Chabad - Today in Judaism - TODAY IS: Tuesday, 18 Cheshvan 5775 • 11 November 2014

Chabad - Today in Judaism - TODAY IS: Tuesday, 18 Cheshvan 5775 • 11 November 2014
Today's Laws & Customs:

Today in Jewish History:
Assassination of Meir Kahane
Born in 1932, Meir Kahane was a controversial American-Israeli rabbi and activist. In 1968, he founded the Jewish Defense League in New York. With the motto of "Never Again," the stated goal of the organization was to protect Jews from anti-Semitism in all its forms. In 1971, he moved his family to Israel, founding the Kach political party, and he was elected to the Knesset in 1984 (the Kach party was later outlawed in Israel). In 1990, after concluding a speech in a Manhattan hotel, Kahane was fatally shot by an Egyptian-born terrorist. While strangely acquitted of the murder, El Sayyid Nosair was later convicted in relation to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
DAILY QUOTE:
America is no different!(Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak of Lubavitch, upon arriving in New York in 1940, insisting that the "New World" too, can be made a place that is hospitable to Torah and Judaism)

DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Parshat Chayei Sarah, 3rd Portion (Genesis 24:10-24:26) with Rashi
• Chapter 24
10. And the servant took ten camels of his master's camels, and he went, and all the best of his master was in his hand; and he arose, and he went to Aram naharaim, to the city of Nahor. י. וַיִּקַּח הָעֶבֶד עֲשָׂרָה גְמַלִּים מִגְּמַלֵּי אֲדֹנָיו וַיֵּלֶךְ וְכָל טוּב אֲדֹנָיו בְּיָדוֹ וַיָּקָם וַיֵּלֶךְ אֶל אֲרַם נַהֲרַיִם אֶל עִיר נָחוֹר:
of his master’s camels: (Gen. Rabbah 59:11). They were distinguishable from other camels by the fact that they would go out muzzled to prevent robbery, that they should not graze in strangers’ fields.
מגמלי אדוניו: נכרין היו משאר גמלים, שהיו יוצאין זמומין מפני הגזל שלא ירעו בשדות אחרים:
all the best of his master was in his hand: (Gen. Rabbah ad loc.) He wrote a gift deed to Isaac for everything he owned, so that they would hasten [lit., jump] to send him their daughter.
וכל טוב אדוניו בידו: שטר מתנה כתב ליצחק על כל אשר לו, כדי שיקפצו לשלוח לו בתם:
Aram-naharaim: [lit., Aram of the two rivers.] It is situated between two rivers.
ארם נהרים: בין שתי נהרות יושבת:
11. And he made the camels kneel outside the city beside the well of water, at eventide, at the time the maidens go out to draw water. יא. וַיַּבְרֵךְ הַגְּמַלִּים מִחוּץ לָעִיר אֶל בְּאֵר הַמָּיִם לְעֵת עֶרֶב לְעֵת צֵאת הַשֹּׁאֲבֹת:
And he made the camels kneel: He made them lie down. — [Gen. Rabbah 59:11, Targum Jonathan]
ויברך הגמלים: הרביצם:  
12. And he said, "O Lord, the God of my master Abraham, please cause to happen to me today, and perform loving kindness with my master, Abraham. יב. וַיֹּאמַר | יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵי אֲדֹנִי אַבְרָהָם הַקְרֵה נָא לְפָנַי הַיּוֹם וַעֲשֵׂה חֶסֶד עִם אֲדֹנִי אַבְרָהָם:
13. Behold, I am standing by the water fountain, and the daughters of the people of the city are coming out to draw water. יג. הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי נִצָּב עַל עֵין הַמָּיִם וּבְנוֹת אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר יֹצְאֹת לִשְׁאֹב מָיִם:
14. And it will be, [that] the maiden to whom I will say, 'Lower your pitcher and I will drink,' and she will say, 'Drink, and I will also water your camels,' her have You designated for Your servant, for Isaac, and through her may I know that You have performed loving kindness with my master." יד. וְהָיָה הַנַּעֲרָה אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיהָ הַטִּי נָא כַדֵּךְ וְאֶשְׁתֶּה וְאָמְרָה שְׁתֵה וְגַם גְּמַלֶּיךָ אַשְׁקֶה אֹתָהּ הֹכַחְתָּ לְעַבְדְּךָ לְיִצְחָק וּבָהּ אֵדַע כִּי עָשִׂיתָ חֶסֶד עִם אֲדֹנִי:
her have You designated: She is worthy of him, for she will perform acts of kindness, and she is fit to enter the house of Abraham; and the expression הֹכַחְתָּ means “You chose,” esprover in Old French.
אותה הכחת: ראויה היא לו שתהא גומלת חסדים וכדאי ליכנס בביתו של אברהם. ולשון הוכחת ביררת, אפרוביש"ט בלע"ז [להראות בבירור]:
and through her may I know: An expression of supplication:“Let me know through her.”
ובה אדע: לשון תחנה, הודע לי בה:
that You have performed loving-kindness: If she will be from his family and fit for him, I will know that You have performed loving-kindness.
כי עשית חסד: אם תהיה ממשפחתו והוגנת לו, אדע כי עשית חסד:
15. Now he had not yet finished speaking, and behold, Rebecca came out, who had been born to Bethuel the son of Milcah, the wife of Nahor, Abraham's brother, and her pitcher was on her shoulder. טו. וַיְהִי הוּא טֶרֶם כִּלָּה לְדַבֵּר וְהִנֵּה רִבְקָה יֹצֵאת אֲשֶׁר יֻלְּדָה לִבְתוּאֵל בֶּן מִלְכָּה אֵשֶׁת נָחוֹר אֲחִי אַבְרָהָם וְכַדָּהּ עַל שִׁכְמָהּ:
16. Now the maiden was of very comely appearance, a virgin, and no man had been intimate with her, and she went down to the fountain, and she filled her pitcher and went up. טז. וְהַנַּעֲרָה טֹבַת מַרְאֶה מְאֹד בְּתוּלָה וְאִישׁ לֹא יְדָעָהּ וַתֵּרֶד הָעַיְנָה וַתְּמַלֵּא כַדָּהּ וַתָּעַל:
a virgin: from the place of her virginity. — [Gen. Rabbah 60:5]
בתולה: ממקום בתולים:
and no man had been intimate with her: in an unnatural way. Since the daughters of the gentiles would preserve their virginity but were promiscuous in unnatural ways, Scripture attests that she was completely innocent. — [Gen. Rabbah ad loc.]
ואיש לא ידעה: שלא כדרכה, לפי שבנות הגוים היו משמרות מקום בתוליהן ומפקירות עצמן ממקום אחר, העיד על זו שנקיה מכל:
17. And the servant ran toward her, and he said, "Please let me sip a little water from your pitcher." יז. וַיָּרָץ הָעֶבֶד לִקְרָאתָהּ וַיֹּאמֶר הַגְמִיאִינִי נָא מְעַט מַיִם מִכַּדֵּךְ:
And the servant ran toward her: Because he saw that the water had risen toward her. — [Gen. Rabbah ad loc.]
וירץ העבד לקראתה: לפי שראה שעלו המים לקראתה:
Please let me sip: An expression of swallowing, humer in Old French.
הגמיאיני נא: לשון גמיעה, הומיי"ר בלע"ז [לגמוא]:
18. And she said, "Drink, my lord." And she hastened and lowered her pitcher to her hand, and she gave him to drink. יח. וַתֹּאמֶר שְׁתֵה אֲדֹנִי וַתְּמַהֵר וַתֹּרֶד כַּדָּהּ עַל יָדָהּ וַתַּשְׁקֵהוּ:
and lowered her pitcher: from her shoulder.
ותורד כדה: מעל שכמה:
19. And she finished giving him to drink, and she said, "I will also draw for your camels, until they will have finished drinking." יט. וַתְּכַל לְהַשְׁקֹתוֹ וַתֹּאמֶר גַּם לִגְמַלֶּיךָ אֶשְׁאָב עַד אִם כִּלּוּ לִשְׁתֹּת:
until they will have finished drinking: Here the word אִם is used in the sense of אִשֶׁר, that
עד אם כלו: הרי אם משמש בלשון אשר, אם כלו, די ספקון, שזו היא גמר שתייתן כששתו די ספוקן:
they will have finished: Onkelos renders: until they have had enough, because that is the end of their drinking, when they have drunk their fill.
