Mishpatim: Exodus 21:1 “These are the rulings you are to present to them:
2 “If you purchase a Hebrew slave, he is to work six years; but in the seventh, he is to be given his freedom without having to pay anything. 3 If he came single, he is to leave single; if he was married when he came, his wife is to go with him when he leaves. 4 But if his master gave him a wife, and she bore him sons or daughters, then the wife and her children will belong to her master, and he will leave by himself. 5 Nevertheless, if the slave declares, ‘I love my master, my wife and my children, so I don’t want to go free,’ 6 then his master is to bring him before God; and there at the door or doorpost, his master is to pierce his ear with an awl; and the man will be his slave for life.
7 “If a man sells his daughter as a slave, she is not to go free like the men-slaves. 8 If her master married her but decides she no longer pleases him, then he is to allow her to be redeemed. He is not allowed to sell her to a foreign people, because he has treated her unfairly. 9 If he has her marry his son, then he is to treat her like a daughter. 10 If he marries another wife, he is not to reduce her food, clothing or marital rights. 11 If he fails to provide her with these three things, she is to be given her freedom without having to pay anything.
12 “Whoever attacks a person and causes his death must be put to death. 13 If it was not premeditated but an act of God, then I will designate for you a place to which he can flee. 14 But if someone willfully kills another after deliberate planning, you are to take him even from my altar and put him to death.
15 “Whoever attacks his father or mother must be put to death.
16 “Whoever kidnaps someone must be put to death, regardless of whether he has already sold him or the person is found still in his possession.
17 “Whoever curses his father or mother must be put to death.
18 “If two people fight, and one hits the other with a stone or with his fist, and the injured party doesn’t die but is confined to his bed; 19 then, if he recovers enough to be able to walk around outside, even if with a cane, the attacker will be free of liability, except to compensate him for his loss of time and take responsibility for his care until his recovery is complete.
(ii) 20 “If a person beats his male or female slave with a stick so severely that he dies, he is to be punished; 21 except that if the slave lives for a day or two, he is not to be punished, since the slave is his property.
22 “If people are fighting with each other and happen to hurt a pregnant woman so badly that her unborn child dies, then, even if no other harm follows, he must be fined. He must pay the amount set by the woman’s husband and confirmed by judges. 23 But if any harm follows, then you are to give life for life, 24 eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25 burn for burn, wound for wound and bruise for bruise.
26 “If a person hits his male or female slave’s eye and destroys it, he must let him go free in compensation for his eye. 27 If he knocks out his male or female slave’s tooth, he must let him go free in compensation for his tooth.
28 “If an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox is to be stoned and its flesh not eaten, but the owner of the ox will have no further liability. 29 However, if the ox was in the habit of goring in the past, and the owner was warned but did not confine it, so that it ended up killing a man or a woman; then the ox is to be stoned, and its owner too is to be put to death. 30 However, a ransom may be imposed on him; and the death penalty will be commuted if he pays the amount imposed. 31 If the ox gores a son or daughter, the same rule applies. 32 If the ox gores a male or female slave, its owner must give their master twelve ounces of silver; and the ox is to be stoned to death.
33 “If someone removes the cover from a cistern or digs one and fails to cover it, and an ox or donkey falls in, 34 the owner of the cistern must make good the loss by compensating the animal’s owner; but the dead animal will be his.
35 “If one person’s ox hurts another’s, so that it dies, they are to sell the live ox and divide the revenue from the sale; and they are also to divide the dead animal. 36 But if it is known that the ox was in the habit of goring in the past, and the owner did not confine it; he must pay ox for ox, but the dead animal will be his.
37 (22:1) “If someone steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it, he is to pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep.
22:1 (2) “If a thief caught in the act of breaking in is beaten to death, it is not murder; 2 (3) unless it happens after sunrise, in which case it is murder. A thief must make restitution; so if he has nothing, he himself is to be sold to make good the loss from the theft. 3 (4) If what he stole is found alive in his possession, he is to pay double, no matter whether it is an ox, a donkey or a sheep.
(iii) 4 (5) “If a person causes a field or vineyard to be grazed over or lets his animal loose to graze in someone else’s field, he is to make restitution from the best produce of his own field and vineyard.
5 (6) “If a fire is started and spreads to thorns, so that stacked grain, standing grain or a field is destroyed, the person who lit it must make restitution.
6 (7) “If a person entrusts a neighbor with money or goods, and they are stolen from the trustee’s house, then, if the thief is found, he must pay double. 7 (8) But if the thief is not found, then the trustee must state before God that he did not take the person’s goods himself. 8 (9) In every case of dispute over ownership, whether of an ox, a donkey, a sheep, clothing, or any missing property, where one person says, ‘This is mine,’ both parties are to come before God; and the one whom God condemns must pay the other one double.
9 (10) “If a person trusts a neighbor to look after a donkey, ox, sheep or any animal, and it dies, is injured or is driven away unseen, 10 (11) then the neighbor’s oath before Adonai that he has not taken the goods will settle the matter between them — the owner is to accept it without the neighbor’s making restitution. 11 (12) But if it was stolen from the neighbor, he must make restitution to the owner. 12 (13) If it was torn to pieces by an animal, the neighbor must bring it as evidence, and then he doesn’t need to make good the loss.
13 (14) “If someone borrows something from his neighbor, and it gets injured or dies with the owner not present, he must make restitution. 14 (15) If the owner was present, he need not make good the loss. If the owner hired it out, the loss is covered by the hiring fee.
15 (16) “If a man seduces a virgin who is not engaged to be married and sleeps with her, he must pay the bride-price for her to be his wife. 16 (17) But if her father refuses to give her to him, he must pay a sum equivalent to the bride-price for virgins.
17 (18) “You are not to permit a sorceress to live.
18 (19) “Whoever has sexual relations with an animal must be put to death.
19 (20) “Anyone who sacrifices to any god other than Adonai alone is to be completely destroyed.
20 (21) “You must neither wrong nor oppress a foreigner living among you, for you yourselves were foreigners in the land of Egypt.
21 (22) “You are not to abuse any widow or orphan. 22 (23) If you do abuse them in any way, and they cry to me, I will certainly heed their cry. 23 (24) My anger will burn, and I will kill you with the sword — your own wives will be widows and your own children fatherless.
24 (25) “If you loan money to one of my people who is poor, you are not to deal with him as would a creditor; and you are not to charge him interest. 25 (26) If you take your neighbor’s coat as collateral, you are to restore it to him by sundown, 26 (27) because it is his only garment — he needs it to wrap his body; what else does he have in which to sleep? Moreover, if he cries out to me, I will listen; because I am compassionate.
(iv) 27 (28) “You are not to curse God, and you are not to curse a leader of your people.
28 (29) “You are not to delay offering from your harvest of grain, olive oil or wine.
“The firstborn of your sons you are to give to me. 29 (30) You are to do the same with your oxen and your sheep — it is to stay with its mother seven days, and on the eighth day you are to give it to me.
30 (31) “You are to be my specially separated people. Therefore you are not to eat any flesh torn by wild animals in the countryside; rather, throw it out for the dogs.
23:1 “You are not to repeat false rumors; do not join hands with the wicked by offering perjured testimony. 2 Do not follow the crowd when it does what is wrong; and don’t allow the popular view to sway you into offering testimony for any cause if the effect will be to pervert justice. 3 On the other hand, don’t favor a person’s lawsuit simply because he is poor.
4 “If you come upon your enemy’s ox or donkey straying, you must return it to him. 5 If you see the donkey which belongs to someone who hates you lying down helpless under its load, you are not to pass him by but to go and help him free it.
(v) 6 “Do not deny anyone justice in his lawsuit simply because he is poor. 7 Keep away from fraud, and do not cause the death of the innocent and righteous; for I will not justify the wicked. 8 You are not to receive a bribe, for a bribe blinds the clearsighted and subverts the cause of the righteous.
9 “You are not to oppress a foreigner, for you know how a foreigner feels, since you were foreigners in the land of Egypt.
10 “For six years, you are to sow your land with seed and gather in its harvest. 11 But the seventh year, you are to let it rest and lie fallow, so that the poor among your people can eat; and what they leave, the wild animals in the countryside can eat. Do the same with your vineyard and olive grove.
12 “For six days, you are to work. But on the seventh day, you are to rest, so that your ox and donkey can rest, and your slave-girl’s son and the foreigner be renewed.
13 “Pay attention to everything I have said to you; do not invoke the names of other gods or even let them be heard crossing your lips.
14 “Three times a year, you are to observe a festival for me. 15 Keep the festival of matzah: for seven days, as I ordered you, you are to eat matzah at the time determined in the month of Aviv; for it was in that month that you left Egypt. No one is to appear before me empty-handed. 16 Next, the festival of harvest, the firstfruits of your efforts sowing in the field; and last, the festival of ingathering, at the end of the year, when you gather in from the fields the results of your efforts. 17 Three times a year all your men are to appear before the Lord, Adonai.
18 “You are not to offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread, nor is the fat of my festival to remain all night until morning.
19 “You are to bring the best firstfruits of your land into the house of Adonai your God.
“You are not to boil a young animal in its mother’s milk.
(vi) 20 “I am sending an angel ahead of you to guard you on the way and bring you to the place I have prepared. 21 Pay attention to him, listen to what he says and do not rebel against him; because he will not forgive any wrongdoing of yours, since my name resides in him. 22 But if you listen to what he says and do everything I tell you, then I will be an enemy to your enemies and a foe to your foes. 23 When my angel goes ahead of you and brings you to the Emori, Hitti, P’rizi, Kena‘ani, Hivi and Y’vusi, I will make an end of them. 24 You are not to worship their gods, serve them or follow their practices; rather, you are to demolish them completely and smash their standing-stones to pieces.
25 “You are to serve Adonai your God; and he will bless your food and water. I will take sickness away from among you. (vii) 26 In your land your women will not miscarry or be barren, and you will live out the full span of your lives. 27 I will send terror of me ahead of you, throwing into confusion all the people to whom you come; and I will make all your enemies turn their backs on you. 28 I will send hornets ahead of you to drive out the Hivi, Kena‘ani and Hitti from before you. 29 I will not drive them out from before you in one year, which would cause the land to become desolate and the wild animals too many for you. 30 I will drive them out from before you gradually, until you have grown in number and can take possession of the land. 31 I will set your boundaries from the Sea of Suf to the sea of the P’lishtim and from the desert to the [Euphrates] River, for I will hand the inhabitants of the land over to you, and you will drive them out from before you. 32 You are not to make a covenant with them or with their gods. 33 They are not to live in your land; otherwise they will make you sin against me by ensnaring you to serve their gods.”
24:1 To Moshe [Adonai] said, “Come up to Adonai — you, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu, and seventy of the leaders of Isra’el. Prostrate yourselves at a distance, 2 while Moshe alone approaches Adonai — the others are not to approach, and the people are not to go up with him.” 3 Moshe came and told the people everything Adonai had said, including all the rulings. The people answered with one voice: “We will obey every word Adonai has spoken.”
4 Moshe wrote down all the words of Adonai. He rose early in the morning, built an altar at the base of the mountain and set upright twelve large stones to represent the twelve tribes of Isra’el. 5 He sent the young men of the people of Isra’el to offer burnt offerings and sacrifice peace offerings of oxen to Adonai. 6 Moshe took half of the blood and put it in basins; the other half of the blood he splashed against the altar. 7 Then he took the book of the covenant and read it aloud, so that the people could hear; and they responded, “Everything that Adonai has spoken, we will do and obey.” 8 Moshe took the blood, sprinkled it on the people and said, “This is the blood of the covenant which Adonai has made with you in accordance with all these words.”
9 Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and seventy of the leaders went up; 10 and they saw the God of Isra’el. Under his feet was something like a sapphire stone pavement as clear as the sky itself. 11 He did not reach out his hand against these notables of Isra’el; on the contrary, they saw God, even as they were eating and drinking.
12 Adonai said to Moshe, “Come up to me on the mountain, and stay there. I will give you the stone tablets with the Torah and the mitzvot I have written on them, so that you can teach them.” 13 Moshe got up, also Y’hoshua his assistant; and Moshe went up onto the mountain of God. 14 To the leaders he said, “Stay here for us, until we come back to you. See, Aharon and Hur are with you; whoever has a problem should turn to them.” (S: Maftir) 15 Moshe went up onto the mountain, and the cloud covered the mountain. (A: Maftir) 16 The glory of Adonai stayed on Mount Sinai, and the cloud covered it for six days. On the seventh day he called to Moshe out of the cloud. 17 To the people of Isra’el the glory of Adonai looked like a raging fire on the top of the mountain. 18 Moshe entered the cloud and went up on the mountain; he was on the mountain forty days and nights.
Jeremiah 34:8 This word came to Yirmeyahu from Adonai after King Tzidkiyahu had made a covenant with all the people in Yerushalayim to emancipate them. 9 Everyone who had a male or female slave who was Hebrew was to let him go free; none was to keep as his slave a fellow Jew. 10 All the leaders and all the people listened who had entered into the covenant, wherein everyone was to free his male and female slaves and not keep them in bondage any longer. They listened, and they let them go. 11 But afterwards, they changed their minds; they made the male and female slaves, whom they had freed, return; and they brought them back into subjection as slaves. 12 Therefore this word of Adonai came to Yirmeyahu from Adonai: 13 “Here is what Adonai the God of Isra’el says: ‘When I brought your ancestors out of the land of Egypt, where they lived as slaves, I made this covenant with them: 14 “At the end of seven years every one of you is to set free his brother Hebrew who has been sold to you and has served you six years. You are to let him go free from you.” But your ancestors did not listen to me or pay any attention. 15 Now you repented, you did what is right from my viewpoint when each of you proclaimed freedom to his fellow; and you made a covenant before me in the house bearing my name. 16 But then you changed your minds. You profaned my name when each of you took back his male and female slaves, whom you had set free to live as they wished, and brought them back into subjection as your slaves.’ 17 Therefore here is what Adonai says: ‘You did not heed me and proclaim freedom, each to his brother and each to his neighbor; so now I proclaim for you a freedom,’ says Adonai, ‘for sword, plague and famine. I will make you an object of horror to all the kingdoms on earth. 18 As for the men who violated my covenant by not living up to the conditions of the covenant which they made in my presence when they cut the calf in two and passed between its parts — 19 the leaders of Y’hudah, the leaders of Yerushalayim, the officials, the cohanim and all the people of the land who passed between the parts of the calf; 20 I will hand them over to their enemies, hand them over to those who seek their lives; and their corpses will become food for birds in the air and wild animals. 21 Tzidkiyahu king of Y’hudah and his officials I will hand over to their enemies, to those who seek their lives and to the army of the king of Bavel, which has withdrawn. 22 I will give the order,’ says Adonai, ‘and cause them to return to this city. They will attack it, capture it and burn it to the ground; and I will make the cities of Y’hudah desolate and uninhabited.’”; Jeremiah 33:25 Here is what Adonai says: ‘If I have not established my covenant with day and night and fixed the laws for sky and earth, 26 then I will also reject the descendants of Ya‘akov and of my servant David, not choosing from his descendants people to rule over the descendants of Avraham, Yis’chak and Ya‘akov. For I will cause their captives to come back, and I will show them compassion.’”
Today's Laws & Customs:
• Blessing the New Month This Shabbat is Shabbat Mevarchim ("the Shabbat that blesses" the new month): a special prayer is recited blessing the Rosh Chodesh ("Head of the Month") of upcoming month of Adar I, which falls on Tuesday and Wednesday of next week.
Prior to the blessing, we announce the precise time of the molad, the "birth" of the new moon.Click here for molad times.
It is a Chabad custom to recite the entire book of Psalms before morning prayers, and to conduct farbrengens (chassidic gatherings) in the course of the Shabbat.
Links: On the Significance of Shabbat Mevarchim; Tehillim (the Book of Psalms); The Farbrengen
Today in Jewish History:
• Passing of Rabbi Alexander Sender Schorr (1737)
Rabbi Alexander Sender Schorr was a direct descendant of Rabbi Yosef Bechor Schorr of Orleans, one of the most famous of the French Tosafists. At a young age he was already appointed Chief Justice of the Rabbinic Court in the town of Hovniv which is directly outside of Lvov, Poland.
He authored the classic work on the laws of ritual slaughter called Simlah Chadashah, as well as a deeper commentary on those laws called Tevu'ot Shor.
The Simlah Chadashah has been reprinted more than one hundred times, and is the most widely used book to learn the laws of shechitah (ritual slaughter). Rabbi Alexander Sender Schorr passed away in the town of Zelkava on the 27th of Shevat in the year 5497 (1737).
Link: Shechitah—Laws of Ritual Slaughter
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Mishpatim, 7th Portion Exodus 23:26-24:18 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 23
26There will be no bereaved or barren woman in your land; I will fill the number of your days. כולֹ֥א תִֽהְיֶ֛ה מְשַׁכֵּלָ֥ה וַֽעֲקָרָ֖ה בְּאַרְצֶ֑ךָ אֶת־מִסְפַּ֥ר יָמֶ֖יךָ אֲמַלֵּֽא:
There will be no bereaved… woman: if you comply with My will. לא תהיה משכלה: אם תעשה רצוני:
bereaved… woman: Heb. מְשַׁכֵּלָה. [A woman who] miscarries or buries her children is called מְשַׁכֵּלָה. משכלה: מפלת נפלים או קוברת את בניה, קרויה משכלה:
27I will send My fear before you, and I will confuse all the people among whom you shall come, and I will make all your enemies turn their backs to you. כזאֶת־אֵֽימָתִי֙ אֲשַׁלַּ֣ח לְפָנֶ֔יךָ וְהַמֹּתִי֙ אֶת־כָּל־הָעָ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר תָּבֹ֖א בָּהֶ֑ם וְנָֽתַתִּ֧י אֶת־כָּל־אֹֽיְבֶ֛יךָ אֵלֶ֖יךָ עֹֽרֶף:
and I will confuse: Heb. וְהַמֹּתִי, like הָמַמְךְתִּי (I will confound), and its Aramaic translation is וֶאשַׁגֵּשׁ. Likewise, any word whose verb root has the last letter doubled, when it is converted to speak in the פָעַלְךְתִּי form [i.e., the first person past tense], in some instances the doubled letter is dropped [i.e., the third letter of the root], and a “dagesh” is placed into the [second] letter, and it is vowelized with a “melupum” [a “cholam”], like וְהַמֹּתִי [in this verse is] from the same root as in “and the wheel of his wagon shall be confused (וְהָמַם) ” (Isa. 28:28); “And I turned about (וְסַבּוֹתִי) ” (Eccl. 2:20), [which is] from the same root as “and go around (וְסָבַב) ” (I Sam. 7:16); “I was poor (דַּלוֹתִי)” (Ps. 116:6), from the same root as “became impoverished (דָלְלוּ)” (Isa. 19:6); “have I engraved you (חַקֹתִי) ” (Isa. 49:16), from the same root as “resolves of (חִקְקֵי) heart” (Jud. 5:15); “whom did I oppress (רַצֹּתִי)” (I Sam. 12:3), from the same root as “When he oppressed רִצַץ, he abandoned the poor” (Job 20:19). The one who translates וְהַמֹּתִי as וְאֶקְטַל, “and I will kill,” is in error, because if this was from the same root as מִיתָה, death, the “hey” of this word would not be vowelized with a “pattach,” and the “mem” would not be punctuated with a “dagesh” and not be vowelized with a “melupum,” rather וְהֵמַךְתִּי (with a “tzeirei,” ) like “and You will kill (וְהֵמַךְתָּה) this nation” (Num. 14:15), and the “tav” would be punctuated with a “dagesh,” because it would represent two “tav” s, one a root letter (מוּת) and one [“tav”] a suffix, like “I said, (אָמַרְךְתִּי) ” “I sinned (חָטָאתִי),” “I did (עָשִׂיתִי),” and so, in “and I will give (וְנָתַךְתִּי),” the “tav” is punctuated with a “dagesh,” because it comes instead of two [“tav” s], because there should have been three “tav” s, two of the root, like “on the day the Lord delivered up (ךְתֵּת) ” (Josh. 10:12), “it is a gift of (מַךְתַּת) God” (Eccl. 3:13), and the third [“tav”] as a suffix. והמתי: כמו והממתי ותרגומו ואשגש. וכן כל תיבה שפועל שלה בכפל האות האחרונה, כשתהפוך לדבר בלשון פעלתי, יש מקומות שנוטל אות הכפולה ומדגיש את האות ונוקדו במלאפום, כגון והמותי, מגזרת (ישעיה כח כח) והמם גלגל עגלתו, (קהלת ב כ) וסבותי, מגזרת (שמואל א' ז טז) וסבב בית אל, (תהלים קטז ו) דלותי, מגזרת (ישעיה יט ו) דללו וחרבו, (שם מט טז) על כפים חקותיך, מגזרת (שופטים ה טו) חקקי לב, (שמואל א' יב ג) את מי רצותי, מגזרת (איוב כ יט) רצץ עזב דלים. והמתרגם והמותי ואיקטל, טועה הוא, שאלו מגזרת מיתה היה, אין ה"א שלה בפת"ח, ולא מ"ם שלו מודגשת, ולא נקודה מלאפום, אלא והמתי, כגון (במדבר יד טו) והמתה את העם הזה, והתי"ו מודגשת, לפי שתבא במקום ב' תוי"ן, האחת נשרשת, לפי שאין מיתה בלא ת"ו, והאחרת משמשת, כמו אמרתי, חטאתי, עשיתי, וכן ונתתי, הת"ו מודגשת, שהיא באה במקום שתים, לפי שהיה צריך שלש תוי"ן, שתים ליסוד, כמו (יהושע י יב) ביום תת ה', (קהלת ג יג) מתת א-להים היא, והשלישית לשמוש:
their backs: That they will flee from before you and turn their backs to you. ערף: שינוסו מפניך ויהפכו לך ערפם:
28And I will send the tzir'ah before you, and it will drive out the Hivvites, the Canaanites, and the Hittites from before you. כחוְשָׁלַֽחְתִּ֥י אֶת־הַצִּרְעָ֖ה לְפָנֶ֑יךָ וְגֵֽרְשָׁ֗ה אֶת־הַֽחִוִּ֧י אֶת־הַכְּנַֽעֲנִ֛י וְאֶת־הַֽחִתִּ֖י מִלְּפָנֶֽיךָ:
the tzir’ah: [This was] a kind of flying insect, which would strike them [people] in their eyes, inject venom into them, and they would die (Tanchuma 18). The tzir’ah did not cross the Jordan, and the Hittites and the Canaanites are [those of] the land of Sihon and Og. Therefore, out of all the seven nations [the Torah] did not count [any] but these. As for the Hivvites, although they were on the other side of the Jordan, in tractate Sotah (36a) our Rabbis taught: It stood on the bank of the Jordan and cast venom upon them. הצרעה: מין שרץ העוף, והיתה מכה אותם בעיניהם ומטילה בהם ארס והם מתים, והצרעה לא עברה את הירדן, והחתי והכנעני הם ארץ סיחון ועוג, לפיכך מכל שבע אומות לא מנה כאן אלא אלו. וחוי אף על פי שהוא מעבר הירדן והלאה, שנו רבותינו במסכת סוטה (סוטה לו א) על שפת הירדן עמדה וזרקה בהם מרה:
29I will not drive them away from before you in one year, lest the land become desolate and the beasts of the field outnumber you. כטלֹ֧א אֲגָֽרְשֶׁ֛נּוּ מִפָּנֶ֖יךָ בְּשָׁנָ֣ה אֶחָ֑ת פֶּן־תִּֽהְיֶ֤ה הָאָ֨רֶץ֙ שְׁמָמָ֔ה וְרַבָּ֥ה עָלֶ֖יךָ חַיַּ֥ת הַשָּׂדֶֽה:
desolate: Empty of human beings, since you are few and there are not enough of you to fill it [the land]. שממה: ריקנית מבני אדם, לפי שאתם מעט ואין בכם כדי למלאות אותה:
and… outnumber you: Heb. וְרַבָּה, and will outnumber you. [The word וְרַבָּה is not an adjective, but a verb in the past tense. The “vav” converts it to the future.] ורבה עליך: ותרבה עליך:
30I will drive them out from before you little by little, until you have increased and can occupy the land. למְעַ֥ט מְעַ֛ט אֲגָֽרְשֶׁ֖נּוּ מִפָּנֶ֑יךָ עַ֚ד אֲשֶׁ֣ר תִּפְרֶ֔ה וְנָֽחַלְתָּ֖ אֶת־הָאָֽרֶץ:
until you have increased: Heb. ךְתִּפְרֶה. You will increase, an expression of fruit, similar to “Be fruitful (פְּרוּ) and multiply” (Gen. 1:28). עד אשר תפרה: תרבה, לשון פרי, כמו פרו ורבו:
31And I will make your boundary from the Red Sea to the sea of the Philistines, and from the desert to the river, for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hands, and you shall drive them out from before you. לאוְשַׁתִּ֣י אֶת־גְּבֻֽלְךָ֗ מִיַּם־סוּף֙ וְעַד־יָ֣ם פְּלִשְׁתִּ֔ים וּמִמִּדְבָּ֖ר עַד־הַנָּהָ֑ר כִּ֣י | אֶתֵּ֣ן בְּיֶדְכֶ֗ם אֵ֚ת יֽשְׁבֵ֣י הָאָ֔רֶץ וְגֵֽרַשְׁתָּ֖מוֹ מִפָּנֶֽיךָ:
And I will make: Heb. וְשַׁךְתִּי, an expression of הִשָׁתָה, [meaning] placing. The “tav” is punctuated with a “dagesh” because it represents two “tav” s, since there is no [expression of] placing [or making, שִׁיתָה] without a “tav,” and the second one is [needed] for a suffix. ושתי: לשון השתה, והת"ו מודגשת מפני שבאה תחת שתים, שאין שיתה בלא ת"ו, והאחת לשמוש:
to the river: [Meaning] the Euphrates. — [from targumim] עד הנהר: פרת:
and you shall drive them out: Heb. וְגֵרַשְׁךְתָּמוֹ, [the equivalent of] וּתְגָרְשֵׁם, and you shall drive them out. וגרשתמו: ותגרשם:
32You shall not form a covenant for them or for their gods. לבלֹֽא־תִכְרֹ֥ת לָהֶ֛ם וְלֵאלֹֽהֵיהֶ֖ם בְּרִֽית:
33They shall not dwell in your land, lest they cause you to sin against Me, that you will worship their gods, which will be a snare for you. לגלֹ֤א יֵֽשְׁבוּ֙ בְּאַרְצְךָ֔ פֶּן־יַֽחֲטִ֥יאוּ אֹֽתְךָ֖ לִ֑י כִּ֤י תַֽעֲבֹד֙ אֶת־אֱלֹ֣הֵיהֶ֔ם כִּי־יִֽהְיֶ֥ה לְךָ֖ לְמוֹקֵֽשׁ:
that you will worship, etc.: Heb. תַעִבֹד וְגוֹ כִּי-יִהְיֶה וְגוֹ כִּי. These [instances of] כִּי are used instead of אִשֶׁר [i.e.,] that, and so it is in many places. This is [similar to] the usage of אִי, if, which is one of the four expressions for which כִּי is used (Rosh Hashanah 3a). We also find אִם used as an expression of כַּאִשֶׁר, when, in many places, such as “And when (וְאִם) you offer up an offering of first fruits (Lev. 2:14), which is obligatory [and not optional]. כי תעבד כי יהיה לך למקש: הרי אלו כי משמשין במקום אשר, וכן בכמה מקומות, וזהו לשון אי, שהוא אחד מארבע לשונות שהכי משמש. וגם מצינו בהרבה מקומות אם משמש בלשון אשר, כמו (ויקרא ב יד) ואם תקריב מנחת בכורים, שהיא חובה:
Exodus Chapter 24
1And to Moses He said, "Come up to the Lord, you and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and prostrate yourselves from afar. אוְאֶל־משֶׁ֨ה אָמַ֜ר עֲלֵ֣ה אֶל־יְהֹוָ֗ה אַתָּה֙ וְאַֽהֲרֹן֙ נָדָ֣ב וַֽאֲבִיה֔וּא וְשִׁבְעִ֖ים מִזִּקְנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וְהִשְׁתַּֽחֲוִיתֶ֖ם מֵֽרָחֹֽק:
And to Moses He said, “Come up…: ” This section was [actually] said before the Ten Commandments [were given] (Mechilta 19:10). On the fourth of Sivan, “Come up” was said to him [Moses]. [Midrash Lekach Tov, based on Mechilta and Mechilta d’Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai onExod. 19:10, Shab. 88a] See also Midrash Hagadol on this. ואל משה אמר עלה: פרשה זו נאמרה קודם עשרת הדברות, ובארבעה בסיון נאמר לו עלה:
2And Moses alone shall approach the Lord but they shall not approach, and the people shall not ascend with him." בוְנִגַּ֨שׁ משֶׁ֤ה לְבַדּוֹ֙ אֶל־יְהֹוָ֔ה וְהֵ֖ם לֹ֣א יִגָּ֑שׁוּ וְהָעָ֕ם לֹ֥א יַֽעֲל֖וּ עִמּֽוֹ:
And Moses alone shall approach: to the opaque darkness. -[Midrash Lekach Tov] ונגש משה לבדו: אל הערפל:
3So Moses came and told the people all the words of the Lord and all the ordinances, and all the people answered in unison and said, "All the words that the Lord has spoken we will do." גוַיָּבֹ֣א משֶׁ֗ה וַיְסַפֵּ֤ר לָעָם֙ אֵ֚ת כָּל־דִּבְרֵ֣י יְהֹוָ֔ה וְאֵ֖ת כָּל־הַמִּשְׁפָּטִ֑ים וַיַּ֨עַן כָּל־הָעָ֜ם ק֤וֹל אֶחָד֙ וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ כָּל־הַדְּבָרִ֛ים אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּ֥ר יְהֹוָ֖ה נַֽעֲשֶֽׂה:
So Moses came and told the people: on that day. ויבא משה ויספר לעם: בו ביום:
all the words of the Lord: The commandments of separation [of the men from the women] and setting boundaries [around the mountain so that people would not cross]. את כל דברי ה': מצות פרישה והגבלה:
and all the ordinances: The seven commandments that the Noachides were commanded [to observe], in addition to [keeping] the Sabbath, honoring one’s father and mother, [the laws of] the red cow, and laws of jurisprudence, which were given to them in Marah. -[Mechilta on Exod. 19:10, Sanh. 56b] [Since this was before the giving of the Torah, there were only these commandments and ordinances.] ואת כל המשפטים: שבע מצות שנצטוו בני נח. ושבת וכבוד אב ואם ופרה אדומה ודינין שניתנו להם במרה:
4And Moses wrote all the words of the Lord, and he arose early in the morning and built an altar at the foot of the mountain and twelve monuments for the twelve tribes of Israel. דוַיִּכְתֹּ֣ב משֶׁ֗ה אֵ֚ת כָּל־דִּבְרֵ֣י יְהֹוָ֔ה וַיַּשְׁכֵּ֣ם בַּבֹּ֔קֶר וַיִּ֥בֶן מִזְבֵּ֖חַ תַּ֣חַת הָהָ֑ר וּשְׁתֵּ֤ים עֶשְׂרֵה֙ מַצֵּבָ֔ה לִשְׁנֵ֥ים עָשָׂ֖ר שִׁבְטֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
And Moses wrote: [the Torah’s text] from “In the beginning” (Gen 1:1), until the giving of the Torah. He [also] wrote the commandments that they were commanded in Marah. [Again, since all this took place before the giving of the Torah, Moses could write only up to that point.] ויכתב משה: מבראשית ועד מתן תורה, וכתב מצות שנצטוו במרה:
and he arose early in the morning: on the fifth of Sivan. -[From Mechilta on Exod. 19: 10, Shab. 88a] וישכם בבקר: בחמשה בסיון:
5And he sent the youths of the children of Israel, and they offered up burnt offerings, and they slaughtered peace offerings to the Lord, bulls. הוַיִּשְׁלַ֗ח אֶת־נַֽעֲרֵי֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל וַיַּֽעֲל֖וּ עֹלֹ֑ת וַיִּזְבְּח֞וּ זְבָחִ֧ים שְׁלָמִ֛ים לַֽיהֹוָ֖ה פָּרִֽים:
the youths: Heb. נַעִרֵי, the firstborn. -[From targumim, Zev. 115b, Num. Rabbah 4:8] את נערי: הבכורות:
6And Moses took half the blood and put it into the basins, and half the blood he cast onto the altar. ווַיִּקַּ֤ח משֶׁה֙ חֲצִ֣י הַדָּ֔ם וַיָּ֖שֶׂם בָּֽאַגָּנֹ֑ת וַֽחֲצִ֣י הַדָּ֔ם זָרַ֖ק עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּֽחַ:
And Moses took half the blood: Who [first] divided it [exactly in half]? An angel came and divided it. -[From Lev. Rabbah 6:5] ויקח משה חצי הדם: מי חלקו, מלאך בא וחלקו:
in the basins: Two basins, one for half the blood of the burnt offering and one for half the blood of the peace offering, [in order] to sprinkle them on the people. From here our Sages learned that our ancestors entered the covenant with circumcision, immersion [in a mikvah], and the sprinkling of the blood [of the sacrifice on the altar], for there is no sprinkling [of blood on a person] without immersion [preceding it]. -[From Yev. 46b, Kreis. 9b] באגנות: שני אגנות אחד לחצי דם עולה ואחד לחצי דם שלמים להזות אותם על העם. ומכאן למדו רבותינו שנכנסו אבותינו לברית במילה וטבילה והרצאת דמים שאין הזאה בלא טבילה:
