the Lord.”
2. Our feet were standing within your gates, O Jerusalem;
3. Jerusalem that is built like a city in which [all Israel] is united together.
4. For there the tribes went up, the tribes of God-as enjoined upon Israel-to offer praise to the Name of the Lord.
5. For there stood the seats of justice, the thrones of the house of David.
6. Pray for the peace of Jerusalem; may those who love you have peace.
7. May there be peace within your walls, serenity within your mansions.
8. For the sake of my brethren and friends, I ask that there be peace within you.
9. For the sake of the House of the Lord our God, I seek your well-being.
Chapter 123
The psalmist laments the length of time we have already suffered in exile.
1. A song of ascents. To You have I lifted my eyes, You Who are enthroned in heaven.
2. Indeed, as the eyes of servants are turned to the hand of their masters, as the eyes of a maid to the hand of her mistress, so are our eyes turned to the Lord our God, until He will be gracious to us.
3. Be gracious to us, Lord, be gracious to us, for we have been surfeited with humiliation.
4. Our soul has been overfilled with the derision of the complacent, with the scorn of the arrogant.
Chapter 124
1. A song of ascents by David. Were it not for the Lord Who was with us-let Israel declare-
2. were it not for the Lord Who was with us when men rose up against us,
3. then they would have swallowed us alive in their burning rage against us.
4. Then the waters would have inundated us, the torrent would have swept over our soul;
5. then the raging waters would have surged over our soul.
6. Blessed is the Lord, Who did not permit us to be prey for their teeth.
7. Our soul is like a bird which has escaped from the fowler's snare; the snare broke and we escaped.
8. Our help is in the Name of the Lord, the Maker of heaven and earth.
Chapter 125
1. A song of ascents. Those who trust in the Lord are as Mount Zion which never falters, but abides forever.
2. Mountains surround Jerusalem, and the Lord surrounds His people from this time and forever.
3. For the rod of wickedness will never come to rest upon the lot of the righteous; therefore the righteous need not stretch their hand to iniquity.
4. Be beneficent, O Lord, to the good and to those who are upright in their hearts.
5. But as for those that turn to their perverseness, may the Lord lead them with the workers of iniquity. Peace be upon Israel.
Chapter 126
The psalmist speaks of the future, comparing our Divine service in exile to one who sows arid land, then cries and begs God to send rain upon it so that the seed not be wasted. When he merits to reap the crop, he offers thanks to God.
1. A song of ascents. When the Lord will return the exiles of Zion, we will have been like dreamers.
2. Then our mouth will be filled with laughter, and our tongue with songs of joy; then will they say among the nations, "The Lord has done great things for these.”
3. The Lord has done great things for us; we were joyful.
4. Lord, return our exiles as streams to arid soil.
5. Those who sow in tears will reap with songs of joy.
6. He goes along weeping, carrying the bag of seed; he will surely return with songs of joy, carrying his sheaves.
Chapter 127
King David instructs his generation, and especially his son Solomon, to be sure that all one's actions be for the sake of Heaven. He also criticizes those who toil day and night in pursuit of a livelihood.
1. A song of ascents for Solomon. If the Lord does not build a house, then its builders labor upon it in vain. If the Lord will not guard a city, the vigilance of its watchman is in vain.
2. It is in vain for you, you who rise early, who sit up late, and who eat the bread of tension, for in fact He gives His loved ones sleep.
3. Behold, the heritage of the Lord is children; the fruit of the womb is a reward.
4. As arrows in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of youth.
5. Fortunate is the man who has his quiver full of them; they will not find themselves shamed when they speak with enemies in public places.
Chapter 128
This psalm extols one who enjoys the fruits of his own labor, avoiding theft and deception, even refusing gifts. It also describes behavior appropriate to the God-fearing.
1. A song of ascents. Fortunate is every man who fears the Lord, who walks in His ways.
2. When you eat of the labor of your hands, you will be happy, and you will have goodness.
3. Your wife will be like a fruitful vine in the inner chambers of your house; your children will be like olive saplings around your table.
4. Behold, so will be blessed the man who fears the Lord.
5. May the Lord bless you out of Zion, and may you see the goodness of Jerusalem all the days of your life.
6. And may you see children [born] to your children; peace upon Israel.
Chapter 129
The psalmist laments the troubles of Israel.
1. A song of ascents. Much have they persecuted me from my youth on. Let Israel declare it now-
2. "Much have they persecuted me from my youth on, [but] they have not prevailed against me.”
3. The plowmen plowed upon my back; they wished to make their furrow long.
4. But the Lord is just; He cut the cords of the lawless.
5. They will be humiliated and will be turned back, all the haters of Zion.
6. They will be as grass upon the rooftops that withers before one plucks it,
7. wherewith the reaper has never filled his hand, nor the sheaf-binder his arm;
8. and of which the passers-by never have said: "The blessing of the Lord be upon you; we bless you in the name of the Lord."
Chapter 130
The psalmist prays for an end to this long exile.
1. A song of ascents. Out of the depths I call to You, O Lord.
2. My Lord, hearken to my voice; let Your ears be attentive to the sound of my pleas.
3. God, if You were to preserve iniquities, my Lord, who could survive?
4. But forgiveness is with You, that You may be held in awe.
5. I hope in the Lord; my soul hopes, and I long for His word.
6. My soul yearns for the Lord more than those awaiting the morning wait for the morning.
7. Israel, put your hope in the Lord, for with the Lord there is kindness; with Him there is abounding deliverance.
8. And He will redeem Israel from all its iniquities.
Chapter 131
In this prayer, David declares that never in the course of his life was he haughty, nor did he pursue greatness or worldly pleasures.
1. A song of ascents, by David. O Lord, my heart was not proud, nor were my eyes haughty; I did not seek matters that were too great and too wondrous for me.
2. Surely I put my soul at peace and soothed it like a weaned child with his mother; my soul was like a weaned child.
3. Let Israel hope in the Lord from this time forth and forever.
Chapter 132
David composed this psalm while he and the elders of Israel wore sackcloth, in mourning over the plague that had descended upon the land, and their being distant from the Holy Temple. David therefore offers intense prayers, entreating God to remember the hardship and sacrifice he endured for the sake of the Temple.
1. A song of ascents. O Lord, remember unto David all his suffering,
2. how he swore to the Lord, and vowed to the Mighty Power of Jacob:
3. "I will not enter into the tent of my house; I will not go up into the bed that is spread for me;
4. I will not give sleep to my eyes, nor slumber to my eyelids;
5. until I will have found a place for the Lord, a resting place for the Mighty Power of Jacob.”
6. Lo, we heard of it in Ephrath; we found it in the field of the forest.
7. We will come to His resting places; we will prostrate ourselves at His footstool.
8. Ascend, O Lord, to Your resting place, You and the Ark of Your might.
9. May Your priests clothe themselves in righteousness, and may Your pious ones sing joyous songs.
10. For the sake of David Your servant, turn not away the face of Your anointed.
11. For the Lord has sworn to David a truth from which He will never retreat: "From the fruit of your womb will I set for you upon the throne.
12. If your sons will keep My covenant and this testimony of mine which I will teach them, then their sons, too, will sit on the throne for you until the end of time.
13. For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His habitation.
14. This is My resting place to the end of time. Here will I dwell, for I have desired it.
15. I will abundantly bless her sustenance; I will satisfy her needy with bread.
16. I will clothe her priests with salvation, and her pious ones will sing joyous songs.
17. There I will cause David's power to flourish; there I have prepared a lamp for My anointed.
18. His enemies will I clothe with shame, but upon him, his crown will blossom."
Chapter 133
1. A song of ascents, by David. Behold, how good and how pleasant it is when brothers dwell together.
2. Like the precious oil [placed] upon the head, flowing [in abundance] down the beard, the beard of Aaron which rests upon his garments.
3. Like the dew of Hermon which comes down upon the mountains of Zion, for there the Lord has commanded blessing, life unto eternity.
Chapter 134
The psalmist exhorts the scholarly and pious to rise from their beds at night, and go to the House of God.
1. A song of ascents. Behold: Bless the Lord, all you servants of the Lord who stand in the House of the Lord in the nights.
2. Lift up your hands in holiness and bless the Lord.
3. May the Lord, Who makes heaven and earth, bless you from Zion.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 8
Lessons in Tanya
• Wednesday, 
Menachem Av 27, 5775 · August 12, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 8
אך הענין הוא, על דרך משל, כמו שזורעין זרעים או נוטעין גרעין
The above concept, however, can be understood by the analogy of sowing seeds of grain or planting kernels of fruit:
שהשבולת הצומחת מהזרע, והאילן ופירותיו מהגרעין
the shoot that sprouts from the seed, and the tree with its fruits from the kernel,
אינן מהותן ועצמותן של הזרע והגרעין כלל
are not the very essence and being of the seed or the kernel at all,
כי מהותם ועצמותם כלה ונרקב בארץ
for their essence and being has been spent and is decayed in the soil, and they are thus not the source of the vegetative property.
