Rosh Chodesh: Numbers 28:1 (v) Adonai said to Moshe, 2 “Give an order to the people of Isra’el. Tell them, ‘You are to take care to offer me at the proper time the food presented to me as offerings made by fire, providing a fragrant aroma for me.’ 3 Tell them, ‘This is the offering made by fire that you are to bring to Adonai: male lambs in their first year and without defect, two daily as a regular burnt offering.
28:3 Tell them, ‘This is the offering made by fire that you are to bring to Adonai: male lambs in their first year and without defect, two daily as a regular burnt offering. 4 Offer the one lamb in the morning and the other lamb at dusk, 5 along with two quarts of fine flour as a grain offering, mixed with one quart of oil from pressed olives. 6 It is the regular burnt offering, the same as was offered on Mount Sinai to give a fragrant aroma, an offering made by fire for Adonai. 7 Its drink offering is to be one-quarter hin for one lamb; in the Holy Place you are to pour out a drink offering of intoxicating liquor to Adonai. 8 The other lamb you are to present at dusk; present it with the same kind of grain offering and drink offering as in the morning; it is an offering made by fire, with a fragrant aroma for Adonai.
9 “‘On Shabbat offer two male lambs in their first year and without defect, with one gallon of fine flour as a grain offering, mixed with olive oil, and its drink offering. 10 This is the burnt offering for every Shabbat, in addition to the regular burnt offering and its drink offering.
11 “‘At each Rosh-Hodesh of yours, you are to present a burnt offering to Adonai consisting of two young bulls, one ram and seven male lambs in their first year and without defect; 12 with six quarts of fine flour mixed with olive oil as a grain offering for the one ram; 13 and two quarts of fine flour mixed with olive oil as a grain offering for each lamb. This will be the burnt offering giving a fragrant aroma, an offering made by fire for Adonai. 14 Their drink offerings will be two quarts of wine for a bull, one-and-one-third quarts for the ram, and one quart for each lamb. This is the burnt offering for every Rosh-Hodesh throughout the months of the year. 15 Also a male goat is to be offered as a sin offering to Adonai, in addition to the regular burnt offering and its drink offering.
Today's Laws & Customs:
• Rosh Chodesh Observances Today is the first of the two Rosh Chodesh ("Head of the Month") days for the month of Adar I (this year being a leap year there are two months called "Adar" -- Adar I and Adar II).
Special portions are added to the daily prayers: Hallel (Psalms 113-118) is recited -- in its "partial" form -- following the Shacharit morning prayer, and the Yaaleh V'yavo prayer is added to the Amidah and to Grace After Meals; the additional Musaf prayer is said (when Rosh Chodesh is Shabbat, special additions are made to the Shabbat Musaf). Tachnun (confession of sins) and similar prayers are omitted.
Many have the custom to mark Rosh Chodesh with a festive meal and reduced work activity. The latter custom is prevalent amongst women, who have a special affinity with Rosh Chodesh -- the month being the feminine aspect of the Jewish Calendar.
Links: The 29th Day; The Lunar Files
Today in Jewish History:
• Tosfot Yomtov Appointed Rabbi of Krakow (1644)
The 30th of Shevat is celebrated by the descendents of Rabbi Yomtov Lipman Heller (1579-1654) as a day of thanksgiving, for his liberation and restoration after his imprisonment in Vienna in 1629.
Rabbi Yomtov Lipman was one of the important rabbinical figures of the early 17th century. Known as the "Tosfos Yomtov" after his commentary on the Mishnah by that name, he also authored important commentaries on the Rosh and other rabbinical works. A disciple of the famed Maharal of Prague, Rabbi Yomtov Lipman was appointed, at the tender age of 18, to serve as a dayan (rabbinical judge) in in that city. He subsequently filled a number of prestigious rabbinical positions, including rabbi of Nikolsburg and of Vienna. In 1627 he was recalled to Prague to serve as the city's chief rabbi.
That position earned him powerful enemies when he refused to follow the dictates of Prague's rich and influential citizens and strove to relieve the burden imposed on the poor by the suffocating "crown taxes" imposed on the Jews. His enemies informed on him to the government, falsely accusing him of treason. In 1629, Rabbi Yomtov Lipman was arrested, tried and sentenced to death. The Jewish communities of Bohemia succeeded in having the sentence commuted and reduced to a heavy fine, and raised the funds for the payment of the first installment that secured his release. However, his enemies obtained an imperial decision that he could not officiate as rabbi in any town of the empire, leaving him homeless and destitute. It took many years for him to pay off the balance of the fine and be restored to his former position. It was only in the winter of 1644, when he settled in Krakow after being appointed chief rabbi of the city, that he felt that that he could celebrate his release and restoration.
Shevat 30th (the 1st day of Rosh Chodesh Adar)--the day that Rabbi Yomtov Lipman assumed the rabbinate of Krakow--was celebrated by him and his family as a day of thanksgiving to G-d. Rabbi Yomtov Lipman asked that future generations continue to mark the date, and the custom is upheld by his descendants to this day.
Links:
The Tosfot Yomtov
Daily Quote:
It is one of the foundations of the Jewish religion that G-d communicates to human beings in prophesy[Maimonides]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Terumah, 3rd Portion Exodus 25:31-26:14 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 25
31And you shall make a menorah of pure gold. The menorah shall be made of hammered work; its base and its stem, its goblets, its knobs, and its flowers shall [all] be [one piece] with it. לאוְעָשִׂ֥יתָ מְנֹרַ֖ת זָהָ֣ב טָה֑וֹר מִקְשָׁ֞ה תֵּֽיעָשֶׂ֤ה הַמְּנוֹרָה֙ יְרֵכָ֣הּ וְקָנָ֔הּ גְּבִיעֶ֛יהָ כַּפְתֹּרֶ֥יהָ וּפְרָחֶ֖יהָ מִמֶּ֥נָּה יִֽהְיֽוּ:
The menorah shall be made of hammered work: [meaning] that it must not be made in sections, [which can be removed]. Its branches and its lamps should not be made individually and then attached, as is the custom of the smiths [through a process] called solderez [in French], soldering, but it [the menorah] must come [be constructed] entirely from one piece [of gold]-beaten with a hammer and cut with a tool, and the branches separated on both sides. — [from Baraitha Melecheth HaMishkan.] מקשה תעשה המנורה: שלא יעשנה חוליות, ולא יעשה קניה ונרותיה איברים איברים, ואחר כך ידביקם כדרך הצורפין, שקורין שולדי"ר בלעז [להלחים] אלא כולה באה מחתיכה אחת, ומקיש בקורנס וחותך בכלי האומנות ומפריד הקנים אילך ואילך:
of hammered work: Heb. מִקְשָׁה. Its Aramaic translation is נְגִיד, an expression of drawing out, [meaning] that he draws the parts out of the block of gold on either side by beating [it] with a hammer. The word מִקְשָׁה means the blow of a hammer, batediz in Old French, hammered, like “knocked (נָקְשָׁן) one against the other” (Dan. 5:6). מקשה: תרגומו נגיד, לשון המשכה שממשיך את האיברים מן העשת לכאן ולכאן בהקשת הקורנס, ולשון מקשה מכת קורנס, בטידי"ץ בלעז [עשוי בהכאה] כמו (דניאל ה ו) דא לדא נקשן):
the menorah shall be made: By itself. Since Moses found difficulty with it [i.e., figuring out how to form the menorah], the Holy One, blessed is He, said to him, “Cast the talent [equivalent to sixty-four pounds of gold] into the fire, and it will be made by itself.” Therefore, it is not written: ךְתֵּעָשֶׂה but ךְתֵּיעָשֶׂה. -[from Tan. Beha’alothecha 3] תיעשה המנורה: מאליה, לפי שהיה משה מתקשה בה, אמר לו הקב"ה השלך את הככר לאור והיא נעשית מאליה, לכך לא נכתב תעשה:
its base: This refers to the foot on the bottom [of the menorah], which was made like a box with three legs coming out of it [protruding] downwards. ירכה: הוא הרגל של מטה העשוי כמין תיבה, ושלשה רגלים יוצאין הימנה ולמטה:
and its stem: [This refers to] its central stem rising from the middle of the base, erected upward. At the top of it was the middle lamp, made like a spoon, into which the oil was poured and the wick inserted. וקנה: הקנה האמצעי שלה העולה באמצע הירך זקוף כלפי מעלה, ועליו נר האמצעי עשוי כמין בזך לצוק השמן לתוכו ולתת הפתילה:
its goblets: They are a sort of cups made of glass, long and narrow, which are called maderins [in Old French], long, slender glass goblets. These, however, were made of gold, and they protruded from every branch according to the number prescribed by the text. They were [placed] on it [the menorah] only for beauty. גביעיה: הן כמין כוסות שעושין מזכוכית ארוכים וקצרים, וקורין להם מדרינ"ש בלעז [גביעים], ואלו עשויין מזהב ובולטין ויוצאין מכל קנה וקנה כמנין שנתן בהם הכתוב, ולא היו בה אלא לנוי:
its knobs: [They were] like sort of round apples all around [the branch], protruding [outward] around the middle branch, in the style of the menoroth that are made for princes. They are called pomeles [in French], apple-shaped knobs (Men. 28b). Their number is prescribed in this parsha, [i.e.,] how many knobs protruded from it and how much [space] was [left] unadorned between one knob and another knob. כפתריה: כמין תפוחים עגולין סביב, בולטין סביבות הקנה האמצעי, כדרך שעושין למנורות שלפני השרים וקורין להם פומיל"ש בלעז [כפתורים], ומנין שלהם כתוב בפרשה, כמה כפתורים בולטין ממנה, וכמה חלק בין כפתור לכפתור:
and its flowers: Engravings made on it like a sort of flowers. ופרחיה: ציורין עשויין בה כמין פרחים:
shall [all] be [one piece] with it: Everything shall be of hammered work, out of the solid block [of gold], and not made separately and then attached [to the main stem]. ממנה יהיו: הכל מקשה יוצא מתוך חתיכת העשת, ולא יעשם לבדם וידביקם:
32And six branches coming out of its sides: three menorah branches from its one side and three menorah branches from its second side. לבוְשִׁשָּׁ֣ה קָנִ֔ים יֹֽצְאִ֖ים מִצִּדֶּ֑יהָ שְׁלשָׁ֣ה | קְנֵ֣י מְנֹרָ֗ה מִצִּדָּהּ֙ הָֽאֶחָ֔ד וּשְׁלשָׁה֙ קְנֵ֣י מְנֹרָ֔ה מִצִּדָּ֖הּ הַשֵּׁנִֽי:
coming out of its sides: from here and there [in each direction] diagonally, drawn upwards until [they reached] the height of the menorah, which is the middle stem. They came out of the middle stem, one higher than the others: the bottom one was longest, the one above it was shorter than it, and the highest one shorter than that, because the height of their ends [at their tops] was equal to the height of the seventh, middle stem, out of which the six branches extended. יצאים מצדיה: לכאן ולכאן באלכסון, נמשכים ועולין עד כנגד גובהה של מנורה, שהוא קנה האמצעי, ויוצאין מתוך קנה האמצעי זה למעלה מזה, התחתון ארוך, ושל מעלה קצר הימנו והעליון קצר הימנו, לפי שהיה גובה ראשיהן שוה לגובהו של קנה האמצעי השביעי, שממנו יוצאים ששת הקנים:
33Three decorated goblets on one branch, a knob and a flower, and three decorated goblets on one branch, a knob and a flower; so for the six branches that come out of the menorah. לגשְׁלשָׁ֣ה גְ֠בִעִ֠ים מְשֻׁקָּדִ֞ים בַּקָּנֶ֣ה הָֽאֶחָד֘ כַּפְתֹּ֣ר וָפֶ֒רַח֒ וּשְׁלשָׁ֣ה גְבִעִ֗ים מְשֻׁקָּדִ֛ים בַּקָּנֶ֥ה הָֽאֶחָ֖ד כַּפְתֹּ֣ר וָפָ֑רַח כֵּ֚ן לְשֵׁ֣שֶׁת הַקָּנִ֔ים הַיֹּֽצְאִ֖ים מִן־הַמְּנֹרָֽה:
decorated: Heb. מְשֻׁקָּדִים, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders מְצַיְירִין. They were decorated in the manner that silver and gold vessels are made, which is called nieler [in Old French, nieller in modern French, niello in English]. משקדים: כתרגומו, מצויירים היו כדרך שעושין לכלי כסף וזהב שקורין ניילי"ר [לגפר]:
and three decorated goblets: protruding from each branch. ושלשה גבעים: בולטין מכל קנה וקנה:
a knob and a flower: were on each branch. כפתר ופרח: היה לכל קנה וקנה:
34And on [the stem of] the menorah [shall be] four decorated goblets, its knobs and its flowers. לדוּבַמְּנֹרָ֖ה אַרְבָּעָ֣ה גְבִעִ֑ים מְשֻׁ֨קָּדִ֔ים כַּפְתֹּרֶ֖יהָ וּפְרָחֶֽיהָ:
And on [the stem of] the menorah [shall be] four… goblets: On the main stem of the menorah were four goblets: one protruding on it below the branches and three above the exit of the three branches that extended outwards from its sides. ובמנרה ארבעה גבעים: בגופה של מנורה היו ארבעה גביעים אחד בולט בה למטה מן הקנים, והשלשה למעלה מן יציאת הקנים היוצאים מצדיה:
decorated…its knobs and its flowers: This is one of the five verses whose meaning cannot be determined. It is unknown whether [to read] “decorated goblets” or “decorated its knobs and its flowers."-[from Yoma 52b] משקדים כפתריה ופרחיה: זה אחד מחמשה מקראות שאין להם הכרע, שאין ידוע אם גביעים משוקדים או משוקדים כפתוריה ופרחיה:
35And a knob under the two branches from it, and a knob under the two branches from it, and a knob under the two branches from it; so for the six branches that come out of the menorah. להוְכַפְתֹּ֡ר תַּ֩חַת֩ שְׁ֨נֵי הַקָּנִ֜ים מִמֶּ֗נָּה וְכַפְתֹּר֙ תַּ֣חַת שְׁנֵ֤י הַקָּנִים֙ מִמֶּ֔נָּה וְכַפְתֹּ֕ר תַּֽחַת־שְׁנֵ֥י הַקָּנִ֖ים מִמֶּ֑נָּה לְשֵׁ֨שֶׁת֙ הַקָּנִ֔ים הַיֹּֽצְאִ֖ים מִן־הַמְּנֹרָֽה:
And a knob under the two branches: From the knob, the branches extended from its two sides in either direction. This is what we learned in the [Baraitha] Melecheth HaMishkan [ch. 10, Men. 28b, 29a]: The height of the menorah was eighteen handbreadths. [This total is arrived at as follows:] The feet [of the menorah] and the [lowest] flower were three handbreadths. That is the flower mentioned in connection with the base, as it is said: “to its base, to its flower” (Num. 8:4). Then two handbreadths [above this were] unadorned, and a handbreadth [above that] in which [there] was a goblet-[namely one] of the four goblets [mentioned in verse 34]-and a knob and a flower of the two knobs and the two flowers mentioned in connection with the menorah itself, as it is said [on verse 34]: “decorated…its knobs and its flowers.” We learn that on the main stem there were two knobs and two flowers, in addition to the three knobs from which the branches extended, as it is said [here]: “And a knob under the two branches.” And [above the lowest branches were] two handbreadths unadorned, and a handbreadth with a knob and two branches coming out of it on either side, extending upward, opposite the height of the menorah, and one handbreadth unadorned, and a handbreadth with a knob and two branches coming out of it, and one handbreadth unadorned, and a handbreadth with a knob and two branches coming out of it, extending upward, opposite the height of the menorah, and two handbreadths unadorned. [Hence,] three handbreadths remain, in which there were three goblets, a knob, and a flower. The goblets were found to number twenty-two: eighteen for the six branches [of the menorah]-three for each one-and four on the menorah itself, totaling twenty-two. And [there were] eleven knobs-six on the six branches [one on each branch], three on the menorah itself, from which the branches extended, and two more on the menorah, as it is said [in verse 34]: “decorated…its knobs,” [which means two knobs] since the minimum of [the plural] “knobs” is two. One [knob was] below, next to the base, and one in the top three handbreadths [together] with the three goblets. And it [the menorah] had nine flowers: six on the six branches [one on each branch] as it is said [in verse 33]: “on one branch, [there was] a knob and a flower,” and three [flowers] on the menorah [itself], as it is said [here], "decorated…its knobs and its flowers"-the minimum of [the plural] “flowers” is two, and one [additional flower is] mentioned in the parsha Beha’alothecha: “to its base to its flower” (Num. 8:4). If you carefully study this Mishnah that is written above, you will find them [the decorations of the menorah] according to their number, each one in its place. — [from Men. 28b] וכפתר תחת שני הקנים: מתוך הכפתור היו הקנים נמשכים משני צדיה אילך ואילך. כך שנינו במלאכת המשכן (פרק י) גובהה של מנורה שמונה עשר טפחים, הרגלים והפרח שלשה טפחים, הוא הפרח האמור בירך, שנאמר (במדבר ח ד) עד ירכה עד פרחה, וטפחיים חלק, וטפח שבו גביע מהארבעה גביעים, וכפתור ופרח משני כפתורים ושני פרחים האמורים במנורה עצמה, שנאמר משוקדים כפתוריה ופרחיה, למדנו שהיו בקנה שני כפתורים ושני פרחים לבד מן השלשה כפתורים, שהקנים נמשכין מתוכן, שנאמר וכפתור תחת שני הקנים, וגו' וטפחים חלק, וטפח כפתור ושני קנים יוצאים ממנו אילך ואילך נמשכים ועולים כנגד גובהה של מנורה, וטפחיים חלק, וטפח כפתור ושני קנים יוצאים ממנו, וטפחיים חלק וטפח כפתור ושני קנים יוצאים ממנו ונמשכים ועולין כנגד גובהה של מנורה וטפחיים חלק, נשתיירו שם שלשה טפחים, שבהם שלשה גביעים וכפתור ופרח. נמצאו גביעים עשרים ושנים שמונה עשר לששה קנים, שלשה לכל אחד ואחד, וארבעה בגופה של מנורה, הרי עשרים ושנים, ואחד עשר כפתורים ששה בששת הקנים, ושלשה בגופה של מנורה, שהקנים יוצאים מהם, ושניים עוד במנורה, שנאמר משוקדים כפתוריה, מיעוט כפתורים שנים האחד למטה אצל הירך, והאחד בשלשת טפחים העליונים עם שלשת הגביעים, ותשעה פרחים היו לה ששה לששת הקנים, שנאמר (פסוק לג) בקנה האחד כפתור ופרח, ושלשה למנורה, שנאמר משוקדים כפתוריה ופרחיה, ומיעוט פרחים שנים, ואחד האמור בפרשת בהעלותך (במדבר ח ד) עד ירכה עד פרחה. ואם תדקדק במשנה זו הכתובה למעלה, תמצאם כמנינם איש איש במקומו:
36Their knobs and their branches shall [all] be [one piece] with it; all of it [shall be] one hammered mass of pure gold. לוכַּפְתֹּֽרֵיהֶ֥ם וּקְנֹתָ֖ם מִמֶּ֣נָּה יִֽהְי֑וּ כֻּלָּ֛הּ מִקְשָׁ֥ה אַחַ֖ת זָהָ֥ב טָהֽוֹר:
37And you shall make its lamps seven, and he shall kindle its lamps [so that they] shed light toward its face. לזוְעָשִׂ֥יתָ אֶת־נֵֽרֹתֶ֖יהָ שִׁבְעָ֑ה וְהֶֽעֱלָה֙ אֶת־נֵ֣רֹתֶ֔יהָ וְהֵאִ֖יר עַל־עֵ֥בֶר פָּנֶֽיהָ:
its lamps: [They were] sort of cups into which the oil and the wicks were put. את נרתיה: כמין בזיכין שנותנין בתוכם השמן והפתילות:
[so that they] shed light toward its face: [Namely,] make the openings of the six lamps [which were] at the top of the branches that extend from of its [the menorah’s] sides, turned toward the middle one, so that when the lamps were lit they would shed light עֵבֶר פָּנֶיהָ, towards [or in the direction of] its face. Their light should be turned towards the face of the middle branch, which is the body of the menorah. והאיר על עבר פניה: עשה ששת הנרות שבראשי הקנים, היוצאים מצדיה, מסובים כלפי האמצעי, כדי שיהיו הנרות כשתדליקם מאירים אל עבר פניה, מוסב אורם אל צד פני הקנה האמצעי, שהוא גוף המנורה:
38And its tongs and its scoops [shall be] of pure gold. לחוּמַלְקָחֶ֥יהָ וּמַחְתֹּתֶ֖יהָ זָהָ֥ב טָהֽוֹר:
And its tongs: Heb. וּמַלְקָחֶיהָ. They are the tongs made to take the wicks from the oil, to set them in place and to draw them into the mouths of the lamps. Since they [are used for] taking (לוֹקְחִים) [the wicks] with them, they are called מֶלְקָחַיִם, a pair of “takers.” [The Aramaic word] וְצִבְיָתָהָא, which Onkelos renders [for וּמַלְקָחֶיהָ], is a term related to צְבַת, tenailles in French, tongs. ומלקחיה: הם הצבתים העשויין ליקח בהם הפתילה מתוך השמן לישבן ולמושכן בפי הנרות, ועל שם שלוקחים בהם קרויים מלקחים. וצביתהא שתרגם אונקלוס, לשון צבת, טינליי"א בלעז [צבת]:
and its scoops: Heb. וּמַחְךְתֹּתֶיהָ. They are a kind of small cup with which he [the kohen] would scoop the ashes that are in the lamp every morning when he [the kohen] cleaned the lamps from the ashes of the wicks that burned during the night and were [now] extinguished. The word מַחְךְתָּה is [the equivalent of] poseydure [or poysedure] in Old French, a little shovel [or] ash pan, like “to scoop (לַחְךְתּוֹת) fire from a hearth” (Isa. 30:14). ומחתתיה: הם כמין בזיכין קטנים, שחותה בהן את האפר שבנר בבקר בבקר, כשהוא מטיב את הנרות מאפר הפתילות, שדלקו הלילה וכבו, ולשון מחתה פוישידויר"א בלעז [יעה], כמו (ישעיה ל יד) לחתות אש מיקוד:
39He shall make it of a talent of pure gold, with all these implements. לטכִּכַּ֛ר זָהָ֥ב טָה֖וֹר יַֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה אֹתָ֑הּ אֵ֥ת כָּל־הַכֵּלִ֖ים הָאֵֽלֶּה:
a talent pure gold: Heb. כִּכַּר.[This means] that its weight along with all its implements shall be nothing but a talent, no less and no more. The talent used for mundane matters was sixty maneh, and the one used for holy matters was double, thus one hundred twenty maneh (Bech. 5a). The maneh is the litra with which silver is weighed according to the weight used in Cologne, which is the equivalent of one hundred gold pieces [or] twenty-five selas, for the sela is equivalent to four gold pieces. [This is the equivalent of sixty-four pounds.] ככר זהב טהור: שלא יהיה משקלה עם כל כליה אלא ככר, לא פחות ולא יותר, והככר של חול ששים מנה ושל קדש היה כפול, מאה עשרים מנה, והמנה הוא ליטרא ששוקלין בה כסף למשקל קולוני"א והם מאה זהובים, עשרים וחמשה סלעים והסלע ארבעה זהובים:
40Now see and make according to their pattern, which you are shown on the mountain. מוּרְאֵ֖ה וַֽעֲשֵׂ֑ה בְּתַ֨בְנִיתָ֔ם אֲשֶׁר־אַתָּ֥ה מָרְאֶ֖ה בָּהָֽר:
Now see and make: See here on the mountain the pattern that I am showing you. [This] informs us that Moses had difficulties with the construction of the menorah, until the Holy One, blessed is He, showed him a [model] menorah of fire. -[from Men. 29a] וראה ועשה: ראה כאן בהר תבנית שאני מראה אותך, מגיד שנתקשה משה במעשה המנורה, עד שהראה לו הקב"ה מנורה של אש:
which you are shown: Heb. אִשֶׁר-אַךְתָּה מָרְאֶה, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: דִי אַךְתְּ מִתְחַזֵי, which you are shown. If it were punctuated מַרְאֶה with a “pattach,” it would mean that you show others. Now that it is punctuated with a short “kamatz,” it means that you are shown, that others show you, (for the punctuation distinguishes between the active and the passive). אשר אתה מראה: כתרגומו דאת מתחזי בטורא, אלו היה נקוד מראה בפת"ח, היה פתרונו אתה מראה לאחרים, עכשיו שנקוד חטף קמ"ץ, פתרונו דאת מתחזי, שאחרים מראים לך, שהנקוד מפריד בין עושה לנעשה:
Exodus Chapter 26
1"And the Mishkan you shall make out of ten curtains [consisting] of twisted fine linen, and blue, purple, and crimson wool. A cherubim design of the work of a master weaver you shall make them. אוְאֶת־הַמִּשְׁכָּ֥ן תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה עֶ֣שֶׂר יְרִיעֹ֑ת שֵׁ֣שׁ מָשְׁזָ֗ר וּתְכֵ֤לֶת וְאַרְגָּמָן֙ וְתֹלַ֣עַת שָׁנִ֔י כְּרֻבִ֛ים מַֽעֲשֵׂ֥ה חשֵׁ֖ב תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה אֹתָֽם:
And the Mishkan you shall make out of ten curtains: to be its roof and [cover its] walls outside the planks, for the curtains are hung behind them to cover them. ואת המשכן תעשה עשר יריעות: להיות לו לגג ולמחיצות מחוץ לקרשים שהיריעות תלויות מאחוריהן לכסותן:
of twisted fine linen, and blue, purple, and crimson wool: Thus there are four kinds [of material] together in each thread, one of linen and three of wool, and each thread was doubled six times. Thus, four kinds [of material], when they are twisted together, yield twenty-four strands to a thread. — [from Baraitha Melecheth HaMishkan, ch. 2, Yoma 71b] שש משזר ותכלת וארגמן ותולעת שני: הרי ארבע מינין יחד בכל חוט וחוט אחד של פשתים ושלשה של צמר, וכל חוט וחוט כפול ששה הרי ארבעה מינין, כשהן שזורין יחד, עשרים וארבע כפלים לחוט:
A cherubim design of the work of a master weaver: Cherubim were drawn on them [the curtains] in their weave; not with embroidery, which is needlework, but with weaving on both sides, one face from here [one side] and one face from there [the other side]: a lion from this side and an eagle from that side, as silk girdles, called feysses in Old French, are woven. — [from Yoma 72b] כרבים מעשה חשב: כרובים היו מצויירין בהם באריגתן, ולא ברקימה שהוא מעשה מחט, אלא באריגה בשני כותלים, פרצוף אחד מכאן ופרצוף אחד מכאן, ארי מצד זה ונשר מצד זה, וכמו שאורגין חגורות של משי, שקורין בלעז פיישי"ש [רצועות]:
2"The length of one curtain [shall be] twenty eight cubits, and the width of one curtain [shall be] four cubits; the same measure for all the curtains. באֹ֣רֶךְ | הַיְרִיעָ֣ה הָֽאַחַ֗ת שְׁמֹנֶ֤ה וְעֶשְׂרִים֙ בָּֽאַמָּ֔ה וְרֹ֨חַב֙ אַרְבַּ֣ע בָּֽאַמָּ֔ה הַיְרִיעָ֖ה הָֽאֶחָ֑ת מִדָּ֥ה אַחַ֖ת לְכָל־הַיְרִיעֹֽת:
3"Five of these curtains shall be joined to one another, and [the other] five curtains shall [also] be joined to one another. גחֲמֵ֣שׁ הַיְרִיעֹ֗ת תִּֽהְיֶ֨יןָ֙ חֹֽבְרֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָ֑הּ וְחָמֵ֤שׁ יְרִיעֹת֙ חֹֽבְרֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָֽהּ:
shall be joined: He [Bezalel] would sew them with a needle, one [curtain] alongside the other, five separately and [the other] five separately. תהיין חוברות: תופרן במחט זו בצד זו, חמש לבד וחמש לבד:
to one another: Heb. אִשָׁה אֶל-אִחֹתָהּ, lit., a woman to her sister. It is customary for Scripture to speak this way concerning a noun in the feminine gender, and concerning a noun in the masculine gender, אִישׁ אֶל-אָחִיו [lit., a man to his brother], as it is said concerning the cherubim: אִישׁ אֶל-אָחִיו (Exod. 25:20). אשה אל אחותה: כך דרך המקרא לדבר בדבר שהוא לשון נקבה. ובדבר שהוא לשון זכר אומר איש אל אחיו, כמו שנאמר בכרובים (שמות כה כ) ופניהם איש אל אחיו:
4"And you shall make loops of blue wool on the edge of one curtain [that is] at the edge of the [first] set, and so shall you do on the edge of the outermost curtain of the second set. דוְעָשִׂ֜יתָ לֻֽלְאֹ֣ת תְּכֵ֗לֶת עַ֣ל שְׂפַ֤ת הַיְרִיעָה֙ הָֽאֶחָ֔ת מִקָּצָ֖ה בַּֽחֹבָ֑רֶת וְכֵ֤ן תַּֽעֲשֶׂה֙ בִּשְׂפַ֣ת הַיְרִיעָ֔ה הַקִּ֣יצוֹנָ֔ה בַּמַּחְבֶּ֖רֶת הַשֵּׁנִֽית:
loops: Heb. לֻלָאֹת, lazoles in Old French, loops. So did Onkelos render [it]: עִנוּבִין, a term meaning a bow. ללאת: לצול"ש בלעז [שרוכים] וכן תרגם אונקלוס ענובין, לשון עניבה:
curtain [that is] at the edge of the [first] set: Heb. בַּחֹבָרֶת. On the curtain that is the outermost of the set. The group of five curtains is called חוֹבֶרֶת. מקצה בחברת: באותה יריעה שבסוף החבור, קבוצת חמשת היריעות קרויה חוברת:
and so shall you do on the edge of the outermost curtain of the second set: On that curtain that is the outermost (הַקִּצוֹנָה), an expression derived from קָצֶה, end, meaning at the end of the set [of curtains]. וכן תעשה בשפת היריעה הקיצונה במחברת השנית:באותה יריעה שהיא קיצונה, לשון קצה, כלומר לסוף החוברת:
5"You shall make fifty loops on [the edge of] one curtain, and you shall make fifty loops on the edge of the curtain in the second set; the loops shall correspond to one another. החֲמִשִּׁ֣ים לֻֽלָאֹ֗ת תַּֽעֲשֶׂה֘ בַּיְרִיעָ֣ה הָֽאֶחָת֒ וַֽחֲמִשִּׁ֣ים לֻֽלָאֹ֗ת תַּֽעֲשֶׂה֙ בִּקְצֵ֣ה הַיְרִיעָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֖ר בַּמַּחְבֶּ֣רֶת הַשֵּׁנִ֑ית מַקְבִּילֹת֙ הַלֻּֽלָאֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָֽהּ:
the loops shall correspond to one another: Heb. מַקְבִּילֹתהַלֻּלָאֹת. Make sure that you make the loops exactly equidistant from one another. Their measure on this curtain should be the same for its mate. When you spread one set [of curtains] next to the other set, the loops of this curtain shall line up exactly opposite the loops of the other [curtain]. This is the [meaning of the] word מַקְבִּילֹת, [i.e.,] this one opposite that one. The Aramaic translation of נֶגֶד, opposite, is לָקֳבֵל. [Each] curtain was twenty-eight [cubits] long and four [cubits] wide. When five curtains were joined together, it was found that [altogether] they were twenty [cubits] wide, and so [too] with the second set. The length of the Mishkan was thirty [cubits] from east to west, as it is said: “twenty planks for the southern side” (verse 18), and so for the north, [with] every plank a cubit and a half [wide]. Thus, [we have altogether] thirty [cubits] from east to west. The width of the Mishkan from north to south was ten cubits, as it is said: “And for the western end of the Mishkan [you shall make six planks]” (verse 22), and [thus with] two planks at the corners [i.e., one plank at each end of the western wall], we have ten. [I.e., the interior of the Mishkan was ten cubits wide, not counting the northern and southern walls, which were each one cubit thick. Hence, the remainder of the two corner planks that do not fit against the side planks is a half cubit each, equaling one cubit. The six planks along the western side total nine cubits, thus we have altogether ten cubits on the western side.] In their [respective] places, I will explain these verses. The curtains were placed [so that] their length [was across] the [interior] width of the Mishkan, ten [of the curtains’] middle cubits as the roof of the space of the width of the Mishkan. [Another] cubit from here and a cubit from there covered the thickness of the tops of the planks, whose width was a cubit thick. Thus remained sixteen cubits: eight on the north[ern side] and eight on the south[ern side], covering the height of the planks, which were ten [cubits] high. [Thus] the bottom two cubits were exposed. The curtains were forty cubits wide when they were joined-twenty cubits for each set. Thirty of them [of the forty cubits] were for the roof of the Mishkan’s [interior] space lengthwise; one cubit corresponded to the thickness of the ends of the planks on the [Mishkan’s] west[ern side] and one cubit [was meant] to cover the thickness of the pillars on the east[ern side]-for there were no planks on the [Mishkan’s] east[ern side], only four (Old Rashi-five) pillars upon whose hooks the screen was spread and hung, like a curtain. [Aside from the above two cubits,] there remained eight cubits that hung in the back of the Mishkan on the west[ern side], with the bottom two cubits uncovered. I found this in the Baraitha of Forty-Nine Middoth. However, in Tractate Shabbath (98b) [it is stated]: The curtains did not cover the eastern pillars, and nine cubits hung in the back of the Mishkan. The text supports us [in our quotation of the Talmud, for the Torah states]: “And you shall place the dividing curtain beneath the clasps” (verse 33), but if [the truth is] like the words of this Baraitha, [it would mean that] the dividing curtain would be found to be drawn back one cubit to the west of the clasps. מקבילות הלולאות אשה אל אחותה: שמור שתעשה הלולאות במדה אחת מכוונות הבדלתן זו מזו, וכמדתן ביריעה זו כן יהא בחברתה, כשתפרוש חוברת אצל חוברת, יהיו הלולאות של יריעה זו מכוונות כנגד לולאות של זו. וזהו לשון מקבילות זו כנגד זו. תרגומו של נגד, קביל. היריעות ארכן עשרים ושמונה ורחבן ארבע, וכשחבר חמש יריעות יחד, נמצא רחבן עשרים, וכן החוברת השנית. והמשכן ארכו שלשים מן המזרח למערב, שנאמר עשרים קרש לפאת נגב תימנה (פסוק יח) וכן לצפון, וכל קרש אמה וחצי האמה, הרי שלשים מן המזרח למערב. רוחב המשכן מן הצפון לדרום עשר אמות. שנאמר (כו כב - כג) ולירכתי המשכן ימה וגו', ושני קרשים למקצעות, הרי עשר. ובמקומם אפרשם למקראות הללו. נותן היריעות אורכן לרוחבו של משכן, עשר אמות אמצעיות לגג חלל רוחב המשכן, ואמה מכאן ואמה מכאן לעובי ראשי הקרשים שעוביין אמה, נשתיירו שש עשרה אמה, שמונה לצפון ושמונה לדרום מכסות קומת הקרשים שגבהן עשר, נמצאו שתי אמות התחתונות מגולות. רחבן של יריעות ארבעים אמה, כשהן מחוברות עשרים אמה לחוברת, שלשים מהן לגג חלל המשכן לארכו ואמה כנגד עובי ראשי הקרשים שבמערב, ואמה לכסות עובי העמודים שבמזרח, שלא היו קרשים במזרח אלא ארבעה עמודים, שהמסך פרוש ותלוי בווין שבהן כמין וילון. נשתיירו שמונה אמות התלויין על אחורי הקרשים שבמערב ושתי אמות התחתונות מגולות. זו מצאתי בברייתא דארבעים ותשע מדות. אבל במסכת שבת (צח ב) אין היריעות מכסות את עמודי המזרח, ותשע אמות תלויות אחורי המשכן, והכתוב מסייענו ונתת את הפרוכת תחת הקרסים, ואם כדברי הברייתא הזאת, נמצאת פרוכת משוכה מן הקרסים ולמערב אמה:
6"And you shall make fifty golden clasps, and you shall fasten the curtains to one another with the clasps; so shall the Mishkan become one. ווְעָשִׂ֕יתָ חֲמִשִּׁ֖ים קַרְסֵ֣י זָהָ֑ב וְחִבַּרְתָּ֙ אֶת־הַיְרִיעֹ֜ת אִשָּׁ֤ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָהּ֙ בַּקְּרָסִ֔ים וְהָיָ֥ה הַמִּשְׁכָּ֖ן אֶחָֽד:
golden clasps: Heb. קַרְסֵי, fermeylz, fermels, fermails in Old French, [meaning] hooks, clasps. One of its ends is inserted into [one of] the loops of this [one] set [of curtains] and the other end into the loops of the [second] set [of curtains, thus] fastening them [the loops] with them [the clasps]. קרסי זהב: פירמייל"ץ בלעז [סגרים] ומכניסין ראשן אחד בלולאות שבחוברת זו וראשן אחד בלולאות שבחוברת זו ומחברן בהן:
7"And [then] you shall make curtains of goat hair for a tent over the Mishkan; you shall make eleven curtains. זוְעָשִׂ֨יתָ֙ יְרִיעֹ֣ת עִזִּ֔ים לְאֹ֖הֶל עַל־הַמִּשְׁכָּ֑ן עַשְׁתֵּֽי־עֶשְׂרֵ֥ה יְרִיעֹ֖ת תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה אֹתָֽם:
curtains of goat hair: Heb. עִזִים, goats, from the hair of goats. — [from Baraitha Melecheth HaMishkan, ch. 3] יריעות עזים: מנוצה של עזים:
for a tent over the Mishkan: To spread them over the lower curtains. לאהל על המשכן: לפרוש אותן על היריעות התחתונות:
8"The length of one curtain [shall be] thirty cubits, and the width of one curtain four cubits; the same measure for the eleven curtains. חאֹ֣רֶךְ | הַיְרִיעָ֣ה הָֽאַחַ֗ת שְׁלשִׁים֙ בָּֽאַמָּ֔ה וְרֹ֨חַב֙ אַרְבַּ֣ע בָּֽאַמָּ֔ה הַיְרִיעָ֖ה הָֽאֶחָ֑ת מִדָּ֣ה אַחַ֔ת לְעַשְׁתֵּ֥י עֶשְׂרֵ֖ה יְרִיעֹֽת:
thirty cubits: For when [Moses] placed their [the curtains’] length across the width of the Mishkan, as he did with the first [set of curtains], these were found to exceed [and overhang them] by a cubit from here [on one side] and a cubit from there [on the other side] to cover one of the two cubits of the planks that remained exposed. The bottom cubit of the plank, which the curtain did not cover, was the cubit [that was] inserted into the socket hole, for the sockets were a cubit deep. — [from Shab. 98b] שלשים באמה: שכשנותן ארכן לרוחב המשכן, כמו שנתן את הראשונות, נמצאו אלו עודפות אמה מכאן ואמה מכאן לכסות אחת מהשתי אמות, שנשארו מגולות מן הקרשים, והאמה התחתונה של קרש, שאין היריעה מכסה אותו היא האמה התחובה בנקב האדן, שהא-דנים גבהן אמה:
9"And you shall join the five curtains by themselves, and the [other] six curtains by themselves; and you shall fold the sixth curtain before the front of the tent. טוְחִבַּרְתָּ֞ אֶת־חֲמֵ֤שׁ הַיְרִיעֹת֙ לְבָ֔ד וְאֶת־שֵׁ֥שׁ הַיְרִיעֹ֖ת לְבָ֑ד וְכָֽפַלְתָּ֙ אֶת־הַיְרִיעָ֣ה הַשִּׁשִּׁ֔ית אֶל־מ֖וּל פְּנֵ֥י הָאֹֽהֶל:
and you shall fold the sixth curtain: [I.e.,] of these upper curtains, which exceeds [overhangs] the lower ones. וכפלת את היריעה הששית: העודפת באלו העליונות יותר מן התחתונות:
before the front of the tent: Half its width [of the sixth curtain] was hanging and folded over the screen on the east[ern side of the Mishkan], before the entrance, resembling a modest bride whose face is covered with a veil. אל מול פני האהל: חצי רחבה היה תלוי וכפול על המסך שבמזרח כנגד הפתח, דומה לכלה צנועה המכוסה בצעיף על פניה:
10"And you shall make fifty loops on the edge of one curtain, [which is] at the edge of the [first] set, and fifty loops on the edge of the [outermost] curtain of the second set. יוְעָשִׂ֜יתָ חֲמִשִּׁ֣ים לֻֽלָאֹ֗ת עַ֣ל שְׂפַ֤ת הַיְרִיעָה֙ הָֽאֶחָ֔ת הַקִּֽיצֹנָ֖ה בַּֽחֹבָ֑רֶת וַֽחֲמִשִּׁ֣ים לֻֽלָאֹ֗ת עַ֚ל שְׂפַ֣ת הַיְרִיעָ֔ה הַֽחֹבֶ֖רֶת הַשֵּׁנִֽית:
11"And you shall make fifty copper clasps; you shall bring the clasps into the loops, and you shall fasten the tent together so that it will become one. יאוְעָשִׂ֛יתָ קַרְסֵ֥י נְח֖שֶׁת חֲמִשִּׁ֑ים וְהֵֽבֵאתָ֤ אֶת־הַקְּרָסִים֙ בַּלֻּ֣לָאֹ֔ת וְחִבַּרְתָּ֥ אֶת־הָאֹ֖הֶל וְהָיָ֥ה אֶחָֽד:
12"And the overhanging excess in the curtains of the tent half of the extra curtain shall hang over the rear of the Mishkan. יבוְסֶ֨רַח֙ הָֽעֹדֵ֔ף בִּֽירִיעֹ֖ת הָאֹ֑הֶל חֲצִ֤י הַיְרִיעָה֙ הָֽעֹדֶ֔פֶת תִּסְרַ֕ח עַ֖ל אֲחֹרֵ֥י הַמִּשְׁכָּֽן:
And the overhanging excess in the curtains of the tent: over the curtains of the Mishkan. The curtains of the tent were the upper ones, [curtains] of goat hair. [They are] referred to as “tent,” as it is written about them, “for a tent over the Mishkan” (verse 7). Every expression of “tent” (אֹהֶל) stated in their context [i.e., referring to the upper curtains] is only an expression meaning a roof, for they form a tent and a roof over the lower [curtains]. They [the upper curtains] exceeded the lower ones by half a curtain on the west[ern side], since half of the extra eleventh curtain was folded opposite the front of the tent. [Hence,] there remained two cubits, [representing] the width of half of it [the upper curtains], exceeding the width of the lower [curtains]. וסרח העדף ביריעת האהל: על יריעות המשכן. יריעות האהל הן העליונות של עזים שקרויים אהל, כמו שכתוב בהן (פסוק ז) לאהל על המשכן, וכל אהל האמור בהן אינו אלא לשון גג, שמאהילות ומסככות על התחתונות, והן היו עודפות על התחתונות חצי היריעה למערב, שהחצי של יריעה אחת עשרה היתרה, היה נכפל אל מול פני האהל, נשארו שתי אמות רוחב חציה עודף על רוחב התחתונות:
shall hang over the rear of the Mishkan: to cover the two cubits of the planks that were exposed. תסרח על אחרי המשכן: לכסות שתי אמות שהיו מגולות בקרשים:
the rear of the Mishkan: This means the western side, since the entrance [to the Mishkan] was on the east[ern side], which is [referred to as] its front, and the north[ern] and south[ern sides] are referred to as sides to the right and to the left. אחרי המשכן: הוא צד מערבי, לפי שהפתח במזרח שהם פניו, וצפון ודרום קרויין צדדין לימין ולשמאל:
13"And the cubit from here and the cubit from there of the excess in the length of the curtains of the tent shall hang over the sides of the Mishkan from here and from there to cover it. יגוְהָֽאַמָּ֨ה מִזֶּ֜ה וְהָֽאַמָּ֤ה מִזֶּה֙ בָּֽעֹדֵ֔ף בְּאֹ֖רֶךְ יְרִיעֹ֣ת הָאֹ֑הֶל יִֽהְיֶ֨ה סָר֜וּחַ עַל־צִדֵּ֧י הַמִּשְׁכָּ֛ן מִזֶּ֥ה וּמִזֶּ֖ה לְכַסֹּתֽוֹ:
And the cubit from here and the cubit from there: on the north[ern] and on the south[ern] sides of the Mishkan]. והאמה מזה והאמה מזה: לצפון ולדרום:
of the excess in the length of the curtains of the tent: which exceed the length of the lower curtains of the Mishkan by two cubits. בעדף בארך יריעות האהל: שהן עודפות על אורך יריעות המשכן שתי אמות:
shall hang over the sides of the Mishkan: [I.e.,] on the northern and southern [sides], as I explained above [verse 12]. The Torah taught [us] manners, that one should spare the beautiful. — [from an unknown midrashic source, also quoted by Yalkut Shimoni 422] יהיה סרוח על צדי המשכן: לצפון ולדרום, כמו שפירשתי למעלה. למדה תורה דרך ארץ שיהא אדם חס על היפה:
14"And you shall make a covering for the tent of ram skins dyed red and a covering of tachash skins above. ידוְעָשִׂ֤יתָ מִכְסֶה֙ לָאֹ֔הֶל עֹרֹ֥ת אֵילִ֖ם מְאָדָּמִ֑ים וּמִכְסֵ֛ה עֹרֹ֥ת תְּחָשִׁ֖ים מִלְמָֽעְלָה:
a covering for the tent: For the roof of goat hair curtains, make an additional covering of ram skins dyed red. Additionally, above it [place] a covering of tachash skins. These [two] coverings covered only the roof, their length being thirty [cubits] and their width ten. These are Rabbi Nehemiah’s words, but according to Rabbi Judah, there was [only] one cover, half of [it made from] ram skins dyed red and half of [it made from] tachash skins. -[from Shab. 28a] מכסה לאהל: לאותו גג של יריעות עזים עשה עוד מכסה אחד של עורות אילים מאדמים, ועוד למעלה ממנו מכסה עורות תחשים, ואותן מכסאות לא היו מכסין אלא את הגג, ארכן שלשים ורחבן עשר, אלו דברי רבי נחמיה, ולדברי רבי יהודה מכסה אחד היה, חציו של עורות אילים מאדמים, וחציו של עורות תחשים
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Daily Tehillim: Chapters 145 - 150
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 145
One who recites this psalm three times daily with absolute concentration is guaranteed a portion in the World to Come. Because of its prominence, this psalm was composed in alphabetical sequence.