:
20. And she hastened, and she emptied her pitcher into the trough, and she ran again to the well to draw water, and she drew for all his camels. כ. וַתְּמַהֵר וַתְּעַר כַּדָּהּ אֶל הַשֹּׁקֶת וַתָּרָץ עוֹד אֶל הַבְּאֵר לִשְׁאֹב וַתִּשְׁאַב לְכָל גְּמַלָּיו:
and she emptied: וַתְּעַר is an expression of emptying. There are many examples in the language of the Mishnah:“One who empties (הַמְעָרֵה) from one vessel to another.” It is also found in Scripture (Psalms 141:8):“Do not cast out (תְּעַר) my soul” ; (Isa. 53:12):“That he poured out (הֶעֱרָה) his soul to death.”
ותער: לשון נפיצה, והרבה יש בלשון משנה (עבודה זרה ה ז) המערה מכלי אל כלי, ובמקרא יש לו דומה (תהלים קמא ח) אל תער נפשי, (ישעיה נג יב) אשר הערה למות נפשו:
the trough: A hollow stone from which the camels drink.
השקת: אבן חלולה ששותים בה הגמלים:
21. And the man was astonished at her, standing silent, [waiting] to know whether the Lord had caused his way to prosper or not. כא. וְהָאִישׁ מִשְׁתָּאֵה לָהּ מַחֲרִישׁ לָדַעַת הַהִצְלִיחַ יְהֹוָה דַּרְכּוֹ אִם לֹא:
was astonished: Heb. מִשְׁתָּאֵה, an expression of desolation, as in (Isa. 6:11):“[until] the cities become desolate (שָׁאוּ) …and [the ground] lies waste (תִּשָׁאֶה) and desolate.”
משתאה: לשון שאייה, כמו (ישעיה ו יא) שאו ערים, תשאה שממה:
was astonished: מִשְׁתָּאֵה [means that] he was astonished and startled because he saw his efforts on the verge of succeeding, but he did not yet know whether she was of Abraham’s family or not. Do not be surprised by the letter“tav” in the word מִשׁ ְתָּאֵה [since the root is שׁאה], because there is no word [verb] whose first root-letter is a “shin,” which is used in the reflexive [Hitpa’el] form, in which a“tav” does not separate the first two letters of the root, e.g. מִשְׁתָּאֵה [here]; or (Isa. 59:15) מִשְׁתּוֹלֵל which is from the same root as תּשׁוֹלָל or (ibid. 59:16) וַיִּשְׁתּוֹמֵם, from the same root as שְׁמָמָה or (Micah 6:16):“And the statutes of Omri shall be observed (וַיִּשְתַמֵּר),” from the same root as וַיִּשְׁמֹר. Here too, מִשְׁתָּאֵה is from the same root as תִּשָׁאֶה. And just as you find the expression מְשׁוֹמֵם used concerning a person who is astonished, dumbfounded, and engrossed in thought, as in (Job 18:20):“Those who come after shall be astonished (נָשַׁמּוּ) at his day” ; or (Jer. 2:12):“O heavens, be ye astonished (שׁוֹמּוּ)” ; or (Dan. 4: 16):“He was bewildered (אֶשְׁתּוֹמַם) for awhile”; so can you explain the expression שְׁאִיָה as referring to a person who is astonished and engrossed in thought. Onkelos, however, renders it as an expression of waiting (שְׁהִיָה) :“and the man waited (שָׁהֵי) ,” [meaning that] he waited and stood in one place to see“whether the Lord had made his way prosper.” However, we cannot translate מִשְׁתָּאֵה as meaning שָׁתֵי,“to drink,” because [the word מִשְׁתָּאֵה] does not mean drinking, for the “aleph” does not occur in the verb“to drink” (שְׁתִּיָה).
משתאה: משתומם ומתבהל על שראה דברו קרוב להצליח. אבל אינו יודע אם ממשפחת אברהם היא אם לאו. ואל תתמה בתי"ו של משתאה שאין לך תיבה שתחלת יסודה שי"ן ומדברת בלשון מתפעל שאין תי"ו מפרידה בין שתי אותיות של עיקר היסוד כגון משתאה מגזרת שאה, (ישעיה נט טו) משתולל מגזרת שולל, (שם נט טז) וישתומם מגזרת שממה, (מיכה ו טז) וישתמר חקות עמרי מגזרת וישמר, אף כאן משתאה מגזרת תשאה, וכשם שאתה מוצא לשון משומם באדם נבהל ונאלם ובעל מחשבות, כמו (איוב יח כ) על יומו נשמו אחרונים, (ירמיה ב יב) שומו שמים, (דניאל ד טז) אשתומם כשעה חדא, כך תפרש לשון שאייה באדם בהול ובעל מחשבות. ואונקלוס תרגם לשון שהייה וגברא שהי, שוהא ועומד במקום אחד לראות ההצליח ה' דרכו. ואין לתרגם שתי, שהרי אינו לשון שתיה, שאין אל"ף נופלת בלשון שתיה:
was astonished at her: [לָהּ means] he was astonished about her, as in [above 20:13]:“Say about me (לִי) , ‘He is my brother’ ” ; and as in [26:7]:“The people of the place asked about his wife (לְאִשׁתּוֹ) .”
משתאה לה: משתומם עליה כמו (לעיל כ יג) אמרי לי אחי הוא, וכמו (לקמן כו ז) וישאלו אנשי המקום לאשתו:
22. Now it came about, when the camels had finished drinking, [that] the man took a golden nose ring, weighing half [a shekel], and two bracelets for her hands, weighing ten gold [shekels]. כב. וַיְהִי כַּאֲשֶׁר כִּלּוּ הַגְּמַלִּים לִשְׁתּוֹת וַיִּקַּח הָאִישׁ נֶזֶם זָהָב בֶּקַע מִשְׁקָלוֹ וּשְׁנֵי צְמִידִים עַל יָדֶיהָ עֲשָׂרָה זָהָב מִשְׁקָלָם:
half [a shekel]: This alludes to the shekels of Israel, half a shekel per head. — [Targum Jonathan]
בקע: רמז לשקלי ישראל בקע לגלגלת:
and two bracelets: An allusion to the two Tablets paired together. — [Gen. Rabbah (60:6), Targum Jonathan]
ושני צמידים: רמז לשני לוחות מצומדות:
weighing ten gold [shekels]: An allusion to the Ten Commandments [inscribed] on them. — [Gen. Rabbah 60:6]
עשרה זהב משקלם: רמז לעשרת הדברות שבהן:
23. And he said, "Whose daughter are you? Please tell me. Is there place for us for lodging in your father's house?" כג. וַיֹּאמֶר בַּת מִי אַתְּ הַגִּידִי נָא לִי הֲיֵשׁ בֵּית אָבִיךְ מָקוֹם לָנוּ לָלִין:
And he said,"Whose daughter are you?: He asked her this after giving her [the gifts] because he was confident that in the merit of Abraham, the Holy One, blessed be He, had caused his way to prosper.
ויאמר בת מי את: לאחר שנתן לה שאלה, לפי שהיה בטוח בזכותו של אברהם שהצליח הקב"ה דרכו:
for lodging: לִין means one night’s lodging. - לִין is a noun. But she replied, לָלוּן, meaning many lodgings. — [Gen. Rabbah 60:6] [Since לָלוּן is a verb, it does not limit the number of lodgings.]
ללין: לינה אחת. לין שם דבר והיא אמרה ללון כמה לינות:
24. And she said to him, "I am the daughter of Bethuel, the son of Milcah, whom she bore to Nahor." כד. וַתֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו בַּת בְּתוּאֵל אָנֹכִי בֶּן מִלְכָּה אֲשֶׁר יָלְדָה לְנָחוֹר:
the daughter of Bethuel: She answered his first question first and his last question last.
