TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• ISRAEL SECURES EIN GEDI (1949)
Following the War of Independance, Israel needed to secure its borders against the hostile Arab nations which surrounded it. Ein Gedi, on the western shore of the Dead Sea, was secured on Sunday, March 20, 1949.
Link:
War of Independence
DAILY QUOTE
A person's emissary is as the person himself--Talmud, Berachot 34b
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Shemini, 6th Portion Leviticus 11:1-11:32 with Rashi
• Chapter 11
1. And the Lord spoke to Moses and to Aaron, to say to them: א. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם:
[And the Lord spoke] to Moses and to Aaron: He told Moses that he should [in turn] tell Aaron. — [Torath Kohanim 1:4]
אל משה ואל אהרן: למשה אמר שיאמר לאהרן:
to say to them: [Whom does “to them” refer to?] The Lord said that [Aaron] should tell Eleazar and Ithamar. Or perhaps it means only to tell the Israelites? However, when [Scripture] says (verse 2),“Speak to the children of Israel,” speaking to Israel is already mentioned. So how do I understand “to say to them”? [That Aaron was to say] to his sons, to Eleazar and to Ithamar [who, in turn, were to tell the children of Israel the laws that follow]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:61]
לאמר אליהם: אמר שיאמר לאלעזר ולאיתמר, או אינו אלא לאמר לישראל, כשהוא אומר דברו אל בני ישראל, הרי דבור אמור לישראל, הא מה אני מקיים לאמר אליהם, לבניו לאלעזר ולאיתמר:
2. Speak to the children of Israel, saying: These are the creatures that you may eat among all the animals on earth: ב. דַּבְּרוּ אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכָּל הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל הָאָרֶץ:
Speak to the children of Israel: God made them all [namely Moses, Aaron, Eleazar, and Ithamar] equal messengers for [relaying] the following speech. [And why did Aaron and his sons deserve this special honor?] Because they all equally remained silent, accepting the Omnipresent’s decree [to put Nadab and Abihu to death] with love.
דברו אל בני ישראל: את כולם השוה להיות שלוחים בדבור זה, לפי שהושוו בדמימה וקבלו עליהם גזירת המקום באהבה:
These are the creatures: [The word חַיָּה, “living creature”] denotes חַיִּים, “life.” [In the context of this passage, which sets out the clean and unclean creatures, the meaning is expounded as follows:] Since the Israelites cleave to the Omnipresent and are therefore worthy of being alive, accordingly, God separated them from uncleanness and decreed commandments upon them [so that through these commandments Israel would live]. For the other nations, however, He prohibited nothing. This is comparable to a physician who went to visit a patient [who was incurable, and allowed him to eat anything he wished, whereas when he went to his patient who was to recover, the physician imposed restrictions on his diet that would ensure that the recoverable patient would live. So too, the nations and Israel…], etc. as is found in the Midrash of Rabbi Tanchuma (6).
זאת החיה: לשון חיים, לפי שישראל דבוקים במקום וראויין להיות חיים, לפיכך הבדילם מן הטומאה וגזר עליהם מצות, ולאומות העולם לא אסר כלום. משל לרופא שנכנס לבקר את החולה וכו', כדאיתא במדרש רבי תנחומא:
These are the creatures: [When the verse says “These are…,” the word זֹאת] teaches us that Moses would hold up an animal and show it to the Israelites, saying, “This one you may eat,” and “This one you may not eat.” “You may eat the following!” (verse 9) even with the creatures of the water-he held up [one] of every species and showed it to them. And likewise with birds [as stated in verse 13], “you shall hold these in abomination….” Similarly with creeping creatures, (שְׁרָצִים) [as stated in verse 29], “these are unclean….” - [Torath Kohanim 11:62]
זאת החיה: מלמד שהיה משה אוחז בחיה ומראה אותה לישראל, זאת תאכלו וזאת לא תאכלו:
These are the creatures…among all the animals: [The word חַיָּה, although usually denoting an undomesticated animal, such as a deer, also has the meaning of “living (חַי) creatures” in general; the word בְּהֵמָה, usually denoting domesticated animals like cattle, also has the meaning of large land animals, or mammals. We see this in our verse, for it says here, "These are the creatures (חַיָּה) that you may eat among all the animals (בְּהֵמָה) on earth, thus,] teaching that [the term] בְּהֵמָה is included in [the more general term] חַיָּה. - [Torath Kohanim 11:66; and see Rashi Chul. 70b]
את זה תאכלו וגו': אף בשרצי המים אחז מכל מין ומין והראה להם. וכן בעוף ואת אלה תשקצו מן העוף. וכן בשרצים וזה לכם הטמא:
3. Any animal that has a cloven hoof that is completely split into double hooves, and which brings up its cud that one you may eat. ג. כֹּל | מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְשֹׁסַעַת שֶׁסַע פְּרָסֹת מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה בַּבְּהֵמָה אֹתָהּ תֹּאכֵלוּ:
which has a cloven: Heb. מַפְרֶסֶת. [Although resembling the following word, פַּרְסָה, the word, מַפְרֶסֶת, is to be understood] as the Targum [Onkelos] renders it: סְדִיקָא, “split.”
מפרסת: כתרגומו סדיקא:
hoof: Heb. פַּרְסָה, plante in French [meaning “ sole” or “hoof.” Thus, מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה means: “split or cloven hoof”].
פרסה: פלאנט"ה בלע"ז [כף רגל]:
that is completely separated into double hooves: Heb. וְשֹׁסַעַת שֶׁסַע [meaning that the hoof] is completely separated [i.e., split] from top to bottom, into two nails, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders it: וּמְטַלְפָא טִילְפִין, meaning “split into hooves” [i.e., split into two hoof sections,] because there are animals whose hooves are split at the top, but are not completely split and separated [into two hoof sections], since the bottom [sections of the hoof] are connected.
ושסעת שסע: שמובדלת מלמעלה ומלמטה בשתי צפרנין, כתרגומו ומטלפא טלפין, שיש שפרסותיו סדוקות מלמעלה ואינן שסועות ומובדלות לגמרי, שמלמטה מחוברות:
which brings up its cud: It brings up and regurgitates the [ingested] food from its stomach, returning the food to its mouth, in order to thoroughly crush it and grind it thoroughly.
מעלת גרה: מעלה ומקיאה האוכל ממעיה ומחזרת אותו לתוך פיה לכתשו ולטחנו הדק:
cud: Heb. גֵּרָה. This is its name. [I.e., the name of the food that an animal regurgitates.] It possibly stems from the root [נגר, “to drag” or “flow,” as in the verse] “and as water which has flowed (הַנִּגָּרִים) ” (II Sam. 14:14), for the regurgitated food “flows back” to the mouth. Targum [Onkelos] renders the word גֵּרָה as פִּישְׁרָא, dissolved, since, through its being regurgitated, the food is dissolved and melted.
