TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• MISHKAN ASSEMBLED FOR THE 1ST TIME; "SEVEN DAYS OF TRAINING" BEGIN (1312 BCE)
The Children of Israel began building the "Mishkan" (also called the "Tabernacle"--a portable sanctuary to house the Divine presence in their midst as they journeyed through the desert) on the 11th of Tishrei of the year 2449 from creation (1312 BCE) -- six months after their Exodus from Egypt, four months after the revelation at Sinai, and 80 days after their worship of the Golden Calf. The construction of the Mishkan, which followed a detailed set of instructions issued to Moses on Mount Sinai, lasted 74 days, and was completed on the 25th of Kislev; but the Divine command to erect the edifice came only three months later, on the 23rd of Adar, when Moses was instructed to begin a 7-day "training period."
During the week of Adar 23-29, the Mishkan was erected each morning and dismantled each evening; Moses served as the High Priest and initiated Aaron and his four sons into the priesthood. Then, on the "eighth day" -- the 1st of Nissan -- the Mishkan was "permanently" assembled (that is, put up to stand until the Divine command would come to journey on), Aaron and his sons assumed the priesthood, and the divine presence came to dwell in the Mishkan.
Links:
Parshah Terumah (detailed description of Mishkan with commentary)
Why It's Frustrating Having a Brain
More on the Mishkan
• PASSING OF 1ST REBBE OF GER (1866)
Chassidic Rabbi Yitzchak Meir Altar (1799-1866), author of Chiddushei Harim (a commentary on the Talmud and Shulchan Aruch), was a disciple of the Maggid of Koshnitz and Rabbi Simcha Bunim of Peshischa, and the founder of the "Ger" (Gerer) Chassidic dynasty. All his 13 sons had died in his lifetime, and he was succeeded (in 1870) by his young grandson, Rabbi Yehudah Leib Alter (the "Sefat Emmet").
DAILY QUOTE:
The Hebrew word for ark, teivah, also means “word.” When G d says (to Noah), “Come into the ark,” He is also saying: Enter into the words of prayer and Torah study; there you will find a sanctuary of wisdom, meaning and holiness amidst the raging floodwaters of life.--Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Tazria, 3rd Portion Leviticus 13:18-13:23 with Rashi
• Chapter 13
18. If [a person's] flesh has an inflammation on its skin, and it heals, יח. וּבָשָׂר כִּי יִהְיֶה בוֹ בְעֹרוֹ שְׁחִין וְנִרְפָּא:
an inflammation: Heb. שְׁחִין. [This term] denotes heat, that the flesh became heated by the injury caused it by a blow, not by fire. — [Chul. 8a]
שחין: לשון חמום, שנתחמם הבשר בלקוי הבא לו מחמת מכה, שלא מחמת האור:
and it heals: The inflammation healed, and in its place, another lesion appeared. [Not that the flesh healed, because, were that the case, there would be no lesion.]
ונרפא: השחין העלה ארוכה ובמקומו העלה נגע אחר:
19. and on the place of the inflammation there is a white se'eith, or a reddish white bahereth, it shall be shown to the kohen. יט. וְהָיָה בִּמְקוֹם הַשְּׁחִין שְׂאֵת לְבָנָה אוֹ בַהֶרֶת לְבָנָה אֲדַמְדָּמֶת וְנִרְאָה אֶל הַכֹּהֵן:
A reddish-white bahereth: [meaning] that the lesion is not solid white, but streaked and blended of two colors, white and red.
או בהרת לבנה אדמדמת: שאין הנגע לבן חלק אלא פתוך ומעורב בשתי מראות לובן ואודם:
20. The kohen shall look [at it]. And, behold! its appearance is lower than the skin, and its hair has turned white; so the kohen shall pronounce him unclean. It is a lesion of tzara'ath that has erupted on the inflammation. כ. וְרָאָה הַכֹּהֵן וְהִנֵּה מַרְאֶהָ שָׁפָל מִן הָעוֹר וּשְׂעָרָהּ הָפַךְ לָבָן וְטִמְּאוֹ הַכֹּהֵן נֶגַע צָרַעַת הִוא בַּשְּׁחִין פָּרָחָה:
it appearance is lower than the skin: But its substance is not lower. Rather, because of its whiteness, the lesion [only] appears lower and deeper [than the skin], just as sunlight appears deeper than a shadow. - [Torath Kohanim 13:50]
מראה שפל: ואין ממשה שפל, אלא מתוך לבנוניתו הוא נראה שפל ועמוק, כמראה חמה עמוקה מן הצל:
21. But if the kohen looks at it, and behold! it does not contain white hair, nor does it appear to be lower than the skin, and it is dim, the kohen shall quarantine him for seven days. כא. וְאִם | יִרְאֶנָּה הַכֹּהֵן וְהִנֵּה אֵין בָּהּ שֵׂעָר לָבָן וּשְׁפָלָה אֵינֶנָּה מִן הָעוֹר וְהִיא כֵהָה וְהִסְגִּירוֹ הַכֹּהֵן שִׁבְעַת יָמִים:
22. And if it spreads on the skin, the kohen shall pronounce him unclean. It is a lesion. כב. וְאִם פָּשׂה תִפְשֶׂה בָּעוֹר וְטִמֵּא הַכֹּהֵן אֹתוֹ נֶגַע הִוא:
It is a lesion: Heb. נֶגַע הִוא. [Here, the pronoun is feminine. Since נֶגַע is masculine, however, it requires the masculine pronoun הוּא. But our verse here uses the feminine הִיא because the word “it” is referring to] this se’eith or this bahereth [both of which are feminine].
נגע הוא: השאת הזאת או הבהרת:
23. But if the bahereth remains in its place, not spreading, it is the scar tissue of the inflammation, and the kohen shall pronounce him clean. כג. וְאִם תַּחְתֶּיהָ תַּעֲמֹד הַבַּהֶרֶת לֹא פָשָׂתָה צָרֶבֶת הַשְּׁחִין הִוא וְטִהֲרוֹ הַכֹּהֵן:
in its place: Heb. תַּחְתֶּיה, [lit., “under it,” here meaning:] In its place.
תחתיה: במקומה:
it is the scar tissue of the inflamation: Heb. צָרֶבֶת הַשְּׁחִין, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders it: רוֹשַׁם שִׁיחִנָא, a residual impression of the inflammation, identifiable on the flesh [i.e., a scar]. Every expression of צָרֶבֶת [in Scripture] denotes the contraction of skin that has become shriveled because of heat. Similarly, the verse, “And all faces [from the south to the north] will be shriveled by it” (Ezek. 21:3), retrire in Old French, to contract.
צרבת השחין: כתרגומו רושם שיחנא, אינו אלא רושם החמום הניכר בבשר. כל צרבת לשון רגיעת עור הנרגע מחמת חימום, כמו (יחזקאל כא ג) ונצרבו בה כל פנים, רייטרי"ר בלע"ז [לכווץ]:
it is scar tissue: Heb. צָרֶבֶת, retriyemant in Old French, shriveling.
צרבת: ריטריימינ"ט בלע"ז [כיווץ]:
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Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 108 - 112
• Chapter 108
1. A song, a psalm by David.
2. My heart is steadfast, O God; I will sing and chant praises even with my soul.
3. Awake, O lyre and harp; I shall awaken the dawn.
4. I will thank You among the nations, Lord; I will sing praises to You among the peoples.
5. Indeed, Your kindness reaches above the heavens; Your truth reaches to the skies.
6. Be exalted upon the heavens, O God, [show] Your glory upon all the earth.
7. That Your beloved ones may be delivered, help with Your right hand and answer me.
8. God spoke in His holiness that I would exult, I would divide portions [of the enemies' land], I would measure the Valley of Succot.
9. Mine is Gilead, mine is Manasseh, and Ephraim is the stronghold of my head, Judah is my prince.
10. Moab is my washbasin, I will cast my shoe upon Edom, I will shout over Philistia.
11. Who brings me to the fortified city? Who led me unto Edom?
12. Is it not God, Who has [until now] forsaken us, and did not go forth, O God, with our armies?
13. Give us help against the adversary; futile is the help of man.
14. Through God we will do valiantly, and He will trample our oppressors.
Chapter 109
David composed this psalm while fleeing from Saul. At that time he faced many enemies who, despite acting friendly in his presence, spoke only evil of him; he therefore curses them bitterly.
1. For the Conductor, by David, a psalm. O God of my praise, be not silent.
2. For the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful have opened against me; they spoke to me with a false tongue.
3. They have surrounded me with words of hate, and attacked me without cause.
4. In return for my love they hate me; still, I am [a man of] prayer.
5. They placed harm upon me in return for my favor, and hatred in return for my love.
6. Appoint a wicked man over him; let an adversary stand at his right.
7. When he is judged may he go out condemned; may his prayer be considered a sin.
8. May his days be few; may another take his position.
9. May his children be orphans and his wife a widow.
10. May his children wander about and beg; may they seek charity from amid their ruins.
11. May the creditor seize all that he has, and may strangers plunder [the fruits of] his labor.
12. May he have none who extends him kindness, and may none be gracious to his orphans.
13. May his posterity be cut off; may their name be erased in a later generation.
14. May the iniquity of his fathers be remembered by the Lord, and the sin of his mother not be erased.
15. May they be before the Lord always, and may He cut off their memory from the earth.
16. Because he did not remember to do kindness, and he pursued the poor and destitute man and the broken-hearted, to kill [him].
17. He loved the curse and it has come upon him; he did not desire blessing, and it has remained far from him.
18. He donned the curse like his garment, and it came like water into his innards, like oil into his bones.
19. May it be to him like a cloak in which he wraps himself, as a belt with which he girds himself always.
20. This is from the Lord for the deeds of my enemies, and [for] those who speak evil against my soul.
21. And You, God, my Lord, do [kindness] with me for the sake of Your Name; for Your kindness is good, rescue me!
22. For I am poor and destitute, and my heart has died within me.
23. Like the fleeting shadow I am banished, I am tossed about like the locust.
24. My knees totter from fasting, and my flesh is lean without fat.
25. And I became a disgrace to them; they see me and shake their heads.
26. Help me, Lord, my God, deliver me according to Your kindness.
27. Let them know that this is Your hand, that You, Lord, have done it.
28. Let them curse, but You will bless; they arose, but they will be shamed, and Your servant will rejoice.
29. May my adversaries be clothed in humiliation; may they wrap themselves in their shame as in a cloak.
30. I will thank the Lord profusely with my mouth, and amid the multitude I will praise Him,
31. when He stands at the right of the destitute one to deliver him from the condemners of his soul.
Chapter 110
This psalm records the response of Eliezer, servant of Abraham (to those who asked how Abraham managed to defeat the four kings). He tells of Abraham killing the mighty kings and their armies. Read, and you will discover that the entire psalm refers to Abraham, who merited prominence for recognizing God in his youth.
1. By David, a psalm. The Lord said to my master, "Sit at My right, until I make your enemies a stool for your feet.”
2. The staff of your strength the Lord will send from Zion, to rule amid your enemies.
3. Your people [will come] willingly on the day of your campaign; because of your splendid sanctity from when you emerged from the womb, you still possess the dew of your youth.
4. The Lord has sworn and will not regret: "You shall be a priest forever, just as Melchizedek!”
5. My Lord is at your right; He has crushed kings on the day of His fury.
6. He will render judgement upon the nations, and they will be filled with corpses; He will crush heads over a vast land.
