TODAY'S LAWS & CUSTOMS:
• COUNT "FOURTEEN DAYS TO THE OMER" TONIGHT
Tomorrow is the fourteenth day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer for tomorrow's date tonight, after nightfall: "Today is fourteen days, which are two weeks, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all day tomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day is Shavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Malchut sheb'Gevurah -- "Receptiveness in Restraint"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" -- Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed, Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• JERICHO'S WALL COLLAPSES (1273 BCE)
On the seventh day of the encirclement of Jericho (see Jewish History for the 22nd of Nissan), the Jews, accompanied by the Holy Ark, circled the city seven times. After the blowing of the shofar, the walls miraculously crashed and sank, leaving the city open and unprotected. Jericho was easily conquered, becoming the first fortified Canaanite city to fall to the Children of Israel in their conquest of the Promised Land.
Links:
Joshua chapter six with commentary
Crossing the Jordan
• BUCHENWALD LIBERATED BY AMERICAN FORCES (1945)
The Buchenwald concentration camp was founded in 1937 near the town of Weimar, Germany. Approximately 250,000 prisoners were incarcerated in this camp until its liberation in 1945.
Weimar is a German city known for its highly cultured citizenry. It was the home of many of the upper class intellectual members of Europe’s society. Among others, Goethe, Schiller, Franz Liszt, and Bach lived in Weimar.
Though technically not an extermination camp, approximately 56,000 prisoners were murdered in Buchenwald (not including many others who died after being transferred to other extermination camps). They died from vicious medical experiments, summary executions, torture, beatings, starvation, and inhuman work conditions. The camp was also known for its brutality. German officers would force inmates to eat their meager soup ration off the mud on the ground; would keep them standing in the cold until they froze to death; and they would even use skin of dead inmates to make lamp shades.
On the 29th of Nissan 1945 the Sixth Armored Division of the United States Third Army liberated the camp.
Among the more famous inmates who spent time in Buchenwald are Rabbi Israel Meir Lau, former Chief Rabbi of Israel, and Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel.
Links:
The Holocaust
Ethics Based on Torah
• REBBE'S CALL (1991)
On the eve of Nissan 28, 5751 (April 11, 1991), the Lubavitcher Rebbe issued an emotional call to his followers, and to the world Jewish community, to increase their efforts to bring Moshiach and the ultimate redemption. Spoken in an anguished voice and couched in uncharacteristically personal terms, the Rebbe's words deeply shocked the Chassidim present in the Rebbe's synagogue and reverberated worldwide. "How is it that the Redemption has not yet been attained?" the Rebbe cried. "That despite all that has transpired and all that has been done, Moshiach has still not come? What more can I do? I have done all I can to bring the world to truly demand and clamor for the Redemption...The only thing that remains for me to do is to give over the matter to you. Do all that is in your power to achieve this thing--a most sublime and transcendent light that needs to be brought down into our world with pragmatic tools... I have done all I can. I give it over to you. Do all that you can to bring the righteous redeemer, immediately! I have done my part. From this point on, all is in your hands..."
Links:
Transmission
Moshiach: an Anthology
Moshiach and the Future Redemption
DAILY QUOTE:
One does not tire of counting diamonds.--The Lubavitcher Rebbe, when asked how he could stand on his feet for hours greeting the thousands who came to see him
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Emor, 2nd Portion Leviticus 21:16-22:16 with Rashi
• Chapter 21
16. And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, טז. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
17. Speak to Aaron, saying: Any man among your offspring throughout their generations who has a defect, shall not come near to offer up his God's food. יז. דַּבֵּר אֶל אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אִישׁ מִזַּרְעֲךָ לְדֹרֹתָם אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בוֹ מוּם לֹא יִקְרַב לְהַקְרִיב לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו:
his God’s food: Heb. לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו, his God’s food. Any meal is termed לֶחֶם, as in, “…made a great feast (לְחֵם) ” (Dan. 5:1).
לחם אלהיו: מאכל אלהיו, כל סעודה קרויה לחם, כמו (דניאל ה א) עבד לחם רב:
18. For any man who has a defect should not approach: A blind man or a lame one, or one with a sunken nose or with mismatching limbs; יח. כִּי כָל אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר בּוֹ מוּם לֹא יִקְרָב אִישׁ עִוֵּר אוֹ פִסֵּחַ אוֹ חָרֻם אוֹ שָׂרוּעַ:
For any man who has a defect should not approach: [But this prohibition has already been stated (preceding verse). The meaning here is that] it is not fitting that he should approach, like “[When you offer up a blind [animal]…a lame or a sick one, is there nothing wrong?] Were you to offer it to your governor, [would he accept you or would he favor you? says the Lord of Hosts” (Malachi 1:8). Thus, just as an animal with a defect is not fitting as an offering, neither is a person with a defect fit for presenting it.]