וכח הצומח שבארץ עצמה נוסח אחר: עצמו, הוא המוציא והמגדל השבולת והאילן ופירותיו
It is the vegetative property in the soil itself rather than the particular vegetative power that resulted in the seed or the kernel which brings about the growth of the shoot or the tree and its fruit;
The vegetative power of growth is a Divine faculty that enables physical growth to result from a spiritual property, in a manner of creation ex nihilo. But if the actual growth of any grain or fruit results from the universal power of vegetative growth and not from a particular seed or kernel, then why plant them in the first place? The answer is:
רק שאינו מוציא ומגלה כחו לחוץ, מהכח אל הפועל
it is only that [the earth’s vegetative power] does not manifest its power outwardly, from the potential to the actual,
כי אם על ידי הזרע והגרעין
except by means of the seed or the kernel
שנרקבין בארץ, וכלה כל כחם בכח הצומח שבארץ
that are decayed in the soil and whose whole power — the power of growth that originated in the earth’s vegetative property that was implanted in them as they grew — has been consumed by the vegetative property in the soil,
ונתאחדו והיו לאחדים
so that they unite and become one. I.e., the particular power of growth, that resulted in the seed or kernel, unites with the earth’s universal vegetative property.
ועל ידי זה מוציא כח הצומח את כחו אל הפועל, ומשפיע חיות לגדל שבולת כעין הזרע
In this way the vegetative property actualizes its potential, and effuses vitality that makes possible the growth of a shoot that is related to the seed that was sown,
אבל בריבוי הרבה מאד בשבולת אחת
though with a very great increase in any single shoot, so that one ear of corn comprises many grains,
וכן פירות הרבה על אילן אחד
and likewise, there are many fruits on a single tree.
וגם מהותן ועצמותן של הפירות מעולה, בעילוי רב ועצום, למעלה מעלה ממהותו ועצמותו של הגרעין הנטוע
Moreover, the very nature and essence of the fruits immensely excels the nature and essence of the planted kernel, in that the bland and tasteless kernel serves as the source for delicious fruit.
וכן כהאי גוונא בפירות הארץ, הגדלים מזרעונין כעין גרעינין, כמו קשואים וכהאי גוונא
The same is true of the produce of the earth which grows from seeds just like kernels, such as cucumbers, and the like.
Thus, fruits and vegetables are not only quantitatively superior to the kernels that served as their respective sources, but are qualitatively superior as well. (The difference between grain and its original seed, however, is only one of quantity.)
והכל הוא מפני שעיקר ושרש חיות הפירות נשפע מכח הצומח שבארץ
All this is so because the stem and root of the vitality of the fruits issues from the vegetative property in the soil,
הכולל חיות כל הפירות
which includes the vitality of all fruits and causes them to grow,
Nevertheless, a kernel — moreover, the kernel of the specific species desired — must be sown, as is now explained:
והגרעינין הזרועים בארץ אינן אלא כעין אתערותא דלתתא
while the kernels that are sown in the ground are only like an “arousal from below,” that is necessary if one is to elicit a reciprocal “arousal from Above,”
הנקרא בשם העלאת מיין נוקבין בכתבי האריז״ל
this [“arousal from below”] being referred to in the writings of Rabbi Isaac Luria, of blessed memory, as the “elevation of mayin nukvin” (commonly abbreviated מ״נ) — the arousal of the “feminine waters” that serve as the recipient of the efflux of the “male waters.”
The same applies here as well: The power of vegetative growth is a spiritual power that encompasses all fruits and vegetables. Its spiritual state is such that it is far too lofty to descend spontaneously to a level at which it can make physical produce grow. The actual growth can only come about as a result of the “elevation of the feminine waters” of a particular fruit or grain. This arouses within the universal vegetative proper-ty the particular manifestation necessary for the growth of the specific kind of produce that is inherent in the kernel or seed that is sown.
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Wednesday, Menachem Av 27, 5775 · August 12, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 109
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
"He shall bathe all his body in water"—Leviticus 15:16.
A person who chooses to become cleansed of any ritual impurity is commanded to immerse in a mikvah [a natural pool of water]. According to the tradition of the Oral Law, for a mikvah to be kosher it must contain enough water for [an average] person to submerge himself within them—unless it is a moving stream of water, in which case even the smallest amount of water suffices [for a smaller than average individual, or for immersing a ritually impure utensil].
Some details:
Of all the types of ritually impure people, only the zav requires immersion in a moving stream of water.
This mitzvah is not obligatory. As long as an individual has no intention of entering the Temple Mount, he may remain in his ritually impure state.
An individual's purification process is not finalized until the sun sets on the day he immerses.
There may not be anything separating between the person's body and the waters of the mikvah.
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
Immersing in a Mikvah (Ritual Pool)
Positive Commandment 109
Translated by Berel Bell
The 109th mitzvah is that we are commanded to immerse in the waters of a mikvah and thereby be purified from whichever form of tumah previously existed.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He must immerse his entire body in water." The Oral Tradition2 explains that [the phrase "his entire body" also teaches that] there must be enough water to cover his entire body.3 This is the minimum size of a mikvah unless the water is from a spring, in which case there is no minimum amount,4 as explained in the laws which deal with this mitzvah.
Among the conditions [governing the mikvah] is that only in the case of a zav is spring water required,5 as the verse6 states, "mayim chaim."
When we say that immersion is a mitzvah, this does not mean that any person who is tameh is required to immerse himself — as one who wears a four-cornered garment must put tzitzis on it, or that anyone with a house must build a fence around the roof. [When I say, "it is a mitzvah,"] I refer to the laws of immersion — that we are commanded that anyone who wants purification from tumah can do so only through immersion in water, after which he becomes tahor.
The Sifra7 says, "One might think that the phrase8 'He must immerse in water' is a Divine decree [and that it is an absolute requirement to immerse]. The verse therefore says, 'then he can return to the camp' [after being purified] from tumah." This hints to the principle I just explained, i.e. that the mitzvah is just the law, i.e. that one who wants to be purified should take certain steps. This law is itself the mitzvah. This does not mean however, that there is an independent requirement to immerse — should he want to remain tameh and not enter the machaneh Shechinah9 for any period of time, he may do so.
The Book of Truth (i.e. the Torah) explains that even though after the person immerses he becomes tahor, his purification is incomplete until sunset.10 The Oral Tradition also explains that during immersion he must be naked and that his entire body must come in contact with the water. As our Sages put it,11 "The phrase, 'his entire body' teaches that there can be nothing intervening between his body and the water."
We have therefore explained that this mitzvah of immersion includes the laws of mikvah, of intervening substances, and t'vul yom.12 This mitzvah is explained in tractates Mikva'os and T'vul Yom.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 15:16.
2.Sifra.
3.This is 40 se'ah of water.
4.In practice, even a mikvah of spring water must contain 40 se'ah.
5.In other cases, even for a zavah, rain water is sufficient.
6.Lev. 15:13.
7.Ibid., 16:26.
8.Ibid., 14:8.
9.Corresponding to the Temple courtyard.
10.See Lev. 22:6. A person in this state is called a t'vul yom.
11.Eruvin 4b.
12.One who has immersed and is awaiting sunset, as mentioned above.

• 1 Chapter: Gerushin Gerushin - Chapter Ten

Gerushin - Chapter Ten

Halacha 1
Whenever in this text1 we have used the terms "the get is void," or "the divorce is not effective," the intent is that the get is void according to Scriptural law. The woman is married in the full sense of the term. If she remarries, she must leave [her second husband]; any child she bears him is illegitimate.
If the husband [of a woman who receives such a get] is a priest, she is not forbidden to him as a divorced woman,2 with one exception: a person who divorces his wife and tells her: "You are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to marry anyone else."3 Although such a divorce is not binding, according to Rabbinic law4 such a woman is forbidden to marry a priest, as [implied by Leviticus 21:7]: "[They may not take] a woman divorced from her husband." Our Sages interpreted this to mean: "Even if she is divorced only from her husband and not permitted to marry any one else, she is forbidden to the priesthood. This is the "wisp of a get" that disqualifies [a woman] from [marrying a member of] the priesthood by Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 2
Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the get is unacceptable," the intent is that the get is unacceptable merely according to Rabbinic decree.5Thus, according to Scriptural law, the woman is forbidden to the priesthood.6
A priori, she should not remarry. If, however, she has remarried, she need not leave [her second husband].7 Children born [from her second marriage] are legitimate. A second get that is acceptable should be given to her, while she remains married to her [second] husband.