1. A psalm of praise by David: I will exalt You, my God the King, and bless Your Name forever.
2. Every day I will bless You, and extol Your Name forever.
3. The Lord is great and exceedingly exalted; there is no limit to His greatness.
4. One generation to another will laud Your works, and tell of Your mighty acts.
5. I will speak of the splendor of Your glorious majesty and of Your wondrous deeds.
6. They will proclaim the might of Your awesome acts, and I will recount Your greatness.
7. They will express the remembrance of Your abounding goodness, and sing of Your righteousness.
8. The Lord is gracious and compassionate, slow to anger and of great kindness.
9. The Lord is good to all, and His mercies extend over all His works.
10. Lord, all Your works will give thanks to You, and Your pious ones will bless You.
11. They will declare the glory of Your kingdom, and tell of Your strength,
12. to make known to men His mighty acts, and the glorious majesty of His kingdom.
13. Your kingship is a kingship over all worlds, and Your dominion is throughout all generations.
14. The Lord supports all who fall, and straightens all who are bent.
15. The eyes of all look expectantly to You, and You give them their food at the proper time.
16. You open Your hand and satisfy the desire of every living thing.
17. The Lord is righteous in all His ways, and benevolent in all His deeds.
18. The Lord is close to all who call upon Him, to all who call upon Him in truth.
19. He fulfills the desire of those who fear Him, hears their cry and delivers them.
20. The Lord watches over all who love Him, and will destroy all the wicked.
21. My mouth will utter the praise of the Lord, and let all flesh bless His holy Name forever.
Chapter 146
This psalm inspires man to repent and perform good deeds while still alive. Let him not rely on mortals who are unable to help themselves, and who may suddenly pass on. Rather, one should put his trust in God, Who is capable of carrying out all He desires.
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Lord, O my soul.
2. I will sing to the Lord with my soul; I will chant praises to my God while I yet exist.
3. Do not place your trust in nobles, nor in mortal man who has not the ability to bring deliverance.
4. When his spirit departs, he returns to his earth; on that very day, his plans come to naught.
5. Fortunate is he whose help is the God of Jacob, whose hope rests upon the Lord his God.
6. He makes the heavens, the earth, the sea, and all that is in them; He keeps His promise faithfully forever.
7. He renders justice to the oppressed; He gives food to the hungry; the Lord releases those who are bound.
8. The Lord opens the eyes of the blind; the Lord straightens those who are bowed; the Lord loves the righteous.
9. The Lord watches over the strangers; He gives strength to orphan and widow; He thwarts the way of the wicked.
10. The Lord shall reign forever, your God, O Zion, throughout all generations. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 147
This psalm recounts God's greatness, and His kindness and goodness to His creations.
1. Praise the Lord! Sing to our God for He is good; praise befits Him for He is pleasant.
2. The Lord is the rebuilder of Jerusalem; He will gather the banished of Israel.
3. He heals the broken-hearted, and bandages their wounds.
4. He counts the number of the stars; He gives a name to each of them.
5. Great is our Master and abounding in might; His understanding is beyond reckoning.
6. The Lord strengthens the humble; He casts the wicked to the ground.
7. Lift your voices to the Lord in gratitude; sing to our God with the harp.
8. He covers the heaven with clouds; He prepares rain for the earth, and makes grass grow upon the mountains.
9. He gives the animal its food, to the young ravens which cry to Him.
10. He does not desire [those who place their trust in] the strength of the horse, nor does He want those who rely upon the thighs [swiftness] of man.
11. He desires those who fear Him, those who long for His kindness.
12. Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; Zion, extol your God.
13. For He has strengthened the bolts of your gates; He has blessed your children in your midst.
14. He has made peace within your borders; He satiates you with the finest of wheat.
15. He issues His command to the earth; swiftly does His word run.
16. He dispenses snow like fleece; He scatters frost like ashes.
17. He hurls His ice like morsels; who can withstand His cold?
18. He sends forth His word and melts them; He causes His wind to blow, and the waters flow.
19. He tells His words [Torah] to Jacob, His statutes and ordinances to Israel.
20. He has not done so for other nations, and they do not know [His] ordinances. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 148
The psalmist inspires one to praise God for His creations-above and below-all of which exist by God's might alone.
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Lord from the heavens; praise Him in the celestial heights.
2. Praise Him, all His angels; praise Him, all His hosts.
3. Praise Him, sun and moon; praise Him, all the shining stars.
4. Praise Him, hea-ven of heavens, and the waters that are above the heavens.
5. Let them praise the Name of the Lord, for He comman-ded and they were created.
6. He has established them forever, for all time; He issued a decree, and it shall not be transgressed.
7. Praise the Lord from the earth, sea-monsters and all [that dwell in] the depths;
8. fire and hail, snow and vapor, stormy wind carrying out His command;
9. the mountains and all hills, fruit-bearing trees and all cedars;
10. the beasts and all cattle, creeping things and winged fowl;
11. kings of the earth and all nations, rulers and all judges of the land;
12. young men as well as maidens, elders with young lads.
13. Let them praise the Name of the Lord, for His Name is sublime, to Himself; its radiance [alone] is upon earth and heaven.
14. He shall raise the glory of His people, [increase] the praise of all His pious ones, the Children of Israel, the people close to Him. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 149
1. Praise the Lord! Sing to the Lord a new song, [recount] His praise in the assembly of the pious.
2. Israel will rejoice in its Maker; the children of Zion will delight in their King.
3. They will praise His Name with dancing; they will sing to Him with the drum and harp.
4. For the Lord desires His people; He will adorn the humble with salvation.
5. The pious will exult in glory; they will sing upon their beds.
6. The exaltation of God is in their throat, and a double-edged sword in their hand,
7. to bring retribution upon the nations, punishment upon the peoples;
8. to bind their kings with chains, and their nobles with iron fetters;
9. to execute upon them the prescribed judgment; it shall be a glory for all His pious ones. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 150
This psalm contains thirteen praises, alluding to the Thirteen Attributes (of Mercy) with which God conducts the world.
1. Praise the Lord! Praise God in His holiness; praise Him in the firmament of His strength.
2. Praise Him for His mighty acts; praise Him according to His abundant greatness.
3. Praise Him with the call of the shofar; praise Him with harp and lyre.
4. Praise Him with timbrel and dance; praise Him with stringed instruments and flute.
5. Praise Him with resounding cymbals; praise Him with clanging cymbals.
6. Let every soul praise the Lord. Praise the Lord!
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 25
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
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• Tuesday, Shevat 30, 5776 · February 9, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 25
ובזה יובן למה צוה משה רבינו עליו השלום במשנה תורה לדור שנכנסו לארץ, לקרות קריאת שמע פעמים בכל יום, לקבל עליו מלכות שמים במסירת נפש
In light of the above, it will be understood why Moshe Rabbeinu, peace be upon him, commanded in the Book of Devarim (— not in the earlier Books of the Bible addressed to the generation of Jews who wandered in the desert,1 but) to the generation that entered the Holy Land that they (too, and not only the subsequent generations2)recite the Shema twice daily, the intention in the Shema being to acknowledge the Kingdom of Heaven with self-sacrifice; i.e., the Shema teaches us to accept martyrdom for the sanctification of G‑d’s Name.
והלא הבטיח להם: פחדכם ומוראכם יתן ה’ וגו‘
Now one may ask: Why was it necessary for our forefathers to prepare themselves for martyrdom? Had they not been promised that3 “G‑d will lay the fear and dread of you [upon all the inhabitants of the land]”?
They had no reason to fear that anyone would attempt to force them to deny the Kingdom of Heaven, necessitating self-sacrifice to resist such efforts. In this sense, they were as well protected as the Jews who traveled the desert with Moses (who were not commanded to recite the Shema.)4 We must therefore conclude that preparation for martyrdom is necessary not only to ensure that it will be put into practice if and when necessary,
אלא משום שקיום התורה ומצותיה תלוי בזה שיזכור תמיד ענין מסירת נפשו לה’ על יחודו, שיהיה קבוע בלבו תמיד ממש יומם ולילה לא ימיש מזכרונו
but because the fulfillment of the Torah and its commandments is contingent on one’s being constantly aware of his readiness to surrender his life to G‑d for the sake of His unity, i.e., that a person remember that he would be willing to sacrifice his life for the sake of G‑d’s unity, if the situation would warrant it — which is the message contained in the Shema; he must therefore recite it twice daily, morning and evening, so that this awareness will be fixed permanently in his heart, and will not depart from his memory night and day.
כי בזה יוכל לעמוד נגד יצרו לנצחו תמיד בכל עת ובכל שעה
In this way, one is able to withstand his Evil Inclination and to vanquish it at every time and every moment, even after Moses‘ passing, whenever Jews are engaged in an intense struggle with the Evil Inclination, as it is written: 5 “G‑d said to Moses, ’Behold, you are about to sleep with your fathers, and this people will rise up and stray,‘”6
כנ״ל
as explained above — that when one remembers that he would be prepared to suffer martyrdom for his love of G‑d and his belief in G‑d’s unity, he will surely be able to overcome his Evil Inclination and perform all the mitzvot.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Based on a comment by the Rebbe. |
| 2. | Based on a comment by the Rebbe. |
| 3. | Devarim 11:25. |
| 4. | Based on a comment by the Rebbe. |
| 5. | Ibid. 31:16. |
| 6. | Based on a comment by the Rebbe. |
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
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A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 217
Circumventing Levirate Marriage
"And she shall remove his shoe off his foot"—Deuteronomy 25:9.
If the brother of a married man who dies childless does not marry his widowed sister-in-law [See Positive Commandment 216], the widow is commanded to remove her brother-in-law's shoe [as part of the chalitzah ceremony described in the Torah, and she is then permitted to marry whomever she desires].
Our sages tell us that performing levirate marriage is preferable to employing chalitzah to release the widow and brother-in-law from their bond.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Circumventing Levirate Marriage
Positive Commandment 217
Translated by Berel Bell
The 217th mitzvah is that in a case when a yavam1 will not marry his yevamah2, she performs chalitzah3 on him.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement4 (exalted be He), "She shall remove his shoe from his foot."
The details of this mitzvah are found in the tractate devoted to this subject, tractate Yevamos.
You are already familiar with the statement of our Sages,5 "Performing the mitzvah of yibum [i.e. marrying the yevamah] is preferable to performing the mitzvah of chalitzah."6
For this same reason7 they called the tractate "Yevamos"8, even though it gives equal coverage both to the laws of yibum and those of chalitzah.
FOOTNOTES
1.When a husband has died, and the couple had no children, the woman is known as a yevamah; the deceased man's surviving brother is known as a yavam; the mitzvah to marry her is called yibum. See P216.
When yibum is not performed, she is still not allowed to remarry unless chalitzah is performed, i.e. the yavam dons a specially made shoe on his right foot; then the yevamah from the yavam's foot, spits on the ground, and makes a verbal statement.
2.See note above.
3.See note above.
4.Deut. 25:9.
5.Bechoros 1:7.
6.From this expression, "the mitzvah of chalitzah," we see clearly that chalitzah counts as one of the mitzvos.
7.. That yibum is preferable to chalitzah.
8.. Rather than "Yevamos and Chalitzos," or something similar.
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• 1 Chapter: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 7 • English Text | Hebrew Text |
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Halacha 1
[The following laws apply when] there are two doughs that when combined comprise the measure that obligates the separation of challah, but neither comprises that measure alone should they touch each other and become attached to each other.1 If they belong to two individuals,2 they are exempt from challah even though they are of the same type of grain.3 [The rationale is that] we assume that the two people object [to the combination of their doughs].4 If it is known that they would not object to the combination of their doughs, they are considered as one.
Halacha 2
[Different rules apply if] the two belonged to one person. If they were from one type [of grain], they are combined and challah is obligated to be separated from them. If they are from two types, they are not combined. [The rationale is that] we assume that one person does not object [to the combination of his doughs].5 If he objects [to their combination and endeavors] that one dough not touch the other or become mixed with it, they are not considered as one, even if they are of one type of grain.
Halacha 3
What is meant by the statement that if they belonged to one person and were from the same type [of grain] they are combined? When a dough from wheat touches6 a dough from spelt, they are combined.7 If it touched [a dough from] another type of grain,8 they are not combined.9 Similarly, if a dough of barley touches a dough of spelt,10 oats, or rye, or doughs of spelt, oats, or rye touch each other, they can be combined.11
Halacha 4
A dough from grain from one year should not be combined with a dough from grain from the previous year even though they are of the same species. [This is a decree,] lest people say that terumah may be separated from new grain for old grain.12 A person should not separate [the challah] from the middle of the two.13 Instead, he should bring another dough - either from this year or the previous - and combine it with them to complete the required measure.14
When does the above apply? When one dough touches another. If, however, one mixes flour from the species of grain and makes a single dough from one of them, the five are combined to comprise the measure of dough required forchallah, as we explained.15
Halacha 5
When there is a dough that is less than the required measure on one side and another dough less than the required measure on the other side,16 and a dough that is exempt from challah in the middle - e.g., a dough of rice, a dough of terumah [flour] or from terumah [flour] that was mixed with ordinary flour, or a dough from a gentile17 - [the doughs] are not combined even though they touch each other.18 [The rationale is that] an entity that is exempt from challahseparates in the middle.
Halacha 6
When, by contrast, there is a dough from which challah was separated between them, [the two outer doughs] can be combined, because originally, there was an obligation to separate challah from the dough in the center.19Similarly, if a dough that was consecrated was in the center, they are combined, [because that dough] is fit to be redeemed20 [at which point,] there will be an obligation to separate challah from it. Similarly, if there was a dough of another type of grain, a dough belonging to another person, or a dough from a different year between them, the doughs on the sides are combined [to comprise an obligation to separate] challah.
Halacha 7
There were two doughs, each one of them less than the minimum measure forchallah. One separated challah from each of them. Afterwards, they touched each other and [the combined doughs] comprise the [required] measure. There is an obligation to separate challah [from the combined doughs], for thechallot separated originally are of no consequence.21
Halacha 8
Two gentiles22 made a dough comprising the required measure [for challah]23and divided it. Afterwards, they converted24 and after the conversion, each one added to his portion until it comprised the [required] measure. There is an obligation [to separate] challah. [The rationale is that] there was no time that it was of the size obligating [challah] while they were gentiles, because each was to receive less than the required measure.25
Halacha 9
If, however, two Jews made [a dough] in the above manner and then, they divided it and each one of them added to his portion26 until it comprised the required measure, it is exempt. [The rationale is that] there was a time when there would have been an obligation [to separate challah from the original dough]27and they were exempt at that time, because the dough was made to be divided.28
Halacha 10
[Different rules apply when], by contrast, the dough was owned by a gentile and a Jew in partnership and they divided it.29 If, afterwards, the gentile converted and then added to his portion and the Jew added to his portion until each one of them completed the measure that requires the separation ofchallah, there is an obligation to separate challah from the dough of the Jew,30but the dough of the gentile31 is exempt.32
Halacha 11
[The following laws apply when a person] takes yeast from a dough from which challah was not separated and places it in a dough from which challahwas separated. He should bring a second dough that - together with this yeast - will comprise a measure that obligates the separation of challah and combine it with the dough from which challah was separated.33 He should then separate from the second dough the appropriate measure of challah for it and for the yeast. [In this manner,] he is separating [challah] from [dough] that is in the same place.34 If he does not have a second dough, the entire [first dough] is considered as tevel. He should separate challah for the entire amount.35[The rationale is that] when tevel36 is mixed with its own type,37 even the slightest amount causes the mixture to become forbidden.38
Halacha 12
A dough from which challah has not been separated is like ordinary produce and not like challah with regard to the laws of ritual purity. As will be explained in the appropriate place,39 impurity of the second degree does not bring about impurity of the third degree with regard to ordinary produce.40
It is permitted to cause ordinary produce to contract ritual impurity in Eretz Yisrael.41 Therefore when there are two doughs, one that is ritually impure and one that is ritually pure, one may take [a portion of dough]42 equivalent to the measure of challah to be separated from both of them from a dough from which challah was not separated and place it in the center close to the pure dough. He should then extend a portion of the impure dough the size of an egg43 to the pure dough44 so that he will be able to separate challah45 from the dough in the same place.46
Halacha 13
A person may make a pure dough and refrain from separating challah from it, setting it - or a portion of it - aside to continuously separate challot from other doughs with it until the dough set aside becomes challah in its entirety,47provided [the dough set aside] does not become spoiled to the point that it is no longer fit for human consumption. [This applies] even if the doughs became impure. Once the dough is no longer fit for human consumption, [challah] cannot be separated with it.
When does the above apply? When there is a question whether or not challahhas been separated from the doughs for which he is separating challah.48[The rationale is that] challah of a doubtful status49may be taken from the pure dough for the impure as an initial preference50 and the two need not be in the same place.51
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Radbaz emphasizes that touching each other is not sufficient; the two doughs must become attached. See Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 325:1).
2.
Who are not partners (Siftei Cohen 326:1).
3.
See the following halachah which distinguishes between doughs made from one type and those made from two. See also Chapter 6, Halachot 16-17, which deal with the issues mentioned in this and the following halachot.
4.
Thus even if they were kneaded together, since they were intended to be separated, they are considered as distinct entities.
5.
Since they both belong to him and are of the same type of grain, why would he object to their combination?
This, however, applies only when the two doughs are types that would normally be mixed together. If they would not be normally mixed, even if they are owned by one person, this principle does not apply [Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Yoreh De'ah326:1)].
6.
And becomes attached. This applies to all the other instances when touching doughs are mentioned in this chapter.
7.
Although they are from different species, since they are of the same general type (for the doughs made from the two are similar, see Chapter 8, Halachah 4), they are combined.
8.
I.e., barley, oats, or rye.
9.
Despite the fact that if the different species of grain are mixed in the same dough, they are combined, as stated in the following halachah.
10.
Although spelt is often associated with wheat (ibid.), its dough can be combined with that of rye.
11.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:2) mentions the Rambam's perspective as a minority ruling, favoring the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that rye can be combined with barley and with spelt, but not with oats or wheat. And oats can be combined with barley and spelt, but not with rye or wheat.
12.
See Hilchot Terumah 10:18.
13.
I.e., taking a portion of both of the two doughs. This advice was given by Rabbi Yishmael (Challah 4:4).
14.
I.e., placing the doughs of new grain on either side of the dough of old grain or the doughs of old grain on either side of the dough from new grain. Since the person will see that he is adding an extra dough, he will not err and think that one may separateterumah from new grain for old grain [Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah324:8); see Halachah 6]. The Radbaz offers a different explanation.
15.
Chapter 6, Halachah 15.
16.
The two doughs on the sides are of the same type of grain and together, they comprise the required measure.
17.
See Chapter 6, Halachot 2-4, 9-10, which mention the exemption of these doughs.
18.
I.e., the two external doughs touch the middle dough. If, however, the two external doughs are touching, challah must be separated from them.
19.
In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the governing principle is that even if the dough in the center cannot be combined with those on the side (as explained in Halachot 1-4), since it is fit to require the separation of challah, it does not prevent the doughs on the side from being combined.
20.
This is speaking about a dough that was not consecrated until after it was made. If it was consecrated before it was rolled together, it is not fit to be redeemed. See Chapter 8, Halachot 6-7.
21.
As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 16.
22.
In contrast to two Jews or a Jew and a gentile, as explained in the following halachot.
23.
Since they were gentiles (see Chapter 6, Halachah 8) at the time the obligation to separate challah could have taken effect, the mitzvah of challah is not relevant to them at all . Hence, the exemption because the dough was made with the intent that it be divided into small portions (see ibid. 19) is not significant.
24.
If, however, they divided the dough after they converted, there is no obligation to separate challah even if they added to the dough. For in such an instance, they would be comparable to the two Jews mentioned in the following halachah (Rambam LeAm).
25.
Hence we do not say - as is said with regard to the following halachah - since the dough was exempt at the time when it could have been obligated, it cannot become obligated again.
26.
The Siftei Cohen 326:8 emphasizes that for this law to apply the addition must be less than the size that obligates the separation ofchallah.
27.
Had it belonged to one person.
28.
And since the obligation was not incurred at the time it could have been incurred originally, it cannot be incurred afterwards.
The Ra'avad objects to this ruling. He admits that it appears to have a source in the Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 3:4), but argues that logically, it is hard to distinguish this from a situation where a person made a dough smaller than the required size and then attached it to a dough of the required size (see Chapter 6, Halachah 16). Hence, he rules that both Jews should separatechallah from the dough after they increased its size.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishnehsupport the Rambam's ruling, differentiating between the two instances by explaining that when a dough is smaller than the required size, it has never reached a state where the obligation to separate challah relates to it. In contrast, in the instance described here, the dough was of the size that obligates the separation of challah and it was exempted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 326:4) quotes the Rambam's view.
29.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishnehexplains that this is speaking about a situation where the two had not originally intended to divide their dough and then decided to divide it. Had they originally intended to divide it, it would be necessary to separate challah from the portion belonging to the convert as well.
30.
In contrast to the situation mentioned in the previous halachah, the dough was not originally intended to be divided. Hence, since the gentile has a portion in it, while it is whole, it is not considered as if the mitzvah of challah relates to it. Thus the Jew's portion of the dough was never of the size that requires the separation of challah and when he increases its size, an obligation is created (Radbaz).
31.
I.e., the convert.
32.
Since originally, the gentile's involvement in the dough caused his portion to be exempted, when he adds to it, it is not liable, based on the principle explained above. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that there is an obligation to separate challah from both doughs. For just as the mitzvah of challah is not considered as relating to the Jew's dough, it also does not relate to the gentile's dough. Hence, when he adds to it after his conversion, the obligation takes effect. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh favor the Rambam's understanding and it is quoted as halachah by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah330:6).
33.
This is preferable to separating challah from the dough with which the yeast was mixed, because a) it will represent a saving for the person separating the challah, since he will not be separating challah a second time; b) it is not desirable to separate challah from the first dough, because the obligation to separate challah from it is Rabbinic, not Scriptural, as will be explained.
34.
As is required (Chapter 5, Halachah 14). That is why the second dough must be combined with the first dough into which the yeast was placed.
35.
The combination of the yeast and the dough.
36.
The yeast.
37.
And yeast and dough are considered of the same type.
38.
This is a Rabbinic decree, according to Scriptural Law, the presence of tevel is also nullified when there is a majority of permitted substances. Our Sages considered tevel as a devar sheyeish lo matirin, a prohibition that could be released, since once the necessary separations are made, the prohibition no longer exists. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:6. Hence, he is not considered to be separating challah from dough that is obligated for that which is exempt (Siftei Cohen 324:20).
39.
Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 11:2, 15.
40.
It does, however, have such an effect with regard to terumah and challah.
41.
See Hilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 16:9. There the Rambam differentiates between produce from which the appropriate agricultural separations have been made and produce from which they have not been made (as in the present instance). If the separations have already been made, one may bring it into direct contact with ritual impurity. If they have not been made, one may only "cause it to contract ritual impurity," i.e., indirectly.
42.
Which is ritually pure.
43.
Challah 2:8 gives this suggestion, but speaks of taking less than the size of an egg of the impure dough, for in that manner, the other dough will not become impure.
44.
Causing it to touch it. This will cause the pure dough to become ritually impure (seeHilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 6:18). Nevertheless, this is not significant, because - as the Rambam stated - there is no prohibition against causing food to become ritually impure.
45.
The dough set aside to be separated aschallah does not become ritually impure, because until it becomes consecrated aschallah, it does not become impure because it was touched by dough that was impure to the second degree. And before it is consecrated as challah, it is lifted up and no longer in contact with the source of ritual impurity. To clarify this, the Rambam began this halachah: "A dough from which challahhas not been separated is like ordinary produce and... impurity of the second degree does not bring about impurity of the third degree with regard to ordinary produce" (Radbaz).
46.
Ordinarily to separate challah for two doughs in the same place, it is not necessary for them to touch. Nevertheless, since one should not separate challah from dough that is ritually pure for dough that is ritually impure (Chapter 5, Halachah 14), in this instance, they must be touching.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, based on Challah 2:8, but the Radbaz explains the Rambam's position as above.
47.
I.e., the person would consider an appropriate portion of the dough set aside aschallah for a given dough and would continue doing this for future doughs until the entire dough that was set aside becamechallah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 4:6)].
48.
E.g., two witnesses stated that challah had been separated from the dough and two other witnesses state that it was not separated.
49.
Here the demai is being used differently than its ordinary meaning. For unlike the tithes, it is taken for granted that the common people separate challah just as they separateterumah (Radbaz; see Chapter 8, Halachah 14).
50.
Generally, the initial preference is not to separate challah from dough that is ritually pure for dough that is ritually impure (Chapter 5, Halachah 14).
51.
And generally, they must (ibid.).
• 3 Chapters: Yibbum vChalitzah Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Three, Yibbum vChalitzah Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Four, Yibbum vChalitzah Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Five • English Text | Hebrew Text |
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Halacha 1
When a man says: "This is my son," or "I have sons," his word is accepted,1and he frees his wife from [the obligation of] yibbum or chalitzah.
Halacha 2
When2 a man says: "This is my brother," or "I have brothers," his word is not accepted, and his wife does not become forbidden [to others because] she is required to perform yibbum. [We assume that] his intent was to cause his wife to be forbidden [to other men] after his death.
Halacha 3
When the prevailing presumption is that [a man] has brothers and he says at the time of his death,3 "I do not have brothers," his word is not accepted.4Similarly, if he says that a person presumed to be his brother is not his brother, his word is not accepted.
If there was no prevailing presumption that he has brothers, but a rumor becomes circulated5 that there are witnesses who will testify that he has brothers, but these witnesses are overseas, the woman must take this factor into consideration and wait until the witnesses who were mentioned come, and are asked [concerning the matter]. [This ruling applies] even when the husband says, "I do not have a brother" at the time of his death.
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when] a man engaged in licentious relations with either a single woman or a married woman, she became pregnant, and he claims that he fathered the child. Even if [the mother] acknowledges his statements, and thus the son is considered his with regard to the laws of inheritance,6 the matter is considered to be one of doubt with regard to the laws of yibbum. For just as the woman engaged in relations with him, she could have engaged in relations with another man.7 How is it possible to know with certainty that this is his son? There is no prevailing presumption to that effect.
Halacha 5
The testimony of one witness is accepted with regard to the death of a woman's husband, and she may perform yibbum on this basis. [Similarly, such testimony is acceptable if he states that] her yavam died,10 or that her husband fathered a son,11 on which basis she would be granted permission to marry another person [without chalitzah].
