Wednesday, February 24, 2016

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Thursday, February 25, 2016 - Today is: Thursday, Adar I 16, 5776 · February 25, 2016

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Thursday, February 25, 2016 - Today is: Thursday, Adar I 16, 5776 · February 25, 2016 - Torah Reading
Ki Tisa: Exodus 30:11 Adonai said to Moshe, 12 “When you take a census of the people of Isra’el and register them, each, upon registration, is to pay a ransom for his life to Adonai, to avoid any breakout of plague among them during the time of the census. 13 Everyone subject to the census is to pay as an offering to Adonai half a shekel [one-fifth of an ounce of silver]— by the standard of the sanctuary shekel (a shekel equals twenty gerahs). 14 Everyone over twenty years of age who is subject to the census is to give this offering to Adonai — 15 the rich is not to give more or the poor less than the half-shekel when giving Adonai’s offering to atone for your lives. 16 You are to take the atonement money from the people of Isra’el and use it for the service in the tent of meeting, so that it will be a reminder of the people of Isra’el before Adonai to atone for your lives.”
17 Adonai said to Moshe, 18 “You are to make a basin of bronze, with a base of bronze, for washing. Place it between the tent of meeting and the altar, and put water in it. 19 Aharon and his sons will wash their hands and feet there 20 when they enter the tent of meeting — they are to wash with water, so that they won’t die. Also when they approach the altar to minister by burning an offering for Adonai, 21 they are to wash their hands and feet, so that they won’t die. This is to be a perpetual law for them through all their generations.”
Daily Quote:
Whoever studies the laws of the sin-offering, it is as though he were offering a sin-offering; and whoever studies the laws of the guilt-offering, it is as though he were offering a guilt-offering[Talmud, Menachot 110a]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Ki Tisa, 5th Portion Exodus 34:1-34:9 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Exodus Chapter 34
1And the Lord said to Moses: "Hew for yourself two stone tablets like the first ones. And I will inscribe upon the tablets the words that were on the first tablets, which you broke. אוַיֹּ֤אמֶר יְהֹוָה֙ אֶל־משֶׁ֔ה פְּסָל־לְךָ֛ שְׁנֵֽי־לֻחֹ֥ת אֲבָנִ֖ים כָּרִֽאשֹׁנִ֑ים וְכָֽתַבְתִּי֙ עַל־הַלֻּחֹ֔ת אֶת־הַ֨דְּבָרִ֔ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר הָי֛וּ עַל־הַלֻּחֹ֥ת הָרִֽאשֹׁנִ֖ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר שִׁבַּֽרְתָּ:
Hew for yourself: Heb. פְּסָל לְ. He [God] showed him [Moses] a sapphire mine from within his tent, and He said to him, “The [sapphire] chips shall be yours,” and from there Moses became very wealthy. -[from Tanchuma 29, Lev. Rabbah 32:2] פסל לך: הראהו מחצב סנפירינון מתוך אהלו, ואמר לו הפסולת יהיה שלך, ומשם נתעשר משה הרבה:
Hew for yourself: You broke the first ones. You hew others for yourself. This can be compared to a king who went abroad and left his betrothed with the maidservants. Because of the immoral behavior of the maidservants, she acquired a bad reputation. Her bridesman [the person appointed to defend the bride should any problems arise] arose and tore up her marriage contract. He said, “If the king decides to kill her, I will say to him, ‘She is not yet your wife.’” The king investigated and discovered that only the maidservants were guilty of immoral behavior. He [therefore] became appeased to her. So her bridesman said to him, “Write her another marriage contract because the first one was torn up.” The king replied to him, “You tore it up. You buy yourself another [sheet of] paper, and I will write to her with my [personal] hand [writing].” Likewise, the king represents the Holy One, blessed is He. The maidservants represent the mixed multitude. The bridesman is Moses, and the betrothed of the Holy One, blessed is He, is Israel. That is why it says: “Hew for yourself.” -[from Tanchuma 30] פסל לך: אתה שברת הראשונות, אתה פסל לך אחרות. משל למלך שהלך למדינת הים והניח ארוסתו עם השפחות, מתוך קלקול השפחות יצא עליה שם רע, עמד שושבינה וקרע כתובתה, אמר אם יאמר המלך להורגה אומר לו עדיין אינה אשתך. בדק המלך ומצא, שלא היה הקלקול אלא מן השפחות, נתרצה לה. אמר לו שושבינה כתוב לה כתובה אחרת, שנקרעה הראשונה. אמר לו המלך אתה קרעת אותה, אתה קנה לך נייר אחר, ואני אכתוב לה בכתב ידי, כן המלך זה הקדוש ברוך הוא, השפחות אלו ערב רב, והשושבין זה משה, ארוסתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא אלו ישראל, לכך נאמר פסל לך:
2Be prepared for the morning, and in the morning you shall ascend Mount Sinai and stand before Me there on the top of the mountain. בוֶֽהְיֵ֥ה נָכ֖וֹן לַבֹּ֑קֶר וְעָלִ֤יתָ בַבֹּ֨קֶר֙ אֶל־הַ֣ר סִינַ֔י וְנִצַּבְתָּ֥ לִ֛י שָׁ֖ם עַל־רֹ֥אשׁ הָהָֽר:
prepared: Heb. נָכוֹן, ready. נכון: מזומן:
3No one shall ascend with you, neither shall anyone be seen anywhere on the mountain, neither shall the sheep and the cattle graze facing that mountain." גוְאִישׁ֙ לֹא־יַֽעֲלֶ֣ה עִמָּ֔ךְ וְגַם־אִ֥ישׁ אַל־יֵרָ֖א בְּכָל־הָהָ֑ר גַּם־הַצֹּ֤אן וְהַבָּקָר֙ אַל־יִרְע֔וּ אֶל־מ֖וּל הָהָ֥ר הַהֽוּא:
No one shall ascend with you: Since the first ones [i.e., tablets] were accompanied by loud noises, sounds, and with a multitude, the evil eye affected them. [Our conclusion is that] there is nothing better than modesty. -[from Tanchuma 30] ואיש לא יעלה עמך: הראשונות על ידי שהיו בתשואות וקולות וקהלה, שלטה בהן עין רעה, אין לך מדה יפה מן הצניעות:
4So he [Moses] hewed two stone tablets like the first ones, and Moses arose early in the morning and ascended Mount Sinai as the Lord had commanded him, and he took two stone tablets in his hand. דוַיִּפְסֹ֡ל שְׁנֵֽי־לֻחֹ֨ת אֲבָנִ֜ים כָּרִֽאשֹׁנִ֗ים וַיַּשְׁכֵּ֨ם משֶׁ֤ה בַבֹּ֨קֶר֙ וַיַּ֨עַל֙ אֶל־הַ֣ר סִינַ֔י כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֛ר צִוָּ֥ה יְהֹוָ֖ה אֹת֑וֹ וַיִּקַּ֣ח בְּיָד֔וֹ שְׁנֵ֖י לֻחֹ֥ת אֲבָנִֽים:
5And the Lord descended in the cloud and stood with him there, and He called out in the name of the Lord. הוַיֵּ֤רֶד יְהֹוָה֙ בֶּֽעָנָ֔ן וַיִּתְיַצֵּ֥ב עִמּ֖וֹ שָׁ֑ם וַיִּקְרָ֥א בְשֵׁ֖ם יְהֹוָֽה:
and He called out in the name of the Lord: We render: וּקְרָא בִשְׁמָא דַיְיָ, and he called out in the name of the Lord. [from Onkelos] ויקרא בשם ה': מתרגמינן וקרא בשמא דה':
6And the Lord passed before him and proclaimed: Lord, Lord, benevolent God, Who is compassionate and gracious, slow to anger and abundant in loving kindness and truth, ווַיַּֽעֲבֹ֨ר יְהֹוָ֥ה | עַל־פָּנָיו֘ וַיִּקְרָא֒ יְהֹוָ֣ה | יְהֹוָ֔ה אֵ֥ל רַח֖וּם וְחַנּ֑וּן אֶ֥רֶךְ אַפַּ֖יִם וְרַב־חֶ֥סֶד וֶֽאֱמֶֽת:
Lord, Lord: This is God's Attribute of Compassion. [It is repeated,] once for before the person sins, and once for after he sins and repents. ה' ה': מדת הרחמים היא, אחת קודם שיחטא, ואחת אחר שיחטא וישוב:
God: Heb. אֵל. This too is an attribute of compassion [for God], and so he [the Psalmist] says: “My God, my God, why have You forsaken me?” (Ps. 22:2). One cannot say to the Divine attribute of justice, “Why have You forsaken me?” I found this in the Mechilta (Exod. 15:2). אל: אף זו מדת רחמים, וכן הוא אומר (תהלים כב ב) אלי אלי למה עזבתני, ואין לומר למדת הדין למה עזבני כך מצאתי במכילתא:
slow to anger: He puts off His anger and does not hasten to exact retribution, [hoping that] perhaps he [the sinner] will repent. ארך אפים: מאריך אפו ואינו ממהר ליפרע, שמא יעשה תשובה:
and abundant in loving-kindness: for those who need loving-kindness because they lack sufficient merits. -[from R.H. 17a] ורב חסד: לצריכים חסד, שאין להם זכיות כל כך:
and truth: to pay a good reward to those who do His will. ואמת: לשלם שכר טוב לעושי רצונו:
7preserving loving kindness for thousands, forgiving iniquity and rebellion and sin; yet He does not completely clear [of sin] He visits the iniquity of parents on children and children's children, to the third and fourth generations." זנֹצֵ֥ר חֶ֨סֶד֙ לָֽאֲלָפִ֔ים נֹשֵׂ֥א עָוֹ֛ן וָפֶ֖שַׁע וְחַטָּאָ֑ה וְנַקֵּה֙ לֹ֣א יְנַקֶּ֔ה פֹּקֵ֣ד | עֲוֹ֣ן אָב֗וֹת עַל־בָּנִים֙ וְעַל־בְּנֵ֣י בָנִ֔ים עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁ֖ים וְעַל־רִבֵּעִֽים:
preserving loving-kindness: that a person does before Him. נצר חסד: שהאדם עושה לפניו:
for thousands: For two thousand generations. לאלפים: לשני אלפים דורות:
[iniquity and rebellion]: Iniquities (עִוֹנוֹת) are intentional sins. פְּשָׁעִים are sins committed out of rebellion, which a person commits [in order] to anger [God]. -[from Yoma 36b] עון ופשע: עונות אלו הזדונות. פשעים אלו המרדים, שאדם עושה להכעיס:
yet He does not completely clear [of sin]: Heb. וְנַקֵּה לֹא יְנַקֶּה. According to its simple interpretation, it means that He does not completely overlook the iniquity but exacts retribution for it little by little. Our Rabbis, however, interpreted [this expression to mean]: He clears those who repent, but does not clear those who do not repent (from Yoma 86a, targumim). ונקה לא ינקה: לפי פשוטו משמע, שאינו מוותר על העון לגמרי, אלא נפרע ממנו מעט מעט. ורבותינו דרשו מנקה הוא לשבים ולא ינקה לשאינן שבים:
He visits the iniquity of parents on the children: when they hold onto the deeds of their parents in their hands [i.e., emulate their ways], for He already explained this in another verse, [that it means only] “of those who hate Me” (Exod. 20:5). -[from Ber. 7a] פקד עון אבות על בנים: כשאוחזים מעשה אבותיהם בידיהם, שכבר פירש במקרא אחר (שמות כ ד) לשונאי:
and fourth generations: Heb. וְעַל רִבֵּעִים, the fourth generation. Thus, the [i.e., God’s] attribute of goodness exceeds the attribute of retribution by a ratio of one to five hundred. Concerning the attribute of goodness, He says: “preserving loving-kindness for thousands.” -[from Tosefta, Sotah 4:1] ועל רבעים: דור רביעי, נמצאת מדה טובה מרובה על מדת פורענות אחת לחמש מאות, שבמדה טובה הוא אומר נוצר חסד לאלפים:
8And Moses hastened, bowed his head to the ground and prostrated himself, חוַיְמַהֵ֖ר משֶׁ֑ה וַיִּקֹּ֥ד אַ֖רְצָה וַיִּשְׁתָּֽחוּ:
And Moses hastened: When Moses saw the Shechinah passing [in front of him] and he heard the voice calling, he immediately prostrated himself. וימהר משה: כשראה משה שכינה עוברת ושמע קול הקריאה, מיד וישתחו:
9and said: "If I have now found favor in Your eyes, O Lord, let the Lord go now in our midst [even] if they are a stiff necked people, and You shall forgive our iniquity and our sin and thus secure us as Your possession." טוַיֹּ֡אמֶר אִם־נָא֩ מָצָ֨אתִי חֵ֤ן בְּעֵינֶ֨יךָ֙ אֲדֹנָ֔י יֵֽלֶךְ־נָ֥א אֲדֹנָ֖י בְּקִרְבֵּ֑נוּ כִּ֤י עַם־קְשֵׁה־עֹ֨רֶף֙ ה֔וּא וְסָֽלַחְתָּ֛ לַֽעֲו‍ֹנֵ֥נוּ וּלְחַטָּאתֵ֖נוּ וּנְחַלְתָּֽנוּ:
let the Lord go now in our midst: As You promised us, since You forgive iniquity. [Which means:] and if they are a stiff-necked people, and they rebelled against You, and You have said concerning this, “Lest I destroy you on the way” (Exod. 33:3), You [still] will forgive our iniquity, etc. There are [other instances where] כִּי [is used] instead of אִם if. ילך נא ה' בקרבנו: כמו שהבטחת, מאחר שאתה נושא עון, ואם עם קשה עורף הוא וימרו בך, ואמרת על זאת פן אכלך בדרך, אתה תסלח לעונינו. ויש כי במקום אם:
and thus secure us as Your possession: And You shall give us to Yourself as a special possession. (Other editions read: and You shall give us a special possession.) That is the [same] request of: “Then I and Your people will be distinguished” (Exod. 33:16), [meaning] that the Shechinah should not rest upon the pagan nations. ונחלתנו: ותתננו לך לנחלה מיוחדת, זו היא בקשת ונפלינו אני ועמך, שלא תשרה שכינתך על האומות:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 79 - 82
Hebrew text
English text
• Chapter 79
In this psalm, Asaph thanks God for sparing the people and directing His wrath upon the wood and stones (of the Temple). Still he cries bitterly, mourning the immense destruction: The place where the High Priest alone was allowed to enter-and only on Yom Kippur-is now so desolate that foxes stroll through it!
1. A psalm by Asaph. O God, nations have entered Your inheritance, they defiled Your Holy Sanctuary; they turned Jerusalem into heaps of rubble.
2. They have rendered the corpses of Your servants as food for the birds of heaven, the flesh of Your pious ones for the beasts of the earth.
3. They spilled their blood like water around Jerusalem, and there is no one to bury [them].
4. We became the object of disgrace to our neighbors, ridicule and scorn to those around us.
5. Until when, O Lord! Will You be angry forever? Will Your jealousy burn like fire?
6. Pour Your wrath upon the nations that do not know You, upon the kingdoms that do not call Your Name,
7. for they devoured Jacob and desolated His abode.
8. Do not recall our former sins; let Your mercies come swiftly towards us, for we have fallen very low.
9. Help us, God of our deliverance, for the sake of the glory of Your Name; save us and pardon our sins for the sake of Your Name.
10. Why should the nations say, "Where is their God?" Let there be known among the nations, before our eyes, the retribution of the spilled blood of Your servants.
11. Let the groan of the prisoner come before You; liberate those condemned to death, as befits the greatness of Your strength.
12. Repay our neighbors sevenfold into their bosom, for the disgrace with which they reviled You, O Lord.
13. And we, Your people, the flock of Your pasture, will thank You forever; for all generations we will recount Your praise.
Chapter 80
An awe-inspiring prayer imploring God to draw near to us as in days of old.
1. For the Conductor, on the shoshanim, 1 a testimony by Asaph, a psalm.
2. Listen, O Shepherd of Israel, Who leads Joseph like sheep. Appear, You Who is enthroned upon the cherubim.
3. Arouse Your might before Ephraim, Benjamin and Menashe, for it is upon You to save us.
4. Return us, O God; cause Your countenance to shine, that we may be saved.
5. O Lord, God of Hosts, until when will You fume at the prayer of Your people?
6. You fed them bread of tears, and gave them tears to drink in great measure.
7. You have made us an object of strife to our neighbors; our enemies mock to themselves.
8. Return us, O God of Hosts; cause Your countenance to shine, that we may be saved.
9. You brought a vine out of Egypt; You drove out nations and planted it.
10. You cleared space before it; it took root and filled the land.
11. Mountains were covered by its shade, and its branches became mighty cedars.
12. It sent forth its branches till the sea, and its tender shoots to the river.
13. Why did You breach its fences, so that every passerby plucked its fruit?
14. The boars of the forest ravage it, and the creepers of the field feed upon it.
15. O God of Hosts, please return! Look down from heaven and see, and be mindful of this vine,
16. and of the foundation which Your right hand has planted, and the son whom You strengthened for Yourself.
17. It is burned by fire, cut down; they perish at the rebuke of Your Presence.
18. Let Your hand be upon the man of Your right hand, upon the son of man whom You strengthened for Yourself.
19. Then we will not withdraw from You; revive us, and we will proclaim Your Name.
20. O Lord, God of Hosts, return us; cause Your countenance to shine that we may be saved.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument shaped like a shoshana, a rose (Metzudot).
Chapter 81
This psalm was chanted in the Holy Temple on Rosh Hashanah, a day on which many miracles were wrought for Israel.
1. For the Conductor, upon the gittit,1 by Asaph.
2. Sing joyously to God, our strength; sound the shofar to the God of Jacob.
3. Raise your voice in song, sound the drum, the pleasant harp, and the lyre.
4. Blow the shofar on the New Month, on the designated day of our Holy Day;
5. for it is a decree for Israel, a ruling of the God of Jacob.
6. He ordained it as a precept for Joseph when he went forth over the land of Egypt; I heard a language which I did not know.
7. I have taken his shoulder from the burden; his hands were removed from the pot.2
8. In distress you called and I delivered you; [you called] in secret, and I answered you with thunderous wonders; I tested you at the waters of Merivah, Selah.
9. Hear, My people, and I will admonish you; Israel, if you would only listen to Me!
10. You shall have no alien god within you, nor shall you bow down to a foreign deity.
11. I am the Lord your God who brought you up from the land of Egypt; open wide your mouth, [state all your desires,] and I shall grant them.
12. But My people did not heed My voice; Israel did not want [to listen to] Me.
13. So I sent them away for the willfulness of their heart, for following their [evil] design.
14. If only My people would listen to Me, if Israel would only walk in My ways,
15. then I would quickly subdue their enemies, and turn My hand against their oppressors.
16. Those who hate the Lord would shrivel before Him, and the time [of their retribution] shall be forever.
17. I would feed him [Israel] with the finest of wheat, and sate you with honey from the rock.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument crafted in Gath (Metzudot).
2.The cooking vessels used to prepare food for their captors (Rashi)
Chapter 82
This psalm admonishes those judges who feign ignorance of the law, dealing unjustly with the pauper or the orphan, while coddling the rich and pocketing their bribes.
1. A psalm by Asaph. God stands in the council of judges; among the judges He renders judgment:
2. How long will you judge wickedly, ever showing partiality toward the evildoers?
3. Render justice to the needy and the orphan; deal righteously with the poor and the destitute.
4. Rescue the needy and the pauper; deliver them from the hand of the wicked.
5. But they do not know, nor do they understand; they go about in darkness, [therefore] all the foundations of the earth tremble.
6. I said that you are angels, supernal beings, all of you;
7. but you will die as mortals, you will fall like any prince.
8. Arise, O God, judge the earth, for You possess all the nations.
---------------------
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 30
Lessons in Tanya
• English Text
Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
Video Class
• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Thursday, Adar I 16, 5776 · February 25, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 30
In ch. 29 the Alter Rebbe discussed various means of overcoming timtum halev — the state of insensitivity in which one’s heart is dull, and unresponsive to his contemplation of G‑d’s greatness. All these methods are aimed at crushing one’s spirit, whereby one crushes the cause of the timtum halev — the arrogance of the sitra achra of the animal soul.
In ch. 30, the Alter Rebbe continues this discussion by outlining another method of dealing with this problem.
עוד זאת ישים אל לבו לקיים מאמר רז״ל: והוי שפל רוח בפני כל האדם
One who suffers from timtum halev must also set his heart to fulfill the instruction of our Sages:1 “Be lowly of spirit before every man.”
Now a number of commentators have noted a difficulty in this Mishnaic dictum. For the Hebrew language distinguishes between two types of humility: the first is a feeling of inferiority in comparison with others; the second is the absence of self-glorification even while recognizing one’s superiority — the thought that his superior qualities are a G‑d-given gift, and that another man similarly endowed might in fact have invested them to better advantage.
The former type of humility is called שפלות — literally, “lowliness”, and the latter — .עניוות
Since the Mishnah employs the adjective שפל רוח , it is explicitly advocating the former type of humility, and here the difficulty arises: Why should one regard himself as being lowlier than every man, lowlier even than the lowliest sinner?
Because of this difficulty, some commentators interpret the Mishnah as saying: “Conduct yourself self-effacingly toward every man,” i.e., “Treat every man with deference, as though he were superior to you.”
The Alter Rebbe, however, objects to this interpretation, as follows:
והוי באמת לאמיתו
The wording implies: “Be thus,” and do not merely act thus, in all sincerity,
בפני כל האדם ממש, אפילו בפני קל שבקלים
in the presence of every man, even in the presence of the most worthless of worthless men (kal shebekalim).
Having rejected this interpretation, however, we remain with the original difficulty: How is one expected to regard himself as being lowlier than the lowliest sinner?
In answer, the Alter Rebbe states that the introspective Beinoni will find that he often fails to wage war against his evil inclination to the same extent as the sinner is required to wage war against his desires. Although the lapses of the Beinoni may be in seemingly inconsequential matters, they are more reprehensible than the lowly sinner’s transgressions. Thus, even theBeinoni, whose observance of the Torah and mitzvot is impeccable, can indeed regard himself as being lowlier than literallyevery man, as the Alter Rebbe goes on to say:
והיינו על פי מאמר רז״ל: אל תדין את חבירך עד שתגיע למקומו
This can be accomplished by following the instruction of our Sages:2 “Judge not your fellow man until you have stood i.e., placed yourself in his place.”
כי מקומו גורם לו לחטוא
For it is literally his “place” i.e., his physical environment that causes him to sin,
להיות פרנסתו לילך בשוק כל היום ולהיות מיושבי קרנות, ועיניו רואות כל התאוות, והעין רואה והלב חומד
since his livelihood requires him to go about the market-place all day, and whenever he is not thus engaged he is of those who sit at the street-corners. Thus his eyes see all sorts of temptation; and “‘what the eyes see, the heart desires.”
ויצרו בוער כתנור בוערה מאופה, כמו שכתוב בהושע: הוא בוער כאש להבה וגו׳
Additionally it may be his spiritual “place”, the nature of his evil impulse, that leads him to sin: his evil nature burns like a baker’s fiery oven, which is heated with greater frequency and intensity than a domestic oven, as it is written inHoshea:3 “It burns like a flaming fire.”
מה שאין כן מי שהולך בשוק מעט, ורוב היום יושב בביתו
It is different, however, with him who goes about but little in the market-place, and most of the day he is at home rather than at the street-corners, and he therefore encounters less temptation.
וגם אם הולך כל היום בשוק, יכול להיות שאינו מחומם כל כך בטבעו
Even if he does go about the market-place all day, so that his physical “place” is the same as that of the kal shebekalim, yet it may be that his spiritual “place” is different, in that he is not so passionate by nature, and is therefore not as greatly tempted by the sights of the market-place.
כי אין היצר שוה בכל נפש: יש שיצרו כו׳, כמו שכתוב במקום אחר
For the evil impulse is not the same in everyone. One person’s nature may be more passionate, and the other’s less so, as explained elsewhere.4
But if the misdeeds of the kal shebekalim are indeed attributable to his environment and to his passionate nature, why does he deserve his derogatory appelation? To this the Alter Rebbe replies:
FOOTNOTES
1.Avot 4:10.
2.Ibid. 2:4.
3.See Hoshea 7:4, 6.
4.See Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 2b.
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Thursday, Adar I 16, 5776 · February 25, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 187
Consuming a Mixture of Meat and Milk
"You shall not boil a kid in its mother milk"—Exodus 34:26.
It is forbidden to consume a mixture of meat and milk.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Consuming a Mixture of Meat and Milk
Negative Commandment 187
Translated by Berel Bell
The 187th prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating a mixture of meat and milk.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not cook meat in its mother's milk," which is repeated in order to prohibit its consumption.
Our Sages said in tractate Chulin,2 "A mixture of meat and milk — one is lashed for cooking it and one is lashed for eating it." And in tractate Makos3 they said, "One who cooks a sciatic nerve in milk on a holiday and eats it receives five sets of lashes: for eating the sciatic nerve, for cooking the sciatic nerve, for cooking a mixture of meat and milk, for eating a mixture of meat and milk, and for making a fire." There they also say, "Delete 'making a fire' and add '[burning] sanctified wood,' which is prohibited by the verse,4 "Burn their Asherah trees...Do not do this to G‑d your L‑rd."
Our5 Sages said in tractate Chulin,6 "The Torah expressed the prohibition against eating [meat and milk] with the word 'cook' in order to teach that just as one is lashed for cooking, one is lashed for eating." And they said the following about meat and milk in the second chapter of Pesachim:7 "The Torah did not explicitly write the prohibition of eating in order to teach that one is lashed even if it was eaten without enjoyment."8 Remember this.
This is the appropriate place to point out an important idea which has not yet mentioned — that G‑d's statement, "Do not cook meat in its mother's milk," is repeated in the Torah three times.9 Those who passed down the Oral Tradition say that each prohibition has a different implication. They explained,10 "One is to prohibit eating, one to prohibit having benefit, and one to prohibit cooking."
Someone could possibly challenge me as follows: Why did you count eating and cooking as two separate mitzvos and not count having benefit as a third mitzvah? The questioner must know that having benefit cannot be counted as a separate mitzvah since it and eating are the same idea, since eating is just one type of benefit. G‑d's statement that a certain thing may not be eaten is just giving one example of benefit, meaning that one may not have any benefit, not by eating it or in any other way. This is seen from the statement of our Sages,11 "Everywhere it says, "lo socheil" or "lo soch'lu" ("Do not eat"), both eating and other forms of benefit are prohibited, until the Torah specifically states [that one may have other types of benefit] as it did with neveilah." In that case the Torah says that benefit is allowed, as seen from G‑d's statement,12 "You may give it to the resident alien in your settlements so that he can eat it, or you may sell it to a non-Jew."
According to this principle, eating and having other forms of benefit cannot be counted as two separate mitzvos. And if we counted them as separate mitzvos in the case of meat and milk, we would also have to do so in the cases of chometz, orlah, and kilai hakerem, with all four mitzvos having separate prohibitions for other types of benefit. In these cases having benefit is not counted and only the prohibition of eating is counting, with benefit being included, in accordance with the principle we explained — the same applies in the case of meat and milk.
Only one last question could be asked: Since — as our Sages (may they rest in peace) said — the prohibition of having benefit is self-understood from that of eating, why was it necessary to write a third prohibition to prohibit having benefit, as we explained above?
The answer is based on the fact that for meat and milk the Torah does not actually use the expression "Do not eat," which would have prohibited both eating and other forms of benefit. A separate statement was therefore necessary in order to prohibit having benefit. And we already mentioned the reason why the Torah didn't mention "eating" meat and milk — because anytime "eating" is prohibited, one is guilty only if he benefits from the eating. But if he opened his mouth and swallowed something prohibited [without tasting it], or ate it when it was so hot that it burned his throat and caused him pain when he swallowed it, etc. — then he is exempt [from punishment]. but meat and milk is an exception, and he is culpable for eating it even if he derived no benefit, as mentioned by our Sages.13 The same applies to kilai hakerem, as we will explain later.14 Understand all these principles and remember them.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 8th chapter of tractate Chulin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 34:26.
2.114a.
3.21a.
4.Deut. 12:3-4.
5.After proving that the repetition actually denotes two separate mitzvos, the Rambam now gives several explanations why the Torah should have said, "Do not cook," when it meant "Do not eat."
6.Ibid.
7.25a.
8.See the end of this mitzvah, where the Rambam brings several examples.
9.Ex. 23:19. 34:26. Deut. 14:21.
10.Mechilta, parshas Mishpatim.
11.Pesachim 21a.
12.Deut. 14:21.
13.Pesachim, ibid.
14.N193.
     -------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 186
Cooking a Mixture of Meat and Milk
"You shall not boil a kid in its mother milk "—Exodus 23:19.
It is forbidden to cook a mixture of meat and milk.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Cooking a Mixture of Meat and Milk
Negative Commandment 186
Translated by Berel Bell
The 186th prohibition is that we are forbidden from cooking a mixture of meat and milk.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not cook meat in its mother's milk."
