Today's Laws & Customs:
Today in Jewish History:
DAILY QUOTE:
Everything that G-d does is for the best(Rabbi Akiva (Talmud, Berachot 60b))
DAILY STUDY:DAILY QUOTE:
Everything that G-d does is for the best(Rabbi Akiva (Talmud, Berachot 60b))
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Chayei Sarah, 1st Portion Genesis 23:1-23:16 with Rashi
• Chapter 23
1. And the life of Sarah was one hundred years and twenty years and seven years; [these were] the years of the life of Sarah. א. וַיִּהְיוּ חַיֵּי שָׂרָה מֵאָה שָׁנָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה וְשֶׁבַע שָׁנִים שְׁנֵי חַיֵּי שָׂרָה:
And the life of Sarah was one hundred years and twenty years and seven years: The reason that the word “years” was written after every digit is to tell you that every digit is to be expounded upon individually: when she was one hundred years old, she was like a twenty-year-old regarding sin. Just as a twenty-year-old has not sinned, because she is not liable to punishment, so too when she was one hundred years old, she was without sin. And when she was twenty, she was like a seven-year-old as regards to beauty. — from Gen. Rabbah 58:1]
ויהיו חיי שרה מאה שנה ועשרים שנה ושבע שנים: לכך נכתב שנה בכל כלל וכלל, לומר לך שכל אחד נדרש לעצמו, בת מאה כבת עשרים לחטא, מה בת עשרים לא חטאה, שהרי אינה בת עונשין, אף בת מאה בלא חטא, ובת עשרים כבת שבע ליופי:
the years of the life of Sarah: All of them equally good.
שני חיי שרה: כלן שוין לטובה:
2. And Sarah died in Kiriath arba, which is Hebron, in the land of Canaan, and Abraham came to eulogize Sarah and to bewail her. ב. וַתָּמָת שָׂרָה בְּקִרְיַת אַרְבַּע הִוא חֶבְרוֹן בְּאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן וַיָּבֹא אַבְרָהָם לִסְפֹּד לְשָׂרָה וְלִבְכֹּתָהּ:
in Kiriath-arba: lit. the city of the four. So named because of the four giants who were there: Ahiman, Sheshai, Talmai, and their father (Gen. Rabbah from Num. 13:23). Another explanation: Because of the four couples that were buried there, man and wife: Adam and Eve, Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, Jacob and Leah (Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer , ch. 20).
בקרית ארבע: על שם ארבע ענקים שהיו שם אחימן ששי ותלמי ואביהם. דבר אחר על שם ארבעה זוגות שנקברו שם איש ואשתו אדם וחוה, אברהם ושרה, יצחק ורבקה, יעקב ולאה:
and Abraham came: from Beer-sheba.
ויבא אברהם: מבאר שבע:
to eulogize Sarah and to bewail her: The account of Sarah’s demise was juxtaposed to the binding of Isaac because as a result of the news of the “binding,” that her son was prepared for slaughter and was almost slaughtered, her soul flew out of her, and she died. — from Gen. Rabbah 58:5]
לספוד לשרה ולבכתה: ונסמכה מיתת שרה לעקידת יצחק, לפי שעל ידי בשורת העקידה שנזדמן בנה לשחיטה וכמעט שלא נשחט, פרחה נשמתה ממנה ומתה:
3. And Abraham arose from before his dead, and he spoke to the sons of Heth, saying, ג. וַיָּקָם אַבְרָהָם מֵעַל פְּנֵי מֵתוֹ וַיְדַבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי חֵת לֵאמֹר:
4. "I am a stranger and an inhabitant with you. Give me burial property with you, so that I may bury my dead from before me." ד. גֵּר וְתוֹשָׁב אָנֹכִי עִמָּכֶם תְּנוּ לִי אֲחֻזַּת קֶבֶר עִמָּכֶם וְאֶקְבְּרָה מֵתִי מִלְּפָנָי:
I am a stranger and an inhabitant with you: [I am] a stranger from another land, and I have settled among you. [Consequently, I have no ancestral burial plot here (Rashbam, Sforno).] And the Midrash Aggadah (Gen. Rabbah 58:6) [states]: If you are willing [to sell me burial property], I am a stranger, but if not, I will be as an inhabitant and will take it legally, for the Holy One, blessed be He, said to me, “To your seed I will give this land” (above 12:7).
גר ותושב אנכי עמכם: גר מארץ אחרת ונתישבתי עמכם. ומדרש אגדה אם תרצו הריני גר, ואם לאו אהיה תושב ואטלנה מן הדין שאמר לי הקב"ה (לעיל יב ז) לזרעך אתן את הארץ הזאת:
burial property: the possession of land for a burial place.
אחזת קבר: אחוזת קרקע לבית הקברות:
5. And the sons of Heth answered Abraham, saying to him, ה. וַיַּעֲנוּ בְנֵי חֵת אֶת אַבְרָהָם לֵאמֹר לוֹ:
6. "Listen to us, my lord; you are a prince of God in our midst; in the choicest of our graves bury your dead. None of us will withhold his grave from you to bury your dead." ו. שְׁמָעֵנוּ | אֲדֹנִי נְשִׂיא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה בְּתוֹכֵנוּ בְּמִבְחַר קְבָרֵינוּ קְבֹר אֶת מֵתֶךָ אִישׁ מִמֶּנּוּ אֶת קִבְרוֹ לֹא יִכְלֶה מִמְּךָ מִקְּבֹר מֵתֶךָ:
none…will withhold: Heb. לא יִכְלֶה, will not withhold, as (Ps. 40:12):“You will not withhold (לא תִכְלָא) Your mercies,” and similarly (above 8:2):“and the rain was withheld (וַיִּכָּלֵא).”
לא יכלה: לא ימנע, כמו (תהלים מ יב) לא תכלא רחמיך, וכמו (לעיל ח ב) ויכלא הגשם:
7. And Abraham arose and prostrated himself to the people of the land, to the sons of Heth. ז. וַיָּקָם אַבְרָהָם וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ לְעַם הָאָרֶץ לִבְנֵי חֵת:
8. And he spoke with them, saying, "If it is your will that I bury my dead from before me, listen to me and entreat for me to Ephron the son of Zohar. ח. וַיְדַבֵּר אִתָּם לֵאמֹר אִם יֵשׁ אֶת נַפְשְׁכֶם לִקְבֹּר אֶת מֵתִי מִלְּפָנַי שְׁמָעוּנִי וּפִגְעוּ לִי בְּעֶפְרוֹן בֶּן צֹחַר:
your will: Heb. נַפְשְׁכֶם, equivalent to רְצוֹנְכֶם, your will.
נפשכם: רצונכם:
and entreat for me: Heb. וּפִגְעוּ, an expression of entreaty, as in (Ruth 1: 16): “Do not entreat me” .
ופגעו לי: לשון בקשה, כמו (רות א טז) אל תפגעי בי:
9. That he may give me the Machpelah (double) Cave, which belongs to him, which is at the end of his field; for a full price let him give it to me in your midst for burial property." ט. וְיִתֶּן לִי אֶת מְעָרַת הַמַּכְפֵּלָה אֲשֶׁר לוֹ אֲשֶׁר בִּקְצֵה שָׂדֵהוּ בְּכֶסֶף מָלֵא יִתְּנֶנָּה לִּי בְּתוֹכְכֶם לַאֲחֻזַּת קָבֶר:
double: A structure with an upper story over it. Another interpretation: [It was called so] because it was doubled with couples (Er. 53a).
המכפלה: בית ועליה על גביו. דבר אחר שכפולה בזוגות:
for a full price: [meaning] its full value. So did David say to Araunah,“for the full price” (I Chron. 21: 24).
בכסף מלא: אשלם כל שוויה, וכן דוד אמר לארונה (דברי הימים א' כא כד) בכסף מלא:
10. Now Ephron was sitting in the midst of the sons of Heth, and Ephron the Hittite answered Abraham in the hearing of the sons of Heth, of all those who had come into the gate of his city, saying, י. וְעֶפְרוֹן ישֵׁב בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי חֵת וַיַּעַן עֶפְרוֹן הַחִתִּי אֶת אַבְרָהָם בְּאָזְנֵי בְנֵי חֵת לְכֹל בָּאֵי שַׁעַר עִירוֹ לֵאמֹר:
Now Ephron was sitting: It ישֵׁב is spelled defectively, [without a“vav.” It can therefore be read יָשַׁב, in the past tense, meaning that he had just sat (Mizrachi, Be’er Yitzchak).] On that very day they had appointed him as an officer over them. Because of the importance of Abraham, who needed him, he rose to an exalted position. — from Gen. Rabbah 58:7]
ועפרון ישב: כתיב חסר, אותו היום מנוהו שוטר עליהם, מפני חשיבותו של אברהם שהיה צריך לו עלה לגדולה:
of all those who had come into the gate of his city: For they all left their work and came to pay their respects to Sarah. — from Gen. Rabbah 58:7]
לכל באי שער עירו: שכולן בטלו ממלאכתן ובאו לגמול חסד לשרה:
11. "No, my lord, listen to me. I have given you the field, and the cave that is in it, I have given it to you. Before the eyes of the sons of my people, I have given it to you; bury your dead." יא. לֹא אֲדֹנִי שְׁמָעֵנִי הַשָּׂדֶה נָתַתִּי לָךְ וְהַמְּעָרָה אֲשֶׁר בּוֹ לְךָ נְתַתִּיהָ לְעֵינֵי בְנֵי עַמִּי נְתַתִּיהָ לָּךְ קְבֹר מֵתֶךָ:
No, my lord: You shall not buy it for money.