7. He will drink from the stream on the way, and so will hold his head high.
Chapter 111
This psalm is written in alphabetical sequence, each verse containing two letters, save the last two verses which contain three letters each. The psalm is short yet prominent, speaking of the works of God and their greatness.
1. Praise the Lord! I will give thanks to the Lord with all my heart, in the counsel of the upright and the congregation.
2. Great are the works of the Lord, [yet] available to all who desire them.
3. Majesty and splendor are His work, and His righteousness endures forever.
4. He established a memorial for His wonders, for the Lord is gracious and compassionate.
5. He gave food to those who fear Him; He remembered His covenant always.
6. He has declared the power of His deeds to His people, to give them the inheritance of nations.
7. The works of His hands are true and just; all His mandates are faithful.
8. They are steadfast for ever and ever, for they are made with truth and uprightness.
9. He sent redemption to His people, [by] commanding His covenant forever; holy and awesome is His Name.
10. The beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; sound wisdom for all who practice it-His praise endures forever.
Chapter 112
This psalm, too, follows alphabetical sequence, each verse containing two letters, save the last two which contain three letters each. It speaks of the good traits man should choose, and of how to give charity-the reward for which is never having to rely on others.
1. Praise the Lord! Fortunate is the man who fears the Lord, and desires His commandments intensely.
2. His descendants will be mighty on the earth; he will be blessed with an upright generation.
3. Wealth and riches are in his house, and his righteousness endures forever.
4. Even in darkness light shines for the upright, for [He is] Compassionate, Merciful, and Just.
5. Good is the man who is compassionate and lends, [but] provides for his own needs with discretion.
6. For he will never falter; the righteous man will be an eternal remembrance.
7. He will not be afraid of a bad tiding; his heart is steadfast, secure in the Lord.
8. His heart is steadfast, he does not fear, until he sees his oppressors [destroyed].
9. He has distributed [his wealth], giving to the needy. His righteousness will endure forever; his might will be uplifted in honor.
10. The wicked man will see and be angry; he will gnash his teeth and melt away; the wish of the wicked will be ruined.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 38
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya's Lesson
• Tuesday, 23 Adar II 5774 / March 25, 2014
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 38
ואף שבשניהם אור אחד שוה בבחינת הסתר פנים
True, in terms of the “concealment of Countenance” i.e., the degree to which the “Countenance,” the inner aspect of the divine life-force, is concealed, the light i.e., the divine creative life-force is the same in both [body and soul] — it is concealed equally in both.
ולבושים שוים שהאור מסתתר ומתעלם ומתלבש בהם
The garments in which the light hides, conceals and clothes itself are identical [in body and soul].
כי שניהם הם מעולם הזה, שבכללותו מסתתר בשוה האור והחיות שמרוח פיו יתברך
For both [body and soul] are of this world where, throughout the world and all its creatures (spiritual as well as physical), the light and life-force issuing from “the breath of [G‑d’s] mouth” are equally concealed,
בבחינת הסתר פנים, וירידת המדרגות בהשתלשלות העולמות ממדרגה למדרגה בצמצומים רבים ועצומים
by “concealment of the Countenance,” and [by] the descent of the life-force from level to level, by means of numerous powerful tzimtzumim (contractions) through the various levels [constituting] the chain-like succession of worlds,
עד שנתלבש בקליפת נוגה, להחיות כללות עולם הזה החומרי
finally clothing itself in kelipat nogah, in order to give life to the totality of this material world.
The Alter Rebbe has here described the process whereby the divine life-force descends from its lofty, G‑dly origin to the point where it creates and gives life to physical matter; i.e., from “the breath of G‑d’s mouth” — a reference to Malchut of the World of Atzilut — to the World of material Asiyah.
He defines various steps in this process: (1) “descent from level to level”; (2) “numerous tzimtzumim”; (3) “powerful tzimtzumim”; (4) “clothing itself in kelipat nogah.”
Let us examine them individually:
(1) “Descent from level to level:” To reach down to the level of Asiyah, the life-force must first descend form the World of Atzilut to Beriah, thence to Yetzirah, and finally to Asiyah. Within each of these Worlds there are many levels, and the life-force must descend through them all before reaching the next lowest World.
(2) “Numerous tzimtzumim:” Each descent of the life-force entails a “contraction” of the light and life-force, lessening its intensity.
But descent and tzimtzumim alone, no matter how numerous, will still not make possible the creation of a physical being; the divine life-force would still be at a level where anything created by it would be a spiritual being, albeit of a lower grade of spirituality. The creation of physical matter presupposes another condition, viz.:
(3) “Powerful tzimtzumim:” I.e., tzimtzumim which entirely change the character of the life-force (and not only its intensity), to the point where it can create and give life to material beings. But even this type of tzimtzum cannot produce a world like ours, in which it is not apparent that G‑d is the Creator, and where, in fact, G‑d’s creations can be used in defiance of His Will. This is achieved only when —
(4) “The life-force... clothes itself in kelipat nogah” (and thereby also in the other kelipot, as will soon be explained). As defined in the first chapter of Tanya, kelipat nogah is a mixture of good and evil. Therefore, whatever receives its G‑dly life-force through the veil of kelipat nogah (in which the life-force is clothed) can be utilized either for a holy purpose, in serving G‑d’s Will through performing a mitzvah, or for an unholy purpose, in violating His Will through a sinful act.
In summary: Through many descents and powerful tzimtzumim, the G‑dly life-force clothes itself in kelipat nogah, and thereby gives life to all the creatures of this world.
The Alter Rebbe now distinguishes between permitted and forbidden objects. The former receive their life-force directly through kelipat nogah; for the latter to receive the G‑dly life-force clothed in kelipat nogah, it must first descend still further, to be veiled in the three completely impure kelipot.
דהיינו כל דברים המותרים והטהורים שבעולם הזה, וממנה ועל ידה מושפעים דברים הטמאים כי היא בחינה ממוצעת, כנ״ל
This means: (1) all things of this world that are permitted and pure which receive their vitality directly via kelipat nogah; and from and through [kelipat nogah] evolve (2) all impure, forbidden things, which derive their vitality from the three impure kelipot; yet their vitality too, stems from nogah since it is the intermediary level between holiness (where all life originates) and the three impure kelipot, as mentioned above.
We can conclude from this that there is no difference between the life-force of the soul and that of the body in terms of revelation or concealment. Since both body and soul are of this world, the life-force in them is equally concealed in the veil of kelipat nogah.
אף על פי כן, ההארה, שהיא המשכת החיות אשר ה׳ מאיר ומחיה דרך לבוש זה
Nevertheless, the [G‑dly] illumination, meaning the flow of vitality by which G‑d illumines and gives life to all creatures of this world by way of this garment i.e., kelipat nogah,
אינה שוה בכולן, בבחינת צמצום והתפשטות
is not the same for them all, and the difference between the life-force of the various creatures is in terms of contraction and expansion. In some creatures the life-force is constricted and limited, while in others it finds broader expression.
The difference between “concealment” (hester) of the life-force and its “contraction” (tzimtzum) can be expressed as follows:
Suppose one hangs a thick curtain on a window to screen out the sunlight. The light entering the room through the curtain will be of an entirely different quality; in fact it might be described as a mere echo of the original light. This is “concealment”.
If on the other hand, one boards up the window and leaves only a tiny hole by which the light may pass, the light shining through the hole, though greatly restricted, will be the same, qualitatively, as the original light. This is what is meant by “contraction”.
So it is too with regard to our subject: Kelipat nogah is the thick curtain which veils the divine creative power equally from all creatures of this world. This “curtained” light varies, however, from one creature to another in degree of contraction. The Alter Rebbe now goes on to enumerate these differences:
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Negative Commandment 262
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
"He shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or conjugal rights"—Exodus 21:10.
The Torah tells us that if a man marries a Jewish slave-girl, he may not torment her by denying her appropriate food, clothing, or conjugal rights. Rather, he must accord her the rights due to all "the daughters [of Israel]." Thus it is clear that this precept applies to all wives.
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
Negative Commandment 262
Translated by Berel Bell
The 262nd prohibition is that one who purchases a Jewish maidservant and then marries her is forbidden from afflicting her. When I say "from afflicting her," I mean that he may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights (sh'eirah, k'susah, onasah) with the intention of afflicting her and causing her anguish.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights."
This same prohibition also applies to one who has married any Jewish woman; he also is prohibited from afflicting her in any of these three areas, with the intention of causing her anguish and distress.
The source for this is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) regarding the Jewish maidservant [whose master marries her and] whose food, clothing, and conjugal rights may not be withheld, "She must be treated exactly as other [married] women." From here we learn that the [proper] treatment of all married women is that one may not diminish their food, clothing, and conjugal rights.
Our Sages explained this in the Mechilta: "What does the verse, '[She must be treated] exactly as other [married] women' teach us [about the treatment of the maidservant]? It appears to come here to teach us something; but rather it ends up being taught about."3
There it is also explained that sh'eirah refers to food; k'susah is meant literally [i.e. clothing], and onasah refers to conjugal rights.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 21:10.
2.Ex. 21:9.
3.By saying that a maidservant must be treated like a regular married woman, it would seem that we know something about the regular woman that we don't know about the maidservant. In reality, however, the opposite is true: we learn from verse 10 that a maidservant's food, clothing, and conjugal relations may not be diminished. By saying in verse 9 that the maidservant is treated like a regular woman, we learn that the same applies to a regular woman.
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Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: Gezelah va'Avedah Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Six Gezelah va'Avedah - Chapter Six
Halacha 1
The following rules apply when a river washes away beams, stones, wood and the like. If the owners despaired of their return, it is permitted for the finder to keep them, and they become his property. If, however, the finder does not know whether or not the owners have despaired, he is obligated to return the objects. Needless to say, this applies if the owners are pursuing the article.
Halacha 2
Therefore, the same principle is applied when a person saves an article from the bed of a sea, from a flooding river, from gentiles, from a fire, from a lion, from a bear, from a tiger or from a leopard. If one knows that the owners have despaired of the article's return, it may be kept by the finder. If one does not know, one must return it.
Halacha 3
When a person saves an article from a Jewish robber, he may keep it, for we assume that the owners despaired of its return. If, however, he knows that they did not despair of its return, he is obligated to return it.
When, by contrast, a person saves an article from a gentile robber, he is obligated to return it, for we do not assume that the owners despaired of its return. If, however, he knows that they did despair of its return, he may keep it.
Why do we say with regard to Jewish robbers that we can assume that the owners despair, while with regard to gentile robbers we do not assume that they despair? Because the owners know that the gentile authorities will require a robber to return an article obtained by robbery, although there are no witnesses that he committed robbery. Circumstantial evidence and probability are sufficient.
Halacha 4
It is not considered robbery to take fresh cress that grows among flax, because it harms the flax belonging to the owner of the field. If the cress has become dry, taking it is considered robbery, because it has already caused whatever damage it might cause.
If it grows on the border of the rows of flax, it is forbidden to be taken even if it is fresh.
Halacha 5
We have stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon that taking straw and hay that a person has placed in the public domain is not considered robbery. If, however, a piece of feces is placed in the public domain, whether during the time when taking out wastes is permitted or at other times, taking it is considered to be robbery.
Halacha 6
When a person's clothes were exchanged for those belonging to another person at a house of mourning or a place of celebration,he should not use the article in his possession unless the owner comes and returns the original article and takes his own.
Slightly different rules apply if a person's articles become exchanged for another's in the home of a craftsman. If the craftsman's wife or children gave him the articles, or the craftsman gave him the articles and told him: "Take your articles," the person should not use the articles in his possession unless the owner comes and returns the original articles and takes his own.