One who cooks them together, even without eating them, is punished by lashes, as explained in many Talmudic passages.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 23:19.
     -------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 189
Bread from the New Harvest
"And you shall not eat bread, roasted grain or fresh grain..."—Leviticus 23:14.
It is forbidden to partake of bread made of the new season's harvest before the 16th of Nissan has passed.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Bread from the New Harvest
Negative Commandment 189
Translated by Berel Bell
The 189th prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating bread which was made from new grain before the 16th of Nissan.1
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,2 "You may not eat bread, roasted grain or fresh grain [until that day when you bring this sacrifice to your G‑d]."
One who eats a kezayis is punished by lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.When the omer offering is brought. See P44.
2.Lev. 23:14.
     ----------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 190
Roasted Grain of the New Harvest
"And you shall not eat bread, roasted grain or fresh grain..."—Leviticus 23:14.
It is forbidden to partake of roasted grain of the new season's harvest before the 16th of Nissan has passed.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Roasted Grain of the New Harvest
Negative Commandment 190
Translated by Berel Bell
 The 190th prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating roasted grain from the new crop before the 16th of Nissan.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 " 'You may not eat bread, roasted grain or fresh grain [until that day when you bring this sacrifice to your G‑d]."
One who eats a kezayis is punished by lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid.
     -----------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 191
Fresh Kernels of the New Harvest
"And you shall not eat bread, roasted grain or fresh grain until this very day"—Leviticus 23:14.
It is forbidden to partake of fresh grain kernels of the new season's harvest before the 16th of Nissan has passed.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Fresh Kernels of the New Harvest
Negative Commandment 191
Translated by Berel Bell
The 191st prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating fresh grain from the new crop before the 16th of Nissan.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 " 'You may not eat bread, roasted grain or fresh grain until that day [when you bring this sacrifice to your G‑d]."
We have already quoted the statement of our Sages,2 "One who eats bread, roasted grain and fresh grain [from the new crop before the 16th of Nissan] is guilty for each one separately." We explained this very thoroughly in the Ninth Principle which preceded this work, see there.
The details of the laws regarding the new crop (chodosh) are explained in the 6th chapter of tractate Menachos, and in many passages of tractates Shvi'is, Ma'asros and Challah.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid.
2.K'risus 5a.
     ---------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 192
Young Fruit
"For three years it shall be forbidden to you; it shall not be eaten"—Leviticus 19:23.
It is forbidden to eat orlah, the fruit of a tree the first three years after it was planted. This prohibition also applies to fruit grown in the Diaspora.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Young Fruit
Negative Commandment 192
Translated by Berel Bell
The 192nd prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating orlah [fruit which grows in a tree's first three years].
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "For three years it [the fruit] shall be a forbidden growth, and it may not be eaten."
One who eats a kezayis is punished by lashes.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Orlah.
It is a halachah l'Moshe miSinai that orlah may not be eaten outside the land of Israel; but the wording in the Written Torah refers only to the land of Israel.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 19:23.
     -------------------------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Shemita Shemita - Chapter 11 
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Shemita - Chapter 11
Halacha 1
[The portions of] Eretz Yisrael that were divided among the tribes1 can never be sold permanently, as [Leviticus 25:23] states: "The land will not be sold in perpetuity." If one sells the land in perpetuity, both [the buyer and the seller] violate a negative commandment.2 Their deeds are of no consequence,3 and the land reverts to its [original] owner in the Jubilee year.
Halacha 2
When a person sells his field for 60 years, it is not returned in the Jubilee.4 For [the only property] that returns in the Jubilee year is property that is sold without qualification or property that is sold in perpetuity.
Halacha 3
A person should not sell his home or his ancestral field even though it returns to him eventually, unless he becomes impoverished, as [Leviticus 25:25] states: "If your brother becomes indigent and sells his ancestral heritage." One is not permitted to sell [such property] and hold the money in his pocket, engage in commerce with them, or purchase utensils, servants, or livestock. [He is only allowed to] sell to provide himself with sustenance. [Nevertheless,] if one transgressed and sold [such property], the sale is valid.
Halacha 4
Judgments are made with regard to a home in accordance with the laws of a walled city,5 and with regard to a field in accordance with the laws of a field that is an ancestral heritage.6 The laws of a person who sells a field that is an ancestral heritage [require] the calculation of the years remaining until the Jubilee. Whenever [the original owner] desires to redeem the field he should make a reckoning with the purchaser with regard to the years from which he benefited from the field and reduce that from the purchase price and return the remainder.7
Halacha 5
What is implied? There remained ten years until the Jubilee and a field was sold for 100 dinar.8 The purchaser benefited from the field for three years and then the seller desired to redeem his field. He should give him 70 dinar and then [the seller] should return the field. Similarly, if he benefited from the field for six years, he should give him 40 dinar and then [the seller] should return the field. If he did not redeem it, but instead left it in the purchaser's possession until the Jubilee, and then it should return to the owner without money, as [indicated by Leviticus 25:15]: "According to the number of years of [its] crops, he will sell it to you."
Halacha 6
If he sold it to him when it was filled with produce and then he redeemed it after two years, he cannot tell him: "Return it to me filled with produce as it was when I sold it to you." Therefore if he sold it to him filled with produce before Rosh HaShanah and redeemed it after two years, the purchaser will have benefited from three harvests in those two years. Nevertheless, [the reduction of the price] is calculated only according to two years, as [implied byibid. 27:18:9 "the priest shall calculate the money...] according to the remaining years," [i.e., the calculation is made according to years,] and not according to crops.10
Halacha 7
The shoots, the twigs, and the fruits from the wild fig trees contained within it belong to the purchaser like its other produce.11 If, however, [the branches of a tree] are cut down12 or it dries,13 they are both forbidden to benefit from it.14What should be done? It should be sold and land purchased with the proceeds. The purchaser is entitled to benefit from that land until the [original] field is redeemed from him.
Halacha 8
If a person purchases a field that is an ancestral heritage and plants trees15which increase the value [of the field], when it returns [to its original owner] in the Jubilee, we should evaluate the increase in value brought about by the trees in it and the owner of the field must pay this sum to the purchaser. [This is derived from ibid. 25:33]: "A home that was sold shall go out... [in the Jubilee]." [Implied is that the home] is returned, but not the increase in its value.
Halacha 9
When a person sells his field in the era when the Jubilee year is observed as we explained, he is not permitted to redeem it in less than two years, as [ibid.:15] states: "According to the number of years16 of [its] crops, he will sell it to you." Even if the purchaser was willing [to return it earlier], it is forbidden, as [the same verse] states: "According to the number of years17 after the Jubilee shall you purchase it from your colleague." [The purchaser must maintain possession for] at least two years from the date of the sale.18
Halacha 10
The purchaser must benefit from two crops in these two years and then [the seller] may redeem it, for it is written "years of its crops." Therefore if one of the two years were the Sabbatical year19 or a year of windblast or blight,20they are not included in the reckoning.
Halacha 11
If, however, the purchaser left it fallow one year and then benefited from it in the second year or benefited from it one year and then lightly plowed it, but did not sow it in the following year, [these years] are included in the reckoning.21 If he sold it in the Jubilee itself, the sale is not binding and the money should be returned to the seller.22
Halacha 12
If he sold it one year before the Jubilee, the purchaser benefits from it for a second year after the Jubilee,23 as [implied by the phrase]: "years of its crops."
Halacha 13
If he sold clefts that were filled with water or rocky [land] that was not fit to sow upon, he may redeem them in less than two years, as [implied by the phrase]: "years of its crops." One might infer that it is only a field that is fit to grow crops that is not redeemed in less than two years. [Nevertheless,] if the original owner did not redeem [this land], it returns to him in the Jubilee even though it is not fit to be sown.24
Halacha 14
If he sold [fruit-]trees,25 they may not be redeemed in less than two years, for they are fit to produce crops. If he did not redeem them, they are not returned to the owner in the Jubilee, as [implied by ibid.:27]: "he shall return to his ancestral heritage." [This excludes] trees.26
Halacha 15
If a person sold his field to one person, that person sold it to a second, the second to a third - even if there were 100 consecutive sales - in the Jubilee, it returns to its original owner, as [implied by Leviticus 27:24]: "In the Jubilee year, the field will return to the one from whom he purchased it, whose ancestral heritage it was."27
Halacha 16
If [the owner] sold it to the first purchaser for 100 dinarim and [the latter] sold it to the second for 200, should the original owner desire to redeem it, he makes a reckoning only with the first purchaser, as [ibid. 25:27] states: "[And return the remainder] to the man to whom he sold it."28 If [the owner] sold it to a person for 200 and [the latter] sold it for 100, [the owner] makes a reckoning with the final [purchaser].29
Similarly, if he sold the field for 100 and it increased in value30 in the possession of the purchaser until it was appropriate to be sold for 200, the reckoning should be made according to the purchase price. If he sold it for 200 and its value diminished31 and it is now fit to be sold for 100, the reckoning should be made according to its present value. [The general principle is:] We always augment the legal power of the seller of an ancestral heritage and weaken the legal power of the purchaser.
Halacha 17
When a person sells a field that is an ancestral heritage, but he also possesses other fields and sells some of those other fields to redeem [his ancestral heritage] that he sold, his [request to redeem the field] is not heeded, for [ibid.:26] states: "And he attained enough to redeem it." [We can infer that] he must attain something that was not accessible to him at the time he sold it. Similarly, if he borrowed [money] to redeem [the field], his [request] is not heeded, for that verse states: "And he acquired." [Implied is that he must obtain the means on his own], not through a loan.
Halacha 18
If he attained a small amount [of resources] and desired to redeem half the field he sold, his [request] is not heeded, for that verse states: "enough to redeem it." Either he redeems the entire [field] or he does not redeem at all.
If a relative desired to redeem it, he may, as [ibid.:25] states: "And his redeemer who is related to him shall come...."32
Halacha 19
When a person gives his field away as a present, it returns to him in the Jubilee, as [ibid.:13] states: "Each man shall return to his ancestral heritage." This includes one who gave [it away as] a present.33
Halacha 20
Brothers who divide [an inheritance] are considered as purchasers34 and each one should return his portion to the other in the Jubilee, but their division is not nullified.35 Similarly, a firstborn36 and one who performs yibbum with his brother's wife,37 return the portion that they received in the Jubilee and take another portion instead of it.
Halacha 21
[Different rules apply with regard to a husband] who inherits his wife's [property]. Although a husband's inheritance of this property is a Rabbinic ordinance,38our Sages reinforced their decree as if it were of Scriptural origin and he is not required to return it [to the women's family] in the Jubilee year.39If he inherited a [family] cemetery from her, he should return it to her family members lest this blemish [the reputation of] the family.40 They should pay him its worth after deducting the value of his wife's grave, for he is obligated to bury her.41
FOOTNOTES
1.
For the entire passage speaks about an "ancestral heritage," i.e., land given to a person's ancestors when the land was originally divided among the tribes (Radbaz). This excludes Jerusalem which was never divided among the tribes (Rambam LeAm).
2.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 227) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 339) include the commandment for the land not to be sold in perpetuity among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
3.
For whenever a person acts in violation of Torah Law, his deeds are of no avail (Temurah 4b). Since their deeds are of no consequence, they are not punished by lashes (Mishneh LiMelech).
4.
Even though a Jubilee year will definitely fall within the span of the sale.
5.
As explained in the following chapter. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 139 andSefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 3410) include the commandment to carry out the laws pertaining to a walled city among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
6.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 138) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 340) include the command to enable a field to be redeemed or for it to be returned to its owner in the Jubilee year among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
7.
As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, the sale of such a field is considered as a rental agreement until the Jubilee year, with the purchase price being divided equally among the years remaining until the Jubilee. Thus each year has a set value. If the seller wants to redeem his field, he must pay back the money for the remaining years.
8.
Thus the right to use the field was sold for 10 dinar a year.
9.
Although this verse is speaking about the consecration of a field and its redemption from the Temple treasury, Arichin 29b-30a explains that the same principles should be applied to a sale to a private person.
10.
As one might conclude from Leviticus 25:15as cited in the previous halachah.
11.
For these are considered as temporary benefits which the field regularly produces.
12.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 2:5). See also the Kessef Mishneh to Chapter 1, Halachah 15.
13.
And thus it has value only to be cut down as firewood.
14.
The purchaser is forbidden to benefit from it alone, because the tree is considered as part of the permanent features of the field and thus was not included in the original sale. On the other hand, the owner cannot take the entire benefit for himself, for the purchaser is entitled to benefit from it for the duration of his ownership of the property.
15.
If, however, the body of the land itself increases in value, that increase is not granted to the purchaser. See Halachah 16.
16.
The use of the plural form implies that the sale must be for at least two years.
17.
If, however, the body of the land itself increases in value, that increase is not granted to the purchaser. See Halachah 16.
18.
I.e., he cannot redeem it until the same date two years later. We do not count the years as beginning from Rosh HaShanah, but from the date of the sale.
19.
When it is forbidden to sow a field.
20.
Which prevented crops from growing in the entire land (Bava Metzia 106a).
21.
Since crops could have grown during those years, and he chose not to sow the land on his own, they are considered "years of its crops." The Kessef Mishneh states that this law also applies if the purchaser leaves it fallow for two years. The Radbaz, however, does not accept this conclusion.
22.
Arachin 29b explains that this is a logical conclusion. If the advent of the Jubilee causes a field that was sold to be returned to its original owners, it will certainly prevent the sale of one that was not sold as of yet from taking effect.
23.
As implied by the phrase "years of its crops," a sale must take effect for at least two years. Hence, the Jubilee does not nullify this sale and the land remains his for one year after the sale. Kin'at Eliyahu notes that since a Jubilee is always preceded by a Sabbatical year (when the purchaser cannot benefit from it), the land must have been sold two years before the Jubilee.
24.
For such land is still called "his ancestral heritage" (Arachin 14b).
25.
The bracketed addition is based on the gloss of the Radbaz who explains that this law would not apply to non-fruit trees. They could be redeemed within the two years. He also explains that the seller must have specifically stated that the sale does not include the land. Otherwise, a certain amount of land is automatically included as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 24:1-2. See also the notes to Hilchot Arichin 4:25.
26.
For the term "ancestral heritage" implies land.
27.
Although the verse is speaking about the return of a purchased field that was consecrated, similar principles apply even if the field was not consecrated.
28.
That purchaser must reimburse the person to whom he sold the field. Although the profit of the purchaser/seller is minimized according to the number of years remaining to the Jubilee, he still retains the profit for the years the sale was viable.
29.
I.e., the owner need not compensate the purchaser/seller for his loss.
30.
This is referring to an increase that comes about because of market fluctuations and not as a result of improvements made by the purchaser as indicated by Halachah 8 (Radbaz).
31.
Here also, the Rambam is speaking about a decrease as a result of market fluctuations. Needless to say, the same law would apply if the value of the land was reduced because of the purchaser's actions.
32.
The classic example of this is the redemption of the field sold by Elimelech by his relative, Boaz, as described at the conclusion of the book of Ruth.
33.
As the Radbaz mentions, in several sources (e.g., Chapter 12, Halachah 4), we find the principle that a present is considered as a sale. [Kin'at Eliyahu asks: If so, why is the prooftext necessary?]
34.
I.e., we consider it as if they sold the share the other received in return for the share that they received. We do not apply the principle of bereirah, i.e., consider the portion received as the portion destined for them at the outset (Bechorot 52b).
35.
I.e., there is no need to nullify the entire division and recalculate. Instead, it is sufficient to merely exchange portions (Kessef Mishneh).
36.
Who receives a double share of the inheritance. From the wording ofDeuteronomy 21:17, our Sages conclude that this double portion is given to the firstborn as a present. Hence, since a present is considered as a sale, the share is returned and the inheritance redivided [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 9:11)].
37.
And is therefore given his brother's share of the inheritance (Hilchot Nachalot 3:7). He is also called a "firstborn" (Deuteronomy 25:6)and thus the concepts mentioned in the previous note apply to him.
38.
See Hilchot Ishut 12:3; Hilchot Nachalot 1:8, 6:8.
39.
I.e., he is considered as a single heir and not as a purchaser.
40.
As the Maggid Mishneh states in his gloss toHilchot Mechirah 24:17, it is an embarrassment for the members of a family that their relatives will not be buried in the family plot.
41.
See Hilchot Ishut 12:2,4.
---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 14, Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 15, Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 16 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 14
Halacha 1
The minimum measure for which one is liable for partaking of any of the forbidden foods in the Torah is [the size of] an average olive.1 [This applies] whether for lashes, kerait2 or death at the hand of heaven.3We already explained4 that anyone who is liable for kerait or death at the hand of heaven for [partaking of] forbidden food, should receive lashes.
Halacha 2
This measure, as all the other measurements, is a halachah conveyed by Moses from Sinai. It is forbidden by Scriptural Law to eat even the slightest amount of a forbidden substance. Nevertheless, one receives lashes only for an olive-sized portion. If one partakes of any amount less than this measure, he is given stripes for rebellious conduct.5
Halacha 3
The measure of "the size of an olive" that we mentioned does not include what is between one's teeth.6 What is between one's gums,7 however, is included in what one swallows, for his palate benefited from an olive-sized portion of food.
Even if one ate half of an olive-sized portion, vomited it, and then ate the same portion that was half the size of an olive that he vomited, he is liable.8 For the liability is for the benefit one's palate receives from a forbidden substance.
Halacha 4
When an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat, a nevelah, piggul,9notar,10 or the like was left in the sun and was reduced in volume, one who eats it is not liable.11
If, afterwards, one left it in the rain and it expanded, one is liable for eitherkerait or lashes.12 If, originally, it was smaller than an olive-sized portion and then expanded to the size of an olive, it is forbidden to partake of it, but one is not liable for lashes for it.13
Halacha 5
We already explained14 that all of the forbidden substances in the Torah are not combined with each other to reach the minimum measure of the size of an olive with the exception of the meat of a nevelah and the meat of a trefe15 and the prohibitions involving a nazirite,16 as explained in the appropriate places. The five types of grain,17 their flour, and the dough made from them all can be combined with each other to reach the minimum measure of the size of an olive with regard to the prohibition against leaven on Pesach, the prohibition against partaking of chadash before the offering of the omer,18 and the prohibitions involving the second tithe and the terumot.
Halacha 6
It appears to me that all [produce] from which we are required to separateterumah and tithes can be combined to reach the minimum measure of the size of an olive with regard to [the prohibition against] tevel because a single prohibition is involved. To what can the matter be compared? To [meat from] the corpse of an ox, the corpse of a sheep, and the corpse of a deer which can be combined to reach the minimum measure of the size of an olive as we explained.19
Halacha 7
When a person partakes of a large amount of food from a forbidden substance, he is not liable for lashes or kerait for every olive-sized portion he eats. Instead, he is liable once for all he ate.20 If, however, the witness gave him a warning for every olive-sized portion, he is liable for every warning even though he ate it in one sitting, without interruption.21
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when] a person partakes of a barley-corn or mustard-seed-sized portion of any forbidden food, waits, and then partakes of another mustard-seed-sized portion whether inadvertently or intentionally. If he waited from the beginning to the end the time it takes to eat a portion of bread with relish the size of three eggs22 [or less], everything [he ate] is combined.23 He is liable for kerait, lashes, or a sacrifice as if he ate an olive-sized portion at one time. If he waits a longer time from the beginning to the end, [the small portions] are not combined. Since he completed the olive-sized portion only in a longer time than k'dei achilat p'ras, he is not liable even if he did not wait at all, but continued eating mustard-seed-sized portion after mustard-seed-sized portion.
Halacha 9
Similar [laws apply when] a person who drinks a revi'it24of ordinary gentile wine little by little, swallows liquefied leaven on Pesach or fat little by little, or drinks blood25 little by little. If he waits from the beginning until the end the time it takes to drink a revi'it, [all of the sipping] is combined.26 If not, it is not combined.27
Halacha 10
One is not liable for partaking of any of the prohibited foods unless one partakes of them in a manner in which one derives satisfaction with the exception of a mixture of meat and milk and mixed species grown in a vineyard. [The rationale is that with regard to these prohibitions, the Torah] does not use the term "eating,"28but instead conveys the prohibition against partaking of them in other terms. [With regard to meat and milk, it uses] the term "cooking" and [with regard to mixed species grown in a vineyard, it uses the term] "become hallowed."29 [This implies] that they are forbidden even when one does not derive satisfaction.
Halacha 11
What is implied? When one liquefied fat and swallowed it when it was so hot that his throat was burned from it, he eat raw fat,30 mixed bitter substances like gall or wormwood into wine31 or into a pot [where meat from] a nevelah [is cooking] and he partook of it while they were bitter,32 or he ate a forbidden foot after it became decayed, spoiled, and unfit for human consumption, he is not liable.33 If, by contrast, he mixed a bitter substance into a a pot [where meat and milk are cooking] or into wine from a vineyard where mixed species are growing and partook of it, he is liable.
Halacha 12
When a person partakes of one of the forbidden food in a frivolous manner or as one who is acting purposelessly, he is liable. Even though he did not intend to actually partake of the food, since he derived pleasure, it is considered as if he intended to actually partake of the food.34 When, [by contrast,] a person is forced to derive [forbidden] pleasure, if he focuses his intent on it, he is liable. If he does not, it is permitted.35
Halacha 13
When a person partakes of a forbidden food because of desire or because of hunger, he is liable.36 If he was wandering in the desert and he has nothing to eat but a forbidden substance, it is permitted, because of the danger to his life.37
Halacha 14
When a pregnant woman smells a forbidden food [and is overcome by desire for it],38 e.g., consecrated meat or ham, she should be given some of the gravy. If her mind becomes settled, that is commendable. If not, we feed her less than the forbidden measure39 [of the meat itself]. If her mind does not become settled, we feed her until her mind becomes settled.
Halacha 15
Similarly, when a sick person smells food that contains vinegar or the like, [i.e.,] substances that arouse a soul's [desire], he is governed by the same laws that apply to a pregnant woman.40
Halacha 16
When a person is overcome by severe hunger,41 he may be fed forbidden food immediately until his eyesight clears. We do not seek permitted food. Instead, we hurry to feed him what is available.42
We feed him substances bound by more lenient prohibitions first. If his sight clears, that is sufficient. If not, we feed him the substances bound by the more severe prohibitions.
Halacha 17
What is implied? If there is tevel43 and a nevelah, we feed him the nevelahfirst. {The rationale is] that [partaking of] tevel is punishable by death [at the hand of heaven].44If [the choice is between] a nevelah and produce that grows on its own during the Sabbatical year, we feed him the produce, for it is forbidden [only] by Rabbinic decree, as will be explained in Hilchot Shemitah.45
If [the choice is between] tevel and produce grown during the Sabbatical year,46 we feed him the produce grown during the Sabbatical year.47 If [the choice is between] tevel and terumah, if it is impossible to make the tevelacceptable,48 we feed him the tevel. [The rationale is] that it is not sanctified as terumah is. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 18
We have already explained49 that one prohibition does not take effect when another prohibition is in effect unless both of the prohibitions take effect at the same time,50 the latter prohibition forbids additional entities,51 or the [latter] prohibition encompasses other entities.52
Accordingly, [it is possible] for there to be a person who eats one olive-sized portion of forbidden food and yet, he will be liable for five [sets of] lashes for it, provided he was warned for all five prohibitions that accumulated.
What is implied? For example, on Yom Kippur, a person who was ritually impure ate an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat from a consecrated animal that remained after its prescribed time.53He is liable for lashes because he partook of forbidden fat, notar, because he ate on Yom Kippur,54 because he partook of consecrated food while ritually impure, and because he derived benefit from consecrated food, thus [violating the prohibition of] me'ilah.
Halacha 19
Why do these prohibitions fall on each other? Because although it was forbidden to partake of the fat of this animal, it was permitted to benefit from it. Once he consecrated it, it became forbidden to benefit from the fat. Since the prohibition to benefit from it was added to it, the prohibition against [benefiting from] consecrated articles became added to it.
Although this fat was forbidden to an ordinary person, it was still permitted to be offered to the One on High. When it became notar, since it became forbidden to the One on High, [that] prohibition was added to an ordinary person.
This person was permitted to partake of the meat of the animal,55 although he was forbidden to partake of its fat. When he became impure, since its meat became forbidden an additional prohibition was added to its fat. When Yom Kippur commenced, all food became included [in the prohibition], since this prohibition affects non-consecrated food, it adds a prohibition to this fat. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The measure of "the size of an olive" cannot be determined by measuring an average olive today. Instead, this refers to a measure established by our Sages and is the subject of debate by later Rabbinic authorities. ThePri Chadash (Orach Chayim 486) states that the Rambam considers an olive as one-third the size of an egg with its shell (17.3 grams according to Shiurei Torah 3:13, 24 grams according to Chazon Ish). Tosafot, Chullin 103a, differs and defines an olive as one-half the size of a shelled egg (25.6 grams according to Shiurei Torah 3:12, 36 grams according to Chazon Ish). In practice, with regard to questions of Scriptural Law, the more stringent opinion should be followed. With regard to questions of Rabbinic Law, one may rely on the more lenient view.
2.
Literally, the soul's being cut off. This involves premature death in this world (before the age of 50, Mo'ed Kattan 28a) and the soul not meriting a portion in the world to come (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1).
3.
Premature death before the age of 60 (Mo'ed Kattan, loc. cit.).
4.
See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 1:7.
5.
The punishment given for the violation of Rabbinic commandments or Scriptural Laws for which there is no specific punishment outlined.
6.
Shiurei Torah suggests including slightly more than 3 grams in the measure of an olive-sized portion to compensate for this factor.
7.
Even though it was not swallowed.
8.
This refers to a situation in which the person ate the vomited food a second time shortly after he ate it the first time. To explain: For a person to be liable, he must eat not only a specific amount (an olive-sized portion), but he must eat it in a specific time: k'dai achilas p'ras, as explained in Halachah 8.
9.
A sacrifice which the priest thought to have its blood or limbs offered on the altar after the time when they should be offered or have its meat eaten after the time it should be eaten (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim13:1).
10.
Sacrificial meat that remained after the time when it is required to be eaten (op cit. 13:3).
11.
As Menachot 54b states, the size of a portion of food at the time one partakes of it determines whether he is liable or not.
12.
For, at the outset, it was the size of an olive.
13.
For its natural size is not an olive.
14.
Chapter 4, Halachot 16 and 17.
15.
For a trefe is the beginning of a nevelah, as stated there.
16.
For they are all grape products, as stated inHilchot Nazirut 5:3.
17.
Wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt. Since they are all grain, they are combined to reach the minimum measure.
18.
See Chapter 10 for a definition of this prohibition.
19.
Chapter 4, Halachah 7.
The Ra'avad qualifies the Rambam's statement, maintaining that it applies only when the types of produce consumed have a similar taste. The Radbaz, however, justifies the Rambam's view.
20.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir6:4), the Rambam states that this leniency applies only with regard to an earthly court. God, however, holds the person liable for each forbidden measure he eats.
21.
For the warnings create a distinction between the food eaten before and afterwards.
22.
Our translation is based on Hilchot Tumat Tzara'at 16:6.
23.
This is one of the fundamental concepts with regard to the mitzvot and prohibitions concerning eating. Just as there is a minimum amount, a k'zayit (an olive-sized portion), which one must eat for the mitzvah or prohibition to be fulfilled; so, too, there is a minimum measure of time, k'dei achilat p'ras, in which that amount of food must be eaten. If one takes a longer time to eat the prohibited food, his eating is not significant, like one who eats less than the minimum amount.
Rashi (Pesachim 44a ) offers a different view and maintains that this measure is defined as the time it takes to eat four eggs.Shiurei Torah mentions several different opinions from between four minutes until nine minutes for this figure.
24.
The standard liquid measure that applies with regard to the Torah's mitzvot and prohibitions.
25.
The commentaries have noted that in Chapter 6, Halachah 1, the Rambam mentioned that the minimum measure for which one is liable for partaking of blood is an olive-sized portion and question why in this context, a revi'it is mentioned. It is possible to explain that here the subjects are slightly different, for we are not speaking about the minimum amount for which one is liable, but rather the minimum time period. The commentaries, however, do not see this as a significant enough point.
26.
For if one prolongs his drinking over a longer period, his deed is not considered significant.
27.
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh note that other authorities do not accept the concept of "the time it takes to drink a revi'it" and even with regard to prohibitions that involve drinking speak of k'dei achilat p'ras. Indeed, the Rambam himself mentions that measure with regard to drinking within the context of the laws of ritual purity (Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTumah.
The Radbaz explains the Rambam's ruling here, stating that with regard to the prohibitions against eating, what is important is that one feel significant satisfaction. If he prolongs his drinking longer than that, he will not feel satisfaction from it. See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Shivitat Esor 2:4 which discusses this issue.
28.