Even the testimony of a servant or a woman, or statements of a gentile made in the midst of conversation are acceptable with regard to the death of ayavam, as they are acceptable with regard to a married woman whose husband has died, to enable her to be permitted to remarry, as mentioned inHilchot Gerushin.12
Halacha 6
Just as the statements of five [specific] women are not accepted with regard to testimony regarding the death of a woman's husband,13 so too, the statements of these five women are not accepted with regard to the death of her yavam.
The laws of the testimony governing the death of a yavam are the same as the testimony [governing the death of the woman's husband] with regard to disparities between the statements of the witnesses and all other matters.
Halacha 7
[The following rule applies when] two widows, [each one married to one of two brothers,]14 come from an overseas country, this one says: "My husband died," and this one says: "My husband died." Each one is forbidden [to remarry] because of her obligation to the husband of the other one.15 For the testimony of a yevamah is not acceptable with regard to the death of the woman's yavam, as stated [in the previous halachah].
Halacha 8
If one of these women has a witness who can testify that her husband died, she is still forbidden to remarry - for she is not forbidden to remarry because of [an apprehension that] her own husband [is alive], but rather because of [the apprehension that] her yavam [is alive].16
The woman who does not have a witness supporting her, by contrast, is permitted [to remarry], for a witness has testified that her yavam died, and her own testimony is accepted with regard to the death of her husband.17
Halacha 9
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
A woman's testimony is accepted with regard to the death of her husband, and she may marry [another man] or perform yibbum [on this basis]. Nevertheless, the testimony of a yevamah is not accepted with regard to the death of her yavam, and it is not considered to be sufficient basis for her to marry another man. The rationale is that the prohibition [against marrying another man when under obligation to a yavam] involves merely a negative commandment.24 And therefore the woman may regard it casually.25
Similarly, the testimony of a yavam is not accepted with regard to the death of his brother, and it is not considered to be sufficient basis for him to marry his brother's wife. [We fear that] perhaps he desired her.
Similarly, a woman's testimony is not accepted with regard to the death of her sister, and it is not considered to be sufficient basis for her to be permitted to marry her sister's husband.26 [By the same token,] a man's testimony that his wife has died is not accepted as sufficient basis for him to marry her sister. In this instance, it is necessary that two witnesses testify that one sister has died before the other sister can enter her household. For the testimony of one witness was accepted only so that license to marry could be granted to a woman who would otherwise be forced to remain unmarried, as we have explained.27
Halacha 12
Accordingly,28 when a woman, her husband and her yavam journey overseas, and she comes and says: "My husband died, and afterwards myyavam died," or "My yavam died, and then my husband died," her word is not accepted.29
If, however, she and her husband depart alone, and she returns and says: "Ayavam was born for me overseas, but he died," her word is accepted, regardless of whether she says "My yavam died, and then my husband died," or "My husband died, and afterwards the yavam who was born for me died." [The rationale is] the source for the statements [on which basis the woman was] forbidden [states that she is] permitted.30
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when] a woman journeys overseas together with her husband and her son: If she returns and says: "My husband died and then my son died," her word is accepted, for at the time she departed the prevailing presumption was that she was permitted to marry another man.
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] a woman journeys overseas together with her husband alone: If she says, "I "bore a son overseas, he died, and then my husband died," her word is accepted and permitted her to perform yibbum. [The rationale is that] the prevailing presumption when she departed was that she was permitted to perform yibbum.
If she says: "My husband died, and then the son who was born to me died," her statements are not accepted as grounds to free her of the obligation foryibbum or chalitzah. Nevertheless, we grant a certain degree of credence to her words, and she should perform chalitzah, but not yibbum.33
Halacha 15
When does the above apply? When she was forbidden to the priesthood at the outset - e.g., she had been divorced or a chalalah34 beforehand,35 - or she said: "We were [alone] in a cave when he died."36
If this is not the situation, she may not perform chalitzah, lest she performchalitzah and then witnesses come and confirm her statements that her husband died first. Thus, it will be evident that this chalitzah was unnecessary, and she [is permitted to] marry a priest. An observer may see that she performs chalitzah and then marries a priest, and he would think that a priest is permitted to marry a woman who performed chalitzah, for he is unaware that witnesses came. Therefore, she should not perform chalitzah, nor should she perform yibbum.37 Instead, she should remain under the obligation to perform yibbum as she was when she departed, until witnesses come [and clarify the situation].38
Halacha 16
Similar laws apply when a woman's husband and a second wife journeyed overseas, and two witnesses came and told [the first wife], "Your husband died." She should not perform chalitzah, nor should she perform yibbum until she knows whether or not her husband's second wife bore a child.39
Why should she not perform chalitzah nine months after the death of her husband, in which case she would be permitted to marry another man from any standpoint? If the other woman bore a child, that frees her of all obligations. And if the other woman did not bear a child, she [should be permitted, because] she performed chalitzah.
[Our Sages prohibited this] as a decree, lest after the woman performedchalitzah, it become known that her husband's other wife bore a viable child. This woman will then not be [bound by the prohibitions of] a woman who performed chalitzah, and she may marry a priest despite performing chalitzah. An observer - who did not know about the witnesses [who informed her of the birth of her husband's child] - might conclude that a priest is permitted to marry a woman who performed chalitzah, and he will testify that a Rabbinic court gave her license to marry a priest. Therefore, if she was forbidden to the priesthood at the outset, she may perform chalitzah nine [months after the death of her husband and] she may marry another man.
Halacha 17
When a woman's husband dies, and her mother-in- law is living overseas, she need not suspect that her mother-in-law bore a child [before her husband's death], and that there is a yavam for her living in another country. Our Sages did not institute a decree of this nature.42 Instead, they allowed the prevailing presumption [regarding her status to continue], and she is permitted to remarry.
The same concept applies when a woman's husband dies, and her son is living overseas - she need not suspect that her son died [before her husband's death]. Instead, we allow the prevailing presumption [regarding her status to continue].
Halacha 18
If, however, the mother-in-law departed [overseas] while she was pregnant, the daughter-in-law must bear that fact in mind. She may not marry another man until she knows the fate of her mother-in-law's pregnancy. Perhaps ayavam for her was born before her husband died.
Halacha 19
[The following laws apply when] a woman's husband and son went overseas, and [witnesses] came and told her: "Your husband died and then your son died." If she married,43 and later discovered that they died in the opposite order,44 she must leave her second husband.45 None of the children she bore him is considered illegitimate, however.46
[More stringent rules apply if she was told: "Your son died and then your husband died," and on that basis she performed the rite of yibbum and then discovered that they died in the opposite order. She is obligated to leave her second husband. All the children she bore him - both those born before she received this notice and those born afterwards - are considered illegitimate.47
FOOTNOTES
1.
The rationale for this ruling is the principle ofmigo. If the husband's statements were untrue, and his intent were merely to free his wife from the obligation of yibbum, he would not have to lie. Instead, he could give her aget (Bava Batra 134b).
See also the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer156:6) and commentaries, which mention other opinions regarding whether this ruling applies when the prevailing presumption is that the man is childless, when the prevailing presumption is that he has brothers, or when witnesses testify that he has brothers.
2.
I.e., when the prevailing presumption is that he does not have a brother, and hence his wife would not be obligated to performyibbum.
3.
Even though the statements are being made at the time of the person's death, when it is unlikely that he would lie, we still suspect that he is speaking falsely to spare his wife the difficulty of yibbum or chalitzah.
4.
One might assume that, as in Halachah 1, the husband's statements would have been accepted based on the principle of migo. For in this instance as well, the husband could free his wife from yibbum by giving her a get. Nevertheless, our Sages explain that the principle of migo does not have the power to counteract a prevailing presumption.
Still, even if the prevailing presumption is that a person has brothers, his word is accepted if he says that he has sons. The rationale is that, in this instance, his statements are not contradicting the prevailing presumption, but rather introducing a new factor (Beit Shmuel157:9).
5.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not this rumor has to be substantiated in a court. The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's opinion as being that even a rumor that is not substantiated should be taken into consideration. Needless to say, in the contemporary era, when communications have advanced and travel is easier, this question is far less significant than in previous ages.
6.
See Hilchot Nachalot 4:1.
7.
If the woman is married, there is no question regarding the Rambam's ruling, for we presume that by and large, she engaged in relations with her husband. If she is single, the matter is more complex.
In this context, the commentaries draw attention to the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Terumot 8:14, which states that when a priest had relations with a woman and she became pregnant, she is allowed to partake of terumah for the sake of her child. This indicates that we assume that she was impregnated by that priest.
As indicated by the Rambam's wording inHilchot Terumot and in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah15:17-18, the matter depends on the woman's reputation. If she is known to be promiscuous, we consider the possibility that she was impregnated by another man. If, however, everyone presumes that she engaged in relations only with this man, he is considered to be the father of the child (Maggid Mishneh).
Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:9) quotes the Rambam's wording without making this distinction. See the Beit Shmuel 156:15.
8.
Lest the child have been fathered by another man, and the deceased in fact be childless.
9.
Lest the child have been fathered by the deceased, in which case relations with his brother would be prohibited.
10.
Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam regarding this matter and maintains that the testimony of one witness is not acceptable with regard to the death of a yavam. Although the Ramah (Even HaEzer 158:3) quotes his opinion, many Ashkenazic authorities recommend leniency. (See Beit Shmuel 158:2.)
11.
The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher differ with the Rambam with regard to this point, for unlike the death of a person, the birth of a child is not a matter that will surely become undeniable public knowledge. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:8) quotes the Rambam's opinion, while the Ramah follows the other view.
12.
In Hilchot Gerushin, Chapters 12 and 13, the Rambam explains that the testimony of one witness is accepted in such instances, because:
When the matter can be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true - e.g., when one testifies that a person died - the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely.For this reason, our Sages [extended] the leniency with regard to this matter and accepted the testimony of a single witness that is based on the testimony of a maidservant, [testimony] from a written document, and [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation. [These leniencies were accepted] so that the daughters of Israel will not be forced to remain unmarried.
13.
See Hilchot Gerushin 12:16, which states that the statements of a woman's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, [her husband's] other wife, her yevamah (i.e., the wife of her husband's brother) and her husband's daughter are not accepted with regard to her husband's death, because the prevailing presumption is that they hate each other.
14.
I.e., the women are married to two brothers. Thus each one is considered the yevamahof the other.
15.
I.e., the testimony of each woman is accepted with regard to the death of her own husband. With regard to the death of heryavam, by contrast, the only testimony is that of her yevamah, and that testimony is not accepted.
16.
And with regard to the death of her yavam, there is no testimony that is acceptable to the court.
Even if the woman actually remarries, at which point it would be likely to assume that her husband is dead, her yevamah is still prohibited. Our Sages feared that a woman would risk ruin in both this world and the next, in order to cause her foe to be forbidden to her husband.
17.
See Hilchot Gerushin 12:15.
18.
And neither has witnesses to support her testimony.
19.
For she is dependent on the testimony of her yevamah, as above.
20.
For her authorization to remarry does not depend on whether or not her yavam is alive.
21.
Or chalitzah.
22.
I.e., there were only three brothers. Since the death of the first two brothers was never verified adequately to allow these women to marry freely, the original prohibition applying to them remains in force.
23.
For her marriage and divorce releases each of the women from their obligation to their missing yavam.
24.
The punishment - lashes - is lesser, and the woman's children are not considered illegitimate.
25.
Having relations with another man while married, by contrast, is a prohibition punishable by execution by the court, her children are considered illegitimate, and it brings severe retribution in the world to come. Because the prohibition against marrying while under obligation to a yavamis less severe, our Sages feared that the woman might lie about the yavam's death and transgress this prohibition.
26.
It is forbidden for a husband to marry his wife's sister while his wife is alive. Our Sages feared that the second sister or the husband may desire to give false testimony, so that they can marry.
27.
I.e., generally, the testimony of two witnesses is required with regard to matters involving marriage and divorce. As mentioned in the concluding passage ofHilchot Gerushin (cited in the notes on Halachah 6), in order to allow a woman to remarry, leniency is granted and we rely on the testimony of one witness. In this instance, however, there is no difficulty in the man's or the woman's remarrying; the only difficulty is that they cannot marry each other. In such an instance, our Sages were not willing to extend leniency.
[There is a slight difficulty when comparing the Rambam's statements here to his statements at the conclusion of Hilchot Gittin. As explained by the Noda BiY'hudah(Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33), the Rambam's wording indicates that, according to Scriptural law, with regard to a point of fact that can be verified, it is not necessary for two witnesses to testify, and the statements of one witness are sufficient. The leniency granted by our Sages was to accept the testimony of women, relatives and others whose testimony would not ordinarily be accepted. Here, however, the Rambam is stating (as he does in Hilchot Edut 5:2) that the acceptance of the testimony of a single witness is a leniency of Rabbinic origin. (See the Responsa of the Rivash, Responsum 181.)]
28.
I.e., based on the premise stated in the first clause of the previous halachah.
29.
For the prevailing presumption when she departed was that she would be obligated to perform yibbum if her husband dies.
30.
The prevailing presumption when she departed was that she would not be obligated to perform yibbum if her husband dies. It is only because of her own statements that we might suspect that she is required to do so. Therefore, her statements are sufficient to offset this suspicion.
31.
We suspect that perhaps she is lying in order to marry her brother-in-law.
32.
I.e., were it not for her statement that her son died first, she would be permitted to marry without any restrictions. Because we give her statements some credence, we require her to perform chalitzah.
33.
I.e., were it not for her statement that her son died after her husband, she would be required to perform yibbum. We do not accept her word to the extent that we allow her to marry without restrictions. Nevertheless, we give her statements some credence and forbid the performance ofyibbum, lest in fact there be no obligation to do so.
34.
A woman who is born from a relationship that is forbidden to a priest, but not to an Israelite.
35.
In which case, the chalitzah does not make any difference, for the woman was forbidden to the priesthood regardless.
36.
In which case, there is no apprehension of witnesses coming.
37.
For according to her testimony, she is forbidden to do so.
38.
Note the discussion of this ruling by the Beit Shmuel 156:17, and the opinion mentioned there that this ruling applies only when there were witnesses who testified that the woman's husband and son both died. Otherwise, the woman's word would be accepted based on the principle of migo - i.e., if she desired to lie, she could have said that her son was still alive.
39.
This law applies even if the second wife was not pregnant when she left. Our Sages considered the possibility of the woman becoming pregnant as a reasonable probability.
40.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.
41.
We do not consider the possibility that the woman was impregnated by her husband before he departed on the journey and did not realize this until he had already departed.
42.
For even if we presume that the mother-in-law will become pregnant, it is more probable that she will miscarry or give birth to a girl (in which cases, the mitzvah of yibbum would not apply) than that she bear a son (Beit Shmuel 157:11).
43.
For according to the testimony she was given, her husband was survived by a son, and the mitzvot of yibbum and chalitzah do not apply.
44.
In which case her husband would have died without children, and she would be obligated to perform yibbum or chalitzah.
45.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 18.
46.
For it is only when a child is born from forbidden relations that are punishable bykaret that this status is incurred (Yevamot49a).
47.
For her relations with her brother-in-law were prohibited by a transgression punishable by karet. The fact that she violated this prohibition unwittingly does not change the status of her children.
Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Four
Halacha 1
What does the mitzvah of chalitzah entail? The yevamah goes to the yavam'splace of residence1 and approaches the judges. They call the yavam and give him advice that is appropriate for him and for her.
Halacha 2
The judges should first establish the place where they will hold session,5 and then she should perform chalitzah there in their presence, as [Deuteronomy 25:7] states: "And his yevamah shall ascend to the gate, [where] the elders [hold court]...."
If [the judges] did not speak about the matter, nor did they establish a place, and [the yevamah] and [the yavam] chanced upon them and performedchalitzah, the chalitzah is acceptable.
Halacha 3
Halacha 4
If the yevamah is familiar [with the phrase] she must recite, we are not fastidious her reading [the above phrase] in one breath. If, however, she is unable [to read], we should train her until she does so [properly].
Halacha 5
Chalitzah must be performed during the day and not at night.8 [The rite] must be performed in the presence of [at least] three individuals9 who know how to read.10
Halacha 6
How is the rite of chalitzah performed? A leather15shoe16 with a heel, that is not sewn with linen threads,17is brought to [the yavam].18 He places it on his right foot and ties its straps around his foot.19
Both [the yavam] and [the yevamah] stand before the court.20 The phrase [Deuteronomy 25:7], Me'ein yevami.... ("My yavam refuses....") is read in Hebrew for the yevamah to repeat. Afterwards, the phrase [ibid.:8], Lo chafatzti lekachtah ("I do not desire to take her") is read for the yavam to repeat.
He then presses his foot to the ground.21 She sits [on the ground],22 extends her hand before the court, loosens the straps of his shoe, removes it,23 and throws it to the ground.24 At the moment she removes the majority of the heel [of the shoe from his foot], she becomes free to marry another man.
Halacha 7
Afterwards, she stands and spits on the earth before his face,25 in a manner that the spittle can be seen by the judges. For the mitzvah of chalitzahrequires that both [the yevamah and the yavam] should stand when they recite [the phrases they must say] and when she spits. The judges must see the spittle that emerges from her mouth.26
Afterwards, the phrase Kachah ye'aseh..., "This is what should be done to a man who does not build his brother's household. And his [family] shall be called within Israel 'the household of the one whose shoe was removed' [Deuteronomy 25:9-10] is read for the yevamah to repeat.
Halacha 8
All [the statements mentioned] above should be made in Hebrew. This is derived from the phrase "This is what" [in the above verse, which is interpreted] to mean "with these words."
All those seated27 in attendance recite chalutz hana'al, "the one whose shoe was removed," three times.28
The yevamah must remove his shoe with willful intent, and [the yavam] must have the intent that he performs this rite on her behalf. They must perform these acts with the intent of enabling her to marry other men.29
A blind man30 should not perform chalitzah,31 for [Deuteronomy 25:9] states: "[She] shall spit before his face," and he cannot see her spittle.
Halacha 9
Thus, the order of chalitzah should be as follows: First she recites: "Myyavam refuses to perpetuate his brother's name within Israel. My yavam did not desire [to marry me].
Afterwards, [the yavam] says: "I do not desire to take her." At which point, she removes his shoe and then spits. Afterwards, she recites: "This is what should be done to a man who does not build his brother's household. And his [family] shall be called within Israel 'the household of the one whose shoe was removed.'
Halacha 10
This order is not, however, an absolute requirement. Instead, even though neither [the yevamah], nor [the yavam] recited [the required phrases], she spit and then removed his shoe, or she recited [the phrases] and then spit, thechalitzah is acceptable.
Halacha 11
Why, [in the above instance,] should she not spit [again], [so that all the required activities] will be performed in the proper order? Lest people [mistakenly] think that spitting alone is of no consequence, and [they err and think] that it does not prevent [the yavam's] other brothers [from performingyibbum with the yevamah].32
Halacha 12
[Even if] she merely removed his shoe, did not recite [the required phrases], and did not spit, the chalitzah is acceptable. Needless to say, if she removed his shoe and recited the required phrases, but did not spit, or if she removed his shoe and spat, but did not recite the required phrases, the chalitzah is acceptable.33
Halacha 13
When does the above apply? When [the yevamah and the yavam] are able to speak, for then they are able to recite [the appropriate phrases].34 When, however, [the yevamah] or [the yavam] is dumb, they may not performchalitzah, and if they do perform chalitzah, the chalitzah is not acceptable.35
[Their deeds are, nevertheless, effective to a certain degree.] They are not comparable to a chalitzah performed by [a yevamah] or [a yavam] who was a deaf-mute, in which case their deeds are of no consequence whatsoever,36for a deaf-mute is not of sufficient mental capacity to take responsibility for his [or her] actions.
Halacha 14
If [the yevamah] only spits, without removing [the yavam's shoe] or reciting [the appropriate phrases], or spits and recites [the appropriate phrases], without removing [the yavam's shoe], it is as if she has performed an unacceptable chalitzah.37
If both [the yevamah and the yavam] recite [the appropriate phrases], but theyevamah does not remove [the yavam's shoe] or spit, they have not accomplished anything.38 [This is implied by the verse:] "This is what should be done to a man" - i.e., a deed removing the shoe or spitting has an effect. The recitation of the verses, by contrast, is not an absolute requirement, nor does it have any effect [on its own].39
Halacha 15
If [the yevamah] removes [the yavam's shoe], spits and recites [the appropriate phrases] while they are sitting, or lying on their sides,40 if the straps of the [yavam's] shoe are tied on his leg below the knee,41 or if she performed chalitzah in the presence of three common people who are not able to read the verses [which the two recite],42 the chalitzah is acceptable. Similarly, if [a yavam who is] blind43 performs chalitzah, [the chalitzah is acceptable].
Halacha 16
Chalitzah is unacceptable [in the following instances]:
a) a woman performed chalitzah at night,44
b) she performed chalitzah in the presence of two judges or in the presence of three judges, and one of them was a relative or [otherwise] disqualified [from serving in this capacity,45
c) the shoe was tied above his knee,46
d) he untied the shoe and she removed it,47 or she untied the shoe and he removed it,
e) she had the intent of performing [these acts to release herself from her obligation to her yavam] but he did not, or he had the intent of performing [these acts to release her from her obligation to her yavam] but she did not,48
f) or a girl below the age of majority removed the shoe of an adult.49
Similarly, if a woman performs chalitzah in the presence of one judge, or even if chalitzah is performed at night by [the yevamah and the yavam] while they are alone, the chalitzah is unacceptable.50 When, however, chalitzah is performed by a deaf-mute, a mentally incapable person, or a minor,51 and similarly, when a man performs chalitzah with a woman who is not obligated to perform chalitzah or yibbum,52 the chalitzah is of no consequence.
Halacha 17
When a yavam's right leg is cut off, he should not perform chalitzah with his left leg.53 If he performs chalitzah with his left leg, the chalitzah is unacceptable.
If [the yavam] is bowlegged, his foot turns to his side, or he always walks on the tips of his toes, she should not perform chalitzah, for the man performingchalitzah must press his heel to the ground, and such a person is incapable of this. If a person with such a disability in his legs performs chalitzah, thechalitzah is unacceptable.54
Halacha 18
A yevamah whose hands are cut off may perform chalitzah. A priori, [it is acceptable,] even if [she must remove the shoe] with her teeth, for the verse does not say that she will remove it with her hands.
If she removes a shoe made from cloth, she has not performed chalitzah.55 If, however, she removes a shoe that does not have a heel, [a shoe] that was sewn with linen threads, a shoe made from goats' hair, the inner bark of a palm tree, cork or wood, the chalitzah is unacceptable.56
[This same ruling applies if] the shoe is so large that [the yavam] could not walk in it, if it is so small that it does not cover the majority of his foot, it is torn to the extent that it does not cover the majority of his foot, or the sole is opened to the extent that it does not cover the majority of his foot.
Halacha 19
Chalitzah is acceptable,57 however, in the following instances:
a) a sandal was made of wood58 and covered with leather, or its soles were leather, and its sides were made from goats' hair,
b) [the yevamah] removed a left shoe from [the yavam's] right foot,
c) the shoe did not belong to the [the yavam],59
d) it was oversized, but he could still walk while wearing it,
e) it was small, but it covered the majority of his foot,
f) it was torn, but it covered the majority of his foot, or
g) the sole was opened, but it covered the majority of his foot.
Halacha 20
When it is questionable that a sandal is affected by tzara'at, or it has definitely been established that this is the case,60 and a sandal belonging to a false deity - i.e., one placed on the feet of an image61 - should not be used forchalitzah.62If, however, it is used for that purpose, the chalitzah is acceptable, despite the fact that deriving benefit from [the sandal] is forbidden.63
[Different rules apply with regard to a sandal that was made from an animal] offered to a false deity,64 one from an apostate city,65 or one that was made to be worn by a corpse when it is buried. If [such a sandal] is used for chalitzah, the chalitzah is unacceptable. [The rationale is] that such a sandal was not made for a person to wear while walking.
Halacha 21
If [the yevamah] tears the shoe off [the yavam's] foot or burns it, the chalitzahis unacceptable.66 [The same ruling applies if the yavam] is wearing two shoes [on his right foot, one on top of the other,] and the yevamah removes [only] the upper one [in the ordinary manner]. Even if she tears off the lower one so that his foot is revealed, the chalitzah is unacceptable.
Halacha 22
Halacha 23
If [a yevamah] spits blood,69 or if blood is dripping from her mouth, [the spitting] is of no consequence. If she sucks [the wound] and then spits, it is acceptable, for it is impossible that there will be blood that was sucked out without some drops of spittle.70
If she spits, and the wind blows away the spittle before it passed before his face - e.g., she is tall and he is short - [the spitting] is of no consequence. If [the wind blows] the spittle [away] after it passes before his face, but before it lands on the ground, it is acceptable.71
If the judges do not see the spittle emerge from [the yevamah's] mouth,72 it is acceptable.
Halacha 24
Chalitzah performed under mistaken premises is unacceptable.
What is implied? For example, [if the yavam] was told: "Perform chalitzah for her; this is the manner in which you acquire her as a wife," "Perform chalitzahfor her. It is a mitzvah, and you do not lose any rights. If you later desire to perform yibbum, you may,"73 or the like, [the chalitzah] is unacceptable.74
If, however, he was deceived and was told: "Perform chalitzah for her on the condition the she give you 200 zuz" - or "...under any other condition" - thechalitzah is acceptable,75 even though she did not give [him the money] or fulfill the condition.76 [The rationale is that] he had the intent [of releasing her from her obligation] when he performed chalitzah.
Halacha 25
When [a man] issues a protest77 with regard to chalitzah, the chalitzah is not acceptable.78 Therefore, it is proper for the judges to tell [the yavam] to nullify all protests [before he performs chalitzah], as they do with regard to a get.79
[The following rules apply when] Jews compel [a yavam] and beat him until he performs chalitzah:80 If they act according to law,81 the chalitzah is acceptable.82 If they do not act according to law - e.g., they were commoners or they erred [in judgment] - the chalitzah is not acceptable.
If gentiles force [a yavam to perform chalitzah] on their own initiative,83 but the law would require that chalitzah be performed, the chalitzah is unacceptable. If they do not act according to law, the chalitzah is of no substance.
Halacha 26
Whenever we have used the terms, "the chalitzah is of no substance," "his actions are of no consequence," or "nothing has been accomplished," the intent is that it is as if the chalitzah had not been performed at all. He does not become forbidden to her relatives,84 nor is she forbidden to the priesthood, and she is permitted to perform yibbum.
Whenever we have used the term, "the chalitzah is unacceptable,"85 he becomes forbidden to her relatives, and she becomes forbidden to the priesthood. She also becomes forbidden to all the brothers, and she may not perform yibbum. She may not marry another man, however, until she performs an acceptable chalitzah.
Halacha 27
If she transgresses and marries [another man], [the yavam] should perform an acceptable chalitzah with her. She is allowed to remain married to her husband; she is not sent away from him.86
Halacha 28
When a yevamah grows up together with [her deceased husband's] brothers, she is permitted to perform yibbum. We do not suspect that she performedchalitzah with one of them alone and thus became forbidden to them.87
If, however, we see that she removed the shoe of one [of the brothers], she is disqualified [from yibbum], lest she have intended to perform chalitzah.88 An acceptable chalitzah must, however, be performed to enable her to marry another man.
Halacha 29
The document recording the chalitzah that we compose is merely a legal record,89 so that a woman will have at hand proof that she performedchalitzah.
Judges do not preside over chalitzah unless they know the identity [of theyevamah and the yavam]. Therefore, a person who observes chalitzah can write a document recording the chalitzah although he does not know90 that the woman is so and so's daughter, that her deceased husband was so and so, and that the person who performed chalitzah with her was [her husband's] brother. [He can assume] that the judges who presided over the chalitzahclarified these matters and afterwards had the chalitzah performed.
30. This is the formal text of the document recording the chalitzah that is employed at present:
On this day of the week and on this day of the month, in this year from the time of creation, according to the reckoning that is followed in this and this place, we, the judges, of whom several have signed below,91 sat in a session of three in court. So and so, the widow of so and so, the daughter of so and so, approached us, as did a man named so and so, the son of so and so.And this woman told us: "So and so, the son of so and so, [is] the paternal brother of so and so, my husband. [My husband,] to whom I was married, died, leaving life to the Sages and to the entire Jewish people. He did not leave a son or a daughter to inherit him and to perpetuate his name within Israel. So and so, his brother is fit to perform yibbum with me."Rabbis, tell that man: 'If you desire to perform yibbum, do so.' If not, let him place his right foot before me, and I will remove his shoe from his foot and spit before him."We clarified the identity of so and so and that he is the paternal brother of so and so, and we told him: "If you desire to perform yibbum, do so. If not, place your right foot before us, so that she can remove your shoe from your foot and spit before you." He answered us: "I do not desire to perform yibbum."Immediately, we had this woman recite after us:92 "My yavam refuses to raise a name for his brother within Israel. My yavam does not desire [to performyibbum]."And then, we had the man recite after us:93 "I do not desire to take her." He then placed his right foot forward. She removed his shoe from his foot and spit before him, emitting spittle that could be seen by us from her mouth to the ground.We then had her recite after us:94 "This is what should be done to a man who does not build his brother's household. And his [family] shall be called within Israel 'the household of the one whose shoe was removed.' And we the judges, and all those sitting before us, answered after her: "the one whose shoe was removed," "the one whose shoe was removed," "the one whose shoe was removed," three times.When this act was performed before us, we granted license for so and so to marry whomever she desires; no man has the right to raise a protest from this day onward.So and so made a request for a legal record of this chalitzah. [Hence,] we wrote it up, signed it and gave to her as proof according to the faith of Moses and Israel.Signed so and so the son of so and so, a witness;so and so the son of so and so, a witness.95
Halacha 31
The three judges, two of the three judges, or two other individuals who witnessed the chalitzah, but who did not serve as the judges presiding over the chalitzah, may testify concerning the matter, as we have explained.96
Even [the testimony of] a woman, a servant or a minor who is perceptive and understanding is accepted if they say that "This is so and so, the brother of so and so, and this is his yevamah." We may then perform chalitzah on this basis. This does not apply with regard to other forms of testimony required by the Torah - neither testimony required in questions of monetary law nor testimony required with regard to prohibitions.
[The rationale for this distinction is that this is a matter that will likely be revealed, and it is possible to know the truth of the matter without relying on their testimony, as we have explained at the conclusion of Hilchot Gittin.97
If the yavam desires to perform yibbum, he should consecrate her, performyibbum and write her a ketubah, as we have explained.98
The following is the text of the ketubah given to yevamot that is customarily employed at present:
Halacha 32
On this day of the week and on this day of the month, in this year according to the reckoning that is followed in this and this place, [we the undersigned testify] that so and so, the son of so and so, appeared before us and told us: "My paternal brother died, leaving life to the Sages and to all of Israel. He did not leave a son or a daughter to inherit him and to perpetuate his name within Israel. He did, however, leave a woman so and so, the daughter of so and so. According to the Torah, she is fit to perform yibbum with me, as it is written in the Torah scroll of Moses: 'A yavam will engage in relations with her.' This woman consented and performed yibbum with so and so, the son of so and so, her yavam, to perpetuate [her deceased husband's] name within Israel, as it is written: "The first-born that she bears will arise in the name of his brother who is deceased."99
So and so, the yavam, has written [a marriage contract for] two hundred silverzuzim, as befits her, as was written in the marriage contract written to her by her first husband,100 and he adds to this pledge from his own resources this and this amount. This is the dowry with which she entered the household... [continuing as in] the ordinary text of a ketubah.
The text of the ketubah13101
33. On this day of the week..., [we the undersigned testify] that so and so, the son of so and so, told so and so, the daughter of so and so, a virgin bride: "Become my wife according to the faith of Moses and the Jewish people. And I, with the help of God, will work to honor you, sustain you, nourish you, provide for you and clothe you according to the custom of Jewish men who faithfully honor, sustain, nurture, provide for and clothe their wives.
"And as a dowry fit for a virgin, I will give you 200 silver zuzim, which are equivalent to 25 zuzim of [pure] silver,102 which are fit for you according to the Torah,103your sustenance, your clothing and your other needs, and I will give you conjugal rights."104
So and so agreed and became the wife of so and so. He consented and added to the essential requirement of the marriage contract, reaching a total sum of such and such. This is the sum of the value of the dowry that she brought to the household, such and such. The groom received this entire amount. It entered his domain and came under his jurisdiction, and he accepted responsibility for the entire amount as a loan and a debt.
Similarly, the groom has told us, "I accept responsibility for the entire [sum mentioned in] this marriage contract: the essential requirement of the marriage contract, the dowry, the additional amount, and all the stipulations of the marriage contract.105
"[This responsibility I accept upon myself,] my heirs and on all the valuable and desirable property and assets that I own beneath the heavens. [This includes] those that I already own and those that I will acquire and includes landed property and movable property that is acquired via the acquisition of landed property. All of them will be liable and accountable for the entire sum of this marriage contract: the essential requirement of the marriage contract, the dowry and the additions that payment be made from them in my lifetime and after my death, including even the cloak I wear on my shoulders."
We have formalized all that is written and explicitly stated above with a comprehensive kinyan.106 It should not be considered as an asmachta107 or as a sample text for legal documents that is not binding. Instead, it is binding with all the power and rigor of marriage contracts that are customarily accepted among the Jewish people, as ordained by our Rabbis of blessed memory. We signed this marriage contract on the date mentioned above. Everything is clear, forceful and viable.
Halacha 34
If the marriage contract is written for a widow, it should mention [the woman's name as] "so and so, the widow."108 If the marriage contract is written for a divorcee, it should mention [the woman's name as] "so and so, the divorcee."109 Similarly, if she had been taken captive [by gentiles], one should write "so and so, who was taken captive," so that a priest will not err [and marry] her.110
[In these instances,] it is written: "And as a dowry, I will give you 100 silverzuzim, which are equivalent to 12 1/2 zuzim of [pure] silver, which are fit for you...."111
Halacha 35
When a legal record of the chalitzah or a ketubah for a yevamah is written, the place where the verses [from the Torah] are written should be ruled with a stylus, for it is forbidden to write three words [from the Torah] without ruling [the surface on which one writes].112
A yevamah who performs chalitzah is permitted to marry on the same day on which she performed chalitzah, for she should not perform chalitzah until 90 days have passed [since her husband's death].113
FOOTNOTES
1.
Sanhedrin 31b derives this fromDeuteronomy 25:8: "And the elders of hiscity shall call him..." - i.e., "his city" and not her city.
2.
Our text is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of theMishneh Torah. This version appears appropriate, for the decision to performyibbum or chalitzah is that of the remaining brother alone.
3.
This follows the Rambam's perspective (Chapter 1, Halachah 2) that, in general, it is preferable to perform yibbum rather thanchalitzah. Even so, the judges should take counsel and see whether the couple appear appropriate for each other.
4.
See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:26.
5.
Darchei Moshe (Even HaEzer 169) states that establishing a place for the chalitzahbeforehand serves to publicize the matter.
6.
For, as explained in the halachot to follow, both the yavam and the yevamah must recite certain phrases within the chalitzahceremony.
7.
Lo avah yabmi means "My yavam did not desire" [Deuteronomy 25:7]. Improper emphasis could, however, cause the statement to be interpreted as: "No, myyavam desired."
8.
For chalitzah is considered as a "judgment," and judgments may not be made at night (Yevamot 104a). (See also Halachah 16.)
9.
I.e., there is no need for these individuals to be formally ordained as judges. Nevertheless, as the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot12:1), and as the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:1) states, at the outset it is proper for three ordained judges to preside over the ceremony.
10.
For they must read the phrases for theyavam and the yevamah, as will be stated later in the text. See Halachah 15, which states that this requirement is a factor only a priori.
11.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 169:2) rules that a judge whose father is a native-born Jew and his mother is a convert may serve in this capacity.
12.
Deuteronomy 25:10 states: "And his name will be called in Israel...." This phrase implies that only those of Jewish ancestry can serve in this capacity.
13.
This serves two purposes. It is of benefit to the woman, for men will become aware that she is eligible to remarry. It also will make known the fact that she is forbidden to a priest (Rashi, Yevamot 101b).
14.
Who do not know how to read. For their presence is only for the sake of making the matter known.
15.
The entire shoe (according to the Ramah,Even HaEzer 169:15, even its straps must be made of leather).
16.
See Yevamot 102a and the Shulchan Aruch(ibid.:16), which discuss whether a sandal or a shoe should be used.
17.
There are certain opinions that allow a shoe that is sewn with linen, but both the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (ibid. 169:15) follow the Rambam's view.
18.
At the outset, the shoe should belong to theyavam. (See the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:14).
19.