גרה: כך שמו. ויתכן להיות מגזרת מים הנגרים (ש"ב יד יד), שהוא נגרר אחר הפה. ותרגומו פשרא שעל ידי הגרה האוכל נפשר ונמוח:
among the animals: Heb. בַּבְּהֵמָה, lit. in the animal. This is an extra word from which to derive that [if a pregnant animal is slaughtered properly,] the fetus inside its mother’s innards is permitted [to be eaten]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:67]
בבהמה: תיבה זו יתירה היא לדרשה, להתיר את השליל הנמצא במעי אמו:
that one you may eat: but not an unclean animal. However, is this [negative inference] not already included in the [explicit] prohibition [stated in verse 4, “…you must not eat…”]? Notwithstanding, [this positive statement is included here] so that [one who eats an unclean animal] transgresses a positive and a negative commandment [i.e., a negative inference of a positive commandment]. — [Torath Kohanim 11:69]
אתה תאכלו: ולא בהמה טמאה. והלא באזהרה היא, אלא לעבור עליה בעשה ולא תעשה:
4. But these you shall not eat among those that bring up the cud and those that have a cloven hoof: the camel, because it brings up its cud, but does not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you. ד. אַךְ אֶת זֶה לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִמַּעֲלֵי הַגֵּרָה וּמִמַּפְרִסֵי הַפַּרְסָה אֶת הַגָּמָל כִּי מַעֲלֵה גֵרָה הוּא וּפַרְסָה אֵינֶנּוּ מַפְרִיס טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם:
5. And the hyrax, because it brings up its cud, but will not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you; ה. וְאֶת הַשָּׁפָן כִּי מַעֲלֵה גֵרָה הוּא וּפַרְסָה לֹא יַפְרִיס טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם:
6. And the hare, because it brings up its cud, but does not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you; ו. וְאֶת הָאַרְנֶבֶת כִּי מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה הִוא וּפַרְסָה לֹא הִפְרִיסָה טְמֵאָה הִוא לָכֶם:
7. And the pig, because it has a cloven hoof that is completely split, but will not regurgitate its cud; it is unclean for you. ז. וְאֶת הַחֲזִיר כִּי מַפְרִיס פַּרְסָה הוּא וְשֹׁסַע שֶׁסַע פַּרְסָה וְהוּא גֵּרָה לֹא יִגָּר טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם:
8. You shall not eat of their flesh, and you shall not touch their carcasses; they are unclean for you. ח. מִבְּשָׂרָם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ וּבְנִבְלָתָם לֹא תִגָּעוּ טְמֵאִים הֵם לָכֶם:
You shall not eat of their flesh: I know only [that] these [animals possessing one sign of cleanness are prohibited to be eaten]. How do we know that any other unclean animal, which has no sign of cleanness altogether [may also not be eaten]? Here, we can infer from a kal vachomer [i.e., an inference from minor to major]: If those animals that have part of the signs of cleanness are prohibited, [how much more so are those animals that lack both signs of cleanness!]- [Torath Kohanim 11:69]
מבשרם לא תאכלו: אין לי אלא אלו, שאר בהמה טמאה שאין לה שום סימן טהרה מנין, אמרת קל וחומר ומה אלו שיש בהן קצת סימני טהרה אסורות וכו':
of their flesh: The [Scriptural] prohibition applies [only] to the “flesh” [of an unclean animal], but not its bones, sinews, horns, or hooves. — [Torath Kohanim 11:74]
מבשרם: על בשרם באזהרה, ולא על עצמות וגידין וקרנים וטלפים:
and you shall not touch their carcasses: One might think that Israelites are prohibited to touch a carcass. Scripture, however, says, “Say to the kohanim …[(a kohen) shall not defile himself for a (dead) person among his people]” (Lev. 21:1); thus, kohanim are prohibited [from defiling themselves by human corpses], but ordinary Israelites are not prohibited. Now a kal vachomer can be made: Since in the more stringent case of defilement by a human corpse, only kohanim are prohibited, then in the more lenient case of defilement by animal carcasses, how much more so [should only kohanim be prohibited! If so,] what does Scripture mean by, “you shall not touch their carcasses”? [It means that Israelites may not touch animal carcasses] on the Festivals [since at those times they deal with holy sacrifices and enter the Temple]. This is what [the Sages] said: A person is obligated to cleanse himself on Festivals. - [R.H. 16b, Torath Kohanim 11:74]
ובנבלתם לא תגעו: יכול יהו ישראל מוזהרים על מגע נבלה, תלמוד לומר אמור אל הכהנים וגו' (ויקרא כא א), כהנים מוזהרין ואין ישראל מוזהרין. קל וחומר מעתה ומה טומאת מת חמורה, לא הזהיר בה אלא כהנים, טומאת נבלה קלה לא כל שכן. ומה תלמוד לומר לא תגעו, ברגל. זהו שאמרו חייב אדם לטהר עצמו ברגל:
9. Among all [creatures] that are in the water, you may eat these: Any [of the creatures] in the water that has fins and scales, those you may eat, whether [it lives] in the waters, in the seas or in the rivers. ט. אֶת זֶה תֹּאכְלוּ מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר בַּמָּיִם כֹּל אֲשֶׁר לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת בַּמַּיִם בַּיַּמִּים וּבַנְּחָלִים אֹתָם תֹּאכֵלוּ:
fins: Heb. סְנַפִּיר. These are [the wing-like appendages] with which it swims [namely, fins].
סנפיר: אלו ששט בהם:
scales: Heb. קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת. These are the scales that are affixed to it, as it is said: “And he was wearing a coat of mail (קַשְׂקַשִּׂים) ” (I Sam. 17:5), [lit. armor of scales]. — [Chul. 66b]
קשקשת: אלו קליפים הקבועים בו, כמו שנאמר (ש"א יז ה) ושריון קשקשים הוא לבוש:
10. But any [creatures]that do not have fins and scales, whether in the seas or in the rivers, among all the creeping creatures in the water and among all living creatures that [live] in the water, are an abomination for you. י. וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֵין לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת בַּיַּמִּים וּבַנְּחָלִים מִכֹּל שֶׁרֶץ הַמַּיִם וּמִכֹּל נֶפֶשׁ הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר בַּמָּיִם שֶׁקֶץ הֵם לָכֶם:
creeping creatures: שֶׁרֶץ. Anywhere this [term] appears [in Scripture], it denotes a low creature that slithers and moves on the ground.
שרץ: בכל מקום משמעו דבר נמוך שרוחש ונע ונד על הארץ:
11. And they shall be an abomination for you. You shall not eat of their flesh, and their dead bodies you shall hold in abomination. יא. וְשֶׁקֶץ יִהְיוּ לָכֶם מִבְּשָׂרָם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ וְאֶת נִבְלָתָם תְּשַׁקֵּצוּ:
And they shall be an abomination: [The statement is repeated] to prohibit their mixtures [i.e., if the flesh of an unclean water creature was mixed with food of another type,] if there is enough [unclean flesh] to impart its taste [to the mixture]. — [See Torath Kohanim 11:82]
ושקץ יהיו: לאסור את עירוביהן, אם יש בו בנותן טעם:
[You shall not eat] of their flesh: [Only their flesh is prohibited,] but one is not prohibited [to eat] the fins or the bones. — [Torath Kohanim 11:82]
מבשרם: אינו מוזהר על הסנפירים ועל העצמות:
and their dead bodies you shall hold in abomination: [This clause comes] to include midges (יַבְחוּשִׁין) that he has filtered out [of water or other liquids. One may ingest these creatures together with water, but once they have been separated from their original source, they are prohibited]. יַבְחוּשִׁין are moucherons in French, midges. — [Torath Kohanim 11:83]
את נבלתם תשקצו: לרבות יבחושין שסיננן. יבחושין מושקירונ"ש בלע"ז [יבחושין]:
12. Any [creature] that does not have fins and scales in the water is an abomination for you. יב. כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אֵין לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת בַּמָּיִם שֶׁקֶץ הוּא לָכֶם:
Any [(creature)] that does not have [fins and scales in the water is an abomination for you]: What does Scripture come to teach us here? [In verse 10, Scripture has already stated, “any (creatures) that do not have fins and scales…are an abomination for you.” However, without this verse] I might think that [a water creature] is permitted only if it brings up its signs [of cleanness, namely fins and scales,] onto dry land; but if [it sheds them in the water, how do we know [that the creature is still permitted]? Scripture therefore, says here, “Any [creature] that does not have fins and scales in the water….,” but if it had them while in the water, even if it shed them in its emergence [onto dry land], it is permitted. — [Torath Kohanim 11:84]
כל אשר אין לו וגו': מה תלמוד לומר, שיכול אין לי שיהא מותר אלא המעלה סימנין שלו ליבשה, השירן במים מנין, תלמוד לומר כל אשר אין לו סנפיר וקשקשת במים, הא אם היו לו במים אף על פי שהשירן בעלייתו מותר:
13. And among birds, you shall hold these in abomination; they shall not be eaten; they are an abomination: The eagle [or the griffin vulture], the kite, the osprey, יג. וְאֶת אֵלֶּה תְּשַׁקְּצוּ מִן הָעוֹף לֹא יֵאָכְלוּ שֶׁקֶץ הֵם אֶת הַנֶּשֶׁר וְאֶת הַפֶּרֶס וְאֵת הָעָזְנִיָּה:
They shall not be eaten: Heb. לֹא יֵאָכְלוּ. [Scripture is telling us that] one may not feed them to minors. [We derive this from the passive voice, “be eaten,”] meaning that these birds may not “be eaten” through you. Or perhaps it is not so, but [it is telling us that in addition to not eating them,] one may not derive any benefit from them? Scripture, therefore, states: “you shall not eat (לֹא תֹּאכְלוּ),” (Deut. 14:12) [in the active voice to teach us that] one is prohibited to eat them but permitted to derive benefit from them. Now, in every [mention of] birds where Scripture says לְמִינָהּ, לְמִינוֹ, לְמִינֵהוּ [“ to its…species,” it does so because] within that species, there are some that resemble each other neither in appearance nor in name, but they are [nevertheless] all one species.
לא יאכלו: לחייב את המאכילן לקטנים. שכך משמעו לא יהיו נאכלים על ידך. או אינו אלא לאסרן בהנאה, תלמוד לומר (דברים יד יב) לא תאכלו, באכילה אסורין בהנאה מותרין. כל עוף שנאמר בו למינה, למינו, למינהו, יש באותו המין שאין דומין זה לזה, לא במראיהם ולא בשמותם, וכולן מין אחד:
14. the kestrel, and the vulture after its species, יד. וְאֶת הַדָּאָה וְאֶת הָאַיָּה לְמִינָהּ:
15. and the raven after its species, טו. אֵת כָּל עֹרֵב לְמִינוֹ:
16. the ostrich, the jay, and the sparrow hawk, and the goshawk after its species; טז. וְאֵת בַּת הַיַּעֲנָה וְאֶת הַתַּחְמָס וְאֶת הַשָּׁחַף וְאֶת הַנֵּץ לְמִינֵהוּ:
the sparrow hawk: הַנֵּץ, esprevier in Old French, [epervier in modern French]. [Note that, according to some editions of Rashi , the reading is ostor, which is translated by Greenberg as goshawk, autour in modern French. This is corroborated by other editions that render הַשָּׁחַף in verse 16 as esprevier..]