לא א-דני: לא תקנה אותה בדמים:
I have given you: It is as though I have given it to you.
נתתי לך: הרי הוא כמו שנתתיה לך:
12. And Abraham prostrated himself before the people of the land. יב. וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ אַבְרָהָם לִפְנֵי עַם הָאָרֶץ:
13. And he spoke to Ephron in the hearing of the people of the land, saying, "But, if only you would listen to me. I am giving the money for the field; take [it] from me, and I will bury my dead there." יג. וַיְדַבֵּר אֶל עֶפְרוֹן בְּאָזְנֵי עַם הָאָרֶץ לֵאמֹר אַךְ אִם אַתָּה לוּ שְׁמָעֵנִי נָתַתִּי כֶּסֶף הַשָּׂדֶה קַח מִמֶּנִּי וְאֶקְבְּרָה אֶת מֵתִי שָׁמָּה:
But, if only you would listen to me: You tell me to listen to you and to take it gratis. I do not wish to do that, but“If you would only (לוּ) listen to me,” [meaning]“If only (הַלְוַאי) you would listen to me.” Rashi explains that the word לוּ is equivalent to הַלְוַאי, if only.
אך אם אתה לו שמעני: אתה אומר לי לשמוע לך וליקח בחנם, אני אי אפשי בכך, אך אם אתה לו שמעני הלואי ותשמעני:
I am giving: lit. I have given, Donai in Old French. It is ready with me, and I wish that I had already given it to you.
נתתי: דונא"י בלע"ז [נתתי] מוכן הוא אצלי והלואי נתתי לך כבר:
14. And Ephron replied to Abraham, saying to him, יד. וַיַּעַן עֶפְרוֹן אֶת אַבְרָהָם לֵאמֹר לוֹ:
15. "My lord, listen to me; a [piece of] land worth four hundred shekels of silver, what is it between me and you? Bury your dead." טו. אֲדֹנִי שְׁמָעֵנִי אֶרֶץ אַרְבַּע מֵאֹת שֶׁקֶל כֶּסֶף בֵּינִי וּבֵינְךָ מַה הִוא וְאֶת מֵתְךָ קְבֹר:
between me and you: Between two friends such as we are, of what importance is it? None! Rather leave the sale and bury your dead.
ביני ובינך: בין שני אוהבים כמונו מה היא חשובה לכלום, אלא הנח את המכר ואת מתך קבור:
16. And Abraham listened to Ephron, and Abraham weighed out to Ephron the silver that he had named in the hearing of the sons of Heth, four hundred shekels of silver, accepted by the merchant. טז. וַיִּשְׁמַע אַבְרָהָם אֶל עֶפְרוֹן וַיִּשְׁקֹל אַבְרָהָם לְעֶפְרֹן אֶת הַכֶּסֶף אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר בְּאָזְנֵי בְנֵי חֵת אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת שֶׁקֶל כֶּסֶף עֹבֵר לַסֹּחֵר:
and Abraham weighed out to Ephron: עֶפְרֹן is spelled without a “vav,” because he promised much but did not do even a little [i.e., he promised the cave as a gift but took a great deal of money for it], for he took from him large shekels, viz. centenaria [worth one hundred smaller shekels], as it is stated:“accepted by the merchant,” i.e., they are accepted as a [full] shekel everywhere, for some places have large shekels, viz. centenaria, centeniers or zenteniyers in Old French,(hundred-unit weights.) - from Gen. Rabbah 58:7, Bech. 50a, B.M. 87a]
וישקל אברהם לעפרן: חסר וי"ו, לפי שאמר הרבה ואפילו מעט לא עשה, שנטל ממנו שקלים גדולים שהן קנטרין, שנאמר (פסוק טז) עובר לסוחר, שמתקבלים בשקל בכל מקום ויש מקום ששקליהן גדולים שהן קנטרין, צינטינייר"ש [מטבעות של מאה] בלע"ז:
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Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 79 - 82
• Chapter 79
In this psalm, Asaph thanks God for sparing the people and directing His wrath upon the wood and stones (of the Temple). Still he cries bitterly, mourning the immense destruction: The place where the High Priest alone was allowed to enter-and only on Yom Kippur-is now so desolate that foxes stroll through it!
1. A psalm by Asaph. O God, nations have entered Your inheritance, they defiled Your Holy Sanctuary; they turned Jerusalem into heaps of rubble.
2. They have rendered the corpses of Your servants as food for the birds of heaven, the flesh of Your pious ones for the beasts of the earth.
3. They spilled their blood like water around Jerusalem, and there is no one to bury [them].
4. We became the object of disgrace to our neighbors, ridicule and scorn to those around us.
5. Until when, O Lord! Will You be angry forever? Will Your jealousy burn like fire?
6. Pour Your wrath upon the nations that do not know You, upon the kingdoms that do not call Your Name,
7. for they devoured Jacob and desolated His abode.
8. Do not recall our former sins; let Your mercies come swiftly towards us, for we have fallen very low.
9. Help us, God of our deliverance, for the sake of the glory of Your Name; save us and pardon our sins for the sake of Your Name.
10. Why should the nations say, "Where is their God?" Let there be known among the nations, before our eyes, the retribution of the spilled blood of Your servants.
11. Let the groan of the prisoner come before You; liberate those condemned to death, as befits the greatness of Your strength.
12. Repay our neighbors sevenfold into their bosom, for the disgrace with which they reviled You, O Lord.
13. And we, Your people, the flock of Your pasture, will thank You forever; for all generations we will recount Your praise.
Chapter 80
An awe-inspiring prayer imploring God to draw near to us as in days of old.
1. For the Conductor, on the shoshanim, 1 a testimony by Asaph, a psalm.
2. Listen, O Shepherd of Israel, Who leads Joseph like sheep. Appear, You Who is enthroned upon the cherubim.
3. Arouse Your might before Ephraim, Benjamin and Menashe, for it is upon You to save us.
4. Return us, O God; cause Your countenance to shine, that we may be saved.
5. O Lord, God of Hosts, until when will You fume at the prayer of Your people?
6. You fed them bread of tears, and gave them tears to drink in great measure.
7. You have made us an object of strife to our neighbors; our enemies mock to themselves.
8. Return us, O God of Hosts; cause Your countenance to shine, that we may be saved.
9. You brought a vine out of Egypt; You drove out nations and planted it.
10. You cleared space before it; it took root and filled the land.
11. Mountains were covered by its shade, and its branches became mighty cedars.
12. It sent forth its branches till the sea, and its tender shoots to the river.
13. Why did You breach its fences, so that every passerby plucked its fruit?
14. The boars of the forest ravage it, and the creepers of the field feed upon it.
15. O God of Hosts, please return! Look down from heaven and see, and be mindful of this vine,
16. and of the foundation which Your right hand has planted, and the son whom You strengthened for Yourself.
17. It is burned by fire, cut down; they perish at the rebuke of Your Presence.
18. Let Your hand be upon the man of Your right hand, upon the son of man whom You strengthened for Yourself.
19. Then we will not withdraw from You; revive us, and we will proclaim Your Name.
20. O Lord, God of Hosts, return us; cause Your countenance to shine that we may be saved.
Chapter 81
This psalm was chanted in the Holy Temple on Rosh Hashanah, a day on which many miracles were wrought for Israel.
1. For the Conductor, upon the gittit,1 by Asaph.
2. Sing joyously to God, our strength; sound the shofar to the God of Jacob.
3. Raise your voice in song, sound the drum, the pleasant harp, and the lyre.
4. Blow the shofar on the New Month, on the designated day of our Holy Day;
5. for it is a decree for Israel, a ruling of the God of Jacob.
6. He ordained it as a precept for Joseph when he went forth over the land of Egypt; I heard a language which I did not know.
7. I have taken his shoulder from the burden; his hands were removed from the pot.2
8. In distress you called and I delivered you; [you called] in secret, and I answered you with thunderous wonders; I tested you at the waters of Merivah, Selah.
9. Hear, My people, and I will admonish you; Israel, if you would only listen to Me!
10. You shall have no alien god within you, nor shall you bow down to a foreign deity.
11. I am the Lord your God who brought you up from the land of Egypt; open wide your mouth, [state all your desires,] and I shall grant them.
12. But My people did not heed My voice; Israel did not want [to listen to] Me.
13. So I sent them away for the willfulness of their heart, for following their [evil] design.
14. If only My people would listen to Me, if Israel would only walk in My ways,
15. then I would quickly subdue their enemies, and turn My hand against their oppressors.
16. Those who hate the Lord would shrivel before Him, and the time [of their retribution] shall be forever.
17. I would feed him [Israel] with the finest of wheat, and sate you with honey from the rock.
Chapter 82
This psalm admonishes those judges who feign ignorance of the law, dealing unjustly with the pauper or the orphan, while coddling the rich and pocketing their bribes.
1. A psalm by Asaph. God stands in the council of judges; among the judges He renders judgment:
2. How long will you judge wickedly, ever showing partiality toward the evildoers?
3. Render justice to the needy and the orphan; deal righteously with the poor and the destitute.
4. Rescue the needy and the pauper; deliver them from the hand of the wicked.
5. But they do not know, nor do they understand; they go about in darkness, [therefore] all the foundations of the earth tremble.