If, however, the craftsman tells him: "Take this article," he may use it until the owner comes and returns the original articles and takes his own. For it is possible that the article belongs to the craftsman, or that the owner of the article told the craftsman to sell it for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
Our Sages forbade many acts, classifying them as robbery - e.g., one who sets doves into flight or plays dice. If a person transgresses these prohibitions, he is considered a robber by Rabbinic decree.
What is meant by setting doves into flight? A person should not set doves into flight in a settled area, because he will take property belonging to others unjustly. For he will send out a male and it will bring a female from another dovecote; he will send out a female and it will bring a male.
This does not apply to doves alone. Instead, anyone who performs a like act with regard to other fowl, beasts or domesticated animals is considered to be a robber by Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 8
Similarly, our Sages forbade snaring doves within a settled area, for we can assume that the doves belong to others. One may not set a snare for doves unless one places a distance of four milbetween the snare and the settled area. Moreover, if the settled area is composed of vineyards, one should not set a snare even within 100 mil, for the doves belong to the owners of the vineyards.
Similarly, a person should not set a snare among dovecotes even if he owns those dovecotes, or they belong to a gentile or are ownerless, even if the dovecotes are more than 100 mil from the settled area, for the doves from the settled area will come to the area of the dovecotes.
Halacha 9
When constructing a dovecote, a person should position it at least 50 cubits from the village. Similarly, a person should not construct a dovecote in his field unless he owns the property in a radius of 50 cubits on all sides, so the doves will not be drawn forth and damage the fields of others by eating their produce.
If a person purchased a dovecote from another person, he may continue using it even if there is only a distance in which a quarter of a kav of grain can be sown between the dovecote and the beginning of his colleague's field. We do not require him to move it further away.
Halacha 10
What is meant by dice players? People who play with pieces of wood, pebbles, bones or the like and establish a condition that whoever will better a colleague in this sport is entitled to take a certain amount of money from him. This is robbery according to Rabbinic decree. Although the person himself consents to the other person's taking his money, since he is taking it for nothing, as part of the frivolous sport, it is considered to be robbery.
Similarly, those who gamble with regard to domesticated animals, beasts or fowl, making a condition that whosoever's animal will vanquish or outrace the other one's is entitled to take a certain amount of money from him - this and all forms of gambling are forbidden and considered to be robbery by Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 11
When a person plays dice with gentiles, he does not violate the prohibition against robbery. He does, however, violate the prohibition against occupying oneself with empty matters. It is not fitting for a person to spend any of his days occupied in anything other than words of wisdom or pursuits that lead to a stable world.
Halacha 12
The following principle applies with regard to snares for beasts, fowl and fish: If an animal falls into such a snare and another person takes it, this is considered robbery by Rabbinic law. It is not considered to be robbery by Scriptural law because they have not as yet entered the possession of the person who acquires them.
Halacha 13
A river and a stream that flow belong to all people.
When a poor person climbs to the top of an olive tree and beats the branches so that olives that have been forgotten by their owner will fall, he is entitled to them. If another poor person takes them, it is considered robbery by Rabbinic decree.
If the poor person collects them in his hand and then throws them to the earth, taking them is full-fledged robbery, for they have entered the possession of the person who acquires them.
Halacha 14
Unlike chickens and ducks, bees are not considered the private property of a person according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, it is possible to acquire them according to Rabbinic law.
A person who steals a swarm of bees or prevents their owner from taking them if the swarm comes into his domain is considered a robber by Rabbinic decree. Thus, if a swarm of bees leaves a person's property and comes to rest in a colleague's property, the owner of the bees has the right to enter his colleague's field and proceed until he takes his bees. If in his progress he damages his colleague's field, he must reimburse him for the damages. He may not, however, cut down a branch with the intent that later he will reimburse the owner for the damages.
Halacha 15
We accept the statements of a woman or a minor who says, "this swarm of bees left this property," provided that the statements are made in the course of conversation and the owners are pursuing the swarm and asking "Where did it come to rest?"
Although a woman or a minor is not generally accepted as a witness, since the ownership of bees is a matter of Rabbinic law, their testimony is accepted in this case.
Halacha 16
Whenever a person is in possession of property that is considered to be robbed according to Rabbinic law, it cannot be expropriated by judges.
Similarly, if the person denied possession of it and took a false oath to that effect, he is not required to add a fifth, as he is with regard to property acquired by full-fledged robbery.
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• 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Seventeen, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Eighteen, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Nineteen
Ishut - Chapter Seventeen
Halacha 1
[The following laws apply when] a person dies after having been married to several wives. Whichever of his wives was married first has the right to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah [before the others]. None may collect [her due] without taking an oath.1
The [wives who married] last are entitled to [collect their due] only from what remains after [those who married previously collect theirs].2 Even the last wife [to collect] must take an oath [before] she collects what remains.3
Similarly, when there is [also] a promissory note [owed by the husband's estate], if the promissory note was dated before [the ketubot], the promissory note should be collected first. If the ketubot were each dated before [the promissory note], the woman should collect [her due] first, and the person owed the promissory note [should collect from] the remainder.
Halacha 2
When does the above apply? When the land from which [the wives and the creditor] desire to collect was owned by [the deceased] at the time he married the women and took the loan. For [in such a situation], the law is that whoever's document is dated first takes precedence.
If, however, a man married several women in succession, and borrowed money - whether before marrying the women or afterwards - and [then - i.e.,] after marrying and borrowing he purchased land - it should be divided among all of them equally, for all their liens took effect at the same time. At the time he purchased the land, each one established a lien on it. None has precedence over the others.4
Halacha 3
Similarly, if all the ketubot and promissory notes were dated on one day - or at a specific time, in a place where it is customary to [include] the time [of a legal document] - it should be divided among all of them equally; none has precedence over the others.
Under all circumstances, [if one of the creditors or one of the wives] took possession of movable property [belonging to the estate as payment for] the loan or ketubah, the property that they took should not be expropriated from him or her. For no creditor has precedence over another with regard to movable property.5
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when] a person divorces his wife at the time he has an outstanding promissory note, and his creditor and his divorcee come to collect [their due]. If the husband owns [enough] money and land to settle the debt and the obligations stemming from the ketubah, the creditor should be awarded the money,6 and his divorcee should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the landed property.7
If all [the husband] possesses is land that is not of sufficient value to settle both debts, and neither [his divorcee nor his creditor] has a prior claim to this land, it should be given [toward the payment of the debt owed to] the creditor. If any [land] remains [after the settlement of the debt], it should be given to the divorcee. If nothing remains, the divorcee must yield to the creditor. [The rationale is that] the creditor suffered a loss; he [lent] money [to the husband]. The woman, by contrast,did not lose anything. For more than a man desires to marry, a woman desires to be married.
Halacha 5
Similarly, if a man dies leaving a widow and a creditor, and land to which neither of them has a prior claim, the widow must yield to the creditor, and he collects the debt owed him first.
Halacha 6
Since the geonim ordained8 that a woman and a creditor may collect their due from movable property, and as is well known, no creditors are given precedence with regard to movable property9 [the following rules apply]. If the husband did not leave enough movable property to settle both accounts, the creditor is allowed to collect the entire debt [owed him] first. If anything remains [after the settlement of the debt] for the wife to receive [by virtue of] her ketubah, it should be given to her. If nothing remains, the wife must yield.
Halacha 7
[The following rule applies when] nichsei tzon barzel were recorded in a woman's ketubah and she claims that they were lost or taken by her husband. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, a woman is regarded like any other creditor.10
Therefore, she is required to take an oath that she did not take possession of them, give them away or forego the obligation [to her husband]. Afterwards, she receives a share in the estate together with the other creditors.
Halacha 8
When a person who has many wives and who dies or divorces them when none of them has a claim of higher priority to his property than the others, and his holdings are not of sufficient value to pay them each the money due them by virtue of their ketubot, how are his holdings divided? If his holdings are sufficiently valuable to provide only the wife with the ketubah of the least value, or if they are less valuable than that, all of his wives divide [his holdings] equally.
If his holdings are more valuable than that, they should be divided equally to provide the wife with [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah of the least value. Afterwards, the remainder is divided among the remaining wives according to the same pattern.
What is implied? [To explain by example:] A man was married to four wives. The ketubah of the first was for 400 [zuz], that of the second for 300, that of the third for 200, and that of the first for 100. The total sum is thus 1000 [zuz]. [The following rules apply] if he divorces all of them or dies. If his holdings are worth 400 [zuz] or less, they divide his holdings equally, and each receives 100 or less. If his holdings are worth 800 [it would be improper to divide them equally]. For if they were divided equally, the fourth wife would receive 200 [zuz], and [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah is only 100.
What is done instead? 400 [zuz] are set aside and divided equally, each receiving 100. Thus, the fourth wife has received [the full amount due her by virtue of] her ketubah and she withdraws [from the suit]. Thus, 400 [zuz] are left for three wives, each of whom has already received 100 zuz]. If the 400 were divided equally among the three of them [it would be unfair]. For the third wife would receive 233 and [the amount due her by virtue of] her ketubah was only 200. Therefore, 300 [zuz] are separated from the 400, and these are divided equally among the three. Thus, the third wife receives her 200 and withdraws [from the suit]. There remain two wives and 100 [zuz]. This sum is divided equally between the first and second wife. Thus, the first and second wife each received 250 zuz; the third wife received 200; and the fourth wife, 100. This pattern of allocation is followed even when there are 100 [wives].11
Halacha 9
A person who guarantees the value of a woman's ketubah is not obligated to pay [her the money due her in the event that her husband's holdings are not sufficient if he dies or divorces her]. [This applies] even when he affirmed his commitment with a contractual act.12 [The rationale is that] his [intent is to] perform a mitzvah,13 and he did not cause the woman to lose anything.14
If, however, a person guarantees the ketubah of his son and affirms his commitment with a contractual act,15 he is obligated to pay. For a father will make a binding commitment on behalf of his son and decide to obligate himself.
A person who underwrites a ketubah, by contrast, is obligated to pay, even though he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. What is meant by a person who underwrites a ketubah? One who tells a woman: "Marry this man. I will give [the money for] this ketubah." If, however, he says: "I will guarantee this ketubah," "I will pay this ketubah," "I am obligated for it" or the like, he is not liable unless he is the father [of the groom].
When a person divorces a wife [whose ketubah has been underwritten in the above fashion], he must first take a vow16 that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect her ketubah from the underwriter or the [husband's] father, if he guaranteed it. [This precaution was instituted,] lest the husband remarry her,17 and thus the two will [have acquired] the property of [the underwriter] through subterfuge.
Halacha 10
Similarly, a person who consecrates his property and then divorces his wife must take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah] from the person who redeems the property from the Temple treasury.18 [This precaution was instituted,] lest the two attempt to deceive the Temple treasury.19
When, however, a person divorces his wife, and she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah] from the [property that was sold to] purchasers, he is not required to take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Instead, she must take the oath required of her, and then she [is entitled to] collect [her due]. If afterwards she desires, she may return to her husband. For the purchasers know that the property was under lien to the ketubah of a woman, and they caused themselves the loss by taking property that was under such a lien.