When, however, the Torah uses the term "eating," that implies that one derives satisfaction in the ordinary manner one derives benefit from food (see the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Chapter 8, Halachah 16). Only then is one liable. Needless to say, it is forbidden by Rabbinic Law to partake of a forbidden substance even if one does not derive benefit.
29.
As explained in Chapter 10, Halachah 6, "becom[ing] hallowed" means being "set apart and forbidden."
30.
Which does not have a pleasant taste.
31.
This concept also applies with regard to wine used as a libation, for, Deuteronomy 32:38, the prooftext from which this prohibition is derived, also mentions "eating" [Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 111)].
32.
I.e., even if the unappetizing element of the food is not dependent on them, but on a foreign substance.
33.
This refers to the concept referred to asnotein taam lifgam, giving an unfavorable taste. Our Rabbis extend this concept further, explaining that any pot which has not been used for non-kosher food for a day no longer causes the pot to be forbidden according to Scriptural Law, because the forbidden food has already lost its flavor [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 103:5)]. See also Chapter 15, Halachot 28-31.
34.
Generally, a person who violates a transgression without intent is not liable (Shabbat 22a). Here, however, an exception is made, because the person is deriving physical benefit.
35.
Even though he derived pleasure, since he did not act voluntarily and did not desire the forbidden pleasure, he is not held liable.
36.
Although either his desire or hunger causes him pain, he is not considered as if he was compelled to partake of the forbidden food.
37.
As stated in Hilchot Yesodei Torah 5:6, all prohibitions are superceded by danger to life without the exception of idolatry, murder, and forbidden sexual relations.
38.
A pregnant woman may have severe cravings for food with an attractive aroma. Our Sages feared that if she were not given some of the food she desired, she might miscarry and perhaps even her own life would be endangered. See Yoma 82b.
39.
I.e., less than an olive-sized portion as stated in Halachah 1. Since one is not liable unless one partakes of an olive-sized portion within k'dei achilat pras (see Halachah 8), if we do not fear the situation is overly dangerous, the woman can be fed this minimal amount in intervals. See Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:9, Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 617:2).
40.
Since he is sick, his condition is precarious and we are concerned that his craving may place his life in danger. See Ketubot 61a.
41.
This refers to a state of infirmity that overcomes a person because of lack of nourishment. He becomes dizzy, faint, and unable to focus his eyes.
42.
Out of fear that the delay may be crucial to his life. Similarly, we do not try first giving him the gravy and then smaller portions as in the previous halachot (Kessef Mishneh). Needless to say, if kosher food is available, there is no reason to give him non-kosher food.
43.
Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated.
44.
This applies when the terumot have not been separated from the produce. If theterumot have been separated, but the tithes have not been separated, the prohibition is of the same degree of severity as partaking of a nevelah. See Chapter 10, Halachot 19-20.
45.
Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 4:2.
46.
I.e., produce grown in the Sabbatical year that remains after the time when it is supposed to be disposed of (Rashi, Yoma83a).
47.
For the prohibition against eating produce cultivated in the Sabbatical year stems from a positive commandment. This is considered as more lenient than a prohibition stemming from a negative commandment, because there is no punishment involved.
48.
Some interpret this as referring to a situation where there is no one who knows how to separate the terumot present. Rashi (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to a situation where the sick person must eat the entire amount of produce available. It is preferable not to separate the terumot. For even though he will be eating less of a forbidden substance, the prohibition will be more severe because terumah is sanctified.
49.
Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 17:8-9.
50.
Chapter 5, Halachah 5, gives an example of this concept. When a person rips a limb from a living animal which causes the animal to become trefe, he is considered to have transgressed two prohibitions: the prohibition against eating flesh from a living animal and the prohibition against partaking of an animal that is trefe, for both prohibitions take effect at the same time.
51.
This concept is exemplified in this and the following halachah. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2, and Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 17:9-10.
52.
This concept is exemplified in Chapter 8, Halachah 6: A person who partakes of a gid hanesheh, a sciatic nerve, of an animal which is trefe is liable for two transgressions. Since when the animal became trefe, its entire body became encompassed in the prohibition, that prohibition also encompasses the gid even though it was prohibited beforehand.
53.
Every sacrifice of which we are allowed to partake has a certain time span - a day and a night or two days and a night - in which we are allowed to partake of it. After that time span, it becomes forbidden because of the prohibition referred to as notar (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:10.
54.
The Rambam also states this concept inHilchot Shegagot 6:4. There he emphasizes that to be liable for eating on Yom Kippur, one must add another small portion of food. For one is not liable for eating on Yom Kippur unless he consumes a date-sized portion. That additional portion, however, need not involve all these different prohibitions.
55.
Before it became notar.

Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 15

Halacha 1
When a forbidden substance becomes mixed with a permitted substance of another type, [it causes it to become forbidden] if its flavor can be detected. When [a forbidden substance becomes mixed with a permitted substance of] the same type and it is impossible to detect [the forbidden substance] by its flavor,1 its presence becomes nullified if there is a majority [of the permitted substance].2
Halacha 2
What is implied? When the fat of the kidneys3 falls into beans and becomes dissolved, the beans should be tasted.4 If the taste of fat cannot be detected, they are permitted. If [not only] the taste, [but also] the substance of the fat is present, they are forbidden according to Scriptural Law. If the flavor could be detected, but there is no substance, they are forbidden by Rabbinic Law.5
Halacha 3
What is meant by its substance? For example, there was enough forbidden fat for there to be an olive-sized portion [of fat] in each portion the size of three eggs from the mixture. If a person eats a portion of beans the size of three eggs, he is liable for lashes for they contain an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat, for [not only] the flavor, [but also] the substance of [the forbidden fat] is present.6 If one eats less than a portion the size of three eggs [of the mixture], one is liable for stripes for rebellious conduct as prescribed by Rabbinic Law.
Similarly, if there was less than an olive-sized portion of [forbidden] fat in every portion the size of three eggs, even if the flavor of fat is detectable and he eats the entire pot, he is not liable for lashes7 [as prescribed by Scriptural Law], only stripes for rebellious conduct.
Halacha 4
[The following laws apply when] the fat of the kidneys8 falls into the fat from the fat tail9 and the entire [mixture] becomes dissolved.10 If there is twice as much fat from the fat tail as fat of the kidneys, the entire mixture is permitted according to Scriptural Law.11 Even when a piece of [meat from] a nevelahbecomes mixed with two pieces of [meat from] a ritually slaughter animal, everything is permitted according to Scriptural Law.12 Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, everything13 is forbidden until the forbidden substance will be nullified because of the tiny proportion [of the entire mixture it represents] to the extent that it is not significant and it is as if it does not exist, as will be explained.14
Halacha 5
Into what quantity [of a permitted substance] must a forbidden substance be mixed for it to be considered nullified because of its tiny proportion? [Each forbidden substance according to] the measure the Sages specified for it. There are substances that are nullified in a mixture 60 times its size, others in a mixture 100 times its size, and still others in a mixture 200 times its size.
Halacha 6
Thus we learn from this that [the following laws apply] with regard to all of the prohibited substances in the Torah, whether those punishable by lashes or punishable by kerait or substances from which it is forbidden to benefit that become mixed with permitted substances. If the substances are of different types, [the mixture is forbidden] if the flavor is detectable.
If the substances are of the same type and thus it is impossible to detect the flavor [of the forbidden substance], we measure [whether there was] 60, 100, or 200 [times the amount of permitted substances]. The only exceptions are wine poured as a libation to a false deity, because of the severity [of the prohibition against] worship of a false deity15 and tevel, because it can be corrected.16 For that reason, even the slightest mixture of them with a substance of their type is forbidden. If they become mixed with substances of a different type, the matter is dependent on whether their flavor is detectable.
Halacha 7
What is implied? When several barrels of wine fell over a drop of wine that was poured as a libation, the entire mixture is forbidden, as will be explained.17 Similarly, if a cup of wine which is tevel becomes nixed into a barrel [of wine], the entire [barrel] is considered tevel until the amount ofterumah and tithes that are appropriate to be separated18 are separated as will be explained in the appropriate place.19
Halacha 8
[Related concepts apply with regard to] produce of the Sabbatical year.20 If [such produce] becomes mixed with [produce of] the same type, the tiniest amount [causes the mixture to be considered bound by the laws of the produce of the Sabbatical year].21 [If it becomes mixed with produce of] another type, [the ruling depends on whether] its flavor can be detected. [Nevertheless,] it is not considered as one of the substances forbidden by Scriptural Law. For this mixture is not forbidden. Instead, one is obligated to eat the entire mixture in keeping with the holiness of the produce of the Sabbatical year, as will be explained in the appropriate place.22
Halacha 9
Although chametz on Pesach is forbidden by Scriptural Law, it is not governed by these general principles,23 for this mixture is not forbidden forever. For after Pesach, the entire mixture will be permitted, as we explained.24 Therefore the slightest amount [of chametz] causes [a mixture] to become forbidden,25 whether [it becomes mixed] with a substance of its own type or of another type.
Halacha 10
The same law26 applies when new grain becomes mixed with old grain before [the offering of] the omer. Even the tiniest amount causes [the entire mixture] to become forbidden. For there is a factor that will cause the substance to become permitted. For after [the offering of] the omer, the entire mixture is permitted.27
Similarly, whenever there is a factor that will cause the substance to become permitted, e.g., consecrated entities,28 the second tithe,29 or the like,30 our Sages did not mention a measure [in which it could be nullified]. Instead, even if one [of the forbidden substance] becomes mixed with several thousand31[times that amount of a permitted substance], it is not nullified. [The rationale is that] there is a way that the prohibition can be released.32 [This principle applies] even when the prohibition stems from Rabbinic decree, e.g., an article set aside or born on a festival.33
Halacha 11
With regard to orlah, mixed species grown in a vineyard, fat, blood, and the like, our Sages fixed a measure [that would enable mixtures to be nullified]. Similarly, our Sages fixed a measure with regard to terumot, for there is no way the can be permitted for all people.34
Halacha 12
It appears to me35 that even there is a factor that will cause a substance to become permitted, if that substance becomes mixed with a substance of a different type and its flavor is not detectable, it is permitted. The fact that there is a factor that will cause the substance to become permitted does not [cause the prohibition to be] more severe than tevel. [For tevel] can be corrected,36and yet when it [becomes mixed with a substance] of a different type, [it is permitted if] its flavor cannot be detected, as explained.37 One should not raise a question with regard to chametz on Pesach [where such leniency is not granted. A distinction can be made.] For with regard to chametz, the Torah [Exodus 12:20] states: "Do not eat any leavened substance." For this reason, [our Sages] were stringent with regard to it, as we explained.38
Halacha 13
These are the measures which the Sages established: Terumah, terumat ma'aser39 challah, and bikkurim become nullified [when the mixture is] 101 times the [original] amount. [In addition,] one must separate [a portion and give it to a priest].40 [All of these sacred foods] are combined one with the other.41Similarly, a slice of the showbread becomes nullified when mixed with slices of ordinary bread [if] the mixture is 101 times the original amount.42
What is implied? When a se'ah of flour from one of the above43- or one se'ahfrom all of them [combined] - falls into 100 se'ah of ordinary [flour] and [the flour] became mixed together,44 one should separate one se'ah from the mixture for the se'ah that fell in originally. The remainder is permitted to all people.45 If it fell into less than 100 se'ah, the entire mixture is meduma.46
Halacha 14
Orlah and mixed species grown in a vineyard become nullified [when the mixture is] 201 times the [original] amount. The [two prohibitions] are combined one with the other,47 and it is not necessary to separate any thing.48
What is implied? When a revi'it of wine which is orlah or which [came from grapes] grown together with mixed species in a vineyard - or one revi'it was combined from both prohibited substances - falls into 200 revi'iot of wine, the entire mixture is permitted. It is not necessary to separate anything. If it falls into less than 200, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire [mixture].49
Halacha 15
Why is it necessary to separate [a measure of] terumah and not a measure oforlah or mixed species from a vineyard? Because terumah is the property of the priests. Accordingly, any terumah which the priests are not concerned with, e.g., terumah from [low-grade] figs,50 carobs, and Edomite barley, need not be separated.51
Halacha 16
Why was the measure doubled for orlah and mixed species grown in a vineyard? Because it is forbidden to benefit from them.52
Why did [the Sages] choose the figure of 100 for terumot? For terumat ma'aser is one hundredth of the entire crop,53 and yet it causes the entire crop to be "sanctified,"54 as [Numbers 18:29] states: "its sacred part."55 Our Sages said: "An entity which must be separated from it sanctifies it if it returns to it.
Halacha 17
The measure for all of the other prohibitions of the Torah,56 e.g., the meat of crawling animals, teeming animals, fat, blood, and the like is sixty times [the original amount].
What is implied? When an olive-sized portion of the fat of the kidneys falls into sixty times the size of an olive of the fat from the fat tail, the entire mixture is permitted. If it falls into less than sixty [that amount], the entire mixture is forbidden. Similarly, if a portion of forbidden fat the size of a barley-corn, [the mixture] must contain permitted substances the size of sixty barley-corns.57Similar [laws apply] with regard to other prohibitions.
Similarly, if the fat of the gid hanesheh falls into a pot of meat,58we require sixty times its amount. The fat of the gid itself is included in this sum.59Although the fat of the gid is prohibited [only] by Rabbinic Law, as we explained,60 since the gid hanesheh is considered a creation in its own right,61[our Sages] ruled stringently concerning it as if it was forbidden by Scriptural Law. The gid itself is not measured and it does not cause other substances to be forbidden, because the gid does not impart flavor.62
Halacha 18
When, by contrast, an udder is cooked with meat, we require sixty times its amount and the udder is considered as part of the sum.63 [The rationale is that] since [the prohibition against] the udder is Rabbinic in origin, [our Sages] were lenient in establishing a measure.64
Halacha 19
[The following laws apply when] an egg in which a chick is found65is cooked together with eggs that are permitted. If there are 61 and it,66 they are permitted. If, however, there are only sixty [permitted eggs], the entire mixture is forbidden. [The rationale is that the chick] is a creation in its own right,67[our Sages] made a distinction and added to its [required] measure.
Halacha 20
If, however, the egg of an non-kosher fowl was cooked together with the eggs of kosher fowl, it does not cause them to become forbidden.68
If [the eggs were opened and] mixed together or the egg of a non-kosher fowl or the egg of a fowl that is trefe become mixed with other eggs,69 the required measure is 60.70
Halacha 21
What is the source because of which the Sages relied on the measure of 60? For the portion given [to the priest] from the ram brought by a Nazirite,71i.e., the foreleg, is one sixtieth of the remainder of the ram. It is cooked together with it and does not cause it to be forbidden,72 as [Numbers 6:19] states: "And the priest shall take the cooked foreleg from the ram."
Halacha 22
[The following rules apply when] two substances of the same type, [one permitted and one forbidden,] and a [third] entity become mixed together, e.g., there was a pot with fat from the fat tail and beans and fat from the kidneys fell into it. The entire [mixture] dissolved and became a single entity. We view the fat from the fat tail and the beans as a single entity and we measure the fat from the kidneys against it. If the ratio was one to sixty, it is permitted. For it is impossible to detect the taste.73
Halacha 23
The same principle applies when terumot are mixed together [with other substances, some of the same type and some of a different type], their measure is 100. And the measure of mixed species from a vineyard and orlahis 200.
Halacha 24
When we calculate the measure of permitted substances with regard to all prohibitions, whether the measure is 60, 100, or 200, we include the soup, the spices, everything that is in the pot, and what the pot has absorbed after the prohibited substance fell according to our estimation.74 For it is impossible to know the exact amount which the pot absorbed.
Halacha 25
It is forbidden to nullify a substance75 forbidden by Scriptural76 Law as an initial and preferred measure. If, however, one nullified it, the mixture is permitted.77 Nevertheless, our Sages penalized such a person and forbade the entire mixture.78 It appears to me that since this is a penalty, we forbid this mixture only to the person79 who transgressed and nullified the prohibited substance.80 For others, however, the entire mixture is permitted.
Halacha 26
What is implied? If a se'ah of orlah falls into 100 se'ah [of permitted produce], the entire [mixture] is forbidden. One should not bring another 100 se'ah and join [the entire quantity] together so that [the forbidden substance] will be nullified because of the presence of 201 times the original amount. If, however, he transgressed and did so, the entire [mixture] is permitted.
With regard to a prohibition forbidden by Rabbinic decree,81 we do nullify a prohibition as an initial and preferred measure.
Halacha 27
What is implied? If milk fell into a pot that contains fowl and imparted its flavor to the food, one may add other fowl to the pot until the flavor [of the milk] is no longer discernable. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 28
We already explained82 that if a forbidden substance imparts its flavor to a permitted substance, the entire mixture is not permitted. When does the above apply? [When the flavor imparted] improves [the flavor of the permitted food]. If, however, the forbidden substance detracts from the flavor of the permitted substance and impairs it, it is permitted.83
[This applies] provided it detracts from its flavor from the beginning until the end. If, however, it detracted from its flavor at the outset, but ultimately improved it or improved it initially, even though it will ultimately detract from it, [the mixture] is forbidden.84
Halacha 29
Who will taste the mixture?85 If terumot were mixed with ordinary crops, a priest should taste the mixture.86 If the flavor of the terumah is discernible, the entire mixture is considered as miduma. In Hilchot Terumot,87 the laws pertaining to [produce that is] miduma will be explained.
Halacha 30
If [the mixture involved] meat and milk, wine poured as a libation, wine that was orlah, or [made from grapes that grew together with] mixed species in a vineyard that fell into honey, or the meat of crawling animals or teeming animals that were cooked with vegetables and the like, a gentile should taste [the mixture].
We rely on his word.88 If he says: "It does not have the flavor [of the forbidden substance]," or he says: "It [imparted] its flavor, but that flavor is bad and it detracts [from the flavor of the permitted substance," the entire [mixture] is permitted, provided it will not ultimately improve it, as we explained.89 If there is no gentile to taste it, we rely on the measures of 60,90 100, or 200.91
Halacha 31
When a rat falls into beer or vinegar, we require a measure of 60, for we suspect that it imparted its flavor to the beer or the vinegar and it improves it.92When, however, it falls into wine, oil, or honey,93 it is permitted, even if it imparts its flavor, for the [rat's] flavor detracts [from the flavor of these substances]. For [these substances] must all have a pleasant fragrance and rat meat spoils their aroma and detracts from their flavor.
Halacha 32
When a goat is roasted in its fat, it is forbidden to eat from even the tip of its ear. [The rationale is that] the fat permeates through all its limbs, improves [their taste], and imparts flavor. Accordingly, if [a goat] is lean and possessed only a meager amount of fat on its kidneys and digestive organs,94 i.e., one in sixty-one [of the entire animal], one may cut away [the meat] and eat it95 until he reaches the fat.
Similarly, when the thigh [of an animal] is roasted96 together with the gid hanesheh, one may cut away [the meat] and eat it until he reaches the gid [hanesheh].97 [This], he should cast away. Similarly, if an animal was roasted whole without removing the forbidden strands of tissue and membranes, one may cut away [the meat] and eat it.98 When he reaches a forbidden substance, he should cast it away. There is no need to calculate the ratio [of this forbidden tissue to the meat,] for this [forbidden] tissue does not impart flavor.
Halacha 33
One should not roast ritually slaughtered meat with the meat of a nevelah or the meat of a non-kosher species in one oven, even though they do not touch each other.99 If one roasted them together, [the kosher meat] is permitted. [This applies] even if the forbidden meat was very succulent and the permitted meat was lean. For an aroma does not cause a substance to become forbidden; only the flavor of a forbidden substance does.
Halacha 34
When the meat of a ritually slaughtered animal100 was mixed together101 with the meat of a nevelah that was salted, the [kosher] meat becomes prohibited,102 for the concentrated [juices] of the nevelah are absorbed in the kosher meat. It is impossible to detect their flavor or to calculate the quantity of the forbidden substance.103
When the meat of a unsalted species of kosher fish was mixed together with the meat of a species of unkosher fish that was salted, the [kosher] fish becomes prohibited because of the [non-kosher] brine. If, however, it was the kosher fish that was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted, the salted fish does not become forbidden. For even though the unsalted [fish] absorbs [the brine] of the salted one, it does not absorb it to the degree that it will cause it to discharge [its own brine].
When a non-kosher fish was pickled with a kosher fish, the entire mixture is forbidden unless the ratio of kosher fish to non-kosher is 200:1.104
FOOTNOTES
1.
Because it tastes the same as the permitted substance.
2.
According to Scriptural Law. As stated in Halachot 4-5, the Rabbis enforced more stringent requirements.
3.
Which is forbidden (Chapter 7, Halachah 5).
4.
By a gentile (see the notes to Halachah 30 and Chapter 9, Halachah 8) for a discussion of why the gentile's word is accepted.
5.
See Tosafot (Chullin 98b) which mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the principle "the flavor of an entity is equivalent to its substance" is of Rabbinic or Scriptural origin.
6.
The Rambam shares the perspective ofTosafot (Avodah Zarah 67b) who maintains that if there is more than an olive-sized portion of fat in a portion of food k'dei achilat p'ras (the size of three eggs), its substance is considered as present even though it is dissolved and not discernable. Rashi differs and maintains that as long as the fat is dissolved, it is considered as if the substance of the forbidden entity is not present.
7.
Even though he may eat an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat, he will not have eaten it in the required time (the time it takes to eat three eggs, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 8) for one to be held liable. The concentration of the forbidden fat is too small for that to happen.
8.
Which is forbidden (Chapter 7, Halachah 5).
9.
Which is permitted.
10.
Since both are fat, the mixture is considered as being of the same substance.
11.
For according to Scriptural Law, as long as the majority is kosher, the mixture may be eaten. Indeed, there is no need for there to be twice as much kosher fat as non-kosher fat. A simple majority is sufficient.
12.
With regard to the mixture of fat, there is greater reason for leniency, for there is no longer any non-kosher fat that exists as an independent entity, it is all mixed together with the kosher fat. In this instance, the meat from the nevelah exists as an independent entity, it is just that we have no way of detecting which of the pieces it is (Radbaz).
13.
In all instances when forbidden substances are mixed with kosher substances. SeeShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 109:1) which rules leniently and allows one to rely on Scriptural Law in certain situations. See the notes to Halachah 20.
14.
In the following halachot.
15.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 5:8), the Rambam cites Deuteronomy 13:18: "No trace of the condemned should cling to your hand" as evidence that even the slightest amount is forbidden. See Chapter 16, Halachah 28, for a leniency that is granted with regard to this restriction.
16.
The terumot and the tithes can be separated from it, causing it to be permitted. See Halachah 10.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam cites the rationale given byAvodah Zarah 73b: Just as one kernel of grain can serve as terumah and correct the entire crop; so, too, one kernel of grain from which terumah was not separated can cause an entire crop to be forbidden. The rationale given by the Rambam here has its source in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shivi'it6:3).
17.
Chapter 16, Halachah 28.
18.
I.e., the terumah and tithes that would have been required to have been separated from the tevel originally. In this context, the fact that it became mixed with other wine is not significant.
19.
Hilchot Terumah, Chapter 13.
20.
The Rambam feels it necessary to mention this point, because his source, Avodah Zarah 73b mentions the produce of the Sabbatical year together with the two prohibited substances mentioned above. The Rambam clarifies that the comparison is not entirely correct, because the produce of the Sabbatical year is not forbidden.
21.
The Ra'avad mentions that this concept applies only until the time it is required to destroy the produce of the Sabbatical year. After that time, that produce is forbidden to be eaten and hence, is considered like other forbidden substances.
22.
Hilchot Shemitrah ViYovel, chs. 4-7.
23.
I.e., although even the tiniest amount ofchametz causes an entire mixture to be forbidden, chametz was not mentioned byAvodah Zarah 73b together with wine poured as a libation and tevel. The reason is that the prohibition of the mixture of chametzis motivated by a different rationale (Kessef Mishneh).
24.
See Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 1:5 which states that a mixture of chametz and another substance is permitted after the Pesach holiday.
25.
As explained in the following halachah and notes. See also Halachah 12.
26.
The Radbaz states that the comparison is totevel and not to chametz on Pesach. For liketevel, if it becomes mixed with a different substance, it is permitted if its flavor cannot be detected. There are special stringencies applied with regard to chametz, as stated in Halachah 12 (Radbaz).
27.
See Chapter 10, Halachah 2.
28.
For they can be redeemed (Radbaz).
29.
For they can be eaten in Jerusalem or their holiness can be transferred to money (Radbaz).
30.
E.g., Bikkurim; see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bkkurim 2:2).
31.
Our Sages (Beitzah 3b) state it is not nullified when mixed with 1000 times the amount of kosher substances. The Rambam's wording clarifies that 1000 is not an upper limit. No matter how many times more of the permitted substance there is, the mixture is forbidden.
32.
Hence, this option should be taken rather than relying on the nullification of the forbidden substance.
33.
As explained in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov1:19 states that when a person sets an object aside before the holiday with the intent that he will not use it on the holiday, he may not change his mind and use it on the holiday. This prohibition is referred to asmuktzeh.
Halachah 1:20 states that an egg laid on a holiday following the Sabbath was prepared on the Sabbath, as it were. Therefore it may not be used on the holiday. This prohibition is referred to as nolad. Both of these prohibitions are of Rabbinic origin. Halachah 1:21 states that if such an egg becomes mixed with other eggs, they are all forbidden.
34.
I.e., a mixture of terumah could be eaten in a permitted manner by a priest. Nevertheless, since there is no way it could be permitted to an ordinary person, our Sages were not stringent (Kessef Mishneh).
Both the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz ask: It is possible to have to have terumahpermitted by making a statement of regret concerning its separation before a wise man. If so, seemingly, it should be considered as an object that could be eaten in a permitted manner. The Radbaz explains that a wise man who can nullify the separation of terumah may not always be found. The Kessef Mishneh states that since this is not the common practice, a substance may not be considered as an object that could be eaten in a permitted manner for this reason.
35.
This term indicates a conclusion deduced by the Rambam without an explicit prior Rabbinic source. There are others, including Rav Yitzchak Alfasi and Rav Moshe HaCohen, who differ and maintain that since the mixture could be eaten in a permitted manner, the above stringencies apply. The Ra'avad, however, states that this concept is explicitly stated in the Mishnah. He does not, however, mention which mishnah. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer different hypotheses as to the Ra'avad's intent and why the Rambam did not accept it.
36.
By separating the appropriate terumot and tithes.
37.
Halachah 6.
38.
Halachah 9.
39.
The terumah which the Levites offer from the tithes they are given.
40.
Although the prohibition is negated, we are still concerned with the fact that property due the priest is not given to him, as stated in Halachah 15.
41.
I.e., as stated in the conclusion of the halachah, if two of these substances fall into the same accumulation of permitted substances, it is necessary to have 100 times their combined size.
42.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam's ruling here appears to contradict his ruling in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim6:24 where he states that the showbread is not nullified. He explains that in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, the Rambam is speaking about pieces of the showbread that are ritually pure. Hence the entire mixture should be eaten by the priests. (Note the Radbaz who questions how the priests could eat the mixture.) Here, by contrast, we are speaking about pieces of the showbread that are impure. If the showbread was a significant part of the mixture, the entire mixture would have to be burnt. Since it is not significant, we considered its existence negated.
43.
Terumah, terumat ma'aser challah, orbikkurim.
44.
If, however, the sacred substances are distinct, they must be separated from the ordinary substances.
45.
It does not have to eaten with attention to the laws of terumah.
46.
This term refers to a mixture of terumah or other sacred substances with ordinary substances. The mixture must be sold to priests (at the price of terumah) with the exception of the original sacred amount (Hilchot Terumah 13:2).
47.
Although they are separate and unrelated prohibitions, since it is forbidden to benefit from both of them and we derive the laws pertaining to one from the laws pertaining to the other, we rule that they may be combined (Orlah 2:1).
48.
As explained in the following halachah, in this instance, one is not causing the priests a loss.
49.
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, objecting to the decision that it is forbidden to benefit from the mixture. (He maintains that although partaking of the mixture is forbidden, one should be able to sell it to a gentile with the exception of the value of the forbidden substance. For, he maintains, it is never forbidden to benefit from a mixture that is not inherently forbidden.) The Radbaz justifies the Rambam's view.
50.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 11:4).
51.
For the priests will not be concerned about its loss.
52.
Therefore they were treated more stringently. The Radbaz emphasizes that they are compared to terumah and not to other forbidden substances for the rootkodesh is used with regard to them.
53.
For it is one tenth of a tenth.
54.
I.e., "forbidden."
55.
As the Rambam continues to explain, the Jerusalem Talmud (Orlah 2:1) offers a non-literal interpretation of this phrase, understanding it as meaning "the one who sanctifies it."
56.
With this wording, the Rambam also eliminates those prohibitions of Rabbinic origin, which have a smaller measure as stated in the following halachah.
57.
Although there is not enough of the forbidden substance for a person to be liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law, unless there is 60 times the amount of forbidden fat, the mixture is forbidden according to Scriptural Law (see Chulin 98a).
