Today's Laws & Customs:
• Purim Minor
In regular years, the 14th of Adar is Purim, the festival that celebrates the salvation of the Jewish people from Haman's evil decree in the year 3405 from creation (356 BCE). In a leap year -- which has two Adars -- Purim is celebrated in Adar II, and the 14th of Adar I is designated as Purim Kattan, the "Little Purim." There are no special observances, however, associated with Purim Kattan, other than the omission of Tachnun ("supplications") from the daily prayers and a prohibition against fasting or holding eulogies on this day. The Code of Jewish Law cites an opinion that one should increase in festivity and joy, but rules that there is no obligation to do so; "Nevertheless,a person should increase somewhat in festivity... for 'One who is of good heart is festive always' " (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 697:1).
Link: Always Happy
Today in Jewish History:
• Moses' Brit (1393 BCE)
According to the opinions that Moses was born on the 7th of Adar I, today was the 8th day of his life and the day on which he was circumcised in accordance with the Divine command to Abraham.
Daily Quote:
The righteous promise little and do a lot; the wicked promise much and don't do even a little[Talmud, Bava Metzia 87a]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Ki Tisa, 3rd Portion Exodus 33:12-33:16 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 33
12Moses said to the Lord: "Look, You say to me: 'Bring this people up!' But You have not informed me whom You will send with me. And You said: 'I have known you by name and you have also found favor in My eyes.' יבוַיֹּ֨אמֶר משֶׁ֜ה אֶל־יְהֹוָ֗ה רְ֠אֵ֠ה אַתָּ֞ה אֹמֵ֤ר אֵלַי֙ הַ֚עַל אֶת־הָעָ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה וְאַתָּה֙ לֹ֣א הֽוֹדַעְתַּ֔נִי אֵ֥ת אֲשֶׁר־תִּשְׁלַ֖ח עִמִּ֑י וְאַתָּ֤ה אָמַ֨רְתָּ֙ יְדַעְתִּ֣יךָ בְשֵׁ֔ם וְגַם־מָצָ֥אתָ חֵ֖ן בְּעֵינָֽי:
Look, You say to me: Heb. רְאֵה, lit., see. רְאֵה means: Direct Your eyes and Your heart on Your words. [I.e., think about what You are saying!] You say to me [“Lead”] but You have not informed me [who will come with us]. You said to me, “Behold, I am sending an angel” (Exod. 23:20), [yet] this is not considered informing because I do not want it [to occur this way]. [Reggio edition: I do not want him.] -[See Exod. Rabbah 45:4] ראה אתה אומר אלי: ראה, תן עיניך ולבך על דבריך. אתה אומר אלי וגו' ואתה לא הודעתני וגו', ואשר אמרת לי (שמות כג כ) הנה אנכי שולח מלאך, אין זו הודעה, שאין אני חפץ בה:
And You said: ‘I have known you by name’: [which means that God is saying:] I have recognized you from other people with a name of importance. For [God] said to me [Moses]: “Behold, I am coming to you in the thickness of the cloud… and they will also believe in you forever” (Exod. 19:9). ואתה אמרת ידעתיך בשם: הכרתיך משאר בני אדם בשם חשיבות, שהרי אמרת לי (שמות יט ט) הנה אנכי בא אליך בעב הענן וגו' וגם בך יאמינו לעולם:
13And now, if I have indeed found favor in Your eyes, pray let me know Your ways, so that I may know You, so that I may find favor in Your eyes; and consider that this nation is Your people." יגוְעַתָּ֡ה אִם־נָא֩ מָצָ֨אתִי חֵ֜ן בְּעֵינֶ֗יךָ הֽוֹדִעֵ֤נִי נָא֙ אֶת־דְּרָכֶ֔ךָ וְאֵדָ֣עֲךָ֔ לְמַ֥עַן אֶמְצָא־חֵ֖ן בְּעֵינֶ֑יךָ וּרְאֵ֕ה כִּ֥י עַמְּךָ֖ הַגּ֥וֹי הַזֶּֽה:
And now: If it is true that I have found favor in Your eyes, pray let me know Your ways, [i.e.,] what reward You give to those who find favor in Your eyes. ועתה: אם אמת שמצאתי חן בעיניך הודיעני נא את דרכך, מה שכר אתה נותן למוצאי חן בעיניך:
so that I may know You, so that I may find favor in Your eyes: And with this I will know the standard of Your recompense, [i.e.,] what constitutes finding favor, since I have found favor in Your eyes. The explanation of “so that I may find favor” means: in order that I may recognize how great the reward of finding favor [with You] is. ואדעך למען אמצא חן בעיניך: ואדע בזו מדת תגמולך מה היא מציאת חן שמצאתי בעיניך, ופתרון למען אמצא חן, למען אכיר כמה שכר מציאת החן:
and consider that this nation is Your people: That You should not say, “and I will make you into a great nation” and [then] forsake these [people]. See [i.e., remember] that they are Your people from long ago, and if You reject them, I would not rely on [only] those descendants who come from my loins to survive; make known to me [now] the payment of my reward through this people. Although our Rabbis expounded on this in tractate Berachoth (7a), I have come to reconcile the verses according to their context and their sequence. וראה כי עמך הגוי הזה: שלא תאמר ואעשה אותך לגוי גדול, ואת אלה תעזוב, ראה כי עמך הם מקדם, ואם בהם תמאס, איני סומך על היוצאים מחלצי שיתקיימו, ואת תשלום השכר שלי בעם הזה תודיעני, ורבותינו דרשוהו במסכת ברכות (דף ז א) ואני ליישב המקראות על אופניהם ועל סדרם באתי:
14So He said, "My Presence will go, and I will give you rest." ידוַיֹּאמַ֑ר פָּנַ֥י יֵלֵ֖כוּ וַֽהֲנִחֹ֥תִי לָֽךְ:
So He said, “My Presence will go…”: Heb. פָּנַי יֵלֵכוּ, lit., My countenance will go. [This is to be understood] as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: [שְׁכִנְךְתִּי תְהַ], I will no longer send an angel; I Myself will go, similar to [the verse:] “and you personally go (הֹלְכִים וּפָנֶי) to battle” (II Sam. 17:11). ויאמר פני ילכו: כתרגומו, לא אשלח עוד מלאך, אני בעצמי אלך, כמו (שמואל ב' יז יא) ופניך הולכים בקרב:
15And he said to Him, "If Your Presence does not go [with us], do not take us up from here. טווַיֹּ֖אמֶר אֵלָ֑יו אִם־אֵ֤ין פָּנֶ֨יךָ֙ הֹֽלְכִ֔ים אַל־תַּֽעֲלֵ֖נוּ מִזֶּֽה:
And he said to Him: This is what I want, because [I] do not [want you to] take us up from here [if it is] through an angel. ויאמר אליו: בזו אני חפץ, כי על ידי מלאך אל תעלנו מזה:
16For how then will it be known that I have found favor in Your eyes, I and Your people? Is it not in that You will go with us? Then I and Your people will be distinguished from every [other] nation on the face of the earth." טזוּבַמֶּ֣ה | יִוָּדַ֣ע אֵפ֗וֹא כִּֽי־מָצָ֨אתִי חֵ֤ן בְּעֵינֶ֨יךָ֙ אֲנִ֣י וְעַמֶּ֔ךָ הֲל֖וֹא בְּלֶכְתְּךָ֣ עִמָּ֑נוּ וְנִפְלִ֨ינוּ֙ אֲנִ֣י וְעַמְּךָ֔ מִכָּ֨ל־הָעָ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֖ר עַל־פְּנֵ֥י הָֽאֲדָמָֽה:
For how then will it be known: [I.e., how] will the finding of favor be known? Is it not in that You will go with us? One other thing I ask of You [I ask] that Your Shechinah shall no longer rest upon heathen nations. -[from Ber. 7a] ובמה יודע אפוא: יודע מציאות החן, הלא בלכתך עמנו. ועוד דבר אחר אני שואל ממך שלא תשרה שכינתך [עוד] על אומות העולם:
Then I and Your people will be distinguished: Heb. וְנִפְלִינוּ. In this respect, we will be separated from every [other] nation, like “And the Lord will make a separation (וְהִפְלָה) …between the livestock of Egypt” (Exod. 9:4). ונפלינו אני ועמך: ונהיה מובדלים בדבר הזה מכל העם, כמו (שמות ט ד) והפלה ה' בין מקנה ישראל וגו':-----------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 72 - 76
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 72
David composed this psalm for Solomon, praying that he be granted the wisdom to provide justice for the poor.
1. For Solomon. O God, impart Your justice to the king, and Your righteousness to the son of the king.
2. May he judge Your people with righteousness, Your poor with justice.
3. May the mountains bear peace to the nation, also the hills, in [reward for their] righteousness.
4. May he judge the nation's poor, save the children of the destitute, and crush the oppressor,
5. so that they will fear You as long as the sun [shines] and the moon endures, generation after generation.
6. May [his words] descend like rain upon cut grass, like raindrops that water the earth.
7. In his days may the righteous flourish, with much peace until the moon is no more.
8. And may he rule from sea to sea, and from the river until the ends of the earth.
9. May nobles kneel before him, and may his enemies lick the dust.
10. The kings of Tarshish and the islands will return tribute, the kings of Sheba and Seba will offer gifts.
11. All kings will bow to him, all nations will serve him;
12. for he rescues the needy one who cries out, the poor one who has no one to help him.
13. He pities the impoverished and needy, and saves the souls of the destitute.
14. He redeems their soul from deception and violence, and their blood is precious in his eyes.
15. He revives [the poor], and gives him of the gold of Sheba; and so [the poor] pray for him always, and bless him all day.
16. May there be abundant grain in the land, upon the mountaintops; may its fruit rustle like the [cedars of] Lebanon, and may [people] blossom from the city like the grass of the earth.
17. May his name endure forever; may his name be magnified as long as the sun [shines]. And all nations will bless themselves by him, they will praise him.
18. Blessed is the Lord God, the God of Israel, Who alone performs wonders.
19. Blessed is His glorious Name forever, and may the whole earth be filled with His glory, Amen and Amen.
20. The prayers of David, son of Jesse, are concluded
FOOTNOTES
1.David composed this psalm at the end of his lifetime.
Chapter 73
This psalm addresses the question of why the righteous suffer while the wicked prosper, and prays for an end to our long exile. Read, and you will find repose for your soul.
1. A psalm by Asaph. Truly God is good to Israel, to the pure of heart.
2. But as for me, my feet nearly strayed; in an instant my steps would have been swept aside.
3. For I envied the revelers when I saw the tranquility of the wicked.
4. For there are no bonds1 to their death, and their health is sound.
5. They have no part in the toil of men, nor are they afflicted like other mortals;
6. therefore they wear pride as a necklace; their bodies are enwrapped in violence.
7. Their eyes bulge from fat; they surpassed the fantasies of their heart.
8. They consume [others], and talk wickedly of oppression-from on high do they speak.
9. They set their mouths against Heaven, while their tongues walk upon the earth.
10. Therefore His people return here,2 and suck the full [cup of bitter] waters.
11. And they say, "How can it be that God knows? Is there knowledge in the Most High?”
12. Behold these are the wicked, and they are ever tranquil, they have gained much wealth.
13. Surely in vain have I purified my heart, and washed my hands in cleanliness;
14. for I was afflicted all day, and my rebuke came each morning.
15. Were I to say, "I shall tell it like it is," behold I would turn the generation of Your children to rebels.
16. And when I pondered to understand this, it was unjust in my eyes;
17. until I came to the sanctuaries of God, and perceived their end.
18. Only on slippery places do You set them, You cast them into darkness.
19. How they have become desolate in an instant! They came to an end, they were consumed by terrors,
20. like a dream upon awakening. O my Lord, disgrace their image in the city.
21. When my heart was in ferment, and my mind was sharpened,
22. I was a boor and did not understand, like an animal was I with You.
23. Yet I was always with You; You held my right hand.
24. Guide me with Your counsel, and afterward, receive me with honor.
25. Whom do I have in heaven [besides You]? And when I am with You I desire nothing on earth.
26. My flesh and my heart yearn; God is the rock of my heart and my portion forever.
27. For behold, all those who are far from You perish, You cut down all who stray from You.
28. But as for me, the nearness of God is my good; I have put my trust in my Lord, God, that I may recount all Your works.
FOOTNOTES
1.Their death is not protracted by illness and misery(Radak).
2.To the way of the wicked (Rashi).
Chapter 74
The psalmist mourns and weeps over all the synagogues and study halls that have been burned: the Philistines destroyed the Tabernacle of Shiloh; Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the first Temple. We have been in exile for so long, without seeing any signs of redemption! When will the redemption come? Read, and you will find lamentation and consolation.
1. A maskil1 by Asaph. Why, O God, have You abandoned us forever, does Your wrath fume against the sheep of Your pasture?
2. Remember Your congregation which You acquired long ago, the tribe of Your inheritance whom You redeemed [and brought to] Mount Zion, where You rested Your Presence.
3. Lift Your steps to inflict eternal ruin, because of all the evil done by the enemy in the Sanctuary.
4. Your foes roared in the midst of Your meeting place; they considered their omens to be [genuine] signs.
5. The axes in the thicket of trees2 were reckoned as bringing [an offering] to the Above.
6. And now, all her ornaments together are smashed by hammer and hatchet.
7. They set Your Sanctuary on fire; they desecrated the Abode of Your Name to the ground.
8. Their rulers thought together in their hearts; they burned all the meeting places of God in the land.
9. We have not seen our signs; there is no longer a prophet, and there is none among us who knows how long.
10. How long, O God, will the adversary disgrace, will the enemy blaspheme Your Name forever!
11. Why do You withdraw Your hand, even Your right hand? Cast it out from within Your bosom!
12. For God is my King from long ago, working salvations in the midst of the earth.
13. In Your might, You divided the sea; You shattered the heads of the sea-monsters on the waters.
14. You crushed the heads of the Leviathan,3 leaving him as food for the nation [wandering in] the wilderness.
15. You split [the rock, bringing forth] fountain and brook; You dried up mighty streams.
16. Yours is the day, the night is also Yours; You established the moon and the sun.
17. You set all the boundaries of the earth; summer and winter-You created them.
18. Remember this, how the enemy reviled the Lord, and the vile nation blasphemed Your Name.
19. Do not give the soul of Your turtledove to the wild beast; do not forget the life of Your poor forever.
20. Look to the covenant, for the dark places of the earth are filled with dens of violence.
21. Do not turn back the oppressed in disgrace; [then] the poor and needy will praise Your Name.
22. Arise, O God, champion Your cause; remember Your insults from the perverse all day long.
23. Forget not the voice of Your adversaries; the tumult of Your opponents ascends always.
FOOTNOTES
1.A psalm intended to enlighten and impart knowledge(Metzudot).
2.Chopping wood for the construction of the Temple (Metzudot).
3.Pharaoh and his chieftains
Chapter 75
How great is Israel! During their holidays they do not engage in frivolity, but in song and praise, and the study of the holiday's laws. Also, when they proclaimed (at the giving of the Torah), "We will do and we will hear!" they allowed the world to remain in existence. This psalm also admonishes those who indulge in worldly pleasures and attribute their prosperity to their own efforts.
1. For the Conductor, a plea not to be destroyed. A psalm by Asaph, a song.
2. We gave thanks to You, O God, we gave thanks; and Your Name was near [when] they1 told of Your wonders.
3. When I choose the appointed time, I will judge with fairness.
4. When the earth and all its inhabitants were melting, I established its pillars forever.
5. I said to the perverse, "Do not pervert [Israel]," and to the wicked, "Do not raise your pride.”
6. Do not raise your pride heavenward, nor speak with an arrogant neck
7. For not from the east or the west, nor from the desert does greatness come.
8. For God is Judge; He humbles one, and elevates the other.
9. For there is a cup [of punishment] in the hand of the Lord, with strong wine of full mixture; He pours from this, and all the wicked of the earth will drink, draining even its dregs.