Halacha 11
When a husband sold his property, and afterwards the woman agreed to [her husband's] act and wrote the purchaser: "I have no claim against you," she may, nevertheless, collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah by expropriating this property].20 [This applies] even when she affirmed [her commitment] with a contractual act.21 [The rationale is] that she wrote this [statement to the purchaser] only so that there will not be strife between her and her husband. She can [therefore excuse herself,] saying: "I was [merely intending] to please my husband."22
[A different rule applies, however, when the purchaser] enters into an agreement with the woman that she foregoes her lien on this property [before purchasing it from her husband]. If this agreement is affirmed with a contractual act, and afterwards the husband sells the property [to him], [the woman is not entitled to] expropriate this property.23
Similarly, [a woman is not entitled to expropriate property sold by her husband in the following circumstance]. Her husband sold a property [on a previous occasion, and at that time] asked his wife to write the purchaser, "I have no claim to this property," and the woman refused, causing the sale to be nullified.24 [If,] afterwards, the husband sells [property] - whether the same field he had sold previously or another field - to another person, and after the husband's sale the woman agreed, [made a commitment] that she has no claim to this field and affirmed it with a contractual act, she may not expropriate it. For she cannot say, "I did this [merely] to please my husband," since on the previous occasion, when she did not want [to waive her rights], she did not follow her husband's desires.
Halacha 12
[The above ruling is also relevant in the following situation.] A man had two wives. He sold a field, and the purchaser had entered into a contractual act with one of [the husband's] wives, waiving her lien to this field in a manner in which the agreement was effective and the woman no longer had the privilege of claiming, "I did this [merely] to please my husband." Afterwards, the husband died or divorced both his wives.
The second wife may expropriate the property from the purchaser, for she did not enter into any agreement with him. The first wife may then expropriate [the property] from the second wife, for she had a prior claim to it, and she waived her lien only with regard to the purchaser [and not with regard to anyone else]. When the property comes into the possession of the first [wife], the purchaser may expropriate it from her, since she made an agreement with him. [The second wife can then expropriate it from the purchaser,] and the cycle continues until they reach a compromise among themselves.25
Halacha 13
[In the event of her husband's death,] a widow - regardless of whether she was widowed from erusin or nisu'in - may take the oath [required of her], sell land belonging to her husband and collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [The sale may be carried out] in a court of expert judges, or in a court whose judges are not expert,26 provided it consists of three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of land. The responsibility for the sale falls on the estate belonging to the heirs.27 A divorcee, by contrast, may sell [her ex-husband's property] only in a court of expert judges.28
Whenever a woman has property sold in court, she must have it sold after a public announcement has been made. In the laws of loans,29 the guidelines for the sale [of property] will be explained. When, by contrast, a woman sells property without the participation of the court,30 a public announcement [of the sale] need not be made. It is, nevertheless, necessary [to consult] with three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation [of property].
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] a widow sells [her husband's] landed property privately in order to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah:31 If she sold the property at its proper value, the sale is binding.32 [All that is necessary is for] her to take the oath required of widows after the sale.33
The above applies when she sells the property to another individual. If she takes it as her own after evaluating it, her act is of no significance.34 [This applies even when] she had announced the sale of the property [and received no better offer].
Halacha 15
[In the above situation,] if the woman's ketubah was for 200 [zuz], and she sold [property] that was worth 100 [zuz] for 200,35 or property that was worth 200 for 100,36 she has received the value of her ketubah and is no longer owed anything. She must, however, take the oath required of a widow.
If her ketubah was for 100 [zuz] and she sold [property] worth 101 [zuz] for 100, the sale is nullified.37 [This applies] even if she says, "I will [accept the loss and] return the [outstanding] dinar to the heirs."
Halacha 16
If her ketubah was for 400 zuz and she sold [four pieces of property], three that were each worth 100 [zuz] for 100 [zuz] each, and one that was worth 101 zuz for 100 [zuz - the final sale is nullified, but the [first three] are all binding.
Halacha 17
A woman has the privilege of selling [the rights to] her ketubah or giving [them] as a present.38 If her husband dies or divorces her, [the purchaser or the recipient] is entitled to come and collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah].39 If she dies in the lifetime of her husband or [after his death, but] before she takes the oath [required of widows], he is not entitled to anything.
Halacha 18
Although a woman sold [the rights to] a portion of her ketubah, used them as security [for a loan] or gave them as a present, she may sell landed property belonging to her husband and collect the remainder of [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [This sale may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men.
[A woman] may sell [portions of her husband's property] many times. [These sales may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of property.
Halacha 19
When a woman sells [the rights to] her ketubah - whether to another person or to her husband - she does not forfeit the other privileges of her ketubah.40 [As such,] if she has a son, [and she dies before her husband does,] he inherits the worth of her ketubah - [although it] was sold from his father's estate - in addition to his share [in the estate, as will be explained].41
If, by contrast, a woman waives her ketubah in favor of her husband, she forfeits all the privileges associated with her ketubah. [Her husband] is not required to provide her even with her subsistence.42
The waiver of a ketubah [in favor of the woman's husband] need not [be affirmed by] a contractual act nor [be observed by] witnesses,43 just as the forfeiture [of any obligations] does not require affirmation by] a contractual act nor [the observation of] witnesses. Through one's words alone [the forfeiture is binding], provided the statement is made seriously, [in a manner that] can be relied upon, rather than facetiously, as a joke, or rhetorically.44
FOOTNOTES
1.In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:4), the Rambam explains that this oath differs from the oath that all widows take before collecting from an estate, as mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 4, and must be taken even when the wives are not obligated to take that oath. The woman must take this oath for the other widows, stating that she did not collect any money from their husband's estate previously. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16), however, states that the first widow takes an oath to the second, the second to the third, the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the heirs.
2.This procedure is followed even if doing so prevents one of the wives from collecting all that is due her. Indeed, even if there is nothing left for her at all, this order should be followed.
3.This ruling follows the opinion of ben Nanas in the above-mentioned mishnah. It involves a reversal of opinion for the Rambam, who, in his Commentary on the Mishnah favored the view of the other Sages.
4.This refers to a situation where the property owned by the estate is sufficient to cover all the obligations. Otherwise, the creditor takes precedence over the widows, as explained in Halachot 4-5 (Maggid Mishneh).
5.If one of the wives or creditors did not wait for the formal deposition of the estate's property, but took possession of some of the movable property on his or her own initiative, they are allowed to retain possession. For in contrast to landed property, the ownership of movable property is not a matter of public knowledge. Hence a creditor does not know whether another creditor preceded him, and therefore no creditor is given the right to collect his due from such property.
As reflected in the rulings of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:2), this ruling applies only when the movable property was not acquired together with and via the acquisition of landed property (kinyan agav). In the latter situation, the ownership of the movable property also becomes public knowledge, and therefore the order in which the liens were established is significant.
The Ramah quotes the opinion of the Mordechai, who states that, in the latter instance, if one of the widows seizes possession of the property, it should be expropriated from her.
6.For it was money that he gave him.
7.For a woman relies on the fact that she will ultimately be able to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the landed property in her husband's estate (Ketubot 86a).
8.See Chapter 16, Halachah 7.
9.See the notes on Halachah 3 with regard to a kinyan agav.
10.The term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property that the woman brought to the household, for which the husband obligated himself to pay a fixed value. In this instance, since the woman, like a creditor, gave up something of value, she is considered on a higher level of precedence than usual.
11.This pattern is also followed in the allocation of a person's holdings when they are not sufficient to pay the debts he owes, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh, Chapter 20. The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's approach and follows the minority view that the Rambam cites in that source, which maintains that the money should be divided proportionately. The Rambam's view is followed by most other Rishonim (Rashi, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:18).
12.Bava Batra 174b explains that the guarantor is not serious about his commitment. He feels that the couple needs only a small push to get married, and that is his intent, rather than making a serious financial commitment. Even a contractual act, which in other contexts serves as an indication of seriousness of purpose, is not sufficient in this instance.
The Ra'avad and the Tur (Even HaEzer 102) differ, and maintain that if a guarantor affirms his commitment with a contractual act, he is liable. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:6) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Ra'avad.
13.I.e., he brought about the marriage between the couple.
14.As can be deduced from the Rambam's wording, the Maggid Mishneh states that if a person guarantees a woman's nedunyah (the goods she brought to the household), his commitment is binding. For in this instance, the woman did give up something of value.
15.In this instance as well, the Ra'avad and the Tur differ and hold the father liable, even when he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:6) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Ra'avad.
16.Moreover, this vow must be taken al da'at rabbim, based on the judgement of the public, and it thus cannot be nullified (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 102:7).
17.I.e., after the woman collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from him.
18.The woman may not collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the property while it is the possession of the Temple treasury. After it is redeemed, however, she may collect her due from the property. The person who redeems the property must, however, be advised that the property is on lien to a woman's ketubah. (See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 18:7; Hilchot Arachin VaCharamin 7:14-15.)
19.I.e., the woman will collect her husband's property because it is on lien on her ketubah. Afterwards, she will remarry her husband, and he will be able to use his property, because of his rights as the woman's husband.
20.The sale is valid, however, until the woman seeks to claim the property. If, by contrast, the husband sells property that belonged to the woman, or property from which she was designated to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, the sale is nullified immediately (Maggid Mishneh). (See Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.)
21.Note the Ramah (Even HaEzer 90:17), who states that if the woman received money from the purchaser, her commitment is binding.
22.I.e., the woman is saying that her commitment was not sincere and was made only to satisfy her husband.
23.Since she entered into the agreement with the purchaser before her husband made the sale, she cannot excuse herself by saying that she made her statements only to please her husband.
24.The Maggid Mishneh questions the reason for this phrase. When this law is cited in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:17), this phrase is omitted. Nevertheless, based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:5), the Ma'aseh Rokeach maintains that, according to the Rambam, a sale must have been nullified in order for the woman's commitment to be binding later on.
25.A three-way compromise would obviously be most desirable. Nevertheless, any compromise between two of the three parties that causes one to renounce his right to expropriate the property is sufficient to stop the cycle (Chelkat Mechokek 100:26).
26.Our Sages understood that the necessity to pursue judicial proceedings is a cause of hardship and embarrassment for women. They felt that rather than subject his wife to such distress, any husband would willingly grant her the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah by selling his property without appearing in court (Ketubot 97b).
Therefore, rather than require her to take the matter to a formal court, they enabled her to resolve the issue by having the property evaluated by three acquaintances who possess the qualities mentioned above. Although these men would not be considered capable of participating in an ordinary court, an exception was made in this case. If, however, the widow has already remarried, she is required to undergo the ordinary judicial procedure.
27.I.e., should the property be expropriated by a creditor of the deceased, his heirs must reimburse the purchaser.
28.With regard to a divorcee, by contrast, our Sages (op. cit.) felt that her ex-husband would not be disturbed by her being subjected to hardship when this is necessary to protect his own interests.
Although there are Rishonim who maintain that the provision made for a widow also applies to a divorcee, the Rambam's ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:3).
29.See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 12:8,10, which explains that public announcements that a property will be sold are made daily for thirty days (or on Mondays and Thursdays, for a period of sixty days).
30.I.e., without the participation of a formal court.
31.I.e., without even the participation of the three acquaintances mentioned in the previous halachah.
32.Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:1) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it does mention other opinions that differ.
33.It would appear that the Rambam requires her merely to take the oath required of all widows before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. In this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:4) requires the woman to take an additional oath, stating that she did not sell the property for less than its worth.
34.The Maggid Mishneh and Chelkat Mechokek 103:11 state that, according to the Rambam, if the woman has the property evaluated by three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the value of property, she is allowed to take the property as her own. Other opinions differ and maintain that this is possible only when the property is evaluated by a proper Rabbinical court.