Should it be impossible to have a second [get] composed, if her second husband is scrupulous and voluntarily divorces her this is praiseworthy, provided she has not borne [him] children. If, however, she has borne him children, he should not divorce her because of [our Sages'] disqualification of her get, lest this cause his sons' reputation to be sullied.
Halacha 3
Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the status of the divorce is in doubt," the woman should not remarry. If she has remarried, she must leave her second husband, and there is a doubt regarding the legimitacy of any children that she bears [her second husband], for her own status is in doubt, and she may be forbidden to engage in marital relations.8
If [a man] divorces his wife with an unacceptable get, or the status of [their] divorce is in doubt, and he desires to remarry her, she is permitted to her husband. He does not have to renew the marriage,9 recite the seven marriage blessings,10 or write her a new marriage contract,11 unless she has been divorced in a manner that is binding.
Halacha 4
Our Sages ordained that whenever [a woman] who was given a get that is void remarries, she must be divorced by her second husband, lest people say: "A married woman has been allowed to remarry without [receiving] a get."12 And she must receive a [second] get from her first husband, so that she be permitted to marry anyone else.
She is forbidden to remarry both her first and second husband forever.13 [This applies] even if she entered into marital relations [with her second husband] without knowing of the prohibition involved. [This prohibition was instituted]14lest people say: "The man remarried his divorcee after she was married [to another man]." If one of the two transgressed and remarried her, he should be compelled to send her away.
Halacha 5
A similar law applies when a woman remarries [after] witnesses testified that her [first] husband died, and later her first husband returns. [This applies] regardless of whether her [first] husband was a mentally sound individual or a deaf-mute, or whether she remarried a mentally sound person or a deaf-mute, who cannot establish a marriage bond in a complete sense.15 She must be divorced by both of them; both must give her a get, and she is forbidden to engage in marital relations with either of them again.
Halacha 6
If [after witnesses testified that a woman's husband died or that she was given aget], she was consecrated [but the marriage bond was not yet consummated],16and then her first husband returned, or it was discovered that the get was void, she is permitted to her first husband. Nor must she be divorced by the second husband, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman who is forbidden because of a severe prohibition.
[In this instance, we do not require a divorce out of fear that] someone say: "A married woman is being released without a get." Since the marriage was not consummated, the person will rationalize: "The consecration was made on condition, and that condition was not fulfilled."
Halacha 7
[The following laws apply when] a woman married, and afterwards it was discovered that her get was void, or [it had been reported that her first husband died,] and he returned. Neither her first nor her second husband is entitled to an ownerless object that she discovers17 nor to the profits from her work.18Neither can he annul her vows.19 None of the benefits that either of them received after she married [her second husband] should be expropriated from them.20 Neither of them is obligated to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract,21 nor to fulfill any of the stipulations of the marriage contract.22
Neither of them is required to pay for her sustenance. If she took [money or property for this purpose] from either of them, she must return it. Neither of them is held responsible for any of the property she brought to the marriage that became worn out or was lost,23 even nichsei tzon barzel.24
A child born to [the second husband] is illegitimate. If the first husband engages in relations with her before she is divorced by the second husband, a child born of this union is illegitimate by virtue of Rabbinic decree.
If the second [husband] divorced her and she received the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, and afterwards her [first] husband came or it was discovered that the divorce was void, we do not expropriate the money she received for her sustenance or by virtue of her marriage contract.25
Halacha 8
Similar laws apply when one of two brothers consecrated a woman.26 The brother who consecrated the woman departed, and afterwards it was reported that he died. The other brother performed the rite of yibbum, marrying his brother's wife, and then the brother returned.
The woman must be divorced by both husbands, receiving a get from both of them, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to her. Similarly, if a man consecrated a woman, she journeyed to another country, the husband heard that she died and married her sister,27 and afterwards it was discovered that she had not died: he must divorce both women, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to both of them.
Halacha 9
[Different rules apply, however, if a man] married a woman who journeyed to another country, he heard that she died, he married her sister, and then it was discovered that his [first] wife was alive. The sister does not require a get, and his [first] wife is permitted to him.
Similar laws apply with regard to other women forbidden by severe prohibitions28 who were married under the assumption that the marriage was permitted,29 and it is discovered that the prohibition still applied. They do not require a divorce, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman forbidden by such a severe prohibition.
Halacha 10
Why did they require that the sister of the woman whom the man consecrated be given a get?30 Lest people say that the [first] kiddushin were given conditionally, [the condition was not fulfilled,] and thus the law would allow marriage to her sister. Since the [first] woman's sister was divorced with a get, she - i.e., the man's first arusah - is forbidden [to him], lest people think that he married his divorcee's sister.
Halacha 11
A scribe composed [a get], but erred and gave the get to the husband and the receipt [for the woman's marriage contract] to the woman, or the man and wife erred, and the husband took the get and the wife the receipt, and thus they thought they were divorced.31
[The following rules apply] if afterwards the get is discovered in the possession of the man. If the woman has not remarried, she is considered as if she has not been divorced; it [appears to] have been revealed that the divorce did not ever take place. The husband should give her the get in the presence [of witnesses], and the divorce takes effect from the time the get is given.
If, however, she had [already] remarried, and afterwards the husband produces the get, claiming that she has not been divorced, for he is in possession of theget and it never reached her, we do not accept his claim. She is not forbidden to her [second] husband.32 Instead, we operate under the presumption that she has been divorced, the get fell from her hand and was found by [her first husband], who desires to cause her to be forbidden to her second husband.33
Halacha 12
When a person divorces his wife because of unsavory reports,34 or because she is indiscriminate with regard to vows, he is told: "Inform her that you are divorcing her to chastise her, and know that you will never be able to remarry her."35
Why is [a man forbidden] to remarry such a woman? This is a decree, [instituted] lest she marry another man, repent and live chastely with him. Her first [husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, it resembles a divorce given on a condition that was not fulfilled,36 in which case, retroactively, the get would be void. Therefore, we tell him: "Make a firm resolve to divorce her, knowing that you will never remarry her."
If, however, he transgresses and remarries her before she is consecrated to another man,37 he need not divorce her.
Halacha 13
Similarly, if [a man] divorces his wife because she is an aylonit38 or because she always experiences menstrual bleeding in the midst of sexual relations,39he should never remarry her.
[This is a decree, instituted] lest she marry another man and have children if she was an aylonit, or her condition be healed if she suffered from menstrual bleeding. [Her first husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, [it would appear] that her get is void and her children illegitimate. If, however, he transgresses and remarries her [before she is consecrated to another man], he need not divorce her.
Halacha 14
When an agent brings a get from the diaspora and says, "It was written and signed in my presence" [to validate the signatures to the get],40 he should not marry her. We fear that perhaps he was attracted to her and therefore testified on her behalf.
[For this same reason,] when one witness testifies that a woman's husband died,41 and she [is given license to] marry on the basis of his testimony, he should not marry her. Similarly, a sage who ruled that a woman is forbidden to her husband because of a vow42 should not marry her.
Similarly, when a man is reputed to have had relations with a maid-servant, and afterwards she was granted her freedom, or when [a man is reputed to have had relations] with a gentile woman, and afterwards she converted, he should not marry her.43 Similarly, if a gentile or a servant had relations with a Jewish woman, and afterwards the gentile converted or the servant was freed, he should not marry this woman.44 In all these instances, if a couple transgress and marry,45 they should not be forced to separate46.
Halacha 15
In all the above instances, if these men had wives and their wives died, or they divorced their wives at their wives' initiative,47 they are permitted to marry [the women mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation.
Similarly if these women married other men and became widowed or were divorced, they are permitted to marry [the men mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation.
Halacha 16
All these women are permitted to marry [any relatives of the men involved]. [A woman may marry] the son of the witness who testified on her behalf, the son of the sage who declared that she was forbidden to her husband, the son of the man with whom she was reputed to have had relations, or any other relative of theirs. [The rationale for this leniency is that] a person will not commit a sin so that another person will benefit.
A woman is permitted to marry one of [the two witnesses] to her divorce or to her mi'un, or to marry one of the judges in whose presence she performed the rite of chalitzah. Our suspicions are aroused only when [the woman's license to marry depends on] the testimony of one witness.48
A person should always shy away from serving as a witness to mi'un,49 and make himself available [as a witness to enable] the rite of chalitzah [to be performed].