7And he took the Book of the Covenant and read it within the hearing of the people, and they said, "All that the Lord spoke we will do and we will hear." זוַיִּקַּח֙ סֵ֣פֶר הַבְּרִ֔ית וַיִּקְרָ֖א בְּאָזְנֵ֣י הָעָ֑ם וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ כֹּ֛ל אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּ֥ר יְהֹוָ֖ה נַֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה וְנִשְׁמָֽע:
the Book of the Covenant: from “In the beginning” (Gen 1:1) until the giving of the Torah, and he [also wrote] the commandments that they were commanded in Marah. -[From Mechilta, Exod. 19: 10] ספר הברית: מבראשית ועד מתן תורה ומצות שנצטוו במרה:
8And Moses took the blood and sprinkled [it] on the people, and he said, "Behold the blood of the covenant, which the Lord has formed with you concerning these words." חוַיִּקַּ֤ח משֶׁה֙ אֶת־הַדָּ֔ם וַיִּזְרֹ֖ק עַל־הָעָ֑ם וַיֹּ֗אמֶר הִנֵּ֤ה דַם־הַבְּרִית֙ אֲשֶׁ֨ר כָּרַ֤ת יְהֹוָה֙ עִמָּכֶ֔ם עַ֥ל כָּל־הַדְּבָרִ֖ים הָאֵֽלֶּה:
and sprinkled [it]: Heb. וַיִזְרֹק, an expression of sprinkling, and the Targum renders: and sprinkled it on the altar to atone for the people. ויזרק: ענין הזאה, ותרגומו וזרק על מדבחא לכפרא על עמא:
9And Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel ascended, טוַיַּ֥עַל משֶׁ֖ה וְאַֽהֲרֹ֑ן נָדָב֙ וַֽאֲבִיה֔וּא וְשִׁבְעִ֖ים מִזִּקְנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
10and they perceived the God of Israel, and beneath His feet was like the forming of a sapphire brick and like the appearance of the heavens for clarity. יוַיִּרְא֕וּ אֵ֖ת אֱלֹהֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וְתַ֣חַת רַגְלָ֗יו כְּמַֽעֲשֵׂה֙ לִבְנַ֣ת הַסַּפִּ֔יר וּכְעֶ֥צֶם הַשָּׁמַ֖יִם לָטֹֽהַר:
and they perceived the God of Israel: They gazed and peered and [because of this] were doomed to die, but the Holy One, blessed is He, did not want to disturb the rejoicing of [this moment of the giving of] the Torah. So He waited for Nadab and Abihu [i.e., to kill them,] until the day of the dedication of the Mishkan, and for [destroying] the elders until [the following incident:] “And the people were as if seeking complaints… and a fire of the Lord broke out against them and devoured at the edge (בִּקְצֵה) of the camp” (Num. 11:1). [בִקְצֵה denotes] the officers (בִקְצִינִים) of the camp [i.e., the elders]. -[From Midrash Tanchuma Beha’alothecha 16] ויראו את אלהי ישראל: נסתכלו והציצו ונתחייבו מיתה, אלא שלא רצה הקב"ה לערבב שמחת התורה, והמתין לנדב ואביהוא עד יום חנוכת המשכן, ולזקנים עד, (במדבר יא א) ויהי העם כמתאוננים וגו' ותבער בם אש ה' ותאכל בקצה המחנה, בקצינים שבמחנה:
like the forming of a sapphire brick: that was before Him at the time of the bondage, to remember Israel’s straits [i.e.,] that they were enslaved in the making of bricks. -[From Lev. Rabbah 23:8] כמעשה לבנת הספיר: היא היתה לפניו בשעת השעבוד לזכור צרתן של ישראל, שהיו משועבדים במעשה לבנים:
and like the appearance of the heavens for clarity: Since they were [finally] redeemed, there was light and joy before Him. -[From Lev. Rabbah 23:8] וכעצם השמים לטהר: משנגאלו היה אור וחדוה לפניו:
and like the appearance: Heb. וּכְעֶצֶם, as the Targum (Onkelos) renders וּכְמֶחֱזֵי : an expression meaning appearance. וכעצם: כתרגומו, לשון מראה:
for clarity: Heb. לָטֹהַר, an expression meaning clear and unclouded. -[From Lev. Rabbah 23:8] I.e., during the bondage of the Israelites, the sapphire brick clouded the heavens, but after the Exodus, the heavens became clear and not a cloud was in sight. -[Lev. Rabbah 23:8] לטהר: לשון ברור וצלול:
11And upon the nobles of the children of Israel He did not lay His hand, and they perceived God, and they ate and drank. יאוְאֶל־אֲצִילֵי֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל לֹ֥א שָׁלַ֖ח יָד֑וֹ וַיֶּֽחֱזוּ֙ אֶת־הָ֣אֱלֹהִ֔ים וַיֹּֽאכְל֖וּ וַיִּשְׁתּֽוּ:
And upon the nobles: They are Nadab and Abihu and the elders. -[From Midrash Tanchuma Beha’alothecha 16] ואל אצילי: הם נדב ואביהוא והזקנים:
He did not lay His hand: This indicates that they deserved that a hand be laid upon them. לא שלח ידו: מכלל שהיו ראוים להשתלח בהם יד:
and they perceived God: They gazed at Him with levity, while [they were] eating and drinking. So is the [interpretation of] Midrash Tanchuma (Beha’alothecha 16). Onkelos, however, did not render [this clause] in this manner. אִצִילֵי means great ones, like [in the phrases:] “and from its nobles (וּמֵאִצִילֶיהָ) I called you” (Isa. 41:9); “and He magnified (וַיָּאצֶל) some of the spirit” (Num. 11:25); “six large cubits (אַצִּילָה) ” (Ezek. 41:8). ויחזו את הא-להים: היו מסתכלין בו בלב גס מתוך אכילה ושתיה, כך מדרש תנחומא. ואונקלוס לא תרגם כן. אצילי לשון גדולים, כמו (ישעיה מא ט) ומאציליה קראתיך, (במדבר יא כה) ויאצל מן הרוח, (יחזקאל מא ח) שש אמות אצילה:
12And the Lord said to Moses, "Come up to Me to the mountain and remain there, and I will give you the stone tablets, the Law and the commandments, which I have written to instruct them." יבוַיֹּ֨אמֶר יְהֹוָ֜ה אֶל־משֶׁ֗ה עֲלֵ֥ה אֵלַ֛י הָהָ֖רָה וֶֽהְיֵה־שָׁ֑ם וְאֶתְּנָ֨ה לְךָ֜ אֶת־לֻחֹ֣ת הָאֶ֗בֶן וְהַתּוֹרָה֙ וְהַמִּצְוָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר כָּתַ֖בְתִּי לְהֽוֹרֹתָֽם:
And the Lord said to Moses: After the giving of the Torah. ויאמר ה' אל משה: לאחר מתן תורה:
Come up to Me to the mountain and remain there: for forty days. עלה אלי ההרה והיה שם: ארבעים יום:
the stone tablets, the Law and the commandments, which I have written to instruct them: All 613 mitzvoth are included in the Ten Commandments. In the “Azharoth” that he composed for each commandment [of the Ten], Rabbenu Saadiah [Goan] explained the mitzvoth dependent upon it [each commandment]. [from Jonathan, Num. Rabbah 13:16] את לחת האבן והתורה והמצוה אשר כתבתי להורתם: כל שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצות בכלל עשרת הדברות הן, ורבינו סעדיה פירש באזהרות שיסד לכל דבור ודבור מצות התלויות בו:
13So Moses and Joshua, his servant, arose, and Moses ascended to the mount of God. יגוַיָּ֣קָם משֶׁ֔ה וִֽיהוֹשֻׁ֖עַ מְשָֽׁרְת֑וֹ וַיַּ֥עַל משֶׁ֖ה אֶל־הַ֥ר הָֽאֱלֹהִֽים:
So Moses and Joshua, his servant, arose: I do not know what business Joshua had here, but I would say that the disciple [Joshua] escorted his mentor [Moses] until the place of the limits of the boundaries of the mountain, for he was not permitted to go past that point. From there Moses alone ascended to the mountain of God. Joshua pitched his tent and waited there for forty days. So we find that when Moses descended, “Joshua heard the voice of the people as they shouted” (Exod. 32:17). We learn [from there] that Joshua was not with them. ויקם משה ויהושע משרתו: לא ידעתי מה טיבו של יהושע כאן. ואומר אני, שהיה התלמיד מלוה לרב עד מקום הגבלת תחומי ההר, שאינו רשאי לילך משם והלאה, ומשם ויעל משה לבדו אל הר הא-להים, ויהושע נטה שם אהלו ונתעכב שם כל ארבעים יום, שכן מצינו, כשירד משה (לקמן לב יז) וישמע יהושע את קול העם ברעה, למדנו שלא היה יהושע עמהם:
14And to the elders he said, "Wait for us here until we return to you, and here Aaron and Hur are with you; whoever has a case, let him go to them." ידוְאֶל־הַזְּקֵנִ֤ים אָמַר֙ שְׁבוּ־לָ֣נוּ בָזֶ֔ה עַ֥ד אֲשֶׁר־נָשׁ֖וּב אֲלֵיכֶ֑ם וְהִנֵּ֨ה אַֽהֲרֹ֤ן וְחוּר֙ עִמָּכֶ֔ם מִי־בַ֥עַל דְּבָרִ֖ים יִגַּ֥שׁ אֲלֵהֶֽם:
And to the elders he said: upon his departure from the camp. ואל הזקנים אמר: בצאתו מן המחנה:
Wait for us here: Wait here with the rest of the people in the camp [so that you will] be ready to judge each person’s quarrel. שבו לנו בזה: והתעכבו כאן עם שאר העם במחנה להיות נכונים לשפוט לכל איש ריבו:
Hur: He was Miriam’s son, and his father was Caleb the son of Jephunneh, as it is said: “and Caleb took to himself Ephrath, and she bore to him Hur” (I Chron. 2:19). Ephrath was Miriam, as is stated in Sotah (11b). חור: בנה של מרים היה, ואביו כלב בן יפנה, שנאמר (דברי הימים א' ב יט) ויקח לו כלב את אפרת ותלד לו את חור. אפרת זו מרים, כדאיתא בסוטה (יא ב):
whoever has a case: lit., whoever is a master of words, whoever has litigation. -[From targumim] מי בעל דברים: מי שיש לו דין:
15And Moses went up to the mountain, and the cloud covered the mountain. טווַיַּ֥עַל משֶׁ֖ה אֶל־הָהָ֑ר וַיְכַ֥ס הֶֽעָנָ֖ן אֶת־הָהָֽר:
16And the glory of the Lord rested on Mount Sinai, and the cloud covered it for six days, and He called to Moses on the seventh day from within the cloud. טזוַיִּשְׁכֹּ֤ן כְּבֽוֹד־יְהֹוָה֙ עַל־הַ֣ר סִינַ֔י וַיְכַסֵּ֥הוּ הֶֽעָנָ֖ן שֵׁ֣שֶׁת יָמִ֑ים וַיִּקְרָ֧א אֶל־משֶׁ֛ה בַּיּ֥וֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִ֖י מִתּ֥וֹךְ הֶֽעָנָֽן:
and the cloud covered it: Our Sages disagree on the matter. Some say that these are the six days from the New Moon [until Shavuoth, the day of the giving of the Torah -(old Rashi)]. ויכסהו הענן: רבותינו חולקין בדבר. יש מהם אומרים אלו ששה ימים שמראש חודש עד עצרת יום מתן תורה:
and the cloud covered it: The mountain. ויכסהו הענן: להר:
and He called to Moses on the seventh day: to say the Ten Commandments, and [in fact] Moses and all Israel were standing [and listening to the Ten Commandments], but the text bestowed honor upon Moses [by mentioning only him]. Others say that the cloud covered Moses for six days after the Ten Commandments [were given], and they [these days] were at the beginning of the forty days that Moses ascended to receive the tablets (Yoma 4a). It teaches you that whoever enters the camp of the Shechinah requires six days separation [seclusion from society] (Yoma 3b). ויקרא אל משה ביום השביעי: לומר עשרת הדברות, ומשה וכל בני ישראל עומדים, אלא שחלק הכתוב כבוד למשה, ויש אומרים ויכסהו הענן למשה ששה ימים לאחר עשרת הדברות, והם היו בתחלת ארבעים יום שעלה משה לקבל הלוחות, ולמדך, שכל הנכנס למחנה שכינה טעון פרישה ששה ימים:
17And the appearance of the glory of the Lord was like a consuming fire atop the mountain, before the eyes of the children of Israel. יזוּמַרְאֵה֙ כְּב֣וֹד יְהֹוָ֔ה כְּאֵ֥שׁ אֹכֶ֖לֶת בְּרֹ֣אשׁ הָהָ֑ר לְעֵינֵ֖י בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
18And Moses came within the cloud, and he went up to the mountain, and Moses was upon the mountain forty days and forty nights. יחוַיָּבֹ֥א משֶׁ֛ה בְּת֥וֹךְ הֶֽעָנָ֖ן וַיַּ֣עַל אֶל־הָהָ֑ר וַיְהִ֤י משֶׁה֙ בָּהָ֔ר אַרְבָּעִ֣ים י֔וֹם וְאַרְבָּעִ֖ים לָֽיְלָה:
within the cloud: This cloud was a kind of smoke, and the Holy One, blessed is He, made a path (another version A canopy) within it. -[From Yoma 4b] בתוך הענן: ענן זה כמין עשן הוא, ועשה לו הקב"ה למשה שביל [חופה] בתוכו:
This psalm rebukes slanderers, describing how the deadly effect of slander reaches even further than weapons.
1. A song of ascents. I have called out to the Lord in my distress, and He answered me.
2. O Lord, rescue my soul from the lips of falsehood, from a deceitful tongue.
3. What can He give you, and what [further restraint] can He add to you, O deceitful tongue?
4. [You resemble] the sharp arrows of a mighty one, and the coals of broom-wood.1
5. Woe unto me that I sojourned among Meshech, that I dwelt beside the tents of Kedar.
6. Too long has my soul dwelt among those who hate peace.
7. I am for peace, but when I speak, they are for war.
FOOTNOTES
1. Which remain hot on the inside while appearing cool to the touch (Rashi).
Chapter 121
This psalm alludes to the Lower Paradise, from which one ascends to the Higher Paradise. It also speaks of how God watches over us.
1. A song of ascents. I lift my eyes to the mountains-from where will my help come?
2. My help will come from the Lord, Maker of heaven and earth.
3. He will not let your foot falter; your guardian does not slumber.
4. Indeed, the Guardian of Israel neither slumbers nor sleeps.
5. The Lord is your guardian; the Lord is your protective shade at your right hand.
6. The sun will not harm you by day, nor the moon by night.
7. The Lord will guard you from all evil; He will guard your soul.
8. The Lord will guard your going and your coming from now and for all time.
Chapter 122
The psalmist sings the praises of Jerusalem and tells of the miracles that happened there.
1. A song of ascents by David. I rejoiced when they said to me, "Let us go to the House of the Lord.”
2. Our feet were standing within your gates, O Jerusalem;
3. Jerusalem that is built like a city in which [all Israel] is united together.
4. For there the tribes went up, the tribes of God-as enjoined upon Israel-to offer praise to the Name of the Lord.
5. For there stood the seats of justice, the thrones of the house of David.
6. Pray for the peace of Jerusalem; may those who love you have peace.
7. May there be peace within your walls, serenity within your mansions.
8. For the sake of my brethren and friends, I ask that there be peace within you.
9. For the sake of the House of the Lord our God, I seek your well-being.
Chapter 123
The psalmist laments the length of time we have already suffered in exile.
1. A song of ascents. To You have I lifted my eyes, You Who are enthroned in heaven.
2. Indeed, as the eyes of servants are turned to the hand of their masters, as the eyes of a maid to the hand of her mistress, so are our eyes turned to the Lord our God, until He will be gracious to us.
3. Be gracious to us, Lord, be gracious to us, for we have been surfeited with humiliation.
4. Our soul has been overfilled with the derision of the complacent, with the scorn of the arrogant.
Chapter 124
1. A song of ascents by David. Were it not for the Lord Who was with us-let Israel declare-
2. were it not for the Lord Who was with us when men rose up against us,
3. then they would have swallowed us alive in their burning rage against us.
4. Then the waters would have inundated us, the torrent would have swept over our soul;
5. then the raging waters would have surged over our soul.
6. Blessed is the Lord, Who did not permit us to be prey for their teeth.
7. Our soul is like a bird which has escaped from the fowler's snare; the snare broke and we escaped.
8. Our help is in the Name of the Lord, the Maker of heaven and earth.
Chapter 125
1. A song of ascents. Those who trust in the Lord are as Mount Zion which never falters, but abides forever.
2. Mountains surround Jerusalem, and the Lord surrounds His people from this time and forever.
3. For the rod of wickedness will never come to rest upon the lot of the righteous; therefore the righteous need not stretch their hand to iniquity.
4. Be beneficent, O Lord, to the good and to those who are upright in their hearts.
5. But as for those that turn to their perverseness, may the Lord lead them with the workers of iniquity. Peace be upon Israel.
Chapter 126
The psalmist speaks of the future, comparing our Divine service in exile to one who sows arid land, then cries and begs God to send rain upon it so that the seed not be wasted. When he merits to reap the crop, he offers thanks to God.
1. A song of ascents. When the Lord will return the exiles of Zion, we will have been like dreamers.
2. Then our mouth will be filled with laughter, and our tongue with songs of joy; then will they say among the nations, "The Lord has done great things for these.”
3. The Lord has done great things for us; we were joyful.
4. Lord, return our exiles as streams to arid soil.
5. Those who sow in tears will reap with songs of joy.
6. He goes along weeping, carrying the bag of seed; he will surely return with songs of joy, carrying his sheaves.
Chapter 127
King David instructs his generation, and especially his son Solomon, to be sure that all one's actions be for the sake of Heaven. He also criticizes those who toil day and night in pursuit of a livelihood.
1. A song of ascents for Solomon. If the Lord does not build a house, then its builders labor upon it in vain. If the Lord will not guard a city, the vigilance of its watchman is in vain.
2. It is in vain for you, you who rise early, who sit up late, and who eat the bread of tension, for in fact He gives His loved ones sleep.
3. Behold, the heritage of the Lord is children; the fruit of the womb is a reward.
4. As arrows in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of youth.
5. Fortunate is the man who has his quiver full of them; they will not find themselves shamed when they speak with enemies in public places.
Chapter 128
This psalm extols one who enjoys the fruits of his own labor, avoiding theft and deception, even refusing gifts. It also describes behavior appropriate to the God-fearing.
1. A song of ascents. Fortunate is every man who fears the Lord, who walks in His ways.
2. When you eat of the labor of your hands, you will be happy, and you will have goodness.
3. Your wife will be like a fruitful vine in the inner chambers of your house; your children will be like olive saplings around your table.
4. Behold, so will be blessed the man who fears the Lord.
5. May the Lord bless you out of Zion, and may you see the goodness of Jerusalem all the days of your life.
6. And may you see children [born] to your children; peace upon Israel.
Chapter 129
The psalmist laments the troubles of Israel.
1. A song of ascents. Much have they persecuted me from my youth on. Let Israel declare it now-
2. "Much have they persecuted me from my youth on, [but] they have not prevailed against me.”
3. The plowmen plowed upon my back; they wished to make their furrow long.
4. But the Lord is just; He cut the cords of the lawless.
5. They will be humiliated and will be turned back, all the haters of Zion.
6. They will be as grass upon the rooftops that withers before one plucks it,
7. wherewith the reaper has never filled his hand, nor the sheaf-binder his arm;
8. and of which the passers-by never have said: "The blessing of the Lord be upon you; we bless you in the name of the Lord."
Chapter 130
The psalmist prays for an end to this long exile.
1. A song of ascents. Out of the depths I call to You, O Lord.
2. My Lord, hearken to my voice; let Your ears be attentive to the sound of my pleas.
3. God, if You were to preserve iniquities, my Lord, who could survive?
4. But forgiveness is with You, that You may be held in awe.
5. I hope in the Lord; my soul hopes, and I long for His word.
6. My soul yearns for the Lord more than those awaiting the morning wait for the morning.
7. Israel, put your hope in the Lord, for with the Lord there is kindness; with Him there is abounding deliverance.
8. And He will redeem Israel from all its iniquities.
Chapter 131
In this prayer, David declares that never in the course of his life was he haughty, nor did he pursue greatness or worldly pleasures.
1. A song of ascents, by David. O Lord, my heart was not proud, nor were my eyes haughty; I did not seek matters that were too great and too wondrous for me.
2. Surely I put my soul at peace and soothed it like a weaned child with his mother; my soul was like a weaned child.
3. Let Israel hope in the Lord from this time forth and forever.
Chapter 132
David composed this psalm while he and the elders of Israel wore sackcloth, in mourning over the plague that had descended upon the land, and their being distant from the Holy Temple. David therefore offers intense prayers, entreating God to remember the hardship and sacrifice he endured for the sake of the Temple.
1. A song of ascents. O Lord, remember unto David all his suffering,
2. how he swore to the Lord, and vowed to the Mighty Power of Jacob:
3. "I will not enter into the tent of my house; I will not go up into the bed that is spread for me;
4. I will not give sleep to my eyes, nor slumber to my eyelids;
5. until I will have found a place for the Lord, a resting place for the Mighty Power of Jacob.”
6. Lo, we heard of it in Ephrath; we found it in the field of the forest.
7. We will come to His resting places; we will prostrate ourselves at His footstool.
8. Ascend, O Lord, to Your resting place, You and the Ark of Your might.
9. May Your priests clothe themselves in righteousness, and may Your pious ones sing joyous songs.
10. For the sake of David Your servant, turn not away the face of Your anointed.
11. For the Lord has sworn to David a truth from which He will never retreat: "From the fruit of your womb will I set for you upon the throne.
12. If your sons will keep My covenant and this testimony of mine which I will teach them, then their sons, too, will sit on the throne for you until the end of time.
13. For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His habitation.
14. This is My resting place to the end of time. Here will I dwell, for I have desired it.
15. I will abundantly bless her sustenance; I will satisfy her needy with bread.
16. I will clothe her priests with salvation, and her pious ones will sing joyous songs.
17. There I will cause David's power to flourish; there I have prepared a lamp for My anointed.
18. His enemies will I clothe with shame, but upon him, his crown will blossom."
Chapter 133
1. A song of ascents, by David. Behold, how good and how pleasant it is when brothers dwell together.
2. Like the precious oil [placed] upon the head, flowing [in abundance] down the beard, the beard of Aaron which rests upon his garments.
3. Like the dew of Hermon which comes down upon the mountains of Zion, for there the Lord has commanded blessing, life unto eternity.
Chapter 134
The psalmist exhorts the scholarly and pious to rise from their beds at night, and go to the House of God.
1. A song of ascents. Behold: Bless the Lord, all you servants of the Lord who stand in the House of the Lord in the nights.
2. Lift up your hands in holiness and bless the Lord.
3. May the Lord, Who makes heaven and earth, bless you from Zion.
• Shabbat, Shevat 27, 5776 · February 6, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 25
והן בבחינת ועשה טוב, להתגבר כארי בגבורה ואומץ הלב
Likewise in the category of “doing good” one can employ the power of his “hidden love,” to strengthen himself like a lion with might and determination of heart,
נגד היצר המכביד את גופו ומפיל עליו עצלה, מבחינת יסוד העפר שבנפש הבהמית
against the evil nature which weighs down his body and casts over him a sloth, which stems from the element of Earth that is in his animal soul. 1
מלהטריח גופו בזריזות בכל מיני טורח ועבודת משא בעבודת ה‘ שיש בה טורח ועמל
This laziness prevents him from exerting his body energetically with every type of effort and strain, in the service of G‑d that entails effort and toil.
כגון לעמול בתורה בעיון, ובפה: לא פסיק פומיה מגירסא
For example, to labor in the Torah with deep concentration, and also orally, so that “his mouth will never cease from Torah study”;
וכמאמר רז״ל: לעולם ישים אדם עצמו על דברי תורה כשור לעול וכחמור למשאוי
as our Sages have said: 2 “A man should always submit to the words of Torah like the ox to the yoke, and the ass to the load.”
וכן לתפלה בכונה, בכל כחו ממש
Similarly with regard to devout prayer, he should exert himself with all the strength he can muster.
וכן בעבודת ה’ שהיא בדבר שבממון, כמו עבודת הצדקה
So too with regard to serving G‑d in monetary matters, such as the duty of charity, 3
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | See ch. 1. |
| 2. | Avodah Zarah 5b. |
| 3. | The three examples given here correspond to the three "pillars" of Torah, avodah, and gemilut chassadim. |
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Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Shabbat, Shevat 27, 5776 · February 6, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 356
Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
"Her first husband who sent her away may not marry her again"—Deuteronomy 24:4.
It is forbidden for a man to remarry a woman he divorced if she has remarried [and subsequently been divorced again or widowed] in the interim.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Shabbat, Shevat 27, 5776 · February 6, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 356
Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
"Her first husband who sent her away may not marry her again"—Deuteronomy 24:4.
It is forbidden for a man to remarry a woman he divorced if she has remarried [and subsequently been divorced again or widowed] in the interim.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
Negative Commandment 356
Translated by Berel Bell
The 356th prohibition is that a man is forbidden from remarrying his divorced wife, if she was married to another man in the interim.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) [that if her second husband divorces her or dies,] "then her first husband who divorced her cannot remarry her."
The punishment for transgression of this prohibition is malkos (lashes).
The details of this mitzvah are explained in a number of passages in Yevamos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Even if the second husband passed away or divorced her.
2.Deut. 24:4.
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• 1 Chapter: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 4 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Bikkurim - Chapter 4
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Bikkurim - Chapter 4
Halacha 1
Whenever anyone brings the first fruits, it is necessary that a [peace] offering be brought, song [be recited], they be raised [up and down and to all four directions] and the person remain in Jerusalem overnight.1 The declaration, however, is not a universal requirement. There are some who are obligated to bring the first fruits, but who do not recite the declaration over them.
Halacha 2
The following must bring [the first fruits], but may not recite the declaration: a woman, a tumtum2 and an adrogynus3 - for there is a doubt whether they are considered as a female;4 none of these can say "[the land] which You gave me,"5 and similarly, a guardian, a servant, and an agent, because they cannot say "which You gave me."6
Halacha 3
A convert, by contrast, may bring the first fruits and make the declaration, for [Genesis 17:5] states with regard to Abraham: "I have made you a father to a multitude of nations." Implied is that he is the father of all those who enter under the shelter of the Divine presence.7 The oath that his descendants would inherit the land was given to Abraham first.8 Similarly, the priest and the Levites bring [first fruits] and make a declaration, because they have cities in which to dwell.9
Halacha 4
A person who purchases two trees in his colleague's field10 must bring [the first fruits], but may not recite the declaration.11 [The rationale is that] there is a doubt whether he has a right to the land [on which the trees stand] or not.
What should he do? He should first12 consecrate them to the Temple treasury13 for it is possible that they are ordinary produce14 and non-consecrated food is not brought into the Temple Courtyard.15 The priest then redeems them from the Temple treasury and partakes of them.
He must separate terumah and the tithes from them, because of the possibility that they are ordinary produce. He must give the tithes from them to the priests,16 because it is a possibility that they are first fruits and forbidden to non-priests. He should not bring them himself, but instead, send them via an agent17 so that [the fact] that the declaration [is not recited] will not prevent them from being eaten. For whenever a declaration concerning [first fruits] is not fit to be made because of a doubt concerning their status, [the fact that] a declaration [is not recited] prevents it [from being eaten].18
Halacha 5
If one set aside his first fruits and then sold his field, he should bring them, but not make the declaration, because he cannot say: "[the land] which You gave me,"19 since it no longer belongs to him. The purchaser is not required to separate other first fruits, because the seller has already separated them.20 If, however, he does separate them, he should bring them, but not make the declaration.21 From another species [of produce], he should set aside the first fruits, bring them, and make the declaration.22
Halacha 6
When a person sells [the right to harvest] the produce of his field, the purchaser should bring [the first fruits], but not make the declaration. [The rationale is that] the acquisition of the produce is not equivalent to the acquisition of [the land] itself.23 When, however, one brings first fruits from the property of his wife,24 he makes the declaration even though he does not own the actual land, as [implied by Deuteronomy 26:11]: "which God, your Lord, has given you and your household."25Even if his wife dies after he has set aside [the first fruits] and he is in the midst of his journey [to Jerusalem], he should bring [the first fruits] and make the declaration.26
Halacha 7
When a person sells his field or sells trees and the land around them in the era when the Jubilee year is observed,27 [the purchaser] should bring [the first fruits] and make the declaration in the first Jubilee.28 [The rationale is that] the seller has not taken for granted that the land will be returned to him.29 If, however, he sold it again in the second Jubilee, [the purchaser] should bring [the first fruits], but should not make the declaration. For he is certain that he will receive only the produce,30 and the acquisition of the produce is not equivalent to the acquisition of [the land] itself.31
Halacha 8
When a person set aside his first fruits and became mortally ill,32 the one who is fit to inherit his [estate] should bring the first fruits without making the declaration.33 When a person set aside his first fruits and sent them with an agent, but the agent died in the midst of the journey, even if the owner brought them, he should not make the delaration. [The rationale is that the phrase (Deuteronomy 26:2):] "And you shall take... and you shall bring" does not apply unless the taking and the bringing are as one.
Halacha 9
When a person set aside his first fruits, but they were lost34 before they reached the Temple Mount and therefore he separated others instead of them,35he should bring the second fruits, but should not make the declaration. [The rationale is that] he cannot say [that he is bringing] "the first fruits of the land," for those that he is bringing are not the first fruits. One is not liable for an additional fifth [for partaking of] the produce separated second, as [he would had he partaken of] the first fruits.36
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
If a person brought his first fruits from one species and made the declaration and afterwards brings first fruits from another species, he should not make the declaration for them. [This is derived from the phrase (Deuteronomy 26:3):] "I am making a statement today." [Implied is that] he makes one statement and not two.
Halacha 12
If a person separated his first fruits and then the spring [that served as his field's water supply]39 dried up or the tree [from which they were reaped] was cut down, he should bring them, but should not make the declaration. [The rationale is that] he is like someone who no longer possesses the land, because it has been ruined.40
Halacha 13
When a person brings his first fruits between Sukkot and Chanukah41- even if he set them aside before Sukkot - he should bring them without making the declaration, [as implied by Deuteronomy 26:11]: "You shall rejoice in all the good." [Implied is that] the declaration should be made only in a time of happiness, [i.e.,] between Shavuot and the end of Sukkot.42 All individuals other than these43 must bring their first fruits and make the declaration.
Halacha 14
The first fruits, the terumot,44 challah, the principal and the fifth,45 and the presents given when slaughtering an animal46 are a priest's private property. He may use them to purchase servants, land, or a non-kosher animal. A debtor47 of his may collect them as payment for his debt and a woman may take them in lieu of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. And they may be used to purchase a Torah scroll.48
Halacha 15
The first fruits and the terumot are forbidden to be eaten by non-priests. [Generally,] when the first fruits are mixed with ordinary produce, they are permitted if there is 101 times the original amount as is the law with regard toterumah.49 Nevertheless, if they become mixed with the same species50of ordinary produce in Jerusalem, [the mixture] is forbidden even if the slightest amount of [the first fruits are mixed in] as [is the law regarding] the second tithe.51[The rationale is that] since [they are located in Jerusalem,] the place where one partakes of them, they are considered like52 an entity that could become permitted.53Although the first fruits are forbidden to non-priests even in Jerusalem, nevertheless, even the slightest presence of them in a mixture causes it to be forbidden.