בת בתואל: השיבתו על ראשון ראשון ועל אחרון אחרון:
25. And she said to him, "Both straw and fodder are plentiful with us; [there is] also a place to lodge." כה. וַתֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו גַּם תֶּבֶן גַּם מִסְפּוֹא רַב עִמָּנוּ גַּם מָקוֹם לָלוּן:
fodder: All camel food is called מִסְפּוֹא, such as straw and barley.
מספוא: כל מאכל הגמלים קרוי מספוא כגון תבן ושעורים:
26. And the man kneeled and prostrated himself to the Lord. כו. וַיִּקֹּד הָאִישׁ וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ לַיהֹוָה:
___________________________
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 88-89
• Chapter 88
The psalmist weeps and laments bitterly over the maladies and suffering Israel endures in exile, which he describes in detail.
1. A song, a psalm by the sons of Korach, for the Conductor, upon the machalat le'anot; 1 a maskil2 for Heiman the Ezrachite.
2. O Lord, God of my deliverance, by day I cried out [to You], by night I [offer my prayer] before You.
3. Let my prayer come before You; turn Your ear to my supplication.
4. For my soul is sated with affliction, and my life has reached the grave.
5. I was reckoned with those who go down to the pit, I was like a man without strength.
6. [I am regarded] among the dead who are free, like corpses lying in the grave, of whom You are not yet mindful, who are yet cut off by Your hand.
7. You have put me into the lowest pit, into the darkest places, into the depths.
8. Your wrath has weighed heavily upon me, and all the waves [of Your fury] have constantly afflicted me.
9. You have estranged my friends from me, You have made me abhorrent to them; I am imprisoned and unable to leave.
10. My eye is afflicted because of distress; I call to You, O Lord, every day; I have stretched out my hands [in prayer] to You.
11. Do You perform wonders for the deceased? Do the dead stand to offer You praise? Selah.
12. Is Your kindness recounted in the grave, your faithfulness in the place of perdition?
13. Are Your wondrous deeds known in the darkness [of the grave], or Your righteousness in the land of oblivion?
14. But, I, to You, O Lord, I cry; each morning my prayer comes before You.
15. Why, O Lord, do You forsake my soul? Why do You conceal Your countenance from Me?
16. From my youth I have been afflicted and approaching death, yet I have borne the fear of You which is firmly established within me.
17. Your furies have passed over me; Your terrors have cut me down.
18. They have engulfed me like water all day long, they all together surrounded me.
19. You have estranged from me beloved and friend; I have been rejected by my intimates.
Chapter 89
This psalm speaks of the kingship of the House of David, the psalmist lamenting its fall from power for many years, and God's abandonment and spurning of us.
1. A maskil1 by Eitan the Ezrachite.
2. I will sing of the Lord's kindness forever; to all generations I will make known Your faithfulness with my mouth.
3. For I have said, "The world is built with kindness; there in the heavens You establish Your faithfulness.”
4. I have made a covenant with My chosen one; I have sworn to David, My servant:
5. "I will establish Your descendants forever; I will build your throne for all generations," Selah.
6. Then the heavens will extol Your wonders, O Lord; Your faithfulness, too, in the congregation of the holy ones.
7. Indeed, who in heaven can be compared to the Lord, who among the supernal beings can be likened to the Lord!
8. The Almighty is revered in the great assembly of the holy ones, awe-inspiring to all who surround Him.
9. O Lord, God of Hosts, who is mighty like You, O God! Your faithfulness surrounds You.
10. You rule the vastness of the sea; when its waves surge, You still them.
11. You crushed Rahav (Egypt) like a corpse; with Your powerful arm You scattered Your enemies.
12. Yours are the heavens, the earth is also Yours; the world and all therein-You established them.
13. The north and the south-You created them; Tabor and Hermon sing of [the greatness] of Your Name.
14. Yours is the arm which has the might; strengthen Your hand, raise high Your right hand.
15. Righteousness and justice are the foundation of Your throne; kindness and truth go before Your countenance.
16. Fortunate is the people who know the sound of the shofar; Lord, they walk in the light of Your countenance.
17. They rejoice in Your Name all day, and they are exalted through Your righteousness.
18. Indeed, You are the splendor of their might, and in Your goodwill our glory is exalted.
19. For our protectors turn to the Lord, and our king to the Holy One of Israel.
20. Then You spoke in a vision to Your pious ones and said: "I have granted aid to [David] the mighty one; I have exalted the one chosen from among the people.
21. I have found David, My servant; I have anointed him with My holy oil.
22. It is he whom My hand shall be prepared [to assist]; My arm, too, shall strengthen him.
23. The enemy shall not prevail over him, nor shall the iniquitous person afflict him.
24. And I will crush his adversaries before him, and will strike down those who hate him.
25. Indeed, My faithfulness and My kindness shall be with him, and through My Name his glory shall be exalted.
26. I will set his hand upon the sea, his right hand upon the rivers.
27. He will call out to Me, 'You are my Father, my God, the strength of my deliverance.’
28. I will also make him [My] firstborn, supreme over the kings of the earth.
29. I will maintain My kindness for him forever; My covenant shall remain true to him.
30. And I will bestow [kingship] upon his seed forever, and his throne will endure as long as the heavens last.
31. If his children forsake My Torah and do not walk in My ordinances;
32. if they profane My statutes and do not observe My commandments,
33. then I will punish their transgression with the rod and their misdeeds with plagues.
34. Yet I shall not take away My kindness from him, nor betray My faithfulness.
35. I will not abrogate My covenant, nor change that which has issued from My lips.
36. One thing I have sworn by My holiness-I will not cause disappointment to David.
37. His seed will endure forever and his throne will be [resplendent] as the sun before Me.
38. Like the moon, it shall be established forever; [the moon] is a faithful witness in the sky for all time.”
39. Yet You have forsaken and abhorred; You became enraged at Your anointed.
40. You annulled the covenant with Your servant; You have profaned his crown [by casting it] to the ground.
41. You shattered all his fences; You turned all his strongholds into ruin.
42. All wayfarers despoiled him; he has become a disgrace to his neighbors.
43. You have uplifted the right hand of his adversaries; You have made all his enemies rejoice.
44. You also turned back the blade of his sword, and did not sustain him in battle.
45. You put an end to his splendor, and toppled his throne to the ground.
46. You have cut short the days of his youth; You have enclothed him with long-lasting shame.
47. How long, O Lord, will You conceal Yourself-forever? [How long] will Your fury blaze like fire?
48. O remember how short is my life span! Why have You created all children of man for naught?
49. What man can live and not see death, can save his soul forever from the grave?
50. Where are Your former deeds of kindness, my Lord, which You swore to David in Your faithfulness?
51. Remember, my Lord, the disgrace of Your servants, that I bear in my bosom from all the many nations;
52. that Your enemies have disgraced, O Lord, that they have disgraced the footsteps of Your anointed.
53. Blessed is the Lord forever, Amen and Amen.
____________________________
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 29
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Tuesday, 18 Cheshvan 5775 • 11 November 2014
Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 29
The focus of the present letter is the distinctive value of studying the halachot, the laws of the Torah. The Sages deem these laws to be the "crown of Torah," because the Supernal Will is most fully revealed within the laws of the Oral Torah, inasmuch as they clearly spell out G-d's will with regard to the performance of the mitzvot.
In fact, as the Alter Rebbe explains, the Supernal Will as expressed in the mitzvot derives from an even higher level of Divinity than does the Chochmah ("wisdom") of the Torah. Indeed, it is this Divine Will that furnishes the "garments" which enable the soul to absorb the Divine radiance that is manifest in the Garden of Eden.
אשת חיל עטרת בעלה כו'
"A woman of valor is the crown of her husband..."
This verse in the Book of Mishlei1 is a metaphor for the Torah. The Torah is also likened to a wife in another verse:2 "See to live your life with the woman whom you love," which our Sages, of blessed memory, explain3 to mean the Torah.
Here, too, "a woman of valor" refers to the Torah. More specifically, within the Torah itself the Oral Torah is the "wife" and the Written Torah is the "husband". The "woman of valor," which the Alter Rebbe will later explain refers to the halachot of Torah, serves as the "crown" to her husband, the Written Torah.