הנץ: אישפרויי"ר [נץ]:
17. The owl, the gull, the little owl; יז. וְאֶת הַכּוֹס וְאֶת הַשָּׁלָךְ וְאֶת הַיַּנְשׁוּף:
the gull: Heb. הַשָּׁלָ Our Rabbis explained: “The שָׁלָ is a bird that draws up (שׁוֹלָה) fish out of the sea” (Chul. 63a). And this is the meaning of Onkelos’ translation [of שָׁלָ]: וְשַׁלֵינוּנָא, “fish catcher.”
השלך: פירשו רבותינו זה השולה דגים מן הים. וזהו שתרגם אונקלוס ושלינונא:
The owl… and the little owl: Heb. כּוֹס וְיַנְשׁוּף. These are chouettes [in French, i.e., “birds”] that shriek at night, which have cheeks like those of a human. There is another [bird] similar to it called hibou [in French].
כוס וינשוף: הם צואיטי"ש [כוס] הצועקים בלילה ויש להם לסתות כאדם. ועוד אחר דומה לו שקורין יב"ן [לילית]:
18. The bat, the starling, the magpie; יח. וְאֶת הַתִּנְשֶׁמֶת וְאֶת הַקָּאָת וְאֶת הָרָחָם:
The bat: Heb. הַתִּנְשֶׁמֶת. That is calve soriz [in Old French, chauve-souris in modern French]. It resembles a mouse and flies about at night. The תִּנְשֶׁמֶת mentioned among the creeping animals (verse 30), resembles this one, insofar as it has no eyes. That [one] is called talpe [in Old French, taupe in modern French, mole in English].
התנשמת: היא קלב"א שורי"ץ [עטלף] ודומה לעכבר ופורחת בלילה. ותנשמת האמורה בשרצים היא דומה לה, ואין לה עינים וקורין לה טלפ"א [חפרפרת]:
19. the stork, the heron after its species; the hoopoe and the atalef [bat?]; יט. וְאֵת הַחֲסִידָה הָאֲנָפָה לְמִינָהּ וְאֶת הַדּוּכִיפַת וְאֶת הָעֲטַלֵּף:
The stork: Heb. הַחֲסִידָה. This is a white dayah, [called] zigoyne [in Old French, cigogne in modern French]. And why is it called חֲסִידָה ? Because it does kindness (חִסִידוּת) with its fellow birds [by sharing] its food (Chul. 63a).
החסידה: זו דיה לבנה ציגוני"ה [חסידה]. ולמה נקרא שמה חסידה, שעושה חסידות עם חברותיה במזונות:
the heron: Heb. הָאֲנָפָה. This is the hot-tempered dayah (Chul.. 63a), and it appears to me that this is the bird called h\'e0yron [in Old French, heron in modern French, heron in English].
האנפה: היא דיה רגזנית. ונראה לי שזו היא שקורין לה היירו"ן [אנפה]:
the hoopoe: Heb. הַדּוּכִיפַת, the wild-rooster, which has a doubled crest. [It is called] herupe [in Old French]. And why is it called דּוּכִיפַת ? Because its glory (הוֹדוֹ), namely its crest, is bound up (כָּפוּת). [I.e., its comb is double and appears to be folded into the head and bound up there (Rashi, Chul. 63a) [Onkelos renders it:] נַגַּר טוּרָא, “mountain carpenter,” named so for what it does, as explained by our rabbis in Tractate Gittin, chapter 7, entitled מִי שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ (68b).
הדוכיפת: תרנגול הבר וכרבלתו כפולה ובלע"ז הירופ"א [דוכיפת], ולמה נקרא שמו דוכיפת, שהודו כפות, וזו היא כרבלתו. ונגר טורא נקרא על שם מעשיו, כמו שפירשו רבותינו במסכת גיטין בפרק מי שאחזו (דף סח ב):
20. Any flying insect that walks on four, is an abomination for you. כ. כֹּל שֶׁרֶץ הָעוֹף הַהֹלֵךְ עַל אַרְבַּע שֶׁקֶץ הוּא לָכֶם:
among all the flying insects: These are the delicate and small creatures that crawl on the ground, like flies, hornets, mosquitoes, and locusts.
שרץ העוף: הם הדקים הנמוכים הרוחשין על הארץ, כגון זבובים וצרעין ויתושין וחגבים:
21. However, among all the flying insects that walk on four [legs], you may eat [from] those that have jointed [leg like] extensions above its [regular] legs, with which they hop on the ground. כא. אַךְ אֶת זֶה תֹּאכְלוּ מִכֹּל שֶׁרֶץ הָעוֹף הַהֹלֵךְ עַל אַרְבַּע אֲשֶׁר לוֹ כְרָעַיִם מִמַּעַל לְרַגְלָיו לְנַתֵּר בָּהֵן עַל הָאָרֶץ:
on four: on four legs.
על ארבע: על ארבע רגלים:
above its [regular] legs: [“Above,” meaning high up on the creature’s body, namely] near its neck, it has two leg-like extensions besides its [regular] four legs. When it wishes to fly or hop from the ground, it bolsters itself firmly with these appendages and flies. [In our regions,] we have many of this sort [of flying creature] called langouste [in Old French] (sea-locusts), but we are no [longer] proficient [in identifying] which ones [are clean and which are unclean. And what is the specific problem we have with this identification?] There are four signs of cleanness enumerated regarding these creatures: a) four legs, b) four wings, c) קַרְסוּלִים, which are the jointed leg-like extensions described above, and d) wings that cover the majority of its body (Chul. 59a; Torath Kohanim 11:91). All of these signs are indeed found in the creatures among us today, but some [creatures] have long heads and some do not have tails, [according to Maharsha (Chul. 66a), the reading is, “and some have tails”] and they must bear the name חָגָב (Chul. 65b). Concerning this [requirement namely, which type is officially called חָגָב and which is not], we no longer know how to distinguish between them.
ממעל לרגליו: סמוך לצוארו יש לו כמין שתי רגלים לבד ארבע רגליו, וכשרוצה לעוף ולקפוץ מן הארץ מתחזק באותן שתי כרעים ופורח, ויש הרבה מהם במקומינו בינותינו, כאותן שקורין לנגושט"א [ארבה], אבל אין אנו בקיאין בהן, שארבעה סימני טהרה נאמרו בהם ארבע רגלים, וארבע כנפים, וקרסולין אלו כרעים הכתובים כאן, וכנפיו חופין את רובו. וכל סימנים הללו מצויין באותן שבינותינו, אבל יש שראשן ארוך ויש שאין להם זנב וצריך שיהא שמו חגב, ובזה אין אנו יודעים להבדיל ביניהם:
22. From this [locust] category, you may eat the following: The red locust after its species, the yellow locust after its species, the spotted gray locust after its species and the white locust after its species. כב. אֶת אֵלֶּה מֵהֶם תֹּאכֵלוּ אֶת הָאַרְבֶּה לְמִינוֹ וְאֶת הַסָּלְעָם לְמִינֵהוּ וְאֶת הַחַרְגֹּל לְמִינֵהוּ וְאֶת הֶחָגָב לְמִינֵהוּ:
23. But any [other] flying insect that has four legs, is an abomination for you. כג. וְכֹל שֶׁרֶץ הָעוֹף אֲשֶׁר לוֹ אַרְבַּע רַגְלָיִם שֶׁקֶץ הוּא לָכֶם:
But any [other] flying insect [that has four legs is an abomination for you]: [In verse 20, it already says, “Any flying insect that walks on four is an abomination for you.” Why is this repeated here?] It comes to teach us that if it has five [legs], it is clean.
וכל שרץ העוף וגו': בא ללמד שאם יש לו חמש טהור:
24. And through these you will become unclean; anyone who touches their dead bodies will be unclean until evening; כד. וּלְאֵלֶּה תִּטַּמָּאוּ כָּל הַנֹּגֵעַ בְּנִבְלָתָם יִטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב:
through these: [I.e., you will become unclean] through those animals that are to be enumerated below. — [Torath Kohanim 11:95]
ולאלה: העתידין להאמר למטה בענין:
you will become unclean: I.e., in touching them, there is uncleanness [not that you are commanded to become unclean].
תטמאו: כלומר בנגיעתם יש טומאה:
25. And anyone who carries their carcass shall immerse his garments, and he shall be unclean until evening: כה. וְכָל הַנֹּשֵׂא מִנִּבְלָתָם יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב:
And anyone who carries their carcass: Any place in Scripture that mentions טֻמְאַת מַשָּׂא [uncleanness acquired by carrying (נוֹשֵׂא) an unclean item], it is more stringent than טֻמְאַת מַגָּע [uncleanness acquired by touching (נֹגֵע) an unclean item], insofar as it requires immersion of the garments [in a mikvah, in addition to the immersion of the person].