The yavam should not be wearing socks, and no mud should be stuck to his feet (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.:26).
20.
The Sifre derives this concept fromDeuteronomy 25:8, which states: "And he shall stand and say." After the fact, however, if the chalitzah was performed while the yavam and the yevamah were seated, it is acceptable (Ramah, ibid.169:12).
21.
The Tur states in the name of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi that if the yavam does not press his foot to the ground, the chalitzah is not acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch(ibid.:32) quotes this as a minority opinion.
22.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:30) differs and follows the opinion of the Tur, who states that the chalitzah should be performed while the woman is standing and bends to untie and remove the yavam's shoe.
23.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) states that theyevamah should untie and remove the shoe with her right hand alone. The Ramah states, however, that, after the fact, thechalitzah is acceptable if she uses her left hand.
24.
The Tur and others question the rationale for this act. Significantly, the commentaries cite the Rambam's source as the Zohar, Volume III, page 180a, which states that the removal of the shoe signifies the cutting of the woman's connection with her deceased husband.
25.
Although the literal meaning of Deuteronomy 25:9 is "she spits in his face," Yevamot 106b explains that in a halachic context, the phrase should be interpreted as above.
26.
For Deuteronomy, ibid., states that she must spit "before the eyes of the elders."
27.
The Mishnah (Yevamot 12:6) and theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:42) mention "those standing there."
28.
We find a threefold repetition of a phrase employed by the Sages as a means of publicizing the matter. See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:11.
The Halachot Gedolot interprets the threefold repetition as a reprimand. It is as if God told him: "Wicked man! With your body, you could have performed a mitzvah, and you refused.... The judges will proclaim: 'The one whose shoe was removed' like a mourner. 'The one whose shoe was removed' like one placed under a ban of ostracism. 'The one whose shoe was removed' like a person who rebels against [God's] commandments."
29.
Our translation of lishmah is based on theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:44).
30.
I.e., one who is blind in both eyes (Hagahot Maimoniot, Ramah, loc. cit.:48).
31.
As reflected by Halachah 15, this is just an a priori ruling. After the fact, the chalitzah is acceptable.
The Ra'avad states that this law applies only when there is another brother who can perform chalitzah. If there is not another brother, the blind man should perform this ritual on the woman's behalf. Although theMaggid Mishneh contests the Ra'avad's decision, the Beit Shmuel 169:48 upholds it.
32.
See Halachah 14.
33.
Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the phrase (Deuteronomy 25:9), kachah ye'aseh, "this is what should be done," implies that all the deeds and the order required by the Torah is imperative for the chalitzah to be effected. The final opinion of Rabbi Akiva does not, however, accept this view (Yevamot 104b).
34.
This reflects a Talmudic principle frequently applied and stated explicitly with regard to the meal offering brought in the Temple. These offerings consist of flour and oil. The flour and the oil should be mixed together. Nevertheless, as long as the quantity of flour is not too large to be mixed with the oil, the offering is acceptable, even when in actual fact the two were not mixed together (Rashi,Yevamot 104b).
35.
The difference between a chalitzah that ispasul, "not acceptable," and a chalitzah that is not significant at all is discussed in Halachah 26.
36.
As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Rambam's view is dependent on theTosefta, while on the surface, the Mishnah (Yevamot 104b) appears to accept the position that a chalitzah performed by a deaf-mute is unacceptable, but not of no consequence. The Maggid Mishnehattempts to justify the Rambam's ruling, but notes that the Ramban and the Rashba follow the latter view. [Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot12:4), the Rambam also appears to favor the latter view, and his decision in theMishneh Torah represents a reversal of his thinking.] The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:44) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one.
37.
As mentioned in Halachah 26, the chalitzahdoes not permit the yevamah to remarry, but prevents her from performing yibbum.
There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether the effectiveness of spitting is a Scriptural law or a Rabbinic institution. The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears that the Rambam is deriving the concept from the exegesis of a verse, but this is not accepted by all authorities.
38.
Yibbum is permitted, and she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
39.
Yevamot 105a distinguishes between spitting and the recitation of the verses as follows: Spitting should be carried out after the removal of the yavam's shoe. Therefore, if it is performed before the removal of the shoe, it is considered a distinct act. The recitation of the verses, by contrast, should be performed before the removal of the shoe. An observer will thus realize that the fundamental aspect of the ceremony is still to be performed.
40.
Instead of the two standing when she spits and they recite the verses, and the yavam'sstanding, as mentioned in Halachot 6 and 7.
41.
And not on his foot itself, as mentioned in Halachah 6.
42.
Instead of judges who know how to read, as stated in Halachah 5.
43.
Although at the outset, a blind person should not perform this act as stated in Halachah 8.
44.
See Halachah 5.
45.
Since chalitzah is considered a judgment, three acceptable judges must preside over the ceremony.
46.
Deuteronomy 25:9 states: "She shall remove his shoe from his foot." If the shoe is tied above the knee, it is not considered to have been removed from his foot.
47.
The entire act of removing the shoe must be performed by the woman. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 169:33) quotes Rabbenu Asher, who rules that if the man could walk wearing the shoe while it is untied, the chalitzah is acceptable even if the man untied the shoe and the woman removed it.
48.
As stated in Halachah 8, the ceremony must be performed with this intent in mind.
49.
Since the girl is not past the age of majority, her deed is not totally effective. Nevertheless, since she can be be married at this age, her deed has a minimal effect, and she can no longer perform yibbum.
50.
The Rambam's intent is that the chalitzah is unacceptable, but it at least has the effect of preventing the woman from performingyibbum in the future, as opposed to achalitzah that is of no consequence, as explained in Halachah 26.
51.
These individuals are all considered mentally incompetent, and their deeds are not considered of consequence with regard to Torah law. As mentioned above, there are opinions that maintain that chalitzahperformed by a deaf-mute is unacceptable, but not of no consequence whatsoever.
52.
E.g., a yevamah who is pregnant.
53.
The commentaries explain that the Rambam's opinion is that such a man should not perform chalitzah at all. Other commentaries maintain that if the stump of the yavam's leg can be placed in a shoe and that shoe tied beneath his knee, thechalitzah is acceptable. Although the Rambam accepts, after the fact, chalitzahperformed when the straps of the shoe are tied below the yavam's knee, that is only because it is theoretically possible to have tied them on his foot. When it is impossible to tie the shoe on to his foot, as in the instance at hand, the chalitzah should not be performed (Maggid Mishneh).
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:35) mentions both opinions, but appears to favor the Rambam's view. The Beit Yosef states that according to the Rambam, such achalitzah is of no consequence at all. TheBeit Shmuel 169:33 states that since there are authorities who maintain that such achalitzah is acceptable, the later authorities agree that a woman may not performyibbum after such a chalitzah.
54.
After the fact, if a yavam does not press his heel to the ground in an ordinary instance, the chalitzah is, nevertheless, acceptable. The distinction between an ordinarychalitzah and the case at hand is that ordinarily, it is possible for the yavam to press his heel to the ground, and therefore the fact that he does not actually do so is not significant. In this instance, the yavam is incapable of doing so. Hence, the chalitzahis unacceptable.
Although the Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam on this issue, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:34) accepts the Rambam's view.
55.
A cloth shoe does not protect the foot at all; therefore, it is not considered a shoe (Yevamot 103a). This ruling is also applied in other contexts - e.g., on Yom Kippur, when we are forbidden to wear shoes, it is permitted to wear a cloth shoe (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 3:7).
The Rashba and others maintain that there is no difference between a cloth slipper and a shoe made from the other substances mentioned. This is the view quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:22).
56.
These substances offer some protection, and so the chalitzah is of some consequence. Nevertheless, when the Torah uses the word נעל, the intent is always a leather shoe.
57.
This applies after the fact. A priori, none of these situations is acceptable.
58.
The same rules apply with regard to a shoe made from any of the other substances mentioned in the previous halachah and covered with leather (Maggid Mishneh).
59.
In the present age, when the Rabbinic court owns a special chalitzah shoe, it is customary to give it to the yavam as a present before the ceremony.
60.
See Hilchot Tum'at Tzara'at, Chapter 12, which describes the process in which a garment or shoe affected by tzara'at is judged by a priest. There are two stages to this process: one in which the article is "quarantined" for a period of a week to determine whether it has actually been affected, and a second stage during which the priest declares that the article is affected and must be burned.
61.
Rashi (Yevamot 103b) interprets this as a leather covering placed on the feet of an idol to prevent damage when it is transported from place to place. Thus, the sandal is placed in the category of "an accessory to a false deity."
62.
For it is abhorrent to use an article associated with impurity or false deities for the purpose of a mitzvah (Yevamot 103b).
63.
The rationale is that the performance of mitzvot is not considered to be a personal benefit (ibid.).
64.
Our translation is based on the gloss of theMaggid Mishneh. The Maggid Mishnehcontinues, stating that if a sandal itself is offered to a false deity, it does not become forbidden. See Beit Shmuel 169:23.
The difference between this and the previous instance can be explained as follows: It is possible to nullify the connection between "an accessory to a false deity" and the worship of the false deity. (See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:8-9.) As such, there is a possibility that such a sandal will not have to be destroyed. An object offered to a false deity, including the hide from which a sandal was made, can never be separated from its association with the false deity (ibid.). As such, it is condemned to be destroyed, forbidden for eternity and considered as if it did not exist. Hence, it is not considered as if the yevamah removed a significant entity from the yavam's foot.
65.
See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 4, which describes the laws governing such a city. All the property in the city is condemned to be burned, and thus it cannot be used forchalitzah, for the reasons described above.
66.
Yevamot 102a questions whether the Torah's intent is that the yevamah must bare the yavam's foot, in which instance these examples would be acceptable, or she must remove his shoe in the ordinary manner, in which instance they would not be acceptable. Since the question remains unresolved, the Rambam rules stringently.
67.
Our translation is based on the Aruch. It is possible that it is not precise according to the Rambam's view. The intent, however, is definitely a sharp pungent herb.
68.
The intent is that she must spit again in order for the chalitzah to be performed as required. Even if she does not spit at all, thechalitzah is acceptable after the fact, as stated in Halachah 12 (Maggid Mishneh).
69.
Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that ayevamah who spits blood need not spit again, even if she does not suck her wound. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 169:40).
70.
The fact that spittle is mixed with blood or another substance does not disqualify it.
71.
The intent is that the spittle must pass in front of or below the yavam's face. If theyevamah was taller than the yavam and the wind moved her spittle away before it passed before his face, the spitting is not acceptable.
72.
Although a priori the judges must see the spittle, as stated in Halachah 7, after the fact their failure to do so does not render the spitting unacceptable.
In Yevamot 106b, a phrase "before the eyes of the elders" (Deuteronomy 25:9) is cited as a support for this requirement. Nevertheless, the Rabbis explain that the requirement is Rabbinic and not Scriptural in origin, and the verse is merely an asmachta. See the Beit Shmuel 169:39.
73.
Note the Maggid Mishneh, which mentions that there is a dispute among the Rabbis about this issue. The rationale for the position that the chalitzah is acceptable is that in this instance, the yavam did intend to free the yevamah from her obligation to him. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer169:52.)
74.
For as mentioned in Halachah 8, thechalitzah must be performed with the intent of releasing the woman from her obligation.
The chalitzah is, however, effective, in that it prevents the man (or his brothers) from ever performing yibbum with this woman. Therefore, the man is compelled by the court to perform an acceptable chalitzah, for from this point on he has nothing to lose, and through his act he can enable the woman to remarry (Rashba, as quoted by Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 169:51).
75.
This applies even if the condition is stated in a manner that meets the requirements of conditional statements (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:50).
76.
If such a condition is made, the woman is, however, rightfully obligated to pay the amount she agreed to pay, unless she has a reason for which she considers the yavamas unfit to marry her that the court would accept [Shulchan Aruch (ibid.)].
77.
Based on Hilchot Gerushin 6:19, it would appear that the intent is that he tells two witnesses that he does not want to perform the chalitzah, the chalitzah should be nullified, because he is being compelled to perform it.
78.
Yevamot 106a establishes an equivalence between divorce and chalitzah with regard to these laws. On this basis, the Rivash (Responsum 482, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh in the gloss on Halachah 16) raises a difficulty, noting that when a husband issues a protest regarding a get, the get is nullified entirely. With regard to chalitzah, however, the Rambam rules that it is merely unacceptable.
The Rivash offers a resolution, explaining that when a protest is issued with regard to a get, the get itself becomes nullified, and therefore the divorce is of no consequence at all. With regard to chalitzah, however, theyavam did perform all the required acts. His protest is accepted to the extent that it is considered that he performed these acts without intending to release the woman from her obligation. This, however, merely causes a chalitzah to be unacceptable, as stated in Halachah 16. It does not nullify it entirely.
79.
See Hilchot Gerushin 6:20.
80.
The equivalence established by Yevamot106a applies in this context as well. The Rambam discusses the laws governing aget given under compulsion in Hilchot Gerushin 2:20.
81.
This refers to a situation analogous to those described in Chapter 2, Halachah 14, or Chapter 6, Halachah 4, in which the person should be compelled to perform chalitzah.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 169:13) states that even according to the Ashkenazic authorities who maintain that the mitzvah ofchalitzah takes precedence, a yavam may be compelled to perform chalitzah only for these reasons.
82.
For, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin, the person's actions are consider to be performed voluntarily, because:
He wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents, he is considered to have [acted] willfully.
83.
I.e., as opposed to acting as agents for a Jewish court.
84.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 13.
85.
As mentioned above, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the Rambam's intent is that these acts of chalitzah are acceptable according to Scriptural law or not.
86.
The Maggid Mishneh states that the woman should, however, be forced to separate from her second husband until she performs an acceptable chalitzah. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 169:55) follows this ruling.
87.
As stated in Halachah 16.
88.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam's ruling alludes to the following law: If neither the yevamah nor the yavam has the intent to perform chalitzah, the fact that she removes his shoe is of no consequence, and she is permitted to perform yibbum. Note the discussion of this subject in Sefer HaKovetz.
89.
This distinguishes it from a bill of divorce (aget), which is actually necessary to effect the divorce. For that reason (as implied byHilchot Gerushin 11:9), it need not be written for the sake of the man and the woman, nor is it bound by the other details that apply to aget.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 169:56), which states that the paper on which the document is written must be ruled with a stylus (i.e., sirtut is required), because it contains Biblical verses.
90.
The Rambam is emphasizing that we do not suspect that perhaps the court erred and presided over a chalitzah without knowing the identity of the parties involved.
91.
For as stated in Halachah 5, at the outset five judges are necessary. Nevertheless, it is the presence of three that is considered significant.
92.
Using the Hebrew words of the verse.
93.
Using the Hebrew words of the verse.
94.
Using the Hebrew words of the verse.
95.
We have included these lines based on the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, although it is highly likely that they are a printer's addition. They are not found in most early manuscripts and printings. Moreover, it is likely that they are a later printer's addition because the Rambam does not mention witnesses signing this document, but rather only the judges who presided over thechalitzah.
96.
See Halachah 29.
97.
The Rambam concludes Hilchot Gerushinby stating:
Do not wonder at the fact that our Sages released the prohibition [against a married woman], which is considered a very severe matter, on the basis of the testimony of a woman, a servant or a maid servant, statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation, a written statement, or [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation, as we have explained.[These leniencies were instituted] because the Torah required the testimony of two witnesses, and all the other details of the laws of witnesses only with regard to matters that cannot be verified definitively except via witnesses and their testimony - e.g., that one person killed another, or that one person lent money to another. When, by contrast, the matter can be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true - e.g., when one testifies that a person died, the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely.
As interpreted by the Noda BiY'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33), the Rambam's statement implies that since the matter will ultimately become public knowledge, no formal testimony is required, and the statements of an individual who witnessed the matter himself are sufficient to be accepted.
98.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 2; Hilchot Ishut22:14.
99.
It appears in this context that the Rambam is referring to the literal meaning of the verse and not the halachic meaning, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 6.
100.
This refers to an instance where the woman was a virgin when she married her first husband. Since she did not collect her due from her first husband, she is still entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred zuz. Otherwise, she would be granted only one hundred zuz, as is granted to other widows.
101.
Although there is some rationale for the placement of the text of the ketubahhere, because the Rambam refers to it in the previous halachah, the commentaries question why he did not include it in Hilchot Ishut, where the laws of ketubot are discussed in detail.
The version of the ketubah cited by the Rambam is employed with minor variations by the Sephardic community today. In the Ashkenazic community, the variations are greater, but the basis of the document remains the same.
102.
For the coins of the Talmudic era were one part silver and seven parts base metal (Hilchot Ishut 10:8).
103.
Based on Hilchot Ishut (ibid.), this phrase appears to be a printer's addition, for the Rambam considers the commitment to this sum to be a Rabbinic ordinance. It is lacking in many authoritative printings and manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. According to Ashkenazic custom, the phrase should be included in the ketubah.
104.
This conveys a man's pledge to give his wife sha'arah (her sustenance), kesutah(her clothing) and onatah (her conjugal rights). These constitute a man's fundamental obligations in marriage, as stated in Exodus 21:10. (See also Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 262;Hilchot Ishut 12:2.)
105.
I.e., to provide his wife with her provisions and clothing.
106.
I.e., a kinyan sudar, the exchange of a handkerchief that serves to formalize the acquisition of property, or the establishment of a binding contractual agreement.
107.
An agreement made facetiously, without the desire to keep it.
108.
The essential requirement of the marriage contract of a widow is only one hundredzuzim. In order to explain this reduction, the marriage contract mentions her status.
109.
This is necessary for the reasons mentioned previously and also to identify the woman as being forbidden to the priesthood. Even if this husband leaves her a widow, she may not marry a priest, because of her previous divorce.
110.
Such a woman is forbidden to the priesthood, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah18:17.
111.
If a woman had engaged in sexual relations previously outside the context of marriage, she should also be given a ketubah of this amount according to many authorities. Others maintain that she should be given the amount usually given to a virgin bride, so that she will not be publicly embarrassed. Others differentiate between a woman who had relations only with her prospective husband (in which case, the second ruling is followed) and one who had relations with others (in which case the first ruling is followed).
112.
The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here [which is also reflected in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sotah 2:4)], and his ruling in Hilchot Sefer Torah 7:16, where he states that one may write three words, but not four, without ruling the writing surface. The Maggid Mishneh notes that both of these opinions have their source inMegillah 7b. He and other commentaries discuss this issue in Hilchot Sefer Torah.
The contradiction was brought to the attention of the Rambam's grandson, Rabbi Yehoshua, who states that the ruling inHilchot Sefer Torah should be followed, since there the subject is given full focus, while in Hilchot Yibbum the matter is mentioned tangentially. Significantly, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah284:2) differs and follows the more stringent view.
113.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.
Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
When a yavam gives a yevamah a bill of divorce (a get),1 he disqualifies her and all of [his deceased brother's] other wives [from performing yibbum] with him or with any of the other brothers. It is considered as if he has performedchalitzah with her.
The power of a get to affect a yevamah is Rabbinic in origin. [They instituted this decree based on the following rationale:] Since a get has the power to bring about the divorce of a married woman, and every get causes a woman to be disqualified from the priesthood, [they decreed] that it should also disqualify a yevamah from performing yibbum. [The yevamah] is not permitted to marry another man, however, until she performs chalitzah.
Halacha 2
A statement of intent to marry (ma'amar)2 does not fully effect the establishment of a marriage bond for a yevamah, and it does not cause her to become a married woman in the full sense. Nevertheless, [if the yavamdesires to nullify the ma'amar,] he must give [the yevamah] a get. For her to marry another man, however, chalitzah must be performed.
Halacha 3
What is implied? When [a yavam] gives a ma'amar to his yevamah, but does not desire to engage in sexual relations with her, he must write a get for her, since she was consecrated unto him, and he must perform chalitzah with her to cause her to be permitted to others.3
For a yevamah is not permitted to marry another man unless she enters into sexual relations with her yavam [and then is divorced or widowed], or if she performs chalitzah. A get disqualifies her for yibbum, but does not permit her to marry another man. A ma'amar does not effect a marriage bond in a complete sense, as sexual relations do.
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
When [a yavam] gives a get [to his yevamah] [to nullify] his connection to her and not {to nullify his ma'amar}, he disqualifies her [from performing yibbum] with him and his other brothers, as stated above.6
He must give her [another] get [to negate] his ma'amar and perform chalitzahwith her to permit her to marry another man.
Halacha 6
When a ma'amar is given to a yevamah at the outset, without its having been preceded by any other activity and without its having been followed by any activity other than the sexual relations between [the yavam] who gave thema'amar and the yevamah, the ma'amar is referred to as "an acceptablema'amar."
By contrast, a ma'amar is referred to as "an unacceptable ma'amar" when:
a) before the ma'amar either this yavam or one of his brothers gave a get to this yevamah or one of the deceased brother's other wives or performedchalitzah with her,7
b) either he or one of his brothers engaged in sexual relations with one of the deceased brother's other wives beforehand,8
c) after the ma'amar, either this yavam or one of his brothers gave a get to this yevamah or one of the deceased brother's other wives or performedchalitzah with her,9
d) he or one of his brothers engaged in sexual relations with one of the deceased brother's other wives or gave a ma'amar to one of them, or
e) one of his brothers gave a ma'amar or engaged in sexual relations [with theyevamah to whom he gave the ma'amar].
[This term applies to] both a ma'amar that preceded these deeds as well as to a ma'amar that was given afterwards.
Halacha 7
What is implied? If [a yavam] a) gave a get or performed chalitzah with hisyevamah and afterwards he or one of his brothers gave her or another of his deceased brother's wives a ma'amar, or b) he entered into relations with hisyevamah10 or gave her a ma'amar, and then he or one of his brothers gave another of his deceased brother's wives a ma'amar or entered into relations with her, the ma'amar is unacceptable. This applies both to the first ma'amar11and the second ma'amar.12
Halacha 8
Thus, we may conclude that whether a ma'amar was preceded by anotherma'amar, a get, a chalitzah, or sexual relations, or whether any of these acts preceded a ma'amar, the ma'amar is unacceptable.13 The only exception is when [a yavam] gives a ma'amar and enters into sexual relations [with theyevamah] after the ma'amar; this follows the dictates of the law.
Halacha 9
When a yavam enters into sexual relations with his yevamah at the outset14or after giving her a ma'amar, and nothing else preceded [their relations], [their] relations are referred to as "acceptable."
If a) a ma'amar from one of his brothers [was given to this yevamah],
b) a get was given [to this yevamah] or to one of [the deceased brother's] other wives,or
c) a ma'amar [was given by this yavam] or one of his brothers to one of [the deceased brother's] other wives, before [the yavam and the yevamah entered into relations], the relations are referred to as unacceptable.15
Halacha 10
When a yavam performs chalitzah with his yevamah at the outset without any other activity preceding it, the act is referred to as "a superior chalitzah."
If [the chalitzah] was preceded by a get or a ma'amar, whether from thisyavam or from his brothers, [which was given] either to this yevamah or to one of [the deceased brother's] other wives, the act is referred to as an "inferior chalitzah."16
Halacha 11
When there are many yevamot coming from one household,17 after one of them has entered into "acceptable relations" or performed a "superiorchalitzah," all are permitted [to marry other men], and their obligation to theyavam is removed.
If one of them entered into "unacceptable relations" or was given an "unacceptable ma'amar," all the wives are forbidden to perform yibbum.18 The woman who entered into relations or who received the ma'amar must be divorced with a get. [In addition,] {each} one19 of them is required to performchalitzah to be permitted to marry another man. For "unacceptable relations" do not remove [a yevamah's] obligation to her yavam.
Halacha 12
If one of [a deceased man's wives] performs an "inferior chalitzah," she is permitted to marry another man, but [the deceased's] other wives remain forbidden [to marry] unless they perform chalitzah or unless all the brothers perform chalitzah with [the yevamah] who performed the "inferior chalitzah." For an "inferior chalitzah" does not remove the obligation of yibbum from this household until [the yevamah who performed the "inferior chalitzah" performschalitzah] with all the brothers, or all [the deceased's wives] perform chalitzah.
Halacha 13
Whenever a yevamah engages in sexual relations with her yavam, [a get is required to terminate the relationship], regardless of whether or not the relations are acceptable. [This applies] even if [the yavam] engaged in relations with [the yevamah] after performing chalitzah with her.20
[Similarly, this ruling applies] regardless of whether [a yavam] or his brothers engaged in the relations for the sake of establishing a marriage bond21 or for the sake of yibbum. Even if [a yavam] or his brother engages in relations with another [one of the deceased's] wives after [the yavam] engages in "acceptable relations" with [his yevamah],22 he must divorce the woman with a get, for these relations effect the establishment of a marriage bond.23
Similarly, whenever a yevamah is given a ma'amar - whether an "acceptablema'amar" or an "unacceptable ma'amar" - a get is required because of thema'amar, as explained.24 Only then is the prohibition brought about by thema'amar removed.
Halacha 14
As mentioned, a get does not dissolve [a yavam's connection with] hisyevamah entirely.25 Similarly, a ma'amar does not acquire her [as a wife for the yavam] in a complete way. It is [only] sexual relations that establish the marriage bond in a complete manner, and it is [only] chalitzah that dissolves the connection entirely.
Therefore, when a yevamah is given one get after another, or one ma'amarafter another, there is an effect.26When, however, [another brother] engages in relations with [a yevamah with whom a yavam] engaged in relations, or performs chalitzah with [a yevamah with whom a yavam] performed chalitzah, the second relations or the second chalitzah are of no consequence.27Similarly, a get or chalitzah that follows relations is of no consequence.
Halacha 15
What is implied? When a yavam gives a get to a yevamah, and afterwards gives a get to another one of [the deceased's] wives, he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both women.28
Similarly, when two yevamim give two gittin to one yevamah, one after the other, she is considered to have been divorced by both of them. They are both forbidden to marry her relatives; one of them should perform chalitzah[with her].29
Similarly, if [a yavam] gives a get to his yevamah, and then his brother gives aget to another one of [the deceased's] wives, each brother is forbidden to marry the relatives of the woman to whom he gave the get. Similarly, if [two brothers each] give a ma'amar, one after the other, [each must give a get], as explained.30
When, however, a yavam performs chalitzah with his yevamah, and afterwards either he or his brother perform chalitzah with another of [the deceased's] wives, or two yevamim perform chalitzah with the sameyevamah, the second chalitzah is of no consequence, and the brother who performed it is not forbidden to marry the woman's relatives.31 It is just as if he performed chalitzah with another woman who is not under obligation to him.
Halacha 16
Similarly, when a man engages in relations with his yevamah,32 and then he or one of his brothers performs chalitzah with her or with one of the other wives [of his deceased brother], this chalitzah is of no consequence.
Similarly, if his brother gave a get to [this yevamah or] any of the other wives [of his deceased brother], it is of no consequence. Nor is it of consequence if one of his brothers gives the woman a ma'amar or engages in relations with her.33 Once the brother engaged in relations with her, he acquired her [as his wife] in a complete manner, and a married woman cannot be consecrated by another man. If, however, one of the brothers gave a ma'amar to one of the other wives [of his deceased brother], or engaged in relations with her, he must release her with a get, as we have explained.34
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when] two yevamim perform yibbum with twoyevamot coming from the same household, and it is not known who performedyibbum first.35 Both should divorce [the women] with gittin.36 The women are then permitted to marry other men, but are forbidden to the yevamim.
Consequently, when Reuven lived in Jerusalem and he had two wives, one living in Akko and one living in Tyre, [and two brothers:] Shimon who lived in Akko and Levi who lived in Tyre, if there is a report that Reuven died, according to law it would be proper for neither brother to perform yibbum until he knows what his other brother did. For perhaps he performed yibbum first.
Halacha 18
When a yavam who is below the age of majority, [but more than] nine years and one day old, enters into relations [with a yevamah], [the consequence] is equivalent to [that of] a ma'amar given by an adult;39 [the yevamah] is not acquired as a wife in a complete manner.40
When [a yavam who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old, gives a ma'amar at the outset, it is effective and causes [theyevamah] to be forbidden to [his brothers] who are past majority. If, however, he gives [the ma'amar after a ma'amar has been given by his brothers who are past majority, his ma'amar] is of no consequence.
[Similarly,] a get that he gives or chalitzah that he performs is always of no consequence, whether it precedes [his brothers' actions] or follows them.41
Halacha 19
What is implied? When a [yavam who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old, engages in relations with his yevamah, or gives her a ma'amar at the outset, he disqualifies her [from performingyibbum] with his other brothers. If, however, [one of the brothers] past majority gave his yevamah a ma'amar, and then [the brother who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old, gives her or another one of the wives [of the deceased brother] a ma'amar, his actions are of no consequence, and he does not cause [the yevamah] to be forbidden to his elder brother.42
If, however, [the brother who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old engages in relations with her or with another one of the wives of [the deceased brother], he causes [the yevamah] to be forbidden to his elder brother, as would be the case when two [brothers] past majority each gave a ma'amar one after the other, as we have explained.43
Halacha 20
When a [yavam who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old, has engaged in relations with his yevamah, and then one of his brothers past majority entered into relations with her, performed chalitzahwith her, gave her a get, or performed one of these activities with another [one of the deceased brother's] wives, he disqualified the minor [from marrying hisyevamah].44
Similarly, if the minor has engaged in relations with another [one of the deceased brother's] wives, or another brother who is also [below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old, has engaged in relations with this woman, or with another [one of the deceased brother's] wives, [the woman with whom the first brother originally engaged in relations] is disqualified [from marrying him], as is the ruling whenever two ma'amarim are given one after the other.
Halacha 21
When a [yavam who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old, engages in relations with his yevamah and then does not engage in relations with her again after he attains majority, [he is] required [to give her] a get and perform chalitzah. The get [is necessary] because the relations in which he engaged are considered equivalent to a ma'amar. Thechalitzah [is necessary] in order to permit the woman to marry another man, for she did not engage in relations that established a complete marriage bond.
If [her yavam] engaged in relations with her after he attained majority, all that is required [to enable her to marry another man] is a get.45
Halacha 22
[The same laws that apply to a yavam who is below the age of majority, but more than] nine years and one day old [apply to a yavam who] is twenty years old and has not manifested signs of physical maturity, but has also not manifested physical signs of impotency, as explained in the beginning of this book.46
Halacha 23
As explained,47 both the consecration of a girl below the age of majority who is fit to leave her husband through the rite of mi'un,48 and [the consecration of a girl who is] a deaf-mute are Rabbinic institutions. Nevertheless, they are two different types of ordinances. [For] the consecration of a minor was ordained so that [men] will not relate to her in an unrestrained manner.49 Her consecration is thus tentative until she comes of age. Consecration was ordained for a deaf-mute [for a different reason,] so that she will not remain unmarried forever.
Halacha 24
If [by contrast, the deceased was married to] a deaf-mute and a minor, engaging in relations with one does not free the other of her obligation.52
Halacha 25
If one [of the deceased's wives] was mentally competent, and one was a deaf-mute, engaging in relations with the mentally competent woman, or performing chalitzah with her frees the deaf-mute of her obligation. Engaging in relations with the deaf-mute, by contrast, does not free the mentally competent woman [from her obligation]. For the consecration of the deaf-mute is merely a Rabbinic institution.56
Similar [laws apply when one of the deceased wives was] above majority, and one was a minor. Engaging in relations with the woman past majority, or performing chalitzah with her frees the minor of her obligation. Engaging in relations with the minor, by contrast, does not free the woman past majority [from her obligation].
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply if] both [the deceased's wives] were minors who are entitled to absolve their marriages through mi'un. If the yavam engages in relations with one of them, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the other, this does not disqualify the marriage to the first.57Nevertheless, we should instruct [the second one] to dissolve her marriage through] mi'un.58 He should then maintain [his marriage] with the minoryevamah with whom he engaged in relations first.
Halacha 27
Similar laws apply if [the deceased was married to] a minor and a deaf-mute. If the yavam first enters into relations with the minor, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the deaf-mute, this does not disqualify the marriage to the minor. The deaf-mute, however, must be divorced via a get.59
[The rationale is that] the relations with the minor are considered superior to relations with the deaf-mute, for ultimately the minor will be fit [to enter into a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law]. Therefore, he should maintain his relationship with the minor with whom he engaged in relations first.60
Halacha 28
[In the above situation,] if the yavam first enters into relations with the deaf-mute, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the minor, this disqualifies the marriage to the deaf-mute.61 We should instruct the minor to dissolve her marriage through] mi'un;62 the deaf-mute must be divorced with a get.63
Halacha 29
[The following rules apply if the deceased was married to] a mentally competent woman and a deaf-mute. If the yavam engaged in relations with the mentally competent woman, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the deaf-mute, this does not disqualify the marriage to the mentally competent woman.64 The deaf-mute, however, must be divorced via a get.65
If the yavam first enters into relations with the deaf-mute, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the mentally competent woman, this disqualifies the marriage to the deaf-mute.66 The deaf-mute must be divorced with a get, and the mentally competent woman should receive both a get andchalitzah.67
Halacha 30
[The following rules apply if the deceased was married to] a woman past the age of majority and one below the age of majority. [If the yavam] first enters into relations with the woman past majority, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the minor, this does not disqualify the marriage to the woman past majority.68 We should, however, instruct the minor to dissolve her marriage through mi'un.69
If he first enters into relations with the minor, and then he or one of his brothers engages in relations with the woman past majority, we should instruct the minor to dissolve her marriage through mi'un,70 and he should remain married to the woman past majority. [The rationale is that] relations with her establish a fully binding marriage bond.
FOOTNOTES
1.
This refers to a get given before the brother made a statement of intent to marry theyevamah (ma'amar). See Halachot 4 and 5.
2.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
3.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 3:5), the Rambam writes that at the outset, the get should precede thechalitzah.
4.
I.e., the get nullifies the kiddushin brought about by the ma'amar.
5.
Whenever the Rambam uses the expression "It appears to me," he is referring to a ruling that is not specifically mentioned in the Talmud. In this instance, Rashi (Yevamot 32a, 52a) agrees with the Rambam, but the Ra'avad and Tosafot differ and maintain that if the yavam who gave her the ma'amar and the get desires, he may still perform yibbum with her. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 170:15) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.
6.
In Halachah 1. The Rambam is adding that even if the yavam had already given theyevamah a ma'amar, this ruling still applies.
If the yavam gives a get without specifying the reason, we assume that his intent is to sever his connection with the yevamah and not merely to nullify his ma'amar (Rashi,Yevamot 32a; Ramah, Even HaEzer170:15).
7.
Once a yavam has performed chalitzah, neither he nor his brothers may performyibbum afterwards. Similarly, once a get has been given, the yavam is obligated to perform chalitzah and may not performyibbum. Since yibbum is not relevant, thema'amar is not acceptable.
8.
For only one of the wives of the deceased brother may be married by a yavam, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
9.
Since a ma'amar does not complete the bond between the yavam and the yevamah, the connection between them can be disqualified because of undesirable actions, such as those mentioned by the Rambam.
10.
Although the ma'amar that follows the relations is nullified, the marriage bond established by the relations remains in effect (Rav David Arameah).
11.
This ma'amar is disqualified by the actions that follow it.
12.
This ma'amar is disqualified by the actions that preceded it.
13.
Although the ma'amar is unacceptable andyibbum is not allowed, a get is necessary (from both brothers, when two ma'amarimare involved), nevertheless, to nullify thekiddushin. Afterwards, one of the brothers should perform chalitzah to enable the woman to marry another man.
14.
According to Rabbinic law, the yavamshould give the yevamah a ma'amar before entering into relations with her. Nevertheless, after the fact, if he failed to give her such a ma'amar, their relations still establish a marriage bond between them that the Sages allowed to continue.
15.
In all these instances, the yavam must divorce the yevamah with a get, because of their relations in which they engaged, and also perform chalitzah because of his original obligation to her. Similarly, he and/or his brothers must give a get to any of his deceased brother's other wives if she was given a ma'amar in such an instance (Maggid Mishneh, based on Yevamot 50b).
16.
See Halachah 12. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 9, from which it is apparent that whenever a yavam cannot perform yibbumwith his yevamah, the chalitzah he performs with her is deemed "inferior."
17.
I.e., the deceased was married to many wives.
18.
I.e., as mentioned above, unacceptable relations and/or an unacceptable ma'amarhave an effect and nullify the possibility of performing yibbum with any of the deceased's other wives.
19.
There is a question among the commentaries if the word "each" is included in the text of the Mishneh Torah or not. TheMaggid Mishneh maintains that this word should be included in the text. According to his interpretation, even if the yavamperforms chalitzah with one of the deceased's wives who did not receive ama'amar or engage in relations with theyavam, this chalitzah does not remove the obligation from the deceased's other wives, and each of them must perform chalitzah.