58.
The prohibitions are considered of the same type, because the taste of the fat is not distinct from that of the meat (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi to Chulin 98a).
59.
As is the law with regard to Rabbinic prohibitions as stated in the following halachah.
60.
Chapter 8, Halachah 1.
61.
As our Sages ruled [Chulin 100a; Chapter 16, Halachah 6; quoted by Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 100:1)], a forbidden being which is a creation in its own right is never forbidden. Therefore they ruled more stringently. In this instance, the gid hanesheh itself will be removed. Hence the full stringency of our Sages' ruling is not applied, nevertheless, in recognition of the serious of the prohibition involved, this stringency is applied.
62.
See Chapter 8, Halachah 6.
63.
Thus instead of requiring 61 times the forbidden substance (60 plus the substance itself) all that is required is 60 (59 and the substance itself).
64.
See Chapter 9, Halachot 12-13. As explained in the notes there, the Ra'avad and the Rashba offer a different rationale for this ruling, explaining that since the meat of the udder is acceptable, we include it in the reckoning of 60. Thus in contrast to other instances where 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance is required, here, we require only 59. According to his view, we cannot extrapolate from this ruling to other Rabbinic prohibitions.
65.
Such an egg is forbidden to be eaten (see Chapter 3, Halachah 8).
66.
I.e., a total of 62.
67.
As stated in the notes to the previous halachah, in this instance, the forbidden substance itself will be removed. Hence the full stringency of our Sages' ruling concerning an entity that is a creation in its own right is not applied. Nevertheless, in recognition of the serious of the prohibition involved, this stringency is applied. See the notes to the following halachah where a rationale cited by other authorities is mentioned.
68.
Here we are talking about eggs that are cooked in their shells. When an egg contains a chick, the chick will impart its flavor to the entire pot. When, by contrast, eggs are cooked in their shells, they do not impart flavor (Chulin 97b). The non-kosher egg must be removed from the mixture. This, however, can sometimes be done, because the appearance of non-kosher eggs may differ from that of kosher eggs (Chapter 3, Halachah 18).
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 86:6) differs and states that if a substantial loss will not be caused, we should be stringent and follow the same ruling with regard to all eggs. If, however, there will be a substantial loss, even he counsels to rely on the more lenient views.
69.
For, at times, non-kosher eggs are not distinguishable from kosher eggs (ibid.).
70.
I.e., the mixture is judged as an ordinary instance in which kosher food becomes mixed with non-kosher food. According to the Rambam, the non-kosher egg is not a creation that is forbidden in its own right.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 86:5) differs and rules that we require 61 kosher eggs in this instance as well. The Ramban explains that the reason is that not all eggs are the same size and by adding an extra egg, we make certain that we have the necessary amount. (He uses this rationale to explain the law stated in the previous halachah as well.) The Siftei Cohen 86:15 offers a different rationale, stating that an egg itself is considered a creation in its own right.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that there are some who would rule that 60 eggs are not necessary, for there are opinions [seeShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 109:1)] that when kosher and non-kosher entities are intermingled in a dry mixture, we rely on Scriptural Law and require only a simple majority of the kosher substances. As obvious from this ruling, the Rambam does not accept this leniency.
71.
When a Nazirite completes the days of his Nazirite vow, he brings several sacrifices. Among them is a ram brought as a peace offering. The foreleg from this offering is given to the priest and may not be eaten by an ordinary Israelite (Chulin 98a; Hilchot Nazirut 8:1-4).
72.
I.e., although this portion which is forbidden to an Israelite is cooked together with the entire ram, the Israelite is permitted to partake of the remainder of the ram. Accordingly, our Sages inferred that a similar ratio may be used when other prohibited substances are cooked with permitted substances.
73.
Because there is no significant difference between the taste of fat from the fat tail and fat from the kidneys, as indicated by Halachah 4.
74.
I.e., at that time, it absorbed both the permitted substances and the prohibited substance (Radbaz).
In his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 99:4), Rav Yosef Caro follows the view of Rashi and the Tur who maintain that we should measure the prohibited substance and the permitted substances as they are at present, for there is no way of knowing how much the pot absorbed. This stringency applies, however, only with regard to forbidden substances mixed with permitted substances of a different type. (For then the prohibition stems from Scriptural Law.) If they are of the same type (when a simple majority is required according to Scriptural Law), theShulchan Aruch rules more leniently and accepts the Rambam's ruling.
75.
I.e., after a forbidden substance fell into a mixture, one may not add enough permitted substances that there will 60, 100, or 200 times the amount of the forbidden substance.
76.
If, however, a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law accidentally fell into a mixture, one may add enough permitted substances to nullify the prohibition, as stated in Halachah 26.
77.
Because in fact the presence of the forbidden substance has been nullified.
78.
The Siftei Cohen 99:11 explains the reason for this penalty. If we would permit him to benefit from it, we fear that if, in the future, such a situation would recur, he would instruct his servants to nullify the prohibited substances for him.
79.
Or the person whom he intended to serve after nullifying the forbidden substance. Were this not the case, he would benefit from his undesirable act (Kessef Mishneh).
80.
The Rambam's wording implies that the penalty was imposed only when he willfully nullified the existence of the forbidden substance. If he did so accidentally or inadvertently, no prohibition applies, for our Sages did not impose penalties in such situations [Kessef MishnehShulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 99:5)].
81.
This point was not accepted by all authorities. The Ashkenazic authorities (as reflected by the ruling of Rabbenu Asher) maintain that even a Rabbinic prohibition should not be nullified as an initial and preferred measure. The Radbaz proposes an intermediate position: that the stringency should be applied only to Rabbinic prohibitions that have a source in Scriptural Law, e.g., milk and fowl, but not those enacted by the Rabbis entirely on their own initiative. This compromise, however, was not accepted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 99:6) adopts the Rambam's position, while the Tur and the Rama follow that of Rabbenu Asher.
82.
Halachah 1.
83.
Avodah Zarah 66a derives this concept from the statements of Deuteronomy 14:21concerning the meat of an animal that died without slaughter: "Give it to the stranger in your gate and he will partake of it." Implied is that the prohibition applies only to meat that is fit for a non-Jew to partake of. If it is not fit for the non-Jew to eat, it cannot cause a Jew's food to be forbidden.
See also Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah103:2) which states: "The impairment of the food's flavor does not have to be complete to the extent that one would be disgusted to eat it. Instead, even if it slightly detracts [from its flavor], it does not cause the mixture to become forbidden."
84.
Avodah Zarah, loc. cit. states that if initially, the flavor of a substance is improved by the addition of the forbidden substance, it becomes forbidden. The fact that ultimately the addition detracts from the flavor of the permitted substance is not sufficient to cause it to become permitted again. The Rambam draws the conclusion that ultimately if the flavor of the substance will be improved, it is also prohibited (Kessef Mishneh).
Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 103:7 who states that it is permitted to partake of a mixture after the flavor of the permitted substance was impaired, before it improved, even though one knows that ultimately, it will improve. Based on the wording of the following halachah, however, it is questionable if the Rambam would accept this conclusion.
85.
I.e., since there is a question whether the mixture is forbidden or not.
86.
For he is permitted to partake of terumot.
87.
Chs. 13 and 14.
88.
There is a difficulty with the Rambam's statements, for generally, we do not rely on the word of a gentile with regard to ritual matters. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah98:1) relies on the opinion of the Rashba quoted by the Tur, that this refers to a situation where the gentile does not know that we are relying on him, but instead makes his statements as a matter of course (masiach lifi tomo).
See also the Turei Zahav 98:2 and the Siftei Cohen 98:2 who quote views which state that an ordinary gentile is not sufficient, but instead, the intent is a gentile chef who is an expert on recognizing flavors. According to some, however, this interpretation leads to a leniency. For since he is a professional, he will not risk his professional reputation by lying to mislead a Jew. Hence, according to these views, his statements can be accepted even if they are made in response to direct questions and not as a matter of course. There are, nevertheless, authorities who differ and require even a chef to make his statements as a matter of course. Moreover, there are authorities (among them, the Radbaz and the Rama) who never accept the statements of a gentile with regard to these matters.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 98:1) states that in the present age, we do not rely on the statements of a non-Jew who tasted food to determine whether it is kosher or not.
89.
Halachah 28.
90.
For it is an accepted principle that the taste of a forbidden substance will be nullified in more than 60 times its volume.
91.
This refers to mixtures of terumot, orlah, and mixed species in a vineyard. The ruling is, however, problematic. For if we are speaking about a mixture of these substances together with different substances, then 60 times their volume will be sufficient. For the taste of all substances except spices is nullified in 60 times their volume as stated in the previous note. And if we are speaking about a mixture of substances with their own kind, the taste of the forbidden substance will not be detectable.
92.
Avodah Zarah 68b leaves unresolved the question whether the rat's flavor detracts from the flavor of beer and vinegar. Hence we rule stringently.
93.
These substances are not mentioned by the Talmud, loc. cit., but it is common knowledge that the rat's flavor will detract from their own, as the Rambam explains (Kessef Mishneh).
94.
These are prohibited by Scriptural Law.
95.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that, according to the Rambam, one may partake of the meat as it is. He need not scrape off or cut away its surface (kelipah or netilah). In his Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 105:5), however, he rules according to the perspective of Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba, the Ran, and the Turwho maintain that the outer layer of the meat next to the fat itself must be cut away.
See also the ruling of the Rama (Yoreh De'ah, loc. cit.) that at present, we are not capable of differentiating which fat is considered succulent and which is considered lean. Hence, we require 60 times the amount of forbidden fat in all instances.
96.
The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that the leniency mentioned by the Rambam applies only when the animal is roasted with its gidor with the forbidden tissues. If it is cooked, more stringent rules apply.
97.
Although the fat of the gid hanesheh is prohibited, there is not enough fat to cause the other limbs of the animal to become prohibited (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, one must cut away the outer layer of the meat next to the gid.
98.
In this instance as well, there is not a significant enough quantity of fat to cause the meat to become forbidden.
99.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 108:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling forbidding roasting the two in the same oven, but allows for certain leniencies, e.g., the oven is very large or the substances are covered.
100.
It appears that the kosher meat was unsalted. If, however, it were salted, it would not absorb the juices of the non-kosher meat, as indicated by the principle: "One that is involved in discharging its own juices does not absorb from another" (Radbaz).
101.
The commentaries note an apparent contradiction to the Rambam's rulings in Chapter 7, Halachot 17-19. The Radbaz explains that there, both the forbidden and the kosher substances were salted, while here the kosher meat was not. The Kessef Mishneh explains that here the two pieces of meat are mixed together, while there the substances were merely near each other.
102.
In this halachah, the Rambam is communicating the principle stated byChulin 111b et al that meat which is salted is considered as if it is burning hot. It emits concentrated juices which are absorbed by other meat.
103.
I.e., no matter what the ration of the kosher meat to the non-kosher meat, the mixture is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 70:3-4) follows the more lenient views of Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba, and the Ran who maintain that only the external surface of the kosher meat becomes forbidden. Once it is peeled off, the meat is permitted.
104.
For pickling is considered equivalent to cooking. Fish brine is considered as very powerful. Hence it requires a much larger measure than ordinary non-kosher substances. See Rav Kapach's notes to the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Terumot 10:8) where he writes that the Rambam changed his mind three times on this issue, twice stating more stringent views than the one stated here, before writing this view as his final conclusion.

Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 16

Halacha 1
All the above measures given by our Sages with regard to a forbidden substance being mixed with a permitted substance of the same type apply when the forbidden substance is not a leavening agent, a spice, or an important entity that is discrete and is not mixed together with or blended with the permitted substance.1If, however, [the forbidden substance] is a leavening agent, a spice, or an important entity, even the slightest amount of it causes [the entire mixture] to be forbidden.2
Halacha 2
What is implied? When yeast from wheat that is terumah falls into a dough of ordinary wheat [flour] and it is of sufficient quantity3 to cause the dough to leaven, the entire dough is considered as having been mixed with terumah.4Similarly, if spices that are terumah fall into a pot of ordinary food [containing] the same substance,5 when [the forbidden spices] are of sufficient quantity to season [the dish], the entire [dish] is considered as having been mixed withterumah. This applies even if the ration between the yeast and the spices [to the permitted substances] is 1:1000.
Similarly, if yeast from mixed species grown in a vineyard fall into a dough or spices of orlah fall into a pot, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire [mixture].
Halacha 3
Even the smallest amount of an important entity [that is forbidden] can cause a mixture of its own type to become forbidden. The seven entities that follow are considered as important: nuts from Perach,6 pomegranates from Baden, sealed barrels,7 beet shoots, cabbage heads, Greek squash, and loaves baked by a private person.8
Halacha 4
What is implied? If one pomegranate from Baden that was orlah became mixed with several thousand other pomegranates, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire mixture.9 Similarly, if a sealed barrel of wine that is orlah or that is a product of mixed species from a vineyard that became mixed with several thousand sealed barrels, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire quantity.
Halacha 5
Similarly, when a piece of meat from a nevelah or from a non-kosher species of animal, beast, fowl, or fish become mixed with several thousand other pieces of meat, the entire mixture is forbidden until one separates that piece of meat and makes certain that there is sixty times its measure.10 For if one does not separate [the forbidden piece of meat], it will continue to be present and it will not have changed.11 And this piece of meat is important to him, for he receives honor [by serving it] to guests.12
Halacha 6
The same laws apply with regard to a piece of meat [cooked] with milk13 or an ordinary animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, for it is forbidden to benefit from [the latter] according to Rabbinic decree,14 as will be explained in Hilchot Shechitah.15 Even the slightest amount of them causes [a mixture] to become forbidden until they are removed.
Similarly, when a gid hanesheh was cooked with other similar tissue or with meat, when it can be recognized, it should be removed and the remainder is permitted. For giddim do not impart flavor.16 If one cannot recognize it, the entire mixture is forbidden. For [the gid hanesheh is considered as a created being in its own right.17 Hence, it is significant; no matter how small it is, it causes [a mixture] to become forbidden.18
Halacha 7
Similarly, all living animals are significant and they never become nullified. Therefore, if an ox sentenced to be stoned to death19 becomes intermingled with 1000 oxen, a calf whose neck is to be broken20 becomes intermingled with 1000 calves, a dove selected for a metzora21 becomes intermingled with 1000 doves, or a firstborn donkey22 becomes intermingled with 1000 donkeys, it is forbidden to benefit from any of them.23With regard to other entities, even though it is customary to [sell] them by number,24 they can be nullified according to the ordinary measures.
Halacha 8
What is implied?25 When a bundle of vegetables that come from mixed species grown in a vineyard are mixed with 200 bundles or an esrog which isorlah is mixed with 200 esrogim, the entire quantity is permitted. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 9
It appears to me that every article that is significant to the inhabitants of a given place as nuts from Perach and pomegranates from Baden were significant in Eretz Yisrael in [the Talmudic] era causes a mixture to be forbidden if even the slightest amount becomes mixed in because of its importance in that time and in that era. The particular entities [referred to above] were mentioned because the slightest amount of them causes a mixture to be forbidden in every place. The same laws apply to articles similar to them in other places. It is clear that all of these prohibitions stem from Rabbinic decree.26
Halacha 10
If one pomegranate from a mixture [of pomegranates including a forbidden pomegranate from Baden] falls into two other [permitted] pomegranates from Baden and then one of these three pomegranates fell into other pomegranates, the latter mixture is permitted. [The rationale is that the presence of] the pomegranate from the first mixture [which fell into the second mixture] is nullified because of the majority of permitted substances.27 If, however, [a pomegranate] from the first mixture falls into 1000 pomegranates, they are all forbidden.28 [The concept that the presence of the forbidden pomegranate] was nullified because of the majority of permitted substances only when there is a multiple doubt involved:29i.e., that if one of the second mixture will fall into another place, it does not cause [that third mixture] to become forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 11
If the nuts that were forbidden because of the nut that was orlah intermingled with them were cracked open, the pomegranates were taken apart, the barrels were opened, the squash was cut, or the bread was sliced after they became forbidden, [the presence of the forbidden entity] can be nullified if there is 201 times its volume.30 This law also applies with regard to a piece of forbidden meat31 that is minced together with other pieces and they are all [minced] in the same way, [the presence of the forbidden entity] can be nullified if there is 60 times its volume.
Halacha 12
It is, however, forbidden to crack the nuts, take apart the pomegranates, open the barrels after they have become forbidden so that [the presence of the forbidden entity] can be nullified if there is 201 times its volume. For, as an initial and preferred measure, we do not nullify the presence of an entity.32 If one does so, we penalize him and forbid [the entity] to him, as explained.33
Halacha 13
[The following rule applies when] yeast that comes from mixed species in a vineyard and from terumah falls into dough and there is not enough of either of [the forbidden substances] alone to cause the dough to rise, but when the two are combined, there is enough to cause the dough to rise. This dough is forbidden to an Israelite, but permitted to the priests.34
Similarly, when spices that come from terumah and from mixed species in a vineyard fall into a pot and there is not enough of either of [the forbidden substances] to spice the pot, but together there is enough of both of them to spice the pot, that pot is forbidden to an Israelite - for an entity forbidden to him spice it - and permitted to the priests.
Halacha 14
When there are two or three types of the same species of spice or three species of the same type, they can be combined to cause a pot to be forbidden when they spice it or when [a similar type mixture] causes dough to leaven.
What is implied? Yeast from wheat and yeast from barley are not considered as being two separate substances. Instead, since the category yeast is the same, they are considered as one substance and they can be combined to measure to see if they are sufficient to cause a dough of wheat to leaven if their combined flavor is that of wheat35 or to cause a dough of barley to leaven if their combined flavor is that of barley.
Halacha 15
What is meant by three species of the same type? For example, river parsley, parsley that grows in meadows, and parsley that grows in gardens. Although each of them has a distinct name, since they are of one type, they can be combined to [cause a dish to be forbidden if they] spice [it].
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply when] yeast that is terumah or from mixed species from a vineyard falls into dough that is already leavened or spices that areterumah or from mixed species from a vineyard fall into a pot that has already been spiced. If there is enough [of the forbidden] yeast to cause the dough to leaven if it had been unleavened or there is enough of the spices to spice the pot had it been unspiced, the entire mixture is forbidden.36 If they are of sufficient size to spice [the pot] or cause [the dough] to leaven, their presence can be nullified according to the required measure: terumah when [the mixture] is 101 times [the size of the forbidden substance] and mixed species in a vineyard when [the mixture] is 201 times [the size of the forbidden substance].
Halacha 17
Terumah can [help] cause orlah and mixed species from a vineyard to be nullified?
What is implied? When a se'ah of terumah falls into 99 [se'ah of] ordinary produce and afterwards, a half se'ah of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard falls into the entire mixture, the prohibition against orlah or mixed species in a vineyard does not apply.37For it is nullified because of the presence of 201 times [the size of the forbidden substance] even though a portion of the 201 is terumah.38
Halacha 18
Similarly, orlah and mixed species from a vineyard can [help] cause terumahto be nullified?
What is implied? When 100 se'ah of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard fall into 20,000 se'ah of ordinary produce, the entire mixture is thus 20,100se'ah.39 Afterwards, a se'ah of terumah fell into every 100 se'ah, the entire [mixture] is permitted and the presence of the terumah is nullified because of the presence of 101 times [the original amount of terumah].40 [This applies] even though part of the 100 that nullify its presence are orlah or mixed species from a vineyard.
Halacha 19
Similarly, orlah may [help] nullify mixed species from a vineyard and mixed species from a vineyard may [help] nullify orlah. Mixed species from a vineyard may [help] nullify [the presence of other] mixed species from a vineyard and orlah may [help] nullify [the presence of other] orlah.
What is implied? 200 se'ah of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard fall into 40,000 se'ah of ordinary produce.41 Afterwards,42 a se'ah of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard fell into each of the 200 se'ah of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard, the entire mixture is permitted. Since the presence of the forbidden substance that fell into [the mixture] originally was nullified, the entire [mixture] is considered as ordinary produce that is permitted.43
Halacha 20
A garment that was dyed with shells of orlah44 should be burnt.45 If it became intermingled with others, [its presence] may be nullified when there are 201 times the original amount.46 Similarly, when a dish was cooked or a loaf of bread baked with the shells of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard, the dish or the bread must be burnt, for the benefit [from the forbidden substance] is evident.47 If it became intermingled with others, [its presence] may be nullified when there are 201 times the original amount.
Halacha 21
Similarly, when milo hasit48 of a garment was dyed with [a dye that is] orlah, and [that garment] cannot be identified, [its presence] may be nullified when there are 201 times the original amount.49 If powdered dye that is orlahbecomes mixed with powdered dye that is permitted, [its presence] may be nullified when there are 201 times the original amount. When liquid dye that isorlah becomes mixed with liquid dye that is permitted, its presence is nullified when there is a majority [of the permitted substance].50
Halacha 22
When an oven has been heated with shells of orlah or mixed species from a vineyard, it must be cooled off [before cooking in it]. [This applies] to both a new and an old [oven]. Afterwards, one should heat [the oven] with permitted wood.51 If one cooked in it before it was cooled, whether bread or food, it is forbidden to benefit from it. [The rationale is that] the forbidden wood increased the value of the bread or the food.52
If one removed the entire fire53 and then cooked or baked with the heat of the oven [that remained], it is permitted, for the forbidden wood is no longer present.54
Halacha 23
It is forbidden to benefit from plates, cups, pots, and bottles that were fired by a potter with shells of orlah. [The rationale is] they are made new by an object from which it is forbidden to benefit.55
Halacha 24
When bread was baked on coals from wood56 that is orlah, it is permitted. Once [the wood] becomes coals, the forbidden dimension is no longer present, even though they are still glowing.57
When a pot was cooked with shells from orlah or mixed species from a vineyard together with permitted wood,58 the food [cooked in it] is forbidden, even though [it was cooked by two factors, one forbidden and one permitted]. [The rationale is] that at the time it was cooked with the forbidden wood, the permitted wood had not been introduced. Thus part of the cooking process was performed with permitted wood and part with forbidden wood.59
Halacha 25
When a plant that is orlah becomes mixed together with other plants or a row of mixed species from a vineyard became mixed with other rows,60 at the outset, one should gather all [the produce].61 If [the ratio of] permitted plants to forbidden plants was 200:1 or the ratio of forbidden rows to permitted ones is 200:1, everything that was gathered is permitted. If the ratio was less than this, all that was gathered is forbidden.
[One might ask:] Why is one permitted to gather [the produce] at the outset? Seemingly, the law should require that everything be forbidden for him until he undertakes the difficulty of removing the forbidden plant or row.62 [It can be explained that that] a person will not cause his vineyard to be forbidden because of one plant.63 Were he to be able to identify it, he would remove it.64
Halacha 26
It is forbidden to benefit from cheese that is made to harden using the syrup of fruit that has not ripened,65 the stomach66 of an animal offered as a sacrifice to false divinities, or vinegar made from the wine of a false divinity. Although the forbidden entity is being mixed with a substance of another type and a very small amount is used, [the cheese] is forbidden for [the effect of] the forbidden entity is obvious, for it [caused the milk] to harden into cheese.67
Halacha 27
The law is that fruit that is orlah or from mixed species from a vineyard should be burnt.68 Liquids from [that fruit] should be buried, because it is impossible to burn liquids.
Halacha 28
When wine that was poured as a libation to idols is mixed with [other] wine, it is forbidden to benefit from the entire mixture regardless of how small [the amount of forbidden wine], as we explained.69
When does the above apply? When the permitted wine is poured onto a drop of wine that had been poured as a libation.70 If, however, one poured wine that had been pour as a libation from a small bottle71 into a cistern of wine, its presence is nullified. Even if one poured the entire day, each individual drop becomes nullified, drop after drop.72
If one pours from a jug,73 the entire quantity is forbidden. [This applies] whether one pours permitted wine into forbidden wine or forbidden wine into permitted wine. [This stringency is enforced,] because the column of wine which descends from the large jug [creates a connection].
Halacha 29
When even the smallest amount of ordinary [gentile] wine is mixed with [Jewish] wine, it is forbidden to drink [the entire mixture].74 Instead, it should be sold to a gentile in its entirety. The money [paid] for the forbidden wine should be cast into the Dead Sea.75 One may, however, benefit from the remainder of the money.76
Similarly, if a jug of wine poured as a libation had become intermingled with jugs of [kosher] wine, it is forbidden to drink the entire mixture.77 One may, however, benefit from it, selling the entire mixture to a gentile and casting the money for the [forbidden] jug into the Dead Sea. The same applies with regard to a jug of ordinary [gentile] wine.78
Halacha 30
When water is mixed into wine or wine is mixed into water, [the forbidden entity causes the mixture to be prohibited] if its flavor can be detected, because they are two different types of substances.79
When does the above apply? When the permitted liquid falls into the forbidden liquid. If, however, the forbidden liquid fell into the permitted liquid, the presence of it is nullified, drop after drop, provided it fell from a from a small bottle.80
How is it possible for water to be forbidden? If it was worshipped or if it was offered to a false divinity.
Halacha 31
[The following law applies when] a pitcher of water fell into a cistern of wine and afterwards,81 wine that was poured as a libation fell into it. [Initially,] we consider the permitted wine as if it did not exist,82 We measure the water in relation to the wine poured as a libation. If it83 is [of sufficient volume] to nullify the taste of the wine poured as a libation, the water is more abundant than it and it nullifies [the forbidden wine] and the entire [mixture] is permitted.
Halacha 32
When wine poured as a libation falls on grapes, one should wash them. They are permitted to be eaten.84 If the grapes have split open,85 when the wine imparts its flavor to them, it is forbidden to benefit from them.86If not, it is permitted to partake of them. [This applies] whether the wine is aged or fresh.87
Halacha 33
When [forbidden wine] falls on figs, they are permitted, because wine impairs the flavor of figs.88
Halacha 34
When wine poured as a libation falls on wheat, [the wheat] is forbidden to be eaten, but it is permitted to benefit from it. One should not sell it to a gentile, lest he sell it again to a Jew. What should be done instead? He should grind [the wheat] into flour, make it into bread, and sell it to a gentile outside the presence of a Jew.89 [In this way,] a Jew will not repurchase it from the gentile,90 for the bread of a gentile is forbidden, as will be explained.91
Why do we not check the wheat to see if [the wine imparted] its flavor? Because [the wheat] draws out the wine92 and it becomes absorbed within it.93
Halacha 35
When wine poured as a libation becomes vinegar94 and falls into vinegar that comes from beer, even the slightest amount causes it to become forbidden. [The rationale is that] it is considered to have become mixed with the same type of substance, because they are both vinegar.95
When wine becomes mixed with vinegar, we see if [the forbidden entity] imparts its flavor.96 [This applies] whether [forbidden] vinegar falls into wine97or [forbidden] wine falls into vinegar.
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., it does not become mixed with the forbidden substances into a single blend, nevertheless, it cannot be distinguished from the kosher substances.
2.
The presence of the forbidden substance is never nullified no matter how great the ratio between it and the permitted substances. Needless to say, this stringency was instituted by Rabbinic degree. As mentioned above, according to Scriptural Law, a simple majority is sufficient to nullify the presence of an entity.
3.
If, however, there is not enough to cause the dough to leaven, it is not considered a leavening agent and its presence can be nullified [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 2:6-7)].
4.
And must be sold to a priest at the price ofterumah.
5.
If, however, they do not contain the same substance, according to the Rambam (loc. cit.), we see if their flavor can be detected or not. If it cannot be detected, the mixture is permitted.
6.
Perach and Baden are names of places. These and the following terms are defined in the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:8).
7.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 134:2) states that this applies only when the barrels are large and therefore important. A small barrel is not important and its presence can be nullified by a simple majority.
8.
In contrast to those baked by a baker.
9.
I.e., all the pomegranates are considered as if they are the pomegranate that is orlah.
The Radbaz mentions opinions that state that one may throw away the value of the forbidden pomegranate, but then benefit from the entire mixture. He, however, brings support for the Rambam's position.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 101:1) appears to support the Rambam's ruling. Note, however, the comments of the Siftei Cohen 110:2 who writes that even though a Jew may not benefit from any one of the forbidden pomegranates himself, he may sell the entire mixture to a gentile, minus the price of the forbidden pomegranate. See also the notes to Halachah 7.
10.
This refers to an instance when the forbidden piece of meat was cooked with the other pieces.
11.
If its form changes, different rules apply, as apparent from Halachah 11.
12.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 109:1) state that if a piece of meat is not of the type that will bring a person respect by serving it to guests, the stringency mentioned in this halachah does not apply.
Tosafot (Chulin 100a) explains that even though in practice, the piece of meat will not bring honor to the person - because since it is forbidden, he cannot serve it - it is placed in this category, for were it not to be forbidden, it would bring him honor.
13.