6. I said that you are angels, supernal beings, all of you;
7. but you will die as mortals, you will fall like any prince.
8. Arise, O God, judge the earth, for You possess all the nations.
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Tanya: Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 28
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Sunday, 16 Cheshvan 5775 • 9 November 2014
Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 28
In the previous Epistle, written to console the chassidic brotherhood after the passing of the saintly R. Mendele Vitebsker, the Alter Rebbe quotes from the Zohar to the effect that a tzaddik is even more accessible in this world after his passing than while he was still alive. Moreover, after his passing his chassidim continue to receive from him both spiritual benefactions which enhance their Torah study and divine service, and protection in material matters.
Following that Epistle the original editors1 placed the present discourse, which the Alter Rebbe wrote by way of consolation to his illustrious colleague, relative-by-marriage, and dear friend, R. Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev, following the tragic passing of his son. Here the Alter Rebbe explains how the passing of a tzaddik “effects salvations in the midst of the earth,” atoning even for intentional sins.
מה שכתב למחותנו, הרב הגאון המפורסם, איש אלקים קדוש ה׳, נר ישראל, עמוד הימני, פטיש החזק
This letter was written [by the Alter Rebbe] to his relative-by-marriage — the famous rabbi and Gaon, the G‑dly man, the holy man of G‑d,2 Lamp of Israel, pillar of the right hand, mighty hammer3 —
מורנו הרב לוי יצחק, נשמתו עדן, אב בית דין דקהלה קדושה בארדיטשוב
our master, R. Levi Yitzchak (may his soul rest in Eden), head of the Rabbinical Court of the holy community of Berditchev,
לנחמו על פטירת בנו, הרב החסיד מורנו ורבנו הרב מאיר, נשמתו עדן
to console him on the passing4 of his son, the pious rabbi, R. Meir (may his soul rest in Eden).
* * *
למה נסמכה פרשת מרים לפרשת פרה
“Why was the passage concerning the passing of Miriam5 adjoined to the passage concerning the Red Heifer6?
לומר לך: מה פרה מכפרת וכו׳
— To teach you that just as the Heifer effects atonement, [so, too, does the passing of the righteous].”
Commenting on this quotation from the Gemara,7 Tosafot8 explains that the Red Heifer atones for the sin of the Golden Calf, and in the same way the passing of the righteous effects atonement.
וצריך להבין למה נסמכה דוקא לפרה אדומה
Now it needs to be understood why [the passage concerning the passing of Miriam] was adjoined specifically to [the passage concerning] the Red Heifer
הנעשה חוץ לשלש מחנות, אלא דחטאת קרייה רחמנא
(which was prepared outside the three camps,9 and as such was not a sacrifice proper, except that the Torah calls it10 a sin-offering),11
ולא נסמכה לפרשת חטאת, הנעשה בפנים על גבי המזבח, כפרה ממש
and it was not adjoined to the passage concerning the sin-offering that was prepared within, on the altar, [and as such effects] actual atonement.
Alternatively, the Hebrew text could be understood to mean “on the actual altar of atonement,” or (preferably) that the sin-offering was “actual atonement,” unlike the Red Heifer which was primarily a rite of purification.
To revert to the question concerning the juxtaposition of the two passages, the Alter Rebbe explains that an offering connoted an “arousal from below,” from the soul of the animal that derives from kelipat nogah. This, in turn, elicited a reciprocal “arousal from Above,” drawing down a finite order of Divine light that can permeate the finite world and be integrated and ingested within it. (This characteristic explains why offerings are referred to as the “food of the altar.”) Being finite, this contracted order of Divine light was only able to effect atonement of unwitting sins, those that derive from undue domination by the animal soul which derives from kelipat nogah.
The Red Heifer, by contrast, produces the “sanctifying purification waters” (Kiddush mei chatat); i.e., it draws down an illumination from the most supremely sanctified levels of Divinity (Kodesh HaElyon) that utterly transcend this world. This intense illumination can transform the darkness of Tohu into the light of Tikkun, and secure purification for even the harshest degree of impurity (Avi Avot HaTumah), which is far lower than kelipat nogah.
In the same way, the passing of a tzaddik draws down a Divine illumination that transcends the world, deriving as it does from that element within the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy which is called the Tikkun of Notzer. The name of this Tikkun, which comprises the same letters as Ratzon, brings about an et ratzon, “an auspicious time,” and secures atonement for the sins of the generation, even those that are committed willfully and that derive from the three completely impure kelipot.
In this regard, the passing of a tzaddik is thus more akin to the Red Heifer than to a sin-offering.
אמנם נודע מזהר הקדוש והאריז״ל, סוד הקרבנות שעל גבי המזבח
Now,12 the mystical principle of the sacrifices offered on the altar is known from the sacred Zohar13 and from R. Isaac Luria,14 of blessed memory:
הן בחינת העלאת מיין נוקבין, מנפש הבהמית שבנוגה
They are an instance of the elevation of mayin nukvin (lit., “feminine waters”; i.e., a mortally-initiated spiritual arousal) deriving from the animal soul, [which receives its life-force from] kelipat nogah,
אל שרשן ומקורן
[this elevation ascending] to their root and source,
הן בחינת ד׳ חיות שבמרכבה, הנושאות את הכסא
i.e., the forms of the four Animals of the Celestial Chariot which bear the Throne,15 as described in Ezekiel, ch. 1:
פני שור ופני נשר וכו׳
the Face of the Ox, and the Face of the Eagle, and so on.
The former level of Divinity is the source of the souls of all animals, the latter is the source of the souls of all birds, these being the two categories of creatures from which offerings are brought. (The other two categories, the Face of the Lion and the Face of Man, are alluded to in the closing phrase, “and so on.”)
Offerings thus constitute an elevation and an “arousal from below” from a willing recipient toward the level of Divinity (here called the four Animals of the Chariot) which is the Source of all things within the finite world and which hence has a connection with it.
ועל ידי זה, נמשכים ויורדים מיין דוכרין מבחינת אדם שעל הכסא, הנקרא מלכא וזעיר אנפין
As a result, reciprocating this arousal, the mayin duchrin (the “male waters” from the benefactor Above) are elicited and descend from the level of Divinity called (in Ezekiel) “the Man upon the Throne,” Who is [also] referred to as Malka (“King”) and Z’eir Anpin (i.e., the bracket of six “masculine” attributes preceding the recipient or “feminine” Sefirah of Malchut).
The resultant illumination flows down to the world and becomes vested and integrated within it. Hence, as mentioned above, offerings are termed “food for the altar,” for they draw down a level of Divine light which can be spiritually ingested.
אכן בשריפת הפרה אדומה, הנה על ידי השלכת עץ ארז ואזוב וכו׳
As for the burning of the Red Heifer, however, it is on account of the throwing in of the cedar wood and the hyssop, and so on, the function of both of which is hamshachah, i.e., drawing down sanctity from Above,16
ונתינת מים חיים אל האפר
and [moreover] the placing of running water into the ashes,
נקרא בשם קידוש מי חטאת במשנה
that in the Mishnah17 [this process] is called the “sanctification (Kiddush) of the purifying waters.”
והיא בחינת קדש העליון, הנקרא בשם טלא דבדולחא
This relates — not only etymologically — to Kodesh HaElyon (“the supreme sanctity”), referred to as Tala DiBedulcha (lit., “the Dew of Bdellium”; cf. the Torah’s descriptions of the manna18).
Unlike the heavenly benefactions that are termed “rain”, for rain results from an “arousal from below” (as it is written,19 “And a vapor rose from the ground and watered...”), the above-described “dew” is a spontaneous “arousal from Above” that transcends dependence on any antecedent “arousal from below.”
כמו שכתוב בזהר הקדוש, שהיא בחינת חכמה עילאה ומוחא סתימאה דאריך אנפין
As stated in the sacred Zohar,20 this [Tala DiBedulcha] is an expression of the Supreme Chochmah and the Mocha Setimaah of Arich Anpin; i.e., it is the level of Chochmah within Keter which entirely transcends the world.
ועלה איתמר בדוכתי טובא בזהר הקדוש: בחכמה איתברירו
Of this [level of Chochmah and Mocha Setimaah] it is said in many places in the sacred Zohar that “through Chochmah they are refined” and rectified;21
ואתהפכא חשוכא לנהורא, דהיינו: עולם התיקון
and then, when by means of the “sanctification of the purifying waters” Divine light is drawn down from this level, darkness is converted to light, that is, [to] the World of Tikkun,
שנתברר ונתתקן על ידי מוחא סתימאה דאריך אנפין
which becomes refined and rectified by means of the Mocha Setimaah of Arich Anpin;
מעולם התהו ושבירת הכלים שנפלו בבריאה, יצירה ועשיה וכו׳
[i.e., the World of Tikkun is refined and rectified] from the World of Tohu and the Breaking of the Vessels [whose sparks] fell into [the Worlds of] Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, and so on,
כנודע
as is known.
The spiritual task of the Jew is to extract, refine and elevate these sparks.
ולזאת מטהרת טומאת המת
This is why [the Red Heifer] purifies one from defilement [contracted by contact] with a corpse,
אף שהוא אבי אבות וכו׳, ולמטה מטה מנוגה
even though this [corpse] is the ultimate degree [of impurity], and far, far lower than Nogah.