וכל הנשא מנבלתם: כל מקום שנאמרה טומאת משא, חמורה מטומאת מגע, שהיא טעונה כבוס בגדים:
26. Any animal that has a cloven hoof that is not completely split, and which does not bring up its cud, is unclean for you. Anyone who touches them shall become unclean. כו. לְכָל הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר הִוא מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְשֶׁסַע | אֵינֶנָּה שֹׁסַעַת וְגֵרָה אֵינֶנָּה מַעֲלָה טְמֵאִים הֵם לָכֶם כָּל הַנֹּגֵעַ בָּהֶם יִטְמָא:
[Any animal that has] a cloven hoof that is not completely split: for instance, a camel, whose hoof is split on the top, but on the bottom it is connected. Here [Scripture] teaches you that the carcass of an unclean animal defiles, while in the section at the end of this parashah (verse 39), [Scripture] explains [that a carcass of] a clean animal [defiles as well. However, Scripture deals with these separately since there is a difference between the two: in the case of a clean animal, its carcass defiles only if it dies, but if it was slaughtered properly, even if it was a טְרֵפָה, i.e., it had a fatal disease or injury, its carcass does not defile. This is derived from verse 39, which reads, “If an animal that you (normally) eat dies…” i.e., only when it dies, its carcass defiles].
מפרסת פרסה ושסע איננה שוסעת: כגון גמל שפרסתו סדוקה למעלה, אבל למטה היא מחוברת. כאן למדך שנבלת בהמה טמאה מטמאה, ובענין שבסוף הפרשה פירש על בהמה טהורה:
27. And among all the animals that walk on four legs, any [animal] that walks on its paws is unclean for you. Anyone who touches their carcass will be unclean until evening. כז. וְכֹל | הוֹלֵךְ עַל כַּפָּיו בְּכָל הַחַיָּה הַהֹלֶכֶת עַל אַרְבַּע טְמֵאִים הֵם לָכֶם כָּל הַנֹּגֵעַ בְּנִבְלָתָם יִטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב:
on its paws: such as a dog, a bear, or a cat.
על כפיו: כגון כלב ודוב וחתול:
are unclean for you: i.e., to touch.
טמאים הם לכם: למגע:
28. And one who carries their carcass shall immerse his garments, and he will be unclean until evening. They are unclean for you. כח. וְהַנֹּשֵׂא אֶת נִבְלָתָם יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב טְמֵאִים הֵמָּה לָכֶם:
29. And this is unclean for you among creeping creatures that creep on the ground: The weasel, the mouse, and the toad after its species; כט. וְזֶה לָכֶם הַטָּמֵא בַּשֶּׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ עַל הָאָרֶץ הַחֹלֶד וְהָעַכְבָּר וְהַצָּב לְמִינֵהוּ:
And this is unclean for you: All these statements of uncleanness are not referring to the prohibition of eating, but rather, to actual uncleanness, i.e., that [the person] will become unclean by touching them, and he will [consequently] be prohibited from eating terumah [the portion of one’s produce given to the kohen] and holy [sacrifices], and from entering the sanctuary.
וזה לכם הטמא: כל טומאות הללו אינן לאיסור אכילה אלא לטומאה ממש, להיות טמא במגען ונאסר לאכול תרומה וקדשים וליכנס במקדש:
The weasel: Heb. הַחֹלֶד, moustele [in Old French], weasel, beach-marten.
החלד: מושטיל"ה [נמיה]:
and the toad: Heb. וְהַצָּב, bot [in Old French], which resembles a frog. [Rashi in Mikraoth Gedoloth reads: froit, which, according to Rashi on Niddah 56a, is the same as bot. According to Berliner and Greenberg, this is a ferret. According to Gukevitzky and Catane, it is a toad. In view of Rashi 's comment that it resembles a frog, this appears to be the correct translation.]
והצב: פרוי"ט [קרפדה] שדומה לצפרדע:
30. The hedgehog, the chameleon, the lizard, the snail, and the mole. ל. וְהָאֲנָקָה וְהַכֹּחַ וְהַלְּטָאָה וְהַחֹמֶט וְהַתִּנְשָׁמֶת:
the hedgehog: Heb. הָאֲנָקָה, herisson [in French].
אנקה: היריצו"ן [קיפוד]:
and the lizard: Heb. וְהַלְּטָאָה, lezard [in French].
הלטאה: לישרד"ה [לטאה]:
and the snail: Heb. וְהַחֹמֶט, limace [in French].
החמט: לימצ"ה [חילזון]:
and the mole: וְהַתִּנְשֶׁמֶת, talpe [in Old French, taupe in modern French].
והתנשמת: טלפ"א [חפרפרת]:
31. These are the ones that are unclean for you, among all creeping creatures; anyone who touches them when they are dead will be unclean until evening. לא. אֵלֶּה הַטְּמֵאִים לָכֶם בְּכָל הַשָּׁרֶץ כָּל הַנֹּגֵעַ בָּהֶם בְּמֹתָם יִטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב:
32. And if any of these dead [creatures] falls upon anything, it will become unclean, whether it is any wooden vessel, garment, hide or sack, any vessel with which work is done; it shall be immersed in water, but will remain unclean until evening, and it will become clean. לב. וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִפֹּל עָלָיו מֵהֶם | בְּמֹתָם יִטְמָא מִכָּל כְּלִי עֵץ אוֹ בֶגֶד אוֹ עוֹר אוֹ שָׂק כָּל כְּלִי אֲשֶׁר יֵעָשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בָּהֶם בַּמַּיִם יוּבָא וְטָמֵא עַד הָעֶרֶב וְטָהֵר:
it shall be immersed in water: Even after its immersion, the item remains unclean for [coming into contact with] terumah.
במים יובא: ואף לאחר טבילתו טמא הוא לתרומה עד הערב, ואחר כך וטהר בהערב השמש:
until evening: And afterwards,
:
it will become clean: when the sun sets. — [Yev. 75a]
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Tehillim: Chapters 90 - 96
• Chapter 90
David found this prayer in its present form-receiving a tradition attributing it to MosesThe Midrash attributes the next eleven psalms to Moses (Rashi).-and incorporated it into the Tehillim. It speaks of the brevity of human life, and inspires man to repent and avoid pride in this world.
1. A prayer by Moses, the man of God. My Lord, You have been a shelter for us in every generation.
2. Before the mountains came into being, before You created the earth and the world-for ever and ever You are Almighty God.
3. You diminish man until he is crushed, and You say, "Return, you children of man.”
4. Indeed, a thousand years are in Your eyes like yesterday that has passed, like a watch of the night.
5. The stream of their life is as but a slumber; in the morning they are like grass that sprouts anew.
6. In the morning it thrives and sprouts anew; in the evening it withers and dries.
7. For we are consumed by Your anger, and destroyed by Your wrath.
8. You have set our wrongdoings before You, our hidden sins before the light of Your countenance.
9. For all our days have vanished in Your wrath; we cause our years to pass like a fleeting sound.
10. The days of our lives number seventy years, and if in great vigor, eighty years; most of them are but travail and futility, passing quickly and flying away.
11. Who can know the intensity of Your anger? Your wrath is commensurate with one's fear of You.
12. Teach us, then, to reckon our days, that we may acquire a wise heart.
13. Relent, O Lord; how long [will Your anger last]? Have compassion upon Your servants.
14. Satiate us in the morning with Your kindness, then we shall sing and rejoice throughout our days.
15. Give us joy corresponding to the days You afflicted us, the years we have seen adversity.
16. Let Your work be revealed to Your servants, and Your splendor be upon their children.
17. May the pleasantness of the Lord our God be upon us; establish for us the work of our hands; establish the work of our hands.
Chapter 91
This psalm inspires the hearts of the people to seek shelter under the wings of the Divine Presence. It also speaks of the four seasons of the year, and their respective ministering powers, instructing those who safeguard their souls to avoid them.
1. You who dwells in the shelter of the Most High, who abides in the shadow of the Omnipotent:
2. I say of the Lord who is my refuge and my stronghold, my God in whom I trust,
3. that He will save you from the ensnaring trap, from the destructive pestilence.
4. He will cover you with His pinions and you will find refuge under His wings; His truth is a shield and an armor.
5. You will not fear the terror of the night, nor the arrow that flies by day;
6. the pestilence that prowls in the darkness, nor the destruction that ravages at noon.
7. A thousand may fall at your [left] side, and ten thousand at your right, but it shall not reach you.
8. You need only look with your eyes, and you will see the retribution of the wicked.
9. Because you [have said,] "The Lord is my shelter," and you have made the Most High your haven,
10. no evil will befall you, no plague will come near your tent.
11. For He will instruct His angels in your behalf, to guard you in all your ways.
12. They will carry you in their hands, lest you injure your foot upon a rock.
13. You will tread upon the lion and the viper; you will trample upon the young lion and the serpent.
14. Because he desires Me, I will deliver him; I will fortify him, for he knows My Name.
15. When he calls on Me, I will answer him; I am with him in distress. I will deliver him and honor him.
16. I will satiate him with long life, and show him My deliverance.
Chapter 92
Sung every Shabbat by the Levites in the Holy Temple, this psalm speaks of the World to Come, and comforts the hearts of those crushed by suffering.