There is an important insight associated with this ruling. The stringency relating to a piece of meat from which one receives honor applies only when the meat is inherently forbidden. When, however, a piece of kosher meat falls into a stew of non-kosher meat, it is not considered a piece of meat from which one receives honor, for it is not inherently forbidden. What is forbidden is the flavor of the non-kosher meat and that flavor is not a substance from which one receives honor.
This does not apply with regard to milk and meat. Although it is absorbing the milk that causes the meat to be considered forbidden, once it absorbs that milk, it becomes inherently forbidden. For both of the substances are themselves permitted, it is their mixture that is forbidden by the Torah (Radbaz).
14.
I.e., this stringency is applied even though we are speaking only about a Rabbinic prohibition (Kessef Mishneh).
15.
Chapter 2, Halachah 3.
16.
The Lechem Mishneh states that this is speaking about a situation when the gid hanesheh was cooked without its fat. Otherwise, 60 times its volume is required, for the fat does impart flavor.
17.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 100:1) gives the following criteria for a creation in its own right: It must be alive, in contrast to a kernel of wheat. It must be inherently forbidden, in contrast to a kosher fowl that was slaughtered improperly. It must be a complete entity to the extent that were it to be divided it would no longer be referred to with that name in contrast to non-kosher fat. And it must actually be whole, in contrast to a gid hanesheh that was cut in half.
18.
This principle applies with regard to all entities that are creations in their own right. Until they are removed, the mixture is forbidden regardless of the ration of kosher to nonkosher substances. Once they are removed, the ratio must be 60:1 (ibid.:2).
19.
An ox sentenced to execution for goring a human being. See Chapter 4, Halachah 22.
20.
This calf is an atonement offering brought by the elders of a city when there is an unresolved murder. See Hilchot Rotzeach , ch. 9.
21.
Tzara'at refers to a unique affliction of the skin resembling leprosy that afflicted a person because of he spoke lashon hora, unfavorable gossip. When the physical signs of his affliction have disappeared, the person must bring two doves as sacrifices. One is slaughtered and one is sent away, as stated in Hilchot Tumat Tzara'at 11:1. It is forbidden to benefit from the one that is slaughtered.
22.
A firstborn donkey must either be either exchanged for a lamb and the lamb given to a priest or the donkey's neck must be broken (Exodus 13:13Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 12).
23.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, stating that all that is necessary is to destroy the benefit one would receive from one of the forbidden entities. The benefit from the remainder is permitted. The Kessef Mishneh points to Halachah 29 as indication that the Rambam would also accept the ruling stated by the Ra'avad. The Migdal Ozdiffers and maintains that the Rambam would not accept that ruling. As mentioned above, the Siftei Cohen 101:2 defends the position of the Kessef Mishneh, stating that the Rambam would allow one to sell the entire mixture to a gentile, minus the price of the forbidden article.
24.
The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 110:1) cite the view of other Rishonim who state that whenever an article is always sold by number, not by a package, its presence is never nullified.
25.
I.e., what is an example of an article that is sold by number being nullified.
26.
For according to Scriptural Law, a substance mixed with substances of the same type are forbidden when there is a majority of the permitted substance. When mixed with substances of a different type, they are nullified when the taste can no longer be detected.
27.
I.e., according to Scriptural Law; according to Rabbinic Law, both the first and the second mixtures are forbidden.
28.
For with regard to each of the pomegranates in the second mixture, there is a question if it is forbidden by Scriptural Law or not (Radbaz).
The Radbaz notes that the Rambam's ruling here appears to contradict his ruling inHilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:10 where the Rambam rules that if a goblet used for idol worship becomes mixed with other goblets and then one from the first mixture falls into a second mixture, one may use the goblets of the second mixture. The Radbaz maintains that with this ruling, the Rambam changed his mind and adopted a more stringent position.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam rules more stringently in this instance than with regard to idol worship because the prohibition against idol worship is universally known. The prohibition against benefiting from a significant entity, by contrast, is less recognized. Therefore there is need for greater stringency. Alternatively, here the Rambam is speaking about partaking of the forbidden mixture, while inHilchot Avodat Kochavim, he is speaking about benefiting from the mixture. Obviously, there is greater reason to prohibited a substance from which one partakes.
The position followed by the Rambam inHilchot Avodat Kochavim is followed by other Rishonim even with regard to a significant entity. The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 110:8) quotes the Rambam's view and the Rama adds further stringencies. The Turei Zahav 110:10 and the Siftei Cohen 110:3 mention the more lenient views.
29.
Perhaps the pomegranate that fell from the first mixture into the second mixture was not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Even if it was forbidden, perhaps the pomegranate that fell from the second mixture was not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Thus there is a multiple doubt if an entity forbidden by Scriptural Law is present.
30.
As required with regard to the prohibitions oforlah and mixed species in a vineyard. I.e., the stringency of a significant article no longer applies, because the entities are no longer whole and in their present form, they are not significant.
31.
Which would be forbidden because one derives honor from serving it as stated in Halachah 5. Once it has been minced, the meat is no longer a piece from which one would derive honor [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah101:6)].
32.
The commentaries question the Rambam's statement, noting that in Chapter 15, Halachah 26, the Rambam states that we may nullify the presence of a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law. Since the prohibition against these mixtures is Rabbinic in origin, seemingly, it would be possible to nullify their presence.
33.
See Chapter 15, Halachah 25.
34.
As mentioned in Halachah 1, if an entity is sufficient to cause a dough to leaven or to spice a pot, its presence can never be nullified. Although neither forbidden entity on its own is large enough to bring about this change, when the two are combined, this result is achieved. Therefore an Israelite is forbidden to partake of the dough or the pot. With regard to a priest, by contrast, sinceterumah is not forbidden to him, we do not say that an article forbidden to him brought about this change. For the mixed species alone is not of sufficient size. Hence, he is permitted to partake of the bread or the cooked food.
35.
If the combined flavor is not that of wheat, the dough does not become forbidden, because the yeast is considered as giving a different flavor to the dough. Hence the dough is forbidden only of that flavor is detectable.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, offering a different interpretation ofAvodah Zarah 65a, the Rambam's source. Significantly, their disagreement is mirrored by similar difference in interpretation by Rashi and Tosafot. Rashi and the Rambam follow one approach and Tosafot and the Ra'avad, the other.
36.
Although in actual fact the forbidden yeast or spices did not have an effect, because the dough leavened and the pot was spiced without them. Nevertheless, since they could have had an effect, they cause the dish to become forbidden.
Avodah Zarah 68a notes that when a dough is already leavened, adding yeast will spoil its flavor. Hence, seemingly, it should not be forbidden. Nevertheless, an exception is made with regard to dough, for when extra yeast is added to dough, that dough is then used to cause other doughs to leaven. Hence, it is not considered to be spoiled.
The Ra'avad understands the emphasis of the passage from Avodah Zarah differently and objects to the Rambam's ruling. He note that Avodah Zarah does not mention spices; the Rambam added those on the basis of his logic. And the Ra'avad, argues, that logic can be disputed. For the addition of yeast to the dough has an effect as explained. The addition of the spices, by contrast, have no effect - for the pot was already spiced. Why then do they cause the pot to be forbidden?
The Lechem Mishneh answers, that even according to the Ra'avad's understanding, the Rambam's logic can be defended, for the food from the heavily spiced pot could be used to spice other pots.
37.
The mixture is, however, forbidden to Israelites and permitted only to priests, for the presence of the terumah is not nullified.
38.
This and the following halachah represent the Rambam's interpretation of Orlah 2:2 which is based on the Jerusalem Talmud.
39.
I.e., the presence of the orlah or the mixed species from the vineyard are nullified.
40.
This example is the product of the Rambam's own deduction. Although the simple interpretation of Orlah, loc. cit., would imply that the concept stated in this halachah could also be derived from the situation described in the previous halachah, it does not work out mathematically. Hence, the Rambam had to find a new example.
41.
The prohibition is thus nullified because the ratio of permitted to forbidden substances is 200:1.
The Ra'avad criticizes the Rambam, questioning why he uses extremely large numbers. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam's figures enable all the calculations to be made without fragments.
42.
I.e., after it was discovered that the forbidden substance had fallen into the permitted substances. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 5:8).
43.
Thus despite the fact that it contains produce that was originally forbidden, the entire quantity may be used to nullify the presence of the second measure of forbidden produce that falls in.
MOSHE WHAT ABOUT CHOZAR VINIUR The rationale for this leniency is that according to Scriptural Law, the entire measure is permitted when there is a simple majority of forbidden substances.
44.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah1:8), the Rambam quotes the Sifra (Parshat Kedoshim) which teaches that since it is forbidden to benefit from Orlah, it is also forbidden to use it as a dye. The Rambam emphasizes that, accordingly, this applies, not only to fruit which is orlah, but also to the shells from which dye is made. In his notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Rav Kapach cites a responsa from the Rambam from which it appears that this applies only to shells because they serve a fruit. It is not forbidden to make dye from the wood or the bark of a tree that is orlah. See Halachah 24 and notes.
45.
Since the substance from which the dye comes is forbidden, the entire article becomes forbidden.
46.
The Rambam's wording - and hence, our translation - implies that one may cause the presence of the forbidden garment to be nullified by adding 200 other garments to it. The Radbaz explains that the mixture is forbidden only according to Rabbinic Law. As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 26, as an initial and preferred option, one may add a sufficient quantity of permitted substances to nullify the presence of a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law. Note, however, the glosses of the Tosafot Yom Tov and Rav Kapach to Orlah 3:1, that do not accept this interpretation and state that one may not nullify the prohibition as an initial and preferred option.
47.
See Halachah 22.
48.
In his notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:2), Rav Kapach elaborates on the definition of this term, concluding that it is equal to two thumbbreadths. This is also reflected in the Rambam's ruling, Hilchot Shabbat 9:18.
49.
I.e., if the entire garment is not 201 times the size of the portion dyed with the forbidden dye. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this law teaches us that if even a small portion of a garment is dyed with forbidden dye, the entire garment may become forbidden.
50.
The Radbaz explains that a more lenient ruling is issued in this instance, because:
a) Here there is no substance that is forbidden, it is only the color that comes from the forbidden dye that is problematic. A differentiation can be made between this instance and the previous laws, for in those instances, the forbidden dye has already become permanently associated with a substance.
b) In this instance, the majority of the dyeing will result from the permitted dye. The effect of the prohibited dye is secondary.
51.
If so, it is then permitted to use even a new oven. Heating a new oven with the shells oforlah completes the task of fashioning the oven. Thus there is reason to say that since it was completed in a forbidden manner, the oven itself would be forbidden. Nevertheless, when permitted fuel is used even for such an oven, the products are permitted. The rationale is that they are produced by two substances: the oven which is forbidden and the fuel which is permitted. Whenever there are two factors involved, one permitted and one forbidden, the result is permitted to be used (Pesachim26b). We do not require the oven to be destroyed, for the oven is not inherently forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).
One might ask: If so, why is an oven that is heated with shells that are orlah forbidden to be used. Here also there are two factors involved, the oven which is permitted and the fuel which is forbidden. It is possible to explain that the leniency of allowing to use the yield produced by a forbidden and a permitted substance only after the fact. In this instance, cooling the oven provides an easy alternative (Radbaz).
52.
One might ask, since the oven is permitted, even though the fuel is forbidden, there is both a permitted and a forbidden factor producing this result. Why, then, is the food forbidden? It is possible to explain that since the fire which is forbidden is evident and apparent, we rule stringently (Radbaz,Kessef Mishneh).
53.
As indicated by the Halachah 24, this applies even if there are still glowing coals in the oven.
54.
One might ask: In the case of a new oven, since both factors - the oven and the fuel - are forbidden. Nevertheless, it appears that according to the Rambam, removing the fire is sufficient for the food to be permitted. For the oven itself is not inherently forbidden, it was only completed in a forbidden manner (Kessef Mishneh).
55.
Since the fuel used to fire the kitchenware is the primary element in completing them, they are forbidden. The Turei Zahav 142:7 explains that here we are speaking about kitchenware on which food is served cold. Since the kitchenware was made in a forbidden manner, it is forbidden to benefit from it. If, however, a pot was fired with forbidden fuel and then used to cook kosher food, that food would be permitted as is the law concerning a new oven. The Meiri (in his gloss to Pesachim 26b), however, explains that if one cooks food with a pot forbidden because of these factors, the food is forbidden.
56.
The Radbaz emphasizes that here, too, we are speaking about shells from fruit that isorlah. The wood of a tree never becomes forbidden as orlah.
57.
For once the wood is consumed by fire, it is no longer considered forbidden. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:13 which states that it is permitted to benefit from the ashes of substances that are forbidden and required to be burnt.
58.
As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, this applies when the permitted fuel was added after the forbidden fuel. Implied is that were the two fuels mixed together at the outset, the dish would be permitted.
59.
The Kessef Mishneh gives two interpretations for this halachah. Our translation follows the first interpretation. TheKessef Mishneh, however, questions that interpretation, stating that seemingly, the fact that the pot in which the food was cooked was permitted would add another permitted factor and thus the food was never cooked in a totally forbidden setting. He therefore offers another interpretation, stating that here the Rambam is speaking about firing the pot in which the food was cooked. First it was fired with forbidden fuel, then it was fired with permitted fuel, and then food was cooked in it with permitted fuel. Since it was originally fired with forbidden fuel, it becomes forbidden and any food cooked in it is likewise prohibited. The Turei Zahav 142:9 favors the first interpretation, explaining that the situation resembles food cooked in an oven with forbidden fuel.
60.
I.e., it was known that one plant or row was forbidden, but one was not able to identify the forbidden plant. It is somewhat difficult to conceive how a row of crops could not be recognized as mixed species growing in a vineyard.
61.
Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:6), the Rambam rules that at the outset, it is forbidden to gather this produce. The leniency stated in this halachah applies only after the fact. TheKessef Mishneh states that the Rambam changed his mind, because the more lenient opinion is mentioned in the Talmud (Gittin54b).
62.
I.e., perhaps we should ordain a decree, forbidding benefit from the entire field, lest one intentionally mix a forbidden orlah plant into his vineyard.
63.
Hence we do not fear that he will introduce a forbidden plant into the vineyard.
64.
I.e., we do not fear that he left the orlah plant intentionally.
In Hilchot Terumot 13:12, the Rambam rules more stringently with regard to terumah. A distinction between the two instances can be made, for terumah may be eaten by priests, while orlah is forbidden to everyone.
65.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah1:7), the Rambam states that it is common to use the white syrup that drips from underdeveloped figs as a catalyst to cause cheese to harden.
66.
I.e., using the renin as a catalyst.
67.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 13. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah2:5), the Rambam writes that the laws applying to a catalyst used to be make cheese are more severe than those applying to spices and yeast (Halachah 1, for the latter can be nullified when they fall into a substance of another type) for the reason explained above. As the Radbaz explains, even without yeast a dough would be able to be baked and a dish could be served without spices, but without a catalyst, milk would never harden into cheese.
68.
Kiddushin 56b derives this from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 22:9pen tikadeish, "lest it become hallowed," interpreting it as pen tukad eish, "lest it be consigned to fire."
69.
Chapter 15, Halachot 6-7.
70.
The Siftei Cohen quotes Rishonim who rule that if a quantity of permitted wine that is 60 times the volume of the forbidden wine falls into the forbidden wine at the same time, the presence of the forbidden wine is nullified. The stringency mentioned by the Rambam applies only when the kosher wine is poured into the forbidden wine little by little. The Siftei Cohen rules that if a severe loss is involved, one may rely on this leniency.
71.
I.e., a bottle from which the wine is poured one drop at a time.
72.
The Radbaz states that this applies even if the majority of the mixture comes from the forbidden wine. Since each drop was nullified, the entire quantity is permitted. TheSiftei Cohen 134:4 differs and requires that the permitted wine be 60 times the volume of the forbidden wine.
According to the Rambam, it is even permitted to drink the wine of the mixture. Rashi (Avodah Zarah 73a) rules that it is permitted to benefit from the wine, drinking it, however, is forbidden. And the Ra'avad rules that it is forbidden even to benefit from it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling.
73.
I.e., a container with a large opening.
74.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 134:2) rules leniently, stating that in the present era, since it is no longer customary to pour wine as libations to false divinities, one may be lenient and permit the mixture if there is 60 times more kosher wine than forbidden wine, provided the kosher wine is not poured into the forbidden wine in one column.
75.
I.e., cast into a place where one will not benefit from it.
76.
One may, however, destroy one jug and then benefit from the others - e.g., to use the wine as a dye - for it is possible that one will be benefiting directly from the forbidden wine. The advice suggested by the Rambam, by contrast, allows the Jew to benefit from the remainder of the wine without any possibility of benefiting directly from the forbidden wine.
The advice suggested applies only to jugs, for each jug is a separate entity. It does not apply when wine becomes mixed with wine, as indicated by the previous halachah (Avodah Zarah 74a).
77.
See the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 134:2) who explains that this applies only when the jugs are large and therefore important as mentioned in Halachah 3. Otherwise, the presence of the forbidden jug can be nullified by a simple majority.
78.
Seemingly, this ruling is obvious. The Kessef Mishneh states that it was added to emphasize the stringency that one must destroy the value of the forbidden jug.
79.
As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.
80.
See Halachah 28.
Rav Moshe HaCohen questions how the presence of the forbidden entity can be nullified, since its flavor can be detected. Indeed, when quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:3) states this leniency applies only when the taste of the forbidden substance cannot be detected.
81.
Avodah Zarah 73a emphasizes that the leniency mentioned in this halachah applies only when the water falls into the wine before the forbidden wine. If the forbidden wine falls in first, the permitted wine becomes prohibited.
82.
And thus it is not automatically forbidden.
83.
I.e., the water alone. The permitted wine is not considered, for any amount of the forbidden wine mixed into it would cause the permitted wine to be prohibited.
84.
For the forbidden wine will not have entered them.
85.
And thus the forbidden wine could enter.
86.
They may, however, be sold to a gentile, minus the increase in their value produced by the forbidden wine [Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 134:8)].
87.
Avodah Zarah 66a emphasizes that even if the fresh wine has the same flavor as the grapes, the grapes are not forbidden. For the wine is considered as a different type of substance.
88.
Hence even if it imparts its flavor, the figs are not forbidden. Although the version ofAvodah Zarah 5:2 which the Rambam relies on differs from the standard published text of the Mishnah, the Rambam's ruling is accepted as halachah by Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah134:9).
89.
This is permitted, for the gentile is paying for the bread alone. He is not paying for the wine at all.
90.
If, however, the Jew selling a fellow Jew selling bread to the gentile, he might purchase it from him.
91.
Chapter 17, Halachah 9. A Jew will have no way of knowing that this bread was not baked by the gentile. Hence he will refrain from purchasing it from him. In a place where it is customary to purchase bread from gentiles, there is no way of benefiting from the wheat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 134:11)].
92.
As Avodah Zarah 65b states, the kernels of wheat are cracked and this causes them to absorb the wine (Lechem Mishneh;Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
93.
The Radbaz emphasizes that the taste of the wine becomes blended in with the taste of the wheat to the extent that it cannot be detected.
94.
The vinegar is forbidden, as the wine was.
95.
The fact that originally one was wine and one was beer is not significant.
96.
If it does, the mixture is forbidden. If not, it is permitted. Even if the vinegar originally came from wine, it is considered as a different substance.
97.
It is not automatically permitted, because vinegar impairs the flavor of wine, for there are some who prefer vinegar to wine (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 134:8)
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class
• "Today's Day"
Thursday, Adar I 16, 5776 · 25 February 2016
Sunday 16 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Ki Tissa, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 79-82.
Tanya: Ch. 30. This also (p. 133)...is explained elsewhere (p. 135).
The Alter Rebbe said: The offerings for the Sanctuary included gold, silver and copper, but nothing sparkled except for the mirrors presented by the women.1 From these mirrors were fashioned the washbasin and its base. These were the last of the Sanctuary articles to be made, but were used at the start of every Sanctuary service (for laving by the kohanim) - for their beginning is implanted in their end.2
FOOTNOTES
1. "He made the copper washbasin and its copper base out of the mirrors of the dedicated women who congregated at the entrance of the Communion Tent." Sh'mot 38:8.
2. "Their beginning is implanted (lit. 'wedged') in their end, and their end in their beginning" (see Sefer Yetzira 1:7). This general principle of Chassidus is often used to indicate the "circular" nature of Divine Flow; e.g. the nethermost levels ("end") of G-dliness inherent within this lowly world express the highest core and essence ("beginning") of G-dliness. A parallel (though not synonymous) concept is: "The final act was the first conceived"; see Likutei Sichot, Vol. 6, p. 19, footnote 57. Here the principle is apparently used in a more general sense (i.e., the washbasin was last to be made, first to be used). However, it may refer to the basin's donation by women (malchut, "end") and its use at the very start ("beginning") of every service. Compare Sh'vat 23, and footnotes.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
Perpetual Freedom
No one is free today because of yesterday.
Freedom is the force that renews this universe out of the void every day and every moment. It is a source of endless energy with infinite possibilities.
You are free when you take part in that endlessness. When you never stand still. When you are forever escaping the confines of today to create a wide-open tomorrow.
---------------------
CHABAD - 
TODAY IN JUDAISM: Thursday, February 11, 2016 - Today is: Thursday, Adar I 2, 5776 · February 11, 2016 - Torah Reading
Terumah: Exodus 25:1 Adonai said to Moshe, 2 “Tell the people of Isra’el to take up a collection for me — accept a contribution from anyone who wholeheartedly wants to give. 3 The contribution you are to take from them is to consist of gold, silver and bronze; 4 blue, purple and scarlet yarn; fine linen, goat’s hair, 5 tanned ram skins and fine leather; acacia-wood; 6 oil for the light, spices for the anointing oil and for the fragrant incense; 7 onyx stones and other stones to be set, for the ritual vest and breastplate.
8 “They are to make me a sanctuary, so that I may live among them. 9 You are to make it according to everything I show you — the design of the tabernacle and the design of its furnishings. This is how you are to make it.
10 “They are to make an ark of acacia-wood three-and-three-quarters feet long, two-and-a-quarter feet wide and two-and-a-quarter feet high. 11 You are to overlay it with pure gold — overlay it both inside and outside — and put a molding of gold around the top of it. 12 Cast four gold rings for it, and attach them to its four feet, two rings on each side. 13 Make poles of acacia-wood, and overlay them with gold. 14 Put the poles into the rings on the sides of the ark; you will use them to carry the ark. 15 The poles are to remain in the rings of the ark; they are not to be removed from it. 16 Into the ark you are to put the testimony which I am about to give you.
Daily Quote:
Anger will kill a fool[Job 5:2]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Terumah, 5th Portion Exodus 26:31-26:37 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Exodus Chapter 26
31"And you shall make a dividing curtain of blue, purple, and crimson wool, and twisted fine linen; the work of a master weaver he shall make it, in a [woven] cherubim design. לאוְעָשִׂ֣יתָ פָרֹ֗כֶת תְּכֵ֧לֶת וְאַרְגָּמָ֛ן וְתוֹלַ֥עַת שָׁנִ֖י וְשֵׁ֣שׁ מָשְׁזָ֑ר מַֽעֲשֵׂ֥ה חשֵׁ֛ב יַֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה אֹתָ֖הּ כְּרֻבִֽים:
a dividing curtain: Heb. פָּרֹכֶת. [This is] a word denoting a dividing curtain. In the language of the Sages [it is called] פַּרְגוֹד (Chag. 15a), something that separates between the king and the people. פרכת: לשון מחיצה הוא, ובלשון חכמים פרגוד, דבר המבדיל בין המלך ובין העם:
blue, purple: Each type was doubled in each thread with six strands. — [from Yoma 71b] תכלת וארגמן: כל מין ומין היה כפול, בכל חוט וחוט ששה חוטין:
the work of a master weaver: Heb. מַעִשֵׂה חשֵׁב I have already explained (verse 1) that this is weaving of two walls, and the designs on both sides of it are unlike one another. מעשה חשב: כבר פירשתי שזו היא אריגה של שני קירות, והציורין שמשני עבריה אינן דומין זה לזה:
cherubim: He shall make designs of creatures. כרובים: ציורין של בריות יעשה בה:
32"And you shall place it on four pillars of acacia wood, overlaid with gold, their hooks [shall be] gold, on four silver sockets. לבוְנָֽתַתָּ֣ה אֹתָ֗הּ עַל־אַרְבָּעָה֙ עַמּוּדֵ֣י שִׁטִּ֔ים מְצֻפִּ֣ים זָהָ֔ב וָֽוֵיהֶ֖ם זָהָ֑ב עַל־אַרְבָּעָ֖ה אַדְנֵי־כָֽסֶף:
four pillars: inserted into four sockets, with hooks attached to them [the pillars], bent on the top [in order] to place upon them a pole around which the top of the dividing curtain was wound. These hooks are the וָוִין [mentioned in the next verse, given this name] because they are made in the shape of [the letter] “vav” (ו). The dividing curtain was ten cubits long, corresponding to the width of the Mishkan [from north to south], and ten cubits wide, like the height of the planks. [It was] spread out at the one-third [point] of the Mishkan [from east to west], so that from it [the dividing curtain] toward the [Mishkan’s] interior were ten cubits, and from it [the dividing curtain] toward the exterior were twenty cubits. Hence, the Holy of Holies was ten [cubits] by ten [cubits], as it is said: “And you shall place the dividing curtain beneath the clasps” (verse 33), which join the two sets of the curtains of the Mishkan, the width of the set being twenty cubits. When he [Moses] spread them on the roof the Mishkan from the entrance [all the way] to the west, it [the first set of curtains] ended after two-thirds of the [way into the] Mishkan. The second set covered [the remaining] third of the Mishkan with the remainder [of the curtains] hanging over its rear to cover the planks. ארבעה עמודי שטים: תקועים בתוך ארבעה א-דנים ואונקליות קבועין בהן עקומים למעלה להושיב עליהן כלונס שראש הפרוכת כרוך בה, והאונקליות הן הווין, שהרי כמין ווין הן עשוים, והפרכת ארכה עשר אמות לרחבו של משכן, ורחבה עשר אמות כגבהן של קרשים, פרוסה בשלישית של משכן, שיהא הימנה ולפנים עשר אמות, והימנה ולחוץ עשרים אמה, נמצא בית קדשי הקדשים עשר על עשר, שנאמר ונתת את הפרכת תחת הקרסים, המחברים את שתי חוברות של יריעות המשכן, ורוחב החוברת עשרים אמה, וכשפרשה על גג המשכן מן הפתח למערב, כלתה בשני שלישי המשכן, והחוברת השניה כסתה שלישו של משכן, והמותר תלוי לאחוריו לכסות את הקרשים:
33"And you shall place the dividing curtain beneath the clasps. You shall bring there on the inner side of the dividing curtain the Ark of the Testimony, and the dividing curtain shall separate for you between the Holy and the Holy of Holies. לגוְנָֽתַתָּ֣ה אֶת־הַפָּרֹ֘כֶת֘ תַּ֣חַת הַקְּרָסִים֒ וְהֵֽבֵאתָ֥ שָׁ֨מָּה֙ מִבֵּ֣ית לַפָּרֹ֔כֶת אֵ֖ת אֲר֣וֹן הָֽעֵד֑וּת וְהִבְדִּילָ֤ה הַפָּרֹ֨כֶת֙ לָכֶ֔ם בֵּ֣ין הַקֹּ֔דֶשׁ וּבֵ֖ין קֹ֥דֶשׁ הַקֳּדָשִֽׁים:
34"And you shall place the ark cover over the Ark of the Testimony in the Holy of Holies. לדוְנָֽתַתָּ֙ אֶת־הַכַּפֹּ֔רֶת עַ֖ל אֲר֣וֹן הָֽעֵדֻ֑ת בְּקֹ֖דֶשׁ הַקֳּדָשִֽׁים:
35"And you shall place the table on the outer side of the dividing curtain and the menorah opposite the table, on the southern side of the Mishkan, and you shall place the table on the northern side. להוְשַׂמְתָּ֤ אֶת־הַשֻּׁלְחָן֙ מִח֣וּץ לַפָּרֹ֔כֶת וְאֶת־הַמְּנֹרָה֙ נֹ֣כַח הַשֻּׁלְחָ֔ן עַ֛ל צֶ֥לַע הַמִּשְׁכָּ֖ן תֵּימָ֑נָה וְהַ֨שֻּׁלְחָ֔ן תִּתֵּ֖ן עַל־צֶ֥לַע צָפֽוֹן:
And you shall place the table: The table was in the north, drawn away from the northern wall [of the Mishkan by] two and one-half cubits. The menorah was [placed] in the south, drawn away from the southern wall [by] two and one-half cubits. The golden altar was placed opposite the space between the table and the menorah, drawn a short distance toward the east. They [the table, menorah, and golden altar] were all situated in the inner half of the Mishkan. How was this? The length of the Mishkan from the entrance to the dividing curtain was twenty cubits. The altar, the table, and the menorah were drawn away from the entrance toward the western side ten cubits. — [from Yoma 33b] ושמת את השלחן: שלחן בצפון, משוך מן הכותל הצפוני שתי אמות ומחצה. ומנורה בדרום משוכה מן הכותל הדרומי שתי אמות ומחצה. ומזבח הזהב נתון כנגד אויר שבין שלחן למנורה, משוך קמעא כלפי המזרח, וכולם נתונים מן חצי המשכן ולפנים. כיצד, אורך המשכן מן הפתח לפרכת עשרים אמה, המזבח והשלחן והמנורה משוכים מן הפתח לצד מערב עשר אמות:
36"And you shall make a screen for the entrance of the tent, of blue, purple, and crimson wool, and twisted fine linen the work of an embroiderer. לווְעָשִׂ֤יתָ מָסָךְ֙ לְפֶ֣תַח הָאֹ֔הֶל תְּכֵ֧לֶת וְאַרְגָּמָ֛ן וְתוֹלַ֥עַת שָׁנִ֖י וְשֵׁ֣שׁ מָשְׁזָ֑ר מַֽעֲשֵׂ֖ה רֹקֵֽם:
And you shall make a screen: Heb. מָסָ, a curtain that is a protector opposite the entrance, like “You made a hedge (שַׂכְךְתָּ) around him” (Job 1:10), an expression of protection. [Note that the “samech” and the “sin” are interchangeable.] ועשית מסך: וילון שהוא מסך כנגד הפתח, כמו (איוב א י) שכת בעדו, לשון מגן:
the work of an embroiderer: The figures [on the screen] are produced on it with needlework-just as the face [was] on one side, so was the face on that [other] side. — [from Yoma 72b, Baraitha Melecheth HaMishkan, ch. 4] מעשה רקם: הצורות עשויות בו מעשה מחט, כפרצוף של עבר זה כך פרצוף של עבר זה:
an embroiderer: Heb. רֹקֵם, the name of the craftsman, not the name of the craft. Its Aramaic translation is עוֹבַד צַיָיר, work of an artist, but not עוֹבֵד צִיוּר, work of artistry. The measurements of the screen were the same as the measurements of the dividing curtain, [namely] ten cubits by ten cubits. — [from Baraitha Melecheth HaMishkan, ch. 4] רקם: שם האומן, ולא שם האומנות, ותרגומו עובד צייר. מדת המסך כמדת הפרוכת, עשר אמות על עשר אמות:
37"You shall make for the screen five pillars of acacia and overlay them with gold, their hooks [shall be] gold, and you shall cast for them five copper sockets. לזוְעָשִׂ֣יתָ לַמָּסָ֗ךְ חֲמִשָּׁה֙ עַמּוּדֵ֣י שִׁטִּ֔ים וְצִפִּיתָ֤ אֹתָם֙ זָהָ֔ב וָֽוֵיהֶ֖ם זָהָ֑ב וְיָֽצַקְתָּ֣ לָהֶ֔ם חֲמִשָּׁ֖ה אַדְנֵ֥י נְחֽשֶׁת:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 10 - 17
Hebrew text
English text
• Chapter 10
This psalm tells of the wicked one’s prosperity and his boasting of it, until he says: “There is neither law nor judge. God pays no attention to the actions of mere mortals.”