The Lechem Mishneh differs and maintains that the word "each" is a later addition. (And indeed most authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torahsubstantiate this contention.) According to this view, if the yavam performs chalitzahwith one of the deceased's wives who did not receive a ma'amar or engage in relations with the yavam, this chalitzah removes the obligation from the deceased's other wives, and none of them is required to performchalitzah.
Even according to this view, if the yavamperforms chalitzah with the yevamah who received an unacceptable ma'amar or engaged in unacceptable relations, thischalitzah does not remove the obligation from the deceased's other wives, and each of them must perform chalitzah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 170:19) quotes the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that other authorities differ.
20.
In which instance she is forbidden to him by Rabbinic decree, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 12.
21.
I.e., consecrating the woman by engaging in sexual relations with her, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 1:2.
22.
In which case the relations with the secondyevamah violate a positive commandment of the Torah, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 12.
23.
For even when the relations violate a Rabbinic prohibition or a positive commandment, a marriage bond is effected, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 4:14.
24.
Halachah 2.
25.
As mentioned in Halachah 1, it is only through chalitzah that the connection is completely dissolved.
26.
As explained in the following halachah.
27.
The intent is that the relations are of no consequence with regard to the laws ofyibbum. They are, however, adulterous relations, and if the yevamah engages in them willingly, she is not permitted to remain married to her husband.
28.
A person is forbidden to marry the women who are closely related to his divorcee. In this instance, although neither of these gittinis necessary, the prohibition is still applied in both cases.
In this instance, both women are required to perform chalitzah in order to marry another man. See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer170:5).
29.
Both brothers are not required to performchalitzah in order for her to be permitted to marry others. Performing chalitzah with her does not, however, cause the deceased's other wives to become permitted, as explained in Halachot 11 and 12.
30.
See Halachah 13.
31.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 14, the same relatives who are forbidden to a man who divorces his wife are forbidden to a man who performs chalitzah.
32.
This refers to "acceptable relations," as stated in Halachah 11. If the relations are "unacceptable," different laws apply (Maggid Mishneh).
33.
If, however, the yevamah engages in these relations willingly, she must be divorced by her husband for committing adultery.
34.
See Halachah 13.
35.
I.e., the deceased left two or more wives and was survived by two or more brothers. One brother decided to perform yibbum with one of the widows. Unknowingly, another brother decided to perform yibbum with another widow, and it is not known who performed yibbum first.
36.
For the marriage of one of them is sinful, transgressing a positive commandment. Since it cannot be determined whose marriage is sinful, both are required to divorce.
See also the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 170), who quotes a responsum of the geonim that also requires that one of the brothers perform chalitzah. The rationale is that perhaps one of the brothers gave hisyevamah a ma'amar, and then the other one performed yibbum. Since these are "unacceptable relations," chalitzah is also necessary, as explained above.
37.
For it is not known that his brother performed yibbum, and even if he did perform yibbum, perhaps he did so after this brother performed yibbum. Since there are several doubts involved (םפק םפקא), theyavam is not forced to divorce until he has determined that his brother has also performed yibbum.
38.
The commentaries have questioned this ruling, based on Chapter 3, Halachah 16, which requires a woman to wait until she discovers what has taken place overseas, lest the chalitzah be unnecessary, she discover that fact and marry a priest and an onlooker not know all the details of the situation. Such a scenario could also happen in the present situation.
There are commentaries that try to reconcile the Rambam's ruling. For example, Mishneh LaMelech explains that in the present instance, the doubt could be protracted indefinitely, while in the previous case, everything is dependent on a woman's giving birth, and the matter can be clarified after nine months. Nevertheless, because of these objections, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 170:20) does not mention this element of the Rambam's ruling.
39.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 15 (and Hilchot Ishut 11:3), when a boy over nine years old enters into sexual relations with a woman, his actions are considered of consequence in certain contexts.
The Maggid Mishneh and Rashi (Kiddushin19a) explain that when a minor above nine years old enters into relations with a woman, he acquires her as his wife according to Scriptural law. (Nevertheless, if another man enters into relations with her, the other man is not executed for committing adultery.) Our Sages, however, reduced the level of connection established and caused their marriage bond to have only the effectiveness of a ma'amar.
[The rationale why yibbum performed by a minor is effective although a minor does not possess the intellectual maturity to take responsibility for his conduct is that we find that yibbum does not require intent at all; what is significant is the act of sexual relations. (See Chapter 2, Halachah 3.)]
Tosafot differ and maintain that, in this context, the relations of a nine-year old are of no consequence according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, the Rabbis enforced a stringency and considered these relations to be equivalent to a ma'amar.
40.
This concept is illustrated in the halachah that follows, as is another consequence of the principle that the sexual relations that this youth engages in are considered equivalent to a ma'amar given by an adult.
41.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 16,chalitzah performed by a minor is of no consequence, because the passage concerning chalitzah explicitly mentions an איש - i.e., a male past majority. Sincechalitzah performed by a minor is of no consequence, a get given by him is of no consequence, because the disqualification caused by a get is an extension by the Rabbis of the Scriptural prohibition caused by chalitzah.
Significantly, the Rambam's statements here represent a reversal of his ruling in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot10:6), in which he rules that a get given by a minor does disqualify a yevamah from performing yibbum with the minor's brothers.
42.
Had the younger brother been past the age of majority, he would have disqualified theyevamah from performing yibbum with his older brother, as stated in Halachot 7 and 14.
43.
See Halachot 7 and 14.
44.
Since the minor's relations possess only the strength of a ma'amar, their effectiveness can be nullified by the actions of an older brother.
45.
For the relations in which they engaged after the yavam attained majority complete the marriage bond.
46.
As explained in Hilchot Ishut 2:11, a male who does not manifest signs of impotency is considered a minor until he attains the age of 35.
47.
See Hilchot Ishut 4:7-9.
48.
As explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:7 and Hilchot Gerushin 11:1, when a girl's father died and she is below the age of majority, our Sages ordained that her mother and/or brothers can arrange a marriage for her. This marriage is not binding according to Scriptural law. Accordingly, when creating this option, our Sages gave the girl the possibility of nullifying the marriage before she reaches majority merely by making a verbal statement.
49.
If, however, she marries, they would respect the limits of modesty and her husband would protect her (Yevamot 112b).
50.
If, however, one is a mentally capable woman past the age of majority, yibbum orchalitzah should be performed with her - for her marriage is binding according to Scriptural law - and not with those whose marriage is binding only by virtue of a Rabbinic ordinance.
51.
For their marriage bonds all share the same status.
52.
The marriage relationship of each one possesses an advantage over the other. The marriage with the minor, had it not been interrupted, could have blossomed into a marriage bond binding according to Scriptural law. On the other hand, there is an advantage to the marriage to the deaf-mute, because the minor had the option of ending her marriage at will, while that of the deaf-mute was binding. As evident from Halachot 27 and 28, the marriage to the minor is preferable.
53.
For just as she can dissolve her relationship with her husband while he is alive, she can nullify it afterwards, freeing herself from any obligation to the yavam (Hilchot Gerushin11:3).
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that a minor is permitted to free herself from an obligation to the yavam through mi'un only when this facilitates the establishment of a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law. (See Halachah 30 and Chapter 7, Halachah 15.) In this instance, however, she is not given the privilege. Instead, she must wait until she attains majority and then perform chalitzah. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 171:1) quotes the Rambam's view.
54.
Since the deaf-mute is not considered responsible for her actions, she cannot perform chalitzah. She must either performyibbum or remain unmarried for the remainder of her life.
If the yavam performs yibbum with the minor, he may not perform yibbum with the deaf-mute, for he is permitted to performyibbum only with one of his deceased brother's wives.
55.
The deaf-mute is not considered responsible for her actions. Nevertheless, since according to Scriptural and Talmudic law aget may be given without the woman's consent, the divorce is binding (Hilchot Gerushin 10:23).
56.
And performing yibbum with a woman who is consecrated only according to Rabbinic law does not free a woman who is consecrated according to Scriptural law from her obligation.
57.
For, as mentioned in Halachah 14, after ayavam engages in relations with hisyevamah, their relationship cannot be disqualified.
58.
If the second wife does not perform mi'un, her consecration is also binding. Nevertheless, it involves the violation of a positive commandment. Moreover, a get is required for nullifying this marriage, and she becomes forbidden to the priesthood. If, however, she dissolves her marriage through mi'un, a get is not required.
59.
For relations with her are forbidden, and yet her consecration is binding.
60.
Although the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that it is forbidden to remain married to the minor, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 171:7) follows the Rambam's ruling.
61.
For the marriage to the minor is preferable to that of the deaf-mute.
62.
Since the yavam entered into relations with the deaf-mute first, he is not able to remain married to the minor. She should therefore dissolve her obligation to him through mi'un. The Sages preferred this option rather than having her wait until she attains majority and receives a get and chalitzah, because of the impression that the latter process might create (Or Sameach). Moreover, far fewer legal details are involved (Kin'at Eliyahu).
Note the Tur (Even HaEzer 171), which interprets the Ra'avad's comments on this halachah as implying that the yavam should remain married to the minor. The Tur does not accept this view.
63.
Once the minor has performed mi'un, it appears that there is no obligation for the deaf-mute to be divorced, for the minor has uprooted her connection to her deceased husband, and as such, the relations with her seemingly should not affect the status of the deaf-mute. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the deaf-mute must be divorced, as a penalty, because the yavam should have waited to engage in relations with her until the minor performed mi'un (Or Sameach).
The Tur (loc. cit) differs and maintains that the yavam may remain married to the deaf-mute. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer171:8) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah mentions that of the Tur.
64.
For her marriage was established through "acceptable relations." Even if the other wife of the deceased was mentally competent, relations with her would not disqualify theyavam's marriage to the first yevamah.
65.
Because the relations with her consecrated her. Nevertheless, continuing this marriage involves a prohibition.
66.
Since the marriage to the mentally competent woman is binding according to Scriptural law, it supersedes the marriage to the deaf-mute.
67.
She must be divorced, because the relations with the deaf-mute cause relations with her to be considered as "unacceptable relations." Therefore, she must receive a getto nullify the consecration brought about by the relations, and chalitzah to nullify her obligation to her yavam.
68.
For these are "acceptable relations."
69.
Since the yavam entered into relations with the woman past majority first, he is not able to remain married to the minor. She should therefore dissolve her obligation to him through mi'un, rather than having her receive a get, because in this manner she is not disqualified from the priesthood.
70.
In this way, the minor dissolves all connection to the yavam, and there is no prohibition against his remaining married to the woman past majority. This option is preferred so that the yavam will have performed an act of yibbum that is binding according to Scriptural law.
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Tuesday, Shevat 30, 5776 · 09 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Friday Sh'vat 30, Rosh Chodesh 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 145-150.
Tanya: In the light of (p. 109)...has been explained. (p. 111).
Many Chassidim considered the day they arrived in Lubavitch to be their "birthday." My teacher, R. Shmuel Betzalel, arrived in Lubavitch the first time on Thursday evening parshat Mishpatim 5608 (1848). Every year after that, he stayed awake all that night and took pains to put on his tefillin at the exact time he had entered the Tzemach Tzedek's chamber for yechidus the first time.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
Chutzpah
The first thing you must know before anything else applies: Truth demands chutzpah.
If what you are doing is the right thing to do, there will be others who will ridicule, taunt and attempt in every way to intimidate you. That is the way the world works.
If you can’t handle it, if you can’t ignore them as you would ignore flies on a camping trip, don’t imagine you can take a single step forward.
Only once you’ve passed the chutzpah test, only then can you begin to grow.
---------------------
CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Monday, February 8, 2016 - Today is: Monday, Shvat 29, 5776 · February 8, 2016 - Torah Reading
Terumah: Exodus 25:1 Adonai said to Moshe, 2 “Tell the people of Isra’el to take up a collection for me — accept a contribution from anyone who wholeheartedly wants to give. 3 The contribution you are to take from them is to consist of gold, silver and bronze; 4 blue, purple and scarlet yarn; fine linen, goat’s hair, 5 tanned ram skins and fine leather; acacia-wood; 6 oil for the light, spices for the anointing oil and for the fragrant incense; 7 onyx stones and other stones to be set, for the ritual vest and breastplate.
8 “They are to make me a sanctuary, so that I may live among them. 9 You are to make it according to everything I show you — the design of the tabernacle and the design of its furnishings. This is how you are to make it.
10 “They are to make an ark of acacia-wood three-and-three-quarters feet long, two-and-a-quarter feet wide and two-and-a-quarter feet high. 11 You are to overlay it with pure gold — overlay it both inside and outside — and put a molding of gold around the top of it. 12 Cast four gold rings for it, and attach them to its four feet, two rings on each side. 13 Make poles of acacia-wood, and overlay them with gold. 14 Put the poles into the rings on the sides of the ark; you will use them to carry the ark. 15 The poles are to remain in the rings of the ark; they are not to be removed from it. 16 Into the ark you are to put the testimony which I am about to give you.
Today in Jewish History:
• Columbia Tragedy; Israeli Astronaut Perishes (2003)
On the morning of February 1, 2003, the Columbia Space Shuttle, returning from its STS-107 mission, was destroyed upon re-entry, 16 minutes before its scheduled landing. All its crew members perished, including Ilan Ramon, a combat pilot in the Israeli Air Force, who was the first Israeli astronaut. Prior to his departing to space on Space Shuttle Columbia, where his mission included the manning of a multispectral camera for recording desert aeroso, he arranged to take kosher food as well as a Kiddush cup, a Torah Scroll, and a dollar from the Lubavitcher Rebbe, of righteous memory.
Links: Pride, Pain and the Suddenness of Life; Remembering Ilan Ramon
Daily Quote:
Such is the way of Torah: Bread with salt you shall eat, water in small measure you shall drink, and upon the ground you shall sleep; live a life of deprivation and toil in Torah. If so you do, "fortunate are you, and good is to you" (Psalms 128:2): fortunate are you in this world, and it is good to you in the World To Come.[Ethics of the Fathers 6:4]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Terumah, 2nd Portion Exodus 25:17-25:30 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 25
17And you shall make an ark cover of pure gold, two and a half cubits its length and a cubit and a half its width. יזוְעָשִׂ֥יתָ כַפֹּ֖רֶת זָהָ֣ב טָה֑וֹר אַמָּתַ֤יִם וָחֵ֨צִי֙ אָרְכָּ֔הּ וְאַמָּ֥ה וָחֵ֖צִי רָחְבָּֽהּ:
an ark cover: Heb. כַפֹּרֶת a cover over the ark, which was open from above. He [Moses] placed it [the cover] over it [the ark] like a board. כפרת: כסוי על הארון שהיה פתוח מלמעלה ומניחו עליו כמין דף:
two and a half cubits its length: like the length of the ark. Its width was like the width of the ark, and it lay on the thickness of the four walls. Although [Scripture] does not give a measure for its thickness, our Rabbis explained that it was a handbreadth thick. — [from Succah 5a] אמתים וחצי ארכה: כארכו של ארון, ורחבה כרחבו של ארון, ומונחת על עובי הכתלים ארבעתם, ואף על פי שלא נתן שיעור לעוביה, פירשו רבותינו שהיה עוביה טפח:
18And you shall make two golden cherubim; you shall make them of hammered work, from the two ends of the ark cover. יחוְעָשִׂ֛יתָ שְׁנַ֥יִם כְּרֻבִ֖ים זָהָ֑ב מִקְשָׁה֙ תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה אֹתָ֔ם מִשְּׁנֵ֖י קְצ֥וֹת הַכַּפֹּֽרֶת:
cherubim: Heb. כְּרֻבִים. They had the features of a child. — [from Succah 5] כרבים: דמות פרצוף תינוק להם:
you shall make…of hammered work: [This means] that you should not make them separate and then join them at the ends of the ark cover after they are made, as smiths do [in a process] called solderez [in Old French], soldered. Instead, you should take a large quantity of gold at the beginning of the construction of the ark cover and beat it with a hammer and with a mallet in the center [of the mass of gold] so that its ends protrude upward, and [then you should] form the cherubim from the protrusion of its ends. מקשה תעשה אותם: שלא תעשם בפני עצמם ותחברם בראשי הכפרת לאחר עשייתם כמעשה צורפים, שקורין שולדי"ץ [מולחמים] אלא הטל זהב הרבה בתחלת עשיית הכפרת והכה בפטיש ובקורנס באמצע, וראשין בולטין למעלה וצייר הכרובים בבליטת קצותיו:
hammered: Heb. מִקְשָׁה, batediz in Old French, hammered, like “knocked (נָקְשָׁן) one against the other” (Dan. 5:6). מקשה: בטידי"ץ בלעז [עשוי בהכאה]. כמו (דניאל ה ו) דא לדא נקשן:
ends of the ark cover: Heb. קְצוֹת הכַּפֹּרֶת, ends of the ark cover. קצות הכפורת: ראשי הכפרת:
19And make one cherub from the one end and the other cherub from the other end; from the ark cover you shall make the cherubim on its two ends. יטוַֽ֠עֲשֵׂ֠ה כְּר֨וּב אֶחָ֤ד מִקָּצָה֙ מִזֶּ֔ה וּכְרוּב־אֶחָ֥ד מִקָּצָ֖ה מִזֶּ֑ה מִן־הַכַּפֹּ֛רֶת תַּֽעֲשׂ֥וּ אֶת־הַכְּרֻבִ֖ים עַל־שְׁנֵ֥י קְצוֹתָֽיו:
And make one cherub from the one end: [The text elaborates] so that you will not say [that it means] two cherubim at each end. Therefore, it had to explain, “one cherub from the one end.” ועשה כרוב אחד מקצה: שלא תאמר שנים כרובים לכל קצה וקצה, לכך הוצרך לפרש כרוב אחד מקצה מזה:
from the ark cover: itself you shall make the cherubim. This is the meaning of “you shall make them of hammered work” -that you shall not make them [the cherubim] separately and [then] attach them to the ark cover. מן הכפרת: עצמה תעשו את הכרובים. זהו פירושו של מקשה תעשה אותם, שלא תעשם בפני עצמם ותחברם לכפרת:
20The cherubim shall have their wings spread upwards, shielding the ark cover with their wings, with their faces toward one another; [turned] toward the ark cover shall be the faces of the cherubim. כוְהָי֣וּ הַכְּרֻבִים֩ פֹּֽרְשֵׂ֨י כְנָפַ֜יִם לְמַ֗עְלָה סֹֽכְכִ֤ים בְּכַנְפֵיהֶם֙ עַל־הַכַּפֹּ֔רֶת וּפְנֵיהֶ֖ם אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֑יו אֶ֨ל־הַכַּפֹּ֔רֶת יִֽהְי֖וּ פְּנֵ֥י הַכְּרֻבִֽים:
their wings spread: [This means] that you shall not make their wings lying down [resting next to their bodies], but spread high alongside their heads, so that there should be ten handbreadths in the space between the wings and the ark cover, as is stated in Succah (5b). פרשי כנפים: שלא תעשה כנפיהם שוכבים, אלא פרושים וגבוהים למעלה אצל ראשיהם, שיהא עשרה טפחים בחלל בין הכנפים לכפרת, כדאיתא בסוכה (דף ה ב):
21And you shall place the ark cover on the ark from above, and into the ark you shall place the testimony, which I will give you. כאוְנָֽתַתָּ֧ אֶת־הַכַּפֹּ֛רֶת עַל־הָֽאָרֹ֖ן מִלְמָ֑עְלָה וְאֶל־הָ֣אָרֹ֔ן תִּתֵּן֙ אֶת־הָ֣עֵדֻ֔ת אֲשֶׁ֥ר אֶתֵּ֖ן אֵלֶֽיךָ:
and into the ark you shall place the testimony: I do not know why it was repeated, for it already said: “And you shall place into the ark the testimony” (verse 16). We may say that it comes to teach that when it [the ark] is still an ark alone, without an ark cover, he [Moses] should first put in the testimony and then place the ark cover over it. So we find [that] when he [Moses] erected the Mishkan, it says: “And he placed the testimony into the ark,” and afterwards, “and he placed the ark cover on the ark from above” (Exod. 40:20). ואל הארן תתן את העדות: לא ידעתי למה נכפל, שהרי כבר נאמר (פסוק טז) ונתת אל הארון את העדות. ויש לומר שבא ללמד, שבעודו ארון לבדו בלא כפרת, יתן תחלה העדות לתוכו, ואחר כך יתן את הכפרת עליו. וכן מצינו כשהקים את המשכן נאמר (שמות מ כ) ויתן את העדות אל הארון, ואחר כך ויתן את הכפורת על הארון מלמעלה:
22I will arrange My meetings with you there, and I will speak with you from atop the ark cover from between the two cherubim that are upon the Ark of the Testimony, all that I will command you unto the children of Israel. כבוְנֽוֹעַדְתִּ֣י לְךָ֘ שָׁם֒ וְדִבַּרְתִּ֨י אִתְּךָ֜ מֵעַ֣ל הַכַּפֹּ֗רֶת מִבֵּין֙ שְׁנֵ֣י הַכְּרֻבִ֔ים אֲשֶׁ֖ר עַל־אֲר֣וֹן הָֽעֵדֻ֑ת אֵ֣ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁ֧ר אֲצַוֶּ֛ה אֽוֹתְךָ֖ אֶל־בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
I will arrange My meetings with you there: When I arrange a meeting for you to speak with you, [it is at] that place that I will arrange for the meeting where I will come to speak to you. ונועדתי: כשאקבע מועד לך לדבר עמך, אותו מקום אקבע למועד שאבא שם לדבר אליך:
and I will speak with you from atop the ark cover: But elsewhere it says: “and the Lord spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting, saying…” (Lev. 1:1). That is the Mishkan, outside the dividing curtain [whereas the ark was within the dividing curtain]. The two verses are found to contradict one another. The third verse comes and reconciles them. "And when Moses came into the Tent of Meeting…he heard the voice speaking to him from atop the ark cover" (Num. 7:89). [The solution is that] Moses would enter the Mishkan and as soon as he came within the doorway, a voice would descend from heaven to [the place] between the cherubim, from where it emanated and was heard by Moses in the Tent of Meeting. — [from Sifrei, end of Naso] ודברתי אתך מעל הכפורת: ובמקום אחר הוא אומר (ויקרא א א) וידבר ה' אליו מאהל מועד לאמר, זה המשכן מחוץ לפרכת, נמצאו שני כתובים מכחישים זה את זה, בא הכתוב השלישי והכריע ביניהם (במדבר ז פט) ובבא משה אל אהל מועד וישמע את הקול מדבר אליו מעל הכפרת וגו', משה היה נכנס למשכן וכיון שבא בתוך הפתח, קול יורד מן השמים לבין הכרובים, ומשם יוצא ונשמע למשה באהל מועד:
and all that I will command you unto the children of Israel: Heb. וְאֵת. This “vav” [that Rashi adds, meaning “and,”] is superfluous, and there are many similar [examples] in the Torah. And you shall interpret it thus: "and all that I will speak with you there is all that I will command you unto the children of Israel." ואת כל אשר אצוה אותך אל בני ישראל: הרי וי"ו זו יתירה וטפלה, וכמוהו הרבה במקרא, וכה תפתר ואת אשר אדבר עמך שם, את כל אשר אצוה אותך אל בני ישראל הוא:
23And you shall make a table of acacia wood, two cubits its length, one cubit its width, and a cubit and a half its height. כגוְעָשִׂ֥יתָ שֻׁלְחָ֖ן עֲצֵ֣י שִׁטִּ֑ים אַמָּתַ֤יִם אָרְכּוֹ֙ וְאַמָּ֣ה רָחְבּ֔וֹ וְאַמָּ֥ה וָחֵ֖צִי קֹֽמָתֽוֹ:
its height: The height of its legs [together] with the thickness of the table [top]. קמתו: גובה רגליו עם עובי השלחן:
24And you shall overlay it with pure gold, and you shall make for it a golden crown all around. כדוְצִפִּיתָ֥ אֹת֖וֹ זָהָ֣ב טָה֑וֹר וְעָשִׂ֥יתָ לּ֛וֹ זֵ֥ר זָהָ֖ב סָבִֽיב:
a golden crown: symbolic of the crown of kingship, for the table represents wealth and greatness, as they say, “the royal table.” -[from Yoma 72b] זר זהב: סימן לכתר מלכות, שהשולחן שם עושר וגדולה, כמו שאמרים שלחן מלכים:
25And you shall make for it a frame a handbreadth [wide] all around, and you shall make a golden crown for its frame all around. כהוְעָשִׂ֨יתָ לּ֥וֹ מִסְגֶּ֛רֶת טֹ֖פַח סָבִ֑יב וְעָשִׂ֧יתָ זֵֽר־זָהָ֛ב לְמִסְגַּרְתּ֖וֹ סָבִֽיב:
a frame: Heb. מִסְגֶּרֶת, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: גְּדַנְפָא, a rim. The Sages of Israel differed concerning the matter. Some say that it was above [i.e., extending from the table top], around the table, like the rims at the edge of the tables of the princes. Some say that it was below [the table top], inserted from one leg to the other on the four sides of the table, and the table top lay on that frame. — [from Men. 96b] מסגרת: כתרגומו גדנפא, ונחלקו חכמי ישראל בדבר יש אומרים, למעלה היתה סביב לשולחן, כמו לבזבזין שבשפת שולחן שרים, ויש אומרים, למטה היתה תקועה מרגל לרגל בארבע רוחות השולחן, ודף השלחן שוכב על אותה מסגרת:
and you shall make a golden crown for its frame: That is the crown mentioned above, and here He explains to you that it was on the frame. ועשית זר זהב למסגרתו: הוא זר האמור למעלה, ופירש לך כאן שעל המסגרת היתה:
26And you shall make for it four golden rings, and you shall place the rings on the four corners that are on its four legs. כווְעָשִׂ֣יתָ לּ֔וֹ אַרְבַּ֖ע טַבְּעֹ֣ת זָהָ֑ב וְנָֽתַתָּ֙ אֶת־הַטַּבָּעֹ֔ת עַ֚ל אַרְבַּ֣ע הַפֵּאֹ֔ת אֲשֶׁ֖ר לְאַרְבַּ֥ע רַגְלָֽיו:
27The rings shall be opposite the frame as holders for the poles [with which] to carry the table. כזלְעֻמַּת֙ הַמִּסְגֶּ֔רֶת תִּֽהְיֶ֖יןָ הַטַּבָּעֹ֑ת לְבָתִּ֣ים לְבַדִּ֔ים לָשֵׂ֖את אֶת־הַשֻּׁלְחָֽן:
The rings shall be opposite the frame: on the legs, inserted opposite the ends of the frame. לעמת המסגרת תהיין הטבעות: ברגלים תקועות כנגד ראשי המסגרת:
as holders for the poles: Those rings shall be holders in which to insert the poles. לבתים לבדים: אותן הטבעות יהיו בתים להכניס בהן הבדים:
as holders: Heb. לְבָתִּים, for the purpose of holders. לבתים: לצורך בתים:
for the poles: Heb. לְבַדִּים, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: אַתְרָא לַאִרִיחַיָא, a place for the poles. לבדים: כתרגומו אתרא לאריחיא:
28And you shall make the poles of acacia wood, and you shall overlay them with gold, and the table shall be carried with them. כחוְעָשִׂ֤יתָ אֶת־הַבַּדִּים֙ עֲצֵ֣י שִׁטִּ֔ים וְצִפִּיתָ֥ אֹתָ֖ם זָהָ֑ב וְנִשָּׂא־בָ֖ם אֶת־הַשֻּׁלְחָֽן:
shall be carried with them: Heb. וְנִשָׂא-בָם, the passive voice. The table shall be carried with them [by the poles]. ונשא בם: לשון נפעל, יהיה נשא בם את השלחן:
29And you shall make its forms, its spoons, its half pipes, and its supports with which it will be covered; of pure gold you shall make them. כטוְעָשִׂ֨יתָ קְּעָֽרֹתָ֜יו וְכַפֹּתָ֗יו וּקְשׂוֹתָיו֙ וּמְנַקִּיֹּתָ֔יו אֲשֶׁ֥ר יֻסַּ֖ךְ בָּהֵ֑ן זָהָ֥ב טָה֖וֹר תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה אֹתָֽם:
And you shall make its forms, its spoons: Heb. קְּעָרֹתָיו וְכַפֹּתָיו. קְּעָרֹתָיו is the form that was made according to the shape of the bread (Men. 97a). The bread was made in the shape of a type of box without a cover. It had a flat bottom (Men. 94b) and it would be bent upward on both sides [forming something] similar to walls. Therefore, it is called לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים, literally, the bread of faces, because it has faces looking in both directions-toward the sides of the house [Mishkan] from here [in one direction] and from there [in the other direction]. It was placed lengthwise across the width of the table, and its walls stood vertically opposite the edge of the table. A golden form and an iron form were made for it. It was baked [on Fridays] in the iron form, and when it was taken out of the oven, it would be placed in the golden form until the next day, which was the Sabbath, when it would be arranged on the table. That form is called קְעָרָה. ועשית קערתיו וכפתיו: קערותיו זה הדפוס שהיה עשוי כדפוס הלחם, והלחם היה עשוי כמין תיבה פרוצה משתי רוחותיה, שולים לו למטה וקופל מכאן ומכאן כלפי מעלה כמין כתלים, ולכך קרוי לחם הפנים, שיש לו פנים רואין לכאן ולכאן לצדי הבית מזה ומזה, ונותן ארכו לרחבו של שולחן, וכתליו זקופים כנגד שפת השלחן, והיה עשוי לו דפוס זהב ודפוס ברזל, בשל ברזל הוא נאפה וכשמוציאו מן התנור נותנו בשל זהב עד למחר בשבת שמסדרו על השלחן, ואותו הדפוס קרוי קערה:
its spoons: Heb. וְכַפֹּתָיו. They were the spoons in which the frankincense was placed. There were two [spoons meant] for the two handfuls of frankincense that were placed beside the two stacks, as it is said: “And you shall place beside the stack pure frankincense” (Lev. 24:7). -[from Men. 97a] וכפתיו: בזיכין שנותנים בהם לבונה, ושתים היו לשני קומצי לבונה שנותנין על שתי המערכות, שנאמר (ויקרא כד ז) ונתת על המערכת לבונה זכה:
its half-pipes: Heb. וּקְשׁוֹתָיו. They are sort of half-tubes, hollow and split along their length. They are similar to the tubes made of gold. Three [tubes] were arranged over each bread, so that each bread would rest upon those tubes. They would separate one bread from the other so that air would enter between them and they [the bread] would not grow moldy. In Arabic, any hollow thing is called kaswa. — [from Men. 96a, 97a] וקשותיו: הן כמין חצאי קנים חלולים הנסדקין לארכן דוגמתן עשה של זהב ומסדר שלשה על ראש כל לחם, שישב לחם האחד על גבי אותן הקנים ומבדילין בין לחם ללחם כדי שתכנס הרוח ביניהם ולא יתעפשו, ובלשון ערבי כל דבר חלול קרוי קסו"ה:
and its supports: Heb. וּמְנַקּיֹתָיו. Its Aramaic translation is וּמְכִילָתֵיהּ, [meaning] and its bearers. They are branches like golden pegs [Mizrachi explains that they were like columns] standing on the ground and reaching a considerable height upwards above the table, corresponding to the height of the stack of bread. [They were] notched with six (Mizrachi-five) notches, one above the other, and the ends of the pipes between one bread and another were supported by these branches so that the burden of the upper breads should not weigh down on the lower ones and cause them to break. The derivation of מְכִילָתֵיהּ is “its bearers,” similar to “I am weary of bearing [it] (הָכִיל)” (Jer. 6:11). But I do not know how the מְנַקִּיוֹת applies to branches. Other Sages of Israel say that קְשׂתָיו refers to the branches, which harden (מְקֻשוֹת) it [the showbread] and strengthen it so that it does not break, and מְנַקִּיוֹתָיו refers to the pipes, which clean (מְנַקִּין) [the bread] so that it should not become moldy (Men. 96a). But Onkelos, who rendered [מְנַקִּיוֹתָיו as] מְכִילָתֵיהּ, understood it in a similar way to the words of the one [Sage] who says [that] מְנַקִּיוֹת are branches. ומנקיתיו: תרגומו ומכילתיה, הן סניפים, כמין יתדות זהב עומדין בארץ וגבוהים עד למעלה מן השולחן הרבה כנגד גובה מערכת הלחם, ומפוצלים ששה פצולים זה למעלה מזה, וראשי הקנים שבין לחם ללחם סמוכין על אותן פצולין, כדי שלא יכבד משא הלחם העליונים על התחתונים וישברו ולשון מכילתיה, סובלותיו, כמו (ירמיהו ו יא) נלאיתי הכיל, אבל לשון מנקיות איני יודע, איך נופל על סניפין. ויש מחכמי ישראל אומרים קשותיו אלו סניפין, שמקשין אותו ומחזיקין אותו שלא ישבר, ומנקיותיו אלו הקנים שמנקין אותו שלא יתעפש, אבל אונקלוס שתרגם ומכילתיה היה שונה כדברי האומר מנקיות הן סניפין:
with which it will be covered: Heb. יֻסַּ, [meaning] with which it will be covered. Regarding the half-pipes, [Scripture] says “with which it will be covered” because they [the half-pipes] were like a sort of roof and cover over it [the bread], and similarly elsewhere (Num. 4:7) [Scripture] says, “the half- pipes which cover (הַנָּסֶ),” and both of these [words]- יֻסַּ and (הַנָּסֶ) Are words meaning a roof and a cover. אשר יסך בהן: אשר יכוסה בהן, ועל קשותיו הוא אומר אשר יוסך, שהיו עליו כמין סכך וכסוי, וכן במקום אחר הוא אומר (במדבר ד ז) ואת קשות הנסך וזה וזה, יוסך והנסך, לשון סכך וכסוי הם:
30And you shall place on the table showbread before Me at all times. לוְנָֽתַתָּ֧ עַל־הַשֻּׁלְחָ֛ן לֶ֥חֶם פָּנִ֖ים לְפָנַ֥י תָּמִֽיד:
showbread: Heb. לֶחֶם פָּנִים, lit., bread of faces, [given this appellation] because it has faces, as I explained [on verse 29]. The number of breads and the order of their stacks are explained in [the parsha of] אֱמֹר אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים, “Speak to the Kohanim” (Lev. 21:1). לחם פנים: שיש לו פנים כמו שפירשתי, ומנין הלחם וסדר מערכותיו מפורשים באמור אל הכהנים:
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Daily Tehillim: Chapters 140 - 144
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 140
David composed this psalm against his slanderers, especially the chief conspirator Doeg. Anyone confronted by slanderers should recite this psalm.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. Rescue me from the evil man, protect me from the man of violence,
3. who devise evil schemes in their heart; every day they gather for wars.
4. They sharpen their tongues like a serpent; the spider's venom is forever under their lips.
5. Guard me, Lord, from the hands of the wicked, protect me from the man of violence-those who plot to cause my steps to slip.
6. Arrogant ones have hidden a snare for me, and ropes; they spread a net by my path, they set traps for me continually.
7. I said to the Lord, "You are my God!" Listen, O Lord, to the voice of my pleas.
8. God, my Lord, the strength of my deliverance, You sheltered my head on the day of armed battle.
9. Grant not, O Lord, the desires of the wicked; fulfill not his scheme, make it unattainable forever.
10. As for the head of my besiegers, let the deceit of their own lips bury them.
11. Let burning coals fall upon them; let it cast them down into the fire, into deep pits, never to rise again.
12. Let not the slanderous man be established in the land; let the evil of the man of violence trap him until he is overthrown.
13. I know that the Lord will execute judgement for the poor, justice for the needy.
14. Indeed, the righteous will extol Your Name; the upright will dwell in Your presence.
Chapter 141
This psalm teaches an important lesson: One should pray for Divine assistance that his mouth not speak that which is not in his heart. The gatekeeper only allows the gate to be opened for a purpose; let it be the same with one's lips.
1. A psalm by David. O Lord, I have called You, hasten to me; listen to my voice when I call to You.
2. Let my prayer be set forth as incense before You, the raising of my hands as an afternoon offering.
3. O Lord, place a guard for my mouth, keep watch over the door of my lips.
4. Do not incline my heart to a bad thing-to perform deeds in wickedness, with men, doers of evil; let me not partake of their delicacies.
5. Let the righteous one strike me with kindness and let him rebuke me; like the finest oil, let my head not refuse it. For as long [as I live], my prayer is [to preserve me] from their harm.