For the “sanctification of the purifying waters” is drawn down from the supreme Chochmah and the Mocha Setimaah of Arich Anpin, an illumination that transcends the world so utterly that it is able to transform the world’s darkness into light.
* * *
FOOTNOTES
1. Note of the Rebbe: “See the ‘Approbation of the ... sons ... of the ... author’ which appears at the beginning of Tanya, [and which states that they were responsible for arranging the manuscript letters of Iggeret HaKodesh for publication].”
2. Cf. II Melachim 4:9.
3. Cf. the metaphors used by the Sages in Berachot 28b to denote resounding scholarship.
4. Note of the Rebbe: “In the year 5566 [1806].”
5. Bamidbar 20:1ff.
6. Ibid., ch. 19.
7. Moed Katan 28a.
8. S.v. Mah parah. See also Rashi on the beginning of Parshat Chukat.
9. Cf. Rashi on Bamidbar 19:3, based on Yoma 68a.
10. Cf. Rashi on verse 9, based on Avodah Zarah 23b and Chullin 11a.
11. Text and parentheses here follow a gloss of the Rebbe in He’arot VeTikkunim, concerning a variant ms. reading which omitted the six Hebrew words here translated as “the three camps, except that the Torah calls it a sin-offering.” There the Rebbe refers the reader to the “Important Notification” (Modaah Rabbah) at the beginning of the edition of 5660 [1900], which states that Iggeret HaKodesh was carefully proofread against various mss. for that edition, which was not the case with earlier printings.
12. Note of the Rebbe: “Concerning the text which follows, see at length in Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshat Chukat.”
13. I, 64b.
14. Likkutei Torah of the AriZal, Parshat Vayikra.
15. Bechaye, Parshat Terumah 25:10, et al.
16. Note of the Rebbe: “So it is explained here. But see Likkutei Torah, Chukat, loc. cit., especially the conclusion of the passage beginning Tosefet Biur on the maamar beginning VeYikchu Eilecha (p. 61b), [where the Alter Rebbe explains that the cedar wood and the hyssop relate to the avodah of elevation, whereas only the addition of the waters is an avodah of drawing Divine energy downward].”
17. Parah, ch. 6.
18. Bamidbar 11:7 and Shmot 16:13.
19. Bereishit 2:6.
20. Cf. Zohar III, 128b.
21. Gloss of the Rebbe to Likkutei Biurim LeTanya by Rabbi Yehoshua Korf: “See Torah Or, Parshat Bereishit, the discourse beginning VaYomer ... Hein HaAdam; ibid., Megillat Esther, the discourse beginning U’vevoah; in the supplements there, the discourse beginning LeHavin Inyan Chalav U’Dvash, sec. 2. See also Zohar II, 254b; Etz Chayim, Shaar 18, sec. 5; Mavo She’arim, Shaar 5, 1:2; Sefer HaMitzvot by the Tzemach Tzedek, Issur Avodat Baal-Mum; et al; — where these contradictions are resolved.”
____________________________
Rambam:
Daily Mitzvah P246 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Sunday, 16 Cheshvan 5775 • 9 November 2014
Positive Commandment 246
Laws of Claims
"In every case of trespass...in which one can say: 'This is it'"—Exodus 22:8.
We are commanded to adjudicate monetary cases between litigants [according to the laws outlined in the Torah].
Laws of Claims
Positive Commandment 246
Translated by Berel Bell
The 246th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding claims and counterclaims [in lawsuits.]
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "In every case of dishonesty... [and the watchman] said that this is it."
In the words of the Mechilta: "The phrase 'that this is it' refers to partial admission to the claim."2
This mitzvah includes anything that can arise from the claims people have against one another involving admission and denial.
The details of this commandment are explained in the 3rd chapter of Bava Kama, the beginning of Bava Metzia, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th chapters of Shavuos. Many questions regarding this subject are spread throughout the Talmud.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:8.
2.Since he has made a partial admission, he is required to take an oath regarding the rest of the claim.
Daily Mitzvah P246 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Sunday, 16 Cheshvan 5775 • 9 November 2014
Positive Commandment 246
Laws of Claims
"In every case of trespass...in which one can say: 'This is it'"—Exodus 22:8.
We are commanded to adjudicate monetary cases between litigants [according to the laws outlined in the Torah].
Laws of Claims
Positive Commandment 246
Translated by Berel Bell
The 246th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding claims and counterclaims [in lawsuits.]
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "In every case of dishonesty... [and the watchman] said that this is it."
In the words of the Mechilta: "The phrase 'that this is it' refers to partial admission to the claim."2
This mitzvah includes anything that can arise from the claims people have against one another involving admission and denial.
The details of this commandment are explained in the 3rd chapter of Bava Kama, the beginning of Bava Metzia, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th chapters of Shavuos. Many questions regarding this subject are spread throughout the Talmud.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:8.
2.Since he has made a partial admission, he is required to take an oath regarding the rest of the claim.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter a Day: Edut - Chapter 20Edut - Chapter 20
Halacha 1
Lying witnesses are neither executed, given lashes, or required to make financial restitution unless both of them were fit to serve as witnesses and they were both disqualified through hazamah after the judgment was rendered.
If, however, only one of them was disqualified through hazamah, they were both disqualified through hazamah before the judgment was rendered, or after the judgment was rendered, one of them was disqualified because of family connections or because he was unfit to serve as a witness, the witnesses are not punished, even though they are disqualified through hazamah and no longer acceptable to deliver testimony in all matters of Scriptural Law.
Halacha 2
Although according to Talmudic logic one might differ, if the person against whom they testified was executed and then they were disqualified through hazamah, they are not executed. This is derived from Deuteronomy 19:19: which speaks of: 'what they conspired to do.' Implied is that it was not already done. This rule is part of the Oral Tradition.
If, however, the person against whom they testified was lashed, they are lashed. Similarly, if money was expropriated from one person and given to another, it is returned to its owner and the witnesses are required to pay the penalty.
Halacha 3
The following laws apply if there were three or even 100 witnesses. If the witnesses deliver testimony in court one after the other, each one testifying immediately after his colleague and several of them were disqualified through hazamah, they do not receive punishment until all of them are disqualified through hazamah.
If, however, the interval between testimonies was greater than the time it takes a student to greet a teacher, the testimonies are divided and the two who were disqualified through hazamah are punished. The two who testified after there was such an interlude between their testimony and that of the first pair are not punished. This applies even though the entire testimony is disqualified because all of the witnesses are considered as one group and when the testimony of part of a group is disqualified, the entire testimony is disqualified.
Halacha 4
When one witness delivers testimony, that testimony is investigated, and the second witness states: 'I also testify like him,' 'Yes, this is what happened,' or the like, they are both executed, lashed, or subjected to a financial penalty if they are both disqualified through hazamah. The rationale is that any witness who says 'Yes, this is what happened' after his colleague testified is considered as having testified and responded to cross-examination as his colleague did.
There is no concept of inadvertent transgression with regard to lying witnesses, because the transgression does not involve a deed. Therefore there is no need for a warning as we explained.
Halacha 5
Just as two witnesses can disqualify 100 witnesses through hazamah if the 100 testify at one time; so, too, they can disqualify them through hazamah if they testify as 50 groups, coming two by two.
What is implied? A group of witnesses testified that Reuven killed Shimon in Jerusalem. Two witnesses came and disqualified that group through hazamah. Another group came and delivered that same testimony, that Reuven killed Shimon in Jerusalem and these same two witnesses arose and disqualified that group through hazamah. This happened a third time and a fourth time. Even if it happens 100 times, all the other witnesses are executed on the basis of the testimony of these two.
Halacha 6
When one group of witnesses testify that Reuven killed Shimon in Jerusalem and a second group come and disqualify the first group through hazamah, the lying witnesses should be executed and Reuven's life saved. If a third group come and disqualify the second group through hazamah, the second group and Reuven should be executed and the lives of the first group saved.
If a fourth group come and disqualify the third group through hazamah, the third and the first groups should be executed and the lives of Reuven and the second group saved. Similarly, even if there are 100 groups, each one disqualifying the testimony of the previous through hazamah, one group's testimony is accepted and the other group's testimony is disqualified.
Halacha 7
When witnesses testify that a person who is trefe murdered a person and then the witnesses are disqualified through hazamah, the witnesses are not executed. The rationale is that even if they had killed him with their hands, they would not be executed, because he is trefe.
Similarly, if witnesses who were trefe testified concerning a matter punishable by execution by the court and were disqualified through hazamah, they are not executed. The rationale is that if their testimony was disqualified through hazamah, and the testimony of the witnesses who testified against them was disqualified through hazamah, those witnesses would not be executed, for they disqualified only a person who was trefe.
Halacha 8
The following rule applies when witnesses testify against another person and have him convicted in a matter that does not involve lashes, capital punishment, or a financial obligation and then the witnesses are disqualified through hazamah. They are given lashes even though they did not conspire to have the defendant lashed or to obligate him financially.
What is implied? Witnesses testified that a priest was a challal, e.g., they testified that his mother was divorced or released through chalitzah in their presence in this-and-this place on this-and-this date. If the witnesses are disqualified through hazamah, they are punished by lashing.
Similarly, if they testified that a person inadvertently killed a colleague and they are disqualified through hazamah, they are punished by lashing; they are not exiled. And if they testify that a person's ox killed another person and they were disqualified through hazamah, they receive lashes and are not required to pay an atonement fine. If they testify that a person was sold as a Hebrew servant and they were disqualified through hazamah, they receive lashes. These four rulings are part of the Oral Tradition.