1. Why, O Lord, do You stand afar, do You hide Yourself in times of distress?
2. The wicked man in his arrogance pursues the poor; they are caught by the schemes they have contrived.
3. For the wicked man glories in the desire of his heart, and the robber boasts that he has scorned the Lord.
4. The wicked one in his insolence [thinks], “He does not avenge”; all his thoughts are, “There is no God.”
5. His ways always succeed; Your retribution is far removed from before him; he puffs at all his foes.
6. He says in his heart, “I shall not falter; for all generations no evil will befall me.”
7. His mouth is full of oaths, deceit and malice; mischief and iniquity are under his tongue.
8. He sits in ambush near open cities; in hidden places he murders the innocent; his eyes stealthily watch for the helpless.
9. He lurks in hiding like a lion in his lair; he lurks to seize the poor, then seizes the poor when he draws his net.
10. He crouches and stoops, then the helpless fall prey to his might.
11. He says in his heart, “God has forgotten, He conceals His countenance, He will never see.”
12. Arise, O Lord! O God, lift Your hand! Do not forget the lowly.
13. Why does the wicked man scorn God? Because he says in his heart, “You do not avenge.”
14. Indeed, You do see! For You behold the mischief and vexation. To recompense is in Your power; the helpless place their trust in You; You have [always] helped the orphan.
15. Break the strength of the wicked; then search for the wickedness of the evil one and You will not find it.
16. The Lord reigns for all eternity; the nations have vanished from His land.
17. Lord, You have heard the desire of the humble; direct their hearts, let Your ear listen,
18. to bring justice to the orphan and the downtrodden, so that [the wicked] shall no longer crush the frail of the earth.
Chapter 11
This psalm declares that the suffering of the righteous one is for his own benefit, to cleanse him of his sins; whereas the wicked one is granted prosperity in this world-similar to the verse, "Wealth remains with its owner, to his detriment."
1. For the Conductor, by David. I have placed my trust in the Lord; [thus] how can you say of my soul, your mountain,1 that it flees like a bird?2
2. For behold, the wicked bend the bow, they have readied their arrow upon the bowstring, to shoot in darkness at the upright of heart.
3. They destroyed the foundations; 3 what [wrong] has the righteous man done?
4. The Lord is in His holy Sanctuary, the Lord's throne is in heaven, [yet] His eyes behold, His pupils probe [the deeds of] mankind.
5. The Lord tests the righteous, but He hates the wicked and the lover of violence.
6. He will rain down upon the wicked fiery coals and brimstone; a scorching wind will be their allotted portion.
7. For the Lord is righteous, He loves [the man of] righteous deeds; the upright will behold His countenance.
FOOTNOTES
1.Your king (Metzudot).
2.And will eventually be captured by Saul (Metzudot).
3.Reffering to the murder of the priests in the city of Nob.
Chapter 12
This psalm admonishes informers, slanderers, and flatterers.
1. For the Conductor, upon the eight-stringed instrument, a psalm by David.
2. Help us, Lord, for the pious are no more; for the faithful have vanished from among men.
3. Men speak falsehood to one another; with flattering lips, with a duplicitous heart do they speak.
4. May the Lord cut off all flattering lips, the tongue that speaks boastfully-
5. those who have said, "With our tongues we shall prevail, our lips are with us, who is master over us!”
6. Because of the plundering of the poor, because of the moaning of the needy, the Lord says, "Now I will arise!" "I will grant deliverance," He says to him.
7. The words of the Lord are pure words, like silver refined in the finest earthen crucible, purified seven times.
8. May You, O Lord, watch over them; may You forever guard them from this generation,
9. [in which] the wicked walk on every side; when they are exalted it is a disgrace to mankind.
Chapter 13
A prayer for an end to the long exile. One in distress should offer this prayer for his troubles and for the length of the exile.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. How long, O Lord, will You forget me, forever? How long will You hide Your countenance from me?
3. How long must I seek counsel within my soul, [to escape] the grief in my heart all day? How long will my enemy be exalted over me?
4. Look! Answer me, O Lord, my God; give light to my eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death.
5. Lest my enemy say, "I have overcome him," [and] my oppressors rejoice when I falter.
6. I have placed my trust in Your kindness, my heart will rejoice in Your deliverance. I will sing to the Lord, for He has dealt kindly with me.
Chapter 14
This psalm speaks of the destruction of the two Holy Temples-the first by Nebuchadnezzar, and the second by Titus.
1. For the Conductor, by David. The fool says in his heart, "There is no God!" [Man's] deeds have become corrupt and abominable, no one does good.
2. The Lord looked down from heaven upon mankind, to see if there was any wise man who searches for God.
3. They have all gone astray together, they have become corrupt; there is none who does good, not even one.
4. Indeed, all the evildoers, who devour My people as they devour bread, who do not call upon the Lord, will [ultimately] come to know [the consequences of their actions].
5. There they will be seized with fright, for God is with the righteous generation.
6. You scorn the counsel of the lowly, that he puts his trust in the Lord.
7. O that out of Zion would come Israel's deliverance! When the Lord returns the captivity of His people, Jacob will exult, Israel will rejoice.
Chapter 15
This psalm speaks of several virtues and attributes with which one should conduct oneself. He is then assured that his soul will rest in Gan Eden.
1. A psalm by David. Who may abide in Your tent, O Lord? Who may dwell on Your holy Mountain?
2. He who walks blamelessly, acts justly, and speaks truth in his heart;
3. who has no slander on his tongue, who has done his fellowman no evil, and who has brought no disgrace upon his relative;
4. in whose eyes a despicable person is abhorrent, but who honors those who are God-fearing; who does not change his oath even if it is to his own detriment;
5. who does not lend his money at interest, nor accept a bribe against the innocent. He who does these things shall never falter.
Chapter 16
When one is in need, he should not implore God in his own merit, for he must leave his merits for his children.
1. A michtam,1 by David. Watch over me, O God, for I have put my trust in You.
2. You, [my soul,] have said to God, "You are my Master; You are not obligated to benefit me.”
3. For the sake of the holy ones who lie in the earth, and for the mighty-all my desires are fulfilled in their merit.
4. Those who hasten after other [gods], their sorrows shall increase; I will not offer their libations of blood, nor take their names upon my lips.
5. The Lord is my allotted portion and my share; You guide my destiny.
6. Portions have fallen to me in pleasant places; indeed, a beautiful inheritance is mine.
7. I bless the Lord Who has advised me; even in the nights my intellect admonishes me.2
8. I have set the Lord before me at all times; because He is at my right hand, I shall not falter.
9. Therefore my heart rejoices and my soul exults; my flesh, too, rests secure.
10. For You will not abandon my soul to the grave, You will not allow Your pious one to see purgatory.
11. Make known to me the path of life, that I may be satiated with the joy of Your presence, with the bliss of Your right hand forever.
FOOTNOTES
1.A psalm that was especially precious to David
2.To fear and love God (Rashi)
Chapter 17
A loftily person should not ask God to test him with some sinful matter, or other things. If one has sinned, he should see to reform himself, and to save many others from sin.
1. A prayer by David. Hear my sincere [plea], O Lord; listen to my cry; give ear to my prayer, expressed by guileless lips.
2. Let my verdict come forth from before You; let Your eyes behold uprightness.
3. You have probed my heart, examined it in the night, tested me and found nothing; no evil thought crossed my mind; as are my words so are my thoughts.
4. So that [my] human deeds conform with the words of Your lips, I guard myself from the paths of the lawbreakers.
5. Support my steps in Your paths, so that my feet shall not falter.
6. I have called upon You, for You, O Lord, will answer me; incline Your ear to me, hear what I say.
7. Withhold Your kindness-O You who delivers with Your right hand those who put their trust in You-from those who rise up against [You].
8. Guard me like the apple of the eye; hide me in the shadow of Your wings
9. from the wicked who despoil me, [from] my mortal enemies who surround me.
10. Their fat has closed [their hearts]; their mouths speak arrogantly.
11. They encircle our footsteps; they set their eyes to make us stray from the earth.
12. His appearance is like a lion longing to devour, like a young lion lurking in hiding.
13. Arise, O Lord! Confront him, bring him to his knees; rescue my soul from the wicked [who serves as] Your sword.
14. Let me be among those whose death is by Your hand, O Lord, among those who die of old age, whose portion is eternal life and whose innards are filled with Your concealed goodness; who are sated with sons and leave their abundance to their offspring.
15. Because of my righteousness, I shall behold Your countenance; in the time of resurrection, I will be sated by Your image.
---------------------
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 27
Lessons in Tanya
• English Text
Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
Video Class
• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Thursday, Adar I 2, 5776 · February 11, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 27
In the previous chapter the Alter Rebbe stated that sadness hinders one’s service of G‑d in general, and his battle with theYetzer Hara in particular. He therefore discussed means of overcoming sadness caused by material concerns, and by anxiety over one’s sins.
In this chapter and the next, he will discuss another type of melancholy, that caused by concern over one’s sinful thoughts and desires. This category itself may be further subdivided into two: (1) Where these thoughts occur while one is occupied with his material affairs, and (2) Where these thoughts disturb his service of G‑d in Torah study, prayer and the like.
In this chapter the Alter Rebbe discusses the first situation. He states that not only are these thoughts no cause for sadness, but on the contrary, they ought to give rise to joy.
ואם העצבות אינה מדאגת עונות, אלא מהרהורים רעים ותאוות רעות שנופלות במחשבתו
If, however, his sadness does not stem from anxiety over sins that he has committed, but from the fact that sinful thoughts and desires enter his mind, then:
הנה אם נופלות לו שלא בשעת העבודה, אלא בעת עסקו בעסקיו ודרך ארץ וכהאי גוונא
If these thoughts occur to him not during his service of G‑d, but while he is occupied with his own affairs and with mundane matters and the like,
אדרבה יש לו לשמוח בחלקו, שאף שנופלות לו במחשבתו הוא מסיח דעתו מהם
he should, on the contrary, be happy in his lot; for although these sinful thoughts enter his mind, he averts his attention from them.
It is clear that here we are speaking of one who does not wilfully dwell on sinful thoughts, for if he does so he is a sinner, and the previous chapter has already dealt with sadness arising from sins.
לקיים מה שנאמר: ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם אשר אתם זונים אחריהם
By averting his mind from sinful thoughts he fulfills the injunction, 1 “You shall not follow after your heart and after your eyes, by which you go astray.”
Only when sinful thoughts enter one’s mind can he fulfill this command. For the intention of the verse is not that one be at a level where such thoughts would not occur to him: this is the level of tzaddikim, who have eradicated all evil from their hearts. Surely, then this verse is not addressed to tzaddikim. The verse refers rather to one who does have such thoughts, and he is commanded to banish them — as the Alter Rebbe continues:
ואין הכתוב מדבר בצדיקים לקראם זונים, חס ושלום
The above verse surely does not speak of tzaddikim, referring to them (G‑d forbid) as “going astray,”
אלא בבינונים כיוצא בו שנופלים לו הרהורי ניאוף במחשבתו, בין בהיתר כו׳
but of Beinonim like himself, in whose mind there do enter erotic thoughts, whether of an innocent nature [or otherwise],
וכשמסיח דעתו, מקיים לאו זה
and when he averts his mind from them, he fulfills this injunction.
ואמרו רז״ל: ישב ולא עבר עבירה, נותנים לו שכר כאילו עשה מצוה
Our Sages have said: 2 “When one passively abstains from sin, he is rewarded as though he had actively performed a mitzvah.”
ועל כן צריך לשמוח בקיום הלאו כמו בקיום מצות עשה ממש
Consequently, he should rejoice in his compliance with the injunction just as he does when performing an actual positive precept.
Thus not only should the occurence of these thoughts not grieve him, but it ought to bring him joy, for only thereby is he able to fulfill this commandment.
FOOTNOTES
1.Bamidbar 15:39.
2.Cf. Kiddushin 39b.
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Thursday, Adar I 2, 5776 · February 11, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 220
The Law of the Seducer
"If a man seduces a virgin..."—Exodus 22:15.
In the event that a man seduces a virgin, we are commanded to follow the pertinent laws detailed in the Torah.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
The Law of the Seducer
Positive Commandment 220
Translated by Berel Bell
The 220th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding the law of a seducer.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "If a man seduces a virgin...."3
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the third and fourth chapters of Kesubos.
FOOTNOTES
1.This refers to a case where the woman was single. If she had already received kiddushin (see first footnote to P213), the transgression would be one of adultery; see N347.
2.Ex. 22:15.
3.He must pay a fine of 50 shekels and is required to marry her. The marriage takes place only if the girl consents.
     -----------------------------------------------------------
Positive Commandment 218
The Law of the Rapist
"She shall be his wife. . . . He may not send her away all the days of his life"—Deuteronomy 22:29.
One who rapes [a virgin] must marry the maiden [if she so desires].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
The Law of the Rapist
Positive Commandment 218
Translated by Berel Bell
The 218th mitzvah is that a rapist is commanded to marry his victim.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "Because he violated her, he must then take her to be his wife, and he may not send her away as long as he lives."
It is explained in tractate Makkos3 that the prohibition on the rapist not to divorce her, i.e. "he may not send her away," is considered "a prohibition which is preceded by a positive commandment." Our Sages stated there,4 "Why [should a rapist who marries his victim, and then divorces her, and then marries her again not receive lashes]? This is a prohibition which is preceded by a positive commandment?!" This statement demonstrates that G‑d's statement, "He must then take her as his wife," counts as a positive commandment.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the third and fourth chapters of Kesubos.
FOOTNOTES
1.As in P220, the marriage takes place only if she consents, and he must pay a fine.
2.Deut. 22:29.
3.15a.
4.The Rambam now proves that this verse contains two separate mitzvos, a positive commandment (that he marry her), and a prohibition (that once he marries her, he is never allowed to divorce her).
The Gemara is discussing the types of prohibitions for which the punishment is lashes. When a positive commandment can "remedy" the prohibited act (lav she'nitak l'aseh), one does not receive lashes as long as that remedial act is performed. For example, there is a prohibition against leaving sacrificial meat beyond the prescribed time. Should one leave the meat too long, there is a positive commandment to burn the meat. As long as the meat can still be burned, one is not lashed for the prohibition.
The Gemara then postulates a distinction: perhaps this principle applies only in such a case, where the prohibition (e.g. leaving the meat) always comes before the positive act (burning it). Perhaps when the positive act can come first (called "a prohibition which is preceded by a positive commandment"), one does receive lashes.
This the Gemara disproves with our mitzvah, regarding which we know clearly that one does not receive lashes since he can always remarry her. It therefore asks: "[According to your reasoning,] why [should he not receive lashes]?" — being that the positive commandment comes first.
The point of quoting this passage is to bring the phrase, "a positive commandment," which shows that marrying her counts as a mitzvah.
     -------------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 358
Divorcing a Rape Victim
"She shall be his wife. . . . He may not send her away all the days of his life"—Deuteronomy 22:29.
As explained in Positive Commandment 218, one who rapes [a virgin] must marry the maiden [if she so desires]. He may never divorce her [without her consent].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Divorcing a Rape Victim
Negative Commandment 358
Translated by Berel Bell
The 358th prohibition is that a rapist is forbidden from divorcing the woman he raped.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "He must then take her to be his wife, and he may not send her away as long as he lives."
This prohibition is preceded by the positive commandment,3 "He must then take her as his wife." In tractate Makkos4 it is clearly explained that this is considered a "prohibition which is preceded by a positive commandment."
It is also said there, "A rapist who divorces his wife — if he is not a Cohen, he remarries her and does not receive lashes. If he is a Cohen, he receives lashes, and he may not remarry her [since a Cohen may not marry a divorcee]."5
You should keep in mind that even a non-Cohen will receive lashes for divorcing the woman he raped, if he cannot perform the remedial positive command [of remarrying her]. This would be in a case where she died before he remarried her, or she married another man after he divorced her.6 This corresponds to our principle, "If he fulfilled [the remedial positive commandment, he does not get lashes]; if he did not fulfill" [this commandment, he would receive lashes].7
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the third and fourth chapters of Kesubos.
FOOTNOTES
1.After he marries her — see P218 above.
2.Deut. 22:29.
3.P218.
4.. 15a. See note to P218 for an explanation of this passage. It is quoted here because it uses the term, "prohibition," which indicates that it counts as one of the 365 prohibitions.
5.Since he is unable to perform the "remedial" positive commandment of remarrying her, it is not considered a lav she'nitak l'aseh. See note to P218.
6.In which case, he is forbidden from later remarrying her. See N356.
7.See Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Sanhedrin 16:4
     ------------------------------------------------------------
Positive Commandment 219
The Slandering Husband
"She shall be his wife; he may not send her away all the days of his life"—Deuteronomy 22:19.
In the event that a man slanders his newly-married virgin wife, falsely accusing her of infidelity, we are commanded to follow the pertinent laws detailed in the Torah. This includes lashes for the husband, and his obligation to remain married to this wife [if she so desires].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
he Slandering Husband
Positive Commandment 219
Translated by Berel Bell
The 219th mitzvah is the law of a motzi shem ra [i.e. one who marries a virgin and falsely accuses her of having relations between the kidushin1 and the n'suin] — that we are commanded to give him lashes, and that he remain married to her, for he also2 is instructed,3 "He must then take her as his wife, and he may not send her away as long as he lives."
It is explained in tractate Makkos4 that this prohibition, is like that of a rapist, i.e. it is considered a "prohibition which is preceded by a positive commandment."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the third and fourth chapters of Kesubos.
FOOTNOTES
1.. In Jewish law, there are two steps to a marriage, kiddushin and n'suin. After the first step of kidushin, they are considered husband and wife, but they may not yet live together as such until after n'suin. During Talmudic times there was a twelve-month period between the two stages, but today they are performed together. See P213.
2.. As the rapist in P218 above.
3.Deut. 22:19.
4.15a.
     --------------------------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 359
Divorcing the Defamation Victim
"He may not send her away as long as he lives"—Deuteronomy 22:19.
As explained in Positive Commandment 219, a husband who slanders his newly-married virgin wife, falsely accusing her of infidelity, must remain married to the wife [if she so desires]. He may never divorce her [without her consent].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Divorcing the Defamation Victim
Negative Commandment 359
Translated by Berel Bell
The 359th prohibition is that the motzi shem ra is forbidden from divorcing his wife.
The source of this commandment too1 is G‑d's statement,2 "he may not send her away as long as he lives."
This prohibition is also3 preceded by a positive command, "he must then take her as his wife."
Should he divorce his wife, the law regarding lashes is like that of the rapist,4 as explained in the last chapter of Makkos.5 The details of this mitzvah are explained there, and in the third and fourth chapters of Kesubos.
FOOTNOTES
1.. As in N358 above.
2.Deut. 22:19.
3.. As in P218 above.
4.See N358 above.
5.15a.
     ---------------------------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 9 
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Bikkurim - Chapter 9
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment for anyone1 who slaughters a kosher domesticated animal to give a priest the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw,2 as [Deuteronomy 18:50] states: "This is the judgment [due] the priests...." These are universally known as "presents."
This mitzvah is practiced at all times, whether at the time the Temple is standing or not, whether in Eretz Yisrael or in the Diaspora,3 with regard to ordinary animals and not consecrated ones.
Halacha 2
There is an obligation to separate the above-mentioned presents from all consecrated animals that had a permanent blemish4 before they were consecrated and were redeemed.5 If, by contrast, they had a temporary blemish6 before their consecration or they were consecrated when they were unblemished, but afterwards, they became blemished,7 and they were redeemed, they are exempt from these presents.8
Halacha 3
If there is an unresolved doubt whether an animal is a firstborn,9 there is certainly an obligation to give the presents [from it to the priest].10 [The rationale is:] If it is a firstborn, it must be given to a priest in its entirety. If it is not a firstborn, the presents must be given to a priest.
If a question arises with regard to the status of two animals11 and a priest took one because of the doubt, the second one is exempt from the presents. [The rationale is that] it is considered as an animal which a priest acquired and then gave to its owners, because of its blemish.12
If, however, there is an unresolved doubt whether an animal is the tithes of the herd,13 it is exempt in all situations. [The rationale is that] when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague,14 the burden of proof is on him.15
Halacha 4
When an animal that was consecrated and then disqualified because of a blemish16 became mixed with other animals - even one with 100 - if one person owns all of them,17 they are all exempt [from the obligation of the presents]. [The rationale is that the status of] each one is doubtful and when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.18 If one person was slaughtering all the animals, only one [set of] presents is exempt.19
Halacha 5
We are required to separate presents only from a kosher domesticated animal,20 [as indicated by Deuteronomy, loc. cit., which] states: "If it be an ox or a sheep."21 If a hybrid is born from a sheep and a goat, there is an obligation for presents to be given.22 We separate all23 the presents from ako'i24even though its status is undetermined.
When a male deer mates with a goat and it gives birth, there is an obligation [to give] half the presents [to a priest]. [This is derived from the above prooftext]: "If it be... a sheep," i.e., even if it is only part sheep.25 [When, by contrast,] a male goat mates with a deer, the offspring is exempt from the presents.26
Halacha 6
Whether a person slaughters an animal for consumption by Jews, by animals, by dogs, or for medical purposes, there is an obligation [to give] the presents.27
Halacha 7
There is an obligation [to separate the presents from] an animal belonging to partners, as [the above prooftext] states: "those who slaughter28 the animal."
Halacha 8
When a person purchases an animal with the produce of the Sabbatical year, he is obligated to [give] presents [to a priest].29
Priests and Levites are exempt from the presents, as [the above prooftext] states: "from the people." It is questionable whether the Levites are considered as part of "the people" or not. Therefore [the presents] are not taken from them.30 If, however, a priest took them, he need not return them.31
Halacha 9
When does the above32 apply? When one slaughters for his own sake. [Different laws apply to] a priest who is butcher, who slaughters [animals] and sells them in the marketplace. We grant him two or three weeks.33Afterwards, we expropriate the presents from him and grant them to other priests.34
If he established a butcher shop to sell meat, we do not wait at all. Instead, we expropriate the presents from him immediately. If he refrains from giving them, we place him under a ban of ostracism35 until he gives them.
Halacha 10
A person who slaughters an animal for the sake of a priest or a gentile is exempt from [the obligation to give presents].36
A person who enters into a partnership with a priest [in the ownership of an animal] must mark his portion, so that he will leave the presents in the portion of the priest. If he does not mark his portion, he is obligated [to give] these presents, because the fact that the priest is his partner is not a matter of public knowledge.37Accordingly, if the priest was standing with him in the butcher store and dealing and negotiating with him,38 he is not required to mark [his portion].39
When a person enters a partnership with a gentile [in the ownership of an animal], he need not mark his portion.40 [The rationale is that] as a rule, a gentile will speak excessively and inform everyone that he is [the Jew's] partner, even if [the Jew] is not present at the time of the sale.
Halacha 11
[If, when negotiating a partnership agreement41 regarding the ownership of an animal,] a priest stipulates to [his partner, an Israelite,] that they are partners with the exception of the presents, the presents belong to the priest. Since the priest stipulated "with the exception of...," he left himself the portion of [the animal containing] the presents. Hence, they are his.42
If, however, the priest told the Israelite: "...on the condition that the presents are mine," the presents belong to the Israelite and he may give them to any priest he desires. Even though [the priest] stipulated that they were his, [the animal] is not exempt from [the obligation to give] the presents.43 For by saying "on the condition that...," he did not leave himself [the ownership of] the presents. Since he did not leave himself a share in their ownership, he did not acquire them through this stipulation.44
Halacha 12
If a priest was a partner in [the ownership of] the head, he is exempt from [giving] the jaw. If he is a partner in the front leg, he is exempt from the fore leg. If he is a partner in the digestive organs, he is exempt from the maw.45
If the priest told [the Israelite]: "The entire animal is mine, but the head is yours," he is obligated to give the jaw, for the portion that must be given belongs to the Israelite.
Halacha 13
[The following laws apply when] a gentile converts and he is in the process of having an animal slaughtered. If it was slaughtered before he converted, he is exempt.46 If [it was slaughtered] after he converted, he is obligated. If there is a doubt concerning the matter, [we follow the principle]: When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.47
Halacha 14
It is permitted to partake [of the meat] of an animal from which the presents were not separated. [The situation] is not analogous to tevel48 [The rationale is that] the presents due to be given the priests are separate and distinct.49It is forbidden for an Israelite to partake of the presents themselves without the permission of a priest. If he transgresses and partakes of them, damages them, or sells them, he is not liable to make financial restitution.50 [The rationale is that] this is money that has no known plaintiff.51 A person who purchases them - even though he is forbidden to do so - is permitted to partake of them, because when the presents to the priests are stolen, the theft effect a change in ownership.
Halacha 15
If one tells a butcher: "Sell me the digestive organs of a cow," and there were presents52 among them, [the purchaser] should give them to a priest,53but [the seller] need not decrease the price [accordingly].54 If [the purchaser] bought [the organs] by weight, he should give them to the priest and deduct their value from the butcher's [due].55
Halacha 16
When a person sends meat to a friend and there were presents56 in [the parcel], the recipient need not be concerned that [the sender] transgressed and stole them.57
In a place where there are no priests,58 one should determine their financial value and partake of them, [so as not to cause] a priest a loss.59 He should then give the money to any priest he desires.
Halacha 17
If a person wants to give the presents to only one priest, he may do so. If he wants to divide them [and give them to several], he should not give half the maw or half the foreleg to one [priest]. Instead, he should give the foreleg to one, the maw to another, and the jaw to two others. [This is inferred fromDeuteronomy 18:4]: "And you shall give it to him," i.e., give him a portion that is a significant present.60 If [he is giving presents] from an ox, he may divide them into portions,61 provided each portion is a significant present.
Halacha 18
What is meant by the foreleg? The right foreleg,62 The portion from the upper-joint until the ankle joint; two limbs, one connected with the other. The jaw refers to the jaw bones until the large ring of the protrusion of the gullet with the tongue between the bones.63 All of this is given to the priest.