35.When selling the property, the woman is considered to be the agent of the heirs, and the profit belongs to them and not to her (Ketubot 98b).
36.In this instance, the woman must accept the loss herself, because she took property that was worth the full value of her ketubah.
37.For she has no right to sell any property that is worth more than her ketubah.
38.The requirement of a ketubah was instituted so that the husband will not consider divorce a light matter, because of the severity of the financial obligation that will result. This remains true even if the woman does not receive the money herself.
39.As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam's words, the woman must first take the oaths required of her as if she herself were to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
40.I.e., her rights to support, medical attention and the like.
41.Chapter 19, Halachah 2.
42.From the Rambam's wording, it appears that the woman is not entitled to her subsistence even during her husband's lifetime, while they remain married. (Note Chapter 10, Halachah 10, which states that if a woman waives her ketubah in favor of her husband, he must write her a new ketubah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:9) quotes the opinion that even during the husband's lifetime, he is not required to support his wife, but appears to favor the view of other Rishonim (Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba), who grant a woman the right to support during her husband's lifetime in such a situation.
See also Chapter 19, Halachah 12, which discusses another consequence of a woman's waiver of her ketubah in favor of her husband.
43.In contrast to their role with regard to marriage and divorce, in financial matters witnesses are necessary only to confirm what happened. Their presence does not make a transaction or a commitment binding, nor hinder it from becoming so. (See Hilchot Mechirah 5:9.)
44.See Hilchot Mechirah 5:11-13.
Ishut - Chapter Eighteen
Halacha 1
A widow is entitled to receive support from the estate [inherited by her husband's] heirs as long as she remains a widow, unless she collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.1 From the time she demands payment for her ketubah in court, however, she is no longer entitled to receive her subsistence.2
Similarly, if she sold [the rights to] her entire ketubah, gave them as security [for a loan] or made her ketubah an ipotiki for another person - i.e., she told him "Collect your debt from here" - she is not entitled to receive her subsistence from the heirs.3 [The above applies] whether these exchanges were made in a court of expert judges or outside a court, or whether they were made in her husband's lifetime or after his death.
If, however, she sold [the rights to] only a portion of her ketubah, she is entitled to receive her subsistence.4 When a widow becomes consecrated5 [to a new husband], she forfeits [her rights to receive] subsistence [from her deceased husband's estate].6
Halacha 2
Just as the woman receives her subsistence from her husband's estate after his death, so, too, is she granted a wardrobe, household utensils and [the right to continue] living in the dwelling she lived in during her husband's lifetime.7 She may continue to make use of the pillows, spreads, servants and maidservants that she made use of during her husband's lifetime.
If the dwelling falls, the heirs are not required to rebuild it.8 [Even] if the widow asked, "Allow me to rebuild it at my own expense," she is not granted this option. Similarly, she may not repair it, nor have the walls sealed [and painted].
She must [continue to] dwell in it in the condition it [was in her husband's passing], or she must leave [and find other accommodations]. Should the heirs sell the dwelling in which a widow is living, their deed is of no consequence.
Halacha 3
If the dwelling [in which she was living fell] or her husband had been renting a dwelling, [the estate must] provide her with a dwelling appropriate to her social standing. Similarly, her subsistence and the wardrobe given her are granted according to her social standing.
If her husband's social standing exceeded her own, she is granted the above according to his social standing. For a woman's [social standing] ascends according to [her husband's] social standing, but does not descend [according to his]. [This applies] even after his death.
Halacha 4
[The widow is given her subsistence as a member of] the household at large. What is the intent of [the latter term]? When five people who would each require a kav of food when they eat alone [live] in the same house and eat together [their needs are reduced]. Four kabbim will be sufficient for them. The same applies with regard to other necessary household [supplies].
Therefore, if a widow says: "I will not leave my father's house. Ascertain the amount of support I deserve for my subsistence and give it to me there," the heirs have the right to tell her: "If you desire to dwell with us, you will receive [a full measure of] support. If not, we will give you only your share as a member of the household at large."
If she explains [that she desires not to live with them] because she is young, and they are young [and the situation would be immodest, her claim is accepted]. [The heirs are required] to provide her with support sufficient for her as she lives alone, while she lives in her father's home.
[Any money] remaining from [the funds granted for] the support of a widow or from her wardrobe belongs to the heirs.9
Halacha 5
[The following laws apply when] a widow becomes sick. If she requires medical treatment that is of an undefined nature, it is considered as support for her subsistence, and the heirs must provide her with it.10 If, however, she requires medical treatment of a limited nature, the treatment [should be paid for by deducting it] from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
If she is taken captive, the heirs are not required to redeem her. [This applies] even if she is a yevamah [and it is a mitzvah for her late husband's brother to marry her]. [Indeed,] even when she was taken captive during her husband's lifetime [and he was thus obligated to redeem her], if he dies while she is in captivity, there is no obligation to redeem her from his estate. Instead, she must be redeemed from her private funds, or she must collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and redeem herself.
Halacha 6
When a widow dies, her late husband's heirs are responsible for her burial. If, however, she had already taken the oath required of a widow [before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah], her heirs inherit her ketubah, and they are required to bury her, and not her late husband's heirs.11
[Her late husband's] heirs are entitled to the income [from the work] of the widow. If the heirs tell the widow, "Take the income you generate in exchange for [receiving] your subsistence," their words are of no substance. If, however, she desires such an arrangement, she is given this prerogative.12
Halacha 7
All the household tasks that a wife performs on behalf of her husband, a widow must perform on behalf of his heirs, with the exception of pouring them drinks, making their beds and washing their face, hands and feet.13
Halacha 8
An ownerless article discovered by a widow and the benefit that accrues from the property that the woman brought to her husband's household belong to the woman herself; the heirs [to her husband's estate] have no right to them at all.14
Halacha 9
The property that [a woman brought to the household as] her nedunyah may be taken by the woman without her having to take an oath.15 The heirs to her husband's estate have no claim with regard to it, except if the nichsei tzon barzel have increased in value during her husband's lifetime. [In this instance,] the increase belongs to the husband16 [and is given to his heirs].
[Even] if a widow dies without taking the oath [required of her], her heirs inherit her nedunyah, even if it is nichsei tzon barzel. If, however, it has increased in value, the increase must go to her husband's heirs.
Halacha 10
When a woman seizes movable property [belonging to her husband's estate, so that she can sell it and use the money] for her subsistence, the property should not be removed from her possession.17 [This applies regardless of] whether she took possession of the movable property during her husband's lifetime or afterwards. Even if she takes possession of a talent of gold18 [it is not removed from her possession].
Instead, the court documents what she has taken into her possession and defines the amount she should be given for her subsistence. Calculations are made, and she is allowed to derive her subsistence from [the property] in her possession until she dies or until she is no longer entitled to support for her subsistence. [At that time,] the heirs are granted the remainder.
Halacha 11
Similarly, if she took possession of movable property during her husband's lifetime [to provide] for [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she may collect [the money due her] from this [property after he dies]. If, however, she took possession of it after her husband's death [to provide] for [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she may not collect [her due] from it.19
Halacha 12
20The geonim ordained that a woman may collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and every obligation due her as a stipulation of her ketubah from the movable property [in her husband's estate]. Based on this [provision], a woman may receive her subsistence from [the sale of] movable property [from her husband's estate].
Nevertheless, if her husband left movable property and she did not take possession of it, the heirs take possession of it, and they must provide her with her subsistence. She has no right to prevent them from taking possession, by saying: "Have the movable property held in the court [so that] I can derive my subsistence from it, lest it become depleted,21 and I will have no means of support." Even if an explicit stipulation was made [by her husband at the time her ketubah was composed] that she could derive her subsistence from this movable property, she cannot prevent [the heirs] from taking possession of it.22 This is the ruling that is universally followed in all courts.
Halacha 13
If, however, her husband left landed property, she has the right to prevent the heirs from selling it. If they do sell it, however, she does not have the right to expropriate [the property] from the purchasers. A widow and a man's daughters may derive their subsistence only from the property that remains in his estate. [In this regard, they have no claim to property that was sold.]23
Halacha 14
If the deceased left many wives, they all have equal rights to receive their subsistence. [This applies] even when he married them one after the other. For the concept of a prior claim does not exist with regard to a claim for support.24
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply with regard to] a widow who has an obligation to marry a yavam.25 During the first three months,26 she derives her subsistence from her deceased husband's estate.27 If it can be determined that she is pregnant, or if it was known that she was pregnant when her husband died, she continues to derive her support [from his estate] until she gives birth. If she bears a viable child, she may continue to derive her subsistence throughout her widowhood as other women do.
If after three months have passed, it is [either] not evident that she is pregnant or she miscarries, she is not entitled to support from either her husband's estate or from her yavam. Instead, she must file a suit against her yavam either to marry her or [to free her of her obligation through] chalitzah.
Halacha 16
If she filed a suit against her yavam either to marry her or [to free her of her obligation through] chalitzah, he appeared in court and then fled or became ill, or if the yavam lives overseas,28 the woman is entitled to derive her support from the property of the yavam without taking any oath at all.29
Halacha 17
If the yavam she was obligated to marry is a minor,30 she is not entitled to receive her support from him until he comes of age and resembles other yevamim.31
Halacha 18
Should a person designate a portion of land to be used for support of his wife after his death, by saying: "This particular place will be for [my wife's] support,"32 he has granted her additional rights with regard to her support.
If the income [from this land] is less than the support due her, she is entitled [to collect] the remainder from the other portions of his estate. If the income [from those portions of land] is less than the support due her, she is entitled to the entire amount.
If, however, he told her, "Your support will come from this particular place," and she remained silent,33 her sole source of support is the income from that particular place. [Her husband] has specificied [the source for] her support.
Halacha 19
There are those who have ruled that when a widow comes to the court to ask for support she should be allotted support without requiring her to take an oath.34 This ruling should not be followed; they have misunderstood [the situation, erroneously associating it with that of] a woman whose husband left on an overseas journey.35
My teachers36 ruled that she should not be allotted support until she takes an oath in court.37 For she is coming to collect from property in the possession of heirs, and anyone who collects property in the possession of heirs may do so only after an oath has been taken. My own conception [also] follows [this approach], and it is proper to rule accordingly.
Halacha 20
When a woman comes to the court to collect support for her subsistence, an oath is administered to her at the outset. The property is then sold without being publicized, and an allotment is made for her subsistence.38
Similarly, she is entitled to sell property for her subsistence without involving a court of expert judges; three trustworthy individuals are sufficient, and the sale need not be publicized. Similarly, if she sells property by herself for its appropriate value to provide for her subsistence, the sale is binding.39 When the heirs come and require her to take an oath, she must take the oath.
Halacha 21
How much property is sold to provide for her subsistence? Enough to provide for her support for six months,40 but not for longer than that. The sale is made on the condition that the purchaser give the widow an allotment for food every thirty days.41 Afterwards, another parcel of property is sold for another six months.
The property should continue to be sold in this manner until all that remains from the estate is [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. She should collect this sum and complete her dealings with the court.42
Halacha 22
When the court allots a widow support for her subsistence, they do not reckon the money she earns until the heirs come and demand it. [If such a demand is made,] and the woman has earned money, they are entitled to it. If not, they have no further claim against her.
I maintain [however] that if the heirs are below majority, the court should make a reckoning with the widow with regard to [her income].43 Just as she is allotted a subsistence, the court declares that her income [should be given to the orphans].