Halacha 17
When a man divorces his wife and then engages in relations with her in the the presence of witnesses before she marries another man,50 we assume that since she was [originally] his wife, he remarried her and engaged in relations with the intent of consecrating her, and not as a licentious act.
[The above rule applies] regardless of whether they were divorced after marriage, or only after consecration. And this applies even if we saw that he paid her money.51 For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not enter into sexual relations with his wife with a licentious intent, when he has the possibility of having these relations considered to be a mitzvah.
For this reason, this woman is definitely considered to be consecrated,52 and requires a second divorce [in order to marry another man].
Halacha 18
[There is an extension to the above principle.] If a man entered into privacy with his divorcee in the presence of witnesses, the two witnesses observed [their conduct] simultaneously,53 and [the couple] had been married previously, we suspect that they engaged in sexual relations.
The witnesses to their entrance into privacy are thus considered to be witnesses to sexual relations. For a person who consecrates his wife via sexual relations need not engage in relations in the presence of witnesses. [All that] is necessary that [the couple] enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses and engage in relations in privacy, as explained.54
Since [it is possible that the couple engaged in relations], the status of the woman is in doubt, because we suspect that she has been consecrated. Because of this suspicion, she requires a [second] get. If, however, the woman had merely been consecrated and was divorced [before she was married], we do not suspect [that they engaged in sexual relations], because they did not share such familiarity.55
Halacha 19
Several of the geonim have ruled that any woman with whom a man engaged in sexual relations in the presence of witnesses requires a get, [the rationale for their ruling being that] a person will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.
[Moreover,] they extended [the application of] this principle, until they decided to rule that when a man's maidservant bore him a son, we take the matter into account, and the man's wife is not [allowed to perform] the rite of yibbum [if he dies without children],56 lest he have freed his maidservant57 and afterwards engaged in relations with her [with the intent of consecrating her]. And there are those who ruled that we can definitely assume that he freed her [and consecrated her],58 for a man will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.
I considered these opinions to be far from the paths of the Torah judgment, and it is not fit for one to rely on them. Our Sages made such statements only with regard to [a man's] wife whom he divorced, or to a person who consecrated a woman conditionally and then entered into sexual relations without clarifying his intent.59 For in these instances the woman is the man's wife, and with regard to a man's wife we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent unless he explicitly states that this is his intent, or that he is entering into these relations with a condition in mind.60
With regard to other women, however, [we do not follow this assumption]. Instead, whenever [a man enters into relations with] a wanton woman, we assume that he had a licentious intent,61 unless he explicitly states that he intends to consecrate her. Needless to say, this applies with regard to a maidservant62 or to a gentile woman,63 for our marriage laws do not apply with regard to them at all, and we have no suspicions [with regard to marriage] at all. A son born by them is assumed to be a gentile or a servant until it is definitively substantiated that his mother was freed or converted.
Halacha 20
When it has been assumed that a woman is either married or consecrated, and a rumor is spread in [her] city that she has been divorced, [the rumor] is not given credence, and we continue to operate under the assumption [that there was no change in her status].64 [This applies] even if the majority, or even the entire city spread this rumor.
[Different rules apply, however, in the following instance.] A rumor was spread through the city that a woman was consecrated, and that rumor was reported in court, in which case we suspect that the woman was consecrated, as explained.65 Afterwards, a rumor was spread that she was divorced from thosekiddushin; we consider her to be divorced.66 [Since] she was forbidden on the basis of a rumor, she is permitted on the basis of a rumor.
Halacha 21
[A man] should not marry a woman if he intends to divorce her.67 Nor should he maintain her as a wife68 and live with her, if he intends to divorce her.69
A man should not divorce his first wife unless he discovers an incident of sexual misconduct,70, as [Deuteronomy 24:1] states: "When he finds evidence of sexual misconduct...." One should not hurry to divorce one's first wife.71 With regard to a second wife, by contrast, if one hates her, one may send her away.72
Halacha 22
It is a mitzvah to divorce a woman who possesses unsavory character traits and does not conduct herself modestly73, as is the practice of proper daughters of Israel, as [implied by Proverbs 22:10]: "Drive away the scoffer, and contention will depart."
When a woman has been divorced for loose moral conduct,74 it is not fitting for a proper man to marry her, lest people say: "This one sent away this wicked woman, and this one brought her home."
Halacha 23
When a man's wife becomes a deaf-mute,75 he may divorce her, [by giving her] a get, and the divorce is effective. If, however, [his wife] loses control of her mental or emotional faculties,76 he may not divorce her until she regains stability.
This is a prescript ordained by our Sages so that she will not [be divorced and left] unattended, [and be violated] by immoral people, for she is unable to care for herself. Therefore, [her husband] should provide a place for her, provide her with food and drink from her own resources,77 and marry another woman. He is not obligated to provide her with her sustenance, garments and conjugal rights.78 [For although our Sages compelled the husband to remain married to such a woman, they did not compel him to live with her as man and wife,] because a mentally sound individual cannot endure living with a mentally incapable person in one dwelling.
[The husband] is not obligated to provide her with medical treatment,79 nor to redeem her if she is taken captive. If he divorces her, the divorce is binding.80He should remove her from his home, and he is not obligated to care for her.
FOOTNOTES
1.
In the Talmud, by contrast, the terms bateil and pasul do not have these specific meanings. There are times when pasul is used to connote a get that is unacceptable according to Scriptural law, and bateil to refer to a get that is unacceptable according to Rabbinic law (Maggid Mishneh). (See also the responsum of the Rambam quoted by the Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 8, Halachah 4.)
2.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the priest should be forbidden to remain married to a woman he divorced with such a get, lest the impression be created that the prohibition against a priest's marrying a divorcee can be waived. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 150:3), however, accepts the Rambam's ruling.
3.
See Chapter 8, Halachah 5.
4.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam considers the proof-text that he quotes as anasmachta - i.e., a support from the Torah invented by the Rabbis to uphold their decree. TheMaggid Mishneh himself differs, noting that Gittin 82a appears to indicate that the prohibition is of Scriptural origin.
Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the Rambam's conception can be resolved based on his statements inSefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2), that any law that is not explicitly stated in the Torah, but rather derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical exegesis, is considered to be Rabbinic in origin (midivrei soferim). This classification does not, however, in any way diminish the status of this practice, and it is as though it were explicitly stated in the Torah. (See the commentaries onHilchot Ishut 1:2.) Similarly, in this instance the prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, but rather derived through exegesis. Thus, it has the status of Scriptural law, but is considered to be Rabbinic in origin.
It must be emphasized that just as the woman is prohibited from remarrying a priest if divorced, she is also prohibited from remaining married to her husband, if he is a priest [Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 150:3)].
5.
I.e., according to Scriptural law, the divorce is binding. Our Sages, however, disqualified the divorce and forbade the woman from remarrying until a get is given that presents no halachic difficulties.
6.
Similarly, if her first husband is a priest, he may no longer become impure while caring for her burial (Hilchot Eivel 2:13).
7.
Since her divorce is effective according to Scriptural law, our Sages did not abrogate her second marriage.
8.
I.e., in these instances, our Sages were unsure whether or not the get is valid according to Scriptural law. Because of the doubt, the woman is not allowed to engage in marital relations with anyone other than her first husband until an acceptable get is given. The first husband can no longer annul her vows, nor does he have the right to inherit her property if she dies in his lifetime.
9.
The Rambam's intent is somewhat questionable. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishnehexplain that even in this situation, the husband must consecrate his wife a second time.
10.
For the marriage blessings should not be recited if there is a doubt whether they are necessary. Even with regard to a get that was disqualified by Rabbinic law, since the woman should not remarry, the blessings should not be recited (Maggid Mishneh).
11.
The marriage contract states: "When you [may] marry another person, you may collect the sum mentioned within." Since such a woman is not fit to remarry, and she could not collect the money due her by virtue of her original marriage contract, that contract remains in effect (Maggid Mishneh).
12.
Although her second marriage is void, and thus, according to Scriptural law there is no need for aget, our Sages established such a requirement because of the impression that might be created.
13.
When a woman commits adultery, she is forbidden to engage in marital relations both with her husband and with the adulterer (even after being divorced from her husband). In this instance, the woman's second marriage is an adulterous relationship. Therefore, she may not remain married to either of her husbands.
14.
I.e., the abovementioned prohibition stems from Scriptural law. It applies, however, only when the prohibition against adultery was willfully violated. Nevertheless, even when adultery was committed unwittingly, the woman is forbidden to both husbands: to her second husband, because her marriage to her first husband has not been terminated, and to her first husband, because of the Rabbinical decree mentioned by the Rambam.