איתא בגמ' פ"ד דמגילה ודאשתמש בתגא חלף כו' זה המשתמש במי ששונה הלכות כתרה של תורה כו'
The Gemara, in ch. 4 of Megillah,4 [commenting on the teaching of our Sages in Avot5 that] "He who makes use of the crown, passes away [from this world]," states: "This applies to him who makes use of one who studies halachot, which are the crown of the Torah..."
Unlike the text of the Bach, which omits "the crown of the Torah," the Alter Rebbe here accepts the standard printed version as quoted above.
תנא דבי אליהו כל השונה הלכות מובטח לו כו'
The Gemara in Megillah goes on to say: "It was taught in the Academy of Elijah that 'Whoever studies halachot is assured [of a share in Olam Haba - the World to Come]."'
At the conclusion of Tractate Niddah6 the text reads, "Whoever studies halachot daily ...." Rashi explains there that the term halachot refers to Mishnah, Beraita, and Halachah L'Moshe MiSinai. In Epistle XXIII (above), the Alter Rebbe (based on Rashi elsewhere7) defines halachot as "clearly adjudicated laws of practical application."
וצריך להבין למה נקראו ההלכות בשם תגא וכתרה של תורה
Now it needs to be understood why the halachot are referred to as a "crown" or "the crown of the Torah."
וגם למה השונה הלכות דוקא מובטח לו כו' ולא שאר ד"ת
Furthermore, why is it that he who studies specifically halachot is assured [of a share in the World to Come], and not other Torah subjects, such as Scriptures, Midrash and the like?
וכן להבין מארז"ל בפי"א דמנחות אפי' לא שנה אדם אלא פרק אחד שחרית כו' יצא י"ח
One also needs to understand the teaching of our Sages, of blessed memory, in ch. 11 of Menachot,8 that "even if one studied only a single chapter in the morning [and a single chapter in the evening], he has fulfilled his obligation to study Torah."
The Gemara states there that the individual has fulfilled the commandment that9 "this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth." According to a second opinion cited later in the Gemara, that this verse does not constitute an obligation, it is to be understood that according to this opinion it is still obligatory to study Torah at all times; however, if one is unable to do so, he can fulfill his obligation by studying a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening.
ולמה אינו יוצא י"ח בשאר ד"ת
Why is one's duty not fulfilled by other Torah subjects?
The expression "one chapter" indicates that the study is of Mishnah, the Oral Torah. Why can one not fulfill his obligation with the study of Scripture, Midrash and the like?
* * *
אך מודעת זאת מ"ש האריז"ל שכל אדם מישראל צריך לבא בגלגולים רבים עד שיקיים כל תרי"ג מצות התורה במחשבה דיבור ומעשה
However, it is well known that R. Isaac Luria, of blessed memory, stated10 that [the soul of] every11Jew needs to be reincarnated many times, until he will fulfill all 613 commandments of the Torah in thought, speech and action, i.e., using all three soul-garments with which one performs the commandments.
להשלים לבושי נפשו ולתקנם שלא יהא לבושא דחסרא כו'
This is in order to complete the garments of his soul and to correct them, so that no garment will be incomplete.
As explained in Tanya, ch. 4, the divine soul has three garments - the thought, speech and action of the 613 commandments of the Torah. If the performance of one of these commandments is lacking, the soul's garments are incomplete. It is thus necessary for each soul to perform all of the commandments.
לבד מצות התלויות במלך שהוא מוציא כל ישראל כי הוא כללות כולם כו'
Excepted12 are the commandments incumbent upon a king,13 because he discharges the obligation of all of Israel, as he is a corporate collective of them all.14
All Jews are incorporated within the king. When he performs those commandments that depend upon him, it is therefore considered as if all the Jewish people had performed them. As to the other commandments, however, if in one incarnation an individual did not perform them all, he must be reincarnated so that he will be able to do so.
Why must one have the garments of all 613 commandments?
והטעם הוא כדי להלביש כל תרי"ג בחי' וכחות שבנפשו
The reason is, in order to garb all the 613 aspects and powers of one's soul,
These 613 "organs" of the soul (see Tanya, ch. 4) must all be clothed in the garments of the mitzvot.
אחת מהנה לא נעדרה כו'
so that not one of them - of these 613 aspects and powers of the soul - will be lacking.
וביאור ענין הכרח וצורך לבושים אלו מבואר בזהר ומובן לכל משכיל
An explanation for the indispensability of these garments is given in the Zohar,15 and is understandable by every thinking person.
כי להיות שנפש רוח ונשמה שבאדם הן בחי' נבראים וא"א לשום נברא להשיג שום השגה בבורא ויוצר הכל א"ס ב"ה
For the Nefesh, Ruach, and Neshamah in man, are created entities, and hence inherently limited, and it is impossible for any created being to attain any apprehension of the blessed Creator and Former of all, Who is infinite.
This, of course, is true with respect to Divinity as it totally transcends all worlds.
וגם אחרי אשר האיר ה' מאורו ית' והאציל בבחי' השתלשלות מדרגות רבות מדרגה אחר מדרגה
Moreover, even after G-d has radiated [a glimmer] of His blessed light, and has caused an emanation in the form of an evolution of numerous [descending] degrees, level beyond level,
בבחי' צמצומים עצומים ולבושים רבים ועצומים
by way of intense contractions and numerous, immense garments that obscure G-dliness -
הידועים לי"ח
these are familiar to those adept in the Esoteric Wisdom,16
ונקראים באד"ר בשם שערות
and in the Idra Rabba17 these [contracted degrees of divine illumination] are referred to as "hairs".
Because the life-force present in hair is so tenuous that it does not even convey sensation, the subtle glimmers of Divine energy that filter through the above-described contractions are referred to metaphorically as "hairs".
וכדכתיב בדניאל ושער רישיה כעמר נקא כו'
And as is written in Daniel,18 "And the hair of His head is like white wool..." from which we see that certain degrees of spiritual down flow are referred to by the term "hair" –
אעפ"כ לא יכלה הנפש או הרוח ונשמה למסבל האור
nevertheless, even after the screening effected by these mighty contractions, neither the Nefesh nor the Ruach and Neshamah can endure the light.
כי טוב ומתוק האור וכו'
For the light is good and sweet... – so intensely so, in fact, that no created being can receive it without expiring, as will soon be explained.
כמ"ש לחזות בנועם ה' לשון נעימות ועריבות ומתיקות ותענוג עצום לאין קץ
As it is written,19 "to behold the pleasantness (no'am) of G-d." [The term no'am] denotes pleasantness, agreeableness, and sweetness, and an infinitely intense delight,
כמ"ש אז תתענג על ה'
as it is written,20 "Then you will delight yourself in G-d,"
והשביע בצחצחות כו'
and21 "He will sate your soul with a pleasurable thirst (tzachtzachot)...."22
לשון צחה צמא
[The word tzachtzachot] is related to23 tzichei tzama "parched with thirst"; it denotes a thirst that cannot be slaked, for the pleasure involved is endless,
כמ"ש בזהר
as stated in the Zohar.24
ואין בכחה לקבל הנעימות ועריבות הצחצחות שלא תצא מנרתקה ותתבטל ממציאותה כנר באבוקה
It is not in [the soul's] power to absorb the pleasantness and agreeableness of the [above] pleasurable thirst without leaving its husk, i.e., its limitation, and becoming wholly nullified, just like a candle-flame [becomes entirely nullified] in a torch.
Just as the light of a candle loses its identity as an independent luminary once it is confronted by the intense diffusion of a fiery torch, so, too, the soul would cease to exist as an independent entity if it were to absorb the radiation emanating from the intense light and sweetness of G-dliness,
אם לא שמבחי' אור זה עצמו תשתלשל ותמשך ממנו איזו הארה מועטת בדרך השתלשלות מדריגה אחר מדרגה בצמצומים רבים
were it not that from this very light there will evolve and issue forth some minute radiation, by way of an evolution of level after level, with multitudinous contractions,
עד שיברא ממנה לבוש אחד נברא מעין מהות אור זה להלביש הנפש רוח ונשמה
until a single garment is created of [this contracted light],a creation akin to the nature of this light, with which to garb the Nefesh, Ruach, and Neshamah.