Halacha 23
When a widow does not manifest possession of her ketubah, she is not granted money for her subsistence. [The rationale is that] perhaps she waived her ketubah [in favor of her husband] or sold it or gave it as security [for a loan].44
Even when the heir[s] do not issue such a claim against her, the court makes this claim on their behalf and tells her: "Bring your ketubah, take the required oath and collect [the money for] your subsistence." [This law applies] unless it is not customary [in a particular locale] to compose a document recording the ketubah.45
Halacha 24
[The following laws apply when] a woman and her husband traveled overseas, and she returned, claiming [her husband] died. If she desires, she is entitled to receive her subsistence from her husband's estate, as are other widows. If she desires, she may collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.46
If she claims, "My husband divorced me," her word is not accepted.47 She is, however, entitled to derive her subsistence from his estate until she receives a sum equal to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [The rationale is] that if she is still his wife, she is entitled to receive her subsistence [from his holdings]. If he divorced her, she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, [provided] she manifests possession of her ketubah. Therefore, she may collect the support for her subsistence until she receives [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [From this point on,] she has completed her dealings with the court.
Halacha 25
[The following laws apply when] there is doubt whether a woman was divorced, and her husband died [afterwards]. She is not entitled to receive her subsistence from his estate, for property cannot be expropriated from an heir on the basis of a doubtful claim.48 During her husband's lifetime, by contrast, she is entitled to her subsistence until she is divorced in a complete and binding manner.49
Halacha 26
If a poor50 widow waits two years before she sues for support - or if a rich widow waits three years - it can be assumed that she has waived her claim to support for the previous years.51Therefore, she is not granted support for that period. From the time she issues a claim onward, however, she is entitled to support.
If, however, she waited even one day less [before presenting her claim], she is not considered to have waived her claim, and she may collect her support for the previous years.
Halacha 27
[The following rules apply when] a widow demands support for her subsistence from the heirs, and they claim to have paid her, while she claims that she did not receive payment. Until she remarries, the burden of proof is on the orphans. [If they do not support their claim], the widow is entitled to take a rabbinical oath and collect the money due her.52 If she has already remarried, the burden of proof is upon her. [If she does not support her claim,] the heirs are entitled to take a rabbinic oath that they paid her [and are freed of obligation].53
Halacha 28
The laws governing the extra sum added by the husband to the ketubah are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. Therefore, if a widow demands payment of this additional amount - or sells it, waives payment of it [in favor of her husband] or gives it as security - together with the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, she is not entitled to support for her subsistence.
If she demanded payment for a portion and left a portion uncollected,54 it is as if she demanded payment for a portion of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah and left a portion uncollected.55
Whenever a woman sells or waives payment of her ketubah without making any further specification, she is considered to have sold or waived this additional amount together with the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. For the term ketubah is universally used to refer to both these items.
FOOTNOTES
1.Rashi (Gittin 35a) states that as long as the widow does not contemplate remarriage, she is showing honor to her deceased husband, and therefore our Sages ordained that she should receive her subsistence from his estate. However, by demanding payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, she indicates that she is seeking to remarry. From that time onward, her deceased husband's estate is no longer obligated to support her.
The option whether to continue receiving her subsistence or to demand payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is hers. The heirs cannot compel her to receive the money due her by virtue of her ketubah and cease giving her support (Ketubot 95b; Maggid Mishneh).
2.The Beit Shmuel 93:13 explains that if the woman asks for payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and the heirs refuse to pay her or are unable to do so, she is still entitled to support.
3.In all these instances, it is considered as if she has already collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
4.In this instance, however, the heirs have the right to pay her the remainder of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and thus prevent her from continuing to collect her subsistence from the estate. If this provision were not granted, every widow would collect all the money due her by virtue of her ketubah except for the final p'rutah, and continue to receive support (Rabbenu Asher, quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 93:10.).
5.In the present age, this law applies even when the woman has merely become engaged to a new husband (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 93, as quoted by the Ramah, Even HaEzer 93:7).
6.Even if she has not collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
7.Nevertheless, the dwelling becomes the property of the heirs, and they are also entitled to live there. The widow is, however, granted a place of dignity in the household (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 94:1).
8.Nor are they required to give her a room in it if they rebuild it themselves. Instead, they may rent her a different dwelling, as stated in the following halachah.
9.The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that these funds are granted to the widow, but the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 95:5) follows the Rambam's ruling.
10.The heirs may, however, fix a price with the physician for the widow's treatment, and then she becomes responsible for the financial burden (Ketubot 52b; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 79:2).
11.The rationale is, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, that the burial of the woman was granted her in return for the husband's right to inherit her ketubah. If her heirs can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, they are required to bury her. If not, since the money for her ketubah remains within the husband's estate, his heirs are responsible for her burial.
Although this is the Rambam's view, the Ra'avad and Rabbenu Nissim do not accept it. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 89:4) mentions the Rambam's view and states that it was not accepted by the other authorities.
12.The same laws apply with regard to her husband during his lifetime, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4.
13.These tasks are acts of endearment, appropriate only for a wife to her husband.
14.Although a husband is granted these rights (Chapter 12, Halachah 3), his heirs are not. The husband is granted the rights to the objects his wife finds so that strife will not arise between them. That rationale is not considered with regard to his heirs (Ketubot 96a).
With regard to the rights to her property: as mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, our Sages associated the rights to a woman's property with her redemption from captivity. Since the heirs are not obligated to redeem her, they are not entitled to this privilege.
15.The property that a woman brings to her household belongs to her. Her husband has merely the right to derive benefit from it; he is not the owner. With regard to this property, she is treated like any of the other creditors of the estate, and no oath is required of her.
16.Nichsei tzon barzel is property that the husband has had evaluated, and it is the value of the article for which he obligates himself or his estate. Nevertheless, if the property itself exists, it is given to the woman. If the property has increased in value, however, the husband - and therefore his heirs - are entitled to the increase.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:1) state that this law refers only in an instance where the property that the woman brought to the household - or an article exchanged for it - is still intact. Otherwise, she is required to take an oath before collecting the money paid in lieu of the property.
17.Although the movable property in her husband's estate is not under lien for her subsistence, it is not taken away from her if she takes possession of it. As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, the above applies with regard to the Talmudic era. As stated in the following halachah, it is customary at present to consider movable property as under lien to all a husband's obligations.
There are some Rishonim who differ with the Rambam and equate the provisions for the widow's subsistence with the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (See the following halachah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:20) follows the Rambam's view.
18.I.e., a sum that will last far longer than thirty days - the length of time for which the court sells property to provide her with her subsistence - or perhaps more than the worth of the woman's entire ketubah.
19.Instead, it must be returned to the heirs.
Tosafot (Ketubot 96a) explains the distinction between a woman's taking possession of movable property to collect for her subsistence and the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah as follows. Our Sages ordained that a woman may collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from property that had belonged to her husband and was sold. Therefore, it is likely that the woman will ultimately receive her due. As such, she is required to return the movable property. With regard to her subsistence, however, no such provision was made. Hence, she is given an alternative, to take possession of movable property.
As explained in the following note, according to the Kessef Mishneh and others this law describes the practices of the Talmudic age and not those of the present era.
20.K'nesset HaGedolah explains that, contrary to the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah, Halachah 12 begins here. This is not a continuation of the previous halachah, because there is a difference with regard to the laws governing movable property between the practices of the Talmudic age and those of the present era.
21.For if the heirs sell it, the woman has no claim to the proceeds of the sale, nor may she expropriate the property from the purchasers. Similarly, if the heirs destroy the movable property, she has no claim against them. From an ethical perspective, however, the heirs are enjoined not to sell this movable property.
22.The Chelkat Mechokek 93:36 states that if a specific clause was included in the ketubah regarding this matter, although the widow cannot nullify the sale she has a right to receive her subsistence from its proceeds.
23.The Rashba states that if a clause was added to the ketubah specifically stating that the woman has the right to collect her subsistence from movable property after her husband's death, then she is allowed to expropriate the landed property from the purchasers (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 93:21).
24.Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed texts substitute "movable property" for "claim for support." Apparently, this version reached the Ra'avad who objects, and states - as is the halachah - that the principle applies with regard to landed property as well.
25.I.e., her husband died childless, and he had a brother who is commanded to marry his widow.
26.This time period is granted in order to determine whether the woman was made pregnant by her husband before he died. If three months pass without pregnancy becoming noticeable, we can assume that a child was not conceived.
27.Until she gives birth or miscarries, she is not entitled to remarry, lest she become bound by the obligation of yibbum. Since it is because of her husband that she may not remarry, his estate is required to provide for her (Rashi, Yevamot 41b).
28.The Maggid Mishneh states that the latter two clauses - that the yavam became sick or that he lived overseas - apply also only if the yavam had previously appeared in court. If, however, he has never appeared in court, he is not under any obligation.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 160:1) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the yavam is obligated to support her in the latter instances only when he consented to marry her. If he desired to perform chalitzah, he is under no obligation to her.
29.There is no need for her to take an oath that the yavam had not given her property. For since they have not established a relationship, such suspicions are unfounded (Ketubot 107b).
30.Who should not perform the mitzvah of yibbum until he attains majority.
31.Since he is forbidden to marry her, he is not required to support her. Nor is she entitled to support from her husband's estate. Yevamot 41b says that it is as if she is penalized from heaven.
32.The Rambam is referring to statements made by a dying man with regard to the allocation of his property. If these statements are observed by witnesses, they are binding. This practice, referred to as a matnat sh'chiv me'ra (the oral will of a dying man) is described in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:2).
33.I.e., since it is possible that the woman will suffer a loss, she has the right to protest. If, however, she remained silent, we assume that she accepted her husband's decision.
34.The reference is to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who ruled this way in a responsum. His opinion is favored also by the Ra'avad, the Ramban, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher. Ketubot 105a states that the woman should take an oath "at the end and not at the beginning." They explain that this refers to a woman whose husband has died. The woman should take the oath when she comes to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and not when she comes asking for support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:19) appears to favor this view, and the Ramah states that it should be followed.
35.See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.
36.Rav Yosef Migash.
37.They interpret Ketubot (loc. cit.) to be referring to a woman whose husband traveled overseas. She should not take an oath at the outset - i.e., when she comes to collect her subsistence - but rather at the end, if her husband comes and requires this of her. See Chapter 12, Halachah 21.
The dissenting authorities refute this interpretation, explaining that it is far more reasonable to require an oath of a woman when her husband is alive than after his death, for after his death it is very likely that the woman will soon take an oath to collect her ketubah.
38.In contrast to the sale of property so that the woman can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Chapter 17, Halachah 13), in this instance the sale need not be publicized. The rationale is that the woman needs the money for her subsistence immediately and should not be required to wait.
39.Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Ramban differ with the Rambam on this point. Although their opinion is also mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:25), it appears that the Rambam's opinion is favored.
40.In this manner, a large amount of property is sold. If a smaller amount were sold, the parcel of land would be too small to fetch a proper price.
41.I.e., the purchaser gives the widow only enough money to support herself for thirty days at a time. The rationale is that if she remarries or seeks to collect her ketubah, she is no longer entitled to receive support for her subsistence. Since there is the possibility that this will happen at any given time, she is given support for only a limited period of time. In the event that she remarries, the remainder of the money left from the sale is given to the heirs (Rashi, Ketubot 97a).
42.The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is simply proper advice for the woman. For she can sell all the land necessary to provide her with the money due her by virtue of her ketubah at one time, while to collect her subsistence she must sell the land in small parcels. If she chooses, however, she may take the latter alternative.