6. For their judges have slipped because of their [hearts of] rock, though they heard my words and they were pleasant.
7. As one who chops and splinters [wood] on the ground, so have our bones been scattered to the mouth of the grave.
8. For to You, God, my Lord, are my eyes; in You I take shelter; do not pour out my soul.
9. Protect me from the hands of the snare they laid for me, and from the traps of the evildoers.
10. Let the wicked fall into their own nets together, until I pass over.
Chapter 142
David composed this psalm while hiding from Saul in a cave, at which time he had cut off the corner of Saul's garment (to prove that he was able to kill him but did not wish to do so). He declared, "Where can I turn, and where can I run? All I have is to cry out to You!"
1. A maskil1 by David, when he was in the cave, a prayer.
2. With my voice I will cry out to the Lord; with my voice I will call to the Lord in supplication.
3. I will pour out my plea before Him; I will declare my distress in His presence.
4. When my spirit is faint within me, You know my path. In the way in which I walk, they have hidden a snare for me.
5. Look to my right and see, there is none that will know me; every escape is lost to me. No man cares for my soul.
6. I cried out to You, O Lord; I said, "You are my refuge, my portion in the land of the living.”
7. Listen to my song of prayer, for I have been brought very low. Deliver me from my pursuers, for they are too mighty for me.
8. Release my soul from confinement, so that it may acknowledge Your Name. Because of me, the righteous will crown [You] when You will deal graciously with me.
FOOTNOTES
1.A psalm intended to enlighten and impart knowledge(Metzudot).
Chapter 143
1. A psalm by David. O Lord, hear my prayer, lend Your ear to my supplications. With Your faithfulness answer me, and with Your righteousness.
2. Do not enter into judgment with Your servant, for no living being would be vindicated before You.
3. For the enemy has pursued my soul; he has crushed my life to the ground; he has set me down in dark places, like those who are eternally dead.
4. Then my spirit became faint within me; my heart was dismayed within me.
5. I remembered the days of old; I meditated on all Your deeds; I spoke of Your handiwork.
6. I spread out my hands to You; like a languishing land my soul yearns after You, Selah.
7. Answer me soon, O Lord, my spirit is spent; hide not Your face from me, lest I become like those who descend into the pit.
8. Let me hear Your kindness in the morning, for have I trusted in You. Let me know the way in which I should walk, for to You I have lifted my soul.
9. Deliver me from my enemies, O Lord. I have concealed [my troubles from all, save] You.
10. Teach me to do Your will, for You are my God. Let Your good spirit lead me in an even path.
11. For the sake of Your Name, O Lord, give me life; in Your righteousness, take my soul out of distress.
12. And in Your kindness, cut off my enemies and obliterate all those who oppress my soul, for I am Your servant.
Chapter 144
After triumphing in all his wars, David composed this psalm in praise of God.
1. By David. Blessed be the Lord, my Rock, Who trains my hands for battle and my fingers for war.
2. My source of kindness and my fortress, my high tower and my rescuer, my shield, in Whom I take refuge; it is He Who makes my people submit to me.
3. O Lord, what is man that You have recognized him; the son of a mortal, that You are mindful of him?
4. Man is like a breath; his days are like a passing shadow.
5. O Lord, incline Your heavens and descend; touch the mountains and they will become vapor.
6. Flash one bolt of lightning and You will scatter them; send out Your arrows and You will confound them.
7. Stretch forth Your hands from on high, rescue me and deliver me out of many waters, from the hand of strangers,
8. whose mouth speaks deceit and whose right hand is a right hand of falsehood.
9. God, I will sing a new song to You, I will play to You upon a harp of ten strings.
10. He who gives victory to kings, He will rescue David, His servant, from the evil sword.
11. Rescue me and deliver me from the hand of strangers, whose mouth speaks deceit and whose right hand is a right hand of falsehood.
12. For our sons are like plants, brought up to manliness in their youth; our daughters are like cornerstones, fashioned after the fashion of a palace.
13. Our storehouses are full, overflowing with all manner of food; our sheep increase by the thousands, growing by the tens of thousands in our open fields.
14. Our leaders bear the heaviest burden; there is none who break through, nor is there bad report, nor outcry in our streets.
15. Happy is the nation for whom this is so. Happy is that nation whose God is the Lord.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 25
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
• Hebrew Text
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• Monday, Shevat 29, 5776 · February 8, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 25
ויחוד זה למעלה הוא נצחי לעולם ועד, כי הוא יתברך ורצונו למעלה מהזמן
In the upper spheres, this union between the soul and G‑d is eternal. For G‑d, blessed be He, and His Will transcend time, and thus the union with G‑d and His Will also transcends time and is eternal.
וכן גילוי רצונו שבדבורו שהיא התורה הוא נצחי
So too even in this world His revealed Will, as expressed in His Word — the Torah, is also eternal,
וכמו שכתוב: ודבר אלקינו יקום לעולם, ודבריו חיים וקיימים כו‘, ולא יחליף ולא ימיר דתו לעולמים כו’
as it is written: 1 “But the Word of our G‑d shall stand forever”; and2 “His words live and endure (eternally)”; and3 “He will never alter or exchange His law.”
Since the revelation of G‑d’s Will as expressed in the Torah is beyond time, the union of the soul with G‑d that Torah andmitzvot effect is likewise eternal.
אלא שלמטה הוא תחת הזמן, ובאותה שעה לבדה שעוסק בה בתורה או במצוה
Here below, however, this union is within the limits of time, for in this world the soul is under the dominion of time,and the soul is united with G‑d only while it is engaged in Torah study or in the performance of a mitzvah.
כי אחר כך אם עוסק בדבר אחר, נפרד מהיחוד העליון למטה והיינו כשעוסק בדברים בטלים לגמרי שאין בהם צורך כלל לעבודת ה‘
For if he engages afterwards in anything else he becomes separated, here below, from this Supernal union (— that is, if he occupies himself with absolutely unnecessary matters that are in no way useful in the service of G‑d).
ואף על פי כן, כשחוזר ושב לעבודת ה’ אחר כך, לתורה ולתפלה, ומבקש מחילה מה‘ על שהיה אפשר לו לעסוק אז בתורה ולא עסק, ה’ יסלח לו
Nevertheless, when he repents and resumes his service of G‑d through Torah study or prayer, and he asks forgiveness of G‑d for not having studied Torah at the time of his occupation in vain matters when he could have done so, G‑d forgives him.
כמאמר רז״ל: עבר על מצות עשה ושב, לא זז משם עד שמוחלין לו
As our Sages have said, 4 “If one neglected to perform a positive precept and repented, he is pardoned forthwith,” and is thus reunited even here below, with G‑d and His Will.
ולזה תקנו ברכת סלח לנו שלש פעמים בכל יום על עון ביטול תורה, שאין אדם ניצול ממנו בכל יום
For this reason i.e., because such a request for forgiveness is immediately effective in reuniting the soul to G‑d, so that it will not be parted from Him even momentarily, the Sages ordained that the blessing beginning “Forgive us...,” in which we beg forgiveness for the sin of neglecting the study of the Torah, be recited as often as three times daily, since no one escapes this sin even a single day.
וכמו התמיד שהיה מכפר על מצות עשה
This [blessing] is like the daily burnt-offering sacrificed in the Holy Temple, that atoned for neglect of the positive precepts.
Yet it may be argued: Since this sin is repeated constantly, begging forgiveness for it is similar to saying, “I will sin and repent, sin and repent.” Our Sages have said5 that in such a case, G‑d does not grant the sinner the opportunity to repent; why then should the request beginning “Forgive us…” be effective in the case of neglecting Torah study? The Alter Rebbe now differentiates between the two cases.
ואין זה אחטא ואשוב, אלא אם כן שבשעת החטא ממש הוא סומך על התשובה ולכך חוטא, כמו שכתוב במקום אחר
This is not the same as saying, “I will sin and repent, sin and repent,” unless at the very time when one commits the sin he relies on subsequent repentance, and sins because of it, as explained elsewhere.
Since he perverted the idea of repentance by using it as an excuse for sinning, he is not given the opportunity to practice it. However, in our case of the oft-repeated sin of neglecting to study Torah, the offender does not rely on teshuvah at the time of his sin, and he is therefore granted the opportunity to ask for forgiveness thrice daily in the blessing of “Forgive us."
* * *
At any rate, we see that the union of the soul with G‑d that is effected through the mitzvot is eternal. When one considers that he would gladly give up his life so as not to be (even momentarily) parted from G‑d by practicing idolatry, he will realize that he surely ought to exert himself in performing the mitzvot which bind him to G‑d forever.
The Alter Rebbe has thus demonstrated how being aware of one’s willingness to sacrifice his life for G‑d, affects both the areas of “turning away from evil” and “doing good,” i.e., the observance of the negative and positive commandments respectively. It follows that this awareness should constantly be on one’s mind, so that he will always be ready to apply it to his performance of the mitzvot.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Yeshayahu 40:8. |
| 2. | From the prayer following the morning Shema. |
| 3. | From the medieval hymn Yigdal, based on the Thirteen Principles of Faith formulated by Rambam. |
| 4. | Yoma 86a. |
| 5. | Ibid. 85b. |
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Monday, Shevat 29, 5776 · February 8, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Negative Commandment 356
Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
"Her first husband who sent her away may not marry her again"—Deuteronomy 24:4.
It is forbidden for a man to remarry a woman he divorced if she has remarried [and subsequently been divorced again or widowed] in the interim.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Remarrying a Divorced Wife Who Remarried in the Interim
Negative Commandment 356
Translated by Berel Bell
The 356th prohibition is that a man is forbidden from remarrying his divorced wife, if she was married to another man in the interim.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) [that if her second husband divorces her or dies,] "then her first husband who divorced her cannot remarry her."
The punishment for transgression of this prohibition is malkos (lashes).
The details of this mitzvah are explained in a number of passages in Yevamos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Even if the second husband passed away or divorced her.
2.Deut. 24:4.
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Positive Commandment 216
Levirate Marriage
"Her husband's brother shall be intimate with her"—Deuteronomy 25:5.
The brother of a married man who dies childless is commanded to marry his widowed sister-in-law. [See Positive Commandment 217 for the mechanism by which this mitzvah can be bypassed.]
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Levirate Marriage
Positive Commandment 216
Translated by Berel Bell
The 216th mitzvah is that we are commanded that a man must marry his brother's wife, if [that brother] died without leaving children.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) "Her yavam [i.e. the surviving brother] must cohabit with her" [i.e. the sister-in-law].
The details of this mitzvah are found in the tractate devoted to this subject, tractate Yevamos.
FOOTNOTES
1.The reason the Torah gives for this marriage is, "so that his [the deceased brother's] name will not be obliterated from Israel" (Deut. 25:6).
2.Deut. 25:5.
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• 1 Chapter: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 6 • English Text | Hebrew Text |
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Halacha 1
Halacha 2
The obligation [to separate] challah applies only to [dough from] the five species of grain: wheat barley, rye, oats, and spelt,3 as [implied by Numbers 15:19]: "When you partake of the bread of the land." The term "bread" refers only to a loaf made from these five species.4 If, however, one makes bread from rice, millet, or other legumes, there is no obligation of challah at all.
Halacha 3
Although there is no obligation to separate terumah from leket, shichachah, pe'ah,5 grain which is ownerless,6 and grain which did not reach a third of its growth,7 there is an obligation to separate challah from these. Similarly, there is an obligation to separate challah [from dough made from grain in the following circumstances]: the tithes was separated from the grain early while it was still stalks8 and terumat ma'aser was separated from it, even though the portion of the great terumah is still included in it,9 [grain that was from] the second tithe or consecrated property that was redeemed, the extra [portions of barley harvested for] the omer offering,10 the two loaves [prepared to be offered on Shavuot], and [the loaves prepared for] the showbread11 which were redeemed.12
Halacha 4
When a dough was made from grain from the second tithe in Jerusalem13or from grain from the Sabbatical year,14 or when there is a doubt whether the dough was made from a mixture of terumah and ordinary produce,15 there is an obligation to separate challah. A mixture of terumah and ordinary produce is exempt from the obligation of challah.16
Halacha 5
The loaves for the thanksgiving offering17 and the wafers for the nazirite offering18 which a person made for himself19 are exempt from the obligation ofchallah, for they are sanctified.20 [If they were made] to sell in the market place to nazirites and to those bringing thanksgiving offerings, there is an obligation to separate challah, since [the baker] has the intent that if they are not sold [for sacrificial purposes], he will eat them.
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
When a person makes dough using grain that is tevel - whether the challah is separated before terumah or the terumah separated before challah - what he did is effective.23 If he separated the challah first, he should not partake of it until he separates terumah and terumat ma'aser for it. If he separated terumahfirst, he should not partake of it until he separates challah.24
Halacha 8
When a person makes a dough with the intent25 of feeding the bread baked from it to an domesticated animal or a wild animal, it is exempt fromchallah.26There is an obligation to separate challah from a dough made for dogs27 which is eaten by the shepherds.28 A dough made by a gentile is exempt from challah.29
Halacha 9
If a gentile and a Jew were partners in a dough and the portion owned by the Jew was large enough to be liable for challah, it is liable for challah.30
Halacha 10
When a gentile separates challah even in Eretz Yisrael, it is not challah. Instead, we inform him that he does not have to [observe this mitzvah. The dough separated] may be eaten by a non-priest.31
Halacha 11
[The following laws apply when a person] mixes flour from wheat34and rice flour35 and makes a dough: If it has the flavor of grain, challah must be separated from it.36 If not, it is exempt. Even if one placed yeast37 from wheat38 into a dough from rice, one is obligated to separate challah from it if it has the flavor of wheat. If it does not have that flavor, it is exempt.
Halacha 12
There is an obligation to separate challah in all [the following instances]:39 a dough that was kneaded with wine, oil, or honey,40 or with boiling water, or one in which spices where placed, water was boiled and flour was placed inside of it and a dough was kneaded. [And challah must be separated when] dough was baked whether in an oven or [in a pit] in the earth,41 whether in a frying pan or a deep pan, whether first one attached the dough to the frying pan or the deep pan and then heated them with fire from below until the loaf was baked or one heated them first and then attached the dough.
If, however, one made a dough to dry it in the sun alone or to cook it in a pot, it is exempt from challah, for [dough cooked] in the sun is not bread whether it was kneaded with water or other liquids.42 Similarly, roasted grain that was kneaded whether with water or honey and which is eaten without being baked is exempt, for the obligation of challah applies only to a dough that will ultimately be baked as bread for human consumption.
Halacha 13
When a dough was first kneaded to make a dough to be cooked in the sun and then the person completed making it for a loaf of bread, or he began making it to bake bread and completed it to cook it in the sun and similarly, when roasted flour was kneaded to bake a loaf of bread, there is an obligation to separate challah.43
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
What is the minimum measure of dough from which we are obligated to separate challah? An entire omer of flour,47 whether from one of the five species or from all five together, for they are all combined to reach the minimum measure.
What is the measure of an omer? One fifth [of a kab] less than two kabbin. Akab is four lugim and a log is four revi'iot.48 A revi'it is the volume of a cube two fingerbreadths by two fingerbreadths by a height of two and seven tenths fingerbreadths. A fingerbreadth refers to the width of a thumb.
Thus an omer is a measure that is ten fingerbreadths by ten fingerbreadths by a height of approximately 3 and one ninth fingerbreadths. Similarly, a cube with each side six and seven ninths fingerbreadths produces a measure of anomer.
How much does this measure contain? The volume of 43 and 1/5 eggs. This is equivalent to the weight of 86 2/3 selaim of Egyptian wheat flour.49 This is equivalent to 520 zuz of Egyptian zuzim at present. A measure that comprises such a weight of wheat is used universally to measure for the separation of challah.
Halacha 16
It is forbidden for a person to make his dough less than the minimum measure50 in order to free it from the obligation of challah.51 When a person separates challah from a dough that is smaller than the prescribed measure, his actions are of no consequence and the dough is ordinary dough as before.
When a person made a dough that is less than the prescribed measure, baked it, and put the loaf in a basket, baked another loaf52 and put it in the basket, and [continued doing this] until a measure from which challah [must be separated] was collected in the basket, the basket joins them together [as a single entity, establishing an obligation for] challah.53 He must separatechallah from the bread. This is derived [from the prooftext mentioned above]: "When you partake of the bread of the land." [The verse] teaches that one should separate [challah] from [bread] that is baked. An oven, [however,] does not join loaves together [to create an obligation to separate] challah.54
Halacha 17
If [small] loaves were joined together and a quantity equal to the measure ofchallah was gathered together, there is an obligation to separate challah.55[This applies] even if they are not placed in a basket [together].56 If one baked loaves a little bit at a time and gathered together the entire quantity on a board that does not have a cavity,57 there is a doubt regarding [the matter].58 If [the obligation to separate] challah is of Rabbinic origin,59 one is not obligated to separate it until they are gathered in a container with a cavity.60
Halacha 18
When flour was not sifted, but instead kneaded together with its bran, since the entire measure of the flour61 comprises an omer, there is an obligation [to separate] challah.62 If, however, one removed the bran from the flour and then completed the [required] measure of dough by returning the bran to the flour, there is no obligation to separate challah.63
Halacha 19
FOOTNOTES
1.
The commentaries raise a question concerning this ruling, because seemingly, the baker should separate challah himself. Moreover, because of the severity of the prohibition of challah, the common people were not considered suspect to refrain from making this separation.
The Radbaz explains that we are speaking about an instance where the baker told the purchaser to separate challah, alternatively, an instance where the baker is suspect not to separate challah. The Kessef Mishnehexplains that the responsibility for the baker to separate challah applies only when thechallah is ritually pure. Since it will be eaten by the priest, it is appropriate that the baker separate it. When, by contrast, it is impure and must be burnt, it should be separated by the purchaser.
2.
Difusim, translated as "trays," literally means "molds." In the Talmudic era, bread was baked in various molds so that the loaves would be shaped differently. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 1:3), the Rambam explains that there was an opinion which forbade separating challahfrom one tray for another lest the flour used to bake the different breads was from different years.
3.
I.e., whether the dough is made from each of the species individually or a combination of any of the five, as stated in Halachah 15.
4.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 1:1) derives this concept because there is an association between challah and matzah. Matzah may only be made from these five species, for they are the only species that can become leaven. Hence, it is these five to which the mitzvah of challah applies. See Halachah 11 which discusses the laws that apply when a dough is made using one of these grains and other species.
5.
These mitzvot refer to grain left for the poor.
6.
When the grain was left by its owner, it was ownerless and hence, there were no agricultural obligations incumbent upon it. Now, however, that someone took possession of it, those obligations do apply.
7.
Because at this point it is not considered as grain yet. See Hilchot Ma'aser 2:3-5. Nevertheless, since a dough made from such grain will become leaven, there is an obligation to separate challah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:4)].
8.
Before it was threshed; see Hilchot Terumah3:13, Hilchot Ma'aser 3:19.
9.
For as stated in Hilchot Terumah, op. cit., there is no obligation to separate terumahfrom such grain. And since there is no obligation to separate terumah, one might think that one is also exempt from the obligation to separate challah
10.
As explained in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim7:11-12, three se'ah of barley would be harvested for the omer offering. That barley was then made into flour, sifted and refined until only an isaron (a far smaller measure) was selected for the omer offering. The remainder of the barley was redeemed and could be used for mundane purposes.
11.
This refers to the extra flour which had been set aside for the two loaves or the showbread, like the remainder of the barley mentioned in the previous note, it could be redeemed and then used for mundane purposes.
12.
In all these instances, since the dough was prepared after it was redeemed, it is considered as bread belonging to an ordinary person. Hence, the obligation to tithe it applies (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
13.
Although produce of the second tithe is "the property of the Most High," in Jerusalem, it is permitted to be eaten by ordinary people. Hence, challah must be separated from the dough (Radbaz).
14.
Like the ownerless produce mentioned in the previous halachah, at present, it is the property of the person who took it as his own. Hence, there is an obligation to separate challah.
15.
Although there is a possibility that the produce is a mixture of terumah and ordinary produce which is exempt as stated in the following clause, there is also a possibility that this is only ordinary produce in which instance, an obligation does apply.
16.
The Radbaz states that this law applies only in the present era when the obligation to separate challah is of Rabbinic origin. In that instance, the prohibition of a mixture ofterumah offsets the obligation to separatechallah, for they are both Rabbinic safeguards. If, however, the obligation to separate challah is Scriptural in origin, it would take precedence.
17.
Together with the thanksgiving offering, 40 loaves (10 each of four types) were offered.
18.
Together with the ram a nazirite offered 30 loaves (10 each of three types) were offered. See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot9:12-24 for a description of these loaves.
19.
To bring as part of his offering, rather than to sell to someone else.
20.
And challah need only be separated from a person's private property, not from consecrated property (Menachot 67a).
21.
This applies even if the dough is not large enough that each of the partners will receive a portion the size of an olive (Radbaz). Even though they intend to separate the bread after it is baked, as long as they do not intend to separate the dough, they are obligated to separate challah (Siftei Cohen326:1).
22.
We are speaking about a situation where a person bakes bread in order to give it to many people. He does not, however, declare the bread ownerless. Were he to do so, there would be no obligation to separatechallah, as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 6.
23.
I.e., even though he should have separated the terumah before the dough was made, after the fact, his separation is effective
24.
The Radbaz questions why the Rambam does not mention the second tithe, for in the years that there is an obligation to separate it, one may not partake of the produce until it is separated.
25.
The Radbaz states that the law depends on the intent of the person making the dough and not what it is eventually used for.
26.
For the mitzvah applies only to dough prepared for human consumption.
27.
A dough made without bran being separated from the flour which is thus usually not intended for human consumption [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 1:8)].
28.
Since the shepherds also intend to partake of it, it is considered as intended for human consumption and challah must be separated from the entire dough, even from the portion intended for the dogs.
29.
Menachot 67a derives this from the fact thatNumbers 15:20, the prooftext for the obligation of challah, speaks of "the first of your dough," i.e., the dough of a Jew and not of a gentile.
30.
The Radbaz maintains that the Jew mayt separate challah from the entire dough, even from the gentile's portion.
31.
Because there is no holiness associated with it.
32.
I.e., the Jew thought that if he gave the dough to a gentile to prepare, it would be exempt and the gentile desired to separatechallah from it. The Radbaz states that although generally we do not suspect that a prohibition is being violated, there is room to do so in this instance, because otherwise, why would the gentile think of separatingchallah.
33.
As stated in Halachah 15.
34.
Or any other of the five species of grain mentioned in Halachah 2.
35.
The Turei Zahav 324:9 states this law applies to rice and not to other species, because rice takes on the flavor of wheat.
36.
This applies even if quantitatively, there is more rice than wheat. For the wheat is considered as dominant.
The Ra'avad states that this ruling applies only when there is enough wheat in the dough to establish an obligation. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the Rambam does not make such a distinction. The difference of opinion between them centers on the interpretation of the Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 3:5). TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:9) quotes the Rambam's wording without any further qualification. There is a similar disagreement between the Rambam and the Ra'avad with regard to matzah made from wheat and rice. See Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 6:5.
37.
Yeast is singled out, because a small amount of yeast can affect an entire dough.
38.
The Ra'avad states that this applies when the yeast is taken from a dough from whichchallah had not been separated. The Radbaz, however, states that it is possible that the Rambam does not accept that conclusion. In this instance as well, theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:10) quotes the Rambam's ruling without further qualification.
39.
All of the instances mentioned in the first clause of the halachah are not bread in the simple sense. Nevertheless, they are all considered as dough within the context of this mitzvah.
40.
Even though no water was mixed into it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 329:9)].
41.
Since ultimately the dough was baked, the fact that the flour was boiled first is not significant (Siftei Cohen 329:8).
42.
Similarly, dough boiled in water is not considered as bread, but as cooked food.
43.
As long as there was an intent to use the dough for bread at one stage in its preparation, challah must be separated.
44.
A mixture of whey and bread crumbs used as a dip.
45.
This shape indicates that he may change his mind and serve the cakes as bread.
46.
This indicates that he is not intending to serve the strips as bread, but will indeed crumble them and use them for kutach.
47.
Our Sages derived this measure as follows:Numbers 15:19 states: "You shall separate the first of your dough as challah." AsExodus 16:16 relates the amount of manna allotted to each individual in the desert was an omer. Hence we use that as the size of the required measure of dough (Eruvin 83b).
48.
A revi'it is approximately 86cc according toShiurei Torah and approximately 150 cc according to Chazon Ish. Thus a log is 344 or 600 cc, a kab 1376 or 2400 cc, and the measure of the dough from which challahmust be separated is 2500 (because the above figures are approximations) or 4320 cc.
49.
Shiurei Torah writes that a blessing should be recited when separating challah from a dough made from 3 pounds and 10 ¾ ounces of flour and one should be stringent and separate challah from a dough made from 2 pounds and 10.1 ounces of flour.
50.
I.e., less than the measure described in the previous halachah.
51.
This applies even though he is ritually impure and he knows that he will be separating the dough to have it burnt (Challah 2:3). The Turei Zahav 324:17 and the Siftei Cohen 324:25 emphasize that this applies only when the person's intent in making the loaf small is that he will not have to separate challah. If he has another intent, his actions are not sanctioned.
52.
Which was also less than the prescribed measure.
53.
This applies even though the loaves themselves are not joined together. One of the examples of the separation of challahwith which many are familiar - the separation of challah from matzah - employs this principle.
54.
I.e., if small loaves are baked together in an oven, but taken out separately, there is no obligation to separate challah.
55.
Even though at the time the dough was made, there was not a sufficient quantity to require the separation of challah.
56.
The fact that they are joined is sufficient for them to be considered as a singled entity.
57.
In contrast to the basket mentioned in the previous halachah.
58.
Pesachim 48b mentions an unresolved difference of opinion concerning this question among the Sages.
59.
Like the challah separated in the present era, as stated Chapter 5, Halachah 5.
60.
For we follow the principle: When there is a doubt regarding a Rabbinic obligation, we rule leniently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 325:1) writes that if one places the bread on a board and then covers it with a cloth, there is an authority who requires the separation of challah. The Siftei Cohen 325:5 questions why the Shulchan Aruch uses the expression "there is an authority...," in as much as this principle is universally accepted.
61.
I.e., the flour together with the bran, even though the flour alone is not of sufficient quantity to require challah to be separated.
62.
For a poor person will eat bread made from coarse flour containing bran (Shabbat 76b).
63.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 2:6) explains that this is derived from Numbers 15:21 that speaks of "your dough," i.e., the way dough is ordinarily made.
64.
According to the Rambam, this halachah pertains to a baker and not to ordinary individuals. The laws pertaining to them are mentioned in the following halachah.
65.
To sell to others to use the yeast to leaven other doughs without this dough being baked.
66.
So that he will be baking smaller portions and not be obligated to separate challah.
67.
I.e., private individuals who will use the yeast for themselves and not for commercial purposes.
68.
Because the dough is not being made to be baked as bread, but to be divided as dough. Since it is being made for private individuals, the Rambam maintains that there is little likelihood that they will change their minds and have it baked. Even though the women did not give their flour to the baker together, the fact that he made a dough from them would have caused an obligation for challahhad the intent been to bake the dough. Moreover, the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 326:3) rules that if the women consent to having their flour mixed in a larger dough, an obligation to separate challah is created.
The Ra'avad maintains that if one woman makes dough to use as yeast, the law mentioned with regard to a baker in the previous halachah applies to her and she is required to separate challah. Here the leniency is granted because several women are involved. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh argue against the Ra'avad's conclusion and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 326:2) states that the stringency applies to a baker and not to an ordinary person.
• 3 Chapters: Gerushin Gerushin - Chapter Thirteen, Yibbum vChalitzah Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter One, Yibbum vChalitzah Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Two • English Text | Hebrew Text |
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Halacha 1
[The following rules apply with regard to] a woman who told her husband:1"You divorced me in the presence of so and so and so and so," and those witnesses came and denied her statements.2 If afterwards, she and her husband departed [for a far-removed country] while peace prevails in the world at large,3 and then she returns and says, "My husband died," her word is not accepted.
[The rationale is] that she is considered to be a liar, who desires to free herself from her ties to her husband.4 If one witness comes and testifies on her behalf that her husband died, she should not [be granted permission to] marry; we fear that perhaps she hired him.5 If, however, she marries, nevertheless, she need not leave [her second husband], for there is a witness who supports her.
Halacha 2
Similarly, when there is a state of war in the world at large, if [a woman] comes and says, "My husband died in the war,"6 her word is not accepted, even where the couple's relationship is peaceful.
[The rationale is that we fear that] she will rely on a situation in which the likelihood is that he will die - e.g., the people in the front and at the rear were killed, and her husband is in the center. She might think, "Since these were killed, and those were killed, he was killed surely together with them."
Halacha 3
If we are not aware of a war raging in the world, and a woman comes and says: "There was a war in a particular county and [my husband] died in that war," a priori, she should not marry. If, however, she marries, she need not leave [her second husband].9
Halacha 4
Similarly, if a woman says, "My husband died in a landslide," her word is not accepted. In the same vein, if an area was overrun by swarms of snakes and scorpions, and she says, "He was bitten by a snake - or a scorpion - and died," h er word is not accepted.10 [The rationale is] that she might rely on the fact that most men die because they were bitten in this manner, [and make a statement without knowing for certain whether or not her husband died].
Halacha 5
If [a woman] says, "They filled the house - or the cave - [in which we were hiding] with smoke; he died, but I was saved," her word is not accepted. [It is possible that] just as she [was saved] by a miracle, he could have been [saved by a miracle].
Halacha 6
If [a woman] says, "Gentiles - or thieves - attacked us. He was slain, and I was saved," her word is accepted, because it is not common for attackers to kill women.13 Thus, [it is not fitting] to say: Just as she was saved, he was saved.
Halacha 7
If an epidemic was raging throughout the world, and [a woman] says, "My husband died," her word is accepted.14 For [there is no widely accepted likelihood] with regard to a plague; everyone knows that in a time of plague some die and some live. And it is possible that strong young men will die from the plague, and elderly infirm people will be saved. And therefore, we do not suspect that she relied on the likelihood that most people died.
Halacha 8
It has already been stated15 that a witness who [did not see evidence of the person's death himself, but who] testifies after hearing the statements of another person is acceptable with regard to [the verification of the death of] a woman's [husband].
When does this apply? When the person heard a mentally competent adult - even a servant or a maid -servant - say that so and so died. If, however, a person heard from a mentally incompetent person or from a minor16 that an individual died, he may not testify [to that effect], nor do we rely on their statements.
Halacha 9
[There is an exception to the above principle.] If a person heard children saying: "We just came from so and so's funeral. These and these many people recited eulogies. The sage so and so and these and these others followed the bier. A nd this and this is what happened to the bier,"17 the person may offer this as testimony [regarding a man's death], and on this basis permission is granted for [the deceased's] wife to remarry.
Halacha 10
When a Jew says, "I killed so and so," [the man's wife] is allowed to remarry on the basis of his testimony. [The rationale is] a person's own testimony cannot be used to incriminate him. [Therefore, he is not disqualified, and] he did testify that [the husband] died.18
Halacha 11
It has already been stated19 that statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation can be used as a basis to grant [a woman] permission to remarry.
What is implied? If a gentile exclaimed: "How terrible is it that so and so died! He was so nice! He did so much for me!" Or if the gentile was talking and said, "We were traveling on our way, and to our amazement, so and so who was traveling with us fell down and died. We all were amazed that he died so suddenly." If he makes statements of this nature that indicate that he has no intention of giving testimony,20 his word is accepted.
Halacha 12
When a Jew hears a gentile [say] in the course of conversation [that a man died], he may testify that he heard these statements, and the man's wife may be granted permission to remarry on this basis.
When does the above apply? When there is no rationale to explain [why the gentile would make these statements if they were not true]. If, however, there could be a reason for the gentile's statements, and he is making them with another intent in mind [his word is not accepted].
For example, [a gentile] told a Jew, "Do such and such for me, or else I will kill you, as I killed so and so,"21 he is not making these statements in the course of conversation, for his intent is to cast fear upon his listener.
Halacha 13
Similarly, if a person heard the gentile legal authorities say, "We executed so and so," their word is not accepted.22 For they will use falsehood to reinforce their position and to cast fear [among the populace]. The same applies in all similar instances.
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
It has already been stated25 that a witness who testifies: "I heard that so and so died,"26 is acceptable with regard to testimony [concerning] a woman's [husband], and the woman may remarry on this basis. [This applies even when] he heard the statements from a woman or from a servant.
If, however, a witness, a woman or a servant says: "So and so died; I saw that he died," the witness should be asked:27 "What did you see? How do you know that he died? " If the witness responds with clear [testimony], his word is accepted. If the witness replies, describing a situation in which it is highly likely that the person would have died, we do not grant his wife license to remarry. For testimony concerning a man's death [can be accepted] only when [the witness can say] with certainty that he saw the man die, and there is no doubt concerning the matter.
Halacha 16
What is implied? If a man was seen falling into the sea, even if he fell into the ocean, testimony should not be offered that the man died, because it is possible that he was cast away or escaped [from the sea] from an [unseen] place.28
If he fell into a body of water with definite boundaries - e.g., a cistern or a cavern in which a person standing [at the edge] could see the entire periphery - testimony that the man died may be offered, and license may be granted for his wife to remarry, provided [the witnesses] remained there for a period of time beyond which it was impossible for the man to live,29 and saw that he did not ascend [from the body of water].
Halacha 17
If [a man] fell into a lair of lions, leopards or the like, testimony that he died may not be offered,32 for it is possible that they will not eat him. If he fell into a pit of snakes and scorpions,33 into a furnace,34 or into a boiling caldron filled with wine or oil,35 or his esophagus and windpipe were slit - either in their majority36 or in their entirety - testimony may be offered that he died, even if he arose and fled. For [in these situations], he ultimately will die.
Similar laws apply in all situations in which it is impossible that the person will live, but rather will die shortly afterwards. Testimony may be offered that he [died].
Halacha 18
If we see a man hanging37 and a vulture eating from his body, testimony may not be offered that he died. [This applies] even if he was stabbed with a lance, or arrows were shot at him.38
If, however, we see the vulture eating from a place that would cause him to die - e.g., his brain, his heart or his intestines, one may offer testimony that he died.
Halacha 19
[The following laws apply when] one witness testifies, "I saw that he died in a war or in a landslide, or that he drowned in the ocean39 and died," or mentioned other causes that would probably lead to death. If he says, "I buried him," his statements are accepted,40 and she may be granted permission to remarry. If he did not say, "I buried him," she should not be granted permission to remarry. If, however, she remarries, she need not leave [her second husband].41
Halacha 20
Similarly, if one witness42 testifies that a woman's husband drowned in the sea or in a body of water that does not have a defined periphery, he did not emerge [from the water], all traces of him have disappeared,43 and his existence has been forgotten, the woman should not [be granted license to] remarry on this basis, as we have explained.44
If, however, she remarries,45 she need not be forced to leave her second husband. Even if a gentile said in the course of conversation, "So and so drowned at sea," and on this basis [the man's wife] remarried, she need not be forced to leave her second husband. Nevertheless, [in the above instances,] the sage who gave permission for her to remarry should be placed under a ban of ostracism.46
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when the body of a man who was] slain or died of natural causes is discovered. If his forehead, his nose and his facial features are intact, and his identity can be established based on them,47 testimony concerning his death may be offered.
If, however, any of these identifying factors is missing, even if there are signs [through which he can be identified]48 on his body and on his personal artifacts,49 even if one of those signs is a mole,50 testimony concerning his death should not be offered.
When does [the leniency mentioned in the first clause] apply? When the corpse was seen within three days of his murder or death. After three days have passed, testimony concerning his death should not be offered, because his facial features [may have] become distorted.51
Halacha 22
[The following rules apply when a man] drowned at sea and was cast out onto dry land. Although several days have passed, if his facial features and his nose can be identified,52 testimony may be offered with regard to his [death], for in water the features of a corpse do not become distorted until an extremely long period of time has passed.53
If the corpse lay on dry land for twelve hours54 after being cast out of the sea and the corpse became bloated,55 testimony may not be offered because [his features] have been distorted.56 When we look at the form [of a corpse] in order to identify [a man] to offer testimony with regard to his [death], [it is acceptable if] we look at [the corpse] even by candlelight or by moonlight.57
Halacha 23
[The following rule applies when] we see a person at a distance and he says that he is so and so, the son of so and so, or so and so from a particular place,58 and that he has been bitten by a snake and is dying. Even if we go [to the place where he was standing], find [the corpse and discover] that its features have changed to the extent that it is no longer distinguishable, we may, nevertheless, [grant license for] his wife [to] remarry.59
Halacha 24
[A person's testimony is effective in the following instance.] A person came and said: "A court - or people - told me, when you arrive at this and this place,60 tell them that Yitzchak, the son of Michael, died." When this person came to that place and delivered the message - although he is not aware of the identity [of the deceased] - since [the people at that place] do know his identity, [the deceased's] wife [may be granted] permission [to remarry]. We do not presume that perhaps it was another person named Yitzchak, the son of Michael, who died.61
Halacha 25
When a Jew and a gentile left from our [location] for a different destination, and the gentile came and said in the course of conversation: "The man who left [this city] with me died," [the deceased's] wife [may be granted license to] remarry. [This applies] even when the gentile does not know the identity of the man, provided he says: "I buried him."62
Halacha 26
Similarly, when ten men were taken together while shackled in chains or tied by heavy ropes used to lead camels63 or the like,64 from one place to another,65 and a gentile came and said in the course of conversation that all ten men who went out while tied died, and he buried them,66 their wives [may be granted license to] remarry.