1. A psalm, a song for the Shabbat day.
2. It is good to praise the Lord, and to sing to Your Name, O Most High;
3. to proclaim Your kindness in the morning, and Your faithfulness in the nights,
4. with a ten-stringed instrument and lyre, to the melody of a harp.
5. For You, Lord, have gladdened me with Your deeds; I sing for joy at the works of Your hand.
6. How great are Your works, O Lord; how very profound Your thoughts!
7. A brutish man cannot know, a fool cannot comprehend this:
8. When the wicked thrive like grass, and all evildoers flourish-it is in order that they may be destroyed forever.
9. But You, Lord, are exalted forever.
10. Indeed, Your enemies, O Lord, indeed Your enemies shall perish; all evildoers shall be scattered.
11. But You have increased my might like that of a wild ox; I am anointed with fresh oil.
12. My eyes have seen [the downfall of] my watchful enemies; my ears have heard [the doom of] the wicked who rise against me.
13. The righteous will flourish like a palm tree, grow tall like a cedar in Lebanon.
14. Planted in the House of the Lord, they shall blossom in the courtyards of our God.
15. They shall be fruitful even in old age; they shall be full of sap and freshness-
16. to declare that the Lord is just; He is my Strength, and there is no injustice in Him.
Chapter 93
This psalm speaks of the Messianic era, when God will don grandeur-allowing no room for man to boast before Him as did Nebuchadnezzar, Pharaoh, and Sennacherib.
1. The Lord is King; He has garbed Himself with grandeur; the Lord has robed Himself, He has girded Himself with strength; He has also established the world firmly that it shall not falter.
2. Your throne stands firm from of old; You have existed forever.
3. The rivers have raised, O Lord, the rivers have raised their voice; the rivers raise their raging waves.
4. More than the sound of many waters, than the mighty breakers of the sea, is the Lord mighty on High.
5. Your testimonies are most trustworthy; Your House will be resplendent in holiness, O Lord, forever.
Chapter 94
An awe-inspiring and wondrous prayer with which every individual can pray for the redemption. It is also an important moral teaching.
1. The Lord is a God of retribution; O God of retribution, reveal Yourself!
2. Judge of the earth, arise; render to the arrogant their recompense.
3. How long shall the wicked, O Lord, how long shall the wicked exult?
4. They continuously speak insolently; all the evildoers act arrogantly.
5. They crush Your people, O Lord, and oppress Your heritage.
6. They kill the widow and the stranger, and murder the orphans.
7. And they say, "The Lord does not see, the God of Jacob does not perceive.”
8. Understand, you senseless among the people; you fools, when will you become wise?
9. Shall He who implants the ear not hear? Shall He who forms the eye not see?
10. Shall He who chastises nations not punish? Shall He who imparts knowledge to man [not know]?
11. The Lord knows the thoughts of man, that they are naught.
12. Fortunate is the man whom You chastise, O Lord, and instruct him in Your Torah,
13. bestowing upon him tranquillity in times of adversity, until the pit is dug for the wicked.
14. For the Lord will not abandon His people, nor forsake His heritage.
15. For judgment shall again be consonant with justice, and all the upright in heart will pursue it.
16. Who would rise up for me against the wicked ones; who would stand up for me against the evildoers?
17. Had the Lord not been a help to me, my soul would have soon dwelt in the silence [of the grave].
18. When I thought that my foot was slipping, Your kindness, O Lord, supported me.
19. When my [worrisome] thoughts multiply within me, Your consolation delights my soul.
20. Can one in the seat of evil, one who makes iniquity into law, consort with You?
21. They band together against the life of the righteous, and condemn innocent blood.
22. The Lord has been my stronghold; my God, the strength of my refuge.
23. He will turn their violence against them and destroy them through their own wickedness; the Lord, our God, will destroy them.
Chapter 95
This psalm speaks of the future, when man will say to his fellow, "Come, let us sing and offer praise to God for the miracles He has performed for us!"
1. Come, let us sing to the Lord; let us raise our voices in jubilation to the Rock of our deliverance.
2. Let us approach Him with thanksgiving; let us raise our voices to Him in song.
3. For the Lord is a great God, and a great King over all supernal beings;
4. in His hands are the depths of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are His.
5. Indeed, the sea is His, for He made it; His hands formed the dry land.
6. Come, let us prostrate ourselves and bow down; let us bend the knee before the Lord, our Maker.
7. For He is our God, and we are the people that He tends, the flock under His [guiding] hand-even this very day, if you would but hearken to His voice!
8. Do not harden your heart as at Merivah, as on the day at Massah in the wilderness,
9. where your fathers tested Me; they tried Me, though they had seen My deeds.
10. For forty years I quarreled with that generation; and I said, "They are a people of erring hearts, they do not know My ways.”
11. So I vowed in My anger that they would not enter My resting place.
Chapter 96
The time will yet come when man will say to his fellow: "Come, let us sing to God!"
1. Sing to the Lord a new song; sing to the Lord, all the earth.
2. Sing to the Lord, bless His Name; proclaim His deliverance from day to day.
3. Recount His glory among the nations, His wonders among all the peoples.
4. For the Lord is great and highly praised; He is awesome above all gods.
5. For all the gods of the nations are naught, but the Lord made the heavens.
6. Majesty and splendor are before Him, might and beauty in His Sanctuary.
7. Render to the Lord, O families of nations, render to the Lord honor and might.
8. Render to the Lord honor due to His Name; bring an offering and come to His courtyards.
9. Bow down to the Lord in resplendent holiness; tremble before Him, all the earth.
10. Proclaim among the nations, "The Lord reigns"; indeed, the world is firmly established that it shall not falter; He will judge the peoples with righteousness.
11. The heavens will rejoice, the earth will exult; the sea and its fullness will roar.
12. The fields and everything therein will jubilate; then all the trees of the forest will sing.
13. Before the Lord [they shall rejoice], for He has come, for He has come to judge the earth; He will judge the world with justice, and the nations with His truth.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 37
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Friday, Adar II 19, 5774 • March 21, 2014
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 37
וכל ניצוץ לא ירד לעולם הזה
Each spark did not descend into this world to perfect itself but to perfect the body and vital soul — as the Alter Rebbe will soon conclude.
Having touched upon the subject of the soul’s descent, however, he adds a parenthetical comment emphasizing the magnitude of this descent. On entering this world, a soul may perhaps attain the loftiest heights of love and fear of G d that are experienced by a perfect tzaddik — but even this cannot compare to the love and fear that it experienced while in the spiritual worlds, before its descent.
אף שהיא ירידה גדולה, ובחינת גלות ממש
Though it is indeed a great descent, a veritable exile for the soul;
כי גם שיהיה צדיק גמור, עובד ה׳ ביראה ואהבה רבה בתענוגים
for even if it become, in this world, a perfect tzaddik, serving G d with fear and abundant love of delights,
לא יגיע למעלות דביקותו בה׳ בדחילו ורחימו בטרם ירידתו לעולם הזה החומרי, לא מינה ולא מקצתה
it will not attain to the quality of its attachment to G d with fear and love that the soul experienced prior to its descent into this corporeal world, nor even [to] a fraction of [its earlier fear and love].
ואין ערך ודמיון ביניהם כלל, כנודע לכל משכיל, שהגוף אינו יכול לסבול כו׳
In fact, there is no comparison or similarity whatever between them — between the love and fear of G d experienced by a soul on earth, and that of the soul above; [for] as is obvious to every intelligent man, the body could not bear etc. a love and fear of such intensity as the soul experienced above, in the spiritual realms.
Having concluded his comment on the formidable nature of the soul’s descent, the Alter Rebbe returns to his original point: The descent of the soul is thus undertaken not for its own sake —
אלא ירידתו לעולם הזה, להתלבש בגוף ונפש החיונית, הוא כדי לתקנם בלבד
but its descent into this world, to be clothed in a body and vital soul, is for the sole purpose of perfecting them;
ולהפרידם מהרע של שלש קליפות הטמאות על ידי שמירת שס״ה לא תעשה וענפיהן
to separate them from the evil of the three impure kelipot, by observing the 365 prohibitions and their “offshoots” i.e., by observing the Biblical and Rabbinic prohibitions,
ולהעלות נפשו החיונית, עם חלקה השייך לה מכללות עולם הזה
and to elevate his vital soul, together with the portion of the world at large that belongs to it,
ולקשרם ולייחדם באור אין סוף ברוך הוא אשר ימשיך בהם על ידי קיומו כל רמ״ח מצות עשה בנפשו החיונית
binding and uniting them with the Ein Sof-light which he draws into them by performing all the 248 positive mitzvot through the agency of the vital soul,
שהיא היא המקיימת כל מצות מעשיות כנ״ל
since [the vital soul] is the one that performs all mitzvot involving action, as explained above, in ch. 36 — that the divine soul can activate the body in performance of the mitzvot only by way of the vital soul.
וכמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים, שער כ״ו כי הנשמה עצמה אינה צריכה תיקון כלל כו׳
It is likewise written (in Etz Chayim, Portal 26) that the [divine] soul itself does not need perfecting at all...;
ולא הוצרכה להתלבש בעולם הזה וכו׳ רק להמשיך אור לתקנם כו׳
and there is no need for it to be embodied in this world, in a body and vital soul... except to draw down light to perfect them — the vital soul and the body...
והוא ממש דוגמת סוד גלות השכינה לברר ניצוצין וכו׳
and this parallels exactly1 the mystery of “the exile of the Shechinah,” whose purpose is to refine the sparks of holiness which fell into the kelipot; so too does the divine soul enter into exile within the body and vital soul in order to perfect them, and to extract from them the sparks of holiness which they contain.
The foregoing discussion enables us to understand the particular virtue of mitzvot performed through action:
Creation, and the soul’s descent into the body, were both intended for the purpose of elevating the body and vital soul, and thereby the entire world; moreover, this objective is reached primarily through the mitzvot involving action, inasmuch as these mitzvot are performed by the body and vital soul; these mitzvot are therefore of primary importance.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Rebbe explains how “the mystery of ‘the exile of the Shechinah’” relates to the subject at hand.
On the surface, the soul’s descent into this world, and its concomitant suffering, is truly inexplicable. The soul is an entity which is truly a part of G d Above, emanating, as it does, from Supernal Wisdom which is wholly at one with G d Himself.
That such a holy being should descend into this world merely to rectify the vitalizing soul and the body whose source is in kelipat nogah, strains the bonds of credulity. For even after the divine soul completely rectifies them — as in the divine service of a consummate tzaddik — the body is still unable to harbor the same love of G d which the soul felt prior to its descent. Why, then, did the soul descend into this world
The Alter Rebbe addresses this question, writes the Rebbe, by stating that the soul’s descent parallels exactly the mystery of the exile of the Shechinah, whose purpose is to refine the sparks of holiness which fell into the kelipot. We shall soon learn that the Shechinah is the source of the divine soul. Furthermore, all things found within this world were created from the sparks of holiness, including the body and the vitalizing soul. Hence the parallel. The soul, whose source is the Shechinah, descends into this world to refine the body and vitalizing soul, whose source is the holy sparks. And just as the exile of the Shechinah is deemed a mystery, for its descent defies logic, so, too, is the soul’s descent into the body and vitalizing soul a mystery: it defies mortal reason.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 355
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
"There shall be no indecent women among the daughters of Israel"—Deuteronomy 23:18.
It is forbidden for a man and woman to be intimate unless married to each other.
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
Negative Commandment 355
Translated by Berel Bell
Negative Commandment 356
The 355th prohibition is that we are forbidden from having relations with a woman without [giving her] a Kesubah and acquiring her (kiddushin).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "There may not be any prostitutes among Jewish girls."
This same commandment is repeated, but using a different expression, in G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The Sifra says, " 'Do not defile your daughter' — this command is directed towards a man who hands over his unmarried daughter for sexual relations without marriage, as well as a girl who herself has sexual relations without marriage."
Now listen as I explain why the prohibition is repeated with this wording,3 and what the repetition adds. G‑d (exalted be He) has already instructed us in the Torah that a man who has relations with a virgin incurs none of the punishments4, regardless of whether he seduced or raped her. Rather, he must pay a monetary fine and marry the girl that he harmed, as explained in the Torah.5
Accordingly, a person might think that since the offender is only required to pay a fine, therefore this is looked upon as a purely financial case. Therefore, just as a person, if he wishes, is allowed to give away his money to another person, or to forgive a debt, so too, [he might think,] he may take his unmarried daughter and give her to a man to have relations with her. This would be like forgiving a debt due to him, since the 50 silver [shekels which the seducer or rapist must pay] go to the father. Alternatively, a person might think that [since this is purely a financial matter,] he may give his daughter on condition that the man pays a certain amount of money.
Therefore, the Torah prohibited this and said, "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The monetary fine only refers to a case where the seduction or rape actually occurred. But it is still completely forbidden for them to engage in sexual relations, even when they both agree.
The Torah also reveals the reason for this prohibition: ["Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations,] and you will then not make the land sexually immoral, and the land [will not] be filled with perversion." The explanation of this: seduction and rape occur very rarely, but if the Torah allowed premarital relations when both parties agree, it would occur often and become widespread throughout the world.
This is a fine and wondrous explanation of this verse, and fits all the sayings of our Sages and laws of the Torah.
This prohibition, i.e. the prohibition of [having relations with] an unmarried woman, is punishable by lashes.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in Kesubos and Kiddushin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 23:18.
2.Lev. 19:29.
3.Directed to the father, unlike the other verse, which is phrased as a general prohibition.
4.. Such as lashes or execution.
5.Ex. 22:15. Deut. 22:28. See P220, P218.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: Gezelah va'Avedah Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Two Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Two
Halacha 1
When an object taken by robbery remains unchanged, it itself must be returned to its original owner. This applies even when the owner has despaired of its return, and even when the robber himself has died, and the article is in his children's possession.
If, however, the article underwent a change while in the robber's possession the robber acquires it because of the change and is required to pay its value at the time of the robbery. This applies even when the owners have not despaired of its recovery.
Halacha 2
This is the law as prescribed by the Torah, as Leviticus 5:23 states: "And he shall return the object he obtained by robbery." The Oral Tradition interprets that verse to mean: If the object is still as it was at the time of the robbery, it should be returned. If it has undergone a change, he should pay its value.
If the owner despaired of its return, but it did not undergo a change, the robber acquires the right to its increase in value from the time the owner despaired. He is required to pay only the value of the article at the time of the robbery. This is also a Rabbinic ordinance to encourage repentance.
In such an instance, when he returns the object he obtained by robbery, the increase in value is evaluated, and the robber is paid for it by the person he robbed.
Halacha 3
If the robber sold the article obtained by robbery or gave it as a present and the owner despaired of its return, the purchaser is not required to return the article itself even though it did not undergo a change. Since the owner despaired of its return - regardless of whether that took place before the sale or afterwards - the purchaser acquires possession of it, because of the despair and because of the transfer from one domain to another.
Halacha 4
When a person obtains an article by robbery, causes it to increase in value, and then sells it or bequeaths it to another person, he bequeaths or sells the increase in value, and the purchaser or the heir acquires the right to this increase. Therefore, at the time of judgment, he should be reimbursed by the original owner for the increase in value, and then return to him the article obtained by robbery. The original owner may then collect the worth of the increase in value from the robber, for he did not despair of its return.
Similarly, if the purchaser or the heir caused the object to increase in value, the original owner should reimburse them for that increase.
Halacha 5
If the robber sold the object obtained by robbery to a gentile, and the gentile caused it to increase in value, at the time of judgment, the article and the increase must be returned to the original owner.
If the gentile sold it to a Jew after it increased in value, since the robber is a Jew and the person in possession of the article is a Jew, the purchaser is considered to have acquired the increase in value. If, however, the original owner seizes the increase in value without paying for it, it is not expropriated from his possession.
Halacha 6
As explained, in order to encourage repentance our Sages ruled that when an article obtained by robbery increases in value after the owner despairs of its return or after it has undergone a change, the robber is entitled to the increase in value. This applies even when the change comes about as a matter of course.
What is implied? If a person obtained a cow by robbery and it became pregnant in his possession, whether or not it bore a calf before he was called to court because of the robbery - since the owner despaired of its return, he is required to pay only the value of the cow at the time of the robbery. Similarly, if he stole a sheep and it grew wool, whether he sheared it before he was called to court or it had not yet been shorn, he is required to pay only its value at the time of the robbery.
If it bore offspring or was shorn, the robber is entitled to the offspring or the shearings. If it had not borne offspring, nor was it shorn at that time, the animal's increase in value is evaluated and may be collected from the original owner. Then the animal itself is returned.
Halacha 7
If a person obtained a pregnant cow by robbery, the owner despaired of its return and then it bore offspring, or he obtained a sheep laden with wool by robbery, the owner despaired of its return and then it was shorn, the robber should pay the value of a cow ready to bear offspring and a sheep ready to be shorn.
If the animal bore offspring or was shorn before the owner despaired of its return, the shearings or the offspring belong to the original owner. This applies even if the animal became pregnant or grew wool while in the possession of the thief. Since the owner did not despair, and the animal did not undergo a change, the object obtained by robbery is still considered to belong to its original owner, although the robber is held responsible in cases of loss due to forces beyond his control.
Halacha 8
If a person stole or obtained an animal by robbery and consecrated or slaughtered it after its owner despaired of its return, it is considered to be the thief's property only from the time he consecrated it. This was enacted so that the sinner will not profit. All its offspring and its shearings from the time that it was stolen until the time it was consecrated belong to its original owner.