43.Since the heirs are orphans, the court is obligated to look after their interests. Therefore, it is obligated to ensure that the woman's earnings are given to them.
44.In all these cases, the widow is no longer entitled to receive support from her deceased's husband's estate, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18.
45.In this instance, since the probability is that the woman would not have been given a document recording her ketubah, the fact that she does not have such a document in her possession is not considered detrimental to her position.
46.See Chapter 16, Halachah 31.
47.See Hilchot Gerushin 12:1.
48.Since her status is questionable, she is not entitled to support. For this is granted only to a man's wife and not to his divorcee.
49.Since divorce is dependent on the husband's initiative, as long as a woman's status is in question - and for that reason she may not marry another person - he is required to continue to support her (Rashi, Ketubot 97b).
50.Ketubot 96a mentions two years and three years, stating that the difference is between a rich widow (who can afford to wait) and a poor one; alternatively, between a brash widow (who is not embarrassed to appear in court) and a modest one (who will hesitate before coming). The Rambam does not mention the second opinion at all (although generally, when the Talmud mentions two opinions, he rules according to the second opinion), nor does the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:14). Rabbenu Asher and the Chelkat Mechokek 93:26, however, do mention the latter opinion.
51.The Rashba maintains that if, however, the woman took property as security, or if she borrowed money to be repaid with the money she will receive for her support, she is still entitled to receive the money retroactively. This opinion is cited by the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.).
52.As long as she has not remarried, the property of her husband's estate is considered under lien to her and in her possession. Hence, she is given this privilege.
53.For once she remarries, the property is considered to be in the possession of the heirs. Hence, they are given this privilege.
54.The same law applies if the widow demanded payment of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, but did not demand payment for the additional amount.
55.See Halachah 1.
Ishut - Chapter Nineteen
Halacha 1
One of the provisions of [a woman's] ketubah is that her male offspring will inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah and the nedunyah she brought to the household as nichsei tzon barzel.1 Afterwards, these children divide the remainder of the estate with their brothers equally.2
Halacha 2
What is implied? A man married a woman whose ketubah and nedunyah were together valued at 1000 [zuz]. She bore a son, and then she died within [her husband's] lifetime. Afterwards, the man married another woman whose ketubah and nedunyah were together valued at 200 [zuz]. She bore a son, and then she died within [her husband's] lifetime. Afterwards, the man died, leaving an estate worth 2000 [zuz].
His first wife's son should inherit 1000 [zuz] by virtue of his mother's ketubah, and his second wife's son should inherit 200 [zuz] by virtue of his mother's ketubah, and the remainder they should [both] inherit and [divide] equally. Thus, the first wife's son will receive 1400 [zuz], and the second wife's son will receive 600 [zuz].
Halacha 3
When does the above apply? When [the estate] is worth at least one dinar more than the amount [due the children by virtue of their mothers'] ketubot. If, however, there is not a dinar or more remaining [in the estate],3 the entire estate should be divided equally [without applying the provision mentioned above].
[The rationale is that] if [the children of one of the mothers] will inherit [what is due them by virtue of] their mother's ketubah, [the other mother's children] will inherit [what is due them by virtue of] their mother's ketubah, and at least one dinar will not remain to be divided among the heirs, then this provision [which is of Rabbinic origin] will supersede [entirely] the equal division of the estate among the children that is required by Scriptural law.
Halacha 4
The same law applies to a man who married many wives, whether one after the other or several at one time. If they have all died in his lifetime, and they have all borne male children from this man, if his estate contains at least a dinar more than the ketubot of all his wives, each of the [sets of] sons inherits the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah. The remainder [of the estate] is divided equally.
Halacha 5
[Should the estate not be large enough to satisfy the obligations of both ketubot and the additional dinar,] and the heirs say: "We will increase the value of our father's estate so that there will be more than a dinar [in addition to the value of the ketubot]," so that they can collect [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah, their request is not accepted. Instead, the estate should be evaluated in court according to its value at the time of their father's death [and the decision rendered on the basis of this figure].
Even if the value of the estate increases or decreases [in the time between] the death of their father and the actual division of the property, [the decision whether to grant the heirs their mothers' ketubot] depends only on the value of the estate at the time of their father's death.
Halacha 6
If the value of the estate was a dinar or more than the sum of the two ketubot, each of the sons inherits the money due his mother by virtue of her ketubah. Even if there is a promissory note due against the estate for the amount that exceeds the value of the ketubot, it is not considered to have reduced [the value of the estate].
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when a man] was married to two wives. One died within his lifetime and one died afterwards, and he has sons from both wives. Although the value of the estate he left does not exceed the value of the two ketubot, the sons of the [wife who died after her husband's death] have the right to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah first, [provided] she took the oath required of a widow before she died.
[The rationale is] that they do not inherit their mother's ketubah by virtue of this provision, but rather through the Torah's laws of inheritance.4 Afterwards, the sons of the wife [who died during her husband's lifetime] inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of her] ketubah on the basis of this provision. If anything remains in the estate afterwards, it should be divided equally.5
If [the woman who died after her husband] died before she was able to take the oath [required of her], only the sons of [the woman who died in her husband's lifetime] are entitled to inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah.6 The remainder is divided equally.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when a man] was married to two wives, fathered sons with both of them and then died. If the wives died after the father did, but after taking the oath [required of widows], each of their sons is entitled to inherit [the money due his mother by virtue of] her ketubah according to the Torah's laws of inheritance, and not by virtue of this provision. Therefore, in this instance it is not significant whether the estate is more valuable than the sum of the two ketubot or not. [The claim of] the heirs of the wife married first takes precedence over the claim of the wife married afterwards.
If neither of the wives took [the required] oath, the sons [of both women] divide the entire estate equally. Neither has the right to inherit [his mother's] ketubah, for a widow is not entitled to her ketubah until she takes the [required] oath.7
Halacha 9
[In the above instance,] if one of the widows took the [required] oath and one did not, the sons of the one who took the oath inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah first, and then the remainder of the estate is divided equally [among all the heirs].8
Whenever [a son] inherits [the money due his mother by virtue of] her ketubah after she died in his father's lifetime, he does not have the right to expropriate property that was sold to others; [he inherits] only property in the possession of the estate.
Halacha 10
Among the provisions of the ketubah is that after the death of their father, [his wife's] daughters have the right to receive support for their sustenance from their father's estate9 until they become consecrated10 or until they reach the age of bagrut.11
If a daughter reaches the age of bagrut but has not been consecrated, or if she is consecrated before she reaches the age of bagrut,12 she is not entitled to receive her sustenance.
When a daughter receives her sustenance from her father's estate after his death, her earnings and the ownerless objects she discovers belong to her, not to her brothers.13
Halacha 11
An allotment of support, garments and living quarters should be made for a man's daughters from his estate, just as it is made for his widow. His [landed property] may be sold to provide his daughters with their sustenance and garments without a public announcement, just as it is sold to provide for his widow's sustenance and garments.
[There is, however, one difference between the two.] The allotment to the widow is made according to her social standing and that of her husband, while his daughters are given only their necessities. The daughters are not, however, required to take an oath.14
Halacha 12
A man's sons are not entitled to inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah, nor are his daughters entitled to receive their sustenance according to the provisions mentioned above unless they manifest possession of the document [recording their mother's] ketubah.15 If, however, they do not manifest possession of the document, they are not entitled to anything, for it is possible that their mother waived her ketubah [in favor of her husband]. In a locale where it is not customary to record the ketubah in a document, however, the children are entitled to [the benefits stemming from] these provisions.
Halacha 13
When, shortly before his passing, a man orders that one of the provisions of [his wife's] ketubah be ignored - e.g., he said: "My daughters should not derive their sustenance from my estate," "My widow should not derive her sustenance from my estate," or "My sons should not inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah" - his words are of no consequence.16
[Although] person gives his entire estate to others through an oral will17 [all the provisions of his wife's ketubah must be met]. [The rationale is] that the transfer of property through an oral will does not take effect until after death, as will be explained.18Thus, the mandate of the will and the obligations of the estate due to the provisions [of the ketubah] take effect simultaneously. Therefore, the widow and [the deceased's] daughters receive support for their sustenance from the estate, and [the deceased's] sons inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah if she dies during her husband's lifetime.19
Halacha 14
A daughter of a girl who nullifies her marriage through mi'un is considered like any other daughter, and she is entitled to support for her sustenance [after her father's death].20 Nevertheless, the daughter of a yevamah,21 the daughter of a sh'niyah,22 the daughter of one's arusah,23 and the daughter of a woman who has been raped24 are not entitled to support for their sustenance after their father's death by virtue of this provision. During their father's lifetime, however, he is obligated to support them like any of his other sons and daughters.
Halacha 15
A man who consecrates a girl who is receiving her sustenance from her brothers is obligated to provide her with support from the time of consecration onward. [Although a husband is ordinarily required to support his wife only after nisu'in, an exception is made in this instance, because] the girl is not entitled to support from her brothers after she becomes consecrated. Nor is she past the age of majority, when she is capable of providing for her own sustenance, but rather she is a minor, or a na'arah.25 [Hence, her husband is obligated to support her, because] a manwould not desire that the woman he consecrated be put to shame [by having to] wander and beg [for her support].26
Halacha 16
Should a daughter marry and then leave her husband through the rite of mi'un, or be divorced, or be widowed - even if she is obligated to marry a yavam - since she returns to her father's home and has not reached the age of bagrut, she is entitled to support from her father's estate until she reaches the age of bagrut or until she becomes consecrated.27
Halacha 17
When a mandies leaving both sons and daughters, the sons inherit his estate,28 and it is their responsibility to provide their sisters with support until they reach the age of bagrut, or until they become consecrated.
When does this apply? When the estate is large enough to provide both the sons and the daughters with their sustenance until the daughters reach the age of bagrut. This is called an ample estate.
If, however, the estate contains only a lesser amount, the funds necessary to support the daughters until they reach the age of bagrut are set aside,29 and the remainder is given to the sons. If the estate contains only enough to provide for the support of the daughters, the daughters are entitled to their sustenance until they reach bagrut or until they become consecrated, and the sons should beg for their support.30
Halacha 18
When does the above apply? When the estate contains landed property. If, however, the estate contains movable property, since it is only by virtue of the ordinance of the geonim that the daughters are entitled to derive their support from the movable property, the sons and the daughters should receive their support equally from this meager estate. For with regard to movable property, [the daughters] were given the right to be considered like the sons, but not superior to them. The geonim have ruled in this manner.31
Halacha 19
If [a man] left an ample estate of landed property, and afterwards [the value of the estate decreased until] it became meager, the heirs have already acquired [the property].32
If [the estate was deemed] meager [in value] at the time of the man's death, and [the value increased afterwards]33 to the point that it is considered ample, the heirs are given the right to inherit it. Even if the value did not increase, if the sons sold an estate that was considered meager, the sale is binding.34
Halacha 20
If the estate was ample but a debt was owed, or [the man] had made a provision with his wife, [promising] to support her daughter [from a previous marriage], the debt or [the obligation to] support the widow's daughter35 does not prevent the estate from being considered ample.36 Instead, the sons inherit the entire estate. [It is their responsibility] to pay the creditor his debt, to support the widow's daughter for the time stipulated and to support their sisters until they reach majority, or until they become consecrated and leave their domain.37
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when a man] left a widow and a daughter, either from her or from another wife, and his estate is not large enough to provide support for both of them. The widow should derive her support from the estate, and the daughter should beg [for alms].38
Similarly, I maintain that support for [a man's] daughter takes precedence over [his] sons' inheritance of their mother's ketubah if she died in her husband's lifetime, although both [rights] are provisions of the ketubah. [This can be derived by making] an inference from a more serious responsibility to a less serious one: If the inheritance [of a man's estate to which the sons are entitled] by virtue of Scriptural law is superseded by [the obligation to provide] the daughter with her support, how much more so should [the sons'] inheritance of [their mother's] ketubah, which is only a Rabbinic ordinance, be superseded by [the obligation to provide] the daughter with her support.