ודרך לבוש זה שהוא מעין אור זה תוכל ליהנות מזיו אור זה ולהשיגו ולא תתבטל ממציאותה
By way of this garment, which is akin to this light, [the soul]can derive enjoyment from the ray of this light, and apprehend it, without becoming wholly nullified out of existence.
Since this garment derives from this light, it not only withstands its intensity itself, but also enables the soul to receive the light. Being a created entity, this garment can be "worn" by the soul. And what is this garment? - It is the garment of mitzvot.
וכמשל הרואה בשמש דרך עששית זכה ומאירה וכו'
This is analogous to someone looking at the sun through a fine and lucid speculum.
וכמ"ש ויבא משה בתוך הענן ויעל כו'
Thus it is written,25 "And Moses entered the midst of the cloud, and he ascended [the mountain]";
שנתלבש בענן ועלה וראה דרך הענן וכו'
that is, he vested himself in the cloud and ascended, and saw by way of the cloud.... i.e., the cloud served as a garment by means of which Moses was able to receive the revelations on Sinai.
כמ"ש בזח"ב דר"י ורכ"ט
Thus it is explained in the Zohar, Volume II, pp. 210 and 229.
FOOTNOTES
1. 12:4.
2. Kohelet 9:9.
3. Cf. Kiddushin 30b.
4. 28b.
5. 1:13.
6. 73a.
7. See Taz, Yoreh Deah 246:2.
8. 99b.
9. Yehoshua 1:8.
10. Note of the Rebbe: "Sefer HaGilgulim, ch. 4; Shaar HaGilgulim, Hakdamah 11:16. The brevity of the Hakdamah to Shaar HaMitzvot precludes any possible contradiction. See also Shelah, beginning of Torah SheBichtav, p. 264b ff."
11. Note of the Rebbe: "Note that in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:4, this subject is cited with a number of differences:
"(a) Here, in Iggeret HaKodesh: 'until he will fulfill'; in the Shulchan Aruch: 'until he fulfills'; preferring actual present performance to future certainty.
The difference may be significant when nonperformance is due to circumstances beyond one's control. See also Shelah, ibid.
"(b) Here, in Iggeret HaKodesh, after 'mitzvot' the Alter Rebbe adds 'of the Torah,' perhaps by way of reinforcing the necessity for reincarnation; in the Shulchan Aruch this is a less relevant consideration.
Moreover, and more importantly, the added phrase distinguishes these mitzvot from the 'seven commandments of the Sages' about to be discussed.
"(c) Here, in Iggeret HaKodesh, the order is 'thought, speech and action'; in the Shulchan Aruch the order is 'action, speech and thought.' The same principle is perhaps common to both: 'Not only this but also the next' (see Tosafot at the beginning of Yevamot).
In the Shulchan Aruch, therefore, where action is all- important, the Alter Rebbe tells us that even if a particular mitzvah was fulfilled in action, yet for the sake of its fulfillment in speech, and so on, the individual still needs to be reincarnated.
Iggeret HaKodesh, however, [embodies the Torah's innermost dimension, viz., Chassidut, and thus] is the soul of Torah. Here, therefore, following the same principle of precedence, the Alter Rebbe tells us that even if a particular mitzvah was performed in thought, nevertheless, for the sake of its performance in speech, and so on, the individual still needs to be reincarnated.
"(d) In the Shulchan Aruch, which is unequivocal law, the Alter Rebbe adds the explanation: 'And speech and thought means the study of their laws; as our Sages taught (Menachot 110) on the verse, 'This is the law of the sin-offering ...,' that 'whoever studies the laws of the sin-offering [is considered to have actually offered the sin-offering].' This may also explain why instead of 'man' (as stated here) the Alter Rebbe there uses the term 'soul.'"
12. Note of the Rebbe: "An explanation is required as to why in the Shulchan Aruch - which, as mentioned above, should surely have the clearest statement of the law - the Alter Rebbe does not mention this exception concerning the commandments incumbent upon a king."
13. Note of the Rebbe: "Torah Or, p. 53c, by contrast, expresses this as follows: 'For every Jew must perform all 613 commandments, except for the commandments of the king, for the king discharges all Jews. All the mitzvot must be performed by every individual, and he must be reincarnated or in a state of ibur [lit., "pregnancy", a state wherein the soul of one person attaches itself to the soul of another].' Similarly in Likkutei Torah, Yom HaKippurim, p. 69a: '...and even the mitzvot of the priests or the High Priest, through ibur or reincarnation."'
14. Note of the Rebbe: "(So, too, in Torah Or, loc cit.:) The Alter Rebbe does not mention the High Priest (Nor does Mishnat Chassidim, Masechet Chiyuv HaNeshamot, beginning of ch. 2.) Likkutei Torah states explicitly that 'every individual is obliged to fulfill ... and even the commandments of priests and the High Priest.' Sefer HaGilgulim, ch. 4, by contrast, groups together 'the commandments ... for the priests ... levites ... kings .. judges and the like.'
"It could perhaps be suggested that the Alter Rebbe's above characterization of a Jewish king as 'a corporate collective of them all' alludes to the state of ibur spoken of in Sefer HaGilgulim, loc. cit. Such an allusion would serve well to explain why the Alter Rebbe chose to explain the function of the king by this phrase ('as he is a corporate collective of them all') rather than by the phrase used by Mishnat Chassidim ('because of his stature')."
15. II, 210b; ibid. 229.
16. In the original, Chochma Nisteres "the Kabbalah", commonly abbreviated in Hebrew to the acronym "chein".
17. Zohar III, 128b ff.
18. 7:9.
19. Tehillim 27:4.
20. Yeshayahu 58:14.
21. Loc. cit., verse 11.
22. Note of the Rebbe: "See Torah Or, Megillat Esther, p 98b; Or HaTorah, Parshat Tetzaveh, p. 1606; Pardes, Shaar HaTzachtzachot.".
23. Yeshayahu 5:13.
24. II, 210b.

25. Shmot 24:18.
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Rambam: 
Daily Mitzvah P246 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Tuesday, 18 Cheshvan 5775 • 11 November 2014
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 246
Laws of Claims
"In every case of trespass...in which one can say: 'This is it'"—Exodus 22:8.
We are commanded to adjudicate monetary cases between litigants [according to the laws outlined in the Torah].
Laws of Claims
Positive Commandment 246
Translated by Berel Bell
The 246th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding claims and counterclaims [in lawsuits.]
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "In every case of dishonesty... [and the watchman] said that this is it."
In the words of the Mechilta: "The phrase 'that this is it' refers to partial admission to the claim."2
This mitzvah includes anything that can arise from the claims people have against one another involving admission and denial.
The details of this commandment are explained in the 3rd chapter of Bava Kama, the beginning of Bava Metzia, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th chapters of Shavuos. Many questions regarding this subject are spread throughout the Talmud.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:8.
2.Since he has made a partial admission, he is required to take an oath regarding the rest of the claim.

________________________________________

Rambam:

• 1 Chapter a Day: Edut - Chapter 22
Edut - Chapter 22
Halacha 1
The following rules apply when two groups of witnesses contradict each other. If one witness from one group came together with one witness from the other group and they both delivered testimony concerning another matter, the testimony is of no consequence. For certainly one of them lied, but we do not know which one.
If one of these groups comes alone and gives testimony and the other group comes alone and gives testimony regarding another matter, we accept the testimony of both groups individually.
Halacha 2
Reuven produced two promissory notes against Shimon: one for a maneh and one for 200 zuz. Shimon denied being obligated for either of the promissory notes. The witnesses to one of the promissory notes were one of the groups whose testimonies contradicted each other and the witnesses to the other were the second group. Shimon is required to pay only a maneh, for the bearer of the promissory note has the position of lesser strength. He must take an oath concerning the remainder.
It appears to me that he must take this oath concerning the remainder while holding a sacred article, as is required of a person who admits a portion of the claim lodged against him. For there are two acceptable witnesses who testify concerning a portion of the money which he denied owing entirely. And the statements of his own mouth should not have greater legal power than the testimony of witnesses as we explained.