Even if one sowed the first fruits after they were brought to Jerusalem,54 even the slightest amount of produce that grows from them causes a mixture to become forbidden.55 If, however, one sows the first fruits before they were brought to Jerusalem, the produce that grows from them is ordinary produce.56
Halacha 16
How are the first fruits brought to Jerusalem? All of [the inhabitants of] the towns in a regional area57 gather in the central town of the regional area, so that they will not ascend to Jerusalem as individuals, for [Proverbs 14:28] teaches: "The glory of the King is among the multitude of people."58
They come and sleep in the city's thoroughfare, but they do not enter the homes lest they contract impurity because of being under the same shelter as a corpse.59 In the morning, the leader calls out: "Arise and let us ascend to Zion, to God our Lord."60 An ox with its horns glazed with gold leads the procession. A crown of olive [branches]61 are placed on its head, to publicize that the first fruits come from the seven species [for which Eretz Yisrael is praised]. A flute plays before them until they arrive close to Jerusalem. They walk the entire way and proclaim: "I rejoiced when it was told me: 'Let us go to the house of God.'
They would travel for only two thirds of the day.62 When they arrived close to Jerusalem they sent emissaries to notify the inhabitants of Jerusalem and they adorned their first fruits63 and beautified them. If they had [some] produce that was fresh and other produce that was dried, the fresh produce was placed on top.64 The leaders of the Israelites and of the priests65 and the Temple treasurers would go out from Jerusalem to greet them. [The size of the welcoming party] was proportionate to the number of people who come. If many people come, many go out to greet them; if few, few. When they have all entered the gates of Jerusalem, they begin declaring: "Our legs were standing in your gates, O Jerusalem" (ibid.).
Halacha 17
All of the artisans in Jerusalem would stand in honor of them66 and would greet them: "Our brethren, the inhabitants of so-and-so, you have come in peace." They proceed through Jerusalem while the flute is sounded until they reach the Temple Mount. When they reach the Temple Mount, each one should carry the first fruits on his shoulders67 and say: "Halleluyah. Praise God in His holiness" [Psalm 150:1] until [the conclusion of that psalm]: "May all the souls praise You." They proceed through the Temple Mount until they reach the Temple Courtyard. When they reach the Temple Courtyard, the Levites open with the song [Psalm 30]: "I will exalt You, for You have drawn me up..."68
FOOTNOTES
1.
As explained in the concluding halachot of the previous chapter.
2.
A person whose genital area is covered with a mass of flesh and whose gender is impossible to detect.
3.
A person with male and female sexual characteristics.
4.
With regard to an androgynus, the doubt concerns the individual's halachic status. With regard to the tumtum, the doubt concerns the actual facts: Which gender is covered by the mass of flesh?
5.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim1:5), the Rambam explains that Eretz Yisraelwas given as an ancestral heritage only to males who are free men. Thus this disqualifies all of those mentioned in this clause and also the servant mentioned in the following clause.
6.
For the first fruits they are bringing are not from their own land. They are acting on behalf of others.
7.
For he taught all mankind faith [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.:4)].
8.
I.e., all future converts are considered as Abraham's seed and thus have a share in the land "that God swore to [give] to your ancestors." Indeed, based on Ezekiel 47:22,Kapot Temarim states that in the Messianic era, converts will be given a share of the Holy Land.
9.
As related in Numbers, ch. 35, in addition to the six cities of refuge, the Levites were given 42 cities that were scattered throughout the entire land of Eretz Yisrael. Although the land was given them from the tribal inheritances of the other tribes, it is still appropriate for them to speak of the land which God gave them, because the gifts were given as a result of God's command (Radbaz). See also Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni11:17.
10.
He does not purchase the land on which the trees grow. Nevertheless, since he purchased two trees, our Sages (Bava Batra 81b; see Hilchot Mechirah 24:6) question whether or not he is given the right to the land around the trees. If, however, he purchases three trees, all agree that he has the right to the land.
11.
Bava Batra 82a questions: Reciting the declaration is no more than reciting verses from the Torah. Even if he is not obligated to do so, what would be wrong with reciting these verses? In resolution, it explains that a) it appears that he is lying (because he is praising God for giving him land which in fact may not be his); or b) by bringing them as first fruits, he will prevent the terumah and the tithes from being separated from them.
12.
I.e., before bringing them to the Temple Courtyard.
13.
The consecration has a questionable status, because a person may not consecrate property that does not belong to him (Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim 6:16). And if the produce is first fruits, it does not belong to him.
14.
For if the land does not belong to him, they are not considered as first fruits.
15.
This is a general principle. See Hilchot Shechitah 2:3.
16.
According to Scriptural Law, tithes must be given to the Levites. Nevertheless, when the Levites failed to return to Zion with Ezra in large numbers, he punished them and decreed that they should not be given the tithes. Afterwards, according to many views, it was possible to give the tithes either to the priests or the Levites. Nevertheless, in this instance, the tithes must be given to the priests for the reason stated by the Rambam.
17.
For when an agent brings first fruits, a declaration should not be made, as stated in Halachah 2.
18.
Bava Batra, loc. cit., explains that when there would be no difficulty in making the declaration, the fact that it is not made does not disqualify the first fruits from being eaten. When, however, it is required to be made, but cannot be made for a particular reason, the failure to make it disqualifies the offering.
19.
Praising God for giving him the land.
20.
And first fruits should be brought only once for each species. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:7, based on the Jerusalem Talmud), the Rambam states that this is derived from Deuteronomy 26:3 which states: "I am making a statement to God your Lord today," implying that the statement can be made only once (see also Halachah 11).
21.
For the concept derived above applies primarily to making the declaration and not actually bringing the first fruits.
22.
Since they are being brought by two individuals, the fact that one species has been brought already does not disqualify the first fruits brought by the other person. If, however, they were being brought by the same person, he would not make the declaration again, as stated in Halachah 11.
23.
And thus he cannot rightfully praise God for giving him the land.
24.
This refers even to property which the husband receives as nichsei milog (seeHilchot Ishut 16:1-2), i.e., the property itself belongs to the woman, but he is entitled to derive benefit from it.
25.
"Your household" can be interpreted as referring to one's wife. Thus even though the land belongs to his wife, he should make the declaration.
26.
The husband inherits his wife's property. Thus now he owns both the land and the produce.
27.
And ancestral property is returned to its original owner. See Hilchot Shemitah VeYoval, ch. 11.
28.
For he is the owner of the land and the produce. Although he is required to return the land in the Jubilee year, that is a result of the Torah's decree and does not diminish the purchaser's ownership of the land.
29.
Since the owner does not have the experience of having his land returned to him, he does not consider it a surety that it will be returned to him. In his mind, it is sold (Radbaz). The Rambam's source is Gittin48a. Rashi interprets the passage differently.
30.
And he knows that the land will be returned. Accordingly, it is as if he purchased only the produce and not the land.
31.
As stated in Halachah 6.
32.
This reflects the Rambam's version of the Jerusalem Talmud (Bikkurim 1:5). The version in the standard published text is slightly different (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
33.
While the owner of the produce is alive, the person fit to inherit the estate is considered as an agent, and hence may not make the declaration. Even though he was not explicitly appointed, we assume that this is the owner's desire. According to the Rambam's conception, if the owner is ill, but is not in mortal danger, another person cannot serve as his agent unless he is appointed as such.
34.
In any manner, as indicated by Chapter 2, Halachah 20.
35.
For he is required to replace them (ibid.).
36.
As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, the first fruits are considered as terumah. And as stated in Hilchot Terumah 6:6, one who partakes of terumah inadvertently must make restitution and add a fifth.
37.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:8). The Ra'avad maintains that the produce should be left in the Temple Courtyard until it rots. From Chapter 2, Halachah 19, some have inferred that according to the Rambam, the impure produce should be burnt. Kin'at Eliyahu maintains that this approach is far more appropriate than leaving it to rot in the Temple Courtyard.
38.
For the declaration is made as a statement of thanksgiving after the first fruits are successfully offered and that is not possible in the present situation.
39.
The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:6).
40.
In its present state, the land is not able to produce fruit. Hence, it is as if he no longer possesses it (ibid.; according to Rav Kappach's text).
41.
After Chanukah, he may not bring them at all.
42.
This is the harvest season when a person feels happy with the bounty God has granted him.
43.
I.e., those mentioned from Halachah 5 and onward.
44.
I.e., both "the great terumah" and terumat ma'aser.
45.
I.e, when a non-priest partakes of any of the above mentioned substances, he is obligated to pay the principal and a fifth as restitution.
46.
See Chapter 9.
47.
Even a non-priest.
48.
The Radbaz questions why a Torah scroll is mentioned. If he is allowed to purchase a non-kosher animal with these objects, seemingly, it is obvious that he should be able to use them to purchase a Torah scroll. He explains that one might think that it is preferable that a person write a Torah scroll himself than purchase one. The Ma'aseh Rokeach explains that in contrast to other types of property, a Torah scroll may never be sold. Hence, if he uses the money from these objects to purchases it, he will never be able to derive physical benefit from these substances.
49.
Hilchot Ma'achalot Asuurot 15:3; Hilchot Terumot 15:20-21.
50.
If, however, they become mixed with a substance of another species, the presence of the first fruits can be nullified. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:12.
51.
See Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 6:14-15.
52.
This refers even to first fruits belonging to an Israelite. Hence, they are considered only "like an entity that could be permitted," but are not actually in that category (Radbaz).
53.
For the entire mixture could be eaten by priests in a state of ritual purity. With regard to the law that the entire mixture is forbidden when even the slightest amount of a forbidden substance becomes mixed with it, see Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:10.
54.
And thus the forbidden fruit itself no longer exists.
55.
This is a penalty imposed upon him because the mixture could have - and the produce that grows could - be given to the priests. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 2:2).
56.
Since the first fruits may not be eaten outside of Jerusalem, the mixture is not judged with the severity that applies to a mixture containing a forbidden entity that could become permitted. Instead, it is considered as an ordinary mixture and the presence of the first fruits can be nullified.
57.
See Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 6:1 for more particulars concerning the Hebrew term.
58.
Thus coming as a group is a greater act of Divine glorification.
59.
I.e., the first fruits must be brought in a state of ritual purity, and if a person bringing them enters a home, he may unknowingly contract ritual impurity, because he was under the same shelter as a corpse.
60.
Cf. Jeremiah 31:5.
61.
For of the seven species, olive branches are the most attractive [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 3:3)].
62.
This would impress them and the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed with the importance of their pilgrimage. Also, it allowed for people of many regions to congregate and ascend to Jerusalem together.
63.
See Chapter 3, Halachot 7 and 9.
64.
Because fresh produce is more attractive.
65.
The Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.).
66.
Kiddushin 33a notes that this is a grat mark of respect for those who bring the first fruits. After all, artisans are not required to stand before Torah scholars and yet they would stand before the people who brought the first fruits.
67.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 12.
68.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 13.
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Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] an agent brings a get from one place to another in Eretz Yisrael.1 Although [the agent] did not witness the writing of the get and does not know who the witnesses are, but rather the get was given to him by the husband, who instructed him to give it to his wife, [the agent] may give [the woman the get] in the presence of witnesses.2 Although the identity of the witnesses [who signed the get] is unknown to us, [the woman] is considered divorced, and she may remarry on this basis.
Halacha 2
If the husband came and protested, saying: "I never divorced her. The get she was given is a forgery," the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified.3If this is impossible, and the witnesses are not known at all, she must leave [her second husband], and [any children born to them] are considered illegitimate,4 for [we assume that] she has not been divorced.5 If the get has been lost, the status of the divorce is in doubt.6
For this reason, women who we presume hate each other are not trusted to bring a get to one another in Eretz Yisrael. [We suspect that] it might be a forgery, because one desires that the other remarry and be forbidden to her husband[s].7
Halacha 3
These are the women who we presume hate each other:8 A mother-in-law, the daughter of a mother-in-law, another woman married to the same man - this applies even if this woman has since remarried9 - her yevamah10 - this applies even if she was her sister11 - and her husband's daughter [from another marriage]. All other women are acceptable [to act in this capacity].
Halacha 4
When a man brings a get from one place to another place in Eretz Yisrael and becomes sick or is prevented from fulfilling his agency because of factors beyond his control, he may send the get via a second agent.12 Similarly, if the second agent becomes sick, he may send it via another agent. Indeed, even 100 agents [may be appointed in this manner].
There is no need for the agent to appoint the second agent in the presence of witnesses.13 The final agent to whom the get is given should give it to the woman in the presence of two witnesses, and the divorce is effective. [This applies] even when the first agent dies [before the divorce takes effect].14
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] an agent brings a get from one place to another in the diaspora, from Eretz Yisrael to the diaspora or from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael. If the agent was present at the time of the composition and signature of the get, he should say, in the presence of two witnesses, "It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence."15
Afterwards, it should be given in her presence, and the divorce takes effect, even though the identity of the witnesses is not known to us. Even if the witnesses' names resemble the names of gentiles, we do not suspect [that there is any difficulty].16
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
Similarly, when an agent who brings a get in Eretz Yisrael says: "It was written and signed in my presence," although he is not required to do so, if the husband comes and protests [that the get was forged], [the husband's] words are of no consequence.19
[With regard to a get sent to or from the diaspora,] if the agent was not present at the time of the writing or signing of the get, it may not be given to the woman unless the signatures [of the witnesses] were verified.20 The agent himself may serve as [one of] the three [judges] who verify the signatures of the witnesses.21
If [the signatures] were not verified, and the get was given to the woman, the divorce is unacceptable22 until [the signatures] are verified. If the husband comes and protests, and the signatures are not verified, we consider her not to be divorced.23 If the get has been lost, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Halacha 8
Why did [our Sages] require [the agent] to say: "It was written and signed in my presence" in the diaspora? So that the woman would not have to have [the signatures] verified if the husband comes and protests. [Our Sages did not desire that she be faced with such a predicament,] because witnesses are often not available to verify signatures [on a document that has been taken] from one place to another in the diaspora.
Halacha 9
When a husband brought explicit proof24 that a get concerning which [an agent] said: "It was written and signed in my presence" is a forgery, [the get] is void. For [our Sages] accepted the statements of one person only in the face of a protest raised by a husband that was not accompanied by substantial proof. When, however, this person's statements are contradicted by witnesses, [his statements] are not accepted.
Halacha 10
The rivers in Eretz Yisrael and the islands in the Mediterranean Sea that are within the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael25 are bound by the rules pertaining toEretz Yisrael. [The islands] that are outside these boundaries are bound by the rules pertaining to the diaspora. The boundaries of Eretz Yisrael are described in Hilchot Terumot.
With regard to gittin, [the rules pertaining to] Eretz Yisrael also pertain to Babylonia.26
Halacha 11
Halacha 12
When a portion of the get is written in [the agent's] presence, and all the signatures were executed in his presence, he may say: "It was written and signed in my presence,"29 provided it was the initial portion - even one line30 - [that was written in his presence].
[Moreover,] even if he merely heard the noise [made by the scribe's] pen [writing], and the witnesses signed in his presence, he may say: "It was written and signed in my presence." Similarly, even if the scribe went out to the marketplace and then returned and completed the get, [the agent] does not fear that another [man] found [the scribe] and told him [to write a get for him], and he [completed] writing the get for another person.31 Instead, [the agent] may say: "It was written and signed in my presence."
Halacha 13
If [the agent] said: "It was written in my presence," but did not say, "It was signed in my presence," [if he said,] "It was signed in my presence," but did not say, "It was written in my presence," or [if he said,] "The entire [get] was written in my presence, and one witness signed [in my presence], but not the other witness," even if he himself was the other witness,32 the signature of the witnesses must be verified.33 Only then, may [the get] be given to her.
If he and another person testify with regard to [the signature of] the second witness, who did not sign in his presence,34 [the get] is acceptable and may be given to her. Needless to say, if two other [witnesses] testify with regard to [the signature of] the second witness, [the get] is acceptable.
Halacha 14
When two agents bring a get from the diaspora, they may give it to [the woman], causing the divorce to be effective, even though it was not written and signed in their presence. Since the husband gave it to them to give to his wife, his protests regarding this get are of no consequence.35 Although [the signatures of the witnesses] have not been verified, the agents he [appointed] serve as witnesses [to its authenticity].36 For if these witnesses said, "She was divorced in our presence," the divorce would be effective, even though there is no get present.
Halacha 15
When does the above apply? When the get is in the possession of both of them.37 If, however, the get is not in the possession of both of them, they must say: "It was written and signed in our presence."
Accordingly, if one agent says, "It was written in my presence," and the second38 says, "It was signed in my presence," or they both say, "It was written in our presence," and one39 says: "It was signed in my presence," since it is not in the possession of both of them, it should not be given to the woman unless the authenticity of the signatures has been verified.
Halacha 16
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when] an agent brings a get in the diaspora and gives it to the woman in private, or gives it to her in the presence of two witnesses, but does not tell her: "It was written and signed in my presence." Even if she has married, he should take the get back from her and then give it to her in the presence of two witnesses and say: "It was written and signed in my presence." If he does not take it back from her, the divorce is unacceptable42 until the signatures [of the witnesses] are verified.43
Halacha 18
If [the agent] gave a woman a get and did not suffice to say: "It was written and signed in my presence," before he lost the power of speech, the signatures [of the witnesses] should be verified.44 Afterwards, he may give it to her.
Halacha 19
A blind person may not bring a get from the diaspora, because he is unable to say: "It was written and signed in my presence." Accordingly, if [the get] was written and signed in his presence while he possessed the power of sight, and he became blind afterwards, he may say in the presence of three [men]: "It was written and signed in my presence," and give [the get] to her.45
Similarly, when a woman brings a get from the diaspora, she must say: "It was written and signed in my presence," in the presence of three [men]. The provision to make these statements in the presence of two men applies only when the agent is acceptable to serve as a witness.46 In such an instance, he joins the other two and serves as one of the three who verify the get, based on his statements.47For a witness may serve as a judge in matters of Rabbinic law.
Halacha 20
When an agent becomes ill or is prevented from carrying out his agency by forces beyond his control, he should approach a Jewish court48 and tell them: "This get was written and signed in my presence."49 [The court,50 then, appoints] another agent and sends [the get to the woman] with him.
The second agent does not have to say: "It was written and signed in my presence." Instead, he says: "I am an agent of the court," and then he gives [the get to the woman] in the presence of witnesses.51
Halacha 21
If the second agent becomes ill or is prevented from carrying out his agency by forces beyond his control, he should appoint another agent in the presence of the court. [Indeed,] even 100 [agents can be appointed in this manner].
[Before transferring the get,] the final agent says: "I am an agent of the court." He should then give the woman [the get]. [The get can be given] even if the first agent died.
Why must [the appointment be made] in court? Because [the first agent] must say: "It was written and signed in my presence."52 If, however, the signatures [of the witnesses] were verified, although one agent gives it to another in private - even if 100 agents are appointed in this way - the get is acceptable when it reaches the woman.
Although the husband did not explicitly tell the agent: "Send [the get] via another person if you are hindered by forces beyond your control," the agent may [appoint another agent] if he becomes ill or is hindered by forces beyond his control.53
Halacha 22
Whenever a person appoints an agent, the agent does not have to be present in court with him. Even if the agent is not present, he may tell [the court]: "So and so is my agent."54 Similarly, an agent may appoint an agent when the latter is not present. [Indeed,] even 100 [agents can be appointed in this manner].
Halacha 23
A husband [may appoint] his wife [as an agent to transport her get to another place]. After having it written and signed in her presence, he gives her the getand tells her: "You are an agent to bring it to the court of so and so. They will appoint an agent, who will give you this get and thus effect the divorce."
Should the woman say: "It was written and signed in my presence," [when delivering the get to the court], her statements are accepted.55 [The court] should take the get from her and give it to the agent so that he can give it to her as the husband instructed.
Halacha 24
When does the above apply? When the husband [explicitly] made this stipulation. But if this stipulation is not made, but instead the husband [merely] gave her the get and it is in her possession, she is not required to make any statements [to the court]. We assume that she is divorced, for she is in possession of a get that is written according to law and that is signed by witnesses.
Although we do not recognize the signatures of the witnesses, and [their authenticity] has not been verified, we do not suspect that [the woman] forged them, for she would not cause her own ruin.56
Moreover, it is considered as if the witnesses who signed the get had testified in court, until a protest is raised. Therefore, we assume that the get was written according to law and [grant the woman permission to] marry, as we assume that a get brought by an agent [in Eretz Yisrael] is acceptable until the husband raises a protest or until he brings proof that it is a forgery or that it is void.
For if we had suspicions concerning these matters and the like, we would have to suspect that perhaps when a husband gave a get in our presence, he nullified it before he gave it; perhaps the witnesses who sign it are unacceptable, causing it to be regarded as a forgery; or perhaps it was not written for the sake [of the man or the woman being divorced]. Just as we do not entertain suspicions concerning these factors and assume that the get [is acceptable] until it is discovered that it is void, so too, we do not entertain suspicions concerning an agent or a woman when a get is in their possession. [The rationale is] that the laws governing prohibitions differ from those governing financial transactions.57
FOOTNOTES
1.
Eretz Yisrael is singled out because Jewish courts frequently held sessions there, and it was feasible to verify the signatures of the witnesses to the get. In contrast, the courts in the diaspora held sessions less frequently, and verifying the signature of witnesses was a far more formidable task. Therefore, different laws apply, as stated in Halachah 5. In the present age, the laws applying to sending gittin in the diaspora are also followed in Eretz Yisrael. (See Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Even HaEzer 142:1.)
2.
More particularly, according to the Rambam, only one witness is necessary, because the agent himself may serve as the second witness.
3.
If the signatures of the witnesses can be verified, the husband's protests are ignored. Once the witnesses sign the get, it is considered as if they have testified in court, and the husband's statements are of no avail.
4.
See the Beit Shmuel 142:5, which quotes a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether or not the Rambam maintains that the husband's protest causes the get to be considered void. The consequence of this difference of opinion is the status of the children born out of a second marriage. Are they definitely considered to be illegitimate, or is this a point of doubt?
5.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam considers the get to be unacceptable because the fact that the husband protests the authenticity of the getand the woman is unable to verify the signatures causes us to question the matter. Since the woman was regarded as married, her status cannot be changed until she receives a get that is not open to doubt.
The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 141) explains that although we assume that the woman has not been divorced, we do not know this with absolutely certainty. Hence, if she is consecrated by another man after receiving this get, she must be divorced by this second husband. Similarly, there are other authorities who maintain that the status of the divorce is doubtful.
6.
For in this instance there is no way to verify the signature of the witnesses.
7.
I.e., if the woman remarries, she will be committing adultery, and hence, she will be forbidden to remain married to her first husband. Nor will she be permitted to remain married to her second husband. Since they were involved in an adulterous relationship, they are forbidden to marry.
8.
I.e., just as a mother-in-law may not bring aget for her daughter-in-law, a daughter-in-law may not bring a get for her mother-in-law.
9.
Despite the fact that this woman has been divorced and remarried, we assume that she still harbors bad feelings towards the woman with whom she shared her previous husband and might desire to create difficulties for her.
10.
I.e., a woman who is married to her husband's brother. If the woman's husband died without children, her husband's brother would be obligated to marry her to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum. Thus, the two women could ultimately become married to the same man.
11.
Although in this instance the mitzvah ofyibbum would not apply because the two sisters are forbidden to marry the same man, our Sages did not differentiate when imposing this restriction.
12.
If, however, there is nothing preventing the agent from carrying out his agency, he may not appoint another agent. For we assume that a husband would object to the substitution (Gittin 29a).
13.
As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 6, Halachah 4, there are opinions that differ and require the appointment of an agent to be observed by witnesses. Although theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:11) favors the Rambam's view with regard to the appointment of the agent himself, theShulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:40) follows the other opinions with regard to the agent's appointment of a second agent. In practice, the present custom is to have the appointment witnessed.
14.
For the husband, and not the previous agent, is the source of empowerment for the final agent.
15.
Generally, the verification of the signature of witnesses on a legal document requires two witnesses. In this instance, however, an exception was made, and the statements of one individual are accepted.
The rationale for this exception can be explained as follows: According to Scriptural law, there is no need for the signatures of the witnesses to a legal document to be verified. This requirement was instituted by our Sages. And in order to prevent a woman from having difficulties in obtaining a divorce, they relaxed that requirement and accepted the statements of the agent (Gittin 3a).
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 142:7) quotes opinions that rule that the phrase "It was written and signed in my presence" must be recited in its Hebrew original, B'fanai nichtav uv'fanai nechtam; a translation is not sufficient.
16.
I.e., we do not suspect that the witnesses were gentiles and that the get is void. For it has been customary for Jews living in the diaspora to adopt gentile names (Tosafot, Gittin 11b).
If, however, the probability is small that a Jew would use such a name, e.g., Nickolas or Patrick, there are authorities who are more stringent. See Beit Shmuel 130:30.
17.
Once the statements of the agent are accepted by the court, they are given the same weight as if they had been made by two witnesses. Therefore, the protest of the husband is of no consequence (Gittin 9a). If, however, the husband brings two witnesses who testify that the get is a forgery, their word - and not that of the agent - is accepted (Halachah 9).
18.
Our suspicion is that these women would forge a get to cause the wife to be forbidden to remained married to both husbands, and that the forgery will be easily discovered, because her first husband will protest the legitimacy of the get. When the agent herself must say "The get was written and signed in my presence," the first husband's protest will not be accepted, and the woman will be allowed to remain married to her second husband. As such, the forgery will not achieve its desired result.
19.
Our Sages accepted the statements of the agent as equivalent to those of two witnesses even when he was not required to have made them (Gittin 6b). Note the comments of the Maggid Mishneh, who questions whether this also applies with regard to questions of monetary law - e.g., the payment of the woman's marriage contract.
20.
The woman might think that the divorce is effective upon receipt of the get and may remarry, without being aware of the difficulties involved.
21.
More particularly, in this matter the agent can serve in three capacities: 1) as the agent to give the get, 2) as a witness to verify the signatures of the witnesses, and 3) as a judge declaring that the signatures have been verified. This is possible because, as explained above, the verification of witnesses is a requirement of Rabbinic law. In matters of Scriptural law, a witness may not serve as a judge. (See also Halachah 19.)
22.
I.e., disqualified by the Rabbis. It is not, however, void according to Scriptural law (Maggid Mishneh). According to the general principles mentioned by the Rambam (Chapter 10, Halachah 2), if the woman remarries in such an instance, she is not obligated to leave her second husband. TheTur (Even HaEzer 142) quotes opinions that differ and require her to leave her second husband, even if her first husband does not protest. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer142:1) follows the Rambam's ruling.
23.
See the notes on Halachah 1.
24.
E.g., two witnesses who testify that the getis a forgery.
25.
As stated in Hilchot Terumot 1:7, the northern boundary of Eretz Yisrael was the Amanon Mountains, a range in Northern Lebanon, far above the position of contemporary Beirut. The southern boundary was the Nile river. All islands within the imaginary line drawn from one point on the Mediterranean to the other are considered to be part of Eretz Yisrael.
26.
In the Talmudic era, Babylonia was a center of Torah study and there would be students traveling from all the cities to and from the central yeshivot in Sura, Neharde'a and Pumbedita. Hence, it was possible to find witnesses to verify the authenticity of the signatures on a get (Gittin 6a).
27.
Regardless of whether the get was given in another place in the diaspora or in Eretz Yisrael, the signature of the witnesses cannot be easily verified, and hence the agent is required to make these statements.
28.
If the get is given in Eretz Yisrael, the signatures of the witnesses can be verified, and hence the agent is not required to make these statements.
29.
The fundamental element to be observed by the agent is the signature of the get by the witnesses. For as long as the scribe wrote a portion of the get lishmah, for the sake of the man and the woman getting divorced, it is sufficient (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Gittin 2:1).
Note the Yadav Shel Moshe, who questions why the Rambam concerns himself with the issue of lishmah. On the difference of opinion between Rabbah and Ravva regarding the reason for the agent having to say: "It was written and signed in my presence," the Rambam follows the opinion of Ravva, who states that the problem is notlishmah, but rather the verification of the signatures of the witnesses.
30.
Rashi, Gittin 15a, interprets this as referring to the line that contains the man's name, the woman's name and the date. Tosafotinterprets it as referring to the first line of theget. The Beit Shmuel 142:28 explains that the Rambam accepts neither of these opinions, but means any given line of theget.
31.
If that were the case, the get would not be written lishmah.
32.
For the confirmation of the get must follow the directives outlined by our Sages in their entirety or rely on the verification of the signatures of the witnesses (Tosafot, Gittin15b).
33.
Since the decree of our Sages was not fulfilled, the only alternative is to verify the signatures of the witnesses.
34.
I.e., the agent says that the get was written, and one signed in his presence, and he and another person verify the signature of the second witness.
35.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 142) differs with this ruling. He agrees that in contrast to a getbrought by one agent, a get brought by two agents may be given to the woman without their saying, "It was written and signed in our presence." Nevertheless, the Tur maintains that if the husband protests the authenticity of the get, the signatures of the witnesses must be verified.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:18) follows the Rambam's ruling, while the Ramah quotes that of the Tur.
36.
This law applies only when the agents are able to serve as witnesses in court. If, however, they are related to the husband or the wife, or would be disqualified for other reasons, they are required to say, "It was written and signed in our presence."
37.
Rashi (Gittin 16b) appears to imply that both agents must be physically holding the gettogether. The Rashba differs [and this opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 142:18)] and states all that is necessary is for the agents to state that they were both appointed by the husband and given the get. The Rashba extends this leniency and states that even if only one agent was appointed by the husband, if another person witnessed his appointment and traveled with him, it is not necessary for the agent to say "It was written and signed in my presence."
38.
As mentioned above, according to the interpretation accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, we are not speaking about a second agent, but another person who accompanied the agent.
39.
This is referring to a third individual, and not one of the agents.
40.
The Maggid Mishneh states that the statement, "It was written in my presence," is unnecessary. Since two witnesses testify that they observed the signing of the get, they have verified the signatures of the witnesses. The Rambam mentions this instance, only because he is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Gittin 2:1). And the Mishnah mentions this only as a literary device, so that the wording in its different clauses are parallel.
41.
Even if the two individuals who speak with regard to the signing of the get are not agents, their statements verify the authenticity of the signatures, making it a valid legal document.
42.
This wording implies that if the woman remarried after this divorce, she may remain married to her second husband. Rabbenu Asher and others rule more stringently, and maintain that in such a situation, the woman must be divorced by her second husband.
43.
Even after the signatures of the witnesses have been verified, the get should be taken from the woman and returned to her in the presence of witnesses, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 15.
44.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that it is not sufficient for the witness to write these words out. Although a person who cannot speak and who witnessed the death of a woman's husband is allowed to write out his testimony (Chapter 13, Halachah 28), there is no alternative in that situation. In these circumstances, there is an alternative: to have the signatures of the witnesses verified (Kessef Mishneh).
45.
Gittin 23a states that when an agent is blind, he must be able to recognize the woman by the sound of her voice. It is not sufficient for others to identify her for him. When an agent can see, however, he need not know the woman's identity and may rely on the statements of others (Maggid Mishneh;Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:11).
46.
Hilchot Edut 9:12 states that a blind person may not serve as a witness, and Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:9 states that such a person may not serve as a judge. Hilchot Edut 9:2 states that a woman may not serve in these capacities. Similarly, if the agent is related to the man or the woman, he is incapable of serving as a judge and three witnesses are necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer142:4).
47.
See Halachot 5 and 7 and notes.
48.
It is sufficient for him to appear before two judges, because he can serve as the third judge himself (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:9).
49.
As opposed to the situation described in Halachah 4, the agent cannot appoint a second agent himself, because he is required to state in a court of law that the getwas written and signed in his presence.
50.
The wording of the Rambam might be understood as implying that the agency is entrusted to the second agent by the court. This, however, is an incorrect inference, for it is the first agent who appoints the subsequent agent. This appointment must, however, be performed in a court to ensure that everything necessary to validate the getis performed. (See Rivash, Responsum 318.)
51.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 142:9) quotes the Rivash as ruling that, if sending a second get would be difficult, it is acceptable for the second agent to bring the get, even though he was not appointed in court, provided he brings a writ of authorization from the first agent.
52.
The reason the appointment of the latter agents must be made in a court is that the signatures of the witnesses have not been verified. By stating that his appointment was made in a court of law, every agent assures the court that the correct process has been followed regarding this get.
53.
If, however, there are no factors preventing the agent from discharging his agency, he may not appoint another agent unless the husband explicitly gave him the authority to do so (Maggid Mishneh).
54.
The Rivash (Responsum 53) differs with this ruling and maintains that if the second agent does not hear the first agent say: "It was written and signed in my presence," he must be given a writ of appointment. Otherwise, he may not serve in this capacity. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:10) quotes the Rambam's ruling - and indeed expands upon it, allowing the agent to give the court the authority to appoint any agent they desire. The Ramah quotes the ruling of the Rivash.
55.