10. But as for me, I will tell of it forever; I will sing to the God of Jacob.
11. I will cut off all glory of the wicked, but the glory of the righteous will be raised up.
FOOTNOTES
1.Our ancestors.
Chapter 76
This psalm contains the prophecy of when the vast army of Sennacherib was seized with a deep slumber that rendered the hands of the soldiers powerless to raise their weapons; thus did they all fall in battle.
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music, a psalm by Asaph, a song.
2. God is known in Judah, His Name is great in Israel.
3. His Tabernacle was in Shalem,1 and His dwelling place in Zion.
4. There He broke the flying arrows of the bow, the shield, the sword and battle-forever.
5. You are illumination, mightier than the mountains of prey.
6. The stout-hearted were without sense, they slept their sleep, and all the warriors were unable to find their strength.
7. At Your rebuke, O God of Jacob, chariot and horse were stunned.
8. You, awesome are You! Who can stand before You once You are enraged.
9. From heaven You let the verdict be heard; the earth feared and was still,
10. when God rose to pass judgement, to save all the humble of the earth forever.
11. The anger of man will cause us to thank You;2 You will restrain the residue of wrath.
12. Make vows to the Lord your God and fulfill them; all who surround Him will bring tribute to the Awesome One.
13. He cuts down the spirit of nobles; He is awesome to the kings of the earth.
FOOTNOTES
1.Jerusalem.
2.When the wicked are punished for being angry with Israel, Israel acknowledges God (Metzudot).
---------------------Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 29
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
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• Adar I 14, 5776 · February 23, 2016• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 29
וגם מי שהוא נקי מחטאות נעורים החמורים ישים אל לבו לקיים מאמר זהר הקדש: להיות ממארי דחושבנא
Even he who is innocent of the grievous sins of youth, but yet wants to attain a broken spirit, should set his heart to fulfill the counsel of the holy Zohar1 — to be “a master of accounts.”
This means that he should do the spiritual accounting described below as a “master”, a proprietor, to whom each set of figures represents either a profit or a loss that directly affects him — rather than as a “servant”, a hired accountant, who can view whatever bottom line eventuates with academic detachment.
דהיינו לעשות חשבון עם נפשו מכל המחשבות והדיבורים והמעשים שחלפו ועברו מיום היותו עד היום הזה, אם היו כולם מצד הקדושה, או מצד הטומאה, רחמנא לצלן, דהיינו כל המחשבות והדיבורים והמעשים אשר לא לה׳ המה, ולרצונו ולעבודתו, שזהו פירוש לשון סטרא אחרא כנ״ל פרק ו׳
This means that he should take stock with his soul of all his thoughts, utterances and actions that have come and gone since the day he came into being and until the present day. Were they all of the realm of holiness, or of the realm of impurity (G‑d forbid)? This latter realm includes also any thought, utterance or action not directed toward G‑d, His Will and His service even when they are not actually sinful, since this is the meaning of the term sitra achra: not necessarily “evil”, but simply “the other side” — the “side” (realm) that is not holy; thus anything that does not contain holiness belongs to the realm of impurity, as explained earlier, in ch. 6.
ומודעת זאת כי כל עת שהאדם מחשב מחשבות קדושות נעשה מרכבה בעת זו להיכלות הקדושה, שמהן מושפעות מחשבות הללו
Now, it is known that whenever a person thinks holy thoughts he becomes, during that time, a “chariot” for the “chambers” (heichalot) of holiness whence these thoughts originate, or, more precisely, whence their vitality originates.
Becoming a “chariot” means that he becomes completely subservient to these heichalot, to the same degree that a vehicle, having no will of its own, is completely subservient to its driver’s will. 2 When he meditates on the love of G‑d, for example, he becomes a “vehicle” for the supernal “chamber of love,” and so on.
וכן להפך, נעשה מרכבה טמאה בעת זו להיכלות הטומאה שמהן מושפעות כל מחשבות רעות, וכן בדבור ומעשה
Conversely, when he thinks impure thoughts he becomes an unclean “vehicle” for the heichalot of impurity, whence all impure thoughts originate. So, too, with speech and action.
Thus, even one who cannot call to mind any past sins can humble his spirit by contemplating how often he has become a vehicle for impurity through his thoughts, words and actions which, though not sinful, were still of the realm of the sitra achra — since they were not directed toward G‑dliness.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | See Zohar III, 178a. |
| 2. | See ch. 23. |
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Tuesday, Adar I 14, 5776 · February 23, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 179
Creeping Creatures or Insects
"You shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creeps, neither shall you make yourselves unclean with them"—Leviticus 11:43.
It is forbidden to eat any creeping creature or insect.
Though there are other prohibitions regarding specific types of insects and creeping creatures (e.g., flying ones, ones that creep on the ground), this prohibition adds a second "encompassing" prohibition on all sorts of creeping creatures, so that one who eats a specific type of creeping creature has transgressed two commandments.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Creeping Creatures or Insects
Negative Commandment 179
Translated by Berel Bell
[From the beginning of this mitzvah until the words "However, this is not a proper explanation," the Rambam explains the mitzvah according to an opinion he rejects. This mitzvah, he later concludes, prohibits eating a water insect. When quoting such an opinion, the Rambam usually hints at the outset that he disagrees. Kapach (5731, note 88) suggests that this first part was an early draft, and the Rambam later changed his mind.]
The 179th prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating any insect whatsoever, regardless of whether it flies (sheretz ha'of), breeds in the water (sheretz hamayim) or on land (sheretz ha'aretz).
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds. Do not defile yourselves with them, because it will make you spiritually insensitive."
This constitutes a separate prohibition punishable by lashes, and resembles an issur kolel (inclusive prohibition). Therefore, one who eats an insect which breeds on the ground (sheretz ha'aretz) receives two sets of lashes: once for the prohibition,2 "Every small creature which breeds on land is repulsive to you. It may not be eaten," and once for the prohibition, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds." Similarly, one who eats a flying insect (sheretz ha'of) receives two sets of lashes: once for the prohibition,3 "All flying insects are unclean to you. They may not be eaten," and once for the prohibition, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds." And if one eats a single insect which both flies and breeds on the ground, and therefore qualifies both as a sheretz ha'of and a sheretz ha'aretz, he receives four sets of lashes. If this same insect also breeds in the water (sheretz hamayim), one would receive six sets of lashes. The fifth set is because of the prohibition against eating a non-kosher fish, regarding which it is written,4 "Do not eat from their flesh," and the sixth set because of [this prohibition], "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds," since it also includes insects which breed in water (sheretz hamayim) and it is the only verse which prohibits such insects.
In accordance with these principles, our Sages said in tractate Makos,5 "One who eats a potisa receives four sets of lashes; a n'mala — five sets; a tzira — six sets." Every commentary on this passage — "One who eats a potisa..." — that I have heard or seen explains it in this way.
However, this is not a valid explanation, and requires one to contradict the proper principles which are explained in the Talmud. This means as follows: If you think into that which was written above, you will find that three sets of lashes are given for the single prohibition, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds." And this idea has no merit, as our Sages have explained in tractate Chullin6 that one can never receive two sets of lashes for a single prohibition. We have already mentioned and explained this principle many times,7 and will bring other examples as well.8
The proper explanation, regarding which there is no doubt or objection, is that one who eats a creature which qualifies as a sheretz ha'of and a sheretz hamayim and a sheretz ha'aretz receives only three sets of lashes — once for the prohibition of sheretz ha'of [N175]; once for the prohibition of sheretz ha'aretz [N176]; and once because of the statement, "Do not make yourselves disgusting," since insects which breed in the water are also included in the phrase "any small creature" (kol hashoretz), and therefore in the prohibition, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds."
And if one ate an insect which breeds only on the ground, he receives just one set of lashes, for the prohibition of sheretz ha'aretz. So too if it was [just] a flying insect, he receives only one set of lashes — for sheretz ha'of. And if it breeds only in the water, he receives just one set — because of the verse, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds."
But9 just because this prohibition includes a sheretz ha'aretz, one cannot be lashed twice for eating one. The reason is that even if there were a thousand prohibitions — each one specifically prohibiting sheretz ha'aretz — one would still only be lashed once, since they are merely repeating the same prohibition. Even if was repeated, "Do not eat (lo soch'lu) a sheretz ha'aretz," "Do not eat (lo yei'o'cheil) a sheretz ha'aretz" one thousand times, only one set of lashes would be given.
Have you seen those who propose this erroneous principle dictating two sets of lashes for a person who wears shatnez, since there are two10 prohibitions? I have not seen them say such a thing, and they would consider it strange if anyone else did. But they somehow do not find it strange when they rule that one who eats a sheretz ha'aretz or sheretz ha'of receive two sets of lashes — once for the specific prohibition and once for the prohibition, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds." This is totally clear even to the deaf and dumb.
I will now go back and complete the discussion begun previously.11 If a living creature developed inside any type of seed or fruit, and then emerged to the surface, one who eats it receives one set of lashes even though it never touched the ground.12 This is because it is covered by a separate prohibition, as explained in the previous commandment [N178].
If this creature reached the ground and crawled (romas13) on it, one who ate it would receive two sets of lashes — one for "Do not defile your souls [by eating] any small creature that lives on land" [N178], and one for "Do not defile your souls [by eating] any small creature that lives on land" [N177].
If this creature was also capable of reproducing, one would receive three sets of lashes — two as mentioned above, and a third for, "Every small creature which breeds on land is repulsive to you. It may not be eaten." [N176].
If it was also able to fly, one would receive a fourth set of lashes because of the prohibition, "All flying insects are unclean to you. They may not be eaten" [N175]. If it could swim as well as fly — as we see many such species — one would receive a fifth set of lashes for the general prohibition which includes a sheretz hamayim, "Do not make yourselves disgusting [by eating] any small creature that breeds." If this same creature which developed [from inside the food] was also a bird, one would receive a sixth set of lashes, for,14 "These are the flying animals that you must avoid. Do not eat..." [N174].
Do not be surprised that a bird could develop from decayed fruit, since we often see birds develop from decaying matter which are larger than a hazelnut.15 You should also not find it strange that the same creature is considered a non-kosher bird and an insect (sheretz ha'of), since it can have the characteristics of a bird and also display the actions and characteristics of an insect. You see that all the early explanations16 include in the six sets of lashes the prohibitions of non-kosher fish [N173] and sheretz hamayim (water insects). This is reasonable and I don't disagree, since it is possible for a creature to be both a fish and a sheretz hamayim.
Similarly, the same creature can be both a bird and a sheretz ha'of. This is the potisa, which is a bird, a sheretz ha'of, a sheretz ha'aretz, and a sheretz hamayim, and one therefore receives four sets of lashes for eating one. The n'mala referred to is one which flies, develops from decaying fruit, and doesn't reproduce. For eating it one receives lashes for an insect which came from food [N178], was shoretz on land [N176], was romeis on land [N177], a sheretz ha'of, and a sheretz hamayim. The tzira, which also develops from decayed matter,17 has the additional quality of being both a bird and a sheretz ha'of.
The development of a tzira or n'mala or other flying or crawling creature from decayed matter or from inside fruit only seems impossible to the uneducated, who are ignorant in natural science.18 They think it impossible for anything to come into existence except through male-female reproduction, since they see that this is so in the majority of cases.
Remember these principles and understand this subject well, since19 "Everything is explained in the proper way." I've explained the ways in which to determine that eating one type of creature is punishable by a certain number of sets of lashes, and another type by a lesser number.
It can be understood from the previous quotes that one if eats an entire creature we do not investigate its size and require a kezayis. Even eating a ba'utz20 is punishable by three sets of lashes — for sheretz hashoretz [N176], romeis [N177], and sheretz ha'of [N175].
Our Sages also said,21 "One who holds himself in from defecating transgresses the prohibition, 'Do not make yourselves disgusting.' " Similarly, "One who drinks water from a karna d'umna — which is a vessel used for bloodletting — transgresses the prohibition, 'Do not make yourselves disgusting.' " The same applies for eating filth or disgusting things or drinking anything repulsive which most people find revolting — they are all prohibited. One does not receive lashes for them, however, since the plain meaning of the verse refers to insects. One is administered makos mardus.22
From everything explained above about this verse, "Do not make yourselves disgusting," we see that it comes to prohibit only the a sheretz hamayim, which is not covered by any other prohibition. You should understand this well.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 11:43.
2.Lev. 11:41 (N176).
3.Deut. 14, 15 (N175).
4.Lev. 11:11 (N173).
5.16b.
6.102b.
7.See N26, N60, N94, N98, N143, N161, N170.
8.See N195, N318, N319.
9.The Rambam now comes to answer the following claim, which is part of the opinion which he already rejected: Since the phrase kol hashoretz ("any small creature") includes both insects which breed in the water and those which breed on land, one would think that eating a sheretz ha'aretz would merit two sets of lashes — one for being a sheretz ha'aretz and one for kol hashoretz.
10.Lev. 19:19. Deut. 22:11.
11.I.e. the explanation of the passage in Makos, "One who ate a potisa..."
12.Apparently the Rambam explains the phrase, "All small creatures which breed on land," as referring to the surface of the seed or fruit. However, see Hilchos Macholos Asuros 2:16, where he rules that it is only a doubtful prohibition, and therefore lashes are not given.
13.See N177, where the Rambam explained that the term romeis is used to refer to an insect which comes into existence from decayed matter and cannot reproduce, and shoretz refers to an insect which does reproduce.
14.Lev. 11:13.
15.See Kapach, 5731, note 97.
16.Of the passage in Makos, quoted above and rejected by the Rambam.
17.Apparently the Rambam means decaying fruit, for otherwise the tzira would also have only five sets of lashes.
18.Some commentaries point out that an insect which is invisible to the naked eye is not considered halachically to exist. For this reason we are allowed to drink tap water even though it is full of microscopic organisms which obviously do not qualify as kosher fish.
For this same reason, an organism which developed from a microscopic stage is not considered by halachah to be an offspring of its "parent," but from the material it came from at the moment it became visible. Some use this idea to reconcile the Rambam's statement with today's scientific views.
19.A paraphrase of Proverbs 25:11.
20.Arabic for the Hebrew yatush or yavchush.
21.Makos 16a. (b?)
22.Lashes for a Rabbinic prohibition.
-------------------------------------Negative Commandment 180
Creatures that were not Properly Slaughtered
"You shall not eat any carcass "—Deuteronomy 14:21.
It is forbidden to eat any [kosher animal, beast or bird] that has died [without being ritually slaughtered].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Creatures that were not Properly Slaughtered
Negative Commandment 180
Translated by Berel Bell
The 180th prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating an animal which died [by itself].
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not eat any neveilah."
One who eats a kezayis of neveilah is punished by lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 14:21.
--------------------------------------Negative Commandment 188
The Flesh of a Condemned Ox
"And his flesh shall not be eaten"—Exodus 21:28.
It is forbidden to eat of the flesh of an ox [or any other animal] condemned to death by the courts [e.g., for killing a human].
This prohibition holds even if the ox was properly slaughtered before the sentence was carried out.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
he Flesh of a Condemned Ox
Negative Commandment 188
Translated by Berel Bell
The 188th prohibition is that we are forbidden from eating the flesh of a shor ha'nis'kal,1 even if it was slaughtered in a kosher manner before being stoned to death.2 Since the final judgment was issued, it is prohibited even if it was slaughtered with a valid shechita.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,3 "Do not eat its flesh."
In the words of the Mechilta, "If an ox was on its way to be stoned to death and its owners slaughtered it first, its flesh may not eaten. For this case, the Torah said, 'Do not eat its flesh.' "
One who eats a kezayis of its flesh is punished by lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, "an ox which is stoned," i.e. which was judged worthy of execution for killing a person, for example.
2.The Rambam adds this explanation, for if it was stoned to death, it would already be prohibited since it wasn't killed with a kosher slaughter.
3.Ex. 21.28.