Halacha 9
With regard to the above matters, our Sages received the following tradition: When two people cause a righteous person to be condemned and a wicked person to be vindicated through their testimony and two others come and disqualify their testimony through hazamah vindicating the righteous person and condemning the wicked, the first pair of witnesses receive lashes even though their condemnation of the righteous person would not have had him subjected to lashes.
If, however, witnesses testify that a person partook of milk and meat or wore shaatnez, they are punished by lashes, as implied by Deuteronomy 19:19: 'You shall requite him as he conspired.'
Halacha 10
When two witnesses testify that Reuven committed adultery with the daughter of a priest, Reuven was sentenced to death by strangulation and the daughter of the priest was sentenced to be burnt to death, and afterwards the witnesses were disqualified through hazamah, they should be executed by strangulation and not burnt to death. This is part of the Oral Tradition.
1. If one of them is unacceptable as a witness, their testimony is no loner effective. Hence they are not punished (Kessef Mishneh).
2. The second pair of witnesses states that one, but not the other of the first pair were with them in a different place at the time they claim that the event transpired.
3. For the punishment was prescribed only for a pair of witnesses (Rashi, Makkot 5b).
4. As described in Chapter 13.
5. As described in Chapters 10-12.
6. As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 4. They are, however, acceptable in matters where leniency is granted with regard to the acceptance of testimony, e.g., testimony concerning the death of a woman's husband.
7. Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who states that the fundamental principle the Rambam is trying to convey with this phrase is that capital punishment is not given unless it is explicitly stated in the Torah. A logical proof is not sufficient.
What is the logic here? If a person who conspires to have a person executed should be executed, should not one who actually caused him to be executed.
8. From the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah and from the gloss of the Radbaz, it appears that although they are not executed, they should be punished by the court.
9. I.e., what they conspired.
10. I.e., the Torah prescribes punishment only in such a situation.
11. The Ra'avad and the Kessef Mishneh question the Rambam's source for this distinction. The Kessef Mishneh explains that it is possible to say that since judgment is ultimately in God's hands, had the executed party not been guilty, God would not have allowed him to be executed. Hence the lying witnesses need not be punished. Alternatively, he can be explained that the punishments inflicted by the courts are not goals in their own right, but means to bring a person to atonement. It is not fitting to give lying witnesses who had a person executed the opportunity to achieve such atonement. Since lashes is not as severe a punishment, neither of these explanations apply.
12. I.e., the plaintiff is required to return it.
13. For financial penalties are established based on Talmudic logic (Kessef Mishneh).
14. As the Rambam continues to explain, the Hebrew term translated as 'immediately after,' toch kidei dibur, has a specific meaning: The time it takes a student to greet a teacher, saying: Shalom alecha rabbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
15. The Ra'avad questions: Since these witnesses were not disqualified through hazamah, why would one think that they should be punished? The Radbaz answers that the very fact that they appeared together with lying witnesses implicates them.
The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is that even if the second pair of witnesses were also disqualified through hazamah, they are not punished. The rationale is that since their testimony was separated from that of the first pair and by the time they testified the defendant could have been executed because of the testimony of the first pair, their testimony is of no consequence. Hence they are not punished.
16. Thus even if there is no difficulty at all with the testimony of the last pair of witnesses, the defendant is not punished. 17. Because they saw the event together and appeared together in court.
18. The rationale for this distinction can be explained as follows: With regard to the disqualification of witnesses, everything is dependent on the testimony of the witnesses in court. Hence if their testimony is separated, they are not considered as a single group. Their classification as a single group, by contrast, depends on their coming to court together. Since they came together with the intent to testify, they are considered as a single group (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra'avad (and Rashi, in his commentary to Makkot 6a) do not accept the Rambam's approach and maintain that even though the first pair of witnesses should be executed, if the testimony of the second pair is validated, the defendant should also be executed.
19. I.e., he is cross-examined by the court, as explained in Chapter 2.
20. I.e., despite the fact that he did not actually testify, it is considered as if he did as the Rambam proceeds to explain. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:8 which states that making such statements is equivalent to actually testifying in court.
21. I.e., they receive punishment even if they committed the transgression without knowing that it was forbidden.
22. The Radbaz explains that Numbers 15:29, the source for the laws of inadvertent transgression mentions 'one who acts inadvertently' (see Hilchot Shegagot 1:2). In this context (in contrast to blasphemy), speaking is not considered as an act. Hence they are not held liable.
Nevertheless, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer a different rationale why these witnesses are punished without a warning: They desired to have the defendant punished although he did not receive a warning. Therefore, they should be punished without a warning.
23. See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.
24. For the entire purpose of a warning is to distinguish between a transgression committed willfully and one committed inadvertently (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2).
25. See Chapter 18, Halachah 3.
26. We do not say that they are lying and have resolved to testify against anyone who delivers testimony in this matter (Rashi, Makkot 5a).
27. Because the testimony of the second group exonerates him from the onus of the testimony of the first group.
28. The second group should be executed as lying witnesses who sought to have the first group executed. Reuven should be executed, because once the testimony of the second group has been disqualified, the testimony of the first group is then reinstated.
29. Because the disqualification of the second group exonerates them.
30. I.e., he has a physical ailment that will cause him to die within 12 months.
31. Seemingly, through their testimony, they are trying to have the defendant executed. Nevertheless, despite the fact they testify that the person who is trefe committed a murder, he is not executed. The rationale is that testimony must be able to be disqualified through hazamah. Since it is impossible to punish the witnesses 'as they conspired to do to their brother,' for they conspired to have a sick person executed and they are healthy, the concept of hazamah is not relevant, as stated in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:9.
32. And a person who kills a colleague who is trefe is not liable for execution. For it is as if he killed a dead person (Sanhedrin 78a; Hilchot Rotzeach 2:8).
33. Here also, it would appear that the intent is that since they are seeking to have the person executed, one might think that they should be executed. In fact, however, their testimony is not effective in having the defendant sentenced to death. Since they are trefe, there is no possibility of requiting them 'as they conspired to do to their brother.' For they conspired to have a healthy person executed and they are sick.
Accordingly, the Kessef Mishneh explains that we are speaking about a situation where the court did not recognize that the witnesses were trefe when it accepted their testimony.
34. Thus the punishment is not 'as they conspired to do to their brother.'
35. For the reasons mentioned by the Rambam in the following halachah.
36. I.e., the descendant of a priest who is not considered as a member of the priesthood, because he was conceived in relations forbidden to his father. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:5.
37. Thus making his mother forbidden to his father.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger raises a question, noting that a woman who underwent chalitzah is only forbidden to a priest by Rabbinic decree. Hence the Ramban and others rule that lashes should not be given. Rabbi Akiva Eiger himself states that since the defendant is being disqualified according to Rabbinic decree through the testimony of the witnesses, and by giving that false testimony, they violate a Scriptural commandment, it is appropriate that they be punished by lashing.
38. We do not say that the witnesses should be considered as challalim themselves. This applies even if the witnesses are priests. Makkot 2b explains this based on Deuteronomy 19:19: 'And you shall requite him as he conspired to do to his brother.' The obligation is to requite him, not to requite his descendants and having him declared a challal would be a punishment against his descendants as well as him.
39. The lying witnesses are not exiled "as they conspired to do to" the defendant. The rationale is that Deuteronomy 19:5 says with regard to a person convicted of inadvertent murder: 'He shall flee to one of these cities.' Makkot, loc. cit., states: ...He,' and not those who conspire against him.'
40. For an atonement fine is not a monetary assessment, but rather a fine designated to bring atonement for the death of the victim. These witnesses do not need that type of atonement, for their ox did not cause death (Rashi, Makkot, loc. cit.; see also Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:4-5).
See also the Ketzot HaChoshen 38:2 which explains that even though the witness also caused the ox to be sentenced to death and no benefit to be derived from it. Nevertheless, the witnesses are lashed and not subjected to these penalties. See also the Ramban who differs and maintains that the witnesses are required to make financial restitution and are not lashed.
41. The Nimukei Mahari (based on Makkot, loc. cit.), explains that the intent is that the witnesses testify that the person stole and did not have the money to make restitution for the theft.
42. Although Makkot, loc. cit., outlines how each of these concepts is derived from the exegesis of a verse, since the concepts are not derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis, the exegesis is considered as only an asmachta. The binding obligation to fulfill these directives stems from the fact that they were transmitted through the Oral Tradition (Radbaz).
43. The Rambam is borrowing the wording of Deuteronomy 25:1-2: 'And they shall validate the righteous and condemn the wicked. If the wicked man is deserving of being beaten...' which continues to speak of the punishment of lashing.
'Condemning the righteous' refers to a situation where lying witnesses caused judgment to be rendered against a righteous person.
44. In this situation, we follow the instructions of the continuation of the verse and punish the person by lashes. Delivering false testimony violates the prohibition 'Do not deliver false testimony against your colleague.' Nevertheless, one might think that since that prohibition does not involve a deed, it is not punishable by lashes. Hence the exegesis of the above verse is necessary. See Makkot 4b (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
45. As in the four cases mentioned in the previous halachah.
46. I.e., since the lying witnesses delivered testimony concerning a transgression punishable by lashes, there is no need for a special teaching to instruct us to give them that punishment. They are requited in this manner, because this is what they 'conspired to do to their brother' (Kessef Mishneh).
47. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 3:3 which states that the two parties to this transgression are given different punishments.
48. Sanhedrin 90a derives this from Deuteronomy 19:19 which speaks of requiting a lying witness, 'as he conspired to do to his brother,' his brother and not his sister. This, however, is an asmachta.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions what the ruling would be in a situation where the witnesses claim to have given a warning to the woman, but not to the man. He supposes that even in such a situation, they should be executed by strangulation, not burning.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters a Day: To`en veNit`an To`en veNit`an - Chapter 1, To`en veNit`an To`en veNit`an - Chapter 2, To`en veNit`an To`en veNit`an - Chapter 3
To`en veNit`an - Chapter 1
The Laws Pertaining to Disputes between Plaintiffs and Defendants
It contains one mitzvah, the laws when a person issues a claim against a colleague and he either admits or denies the claim.
This mitzvah is explained in the following chapters.
Halacha 1
When a person who issues a claim against a colleague with regard to movable property, and the defendant acknowledges a portion of the claim, he must pay what he acknowledged, and take an oath with regard to the remainder. This is a Scriptural obligation, as Exodus 22:8 states: "That this is it."
Similarly, if the defendant denies the entire obligation and says: "Such a thing never happened," and one witness testifies that the defendant is obligated to the plaintiff, the defendant is obligated by Scriptural Law to take an oath. The Oral Tradition teaches: Whenever two witnesses would obligate the person to pay money, one witness obligates him to take an oath.
Similarly, it was derived through the Oral Tradition that one witness shall not rise up against any man for any iniquity or any sin. He may, however, rise up against him to obligate him to take an oath.
Halacha 2
There are only three individuals who are obligated by Scriptural Law to take an oath: a person who denied a portion of a claim of movable property, a person obligated by one witness, and a watchman. For with regard to a watchman, Exodus 22:10 states: "The oath of God shall be between them." We have already explained the oath required of watchman in Hilchot Sechirut.
Each of these three individuals takes an oath and becomes free of his obligation to pay. In contrast, those who take an oath and collect the money they claim, e.g., an employee, a person who was injured, a person who impairs the legal power of his promissory note and the like, and similarly, those who take an oath because there is a possibility of a claim being lodged against them, e.g., partners and sharecroppers, all take oaths because of our Sages' ordinances. Although all these oaths were ordained by Rabbinic decree, they all resemble a Scriptural oath, and all must be taken while holding a sacred article.
Halacha 3
A defendant is not liable to take a Scriptural oath when a colleague claims that he owes movable property and the defendant:
a) denies the entire matter, saying: "Such a thing never occurred";
) admitted a portion of the claim and gave it to him immediately, saying: "This is all I owe you; here it is";
c) admits that he had originally owed the plaintiff the debt, but claims that the plaintiff waived payment, gave him the object claimed as a present, or that he already returned the debt;
d) admits owing barley, while the plaintiff owes wheat.
Nevertheless, the Sages of the Gemara ordained that in all these situations, the defendant should take a sh'vuat heset, before being freed of liability. This oath does not resemble a Scriptural oath, because one need not hold a sacred article while taking it. We have already described the process of taking a Scriptural oath and that of taking a sh'vuat heset in Hilchot Sh'vuos.
Halacha 4
Whenever anyone is required to take an oath by Scriptural Law, he may take the oath and free himself of obligations. If he does not desire to take the oath, we attach his property and expropriate everything the plaintiff claims. For the plaintiff will say: "I will not budge from the Torah's ruling. Either take the oath or pay me." He may, however, have a conditional ban of ostracismissued against anyone who makes a false claim. He must then pay.
Different laws apply when, by contrast, a person is obligated to take an oath by Rabbinic degree. If he was one of those who must take an oath and collect his due, he cannot reverse the oath and require the defendant to take it. For the defendant will tell him: "Take the oath and collect as the Sages ordained for you." If he does not desire to take an oath, he should depart.
My masters ruled that if the plaintiff says: "I do not desire the ordinance which the Sages ordained on my behalf. Instead, I am no different than any other plaintiff," he may require the defendant to take a sh'vuat heset. If the defendant desires to reverse this oath and require the plaintiff to take it, we obligate the plaintiff to take the oath or to depart.
Halacha 5
If a defendant was obligated by Rabbinic decree to take an oath to be released from responsibility, e.g., those who must take an oath because of a doubt or those required to take a sh'vuat heset, and he did not want to take an oath, he is placed under a ban of ostracism for 30 days. If he does not come and seek to be released from his ban, he is given stripes for rebellious conduct.
Similarly, whenever a person has been placed under a ban of ostracism for 30 days, he is given stripes for rebellious conduct and then his ban is lifted. His property is not attached, because he is not required to take an oath by Scriptural Law.
Halacha 6
Whenever a person is obligated to take a sh'vuat heset, if he desires, he may reverse the oath and obligate the plaintiff. The plaintiff may take the sh'vuat heset and then collect his claim from his colleague.
There is no other person who takes a sh'vuat heset and collects his claim from his colleague except this person for whom the obligation to take a sh'vuat heset. A Scriptural oath and a Rabbinic oath that resembles a Scriptural oath may not be reversed.
Halacha 7
A person cannot be required to take a sh'vuat heset unless a definite claim is lodged against him. If, however, the plaintiff's claim is doubt, the defendant is not liable for the oath.
What is implied? The plaintiff says: "It appears to me that you owe me a maneh," "I lent you a maneh, it appears to me that you did not repay me," "My father said that you owe me a maneh, "My father declared to me in the presence of witnesses that you owe me a maneh," "A certain article was stolen from my house. You were the only person there. In my eyes, it is likely that you stole it," "I calculated the money I have and I found that I was lacking some. Perhaps you caused me to err in the accounting," and to all these complaints, the defendant states: "I do not owe you anything," he is not liable even for a sh'vuat heset. The same applies in all analogous situations.
Halacha 8
The defendant is required to take a sh'vuat heset in the following situations. The plaintiff claims: "You definitely owe me a kor of wheat," and the defendant replies: "I don't know. Maybe I owe you, maybe I do not owe you," the defendant must take a sh'vuat heset that he does not know of the obligation. He is then released. He is not liable, because he did not definitely obligate himself. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Similarly, if the plaintiff claims: "You definitely owe me a kor of wheat," and the defendant replies: "I don't know whether I owe you a kor of wheat or barley," the defendant must take a sh'vuat heset that he does not know and pay the plaintiff a kor of barley. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 9
Different rules apply when the plaintiff claims: "You definitely owe me a maneh," and the defendant replies: "I did owe you a maneh. I do not know, however, if I returned it to you or did not return it to you yet." The defendant is obligated to pay. The plaintiff is not obligated to take an oath at all, not even a sh'vuat heset.
The rationale is that the defendant knows that he was liable and the plaintiff is lodging a definite claim against him, and he does not know whether he fulfilled his obligation or not. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
This stringency does not apply if there is no plaintiff, i.e., on his own initiative, the defendant said: "I stole from you...", "You lent me a maneh...", "Your father entrusted me with a maneh, and I do not know if I returned it to you or not, he is not liable at all. If he desires to fulfill his moral and spiritual obligations, he is liable to make restitution.
Halacha 10
As mentioned above, a sh'vuat heset can be reversed. Thus if a plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh," and the defendant responds: "I do not owe you anything," the plaintiff may tell him: "Take a sh'vuat heset and go on your way." And the defendant may respond: "You take the sh'vuat heset and collect your claim." If the plaintiff says: "I do not desire to take the oath," the defendant may tell him: "Either take the oath and collect your claim or go away without anything." The obligation to take the oath may not be reversed again. The plaintiff may, however, have a conditional bill of ostracism issued against anyone who owes him money and refuses to pay.
Halacha 11
My masters ruled that anyone who is obligated to take an oath - whether a Scriptural oath or a Rabbinic oath, even a sh'vuat heset - may, before taking the oath, have a conditional ban of ostracism issued against anyone who lodges a claim against him for money which he does not owe so that he will have to take an oath unnecessarily. The person requiring him to take the oath must answer Amen. Afterwards, the defendant must take that oath.
This is a proper ordinance for litigants so that they will refrain from making false claims and not cause God's name to be mentioned for no purpose, thus preventing them from lodging spurious suits.
Halacha 12
Whenever a person is required to take an oath - whether a Scriptural oath or a Rabbinic oath - the plaintiff can require him to include in his oath a denial of any other claim that he desires which would obligate the defendant financially.
To what extent can he be forced to include a claim? Until the plaintiff has him include in the oath that he was not sold to the plaintiff as a Hebrew servant and is still under his bond.
As mentioned, a worker who is required to take an cannot be forced to include other claims in that oath.
Halacha 13
The following principle applies whenever a person is obligated to take an oath, even a sh'vuat heset, and the plaintiff begins to demand that he include in the oath matters which were not included in the original claim. If the defendant sees this and says: "I do not desire to take the oath. Instead, I will pay the original claim whose denial obligated me to take the oath," we do not accept his request. Instead, we tell him: "Either pay all the definite claims he asked you to include in the oath or take the oath and be released of responsibility."
Halacha 14
When a person lodges many claims against a colleague, the defendant cannot be forced to take an oath on each claim individually. Instead, he includes all the claims in one oath. If a person was obligated to take two oaths on two different claims, one lenient and one more severe, he is required to take the more severe oath and include in it the other claims based on the principle of gilgul sh'vuah.