Halacha 27
If a Jew says: "A Jewish man died in our company in this and this place. These and these were his facial features. These and these were signs of identification," we do not make a guess and say that it was probably so and so.67 Rather [the person is not considered to have died] until a witness mentions his name and the name of his city.68
Halacha 28
[The following rule applies if] a document was found saying: "So and so, the son of so and so, died," or "So and so, the son of so and so, was killed": If it can be determined that this was written71 by a Jew,72 [the man's] wife [may be given permission to] marry.73
Similarly, when a person has lost the power of speech, and he was tested, as he would be tested with regard to a get,74 and it is proven that he is mentally sound, if he writes that so and so died, we may rely on his writing, and [the deceased's] wife [may be given permission to] marry.75
We do not follow the standard process of interrogation76 with regard to witnesses who testify [concerning the death of] a woman's [husband]. For our Sages did not speak about establishing stringencies regarding such matters. [Indeed, their approach was characterized by] leniency in order to permit a woman without a husband [to remarry].77
Halacha 29
Do not wonder at the fact that our Sages discharged78 the prohibition [against a married woman], which is considered a very severe matter, on the basis of the testimony of a woman, a servant or a maidservant, statements made by a gentile in the course of conversation, a written statement or [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation, as we have explained.
[These leniencies were instituted] because the Torah requires only testimony of two witnesses, and all the other details of the laws of witnesses with regard to matters that cannot be verified definitively except via witnesses and their testimony - e.g., that one person killed another, or that one person lent money to another. When, by contrast, the matter may be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true - e.g, when one testifies that a person died,79 the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely.80
For this reason, our Sages [extended] the leniency with regard to this matter and accepted the testimony of a single witness that is based on the testimony of a maidservant, [testimony] from a written document, and [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation. [These leniencies were accepted] so that the daughters of Israel will not be forced to remain unmarried.
Blessed be the Merciful One, who grants assistance.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Note the ruling of the Chelkat Mechokek17:93, who explains that the Rambam's decision applies only in an instance where the woman has already made false statements in the presence of a court. The fact that a couple constantly quarrel is not considered serious enough to warrant the stringencies mentioned in this halachah.
2.
And so, the couple were forced to remain married. Chapter 12, Halachah 15 describes a situation when a man disappears "when their relationship is peaceful, and peace prevails in the world at large." All the laws that follow in that chapter deal with such situations. This chapter describes situations where these conditions do not prevail, and hence more stringent laws apply.
3.
I.e., the stringencies apply even where peace prevails in the world at large, because of the strife that exists between the couple.
4.
Yevamot 116a records a difference of opinion between the Sages regarding the rationale for this ruling. Rav Chananiah states that the reason is that we suspect that the woman is lying. Rav Simi bar Ashi states that we suspect that in an instance where her husband appears to be dying, the woman will not be careful and will conclude that he died, even though he remained alive.
The Rambam's citation of the first opinion in this halachah represents a reversal of his thinking. For in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Yevamot 15:1), he mentions the latter view.
According to the Rambam's opinion stated here, even if the woman says that she buried her husband, her word is not accepted (Hagahot Maimoniot; Ramah,Even HaEzer 17:48).
5.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that this issue is left unresolved by Yevamot 116b, and therefore, the Rambam chooses the more stringent view. The Maggid Mishnehquestions why the Rambam ignores the rationale given by the Talmud - that in most cases, a woman who is granted permission on the basis of the testimony of one witness is careful and thoroughly investigates the matter before she marries, but in this instance, because of her hatred of her husband, she will not make such an investigation - and offers another rationale that is not mentioned there.
Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi (in a responsum quoted by the Kessef Mishneh) offers a resolution to this matter, explaining that the Rambam accepts the testimony of a single witness in such instances without question, because we assume that a person will not lie in an instance where the truth will shortly be revealed. (See the notes at the conclusion of this chapter.) Nevertheless, since the question is left unresolved by our Sages, and a very severe matter is involved, the Rambam does not desire to offer a leniency that was not accepted by our Sages. Therefore, he offers a different rationale, even though it was not mentioned in the Talmud.
On the basis of this explanation, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi explains that if a witness comes to the court on his own initiative, the woman is granted license to remarry even when differences existed between her and her husband previously. The Chelkat Mechokek17:95, however, states that this leniency is not accepted by the latter authorities.
6.
If, however, the woman says that her husband died near the battlefront, but not in battle, her word is accepted (Ramah, Even HaEzer 17:48).
7.
There is a slight difficulty with the Rambam's ruling, because the rationale that the Rambam mentioned previously - that she suspects that her husband died, and because of the high likelihood is willing to make such statements even though she has no definite knowledge - seemingly does not apply when the woman says: "I buried him." For if a person is buried, he is definitely dead.
[For this reason, the Rashba - and his opinion is quoted as a minority view by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:48) - rules that if the woman says that she buried her husband, her word is accepted.]
In the responsum of Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi quoted by the Kessef Mishneh, it is explained that the woman will be afraid to tarry on a battlefield and bury her husband. Nevertheless, since she is certain that he died, she will exaggerate and say that she buried him, although she did not. Alternatively, the Levush states that we suspect that the fear and confusion of wartime is so great that she may have in fact buried a man, but she might have mistaken another man for her husband.
8.
I.e., although war was raging nearby, her husband was not involved in the war and died at home. Her word is accepted, because we do not suspect that she will intentionally lie. And at home, away from the battlefront, she will know for certain whether or not her husband died.
9.
On the one hand, if the woman desired to lie, she could have offered a better lie and not mentioned the war at all (miggo). Nevertheless, when a woman says that her husband died in a war, our suspicion is that she erred and thought her husband died, even when he did not. Therefore, at the outset, she should not be granted permission to marry. If, however, she does marry, since there are grounds to believe her statement, we do not force her to leave her second husband.
The Rambam's ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:49). The Ramah, however, follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that if the woman marries, she should be forced to leave her second husband.
10.
If, however, the woman says that her husband died in bed at those times, her word is accepted. If she says that he died in a landslide or was bitten by a swarming mass of snakes, and she buried him, according to the Rambam her word is not accepted. According to the Rashba, her word is accepted if she says that she buried him [Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Even HaEzer17:51)].
11.
This law applies even if she says that he died on his bed (Ramah, Even HaEzer17:53). We fear that she left her husband sick, without any source of nurture, and assumed that he died without knowing for certain (Yevamot 114b).
12.
In the previous instance, we do not fear that she is lying, but rather merely exaggerating and relying on the likelihood that he died. We do not, however, fear that she would exaggerate and say that she buried him if it were not true.
The woman's word is accepted with regard to a famine, while it is not with regard to war, because of the obvious difference between the two instances. In wartime, there is an immediate danger and everyone is worried about saving his own life (Ibid.).
13.
Rashi (Yevamot 115a, Avodah Zarah 25b) states that the attackers will keep the woman alive in order to rape her. Tosafot(Avodah Zarah 25b) explains that a woman is not considered likely to fight back, and her physical weakness arouses mercy. Therefore, she is left alive.
14.
Rabbenu Asher rules that the woman's word is not accepted. Rabbenu Nissim, moreover, maintains that that is the proper reading in the Mishneh Torah. Our translation follows the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah and the authoritative manuscripts most widely available.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:55) states that the woman's word is accepted, while the Ramah quotes Rabbenu Asher's view.
15.
Chapter 12, Halachah 15.
16.
On the basis of Hilchot Yibbum 4:31, the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 17) and others explain that here the Rambam is talking about a minor who is not intellectually mature. The testimony of a minor who is intellectually mature is accepted (see the following halachah). In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:13), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam's wording exactly. The Turei Zahav 17:9 and the Beit Shmuel 17:33, however, make the above distinction.
17.
Yevamot 121b explains that all these details are necessary, because it is possible that the children are play-acting and buried an insect that they called by the person's name. If, however, their statements reflect sufficient details to indicate that the funeral actually took place, they may serve as the basis for license to be granted a woman to remarry.
18.
This is one of the classic examples of the principle palginin diburo, "we divide his statement." I.e., we accept his word with regard to the fact that so and so died. We discard the portion of his statement in which he said that he himself killed him.
If we accepted that aspect of the statement as well, he would no longer be acceptable as a witness. For his deed would cause him to be disqualified on the basis of Scriptural law. (See also Hilchot Edut 12:2.)
19.
Chapter 12, Halachah 16.
20.
If the gentile is making these statements with the intent that attention be paid to them, there is reason to suspect that perhaps he intends to create legal problems for a Jewish person. If, however, he makes statements casually, in the course of conversation, we do not suspect that a gentile will desire to cause problems for a Jew (Beit Shmuel17:38).
As reflected in the halachot that follow, we do fear that a gentile may lie, if doing so will enhance his position, and we fear that he will rush to the conclusion that a man died when he is in fact alive.
21.
If, however, a gentile says: "I killed so and so," without any apparent intent to cast fear upon his listeners, the deceased's wife is allowed to remarry (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 17:7).
22.
If, however, other gentiles relate in the course of conversation that a Jew was killed by gentile legal authorities, their word is accepted (Ramah, Even HaEzer 17:14). As indicated by the Ramah, there is a difference of opinion whether it is acceptable if gentile legal authorities report that a person was executed, but do not say that they performed the execution.
If gentile government authorities report that a person has died or been killed (but not executed by a court of law), their statements are accepted by many halachic authorities. A distinction should be made between the government authorities in democratic countries where freedom of speech prevails, and totalitarian governments that act arbitrarily without consideration of the populace.
23.
The Chelkat Mechokek 17:29 states that this law applies even in instances where the gentile's original statements were not sufficient to serve as a basis for remarriage.
24.
If, however, the gentile was asked direct questions first, and then in the course of conversation said that a man died, his word is not accepted (Ramah, Even HaEzer17:15).
25.
Chapter 12, Halachah 15.
26.
I.e., as reflected by the second half of the halachah, this applies if the witness does not know any details of the person's death at all. Since we do not know any details of the situation, we assume that his statements are true. When, however, the situation can be investigated, the court is obligated to do so.
This is the subject of the remainder of the chapter and also the concern of many of the responsa issued by our Sages concerning this issue throughout the generations. For quite often, the evidence of a man's death and the identification of his corpse were only partial, and the Rabbis had to clarify whether the testimony was sufficient to serve as grounds for his wife to remarry.
27.
As stated in Halachah 28, the formal process with which witnesses are questioned is not employed with regard to testimony of this nature. Nevertheless, enquiry should be made lest the witness had erred and made his statements on the basis of likelihood and not actual fact.
28.
The commentaries explain that according to Scriptural law, the man is considered to be dead. Nevertheless, our Sages enforced stringencies and forbade a woman from remarrying in such an instance. (See Halachah 20.)
29.
The Pitchei Teshuvah 17:134 quotes many classical commentaries that maintain (based on Yevamot 121a) that this duration of time is considered to be three hours. Nevertheless, the later commentaries are more lenient and consider a far shorter period to be sufficient.
30.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that this applies only when the man was tied to a rope or chain when cast into the water, and then a limb was lifted out, or if the limb was lifted up in a net afterwards, and it could definitely be identified as the man's. When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:32) incorporates these concepts.
31.
In this instance as well, the Maggid Mishnehquotes the Rashba as stating that even when our Sages stated that a person could not live without a particular limb, they did not intend that he would necessarily die immediately, and it is possible that the person could live for twelve months. Therefore, even when such a limb is discovered, the woman is required to wait twelve months before remarrying. TheShulchan Aruch (ibid.) incorporates these concepts into its restatement of the law.
32.
In this instance, however, the Rambam states that the likelihood that the man died is so great that his heirs may take possession of his inheritance (Hilchot Nachalot 7:3).
33.
Based on Yevamot 121a, the Kessef Mishneh explains the difference between a lion's lair and a pit of snakes as follows: A lion's lair is usually wide, and so the person will not necessarily provoke the lions. A pit of snakes is small, and the man will step on the snakes, and this will provoke them. Tosafotadds that we do not say that perhaps a miracle occurred to him as occurred to Daniel.
34.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that this applies only when the furnace is so deep that he cannot emerge from it. This qualification is quoted by the later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 17:57;Beit Shmuel 17:92).
35.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that the same laws apply with regard to a caldron of water. When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:30) incorporates these concepts.
36.
For once the majority of these organs are slit, we can be certain that the person will die.
37.
The Hebrew word צלוב is translated both as crucified (the method of execution often used by the Romans in the Talmudic period) and as hung. We have chosen the latter term to emphasize the rulings of the later halachic authorities. The Bayit Chadash(Even HaEzer 17) rules that if a person is seen hanging, testimony concerning his death may be offered. The Chelkat Mechokek 17:58 and the Beit Shmuel 17:94 dispute this and cite instances in which a person who had been hanged was subsequently rescued.
38.
If, however, he was stabbed or shot in a place that would kill him, testimony that he died may be offered (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 17; Beit Shmuel 17:94).
39.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an instance where the person remained there and watched for an amount of time sufficient for a person to die without seeing the person emerge from the water. This is substantiated by the later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 17:61). If the witness does not observe the sea, watching for the person to emerge for that length of time, more stringent rules apply.
40.
By saying he buried the deceased, the witness erases any questions of doubt that might exist regarding whether or not the person actually died. Alternatively, because he buried him, he will have seen his features closely and will not mistakenly identify him.
As stated in Halachah 3, the testimony of a woman who says that her husband died at war is not accepted, even if she says that she buried him. The commentaries, however, differentiate between the two instances, explaining that since the woman's husband is involved, she will be more emotionally upset and less objective. Hence, it is more likely that she would mistake the deceased's identity.
Alternatively, she desires to remarry, and thus she will stretch the truth slightly to be granted that license, while an outsider will not take such liberties.
With regard to the concept of burial in relation to a person who drowned, there are three opinions mentioned by the Rabbis:
a) The Kessef Mishneh states that if the witness sees that the person did not emerge after waiting the length of time in which one would ordinarily drown, he did not have to bury the deceased in order to testify. (Kin'at Eliyahu notes that this interpretation makes the following halachah appear slightly redundant.)
b) The Chelkat Mechokek 17:62 states that the intent was that we saw the corpse after it was taken out from the water.
c) The Noda BiY'hudah (Volume I, Even HaEzer, Responsum 28) states that the intent is that the drowned man was actually buried. For there are times when a person is taken out of the sea and presumed dead, and then is revived afterwards.
41.
Yevamot 115a states that the question in this instance is whether the testimony of one witness is accepted, because the matter will surely be revealed in the near future - in which case the woman would be permitted to remarry - or because we rely on the fact that the woman will carefully investigate the matter before she remarries, and in this instance, since it is highly likely that her husband died, she will rely on the likelihood and not make a thorough investigation. Therefore, she should not be granted permission to remarry. Since the question is left unresolved, the ruling given by the Rambam applies.
In the responsum quoted by the Kessef Mishneh, Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi explains that - as reflected by the concluding halachah of this chapter - the Rambam maintains that the testimony of one witness is accepted, because the matter will surely be revealed in the near future. Nevertheless, he still maintains that, at the outset, the woman should not be granted permission to remarry, because in these situations it is possible for a person to think that a man has died, even though he is actually alive.
42.
The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that the same ruling is given even if two or more witnesses offer the same testimony. As long as a body of water does not have a defined periphery, these laws apply.
43.
This also reinforces the presumption that he died, for if he had remained alive, most likely he would have returned home or divulged his identity in another manner.
44.
Halachah 16. Note also the Rambam's comments in Hilchot Nachalot 7:3:
When a man drowned in water that does not have a defined periphery, witnesses [testify] that they saw him drown, and all traces of him have disappeared, his heirs may take possession of his estate, despite the fact that a priori, his wife is not granted permission to remarry.The reason stringency was taken in these matters is [the severity of] a prohibition punishable by karet. But with regard to financial matters, if witnesses testify concerning an instance in which we can assume that the man died..., all traces of him have disappeared, and we have heard that he died, the heirs may take possession of his estate.
45.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:34) states that this applies only when the woman remarried after receiving license from a Rabbinic authority. If she remarried on her own initiative without consulting an authority, she should be forced to leave her second husband.
46.
This applies only when the sage issued this ruling knowingly. If, however, he issued the ruling in error, he is not censured in this manner (Chelkat Mechokek 17:64, based onYevamot 121a).
47.
Yevamot 120a quotes Isaiah 3:9: "The recognition of their countenance testifies against them," as support for this concept.
48.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh differentiate among three types of signs: a) simanim g'ru'im, signs that are not definitive, b) simanim muvhakim, signs that are definitive, c) simanim muvhakim b'yoter, signs that are extremely definitive.
Signs that are not definitive are never effective means of identification. Signs that are definitive are effective with regard to the identification of lost objects and other questions of monetary law, as stated inHilchot Gezelah Va'Avedah 13:3-5. They are not, as stated in this halachah, effective with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:3.) Signs that are extremely definitive - e.g., a get has a hole next to a particular letter, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 11 - may be relied upon with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce.
Similarly, if there is an extremely definitive sign on a corpse, it may be used as evidence to identify the body. These distinctions are also reflected in the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 17:24).
49.
With regard to personal artifacts, there is a further problem. Even if there are very distinctive signs on these articles, they cannot serve as a means of identification, because it is possible that they were lost or stolen and taken by another man. SeeShulchan Aruch (op. cit.).
50.
There are opinions that maintain that if the person can pinpoint exactly the place of the mole, it may be used as a sign of identification (Beit Shmuel 17:71).
51.
I.e., even if the witnesses think that they can identify the corpse, their testimony cannot be relied on, because the person's facial features may have been distorted.
52.
Yevamot 121a explains that lying in water generally causes the flesh of a corpse to shrink, and the person's features remain distinct.
53.
Yevamot, ibid., mentions a corpse being identified after being in the Jordan River for 17 days.
54.
Once a corpse that has been lying in the water is brought to dry land, its features will begin to lose their distinctive qualities rapidly.
There are several different versions of this halachah. We have chosen to follow the standard printed text in our translation. TheKessef Mishneh states that the proper version should be "if the corpse lies on dry land for hours" - i.e., it need not be identified immediately, but it cannot wait any significant period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer17:26) states that the body must be identified immediately after it emerges onto dry land. The Beit Shmuel 17:80, however, mentions that an interval of an hour is granted.
55.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam's statement of this law is conditional, "If the... corpse became bloated," implying that if we see that the corpse has not become bloated, we may identify it. The Rashba, by contrast, states we suspect that the facial features of a corpse will become distorted after a brief amount of time, and does not allow room for leniency.
Even according to this conception, leniency has been granted by the later authorities when a corpse was removed frozen from a river, and it took several hours to thaw.
56.
In restating this law, there are several points mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.): a) the corpse may not have a wound. If the body was wounded, we fear that its features will be distorted; b) even if it is less than three days after the deceased's passing, if his corpse lay in water for a significant period, it must be identified directly after its discovery.
The Ramah adds that extremely distinctive signs may be used as a means of identification even though the body has lain on dry land for a long period.
57.
Although these sources of light are not overly bright, our Sages felt that they were sufficient to enable a person to identify a corpse. There is no need to wait until daylight.
58.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 17) states that the person must mention both these factors: his father's name and his city. The Beit Shmuel17:66 states that, although in general one of these means of identification would have been sufficient, both are necessary because the person's facial features have changed. The Chelkat Mechokek 17:40, however, states that when it is obvious that the person knows the place from which the person came, the ruling of the Rambam and theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:23) may be followed, and only one factor need be mentioned. This is also borne out by the following halachah and its source inYevamot 115b.
59.
I.e., we do not assume that the person was lying, but instead suppose that the poison caused his features to change (Meiri).
Yevamot 122a, the source for this halachah, mentions that perhaps the statements were made by a demon. The Rambam, however, does not mention this possibility, in keeping with his conception (see The Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 46), that demons are not a relevant halachic phenomenon.
60.
I.e., he was informing the Rabbinical court of that city that one of the Jewish inhabitants had died (Kessef Mishneh).
61.
The Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishnehmention that this principle applies only when we do not know of another person in the city with that name, or we know that this other person is still alive. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 17:18) incorporates these additions into its statement of this law.
62.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's ruling is that when a gentile knows the name of a Jew, it is unnecessary for him to say that he buried him, when relating that he died. If, however, the gentile did not know the identity of the Jew, it is necessary for him to say that he buried him.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 17) and other authorities do not agree with the Rambam with regard to this point and maintain that the gentile's statements are accepted even when he does not say that he buried the Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer17:17) mentions both opinions, but appears to favor the latter view.
63.
Our translation is based on the gloss of Rav Kapach, who cites a similar interpretation mentioned by the Razeh.
64.
From the Rambam's words, it appears that the men must be tied together. Otherwise, we suspect that one of them left and was replaced by another. In his commentary on the source for this law (Yevamot 122a), Rashi does not share this conception and maintains that the number of men itself is sufficient to serve as identification.
65.
The Noda BiY'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 36) notes that the Rambam requires that a) a specific number of men were mentioned, b) that their starting point and destination were mentioned, and c) that they were chained together.
The Noda BiY'hudah questions these requirements, because the standard text ofYevamot 122a (the Rambam's source) mentions two stories: one of men traveling in chains and one of sixty men traveling to Betar. The Rambam appears to have fused the two stories together, adopting the requirements mentioned by both and thus being more stringent than his source.
The Noda BiY'hudah reconciles this difficulty by referring to the statement of these incidents in Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi'sHalachot, which follows a different version from our text of Yevamot. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi mentions "two men traveling in chains to Antioch." Since the Rambam was a student of one of the disciples of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, it is likely that the Rambam also had the same version of this passage.
66.
Here too, the Rambam is referring to an instance in which the gentile did not know the identity of the people who died. (See the notes on the previous halachah.)
67.
This applies even if the person is missing, and there are no traces of him left.
68.
According to the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, alternatively, a person's name and his father's name.
69.
Our wording is based on the gloss of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:19), who states that this law applies even if the report is given by a gentile in the course of conversation.
70.
In this instance as well, the name of the deceased is not mentioned.
71.
The Maggid Mishnehates that the note must also be signed, andwe must see that the signature was written by a Jew. The signature need not, however, be verified. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 17:11 and commentaries.)
72.
Regardless of the language in which the note was written, if it was written by a Jew, it is acceptable. If, however, it was written by a gentile, it is not acceptable even if it is written in Hebrew. For a gentile's statements are acceptable only when made in the course of conversation (Maggid Mishneh).
In his Bedek HaBayit (Even HaEzer 17), Rav Yosef Karo asks why a statement written by a gentile in the course of conversation is not effective. And in hisShulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), he rules that it is.
73.
This is a leniency accepted in order to allow a woman to remarry. Generally, testimony must be given verbally and not in writing. (See Hilchot Edut 3:4.)
74.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 16.
75.
See Hilchot Edut 9:11, which explains that such testimony is ordinarily not accepted by a Rabbinic court. An exception is made in this instance in order to allow a woman to remarry.
76.
Which includes questions defining the exact time and place of the event. (See Hilchot Edut 1:4.)
77.
Moreover, even if slight contradictions arise regarding minor points of the testimony of two witnesses, the testimony is nevertheless accepted (Shulchan Aruch,Even HaEzer 17:21).
In one of his responsa (quoted by the Ramah, op. cit.), the Rambam writes: "Whoever is stringent and interrogates witnesses exactingly is not conducting himself properly, and his approach does not find favor in the eyes of our Sages." The Ramah, however, continues that if testimony appears contrived to the court, they must thoroughly investigate the matter.
78.
I.e., these are leniencies that our Sages instituted. The acceptance of the testimony of one witness, by contrast, is a leniency implied by Scriptural law.
This follows the interpretation of the Rambam's statements here by the Noda BiY'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33). There is, however, an apparent contradiction based on the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Edut 5:2.
79.
I.e., if the man presumed dead returns, it will be obvious that the witness lied.
80.
See similar statements in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 3:14 and Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:31.
The Ra'avad and others note that our Sages (Yevamot 93b, 115a) mention two rationales why a woman should be permitted to remarry, the one cited by the Rambam and also because of the severe consequences that she will bring upon herself if her husband is found alive (see Chapter 10, Halachah 7), a woman will investigate the matter thoroughly and will not remarry unless she is certain that he has actually died. The Talmud appears to imply that these rationales are contradictory and cites cases in which one would apply, but not the other.
The Noda BiY'hudah (loc. cit.) explains that the Rambam sees the two rationales as complementary. Ordinarily, when a matter can easily be verified - e.g., a question of whether or not chalitzah was performed - the statement of one witness is acceptable without question. In this instance, however, it is not always easy to verify whether in fact the man died, and therefore the rationale that the woman must investigate the matter is necessary. For this reason, in all the instances where the Talmud implies that one rationale would conflict with another, the Rambam reaches a conclusion that takes both rationales into consideration.
Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter One
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment1 of Scriptural law for a man to marry the widow of his paternal2 brother if he died without leaving children, as [Deuteronomy 25:5] states: "[And one of them dies] childless,... her husband's brother should cohabit with her." [This applies to a widow] from nisu'in, or from erusin.
[The childless widow is referred to as a yevamah; the rite through which they marry, yibbum.]
Scriptural law does not require a man to consecrate his yevamah, for she is his wife that heaven acquired for him. [All that is necessary] is that he cohabit with her. Her deceased husband's estate is responsible for her marriage contract.3
Halacha 2
If the yavam does not want to perform the rite of yibbum, or if the woman does not consent,4 he should [free her from this obligation through the rite of]chalitzah. [Only] afterwards is she permitted to marry another man.
It is a positive commandment5 of Scriptural law for [a brother] to performchalitzah for [the deceased's widow], if he does not want to perform the rite ofyibbum, as [Deuteronomy 25:9] states: "She shall... remove his shoe."6
The mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah.7
Halacha 3
The Torah's words [Deuteronomy 25:5], "When one of them dies childless" [should not be interpreted narrowly].8 [When the deceased] has a son, a daughter, a descendant of a son, or a descendant of a daughter, as long as he has left progeny9 - whether from the woman [to whom he is presently married] or from another woman, his wife is free from the obligation ofchalitzah or yibbum.
Even if he has a descendant who is illegitimate or an idolater, [that descendant] frees [the deceased's] wife from the obligation of chalitzah oryibbum.
Halacha 4
[The above applies to children born from a Jewish woman.] If, however, [a deceased man] has a child born from a maidservant or a gentile woman, his wife is not free of these obligations. For the offspring of a maidservant are servants. And the offspring of a gentile woman are gentiles, and considered as if they have no connection to him.
[These concepts are derived as follows:] With regard to a maidservant, [Exodus 21:4] states: "The woman and her children will belong to her master," teaching that her offspring have the same status as she.10 And with regard to a gentile woman, [Deuteronomy 7:4] states: "They will lead your son away from Me" - i.e., prevent him from being considered part of the congregation.
Even when a man's son born from a maidservant is freed, or his son born from a gentile woman converts, he is regarded in the same way as other converts or freed slaves and does not cause [the deceased's] wife to be freed [from the obligation of yibbum]. [Even when a man] fathered a son with a maidservant, freed the son and the mother, and married her - if he dies without fathering any other children, his wife should perform the rite of yibbum with his brother, although the son [whom the deceased] fathered is alive and has been freed.11
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when a man] dies and leaves his wife pregnant: If she miscarries after he dies, his wife [is obligated to] perform the rite ofyibbum. If she bore the child, and the fetus emerged into the world alive, the mother is free of the obligation to perform the rite of chalitzah or yibbum. This applies even when the child dies immediately after being born.
According to Rabbinic decree, however, [this does not apply] unless it is known that the child was carried for a full term pregnancy and was born after nine full months had passed.12 If, however, the term of the pregnancy is unknown [the following rules apply]: If the child lives 30 days, the child is considered viable, and he frees his father's wives from the obligation ofyibbum or chalitzah.
If the child dies within 30 days [of his birth], even on the thirtieth day, there is a doubt whether the child is viable or non-viable. This applies regardless of [the cause of the infant's death], whether he died as a result of illness, fell from a roof or was eaten by a lion. According to Rabbinic law, [the deceased's wives] must perform the rite of chalitzah;13 they may not perform the rite of yibbum.14
Halacha 6
Whenever a man has a brother, even if the brother is illegitimate or an idolater, whether he is above the age of majority or below the age of majority,15 as long as his head and the majority [of his body]16 emerged into the world before his brother's death,17 his existence causes [his brother's wife] to be obligated to perform the rite of yibbum.18
If [the deceased] had a brother who was born to a maidservant or to a gentile woman, he is not considered to be his brother in any [halachic] context. [His existence] does not cause [his brother's wife] to be obligated to perform the rite of yibbum. Even when [the brother] was born as a member of the Jewish people,19 since his mother was not Jewish when he was conceived, he is not considered to be [the deceased's] brother.
Halacha 7
Halacha 8
There is no concept of fraternity among converts and freed slaves. [Thus, even two converts or two freed slaves born from the same father] are considered unrelated.24 Even if one of them was conceived before his parents were converted and born after they were converted, and the other was conceived and born after the parents were converted, they are not considered to have any family connection.
Even if they are twins who were born after their parents were converted, they are not considered to be brothers25 unless they were also conceived after their parents converted.
Halacha 9
When a man who has many wives dies, [a brother who] engages in relations or performes the rite of chalitzah with one of them frees the others from all obligations. [The deceased's brother] may not marry two [of the deceased's wives], as [implied by Deuteronomy 25:9]: "...who did not build his brother's house." [This is interpreted as an exclusion:] he may build one house, but not two houses.26
Similarly, if [the deceased had many brothers, one of them should perform either the rite of chalitzah or yibbum with one of the widows. This frees the others of all obligations.
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply if] the widows include some who are fit to marry into the priesthood, and some who are not fit to marry into the priesthood: If [the brother] desires to perform the rite of yibbum, he may choose any of the widows that he desires. If he desires to perform the rite of chalitzah, he should perform this rite with one of the wives who is already forbidden to the priesthood, so that he will not disqualify one of the women who may marry into the priesthood through the rite of chalitzah.27
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply if] many [of a man's] brothers die and he [becomes obligated to perform the rite of yibbum or chalitzah] to [all] their wives: If it is possible for him to perform the rite of yibbum with all of them,28 he should. If not, he may perform chalitzah with all of them, or perform chalitzah with whomever he desires, or perform yibbum with whomever he desires, [choosing one of the widows] from each [of his deceased brother's] households.
Halacha 12
When [a yavam] marries a yevamah, all the other widows from that household become forbidden to him and to his other brothers. If he or his other brothers have relations with one of the other widows, they transgress a positive commandment, for [Deuteronomy 25:9] states: "Her yavam will engage in relations with her." [This is interpreted to mean:] With her, and not with another woman from that household. A prohibition stemming from a positive commandment is considered to be a positive commandment.29
Similarly, when [one of the brothers] performs chalitzah with his yevamah, the woman with whom chalitzah was performed and all the other widows from that household become forbidden to [the brother who] performed chalitzah and to the other brothers. They are all forbidden to the brothers by Rabbinic decree,30 sharing the status of sh'niyot.31 [This is the only prohibition involved,] for since their brother died childless, the severe prohibition against sexual relations (issur ervah) is removed. Therefore, [if one of the brothers consecrates such a woman,] the consecration is binding, as it would be be if he consecrated one of the sh'niyot.
Halacha 13
When a person performs the rite of chalitzah with his yevamah, not only does she become forbidden to him, but her relatives32 - e.g., her mother and her daughter - also become forbidden. Similarly, she is forbidden to marry his son and his brother.33 Even the sh'niyot - e.g., her daughter's granddaughter - related to her are forbidden to him, and she is forbidden to his son's grandson. To summarize: Her status is like that of a divorced wife.
Similarly, if his yevamah dies while she is still under obligation to him,34 he is forbidden to marry these relatives of hers, as if she were his wife and she died in his lifetime.35 All these prohibitions are of Rabbinic origin.
[If the deceased had two wives, his brother] may marry the sister of the wife with whom he did not perform the rite of chalitzah, or any other of her relatives.36
Halacha 14
It is forbidden for a man to marry a close relative of a woman with whom he is obligated to perform either yibbum or chalitzah - e.g., her mother or her daughter - until one of his brothers performs yibbum with the woman who is obligated, or performs chalitzah with her to free her of her obligation.37
Afterwards, [the other brother] may marry the woman's mother, daughter, or any of her other relatives, despite the fact that these relatives are all forbidden to the brother who performed either yibbum or chalitzah, as explained [in the previous halachah].
Halacha 15
When a man marries his yevamah and then divorces her, he may remarry her if he so desires. She is considered to be his wife with regard to all matters. There remains no trace of the prohibition [that existed when she was] his brother's [wife], neither from Scriptural law nor from Rabbinic law.38
Halacha 16
As explained in Hilchot Ishut,39 the sexual relations in which a boy of nine years and one day engages are halachically significant. This is a law received through the Oral Tradition.
Accordingly, when a yavam who is below the age of majority, but over the age of nine, engages in sexual relations with his yevamah, he should maintain [his bond with her].40 He may not, however, perform the rite of chalitzah until he attains the age of majority and is inspected [for signs of physical maturity].41For with regard to chalitzah, the term ish ("man") is specifically mentioned in the Torah.42
If [a yavam] is below this age, sexual relations in which he engages are of no halachic significance. [Moreover,] even the sexual relations in which a nine-year-old engages do not acquire [the yevamah for him in a manner that is] binding [entirely].43 Therefore, his yevamah is not permitted to marry another man until he engages in relations with her after he attains majority [and divorces her], or performs the rite of chalitzah [at that age], as will be explained.44
Halacha 17
Similarly, with regard to a yevamah who is below the age of majority: If heryavam desires to perform the rite of yibbum with her, he may.45 He may not, however, perform the rite of chalitzah with her until she attains the age of majority and is inspected [for physical signs of maturity]. Even if she engaged in sexual relations after she became twelve years old,46 she may not perform the rite of chalitzah until she undergoes an inspection and manifests signs of physical maturity.
Halacha 18
Just as a yavam may not perform chalitzah until he attains manhood, so too, ayevamah may not perform chalitzah until she attains womanhood.47
When a yavam who is below the age of majority engages in sexual relations with a yevamah who is also below the age of majority, they should grow up together.
Halacha 19
As all other women,48 a yevamah should not perform either yibbum orchalitzah until she waits a 90-day interval. [These 90 days] do not include the day of her previous husband's death or the day of yibbum or chalitzah.
Why may she not perform chalitzah within these 90 days?49Because she is not fit to perform yibbum [at that time]. [Deuteronomy 25:7-9] states: "And if the man does not desire to take his yevamah,... she should remove his shoe" [establishing an equivalence between these two rites]. [Thus,] when she is fit to perform yibbum, she is fit to perform chalitzah. And when she is not fit to perform yibbum, she is not fit to perform chalitzah.50
Should [a brother] perform yibbum or chalitzah with her within these three months, since she is not pregnant, she has discharged her obligation and need not perform any further activity.51
Halacha 20
[The following rules apply when a brother] performs chalitzah with hisyevamah, and afterwards it is discovered that she is pregnant: If she gives birth and the child is viable, it is considered as if she had never performedchalitzah. She is permitted to [marry into the] priesthood, and [the brother who performed chalitzah with her] is permitted [to marry] her relatives.
If the woman miscarries, or if the child who is born does not live for 30 days after being born, this - or another - brother52 should perform chalitzah with her again. For chalitzah performed with a pregnant woman is not consideredchalitzah,53 nor are relations with a pregnant woman considered yibbum.