Halacha 3
Reuven sued Levi, producing a promissory note signed by one of these groups of witnesses. Shimon also sued Levi and produced a promissory note signed by the other group. Although Levi denies both debts, both Reuven and Shimon are given the option of taking an oath and collecting what they claim. The rationale is that certainly one of them has a viable claim against him. The oath required is a Rabbinic institution as is required of a storekeeper who takes an oath to collect a claim supported by his ledger.
Halacha 4
Reuven sued Shimon producing a promissory note signed by one of these groups of witnesses and sued Levi, producing a promissory note signed by the other group. If both defendants deny the debts, we follow the principle: 'A person who seeks to expropriate money from a colleague must prove his claim.' Since Reuven cannot validate either of these legal documents, both the promissory notes are like shards. Both of the defendants are required to take merely a sh'vuat heset and they are released of obligation.
When does the above apply? When the two groups of witnesses come to testify at the same time. Otherwise, whenever a person produces a legal document containing testimony of one of these two groups, he may expropriate property based upon it. Afterwards, if either he or another person produce a legal document with testimony from the other group, it can be used to expropriate property whether from the first borrower or from any other person. The rationale is that it is as if each of the two groups came alone and testified.
Halacha 5
The following rules apply when a person brings witnesses, their testimony is investigated, they were disqualified through hazamah, and then he brought other witnesses concerning the same claim and they were also disqualified through hazamah. Even if he brings 100 groups who are disqualified, if afterwards, he brings other witnesses regarding that same claim and the testimony of these witnesses is found to be accurate, the case is adjudicated on this basis. Even though the plaintiff can be presumed to bring lying witnesses, we do not operate under the presumption that these witnesses are lying.
When, by contrast, there is a legal document concerning which a protest has been sustained, i.e., two witnesses came and said that the plaintiff told them to forge this legal document, we never use that legal document to expropriate property even if the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses is validated.
It appears to me that if the witnesses to the legal document came and testified concerning their signature, the legal document may be used to expropriate money.
Blessed be God who provides assistance.
____________________________
Rambam:
• 3 Chapters a Day: To`en veNit`an - Chapter 7, To`en veNit`an - Chapter 8, To`en veNit`an - Chapter 9
To`en veNit`an - Chapter 7
Halacha 1
When a person admits that he owes a maneh to a colleague in the presence of two witnesses, and makes his statement as an admission and not as a casual matter of conversation, his remarks serve as the basis for testimony. This applies even if he did not charge the witnesses to serve in that capacity, and the plaintiff was not present. If the plaintiff lodged a claim against him and he denied making these statements, his words are not heeded, and he is required to make restitution on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses. If there was only one witness present when he made his statements, he is required to take an oath, for he made his statement as an admission.
If, after the witnesses came and testified, the defendant claimed: "I made the admission in order not to appear wealthy," his word is accepted, but he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset. If the plaintiff was with the witnesses at the time the defendant made the admission, he cannot claim that he made the admission so as not to appear wealthy. If, however, he claims that he paid the debt afterwards, his word is accepted, but he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset.
Halacha 2
Whenever a person makes an admission in the presence of two witnesses, he cannot claim again: "I was speaking facetiously." Needless to say, this applies if he made the admission before three people. Instead, he is obligated to pay the sum that he admitted. For whenever a person makes a statement as an admission, it is as if he charges them with serving as witnesses.
Nevertheless, a legal record of his statements is not composed unless he charges them: "Compose a record, sign it and give it to the plaintiff." Even if he charged them, they must consult with him a second time before they give it to the plaintiff, as we have explained.
Similarly, if a person makes an admission in the court after he was summoned, a legal record may be composed, as will be explained in the following halachah. This applies provided the court knows the identity of both principals," so that two people will not perpetrate deception to obligate another person.
Halacha 3
The following rule applies when a court of three judges were sitting on their initiative in the place fixed for their sessions, and the plaintiff came and lodged a complaint in their presence. If they sent a messenger summoning the defendant, he came and admitted owing the debt in their presence, they may compose a legal record and give it to the plaintiff.
Different rules apply, however, if they were not in their fixed place, and they did not summon him, but instead, he collected them and caused the three judges to sit in session, admitting his debt in their presence and telling them: "Act as judges with regard to my issue." If the plaintiff comes afterwards and says: "Write down the admission for me," we do not compose the document. The rationale is that we suspect that the defendant paid him, and despite that, the plaintiff will try to lodge a claim against the defendant with the legal document. When does the above apply? With regard to a claim involving movable property. If, however, a person admitted an obligation involving landed property, the witnesses may compose a legal record and give it to him even though the admission was made only in the presence of two witnesses, the defendant did not affirm his statement with a kinyan, and the defendant did not instruct them: "Compose a document and give it to him." The rationale is that we need not worry that the defendant will give the defendant the land and then the plaintiff will lodge a claim against him again.
Halacha 4
Despite the fact that a legal record of a debtor's admission produced by the plaintiff does not state: "The defendant told us: 'Write down this record, sign it, and give it to the plaintiff,'" it is acceptable. For it is an accepted presumption that if the defendant had not given the witnesses such instructions, they would not have composed a legal record and given it to the plaintiff.
A question may arise if a legal document states only: "So-and-so acknowledged a debt in our presence in court." If the document does not state that there were three judges present or state information that would indicate that there were three judges present, we suspect that there were only two people present, and they erred and thought that an admission made in the presence of two people is considered an admission made in court. Therefore, we do not regard such a record as a legal document.
Halacha 5
We have already explained that an admission made in court or testimony given by witnesses in court has the same legal power as a loan supported by a promissory note.
When does the above apply? When the defendant did not accept the judgment until he was summoned and brought to court, as we have explained. If, however, two people come to a judgment and one lodges a claim against the other saying, "You owe me a maneh" and the defendant acknowledges the debt, his word is accepted if, after he departs, he claims to have paid the debt. He must, however, affirm that claim with a sh'vuat hesset.
The above applies whether the judges said: "You are obligated to pay him," or "Go out and pay him." Therefore, if the plaintiff comes back and says:
"Write down the admission he made," we do not write it down, for it is possible that the defendant paid him.
Similarly, if a person who was obligated to take an oath in court leaves the court and then returns and said: "I took the oath," his word is accepted. He is not required to take an oath that he took an oath. If there are witnesses who testify that he did not take an oath, a presumption that the defendant is lying with regard to that oath is established. His word is not accepted if he states that he took an oath unless the other litigant acknowledges - or he brings witnesses - that he took the oath in their presence.
Halacha 6
The following rule applies when two people come to judgment, one is obligated to the other, and the judges tell him: "Go out and pay him." If he leaves the court and then returns and said: "I paid," but there are witnesses who testify that he did not pay, a presumption that the defendant is lying with regard to that money is established.
Different rules apply if the judges tell him: "You are obligated to pay him." If he leaves the court and then returns and said: "I paid," but there are witnesses who testify that he did not pay, we do not say that a presumption that the defendant is lying is established. The rationale is that we assume he is procrastinating until the judgment is researched.
Therefore, if on another occasion he claimed that he paid the money that he was obligated to pay by these judges and there are no witnesses who deny his statements this second time, he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset and is then released from all obligations. For this reason, the trained men of wisdom of Spain would, in the presence of the court, tell the judges and a lender who admitted a debt or who was obligated to take an oath in court: "Serve as witnesses that he should not pay me or take an oath for me outside the presence of witnesses."
Halacha 7
When a person acknowledges in court that he owes a plaintiff a maneh and then says: "I now remember paying him the debt that I acknowledged and here are witnesses who substantiate my present claim," their testimony is effective, and the appropriate action is taken. The rationale is that he did not contradict the testimony of the witnesses, and it is not considered as if he said: "I never took this loan."
Halacha 8
A litigant who advanced a claim in court can return and issue a second claim that contradicts the first one. We rely on the second claim even though he did not provide an explanation why he originally lodged a different claim. Even if he left the court and returned he may change and reverse any claims he desires, until witnesses come and testify.
After witnesses come and contradict the final claim on which he relied, he cannot change it to another claim, unless he provides an explanation for the claim on which he relied that could extend its meaning to include also the claim that he made afterwards.