Halacha 9
When does the above apply? To an increase in value that comes as a matter of course - e.g., an animal's shearing or its offspring. If, however, an animal was gaunt, and the robber fattened it, the robber may collect the increase in value due to the fattening from the original owner, even if it took place before the owner despaired. The same applies with regard to all instances where the increase in value comes about as a result of expense.
Halacha 10
A change that can revert to its original state is not considered to be a change.
What is implied? When a person obtains boards by robbery and attaches them to each other with nails and makes a chest, this is not considered a change. For it is possible to separate them and make them simple boards, as they were previously.
Halacha 11
If a person obtained sand by robbery and made it into a brick, he does not acquire it, because one can crush the brick and return it to sand.
If he obtained a strip of metal by robbery and made it into a coin, he does not acquire it, because one can melt the coin and return it to a strip of metal, as it was beforehand. The same principles apply in other similar instances.
Halacha 12
If, however, a person obtained boards by robbery and burned them, cut them or carved them, and in this way fashioned them into a utensil; he obtained wool by robbery and dyed it, spun it or whitened it; he obtained threads by robbery and made them into a garment; he obtained a brick by robbery and made it into dust; obtained stones by robbery and smoothed them; or he obtained coins by robbery and melted them - this is considered a change, for if he makes other coins - or similarly undoes the other changes mentioned above - they are considered to be new entities. The same principles apply in all similar situations.
Halacha 13
When a person robs old coins, polishes them and renews them, he is not considered to have acquired them, for they will age and return to their previous state. If, however, he obtains new coins by robbery and causes them to look old, he does acquire them. For if they were made to appear new again, that would be considered to be a new development.
A person who robs a date palm that is growing and cuts it down does not acquire it. This applies even if he cuts it into sections. If he makes it into boards, he does acquire it.
Halacha 14
If a person obtains large beams by robbery and cuts them into small beams, he does not acquire them. If he cuts them into boards, causing them to be called by a different name, he does acquire them.
If one obtained a palm branch by robbery and separated its leaves, one acquires the leaves. If one obtained palm leaves by robbery and made them into a broom, one acquires the broom.
If one obtains a lamb by robbery and it becomes a ram, or one obtains a calf by robbery and it becomes an ox, it is considered to have undergone a change while in the robber's possession. Therefore, he is considered to have acquired it, and he is required to pay only the value of the article at the time of the robbery, despite the fact that the owner never despaired of the article's return.
Halacha 15
If a person obtains a utensil by robbery and breaks it, we do not evaluate its depreciation. Instead, the robber is obligated to pay its worth, and he is given the broken utensil.
If, however, the original owner desires to take the broken utensil, he is granted it, and the robber must pay for its depreciation. This ordinance was instituted for the sake of the owner, and if he does not desire it, he is granted that prerogative. Similar principles apply in other analogous situations.
Halacha 16
When an object obtained by robbery does not undergo a change, but its value increases, it itself must be returned to its original owner, and the robber is not entitled to anything. This applies even if the owner has despaired of its return.
For the Sages granted the robber only the increase in value after the owner despaired of the object's return, in instances like the shearing of wool and the offspring. He is not, however, granted any increase in value that comes from the rise in article's worth when it is returned intact to its owner.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Five, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Six, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Seven
Ishut - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated.1 [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin2 - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.
Halacha 2
If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, the kiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."
If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned,4 the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.
Halacha 3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year,5 with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer],6 the kiddushin are valid.
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple.7 If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.8
Halacha 4
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's."9
Halacha 5
When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.
When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, the terumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.10
Halacha 6
The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.
When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article,11 and it is known12 that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.
Halacha 8
When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.
If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.13
Halacha 9
When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated.14If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin.15 If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the kiddushin], she is consecrated.
Halacha 11
Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the kiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.16
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.
If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.
Halacha 13
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note,17 she is not consecrated.
What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept as kiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ]18 already spent that dinar and has derived benefit from it already.
Halacha 14
[A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral,19 she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.
Halacha 15
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.
What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.
It is forbidden to make [such a condition], because it is like taking interest.20 My teachers interpreted the expression "the benefit [derived from] a loan," in a way that is not worthy of mention.21
Halacha 16
If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this p'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.22
Halacha 17
When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.23
Halacha 18
[The following rule applies when a man] consecrates [a woman] with an object that he has entrusted to her for safekeeping or with an article that he has lent her: If the entrusted object or borrowed article is worth a p'rutah24 and it exists within her property, she is consecrated.25
Halacha 19
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan,26 and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
Halacha 20
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him].27 And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
Halacha 21
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," the kiddushin are binding.28 Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.
Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding29 provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."
Halacha 22
[To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.30
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated.31 For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.
Halacha 23
When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.32
If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.33
Halacha 24
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.34
Halacha 25
[These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuz that are hidden in the wreath."
If she said yes, she is consecrated. If she remained silent, she is not consecrated with this money, for remaining silent after money has been given is of no consequence.35 There is nonetheless a doubt: perhaps the kiddushin are valid, lest the wreath be worth a p'rutah in another place.36
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status,37 [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.
Halacha 27
[Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful.
[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.
Halacha 28
If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.
Halacha 29
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.38
Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.
FOOTNOTES
1.Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to the Torah, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p'rutah.
2.The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.
From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.
In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Karo follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it as kiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)
The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding.
Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam's perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.
Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p'rutah must be given. Since according to Scriptural law the article has intrinsic worth, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context.
3.See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.
4.For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.)
5.Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman.
6.As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10, based on Kiddushin 58a), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given.
7.See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:3.
8.For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person's private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me'ilah 6:3.)
9.We are required to eat the produce of the second tithe in Jerusalem or redeem it and use the money to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Although one derives personal benefit from eating this produce, it is not considered to be one's own property.
10.In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah's decree - and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity - once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.
11.A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner's despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner's property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article - for she is a third party - the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh).
12.The Rambam's intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushin are invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda Biy'hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77).
13.The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam's own addition. The Noda Biy'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.
The Edut BiY'hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushin are valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person's taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.
The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. The Chatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object's worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of the kiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.
14.We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi, Kiddushin 52b). There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not he is obligated to return the value of the stolen property to her. The Rashba maintains that he is not required, while Rabbenu Nissim states that he is. (See the Ramah and commentaries, Even HaEzer 28:2.)
15.For she merely accepted her own property.
16.Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.
17.The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p'rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding.
18.I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender's, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel 28:19.
19.Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that the kiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it also quotes the other opinion.
20.Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri, Ma'aseh Rokeach) explain that the Rambam's wording is precise. The expression "like interest" implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural law.
21.The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin 6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra'avad. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam's interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushin are binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Ramah, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam's view.
22.Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p'rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushin are binding (Kiddushin 46a).
23.As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt. This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural law.
There are opinions that maintain that the woman is not consecrated. These opinions maintain that even after such a transfer has been made, the original creditor can nullify a debt that has been transferred through such a process. Since there is a possibility that the debt will be nullified, they maintain that the woman will not make the commitment required by kiddushin. (See Rabbenu Nissim and the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 28:13 and commentaries.)
24.Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: "If a p'rutah's worth of the article remains..." - i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p'rutah's worth remains - the consecration is binding. See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries.
25.If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.
Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman's property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make the kiddushin effective.
26.Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah.
27.I.e., it is not as if the man's entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan.
28.Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.
The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman's suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman's offer of kiddushin. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed the kiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear.
29.Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two - because the servant's owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself - the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above.
30.Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.
31.The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by "an important person." Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21).
32.Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.
33.The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushin are not binding.
34.From the Rambam's wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemble chalifin (barter).
The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages' decree (Or Sameach).
35.I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards to be consecrated she must explicitly express her consent. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs and maintains that in such an instance there is a doubt whether or not the kiddushin are binding, and the more stringent ruling must be followed in every instance. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:5).
36.As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.
37.In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, noting that Kiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10 and Hilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon's reasoning.
In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon's view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon's reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit.
38.Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but - in the Talmudic era - it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil - in the Talmudic era - was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.
Ishut - Chapter Six
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the kiddushin are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman.
Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard to kiddushin, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules.1
Halacha 2
These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements:2
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional;3
d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met.
Halacha 3
What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the dinar, the condition is valid, and the kiddushin are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 zuz, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 4
If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.
[The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time;4 she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all.
Halacha 5
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
Halacha 6
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
Halacha 7
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the dinar in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the kiddushin are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your get. But if you do not eat it, the get is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the dinar or the get in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced.
Halacha 9
With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say:5 "Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"?6
When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you."
Halacha 10
What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding,7 for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations.
Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks,8 she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 11
If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of kiddushin or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
Halacha 12
If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
Halacha 13
Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence.
Halacha 14
Some of the later geonim9 maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to kiddushin and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made.
It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither kiddushin nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great geonim of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it.10
Halacha 15
When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the kiddushin become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original] kiddushin.
What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 zuz this year, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her the dinar in Nisan, but gave her the 200 zuz that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second.
Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed.11
Halacha 16
When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this dinar if I give you 200 zuz,"12 when at a later date he gives her the 200 zuz she is consecrated. Retroactively, the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law.