---------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Shemita Shemita - Chapter 9 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Shemita - Chapter 9
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment1 to nullify a loan in the Sabbatical year, as [Deuteronomy 15:2] states: "All of those who bear debt must release their hold." A person who demands payment of a debt after the Sabbatical year passed2 violates a negative commandment,3 as it is stated [ibid.]: "One shall not demand [payment] from his friend and his brother."
Halacha 2
The nullification of debts applies according to Scriptural Law only in the era when the Jubilee year is observed4 and [the sale of] land is also nullified, for the land [that has been sold] returns to its original owners without financial payment.5 This matter was conveyed through the chain of tradition. Our Sages declared:6 In the era when you nullify [the sale of] land, you nullify debts everywhere, whether in Eretz Yisrael or in the Diaspora. In the era when you do not nullify [the sale of] land, you do not nullify debts anywhere, even in Eretz Yisrael.
Halacha 3
Halacha 4
The Sabbatical year does not nullify debts until its conclusion. [This is derived as follows: Deuteronomy 15:1-2] states: "At the end of seven years, you shall effect a remission. This is the matter of the remission." And [Deuteronomy 31:10] states:9 "At the end of seven years, at the time of the Sabbatical year, during the holiday of Sukkot." Just as in that instance, [the event takes place] after the seven [years], so too, the nullification of the debts takes place after the seven [years].
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
The Sabbatical year nullifies a loan, even a loan supported by a promissory note which creates a lien on one's possessions.16 If, however, the borrower designated a field [to serve as payment] for the loan, it is not nullified.17 The Sabbatical year also nullifies the obligation to take an oath,18 for [the prooftext] states: "He shall not demand," i.e., neither payment, nor an oath.
Halacha 7
When does the above apply? With regard to an oath imposed by the judges19and the like, i.e., obligations that were he to accept them, the Sabbatical year would nullify them. But oaths taken by watchmen or partners20 and the like, i.e., oaths that were he to admit [the obligation], he would be required to pay [after the Sabbatical year],21 he is required to take the oath after the Sabbatical year.
Halacha 8
If a person gave a colleague a loan and then demanded payment, [the colleague] denied the obligation and remained in denial when [the conclusion of] the Sabbatical year arrived and then he admitted his obligation or witnesses came [and testified to that effect] after the Sabbatical year [was concluded], the obligation is not nullified.22
Halacha 9
When a person lends money to a colleague and sets [the time of payment] in ten years time, it is not nullified [by the Sabbatical year. The rationale is that] although [ultimately, the command,] "Do not demand [payment]" will apply,23 at present, he may not demand payment.24 If he stipulated that he would not demand payment, [the debt] is nullified by the Sabbatical year.25
Halacha 10
When a person lends money to a colleague and he stipulates with [the borrower] that [the debt] will not be nullified by the Sabbatical year, it is nullified, for he cannot negate the law of the Sabbatical year.26 If [the borrower] stipulates that he will not nullify this debt, even in the Sabbatical year, the stipulation is binding, for any stipulation made regarding financial matters is binding. Thus this person took on a financial obligation which the Torah did not obligate him in.27
Halacha 11
Halacha 12
Halacha 13
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
When a person hands over42 his promissory notes to the court, telling [the judges]: "Collect my debt for me," the debts are not nullified by the Sabbatical year. [This is derived from Deuteronomy 15:3]: "[a debt] that you have from your brother."[Implied is that debts demanded by "your brother," a private individual, are nullified by the Sabbatical year. [Payment for] these [debts, by contrast,] is being demanded by the court.
Similarly, if the court rendered a judgment, writing: "So-and-so, you are obligated to give this person this-and-this amount," [the debt] is not nullified. Such [a debt] is considered as if it has already been collected and entered [the creditor's] possession. It does not resemble a loan.
Halacha 16
When Hillel the Elder saw that the people would refrain from lending to each other and thus violated the Scriptural charge [Deuteronomy 15:9]: "Lest there be a wicked thought in your heart,"43 he ordained a pruzbol44 so that debts would not be nullified and people would lend to each other.
Halacha 17
Halacha 18
Halacha 19
A pruzbol may be composed only when [the borrower possesses] land.55 If the borrower does not possess land, the lender should grant56 the borrower even the slightest amount of land - even enough to grow a cabbage stalk57- in his field. [Even if] he lent him place for an oven or a range, a pruzbol may be composed.58 If [the borrower] owns a field that was given as security, apruzbol may be composed on that basis.
Halacha 20
[A pruzbol] may be composed against a man59 based on property owned by his wife60 or against orphans on property owned by their guardian.61 If [the borrower] does not possess land, but the guarantor does, we can compose apruzbol because of it.62 If [a borrower] is owed a debt by a colleague and the colleague owns land - since that land is on lien [to the first borrower] - we may compose a pruzbol because of it.
Halacha 21
Halacha 22
When a person has a pruzbol composed and then he makes a loan, it is not effective. Instead, the loan will be nullified unless he composes [another]pruzbol after giving the loan. Thus one can conclude that any loan which precedes a pruzbol is not nullified because of this pruzbol. If the pruzbolprecedes the loan, it is nullified [despite] this pruzbol.65
Halacha 23
Accordingly, a pruzbol that is predated is valid, while one that is postdated, is invalid.
What is implied? One wrote a pruzbol in Nissan and predated it to Adar, it is valid, for he has impaired its legal power, for [only the loans given] until Adar are not nullified.66 If, however, he postdated it and dated it in Iyar, it is invalid, for he has strengthened its legal power, for [were it to be effective] the loans given until Iyar would not be nullified. This is unlawful, because it is only [the loans given] until Nissan that are not nullified, for that [is when] the matters were conveyed to the court.
Halacha 24
When a person produces a promissory note after the Sabbatical year without it being accompanied by a pruzbol, the debt is lost.67 If he says: "I possessed [a pruzbol] and it was lost, his word is accepted.68 For from the time of the danger69 onward,70 a creditor was allowed to collect his debt [after the Sabbatical year] without a pruzbol.
Moreover, when a creditor would bring the promissory note [to court] or would come and demand payment of a loan supported by a verbal commitment [alone], [the court] tells the defendant: "Pay him." If the defendant claims: "Where is his pruzbol?", the court asks the plaintiff: "Did you have a pruzbolthat was lost?" If he answers affirmatively, his word is accepted.71 If he admits that he did not have a pruzbol, the debt is nullified.
Halacha 25
[When the plaintiff] produces a pruzbol, the defendant claims: "The loan for which he is demanding payment was made after the pruzbol,"74 and the plaintiff retorts: "It was made before the pruzbol," the plaintiff's word is accepted. [The rationale is] were he to have claimed: "I had [a pruzbol] and it was lost," his word would have been accepted75 even though we do not know the date of the pruzbol that was lost.
Halacha 26
If the defendant claims: "I owe him a debt," and the plaintiff states: "No, it is an account from a store which is not nullified [by the Sabbatical year], because I have not yet considered it as a loan,"76 his word is accepted, for were he to desire,77he could say: "It was a loan, but I had a pruzbol and it was lost." [Leniency is granted in these instances,] because once the Sages instituted [the concept of] pruzbol, we operate under the assumption that a person will not forgo something permitted78 and partake of something that is forbidden.79
Halacha 27
When Torah Sages offer loans to each other80 and one conveys his words to his students,81 saying: "I am notifying you [that I reserve the right] to collect all the debts [owed] to me at any time I desire," he does not have to compose apruzbol.82 [The rationale is that Torah scholars] know that the nullification of debts in the present era is a Rabbinic decree and it can be negated verbally.
Halacha 28
[Whenever] anyone returns a debt [despite the fact] that the Sabbatical year has passed,83 the spirits of our Sages are gratified because of him.84 [When receiving the payment,] the lender must say to the one who is making restitution: "I am nullifying [the debt] and your [obligation] to me has been released."85 If the debtor says: "Nevertheless, I desire that you accept it," he should accept it. For the Torah states: "One shall not demand [payment]," and payment was not demanded.86
[The debtor] should not tell [the creditor]: "I am giving them to you as [payment of ] my debt. Instead, he should tell him: "[The money] is mine,87 and I am giving it to you as a present."
Halacha 29
If [a debtor] returned a debt, but did not make the above statements, [the lender] should turn the conversation to the point where the debtor says: "[The money] is mine, and I am giving it to you as a present." If [the debtor] does not make such statements, [the creditor] should not accept it from him.88 Instead, [the debtor] should take his money and depart.
Halacha 30
One who refrains from lending money to a colleague before the Sabbatical year lest [the repayment] of the debt be delayed and it be nullified, violates a negative commandment, 89 as [Deuteronomy 15:9] states: "Be careful [lest there be a wicked thought in your heart....]" It is a severe sin, for the Torah warned against it with two adjurations, for it is written: "Be careful lest," and whenever the Torah uses the expressions "Be careful," "lest," or "Do not," it is communicating a negative commandment.90 The Torah objected to this evil thought and called it "wicked" and the the verse continued warning and commanding one not to refraining [from lending], but to give [the loan], as [ibid.:10] states: "You shall certainly give him and your Heart should not regret giving him." [Indeed,] the Holy One, blessed be He, promised that the reward for this mitzvah will be granted in this world,91 as [the verse continues:] "Because of this God will bless you."
FOOTNOTES
1.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 141) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 477) includes this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Rambam's wording implies that the nullification of the debt comes as a result of the person's action. It is not automatically nullified at the conclusion of the seventh year. For that reason, the Rambam states in Halachah 28, when a person comes to pay a debt after the conclusion of the seventh, the creditor must say that he is nullifying the debt (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVII, p. 289ff.).
2.
For, according to the Rambam, the debt is not nullified until the conclusion of the Sabbatical year (Halachah 4).
3.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 230) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 475) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
4.
As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 9, after the exile of the tribes of Reuven and Gad, the laws of the Jubilee year no longer applied according to Scriptural Law.
7.
I.e., according to the Rambam's interpretation of Gittin, loc. cit., the nullification of debts applies in the present era, even in the Diaspora. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:1). In his gloss to that text, the Rama quotes different opinions among the Ashkenazic authorities. Some maintain that the Rabbis did not ordain the observance of this law in the present age. Others maintain that it should be observed as a custom. Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halvaah 34, follows the Rambam's view.
9.
With regard to the Hakhel ceremony. The interrelation of these verses has its source in the Sifri.
10.
According to other authorities, although the debt is not remitted until the end of the Sabbatical year, from the beginning of the Sabbatical year, the creditor is forbidden to demand payment. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit. 36.
13.
Since the people considered the day as a festival, the recipients of the meat could not pay for it in an ordinary manner. Hence they promised to pay for their shares later, considering the money as a debt [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:2)].
14.
When the laws of the annulment of debts would no longer apply. The Rambam is speaking about a situation that could have occurred in the time the new month was sanctified based on the testimony of witnesses (in contrast to the present era, when we follow a fixed calendar). In that era as well, the court had a presupposition of the day when Rosh HaShanah would fall and the people celebrated it as a holiday in anticipation of its sanctification. Nevertheless, the moon was not actually sanctified - and thus the holiday officially declared as such - unless witnesses came. Now it was possible, especially if the night was cloudy, that witnesses did not see the moon and hence could not go to the court to give testimony. Hence the day could not be declared as Rosh HaShanah.
15.
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, based on the principle (stated in Halachah 11), that a debt stemming from money owed on account to a grocer is not nullified at the end of the Sabbatical year. Indeed, the source for this law (the Jerusalem Talmud, Sh'vi'it 10:1) states that it follows the opinion that maintains that such an account is nullified by the Sabbatical year. The Radbaz, however, explains that the situations are not identical. For it is common practice for a grocer to sell on account. A butcher, by contrast, expects immediate payment. A similar distinction is suggested by the Kessef Mishneh.
16.
I.e., once a loan is recorded in a promissory note, in the event the debtor does not pay, the creditor can use the promissory note to collect the debt from the landed property belonging to the debtor at the time of the loan (even if it was subsequently sold to others). Since the property is on lien, one might think that the situation is comparable to a loan supported by security (Halachah 14), which is not nullified by the Sabbatical year. That law, however, does not apply in the present instance, because although the lien applies to the debtor's property, it is not associated with a specific property.
18.
For example, a person claimed that a colleague owed him 100 zuz and the colleague admitted only to owing 50. In such an instance, the colleague is required to take an oath regarding the other 50 zuz. If he fails to take the oath before the conclusion of the Sabbatical year, that obligation is nullified.
19.
This is a specific term that, as explained inHilchot Sh'vuot 11:5-6, refers to oaths administered because of the denial of a specific and definite claim that would create a monetary obligation were the defendant to have admitted to it.
20.
See Hilchot Sh'vuot, loc. cit., which explains that these individuals can be compelled to take an oath even though the plaintiff does not have a definite claim against them.
21.
With regard to a watchman, the explanation is that - unlike a loan - the property being watched is considered as always being in the possession of the owner. Hence, the obligation for it is not nullified by the Sabbatical year (see Radbaz). A partner is considered as a watchman (Bava Batra42b).
22.
The rationale is that the obligation was not firmly established before the conclusion of the Sabbatical year, for until the borrower's admission of the debt or the substantiation of the claim by witnesses, the creditor cannot press for payment in a court of law. Hence, the end of the year does not lead to the nullification of the debt. See the Jerusalem Talmud (Sh'vi'it 10:1). The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, but it is supported by the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh and quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:7). Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch does add to the Rambam's wording the concept that the debtor took an oath to support his denial. In his gloss to the Tur, the Darkei Moshe explains that addition, stating that unless the debtor has taken an oath to support his denial, then we are speaking of an ordinary loan and the conclusion of the Sabbatical year nullifies both the loan and the obligation of an oath to support one's denial, as stated in Halachah 6.
24.
For the loan has not become due. And as long as there is no payment demanded, the debt is not nullified, for the Sabbatical year only nullifies a debt for which payment is called for (the Responsa of Rabbenu Asher, sec. 86).
25.
The Radbaz and Rav Yosef Corcus explain that even though the collector has promised not to demand payment of the debt, since there is a payment date before the end of the Sabbatical year, the borrower is under obligation to pay. Hence, it is as if payment is being demanded from him.
26.
This is a general principle, applicable in many contexts. Whenever a person establishes a stipulation that runs contrary to the Torah's laws, his stipulation is nullified. For the Torah is not given over to man's will and no mortal can bend it to fit his whims (see Makkot 3b; Hilchot Ishut 6:9).
27.
The difference between this clause and the previous one can be explained as follows: In the previous instance, the person was attempting to postulate that the Torah's laws should not apply. This is not within a mortal's power. In the second clause, by contrast, the person is saying that although the laws of the Sabbatical Law do apply, he asks the borrower to accept an obligation even though the Torah releases him from it. Torah Law does not prevent him from accepting such an obligation. See the parallels inHilchot Mechirah 11:15.
See also the comments of Beit Yosef(Choshen Mishpat 67), that one is permitted to make such a stipulation. It is not merely that, after the fact, one is bound by it.
Based on this principle, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva'ah:35 draws the following conclusion:
At present, in these countries, it is not customary [to employ] a pruzbol. [Some] have explained the custom [as follows]: Since it has become customary to collect all debts after the Sabbatical year, even without a pruzbol, and the borrower knows of this practice, it is as if the lender made a stipulation at the time of the loan that [the loan was being given] on condition that the borrower never nullify this debt, even in the Sabbatical year. Thus [the borrower] made himself liable for a financial obligation not required of him by the Torah in which instance, his stipulation is binding and he is obligated according to Scriptural Law.
Nevertheless, that text continues, stating that "any G‑d-fearing person will be stringent with regard to his own conduct and make a pruzbol, [for] it is something that does not involve a loss and is easy to arrange."
28.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it10:1), the Rambam explains that until a summary of an account is made, it is not considered as a debt. Instead, the seller trusts the purchaser and is willing to wait for payment. Thus all of the different transactions are considered as one sale. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since it is not customary for the seller to demand payment of such accounts, the account is not bound by the prohibition: "Do not demand payment." Hence, the mitzvah to nullify the obligation also does not apply.