15.
As explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:9, a deaf-mute's mental capacity is considered insufficient for him to establish a marriage bond. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that if a deaf-mute man or woman enters into a marriage relationship, that relationship is binding according to Rabbinic law, regardless of whether the mate is also a deaf-mute or is fully mentally competent.
Since a deaf-mute's marriage is not effective according to Torah law, there is room to suppose that the woman should be allowed to remarry her first husband, for the difference between a deaf-mute's marriage and an ordinary marriage is obvious. And conversely, one might assume that since a deaf-mute is not held responsible for his actions, if a woman's second husband were a deaf-mute, they would be allowed to remain married. For these reasons, it is necessary to state that the stringencies apply in these instances as well.
16.
Since the woman did not enter into forbidden marital relations, there is no reason to penalize her (Yevamot 89a).
17.
The second husband is not entitled to the article, because he is not truly her husband. The first husband is not entitled to it because our Sages granted a husband rights to ownerless articles his wife discovers to prevent friction from arising in the home, and in this instance, since he is required to divorce her, there is no need to prevent friction (Yevamot 90b).
18.
A husband is granted the profits from his wife's work in return for providing for her sustenance. Since neither of the husbands is required to provide for her, neither is entitled to this benefit (Ibid.).
19.
The Torah granted a husband the right to annul his wife's vows so that she will remain attractive to him. In this instance, the husband should not be attracted to the wife (Ibid.).
20.
Our Sages explained that the woman should have been entitled to be recompensed for these benefits. Nevertheless, they were withheld from her as a penalty for her actions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:56) does rule that the benefits that her second husband received after her first husband returned (or after the get was discovered void) should be returned to her.
21.
Our Sages instituted the requirement of a marriage contract so that a husband would be deterred by the financial burden he would have to bear, and would not consider divorce a light matter. In this instance, however, our Sages desire the divorce. Therefore, they did not impose a financial burden (Yevamot 89a).
22.
It is only when a woman is entitled to the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract that the stipulations apply (Ibid.).
23.
I.e., she is judged as a woman who was divorced because of adultery, who is penalized, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 24:10. She is, however, entitled to take all her property that remains intact [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].
24.
Property for which the husband takes financial responsibility (Hilchot Ishut 16:1).
25.
For when she received the funds, they were not aware of the prohibition (Jerusalem Talmud,Yevamot 10:1).
26.
As reflected in the following halachot, based on Yevamot 94b, it appears that only when the woman has been merely consecrated is a get required from the second husband. For it is possible for an onlooker to think that perhaps the first kiddushin were given conditionally, and the marriage to the second brother is binding. Lest a misconception arise and one think that a married woman can be released without a get, the second husband is required to give a get.
If she was married to - not merely consecrated by - her first husband, a get is not required from the second husband, because when his brother returns, everyone will realize that his marriage to his brother's wife is not binding. Rabbenu Asher makes a further distinction and states that when the woman was married to - not merely consecrated by - the first brother, she and her first husband may continue living together as man and wife, despite the fact that she erred and performed the rite of yibbum. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 159:4) follows the Rambam's ruling, while the Ramah follows that of Rabbenu Asher.
27.
It is forbidden to marry two sisters in each other's lifetime. Once a man's wife dies, however, he may marry her sister. (See also Hilchot Yibbum 3:11.)
28.
The intent is the Hebrew term arayot, a word with a specific meaning. As explained in Hilchot Ishut1:5, this refers to a woman with whom sexual relations are forbidden and punishable by karet.
29.
E.g., one was unaware of the family connection.
30.
For, as mentioned, a marriage bond cannot be established with one of the arayot.
If the man married the first sister, then there is no possibility of such a misconception arising. A man will never marry a woman conditionally, for if the condition is not fulfilled, their marital relations are considered to be sinful. We assume that a person will not take that risk (Shulchan Aruch,Even HaEzer 15:27). (Note, however, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 2:10 and the gloss of the Ra'avad.)
31.
The wording used by the Rambam here is somewhat confusing. For the scribe should give the getto the husband, who should give it to his wife. The intent appears to be, as in the source for this halachah, Gittin 80a, that the scribe gave the man the receipt and the woman the get, and they exchanged them. Thus, the woman was never given the get by her husband.
32.
Indeed, we do not even require that, as a safeguard, the first husband give her the get while she is married to her second husband (Beit Shmuel 151:2).
The Beit Shmuel also states that this law applies even if the woman was merely consecrated by the second husband, but their marriage had not been consummated.
33.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 8:7), the Rambam explains that the husband is acting out of spite, seeking to prevent his divorcee from remarrying. Rashi (Gittin 80a) offers a different rationale.
34.
See Hilchot Ishut 24:16.
35.
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Gittin 45b, 46b. Other halachic authorities view this situation slightly differently. The various views are listed in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer10:3).
36.
I.e., it is as if he gave her the get on the condition that she remain unchaste, and, because of her repentance, that condition was not fulfilled. Most authorities maintain that since this condition was not actually stated, such a complaint would not be heeded by the court. Nevertheless, since the matter might become a subject for gossip, her first husband is bound by these restrictions (Tosafot, Gittin 46a). From one of the Rambam's responsa, however, it appears that he maintains that the get would actually be void in such an instance.
37.
If, however, she was consecrated by another man, even if she was divorced before their marriage was consummated, she may not remarry her first husband and must be divorced by him if they do remarry, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 12.
38.
A woman who suffers from physical disorders and lacks female physical characteristics. She is unable to bear children. (See Hilchot Ishut 2:6, 15:7, 24:1.)
39.
See Hilchot Ishut 25:8-9.
40.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 5. If, however, a person brings a get from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another, the permission granted to the woman to remarry does not depend on his statements. Therefore, he is permitted to marry her (Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 12:1).
41.
See Chapter 12, Halachah 15.
42.
I.e., a woman took a vow that caused her to be forbidden to derive benefit from her husband, in which case he is required to divorce her. She asked a sage to annul the vow, but he could not find a halachic basis to do so (Yevamot 25b).
43.
For this would substantiate the initial rumor and make the couple a subject of gossip (Yevamot24b). On this basis, there are authorities who rule that if the rumor is substantiated - e.g., a couple are openly living together, or were married in a secular court - the woman should be encouraged to convert, and they should be married according to Jewish law.
Indeed, we find a responsum of the Rambam himself regarding a man who had an attractive female servant, and it was rumored that they had spent time together in private. The Rambam advises that the man be compelled to free the servant and either marry her or send her away. He acknowledges that doing so would violate the Rabbinic decree mentioned in this halachah, but states that because of the permissive state of morals prevalent in his society, there is no alternative.
44.
From Yevamot (loc. cit.), it would appear that the reason for this restriction is that people should not say that the man converted in order to marry. This is undesirable. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah13:14.) With regard to this prohibition as well, it has become customary in the present time to show leniency.
45.
There are opinions that state that if the woman has merely been consecrated, but the marriage bond has not been consummated, the couple should be forced to separate. (See Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 12:2). There are other opinions, however, that maintain that the consecration is equivalent to the consummation of the marriage. Rav David Arameah cites Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah21:31 as an indication that the Rambam follows the latter view.
46.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as maintaining that a witness who brought a get and said "It was written and signed in my presence," should be forced to divorce the woman if he marries her. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 12:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling. See Chelkat Mechokek 12:1.
47.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 12:4) writes that if the man's wife was sick at the time that the woman became eligible for marriage, the prohibition remains in effect. For it possible that he was waiting for her to die.
The Chelkat Mechokek 12:2 extends this stringency to include a man and wife whose marriage was known to be plagued by strife. Even if the divorce came at the woman's initiative, it is possible that the man expected it and had planned another alternative.
48.
It is unlikely that two individuals will sin so that one may benefit (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot2:12). The Hagahot Maimoniot, nevertheless, state that "a master of his soul" should avoid such a marriage.
49.
Lest the woman later regret her decision (Yevamot 109b).
50.
If the woman has remarried and divorced, however, the presumption stated does not apply, for it is forbidden for her first husband to remarry her (Beit Shmuel 149:2).
51.
Although this would make it appear more likely that the man was relating to her as a prostitute and not as a wife, it is not sufficient cause for us to negate our presumption (Gittin 73b).
52.
The Beit Shmuel 149:3 interprets this to mean that if another person consecrates her afterwards, we consider it as if he had consecrated a married woman, and he is not required to divorce her.
53.
It is not sufficient for one to have observed them in private at one time, and the other at a different time, for the two witnesses who observe the consecration of a woman must be together at that time.