The above applies provided he did not depart from the court. If, however, he departed from the court, he cannot come back and issue a different claim after witnesses came and testified. This is not acceptable; we fear that perhaps wicked people taught him to issue false claims. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
To`en veNit`an - Chapter 8
Halacha 1
It is an accepted presumption that all movable property belongs to the person who is in physical possession of it.' This applies even if the plaintiff brought witnesses who testify that the movable property in question was known to belong to the plaintiff.
What is implied? A plaintiff lodges a claim against a defendant: "This garment..." or "This utensil that is in your possession..." or "... that is in your house belongs to me..,", "... I entrusted it to you for safekeeping...", or "... I lent it to you. Here are witnesses who knew that it was previously in my domain."
The defendant responds: "That is not so. You sold it to me," or "...You gave it to me as a present," the defendant is required to take only a sh'vuat hesset and is freed of responsibility.
Halacha 2
If the defendant claims that the movable property he is holding is security, he may claim up to its value. He must, however, take an oath while holding a sacred object. Afterwards, he may collect his due, as explained.
Halacha 3
When does the above apply? To articles that are not made to lend out or rent out - e.g., garments, produce, household articles, merchandise and the like. Different rules apply with regard to articles that are made to lend out or rent out. Although they are found in the possession of a particular person and there are no witnesses that the original owner lent or rented out this article to this person, it is an accepted presumption that they belong to their original owner.
What is implied? Reuven owned a utensil that was made to lend or rent out, and he has witnesses who know that such an article belonged to him. This utensil is presently in the possession of Shimon. Reuven claims that he lent it or rented it to him," while Shimon claims that Reuven sold it to him, gave it to him as a present or entrusted it to him as security. We do not accept Shimon's claim. Instead, Reuven may take his utensil after taking a sh'vuat hesset in response to Shimon's claim.
Even if Shimon died, Reuven may take his utensil. The Geonim ruled that Reuven must take a sh'vuat hesset, for we advance claims on behalf of an heir.
Halacha 4
When does the above apply? When the utensil can be seen in the possession of Shimon.
Different rules apply when, however, Reuven lodges a claim against Shimon saying: "You have this-and-this utensil of mine. You rented it. Give it back to me. I have witnesses who know that it belongs to me." If Shimon responds: "You sold it to me" or "You gave it to me," his word is accepted. He must take a sh'vuat hesset and then he is released of all obligations. The rationale is since he could say: "Nothing like this ever happened. I do not have anything that belonged to you," we accept his word if he claims: "I have the article, but you sold it to me."
Halacha 5
The above-mentioned concepts apply only when the owner of the utensil claims: "I entrusted it to you" or "I lent it to you." Different laws apply if, however, he claims: "This article is mine. It was stolen, lost or taken by robbery." Although he brings witnesses who testify that the article was known to be his, if the person in possession of the article says: "I do not know what you are talking about. Someone else sold it to me or gave it to me as a present," we allow it to remain in that person's possession although it is an article that is made to be lent out or rented out. He is not required to take an oath at all, because there is no claim against him.
Halacha 6
If a well-founded report has circulated that utensils belonging to the original owner have been stolen, the person in possession of the article may take an oath while holding a sacred article, stating how much he spent on the article. The original owner must reimburse him for this expense and may then take his article, as stated in Hilchot Geneivah.
If the defendant claims: "You sold it to me" or "You gave it to me as a present," he must take a sh'vuat hesset, and he is then allowed to maintain possession of the article, even though a well-founded report has circulated that utensils belonging to the original owner have been stolen, provided the article was not made to be lent or rented out.
From these laws, the following concept can be derived: A person has movable property in his possession and another person claims that it belongs to him. The defendant could claim that he purchased it. Thus, he would be required to take a sh'vuat hesset and would then be released of all obligations. Nevertheless, if the defendant says: "It belongs to you, but you owe me this-and-this," he must take an oath while holding a sacred object. Afterwards, he collects his claim from the property in his possession, as is the law applying to all those who take oaths and collect their due.
Halacha 7
When a person has in his possession articles that were made to lend or rent out, he is allowed to maintain possession even though he acknowledged the plaintiff's ownership, telling him: "I know that this property was yours, but so-and-so sold it to me," or "... gave it to me as a present," we do not expropriate it from the defendant's possession.
The above applies even if the plaintiff brings witnesses who testify that the property was known to belong to him. The rationale is that a person is wont to sell his personal property.
Halacha 8
If, however, the plaintiff claims: "I rented it to you," or "I lent it to you," we expropriate it from his possession. If the object in question was not one that was made to lend or rent out, the defendant may retain possession of the article. He must, however, take a sh'vuat hesset that the plaintiff) did not lend or rent the article to him, but that he purchased it from so-and-so.
Halacha 9
Do not err and interpret the phrase "entities made to lend out or rent out" as meaning "entities that are wont to be lent out or rented out" as did many, [including great sages. For all articles are fit to be lent out and are wont to be lent out. Even a person's cloak, mattress, and bed are fit to be lent out.
The phrase "articles made to lend out or rent out," by contrast, refers to utensils that people in that country make initially with the intent that they be lent out or rented out, so that they can receive a fee for them. They are considered to belong to their owners like landed property, concerning which benefit is derived from its produce, but the land itself remains. Similarly, these utensils are made primarily to benefit from renting them out - e.g., large brass pots used for cooking at party halls, bronze jewelry inlaid with gold that are rented for brides to wear. Such articles are not made to be sold, nor for the owner to use them in his own home. Instead, they are lent out to others with the expectation of receiving benefit in recompense or of renting them out for a fee.
Similarly, if a person has ordinary utensils, but there are witnesses who will testify that he rents them out at all times and lends them, and it is an accepted presumption that he lends them and rents them, they are considered utensils that were made for the sake of being lent or rented.
Halacha 10
When the possible damage to an article is greater than the fee one would receive for renting it out, and people are therefore careful not to lend such articles - e.g., a ritual slaughterer's knife - it is an accepted presumption that it was not made with the intent of being lent or rented out. Therefore, even if people came and testified that a person lent out or rented out such an article on several occasions, their testimony does not negate this presumption, and these utensils are considered to be all other utensils.
Proof of this position can be brought from the fact that Ravva expropriated tailor's scissors used to make a cloak, and an Aggadah scroll as articles that were made to be lent or rented out. Had it not been clarified to him through the testimony of witnesses that these were entities that were lent out, he would not have expropriated them from the orphans. It is evident that other scissors and other scrolls are not placed in this category even though they could be lent or rented out.
This concept is a fundamental principle of law and a point of logic that may be relied upon in judgment. It is clear to those who give forth knowledge. It is appropriate for a judge to keep it in mind at all times and not to sway from it.
To`en veNit`an - Chapter 9
Halacha 1
We do not accept it as a presumption that the utensils in the possession of a craftsman belong to him. This applies both to articles that are made to lend and rent out, and to other articles.
What is implied? A person sees his utensils in the possession of a craftsman. He brings witnesses who testify that they know that the article belongs to him and claims that he gave it to the craftsman to repair. The craftsman, by contrast, maintains that he purchased it, or that it was given to him as a present. Or he claims: "After it was given to me to repair, you sold it to me or gave it to me as a present." Although the owner of the utensil did not give it to the craftsman in the presence of witnesses, his word is accepted and the article is expropriated from the craftsman. The owner must however, take an oath to support his claim.
There are Geonim who ruled that even though the owner did not bring witnesses to testify that the article was his, since he saw his article in the craftsman's possession and the craftsman admits that the article belonged to him, but claims that he sold it to him, the owner's word is accepted. If, however, the craftsman claimed: "This never happened; the article is mine," the craftsman's word is accepted, provided that he takes a sh'vu'at hesset. If, however, the owner brings witnesses who testify that the article was known to belong to him, the craftsman's word is not accepted. This decision is incredulous in my eyes.
Halacha 2
Different rules apply if the owner 10 did not see his utensil in the possession of the craftsman, but instead claimed: "I gave you this-and-this utensil to repair." If the craftsman claims: "You came back and sold it to me" or "... gave it to me as a present," the craftsman is required to take a sh'vu'at hesset and is then released of responsibility. The rationale is that he could claim that the article was never given him."