Halacha 15
When a person lodges a claim against a colleague which would not result in a financial obligation if he would acknowledge its truth, even if the defendant denies the claim, we do not require him to take a sh'vuat heset, nor do we issue a conditional ban of ostracism.
What is implied? The plaintiff claims: "You promised to give me a maneh," and the defendant states: "That never happened," the defendant is not required to take a sh'vuat heset, nor is a conditional ban of ostracism issued against him. The rationale is that even were he to have acknowledged making such a promise, he would not be obligated to fulfill it. Similarly, if a plaintiff claimed: "You cursed me," or "You spread a disparaging report about me," and the defendant replied: "That never happened," a ban of ostracism is not issued in such a situation. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 16
If a plaintiff claims: "You injured me," and the defendant states: "That never happened," the defendant is required to take a sh'vuat heset. The rationale is although the defendant is not liable to pay a k'nas because of his own admission alone, he would be liable to pay the injured party for his unemployment, his medical expenses, and the embarrassment he suffered.
The following rule applies when a plaintiff claims: "You embarrassed me," and the defendant states: "That never happened." If they were in a place where claims involving k'nasot were collected, the defendant is required to take a sh'vuat heset, for if he would acknowledge the truth of the claim, he would be required to pay for the embarrassment he caused.
Halacha 17
When do we apply the above statement: "A person who admits his guilt with regard to a claim involving a k'nas is not liable"? When the defendant says: "I injured this person."
If, however, the defendant says: "I injured this person. He brought witnesses against me in court and it obligated me to pay so and so much for his damages," he is liable. Accordingly, were the plaintiff to claim that a court obligated the defendant to pay him 100 dinarim because he injured him, and the defendant denied the claim, the defendant would be required to take a sh'vuat heset. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
To`en veNit`an - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
Whenever it is suspected that a person might take a false oath,no oath - neither a Scriptural oath, a Rabbinic oath, nor a sh'vuat heset - is administered to him. Even if the plaintiff desires that he take this oath, we do not heed his request.
Halacha 2
A person who took a false oath - whether a sh'vuat bitui,a sh'vuat edut, or a sh'vuat hapikadon - or an unnecessary oath, he is considered suspect to take a false oath.
Similarly, a person who is not acceptable to serve as a witness because he committed a transgression, whether disqualified because of a Scriptural prohibition, e.g., a person who lends at interest, one who eats meat from an animal that was not ritually slaughtered, or a thief, or because of a Rabbinic prohibition, e.g., a dice-player or a dove racer, is considered suspect to take a false oath and we do not administer an oath to him.
Halacha 3
A person is not deemed suspect to take a false oath until witnesses testify that he violated the transgression for which he is disqualified. Different rules apply, however, if a person himself admits that he is suspect to take a false oath, because he committed a transgression that disqualifies him.
We consider him under suspicion and it is not appropriate to make him a witness at the outset. Nevertheless, if he is obligated to take an oath, we administer that oath. For we tell him: "If you are telling the truth, take the oath. The fact that you committed a sin does not make it forbidden for you to take a truthful oath. And if you are lying, acknowledge the other litigant's claim." When a person is deemed suspect because of the testimony of witnesses, we do not believe that he will take a truthful oath.
Halacha 4
Our Sages ordained that whenever a person who is suspect to take a false oath is obligated to take a Scriptural Oath because of a definite claim, the plaintiff is given the option of taking a Rabbinic oath and may then collect what he claims.
If they were both suspect, the responsibility for taking the oath returns to the one obligated to take it, i.e., the defendant. Since he cannot take the oath, he is required to pay.
If the person who was suspect was a watchman who claims that the entrusted article was lost or stolen, the plaintiff cannot take an oath, because he does not have a definite claim that the watchman consumed it. Therefore, if the owner of the entrusted object claims: "He used my entrusted article for his own purposesin my presence," or "I know that he was negligent," the plaintiff may take an oath as ordained by our Sages and collect the money he claims.
Halacha 5
The following laws apply if the person suspect to take a false oath was liable to take a Rabbinic oath. If he is one of those who takes an oath and collects, he may not take the oath and collect. Instead, the defendant is allowed to take a sh'vuat heset and then is freed of liability.
Similarly, when a person who is suspect impairs the legal power of his promissory note or the like and the borrower claims to have paid and requires the plaintiff to take an oath, the defendant is given the option of taking the oath, and in that way becoming released from the obligation of the promissory note.
Halacha 6
If the person who is suspect was one of those who is required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim, he is not allowed to take the oath, nor does the plaintiff take the oath. The rationale is that the defendant was not obligated to take an oath by Scriptural Law and the plaintiff is not lodging a definite claim against him that he could support with an oath.
Halacha 7
When a person who is suspect becomes obligated to take a sh'vuat heset, the plaintiff is not given the option of taking the oath and collecting what he claims. The rationale is that a sh'vuat heset is itself a measure ordained for the benefit of the plaintiff. Therefore we did not ordain a second measure for his benefit. Instead, the defendant is released from liability without taking an oath.
Halacha 8
When a person is obligated to take a sh'vuat heset and the plaintiff is suspect to take a false oath, the defendant does not have the option of reversing the responsibility to take the oath. For the plaintiff is unable to take the oath. Instead, the defendant must pay the claim or take a sh'vuat heset.
We do not accept his request to make the judgment dependant on an impossible factor. This is comparable to a person who seeks to reverse the responsibility of an oath and place it upon a minor. We do not heed him. Instead, he must either take a sh'vuat heset or pay.
Halacha 9
The following principle applies when a person was obligated to take an oath - whether of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin - and he took the oath and either collected his claim or was released and afterwards, witnesses came and testified that he was suspect to take a false oath. The oath which he took is of no consequence. The other litigant may expropriate the money which the person who was suspect collected from him or the other litigant may take an oath and collect his claim.
Halacha 10
These principles are applied with regard to a person suspect of taking a false oath until he receives lashes in court. If there are witnesses that he received lashes and repented, his status is restored and he is acceptable both as a witness and to take an oath.
Halacha 11
The following rules apply when a person lodges a claim against a colleague, the defendant denies the claim and supports his denial by taking either a Scriptural oath or a Rabbinic oath. If afterwards, witnesses come and testify that he took a false oath, he must pay the claim and is deemed suspect of taking a false oath.
We already explained in Hilchot Sh'vuot, that anyone who takes a false oath with regard to money belonging to his colleague and repents must add an additional fifth.
Halacha 12
The following rule applies when a plaintiff claims that a defendant owes him a debt which was undertaken in the presence of witnesses and affirmed by a kinyan, and the defendant agrees that originally this was so, but claims to have paid the debt, or the defendant says: "I do not owe you anything," and takes an oath to support either of these claims. If, afterwards, witnesses to the kinyan testify or the plaintiff produces a promissory note and verifies its authenticity, the defendant is obligated to pay. He is not, however, considered as suspect to take a false oath. For the witnesses did not testify that he did not pay. And the defendant did not say: "This never happened." Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
To`en veNit`an - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
A person who admits a portion of a claim is not liable to take a Scriptural oath until he admits an obligation of a p'rutah or more and denies owing two silver me'in or more.
How much is a p'rutah worth? The weight of half a barleycorn of pure silver. How much is two me'in worth? The weight of 32 barleycorns of pure silver.
Halacha 2
Whenever the Torah speaks of kessef it refers to a holy shekel which is worth 20 me'in. Whenever the term kessef is used with regard to Rabbinic law, the intent is a coin used in Jerusalem referred to as a sela. This coin was one eighth silver and the remainder copper as we explained. A meah, by contrast, even in Jerusalem was pure silver; it was the smallest silver coin used in Jerusalem in that era.
Since the requirement that the claim denied be two measures of silver is Rabbinic in origin, the Sages established it as two silver coins of Jerusalem, i.e., two me'in, rather than two "holy" shekalim. This is the interpretation that appears correct with regard to the amount of money from the claim that must be denied for an oath to be required.
My teachers ruled that the amount of money from the claim that must be denied for an oath to be required is 19 and ½ barleycorns of silver. I have several proofs to refute the path of reasoning they adopted which led to their arriving at this figure. I think that it is an error.
Halacha 3
When the plaintiff claims: "You owe me two me'in and a p'rutah," and the defendant responds: "I owe you only two p'rutot," he is not obligated to take this oath. The rationale is that he denied owing less than two me'in.
When the plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh," and the defendant responds: "I owe you only half a p'rutot," he is not obligated to take this oath. The rationale is that whenever a person acknowledges a debt of less than a p'rutah, it is as if he did not acknowledge any debt at all.
Halacha 4
When the plaintiff claims: "You owe me 100 dates," and the defendant responds: "I owe you only ninety," we make calculations. If the ten dates that he denies are worth two me'in, he must take an oath. If they are not, he is not liable.
When the plaintiff claims: "You owe me five or six nuts," and the defendant responds: "I owe you only one," we make calculations. If the nut that he admits owing is equivalent to p'rutah, he must take an oath. If it is not, he is not liable. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 5
When does the above apply? With regard to money, merchandise, produce, or the like. With regard to utensils, by contrast, we do not evaluate their worth. Even when ten needles are being sold for a p'rutah, if a plaintiff claims two needles and the defendant admits owing one and denies owing the other, he is liable to take an oath.