54.
Hilchot Ishut 3:5; see also Hilchot Ishut 14:16, which states that it is forbidden to engage in sexual relations in the presence of others.
55.
The previous halachah dealt with an instance in which relations were observed; hence, no distinction was made whether the couple was divorced before or after their first marriage was consummated. In this instance, they merely entered into privacy together. If, however, we know for a fact that a couple shared familiarity before the marriage bond was completed, a second get is required (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 149:2).
56.
A son borne by a maidservant is not considered to have any connection to his father. These authorities, however, suspect that the woman was freed and then married, and that the child thus shares a connection with his father. According to this opinion, chalitzah is, nevertheless, required.
57.
For until the maidservant is freed, she cannot be married.
58.
These authorities do not even require chalitzah.
59.
See Hilchot Ishut 7:23.
60.
The Radbaz and others state that if the witnesses know that the woman is in the niddah state, we do not assume that the couple entered into relations for the sake of marriage. If they are prepared to violate the prohibition of niddah, we assume that they will have no hesitation to conduct relations outside marriage. [Some modern authorities consider taking this concept even further. Although a man and a woman claim that their intent is "marriage," if they violate the laws of niddah, their conception of marriage is not kedat Moshe viYisrael, "according to the faith of Moses and Israel," and Torah law does not require a divorce. See the responsum of the Rivash cited below.]
61.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this matter and maintains that if a man is in general known to be moral and observant, we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent. This applies even if he entered into relations with a maidservant. If, however, the man has a reputation for wanton behavior, this assumption is not applied. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 149:5) follows the Rambam's view.
In the law that follows, the Shulchan Aruch explains that if a Jewish man and woman marry according to gentile law, we do not consider them to be man and wife according to Torah law. This ruling is based on a ruling of the Rivash (Responsum 6), which explains that a Jewish marriage must be "according to the faith of Moses and Israel," and a couple who marry according to gentile law, regardless of their desire to live together, are not establishing their union on this foundation.
62.
See Hilchot Nachalot 4:6.
63.
In this instance, the Ra'avad accepts the Rambam's ruling, for it is impossible for a man to compel a woman to convert.
64.
Thus, if her husband was a priest (who may not marry a divorced woman), he may remain married to her. We do not suspect that he divorced her and remarried her. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 17:20.)
65.
See Hilchot Ishut 9:22.
66.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and interprets Gittin 88b, the source for this halachah, as referring to an instance where there is one rumor that says that the woman was consecrated and then divorced. Although Rashi and others interpret the passage as the Rambam does, theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 46:7) appears to merge both views into a single understanding.
67.
If the man informs a woman that he intends to divorce her, he may marry her for a brief amount of time (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:28; Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 119:1).
68.
He did not intend to divorce her originally, made this decision after they married, but lives together with her as husband and wife with the thought of divorcing her in the future.
69.
Children conceived during this time will have severely tainted personalities, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:12.
70.
There is somewhat of a difficulty with the Rambam's ruling. The opinion he cites is that of the School of Shammai, as mentioned at the conclusion of the tractate of Gittin. The School of Hillel differs and maintains that if a woman wrongs her husband, even with regard to as insignificant a matter as burning his meal, he may divorce her. Rabbi Akiva goes even further and maintains that even if a person finds a more attractive woman, he may divorce his wife.
Most authorities agree that in this, as in most other instances, the halachah follows the School of Hillel. Why then does the Rambam (and the Shulchan Aruch [Even HaEzer 119:3]) follow the opinion of the School of Shammai?
Among the resolutions offered is that the difference of opinion between the Schools of Shammai and Hillel applies only with regard to a second marriage. With regard to a first marriage, by contrast, even the School of Hillel accepts the School of Shammai's stringency (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 119).
Note also the statements of the Ramah, who rules that the prohibition applied only during the Talmudic era, when a woman could be divorced against her will. In the present era, when a woman must willingly accept a divorce, this prohibition does not apply.
71.
See Gittin 90b, which states that whenever a man divorces his first wife, the altar itself cries.
On the surface, the wording used by the Rambam is problematic. First he says that it is forbidden to divorce one's first wife, and then he states that one should not hurry, implying that one may, but that it is ethical not to be impulsive about the matter. The Chelkat Mechokek 119:2 offers two resolutions: a) The prohibition exists only when, as was possible in the Talmudic era, the husband is divorcing his first wife against her will. If she is willing to accept the divorce, there is no prohibition; one should, however, proceed without haste. b) Even when one hears about improper sexual conduct, one should not be hasty about the matter. Instead, the incident should be investigated carefully to determine if in fact any wrongdoing occurred.
72.
Although divorce is undesirable, an unhealthy marriage is even more undesirable, and a marriage should be terminated if there are severe ill feelings between a couple.
73.
The implication is both that she is continually contending with her husband and that she is immodest. In such an instance, it is a mitzvah to divorce her, even if she is a man's first bride (Chelkat Mechokek 119:4).
74.
See Hilchot Ishut 24:12.
75.
This refers to a situation in which a woman married while fully capable and became a deaf-mute while married. Since a deaf-mute is considered to be mentally incapable, such a person is unable to establish a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law. Our Rabbis made certain provisions for the marriage of such individuals, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:9. In this instance, however, since the woman was not a deaf-mute at the time of marriage, the marriage is binding according to Scriptural law.
The law teaches us that since according to Scriptural and Talmudic law, a woman can be divorced against her will, the fact that the woman is mentally incapable does not prevent her husband from divorcing her. Since a woman who is a deaf-mute is not totally incapable of caring for herself, our Sages did not make provisions for her, as they did for a woman who becomes mentally unsound.
76.
This also refers to a situation in which the woman lost control of her faculties after marriage. If, however, she was mentally unstable at the outset, any marriage that she enters into is not binding at all (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).
77.
He must, however, put at the woman's disposal the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract and the money due from her dowry (Chelkat Mechokek 119:9).
78.
This ruling does not apply in the Ashkenazic community, nor in other places where the custom is to follow the ban of Rabbenu Gershom not to divorce one's wife against her will. In these communities, the husband is required to provide for his wife's sustenance and garments from his own resources. The rationale is that since he is not able to divorce her - for she is not capable of consenting to the divorce - he remains liable to bear the financial burden of supporting her (Chelkat Mechokek 119:9).
The husband is not, however, obligated to give her conjugal rights. The Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 119) and the Chelkat Mechokek 119:12 state that in such a situation, the husband may be granted license to marry a second wife by 100 rabbis.
79.
Even according to the law in Talmudic times, many differ with the Rambam's thesis and maintain that the husband is obligated for his wife's medical expenses.
The Ra'avad protests that in many instances, a person with mental disorders can be rehabilitated, and he maintains that the husband should be required to pay for such treatment. The Beit Shmuel119:11 states that even the Rambam would agree to such an obligation.
In the Ashkenazic community today, just as a husband is required to supply his wife with her sustenance in such a situation, he is also held liable for all her medical expenses (Ramah, Even HaEzer 119:6, Chelkat Mechokek 119:12).
80.
As the Ra'avad mentions, in an instance when a woman has lost mental competence to the extent that she cannot safeguard the get she was given, all authorities agree that the divorce is not binding. Even when she has that degree of mental competence, there are many authorities that maintain that the divorce is not effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 119:6) quotes the Rambam's view, as interpreted by the Ra'avad. The Ramah follows the more stringent views.
• 3 Chapters: Mikvaot Mikvaot - Chapter 8, Mikvaot Mikvaot - Chapter 9, Mikvaot Mikvaot - Chapter 10
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Mikvaot - Chapter 8

Halacha 1
Any body of water that is in contact with a mikveh, is considered as the mikvehitself and it can be used for immersion. When cavities that are next to the opening of a mikveh or the footprints left by animals share a point of contact with the water of the mikveh that is as large as the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch, they may be used for immersion.
Halacha 2
Cavities at the side of the mikveh or crevices at the side of mikveh may be used for immersion even if they have only the slightest point of contact with the water of the mikveh.
Halacha 3
When a needle was placed on the steps leading to a mikveh, one may move his hand back and forth in the water to create waves. Once the wave passes over the needle, it regains purity.
Halacha 4
The following laws apply to a hidden reservoir in a mikveh: If the ground that separates between the mikveh and the reservoir is sturdy and capable of remaining over the course of time, one may not use the water in the reservoir for immersion unless it shares a point of contact with the mikveh as large as the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch. If it is not capable of remaining for an extended period, one may immerse in its water as long as it shares any contact whatsoever with the water of the mikveh.