Similar concepts are reflected in the treatment of the subject by Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva'ah, subsec. 39, which states: "Since a storekeeper usually extends credit for a year or two and it is unusual for him to demand payment immediately, it is as if he set a time for payment after the Sabbatical year."
29.
The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 67:14 offers two explanations for "establish[ing it] as a debt":
a) setting a time for payment;
b) totaling up the account to arrive at a sum.
31.
Here also the Kessef Mishneh explains that since it is not common for a worker to demand payment of his wages immediately, until he does so, they are not considered as a debt.
35.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it10:2, the Rambam explains that debts are obligations which a person accepts upon himself. Hence they can be nullified. These obligations, by contrast, are penalties imposed upon the transgressor by God. Hence, he cannot absolve himself from them unless he makes payment.
The Kessef Mishneh questions this explanation, for the Torah also requires a person to satisfy the monetary obligations he takes upon himself. He therefore explains that the intent is that since these penalties are written in the Torah, it is as the debts were handed over to the court in which instance, they are not nullified by the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 15.
Rambam LeAm explains the difference between the two on the basis between the distinction between mamon, a financial obligation between men, which a man can release, and k'nas, a penalty required by God from the transgressor that although paid to the person violated is not an obligation to him.
36.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat67:16) defines "establish[ing] as a debt" as calling the defendant to court. Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:31 emphasizes that once the court's decision is written up, it is considered as if the debt has been handed over to the court.
37.
The money he agrees to pay in the event of a divorce (or which his estate must pay in the event of his death).
38.
Since the obligation need not be paid until the woman demands payment, it is not considered as a debt that could be nullified by the Sabbatical year.
39.
I.e., she admitted that a certain portion of the money owed her had already been paid. SeeHilchot Ishut 16:14.
40.
Kiddushin 9b states: "A creditor acquires the security given him." Thus when the loan is given in return for security, it is as if he transferred ownership of the security for the loan until it is repaid [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 9:2)]. Thus it is as if there is no outstanding obligation for the Sabbatical year to nullify.
41.
For this amount is not in his possession. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quote other opinions which do not accept this view and maintain that this portion of the debt is not nullified. In his Kessef Mishneh, however, Rav Yosef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam's position.
42.
Giving them the actual promissory note, not merely assigning it to them (Rav Yosef Corcus, explaining why this is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, while a pruzbolis merely a Rabbinic institution).
43.
The verse continues: "The Sabbatical year is drawing near and you will look negatively at your brother and refrain from giving him." See Halachah 30 which discusses this charge.
44.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it10:3), the Rambam cites the interpretation of this term in Gittin 37a: "the amendment of a matter."
45.
As stated in Halachah 2, the nullification of debts in the present era is a Rabbinic injunction. And since it is a Rabbinic institution, Hillel and his court had the power to institute a provision to reduce its application. Were it to have the power of a Scriptural Law, the Rabbis would not be able to institute such a provision.
46.
The Ra'avad differs with this concept, explaining that it applies even when the Sabbatical Law is observed according to Scriptural Law. The difference between the two authorities reflects a difference between the two Talmudic Sages, Abbaye and Rava, the Rambam follows Abbaye's understanding and the Ra'avad that of Rava. This, however, is slightly problematic, for theBava Metzia 22b states that, with the exception of six specific instances, whenever there is a difference of opinion between these two Sages, the halachah follows Rava's understanding.
The Radbaz explains the Rambam's viewpoint, stating that our Sages' preference for Rava's position applies only when these Sages are arguing concerning their own logical conclusions. When, by contrast, they are arguing about the interpretation of another Sages' position as in the present instance, the halachah can follow Abaye's view.
47.
They were the heads of the leading courts inEretz Yisrael shortly at the beginning of the post-Mishnaic era. Similarly, the court composing a pruzbol must be one of the leading courts in its region and in its era (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
48.
Gittin 36b explains that the institution of apruzbol depends on the principle hefker beit din, hefker; "When the Jewish court absolves a person's ownership, the absolution is binding." As proof of this principle, it cites examples of actions taken by Ezra the Scribe and Joshua. The Rambam understands the Talmud to be saying that even when a financial obligation is Rabbinic in origin, to absolve it, one must have authority comparable to that of Ezra and Joshua. (Significantly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:6 - where the Rambam describes the above principle - and inHilchot Nachalot 6:12 - where he shows another application of it - he does not state that the courts involved must be made up of judges of unique distinction.)
49.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 67) does not accept the Rambam's ruling and maintains that a pruzbol may be composed by any court. The Ramah (loc. cit.:18) states that this leniency can be accepted. Note also the contrast between this law and Halachah 27.
51.
The Rambam is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:4). Although Rabbenu Nissim interprets this to mean that the Rambam accepts the view (Gittin 33a) that two judges are sufficient to compose apruzbol, most authorities require that there be at least three judges on a court which officiates over a pruzbol, as indicated by the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch(Choshen Mishpat 67:19).
52.
The creditor is not transferring the actual promissory note to the court - in which instance a pruzbol would not be necessary, as stated in Halachah 15. Instead, he is making a formal notification of the matter to the court. See Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:39.
54.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam writes that this wording teaches us that a judge may also serve as a witness. This is not allowed in questions involving Scriptural Law, but in questions involving Rabbinic Law, leniency is granted.
55.
The rationale is that when the borrower possesses land, the creditor's debt is secured, because he may expropriate the land in payment (Radbaz). Even though the land does not appear to be worth the full value of the debt, we follow the principle (seeHilchot Mechirah 13:8) that the land may never be considered overpriced (Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:41).
56.
Our text follows the manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text reads slightly differently.
The lender may transfer this property to the borrower without his knowledge, but not against his will [Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 67:22)].
58.
Since the borrower is entitled to use the land, he is considered to have sufficient rights to it to enable a pruzbol to be written.
61.
I.e., when a guardian took out a loan for the sake of orphans, if the guardian possesses land a pruzbol can be composed because the guardian is considered like a guarantor.
65.
This halachah, based on Sh'vi'it 10:5, was the subject of much review and rethinking within the Rambam's own mind. He rewrote his commentary to this mishnah four times, each time, changing his thought somewhat.
At first, he wrote that only a pruzbol written before a loan prevents it from being nullified. Once a loan has already been given, the laws of the Sabbatical year apply to it, and apruzbol cannot nullify it. It was not until his second revision of his commentary that he changed it, amending it to read like his conclusion in the text above.
66.
Since that is the date on the pruzbol, its legal power takes effect from that date even though it was written later and it could have included the loans that were given until the date when it was actually composed.
68.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot9:7), the Rambam explains that the lender's word is accepted based on the principle that a person will not sin when he could achieve the same result in a permitted manner (Gittin37b). Since he could easily preserve the debt by composing a pruzbol, we assume that he did so rather than transgress the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 26.
69.
I.e., in the Talmudic era, the Roman's passed many decrees with the intent of stamping out the observance of the mitzvot. One of them was a prohibition to make apruzbol (for by doing so, they would undermine the observance of the Sabbatical year). Failure to observe these decrees led to very severe punishment. In fear, many people would compose a pruzbol so that they could collect their debts, but destroy it lest it cause them danger (Kessef Mishneh).
70.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that even though the danger passed, the Rabbis never rescinded the leniency granted to allow for a uniformity in Jewish practice.
71.
Gittin, loc. cit. explains that this is like "opening the mouth of the dumb," i.e., offering support to a litigant to enable him to collect what is due him.
73.
The Radbaz cites (Gittin 37a) which states that the Jewish court is considered as "the father of the orphans" and we assume that they do not want to impose Rabbinic decrees in a situation that will harm the orphan's interests. This applies both to loans that they themselves made or that their father made and which are due to his estate (Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:50).
75.
Based on the principle of migo, i.e., had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie. This argument is reinforced by the accepted presumption mentioned previously: that if a person has a permitted way to perform a function, he will not use a forbidden path, i.e., he would make the loan with a valid pruzbol, rather than rely on an invalid one.
Generally, a migo is an accepted argument in its own right. Nevertheless, in this instance, the migo must be reinforced by the assumption, for migo is usually employed as an argument in defense of one's position and not to expropriate money and here the plaintiff is seeking to employ it to expropriate money (Biurei HaGra 67:58).
77.
To lie, i.e., here too, we are relying on the principle of migo, as reinforced by the assumption the Rambam proceeds to mention.
80.
The Rambam's wording implies that both the lender and the borrower must be Torah scholars. His ruling is quoted verbatim by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat67:20). The Rama, however, rules that not only Torah Sages, but even ordinary individuals can benefit from this leniency.
This leniency is part of the rationale, for the observance of the concept of pruzbol by the Ashkenazic community. Since all that is necessary to preserve a loan is a verbal statement made in the presence of three knowledgeable people, it is proper for everyone to do so (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva'ah:35).
81.
The Ra'avad (as understood by the Kessef Mishneh) objects to the Rambam's ruling, for, as stated in Halachah 17, the Rambam maintains that a pruzbol must be composed by a leading court, while here, he seems to imply that any few students are acceptable. The Kessef Mishneh resolves the apparent contradiction by saying that the students the Rambam refers to here are in fact distinguished judges, and there is no difference in practive between the subjects of the two halachot. Rav Yosef Corcus (in his gloss to Halachah 17) states that as long as the important court approves of such an act, the actual pruzbol may be made in the presence of lesser scholars.
83.
And thus, according to law, the debt is nullified and need not be repaid. This halachah is speaking about an instance where a pruzbol was not composed.
84.
I.e., they approve of this step and consider it pious behavior. The Sages thought it desirable for a debt to be returned, for in this way, people will continue lending each other money in the future.
86.
And thus, by accepting it, he is not violating the Torah's commandment to nullify the debt. Indeed, he has fulfilled the commandment to release the debt, for theDeuteronomy 15:2 introduces this commandment with the phrase: "This is the matter (d'var) of remission." D'var, translated as "matter," also relates to the word dibbur meaning "speech," implying that it is sufficient to make a statement of remission to fulfill the mitzvah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:8)].
89.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 231) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 480) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See also Halachah 16 above.
90.
Zevachim 106a; Sifri to the above verse. The fact that this commandment employs two such terms indicates that it is a severe prohibition.
91.
As opposed to many other mitzvot for which reward is granted only in the World-to-Come. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 1:1) for a discussion of this matter.
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• 3 Chapters: Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 8, Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 9, Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 10 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 8
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Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• "Today's Day"
Tuesday, Adar I 14, 5776 · 23 February 2016
Friday 14 Adar I, Purim Katan 5703
Tachanun is not said.
Torah lessons: Chumash: Tetzaveh, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 72-76.
Tanya: And even he (p. 127)...speech and action. (p. 129).
My grandfather told my father: "My father (the Tzemach Tzedek) selected the maamarim printed in Likutei Torah from among 2,000 maamarim.
• 3 Chapters: Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 8, Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 9, Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 10 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 8
Halacha 1
[The prohibition against partaking of] the gid hanesheh1applies with regard to kosher2 domesticated animals and wild beasts,3 even nevelot and trefot.4 It applies to a fetus5 and to animals that have been consecrated, both those consecrated [for sacrifices] of which we partake and for sacrifices of which we do not partake. It applies to [the gid] on the right thigh and that on the left thigh.6
According to Scriptural Law, only [the gid] on the hip socket is forbidden, as [Genesis 32:33] states: "which is on the hip-socket." The remainder of the gidwhich is above the socket or below the socket - and similarly, the fat which is on the gid - are forbidden only according to Rabbinic decree.7There are twogiddim. The inner one next to the bone is forbidden according to Scriptural Law. The entire outer one is forbidden by Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 2
When a person partakes of the inner gid hanesheh on the socket, he is liable for lashes.8 If he partakes of the fat [of the gid], the remainder of the inner gid, or the entire outer one, he is liable for stripes for rebellious conduct.9
What is the measure of which one must partake to be liable? An olive-sized portion. If one ate the entire gid on the socket, one is liable, even though it is less than an olive in size. The rationale is that it is considered as a self-contained entity.10
Halacha 3
When a person eats an olive-sized portion of the gid on the right side and an olive-sized portion of the gid on the left side, or he ate two entire giddim even if they are not the size of an olive, he receives 80 lashes. He is given lashes for every gid independently.11
Halacha 4
The prohibition against gid hanesheh does not apply with regard to a fowl, because it does not have a [round]12 hip-socket. Instead, its thigh is long [and flat]. If there is a fowl whose thigh is shaped like that of the thigh of an animal, i.e., it has a hip-socket, its gid hanesheh is forbidden, but one is not liable for lashes, because of it. Similarly, when there is an animal whose thigh is long like that of a fowl, its gid hanesheh is forbidden, but one is not liable for lashes for it.13
Halacha 5
When a person eats the gid hanesheh from a non-kosher domesticated animal or wild beast, he is not liable.14 [The rationale is that this prohibition] does not apply with regard to a non-kosher animal,15 only with regard to an animal that is entirely permitted. Nor is he considered as one who partook of the remainder of its body, for the gid is not included as meat, as we explained.16 If, however, one partakes of the fat on the gid [of a non-kosher] animal, it is considered as if one ate from its meat.
Halacha 6
When a person partakes of a gid hanesheh from a nevelah, a trefe, or an animal consecrated as a burnt offering, he is liable for two [sets of lashes]. Since [the prohibition]17 includes the remainder of its body which was permitted, it also includes the gid and causes another prohibition to be added to it.18
Halacha 7
One who removes the gid hanesheh must ferret out all traces of it until nothing remains.19 A butcher's word is accepted with regard to the gid hanesheh,20just as it is accepted with regard to forbidden fat. [Accordingly,] we do not purchase meat from every butcher, [only from] an upright man who has established a reputation for observance.21 If he slaughters meat himself and sells it, his word is accepted.
Halacha 8
Where does the above apply? In the Diaspora. In Eretz Yisrael, by contrast, when it is populated entirely by [Torah-observant] Jews, meat may be purchased from anyone.22
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] a butcher is considered as trustworthy to sell meat, but it is discovered that he sold meat that was nevelah or trefe. He must return the money to its owners.23 He is placed under a ban of ostracism and is removed from his position.24
There is no way that he can correct [his act] so that people [will be allowed] to purchase meat from him until he goes to a place where his identity is unknown25and returns a lost object of significant worth or slaughters an animal for his own self and has it declared trefe although it involves a significant financial loss. For these actions indicate that he certainly repented without any [intent to] deceive.26
Halacha 10
When a person purchases meat and sends it via a common person, [the latter's] word is accepted with regard to it. Although he has not established a reputation for Torah observance,27 we do not suspect that he will exchange [the meat for a non-kosher cut].28 Even the servants and maidservants29 of the Jews are trusted with regard to such a matter. A gentile, by contrast, is not [trusted], for we fear that he will exchange [the meat].30
Halacha 11
[The following rule applies when there are] ten stores, nine sell kosher meat and one sells nevelot.31 If one purchased meat from one of these stores and did not know which one he purchased from, [the meat] is forbidden. [The rationale is that] whenever [the presence of a forbidden entity] is firmly established, the situation is considered as half and half.32
Halacha 12
Similarly, when meat is found in the hand of a gentile and it is not known from where he purchased it, if [the majority of] the sellers of meat were Jewish, it is permitted.
This reflects the ruling according to Scriptural Law. [Nevertheless,] our Sages have already forbidden any meat found in the marketplace or in the possession of a gentile35 even though all the slaughterers and all the sellers are Jewish. Moreover, even if one purchased meat, left it in his house, and it disappeared from one's sight, it is forbidden36 unless it had a distinguishing mark, he was familiar with it and could recognize it definitely as [the piece of meat lost],37 or it was bound and sealed.
Halacha 13
[The following rule applies when] one hung a container filled with pieces of meat, the container broke, and the pieces fell to the earth.38 If there is no distinguishing mark [on the meat] and he was not able to recognize it, it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] it is possible to say that the meat that was in the container was dragged away by a wild beast or creeping animal and this is other meat.