Halacha 19
[When giving the jaw and the foreleg to the priest,] we do not pour boiling water on the hide [to remove the hair], nor do we skin it. Instead, we give it to [the priest] with its skin and wool. [We give a priest] the maw with the fat upon it64 and the fat within it. The priests have already accepted the custom of leaving the fat of the maw for the owner.65
Halacha 20
A women of the priestly family may partake of the presents even if she is married to an Israelite, because they are not consecrated. Moreover, her husband may partake of the presents for her sake.
challalah,66 by contrast, may not partake of the presents, becausechallalim67 are not in the category of priests.68 If a priest desires to sell the presents, to give them as gifts, even to a gentile, or to feed them to the dogs, he may, for they are not consecrated at all.69
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when there is] a priest whose friends [continually] give him presents. If he desires to transfer ownership of them to a friend who is an Israelite,70 he may, even though they did not enter [the priest's] domain. Thus [the priest's] friends may slaughter [their animals] and give the presents to the Israelite who acquired them. [This applies] provided the Israelite is in difficult straits and does not have the means to buy meat and the priest who transfers the meat to him is his friend. If, however, the priest is the Israelite's attendant or his hired worker or employee, he may not transfer ownership [of the presents] until they enter his domain.71 [This is a safeguard,] lest he compel him to do so.
Halacha 22
A priest should not grab the presents, nor should he even request them verbally. Instead, if he is given them72 in a respectful manner, he may take them.73 When there are many priests at the slaughter house, the modest ones withdraw and the gluttons take them. [Even though] a priest is modest, [if] it is not known that he is a priest, he should take [the presents] to let it be known to everyone that he is a priest.
The priests should only eat the presents as they are roasted, with mustard on them,74 for [Numbers 18:8] states [that the gifts to the priests75 were given them]: "for distinction." Hence, [they should] be eaten in a manner befitting a king.
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., other than a priest or Levite (see Halachah 8).
2.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 143) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 506) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Chulin 134b states that the priests merited these gifts in recognition of the heroism of Pinchas in stopping the Jews' lewd behavior with the Midianite women.
3.
This is a matter of debate among the commentaries. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:21) quote the Rambam's view, but also mention the opinion of Rashi and Rabbenu Meir of Rutenberg who maintain that this mitzvah is not practiced in the Diaspora. They conclude that this latter view is observed. The Sefer HaChinuch, loc. cit., writes that in the abstract, he agrees that the law should be observed in the present era as well, but "we do not have the power to compel the butchers to observe it." See also the Responsa of the Chatam Sofer, sec. 301, where he writes that he would observe this mitzvah.
4.
These blemishes are listed in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, ch. 7, Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach, ch. 2.
5.
Since they are permanently blemished at the time of their consecration, it is obvious that they will ultimately be redeemed and used for ordinary purposes, not as a sacrifice. Hence it is never considered that their actual bodies became consecrated. Once they are redeemed, they are like any ordinary property. Hence the obligation to separate the presents falls upon them (Radbaz).
6.
Such blemishes are listed in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 2:7.
7.
Even permanently.
8.
In such a situation, the consecration of the animal encompasses its actual body. The rationale is that in the first instance mentioned in this clause, the blemish is not permanent. Hence, it does not block the consecration. And in the second instance, the blemish comes after the consecration already took effect. And since the consecration affected the actual bodies of the animals, it continues to have an effect even after the animals have been redeemed. They are considered as pesulei hamukdashim and are exempt from this obligation (Radbaz, based on Bechorot 15a).
9.
A sheep that had not given birth before gave birth to two offspring, a male - which would be separated as a firstborn - and a female which would not - and it is not known which of them was born first. See Hilchot Bechorot5:1. Alternatively, a firstborn animal became mixed together with other animals [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:20).
10.
A priest to whom a firstborn animal is given is not obligated to separate the presents and give them to another priest. In the instance described above, the Israelite who is the owner of the animal may retain possession of it, for we follow the principle: "When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him." Thus since a priest cannot prove that the animal was a firstborn, it remains the property of the owner. Nevertheless, he must give the presents to a priest based on the rationale presented by the Rambam.
11.
E.g., a sheep that had not given birth before gave birth to two males. Thus one of them is certainly the firstborn and must be given to a priest. The question is which one. Hence the weaker one is given to the priest and the other one remains the property of its owner, but may not be slaughtered until it receives a disqualifying blemish (Hilchot Bechorot, loc. cit.).
12.
I.e., in exchange for giving the priest the weaker animal, the priest forfeits his claim on the other animal. Hence, although there is a possibility that it is an ordinary animal and the presents must be given to the priest, to obtain those presents, the priest is required to prove that claim and he cannot. Hence, the owner may retain possession.
13.
Which the owner must offer as a sacrifice (Hilchot Bechorot 6:4). Were this to be the case, he would not be required to give the presents to a priest.
14.
In this instance, the priest desires to expropriate the presents.
15.
I.e., we cannot obligate him to give the presents to a priest, because unlike the firstborn, the priest has no claim to the animal as a whole.
16.
It is exempt from the obligation to separate the presents as stated in Halachah 2.
17.
Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of theMishneh Torah. The standard printed text differs slightly.
18.
In this instance, the priest desires to expropriate the presents.
19.
Because he knows that only one animal was consecrated and then disqualified.
20.
If, however, he slaughters a kosher wild animal (e.g., a deer) or a kosher fowl, he is not required to give the presents to the priest.
21.
More particularly, the Hebrew term seh can refer either to a sheep or a goat.
22.
For even though it is a hybrid, it is definitely a domesticated animal and hence, there is an obligation for presents to be given.
23.
Not only half.
24.
Generally - and indeed, this interpretation is indicated by the standard published text ofHilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13 - a ko'i is defined as: "a mixed species that comes from the mating of a kosher domesticated animal and a kosher wild beast." Accordingly, the Tur (Yoreh De'ah 61) questions the Rambam's ruling for it appears to contradict his own statements in the continuation of this halachah. Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh to the Mishneh Torah and his Beit Yosef to the Tur) explains that the Rambam understands the term ko'ias referring to an independent species that we do not know whether to classify as a domesticated animal or as a wild beast. He maintains that the proper version of Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot is "any animal whose classification as a domesticated animal or as a beast is doubtful is a ko'i" and he maintains that Hilchot Shechitah 14:4 serves as proof of this interpretation.
25.
Chulin 132a explains that since it is only part sheep, only part of the presents are granted. We do not take the species of the father of the animal into consideration.
26.
For, as in the previous law, we do not take the species of the father of the animal into consideration. Although this matter is not determined definitively, since "when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him," the priest cannot claim the presents definitively either (Siftei Cohen61:10).
27.
Presents need not be separated when an animal is killed without ritual slaughter - or when the ritual slaughter is performed improperly and the animal is forbidden to be eaten (Tosefta, Chulin 9:1). Nevertheless, if the slaughter is performed properly, the presents must be given to a priest, regardless of the reason for which the animal was slaughtered. This is derived from a comparison to the covering of the blood after the slaughter of an animal (Ra'avad).
28.
The use of the plural term implies that the law applies even if there are many for whom the animal is being slaughtered (seeChulin136a).
29.
For even though that produce must be destroyed at the appropriate time, while it is in a person's possession, it is his personal property. See Bechorot 12b.
30.
As above, when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him. And it is impossible for a priest to prove that the Levite is obligated.
From Chulin 131a, it is obvious that a Levite does not have the right to receive presents (Siftei Cohen 61:12).
31.
For now they are in the possession of the priest. He may therefore retain them, for the Levite cannot prove that he is exempt.
The Rambam's view is cited by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:23). The Rama maintains that since the law is that a priest is not entitled to take it, if he takes it by force, he is required to return it. This difference of opinion reflects a divergence on an issue of a greater scope. See Hilchot Bechorot 5:3, where the Rambam rules that when there is a question concerning whether an animal is a firstborn or not, a priest is not permitted to take possession of it. If he takes possession of it, however, it is not expropriated from him. In that instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah315:1) follows the Rambam's approach and the Rama differs.
32.
That the priests are exempt from giving presents.
33.
During which he is allowed to keep the presents for himself.
34.
Since he sells the meat, he is acting on behalf of others and they are not absolved from the obligation of giving the presents. See the gloss of Rav Yosef Korcus who debates whether this is a Scriptural Law or a Rabbinic decree.
35.
See Hilchot Talmud Torah, ch. 6.
36.
We are speaking about a situation where the animal belongs entirely to the priest or the gentile. It is the ownership of the animal, not the identity of the slaughterer which is significant. Since neither the priest nor the gentile would be required to give these presents, a slaughterer who acts on their behalf is also exempt.
37.
Hence, if he does not give a priest the presents, people will suspect him of withholding them.
38.
And thus it is evident that they are partners.
39.
The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 61) differs with the Rambam, explaining Chulin 133a,b (the Rambam's source) differently. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam's interpretation (even though at the outset, he states that the interpretation of the Tur appears more appropriate to the simple meaning of the passage. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:25), he follows the Tur'sinterpretation.
40.
And we nevertheless assume that the presents were in the gentile's portion.
41.
Rashi (in his commentary to Chulin 132a, the source for the Rambam's ruling) and similarly, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 61:29) interpret this as referring to a sale and not a partnership agreement.
42.
Even if they were not marked [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:3)].
43.
The Radbaz explains that the rationale is that his stipulation runs contrary to the Torah - for the Torah requires that the presents be given - and whenever a person makes a stipulation that runs contrary to Torah law, the stipulation is nullified. Hence, it is as if the stipulation was never made and the priest's partner must separate the presents as stated in the previous halachah.
44.
The commentaries note an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Ma'aser 6:19 where he states:
When a priest sells a field to an Israelite and tells him: "[I am selling it] on the condition that the tithes from it belong to me forever," they belong to him. [The rationale is that] saying "on the condition that" is tantamount to setting aside for himself [the portion of the field] where the tithes [grow].
Although there are explicit Talmudic sources for both rulings, their logic appears contradictory. Among the resolutions offered is that here, the Rambam is speaking about the ownership of an animal, while in Hilchot Ma'aser, he is speaking about landed property and the principles of ownership are different in these two instances.
45.
The new concept taught by this halachah is that one can be exempt from part, but not all, of the presents.
46.
Because at that time, he was not obligated, as stated in Halachah 10.
47.
Hence, the convert may retain possession of the presents. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 8, Halachah 9, when a similar situation arises concerning challah, the Rambam rules that the convert is liable to separate the dough. Nevertheless, a distinction between the two can be made because of the severity of that prohibition.
48.
In which instance, it is forbidden to partake of the produce until the terumah and the tithes are separated.
49.
In contrast to the produce where theterumah and tithes must be separated from the produce as a whole.
50.
I.e., he has no legal obligation to make financial restitution. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro questions whether the person has a moral and spiritual obligation to make restitution and in his Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 61:15), he rules that he does.
51.
There is no one priest who can claim that the presents are his and they must be returned to him, for until they are given, the owner has the right to give them to any priest he desires.
52.
I.e., the maw.
53.
For they belong to him.
54.
Since it was obvious that the maw was among the organs he purchased, the purchaser should have realized that it was not included in the price. Instead, he was paying him for the remainder of the meat (Kessef Mishneh).
55.
Since the maw did not belong to the butcher - for it must be given to the priest - he had no right to sell it (ibid.). See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4) which states that it is forbidden to buy the presents, because by doing so, one would be aiding theft.
56.
I.e., some of the organs that have to be given the priest.
57.
For we do not suspect that a person sinned. Instead, the recipient assumes that the sender purchased the presents from a priest; alternatively, there were no priests in the area and he followed the advice given in the following clause.
58.
And thus there is no one to give the presents to.
59.
For if he sets them aside, they will spoil. There is no difficulty in doing so, for the presents are not consecrated at all.
60.
See the notes of Rav Kapach to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4). There he writes that the original version of the Rambam's Commentary did not contain this law, but the later version did.
61.
For even a portion of the organs of an ox are of a significant size.
62.
The Turei Zahav 61:1 states that this is derived from the fact that the prooftext speaks of "the foreleg," i.e., the important one. An animal's foreleg is comprised of three bones. According to the Rambam, the lower two are given to the priest. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4).
63.
Chulin 134b states that one should take the jaw until the place where the animal is slaughtered. See the accompanying diagrams.
64.
This fat is forbidden to be eaten (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 7:6).
65.
Chulin 134b explains that this is an act of generosity on the part of the priests. Since the presents are their personal property without any sanctity at all, they can do with them as they see fit. From the wording of theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:4), however, it appears that this custom is not universally accepted.
66.
In Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:1 describes achallalah as a woman born from relations forbidden to the priesthood or a woman who is forbidden to the priesthood who engaged in relations with a priest.
67.
The term challal refers to the offspring of relations forbidden to a priest.
68.
Hence, just as the presents may not be given to a challal, they may not be given to achallalah.
The concept that challalim are not priests applies in many contexts. See Hilchot Nesiat Kapayim 15:5, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:5,Hilchot Terumah 6:7, et al.
69.
The Siftei Cohen 61:5 states that a priest should not give or sell them to gentiles or feed them to dogs unless they are no longer fit for human consumption.
70.
The Rambam's source (Chulin 133a) mentions that the recipient of these presents must be a Torah scholar. The Tur and theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:14) also mention that point. Apparently, the Rambam thinks that it is not an absolute necessity.
71.
Once they are given to him, however, there are no restrictions on what he may do with them.
72.
Turei Zahav 61:12 states that this is derived from the word "and you shall give" in the prooftext. Implied is that the presents should be given. They should not be taken by the priests on their own initiative.
73.
See parallels in Hilchot Terumah 12:18.
74.
If, however, a priest prefers to eat them in another manner, he may. It is not an obligation to partake of them in the manner described (Tosafot, Chulin 132b).
75.
This verse does not speak about the presents of meat explicitly, but rather the portions of the sacrifices given to the priests. Nevertheless, the concepts can be derived one from the other. See Rashi,Chulin, loc. cit..
---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Naarah Betulah Naarah Betulah - Chapter One, Naarah Betulah Naarah Betulah - Chapter Two, Naarah Betulah Naarah Betulah - Chapter Three • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Naarah Betulah - Chapter One
Halacha 1
When a man seduces a virgin,1 he is fined 50 sela'im of pure silver.2 This is called a k'nas ("fine"). The same law applies if he rapes her.
Payment of this fine is one of the Torah's positive commandments,3, as [Deuteronomy 22:29] states: "The man who raped her must give the maiden's father 50 silver pieces."
Halacha 2
What is meant by a seducer, and what is meant by a rapist? A seducer is one who enters into relations with a girl with her consent; a rapist is one who takes her by force.
Whenever a man entered into relations with a woman in a field, we operate under the presumption that he raped her, and apply those laws4 unless witnesses testify that she entered into relations with him willingly.5 Whenever a man enters into relations with a woman in a city, we operate under the presumption that she consented, because she did not cry out, unless witnesses testify that she was raped - e.g., he pulled out a sword and told her, "If you cry out, I will kill you."
Halacha 3
When a girl who was seduced does not want to marry the seducer, or her father does not want to give her in marriage to him,6 or if [the seducer] does not want to marry her, he may pay the fine and depart. We do not force him to marry her.7
If they do desire [to wed], and he marries her, he does not pay a fine.8Instead, he writes her a ketubah, as is written for other maidens.9
When, however, a woman who is raped or her father do not desire that she marry the rapist, they have that prerogative. [In such an instance,] he must pay the fine and depart. If she and her father desire [that the marriage take place], but he does not desire, we force him to marry her, aside from paying the fine, as [Deuteronomy 22:29] states: "He must take [the maiden] as his wife"; this is a positive commandment.10
Even if the girl is lame, blind, or afflicted with leprosy,11 he is forced to marry her and he may never take the initiative in divorcing her,12 as [the above verse continues]: "He may not send her away as long as he lives." This is a negative commandment.13
Halacha 4
[This girl] is not granted a ketubah. For our Sages instituted the requirement of a ketubah so that [a husband] will not consider divorce a frivolous matter. [In this instance this is unnecessary, because] the man cannot divorce [his wife].
Halacha 5
If the girl he raped was forbidden to him,14 even if the prohibition stems from a positive commandment, or she was a sh'niyah [or forbidden by other Rabbinic prohibitions],15 he should not marry her. Similarly, if he discovers adulterous behavior16 on her part after he marries her, he should divorce her. [These concepts are implied by the phrase: "He must take [the girl] as his wife" [which our Sages interpreted to mean]: "She must be fit to be his wife."
Halacha 6
When a High Priest rapes or seduces a virgin maiden, he should not marry her, because he is commanded to marry a virgin,17and at the time he marries this girl she is not a virgin.18 If he marries [this girl], he must divorce her.
Halacha 7
Although it is said with regard to a rapist: "He may not send her away as long as he lives," since [this prohibition] is preceded by a positive commandment, as it is said, "He must take [the girl] as his wife," the Torah made the prohibition [rectifiable] by the observance of the positive commandment. Thus, this is a negative commandment [whose violation] can be rectified by [the observance of] a positive commandment. Lashes are not given [as punishment for the violation of such a commandment] unless one does not fulfill the positive commandment, as will be explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin.19
Therefore, when a rapist violates [this prohibition] and divorces [his wife], he is compelled to remarry her and is not punished by lashes. If, however, his divorcee dies or is consecrated by another man20 before he remarries her, or if he is a priest, who is forbidden to marry a divorcee, he should be punished by lashes. For he transgressed the negative commandment, and is unable to fulfill the positive commandment associated with it.21
Halacha 8
Neither a rapist nor a seducer is liable to pay the fine unless he engages in relations in the ordinary fashion,22 and the relations are observed by witnesses.23 A warning is not necessary.24
At what age is a girl fit to be paid a fine? From the age of three25 until she reaches the age of bagrut.26 If a man engages in relations with a girl less than three years old, the relations are not significant.27 If he engages in relations with her after she reaches the age of bagrut, he is not fined. For [Deuteronomy 22:28] states: "A virgin maiden," thus excluding a girl who has reached maturity.
Halacha 9
Whether or not [a girl's] father is alive, a fine must be paid.28
A fine need not be paid [because of relations] with the following women: abogeret, a girl who has dissolved a marriage through mi'un,29 an aylonit,30 a mentally incompetent girl, a deaf mute,31 a girl who was reputed to have conducted herself immodestly while young, concerning whom two witnesses testify that she sought sexual relations with them,32 a girl who was married and divorced, but is still a virgin maiden.33
When, by contrast, [a girl] is divorced after merely being consecrated,34 a fine must be paid - and she is entitled to it35 - if she is raped. If she is seduced, she is not entitled to a fine.36
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply with regard to] a convert, a girl who was taken captive, and a [Canaanite] maidservant who was freed:37 If she was converted, redeemed or freed before she reached the age of three, she is entitled to a fine.38
If she was three years old [or older] when she was converted, redeemed or freed, she is not entitled to a fine. Since relations that she engages in at this time are significant, she is placed into the category of non-virgins.
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply when] the virgin [who was raped or seduced] was forbidden to the rapist or the seducer. If the prohibition was punishable bykaret - e.g., she was his sister, his aunt, in the niddah state or the like - or she was forbidden by virtue of a negative commandment [that does not involve either karet or execution], he is not liable for a fine if he was given a warning.39[Instead,] he should be lashed. [The rationale is that] a person is never punished [for the same transgression] by both lashes and a monetary assessment.
If he was not warned, since he is not to be given lashes, he should pay the fine.
Halacha 12
[When the girl raped] was forbidden because of a positive commandment, or she was a sh'niyah or forbidden because of another Rabbinic commandment, [the rapist] is obligated to pay the fine whether he was warned against the transgression or not, because he is not punished by lashes.
Halacha 13
[When the girl raped] was forbidden because of a prohibition punishable by execution by the court - e.g., she was his daughter, daughter-in-law,40 or the like - he is not liable for the fine, regardless of whether or not he received a warning.
[This is derived from Exodus 21:22, which] states: "If there will not be a [fatal] accident, he should be punished."41 Implied is that if there is a [fatal] accident, no punishment should be levied.42 [This applies] although the woman was killed unintentionally, [i.e.,] the man did not intend to strike her,43 as it is written [Ibid.]: "If men strive and a woman receives a blow...." This teaches that with regard to a [fatal] accident, Scripture did not differentiate between an intentional and unintentional act to free him from monetary obligation.
And [Leviticus 24:18-21] says: "A person who [fatally] strikes an animal shall reimburse [its owner] for it, and one who [fatally] strikes a man must die." Just as Scripture did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional action for killing an animal to make him liable for payment, so too, it did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional action for killing a person to free him from financial obligation.
Halacha 14
This law applies with regard to every transgression that is punishable by execution by the court. There is no financial obligation.44
Halacha 15
If [a girl] dies after she [was seduced or raped], [the seducer or the rapist] is not liable for the fine, [as implied by Deuteronomy 22:29]: "the man who raped her must give the maiden's father...." [The verse states] "the father of the maiden," and not "the father of the dead maiden." [This applies] when she dies before the case came to court.45
FOOTNOTES
1.
Between the ages of three and twelve and a half, as evident from Halachah 8. See Ramah (Even HaEzer 177:1).
2.
See Hilchot Eruvin 1:12 and Hilchot Shekalim 1:2, where the Rambam describes the weight of this coin. According to the figures he gives in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:8), in contemporary measure a sela is 19.2 grams. According to the Piskei Siddur of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, it is 20.4 grams.
3.
See Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 220), which describes this mitzvah as "the commandment we have been given with regard to a man who seduces [a virgin]." (See also Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 61.)
Both in the Mishneh Torah and in Sefer HaMitzvot, the payment of the fine by a seducer, a rapist and one who issues a slanderous report appears to be included in the same mitzvah (Nachalat Efrayim).
Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:8 states that the cases involving laws governing a seducer and a rapist are to be tried by judges withsemichah, a qualification that is not possessed by Rabbinical judges in the post-Talmudic period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 177:2) states that in the present age, a seducer and a rapist should be compelled to satisfy the girl's father for the damage they have caused.
4.
As mentioned in the following halachah, a rapist must marry the woman he raped, while a seducer need not. And, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 1, a rapist must also reimburse the woman for the pain and embarrassment he caused her.
5.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that unless there are witnesses to the relations, the woman has no way of proving her claim against the man. The Migdal Oz explains that this refers to an instance where witnesses saw the man and the woman engage in relations from afar and were not able to determine whether she was seduced or raped.
The assumptions mentioned by the Rambam are based on the passage (stated with regard to a consecrated maiden,Deuteronomy 23:24-27): "This is the law when a virgin maiden was consecrated to one man and another man meets her in the city and has relations with her. Both of them should be executed, [i.e., we assume the girl consented]... because she did not cry out in the city.... If the man encountered the maiden who was consecrated in the field..., the girl has not committed a sin... for the man attacked her in the field..., where there was no one to come to her aid."
6.
Exodus 22:16 states: "If her father refuses to allow him to marry her...," and Ketubot39b explains that the girl is also given the option of rejecting the man.
7.
The simple meaning of the passage from Exodus implies that the seducer should marry the girl, but Ketubot 40a explains that this is not a binding obligation.
8.
He does, however, pay damages, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 7.
9.
I.e., she is given a ketubah of 200 zuzim, as is given to other virgin maidens (Hilchot Ishut 11:4), despite the fact that she was not a virgin at the time of the marriage (Ma'aseh Rokeach). Mishneh LaMelech explains that this concept is derived from Exodus 22:16, which states: "he must pay the usual dowry money for virgins."
Tosafot (Yevamot 60a) and the Nimukei Yosef differ and maintain that the girl is given a ketubah of only 100 zuzim as is given to non-virgins.
10.
See Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 218). See also Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 557).
11.
In this halachah, the Rambam uses the Biblical term tzara'at, although generally he uses the Rabbinic term mukeh sh'chin. See Chapter 3, Halachah 4, and the conclusion of Hilchot Ishut.
12.
If, however, the woman wants to be divorced, the rapist may divorce her [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 177:3)].
13.
See Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 358). See also Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 558).
14.
The Torah does not require him to marry a woman with whom there is any prohibition whatsoever.
15.
For all Rabbinic prohibitions have the source in the Torah's commandment to observe the rulings of our Sages.
16.
For a husband is forbidden to engage in marital relations with an adulterous wife, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 24:17. See the Beit Shmuel 177:4, who emphasizes that the intent is that witnesses observed the actual commission of adultery, not merely immodest behavior that suggests adultery.
See also Chapter 3, Halachah 5.
17.
See Leviticus 21:13Hilchot Ishut 1:8.
18.
Although her lack of virginity is a result of his deed, she is still forbidden to him. SeeHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 17:16.
19.
Chapter 18, Halachah 2.
20.
At which point her husband is forbidden to remarry her, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin11:12.
21.
Although he did not personally prevent the positive commandment from being observed, since he is no longer able to observe it, he must bear the consequences of his violation of the prohibition.
22.
I.e., vaginal and not anal intercourse. The Rambam's ruling is not accepted by the Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher, who citeKiddushin 9b-10a in support of their conception.
The Kiryat Sefer supports the Rambam's ruling, based on Sanhedrin 73b, which states that the man is not liable until he inserts the entire penis into the vagina, explaining that it is only then that the woman will lose her virginity. Since she will never lose her virginity through anal intercourse, the man is not held liable.
23.
For a person who admits his culpability in matters punishable by a fine is not liable. See Chapter 2, Halachah 12 and notes.
24.
For a warning is necessary only before infliction of the punishments of execution or lashing.
25.
Although there are times when the Hebrew term na'arah, translated as "maiden," has a more specific meaning (see Hilchot Ishut2:1), Ketubot 40b explains that in this instance the intent is also a girl below the age of twelve.
Although most Rishonim agree with the Rambam, there are, however, significant authorities who rule that a fine need not be paid until the girl reaches the age of na'arut.
26.
Generally, this refers to a girl of the age of twelve and a half who has manifested signs of physical maturity. If a girl does not manifest signs of physical maturity, she is not considered a bogeret until the age of 20 or 35. See Hilchot Ishut 2:1-4.
27.
For her hymen will grow back, as implied byHilchot Ishut 3:11.
28.
Since the Torah states that the fine should be paid to the father, it is necessary to clarify that the fine must be paid even if the father is not alive.
29.
As mentioned in Hilchot Gerushin 11;1, when a girl below the age of majority marries without being consecrated by her father, she can nullify the marriage without a formal divorce. This is called mi'un. When she takes this option, even if we know that she is still a virgin, she is not entitled to receive the fine because she has been married previously.
30.
A woman who does not manifest female sexual characteristics, as explained inHilchot Ishut 2:5. Since an aylonit never becomes a na'arah, she is not entitled to a fine (Kessef Mishneh). The Ra'avad maintains that an aylonit should receive a fine until she reaches the age of twenty.
31.
Since they are not mentally competent, we fear that they were raped previously without their knowing about it. Compare to Hilchot Ishut 11:4,8. Note the Ra'avad, who states that a person who rapes or seduces a deaf mute is liable for a fine.
32.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 17.
33.
Even if we are certain that she and her husband never engaged in sexual relations, she is not paid a fine. Compare to Hilchot Ishut 11:1.
34.
We do not assume that she entered into relations with her husband before the stage of nisu'in.
35.
Although Deuteronomy 22:28 speaks of the fine being paid to the girl's father, from the fact that the verse mentions "a maiden who was not consecrated," Ketubot 38a derives that when a maiden has been consecrated, the fine should be paid to the woman who was raped.
36.
Since she consented to relations, she waives the payment of the fine. See Chapter 2, Halachot 10-11.
Note Rav David Arameah, who states that this applies only when she is a na'arah. If she is still a minor, her father receives the fine, and she does not have the potential to waive it through her consent.
37.
As the Rambam states in Hilchot Ishut 11:2, we operate under the presumption that these women have engaged in relations previously: a convert and a Canaanite maidservant because non-Jews' morals are considered to be weak, and a woman held captive because she is at the mercy of her captors.
38.
Even if she engaged in relations before the age of three, her hymen will grow back, as stated in the notes on Halachah 8.
39.
As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2 and 16:4, a person receives corporal punishment for the commission of a transgression only when he has been warned previously.
40.
This refers to a girl who was divorced after consecration. If she was divorced afternisu'in, the second stage of the marriage, she is not entitled to a fine as stated in Halachah 9.
41.
The verse speaks of the woman's miscarrying. If she herself does not die, the man who caused her to miscarry must pay her damages.
42.
I.e., if the woman dies, her heirs need not be reimbursed. Since the man is liable for a sin of a more severe nature, he is not held liable for damages (Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:5).
43.
Although the general principle stated in this halachah is accepted without dispute, the particular case of the pregnant woman is a matter of question. The Rambam himself states (Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:5-6) that if the man did not intend to strike the woman, he is liable to pay damages to her heirs.
In that source, he explains that the leniency granted by the verse applies when the man intended to strike the woman, but did not intend to kill her.