Halacha 22
When a man dies and leaves older daughters and younger daughters, without leaving a son, we do not say that the younger daughters should be granted their sustenance until they reach the age of bagrut, and then the entire estate should be divided equally. Instead, the entire estate should be divided equally [immediately].
FOOTNOTES
1.This and the laws that follow are relevant only in situations where a man has children from two different wives and he did not divorce the wives before their death. When a man's wives die before he does, he inherits their nedunyah and is not required to pay them the money due them by virtue of their ketubot. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that a woman's children should benefit from her investment in the household and the commitment made to her. Hence, before the father's estate is divided among all the heirs, the children of each of his wives are entitled to receive the monies mentioned above.
2.Note the statements of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 111:16), who states that this practice is not followed in the present age. The rationale is that the practice was instituted in the Talmudic era to encourage a father to give his daughter a generous nedunyah. (For because of this practice, he can be assured that the money he gives will remain within his family.) In the present age, however, this encouragement is not necessary, for it has become customary for parents to endow their daughters generously before marriage.
3.As the Rambam stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 7, the children's inheritance of the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah applies only when there is enough landed property remaining in the estate to pay for both ketubot.
From the wording of the Rambam, it would, nevertheless, appear that it is sufficient that the additional dinar be movable property; it need not be landed property. This indeed is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:14). If this is the intent, it would reflect a change in the Rambam's decision from his ruling in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:3).
4.I.e., once the woman took the oath required of her, the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be justly hers. Her children then inherit her property.
5.In this instance, they are entitled to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah even if the estate is not large enough to allow for the division of the inheritance according to Scriptural law afterwards (Ketubot 91a; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 111:8).
6.Since the woman did not take the oath required of a widow, there is room to suspect that her husband already gave her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or that she took possession of it herself. Therefore, her sons are not entitled to collect her ketubah.
7.Nor are the sons entitled to inherit the money due their mothers by virtue of their ketubot based on the provision mentioned above, because this is applicable only when the woman dies in her husband's lifetime.
8.The sons of the widow who did not take the oath are not entitled to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah.
9.See Chapter 21, Halachah 18, which states that the daughters are granted this right even when their father divorced their mother before his death, and they took up residence with their mother.
10.Once the daughter is consecrated by a husband, her support is no longer the responsibility of her father's estate. (See also Halachah 15.)
11.During a man's lifetime, he is required only to provide his daughters with their sustenance until the age of six (Chapter 12, Halachah 14). After his death, however, they are entitled to support until the age of twelve and a half.
12.From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that he maintains that a girl forfeits her right to support if she becomes consecrated while she is a minor. This ruling is not universally accepted by the Rishonim. The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Chananel and the Rashba as saying that she does not forfeit this right in such an instance. The Tur (Even HaEzer 112) mentions a third view: that if she consecrates herself, she forfeits her support, but if her brothers are involved in her consecration, she is still entitled to support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:3) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah mentions the other opinions.
13.Although during his lifetime, her father is entitled to her earnings and the objects she discovers, this right is not given to his sons. The rationale is that the father would prefer for his daughter to receive her own earnings than to have them given to his sons.
14.Although a widow is not required to take an oath when collecting her support, this is because she is required to take an oath when she collects the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Therefore, one might think that a daughter would be required to take such an oath. Indeed, the Beit Shmuel 112:15, based on the statements of Tosafot, requires that such an oath be taken.
15.The Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh question the Rambam's ruling with regard to the support the man's daughters receive for their sustenance. They maintain that this support is not dependent on whether the mother receives the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (and therefore, the waiver of that payment has no effect). The Rambam's opinion appears to be based on his statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, in which he states that a woman who waives payment of her ketubah forgoes all the provisions of her ketubah. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention this issue, and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 112:1) cites the opinion of the Ra'avad.
16.The rationale is that the obligation took effect at the time of his marriage, and he is incapable of negating it at a later time.
17.An oral will refers to a person's disposition of his property verbally before his death. As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapter 8, our Sages ordain that such a disposition of property is acceptable.
18.Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:8. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 8:9.)
19.The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam with regard to the rights of a person's sons and daughters. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:17) follows the Rambam's view.
20.This ruling has been contested by other authorities on several grounds. First, the Ra'avad challenges the Rambam, asking: how is it possible for a girl who nullifies her marriage through mi'un to have a child? By definition, mi'un is possible when a girl is a k'tanah, a minor (see Chapter 4, Halachah 7), and while she is a minor it is impossible for her to conceive a child. He explains that Ketubot 53b is speaking about a girl who leaves her husband through mi'un - she is entitled to return to her deceased father's home and receive support for her sustenance.
Second, the Maggid Mishneh accepts the fact that a girl can conceive a child while a minor, but asks: Since the mother nullifies the marriage through mi'un, it is as if her husband had never had any obligations to her at all. Her ketubah and all of its provisions are nullified entirely. Why then is his estate liable for the support of his daughter after his death? See the Beit Shmuel 112:11 for a possible explanation.
21.When a man dies childless, his brother (the yavam) inherits his entire estate, and that estate is responsible for the ketubah of the yevamah (the widow who is married by the yavam). If a yevamah bears a girl, the deceased brother's estate is not liable for the girl's support after her father's (the yavam's) death, for she is not the daughter of the deceased brother. Nor is the yavam's estate responsible for her support, for he never gave a ketubah to the yevamah.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:5), which states that if the deceased brother did not leave an estate, the yavam must give the yevamah a ketubah from his own property. Hence, in this instance, his estate becomes liable for the support of his daughters.
22.Since the mother's marriage is forbidden, our Sages did not grant her a ketubah. Ketubot 54a questions whether they also did not grant her the rights stemming from the ketubah's provisions, including her daughter's right to support in this instance. Since the question is left unresolved, her daughter is not granted this privilege.
23.Who was born before the couple entered the phase of nisu'in (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). Since the ketubah takes effect only after nisu'in, this daughter is not entitled to support.
24.The term anusah refers to a virgin who was raped. The rapist is required to marry her and is forbidden to divorce her (Deuteronomy 22:28). Since he is forbidden to divorce her, she is not granted a ketubah. Our Sages (ibid.) question whether or not she was not granted the provisions of a ketubah. This question is also left unresolved, and her daughter is not granted the privilege of deriving her livelihood from her father's estate. Similarly, the daughter of a woman who was raped and never married by the rapist is not entitled to support from her father's estate.
25.The Beit Shmuel 112:6 interprets the Rambam's wording as implying that after the girl reaches the age of bagrut, she is required to support herself.
The Beit Shmuel also mentions that other Rishonim interpret Ketubot 53b, the source for this halachah, differently. According to their interpretation, the husband is not liable for the girl's support. If the husband desires, continues the Beit Shmuel, he may rely on this opinion.
26.It is as if he had made a commitment to support her when he consecrated her.
27.The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:4) cites the Rambam's view. The Ramah differs, however, citing the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that from the time a girl becomes consecrated after her father's death, and onward, she is not entitled to support from his estate.
28.The estate is given to them, and they may use it as they see fit. They are, however, forbidden to sell the property except in an extreme situation - e.g., to use the proceeds to redeem captives (Ramah, Even HaEzer 112:11). Moreover, if the court sees that the sons are spending lavishly and abusing the resources of the estate, they should set aside the daughters' portion.
29.They are entrusted to a guardian appointed by the court.
30.For it is more common for males to beg for alms than for females to do so (Ketubot 67a). This principle is also followed with regard to the distribution of charity. If there is a needy male and a needy female, and the communal fund cannot provide both of them with their needs, the female is given priority (Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 8:15).
31.The Ramah (Even HaEzer 112:12) states that according to the custom to include within the ketubah a clause stating that the obligations of the estate are binding on movable property as well, the estate is considered to be meager and the support for the daughters is set aside.
32.I.e., the property should remain in the possession of the sons, and they must continue to provide for their sisters' sustenance. It is not expropriated from the sons and given to a guardian.
33.The Maggid Mishneh mentions a difference of opinion with regard to the interpretation of the word "afterwards." Rashi (Ketubot 91a) maintains that this means "after the man's death, but before the matter is brought to the court and a guardian appointed." Others (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rashba) maintain that even after a guardian is appointed, the property can be given to the heirs if its value increases.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:14) quotes the Rambam's wording without relating to this issue. The Ramah mentions the latter view.
34.The opinion of Tosafot, et al. is that even if the property has been entrusted to a guardian, if it is sold by the heirs the sale is binding. The Ramah (loc. cit.), however, appears to follow the view that the sale is binding only before the property has been entrusted to a guardian.
According to Rabbenu Asher, the daughters have no lien on the money received from the sale. Although Rav Hai Gaon differs, it appears that Rabbenu Asher's view is favored (Chelkat Mechokek 112:30).
35.See Chapter 23, Halachah 17.
36.The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:15) states that the payment of the money due the widow by virtue of her ketubah is, however, considered in determining whether the estate is ample or not.
37.This ruling entitles the sons to derive their sustenance from the estate together with the daughters until the funds are depleted.
38.According to the Rambam, the property set aside for the widow's support should be given to a third party, and he should follow the guidelines set in Chapter 18, Halachah 21 (Maggid Mishneh).
There are opinions that maintain that property is set aside for the widow's support only when there is a son and a daughter, and the estate is too meager to support both of them. In that instance, since property is being set aside for the daughters' support, and the widow takes precedence over the daughters, property is also set aside for her. When property is not required to be set aside for the daughters, it is not set aside for the widow's support either. Instead, she, the daughters and the sons, all derive their sustenance from the estate together.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:4) mentions both opinions, and the Beit Shmuel 93:9 states that the latter view is favored by most authorities. This difference of opinion also leads to another (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 112:15): Does the obligation to support the widow cause the estate to be considered meager or not? According to the Rambam it does, but according to the other authorities it does not.
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Hayom Yom:
• Tuesday, Adar Sheini 23, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Sh'mini, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 108-112.
Tanya: To be sure (p. 181)...and expansion. (p. 183).
My father once said to a Rav,1 who labored in avoda and was an especially diligent scholar: A Rav must remember at all times and at every moment that he always stands on the threshold between being one of those who bring merit to the public and, G-d forbid, one of those who cause the public to sin - the threshold between the loftiest of heights and the most abysmal depth. All issues must touch him at the innermost core of his soul, literally, because his very soul is at stake.
Compiled and arranged by the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, of righteous memory, in 5703 (1943) from the talks and letters of the sixth Chabad Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, of righteous memory.
FOOTNOTES
1."Senior Rabbi"; a practising Halachic (Torah-law) authority in a congregation, city. etc.
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Daily Thought:
Plant Now True, we have faith that Moshiach will be here tomorrow, because he will come today in the very next moment. And if so, why build a house? Why plant a tree? Why teach a child? But this is the journey that leads to the world to come. At every stop, we do all this place demands of us. At each encampment, we build our tabernacle anew—even if just for the moment. For each moment is an entire world, as precious as eternity.
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