Halacha 14
It is permitted to derive benefit from a gid hanesheh.39 Therefore it is permissible for a person to send a thigh which contains a gid hanesheh to a gentile.40 He may give him the entire thigh intact in the presence of a Jew. We do not suspect that [the other] Jew will partake of this meat before the gid is removed, because its place is recognizable.41 Accordingly, if the thigh was cut into pieces, he should not give it to a gentile in the presence of a Jew, lest the other Jew partake of it.42
Halacha 15
Wherever the Torah states: "Do not eat," "You shall not eat,"43 "They shall not eat," or "It shall not be eaten," the intent is that it is forbidden both to partake of or benefit from the forbidden entity44 unless:
a) a verse explicitly states otherwise, as it does with regard to a nevelah[Deuteronomy 14:21]: "Give it to the stranger in your gate and he shall partake of it," or with regard to forbidden fat [Leviticus 7:24]: "You may use it for any task"; or
b) the Oral Law states explicitly that it is permitted to benefit from it, as is the case with regarding to teeming animals, swarming animals, blood, a limb from a living animal, and the gid hanesheh. For according to the Oral Tradition, it is permitted to benefit from all these prohibited entities, even though it is forbidden to partake of them.
Halacha 16
Whenever it is forbidden to benefit from a substance, if a person derives benefit without partaking of it, e.g., he sold or gave to a gentile or gave it to dogs, he is not liable for lashes.45 He should, however, be given stripes for rebellious conduct. The money [he received] is permitted.46
Whenever it is forbidden to partake of a substance, but it is permitted to benefit from it, even though it is permitted to benefit from it, it is forbidden do business with such articles or establish oneself in a profession that involves forbidden entities.47[There is] an exception, forbidden fat, for concerning it, it is written: "You may use it for any task." For this reason, we do not do business with nevelot, trefot, teeming animals, and swarming animals.
Halacha 17
When a trapper happens upon a non-kosher wild animal, fowl, or fish, and he snares them or he traps both kosher and non-kosher animals, he may sell them.48 He may not, however, intend to have his profession concern non-kosher species.
It is, however, permitted to do business with milk that was milked by a gentile without being observed by a Jew, cheeses made by gentiles, and the like.
Halacha 18
This is the general principle: Whenever a prohibition is forbidden by Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to do business with it. Whenever the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, it is permitted do business with it, whether we are certain of the existence of the prohibition or it is a matter of question.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Genesis, ch. 32, relates that before his confrontation with Esau, Jacob remained alone in his camp. An unidentified being - interpreted by the Torah commentaries to be Esau's archangel - wrestled with him the entire night. When he saw that he could not defeat Jacob, he gave him a blow to his upper thigh, dislocating his gid hanesheh. In commemoration of this event, ""The children of Israel do not eat the gid hanesheh.
The Rabbis identified the gid hanesheh as the sciatic nerve, the large main nerve running down the back of an animal's hind leg. The term gid, though sometimes translated as "sinew," is a general term. As the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:4), it is used to refer to arteries, veins, tendons, nerves, and sinews.
3.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 183) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 3) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
5.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 65:7 does not cite the Rambam's view, but instead quotes two differing opinions: one that the prohibition does not apply to a fetus at all and another, that it applies only when the fetus has completed the period of gestation and is discovered alive.
6.
Although the angel only dislodged the nerve on one of Jacob's legs, we are forbidden to partake of the nerves from both sides.
10.
Accordingly, even if it is less than an olive-sized portion in size, one is liable. Compare to Chapter 2, Halachah 21, Chapter 15, Halachah 17, and Chapter 16, Halachah 6.
11.
Rav Moshe HaCohen writes that this ruling applies when the person was given a separate warning for each gid. Otherwise, he receives only one set of lashes. TheMaggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would also accept that interpretation.
13.
Chullin 92b discusses these issues and leaves both matters unresolved; hence, the Rambam's rulings.
15.
Chullin 101a notes that the confrontation between Jacob and the angel took place before the Giving of the Torah, at a time when the Jews could eat non-kosher animals. Hence, there is reason to say that the prohibition could involve a non-kosher animal, for partaking of such animal was not forbidden until the Giving of the Torah.
In response, the Talmud explains that our observance of this prohibition does not stem from the practice observed by Jacob's descendants, but because this prohibition was reiterated at the time of the Giving of the Torah. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 7:6, the Rambam elaborates on this point, explaining that our observance of Jewish practice, even the mitzvot which we know that the Patriarchs fulfilled like circumcision, stems from God's command at Sinai and not from our ancestors' observance.
16.
Chapter 4, Halachah 18. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 65:9) which states that a gid is "like a piece of wood; it has no flavor."
18.
Following the concept of issur kollel, "an encompassing prohibition," as explained in the conclusion of Halachah 14 (Maggid Mishneh).
The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that Chullin 82b states that according to the opinion that a gid hanesheh does not have any flavor, one is not liable. Only the opinion that maintains that the gid hanesheh does have a flavor holds one liable. From the previous halachah, it appears that the Rambam follows the former view. Why then does he hold the person liable for two sets of lashes.
19.
Since the gid hanesheh and the gidforbidden by Rabbinic decree subdivide into several branches, this is a rather difficult task. For this reason, in most sectors of the Jewish community today, it is customary not to eat the hind-quarters of an animal. Accordingly, several cuts of meat, e.g., sirloin steak, are not available from kosher butchers.
21.
If the person himself does not have a reputation for observance and knowledge of the laws, he can sell meat if he hires such a person to act as a supervisor. This is the rationale for the practice of hasgachah, kashrut inspection, practiced today.
22.
In the present era, there is no difference between Eretz Yisrael and other lands, for the majority of the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael are not Torah observant.
23.
He must return the money entirely. This applies even if the customers already partook of the non-kosher meat (Hilchot Mechirah 16:14). The rationale is that a person's soul is revolted by the commission of a transgression and he is not considered to have benefited from the meat at all (Sefer Meirat Einayim 232:4).
25.
If he performs such an act in a place where his identity is known, it can be said that he did so in order to be reinstated.
26.
I.e., they show that he is willing to forgo his financial benefit in order to keep Torah law. See also Hilchot Shechitah 10:14 and Hilchot Edut 12:9 which deal with the same concept.Hilchot Edut states that in order to be accepted as a witness, he must wear black garments as a sign of repentance.
27.
See the Maggid Mishneh who maintains that the Rambam would rule in this manner even when a Jew is reputed to transgress various prohibitions. He also mentions the opinion of the Rashba who maintains that further precautions must be taken if an article is entrusted to a non-observant Jew. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 118:8) quotes the Rambam's ruling and then cites the Rashba's view without indicating which opinion should be followed.
28.
I.e., we do not expect that he will steal. Moreover, he will derive no benefit from doing so, for he will have to supply an equivalent piece of meat for the one he exchanges. We do not expect him to cause sin without deriving any benefit. If, however, he has a reputation for stealing, his word is not accepted (Maggid Mishneh).
29.
I.e., Canaanite servants, non-Jews purchased as servants who have undergone a partial conversion process (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 12:11).
30.
For a gentile is never trusted in any matters involving Jewish observance. When one desires to send food that involves prohibitions with a gentile, it is necessary to take precautions as stated in Chapter 13, Halachot 8-10.
31.
I.e., even if the proportions are heavily weighted in favor of the conclusion that the meat is kosher, we accept the possibility that it is non-kosher.
32.
This is a general principle applying in many other contexts as well, e.g., Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 2:10, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:15.
33.
The Hagahot Maimoniot explains that this law applies only when the meat is discovered in the public domain. If a person is seen taking meat from a store, but it is not known which store he took it from, the previous law applies.
35.
As mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh, there are Rishonim who permit meat found in the possession of a gentile when the majority of the sellers are Jewish, maintaining that this is evident from Chullin 95a. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 63:1, however, quotes the Rambam's view.
36.
According to the literal meaning of the Rambam's words, if meat was placed in the freezer, it would be forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 63:2) cites, however, the opinion of Rashbam which permits the meat if it is found in the same place that it was placed. The Rama writes that it is customary to follow this view.
37.
The Maggid Mishneh states that if a person has a reputation for upright conduct, his word is accepted in this concept even if he is not a Torah scholar. Note the contrast toHilchot Gezeilah V'Aveidah 14:12 which accepts only the word of a Torah scholar if one claims to recognize a lost object, but cannot identify it with distinctive marks.
39.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that according toPesachim 22a, it would appear that the authorities who maintain that the gid hanesheh has no flavor also maintain that it is forbidden to benefit from it. Now the Rambam follow the perspective that the gid hanesheh has no flavor (see Halachah 5). Hence his position here is somewhat difficult. The Maggid Mishneh explains, however, that the two positions are not necessary interrelated and both rulings of the Rambam can be upheld.
40.
I.e., because there is no prohibition against receiving benefit from the gid hanesheh, he does not have to remove it before selling the meat.
41.
Since the Jew sees a co-religionist giving the gentile the meat, he will assume that it was ritually slaughtered and that the meat was kosher. [This applies in a place where public announcements are made when an animal is discovered to be trefe (Chullin93b). Otherwise, the Jew must tell the gentile that the animal is kosher (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 65:11)].
Nevertheless, since the place of the gid hanesheh is recognizable - i.e., it is obvious whether the gid is still in the thigh or has already been removed - he will not partake of the meat until the gid is removed.
42.
Since the place of the gid hanesheh is not obvious, the other Jew may think that ordinary kosher meat is being given and may partake of it.
44.
Sometimes the command is stated in an active voice; sometimes, it is passive; sometimes, singular and sometimes plural. The passive form implies that it is forbidden to derive any benefit that could lead to one's eating, e.g., selling it for money that could be used to purchase food.
45.
Rav Moshe HaCohen questions this ruling, stating that if the intent of the Scriptural prohibition is that it is forbidden to benefit from these substances, why is one not liable for lashes for deriving such benefit? TheMaggid Mishneh explains that he is not liable, for one is liable for lashes only when he derives benefit from the food in the ordinary manner one derives benefit from food. This includes only eating. Receiving money, by contrast, is not considered as benefiting from food in the ordinary manner. Rav Moshe HaCohen, however, anticipated that attempted resolution and explains that, on the contrary, selling edible food is an ordinary way of deriving benefit.
46.
There is one exception to this: money received in return for a false deity or articles associated with it. That money is itself forbidden (see Chapter 13, Halachah 15;Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:19).
47.
I.e., one's livelihood may not revolve around the sale of these forbidden entities or performing work with them (e.g., serving as a chef in a non-kosher restaurant). The rationale for the prohibition is that we fear that a person who has extensive involvement with forbidden substances may come to partake of them (Rashba).
The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that the above applies only with regard to food from forbidden species. One may choose a profession that involves employing a horse or a donkey as a beast of burden.
48.
He must sell them immediately. He may not raise them until they become large [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 117:4)]. See also Siftei Cohen117:6 who questions whether the leniency is granted only to a professional trapper or to any person.
Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 9
Halacha 1
It is forbidden to cook meat and milk together and to partake of them according to Scriptural Law.1 It is forbidden to benefit from [such a mixture]. It must be buried. Its ashes are forbidden like the ashes of all substances that must be buried.2
Whenever a person cooks an olive-sized portion of the two substances together,3 he is worthy of lashes, as [Exodus 23:19] states: "Do not cook a kid in its mother's milk." Similarly, a person who partakes of an olive-sized portion of the meat and milk that were cooked together4 is worthy of lashes even though he was not the one who cooked them.5
Halacha 2
The Torah remained silent concerning the prohibition against partaking [of meat and milk]6 only because it forbade cooking them. This is as if to say: Even cooking it is forbidden, how much more so partaking of it.7 [To cite a parallel:] The Torah did not mention the prohibition against relations with one's daughter, because it forbade those with the daughter of one's daughter.8
Halacha 3
According to Scriptural Law, the prohibition involves only [a mixture of] meat from a kosher domesticated animal9 and milk from a kosher domesticated animal, as implied by the verse: "Do not cook a kid in its mother's milk."10 The term "a kid" includes the offspring of an ox, the offspring of a sheep, and the offspring of a goat unless the verse states explicitly, a goat-kid.11The term "a kid in its mother's milk" [does not exclude all other situations].12 Instead, the Torah is speaking regarding the commonplace circumstance.
With regard to the meat of a kosher animal which was cooked in the milk of a non-kosher animal or the meat of a non-kosher animal which was cooked in the milk of a kosher animal, by contrast, cooking is permitted, and deriving benefit is permitted. One is not liable for [transgressing the prohibition against partaking of] meat and milk if one partakes of it.13
Halacha 4
Similarly, the meat of a wild beast and the meat of a fowl together with the milk of a wild beast or the milk of a domesticated animal is not forbidden according to Scriptural Law.14 Therefore it is permitted to cook it and it is permitted to benefit from it. It is forbidden to partake of it according to Rabbinic Law so that people at large will not be negligent and come to violate the Scriptural prohibition against milk and meat and partake of the meat of a kosher domesticated animal [cooked] in the milk of a kosher domesticated animal. For the literal meaning of the verse implies only the meat of a kid in the milk of its actual mother.15 Therefore, they forbade all meat in milk.
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
When [milk and meat] are smoked, cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias, or the like, one is not liable for lashes.18 Similarly, when meat is cooked in whey, milk from a dead animal,19 or milk from a male,20 or if blood is cooked with milk, one is absolved and is not liable for partaking [of the mixture] because of [the prohibition against partaking of] milk and meat.21
When, however, a person cooks the meat of a dead animal, forbidden fat, or the like in milk, he is liable for lashes for cooking.22 He is not liable for lashes for partaking [of the mixture] because of the prohibition against meat and milk.23For the prohibition against [mixtures of] meat and milk does not take effect with regard to [entities] prohibited as nevelah or forbidden fat, because we are not speaking about a more encompassing prohibition, a prohibition which adds a new dimension, or [two] prohibitions that take effect at the same time.24
Halacha 7
When a person cooks a fetus in milk, he is liable. Similarly, one who partakes of it is liable. When, however, one cooks a placenta, skin, sinews, bones, the roots of the horns, or the soft portion of the hoofs [cooked] in meat,25he is not liable. Similarly, one who partakes [of such a mixture] is not liable.
Halacha 8
When meat falls into milk or milk falls into meat and they are cooked together, the minimum measure [for which one is liable is] enough for one substance to impart its flavor to the other.
What is implied? When a piece of meat falls into a bubbling pot26 full of milk, a gentile should taste [the contents of] the pot.27 If it has the flavor of meat, it is forbidden. If not, it is permitted, but the piece of meat is forbidden.28
When does the above apply? When he hurried and removed the piece of meat before it discharged the milk that it absorbed. If he did not remove it [that quickly], we require 60 times its volume,29 because the milk that it absorbed became forbidden. It was discharged and then mixed together with the remainder of the milk.30
Halacha 9
When milk falls [onto a piece of] meat [being cooked] in a pot,31 we taste32 the piece on which the milk fell. If it does not have the flavor of milk, everything is permitted.33 [More stringent rules apply] if the piece of meat has the flavor of milk. Even though if the piece of meat was pressed to remove [the absorbed liquid], the flavor [of milk] would not remain, since it has the flavor of milk now, it is forbidden and we must measure its entire volume.34 If everything in the pot - the other meat, the vegetables, the sauce, and the spices - is great enough so that the piece is one sixtieth of the entire [volume], that piece of meat is forbidden35 and the remainder is permitted.36
Halacha 10
When does the above apply? When he did not stir the pot at the outset when the milk fell into it. [He did so] only at the end37 and did not cover the pot.38
If, however, he stirred the pot from the beginning until the end39 or covered [the pot]40 from the time [the milk] fell until the end, [the question of whether a prohibition exists depends] on whether [the milk] imparted its flavor.41
Similarly, if the milk fell into the sauce or onto all the pieces and it was not known on which piece [the milk] fell,42 he should stir the entire pot so that all its contents will be mixed [thoroughly].43 If the flavor of milk [can be detected] in the entire pot, it is forbidden. If not, it is permitted. If a gentile to taste [the pot] whom we can rely on cannot be found, we require a measure of sixty whether for meat in milk or milk in meat. If there is one measure in sixty,44 it is permitted. If there is less than sixty, it is forbidden.