Moreover, even if the owner gave the article to the craftsman to repair in the presence of witnesses, the craftsman's word is accepted, because he could claim: "I returned it." For although an article is entrusted to a person in the presence of witnesses, he is not required to return it to him in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, the craftsman is required to take only a sh'vu'at hesset; we do not require him to produce the article.
If, however, he does produce the article, since it becomes visible, the owner may bring witnesses who testify that it belongs to him. He may then expropriate it even though he did not entrust it to the craftsman in the presence of witnesses, as explained in the previous halachah.
Based on the above, the following rules apply if the craftsman claimed: "You agreed to pay me two dinarim as a wage," and the owner responded: "I agreed to pay you only one." If the utensil was visible before them, since the craftsman's possession does not bring about an accepted presumption of ownership, and we would not accept his claim that he purchased the article, the owner's claim regarding the promised wage is accepted, provided that he takes a sh'vu'at hesset, as we stated in Hilchot Sechirut. He must pay that amount.
If, however, the utensil is not visible, since the craftsman could claim that he purchased the article, he can also claim a wage equal to its value. He must take an oath holding a sacred article. Then he may collect his claim, as do all those who take an oath and collect, as we have explained.
Halacha 3
A craftsman who gave up his profession, and a craftsman's son are like any other person. When movable property is in their possession, we presume that it belongs to them, as we have explained.
Halacha 4
The following rules apply when a person enters a colleague's house in the presence of the owner and leaves with utensils hidden under the corners of his garments, and witnesses see him. Afterwards, the owner lodges a claim against him, saying: "Return the utensils that I lent you; here are witnesses." Although the defendant claims: "I purchased them," his word is not accepted. Instead, the owner must take a sh'vu'at hesset to support his claim that he did not sell or give away the utensils. The court returns the utensils to the owner.
When does the above apply? With regard to an owner who is not accustomed to sell his property, when the person who removed the utensils under his cloak does not normally hide them, and when the utensils are not of the type that people would ordinarily hide. Therefore, the defendant is obligated to return the articles. We assume that he hid them only so that he could deny taking them.
If, however, an owner frequently sells his personal property, even though the person who took the utensils would not ordinarily hide them, and it is not ordinary practice for these utensils to be hidden under one's cloak, the defendant may take a sh'vu'at hesset that he purchased the articles.
Similarly, if he took the articles out so that they were visible for the witnesses to see, even when the owner does not frequently sell his personal property, the defendant's word is accepted when he says that he purchased the utensils, provided that the articles are not of the type that are made with the intent of being lent or rented out. For it is possible that the owner needed money, and hence sold his property.
If, however, the articles are of the type that are made with the intent of being lent or rented out, our presumption is always that they belong to their original owner, as we have explained. Even if the person took out such utensils in a visible manner and the owner was accustomed to selling his personal utensils, if he has witnesses that this utensil that was made with the intent of being lent or rented out was known to belong to him, he may expropriate the utensils from the defendant immediately, unless he brings proof that he sold it to him or gave it to him as a present, as is the law with regard to landed property.
Halacha 5
In the above situation, if the person in whose possession the utensil was found died, we expropriate it from the heir. Moreover, the owner is not required to take an oath. An oath is not required because, since his father is not present to claim that that he purchased it or that it is security for a specific amount, the heir cannot require the owner to take an oath.
If the heir lodges a definite claim, saying: "He gave it to my father - or sold it to him - in my presence," the owner is required to take a sh'vu'at hesset, as required of all those who are obligated to take oaths. We explained that there are opinions that require the owner to take a sh'vu'at hesset in all instances before his utensil is returned by the heir, but I do not accept this approach.
Halacha 6
When a person takes an ax and says: "I am going to chop down the palm tree belonging to so-and-so," if he in fact chops down the tree, we presume that it belonged to him. For a person would not be so bold as to cut down a tree that did not belong to him. If the owner claims that he did not sell it, the person who cut down the tree is required to take a sh'vu'at hesset that the tree belonged to him. He is then freed of responsibility. The rationale is that once the tree is cut down, it is like other movable property.
Similar laws apply when a person enters a colleague's field without permission and partakes of its produce for a year or two. If the owner claims that the person entered without permission, that he is a robber, and that he partook of the field's produce, and the owner brings witnesses who confirm that he partook of the produce, and the person claims that the owner gave him permission to partake of the produce, that person's word is accepted.
The rationale is that it is an accepted presumption that a person would not be so bold as to eat produce that does not belong to him. Although the land is presumed to belong to its original owner, the produce is not. For a person does not necessarily sell produce with a bill of sale, so that the purchaser could be told: "Present your bill of sale."
Needless to say, these laws apply if the squatter partook of a field's produce for many years. In such a situation, since he could claim that he had purchased the field, his word is accepted when he says that he has a right only to the produce. He must, however, take a sh'vu'at hesset.
Halacha 7
The following laws apply when two people are holding one article, both are riding on one animal, one was riding the animal and one was leading it, or they were sitting next to an ownerless pile of wheat that was located in a lane or in a courtyard belonging to both of them. If each claims that the article belongs to him in its entirety, they should both take an oath holding a sacred article that they own no less than half the article. Afterwards, it should be divided between them.
This oath was ordained by the Sages so that everyone will not grab unto a garment belonging to a colleague and take it without having to take an oath.
Halacha 8
If one says: "The entire article belongs to me," and the other says: "Half of it belongs to me," the one who claims the entire article must take an oath that he owns no less than three fourths of the article, and the one who claims half the article must take an oath that he owns no less than one fourth. They then divide the article accordingly.
From this, one can learn that all those who take an oath to expropriate property - whether a minor oath or a severe oath - should not take that oath concerning what they claim, but rather what they will receive even though they claim more.
Halacha 9
When two people were both clinging to a garment, and each claims that the entire garment belongs to him, each is awarded the portion he is holding. The remainder is divided equally after they take the appropriate oaths. Based on the principle of gilgul sh'vu'ah, each of the litigants can require the other to take an oath that he is legally entitled to everything he collects.
Halacha 10
If one was holding the strings on one side of the garment, and the other holding the strings on the other side, they should divide the entire garment equally, after they take the required oaths.
When the term "division" is used in this context, it refers to a division of the article's value, not that a utensil itself or a garment should be divided and ruined, or that an animal should be killed.
Halacha 11
If one person was holding onto the article in its entirety, and the other was struggling with him and clasping it, the article is considered to belong to the person holding it in its entirety.
Halacha 12
The following rules apply when two people came to court holding onto the garment, and one pulled it away from the other in our presence. If at first the person from whom the garment was taken remained silent, even though afterwards he protested, we do not expropriate it from the possession of the one who seized it. The rationale is that since he remained silent at the outset, it is as if he acknowledged the other's ownership.
If the second person came and grabbed it from the one who seized it, even though that person protested continuously, the garment should be divided between the two of them.
Halacha 13

The following laws apply when two people come to court holding onto a garment, and the court instructs them to go out and divide its value. They depart and return, but the article is now in the possession of only one of them. The person in possession claims: "He acknowledged my claim and withdrew his claim from it," while the other person claims: "I sold it to him," or "He overcame me and seized it from me," we follow the principle: "A person who seeks to expropriate property from a colleague must prove his claim." If he cannot bring proof of his claim, the other litigant may take an oath that the article belongs to him and be released of liability. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
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Hayom Yom:
Tuesday, 18 Cheshvan 5775 • 11 November 2014

"Today's Day"
Tuesday, Cheshvan 18, 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Chayei Sara, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 88-89.
Tanya: XXIX. "A woman of (p. 575) ...210 and 229. (p. 577).
(At this point there appears in the Hebrew text emendations of Torah Or on this week's sedra, meaningful only in Hebrew. Translator).
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Daily Thought:
The Parable
The world is a parable, two stories at once; one layered beneath the other.
On the outside, it is the story of a brute called Reality, a bloodless monster hosting an army of fiends, beasts, lunacy and, worst of all, futility.
On the inside, it is a story of its own Author with you alone, in eternal love, and every challenge of this adventure just another expression of that love, drawing the two of you yet closer.
The world is a parable, a story on two channels at once.
On which channel do you choose to spend your precious time?(Hayom Yom, 8 Sivan; 10 Shvat 5732:1, 6.)
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