She must, however, make these statements for the divorce to be effective. Our Sages made this requirement in order not to differentiate between one agency and another (Rashba, commenting on Gittin24a).
56.
It is likely that a forgery would ultimately be discovered, and she would then be forbidden to remain married to her second husband, nor would she be permitted to return to her first husband.
The Maggid Mishneh draws a connection between this halachah and Chapter 12, Halachah 2, which states that the statements of a woman who produces a getare accepted, even though the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses to the gethas not been verified. The Ra'avad in his gloss on Hilchot Avadim 6:7 differs (see also his gloss to Chapter 12, Halachah 2). TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:13-14) quotes the opinions of both the Rambam and the Ra'avad. See the Rivash (Responsum 385).
57.
With regard to financial transactions, a person's statements are not accepted if he has an interest in the matter, unless he substantiates them with proof. Therefore, if a person gives a servant a deed of release that states that he has been freed and has been granted his master's possessions, his word is accepted with regard to his freedom. With regard to the possessions, however, he is required to substantiate his statements by verifying the authenticity of the witnesses to the deed (Hilchot Avadim 7:2).
Gerushin - Chapter Eight
Halacha 1
When [a man] divorces [his wife] according to a conditional arrangement, and the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is effective. If the condition is not fulfilled, the divorce is not effective. All the laws governing conditional agreements have been explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 6.1
There it is explained that when [a man] divorces [his wife] according to a conditional arrangement, and the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is effective from the time the condition is fulfilled, and not from the time the get is given to her.
As such, a husband may nullify a get, add to his conditions or add a further condition, until the original condition is fulfilled although [the woman] has already been given the get.
If the husband dies [before the condition is fulfilled],2 or the get is lost or consumed by fire before the condition is fulfilled, the divorce is not effective.3A priori, [the woman] should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled.4 If, however, she has already married, she need not leave [her second husband],5 unless she is no longer able to fulfill [the condition].6 [For since] the condition is nullified [the divorce is void.]
There it is explained that if [the husband] tells [his wife]: "You are divorced from the present time - or from today - on the following condition," or "You are divorced on the condition7 that this and this be done," when the condition is fulfilled the divorce becomes effective retroactively from the time the getreaches the woman.
Therefore, once the get reaches the woman's possession, [the husband] can no longer nullify the get,8 add to his conditions or add a further condition. If theget is lost or consumed by fire, or even if the husband dies before the condition is fulfilled, she should fulfill the condition after his death, and the divorce is considered effective from the time the get was given to her.
Halacha 2
Whenever [a man] divorces [his wife] conditionally - whether he states, "from this time onward," or makes [a repeated statement of the condition, as required] - he should not enter into privacy with his wife throughout the entire time the condition remains unfulfilled.
Instead, [all his dealings with her should be] in the presence of [at least one] witness. Even a servant or a maid-servant can serve this purpose, with the exception of her [private] maid-servant or her young son. For she is not embarrassed to enter into marital relations in the presence of these people.
It is well known that if [the husband] enters into privacy [with his wife] in the presence of two witnesses at the same time, the status of the divorce is doubtful, even if the condition was fulfilled. [We suspect] that he engaged in marital relations [with her],11 and nullified the get,12 as will be explained in these laws.
Halacha 3
How should a man divorce [his wife] conditionally? He should not say: "Write a get for my wife on this condition," or "Write a get and give it to her on this condition." Needless to say, he should not write in the get: "So and so divorces so and so on the [following] condition."13
What procedure should instead be followed? He should instruct the scribe to write [a get] and the witnesses to sign. They should write an acceptable getthat does not mention any condition at all. Afterwards, he should give her theget and tell her: "This is your get..." or "Behold you are divorced on the following condition." Or he should tell [the witnesses] or his agent: "Give her this get on the following condition."14
Halacha 4
If [a husband] had a condition15 written in the get after the essential portion of the get16 was written, the get is acceptable, regardless of whether [the condition] was written before the signature of the witnesses or after their signature.
If, however, [the condition] was written before the essential portion of the get - even if he used the wording, "on the following condition"17 - the status of the divorce is doubtful, for the husband retains rights in the essential matter of theget. Similarly, if he verbally stated a condition before the essential portion of the get was written, the status of the divorce is doubtful.18
Halacha 5
[These rules apply when a man] divorces his wife and [makes the following conditions] whether verbally or in writing, after the essential portion [of the get] has been written,19. If he tells her: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man aside from so and so," or "...with the exception of so and so," [the ruling would depend on the identity of the individual specified].
If that individual is a gentile, a servant or a person with whom the woman is forbidden to engage in marital relations - e.g., her father, her brother, his father or his brother - the get is acceptable.20 If, however, the individual is one who could consecrate her [as a wife], the get is void,21 even if there is a negative prohibition [that is not punishable by death - neither at the hand of God nor the court - involved in such relations]22 or that individual is a minor.23 [The rationale is that by making such a condition,] the husband retained certain rights with regard to the divorce, and [the bond between the couple] is not [entirely] severed.
If [the individual mentioned] is the husband of the wife's sister, the status of the divorce is in doubt. For although at present relations between the wife and that man are forbidden, if her sister dies, she will become permitted to marry him.
Halacha 6
The status of the divorce is in doubt24 when [a husband divorces his wife and] tells her: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man, aside from a man who will be born in the future, who does not exist at present," "...aside from promiscuous relationships" - i.e., it is as if he said: "Behold, you are permitted to marry any man, but with regard to promiscuous relations, it is as if you remain forbidden like a married woman."
[This ruling also applies if he tells her:] "You are permitted to any man who will engage in relations with you in the ordinary manner, but with regard to anal intercourse, you remain prohibited," "You are permitted [to marry] any man, aside from one who consecrates you with a legal document" - i.e, the woman may be consecrated by [a gift of] money or via sexual relations, but if one consecrates her with a legal document, she is forbidden like a married woman - or "You are permitted [to marry] any man, with the exception of [the right to] nullify your vows" - i.e., [I] retain none of the rights of the marriage relationship except [the right to] nullify your vows; in that regard, it is as if you remained my wife.
[Similarly, if the husband desires that the woman be considered as if she were married with regard to her right] to partake of terumah,25 or with regard to his right to inherit her property if she dies [in his lifetime, the status of the divorce is in doubt].
Halacha 7
[If a husband] tells [his wife]: "You are permitted [to marry] any man aside from Reuven and Shimon," and then tells her: "You are permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon," the divorce is acceptable.26 For he has nullified his condition, permitting his wife [to marry] the men [concerning whom] the condition was made.
Halacha 8
[If, after telling his wife that she is permitted to marry any man aside from Reuven and Shimon, the husband] tells her: "You are permitted [to marry] Reuven," the divorce is void, because he has not nullified the condition [preventing her from marrying] Shimon.
If he tells her: "You are permitted to [marry] Shimon," or "You are even permitted to [marry] Shimon," the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps he permitted her only to Shimon, and she is still forbidden to Reuven. By saying "even to Shimon," he meant "to everyone, even to Shimon." [Nevertheless, the divorce is not void, for] perhaps he permitted her to everyone, and by saying "even to Shimon," he meant "to Shimon and also to Reuven." [This is plausible,] for Shimon was mentioned after Reuven in his condition.
Halacha 9
If [a husband] makes a condition, saying; "Today you are not my wife, but tomorrow you will be my wife," the divorce is not effective.27 Although the connection between the couple is severed on the day [of the get, it is renewed afterwards]. For this reason, in the wording of the get, is written the phrase: "from the present day onward."
Halacha 10
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never drink wine for the rest of your life," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed.28
If the condition states "for as long as I live" or "for as long as so and so lives," the divorce is effective, for the relationship between the couple is severed. When that person dies, [the woman] will no longer have any connection with [her previous husband].
Halacha 11
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you do not go to your father's house for 30 days, the divorce is effective. "...That you never go to your father's house," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed.
[Similarly, if a husband] tells [his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never eat meat," or "...that you never drink wine," the divorce is not effective, for [the relationship between them] has not been severed. "...[that you not eat meat or drink wine] for 30 days, the divorce is effective.
Halacha 12
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you never marry so and so," the divorce is not effective.29 To what can this be compared? to his telling her: "This is your get on the condition that you never drink wine," "...that you never go to your father's home," or "[that you not go to your father's home] for the rest of your life."30
If, however, he tells her: "[This is your get] on the condition that you do not marry so and so for fifty years,"31 the divorce is effective; she may not marry the person during the time specified.32 If she marries him, the divorce is nullified retroactively.33
If [the woman] engages in promiscuous sexual relations with the man specified, any child born to her is legitimate, and the divorce remains acceptable. For [the husband's] condition mentioned only marriage.
Halacha 13
[If a husband tells his wife:] "This is your get on the condition that you marry so and so," if she marries him [the divorce is effective], as it would be if other conditions were involved. Nevertheless, our Sages said that she should not marry either the man specified or any other man.
She should not marry the man specified, lest the people say: "They are giving their wives as presents to each other."34 Nor should she marry anyone else, for the get is effective only when the condition is fulfilled.
If she transgresses and marries the man specified, she need not be divorced. If she marries another person before she marries the man specified, the get is nullified, and she must leave her second husband. Any child she bears [the second husband] is illegitimate. He must, however, divorce her with a get.35
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
If he engraved a get on a plate of gold and gave it to her, telling her: "This is [both] your get and [the money due you by virtue of] your ketubah, [the divorce is] acceptable and she is considered to have received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah,38 provided the plate is worth the value of herketubah. If it is not, he should compensate [for the difference].
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when a man] divorces [his wife] conditionally, including a stipulation that causes the divorce to be considered void - e.g., that she never eat meat or drink wine for the rest of her life, or that she be free to marry any man with the exception of a particular individual, or that he mentioned other conditions before the essential portion of the get was written: If the condition was written in the get, and he rubbed it out and gave it to her, the status of the divorce is in doubt.39 If the condition was stated verbally,40he should take the get from her and give it to her again without mentioning a condition, or mention a condition that is acceptable.
Halacha 17
What is implied? [A man] gave a get to his wife and told her, "Behold, you are divorced with this [get] and are free [to marry] any man aside from so and so."41 If he took [the get] from her and gave it to her and said: "Behold you are free [to marry] any man," or "This is your get," the divorce is effective. The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 18
When [a man] gives a get to his wife on the condition that she give him two hundred zuz, and afterwards establishes a second condition in the presence of witnesses that she serve his father for two years, his latter statement did not nullify his original one.42 Instead, it is as if he told her: "Fulfill one of the two conditions." If she desires, she may serve his father, or if she desires, she may give [him the money]. One of the witnesses to the first condition cannot join with one of the witnesses to the second condition [to testify that the getwas given on a conditional basis].43
If, however, [the husband] made a condition that the woman must give him 200 zuz, and afterwards made a condition in the presence of two [witnesses] that she must give him 300 zuz, the condition of 200 has been nullified, and she must give [him] 300 zuz. The same principle applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 19
If [a husband] makes a condition that his wife must perform a specific activity without stating a duration of time, it is considered as if he stated that she should perform this activity for one day. For he did not specify any amount of time.
What is implied? If he told her: "This is your get on condition that you perform work for me," "...on condition that you serve my father," or "...on condition that you nurse my son," if she performs work for him or serves his father for one day or nurses his son for one day during the time when a child [usually] nurses - i.e., within his first 24 months [of life] - the get is effective.44If the son or the father dies before she nurses him or serves him, the get is not effective.45
Halacha 20
If [the husband] tells her: "[This is your get] on condition that you nurse my son..." or "...serve my father for two years," [for the divorce to be effective] she must complete the time specified. If the son or the father dies within this period, or the father says: "I don't want you to serve me," the get is not effective, for the condition has not been fulfilled.46 The same principles apply in all similar situations.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when a husband] tells [his wife]: "[This is your get] on condition that you give me 200 zuz within 30 days." If she gives him [the money] within 30 days with his consent, the divorce is effective. If she gives [it] after 30 days, the divorce is not effective. If she gives it to him against his will, and he refuses to accept it, the divorce is unacceptable until he willingly accepts it.47
Halacha 22
If he tells her, "[This is your get] on condition that you give me 200 zuz," without specifying a time period, and he dies before she gives [him the money], she cannot give [the sum] to his heirs; the condition was that it be given to him. [In this instance, however,] the get is not nullified [by the husband's death], since a definite time period was not specified.50 Therefore, even if the get was lost or ripped before he died, [the woman] should not marry another man until she performs the rite of chalitzah.
Halacha 23
[If the husband tells her:] "This is your get on condition that you give me this particular utensil," or "...this particular garment," and that utensil or garment is lost or stolen, even if she gives him 1000 zuz in compensation for [the desired object],51 the divorce is not effective until she gives him the specified utensil or garment, or until he nullifies the condition.52
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when a woman] is divorced conditionally, and another man consecrates her before the condition is fulfilled. If the condition is fulfilled [afterwards], she is consecrated.53 If, however, the condition is not fulfilled and the get is nullified,54 she does not require a get from the second husband,55 for [in this situation] she cannot be consecrated. If, however, she marries [a second husband], the condition is not fulfilled, and the get is nullified, she must also be divorced by the second [husband], as explained above.56
FOOTNOTES
1.
See Halachah 2 of that chapter, which explains that there are four rules that govern all conditional agreements:
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the action that one desires to make conditional;
d) the stipulation must be something with which it is possible to comply.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there were no condition at all. Note the details and explanations of these rules there.
2.
This is relevant if the couple is childless, and the woman is obligated to fulfill either the rite of yibbum or of chalitzah.
3.
With regard to the first clause, a get can be effective only when the husband granting the divorce is still alive. If he dies, the marriage bonds are already rent by his death. With regard to the latter clause, since the gettakes effect only when the condition is fulfilled, the get itself must be intact at that time. If it is not, there is no medium through which the divorce takes effect (see Gittin74a).
4.
Lest the husband die or the get be destroyed, and thus the divorce be nullified.
5.
The Rambam's ruling is clarified by his statements in Chapter 9, Halachah 5, in which he states that a conditional divorce begins when the get is given and is not concluded until the condition is fulfilled. This conception has aroused objections among the commentators, who maintain that until the condition is fulfilled, the woman is like any other married woman. She cannot be consecrated, and marital relations with her are considered adulterous. Although in hisBeit Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo supports the more stringent views, in his Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 143:2), he appears to follow the Rambam's opinion (Beit Shmuel 143:2).
6.
E.g., her husband made a condition that she give an article to his father, and his father dies.
7.
I.e., the husband uses this expression rather than saying: "If you do such and such, the divorce is effective. If you do not do such and such, the divorce is not effective." The Ramah (Even HaEzer 144:3) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer144:4) mention opinions that do not equate "on the condition that" with "from now onwards."
8.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 143:2) quotes opinions that maintain that even when a condition is stated using the wording "on the condition that," the husband has the right to nullify the get until the condition is fulfilled.
9.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this ruling and declares that the woman should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled. There is, however, one exception: a condition that requires the woman to refrain from performing a particular activity before the divorce takes effect.
10.
I.e., because of the severe consequences this will bring upon her, we do not suspect that she will fail to do what is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of her second marriage.
11.
For entering into privacy with a woman in the presence of witnesses is considered equivalent to actual relations. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 18.)
12.
See Chapter 10, Halachah 19, which explains that when there is a possibility that a man has had marital relations with his divorcee, we assume that he consecrated her again, rather than conducting these relations in a licentious manner. (See also Chapter 9, Halachah 25.)
13.
This is unacceptable, as explained in the following halachah.
14.
See the Beit Shmuel 147:1, which states that in a situation of difficulty in which the husband cannot wait until the get is written, we rely on more lenient views that differ with the Rambam. According to these views, the husband may instruct the scribe and the witnesses to write a get in the usual manner and to give it to the agent and before it is written, instruct the agent to give it to the woman conditionally.
15.
I.e., a condition that is acceptable (Beit Shmuel 147:2).
16.
I.e., the man's name, the woman's name, the date and the sentence: "Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man," as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 17.
17.
I.e., using acceptable wording, as opposed to the wording described in the following halachah.
18.
This ruling is questioned by the commentaries. Gittin 84b states that such aget is pasul, "unacceptable." Unlike the Rambam, for whom this term has an explicit meaning (see Chapter 10, Halachah 20), in the Talmud the interpretation of the term is somewhat ambiguous. In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that since - as mentioned in the previous halachah - the difficulty concerns a point of Torah law, and yet the Talmud did not rule the get to be void, he maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam interprets the ruling as dependent on the principle of bererah, that retroactively, when the condition is fulfilled, it becomes apparent that the get did sever the connection between the husband and the wife. Since our Sages did not determine whether or not the principle of bererahapplies with regard to questions of Torah law, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Other authorities differ and maintain that if the condition was stated properly before the essential portion of the get was written and fulfilled, the get is acceptable. If the condition was written in the get itself, Tosafot, the Ramban and the Ra'avad maintain that theget is acceptable, while Rabbenu Nissim states that such a get is deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic decree.
At the outset, all the authorities maintain that the rules stated by the Rambam should be followed. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer147:2) also quotes the Rambam's ruling that the status of the divorce is in doubt. In a case of hardship, however, the Beit Shmuel147:2 states that the more lenient views can be relied upon.
19.
Needless to say, according to the Rambam, when any of the following conditions is binding, it invalidates the get if it was made or stated before the essential portion of theget was written. The difference between these conditions and those stated in the previous halachah is that those conditions can be fulfilled through a specific activity, and once they are fulfilled the marriage bond is severed entirely. The conditions mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, remain binding throughout the woman's life. Thus, her connection to her husband is never severed entirely.
The authorities which differ with the Rambam in the previous halachah, also differ in this instance, and maintain that if this condition is written in the get itself, the get is acceptable according to Scriptural law, but disqualified by Rabbinic decree. See Beit Shmuel 137:3.
20.
Because of the prohibitions involved, there is no possibility of the woman's establishing a marriage bond with these individuals (seeHilchot Ishut 4:14-15), and therefore, her husband's statements are of no consequence.
21.
Note, however, Chapter 10, Halachah 1. Rabbenu Nissim and other authorities rule more leniently and maintain that such a getis acceptable according to Scriptural law and was deemed unacceptable only by virtue of Rabbinic decree.
22.
In such instances, even though marital relations violate a prohibition, a marriage bond can be established (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).
23.
For ultimately, the minor will attain majority. Rabbenu Chanan'el differs and states that with regard to a minor, the status of the divorce is doubtful. The difference of opinion is dependent on the text of Gittin 85b, of which two versions exist.
24.
In all the cases to follow, the divorce does not totally sever the relationship between the husband and the wife. Nevertheless, our Sages were not certain that the rights retained by the husband were sufficient to render the divorce void (Gittin 85a,Perishah, Even HaEzer 137).
25.
I.e., the husband is a priest, and while married his wife may partake of terumah, although she is the daughter of an Israelite.
26.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an instance where the husband takes the get back from the woman and gives it to her again, making the latter statement. This conception is also reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:1).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 137) differs with the Rambam and maintains that in this instance the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps the intent of his latter statement was to permit her to Reuven and Shimon, but to forbid her to everyone else. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:4) accepts the Tur's ruling. All authorities agree that if the husband says: "You are also permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon," theget is acceptable.
27.
Rabbenu Asher and the Rashba differ and maintain that in such an instance, the divorce is effective. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 137:5) follows the view of Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
28.
There is a factor, the prohibition against drinking wine, that always maintains the connection between them.
29.
The Rashba differs with this ruling, explaining that since the other person may die, this can be compared to an instance where the husband makes a condition that his wife not drink wine during the duration of another person's life. Just as that condition is considered to be having a limit, so too, should this condition be considered to be limited.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in the instance at hand, the woman will never be able to marry the man specified in the condition. As such, the condition is not considered limited. In his Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 143:22), he quotes both opinions and states that the stringencies required by both views should be observed.
30.
I.e., the condition is one that binds a woman to her husband for her entire life.
31.
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum of the Rashbatz that states that the intent is that the marriage will be forbidden for a period longer than the woman is expected to live. Thus, though the husband has in effect prohibited the woman from marrying the other man forever, since this is not explicitly stated, the condition is considered to be limited in scope.
32.
According to the Rambam, it appears that the woman is free to marry another man immediately, for we assume that she will abide by the condition, rather than place herself in a compromising situation. There are, however, other opinions that state that she is not allowed to remarry until the person specified dies. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 143:16) quotes both opinions without appearing to favor either one.
33.
I.e., it is considered as if the original marriage bond had never been severed. Any children born to her between the divorce and its nullification are deemed illegitimate.
34.
This would compromise the entire image of Jewish divorce. (See Rashi, Gittin 84a.)
35.
The requirement for the woman's second husband to divorce her is a Rabbinic decree, instituted lest people see a woman who appears married leave her husband without a get. According to Scriptural law, aget is not necessary (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra'avad and the Tur (Even HaEzer143) suggest that she can have the legitimacy of the children of her second husband restored retroactively by marrying the person specified in the first get after being divorced by her second husband. In this way, the condition will have been kept.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the husband's intent was that the woman should marry the man specified before marrying anyone else. (The commentaries cite a parallel to this ruling inHilchot Mechirah 11:10.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:15) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah follows that of the Ra'avad and the Tur.
36.
Since the husband maintains possession of the paper on which the get is written, the couple's marriage relationship has not been totally severed. Rashi (Gittin 75b) offers a different interpretation of this ruling.
37.
When she receives the get, the paper belongs to her. Afterwards, she willingly gives it back. This follows the principle that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered to be a present (Rashi, Gittin20b).
38.
Gittin 20b explains that the fact that the same article serves two purposes - effecting the divorce and providing remuneration for the woman's marriage contract - does not prevent it from being effective.
39.
Since the get was written in an unacceptable manner, there is reason to maintain that theget can never be acceptable. This applies when the unacceptable condition was written before the essential portion of the get.
The wording used by the Rambam is, however, questionable. The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 9:1) and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on this halachah use the word pasul"unacceptable," rather than "the status of the divorce is in doubt" to describe such aget. Perhaps here, the Rambam uses the term "the status of the divorce is in doubt," because, as cited above from the Rambam's responsa, according to the Rambam, the question in these situations is whether the get is written for the sake of severing the marriage bond. And this is a question of Scriptural law (Rav Kapach).
40.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to a condition stated after the essential portion of the get was written. If such a condition was stated before the essential portion was written, the get is unacceptable, because it was not written with the intent of severing the marriage relationship. See Halachah 4 and notes.
41.
The Sages decreed that unless the get is returned, it not effective, even if the condition was nullified. Since the original giving of such a get has a permanent effect - the woman is forbidden to marry a priest (or to remain married to her husband, if he is a priest), as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 1 - the only way such a condition can be nullified is by returning the get to the husband, and having him give it again without any condition.
The Beit Shmuel 147:6 states that this law applies only with regard to a condition that prevents her from marrying a particular man that was stated after the essential portion of the get was written. When a condition that nullifies the get was written before the essential portion of the get was written, theget is void and cannot be rectified. When a stipulation such as "on the condition that you do not drink wine for the rest of your life" was made after the essential portion of theget was written, there is no need to take theget back from the woman. It is sufficient to nullify the stipulation.
42.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to an instance where the condition was stated in a twofold statement: "If you do such and such, the get is effective, but if you do not do such and such, the get is not effective." In such instances, since the divorce is not effective until the condition is fulfilled, the husband may alter the condition. When, however, a get is given "on condition that... ," the divorce is retroactively effective from the time the get was given. Hence, the condition cannot be changed.
Rashi (Gittin 76a) offers a different interpretation of this passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:10) follows the Rambam's interpretation, while the Ramah follows that of Rashi.
43.
For each of the conditions is considered to be a separate matter.
44.
This ruling reflects an interesting halachic judgment on the Rambam's part. Gittin 75b explains that the ruling cited by the Rambam was authored by Rav Ashi. Although the Gemara poses questions on Rav Ashi's view that are left unresolved, since his position was not refuted, according to the Rambam, the halachah follows his view.
The Tur follows a different view and maintains that the woman must serve her husband's father for the duration of the father's life and nurse the son for the entire two-year period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Tur.
45.
For the condition has not been fulfilled.
46.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and states that since the woman did not prevent the condition from being fulfilled, the get is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) does not accept this view. The Ramah states that the more stringent view should be followed.
47.
There is a difference of opinion among our Sages regarding whether a person who forces a colleague to accept something is considered to have given it to him or not. Although the view that he is considered to have given the object is favored, the Rabbis deemed the divorce unacceptable in consideration of the other view (Gittin 74a, 75a).
More specifically, it appears that the Rambam maintains that according to Scriptural law, the get is effective, and it is disqualified merely by virtue of Rabbinic decree, while Rabbenu Asher and the Rashba maintain that, according to Scriptural law, there is a doubt regarding the issue (Beit Shmuel 143:7).
48.
As reflected in Halachah 23, a husband can nullify a condition that he makes to a get. In this instance, however, he is not nullifying the condition, but rather trying to have it satisfied in a way other than that which he originally intended. This is not acceptable. Originally, he made the condition to annoy the woman, and since she did not suffer this worrying, the divorce is not effective unless he nullifies the condition entirely (Gittin 74b;Maggid Mishneh).
49.
Thus, if the husband dies without children, she is required to perform either the rites ofyibbum or chalitzah.
50.
When a specific time period is mentioned and the condition is not fulfilled in that period, the divorce is nullified. In this instance, however, since a specific time is not mentioned, the Rambam maintains that the divorce is never nullified.
Rav Kapach explains that the Rambam's approach is based on his conception (see Halachah 1 of this chapter, and Chapter 9, Halachot 1 and 5) that when a get is given on a conditional basis, the get takes effect immediately, but it is not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, in this instance, since the condition can never be fulfilled, the divorce is not completed, andchalitzah is necessary if the husband dies childless. Nevertheless, yibbum cannot be performed, for the divorce has already begun.
Other commentaries offer different interpretations of the Rambam's views. TheTur (Even HaEzer 143) rejects the Rambam's ruling and maintains that the woman may also perform the rite of yibbum. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:3) follows the Rambam's view.
51.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and explains that the husband has the option of accepting the money in lieu of the object originally mentioned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:6) mentions both views, it appears to favor that of the Rambam.
52.
I.e., he tells the woman, "This is your get; there are no conditions attached." He does not have to take the get back from the woman.
53.
The Beit Shmuel 146:5 states that this applies when the husband gave the get "on the condition that...," for in such an instance the divorce is effective retroactively from the time the get was given. (With regard to other conditions, see the notes on Halachah 1.)
54.
E.g., the condition was limited to a specific time span, as in Halachah 22, or the condition was that she would not perform a specific act and she did perform it. If, however, the condition involves an act that she is capable of performing, we suspect that she has fulfilled the condition (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Even HaEzer 146:5).
55.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's decision and maintains that since it was possible for the woman to have fulfilled the condition, we suspect that perhaps she did in fact fulfill it. Therefore, she is forbidden to remain married to her first husband. It is the Rambam's view that is accepted by theShulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4).
56.
Halachah 13.
Gerushin - Chapter Nine
Halacha 1
[When a man] divorces his wife and [asserts that the divorce] will not take effect until a specific time passes, the divorce takes effect when that time arrives. Thus, this resembles [a get given on] a conditional basis, and yet it is not a conditional get.
It resembles [a get given on] a conditional basis because the divorce takes effect when the specified time arrives [as in the case of a conditional get, which is completed when the condition is fulfilled]. Nevertheless, it is not considered a conditional get because a person who divorces [his wife] conditionally has already performed the divorce, and in this instance, the man has not divorced her until the time arrives.
For this reason, a person who gives a conditional get must restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], while this person does not have to restate his words. Nor must he comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained.1.
Halacha 2
What is implied? [When a husband] tells his wife: "This is your get, but the divorce does not take effect until 30 days pass," she is not divorced until after the passage of 30 days. If her husband dies, or the get is lost or consumed by fire in the interim, she is not divorced.2
Halacha 3
[When the woman] went and placed [the get] in [a place] at the side of the public domain,3 and after 30 days passed it was stolen or lost, the divorce is effective. Since the get existed on the day when it took effect, and it was set aside in a designated place that is not public domain [it can serve as the medium for the divorce].4 [The governing principle is that the area at] the sides of the public domain is not the same as the public domain itself.5
Halacha 4
Similarly, if the husband makes the divorce dependent on an action,6 the same rules that govern a get that takes effect after a specific time apply. For example, [a husband] said to [his] wife: "This is your get, but the divorce does not take effect until you give me 200 zuz." After [the woman] gives [the money], the divorce takes effect.7
In this instance [as well], there is no need to restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], nor to comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained. For this person has not divorced [his wife] conditionally - he has not yet divorced her at all. Instead, he made the divorce dependent on a specific action, and after [that action is completed], the divorce will take effect.
Halacha 5
What is the difference between a conditional divorce and a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time, or a divorce dependent on an action? With regard to a conditional divorce, the divorce is a fact; it is, however, not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, the divorce takes effect as long as the get exists, even if it is not in the woman's possession. When the condition is fulfilled, there is no need for [the woman] to pick up [the get] or take possession, for it was given to her for the purpose of divorce. If she married before the condition was fulfilled, she need not leave [her second husband], as explained.8
With regard to a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time or a divorce dependent on an action, by contrast, she was not given the get for the [immediate] purpose of divorce. Instead, it is considered to be an entrusted object until the specified time arrives or she performs the action. Therefore, it is necessary that the get be in her possession at that time, that she take [possession of it], or that it be in a place that she designated for it even though it is not in her domain, as we have explained.9 Only then, is she divorced by virtue [of this get].
If she marries before the specified time arrives, or before she performs the action on which the divorce is dependent, she must leave her second husband,10 and any child [born of their union] is considered illegitimate. For she is a married woman, and the divorce is not [yet] effective.
Halacha 6
When [a man] gives his wife a get and tells her: "If you do not give me 200zuz, this get is not effective," or "...you are not divorced," he is not considered to have performed a divorce at all.11 For the get was not given on a conditional basis, nor was it made dependent on an action. The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.
Halacha 7
When a person would like to give a conditional divorce, with the condition being that the divorce not take effect until a particular time, he should express the concept in a conditional statement, making the condition dependent on his departure or return at a specific time.12
What is implied? He tells her: "If I do not return between the present time and 30 days, this get is effective. If I do return within 30 days, this get is not effective." He [then] gives her the get. Alternatively, he should tell her: "This is your get on condition that I do not return to this country within 30 days." The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.
Halacha 8
When a person divorces [his wife] on the condition that he not return to this country within 30 days, and he set out to return within 30 days, but became ill or was prevented [from returning by a flooding] river and did not return until after 30 days, the get is effective. Even if he protests, "I am being held back by forces beyond my control" [the get is effective].13
[The rationale is that the claim,] "I was prevented by forces beyond my control," is not accepted with regard to gittin,14 even if the husband makes it evident that he does not desire that the divorce take effect.
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when a man gives a] divorce on the condition15 that it become effective if 30 days pass without [his seeing his wife's] face. If he repeatedly came [and appeared before her], but never entered into privacy with her, and then 30 days [passed without his seeing her], the get is effective.16 Although he came [and appeared before her] within 30 days [after the get was given], since he did not enter into privacy with her,17 [once the condition was fulfilled,] the get is effective.
When does the above apply? When he made the condition and said: "I accept her word with regard to [whether or] not I appeased her."18If, however, he did not accept her word, we suspect that perhaps he placated her when he came and visited her, she was willing to forego [her desire to be with him], and he nullified the get.19 For this reason, the get is unacceptable [even] after 30 days [pass without the husband seeing her].20
Similarly, when a man tells a woman: "This is your get and [it becomes effective] after twelve months pass," if he lives in the same city as she does, we suspect that he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word that I did not appease her."
Halacha 10
A similar [principle applies with regard to] all conditions that are dependent on her will, and the get would be nullified if she was willing to forego these conditions in favor of her husband. We suspect that perhaps he appeased her,21 unless he said: "I accept her word...."
When does the above apply? When the woman is divorced after nisu'in, for he is familiar with her.22 When, however, [a husband] divorces [his wife] after [merely] consecrating her, we do not suspect that he appeased her.
Halacha 11
[When a man gives his wife a get and tells her:] "This is your get [and it is effective] from the present time onward if I do not return within twelve months," we do not suspect that perhaps he returned in secrecy, for people do not generally come in secrecy. [Therefore,] if the time period he specified passes without his coming, the divorce is effective.23
If he dies within the twelve months, although the divorce [will become] effective, for there is no way that he can come, if she would have been obligated to perform the rite of yibbum, she should not marry until the twelve months pass and the condition is fulfilled.24
Halacha 12
When a healthy person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the get take effect if he dies, and when a sick person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the get take effect if he dies from the illness afflicting him,25 their statements are of no consequence.26 The expression "if I die" implies [that it takes effect] after his death. [Alternatively,] the intent is that [it take effect] retroactively [if he dies]. [Because of the doubt involved,] if [a man] uses the expression "If I die...," it is considered as if he said "after my death." [The getis therefore void, because] there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.27
Halacha 13
If, [however, the husband] tells her: "This is your get. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time," or "...If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present day,"28 the get is valid. When he dies, [his wife] is divorced.