Halacha 11
Halacha 12
The udders [of an animal] are forbidden according to Rabbinic Law.47 [The prohibition is not of Scriptural origin, because] meat that was cooked in milk from an animal that was slaughtered is not forbidden according to Scriptural Law, as we explained.48
Therefore if one cut it open and discharged the milk it contained, it is permitted to roast it and eat it. If one cut it both horizontally and vertically and then pressed it into a wall until none of the moisture of the milk remained, it may be cooked with other meat.49
When an udder has not been cut open, when from a young animal that never nursed50 or from an older one, it is forbidden to cook it. If one transgressed and cooked it alone, it is permitted to partake of it. If one cooked it with other meat, we require 60 times its volume. The udder itself is calculated in the 60.51
Halacha 13
What is implied? If the entire mixture together with the udder was sixty times the volume of the udder, the udder is forbidden,52 and the remainder is permitted. If there was less than 60 times its volume, the entire mixture is forbidden. Regardless of [the ruling applying to the entire mixture], if the udder fell into another pot, it can cause it to be forbidden. We require 60 times its volume as in the original instance.53 [The rationale is that] the udder which is cooked becomes considered as a forbidden piece of meat.
We measure [the volume of] the udder at the time that it was cooked, not according to its state when it fell [into the mixture].
Halacha 14
Halacha 15
Halacha 16
It is forbidden to place the skin of a kosher animal's stomach [in milk] to serve as a catalyst for it to harden into cheese. If one used it as a catalyst, [a gentile] should taste the cheese. If it has a taste of meat, it is forbidden. If not, it is permitted. [The rationale is that] the catalyst is itself a permitted entity,58for it comes from the stomach of a kosher animal. [The only question] is [whether] the prohibition against meat and milk [was violated] and that is dependent on whether the flavor was imparted.
[Different laws apply, however, when] one uses the skin of the stomach of anevelah, a trefe, or a non-kosher animal. [The rationale is that] since the catalyst is forbidden in its own right, the cheese becomes forbidden, not because of the prohibition of meat and milk, but because of the prohibition against a nevelah. For this reason, [our Sages] forbade cheeses made by gentiles, as we explained.59
Halacha 17
Meat alone is permitted and milk alone is permitted. It is [only] when the two become mixed together through cooking that they both become forbidden.
When does the above apply? When they were cooked together, when a hot object fell into a hot object,60 or when a cold object fell into a hot object.61If, however, [milk or meat] that is hot fell into the other when it is cold, [all that is necessary is to] remove the surface of the meat which touched the milk; the remainder may be eaten.62
If cold [meat] fell into cold [milk or the opposite], one must wash the piece of meat thoroughly.63 [Afterwards,] it may be eaten. For this reason, it is permitted to [carry] meat and milk bound together in a single handkerchief, provided they do not touch each other. If they do touch each other, one must wash the meat and wash the cheese.64 [Afterwards,] he may partake of them.
Halacha 18
Halacha 19
[The following rules apply when] a fowl that has been slaughtered falls into milk or kutach that contains milk: If it is raw, it need only be washed thoroughly and it is permitted. If it was roasted, one should remove its surface.69If it has portions where it is open70 or it is spiced and it falls into milk or kutach, it is forbidden.71
Halacha 20
Halacha 21
When two guests who are not familiar with each other are eating at the same table, one may eat the meat of an animal and one may eat cheese. [The rationale is] that they are not well-acquainted with each other to the extent that they will eat together.76
Halacha 22
We do not knead a loaf with milk. If one kneaded it [with milk], the loaf is forbidden,77 because habit [might lead] to sin, lest he eat it together with meat. We do not dab an oven with animal fat.78 If in fact one dabbed an oven [with fat], any loaf is forbidden79 until one fires the oven,80 lest one eat milk with [that loaf]. If one altered the appearance of the bread so that it will be evident that one should not eat meat or milk with it, it is permitted.
Halacha 23
Halacha 24
When a knife was used to cut roasted meat85 and then was used to cut radish or other sharp foods, it is forbidden to eat them together with kutach.86 If, however, one cut meat [with a knife] and afterwards cut zucchini or watermelon,87 one should scrape away the place where the cut was made and the remainder may be eaten with milk.
Halacha 25
Halacha 26
When a person eats cheese or milk first, it is permitted for him to eat meat directly afterwards. He must, however, wash his hands90 and clean his mouth between the cheese and the meat.91
With what should he clean his mouth? With bread or with fruit that [require him] to chew and then swallow or spit them out.92 One may clean his mouth with all substances with the exception of dates, flour, and vegetables, because they do not clean effectively.
Halacha 27
Halacha 28
When a person ate meat first - whether the meat of an animal or the meat of a fowl - he should not partake of milk afterwards unless he waits the time for another meal, approximately six hours.95 This stringency is required because meat that becomes stuck between teeth and is not removed by cleaning.96
FOOTNOTES
1.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 186-187) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 113 and 92) include these prohibitions among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
3.
I.e., together the mixture is the size of an olive. It is not necessary that one have an olive-sized portion of milk and an olive-sized portion of meat.
4.
If, however, the meat and milk have not been cooked together, there is no Scriptural prohibition against partaking of them together (Maggid Mishneh). According to Rabbinic Law, it is forbidden to partake of them in any manner.
5.
Even if a prohibition was not violated when cooking them together (e.g., they were cooked by a gentile), it is forbidden for a Jew to partake of the mixture. The implication is that the prohibitions against cooking the mixture and partaking of it are separate issues that do not necessarily share a connection (Maggid Mishneh).
7.
Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit., the Rambam explains that the prohibitions against partaking of and benefiting from milk and meat are derived from the fact that the Torah repeats this prohibition three times. Perhaps the reason the Rambam does not mention this means of derivation here is to avoid the following question being raised: Why are lashes not given for benefiting from milk and meat?
To explain: In Chapter 8, Halachah 16, the Rambam writes that one is not liable for lashes for deriving benefit from a forbidden substance. As explained in the notes to that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh explains that one is liable for lashes only when he derives benefit from the food in an ordinary manner from food. This includes only eating and not other forms of deriving benefit. Nevertheless, seemingly this should not apply with regard to benefiting from a mixture of milk and meat. For, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 10, in that instance, one is liable even if one does not derive benefit in the ordinary manner. Hence, it would appear that one should be liable for lashes for partaking of such a mixture.
Among the explanations given why one is not liable is that the prohibition against deriving benefit from a mixture of milk and meat is derived from an inference from a more lenient instance to a more stringent one (a kal vichomer; see Chullin 115b). And we follow the principle that punishment is not meted out when a prohibition is derived in such a fashion, only when it is stated explicitly (Sifri, Naso). If, however, there was an explicit prohibition in the Torah teaching us that deriving benefit from a mixture of milk and meat was forbidden. Seemingly, one would be liable for lashes (Lechem Mishneh).
9.
With regard to the meat or milk of a kosher wild beast or fowl, see the following halachah and notes.
10.
I.e., the prohibition involves only a kid that could be eaten and milk of which one could partake.
11.
I.e., the term gidi translated as "kid," commonly means "a kid-goat." Nevertheless, according to the Bible, it is not necessarily restricted to this meaning unless the verse specifies so explicitly, as inGenesis 27:16; 38:20.
12.
I.e., the intent is not that one is liable only for cooking an offspring in the milk of its mother and not in any other situations. See the conclusion of the following halachah.
14.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis in Chullin 116a whether the prohibition against eat the meat of a wild beast [cooked] in milk is Scriptural or Rabbinic in origin. According to some interpretations, that difference of opinion is perpetuated among the Rishonim (see Siftei Cohen 87:4). Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Rishonim andAchronim follow the opinion the Rambam states here. This is also the ruling of theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 87:3).
Significantly, in (Hilchot Mamrim 2:9), the Rambam states that the meat of a wild beast that is cooked in milk is forbidden according to Scriptural Law. In their glosses to Hilchot Mamrim, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that there, the Rambam is speaking theoretically: Were the halachah to follow the opinion that the meat of a wild beast is forbidden according to Scriptural law, the ruling would be such and such. TheMerkevat HaMishneh, however, maintains that a printing error crept into the text inHilchot Ma'achalot Assurot and the text should be changed to fit the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Mamrim.
15.
Hence were the Sages to allow one to partake of the meat of a wild beast and fowl cooked in milk, one might think that the prohibition applies only in its most literal context. As a safeguard to prevent this error from occurring, they instituted this prohibition.
16.
The Turei Zahav 87:3 and the Siftei Cohen87:5 mention that there are authorities who forbid eating fish and milk together because it can cause health dangers. They, however, reject that ruling.
17.
This refers to eggs that already have a yolk and whites, but are still connected to the chicken's body (Maggid Mishneh). See theTurei Zahav 87:6 and the Siftei Cohen 87:9 who quote authorities who explain that even though such eggs are considered as meat in certain contexts, there is no prohibition against partaking of them together with milk.
18.
Nevertheless, there is a prohibition against partaking of all these mixtures and those mentioned in the following clause.
20.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 87:6) states that, after the fact, there is no prohibition against a mixture of milk from a male and meat. TheSiftei Cohen 87:16 explains that this refers to milk from a male human. Even the Rama would forbid milk from a male animal according to Rabbinic Law.
21.
Implied is that in the latter instance, one is liable for partaking of blood. The Siftei Cohen87:15 notes that according to many authorities, one is not liable for lashes for partaking of blood that has been cooked.
22.
Since we are speaking about meat or fat from a kosher species, the prohibition against cooking applies. In this instance, we do not say that "one prohibition does not fall upon another," because there is no prohibition against cooking a nevelah or forbidden fat.
24.
As stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 18, and inHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 17:8, it is only in these circumstances, that we do not follow the general principle: One prohibition does not fall upon another prohibition.
The commentaries ask: Seemingly, the prohibition against a mixture of meat and milk does add a new dimension to this prohibition, because it is forbidden to benefit from such a mixture. Why then does the prohibition against partaking of milk and meat not apply?
The Rambam attempts to resolve this question in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:4) by explaining that since the prohibition against benefiting from the mixture is an extension of the prohibition against partaking of it, when - as in the present instance - the prohibition against partaking of it does not apply, the prohibition against benefiting from it also does not apply.
25.
For as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 18, such substances are not fit to be eaten and thus are not considered as meat.
26.
The pot must be boiling hot. If meat falls into cold milk, it will not absorb it. See Halachah 17.
27.
Chullin 97a states "An Aramean chef shall taste it." Tosafot and others explain that only a chef's word is accepted. He will not lie, because if his falsification is discovered, his professional reputation will be tarnished and he will suffer a loss. We suspect that an ordinary gentile, by contrast, will lie. His word is only accepted with regard to ritual matters when he makes statements in the course of conversation, without knowing that a Jew is depending on his word.
This interpretation is not evident from the Rambam's words. On the contrary, it appears that according to the Rambam, the statements of any gentile are acceptable (see Chapter 15, Law 30, and notes). TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 92:1 quotes the Rambam's words. The Siftei Cohen 92:1 mentions the view of Tosafot. The Rama states that in the Ashkenazic community, the custom is not to rely on the word of a gentile in this context. Instead, we require sixty times the volume of the meat in all instances. Otherwise, both the milk and the meat are forbidden.
29.
As will be explained (see Chapter 15, Halachah 6, and notes), our Sages received the tradition that a forbidden substances will not impart its flavor to a mixture when the mixture contains sixty times its volume.
30.
There is no way of distinguishing the remainder of the milk from the forbidden milk. Hence the entire mixture is forbidden unless there is more than 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance.
31.
As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's words in this and the following halachah, we are speaking of an instance where milk falls on a piece of meat that is not in the sauce. According to Rashi, the lower portion of the meat is resting within the sauce in the pot and its upper portion - on which the milk falls - projects beyond it. According to Rabbenu Yitzchak, the entire portion is outside the sauce. See Turei Zahav 92:2; Siftei Cohen 92:4. (From the Rambam's wording at the beginning of the following halachah, it would appear that he follows Rabbenu Yitzchak's position.)
34.
Since the meat becomes forbidden, because it is meat that has been mixed with milk, tasting the mixture for milk is not sufficient. Instead, we consider the meat as a forbidden article and measure 60 times its volume. It is not possible to distinguish between the flavor of the forbidden meat and that of the permitted meat.
35.
Once it becomes forbidden, it is considered as a prohibited entity and cannot become permitted again. Our Sages [Chullin 108b; Rama (Yoreh De'ah 92:3-4)] use the expression: "The piece becomes like carrion," i.e., as if it is inherently forbidden.
36.
As if it was mixed with 60 times its volume of non-kosher meat. If the entire mixture is not 60 times the volume of the forbidden piece, the entire mixture becomes forbidden.
37.
Since he mixed at the end, after the meat became forbidden, the entire mixture may become forbidden.
38.
Thus the piece of meat on which the milk fell remained a discrete entity, separate from the entire mixture. Hence it becomes forbidden.
39.
The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 82) states that it is sufficient for him to stir the mixture at the beginning. This will cause the milk to be blended throughout the entire mixture. There is no need for him to continue stirring the pot. Rav Yaakov ibn Chaviv maintains that the Rambam would also accept this position. The Rambam mentions stirring the put until the end only for stylistic reasons. This interpretation is also apparent in the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 8:3).
In his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef, Rav Yosef Caro differs and maintains that the Rambam's words here should be understood literally. Unless he mixed the pot from the beginning until the end, we fear that it was not mixed well. Hence in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 92:2, he quotes the Rambam exactly. The Rama, however, cites the Tur's position.
40.
For covering the pot also causes the flavor of the milk to be blended throughout the entire mixture.
42.
The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 92:2) emphasize that if the person does not stir the pot immediately after the milk fell in, the piece on which the milk fell becomes forbidden. Since its identity is unknown, all the pieces are forbidden unless the entire mixture is 60 times larger than its largest piece.
Rav Yaakov ibn Chaviv and Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef) interpret the Rambam's intent as analogous to that of the Tur. They maintain that the Rambam also would agree that if person waited after the milk fell on the piece, that piece - and perhaps all the pieces - become(s) forbidden.
The Maggid Mishneh offers a different interpretation, explaining that in this instance, we do not say that the piece of meat on which the milk fell becomes forbidden because we do not know which piece it is. Hence rather than have the taste of the milk affect that piece, we stir the entire mixture so that the milk will become blended into it and become nullified as explained in the following note.
The Turei Zahav 92:6 and the Siftei Cohen92:8 follow the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh, explaining that in this instance, the principle (Beitzah 4b): "We do not nullify the existence of a forbidden substance at the outset," does not apply. For since the identity of the forbidden substance was never established, there is no specific prohibited substance involved. Hence at the outset, the entire pot is considered as subject to being forbidden. To prevent that from happening, we stir it so that the prohibition will not take effect.
43.
I.e., intentionally mixing the milk throughout the entire pot and thus nullifying its presence. As the Tur (loc. cit) writes, if the milk fell into the sauce, even if the person did not stir the mixture, this would be the ruling. Nevertheless, the Rambam advises the person to stir the mixture so that it will be mixed thoroughly and no trace will remain.
44.
More precisely, the permitted substance must be sixty times the volume of the forbidden substance. Thus we are speaking about the forbidden substance being one sixty-first.
45.
This applies even on a later day. According to Scriptural Law, after 24 hours, there is no prohibition. Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, at the outset, one should be stringent and not cook milk in a pot in which meat was cooked previously even if it had been cooked several days beforehand.
46.