Halacha 5
When the wall between two mikveot is cracked in half, the two mikveot are considered as joined. If together they contain 40 se'ah, either of them may be used for immersion. If the wall is cracked horizontally, they are not considered as joined unless there is a point of contact the size of the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch. If the water is joined above the wall, they are considered as joined provided there is a layer of water even as thin as a garlic peel connecting them over the width of a space the size of the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch.
Halacha 6
How large is the measure of a hole the size of the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch? A circle with a diameter the width sufficient to enable two average-sized fingers of an ordinary person to rotate within it. The fingers mentioned do not refer to the thumb, but to the first two of the four on the palm of one's hand.
Any entity present in the hole the size of the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch reduces that measure. This applies even to entities that were created from the water.
If there is a doubt whether a hole is the size of the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch or not, the mikveot are not considered as joined. The rationale is that the primary obligation to immerse is Scriptural. And whenever the primary obligation is Scriptural, even when the measure stated is conveyed by the Oral Tradition, we rule stringently when there is an unresolved doubt regarding its measure.
Halacha 7
Mikveot may be purified from each other, an upper mikveh from a lower one and a far-away mikveh from one that is close.
What is implied? An earthenware or lead pipe - for pipes do not disqualify amikveh - is brought and inserted into the acceptable mikveh. One places his hand under it until it becomes full and then takes it and connects it so that the water in the pipe will become intermingled with the water of the other mikveh. Even if the point where they become intermingled is only a hairsbreadth, it is sufficient. Then the two mikveot connected by the pipe are considered as one.
Halacha 8
The following rules apply when there are three cavities in a wadi, the higher one and the lower one contain only 20 se'ah, the middle one contains 40 se'ah, and a current of rain water flows through the wadi. Although the current of water flows into the cavities and out of them, it does not join the cavities as one. Hence, only the middle one is acceptable for immersion. The rationale is that water that is flowing does not join mikveot unless it collects in one place.
Halacha 9
Soft mud from which a cow drinks may be measured as part of a mikveh. If it is so thick that a cow would not drink from it, it should not be measured as part of it.
Halacha 10
When a mikveh contains 40 se'ah of water and mud, one may immerse in both the mud and the water. In which mud may one immerse? In soft mud over which water collects. If the water was on one side and the soft mud on the other side, one may immerse in the water, but not in the mud.
Halacha 11
Any substance that was created from the water, e.g., red worms, is acceptable for immersion. One may immerse in the eye of a giant fish.
Halacha 12
When a mikveh contains exactly 40 se'ah of water and two people descended and immersed, one after the other, the first is pure and the second remains impure. The rationale is that some of water contained in the original 40 se'ahwas removed. This stringency applies even in the feet of the first person were still in the water when the second immerses.
If one immersed a thick sponge or the like in such a mikveh and lifted it up, as long as part of the sponge is touching the water, one who immerses afterwards is pure. The rationale is that all of the water is considered as intermingled.
When one immerses a bed or the like, even though he pushed its legs into the thick mud on the bottom of the mikveh until the water covers it from above, it is pure. The rationale is that it does not become sunk in the water until it becomes immersed in the water first.
When one immerses a large pot in a mikveh with a limited amount of water, it is impure, as it was beforehand, because the water will splash out of the mikveh. Thus the mikveh will be less than 40 se'ah. What should he do? He should lower it via its opening, turn it over in the mikveh, immerse it, and lift it up by its base, so that the water inside will not become "drawn," and return to the mikvehand disqualify it.
Halacha 13
When the water in a mikveh is dispersed, one may press even bundles of straw and bundles of reeds into the water from the sides until the water level will rise and one can descend and immerse within.

Mikvaot - Chapter 9

Halacha 1
There are six categories of mikveot, one superior to another. The first is the water of pit, cisterns, storage trenches, storage caverns, and the like, where water is collected on the earth. Even though the water was "drawn" and even though there were less than 40 se'ah, since the water only contracts impurity through willful activity, as we explained, the prevailing assumption is that it is pure. It is fit to use such water to make dough from which challah must be separated or to wash one's hands, provided he washes his hands with a container, as we explained.
Halacha 2
On a superior level is rainwater that has not ceased flowing, i.e., the rain is still descending and the mountains are still gushing with water and that water flows down and collects on the ground. It is not "drawn;" however, there are not 40se'ah. Such water is acceptable for terumah, for the washing of hands, and for the immersion of water that became impure.
If the rains ceased descending, but the water was still flowing from the mountains, such water is still considered in this category. If water is no longer flowing from mountains and they are not gushing, it is considered as water collected in a pit.
Halacha 3
When one digs at the side of the sea, a river, or a swamp, and water from these bodies flows into the pit that was dug, the water is considered like water that has not ceased flowing.
Halacha 4
When one digs at the side of a spring, as long as the water emerges because of the spring, even though at times, its flow is interrupted, but then it flows again, it is considered as a spring. If it ceased flowing entirely, it is considered as water collected in a pit.
Halacha 5
On a superior level is a mikveh that contains 40 se'ah of water that was not drawn. Every person can immerse in such a mikveh to regain purity except a male zav. All impure keilim and hands that must be immersed to touch sacrificial foods are immersed in such a mikveh, as we explained.
Halacha 6
On a superior level is a natural spring whose water is minimal and drawn water was added to it. The laws governing it resemble those governing a mikveh in that it does not impart purity through immersion in the water that flows from it, only in water that is collected and stationary in a reservoir. And they resemble those governing a natural spring in that even the smallest amount of its water imparts purity. For there is no minimum measure required for the water of a natural spring. Even the slightest amount can impart purity.
Halacha 7
On a superior level is a natural spring in which drawn water was not mixed, but its water was spoiled; it was bitter or salty. It imparts purity when its water is flowing, i.e., the water emerges and streams forth from the spring.
Halacha 8
On a superior level is a natural spring whose water is "living water." In such springs alone may male zavim immerse and from them alone water may be taken for the purification of a person afflicted with tzara'at and for the sanctification of the water used for the ashes of the red heifer.
What are the differences between the laws governing a natural spring and amikveh? A mikveh does not impart purity unless it contains 40 se'ah of water, while even the smallest amount of water from a natural spring imparts purity. And the water of a mikveh imparts purity only if it is collected in a reservoir. Any water flowing out from it does not impart purity. The water of a natural spring, by contrast, imparts purity when flowing. Also, immersion in a mikveh is not effective for zavim, while a zav may immerse in a natural spring of "living water."
Halacha 9
When the waters of a spring flow outward and into a receptacle in a stone and afterwards emerge from the receptacle and flow further, all of the water in the receptacle and all that flowed out of it is unacceptable for immersion. If some of the water from the spring - even the slightest amount - was flowing over the edge of the receptacle, the water outside the receptacle is acceptable for immersion. The rationale is that a natural spring purifies water as long as it shares even the slightest amount of contact with it.
When water from a natural spring was flowing into a pool that was filled with water and collects there, that pool is considered as a mikveh. If the water flows outside the pool, that water is not acceptable for the purification of zavim and those afflicted with tzara'at or for the sanctification of the water for the ashes of the red heifer until one is certain that all of the collected water that was originally in the pool has flowed out.
Halacha 10
When the waters of a spring flow over articles that do not have a receptacle, e.g., a table, a bench, or the like, the water is considered as a mikveh, provided one does not immerse above the articles themselves.
Halacha 11
When there was a natural spring with small irrigation ditches flowing out from it and one poured water into the spring so that the water in the ditches would increase and flow powerfully, the water is considered as a spring in all regards.
If the water of the spring was stationary and not flowing and one added water until it flowed into the irrigation ditches, the water that flows into those ditches is comparable to a mikveh in that it imparts purity only when collected in a reservoir and it is comparable to a spring in that even the slightest amount imparts purity.
Halacha 12
All of the seas impart purity despite the fact that their water is flowing, but they are invalid for the purification of zavim and persons afflicted with tzara'at and for the sanctification of the water used for the ashes of the red heifer.
Halacha 13
Water that flows from a natural spring is considered as an extension of the spring in all contexts. Water that drips from a spring, even though the dripping is continuous, is considered only as a mikveh and does not impart purity unless there are 40 se'ah standing in one place. Such water is not acceptable for the purification of zavim and those afflicted with tzara'at or for the sanctification of the water for the ashes of the red heifer.
If the water flowing from the spring becomes mixed with water dripping from it, it is considered like a stream in all respects. If, however, the amount of the water of the stream that was dripping was greater than that which was flowing, or if an amount of rainwater greater than the water in a river flowed into it, the water does not impart purity when flowing, only when in a reservoir. Therefore one must use a mat or the like to surround the portion of the river where the water is mixed until the water will be gathered in a single place so that one can immerse in it.