Halacha 14
[If a husband] says: "This is your get. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time - or from the present day - after my death," when [the husband] dies, the status of his wife's divorce is in doubt.29 [We suspect that] perhaps, after saying "from the present time," he changed his mind and [did not desire that the get become effective] from the present time, and instead take effect after his death. And there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.
Halacha 15
[If a husband] says: "This is your get. [It becomes effective] when the sun emerges from its shield," it is not effective if he dies that night.30 [If he gave the get] on the condition that the sun shine and he dies that night, the get is effective, for when the sun shines [on the following day], the condition that he established becomes fulfilled.31
If [the husband gives a get and] establishes a condition: "If the sun shines, theget is effective. But if it does not shine, it is not effective," [the get] is not effective if he dies at night. For the condition was not fulfilled until after he died,32 and there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.
Halacha 16
When a person who is mortally ill has a get written for his wife and divorces her and then recovers, he cannot retract the divorce. A divorce [performed by a person in such a state] is not [governed by] the same laws as a present he gives.33 [The rationale for this distinction is] that if he were given the prerogative of retracting, the divorce would appear to take effect after death, in the same way that a present he gives is not legally transferred until after death.34
Halacha 17
[If a husband says:] "This is your get. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake, devoured by a lion or dies because of other similar causes, the divorce is not effective.35
Halacha 18
[If, by contrast,] he tells her: "...if I do not arise from this sickness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake or devoured by a lion, the status of the divorce is in doubt.36
[The following rules apply when a husband tells his wife:] "Here is your get. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and then rises [from his sickbed], walks in the marketplace,37 and afterwards falls ill and dies. We make an assessment. If he died from the first illness, the divorce is effective. If not, it is not effective. If he progresses from one illness to another illness,38 and does not arise [and walk] in the marketplace, the divorce is effective. There is no need to make an assessment.
Halacha 19
With regard to all the conditions [mentioned above], during the days between the giving of the get and his death [with its consequent] fulfillment of the condition, she is considered to be a divorced woman with regard to all matters,39 provided he does not enter into privacy with her, as explained.40
Halacha 20
[The following rules apply when] a sick person desires to divorce his wife conditionally, so that if he dies she will not be obligated to perform the rite ofyibbum, but if he recovers, the divorce will not be effective; he does not desire that the get take effect [retroactively] from the time he gives it, lest the matter be overly disturbing for him.
He should write the following in the get after writing the essential portion; alternatively, he should make these statements when he gives [his wife] theget: "If I do not die, this get will not be effective. If I die, this get will be effective. If I do not die, this get will not be effective." In this manner, the conditional factor is repeated. The positive factor is stated before the negative factor,41 and the person's opening remarks do not speak of misfortune.
[If a get is given with such a condition,] the divorce will take effect when [the husband] dies,42 provided that the get reaches the woman before his death.
Halacha 21
When a husband tells a colleague:43 "Acquire this get on behalf of my wife, so that she will not be required to fulfill the rite of yibbum," and gives him the get, but the husband dies before the get reaches [the woman], the status of the divorce is in doubt. [Although there are times when a woman would be willing to marry the yavam,] it is to the advantage of most women not to be required to fulfill the rite of yibbum. Therefore, even though the get did not reach the woman, since another person acquired it on her behalf, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Halacha 22
When [a man] tells witnesses: "Write a get for my wife after twelve months," or "Write a get for my wife and give it to her after twelve months," they should write [the get] and give it to her after the time he specified. If they write it within the time he specified,44 it is void, even if they do not give it to the woman until afterwards.
If they write it after the time he specified, but [the husband] dies before they give it to her, it is void. If it is not known whether he died before the get was given, or the get was given before he died, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Halacha 23
[If a husband] instructs [agents]: "Write a get for my wife and give it to her after the Sabbatical cycle," they must write it within the first year after the conclusion of the Sabbatical cycle.45 If he told them: "...after a year," they must write it during the first month of the coming year.
If he told them: "...after a month," they must write it during the first week of the coming month. If he told them: "...after the Sabbath," they must write it before the end of Tuesday. If he told them: "...before the Sabbath," they must write it between Wednesday and the end of Friday.
Halacha 24
If they delayed and did not write and give the get at the time he specified - e.g., he told them "after a month," and they wrote the get and gave it to her after two weeks had passed in the second month, the get is unacceptable.46
Halacha 25
If [the husband] entered into privacy with [his wife] after he told [agents] to write [a get], sign it and give it to her, they should not write it. One can make an [obvious] inference. If a get that he gave her is disqualified47 when he enters into privacy with her, lest they have engaged in marital relations, how much more so should a get that was not yet written [be left unwritten]. If [the agents] wrote the get and gave it to her after he entered into privacy with her, the get is void.48
Halacha 26
[If a man] tells ten people: "Write a get for my wife," one of them should write it on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, write it," one should write it in the presence of all of them.
[If he tells them:] "Bring this get to my wife," one of them should bring it to her on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, bring this get to my wife," one should bring it [to her] in the presence of all of them.49
Halacha 27
[If a man] tells ten people: "Write a get, sign it and give it to my wife," one of them should write it, two should sign it, and one should give it to her. It is acceptable even if one person writes it, he serves as one of the two witnesses who signs it, and he serves as the agent who gives it to her.50
If [the husband] tells them: "All of you sign it," they must all sign it. If the husband counted the people - whether he counted all of them or merely some of them51 - and told them to sign it, it is considered as if he told all of them to sign it. The two who sign it at the outset act as witnesses,52 while the others [should sign it to complete] the stipulation [the husband] made.
Accordingly, if the remaining witnesses were unacceptable, or one signed it on the day the get was written and the others on subsequent days53 - even several days after [the get was written],54 the get is acceptable.55
If one of them died before signing it, the get is void.56If one of the first witnesses who signed it was unacceptable, the get is unacceptable, lest it be said that an unacceptable witness may sign other legal documents when many witnesses sign.57The only reason [our Sages] accepted [such signatures] with regard to a get signed by many witnesses is that the witnesses who observe the transfer are of fundamental importance.58
Halacha 28
Our Sages established the [following] rules with regard to a person who tells many people to write, sign, or bring a get for his wife.59 With regard to writing, he should tell them: "Any one of you may write a get for my wife." Similarly, with regard to bringing [the get], [he should say]: "Any one of you may bring...." With regard to signing, he should tell them: "Any pair of you should sign this get and give it to my wife."
Halacha 29
Why did our Sages state that the witnesses to a get should sign only in each other's presence?60 [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest a person tell many others: "All of you sign [as witnesses]." If it were possible for witnesses to sign outside the presence of the other witnesses, two witnesses might sign the get, and the woman might take it and think that it does not require any more witnesses, [when in fact] the condition that [the husband made] was not fulfilled.
Halacha 30
If [a man] tells three people, including a father and a son, "Two of you should write a get for my wife, sign it and give it to her," the get is acceptable whether the son signs with the other person or the father signs with the other person.61[The son may serve in this capacity] because a person may appoint a son as an agent instead of his father.
Halacha 31
When [a man] tells two [colleagues]: "Write [a get], sign it and give it to so and so to bring to my wife," or "...give it to [my] agent to bring to her," one of them should write it, and they should both sign it and give it to the agent. If they bring it to the woman themselves, the divorce is not effective, for they were not appointed as agents to effect the divorce.
What should they do [if in error they gave it to the woman]? They should take it back from her and give it to the agent, who should in turn give it back to the woman in their presence or in the presence of other [witnesses].
My teachers issued a ruling with regard to such a get that d oes not appear to be appropriate, because of a flaw that existed in the versions [of the Talmud] that they possessed.62
Halacha 32
[Our Sages ruled that] the status of a divorce is in doubt [in the following situation: A husband] tells a scribe: "Write me a get for my wife." [The scribe] wrote it and gave it to the husband, without this being observed by witnesses.63 The husband took it, gave it to an agent,64 and told him: "Give this get to my wife in the presence of witnesses." The agent [carried out the instructions] and gave it to [the woman] in the presence of witnesses.
[The rationale is] that since he is only a single witness, an agent's statements would not be accepted [as grounds] to permit a woman who was [previously] forbidden to marry, except for the fact [that his statements are supported by] the written statements of the witnesses who signed the get. [For the witnesses' statements] are considered as if they were testimony given in court until [the husband] lodges a protest, as we have explained.65 If there are two witnesses who observed the husband giving the get to the agent and instructing him to use it for the divorce, the divorce is binding.66
Halacha 33
[When a husband] tells an agent: "Give this get to my wife in this and this place," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to her in another place.67"...She is in this and this place," and the agent gave it to her in another place, [the get] is binding; he is merely pointing out the place.
Similarly, if he tells [the agent]: "Do not give it to her [anywhere] except in the house," and he gives it to her in the loft; "Do not give it to her except with your right hand," and he gives it to her with his left; "Give it to her on this and this day," and he gives it to her before that date; 68 the divorce is not effective. "Do not give it to her except on this and this day," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to the woman before or afterwards, for he indicated that he wanted theget to be given on that date. Similar rulings apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 34
Similarly, when a woman tells her agent: "Receive my get for me in this and this place," and he receives it for her in another place, the divorce is not effective. [When she tells him:] "Bring me my get in this and this place," theget is acceptable if he brings it to her in another place.69
Halacha 35
When [a man] tells an agent: "Bring this get to my wife," the agent may send the get with another person if he becomes ill or is otherwise prevented [from bringing it to her] by forces beyond his control.70 [This applies] regardless of whether he told him: "Bring it [to her]," or "You bring it [to her]."
If, however, [the husband] told [the agent]: "Take the following article from her and give her this get," the agent should not send the get via another individual.71 If [the agent] did send [the get] via another individual, and the woman came out to greet the agent and she gave him the article, and afterwards he gave her the get, the divorce is binding.72
Halacha 36
If the agent - i.e., [either] the first [or the second] agent - gave the woman theget first and then she gave him the article, the divorce is not effective. [The rationale is] that [the agent] violated the husband's instructions with regard to a matter which, in general, would cause people to object.73 For the husband told him: "Take the article first and then give her t he get," and he gave [theget] first and then took [the article].
Halacha 37
[If the husband] told the agent: "Give her the get and take this and this article from her," [the agent] should not send the get via another person, for [the principal] would not desire that his article be entrusted to a person [other than the one he appointed].
If, however, the agent sent it with another person, the divorce is binding. [This applies] regardless of whether she gave the article before [receiving the get] or afterwards.74
Halacha 38
[If the husband] gives an agent a get and tells him: "No one other than you should give it to her," the divorce is not effective, if the agent gives [the get] to another person who gives it to the woman.
Similarly, [if the husband] told the agent: "Do not give it to her yourself. Give it to so and so, and he will give it to her," the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives it to the woman. For he was not appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.
Halacha 39
[A husband] gave [an agent] a get and told him: "Bring this get to my wife."
The agent told him: "I do not know who she is."
The husband replied: "Give it to so and so. He knows who she is."
The [first] agent has not been appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.75 All he can do is give the get to the person w hom the husband designated. That person is the agent appointed to effect the divorce. He must bring [the get to the woman] or send it via another agent if he becomes ill or is prevented from doing so by forces beyond his control.
Halacha 40
When [a husband] gives an agent a get and tells him: "Do not give this get to my wife until after 30 days," [the agent] may send it to her via a second agent [whom he appoints] within the 30 days, if he becomes ill or is prevented from giving it to her by forces beyond his control.
[The rationale is that] even though at the time [he appoints the second agent] he is not charged with effecting the divorce, since he will function in that capacity after 30 days pass, he has the authority to appoint a second agent within the 30 days.76
Halacha 41
When does the above apply? When the husband was not in the same city as his wife, or he was divorcing her after consecration,77[but before the marriage bond has been consummated].
If, however, the marriage bond has been consummated, we suspect that perhaps the husband appeased her. Therefore, the agent should not appoint another agent within the 30 days unless the husband said: "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her." After 30 days pass, [the agent] should give her the get. However, we suspect [that perhaps it was nullified], as explained,78 unless [the husband] said, "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her."
FOOTNOTES
1.
See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 1.
2.
If the husband dies she is not divorced, because a divorce must take effect before death. If the get is destroyed, she is not divorced because it is the get that serves as the medium of divorce, and at the time when the get must take effect, it no longer exists.
3.
The public domain was a marketplace with pillars on either side. At the side of the pillars, there was space that though ownerless, could be used to acquire property, because it was not common for people to walk in that space. (See Hilchot Gezelah Va'Avedah 17:9.)
4.
The Maggid Mishneh, the Kessef Mishnehand others contrast the Rambam's ruling here, that the divorce is not retroactively effective from the time the husband gave theget, to his ruling in Hilchot Mechirah 2:9. That source states that a sale can be effective when made with the stipulation that it take effect after 30 days, only when the stipulation is that it take effect retroactively. The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the two instances, explaining that a sale requires an act of contract to effect a transfer, and that act took place when the sale was originally made, not 30 days afterwards. In contrast, with regard to a get, the fundamental aspect of the divorce is effected by the writing of the get.
5.
Had the get been placed by the woman in the public domain itself, it would not be effective even if it existed when the time specified by the husband arrived. Since it left the woman's domain entirely, the giving of the get originally performed by the husband is no longer considered significant. And, as stated at the beginning of these laws, one of the requirements of a divorce is that the getbe given to the woman by her husband.
6.
I.e., in this instance as well, there is a resemblance to the laws of a conditional divorce. Nevertheless, since different wording is used, the laws vary.
7.
Moreover, the action specified by the husband may be something that does not require anything to be done by his wife. For example, he may tell her that the divorce will take effect after the first rainfall (Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 3:3).
8.
Chapter 8, Halachah 1. See the notes on that halachah.
9.
Halachah 3. If the get is not in the woman's possession at this time, the divorce is not effective according to the Rambam. Nevertheless, other authorities have a different conception of these laws, and according to them, the status of the divorce would be doubtful (Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 146:3).
10.
For their relations are considered adulterous.
11.
For he did not preface his statements by saying: "This is your get," or "You are divorced...." Hence, he is not considered to have given the get for the sake of divorce. Although such an intent could be deduced from his words, since his statements were not explicit, they are of no consequence. Indeed, making such a statement is less effective than not saying anything at all (Maggid Mishneh; Kiryat Melech Rav).
12.
I.e., he desires that the get not take effect until a specific time, but does not want the restrictions mentioned in the previous halachah to apply. This is not merely a theoretical situation. Such gittin were given frequently in previous generations when a man undertook an overseas journey and wished to spare his wife from having to remain unmarried if he was killed, kidnapped by pirates or in other ways prevented from returning against his will.
13.
Gittin 30a cites an example of a man who divorced his wife on condition that he not return within 30 days. A river washed away the bridge leading to his city. Although he stood on the river banks and called to his townsmen: "See, I have returned," our Sages ruled that he is not considered to have returned, and they considered the divorce binding.
14.
According to Scriptural law, a person who is prevented from fulfilling a condition by forces beyond his control is not considered as having failed to fulfill it. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the laws of divorce are an exception to this principle, because modest women might presume that their husbands were prevented from fulfilling their condition by forces beyond their control and never remarry (Ketubot 2b).
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinion ofTosafot (Ketubot 2b) and others, who state that this principle applies only with regard to events beyond mortal control that one could possibly foresee - e.g., illness or flood. It does not apply with regard to events beyond a person's control that are totally unlikely - e.g., earthquakes. The Maggid Mishnehcites statements by the Rambam in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 19, which indicate that he would also accept this restriction.
The Maggid Mishneh's premise is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer144:1). It appears that the determination of what is an event beyond a person's control that is totally unlikely is dependent on the sociological conditions of the age. For example, the Ramah rules that being held as a captive is not a totally unlikely occurrence.
15.
As will be explained, this law applies when the husband stated "on condition that..." when giving the get.
16.
Since ultimately the condition was fulfilled.
17.
If he entered into privacy with her, the getwould be nullified. See Chapter 3, Halachah 5, Chapter 8, Halachah 2.
18.
In such an instance, if the woman were to say that she never agreed to her husband's spending more than 30 days away from her, the get would be effective after the condition is fulfilled.
19.
The husband gave his wife the get because he was going away on a journey and knew that she would not desire to be alone. If he was able to appease her and she was willing to remain alone for 30 days, he is able to nullify the get. Usually, once a get is given "on condition that...," it cannot be nullified once it has been given. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the condition was made for the sake of the woman, if she is willing to forego seeing her husband, the husband may nullify the get (Maggid Mishneh).
20.
I.e., according to Scriptural law, since the condition was fulfilled, and there is no evidence that the couple resolved their differences, the get is binding. Our Sages, nevertheless, disqualified the get for the reasons stated above.
21.
Hence, the divorce is unacceptable.
22.
And we assume that because of their familiarity, he knows how to appease her, and she is more willing to accept his overtures.
23.
The Rambam's decision is based on his interpretation of Gittin 76b. The Ra'avad interprets that passage more stringently and requires the husband to have accepted his wife's statements as to whether or not he came as binding. Otherwise, we suspect that he came in secrecy. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:7) follows the Rambam's view, but states that a priori, it is customary to include the condition mentioned by the Ra'avad.
24.
If she desires to marry within the twelve months, she must undergo the rite ofchalitzah first.
25.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:8) quotes the Rashba, who states that even if a sick person does not specify that he die from the illness afflicting him, we assume that this is his intent.
26.
I.e., the advantage of such a get would be to free his wife of the obligation of yibbum orchalitzah. Similarly, the subsequent halachot refer to gittin given for this purpose.
27.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling. He maintains that the date of the getindicates that the husband desires that theget take effect retroactively. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:1) quotes the Rambam's view, but mentions a minority opinion that takes the Ra'avad's view into consideration.
28.
The Hagahot Maimoniot quote Rabbenu Tam as stating that it is preferable for the person to say: "from the present time," rather than "from the present day," lest he die before the conclusion of the day. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:2) quotes this suggestion.
29.
Therefore, if childless, she must perform the rite of chalitzah before marrying, and may not perform the rite of yibbum. As stated inHilchot Ishut 18:25, such a woman is not entitled to receive support from her husband's estate after his death.
30.
For the get does not become effective until the morning. Since he died beforehand, a getcannot be effective after death.
31.
For a get given "on the condition that" becomes effective retroactively from the time it was originally given, once the condition is fulfilled.
32.
A get given according to the rules of conditional agreements is not effective until the condition is fulfilled.
33.
As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah8:14, when a person who is mortally ill gives away all of his property as a present and then recovers, the present is automatically retracted, for we assume that his intent was solely to distribute his property after his death.
34.
Thus, the two laws are in direct contradiction. A present given by a dying man does not take effect until after he dies, and a divorce that he grants cannot take effect after he dies.
35.
For the condition that he stated was not fulfilled (Gittin 73a).
36.
On the one hand, he did not arise from his sickbed. On the other hand, there is reason to assume that his intent was that he is giving the get on the condition that he die from the illness afflicting him, and this was not the case (Gittin 73a).
37.
This applies even if he walks in the marketplace without any support. Since he did not regain his health entirely, it is necessary to determine whether or not he died from the first illness. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:26.
38.
Note the Beit Shmuel 145:14, who states that, according to the Rambam, for the divorce to be effective the man must still be afflicted with the first illness when he dies. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:27.
39.
I.e., he has none of the privileges of a husband - e.g., he is not entitled to her earnings, he may not nullify her vows, and if he is a priest, he may not become impure because of her in the event of her death. With regard to paying for the woman's support, most authorities maintain that the husband is liable. There is no explicit statement from the Rambam regarding this issue.
40.
In such an instance, we suspect that the couple may have engaged in marital relations, and that the husband nullified theget beforehand.
41.
I.e., the requirement is not that the positive factor be stated first, but that it be stated before the negative factor. This is accomplished by restating the condition that would negate the get.
42.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that from his previous decisions, it appears that unless the man says that the get will take effect retroactively me'achshav, "from this time onward," the get is not effective, because it does not take effect until after the man's death. Apparently, the Rambam maintains that the restatement of the condition resolves that difficulty, but this concept is not accepted by many other authorities. When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 145:5) quotes the Rambam's wording, but adds the word me'achshav.
43.
I.e., the colleague was not appointed by the wife to serve as an agent to receive the get. The husband appointed him as her agent, because he felt that she would not desire to marry her yavam. According to Torah law, one may perform an action on a person's behalf without his knowledge if it is to his advantage - e.g., one may take possession of an ownerless object on behalf of a colleague without asking him. Hence, it is possible to assume that the agent can act on behalf of the woman without her knowledge (Yevamot 118b).
44.
Because by writing it within this time, they deviated from the instructions with which they were charged (Gittin 76b).
45.
I.e., although the wording of the Hebrew original could possibly be interpreted otherwise, the commentaries agree that the Rambam's intent is that the get may be written immediately after the time specified and should not be written after a prolonged period has elapsed from that time.
46.
The get is unacceptable because the husband's words also imply a restriction, that the get should be written directly afterwards and not after a prolonged period. Indeed, for this reason, Rabbenu Nissim [and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer144:6)] rule that in such a situation, the status of the divorce is in doubt. In defense of the Rambam's ruling, the commentaries explain that even though the husband's intent may have been that the get be given immediately, since the wording he used could be interpreted to mean after a prolonged period, the get is acceptable according to Scriptural law.
47.
The Rambam is referring to his statements in Chapter 8, Halachah 2. There, however, he uses the expression, "the status of theget is in doubt."
48.
The commentaries question the Rambam's decision, explaining that although there is a possibility that the couple engaged in marital relations and the husband consecrated her at that time (see Chapter 10, Halachah 18), it is also possible that this did not take place. Indeed, in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, with reference to a get given by a husband after he entered into privacy with his wife, the Rambam rules that after the fact, the get is acceptable.
[It is possible to differentiate between the two instances, because in that halachah, the husband himself gave the woman the get. This is a greater indication that he did not nullify it (Maggid Mishneh). Even after that explanation, however, the Rambam's ruling in this halachah raises questions.]
When referring to this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:7) accepts the ruling that at the outset, the witnesses should not have such a get written, but follows the ruling of the Ramban and the Rashba, who maintain that if they had theget written and gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
49.
This is the ruling according to Scriptural law. See, however, Halachah 28.
50.
There are many authorities who object to this ruling, maintaining that the scribe cannot sign as a witness to the get. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo states that even the Rambam agrees that at the outset, a scribe should not sign as a witness. After the fact, however, the Rambam maintains that his signature does not disqualify the get. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer130:18), Rav Yosef Karo writes: "One should be careful not to have the scribe sign as a witness, because there are authorities who disqualify this."
51.
I.e., speaking to the people, he said: "One, two, three, four, write a get..." (Chelkat Mechokek 120:18).
52.
According to the Rambam, it appears that not only must the signatures of the acceptable witnesses be first chronologically, but they must also appear first on the get. Other authorities do not make this requirement and maintain that it is only chronological precedence that is significant (Beit Shmuel 120:14).
53.
The two witnesses whose signatures are required must sign the get on the day that it was written (Chapter 1, Halachah 25).
54.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:9) states that they may sign the get to fulfill the condition even after it was given to the woman. The Ramah adds that this may be done even after she has remarried.
55.
Tosafot and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities differ and maintain that for the getto be valid, all the witnesses must be acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:10) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. The Ramah follows Tosafot's ruling.
56.
Because the instructions that the husband gave concerning the get were not fulfilled.
57.
See Hilchot Edut 5:6-7, which states that if persons who are unacceptable as witnesses signed a legal document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is disqualified, even if two acceptable witnesses signed it first. If, however, the persons who were unacceptable did not sign the document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is acceptable, even if the signature of the unacceptable person appears first.
58.
As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15. With regard to other legal documents, the witnesses who sign the contract are of paramount importance, and they must all therefore be acceptable. The witnesses who observe its transfer are less significant. But with regard to gittin, it is the witnesses who observe the transfer who are of primary importance. Therefore, if the initial two signatures to the get are acceptable, we are not concerned with those who sign subsequently (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Edut).
59.
These rules were instituted lest the the husband tell a group of people that they all should write, sign or bring a get, and they not appreciate that they were all charged with this responsibility. Lest some of them fail to discharge this responsibility and thus cause the get to be void, our Sages required that whenever many people are instructed to be involved in a get, they all must take full participatory roles.
60.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 24, based on Gittin10b. If the witnesses do not sign in each other's presence, the get is unacceptable (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 130:13).
61.
The father and the son may not both sign as witnesses, because witnesses may not be related to each other.
62.
The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Gittin 63b. Significantly, the standard published texts of the Talmud available to us follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:36) follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's conception and rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt. (See the notes of the Beit Shmuel141:99, which explain the Rambam's interpretation.)
63.
And thus the get is not signed by witnesses.
64.
According to the Rambam (Chapter 6, Halachah 4), the appointment of such an agent need not be observed by witnesses.
65.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 24. Note the question of the Beit Shmuel 141:17, who asks why the Rambam distinguishes between this instance and an agent charged with consecrating a woman, whose word is accepted, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 3:15. The Beit Shmuel explains that the fact that the get is not signed detracts from the agent's credibility. For although a get is acceptable when it has not been signed, this is not desirable. Hence, we are more suspicious of the possibility of forgery.
66.
As long as there are witnesses who observe the transfer of the get, the agent's actions are considered to be equivalent to those of the husband himself. Hence, just as a getgiven by the husband is acceptable after the fact if its transfer was observed by witnesses, even if the get was not signed, this same ruling applies when his agent gives the get.
67.
For the wording the husband used implies that he is stipulating that the get must be given in that place.
68.
From the contrast with the following clause, the Beit Shmuel 141:63 and others rule that, in this instance, the get is binding if it is given after that date. Note, however, the Mishneh LaMelech who differs and rules that the divorce is disqualified by the Sages.
69.
By accepting the get from the agent in the place she receives it, the woman shows that she is not particular about where she receives it (Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 6, Halachah 4). The Rambam's ruling indicates a slight textual difference from the popular version of Gittin 6:3, the source for this halachah. There is, however, no difference in principle between them.
70.
If, however, the agent is not prevented from discharging his agency, he should not charge another person with that responsibility. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 4 and notes.)
71.
For it is likely that the principal would not desire that anyone other than the person he designated be given his article to guard. Rashi (Gittin 29a) offers a different interpretation. (See Beit Shmuel 141:65.)
72.
Since the second agent did not deviate from the husband's instructions, the get is acceptable, despite the fact that a person other than the one appointed by the husband gave the get to the woman.
Rabbenu Asher rules that even if the second agent takes the article before giving the woman the get, the divorce is not effective. Although Rabbenu Asher's ruling is also mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:51) appears to follow the Rambam's decision.
73.
I.e., the husband was in effect saying, "Make sure you get the article before you give her the get." Since the agent did not fulfill these instructions, the divorce is not valid. See the Beit Shmuel 141:66, who quotes opinions that state that if the husband's wording does not indicate that he definitely wants the agent to secure possession of the article before giving theget, the divorce is binding.
74.
For in this instance, there is no obvious advantage to the principal in having the agent give the get first.
As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Ramban differs and maintains that for the divorce to be binding the woman must give the agent the article first.
75.
According to the Rambam, if the first agent gives the woman the get, the divorce is not effective. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 31, other opinions differ and maintain that in this instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
76.
Needless to say, the second agent should not give the woman the get until the original 30 days have passed.
Rav Meir HaLevi states that we suspect that the first agent will not convey these instructions clearly to the second agent. Therefore, the first agent should entrust theget to the court, which will appoint a second agent after the 30 days have passed. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer141:37) mentions this view, it appears that the Rambam's view is favored.
77.
See Halachot 10 and 11.
78.
See Halachah 9.
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Shabbat, Shevat 27, 5776 · 06 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Tuesday Sh'vat 27 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 120-134.
Tanya: Likewise in the (p. 107)...duty of charity. (p. 107).
My father writes in one of his maamarim: Early chassidim resolved in their souls to refrain from anything that is permissible (by Torah law) but for which they felt a desire and urge. This breaks the passion.
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Shabbat, Shevat 27, 5776 · 06 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Tuesday Sh'vat 27 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 120-134.
Tanya: Likewise in the (p. 107)...duty of charity. (p. 107).
My father writes in one of his maamarim: Early chassidim resolved in their souls to refrain from anything that is permissible (by Torah law) but for which they felt a desire and urge. This breaks the passion.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Friday, February 5, 2016 - Today is: Friday, Shvat 26, 5776 · February 5, 2016 - Candle Lighting
• Passing of the Taz (1667)
Shevat 26 is the yahrtzeit (anniversary of the passing) of Rabbi Dovid ben Shmuel Halevi(1586-1667), a primary Halachic authority, known as Taz after his work Turei Zahav ("Rows of Gold") -- a commentary on Rabbi Yosef Caro's Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law).
Links: Rabbi David Halevi (Taz)
Daily Quote:
"Judges and officers you shall place at all your city-gates..." (Deuteronomy 16:18). The human body is a city with seven gates--seven portals to the outside world: the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and the mouth. Here, too, it is incumbent upon us to place internal "judges" to discriminate and regulate what should be admitted and what should be kept out, and "officers" to enforce the judges' decisions...[Rabbi Shabtai HaCohen ("Shach"), 1622-1663]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Mishpatim, 6th Portion Exodus 23:20-23:25 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 23
20Behold, I am sending an angel before you to guard you on the way and to bring you to the place that I have prepared. כהִנֵּ֨ה אָֽנֹכִ֜י שֹׁלֵ֤חַ מַלְאָךְ֙ לְפָנֶ֔יךָ לִשְׁמָרְךָ֖ בַּדָּ֑רֶךְ וְלַֽהֲבִ֣יאֲךָ֔ אֶל־הַמָּק֖וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר הֲכִנֹֽתִי:
Behold, I am sending an angel before you: Here they were informed that they were destined to sin, and the Shechinah would say to them, “for I will not ascend in your midst” (Exod. 33: 3). -[From Exod. Rabbah 32:3] הנה אנכי שולח מלאך: כאן נתבשרו שעתידין לחטוא, ושכינה אומרת להם (שמות לג ג) כי לא אעלה בקרבך:
that I have prepared: to give to you. This is its simple meaning. Its midrashic interpretation is: "That I have prepared": My place is already recognizable opposite it. This is one of the verses that state that the heavenly Temple is directly opposite the earthly Temple. [From Midrash Tanchuma 18] אשר הכינותי: אשר זמנתי לתת לכם, זהו פשוטו ומדרשו אל המקום אשר הכינותי כבר מקומי ניכר כנגדו, וזה אחד מן המקראות שאומרים, שבית המקדש של מעלה מכוון כנגד בית המקדש של מטה:
21Beware of him and obey him; do not rebel against him, for he will not forgive your transgression, for My Name is within him. כאהִשָּׁ֧מֶר מִפָּנָ֛יו וּשְׁמַ֥ע בְּקֹל֖וֹ אַל־תַּמֵּ֣ר בּ֑וֹ כִּ֣י לֹ֤א יִשָּׂא֙ לְפִשְׁעֲכֶ֔ם כִּ֥י שְׁמִ֖י בְּקִרְבּֽוֹ:
do not rebel against him: Heb. ךְתַּמֵּר, an expression of rebellion הַמְרָאָה, like “Any man who rebels (יַמְרֶה) against your orders” (Josh. 1:18). אל תמר בו: לשון המראה, כמו (יהושע א יח) אשר ימרה את פיך:
for he will not forgive your transgression: He is not accustomed to that [i.e., forgiving], for he is of the group that do not sin. And moreover, he is a messenger, and he can do only his mission. -[From Midrash Tanchuma 18] כי לא ישא לפשעכם: אינו מלומד בכך, שהוא מן הכת שאין חוטאין, ועוד שהוא שליח ואינו עושה אלא שליחותו:
for My Name is within him: [This clause] is connected to the beginning of the verse: Beware of him because My Name is associated with him. Our Sages, however, said: This is [the angel] Metatron, whose name is like the name of his Master (Sanh. 38b). The numerical value of מֵטַטְרוֹן [314] equals that of שַׁדַּי [314]. -[From Tikunei Zohar 66b] כי שמי בקרבו: מחובר לראש המקרא, השמר מפניו כי שמי משותף בו, ורבותינו אמרו זה מטטרו"ן ששמו כשם רבו. מטטרו"ן בגימטריא שדי:
22For if you hearken to his voice and do all that I say, I will hate your enemies and oppress your adversaries. כבכִּ֣י אִם־שָׁמ֤וֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע֙ בְּקֹל֔וֹ וְעָשִׂ֕יתָ כֹּ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֣ר אֲדַבֵּ֑ר וְאָֽיַבְתִּי֙ אֶת־אֹ֣יְבֶ֔יךָ וְצַרְתִּ֖י אֶת־צֹֽרְרֶֽיךָ:
and oppress: Heb. וְצַרְךְתִּי, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: וְאָעֵיק, and I will cause distress. וצרתי: כתרגומו ואעיק:
23For My angel will go before you, and bring you to the Amorites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Canaanites, the Hivvites, and the Jebusites, and I will destroy them. כגכִּֽי־יֵלֵ֣ךְ מַלְאָכִי֘ לְפָנֶ֒יךָ֒ וֶֽהֱבִֽיאֲךָ֗ אֶל־הָֽאֱמֹרִי֙ וְהַ֣חִתִּ֔י וְהַפְּרִזִּי֙ וְהַכְּנַֽעֲנִ֔י הַֽחִוִּ֖י וְהַיְבוּסִ֑י וְהִכְחַדְתִּֽיו:
24You shall not prostrate yourself before their gods, and you shall not worship them, and you shall not follow their practices, but you shall tear them down and you shall utterly shatter their monuments. כדלֹֽא־תִשְׁתַּֽחֲוֶ֤ה לֵאלֹֽהֵיהֶם֙ וְלֹ֣א תָֽעָבְדֵ֔ם וְלֹ֥א תַֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה כְּמַֽעֲשֵׂיהֶ֑ם כִּ֤י הָרֵס֙ תְּהָ֣רְסֵ֔ם וְשַׁבֵּ֥ר תְּשַׁבֵּ֖ר מַצֵּבֹֽתֵיהֶֽם:
but you shall tear them down: Those gods. הרס תהרסם: לאותם אלהות:
their monuments: Heb. מַצֵּבֹתֵיהֶם. Stones they erect (מַצִּיבִין) upon which to prostate themselves before them [idols]. מצבותיהם: אבנים שהם מציבין להשתחוות להם:
25And you shall worship the Lord, your God, and He will bless your food and your drink, and I will remove illness from your midst. כהוַֽעֲבַדְתֶּ֗ם אֵ֚ת יְהֹוָ֣ה אֱלֹֽהֵיכֶ֔ם וּבֵרַ֥ךְ אֶת־לַחְמְךָ֖ וְאֶת־מֵימֶ֑יךָ וַֽהֲסִֽרֹתִ֥י מַֽחֲלָ֖ה מִקִּרְבֶּֽךָ:
Investing in Earth
Why are you afraid? Why do you panic?