I.e., it should be tasted by a gentile. According to the Ashkenazic custom not to rely on a gentile, we require that the contents be 60 times the volume of the pot. The Siftei Cohen 93:1 states that it would be very rare for such a situation to exist. Generally, the ratio between a pot and its contents is less than 60. Hence, in most instances, the food would be prohibited.
47.
I.e., we are afraid that a certain amount of milk remained in the udder or that the udder absorbed a certain amount of milk. Since we do not know how much milk it absorbed, we assume that it is entirely forbidden.
49.
The ruling regarding roasting is more lenient than the ruling regarding cooking, because when meat is roasted, any fluids it contains are discharged and flow outward without being absorbed (see Halachah 14). When it is cooked, by contrast, it stews in its juices and it and any other meat will absorb the milk it discharges.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 90:2) writes that the accepted custom is not to cook it with other meat at all and to cook it alone only after it has been cut vertically and horizontally and pressed into a wall. The Rama adds that it is Ashkenazic custom not to cook it at all.
50.
I.e., our Sages enforced their decree universally, without differentiating between one animal and another.
51.
In Chapter 15, Halachah 18, the Rambam explains that since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, our Sages were more lenient. Thus the Rambam interprets this ruling as being of general significance. The Rashba offers a different rationale for this ruling, explaining that since the meat of the udder is acceptable, we include it in the reckoning of 60. Thus in contrast to other instances where 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance is required, here, we require only 59.
52.
Rashi, Chullin 97b, explains that we assume that the milk imparted its flavor to the udder. Hence it becomes forbidden as the Rambam proceeds to state.
53.
Thus according to the Rambam, only 59 times its volume is required. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah90:1). The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that the second mixture is judged more stringently than the first. They follow the rationale of the Rashba cited above. Thus they maintain at first, the udder is included in the reckoning, because its meat is permitted. With regard to the second mixture, by contrast, it is the meat, not the milk of the udder which is forbidden. Hence 60 times its volume is required.
54.
This is a safeguard so that it will not discharge milk which will flow over other pieces of meat.
55.
For even if its milk does flow over other pieces of meat, they are not forbidden. The rationale is that since it has been cut open, we do not suspect that perhaps some milk remained. Since the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, we are not overly stringent. The Rama states if the udder was not cut open beforehand, the meat that is lower on the spit is forbidden.
57.
The Kessef Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, this applies even to milk that is still liquid. Since it has already undergone preliminary digestive processes, it is no longer considered as milk. See Chapter 4, Halachah 19.
59.
Chapter 3, Halachah 13. As the Rambam states in that halachah, since the amount of skin used is minimal, we might think that no prohibition is involved, for the forbidden substance would be nullified. Nevertheless, the Rabbis ruled stringently, explaining that since the catalyst which causes the milk to curdle is forbidden, everything is forbidden.
60.
For in this instance, the two substances will be absorbed by each other just as if they had been cooked together.
61.
For we follow the principle (Pesachim 76a): "The lower one dominates," and the food is considered as hot.
62.
We assume that the meat's surface absorbed a small amount of milk while it was cooling down (ibid.). Hence the surface is forbidden and must be removed. The milk does not, however, permeate beyond the surface. Therefore the remainder is permitted. With regard to the milk, it appears that there is no prohibition. The Radbaz explains that since it is not possible to remove the surface of the milk, there is no prohibition whatsoever. Other Rishonimrequire that the milk be sixty times the volume of the surface of the meat. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 91:4) quotes the Rambam's ruling and the Siftei Cohen91:8 states that this decision is accepted by the Rama despite the fact that this might appear incompatible with some of the other rulings of the Rama. The Turei Zahav 91:7, however, argues in favor of the view of the other Rishonim.
63.
Since they are both cold, there is no suspicion that one will be absorbed by the other. Washing the meat is necessary only to remove any traces of milk that might be left.
64.
The Bayit Chadash rules that this applies only when one of them is moist. If they are both solid, they need not even be washed.
65.
In previous eras, before the advent of refrigeration, meat was salted thoroughly to preserve it. Afterwards, when one desired to partake of it, he would soak it in water to remove the salt (Rashi, Chullin 112a). The Radbaz states that we are speaking about salting meat in a manner similar to the way it is salted to remove its blood. If less salt than that is used, these laws do not apply. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 91:5) which discusses these laws.
66.
I.e., we assume that it will cause substances to be discharged and absorbed as cooking does. This is merely a Rabbinic stringency.
It must be emphasized that the comparison to cooking is not total. Generally, salting only causes the surface of the substance to become forbidden. If, however, the substance is fatty, the entire substance becomes forbidden (ibid.:6).
69.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if this is speaking about a roasted fowl that is hot, or even one that is not hot. According to the latter opinion, it will still absorb some milk because it has become soft and permeable. The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 91:7) quotes the first view while the Turand the Rama mention the second.
71.
Because the cracks in its surface or the spices will cause it to absorb the milk to a greater extent than it would otherwise. This clause appears also to be referring to meat that has been roasted. There are, however, opinions that interpret it as referring to raw meat. See Siftei Cohen 91:21.
74.
Since both substances are permitted and they are served together, one might accidentally partake of them together.
Implied is that if substances are forbidden and one would not ordinarily partake of them, there is no difficulty in having them served on the table at which one is eating. See Siftei Cohen 88:2.
75.
See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 88:2) which explains that if a distinction is made, e.g., the milk is placed on one type of placemat and the meat on another, there is no prohibition.
77.
Even to be eaten alone [Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 97:1)]. The Shulchan Aruch, however, grants license if only a small amount of bread was prepared in this manner and thus it can be eaten at one time.
81.
Even if they did not touch each other. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 116) and the Turei Zahav 95:3) which mention that there is a prohibition against eating fish roasted with meat because it could cause a health problem.
82.
For the vapors from the meat become absorbed in the bread or in the fish. In Chapter 15, Halachah 32, the Rambam rules that vapors do not cause an object to become forbidden. There is not necessarily a contradiction between these two rulings, for here we are speaking about a small oven [Radbaz, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah97:3). Even though, after the fact, kosher meat roasted together with non-kosher meat in a small oven is permitted, here one is not deeming the bread or fish forbidden, one is merely prohibiting that it be eaten with milk (Siftei Cohen 97:4).
83.
Or cooked [Radbaz, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 95:1)]. The Shulchan Aruch adds that this ruling applies only when the dish was thoroughly washed and no trace of meat remains.
84.
Even though the kutach contains milk. The rationale is that although the flavor of the meat was imparted to the dish and from the dish, it was imparted to the fish. Nevertheless, since it went through these two intermediate stages, it is not considered significant and does not cause the fish to be considered fleishig. The Rabbis referred to this concept as nat bar nat - notain taam bar notain tam ("imparting merely flavor a second time").
It must be emphasized that nat bar nat is permitted only with regard to a mixture of milk and meat. The rationale is that both milk and meat are permitted, a prohibition only exists when they are mixed together and if one of them has been weakened to the extent that it is nat bar nat, it is not considered significant. When, however, an entity is inherently forbidden, e.g., non-kosher meat, when its flavor becomes absorbed into a dish, that dish becomes forbidden and it may not be used again for hot food (Radbaz).
85.
The Rambam's wording implies that the meat was hot (Radbaz). This ruling applies also to hot cooked meat (Kessef Mishneh). There are opinions that maintain that this ruling also applies when the meat was cold (Radbaz).
86.
Rashi, Chullin 111b, states that the rationale is that it is likely that there will be a small amount of fat left on the knife. Thus when the knife is used to cut the sharp food, its sharpness will cause the flavor of the fat will be imparted to it. According to this view, if the knife was cleaned or used to cut another substance first, it does not cause the radish to be forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 96:5); note also the dissenting view of the Rama]. (This opinion speaks of fat being left on the knife, for if there was no fat there, seemingly, this instance would resemble the concept of nat bar nat mentioned in the previous halachah.)
There are, however, other opinions (Tosafot, Sefer HaTerumot) which maintain that this ruling would apply even if the knife was clean. The rationale is the pungency of the food and the pressure of the knife cause it to absorb more than an ordinary instance of nat bar nat.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that the entire radish is forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 96:1), however, rules that it is sufficient to remove a piece a fingerbreadth in thickness. The Rama, however, mentions the Rambam's view.
87.
I.e., substances that are not pungent and soft and contain moisture. If one cuts a vegetable that is not soft and moist, it is sufficient to wash it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 96:5)].
88.
The Ra'avad and the Radbaz note that the Rambam apparently had a slightly different version of Chullin 112a, the source for this halachah, than that found in the standard printed texts of the Talmud. According to the standard version, the rationale is that we fear that some drops of kutach will fall into the salt. The Radbaz adds that according to the Rambam, the prohibition applies only with regard to earthenware jugs. If they are made from metal, the material will be too dense to allow for the flavor to be drawn out.
89.
According to the other rationale, the kutachwill remain a distinct entity if it falls into the salt, but it will become mixed with the vinegar and nullified if it falls into it (Radbaz; Turei Zahav 95:16).
90.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 89:2) states that if one sees that his hands are clean, it is not necessary to wash them.
91.
The Rama quotes a view that requires one to wait six hours after eating hard cheese. It is, however, questionable if this would be required for most hard cheese commercially produced today.
93.
The requirement of this stringency for the meat of a domesticated animal is understandable, for the prohibition is of Scriptural origin. Nevertheless, according to the standard text of Halachah 4, the prohibition against a mixture of milk and the meat of a wild beast is also Rabbinic in origin. What then is the difference between the meat of a wild beast and that of a fowl? The Kessef Mishneh, however, explains that the meat of a domesticated animal resembles the meat of a wild beast. Hence it was necessary for the Rabbis to forbid it. Alternatively, Rabbenu Tam explains that the meat of a wild beast will stick to a person's mouth and hands more than the meat of a fowl.
94.
Since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, our Sages did not enforce any further stringency.
95.
This is the view stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 89:1) and in the Rama's conclusion, although the Rama does mention that there are some more lenient views.
96.
The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 89) gives a different rationale: that because meat is fatty, its taste persists for a long time.
Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 10
Halacha 1
All the prohibitions we mentioned involve living beings. There are also other Scriptural prohibitions that involve the produce of the earth. They include:chadash, kilai hakerem, tevel, and orlah.1
Halacha 2
What is meant by chadash?2 It is forbidden to partake of any of the five species of grain3 alone4 before the omer5is offered on the sixteenth of Nisan, as [Leviticus 23:14] states: "You may not partake of bread, roasted kernels, or fresh kernels."6
Anyone who partakes of an olive-sized portion of fresh grain before the offering of the omer is liable for lashes. [This applies] in every place and at all times, whether in Eretz [Yisrael] or in the Diaspora,7 whether at the time of the Temple or when the Temple is no longer standing.8
[The only difference in observance is that] while the Temple is standing, once the omer has been offered, it is permitted [to partake of] new grain in Jerusalem. Distant places9 are permitted [to partake of new grain] after midday. For the court will not be indolent with regard to [the offering of omer] beyond midday.10 [Now] when the Temple is no longer standing, the entire day is forbidden according to Scriptural Law. In the present age, in the places where the festivals are observed for two days,11 chadash is forbidden on the entire day of the seventeenth of Nisan until the evening according to Rabbinic Law.12
Halacha 3
When a person partakes of an olive-sized portion of bread from each of roasted kernels, or fresh kernels [from chadash], he is liable for three sets of lashes,13 as [implied by the verse]: "You may not partake of bread, roasted kernels, or fresh kernels." According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that all three involve separate prohibitions.14
Halacha 4
Whenever grain took root before the offering of the omer, it is permitted to be eaten after the offering of the omer despite the fact that it did not reach maturity until after that offering. Grain that took root after the offering of theomer is forbidden until the offering of that sacrifice the following year even though it was planted before that offering was brought. This law applies in every place15 and in every era according to Scriptural Law.
Halacha 5
[There is an unresolved halachic difficulty in the following situations:] Grain took root after the omer. One harvested it and sowed this wheat in the ground. Afterwards, the omer of the following year was offered, while these kernels of wheat were still in the ground.16 There is a doubt whether [the offering of] theomer caused [these kernels] to be permitted as if they had been stored in a jar or it did not cause them to be permitted, because they have been nullified in the ground.17 Therefore if a person collected them and partook of them, he is not liable for lashes, but [instead] is given stripes for rebellious conduct.
Similarly, when a stalk reached a third of its growth before the offering of theomer,18 one uprooted it and then replanted it after the offering of the omer, and it increased in size. There is a doubt whether it is forbidden because of the increase in size until the offering of the omer the following year or it is not forbidden because it took root before the offering of the omer.19
Halacha 6
What is meant by kilai hakerem?20 Sowing a species of grain or a type of vegetable together with a vine.21 [This applies] whether they were sown by a Jew or a non-Jew,22 whether they grew on their own, or whether one planted a vine among vegetables, we are prohibited against partaking and benefiting from both of them, as [Deuteronomy 22:9] states: "Lest the fullness of the seed which you sowed and the produce of the vineyard become hallowed."23["Becom[ing] hallowed"] means being set apart and forbidden.
Halacha 7
Halacha 8
When does the above26 apply? When they were sown in Eretz Yisrael.27 In the Diaspora, by contrast, kilai hakerem are forbidden by Rabbinic decree.
In Hilchot Kelayim,28 it will be explained which species are forbidden as kilai hakerem and which are not forbidden, how they become forbidden, when they become forbidden, in which situations, produce causes vines to llowed," and when they do not cause them to become "hallowed."
Halacha 9
What is meant by orlah?29 Whenever anyone plants30 a fruit tree, it is forbidden to partake of or benefit from all of the fruit the tree produces for three years after being planted, as [Leviticus 19:23] states: "For three years, they shall be closed off for you, they may not be eaten."31 Whoever eats an olive-sized portion of such fruit is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law.
Halacha 10
When does this apply when one plants in Eretz Yisrael, as [the above] verse states: "When you enter the land...." With regard to the prohibition againstorlah in the Diaspora, it is a halachah transmitted to Moses at Sinai32 that fruit that is definitely orlah is forbidden. If there is a doubt regarding the matter, it is permitted. In Hilchot Ma'aaser Sheni,33it will be explained which [growths] are forbidden as orlah and which are permitted.34
Halacha 11
When there is a doubt whether produce is orlah or kilai hakerem in Eretz Yisrael, it is forbidden.35 In Syria, i.e., the lands that David conquered,36 it is permitted.
What is implied? If there was a vineyard [containing] orlah and grapes were being sold outside it, or there were vegetables sown inside it37 and vegetables were being sold outside it, [in which instance,] there is a doubt whether [the grapes or the vegetables] came from it or from another place, in Syria, they are permitted.38 In the Diaspora, even if one sees grapes being taken out from a vineyard that is orlah or vegetables being taken out from a vineyard, one may purchase them provided one does not actually see orlah being reaped or the vegetables being harvested [from the vineyard].
Halacha 12
When there is a doubt whether a vineyard [contains] orlah or kilai hakerem, inEretz Yisrael, it is forbidden. In Syria, it is permitted.39 Needless to say, that ruling prevails in the Diaspora.
Halacha 13
It is forbidden40 to drink a jug of wine that is found hidden in an orchard [whose produce is] orlah. It is permitted to benefit from it. [The rationale is] that a thief will not steal from a place and hide [what he stole] there. Grapes that are hidden there are forbidden, lest they have been harvested from there and stored away there.
Halacha 14
[The following laws apply when] a gentile and a Jew are partners in planting [an orchard]. If at the beginning of the partnership, they agreed that the gentile would benefit from the produce during the years of orlah and the Jew would benefit from it for three years when the produce is permitted afterwards, it is permitted.41 If they did not make such an agreement at the outset, it is forbidden [to make one afterwards].42 [Even when the agreement was made at the outset,] they may not make a reckoning.