44.
In contrast, with regard to a transgression punishable by lashes: if it is performed unintentionally, one is still held liable for the financial repercussions.
45.
Once, however, the case is heard before the court, the rapist is held liable if proven guilty, even if the maiden dies. The fine is given to the girl's heirs (Kessef Mishneh).

Naarah Betulah - Chapter Two

Halacha 1
The fine of 50 silver pieces represents merely the payment for the pleasure of sexual relations. In addition, a seducer is obligated to pay for embarrassment and damages1 in addition to the fixed amount mentioned by the Torah.
A rapist, moreover, also pays for the pain [he caused the girl]. [A seducer is not required to make this payment,] because a girl who willingly engages in relations does not [suffer] pain. A girl who is raped does, as reflected by [Deuteronomy 22:29]: "because he violated her."2
Halacha 2
Thus, a seducer makes three payments: the fine, and compensation for embarrassment and damages. A rapist makes four payments: the fine, and compensation for embarrassment, pain and damages.
Halacha 3
The fine is the same in all instances. Whether one has relations with the daughter of the High Priest, or the daughter of a convert or a bastard,3 the fine is 50 silver pieces. The amount paid for embarrassment, damages and pain is not uniform, however. Instead, the amount must be evaluated [by the court].
Halacha 4
How is this evaluation made? With regard to embarrassment, everything is dependent on the identity of the person who is embarrassed, and the identity of the person who embarrasses her. The embarrassment suffered by a girl of high repute from a family of known lineage cannot be compared to the embarrassment suffered by a poor, ignoble maiden.4 And the embarrassment suffered at the hands of an important person of great stature cannot be compared to that suffered at the hands of a base and empty fellow.5
Halacha 5
On this basis, the judges consider the stature of [the rapist or the seducer] and his victim. They evaluate how much a father and the girl's family would give to prevent [these relations] from taking place with this individual. This is the amount [the man] is obligated to pay.
Halacha 6
Damages [are evaluated] according to [the girl's] beauty. We look at her as if she were a maid-servant being sold in the marketplace: what price would she fetch as a virgin, and what price would she fetch as a non-virgin. For a man would like to buy a virgin maid-servant to give him to his servant, whose welfare and satisfaction he desires. [The rapist or the seducer] should pay the difference in the price.
The compensation for pain is evaluated based on her youth and the size of her body, and his age and the size of his body.6 We evaluate how much a father would be willing to pay so that such [a daughter] would not suffer pain from such [a man], and [the rapist is obligated to] pay [this amount].
Halacha 7
A seducer must compensate [the girl's father] for the embarrassment and damages immediately. He is not, however, required to pay the fine unless he does not marry [the girl], as [Exodus 22:16] states: "If her father refuses to allow him to marry her, then he must pay...."
A rapist, by contrast, must make all four payments and marry her immediately. Therefore, whenever the woman desires to divorce7 or when she becomes widowed, she does not receive anything.8
Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when] two men entered into relations with her, one through vaginal intercourse and one through anal intercourse. If the man who had anal intercourse with her was first, he is liable for embarrassment and for damages.9 If he was second, he is liable only for embarrassment, because she has already suffered damages.
The one who engaged in vaginal intercourse, whether first or last, is liable for the fine and all other payments. Nevertheless, the embarrassment and damages to a girl who had never engaged in relations at all cannot be compared to the embarrassment and damages to a girl who has engaged in anal intercourse.
Halacha 9
We have already mentioned10 the girls for whom a fine need not be paid: They are ten: A bogeret, a girl who dissolved her marriage via mi'un, one who was divorced, an aylonit, a mentally incompetent girl, a deaf mute, a convert, a girl who had been taken captive, a freed slave, and one who has a tarnished reputation. A fine must be paid for all other girls.
Halacha 10
Whenever a fine is required to be paid for a girl, compensation is also required for embarrassment and damages, and if she was raped she must also be compensated for the pain.
Conversely, whenever a fine is not required to be paid for her, she is not entitled to compensation for embarrassment and damages11 if she is seduced or raped. Exceptions to this are a bogeret, a girl who had dissolved her marriage via mi'un, a mentally incompetent girl and a deaf mute. [If they are seduced, no payment is required at all.]
Halacha 11
What is implied? If a man rapes a bogeret or a girl who had dissolved her marriage via mi'un, although a fine is not required to be paid, compensation is also required for embarrassment damages and pain.12 And a man who rapes a a mentally incompetent girl or a deaf mute is required to make compensation for pain.13 One who seduces any of these girls is not liable at all.14
Halacha 12
A person is not ever liable to pay a fine because of his own admission. Instead, he is made liable by the testimony of witnesses.15 Therefore, [if a man] says: "I raped or seduced the daughter of so and so," he is not liable to pay a fine. He must, however, make restitution for the embarrassment and the damages [he caused].16
Similarly, when a maiden files a legal claim against a man, saying "You raped me," or "You seduced me," and he denies the matter entirely, he is required to take a Rabbinic oath17 to support his claim, for if he admits his culpability, he would be liable for the embarrassment, the damages and the pain.18
Halacha 13
If a girl claims, "You raped me," and the man claims, "No, I seduced you," he is required to take an oath mandated by Scriptural law with regard to [the compensation for] the pain, and he must pay the damages and the embarrassment. [The oath is required] because he admitted a portion of the claim [made against him], as will be explained in [the section dealing with that subject].19
Halacha 14
The three payments made because of seduction, and the four payments made because of rape are made to the girl's father, for all the monetary benefit that accrues during a girl's youth belongs to her father.20
If her father is no longer alive [at the time of the rape or the seduction], [these payments are made] to her.21
Halacha 15
When a girl who was raped or seduced does not file a claim until [either] she reaches bagrut, she marries, or her father dies,22 she herself is entitled to the three or four payments [mentioned above].23
If she appeared in court and filed a claim for payment, and then she reachedbagrut or she married, the father is entitled to the payments. If the father dies after she files a claim for payment in court, the payments belong to her brothers, for they are her father's heirs. [The rationale is that] once she files a claim for payment in court, her father is considered to have acquired the payments.
Halacha 16
When a girl was consecrated and then divorced, she is entitled to the fine, but only that.24 If she was raped or seduced, and afterwards, she becomes consecrated to another [man], her father is entitled to the fine and the damages, for consecration does not take a girl out of her father's domain [and nullify his rights over her].
Halacha 17
I maintain that [the intent of] the Torah's statement [Leviticus 19:29], "Do not defile your daughter to have her play the harlot," is that a father should not say: "Since the obligation of the Torah for a seducer or a rapist was solely that he should give the father money, I will hire my virgin daughter to someone to have relations with her for whatever price I desire, or I will allow him to have relations for her without charge. For a man has the right to forgo monetary rights to him to any person he desires." To counter such thoughts, it is written: "Do not defile your daughter."
The Torah obligates a rapist and a seducer to pay money rather than be punished by lashes when the matter happened by chance, without the knowledge of [the girl's] father, and she did not ready herself for [the relations]. For this is an extraordinary and uncommon matter.
If, however, a person leaves his virgin daughter accessible for anyone to engage in relations with her, this will cause the entire earth to be filled with sexual immorality.25 For [ultimately], a father will marry his daughter and a brother his sister, [for in a sexually permissive society] a [girl] may become pregnant and give birth without knowing who the child's father is.
When a person has his daughter act in this manner, she is considered to be a harlot, and both the man and the girl who engage in relations should be punished by lashes, as [Deuteronomy 23:18] states: "There shall not be a harlot."26
[In such an instance,] the man is not required to pay a fine, for the Torah prescribed a fine only in the instance of seduction or rape. When a girl prepares herself [for relations] either on her initiative or on that of her father, she is a harlot. And the prohibition against harlotry applies both with regard to a virgin and a non-virgin.
For this reason our Sages stated that a girl who was reputed to have conducted herself immodestly while young is not entitled to a fine, as we have explained,27 for we can assume that she willingly opened herself to this experience.
FOOTNOTES
1.
As explained in the following halachot.
2.
Inah, the word translated as "violated," more specifically means "oppressed." Significantly, Exodus 22:15, which describes the fine of the seducer, does not use this term.
3.
The Rambam is employing the instance of the daughter of a bastard primarily as a figure of speech. The commentaries have noted that if in fact one has relations with the daughter of a bastard, in most instances the transgression of a negative commandment is involved, and the violator should be lashed rather than fined, unless a warning was not given.
4.
Obviously, the penalty to be paid to the former exceeds that to be paid to the latter.
5.
Rav David Arameah explains that the intent is that the embarrassment suffered at the hands of a person of stature is more significant. The commentaries note, however, that in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:1, the Rambam states that the embarrassment suffered at the hands of a base person is more severe.
6.
The younger and smaller a girl, the more painful is the experience. Similarly, the older and larger the rapist, the more painful the experience is.
7.
The Rambam mentions the divorce as being dependent on the woman, because the rapist cannot initiate divorce, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.
8.
In contrast to other women, who would receive payment for their marriage contracts.
9.
The girl's value is reduced even through anal intercourse, albeit less than through vaginal intercourse. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 8, a fine is not required for anal intercourse.
10.
Chapter 1, Halachot 9 and 10.
11.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 177) differs with the Rambam and maintains that these women are entitled to damages. The fact that they are not granted a fine has no bearing on this manner.
12.
A fine is not required for a bogeret, because the verse mentions a na'arah, a younger maiden. Nevertheless, if one seduces abogeret, no fine is required, because she willingly accepted any damages and embarrassment.
With regard to a minor who has dissolved her marriage through mi'un, we are obviously speaking of a girl who did not engage in sexual relations as a minor and was still a virgin. Although she is not entitled to a fine, since she was a virgin, she does receive damages. The commentaries have questioned the distinction between such a woman and a woman who is divorced afternisu'in, but is still a virgin.
13.
He is not liable to make compensation for the embarrassment and damages because these women are not entitled to damages, because they have no financial worth; they would not be purchased if sold as slaves. (See Ketubot 32a, Bava Metzia 80a.) And with regard to embarrassment, since they are mentally incompetent, they suffer no embarrassment.
(Compare, however, to Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:4, which states that a mentally incompetent person is not reimbursed for embarrassment, but a deaf mute is.)
14.
For, as mentioned previously, a girl who is seduced does not suffer pain, and she either forgoes or need not be reimbursed for damages and embarrassment.
15.
This is a principle that applies not only with regard to the fine in question, but with regard to all k'nasot levied by the Torah. To explain: There are two types of monetary penalties levied by the Torah: a) nezek, damages - i.e., compensation for personal injury and/or loss of property - and k'nas, a fine, payment required by the Torah over and above what a person would be held liable for damages.
Although a person is liable for nezek when he makes an admission of guilt, he is not held liable for a k'nas unless his guilt is established by witnesses. (See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8 and Hilchot Geneivah3:7.) Moreover, even if he admits his guilt and then witnesses come, he is not liable for payment of the k'nas.
16.
As mentioned in the Kessef Mishneh, the Rambam's statements here are in direct contradiction to his statements in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:6, where he states that when a person admits injuring a colleague, but there are no witnesses who testify to the matter, he is not liable for the damages and the pain, but is liable for the injured's unemployment, embarrassment and medical treatment. (As reflected by the commentaries on Hilchot Chovel UMazik, this ruling is contested by many authorities.)
The Rambam's descendant, Rav Yehoshua, attempts to reconcile the Rambam's rulings, explaining that the laws governing the injuries suffered by a raped or seduced maiden differ from those governing other types of injury.
17.
More precisely, the term used is sh'vuat hesset, a Rabbinic oath of lesser severity. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:13 and Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 1:3.
18.
The Rambam is emphasizing that if the only issue were the k'nas, the man would not be held liable for an oath, because this oath was instituted to encourage the defendant to admit his guilt. With regard to the k'nas, this admission would be of no significance, because his liability is dependent only on the testimony of witnesses. Nevertheless, since there is also a claim for damages, and on that matter his admission would make him liable, he is required to take an oath.
19.
As explained in Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 1:1, whenever a person admits a portion of the claim against him, he is required by Scriptural law to take an oath stating his lack of liability to the remaining portion of the claim.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, because, as mentioned in the following halachah, the payment for these damages goes to the girl's father and not to her herself. Hence, the situation resembles the case (Sh'vuot 38b) where a person claims "You owe my father 100 zuzim," and the defendant states, "I owe him only 50," in which instance the defendant is not required to take an oath, because the person making the claim is not the one to whom the money is paid.
It is possible, the Ra'avad continues, for the father to make a definite claim that his daughter was raped. But it must be established that this indeed was the case.
The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling, explaining that this instance is unique. Although the money goes to the girl's father, she and not her father is considered to be the plaintiff.
20.
When the girl manifests physical signs of maturity at the ordinary times, the period of "youth" mentioned here continues until she is twelve and a half. During that time, as mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 3:11, the father is entitled to consecrate his daughter and receive the money given for consecration, and to receive any benefits from her labor.
21.
And not to any other heirs of her father's estate. With regard to the k'nas, the money is not considered to be owed the father until the defendant denies the debt in court (for if he agreed to the claim, he would not be obligated to pay the fine). Therefore, the money owed because of the fine is not considered part of the father's estate. SeeOr Sameach.
22.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this point, stating that this money is considered part of the father's estate, and belongs to his heirs. The Kessef Mishnehand others, however, question the reason for the difference, noting that the Rambam's opinion is based on an explicit mishnah.
23.
In all the instances mentioned, she leaves her father's domain and assumes independent responsibility for her own financial concerns. Although the event for which the person becomes liable took place before the girl has assumed financial independence, since a claim was not issued at that time, she and not her father (or his heirs) is entitled to the money.
Kin'at Eliyahu states that this supports the thesis of the Kessef Mishneh mentioned in the notes on Halachah 13, that the girl herself is the plaintiff.
24.
But not to the payment for damages; that is awarded to her father. As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 9, our Sages derived from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 22:29 that when a girl has been consecrated, she is entitled to the fine. But that applies only to the fine and not to the damages (Kessef Mishneh). Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that she is also entitled to the damages, for she is no longer within her father's domain.
25.
The Rambam is referring to the wording of the verse in Leviticus cited previously.
26.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that a woman is not considered to be a harlot unless she is a professional prostitute. See the discussion of this issue in Hilchot Ishut1:4.
27.
Chapter 1, Halachah 9.

Naarah Betulah - Chapter Three

Halacha 1
When a person issues a slanderous report concerning a Jewish maiden, and the matter is discovered to be false, he should be punished by lashing, as [Deuteronomy 22:18] states: "And he shall be flogged." The warning [for this negative commandment] is derived from [Leviticus 19:16]: "Do not go about as a slanderer among your people."1
He must also give her father 100 sela'im of pure silver.2If the girl is an orphan, the money is given to her.3
Halacha 2
When a person issues a slanderous report on a girl below majority, or on abogeret, he is not liable for the fine or for lashes. He is not liable unless he issues a slanderous report regarding a na'arah.4 [This is derived fromDeuteronomy 22:15]: "[They will] present signs of the maiden's virginity." The word נערה, "maiden" is written in a full form.5
Halacha 3
Cases pertaining to this law may be brought only in the time of the Temple, and in the presence of a court of 23 [judges], because there is the possibility that capital punishment will be involved.6 For if the accusation [brought by the husband] is discovered to be true, the girl must be executed.7
Cases involving rape or seduction, by contrast, are judged at all times in the presence of three [judges], as will be explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin.8
Halacha 4
It is one of the Torah's positive commandments for the wife of a man who issued a slanderous report about her to remain married to him forever, as [Deuteronomy 21:19] states: "She must remain his wife."9 This applies even if she is blind or a leper.
If he divorces her, he transgresses a negative commandment, as the verse continues: "He may never send her away as long as he lives."10
[If he divorces her,] we compel him to remarry her, and he is not lashed, as explained with regard to a rapist.11 If, however, another man takes the initiative and consecrates her first,12 she dies, or he is a priest, who is forbidden to marry a divorcee, he should be punished by lashes for divorcing her.
Halacha 5
If immodest behavior [on the woman's part is discovered], or it is discovered that she is forbidden to him as a result of a negative commandment, a positive commandment, or even [a Rabbinic commandment, such as the prohibition against] a sh'niyah, he should divorce her with a get.13
Why should the positive commandment [of remaining married to the woman] not supersede the negative commandment [of engaging in relations with an adulterous wife, or any other negative commandment] with regard to this man who issues a slanderous report or a rapist, and thus he should marry [or remain married to] this woman who is forbidden to him? For it is possible that she will not desire to remain married to him, and thus, both the positive and negative commandments will be observed.14
Halacha 6
What is implied by the term "issuing a slanderous report"? That a person should come to court and say: "I engaged in marital relations with this maiden,15 and I discovered that she was not a virgin. I investigated the matter and determined that she committed adultery after I had consecrated her.16These are the witnesses in whose presence she committed adultery."17
The court then listens to the words of the witnesses and examines their testimony. If the truth of the claim is substantiated, the girl is executed by stoning.18
If the [girl's] father brings witnesses who nullify [the testimony] of the witnesses,19 and it is determined that they testified falsely, [the witnesses] should be executed by stoning,20 [the husband] should be flogged, and he should pay 100 sela'im.21
This is what is meant by [Deuteronomy 22:17]: "This is [evidence of] my daughter's virginity" - i.e., these are the witnesses who nullify [the testimony] of the husband's witnesses.
If the husband brings other witnesses who nullify [the testimony]22 of the father's witnesses, the maiden and the father's witness should be executed by stoning.23 This is what is meant by [Deuteronomy 22:20]: "If the [accusation] is true." According to the Oral Tradition, the passage speaks of witnesses who nullify the testimony of other witnesses, and a third pair who nullify the testimony of the second pair.
Halacha 7
When a man issues a slanderous report about his wife after she becomes abogeret, he is free of liability for the lashes and for the fine, even though his witnesses testify that she committed adultery when she was a na'arah.24
If the accusations are proven true, [the girl] should be executed by stoning, even though she is a bogeret.25 [The rationale is] that she was a na'arah when she committed adultery.
Halacha 8
Whenever a na'arah is not entitled to a fine if she was raped or seduced,26[her husband] is not punished by flogging or by a fine if he issues a slanderous report about her.
In addition, when a non-Jewish girl was converted below the age of three or a maidservant was freed below the age of three,27 [her husband] is not punished by flogging or by a fine if he issues a slanderous report about her. This applies even if a girl was conceived before her mother was converted and born after she was converted. [The rationale is based on Deuteronomy 22:19]: "Because [the husband] defamed the virtue of an Israelite maiden." [Implied is that] she must be conceived and born as an Israelite.
Halacha 9
A man is not held liable when [his] witnesses are discovered to have lied [in the following situation]. He consecrates a maiden and divorces her, consecrates her again and then issues a slanderous report about her, bringing witnesses who say that she committed adultery during the first time she had been consecrated.28
Similarly, a man is not held liable to be flogged or for a fine when [his] witnesses are discovered to have lied [in the following situation]. He issues a slanderous report about his yevamah, bringing witnesses who say that she committed adultery during the time she had been consecrated to his brother.29
Whenever a man is not liable [to be flogged and fined], he may divorce his wife if he desires to.30
Halacha 10
A man is not liable [for these penalties] unless he engages in relations with his wife in the ordinary manner and issues a slanderous report about her, saying that she engaged in relations [previously] in the ordinary manner.31
If he engaged in anal intercourse with his wife, and said that he discovered that she was not a virgin,32 he is not liable [for these penalties]. He is, however, given stripes for rebellious conduct.33
Halacha 11
Similarly, if he says, "I discovered that she was not a virgin," but does not say that she committed adultery after he had consecrated her,34 or if he claims that she committed adultery but did not bring witnesses, but rather the witnesses came on their own initiative, he is not liable [for these penalties]. Nevertheless, the witnesses are executed if their testimony is nullified.35
Halacha 12
The Torah's statement [Deuteronomy 22:17]: "They will then spread the garment" is a euphemism. The intent is that they debate the private aspects of this matter.36
Similarly, [other expressions in the passage are to be understood non-literally. [For example,] "This is [evidence of] my daughter's virginity" means "these are the witnesses who nullify the testimony of the husband's witnesses."
The death penalty issued "if the [accusation] is true" is issued only when she has committed adultery after being consecrated [and is observed by] witnesses,37 as implied by [Deuteronomy 22:21]: "acting immorally [in] her father's house."38 Before she is consecrated,39 the Torah does not hold her liable at all, and a person who engages in relations with her is liable only for a financial penalty, whether he seduced her or raped her.
FOOTNOTES
1.
As is the case with regard to several other mitzvot, the passage in Deuteronomy obviously indicates that the transgression of a negative commandment is involved in making such slanderous remarks about one's wife. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the punishment of lashes to be given. There is, however, no explicit statement in that passage saying, "Do not make such statements." Therefore, it is necessary to find another verse that has a specific statement forbidding slander.
2.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 1. This is the only instance in the Torah when a person who violates a prohibition is given corporal punishment and is also required to make financial restitution.
3.
And not to her father's heirs.
4.
As mentioned previously, the term na'arahimplies a specific time frame: the six months after a girl's manifestation of physical signs of maturity once she has reached the age of twelve.
As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 8, the word na'arah, "maiden" is sometimes used by the Torah to refer to girls between the ages of three and twelve and a half. In this instance, however, the meaning of the term is specific.
5.
Generally, the word נערה, maiden, is written in the Torah without the final heh. The inclusion of the heh is obviously purposeful and intended to teach a concept.
The Rambam's statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries, for in our Torah scrolls the word נערה in the verse cited by the Rambam lacks a heh. TheKessef Mishneh (based on Ketubot 40b and Rashi, 44b) notes that the Talmud derives this concept from Deuteronomy 22:19: "And he shall give it to the father of the maiden." In that verse, the word נערה is written with aheh in our Torah scrolls.
6.
Cases involving capital punishment are judged by a court of 23 judges. These cases can by judged only when the Sanhedrinholds sessions in the Courtyard of Hewn Stone next to the Temple, as stated inHilchot Sanhedrin 14:11-14. (Once theSanhedrin ceased holding sessions in that place, even a court of judges with semichahcannot try capital cases.)
7.
As stated in Deuteronomy 22:20.
8.
Chapter 5, Halachah 5:3. Based on Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:17 and the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 177:2), it would appear that in the present age, the court should hold a person who makes such statements responsible and compel him to reach a settlement with the father of the girl whose reputation he maligned.
9.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 219) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 553) regard this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Sefer HaMitzvot states that this commandment also includes flogging him.
10.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 359) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 554) regard this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
11.
Chapter 1, Halachah 7.
12.
In which instance, her first husband is forbidden to remarry her.
13.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 5, and notes.
14.
Ketubot 40a explains that in such an instance the woman is taught to say that she does not desire to remain married to the man, so that there is no obstacle presented to the divorce.
15.
There is a difference of opinion among our Sages whether or not all the following laws apply if the husband did not engage in marital relations with his wife. The Rambam follows the opinion that it is necessary for the couple to have engaged in marital relations. See the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Halachah 12.
16.
I.e., the husband's claim is twofold: a) that contrary to his supposition, his bride was not a virgin; b) that she had committed adultery between the time he consecrated her, and the time he consummated the marriage. The latter dimension of the claim is more significant, because if substantiated, it involves the death penalty. The issue of a groom's claim that a bride presumed to be a virgin was not - without any knowledge of an adulterous relationship - is discussed inHilchot Ishut 11:8-17. See Halachah 11.
17.
For no punishment will be administered by the court unless two witnesses testify to the wrongdoing.
18.
The punishment given for adultery committed by a consecrated maiden (Deuteronomy 22:23).
19.
The term used for nullify here, hazamah, has a very specific meaning. It refers to witnesses who testify that it was impossible for the husband's witnesses to testify with regard to the alleged adultery, because the two witnesses were together in a different place at the time the first witnesses testified that the adultery took place. If the second pair of witnesses state that they were in the same place as the first pair and did not witness the commission of adultery, the testimony of the first pair is nullified, but the first pair of witnesses is not punished. This is referred to as hakashah. See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 18.
20.
As stated in Deuteronomy 19:19, when the testimony of witnesses is nullified in the above fashion, the lying witnesses are giving the punishment they desired to have imposed upon the defendant.
21.
Note the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 553), who quotes opinions that maintain that if the girl's father brings witnesses who nullify the husband's witnesses through hakashah, the husband's witnesses are not punished, but the husband himself is required to pay the fine.
22.
Here again the intent is hazamah.
23.
Moreover, the witnesses must pay a fine of 100 sela'im to the husband.
24.
The husband incurs these penalties at the time he makes his statements in court. At that time, the woman has already become abogeret.
25.
Generally, when a bogeret commits adultery she is executed by strangulation, a less severe means of execution. In this case, the woman is still given the penalty designated for a na'arah, as the Rambam explains.
26.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
The rationale for this ruling can be explained as follows: Most of the women mentioned in that halachah are not granted a fine, because we assume that they are non-virgins. For this reason, the husband should not have presumed that she was a virgin.
With regard to an aylonit, she is never considered to be a na'arah. Until the age of twenty, she is considered to be a k'tanah, and after twenty, she is considered to be abogeret.
27.
In which case, she is entitled to a fine in the event of seduction or rape.
28.
Ketubot 46a leaves this issue unresolved. As such, we follow the more lenient ruling and free the man of punishment.
29.
Ketubot, loc. cit., explains that relations with a yevamah are excluded from these laws, because the relevant passage quotes the girl's father as saying (Deuteronomy 22:16): "I gave my daughter to this man as a wife." This does not apply to the relationship between a yavam and a yevamah, for they are destined for each other by Divine decree.
30.
The Mishneh LaMelech states that this statement applies with regard to the relationship between a yavam and ayevamah and similar instances, but does not apply with regard to the first law stated in this halachah. In that instance, the husband is not held liable because we are in doubt with regard to the law. For that same reason, he should be enjoined against divorcing his wife.
31.
I.e., if he issues a slanderous report that she had engaged in anal intercourse previously, he is not held liable (Ketubot 46a,b).
32.
I.e., he claims that witnesses supplied him with this information.
33.
Although the Scriptural penalty is not imposed, our Sages required that he receive punishment for slandering his wife.
34.
See Hilchot Ishut 11:8-17.
35.
For they desired to have someone stoned, and thus should receive the appropriate penalty.
36.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that this is a matter of debate in Ketubot 46a. Although the Sages advance the opinion quoted by the Rambam, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov states that the intent is that the girl's parents produce the sheet on which the couple engaged in relations. Since the Rambam follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov's opinion as reflected in Halachah 8, it is difficult to understand why he uses the Sages' explanation in this halachah. The commentaries explain that the two opinions in the Talmud are not mutually exclusive, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov would also accept the Sages' view.
Note also the gloss of Rav David Arameah, who states that when a husband brings witnesses who testify that the girl committed adultery, it is not sufficient for the parents to bring a blood-stained garment, for we fear that perhaps the blood came from another source. The testimony of witnesses, he explains, can be nullified only by other witnesses.
37.
More particulars about the execution are mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 3:8.
38.
It is when she is consecrated, but not married, that there is the possibility that she will "act immorally in her father's house," for that is where she lives.
39.
Even if engaged.
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class
• "Today's Day"
Thursday, Adar I 2, 5776 · 02/11/2016
Sunday 2 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: T'ruma, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 10-17.
Tanya: Ch. 27. Should the (p. 115)...positive precepts. (p. 117).
Rabeinu Haggadol1 the Alter Rebbe, set forth a program for Chassidim of striving (avoda) with the mind and seeking truth, to critically examine one's every move to be certain it conforms strictly with truth2 and comes through avoda, effort.
This avoda does not imply - as some think, altogether erroneously - that one must pulverize mountains and shatter boulders, turn the world upside down. The absolute truth is that any avoda, any act, whatever it may be, is perfectly satisfactory when performed with true kavana, intent: A b'racha pronounced with kavana; a word of davening as it should be, with a prepared heart and an awareness of "before Whom you stand"; a passage in Chumash said with an awareness that it is the word of G-d; a verse of Tehillim; a beneficent trait of character expressed in befriending another with affection and love.
The truth of the matter is, that to achieve this calls for great and intense effort, meaning simply to study a great deal of Torah and to comprehend it - each according to his ability - and then G-d will help him be what truth demands.
FOOTNOTES
1. "Our great teacher."
2. See 20 Adar I.
---------------------• Daily Thought:
Naturally Outrageous
When G‑d desired to create the world, He went for the most outrageous solution. With the power of His very Essence, He burst it into being out of the absolute void. And He continues doing so every moment.
He could have done things otherwise. He could have taken an orderly approach and allowed a creation to gradually evolve, while staying aloof and beyond the whole thing. Even though that doesn’t make sense to us, He could have made a universe with a different set of logic so that it would have made sense.
But as it stands, the world was created with an outrageous solution. That is why such solutions tend to be the most natural ones to this day. With all your essence, go for it head-on.
---------------------

No comments:

Post a Comment