Eagerly and with purpose, your soul plunged downward to live in an earthly realm,
to enwrap herself in a body of flesh and blood.
What emboldened her? What drew her to squeeze her unbounded light
into the straitjacket of time and space?
It was neither fear, nor dread, nor panic.
It was the knowledge that here below
is a beauty the highest of angels cannot touch.
Care for yourself, for your family, for your fellow human beings and our lovely planet earth,
not out of fear, nor from distress,
but out of love and awe
for the beauty within
that we came to uncover.
---------------------CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Friday, February 5, 2016 - Today is: Friday, Shvat 26, 5776 · February 5, 2016 - Candle Lighting
Light Candles before sunset
Today in Jewish History:• Passing of the Taz (1667)
Shevat 26 is the yahrtzeit (anniversary of the passing) of Rabbi Dovid ben Shmuel Halevi(1586-1667), a primary Halachic authority, known as Taz after his work Turei Zahav ("Rows of Gold") -- a commentary on Rabbi Yosef Caro's Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law).
Links: Rabbi David Halevi (Taz)
Daily Quote:
"Judges and officers you shall place at all your city-gates..." (Deuteronomy 16:18). The human body is a city with seven gates--seven portals to the outside world: the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and the mouth. Here, too, it is incumbent upon us to place internal "judges" to discriminate and regulate what should be admitted and what should be kept out, and "officers" to enforce the judges' decisions...[Rabbi Shabtai HaCohen ("Shach"), 1622-1663]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Mishpatim, 6th Portion Exodus 23:20-23:25 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 23
20Behold, I am sending an angel before you to guard you on the way and to bring you to the place that I have prepared. כהִנֵּ֨ה אָֽנֹכִ֜י שֹׁלֵ֤חַ מַלְאָךְ֙ לְפָנֶ֔יךָ לִשְׁמָרְךָ֖ בַּדָּ֑רֶךְ וְלַֽהֲבִ֣יאֲךָ֔ אֶל־הַמָּק֖וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר הֲכִנֹֽתִי:
Behold, I am sending an angel before you: Here they were informed that they were destined to sin, and the Shechinah would say to them, “for I will not ascend in your midst” (Exod. 33: 3). -[From Exod. Rabbah 32:3] הנה אנכי שולח מלאך: כאן נתבשרו שעתידין לחטוא, ושכינה אומרת להם (שמות לג ג) כי לא אעלה בקרבך:
that I have prepared: to give to you. This is its simple meaning. Its midrashic interpretation is: "That I have prepared": My place is already recognizable opposite it. This is one of the verses that state that the heavenly Temple is directly opposite the earthly Temple. [From Midrash Tanchuma 18] אשר הכינותי: אשר זמנתי לתת לכם, זהו פשוטו ומדרשו אל המקום אשר הכינותי כבר מקומי ניכר כנגדו, וזה אחד מן המקראות שאומרים, שבית המקדש של מעלה מכוון כנגד בית המקדש של מטה:
21Beware of him and obey him; do not rebel against him, for he will not forgive your transgression, for My Name is within him. כאהִשָּׁ֧מֶר מִפָּנָ֛יו וּשְׁמַ֥ע בְּקֹל֖וֹ אַל־תַּמֵּ֣ר בּ֑וֹ כִּ֣י לֹ֤א יִשָּׂא֙ לְפִשְׁעֲכֶ֔ם כִּ֥י שְׁמִ֖י בְּקִרְבּֽוֹ:
do not rebel against him: Heb. ךְתַּמֵּר, an expression of rebellion הַמְרָאָה, like “Any man who rebels (יַמְרֶה) against your orders” (Josh. 1:18). אל תמר בו: לשון המראה, כמו (יהושע א יח) אשר ימרה את פיך:
for he will not forgive your transgression: He is not accustomed to that [i.e., forgiving], for he is of the group that do not sin. And moreover, he is a messenger, and he can do only his mission. -[From Midrash Tanchuma 18] כי לא ישא לפשעכם: אינו מלומד בכך, שהוא מן הכת שאין חוטאין, ועוד שהוא שליח ואינו עושה אלא שליחותו:
for My Name is within him: [This clause] is connected to the beginning of the verse: Beware of him because My Name is associated with him. Our Sages, however, said: This is [the angel] Metatron, whose name is like the name of his Master (Sanh. 38b). The numerical value of מֵטַטְרוֹן [314] equals that of שַׁדַּי [314]. -[From Tikunei Zohar 66b] כי שמי בקרבו: מחובר לראש המקרא, השמר מפניו כי שמי משותף בו, ורבותינו אמרו זה מטטרו"ן ששמו כשם רבו. מטטרו"ן בגימטריא שדי:
22For if you hearken to his voice and do all that I say, I will hate your enemies and oppress your adversaries. כבכִּ֣י אִם־שָׁמ֤וֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע֙ בְּקֹל֔וֹ וְעָשִׂ֕יתָ כֹּ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֣ר אֲדַבֵּ֑ר וְאָֽיַבְתִּי֙ אֶת־אֹ֣יְבֶ֔יךָ וְצַרְתִּ֖י אֶת־צֹֽרְרֶֽיךָ:
and oppress: Heb. וְצַרְךְתִּי, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: וְאָעֵיק, and I will cause distress. וצרתי: כתרגומו ואעיק:
23For My angel will go before you, and bring you to the Amorites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Canaanites, the Hivvites, and the Jebusites, and I will destroy them. כגכִּֽי־יֵלֵ֣ךְ מַלְאָכִי֘ לְפָנֶ֒יךָ֒ וֶֽהֱבִֽיאֲךָ֗ אֶל־הָֽאֱמֹרִי֙ וְהַ֣חִתִּ֔י וְהַפְּרִזִּי֙ וְהַכְּנַֽעֲנִ֔י הַֽחִוִּ֖י וְהַיְבוּסִ֑י וְהִכְחַדְתִּֽיו:
24You shall not prostrate yourself before their gods, and you shall not worship them, and you shall not follow their practices, but you shall tear them down and you shall utterly shatter their monuments. כדלֹֽא־תִשְׁתַּֽחֲוֶ֤ה לֵאלֹֽהֵיהֶם֙ וְלֹ֣א תָֽעָבְדֵ֔ם וְלֹ֥א תַֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה כְּמַֽעֲשֵׂיהֶ֑ם כִּ֤י הָרֵס֙ תְּהָ֣רְסֵ֔ם וְשַׁבֵּ֥ר תְּשַׁבֵּ֖ר מַצֵּבֹֽתֵיהֶֽם:
but you shall tear them down: Those gods. הרס תהרסם: לאותם אלהות:
their monuments: Heb. מַצֵּבֹתֵיהֶם. Stones they erect (מַצִּיבִין) upon which to prostate themselves before them [idols]. מצבותיהם: אבנים שהם מציבין להשתחוות להם:
25And you shall worship the Lord, your God, and He will bless your food and your drink, and I will remove illness from your midst. כהוַֽעֲבַדְתֶּ֗ם אֵ֚ת יְהֹוָ֣ה אֱלֹֽהֵיכֶ֔ם וּבֵרַ֥ךְ אֶת־לַחְמְךָ֖ וְאֶת־מֵימֶ֑יךָ וַֽהֲסִֽרֹתִ֥י מַֽחֲלָ֖ה מִקִּרְבֶּֽךָ:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
• Hebrew text
• English text• Verses 97-176
Daily Tehillim: Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
• Hebrew text
• English text• Verses 97-176
97. O how I love Your Torah! All day it is my discussion.
98. Your commandments make me wiser than my enemies, for they are ever with me.
99. From all my teachers I have gained wisdom, for Your testimonies are my discussion.
100. I will be more perceptive than elders, because I have guarded Your precepts.
101. I have restrained my feet from every evil path, that I might keep Your word.
102. I have not turned away from Your judgments, for You have instructed me.
103. How sweet are Your words to my palate, [sweeter] than honey to my mouth!
104. From Your precepts I gain understanding, therefore I hate every path of falsehood.
105. Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.
106. I have sworn-and I will fulfill it-to keep Your righteous judgments.
107. I am afflicted to the extreme; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your promise.
108. Accept with favor, O Lord, the offerings of my lips, and teach me Your laws.
109. My soul is in danger always, yet I have not forgotten Your Torah.
110. The wicked laid a snare for me, yet I have not strayed from Your precepts.
111. I have taken Your testimonies as an eternal heritage, for they are the joy of my heart.
112. I have inclined my heart to perform Your statutes, forever, to the last.
113. I despise vain thoughts, but I love Your Torah.
114. You are my refuge and my shield; I place hope in Your promise.
115. Turn away from me, you evildoers, and I will keep the commandments of my God.
116. Support me according to Your promise, and I will live; let me not be shamed because of my hope.
117. Sustain me, and I will be saved, and I will be engrossed in Your statutes always.
118. You trample all who stray from Your statutes, for their ploy is a lie.
119. You have purged all the wicked of the earth like dross, therefore I love Your testimonies.
120. My flesh bristles from fear of You, and I am in awe of Your judgments.
121. I practiced justice and righteousness; leave me not to my oppressors.
122. Guarantee Your servant goodness; let not the wicked exploit me.
123. My eyes long for Your salvation, and for the word of Your righteousness.
124. Treat Your servant according to Your kindness, and teach me Your statutes.
125. I am Your servant; grant me understanding, that I may know Your testimonies.
126. It is time to act for the Lord; they have abrogated Your Torah.
127. Therefore I love Your commandments more than gold, even fine gold.
128. Therefore I affirmed all Your precepts; I have hated every path of falsehood.
129. Your testimonies are wondrous, therefore does my soul guard them.
130. Your opening words illuminate, enlightening the simple.
131. I opened my mouth and swallowed, because I craved Your commandments.
132. Turn to me and favor me, as is [Your] law for those who love Your Name.
133. Set my steps in Your word, and let no iniquity rule over me.
134. Deliver me from the oppression of man, and I will keep Your precepts.
135. Let Your face shine upon Your servant, and teach me Your statutes.
136. My eyes shed streams of water, because they do not keep Your Torah.
137. Righteous are you, O Lord, and Your judgments are upright.
138. You commanded Your testimonies in righteousness and great faithfulness.
139. My zeal consumes me, because my enemies have forgotten Your words.
140. Your word is very pure, and Your servant cherishes it.
141. I am young and despised, yet I do not forget Your precepts.
142. Your righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and Your Torah is truth.
143. Trouble and anguish have taken hold of me, yet Your commandments are my delight.
144. Your testimonies are righteous forever; give me understanding, that I may live.
145. I call out with all my heart; answer me, O Lord; I will keep Your statutes.
146. I call out to You; save me, and I will observe Your testimonies.
147. I rose before dawn and cried out; my hope is in Your word.
148. My eyes preceded the night watches, that I may discuss Your word.
149. Hear my voice in keeping with Your kindness; O Lord, grant me life as is Your practice.
150. Those who pursue mischief draw near; they are far from Your Torah.
151. You are near, O Lord, and all Your commandments are truth.
152. From the beginning I discerned from Your testimonies that You had established them forever.
153. Behold my affliction and deliver me, for I have not forgotten Your Torah.
154. Wage my battle and redeem me; grant me life for the sake of Your word.
155. Salvation is far from the wicked, for they seek not Your statutes.
156. Your mercies are great, O Lord; grant me life as is Your practice.
157. My pursuers and my enemies are many, yet I did not turn away from Your testimonies.
158. I saw traitors and I quarreled with them, because they do not keep Your words.
159. Behold how I love Your precepts; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your kindness.
160. The beginning of Your word is truth, and forever are all Your righteous judgements.
161. Princes have pursued me without cause, but it is Your word my heart fears.
162. I rejoice at Your word, like one who finds abundant spoil.
163. I hate falsehood and abhor it, but Your Torah I love.
164. Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous judgments.
165. There is abundant peace for those who love Your Torah, and there is no stumbling for them.
166. I hoped for Your salvation, O Lord, and I performed Your commandments.
167. My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them intensely.
168. I have kept Your precepts and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You
169. Let my prayer approach Your presence, O Lord; grant me understanding according to Your word.
170. Let my supplication come before You; save me according to Your promise.
171. My lips will utter praise, for You have taught me Your statutes.
172. My tongue will echo Your word, for all Your commandments are just.
173. Let Your hand be ready to help me, for I have chosen Your precepts.
174. I long for Your salvation, O Lord, and Your Torah is my delight.
175. Let my soul live, and it will praise You, and let Your judgment help me.
176. I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out Your servant, for I have not forgotten Your commandments.
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson• Friday, Shevat 26, 5776 · February 5, 2016
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson• Friday, Shevat 26, 5776 · February 5, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 25
Yet one may argue that in reality this is no option at all. The Talmud states that when one sins because he relies on subsequent teshuvah, G‑d does not allow him to practice teshuvah. Since he cannot rely on this, he must sacrifice his life so as not to remain permanently separated from G‑d through idolatry. With a minor sin, however, the separation from G‑d that it causes is in any case temporary, even without recourse to teshuvah.
We are thus once again left with our original question: How can it be said that the same fear of separation from G‑d that motivates a Jew to sacrifice his life with regard to idolatry, can also motivate him to refrain from even a minor sin? The two cases are altogether different: the former causes a lasting separation, and the latter, a momentary one.
The Alter Rebbe answers this objection by clarifying the Talmudic statement on which it is based. The Talmud does not imply, he explains, that the sinner who relies on teshuvah utterly loses his ability to repent, but rather that the Divine assistance usually granted to a penitent sinner is withheld from him.
Thus one could, after all, submit to coercion and practice idolatry, and rely on teshuvah to save him from a lasting separation from G‑d. Yet no Jew would take advantage of this resource; the love of G‑d innate in every Jew dictates that he sacrifice his life rather than bear the temporary separation caused by idolatry.
This discussion is contained in the following paragraphs.
ואף שהאומר אחטא ואשוב, אין מספיקין כו‘
(1Although the Talmud states that2 “He who says, ’I will sin and repent, sin and repent,‘ is not given an opportunity to do so,”
היינו שאין מחזיקים ידו להיות לו שעת הכושר לעשות תשובה
yet this means merely that G‑d does not aid such a sinner, granting him the auspicious occasion to repent.
Generally, G‑d grants one who wishes to repent the necessary power and the opportune moment to realize his good intentions. However, where one’s reliance on teshuvah formed the basis for his sin, he is lent neither the strength nor the opportunity.
אבל אם דחק השעה ועשה תשובה, אין לך דבר שעומד בפני התשובה
If, however, he seizes the opportunity himself and he repents, 3 “Nothing can stand in the way of repentance.”
Thus, even in the case of idolatry one could conceivably rely on teshuvah to prevent a lasting separation from G‑d.
ואף על פי כן, כל איש ישראל מוכן ומזומן למסור נפשו על קדושת ה’
Nevertheless, every Jew is prepared and ready to suffer martyrdom for the sanctification of G‑d’s Name,
שלא להשתחוות לעבודה זרה אפילו לפי שעה ולעשות תשובה אחר כך
and will not perform an idolatrous act lit., “to bow down before an idol” even temporarily, with the intention of repenting afterwards — indicating that the fear of even a temporary separation from G‑d is sufficient motivation for self-sacrifice.
והיינו מפני אור ה‘ המלובש בנפשם כנ״ל, שאינו בבחינת זמן ושעה כלל אלא למעלה מהזמן, ושליט ומושל עליו כנודע
This is because of the Divine light which is clothed in his soul, as explained above, which does not come within the realm of time at all, but transcends time, and therefore in relation to this light every action is eternal;furthermore, as is known this Divine light rules and dominates time — not only is it not governed by the laws of time, but on the contrary it governs them.
Thus, an action which took but a moment (and, judged by temporal standards, has no value) can become more momentous than one which takes much longer. 4
Since the Divine light clothed in the soul transcends and dominates time, it does not permit any separation from G‑d, no matter how short its duration.
The discussion until now centered on the category of “turning away from evil.” The Alter Rebbe showed how one could utilize his hidden love of G‑d in refraining from sin. He now goes on to the category of “doing good,” discussing the use of the hidden love in leading one to perform all the positive commandments.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
| 2. | Yoma 85b. |
| 3. | Cf. Talmud Yerushalmi, Pe'ah 1:1. |
| 4. | Based on a comment by the Rebbe. |
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Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Friday Shevat 26, 5776 · February 5, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 222
Divorce
"And he shall write her a bill of divorce and place it in her hand"—Deuteronomy 24:1.
In the event that a couple decides to divorce, it is a mitzvah for the husband to effectuate the divorce through a bill of divorce, known as a get.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Friday Shevat 26, 5776 · February 5, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 222
Divorce
"And he shall write her a bill of divorce and place it in her hand"—Deuteronomy 24:1.
In the event that a couple decides to divorce, it is a mitzvah for the husband to effectuate the divorce through a bill of divorce, known as a get.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Divorce
Positive Commandment 222
Translated by Berel Bell
The 222nd mitzvah is that when we wish to divorce, we are commanded to do so only with a written document [i.e. a get].
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), [that when a man wants to divorce his wife,] "he shall write her a bill of divorce and place it in her hand."
The details of this mitzvah, i.e. all the laws of divorce, are found in the tractate devoted to this subject, tractate Gittin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 24:1.
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• 1 Chapter: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 3
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English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Bikkurim - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
The first fruits are given to the men of the priestly watch1 [on duty at that time]. They divide them among themselves like the Temple sacrifices.2 We have already explained that [the first fruits] are called terumah.3 Therefore a non-priest who partakes of the first fruits anywhere4 is liable for death at the hand of heaven,5 provided he partook of them after they entered the walls of Jerusalem.6
Halacha 2
If a portion [of the first fruits] were inside Jerusalem and a portion were outside,7 [a non-priest] is liable for death for the portion that is inside and it is considered as consecrated property in all contexts. The portion that is outside is considered as ordinary property in all contexts.
Halacha 3
When a priest partakes of the first fruits outside of Jerusalem after they have entered inside [the city's] walls, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law, as [Deuteronomy 12:17] states: 'You may not eat within your gates...8the terumah of your hand.' [The latter term] refers to the first fruits,9 as we explained in Hilchot Terumah.10
Similarly, if a priest partakes of them in Jerusalem before they are placed in the Temple courtyard,11 he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law, as if he partook of them outside of Jerusalem,12 because [the first fruits] must be placed down in the Temple Courtyard as [ibid. 26:10] states: 'And you shall place them before the altar of God your Lord.'
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
[The laws applying to] partaking of the first fruits are identical [to those applying] to partaking of terumah in all of their details. In addition, [the following stringencies apply with regard] to first fruits. They are forbidden to one in the acute state of one in mourning.15 They must be brought to [Jerusalem]. And a priest who is ritually pure who partook of the first fruits that were impure receives lashes like an Israelite who is ritually pure who partook of the second tithe that became impure.16 [These concepts] do not apply with regard toterumah.17
Halacha 6
What is the source which teaches that the first fruits are forbidden to anonein?18 With regard to these fruits, [Deuteronomy 26:11] states: 'And you shall rejoice in all the good.'19 Implied is that they have to be eaten in a state of happiness and not in a state of acute mourning. One who partakes of [these fruits] in a state of acute mourning is liable for stripes for rebellious conduct.20
Halacha 7
The first fruits must [be brought in] a container, as [ibid.:2] states: 'And you shall place them in a container.' The most preferable way of performing the mitzvah is to bring each type of fruit in a separate container. If one brings them [all] in one container, he has fulfilled his obligation. [Even in such an instance,] he should not bring them mixed together. Instead, he should bring the barley below,21 wheat on top of it, olives on top of it, dates on top of them, pomegranates on top of them, and figs on the top of the container. There should be a substance, e.g., palm leaves, wild grass, or leaves, or the like, that intervenes between each type of produce. One should surround the figs with clusters of grapes from the outside.
Halacha 8
When a person brings the first fruits in a metal container, the priest takes them and returns the container to its owner. If he brings them in a reed or grass basket or the like, both the first fruits and the basket should be given to the priests.22 If the first fruits become impure, the baskets should not be given to the priests.23
Halacha 9
When they would bring the first fruits, they would also bring turtle doves and doves in their hands. Similarly, they would hang turtle doves and doves from the sides of the baskets24 in order to adorn the first fruits. Those that were with the baskets would be offered as burnt offerings25 and those they would bring by hand would be given to the priests [as presents].26
Halacha 10
It is a positive commandment27 to make a declaration in the Temple concerning the first fruits when they are brought. One should begin and say [Deuteronomy 26:3-10]: 'I am making a statement to God your Lord that I have come to the land... An Aramean [sought] to destroy my ancestor...'until he completes the entire passage, concluding: '...You gave me, O God.' [This declaration] may only be made in the Holy Tongue, as it states: 'And you shall respond and say.'28
Halacha 11
At first, those who knew how to read would read [the passage themselves] and those who did not know how to read would read after one who read for them. [As a result,] those who did not know how to read would refrain from bringing [the first fruits] so that they would not be embarrassed.29 [Hence] the court ordained that the passage would be read for one who knows how to read like it is read for one who does not know.30
Halacha 12
A person who brings the first fruits is permitted to give them to his servant or his relative [to carry] throughout the journey until he reaches the Temple Mount.31When he reaches the Temple Mount, even if he is a king of Israel,32he must place the basket on his own shoulder33 and proceed until he reaches the Temple Courtyard. He should read [the declaration,] 'I am making a statement to God your Lord today...,' while the basket is still on his shoulder. He then removes the basket from his shoulder. While he holds it by its edge, the priest puts his hand below it and raises it [up and down and to all four directions].34 He then reads: An Aramean [sought] to destroy my ancestor and he descended to Egypt...' until he completes the entire passage.' He then places the first fruits at the side of the altar, at the southwest comer, on the south side of the altar.35 He then prostrates himself36 and departs.
What is the source which teaches that the first fruits must be raised [up and down and to all four directions]? [The above prooftext states:] 'And the priest shall take the basket from your hand,' including [an obligation to] raise the first fruits [up and down and to all four directions]. Just as [the first fruits] must be raised [up and down and to all four directions], so to they require that a peace offering be brought with them and song [accompany their offering], for with regard to them, [ibid.:9] states: 'And you shall rejoice in all the good.' [Now,] with regard to the festivals, [ibid. states: 'And you shall rejoice on your festivals.' [An association is drawn between the two:] Just as the happiness of the festivals is marked by peace offerings, so too, peace offerings [are required] here. [Nevertheless,] these offerings are not absolute requirements.37
Halacha 13
When is a song pronounced over them? When they reach the Temple courtyard. The Levites would begin proclaiming:38 'I will exalt You God, for You have drawn me up...' (Psalms 30:2).39
Halacha 14
[When bringing] the first fruits, it is necessary that one remain [in Jerusalem] overnight.
What is implied? When a person brought his first fruits to the Temple, made the declaration, and offered his peace offerings, he should not depart from Jerusalem that day to return home.40 Instead, he should stay in Jerusalem overnight and return to his city on the following day, as [Deuteronomy 16:7] states: 'And you shall turn back in the morning and return to your tent.' [That verse41 teaches a general principle:] All occasions when you turn from the Temple when you visit it should only be in the morning.42
Thus the first fruits require seven factors: a) that they be brought to [Jerusalem], b) [in a] container, c) that the declaration be recited, d) that they be accompanied by a peace offering, e) and song, f) that they be raised [up and down and to all four directions], and g) that the person stay overnight [in Jerusalem].
FOOTNOTES
1.
The priests were divided into 24 watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week at a time.
2.
See Hilchot Ma'aseh Korbanot10:15.
3.
HilchotTerumah15:20, Chapter 2, Halachah 19 above, et al.
4.
I.e., within Jerusalem or outside the city.
5.
The punishment a non-priest incurs for partaking of terumah (Hilchot Terumah 6:6).
6.
It is forbidden to partake of the first fruits in all situations. One does not, however, become liable for this severe penalty unless they first entered the holy city. The rationale is that since a priest may not partake of them until they are brought to Jerusalem, the prohibition against a non-priest partaking of them does not apply until then.
7.
The Aruch LeNer states that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if this law applies when the produce is carried in a single container or only when it is carried in two containers.
8.
I.e., in cities outside of Jerusalem.
9.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 149) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 449) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
10.
Hilchot Terumah 15:20.
11.
Nevertheless, as indicated by the following halachah, the person bringing the first fruits need not make the declaration for them to be permitted.
12.
I.e., this is included in the same negative commandment.
13.
I.e., Jerusalem, the place where they may be eaten.
14.
Sacrificial meat, by contrast, would be disqualified if this happened.
15.
See the following halachah.
16.
See Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 3:1.
17.
Although a priest is not allowed to partake of impure terumah, such a transgression is not punishable by lashes. It is only a prohibition that results from a positive commandment (Hilchot Terumah 7:3).
18.
Aninut refers to the state of severe mourning experienced on the day of the death of one's relative. See Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 3:6.
19.
From this phrase, it is derived (Halachah 13) that it is necessary to bring peace offerings together with the first fruits. However, the two teachings are not exclusive.
20.
Since the prohibition is not stated as a negative commandment in the Torah, one is not liable for lashes as prescribed by Scriptural Law. The Radbaz and others question this ruling, because, as Yevamot73b teaches, an association is established between the first fruits and the second tithe. Hence just as one is liable for lashes for partaking of the second tithe in a state of acute mourning, so too, one should be liable for partaking of the first fruits.
21.
This order is prescribed by the Tosefta, Bikkurim 2:8. The commentaries explain that the rationale for this order is that the produce that is most perishable is placed on top and that which is preserved best on bottom.
22.
Bikkurim 3:8 relates that the rich would bring their first fruits in gold and silver containers, while the poor would bring them in wicker baskets. The rich would thus be allowed to keep their containers, while the poor would have to give them to the priests.
The rationale is that the metal containers are significant and thus cannot be considered to be ancillary to the fruits. Hence they must be returned to their owners. The wicker baskets, by contrast, are not significant and thus are considered to be ancillary to the fruits. Therefore they may be kept by the priests. In this regard, Bava Kama 913 states, 'Poverty pursues the poor,' i.e., because they were too poor to afford expensive containers, they were required to forfeit even their simple baskets.
23.
Since the first fruits themselves are not given to the priests (see Chapter 4, Halachah 10), they do not acquire the containers either.
24.
They were not placed on the baskets themselves, lest they soil the fruit [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 3:5)].
25.
For fowl that were given as a free-will offering were sacrificed only as burnt offerings.
26.
The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation of the above mishnah, explaining that only the first fruits were given to the priests, the fowl would be offered as burnt offerings. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's interpretation. Nevertheless, Rashi (Menachot 58a) and Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura follow the Ra'avad's understanding.
27.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 132) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 606) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
28.
Sotah 32a understand this phrase as indicating that the passage should be recited exactly as it is written in the Torah.
29.
I.e., the fact that they did not know the Holy Tongue would be an embarrassment for them. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 3:7), the Rambam explains that this practice was instituted in the early age of the Second Temple era when many of those who returned to Zion did not know the Holy Tongue, as indicated by Nechemiah 13:24.
30.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that there is a support for this in the Biblical verse cited above: 'And you shall respond and say.' Anita, translated as 'respond,' has the connotation of repeating what someone else says.
31.
As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 21, a person should not send his first fruits to Jerusalem via an agent and if he does so, he may not make the declaration (Chapter 4, Halachah 8). Nevertheless, if he himself is bringing them, he may lighten his burden by having another person carry them. All of this applies before he reaches the Temple Mount At that point, he must carry them himself.
32.
The Mishnah (Bikkurim 3:4) cites as an example, the conduct of King Aggripas.
33.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that the Torah explicitly requires the person to bring the first fruits to the priest by hand.
34.
This practice, referred to as tenufah, is required when bringing the peace offerings and other sacrifices.
35.
The side which is before the entrance to the Sanctuary, for the first fruits must be Elaced down 'before God' (Radbaz).
36.
As required by Deuteronomy 26:10.
37.
After the fact, the first fruits are acceptable even if the sacrifices were not brought. The rationale is that the offering is not explicitly mentioned in the Biblical passage (Radbaz to Halachah 14). This concept also applies with regard to the song that should accompany them.
38.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 17.
39.
This psalm relates to the theme of thanksgiving, and was also recited over the thanksgiving offering (Sh'vuot 15b).
40.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh clarify that even if the person does not bring a sacrifice, he is still required to stay in Jerusalem overnight because of the first fruits.
41.
Which speaks about the pilgrimage festivals, not bringing first fruits.
42.
The commentaries question why, since, this is a general theme, the Rambam mentions it only here and not in other places.
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Halacha 1
A get may be written only with a substance that leaves a permanent impression - e.g., ink,1 sikra, kumus, kankantum2 or the like. If, however, [aget] is written with a substance that does not leave a permanent impression - e.g., beverages, fruit juices or the like - the get is void.
If [a get] is written with lead, a stylus or charcoal,3it is acceptable. At the outset, however, these substances should not be used.
Halacha 2
A priori, we may write with gallnut juice on paper, on a hide or the like. We may not use it to write on parchment that has been treated with gallnut juice, for it will not be distinct. If such a get is written, it is void. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 3
What is implied? If a get is written on paper with erasures,6 on parchment that has not been fully processed, on a shard, on leaves, on the arm of a servant or on the horn of a cow,7 [it is acceptable, provided the husband] gives [his wife] the servant, the cow,8 the paper, the parchment or the like in the presence of witnesses.
Halacha 4
When the get is tattooed on the hand of a servant,9the signature of the witnesses is also tattooed there,10 and he is in the possession of [the wife], the divorce is effective, even though there are no witnesses to [the servant's] transfer,11 for [the tattoo] cannot be forged.
Even when it is known to us that the servant [previously] belonged to the husband, the get is tattooed on his hand, and he is in the possession of the woman, and she says: "He was given to me in the presence of witnesses," the status of the divorce is in doubt.12 For the possession of living beings that can move independently is not considered proof of their ownership.13
Halacha 5
If a get is engraved on a tablet [with a stylus], and it is signed by witnesses, and [the tablet] is in [the woman's] possession, the divorce is effective. [This applies] even when it is known to us that the tablet [had previously] belonged to [the wife].14For a woman is allowed to write her get herself. The verification of a get is dependent on [the witnesses who] signed it, if there are no witnesses to its transfer.15
Halacha 6
[The following laws apply when] a get is engraved on a board, on a stone or on a metal plate: If the scribe engraved the form of the letters,16 it is acceptable. This is considered writing, as [reflected by] the verse, [Jeremiah 17:1]: "Written with a pen of iron" - i.e., hewed out. Similarly, if one engraved the letters from the back of the plate until they projected from the front of the plate [the get is acceptable].