Halacha 21
Therefore, when [a man] marries or performs chalitzah with his yevamah who is pregnant, another woman who was married to the deceased husband should not remarry until this woman gives birth. For a child does not remove [the obligation of yibbum] until it emerges into the world.54
Halacha 22
[The following laws apply when a yavam] marries his yevamah, and then she is discovered to be pregnant. They should be separated [immediately],55 and we wait [to see the results of] her pregnancy. If she miscarries, he should maintain her as his wife.56
If she gives birth [different rules apply]: If the child dies, even on the day it was born, the yavam should divorce her, [give her] a get and perform chalitzahwith her.57 [Only] then, is she permitted to marry another man. If the child lives for 30 days after its birth,58 [the child] is considered to be viable, and there is no need for a divorce, for [relations between the two are forbidden by] a severe prohibition].59
Halacha 23
If she gives birth to a viable child six months after she performed yibbum, there is a doubt whether this child is the son of her first husband and was born after a nine-month pregnancy, or is the son of her [yavam] and was born after a six-month pregnancy. Therefore, [the yavam] should divorce his wife, giving her a get. The child is not, however, considered illegitimate.60
If [the yavam] has relations with her after she gives birth, the children that are born afterwards are considered to be of doubtful legitimacy.61
FOOTNOTES
1.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 216) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 598) include this mitzvah as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In his Guide for the Perplexed, the Rambam explains that marriage of this nature was a custom carried out before the giving of the Torah (as reflected by Genesis 38:8), and the Torah allowed this rite to be perpetuated.Sefer HaChinuch explains that the closeness shared with the deceased by both his widow and his brother enjoins them to come together and produce a child who will perpetuate the deceased's memory and virtue. As Sefer HaChinuch mentions, there are also profound mystic concepts associated with this mitzvah.
2.
Implied is an exclusion. One should not perform this rite with the widow of one's maternal brother (Yevamot 17b; Halachah 7 below).
3.
See Hilchot Ishut 22:10-14.
4.
According to the Rambam's conception, the woman cannot be compelled to marry her brother-in-law against her will. See Chapter 2, Halachah 10 and notes.
5.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 217) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 599) include this mitzvah as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
6.
The woman also participates - indeed she plays a more active role - in the rite ofchalitzah. Nevertheless, the mitzvah is considered to be incumbent on the brother of the deceased, because the effect of this mitzvah is that he foregoes a right - the right to marry the woman - that belongs to him. Until he performs chalitzah, the woman is bonded to him, and through performingchalitzah he severs this connection. Therefore, the mitzvah is considered his.
Moreover, chalitzah is a means to dissolve the connection established by kiddushin. Since kiddushin are established by the man,chalitzah is also his initiative. See the Kovetzwho questions whether the man is obligated to perform chalitzah or he merely has the opportunity of doing so.
7.
The concluding mishnah of the first chapter of Bechorot states:
The mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah. [This applied] originally, when the participants [in the rite] intended to perform a mitzvah. In the present age, when they do not intend to perform a mitzvah, the mitzvah of chalitzahtakes precedence over the mitzvah ofyibbum.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that the Mishnah follows the opinion of Abba Shaul, who maintains that the prohibition against marrying one's brother's wife is not removed entirely by the mitzvah of yibbum. Instead, it is merely temporarily superseded. And therefore, if the couple have any intentions other than the fulfillment of the mitzvah, they transgress this prohibition. As such, rather than involve oneself in such a challenge, one should perform the mitzvah of chalitzah.
In that commentary, and in a subsequent responsum, the Rambam explains that the halachah follows the opinion of the Sages who differ with Abba Shaul. These Sages maintain that when a man dies childless, the prohibition against his brother's marrying his wife is lifted entirely. Even if the brother marries the widow because of her looks, or because of her money, there is no prohibition involved. For that reason, the mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence.
The Ashkenazic community, following the rulings of Rabbenu Tam and the authorities who succeeded him, do not accept this ruling and follow Abba Shaul's opinion. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 165:1) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah states that chalitzah is preferable, and that a couple should not be allowed to perform yibbum unless the court is certain that their intent is solely to perform the mitzvah.
There is some discussion of the Rambam's intent by the commentaries, for his ruling inHilchot Gerushin 10:16 implies a recognition of the importance of chalitzah. Nevertheless, the clarity of his statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah and in Sefer HaMitzvot makes it obvious that he follows the opinion of the Sages who differ with Abba Shaul. At present, even within the Sephardic community, the mitzvah of chalitzah is generally observed.
[Note also the opinion of the Beit Shmuel174:3, who states that even according to the Ashkenazic authorities, by Scriptural lawyibbum takes precedence, and that the primacy given to chalitzah is a Rabbinic institution.]
8.
The Hebrew word בן, translated as "son," can also mean "child" or "descendant." Hence, the ruling mentioned by the Rambam.
9.
If, however, a man fathered a child [or children], and he [they all] died in the father's lifetime, the man's wife is obligated to perform the rite of yibbum.
10.
Regardless of who the father is.
11.
See Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.
12.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 156:4) states that these laws apply as long as we know that the pregnancy lasted into the ninth month.
13.
The Ramah (ibid.) rules that even if a fetus is stillborn, these laws still apply.
14.
For according to Scriptural law, there is no obligation for yibbum, and the prohibition against relations with her husband's brother remains in force.
15.
In such an instance, the brother may not perform the rites of yibbum or chalitzah until he comes of age, as is explained below.
16.
The Gur Aryeh notes that Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 10:6 appears to imply that the emergence of an infant's forehead alone is sufficient for it to be considered having been "born." Hence, he interprets the Rambam's words as meaning either the forehead or the majority of the body.
17.
If, however, the brother is not born until after the man's death, the deceased's wife is not obligated to perform the rite of yibbum, as explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 16.
18.
Needless to say, the woman should not marry the illegitimate man or the idolater. Instead, she should seek to be freed from her obligation through chalitzah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 157:4) and the Ramah mention the possibility of leniency, if the deceased's brother was an apostate at the time the deceased married his wife.
19.
I.e., the maidservant was freed, or the gentile woman was converted, before the baby was born.
20.
See Hilchot Aveilut 2:1.
21.
See Hilchot Edut 13:1.
22.
See Hilchot Nachalot 1:6.
23.
Yevamot 17b derives this concept fromGenesis 42:13: "We are twelve brothers, the son of one father."
24.
And therefore, one is not obligated to perform the rite of yibbum if his brother dies childless.
25.
This ruling applies with regard to the laws ofyibbum. With regard to the laws of forbidden relationships, by contrast, in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah the Rambam rules that if one twin has relations with the other's wife, he is liable for transgressing the prohibition against relations with his brother's wife.
26.
As reflected in Halachah 12, there is a prohibition involved.
27.
Our Sages forbade a priest from marrying a woman who performed the rite of chalitzah(Hilchot Ishut 1:7). Since it makes no difference to the brother with which widow he performs the rite of chalitzah, our Sages counsel that it be performed in a manner that does not damage a woman's future possibilities. See Yevamot 44a.
A court should enforce the application of this law (Beit Shmuel 161:2).
28.
I.e., if he is capable of meeting the responsibilities a husband has - providing for his wife's livelihood, her clothing and her conjugal rights.
29.
A person who transgresses a positive commandment is not liable to receive the forty lashes given when a negative commandment of the Torah is violated. Hence, the Rambam clarifies that although a prohibition is involved, it is a prohibition stemming from a positive commandment, and not one stemming from a negative commandment.
30.
The Ramban (Nachmonides, Hasagot L'Sefer HaMitzvot, Hosafot Negative Commandment 14) differs and maintains that the violation of a Scriptural prohibition is involved. The difference between their opinions stems from their interpretation ofYevamot 10b.
That passage interprets Deuteronomy 25:9: "... who did not build his brother's house," as implying a prohibition. "Once he did not build it, he no longer has the right to build it." The Ramban follows the authorities who maintain that this is a Scriptural prohibition, while the Rambam (based on Yevamot 40b) maintains that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, and the reference to the verse is merely anasmachta, a support.
31.
Literally, "prohibitions of a second degree," relatives with whom relations are permitted by Scriptural law, but forbidden by Rabbinic decree. See Hilchot Ishut 1:6.
32.
This refers to seven women who are included in the category of arayot and with whom sexual relations are forbidden, as mentioned in Leviticus, Chapter 18, andHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 2:7,9. They include her mother, both her maternal and paternal grandmothers, her daughter, the daughter of her son, the daughter of her daughter and her sister.
33.
I.e., even a brother who was not born during the lifetime of the widow's husband.
34.
I.e., before she performs either yibbum orchalitzah.
35.
He is, however, permitted to marry the woman's sister, just as he is allowed to marry his wife's sister after her death.
36.
Although the woman herself is forbidden, as stated in the previous halachah, her relatives are permitted.
37.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 8.
38.
I.e., we do not say that he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of yibbum, and now the woman's status reverts to the prohibition under which she was previously forbidden. See Yevamot 39a.
39.
Chapter 11, Halachah 3.
40.
I.e., none of the other brothers should marry her instead. See Chapter 5, Halachot 18-19.
41.
Two pubic hairs, as stated in Hilchot Ishut2:10.
42.
Deuteronomy 25:7 states: "If the man does not desire...."
43.
Rather, these sexual relations are considered to be equivalent to a ma'amar, the status of which is discussed in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
44.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 21, where this situation is described in detail.
45.
Yevamot 119a explains that there is a certain dimension of leniency implied by this ruling. Since the woman is below the age of majority, it is possible that as she grows older she will manifest signs of being anaylonit, a woman who lacks female sexual characteristics (Hilchot Ishut 2:3,6). If that were to be the case, then the mitzvah ofyibbum would not apply to such a woman, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 8, and relations with her would still be forbidden. Nevertheless, since the overwhelming probability is that a woman will not be anaylonit, our Sages did not impose any restrictions.
46.
Rav David Arameah interprets this to be referring to engaging in relations with her previous husband before her death. Although with regard to her husband, we assume that she has manifested signs of physical maturity, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:5, with regard to the laws ofyibbum and chalitzah an inspection is required. Note an alternative explanation offered by the Or Sameach.
47.
See Chapter 6, Halachah 6.
48.
See Hilchot Gerushin 11:18, which prohibits a widow or a divorcee from remarrying within 90 days of her husband's death or their divorce, to preclude the possibility of questions arising concerning who is the father of her child.
49.
For performing chalitzah will not prevent the determination of a child's father.
50.
The converse of this principle - that one who does not perform chalitzah (e.g., a king) does not perform yibbum - also applies. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Sanhedrin 2:1 and Hilchot Melachim 2:3).
51.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 164:1) differs and maintains that such a woman requireschalitzah from her deceased husband's other brothers after the three months have passed. See also Beit Shmuel 164:4.
52.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 164:2) states that the chalitzah should be performed by another brother, and not by the brother who had originally performed chalitzah with her.
53.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 26.
The Beit Shmuel 164:5 quotes the view ofTosafot, who maintain that, according to Rabbinic law, performing chalitzah while pregnant disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood and prevents her from performing yibbum if she miscarries.
54.
And the yibbum or the chalitzah performed by the woman is of no consequence whatsoever.
55.
Lest she give birth, in which case she would be forbidden to the yavam.
56.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 164:5) states that this rule applies only if he marries her before her pregnancy is discovered. If he marries her after her pregnancy is discovered, their relationship should be terminated even if she miscarries.
57.
The divorce is necessary lest it appear that a married couple are separating without a divorce, and the chalitzah is necessary as explained in Halachah 5. (See also Chapter 2, Halachah 21.)
58.
The Maggid Mishneh states that the same law applies if the child is born with its limbs properly formed after a full-term pregnancy, even if he dies on the day of birth. This ruling is quoted by the Ramah (Even HaEzer164:6).
59.
She does not require a get, because everyone knows that the consecration of such a woman is not binding.
60.
For whether he is the son of the woman's first husband or the son of her second husband, no sin was committed in his conception.
61.
For we are unsure whether or not the woman is permitted to remain married to heryavam. The laws governing a person of doubtful legitimacy are discussed in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:21-22.
Yibbum vChalitzah - Chapter Two
Halacha 1
It is a Rabbinic ordinance that a yavam should not enter into marital relations with his yevamah until he consecrates her in the presence of two witnesses, with a p'rutah or an article worth a p'rutah.1 This [act] is called a ma'amar.2
A ma'amar does not complete the acquisition of a yevamah, as will be explained.3
Halacha 2
Just as [the yavam] must consecrate his yevamah, so too, he should recite the marriage blessings in the presence of ten men6 and compose a ketubah("marriage contract"), as is required of any man who marries a woman.7
When [a yavam] enters into marital relations with his yevamah without previously performing a ma'amar with her, he acquires her in a binding manner;8 he does not have to consecrate her after engaging in marital relations with her. He should be given stripes for rebellious conduct9 and should write a ketubah for her.
Halacha 3
When [a yavam] engages in marital relations with his yevamah, he acquires her [as his wife]. [This applies] regardless of whether he entered into these relations unintentionally10 or with a licentious intent,11 under duress or willingly, whether he acted with a licentious intent and she acted unintentionally or under duress, or she acted with a licentious intent and he acted unintentionally or under duress, whether she was asleep12 or awake, whether he performed vaginal or anal intercourse,13 whether he inserted merely the head of his penis or the entire organ.14
Halacha 4
When does the above apply? When [the yavam] intends to perform a sexual act. If, however, he fell from the roof [with an erection] and [accidentally] inserted his organ into his yevamah, had relations with her when he was so intoxicated that he was not conscious of anything,15 or when he was asleep, he does not acquire her [as his wife].
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when a yavam takes] his yevamah [home to] perform yibbum, and within 30 days she claims that they did not engage in sexual relations. [The yavam] claims that they did engage in relations and then divorces her. Since he already took the initiative and divorced her, we compel him to perform chalitzah with her.18
If he did not divorce her, we compel him to engage in relations with her,19 or to perform chalitzah and also to divorce her, giving her a get.20
If he divorced her after thirty days had passed, and she claims that they did not engage in sexual relations, we request that he perform chalitzah with her.21 If, however, he admits that he had not entered into relations with her, we compel him to perform chalitzah with her.22
If she claims that they engaged in sexual relations, and he denies engaging in relations, she is not required to engage in chalitzah, for his word is not accepted [when he desires] to cause her to be forbidden to all other men, once he brings her to his home as his wife.
Halacha 6
When a man dies [childless], and he is survived by many brothers, the mitzvah is incumbent on the eldest brother to perform either yibbum orchalitzah, as [implied by Deuteronomy 25:6]: "The firstborn son whom she bears [will perpetuate the name of the deceased brother]." The Oral Tradition interprets the verse as referring to the eldest of the surviving brothers, causing the verse to be rendered: "The eldest brother will perpetuate the name of the deceased brother." The subject of the phrase "whom she bears" is the mother of the brothers and not the yevamah.23
Halacha 7
If the eldest brother does not desire to perform yibbum, all the other brothers are given that option.24 If they also do not desire, we return to the eldest brother and tell him: "The mitzvah is incumbent on you. Perform either yibbumor chalitzah." We do not compel the yavam to perform yibbum;25 we do, however, compel him to perform chalitzah.26
Halacha 8
If the eldest brother says: "Give me a respite until [a brother] who is a minor attains majority," "... until [a brother] who is on a journey returns," or "... until [a brother] who has [temporarily] lost his powers of speech and hearing recovers; if he refuses, I will perform yibbum or chalitzah" - his request is not accepted. He is told: "The mitzvah is incumbent on you. Perform eitheryibbum or chalitzah."27
Halacha 9
Similarly, if the eldest brother is in another country,28[the obligation is transferred to his younger brother]. The younger brother does not have the option of saying: "The mitzvah is incumbent on my older brother. Wait until he comes." Instead, we tell the brother that is present: "Perform either yibbum orchalitzah."29
Halacha 10
The laws pertaining to a yevamah who is fit to perform yibbum30 and refuses to do so are the same as those governing a woman who rebels against her husband.31 We compel her yavam to perform chalitzah with her,32 and she forfeits [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract.
When the deceased is survived by many wives, the one that the yavam asks to perform yibbum and refuses is considered to have "rebelled." He should perform chalitzah with her, and she forfeits [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract.33The other wives who were not asked [to performyibbum] receive [the money due them by virtue of their] marriage contracts, as other widows do.
Halacha 11
If [the deceased was survived by] many [brothers], and the eldest brother states that he wants to perform yibbum with [one of the deceased's wives], [she is under obligation to him].34 Even if she does not desire [to marry] him, but is willing to marry one of his brothers, her desire is not considered. For the mitzvah is that the eldest brother perform yibbum.
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when] the eldest brother says: "I do not want to perform either yibbum or chalitzah. Behold, my brother is present." If one of the brothers asks her to perform yibbum, and she does not desire [to marry] him, but she does desire [to marry] another brother, and he desires [to marry] her, she is not considered to have "rebelled." Once the eldest brother upon whom the mitzvah is incumbent demurs, all the brothers are equal.35 Since she desires [to marry] one of [the brothers], and he desires [to marry] her, she is not considered to have "rebelled."36
Moreover, if one of the brothers was in another country, and the woman says: "I would prefer to wait for him to come and perform yibbum with me. I do not want [to marry] this one," she is not considered to have "rebelled." [Since] the brother who asks [to marry her] is not the eldest, we tell him: "If you desire to perform chalitzah and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract, you may.37 If not, she wants to wait until your brother comes. Since you do not have a prior claim, [she is granted that prerogative].38
Halacha 13
If the brother [whom the yevamah desired to marry] returned and did not desire [to marry] her, we turn again to the brother who desired to performyibbum, but was not desired by the woman. We tell the woman: "There is no one who desires to perform yibbum with you except this one, and the mitzvah of yibbum is given priority. Either perform yibbum with this one, or leave without receiving [the money due because of your] marriage contract, as is the law with regard to all women who rebel."
Halacha 14
Whenever the law is that a woman should perform chalitzah and not yibbum, as we have mentioned,39 if she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her marriage contract,40she may collect that money in the same way as other widows.
Similarly, if the yavam was a leper or he has other blemishes [for which] men [are required to divorce],41 he must perform chalitzah for her, and she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her marriage contract.
If a yevamah suffered blemishes while she was waiting for yibbum, it is theyavam's lack of fortune.42 If he does not desire to perform yibbum, he must perform chalitzah and give her [the money due her by virtue of] her marriage contract.
Halacha 15
When, during her [first] husband's lifetime, a yevamah takes a vow prohibiting her from deriving benefit from her yavam,43 or from all Jews,44 [her yavam] should be compelled to perform chalitzah for her, and she is entitled to collect [the money due by virtue of] her marriage contract.45
If she takes such a vow after her [first] husband's death, we request46 [heryavam] to perform chalitzah for her.47 If he does not desire to do so, she is considered to have "rebelled."48Similarly, even if she took such a vow in her husband's lifetime, if her intent was that he should not perform yibbum with her,49 he is not compelled to perform chalitzah, unless she [accepts the status of] one who rebels and forfeits [payment of] her marriage contract.
Halacha 16
No heed is paid to the words of a yevamah, when her yavam asks her to perform chalitzah, and she says: "I do not want to perform chalitzah, nor do I want to collect [the money due me by virtue of my] marriage contract. Instead, I will remain in my husband's house like other widows."50 For she was given over to [the yavam] from heaven, and the choice [is his whether] to performyibbum or to perform chalitzah51 and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] marriage contract.
Moreover, even if she says "I will provide for my sustenance from my own means, and I will remain without a husband for the rest of my life,"52 her words are not heeded. For the yavam will tell her: "As long as you are under obligation to me, no one else will want to marry me."53 Even if he is already married [this argument still holds weight], for it is possible for him [to desire] to marry another wife, or that [his obligation to] the yevamah will cause strife within his marriage.54
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when] a yevamah had no right to the privileges of a marriage contract from her [deceased] husband, because she was forbidden to him, but she is permitted to marry the yavam, as will be explained.55 If theyavam desires to perform yibbum, he may. He is not obligated to the woman [for the privileges of her] marriage contract, just as her [previous] husband was not.56 The laws regarding the yavam's obligation for the additional amount to be paid the woman are the same as those that applied with regard to her husband.57
If, however, a husband did not write his wife a marriage contract, or she sold him or waived to him the rights to her marriage contract, the yavam is obligated to write a new marriage contract for her as he would be required for another widow.58
Halacha 18
Before the yavam performs yibbum or chalitzah with the yevamah, she is forbidden to marry another man,59 as [Deuteronomy 25:5] states: "the wife of the deceased should not be allowed to [marry] an outsider."
If she marries another person,60 and they engage in sexual relations, they are both punished by lashes,61 and he must divorce her with a get. [This applies] even if she has borne him several children.62 She is forbidden to him and to her yavam.63Her yavam should perform chalitzah with her; this causes her to be permitted to marry other men.
Halacha 19
If she was consecrated by another man, she does not become forbidden to her yavam. Instead, the man who consecrated her should divorce her, and her yavam may perform either yibbum or chalitzah.64
If her yavam was a priest who is forbidden to marry a divorcee, she should be divorced by the man who consecrated her, so that the sinner should not benefit, and her yavam should perform chalitzah with her.65
Halacha 20
If the man who consecrated [the yevamah] and then divorced her, marries her [after] her yavam performs chalitzah with her, they are not forced to separate.66 If, by contrast, a man divorced [a yevamah] after being married to her and then remarried her again, the couple are forced to separate. For this resembles the case of a married woman who [thought that her husband had died and] remarried, who is forbidden to both her first and second husbands, as has been explained.67
A yevamah who engages in licentious sexual relations does not become forbidden to her yavam.68 If he desires, he may perform chalitzah; if he desires, he may perform yibbum.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply to] any yevamah concerning whom there is a question according to Rabbinic law whether or not she is under obligation to ayavam - e.g., a yevamah bore a child who died within thirty days, after a pregnancy that was not full term. In this instance, she is required by Rabbinic law to perform chalitzah, because of the doubt [that exists whether the birth was viable], as explained above.69 If such a woman was consecrated by another man before performing chalitzah, her yavam should perform chalitzahwith her, and she may remain married to her husband.70
If she was consecrated by a priest - who is forbidden to be married to a woman who performed chalitzah - [her yavam] should not perform chalitzahfor her.71 [This leniency was instituted] since we do not cause a man's wife to be forbidden because of a Rabbinic decree instituted on account of doubt.72
If the priest divorces [the woman] or dies, she should perform chalitzah.73Afterwards, she is permitted, a priori, to marry other men.
FOOTNOTES
1.
A ma'amar can also be effected with ash'tar, a legal document (Maggid Mishneh).
From Yevamot 52a it would appear that this practice was instituted as an expression of modesty. Just as with regard to marriage, although it is acceptable to consecrate a woman through sexual relations according to Scriptural law, our Rabbis ordered a ban of ostracism to be placed on a person who does so; so too, with regard to yibbum, they required that the man designate the woman as his wife before entering into marital relations with her.
2.
The word ma'amar means "statement." TheTosefot Yom Tov explains that the term was chosen because the yavam must make a statement of intent. Rav Kapach offers an alternative interpretation, citing Deuteronomy 26:17,18, which uses the root אמר to mean "designate," or "declare allegiance to."
3.
See Chapter 5, Halachot 2-3.
The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah continues "as does sexual relations." Nevertheless, authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah do not contain this addition. Based on that version, Rav Kapach explains that the comparison may be, not to sexual relations with ayevamah, but rather to the effectiveness of the transfer of money in ordinary kiddushin.
4.
See Hilchot Ishut 4:1.
5.
If the minor's marriage is consummated, she leaves her father's authority and acts independently. As long as she is merely consecrated, however, she is under her father's authority. See Hilchot Ishut 3:11-12.
6.
See Hilchot Ishut 10:3 for the text of these blessings. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 166:2) states that the ceremony of chuppah should also be performed, and the Ma'aseh Rokeach adds that Birkat Erusin (Hilchot Ishut 3:23) should be recited.
7.
The text of the ketubah to be composed by the yavam appears in Chapter 4, Halachah 32.
8.
The fact that he disobeyed our Sages' wishes does not cause his deed to lose its effectiveness.
9.
The punishment given for disobeying a Rabbinic ordinance. See Hilchot Ishut 3:21.
10.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer166:9), which cites a minority opinion that differentiates between whether the yevamahhad been married to her first husband or merely consecrated by him. In the latter instance, she must be consecrated a second time.
11.
Our translation is based on Rashi's gloss,Yevamot 53b.
12.
Although it is improper for a husband to engage in relations with his wife when she is asleep, this does not negate the effectiveness of the yavam's act.
13.
The purpose of yibbum is to "perpetuate the name of his brother" (Deuteronomy 25:7) - i.e., to conceive progeny. Although this objective cannot be achieved through anal intercourse, it is still an effective means of acquisition. Since both the man and the woman are capable of conceiving children, the fact that they cannot accomplish that through this sexual act does not detract from its effectiveness (Beit Shmuel 166:6).
14.
Our translation is based on Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 1:10.
15.
Note the Or Sameach, who questions this ruling based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 6:1, quoted by the Rambam in Chapter 6, Halachah 3), which states that when a mentally incompetent person performs yibbum, his act is binding. The Or Sameach explains that a mentally incompetent person may have the intent to engage in sexual relations. In this instance, however, the person has lost control of his faculties to the extent that he has no intent whatsoever.
16.
For masturbation is not considered to be sexual relations.
17.
For sodomy is considered to be a forbidden form of relations.
18.
Since it is within 30 days, we accept the possibility that the yavam did not engage in relations with her, and compel him to perform chalitzah so the yevamah can remarry another man (Yevamot 111b).
19.
And remain married to her.
20.
Since he brought her home as his wife, even if he agrees that they did not engage in relations, he is required to divorce her, because it is likely that they did engage in relations (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 167:6). Nevertheless, since she claims that they did not, and there is plausibility to her claim, he is also required to perform chalitzah.
21.
After a couple have lived together for thirty days, we assume that they have engaged in relations, for a man will not restrain himself any longer. Hence, the man cannot be compelled to perform chalitzah (Yevamot, ibid.). Nevertheless, we ask him to perform this rite, for otherwise the woman will not be permitted to remarry.
22.
He has nothing to lose in this concern, for since he divorced her without entering into relations with her, he is no longer permitted to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum. Therefore, he should fulfill the mitzvah of chalitzah so that she can remarry.
23.
According to the simple meaning of the verse, the subject is - as reflected in our translation - the yevamah. Nevertheless, in a halachic context, it is possible for one verse to have several interpretations. Accordingly, Yevamot 2:8 (see the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah) interprets this verse to be referring to the deceased's mother. (See also Yevamot 24a, quoted in Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which considers the yevamah the subject of the phrase in a different halachic context.)
24.
See Halachah 12.
25.
Although the Rambam maintains that the mitzvah of yibbum takes priority over the mitzvah of chalitzah, we cannot compel a man to wed a woman with whom he does not desire to live.
26.
For until this mitzvah is performed, theyevamah may not remarry.
27.
I.e., the yevamah should not be subjected to an unnecessary delay, if possible.
28.
When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 161:5) uses the expression "an overseas country." The Beit Shmuel161:6 cites the expression used by the Rambam and explains that it refers to a country in which a different language is spoken, even if it is relatively close. He cites a ruling of Mahari Mintz, which states that if the eldest brother is in another city, and theyevamah does not have the funds to pay for travel there, the younger brother can be compelled to perform the mitzvah. (Kin'at Eliyahu notes that the Rambam often uses the word medinah to mean metropolis. He questions whether that is the Rambam's intent here.)
29.
Here also, the intent is not to subject theyevamah to an unnecessary delay.
30.
I.e., there is no halachic reason preventing her from doing so.
31.
See Hilchot Ishut 14:8, which states that a woman who refuses to engage in marital relations because she is repelled by her husband, should be divorced by her husband, because "she is not like a captive, [to be forced] to engage in relations with someone she loathes." She does, however, forfeit the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract and any presents that her husband gave her. As mentioned in the notes on Hilchot Ishut, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 77:2) follows a different perspective with regard to this ruling.
There is also a difference of opinion among the authorities whether a woman who refuses to engage in yibbum is considered to have "rebelled." As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 2, the Ashkenazic authorities maintain that the mitzvah ofchalitzah takes precedence over the mitzvah of yibbum. Therefore, they maintain that a woman has the right to refuse to engage in yibbum, and she is not judged to have "rebelled" for this reason.
32.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) differs with the Rambam and maintains that a husband should not be compelled to divorce a woman who "rebels." According to that perspective, a yavam should also not be compelled to perform chalitzah.
According to the Ramah (Even HaEzer165:1), who favors chalitzah, when a yavamdesires to perform yibbum and the yevamahrefuses, the yavam cannot be compelled by force to perform chalitzah. He should, however, be convinced to do so. Note the gloss of the Beit Shmuel 165:1, which discusses this ruling in detail.
All authorities agree that if the yavam is one of the individuals considered unfit to marry (see Halachah 14), he should be compelled to perform chalitzah.
33.
This applies even if one of the other women would be willing to marry the yavam; the choice is his and not hers.
34.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the woman must either consent to yibbum or be considered to have "rebelled."
35.
The Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that if the eldest brother demurs, the prerogative is given to the brother who is next in the order of age. This perspective is followed by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 161:4).
36.
If, however, the brother she desires to marry does not desire to marry her, she is considered to have "rebelled," as stated in the following halachah.
37.
Although, according to the Rambam, the mitzvah of yibbum takes priority over the mitzvah of chalitzah, this is the case only when yibbum can be performed immediately. In this instance, this brother is not forced to wait until his other brother returns, for having the obligation to perform yibbum or chalitzahis a detriment to a man, as stated in Halachah 16 (Rav David Arameah).
38.
Generally, the court makes an effort to have the mitzvah of yibbum or chalitzahperformed as soon as possible, as reflected in Halachot 8 and 9. This, however, is a measure of consideration for the woman, so that she will not be forced to remain without a husband. In this instance, it is she who desires the delay. Hence, she is given that prerogative (Or Sameach).
39.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 5. (See also Chapter 3, Halachot 4, 13-14 and Chapter 6, Halachah 7.)
40.
I.e., her first husband or his estate would have had to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract.
41.
He has constant bad breath or a smell coming from his nose, or he works as a copper miner, a tanner, or a collector of dog feces, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 25:11.
42.
A man is entitled to divorce his wife if he discovers that she possessed physical blemishes that mar her appeal before her marriage, and he is not required to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 7:8, 25:2. Nevertheless, in this instance this law does not apply, because the connection between the yavam and the yevamah begins directly after her first husband's death.
43.
I.e., she took a vow not to benefit from theyavam in her husband's lifetime for other reasons, without the explicit intent that she would free herself from obligation to him.
44.
I.e., the woman took a vow not to benefit from any Jews. Although that vow did not take effect with regard to her husband, once her husband died it takes effect with regard to the yavam.
45.
She is not allowed to marry the yavam, because she will derive benefit from him and thus break her vow. Nor is she considered to be a woman who rebels, because her vow was not taken to free her from the obligation of yibbum. (See Yevamot 112a.)
46.
Since the vow was taken specifically to free her from the obligation of yibbum, the yavamis not obligated to respect it.
47.
If he agrees and performs chalitzah willingly, he is obligated to pay her the money due by virtue of her marriage contract.
48.
In which case he is compelled to performchalitzah with her, but is not required to pay her the money due by virtue of her marriage contract, as stated in Halachah 10.
49.
Moreover, even if we are unsure of the woman's intent when taking the vow, we assume that she desired to free herself from the obligation of yibbum.
50.
As stated in Hilchot Ishut 18:1-2, a widow is entitled to live in her deceased husband's home and derive her livelihood from his estate until she remarries.
51.
The Kiryat Sefer explains that just as a man can divorce his wife against her will, so too, a yavam can perform chalitzah with hisyevamah against her will. Even if she desires yibbum, she can be compelled to perform chalitzah. The Maggid Mishnehcites certain authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that since the mitzvah of yibbum takes priority, theyevamah cannot be forced to performchalitzah.
52.
I.e., she is willing to forego the obligation of her husband's estate to her.
53.
For as long as there is the possibility that theyavam will marry the yevamah, other women will hesitate to marry him, for no woman would like to share her husband with another woman.
54.
Hence, the woman is compelled to performchalitzah.
If neither the yevamah nor the yavamdesires to perform chalitzah, the court is under no obligation to see that the mitzvah is performed. Although the Zohar, Volume III, page 180a, explains that chalitzah brings about benefit for the deceased's soul, neither his brother nor his wife has a binding obligation to perform this act on his behalf. If they desire to, they may, but they cannot be compelled to do so. (See the Responsa of the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 85.)
55.
See Chapter 6, Halachah 13.
56.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ramban and the Rashba as saying that if the yavamdesires to divorce the yevamah immediately, he is not required to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract. If, however, he desires to remain married to the woman, he must write a marriage contract for her, for it is forbidden for a man to remain married to a woman without a marriage contract, as stated in Hilchot Ishut10:10. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 168:9) quotes this interpretation.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that this interpretation does not fit the Rambam's wording. In that light, the Or Sameach offers the following interpretation: The yavam is never obligated to write a marriage contract for the yevamah. Why did our Sages require a man to write a marriage contract for his wife? So that there would be a financial responsibility attached to divorce, and hence a husband would not consider it to be a light matter. In this instance, the yavam is held responsible for the additional amount that the husband added to the marriage contract. Hence, there is financial responsibility attached to divorce, and there is no imperative for a further obligation.
57.
As mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 24:2-3, although her husband is not obligated for the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, he is obligated for the additional amount that he promised her. This obligation is transferred to the yavam.
58.
The yavam is not, however, obligated to write a marriage contract equivalent to the one that the woman's first husband gave her. It is sufficient that he write her a marriage contract for 100 zuz, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 22:14.
59.
Both Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 357) and Sefer HaChinuch(Mitzvah 596) include this as one of the Torah's 613 commandments.
60.
This applies even if she married without knowing of the existence of the yavam(Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 159:2).
61.
If, however, the couple do not engage in relations, they are not punished with lashes.
62.
The children are not, however, considered illegitimate. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:1-2.
63.
I.e., she is compared to a woman who engages in relations with another man while married. See Hilchot Gerushin 10:7.
She becomes forbidden to both men, even though she claims not to have engaged in sexual relations with her second husband (Kessef Mishneh; Ma'aseh Rokeach; seeHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:3).
64.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 159:1) states that this law applies even when the man consecrates her without knowing of the existence of the yavam. The Beit Shmuel159:1 differs and cites the opinion of the Rashba and the Ramban, who maintain that in such an instance, if the yavam desires to perform chalitzah, the woman may remain married to her second husband.
65.
I.e., one might think that since the yavamcannot perform yibbum with her, she should be allowed to remain married to her second husband. If so, however, the man's transgression - marrying the yevamah - will have brought him benefit. Hence, he is required to divorce her (Yevamot 92b).
66.
The rationale is that since the prohibition is merely a disciplinary measure, if the couple marry again they may remain married (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 159:1) states that if the second husband knew of the existence of the yavam and consecrated the woman anyway, he is forbidden to remain married to her, even if he remarried her afterchalitzah.
67.
See Hilchot Gerushin 10:5,7).
68.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 159:3) states that she does, however, become forbidden to the man with whom she engaged in relations. Even if her yavam performschalitzah, the two may not marry.
69.
This refers to an instance where the child's physical appearance indicates that the birth was viable. Therefore, the woman is not required to perform chalitzah according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, because the pregnancy was not full term, our Sages required chalitzah, as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 5.
70.
I.e., we do not force the couple to divorce, as in the previous halachah.
71.
In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 164:7), Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this leniency applies only when the priest consecrated the woman without knowing of her obligation to performchalitzah. If he knew of her obligation and consecrated her nonetheless, the couple are not permitted to remain married.
72.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 164:7) states that similar laws apply when a yevamah was consecrated by an Israelite, and her yavamis abroad and cannot perform chalitzah for her.
73.
I.e., the leniency is granted to the priest, because it is necessary and not to other men.
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Monday, Shevat 29, 5776 · 08 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Thursday Sh'vat 29 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Mishpatim, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 140-144.
Tanya: This union is (p. 109)...as explained elsewhere. (p. 109).
The Alter Rebbe once said:
Rashi's commentary on Chumash is the "wine of Torah." It opens the heart and uncovers one's essence-love1and essence-fear (of G-d).
Rashi's commentary on Talmud opens the mind and uncovers the essence-intellect.2
FOOTNOTES
1. See Supplementary Footnotes in the printed version.
2. Rashi's genius lay (in part) in his ability to express the essence of the Talmudic concept briefly, succinctly, and in terms lucid to the beginning student, yet providing illumination to the seasoned scholar. Rashi engages the core of intellect of the student, the pre-verbal cognition that may develop into depth and breadth of comprehension.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
Two Decisions
Standing at the threshold of Creation, He determined two things:
- I will be involved in every detail.
- I won’t be found in that place until they invite me in.
And so, within each detail of His creation, an awesome, infinite Creator gently knocks, awaiting us to hear, and let Him in.
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