Halacha 17
Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation,13 nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.14 Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation.
When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording al menat ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply.15 It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.
Halacha 18
What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 zuz," "here is your get on condition that you give me 200 zuz," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 zuz," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200 zuz. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field.
[The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the kiddushin or the get in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.16
FOOTNOTES
1.See Halachah 14 and notes.
2.We find a conditional agreement in the Torah: Moses' granting the lands of Transjordan to the tribes of Reuven and Gad (Numbers 32:29-30). All these four rules were evident in Moses' phrasing of the stipulation. Accordingly, our Sages (Kiddushin 61a) consider this a prototype for all future conditional agreements.
3.This is the Rambam's interpretation of the requirement that in its Hebrew original states: שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. The Ra'avad (in his gloss on Halachah 4) interprets the phrase differently. He states that in the wording of the person making the stipulation, the stipulation must be stated before the result of its completion: e.g., "If you give me 200 zuz, you will be consecrated..., and if you do not give me that sum, you will not be consecrated." The Beit Shmuel 38:2 accepts the Ra'avad's interpretation and not that of the Rambam.
4.We have chosen a very loose translation. The Hebrew toch kedei dibbur has a precise connotation, meaning the amount of time it takes to say the words Shalom alecha rabbi umori.
5.Kiddushin 19b.
6.An exception is made with regard to financial matters, because with regard to these matters the Torah grants the person the right to waive monetary privileges that are due him. Privileges that are not monetary in nature may not be waived.
7.Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia, the conclusion of Chapter 7), the Ritba (Kiddushin 19a) and the Mordechai (gloss on Bava Metzia 93a) maintain that even conjugal rights can be considered to be a financial consideration, for it is a matter of physical pleasure. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted as halachah. Instead, withholding conjugal relations is considered a matter of physical anguish. Hence a woman does not have the prerogative of waiving this right.
8.Deuteronomy 21:11-14 describes the right of a soldier to have relations with a female captive of war whom he desires. Once he has relations with her, he may no longer treat her as a servant.
9.The commentaries have pointed to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni HaCohen.
10.The Ra'avad, the Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam's reasoning. According to the position of these authorities, it is only one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the rules regarding conditional agreements were derived from the agreement made between Moses and the tribes of Reuven and Gad. They maintain that the need to repeat the condition applies only with regard to kiddushin, and was instituted only because of the severity of the establishment and annulment of the marriage relationship. With regard to other matters, however, there is no such requirement. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:9) follow the Rambam's view.
11.The above applies when the agreement is made verbally. If, however, a conditional sale or a present is recorded in a legal document, it is considered to be effective retroactively from the date stated in the document, although the stipulation is not carried out until much later.
Others maintain that the same principle applies with regard to a get, and if a date is included in a conditional bill of divorce, the divorce is retroactively effective from the date of the get, even though the stipulation is carried out much later. As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 8:1, the Rambam does not follow this approach. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 143:2.)
12.In such an instance, the stipulation need not be restated, as mentioned in the following halachah.
13.Since the condition does not have to be restated, there is also no need for the positive statement to precede the negative.
14.This follows the Rambam's interpretation of the Talmud's wording שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה, as explained in Halachah 2.
15.Tosafot and many subsequent Ashkenazic authorities do not accept this ruling. The difference of opinion is noted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4).
16.Among the other rationales offered are that the rules for a conditional agreement are derived from the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and in that instance that condition was phrased using the term "if," rather than "from this time onward" or "on condition that" (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The Ra'avad explains that stating a stipulation using the wording "if" nullifies the act the person performs. For a stipulation to have this power, it must be worded precisely. If, however, the wording "on condition that" or "from now onward" is used, the implication is that the act is not nullified, but is merely dependent on the fulfillment of the condition. Since the stipulation is not that powerful, its wording need not be as precise.
Ishut - Chapter Seven
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated.1 If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated.2
[If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so the kiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.3
Halacha 2
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain."4 If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.5
Halacha 3
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.6
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him.
If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown.7 If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments.8 If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these."
If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these."
What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained.9 In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women,10 a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead.
This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as an isar11 even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.
Halacha 8
When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.12
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her,13 she is consecrated.
Halacha 9
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes.14
When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.15
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated.
[If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuz after 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 11
If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.16
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter,17 and] both [men] are considered as having established kiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her.18 The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days19 or afterwards.
[Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.
Halacha 13
When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and these kiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.20
If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.21
Halacha 14
When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again22 until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin established by the second p'rutah.
If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude],"23 "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies,"24 she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.25
Halacha 15
When [a man] tells a yevamah: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after your yavam performs chalitzah for you,"26 she is consecrated. [The rationale is] that even if he consecrated her at present, the kiddushin would be [at least] of a doubtful status.27
Halacha 16
When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence.28 If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated.29 [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.
Halacha 17
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100 dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar].
When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100].30 Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given.
Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated.31 [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [the kiddushin are valid, provided]32 he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire,33 and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.
Halacha 19
A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home.
[The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.
Halacha 20
When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid.34 Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.
Halacha 21
When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid.35 [If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found].
Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives the kiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].
Halacha 22
When [a man] consecrates a woman, but he or she desires to retract immediately - even if the retraction is made within a very short amount of time36 - the retraction is of no consequence and the woman is consecrated.37
Halacha 23
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to the kiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence.38
Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to the kiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]39 even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her.
Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than a p'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate.
[The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.40
FOOTNOTES
1.It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father's consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra'avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:8) quotes the Rambam's wording.
2.There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of "consent": a) to say "yes," b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra'avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.
3.Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband. Were the father to indeed consent, she would be under obligation either to marry the deceased's brother, or have the obligation removed through chalitzah.
4.In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that the kiddushin would be void.
5.I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her original kiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.
6.Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people's knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present, or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:20) quotes the Rambam's decision.
7.The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation, and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field.
8.The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)
Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving ענוי נפש, "the oppression of the soul" (cf. Numbers 30:14). Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.
In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving ענוי נפש; it also includes those בינו לבינה, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17). (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, Chapter 234.)
9.Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed.
10.Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5).
11.An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:1).
12.She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.
This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.
13.A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them. (See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 4.)
The kiddushin are binding only when the wise man nullifies the vows before the woman's intended husband discovers their existence. Once he discovers that she is bound by vows, the kiddushin are nullified even when she has the vows nullified afterwards (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:2).
14.The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes," the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).
15.The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason the kiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.
Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man's nullification and a physician's healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of the kiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of the kiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.
16.From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man's kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin 59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman's acceptance of the second kiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah and Tur, Even HaEzer 40:2.)
17.Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying the kiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying "after 30 days," the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man's kiddushin would be binding.
Significantly, if a person made a similar statement with regard to a sale, the Rambam rules (Hilchot Mechirah 2:9) that this is a conditional statement. Thus, it appears that his ruling here is a stringency, accepted because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce.
18.The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this ruling, many later authorities do.
19.Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce.
20.The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond of kiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 38:68, there are authorities who maintain that the kiddushin are not binding at all.
21.For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.
22.In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Karo rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated.
23.This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant.
24.I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman's sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may.
25.Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time the kiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is "something that has not come into the world," for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.
26.I.e., when a woman's husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite of chalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed.
27.See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since the kiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect, kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:6) rules that even when a conditional statement is made, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. There are some manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that indicate that the Rambam also shared that view.
28.For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist.
29.The Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage.
30.Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a).
31.For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushin would be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 29:7.)
32.The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling.
33.The Rambam's wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel 31:1.)
Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk: Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily - e.g., a precious stone - a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert's appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone.
34.For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. As such he is acting on his own initiative, and not as the agent of the principal.
35.Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.
36.Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.
37.Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person's retraction is of no consequence.)
38.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam's decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)
The Rashba accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to conditions involving money - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you give me 200 zuz." For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows" - he does not accept the Rambam's position. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam's ruling.
39.I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establish kiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Ramah, Even HaEzer 38:35).
40.In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)
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Hayom Yom:
• "Today's Day"
Friday, Adar II 19, 5774 • 21 March 2014
Friday, Adar Sheini 19, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Tzav, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 90-96.
Tanya: And each spark...(p. 173) to...elevating the sparks. (p. 175).
R. Moshe Meisels related: The (Alter) Rebbe taught us that the alef of Chassidus is to use our natural traits and instincts in avoda. The beginning of avoda is to employ the natural characteristics of man's powers, for example the natural dominion of mind over heart.*
FOOTNOTES
*. See Supplementary Footnotes, (printed edition) p. 125.
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Daily Thought:
What Lies Inside
Within each thing we behold, the moshiach dwells, like the embryo waiting to break out of its egg. In the rhythm of a dandelion shivering in the breeze, in the eyes of the children we raise, in the goals we make in life, in the machines we use and the art we create, in the air we breathe and the blood rushing through our veins.
When the world was made, the sages say, the moshiach was the wind hovering over all that would be.
Within each thing, infinite beauty awaits us to tap upon its shell.
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