If, however, one hewed out the inside of the letter, [and the area around it,] until the form of the letter protruded on both sides, like the protruding writing on golden dinarim, the get is void, because this is not considered writing.17
Halacha 7
Halacha 8
Halacha 9
Regardless of the language in which a get is written, the scribe must be careful that the wording of the get does not allow for two meanings. It should not [leave] the reader [in doubt, wondering]: "Perhaps this was his intention" - i.e., something other than divorce - "or perhaps this was his intention" - i.e., divorce.26 Instead, [whatever] the language [of the get], the wording should unequivocally state one concept: that so and so divorces so and so.
Halacha 10
Similarly, regardless of the letters used, the penmanship [of the scribe] must be clear, so that children who know those letters would be able to read it. [The intent is] children who are not overly bright, nor those who are overly slow, but rather those of average intelligence.27
The writing should not be crooked, nor incoherent, lest one letter be confused with another, changing the meaning of the text.28
Halacha 11
If [the wording of a get] has two implications, or its writing is crooked or incoherent to the extent that it is possible to understand a different concept from it, it is unacceptable. [It is not void,] because it may be read as referring to a divorce and its meaning involves divorce.
Although a priori it is permissible to write a get in any language, it has already become universal Jewish practice to write gittin in Aramaic, using the following text.29
Halacha 12
This is the text of the get:
On this day of the week, on this day of the month, in this year from creation - or according to the chronology employed for legal documents30 - according to the reckoning that we keep here in [the name of the place where the get is being given], in the following way, I [the husband's name,] the son of [his father's name], from [the name of his city]31 or by whatever names or nicknames32 by which I, my father, my place or his place are called, desire out of independent will without anyone forcing me, to dismiss, to release, to divorce you, [the woman's name,] the daughter of [her father's name], from [the name of her city] or by whatever names or nicknames you, your father, your place or his place is known.33[Although] previously, you were my wife, now I am dismissing, releasing and divorcing you, so that you have the license and the authority to go and marry any man whom you desire. No one will protest [your actions] from the present day onward. You are free [to marry] any man. This will serve you as a bill of divorce, a get dismissing you, and a letter releasing you, from me, according to the faith of Moses and Israel.
The witnesses sign below, as we explained:34 [The witness's name] the son of [his father's name], a witness, [the witness's name] the son of [his father's name], a witness.
Halacha 13
When a get is written using the above text and wording, [the following rules should be adhered to:] The word ודן should not be written with a yud, so that it might be read as ודין, which might be interpreted as meaning: "There will be a judgment between me and you."
The word ואגרת should not be written with a yud, lest it be read as ואי גרת, meaning "If you commit adultery."
The word למהך should not be written with a yud, lest it be read as לי מהך - i.e., that it is a joke for me.35
The words תהוייין and תצבייין should not be written with only two yuddin, lest a reader get the impression that the man is speaking with two women, and rather than divorce the one, he is divorcing two others.
Similarly, he should elongate the [latter] vav in the word וכדו lest it resemble ayud, which would cause the word to be read as uch'dei, in which instance, it would mean that "I am divorcing you on this condition." By the same token, he should elongate the vav in the words תרוכין and שבוקין, lest they resembleyuddin, in which instance it would mean that he is telling her that she is releasing and divorcing him.
In a similar fashion, care must be taken in every language and with every form of lettering to make certain that [the wording of the get] does not leave the possibility for two implications.
Halacha 14
If [a scribe] wrote [a get] using this text and did not elongate the vavinmentioned, did not write the extra yuddin, or wrote the yuddin that we said should not be written, the get is unacceptable.36 Similarly, [if a get is written] in another language, and imprecise wording or writing is used, it is unacceptable.
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply if] a letter or a word of a get was rubbed out or written between the lines. If it is from the standard portion of the get, it is acceptable. If it is from the portions of the get that are of fundamental importance, the get is void. If, however, at the conclusion of the get, it is stated that the particular letter has been written between the lines or has been rubbed out, the get is acceptable, as other legal documents would be,37 even if [the difficulty] concerns the portions of the get that are of fundamental importance.38
Similarly, if a get was discovered to be torn [both] horizontally and vertically, as is customary for a court [to tear a legal document], the get is void, as would be other legal documents.39 If, however, it is torn in a way other than the manner customary for a court [to tear a legal document], it is acceptable.
Halacha 16
If [the get] has faded, rotted or become [filled with holes like] a sieve, it is acceptable. [The following rules apply if] it has been rubbed out or the letters have become blurred, but their form remains. If it can be read, it is acceptable;40 if not, it is void.
Halacha 17
When does the above41 apply? When the woman is in possession of a getthat has been signed by witnesses, and there are no witnesses to its transfer. If, however, there are witnesses who testify that the get was transferred in their presence, and at that time it was acceptable, the divorce is binding.42
[This applies] even if the fundamental portions of the get were written on erased parchment or between the lines, or [the get] was torn [both] horizontally and vertically when it was given to [the woman] in their presence.43
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply when] five men write a single get to divorce their five wives. The get is acceptable if the wording they use is inclusive - i.e., they wrote "On the day of the week, so and so divorced so and so, and so and so divorced so and so..." - every husband making a statement to his wife. Similarly, each of them told his wife: "so that you have the license to...," including the entire standard portion of the get. Two witnesses must sign below.
[This get] must be given to each of the women in the presence of witnesses who observe its transfer. If no witnesses observe its transfer at all, the woman who is in possession of the get is considered to be divorced.44
[Different rules apply if,] by contrast, [the scribe] wrote: "On the day of the week, so and so divorced so and so...," completing the entire text of the getand then began writing a second get directly under it in the same scroll. [He continued] writing: "On the day of the week, so and so divorced so and so...," and so completed the entire text of the second get and similarly completed all the gittin in this manner [on the same scroll], and the witnesses signed below [the final get].
If this scroll was given to each of the women in the presence of witnesses who observed the transfer, all their divorces are effective.45 [More stringent rules apply] if there are no witnesses who observed the transfer, and the scroll is in the possession of one of the women: If hers was the last get written on the scroll and the signatures of the witnesses are read together with [that statement], her divorce is effective.46 If the scroll is in the possession of one of the women whose gittin precede the last one, the status of her divorce is in doubt.
Halacha 19
If [the scribe] writes: "We, so and so and so and so, divorce our wives, so and so and so and so,..." and then completes the get, the get is void, even though it was given to each one of them in the presence of witnesses who observed its transfer. [The rationale:] two women cannot be divorced with the same get, as [we can infer from Deuteronomy 24:1]: "And he shall write for her," [implied is:] for her and not for her and her colleague.
If after [writing the text as above], he continued and wrote individual statements for each one within the get, stating, "So and so is divorcing so and so, and so and so is divorcing so and so on this date,"47 the divorces are acceptable.
Halacha 20
[The following rules apply when a scribe] wrote two gittin in two columns on one scroll side by side. If there are two witnesses [whose signatures] are read [as a continuation of] one get, and two witnesses [whose signatures] are read [as a continuation of] the other get, the get is acceptable.48 Whichever woman is in possession of the get is divorced.49
Halacha 21
[In the above instance, if the gittin] were signed by only two witnesses, who signed across the width of both gittin, the divorce is valid only when the scroll is in the possession of the woman under whose get the signatures appear.50
If the scroll is in the possession of the woman under whose get the signatures of the witnesses do not appear, the get is not acceptable unless it is given to her in the presence of witnesses [who observe the transfer].51
Halacha 22
[The following rules apply if a scribe] writes two gittin, one above the other, and the witnesses sign between the two gittin - their signatures thus being below the first get and above the second get. If the scroll is in the possession of the woman under whose get the signatures appear, her divorce is valid, and the woman above whose get the signatures appear is not divorced.52
Halacha 23
If two gittin [were written in an arc,] with the beginning of one get facing the beginning of the other get, and the signature of the witnesses is located between the tops of both gittin, both are void. If they are transferred in the presence of witnesses, both are acceptable.
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply if the scribe did not complete the text of the get in one column,] left a portion unwritten and wrote it at the top of a second column. If the witnesses signed below, at the end of the second column, it is acceptable, provided it is obvious that the scroll was not cut off, and it was the scribe's intent to complete the get in the second column.
If, however, this is not apparent, the status of the divorce is in doubt, even if the get was given in the presence of witnesses. [The rationale is that] perhaps there were two gittin, and the portion below the get in the first column and a portion above the get in the second column were cut off.55
Halacha 25
If, after writing the get and completing it, [the scribe] wrote: "Give regards to so and so," "Greetings to you, so and so, my friend," or the like, and afterwards the witnesses signed beneath the greeting, the status of the divorce is doubtful,56 despite the fact that the woman is in possession of theget. [The rationale is] perhaps the witnesses signed only for the greeting [without paying attention to the get].
If, however, the scribe wrote: "And give regards to so and so," "And greetings to you, so and so, my friend," or the like, the get is acceptable. Since [the greeting] accompanies the get,57 [we presume that the witnesses] signed with both these thoughts in mind.
If [the get] was given to her in the presence of witnesses, it is acceptable in either instance.58
FOOTNOTES
1.
In Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, the Rambam describes the process by which ink is made as follows:
One collects the vapor of oils, of tar, of wax or the like, [causes it to condense,] and kneads it together with sap from a tree and a drop of honey. It is moistened extensively, crushed until it is formed into flat cakes, dried and then stored.When one desires to write with it, one soaks [the cakes of ink] in gallnut juice or the like and writes with it. Thus, if one attempts to rub it out, he would be able to.
2.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Gittin2:3, the Rambam mentions three Arabic terms for these words. Rav Kapach explains the meaning as follows: sikra refers to red clay that is used for painting. Kumus andkankantum are two similar substances, yellow and green powders, which when mixed with gallnut juice produce a black substance. Other commentaries offer different interpretations.
3.
Our translation of these terms is based on the Aruch, as quoted by the Ramah (Even HaEzer 125:2).
4.
The Beit Shmuel 124:1 explains that, a priori, the Rambam allows a get to be written on a substance from which we are forbidden to benefit. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer124:1) differs and follows the opinion ofTosafot, which states that it is only after the fact that such a get is acceptable. The Ramah adds that if we are obligated to destroy the substance on which the get was written, the get is void.
5.
The Rambam rules that a get signed by acceptable witnesses is valid even when it was given without witnesses' observing the transfer (Chapter 1, Halachah 16). In this instance, however, even he maintains that witnesses must observe the transfer, for it is possible that the signatures of the witnesses on the get could be forged (Chelkat Mechokek 124:2).
6.
The difficulty with a get written on a parchment with erasures is that the text can be erased again and additions or deletions made without making a noticeable difference in the final product. Thus, stipulations could be added to the get, or the signatures of the witnesses altered. Similarly, changes could be made to a get written on any of the other substances that follow.
Another type of legal document written on such parchment would not be acceptable. The laws pertaining to a get are different, for in this instance the purpose of the document is not to serve as proof of the divorce, but instead to effect the dissolution of the marriage bond. The purpose of other legal documents, by contrast, is to serve as an account of the transactions they record.
7.
As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6, one may not detach the horn from the cow after the get was written on it, before giving the cow to the woman.
8.
Normally mesirah, transferring the reigns of an animal, is not an acceptable means of acquiring a cow, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 3:5. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, because the fundamental purpose of this transaction is not to transfer the cow, but to transfer theget (Hafla'ah; see also the gloss of theMaggid Mishneh to Chapter 9, Halachah 3).
9.
As reflected by a comparison to the second clause, this law applies when it is known that the servant belonged to the woman (Beit Shmuel 124:17). (See the notes on the following halachah.)
10.
The commentaries question why the signature of the witnesses is significant, for by tattooing the servant they have committed a transgression that disqualifies them from serving as witnesses.
11.
In this instance, the situation parallels the law described in Chapter 1, Halachah 16, which rules that a get signed by acceptable witnesses is acceptable, even when there are no witnesses to its transfer.
12.
See the Chelkat Mechokek 124:19, which states that if there are witnesses to the transfer of the servant, or the husband admits that the servant was given to the woman, the divorce is effective.
13.
See Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 10:1.
14.
Although the article on which the husband has the get written must belong to him, there is no difficulty in this instance, as will be explained.
15.
We assume that the witnesses who signed the get would have signed it only after verifying that the woman gave the tablet to her husband for the purpose of the divorce.
16.
I.e., he hewed out the lines that would normally be written.
17.
I.e., the letter is formed by working around the letter, and not on the form of the letter itself. This law has a corollary that is applicable to contemporary halachah. If ink spills near a letter, the shape of the letter may not be formed by scratching out the ink blotch (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer125:8).
18.
Without writing.
19.
In this instance, the writing will not remain permanently, but instead will be rubbed out in a short time. For this reason, the Rambam rules in Hilchot Shabbat 11:16 that sketching on a hide is not considered writing. Nevertheless, in this instance, since there is nothing lacking in the writing itself, the Rambam deems the get acceptable.
20.
See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer125:5), which mentions that there are some authorities who rule that etching is acceptable and sketching unacceptable, and others who accept sketching and disqualify etching.
21.
I.e., one may use Rashi script, rather than ordinary Hebrew writing (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 126:1). Indeed, in one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that his teacher, Rav Yosef Migash, preferred having a get written in Rashi script rather than using the letters used in writing a Torah scroll. The univeral custom at present, however, is to use the Assyrian script with which Torah scrolls are written [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 126:1)].
22.
I.e., there is no requirement to write it in Hebrew or Aramaic. Nevertheless, for centuries, it has been customary to use the standard Aramaic text quoted by the Rambam later on in this chapter.
23.
In Chapter 1, Halachah 23, the Rambam allows a get to be read for the witnesses. Nevertheless, in this instance the Rambam requires the witnesses to read the getthemselves. Since signing in another language is already a departure from the norm, no further leniency is granted (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
24.
Gittin 9:7 gives an example of one witness signing in Greek and the other in Hebrew. Even though the two languages use different characters, and even require writing in different directions, the get is acceptable.
Each of the witnesses' signatures is a separate and independent statement. Therefore, there is no need for the two signatures to be in the same language. Theget, by contrast, is a single unit and must be written in one language (Kessef Mishneh).
25.
This ruling is accepted by all authorities. Although the standard text of the get that is universally employed uses both Aramaic and Hebrew, this does not represent a contradiction. Our Sages explain that since both these languages were used at Mount Sinai, they are considered to be a single tongue (Ramah, Even HaEzer 126:1).
26.
See Halachah 13 for examples of wording that could create such doubt.
27.
See Hilchot Tefillin 1:19, which states that when a question arises concerning the writing for the parchments of the tefillin, a determination may be made on the basis of the reading of such a child.
28.
See Halachah 13 for examples of steps taken to prevent such confusion from arising.
29.
This basic text was already employed during the Talmudic era. At present, the later authorities in both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities have suggested minor emendations to the text quoted by the Rambam. As such, there are two standardgittin employed in Eretz Yisrael today.
30.
This refers to the years dating back to the beginning of Alexander the Great's kingdom, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 27.
31.
I.e., the city in which he dwells, not the city in which he was born (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 128:2). The Shulchan Aruchcontinues, stating "At present, when we are constantly being exiled and must wander, our place of residence is not defined." Instead, if the man is present at the composition of the get, it is written "who is located at present in this and this place."
32.
The Ashkenazi custom is not to employ this phrase and instead to specify all the names by which a person is called (Ramah, Even HaEzer 129:1).
33.
The concepts mentioned in the notes above with regard to the husband's place and names also apply with regard to his wife's.
34.
Chapter 1, Hilchot 15, 18, et al. In many manuscripts and early printings of theMishneh Torah, the phrases that follow are omitted, leading some to consider them to be the additions of a printer.
35.
Some texts of the Mishneh Torah also include the statement that space should be left between the leg of the heh and its roof. According to that text, לי מהך "for me, from now on."
36.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the get is unacceptable only when the husband protests and maintains that he intentionally had the scribe make such a mistake. If he does not issue such a protest, the get is acceptable. The Maggid Mishneh also mentions that there is a difference if the woman subsequently married on the basis of the get or not, and the Tur states that the get may be disqualified on this basis only if the husband writes it himself, or the scribe writes it in response to his explicit instructions.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 126:22) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but also mentions that of the Ra'avad and the Tur. An exception, however, is made with regard to writing the three yuddin in the words תצבייין and תהוייין. If only two yuddin are written, theget is acceptable. (See also the Beit Shmuel126:32.)
37.
See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 27:8.
38.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:19) states that at present it is customary to discard a get with a portion that has been rubbed out, instead of adding this line at the conclusion of the get. If, however, there is no alternative, a get is acceptable with an erasure, even if there is no explanation at the end, for we rely on the witnesses who observe the transfer (Beit Shmuel 125:35).
39.
The Ra'avad states that if the get had been certified by the court, it is acceptable even if it is torn in the above manner. The rationale is that we assume that the get was torn so that the woman would not be able to use it to demand payment of her ketubah a second time. The Rambam's ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:20), and the Ra'avad's clarification is mentioned by the Chelkat Mechokek 125:41.
40.
As reflected by the following halachah, this refers to an instance in which the get was given when it was acceptable, and its condition deteriorated afterwards.
41.
I.e., the disqualifications mentioned in the previous two halachot.
42.
This represents a difference between gittinand other legal documents, as reflected in Halachah 3 and notes (Maggid Mishneh).
43.
The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that if theget is faded to the point that it cannot be read at the time it is transferred, the fact that the transfer is observed by witnesses is to no avail, and the divorce is void.
He also mentions the opinion of the Rashba, who states that a get that is torn vertically and horizontally before it is given to the woman is not acceptable. He does not, however, accept that decision. His rulings are paralleled by those of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:21), which mentions both the Rambam's and the Rashba's views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.
44.
The others, by contrast, are not considered to be divorced, for we have no proof that the woman's husband in fact gave her this get. (See Gittin 86b.)
45.
I.e., no attention is paid to the witnesses who signed the get. Each of the women received a get that was written in acceptable manner, and whose transfer was observed by witnesses. This is sufficient for a divorce to be acceptable.
46.
For hers is an acceptable get, signed by witnesses. We are not concerned with the fact that the scroll contains other gittin above it.
47.
The get is acceptable only if the date that is stated in the beginning of the get is restated in the individual statement written for each woman. (See Beit Shmuel 130:13.)
48.
If the get is given to both women in the presence of witnesses who observe the transfer, both are divorced (Maggid Mishneh).
49.
Even when there are no witnesses who observe the transfer.
50.
I.e., under the first column, the witness signed "Ya'akov, the son of," and in the second column he continued "Yitzchak, a witness." The second witness did the same. In this instance, the witnesses have signed under the first get. If the witnesses signed their first names under one column, and signed "the son of so and so" in the second column, both gittin would be acceptable. For "the son of Ya'akov" is an acceptable signature."
This interpretation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 9:6). The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:8) offers a slightly different interpretation.
51.
I.e., the fact that the names of the fathers of the witnesses are located under the woman's get does not cause it to be considered a get with false signatures. (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 130:8.)
52.
These laws apply even when there are no witnesses who observed the transfer of the scroll. If there are witnesses who observed the transfer of the scroll to the second woman, even the second get is acceptable.
If the scroll is in the possession of the woman above whose get the witnesses sign, both the gittin are unacceptable unless there are witnesses who observed their transfer.
53.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 130:4) states that the get ispasul, unacceptable. That term implies that it is the Rabbis who disqualified the use of such a get, while according to Scriptural law it is acceptable.
54.
The fact that the witnesses did not sign in the proper place does not make the getinvalid.
55.
And thus a portion of the get that the woman receives would not have been written for her sake. For this reason, even if the get was given in the presence of witnesses who observed the transfer, it is not acceptable unless the witnesses testify that the get was originally written in two columns (Maggid Mishneh).
56.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:3) uses the term pasul, "unacceptable," meaning that the get was disqualified by Rabbinic decree alone. (See Beit Shmuel130:4.)
57.
The word "and" (in Hebrew, the letter vav) establishes a connection between the two, and the greeting is not considered to be a separate entity.
58.
In the first instance, even if we were to assume that the intent of the witnesses was to sign on the greeting, that does not disqualify the get. It is acceptable when given in the presence of witnesses.
Gerushin - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
The Torah's expression, [Deuteronomy, 24:1]: "He will... place it in her hand," need not be interpreted only [according to its strict literal meaning], that the getmust be placed in her hand. Regardless of whether the get is placed in her hand, her bosom or her courtyard, or is given to her agent whom she charged that his hand would be as her hand, the same law applies.1
The same laws apply to a courtyard that she acquired, one that she rented or one that is lent to her. They are all considered to be her property, and once the get reaches her property, the divorce is effective.
Halacha 2
[The following laws apply when a man] throws a get for his wife into her courtyard. If she is standing next to her courtyard, the divorce is effective.2 If she is not standing next to her courtyard, the divorce is not effective until she stands next to her courtyard.3
[These principles apply] even when the get will be guarded in the courtyard in which [it is placed]. [The rationale is that] divorce is considered to be a liability [and not an advantage] for [a woman]. And a liability may not be invoked against [a person] outside his [or her] presence.4
Halacha 3
[These rules apply when a get is given in the following situation. A woman] is standing on her roof, and [her husband] is standing in his courtyard that is located below it. He throws a get upwards to her.
Once the get reaches the space of the guardrail [to her roof] or comes within three handbreadths5 of the roof [when her roof does not have a guardrail], the divorce is effective.6 [This applies provided the get ultimately] comes to rest on her roof.7
If, however, [the writing of the get] is erased or [the get] is consumed by fire before it reaches her, the divorce is not effective. [This applies] even if the getis erased or consumed by fire after it passes the barriers of the woman's property or after it reaches within three handbreadths of her roof. [The rationale is that] since the get will never come to rest [in a complete state], it is void.
Halacha 4
[Different rules apply when] the roof belongs to the husband and he stands on it, while his wife stands below in a courtyard that belongs to her, and he throws her a get. Once the get passes the boundaries of his property and enters the boundaries of her property, where she is standing, the divorce is binding.8
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
When the husband tosses the get on top of a reed or a spear implanted in her domain,11 the divorce is not effective until [the get] comes to rest in a place that is protected by her.12
[The following rule applies when] there are two courtyards, the inner courtyard belongs to the woman, the outer courtyard belongs to the man, and the walls of the outer courtyard are taller than those of the inner courtyard. If [the husband] throws the get into the space [of the inner courtyard, above its walls, but lower than the walls] of the outer courtyard, the divorce is effective.13 [The rationale is] the inner [courtyard] is protected by the walls of the outer [courtyard]. This concept does not apply with regard to containers.
Halacha 7
What is implied?14 There are two containers, located one inside the other [and both are located in the husband's domain].15 The inner container belongs to her and the outer container belongs to him. If [the husband] throws the get to [his wife] toward the containers, the divorce is not effective16 - even when theget reaches the space of the inner container - until it comes to rest on the side of the inner container.
[Moreover,] the above applies only when [the woman's container] is lying on its side and does not have a bottom.17 If it has a bottom, even if [the get] comes to rest on that bottom, the divorce is not effective.18 For when a container belonging to a woman is located in the domain of the husband, the woman may not acquire a get by means of it unless the husband is not concerned about the place it occupies.
Halacha 8
When [a husband] throws a get to his wife while she is located in his house or in his courtyard, the divorce is not effective until the get reaches the woman's hand or a container that belongs to her, to whose presence within his domain the husband does not object - e.g., a small bottle or basket or the like.19
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] the husband lends his wife a place in his courtyard [for the purpose of receiving her get], without defining its borders.23If he throws her the get and it reaches within four cubits of where she is standing, the divorce is effective.24
When [in the above instance, the get] rolled away [from the place where the woman is standing,] and fell on a beam or on a rock further removed from her,25 [the following rules apply]. If the place where [the get] fell is not four cubits by four cubits, nor is it ten [handbreadths] high, nor does it have a separate name of its own, it is not considered to be a distinct entity, and it is as if [the get] and [the woman] were in the same place. [Therefore, the divorce is effective.]
If the place is characterized by any of these three factors, it is considered to be a distinct entity. [Since] the husband lent the woman one place, but not two places, the divorce is not effective until the get reaches her hand.
Halacha 10
If [the husband] throws the get to her [while she is in her domain], and [the get] passes through the domain and falls outside her domain [the divorce is not effective]. Even if the get passes within three [handbreadths] of the ground,26the divorce is not effective27 until [the get] comes to rest in her domain.
Halacha 11
[The following rule applies when a woman] is standing on her roof, [her husband] throws her [a get], and [instead of reaching her,] it falls on a roof [belonging to another person].28 If the woman can stretch out her hand and take it, the divorce is effective.
[The rationale is that] although the domains are divided above as they are divided below, [and thus the get is located on a domain that does not belong to the woman, this is not significant,] for people are not concerned with [a neighbor's making use of] their property in such a manner.
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply if a woman holds] her hand at an incline, [her husband] throws a get to her hand, and it falls to the earth. If it falls within four cubits of where she is standing and comes to rest there, the divorce is effective.29
When, [however, the get] falls into the sea or into a fire, the divorce is not effective, if she is standing next to the water or the fire [when the get is thrown to her]. [The rationale is] that, at the outset, it would be destroyed as it fell.
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when a husband] throws a get to [his wife] in the public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them. If [the get] is "close to him," the divorce is not effective. If [the get] is partially "close to him," and partially "close to her," the status of the divorce is in doubt unless it is definitely close to her. If [the get] is close enough to her that she can bend down and pick it up, the divorce is unacceptable [according to Rabbinic decree].30 [Only when] the get reaches her hand may she remarry on this basis a priori.
Halacha 14
What is meant by "close to him"? That he could protect the get while she could not. If both are able to protect [the get], or both are unable to protect it, it is considered to be partially "close to him," and partially "close to her."31
Halacha 15
[If a husband] comes to a place first and stands there, and then [his wife] comes and stands opposite him, the divorce is not effective if he throws her [aget] and [it falls] within his four cubits,32 even if she can bend down and pick it up.
If she comes to the place first and stands, and then he comes and stands opposite her and throws it to her, even when [the get] is partially "close to him" and partially "close to her," the get is [merely] deemed unacceptable [by virtue of Rabbinic decree] because it is within her four cubits.33 [Only when] the getreaches her hand [is the divorce effective a priori].
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when a husband] throws a get that is tied with a string into [his wife's] hand and he remains holding the other end of the string. If he can pull [the get from her hand] and bring it back to him,34 the divorce is not effective35 until he snaps the string.36 If he cannot pull [the get from her], the divorce is effective.
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when a husband] gives [a woman's] get to a servant belonging to her. If he is awake, he is bound and she is guarding him, the divorce is effective. It is considered to be as if [the get] were placed in a courtyard belonging to her and she is standing at its side. If [the servant] is not bound, the divorce is not effective.37
If [the husband] places [the get] in the servant's hand while he is sleeping, and [the woman] is guarding him, the get is unacceptable [by virtue of Rabbinic decree].38 If [the servant] is bound, the divorce is acceptable.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply if a husband] writes a get, places it in the hand of a servant belonging to him and writes a deed for the woman, giving her the servant as a present. If the servant is bound, the divorce is effective, for when she acquires the servant she also acquires the get. If the servant is unbound and awake, [the woman] acquires the servant; the divorce, however, is not effective until the get reaches her hand.39
Similarly, if [a man] placed a get in a courtyard belonging to him and sold or gave the courtyard to [his wife], the divorce is effective once she acquires the courtyard by virtue of the transfer of a deed or money, or by manifesting her ownership over it.
FOOTNOTES
1.
See Numbers 21:26, which uses the wordmiyado - literally, "from his hand" - as meaning "from his possession." A similar usage is frequent within the Torah and within Talmudic sources.
It must, however, be emphasized that the accepted practice is to place the get in the woman's hand and not to remain content with depositing it in her courtyard. (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 139:14.)
2.
With regard to a courtyard, a point of clarification is necessary. In general, the benefit from a woman's property belongs to her husband, and whatever is acquired by her property belongs to him. In this instance, however, we say that the acquisition of the bill of the divorce and the right to acquire the articles placed in her property become hers simultaneously.
3.
The Rambam's wording implies, however, that when the woman returns to her courtyard, the divorce is effective. Rav Meir HaLevi, as quoted by the Tur (Even HaEzer139) differs and maintains that the woman must be present at the time the get is placed in her courtyard. If she is not present at that time, Rav Meir HaLevi maintains that the divorce is not effective unless the husband waits and tells the woman: "This is your get," when she picks it up, or the husband must pick it up and give it to her again.
The Rashba submits a third opinion. He maintains that the status of the divorce is doubtful, for perhaps the woman desired the divorce. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer139:2-3 and commentaries.)
4.
When considering something which is to a person's advantage - e.g., the acquisition of an ownerless object - a person may perform this act on behalf of a colleague without his knowledge, for our Sages postulated: "one may act to a person's advantage outside his presence." The rationale is that the person would probably desire to acquire the object. When, however, a liability is considered, this principle does not apply. Nevertheless, if a woman explicitly states that a get should be placed in her courtyard, the divorce is effective even when she is not standing next to it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 139).
5.
In many different halachic contexts, three handbreadths of empty space is considered to be a continuation of the nearest significant halachic entity. This principle is referred to by the name l'vud.
6.
Since it will ultimately come to rest within her property, it is considered as though it has already come to rest.
Accordingly, from this time onward, even if the husband changes his mind and desires to nullify the divorce before the get reaches the ground, he no longer has that option. The divorce is effective and the marriage bond has been broken. If a second man consecrates her at this time, she is considered to be his wife (Maggid Mishneh).
7.
Most other authorities differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that as soon as the get enters the woman's possession, the divorce is effective, even though afterwards it is consumed by fire or its writing is wiped away by water, provided the fire or the water was not there before the husband threw the get. [Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 8:3), the Rambam does not mention the provision that ultimately the get must come to rest.] Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer139:4-5) mentions the Rambam's view, it is the approach of the other authorities that is favored.
8.
I.e., immediately, even if the get does not reach the woman's property. The rationale is that as long as the conditions mentioned in the following halachah are met, it may be assumed that the laws of gravity will prevail, and the get will come to rest in the woman's property. Therefore, even if it is destroyed by a fluke occurrence beforehand, the divorce is effective (Maggid Mishneh;Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 139:6).
9.
Since he initially threw the get into the fire, it is considered as though it will never come to rest and will never enter the woman's possession in a complete state.
10.
The phrase set off by parentheses is found in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, but is lacking in many authentic manuscripts and early printings. Eliminating the phrase would imply that there is a difference between the situation described in Halachah 4 and that described in Halachah 3.
This indeed is the Maggid Mishneh'scontention. As he explains, in Halachah 3 the husband is throwing the get against the natural gravitational pattern that prevails within the world, while in Halachah 4 the getis being thrown in a manner that conforms with the pattern of gravity. Therefore, as long as the get was not thrown into fire or water, the divorce is binding as soon as theget enters the woman's domain.
11.
The commentaries on Gittin 79a explain that this refers to an instance where the top of the reed or the spear is higher than the walls of the courtyard.
12.
For the wind may blow it outside the courtyard.
13.
Since the get will be protected by the walls of the outer courtyard even within the inner courtyard, if it is thrown toward the inner courtyard the divorce is effective after it enters the space of the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 139:9).
14.
There are two differences between courtyards and containers located in the husband's domain: a) With regard to the courtyard, it is sufficient for the get to enter the space of the husband's courtyard. With regard to a container, by contrast, this is not sufficient.
b) Even when a get comes to rest within a container, the divorce is not effective, except in the specific instance mentioned by the Rambam.
The rationale for both these differences is that the walls of a courtyard are made primarily for protecting the articles contained within, and in the above instance the walls of the outer courtyard also protect the articles within the inner courtyard. In contrast, the function of the wall of a container is to hold the object it contains (Rashi, Gittin 79b).
15.
The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh. There are other commentaries that maintain that the containers are located in the woman's domain or in a neutral domain. (See Beit Shmuel 139:13 and the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger on those comments.)
16.
The fundamental principle involved here is that a person cannot acquire an object by virtue of its being placed in a container belonging to him, if that container is located in a domain belonging to the giver, unless the giver is not concerned with the presence of the recipient's container. (See Hilchot Mechirah 4:1.)
It must be emphasized that this concept is not accepted by Rabbenu Asher and theTur. (See Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 200:3 and commentaries.)
17.
When a container is lying on its side and it does not have a bottom, it will not serve a functional purpose. Therefore, the husband will not be concerned that it is placed in his property. As such, if the get comes to rest on it, the divorce is effective.
18.