This is derived from Exodus 22:6 which speaks of "money or utensils...." Implied is that all utensils are like money.
The following rules apply when the plaintiff claims that he is owed both money and utensils and the defendant admits owing the utensils, but denies owing the money. If the money he denies is equivalent to two me'in, he is obligated to take this oath. If not, he is under no obligation. Conversely, if he admits owing the money, but denies owing the utensils, he is liable if he admits owing a p'rutah. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 6
When one witness testifies against a colleague, stating that he owes money, he is required to take an oath even when he denied owing only a p'rutah. The rationale is that whenever the testimony of two witnesses would require a person to make a payment, the testimony of one witness obligates him to take an oath.
What is implied? The plaintiff claims: "You owe a p'rutah," or "...merchandise worth a p'rutah," the defendant responds: "I don't owe you anything," and a witness testifies that he does owe the plaintiff, he is required to take an oath.
Similar concepts apply with regard to an oath taken by a watchman. Even if a person entrusted a p'rutah or the worth of a p'rutah to a colleague and that person claimed that it was lost, he is required to take an oath. Anything less than a p'rutah is not financially significant and the court does not concern itself with it. Similarly, all those who take oaths and collect their claim, they take their oaths and collect any claim equivalent to a p'rutah or more.
Halacha 7
My teachers' ruled that a person who takes an oath and collects his claim does not have to issue a claim equivalent to two silver me'in. I differ and maintain that the defendant must deny a claim equivalent to two silver me'in for the plaintiff to be required to take an oath as ordained by the Sages to collect his claim. The rationale is that those who must take an oath because of a claim concerning which doubt exists are not required to take that oath unless there is a sum equivalent to two silver me'in which is denied.
Halacha 8
A person who admits a portion of a claim is not obligated to take an oath unless the admission is of the same nature as the claim.
What is implied? The plaintiff claims: "You owe me a kor of wheat." If the defendant responds: "I only owe you a letach of wheat," he is liable to take the oath. If, however, the defendant responds: "I only owe you a kor of barley," he is not liable. The rationale is that the defendant did not admit owing the species which the plaintiff claimed, and the plaintiff did not claim the species which the defendant admitted owing.
If the plaintiff claims: "I gave you golden dinarim for safekeeping," and the defendant responds: "You entrusted me only with silver dinarim," or the plaintiff claims: "I gave you a silver meah for safekeeping," and the defendant responds: "You entrusted me only with a p'rutah, the defendant is not liable, because the plaintiff claimed one species and the defendant admitted owing another.
Similarly, if the plaintiff claims: "I gave you 10 Egyptian dinarim for safekeeping," and the defendant responds: "You entrusted me only with Tyrian dinarim," he is not obligated to take an oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 9
If the plaintiff claims: "You have a large lamp of mine," and the defendant responds: "I have only a small lamp of yours," he is not liable. If, however, the plaintiff claimed a lamp weighing ten liter, and the defendant admitted owing a lamp weighing five liter, he is considered as one who has admitted a portion of a claim. The rationale is that one can cut away the larger lamp and cause it to weigh only five.
Similarly, if the plaintiff claimed being owed a large belt, and the defendant replied: "I have only a small belt," he is not liable. If he claimed a curtain that was 20 cubits long and he admitted owing a curtain ten cubits long, he is required to take an oath, because it can be cut and limited to ten. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 10
If the plaintiff claims: "You have a kor of wheat of mine in your possession," and the defendant answers: "I have only a kor of barley," he is not liable, not even for the barley. The rationale is that the plaintiff states: "You do not owe me barley." Thus the situation resembles one in which a person tells a colleague in court: "I have a maneh of yours," and that colleague replies: "You do not owe me anything." In such a situation, the court does not require the person making the admission to pay his colleague anything.
If the plaintiff who claims the wheat seizes possession of the barley, we do not expropriate it from him.
Halacha 11
When a person claims that a colleague owes him two types of produce and the colleague admits owing only one, his admission is considered as the same type of the claim and he is required to take an oath. What is implied? The plaintiff claims: "You have a kor of wheat and a kor of barley of mine in your possession," and the defendant answers: "I have only a kor of wheat," he is liable.
The following rules apply when the plaintiff begins saying: "You have a kor of wheat in your possession," and before the plaintiff can complete his statements and add: "And you have a kor of barley of mine in your possession," the defendant answers: "I have only a kor of barley." If it appears to the judges that the defendant is seeking to deceive, he is required to take the oath. If it appears, that he acted in good faith, he is not liable.
Halacha 12
Different rules apply if the plaintiff does not issue both claims at once. For example, he claims: "You have a kor of wheat of mine in your possession," and the defendant answers: "Yes." And then he says: "and a kor of barley," to which the defendant replies: "I have no wheat of yours." He is not considered as admitting a portion of the claim unless the defendant makes these statements at one time. For an oath to be required, the plaintiff must claim: "You have a kor of wheat and a kor of barley of mine in your possession," and the defendant must answer: "I have only a kor of barley." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 13
Similarly, the defendant is not held liable for an oath when the plaintiff claims: "You have a quantity of oil large enough to fill ten jugs of mine in your possession," and the defendant answers: "I owe you only ten empty jugs." The rationale is that the plaintiff claimed oil and the defendant admitted owing only earthenware.
Different rules apply if the plaintiff claimed: "You have ten jugs of oil of mine in your possession," and the defendant answers: "I owe you only ten empty jugs." The defendant is liable to take an oath. The rationale is that the plaintiff claimed both jugs and oil and the defendant admitted owing the jugs. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 14
My teachers ruled that the defendant is considered as admitting a portion of a claim and is required to take an oath when the plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh which was given to you as a loan," and the defendant answers: "That never happened. I never borrowed from you. I do, however, owe you 50 dinarim which you entrusted to me for safekeeping," "...because of damages," or the like. The rationale is that the plaintiff claimed that the defendant owed him 100 and the defendant admitting owing 50. What difference does it make to me if he became liable because of a loan, as a trustee of an entrusted article, or because of damages? I also favor this approach.
Halacha 15
When a plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh and a utensil" and the defendant responds: "I owe you only the utensil. Here it is," the defendant is not required to take a Scriptural oath. He must, however, take a sh'vuat heset that this is all he owes him.
If the owner of the utensil claims that the utensil the defendant seeks to give him is not his own, the defendant must include in his oath that the utensil belongs to the plaintiff. If the defendant admits that this utensil is not the plaintiff's, but was exchanged for it, he is obligated to take an oath.
Whenever we have mentioned above that the defendant is not obligated, the intent is that he is not obligated to take a Scriptural oath. He is, however, obligated to take a sh'vuat heset as we explained on several occasions.
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Hayom Yom:
Sunday, 16 Cheshvan 5775 • 9 November 2014
"Today's Day"
Sunday, Cheshvan 16, 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Chayei Sara, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 79-82.
Tanya: XXVIII. "Why was the (p. 571) ...lower than nogah. (p. 573).
Thought is a garment and servant of the intellect and emotions.1 Even when it is not serving the intellect or emotions, it continues to function, thinking and meditating. However, this activity is then not only devoid of content, but also open to depravement... It is explained that alien or evil thoughts are caused by "emptiness of the head." For when the mind is occupied, the thought has something to serve, and there is no room for stupid and vain thoughts devoid of substance.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Tanya Ch. 4.
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Daily Thought:
Higher Life(Chayei Sarah)
The years of Sarah were…these were the years of Sarah.—Genesis 23:1
Sarah had two sets of life, because she merited to higher life as well. Why Sarah more than anyone else? Because she descended to Egypt and rose back up.—Zohar
You came to this life to achieve higher life. Yet whatever spiritual heights you could achieve in this life cannot compare to the heights of your soul before it was squeezed into the limitations of a body. Before it descended to Egypt.
That is, until you do what was put in front of you to do, until you work with this Egypt into which you have been sent, holding tight to your integrity, filling each act with meaning, redeeming the jewels that were lost among the ashes.
Then you will rise higher than anything your soul could achieve. Even while living in this world, you will have higher life.(Maamar Chayei Sarah 5713 (1958))
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Sunday, Cheshvan 16, 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Chayei Sara, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 79-82.
Tanya: XXVIII. "Why was the (p. 571) ...lower than nogah. (p. 573).
Thought is a garment and servant of the intellect and emotions.1 Even when it is not serving the intellect or emotions, it continues to function, thinking and meditating. However, this activity is then not only devoid of content, but also open to depravement... It is explained that alien or evil thoughts are caused by "emptiness of the head." For when the mind is occupied, the thought has something to serve, and there is no room for stupid and vain thoughts devoid of substance.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Tanya Ch. 4.
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Daily Thought:
Higher Life(Chayei Sarah)
The years of Sarah were…these were the years of Sarah.—Genesis 23:1
Sarah had two sets of life, because she merited to higher life as well. Why Sarah more than anyone else? Because she descended to Egypt and rose back up.—Zohar
You came to this life to achieve higher life. Yet whatever spiritual heights you could achieve in this life cannot compare to the heights of your soul before it was squeezed into the limitations of a body. Before it descended to Egypt.
That is, until you do what was put in front of you to do, until you work with this Egypt into which you have been sent, holding tight to your integrity, filling each act with meaning, redeeming the jewels that were lost among the ashes.
Then you will rise higher than anything your soul could achieve. Even while living in this world, you will have higher life.(Maamar Chayei Sarah 5713 (1958))
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