What is meant [by making a reckoning]? I.e., to calculate the quantity of produce from which the gentile benefited in the years of orlah so that the Jew will benefit from exactly that amount. If they made such an agreement, it is forbidden, for this is exchanging the produce which is orlah.43
Halacha 15
It appears to me that the laws of neta reva'i44 do not apply in the Diaspora. Instead, one may eat the produce of the fourth year without redeeming it at all. Our Sages mentioned only orlah.
An extrapolation can be made from a more stringent instance to [this one] which is less stringent. In Syria, the laws governing the tithes and the Sabbatical year apply by Rabbinic decree,45 nevertheless, the laws governingneta reva'i do not apply, as will be explained in Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni.46 Thus, in the Diaspoa,47 how much more so should [we conclude] that the laws governing neta reva'i do not apply.
Halacha 16
In Eretz Yisrael, it is forbidden to eat any of the produce of the fourth year51until it is redeemed.52 In Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, we will explain the laws governing the redemption [of the produce], how it should be eaten, and when we begin calculating the growth of a tree with regard to orlah and [netah] reva'i.
Halacha 17
How is produce which is neta reva'i redeemed in the present age?53 After [the produce] is collected, one recites the blessing: Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the earth, who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to redeem neta reva'i. Afterwards, one redeems the entire crop even with one p'rutah.54 This p'rutah is then cast into the Dead Sea.55
Alternatively, one may transfer the holiness to other produce that is worth ap'rutah by saying:56 "The holiness of all of this produce is transferred to this wheat," "...to this barley," or the like.57 Afterwards, one burns the [latter quantity of produce] so that they will not cause difficulty to others.58 He may then partake of all the produce [he harvested].
Halacha 18
Some of the Geonim ruled that even though one redeemed the produce of the fourth year or transferred its holiness, it is forbidden to partake of it until the entrance of the fifth year. This ruling has no foundation. It appears to me that it is in error. [Although Leviticus 19:25] states: "And in the fifth year, you shall partake of its produce," the intent of the verse is that in the fifth year you will partake of its produce without redeeming it like any ordinary produce in the world. One should not heed the above ruling.
Halacha 19
What is meant by tevel? Any produce from which one is obligated to separateterumah and tithes is called tevel before one separates these portions.59 [In that state,] it is forbidden to partake of it,60 as [Leviticus 22:16] states: "And they shall not desecrate the sacraments of the children of Israel which they will dedicate to God," i.e., one should not treat them in an ordinary manner while the sacred elements that will be separated in the future have not yet been separated.
When a person61 partakes of an olive-sized portion of tevel before he separates terumah gedolah and terumat ma'aser, he is liable for death by the hand of heaven,62 as [Leviticus 22:15-16] states: "And they shall not desecrate the sacraments of the children of Israel... And they will bear the sin of guilt."
Halacha 20
When, however, one partakes of food from which terumah gedolah andterumat ma'aser63 have been separated, but from which tithes - even the tithes of the poor have not been separated - he is worthy of lashes for partaking of tevel. He is not worthy of death. For only with regard to terumah gedolah and terumat ma'aser is the sin worthy of death.64
Halacha 21
The warning against partaking of tevel from which tithes were not separated is included in [Deuteronomy 12:17 which] states: "You may not eat the tithes of grain... in your gates."65
In Hilchot Terumot and Hilchot Ma'aserot, it will be explained which produce is obligated to have terumah and the tithes [separated from it] and which is not, when does the obligation stem from Scriptural Law and when is it Rabbinic. When a person partakes of an olive-sized portion of produce that is tevelaccording to Rabbinic Law66 or kilai hakerem or orlah from the Diaspora,67he is liable for stripes for rebellious conduct.
Halacha 22
The juices that come from produce that is tevel, chadash, consecrated to the Temple, growths of the Sabbatical year, kilayim, and orlah are forbidden as they are. One is not, however, liable for lashes for partaking of them.68Exceptions are wine and oil that are orlah and wine that is kilai hakerem. One is liable for lashes for them just as one is liable for lashes for the olives and grapes,
Halacha 23
There are other prohibitions involving foods applicable to consecrated entities. They are all of Scriptural origin, e.g., there are prohibitions against partaking ofterumot, the first fruits, challah, and the second tithe. And there are prohibitions involving sacrifices consecrated [to be offered] on the altar, e.g.,piggul, sacrificial meat that remains past its time, and sacrifices that have become impure.69 All of these [prohibitions] will be explained in the appropriate place.
Halacha 24
The measure for which one is liable - whether for lashes or for kerait is an olive-sized portion. We have already explained the prohibition against [partaking of] leaven on Pesach and the [relevant] laws in Hilchot Chametz UMatzah. The prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur is a different type of prohibition.70 The prohibition against all products of the vine that applies to a Nazirite does not apply equally to all. Therefore, all of these prohibitions, the measure for which one is liable, and the [relevant] laws are explained in the appropriate place.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Rambam proceeds to define each of these terms in the subsequent halachot. The prohibitions the Rambam mentions in this chapter apply universally. There are other prohibitions involving the consumption of agricultural products that apply with regard to non-priests, e.g., terumah, as explained inSefer Zeraim and others involving the sacrifices as explained in Sefer HaAvodah(Radbaz).
2.
The term chadash literally means "new." It refers to new grain, i.e., grain that is harvested before the sixteenth of Nisan, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.
3.
These five species are commonly identified as wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt. As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Berachot3:1, there is some discussion whether these are in fact the species of which the Talmud and the Rambam speak.
4.
I.e., other species commonly identified as grain, e.g., corn, rice, and millet, are not included in this ban.
5.
A measure of barley that is offered on the sixteenth of Nisan, as explained in Leviticus 23:9-15; Hilchot Temidim UMusafim, ch. 7.
6.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 189-191) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 303-305) include these prohibitions among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Radbaz states that the Rambam mentions chadashbefore the other prohibitions, because it occurs most frequently, recurring every year.
7.
In the Diaspora, where crops of grain are sometimes planted after Pesach, this prohibition could present a problem. For all grain planted after Pesach, will not be permitted until the following year. In resolution, the Rama writes that unless we know otherwise, all grain is permitted after Pesach, based on the concept of sefek-sefekah - multiple doubt. It is possible it is from the previous year's crop. Even if it is from this year's crop, perhaps it took root before Pesach and is thus permitted.
The Bayit Chadash in his gloss to the Tur(Yoreh De'ah 293) elaborates on the concept that the prohibition against chadashapplies only to grain belonging to a Jew. Grain belonging to a non-Jew is not bound by this prohibition. The Turei Zahav 293:2 differs and maintains that it applies also to grain grown by a gentile. Most of the authorities respect the Bayit Chadash for his attempt to absolve most of the Jewish people from the prohibition (since by and large, the grain available in the Diaspora is grown by non-Jews) but accept the logic of the Turei Zahav. In practice, however, it is customary to rely on the leniency of the Rama.
8.
I.e., the prohibition is not dependent on the offering of the omer, but instead applies even when no sacrifices are offered.
9.
I.e., places that will not be able to hear a report when the omer was actually offered before noon because they are far removed from Jerusalem.
11.
See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, ch. 5, which explains that in places where messengers from Jerusalem would not inform the Jewish community when the new month had been sanctified, the festivals are observed for two days, for perhaps the day considered as the fifteenth of Nisan was really the fourteenth.
12.
Since the observance of the second day was instituted because there was a doubt concerning the day on which the festival should be observed, our Sages ordained that the prohibition concerning chadashshould be observed by Rabbinical decree until the conclusion of the seventeenth so as not to minimize the importance of the festival. Even though there is no longer any doubt concerning the day on which the festival should be observed, we heed this prohibition to maintain our Sages' original decree (Radbaz).
14.
All three are mentioned in one verse. Thus one might think that we are speaking of a prohibition of a general nature and we follow the principle (see Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3) that lashes are not given for a prohibition of a general nature. Nevertheless, Keritot 5a explains why this instance is an exception.
21.
The Rambam's statements have attracted the attention of the commentaries, for they represent a contradiction to his statements in Hilchot Kelayim 8:1: "One is not liable for sowing kilai hakerem unless he sows wheat, barley, and grape seeds together." The Radbaz explains that the laws governing sowing mixed species are different than those regarding partaking of them.
23.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 193) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 549) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
24.
The Torah does not specifically mention that it is forbidden to partake of the mixed species. Nevertheless, it states that it is forbidden to derive benefit from them. There is no great derivation of benefit than eating (Radbaz). From the Rambam's wording, one would surmise that one is not liable for lashes from merely benefiting from kilai hakerem.
25.
I.e., when one eats some of the grapes and some of the vegetables, if the combined volume is the size of an olive, he is liable.
27.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah3:10), the Rambam writes that this concept is derived from Deuteronomy 22:9: "Do not sow kilayom in your vineyard." For the only vineyard that can truly be considered as "yours," i.e., belonging to a Jew, is one inEretz Yisrael.
The Mishneh LiMelech writes that in the present era, when the observance of the agricultural laws in Eretz Yisrael is only a matter of Rabbinic Law (see Hilchot Terumah 1:26), the prohibition against kilai hakerem is also of Rabbinic origin.
29.
The term literally means "covered." Thus the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aserot 4:4) speaks of "something which covers (oral) its fruit." For that reason, a foreskin is described as an orlah, because it covers the male organ. Here also this fruit is "covered" by a forbidden quality.
30.
I.e., replants an existing seedling or plants a seed and grows the tree from the outset (Radbaz).
31.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 192) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 246) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
34.
I.e., which type of planting or replanting incurs the prohibition against orlah and which does not.
35.
A Scriptural prohibition is involved. Hence we follow the principle: Whenever a Scriptural prohibition is involved, we rule stringently.
36.
As explained in Hilchot Terumah 1:3, King David conquered parts of Syria before he completed the conquest of Eretz Yisrael. Hence, these lands were not considered as part of Eretz Yisrael proper. Nevertheless, certain laws concerning the produce ofEretz Yisrael were applied there by Rabbinic decree.
38.
I.e., permission is granted even in an instance were it is highly likely that the produce is prohibited.
39.
I.e., one may purchase the produce even if one is certain it comes from the vineyard in question. Indeed, one may even pick the produce from that vineyard by oneself (Radbaz; Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 10:11).
40.
This represents the Rambam's interpretation of Bava Batra 24a. Others interpret that passage as stating that we are even permitted to partake of the wine. This is the view quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:11).
Tosafot questions: Why isn't the wine forbidden as yayin nesech, wine touched by a gentile? They reply that we assume that the thieves were Jewish. Thus if there is reason to think that the thieves are gentile, the wine is forbidden (Siftei Cohen 294:22).
41.
I.e., the gentile takes care of the orchard in the orlah years, and the Jew in the subsequent years. He is not considered as benefiting from the produce that is orlah, because it never belonged to him.
42.
For the crops that are orlah are considered to have become the Jew's property and he is bartering them. Rashi and Rabbenu Asher (Avodah Zarah 22a) differ and permit such an arrangement to be made. They explain that although if such an arrangement is not made at the outset, it is forbidden to make it with regard to the Sabbath, different rules apply here. On the Sabbath, it is forbidden for the gentile to perform work on behalf of the Jew. In this instance, no such prohibition exists (Siftei Cohen 294:28). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:13) follows the Rambam's approach, while the Rama follows that of Rabbenu Asher.
43.
Here also, the authorities who rule leniently as mentioned in the previous note would rule leniently (Siftei Cohen 294:29).
44.
This term refers to the produce of the fourth year of a tree's growth. This produce must be taken to Jerusalem and eaten in a state of ritual purity or redeemed and the money taken to Jerusalem to be used for food to be eaten there.
48.
The Rambam's wording is somewhat misleading. The laws of neta reva'i are not dependent on the existence of the Temple. Even if the Temple is not standing, this mitzvah applies. Nevertheless, according to Scriptural Law, they apply only when the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael is intact. And according to Scriptural Law, that sanctity was nullified after the conquest of the land by the Assyrians and Babylonians. According to Rabbinic Law, however, these laws do apply in Eretz Yisrael in the present age.
50.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:7) quotes opinions that state that the laws applying to neta reva'i also apply in the Diaspora, as well as the Rambam's view that they do not apply. The Tur and the Rama quote the opinion of the Geonim who maintain that these laws apply with regard to a vineyard, but not with regard to any other types of produce.
51.
The Radbaz emphasizes that even if the fourth year passes, fruit which grew during that year is forbidden in the fifth year until it is redeemed. This is also included as one of the 613 mitzvot. The Rambam, however, lists that mitzvah in Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni.
53.
In Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, the Rambam explains that in the era of the Temple, the produce would be taken to be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity (or redeemed for its value and that money taken to Jerusalem to be used to purchase food to be eaten there in a state of ritual purity). Since that is not possible in the present era, different laws apply.
54.
A copper coin of minimal value. In the era of the Temple, it was necessary to redeem the produce for its value and add a fifth (Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 4:1,9). In the present era, since there is no opportunity to use the money as required, a p'rutah is sufficient for one's entire harvest (Arachin 29a).
55.
I.e., a place where no one will benefit from it. In Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 2:2, the Rambam states that the p'rutah should be cast into the Mediterranean Sea. At times, the termYam HaMelech which is commonly translated as the Dead Sea is used to refer to the Mediterranean. The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 294:6) mentions the Mediterranean. It also states that one may grind the coin into dust.
56.
Seemingly, the wording of the blessing should also be altered as indicated byHilchot Ma'aser Sheni 4:3.
57.
This is also a leniency granted in the present age. In the era of the Temple, at the outset, one should not transfer the holiness from one species of produce to another (Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 4:2).
58.
These kernels of grain must also be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity. Since this is impossible, they should be destroyed, lest another person transgress by eating them elsewhere.
59.
Before produce may be eaten, a person must separate bikkurim (the first fruits),terumah gedolah (a small portion - 1/40 to 1/60 of the produce) which is given to the priests, ma'aser (tithes, which is given to the Levites), and ma'aser sheni (the second tithe, which is eaten in a state of purity in Jerusalem) or ma'aser oni (the tithe given to the poor). From the tithe which the Levites receive, they must give a tithe to the priests as terumat ma'aser.
60.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 153) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 284) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
61.
There is a question if this prohibition applies even to a priest who would later be permitted to partake of terumah. To explain: There is a discussion among the Achronim if tevel is considered as an independent prohibition or if it is forbidden because of terumah that has not been separated (see Tzaphnat Paneach; Atvan D'Oraita). According to the former view, even a priest is liable, while according to the second view, there is room for leniency.
63.
Terumat Ma'aser should be separated after the tithes are separated. Nevertheless, after the fact, if one separated it beforehand, the separation is valid.
64.
The Ra'avad explains the Rambam's ruling on the basis of the prooftext cited in the previous halachah which puts an emphasis on "the sacraments of the children of Israel." That term refers to terumah. The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the second tithe is also referred to as "a sacrament." The Lechem Mishneh, however, offers a resolution.
65.
Although that prohibition forbids eating the second tithe outside of Jerusalem, it also has this intent.
68.
The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to Chapter 8, Halachah 16) states that this is not the ordinary way which one benefits from such produce. The Lechem Mishneh explains that other juices, in contrast to wine and oil, are not considered to have the substance of the fruit.
70.
In all other instances, it is the substance (cheftzah) that is forbidden. On Yom Kippur, the prohibition does not apply to the substance, but to the person (the gavra). He is forbidden to partake of all foods.
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• "Today's Day"
Tuesday, Adar I 14, 5776 · 23 February 2016
Friday 14 Adar I, Purim Katan 5703
Tachanun is not said.
Torah lessons: Chumash: Tetzaveh, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 72-76.
Tanya: And even he (p. 127)...speech and action. (p. 129).
My grandfather told my father: "My father (the Tzemach Tzedek) selected the maamarim printed in Likutei Torah from among 2,000 maamarim.
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Daily Thought:
The Highest High
There's no greater high than finding truth on your own.
All worlds were made, all barriers put in place, every veil over truth was hung, and the soul plummeted from its pristine height into the confusion of this harsh world—
—all for this one thing alone: That you should uncover truth on your own.
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