In this instance, the woman's container will serve a functional purpose. Therefore, it is likely that the husband will object to its presence on his property.
It must be emphasized that Tosafot, the Ra'avad, Rabbenu Nissim and others interpret the passage in Gittin, loc. cit.,differently from the Rambam. It is, however, the Rambam's view that is accepted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:9).
19.
Rashi (Gittin 77a) explains that a man must assume that a woman will bring such articles with her when she enters a domain. Therefore, the husband's acceptance of the woman's presence also implies a willingness to allow her to bring in such articles.
20.
If, however, the couch belongs to the husband, the divorce is not effective unless the get is given to the woman, even when the woman is sitting on the couch.
21.
Since the couch is ten handbreadths (80 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, 96 centimeters according to Chazon Ish) high, it is considered to be a separate entity. (See a parallel concept in Hilchot Kri'at Shema3:9.)
22.
Note the Maggid Mishneh, which explains that in other situations - e.g., a couch belonging to a purchaser that is in the domain of a seller - this concept would not necessarily apply, and the transfer would not be considered effective. (Note Beit Shmuel 139:15.)
23.
If he specified a place, the get would have to be deposited in that place.
24.
For we assume that the place where the woman is standing is the place that she was granted.
25.
Our translation is based on the interpretation of the Rambam's ruling offered by Rabbenu Nissim. The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's rulings, interpreting his approach as implying that if the place where the getcomes to rest is within four cubits of the woman, it would appear that the divorce should be effective even if any of these factors applies. And if the place is further removed, the divorce is never effective. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:11) rules according to other authorities, who interpret this passage according to the interpretation offered by Rabbenu Nissim. The interpretation of the Rambam's words offered by the Maggid Mishneh is mentioned as a minority opinion.
26.
Based on the principle of l'vud, three handbreadths is an extension of any given entity. Nevertheless, since, as happened, the get did not come to rest within the woman's domain, the fact that it passed through it close to the ground is not significant. This same principle is cited in several other contexts - e.g., Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 4:9. See also Hilchot Shabbat 13:16.
27.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 139) maintains that, as appears from Bava Metzia 12a, the matter is the subject of an unresolved Talmudic debate. Hence, the status of the divorce is a matter of doubt, and although the woman may not consider herself to be divorced, she may not continue living with her first husband, and if she was consecrated by another person, he is required to divorce her before she may marry anyone else.
28.
Our translation is based on the gloss of theMaggid Mishneh. The Ra'avad and others interpret Gittin 79b, the source for this halachah, as referring to two roofs belonging to the husband, and explain that it teaches a concept similar to that reflected by Halachah 9. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:12) mentions the Rambam's view, it favors the other interpretation.
29.
In certain circumstances, our Sages ordained although a person is standing in property that does not belong to him, the four cubits around him [or her] are considered to be his courtyard. And placing an article within that space is considered to be placing it in his domain. (See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9.) Therefore, just as if the get in a woman's courtyard had come to rest in the woman's courtyard, the divorce would be effective, so too it is effective if it comes to rest within four cubits of her.
If the get does not come to rest within four cubits of the woman, one might say that the outcome is dependent on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Turmentioned in the notes on Halachah 10. In this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:15) follows the opinion of theTur and rules that the status of the divorce is doubtful.
30.
In this instance, if the woman erred and remarried she is not forced to divorce her second husband. If, however, she remarried when the status of the divorce is in doubt, she may not remain married to her second husband.
31.
The Rambam does not mention an instance where the woman can protect the get but the husband cannot, and yet it is not close enough to her for her to bend down and pick it up. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would maintain that in such an instance the status of the divorce is doubtful.
Although with regard to kiddushin, in such an instance the Rambam rules that a marriage bond is established (Hilchot Ishut 4:22), the laws are more stringent with regard to divorce. The Beit Shmuel 139:22 states that most other authorities would differ and would agree that according to Scriptural law, the divorce is effective in such an instance; it is disqualified only by virtue of Rabbinic decree.
32.
Whenever an area becomes considered to be the "four cubits" belonging to one individual, another person may not acquire an article in that area until the first person departs (Gittin 78a).
33.
I.e., according to Scriptural law the divorce is effective, because the four cubits in which the woman is standing become her exclusive property.
34.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 138:2) interprets the intent as being that the knot tying the string to the get must be attached in a manner strong enough to allow the getto be pulled back to the husband. If it is tied loosely, the divorce is effective. If, however, it is the woman who prevents the husband from drawing back the get by clasping it within her hand, the divorce is not effective. The Shulchan Aruch does, however, mention another view, which rules the divorce acceptable in such an instance.
35.
Gittin 78b also derives this concept from the description of a divorce in Deuteronomy 24:3: "And he will write a bill of divorce for her, place it in her hand...." As long as the husband can retake possession of the bill of divorce, he has not severed his connection with the woman.
36.
If, however, the husband does snap the string, the Rambam rules the divorce to be effective. Other commentaries differ, explaining that since the giving of the getwas not carried out in the proper manner, the get must be given again for the divorce to be acceptable.
37.
Since the servant has an independent will, he is considered to be a courtyard that is not guarded by the woman herself. Also, the conception of a domain as equivalent to a person's hand applies only when that domain remains still and not when, as in the case of a servant, it moves.
Based on a difference in the version of Gittin78a, the source for this halachah, the Tur(Even HaEzer 139) and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that it is necessary for the servant to be both bound and asleep for the divorce to be effective. Although theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:16) quotes both opinions, the Rambam's view appears to be favored.
38.
I.e., since the servant was not bound, the Sages disqualified the divorce, lest one give a get to a servant while awake and unbound.
39.
The Rambam's wording implies that once the servant gives her the get, however, the divorce is effective. It is not necessary for the husband to take the get from the servant and give it to her. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 139:29, this point is not accepted by all authorities.
Gerushin - Chapter Six
Halacha 1
An agent who is appointed by a woman to receive her get from her husband is called a receiving agent (sh'liach kabbalah). When the get reaches this agent's hand, the divorce is completed,1 as if it has reached the hands of the woman herself.
[The agent] must be appointed in the presence of two witnesses, and two witnesses must be present when the get is conveyed to the agent. Even if the second pair of witnesses is the same as the first pair, or one of them is from the first pair, they are acceptable as witnesses.
Halacha 2
When does the above2 apply? When the get is lost or torn. If, however, the getis in the possession of the sh'liach kabbalah, there is no need for witnesses. This applies whether the get was given by the husband in private, or it was given in the presence of witnesses. The presence of the get in the possession of the agent is equivalent to its presence in the possession of the woman.3Nevertheless, a priori, the get should be given only in the presence of witnesses who observe its transfer, as is the case with regard to [a get given to] the woman herself.4
Halacha 3
A husband may not appoint an agent to receive a get for his wife.5 He may, however, appoint an agent to deliver a get to his wife. Such an agent is referred to as a delivery agent (sh'liach holachah).
Halacha 4
Similarly, a woman may appoint an agent to fetch her get for her from her husband. Such an agent is referred to as an agent who fetches (sh'liach hava'ah). Neither a sh'liach holachah nor a sh'liach hava'ah need [be appointed in the presence of] witnesses.6
Halacha 5
A woman is not divorced through the medium of a get sent by her husband or brought by a sh'liach hava'ah [whom she appointed] until the get reaches her hand.
Whenever the term agent is used with regard to a get without any further explanation, the intent is a sh'liach holachah or a sh'liach hava'ah.
Halacha 6
Anyone is acceptable to act as an agent with regard to a divorce, whether as a sh'liach kabbalah, a sh'liach holachah or a sh'liach hava'ah,7 with the exception of five individuals: a gentile, a servant, a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual and a minor.8 If one of these individuals brings or receives [a get], the divorce is not effective.
Halacha 7
Even women, relatives9 and individuals who are disqualified [from serving as witnesses] because of the violation of Rabbinic law are acceptable to serve as agents for a divorce.10 Individuals who are disqualified because of the violation of Scriptural law, by contrast, are not acceptable [to serve as agents] to deliver a get. If they bring it, the divorce is unacceptable.
Halacha 8
If the agent was a minor when he was given the get, and he attained majority when he brought it [to the woman], [or he was a] deaf mute and gained the ability to hear and speak, [or he was] mentally incompetent and gained competence, [or he was] a gentile and converted, or a servant and was freed, the divorce is void.14
If, however, the husband gives [an agent] a get while [the agent] is able to hear and speak, [or the agent then] becomes a deaf mute and afterwards regains his ability to hear and speak, or [the agent] was mentally competent, he lost his competence and then regained it when he brought it to the woman, the get is acceptable, for at the outset and at the conclusion, [the agent] was of sound mind.15
Halacha 9
When a woman appoints an agent in the presence of witnesses and tells him: "Take my get and keep it for me in your possession," the person is a sh'liach kabbalah. It is as if she told him: "Receive my get for me."
A woman may appoint a sh'liach kabbalah to receive her get for her from an agent appointed by her husband.16
A girl below the age of majority may not appoint a sh'liach kabbalah. Although she may acquire property by virtue of her courtyard in the same manner as an adult woman17 [she does not have the privilege of appointing an agent]. The rationale is that [the appointment of] a sh'liach kabbalah requires witnesses, and witnesses may not testify with regard to a minor, because she is not of complete mental competence.18
Halacha 10
[The following laws apply] when a woman has appointed a sh'liach kabbalahand her husband told him: "I do not want you to receive the get for her. Instead, here is her get. Bring it to her." The husband has this prerogative, and the person becomes a sh'liach holachah, rather than a sh'liach kabbalah.19
If, however, the husband tells [the woman's agent]: "Receive the get for her," "Here it is," or "Acquire it for her," he has not revoked the agency [with which] the sh'liach kabbalah [was charged]. But if [the husband] tells [the agent]: "Bring it to her," he has revoked the agency [with which] the sh'liach kabbalah[was charged] and has made him the agent of the husband.20 Similarly, if the husband said: "Bring it and give it to her," he has revoked the agency [with which] the sh'liach kabbalah [was charged].21
Halacha 11
[In the following situation, although the get reaches the woman's hand, the divorce is not effective because of the confusion in the delegation of agency.] An agent appointed by a woman came to receive her get from her husband. The agent told the husband: "I am a sh'liach kabbalah."
The husband responded: "Bring the get [in the capacity] in which she appointed you"22 - i.e., he did not revoke his agency. Instead, it is as if he had said: "Whether she appointed you to be a sh'liach kabbalah or a sh'liach hava'ah, you remain in that capacity."
The agent brought [the woman] the get, but she told him: "I did not appoint you to be a sh'liach kabbalah, but rather to be a sh'liach hava'ah." Even if the agent gives her the get, the divorce is not effective, for in speaking to the husband, the agent revoked the agency that he was granted. It is as if he had told him: "I was never appointed a sh'liach hava'ah on her behalf."
Halacha 12
[A different ruling applies in the following instance.] The agent told the husband, "I am a sh'liach hava'ah," and the husband told him, "Bring [the getin the capacity] in which she appointed you."
The agent brought [the woman] the get, but she told him: "I appointed you to be a sh'liach kabbalah." When the get is delivered to the woman, the divorce is effective, for he did not revoke the agency that he was granted. He merely reduced [her dependence on him]. For she appointed him [as an agent] to receive [the get], and he said: "I will merely bring it."23
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when] a husband sends a get to his wife, and when the agent attempts to give it to her, she refuses to take it and tells him in the presence of witnesses, "Hold the get in safekeeping,"24 or "You are an agent to receive it for me." Until the get is given to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt.25 Once it reaches her possession, the divorce is definitely binding.
Halacha 14
When an agent brings a get, he must give it to the woman in the presence of two [witnesses].26 These two [witnesses] must read [the get] and then have it given in their presence.27 For the laws applying to the exchange between the agent and the woman are the same as those applying to her exchange with her husband, for the agent is taking his place.
Accordingly, if the agent gave [the get] to her without having it read by the witnesses who observed its transfer, and the woman took it and threw it into a fire, the status of the divorce is in doubt.28
Halacha 15
When an agent transgresses and gives [a woman her] get in private, he should take it back from her and give it to her in the presence of two [witnesses].29 If he dies [and thus this is no longer possible], and the signatures of the witnesses on the get that the woman possesses have been verified, the divorce is acceptable.
Halacha 16
Even when a get is delivered to the woman [for whom it is intended], it can be nullified [in the following instances]: The agent took the get, but the husband changed his mind before it reached the woman and told him or her: "The getthat I sent you is void," he sent another agent to nullify [the get], or he told others, "The get that I sent to my wife is void."30
When [a husband] nullifies the get in the presence of other people,31 there must be at least two people present.32 If the get has already been delivered to the woman or to a sh'liach kabbalah, the husband can no longer nullify it.33[This applies] even if he nullifies the get within a very brief time34 [after appointing the agent];35 since [the get] was nullified after being delivered to the woman, to [her] sh'liach kabbalah or to her courtyard, it is not void, and the divorce is effective.
Halacha 17
Although [a husband] was seeking to appoint an agent to nullify [a get], or he was seeking two individuals so that he could nullify [the get] in their presence, and during the time he was searching for these individuals the get reached the woman's hand, and afterwards he nullified it, it is not void.36 Despite the fact that he was trying to nullify it before it reached her hand [the divorce is effective].
Halacha 18
If [the husband] told ten men: "Write a get and give it to my wife,"37 he may nullify [the get] in the presence of one of the ten, although the others are not present. And he may nullify it in the presence of two other people [who were not involved originally].
If he sent the get via two [agents], he may negate one of the agents although the other is not present. Even when there are ten agents, when he negates [the agency] in the presence of one of them, the get is void.38
Halacha 19
Similarly, when a person tells two [witnesses],39 "The get that I [am intending to] write for my wife is nullified," although he has a get written afterwards and gives it to her in the presence of two other [witnesses], the divorce is void. This is referred to as lodging an objection with regard to a get.40
Similarly, if [the husband] were to tell two [witnesses]: "Any get that so and so will write for me is nullified," "Any get that I will have written in the court of so and so is nullified," or "Any get that I will have written in the next twenty years is nullified," the get is nullified.
Similarly, if he told two [witnesses]: "Any get that I write for so and so, my wife, is nullified. And any statements that I make to nullify this objection are nullified," the get is void, although he had it written and given to her, despite the fact that he nullified his objection before having the get written.
Halacha 20
How can the latter situation be corrected?41 The witnesses should tell [the husband] before the composition of the get: "Affirm in our presence that any statements that you have made that when verified would cause [this] get to be nullified, are themselves nullified."42 [The husband] must answer "Yes."
Afterwards, he should instruct them to write the get, sign it and give it to his wife. We do not let [the husband] leave until the get is delivered [to his wife], lest he go out and nullify [the get].43
Neither a person who lodges an objection [to a get], nor one who seeks to nullify such an objection needs [to have his statements affirmed by] an act of contract.
Halacha 21
When a person has sent a get via an agent and [later] nullifies [the giving of] the get, he may divorce the woman with [this get] whenever he desires. He did not nullify the get as a get; he merely nullified the agency.
Therefore, if the get was in the possession of the husband and he nullified it - e.g., he said: "This get is nullified" - he may never use it for a divorce. It is like a broken shard, and if it is used for a divorce, the divorce is not effective.44
Similarly, if the get was entrusted to the agent, but the husband made an explicit statement, saying: "The get that I sent is nullified [and may not] serve as a get," he may never use it to effect a divorce.
Halacha 22
Which wording can be used to nullify a get? [The husband] says: "It is nullified," "I cannot abide by it," "May this get not be effective," "[May it] not permit [her]," "[May it] not release [her], "[May it] not send [her] forth," "[May it] not divorce [her]," "May it be a shard," "May it be like a shard," or "Behold it is like a shard" - If he used any of these expressions or a similar one, he has negated it.45
Halacha 23
If, however, [the husband] says: "This get is not a get," "It is unacceptable," "It is not effective," "It does not permit [her]," "It does not release [her], "It does not send [her] forth," "It does not divorce [her]," "It is a shard," his statements are not effective. This wording does not [indicate his desire to] nullify [the get]. Instead, they are statements of fact, and in this instance, statements of incorrect fact.46 It is as if someone said that a forbidden entity were permitted or that an impure object were pure.
Halacha 24
If he says, "This get is nullified," [it is possible that] the implication is the use of the past tense, as in the phrase [Song of Songs 5:6]: "He turned away and was gone." Thus, there is a question concerning the matter.47 Therefore, if [a woman] has been divorced with this get [after such statements were made], the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Halacha 25
[As reflected in the following instance, an explicit statement must be made to nullify the get: A man] sent a get to his wife [via an agent]. The agent returned to him and said: "I could not find her," or "She did not want to receive it." Although the husband answered: "Blessed be He who is good and does good," or made other statements that imply that he no longer wants to divorce her, and that he is happy that the get was not delivered, the get is not nullified. Instead, he may give it to her and the divorce will be effective. [For the get to be nullified,] he must explicitly say "Do not give it to her," or he should explicitly nullify it [using one of the above expressions].
Halacha 26
A person who sent a get to his wife [via an agent] and then nullified [the get] in the presence of two other people,48 and similarly, a person who issued an objection [nullifying] a get, should be given stripes for rebelliousness, because he makes it possible for illegitimate children to be conceived.
Since a get reached [the woman], [it is possible that] she will marry on this basis. [Only] afterwards, when the witnesses in whose presence the husband nullified the get or issued an objection before the get was written appear [will she realize the difficulty]. Thus, a child [conceived in her second marriage] will be illegitimate.
Halacha 27
When an agent brings a get and gives it to a woman, we do not suspect that the husband nullified it. Instead, he should give it to the woman under the presumption that it is acceptable, and the woman may marry on this basis. If it is discovered afterwards that [the husband] negated it, [the woman] must leave [her second husband], and any children conceived are illegitimate.
Similarly, when [a husband] has a get written and gives it to his wife, we do not suspect that perhaps he lodged an objection regarding this get. Instead, we operate under the conception that the get is acceptable, and the woman is allowed to marry on this basis.
Halacha 28
Similarly, when an agent brings a get [that was sent by] a man who was sick or elderly, he may give it to the woman under the presumption that the husband is still alive. If, however, the husband was in his death throes when [the agent left], even when he gives the get to the woman the status of the divorce is in doubt. For the majority of those in their death throes will die, and a get given after death is not effective.49
Similarly, when a city is surrounded by an army50 and held under siege, a ship is in distress at sea,51 or a person is taken out to be judged [with regard to a capital case],52 we presume that any person in such a situation is alive. If a person in such a situation has sent a get [to his wife] via an agent, he may give it to her, and the presumption will be that the divorce is effective.
Halacha 29
When, by contrast, a city has been conquered by an attacking army and [its wall] broken, a ship is lost at sea,53 a person is being taken out to be executed by a gentile court,54 or he is being dragged by a beast of prey, swept away by a river or an avalanche has fallen upon him, the stringencies applying to both the living and the dead, are followed.
Halacha 30
When a husband sends his wife a get, he is obligated to provide her with support and fulfill the other stipulations of the marriage contract, until the getreaches [his wife] or a sh'liach kabbalah she has appointed.57
FOOTNOTES
1.
And from that time onward, the husband cannot recant.
2.
That is, when does the requirement for witnesses apply?
3.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 16.
4.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 15.
5.
A divorce is considered to be undesirable and detrimental for a woman. Therefore, an agent cannot be appointed for her without her consent. For an activity that is detrimental to a person cannot be performed on his or her behalf without his will (Gittin62b).
6.
See Hilchot Ishut 3:15, where the Rambam states: "For the only purpose witnesses would serve with regard to the agency... is to make known the truth of the matter."
According to the Rambam, the distinction between these agents and a sh'liach kabbalah appointed by the woman is that through the acceptance of the get the marriage bonds are annulled, and "no matters involving forbidden sexual relations [are established if] fewer than two witnesses are present (Yevamot 88a)." Since thesh'liach kabbalah is concerned only with receiving the get, his agency involves nothing else but the actual divorce. Hence, witnesses must be present to acknowledge the appointment of this agent. In contrast, the agency of a sh'liach holachah and ash'liach hava'ah also involves transporting the get, an activity that is merely a preparatory step for the divorce. Hence, witnesses are not required for his appointment.
It must be emphasized that the Ra'avad and others offer a far more straightforward rationale clarifying the distinction between these agents. A sh'liach holachah and ash'liach hava'ah each carry the get with them. Hence, they need no further proof of their agency. A sh'liach kabbalah, by contrast, does not have possession of theget before the divorce. Hence, his position must be strengthened by having his appointment observed by witnesses.
In practice, it has already become customary for the appointment of a sh'liach holachah to be certified by a written document. There are opinions that differ and require that the appointment of a sh'liach holachah also be observed by witnesses. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 141:11, 30, 40.)
7.
The Rambam's statements are intended to negate the opinion of his teacher, Rabbi Yosef Migash, who maintains that a servant may serve as a sh'liach holachah. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:31) quotes both views, but appears to favor the Rambam's view.
8.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 15, and Hilchot Ishut 3:17.
9.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 141:33) states that a priori, it is proper that the agent not share any family ties with the husband, his wife, or the judges executing the divorce.
10.
It would appear that even if the signatures of the witnesses have not been verified, and the acceptability of a get depends on the agents' statements, these individuals may serve as agents.
11.
That the divorce is unacceptable, but not void.
12.
As can be seen in the various manuscript copies of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 2:6), the Rambam changed his opinion regarding the acceptance of these individuals as agents when the veracity of the signature on a get has been established. The standard text of the Commentary on the Mishnah states that if the witnesses' signatures have been verified, the get is acceptable unless the person worships false gods or violates the Sabbath in public. This is also the view of other authorities and is the ruling favored by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:33).
13.
See also Chapter 12, Halachah 17. Based on the objections of the Ra'avad, the Kessef Mishneh modifies the Rambam's ruling slightly, explaining that the intent is that the woman may not remarry, and not that theget is void. If, however, she does remarry, her second husband is also required to divorce her.
The get she received from her first husband is not void, because it is possible that witnesses will come and verify the signatures on the get. In such an event, the divorce will be effective retroactively. Nevertheless, since those signatures have not been verified as of yet, her second husband must divorce her.
Rav David Arameah explains that the Rambam's intent is that the get is still viable, but it should be given to another agent to effect the divorce. Note the Maggid Mishnehand others, who question the source for the Rambam's ruling.
14.
In all these instances, since the agent was not fit to serve in that capacity at the time the agency was delegated to him, it is as if the agency had never been conveyed upon him.
15.
The fact that, in the interim, he was unfit to serve as an agent is of no significance. Note the Or Sameach, who on this basis questions what the law would be if the husband negates the agency and then desires to reestablish it. Must he reappoint the agent or not?
16.
Gittin 63b states that our Sages entertained a hypothesis that this involves a disregard for the honor of the husband, and therefore the divorce should be void, but they did not accept this theory.
17.
And thus, if a get were placed in her courtyard, the divorce would be acceptable. Moreover, the effectiveness of a courtyard in the acceptance of a get is associated with the concept of agency. (See Bava Metzia10b and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on Chapter 5, Halachah 2.)
18.
The Ra'avad disagrees with the Rambam and maintains that the rationale is that a minor is never empowered to appoint an agent. And thus, a woman below majority may not appoint a sh'liach hava'ah either. It must be noted that in Hilchot Sh'luchin V'Shutafin 2:2, the Rambam indeed states that in no instance may a minor appoint an agent. See the Lechem Mishneh and Rav Kapach, who emphasize that a special law applies with regard to an agent to receive aget, for he is considered to be the extension of the woman's hand. Note the Rambam's wording in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.
19.
Hence, the divorce does not become final when the agent receives the get. It is only when the get reaches the woman's hand that the divorce takes effect.
20.
I.e., the husband's statements imply that he is unwilling to give the agent the get in his original capacity, but that he is willing to charge him with a different agency - bringing the woman the get as agent of the husband.
This ruling is not accepted by all authorities. The Rashba and Rabbenu Nissim differ, maintaining that in such an instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt. The Rambam's opinion is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 140:6), while the other views are cited by the Ramah.
21.
Although with regard to the transfer of a present the Rambam maintains that the expression "Give it to him" is equivalent to saying "Acquire it on his behalf" (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:4), because the husband said "Bring it to her" it is clear that he desired the agent to serve in the capacity of a sh'liach holachah.
22.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 140:8) explains that the phrase "in the capacity in which she appointed you" is of primary significance here. If the husband does not add that phrase and says merely: "Bring theget to her," he is appointing the agent to be ash'liach holachah, and by taking the get the agent is accepting this appointment. Therefore, if the agent delivers the get to the woman, the divorce is effective.
23.
By serving as a sh'liach hava'ah, the agent accepts far more responsibility and difficulty than by serving as a sh'liach kabbalah. If he served as a sh'liach kabbalah, the divorce would be completed after he received theget. As a sh'liach hava'ah, the agent must trouble himself to bring the get to the woman. As such, we assume that since the woman was willing to accept the agent as a sh'liach kabbalah, she is certainly willing to accept him as a sh'liach hava'ah.
Note the Lechem Mishneh and Rabbenu Nissim, who explain that it is possible that the husband relied on the words of the agent, or it is possible that he was concerned with the words of his wife. Indeed, with regard to questions of commercial law, there is an unresolved question in Bava Metzia 76a regarding this matter. Following this rationale, even if theget never reached the woman, as long as it reached the agent the status of the divorce is in doubt. This ruling is also cited by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 140:9).
24.
With this expression, the woman's intent is that the agent should begin acting as her agent and hold the get for her. For keeping the get as an entrusted article violates the instructions that her husband gave him (Rabbenu Nissim).
25.
The doubt is whether an agent can begin acting in the capacity of the woman's agent before he has completed executing the agency with which he was charged by the husband (Gittin 63b).
26.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 16.
27.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.
28.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 21.
29.
The Rambam rules that after the fact, a getgiven in private is acceptable. There are, however, geonim who hold that such a get is unacceptable (Chapter 1, Halachah 16). Since the status of an agent is weaker than that of the husband himself, a second transfer of the get is required in this instancea priori (Maggid Mishneh).
30.
See Halachah 26. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 141:59) rules that at the outset, a husband should not nullify a getunless either the agent he appointed or his wife is present. Otherwise, it is possible that the woman may receive the get - and marry another man - before receiving notice that her get was nullified.
31.
I.e., people other than the agent. If he nullifies the get in the presence of the agent, no one else need be present.
32.
Note the Ramah (Even HaEzer 141:59), who cites an opinion that allows the husband to nullify the get by speaking to two people, one outside the presence of the other.
33.
For the divorce has already taken effect.
34.
In this context, the words "a very brief time" are a loose translation. The Hebrew termtoch k'dei dibbur has a very specific meaning: the amount of time necessary to say "Shalom alecha, rabbi umori."
35.
The rationale is that divorcing a wife is a very serious matter, and a man would not make such a decision unless he were resolute. Therefore, his change of mind is not considered to be a clarification of his original position (as in certain other instances - e.g., a retraction of a business commitment), but rather an entirely new decision. (Note the parallels to Hilchot Ishut7:22, Hilchot Avodah Zarah 2:9 and Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17.)
36.
The fundamental principle involved is that Torah law depends on a person's acts and statements, not his feelings. Although it is obvious that the husband desired to nullify the get, since he was not able to take binding action the divorce is valid. (See also Halachah 25.)
37.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 27.
38.
The Ra'avad differs with Rambam and maintains that although a person may nullify the agency of one of the two (or ten), doing so does not nullify the agency of the other(s), and if they give the woman the get, the divorce is effective. Although the Rambam's opinion is also mentioned, it is that of the Ra'avad that is favored by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:61).
39.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 134:1) states that even when the husband makes statements to two witnesses individually, the objection is binding.
40.
In Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 6, the Rambam explains the details of lodging an objection with regard to a sale. There he explains that when a person is compelled to make a sale against his will, he can nullify the transaction by issuing an objection stating that he was compelled to make this sale. With regard to an objection to a get, other authorities (seeTur and Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, Chapter 134) also mention the concept of compulsion. The Rambam, however, omits mention of the subject entirely.
As reflected in Halachah 27, our Sages considered lodging an objection to a get in a very negative light.
41.
The situation mentioned by the Rambam in the previous halachah is not merely a theoretical question. In many instances, a husband who was compelled to divorce his wife would seek to have the get nullified so that their marriage could continue. Similarly, apostates and men whose feelings toward their wives have soured have sought to nullify their divorces in order to cause their wives difficulties.
42.
Many of the other commentaries differ with the Rambam concerning this point. Some - e.g., the Rashba - are more stringent, for they maintain that the husband can word his objection to nullify even such a statement. They explain that to insure that the get is not nullified, the husband must also disqualify the testimony of any witness who heard his objections.
Others - e.g., Rabbenu Asher - are more lenient and maintain that all that is necessary is for the husband to say that all objections to the get are nullified. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 134:3) rules according to the Rashba. The Ramah maintains that Rabbenu Asher's ruling is halachically acceptable; however, he counsels following the Rashba's ruling to eliminate all doubts.
43.
Despite the statements that he had made previously, if the husband nullified the getafterwards, his statements would be effective and the divorce void (Maggid Mishneh).
44.
There are authorities who differ with the Rambam on this point, based on their version of Gittin 32b. According to these authorities, since the get was written according to law, it is always able to be used for a divorce and can never be nullified by the husband. In consideration of the opinion of these authorities, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 141:66), when quoting this law, rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
45.
The point is that these expressions all indicate that the husband no longer desires to use this get to divorce his wife.
46.
For all the statements quoted above are false. The get is effective; it is the husband who no longer desires to use it.
47.
The Rambam implies that the question is whether the word לטב implies a future tense - i.e., that his intent is to nullify the get - in which instance the divorce would not be effective. Or whether it implies the past tense, in which case, as in the previous halachah, the husband would be giving us incorrect information.
Rashi offers a slightly different interpretation of the passage in Gittin 32b that serves as the source for this halachah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:63) quotes both opinions.
48.
If, however, the man nullifies the get in the presence of the agent or in the presence of his wife, there is no difficulty.
49.
The primary reason for giving such a get - for the marriage is terminated with the husband's death regardless - is to free a childless woman from the obligations ofyibbum and chalitzah. If the get was given before the husband's death, these rites are not necessary. Otherwise, they are. With the current advances in record keeping and communication, it is usually possible to eliminate the doubt mentioned in this halachah.
50.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:69) states that this law applies only when a city is surrounded by the army of the ruling authority. If it is surrounded by an army from another country, we no longer operate under the presumption that the husband is alive.
51.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin3:4), the Rambam defines a ship in distress as follows: "One that faces a tempest-torn sea that threatens to sink it. The sailors are unable to control its path as they desire.... Nevertheless, all the oars and the other instruments remain intact."
52.
This applies regardless of whether the person is being tried by a Jewish court or a gentile court.
53.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam defines this as referring to a ship whose oars, steering mechanism and other navigational tools have been broken, and it is totally at the mercy of the waters.
The laws that apply when a ship has sunk are described in Chapter 13, Halachah 16.
54.
The implication is that if the person was sentenced to death by a Jewish court, we presume that the sentence was carried out. (See Hilchot Terumot 9:2.) In contrast, there is a possibility that a gentile court will accept a bribe.
55.
Lest the husband have died already.
56.
For we do not know which came first, the husband's death or the giving of the get.
57.
Although the husband desires to divorce her, she remains his wife until the getreaches her. Therefore, the husband remains obligated by the marriage contract.
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Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Friday, Shevat 26, 5776 · 05 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Monday Sh'vat 26 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: To be sure (p. 107)...as is known. (p. 107).
Ahava, affection, is the breath of life in the Avoda of Chassidus. It is the thread that binds chassidim to each other, that binds Rebbe to chassidim and chassidim to Rebbe. Ahava works in a direct way (initiated affection) and also in a reflective way (responding to the other's affection). It knows no barriers and transcends the limits of time and place.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Friday, Shevat 26, 5776 · 05 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Monday Sh'vat 26 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: To be sure (p. 107)...as is known. (p. 107).
Ahava, affection, is the breath of life in the Avoda of Chassidus. It is the thread that binds chassidim to each other, that binds Rebbe to chassidim and chassidim to Rebbe. Ahava works in a direct way (initiated affection) and also in a reflective way (responding to the other's affection). It knows no barriers and transcends the limits of time and place.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
Investing in Earth
Why are you afraid? Why do you panic?
Eagerly and with purpose, your soul plunged downward to live in an earthly realm,
to enwrap herself in a body of flesh and blood.
What emboldened her? What drew her to squeeze her unbounded light
into the straitjacket of time and space?
It was neither fear, nor dread, nor panic.
It was the knowledge that here below
is a beauty the highest of angels cannot touch.
Care for yourself, for your family, for your fellow human beings and our lovely planet earth,
not out of fear, nor from distress,
but out of love and awe
for the beauty within
that we came to uncover.
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