Halacha 14
When one caused water that was dripping to flow, e.g., one placed a smooth earthenware tablet next to a mikveh whose water was dripping and thus the water was flowing as it descended down the tablet, it is acceptable. Any article that is susceptible to impurity, even by Rabbinic decree, should not be used as a conduit for water.
Halacha 15
When one uses the external green shell of a nut to change the direction of the flow of water the water is acceptable as water from a spring, as it was before. It is not disqualified, because a fresh nut shell which imparts color is not considered as a container.
Halacha 16
When rainwater is cascading down a hill, flowing as it descends, even though there are more than 40 se'ah of water from the beginning of the torrent to its end, it is not acceptable for immersion while it is flowing. It must be collected in a reservoir containing 40 se'ah. If one surrounded the water with containers, having them serve as partitions, i.e., walls for a body of water to collect, and 40se'ah of rainwater flowed into it and collected there, it is acceptable for immersion. The containers with which one surrounded the water are not considered to have been immersed.
Halacha 17
When a wave becomes separated from the sea and falls on a person or onkeilim, they are pure for ordinary purposes, provided the wave contains 40se'ah, for a person who immerses does not have to have a specific intent, as we explained in Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah. If the person focused his intent on purifying himself for a specific level of purity, and was waiting in anticipation of the wave falling upon him, he is considered to have purified himself for the activity for which he desired to purify himself.
Halacha 18
One may not immerse in a wave when it is in the air before it falls on the earth even if it contains 40 se'ah of water. The rationale is that just as we do not immerse in water that is flowing, how much more so do we not immerse in water that is in the air. When the two ends of a wave are touching the earth, we can immerse in it. We do not, however, immerse in its crest, because that water is in the air.

Mikvaot - Chapter 10

Halacha 1
What is meant by an unresolved doubt regarding drawn water that our Sages ruled as pure? A mikveh about which one was unsure whether drawn water fell into it. Or even if one was certain that drawn water fell into it, but was in doubt whether there were three lugim or not. Or even when one was certain that there were three lugim of drawn water, but there was a doubt whether the mikveh into which the water fell contained 40 se'ah or not. In all instances, the mikveh is acceptable.
Halacha 2
The following law applies when there are two mikveot, one containing 40 se'ahand one containing a lesser amount. Three lugim of drawn water fell into one of them, but it is not known into which they fell. Because of the doubt, we rule that the acceptable mikveh is pure, because there is a factor on which one can rely.
If they both contained less than 40 se'ah and three lugim fell into one of them, they are both disqualified, because there is no factor on which one can rely. If the drawn water fell into one, it would be disqualified and if it fell into the other, it would be disqualified.
Halacha 3
When one left a mikveh empty, and returned and found it full, it is acceptable, for there is an unresolved doubt whether the water for this mikveh was drawn.
Halacha 4
When a pipe carried water into a mikveh, but there is a mill next to it, if there is a doubt whether water flowed into the mikveh from the pipe or from the mill, it is unacceptable, because the disqualifying factor is evident. If, however, themikveh contains a majority of acceptable water, it is acceptable because the doubt involves drawn water and there is an acceptable mikveh whose presence had been established.
Halacha 5
All of the mikveot found in the lands of the nations are invalid for immersion, for we operate under the presumption that the water is drawn. All of the mikveotfound in Eretz Yisrael, in the cities, within the gates are assumed to be invalid, because the inhabitants of the cities wash their garments in them and pour drawn water into them at all times. All of the mikveot found in Eretz Yisraeloutside the gates of a city are presumed to be pure. For it is assumed that they came from rainwater.
Halacha 6
In all the following situations, when an impure person descends to purify himself and:
a) there is a doubt whether he immersed or did not immerse,
b) even if it was known that he immersed, but there is a doubt whether themikveh contained 40 se'ah or not, or
c) there were two mikveot, one containing 40 se'ah and one that did not contain 40 se'ah, he immersed in one of them and did not know in which one he immersed, he is impure because of the doubt. The rationale is that we presume that the impure person is impure until it is certain that he immersed in the proper manner.
Similarly, if a mikveh was measured and it was discovered that it did not contain the required amount of water, whether the mikveh was located in the public domain or a private domain, all of the pure articles that were immersed in it are considered as impure retroactively until a time when it was measured and it was complete.
When does the above apply? When the immersion was intended to purify the person or the article from severe impurity. When, however, the immersion was because of a light impurity, e.g., one ate impure foods or drank impure beverages, his head and the majority of his body entered drawn water, or threelugim of drawn water fell on his head and on the majority of his body, since the primary aspect of these types of impurity are Rabbinical in origin, he is pure despite the doubt, as we explained. Even though the person is in doubt whether he immersed or not, the mikveh in which he immersed was discovered to be lacking afterwards, or other doubts of this nature arise, he is pure.
Halacha 7
When there were two mikveot, one kosher and one unacceptable, a person immersed in one to purify himself from a severe type of impurity, and touched pure foods, their status is questionable. If he immersed in the second mikveh as well and touched pure foods, the status of the first remains questionable as before and the second ones are pure. If these two batches of foods touch each other, the status of the first remain questionable and the second should be consigned to fire. This ruling also applies if in the interim he contracted impurity from a light source of impurity, as we explained, immersed in the secondmikveh and touched pure foods.
If, however, he immersed in one of the mikveot because of a light impurity and then touched pure foods and then contracted a severe type of impurity, immersed in the second, and then touched pure foods, the first batch are pure and the status of the second is questionable. If these two batches of foods touch each other, the first should be consigned to fire and the status of the second remains the same as before.
The following rules apply if one of two mikveot contained 40 se'ah of acceptable water and the other was filled entirely with drawn water and two people immersed in them without knowing which one immersed in the acceptablemikveh and which immersed in the unacceptable one. One of the two had contracted a severe type of impurity and one had contracted a light type of impurity. They both touched pure foods. The status of the foods touched by the one who immersed because of a severe type of impurity is questionable, but those touched by the one who immersed because of the light type of impurity are pure.
In the situation described in the above clause, if one person was impure and descended to immerse and the other was pure and descended merely to cool off, pure foods touched by the one who descended to immerse in one of them are of questionable status, as we explained. And the one who descended to cool off is pure as he was previously. The rationale is that this is a doubt concerning drawn water, for the question is: perhaps he immersed in the pool of drawn water when he cooled off and thus contracted impurity.
Halacha 8
The following rules apply when there are two mikveot, each containing 20se'ah, one of drawn water and one of acceptable water. If a person cooled off in one of them and then touched pure foods, they are considered pure. If afterwards, he cooled off in the second and touched pure foods, they should be consigned to fire. For his head and the larger greater of his body certainly entered drawn water, as we explained.
Hayom Yom:
• Wednesday, 
Menachem Av 27, 5775 · 12 August 2015
"Today's Day"
Shabbat Menachem Av 27 5703
Bless Rosh Chodesh Elul. Say all the Tehillim in the early morning. Day of farbrengen.
Torah lessons: Chumash: Re'ei, Shevi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 120-134.
Tanya: VIII. "He sows (p. 431) ...for the initiated. (p. 435).
The month of Elul is the month of reckoning. In the material world, if a businessman is to conduct his affairs properly and with great profit, he must periodically take an accounting and correct any deficiencies... Likewise in the spiritual avoda of serving G-d. Throughout the year all Israel are occupied with Torah, Mitzvot and (developing and expressing) good traits. The month of Elul is the month of reckoning, when every Jew, each commensurate with his abilities, whether scholar or businessman, must make an accurate accounting in his soul of everything that occurred in the course of the year. Each must know the good qualities in his service of G-d and strengthen them; he must also be aware of the deficiencies in himself and in his service, and correct these. Through this excellent preparation, one merits a good and sweet year, materially and spiritually.

Daily Thought:
Hiding Destiny
How did He make a world?
First, He thought to Himself, “I desire light. I desire love. I desire acts of kindness and beauty.” And He saw that this was good.
Then He put aside that light. As a person who puts aside his dreams so that he can begin the work that will make them possible, so the Creator put aside the vision He first desired.
And He made a world. As though that was the whole point, a world for the sake of being a world.
Only much later in the story did someone hear a whisper, “Do you know the real purpose for which I made this world?”
Now you know why reality is hard and love is soft,
Why apathy flows with ease while kindness must climb mountains,
Why light is always the intruder upon the boundless empire of darkness.
And yet, in the end, light is the hidden destiny of all that is.
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