כי כל איש אשר בו מום לא יקרב: אינו דין שיקרב, כמו (מלאכי א ח) הקריבהו נא לפחתך:
with a sunken nose: Heb. חָרֻם. [This term means] that his nose is sunken between his two eyes, such that he applies [eye shadow to] his two eyes with one stroke [i.e., his nose is so sunken that its bridge does not intercede between the two eyes]. — [Torath Kohanim 21:48; Bech. 43b]
חרם: שחוטמו שקוע בין שתי העינים, שכוחל שתי עיניו כאחת:
with mismatching limbs: Heb. שָׂרוּעַ [This term means] that one of his limbs is bigger than its counterpart, [e.g.,] one of his eyes is large, and one of his eyes is smaller [normal], or one thigh longer than its [normal] counterpart. — [see Sifthei Chachamim; Bech. 40b]
שרוע: שאחד מאיבריו גדול מחברו, עינו אחת גדולה ועינו אחת קטנה, או שוקו אחת ארוכה מחברתה:
19. or a man who has a broken leg or a broken arm; יט. אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בוֹ שֶׁבֶר רָגֶל אוֹ שֶׁבֶר יָד:
20. or one with long eyebrows, or a cataract, or a commingling in his eye; dry lesions or weeping sores, or one with crushed testicles כ. אוֹ גִבֵּן אוֹ דַק אוֹ תְּבַלֻּל בְּעֵינוֹ אוֹ גָרָב אוֹ יַלֶּפֶת אוֹ מְרוֹחַ אָשֶׁךְ:
one who has unusually long eyebrows: Heb. גִּבֵּן, sourcils in French, [meaning] that his eyebrow (גַּבִּין) hairs are [abnormally] long and droop. — [Bech. 43b]
או גבן: שורצילו"ש בלע"ז [בעל גבות ארוכות] שגביני עיניו שערן ארוך ושוכב:
cataract: Heb. דַּק. [This means] that over his eyes he has a [thin] membrane (דּוֹק) which is called teile, tele, toyle, or tele in Old French, as in, “He Who stretches out [the heavens] like a curtain (דֹּק) ” (Isa. 40:22). — [Torath Kohanim 21:52; Bech. 38a]
או דק: שיש לו בעיניו דוק שקורין טיל"א [קרום], כמו (ישעיה מ כב) הנוטה כדוק:
a commingling in his eyes: Heb. תְּבֻלַּל, something that mixes (מְבַלְבֵּל) the [colors of the] eye, e.g., a white line that extends from the white [of the eye], piercing the “ring” [viz., the iris,] i.e., the [colored] annulus that encompasses the black [center of the eye, viz., the pupil,] called prunelle in French. This line pierces the iris and enters the black [pupil]. The Targum renders תְּבֻלַּל as חִילִיז, derived from חִלָּזוֹן, because this line resembles a worm. And so did the Sages of Israel call it [when they enumerate] the defects of a firstborn animal [in the context of whether it may be slaughtered outside the Temple]: עֵינָב, נָחָשׁ, חִלָּזוֹן, a worm-shaped, snake-shaped [growth], or a berry-shaped [growth]. — [Torath Kohanim 21:52, Bech. 38a, Mishnah Bech. 6:2]
או תבלל: דבר המבלבל את העין, כגון חוט לבן הנמשך מן הלבן ופוסק בסירא, שהוא עוגל המקיף את השחור, שקוראים פרוניל"א [אישון], והחוט הזה פוסק את העוגל ונכנס בשחור. ותרגום תבלול חיליז, לשון חלזון, שהוא דומה לתולעת אותו החוט. וכן כינוהו חכמי ישראל במומי הבכור חלזון נחש עינב (בכורות לח א):
or dry lesions or weeping sores: These are various types of boils.
גרב וילפת: מיני שחין הם:
dry lesions: Heb. גָרָב. This is [equivalent to] חֶרֶס, a skin disease [whose lesions are] dry [both] underneath and on the surface.
גרב: זו החרס, שחין היבש מבפנים ומבחוץ:
weeping sores: Heb. יַלֶּפֶת. This is the Egyptian lichen. And why is it called יַלֶּפֶת ? Because it bonds (מְלַפֶּפֶת) itself more and more [to the stricken person] until the day of [his] death. It is wet on its surface and dry underneath. Now, in another passage, a lesion wet on the surface and dry underneath is called גָרָב, as the verse says (Deut. 28:27), “weeping sores (גָרָב) and with dry lesions (חֶרֶס).” (But how is that so, when here, we have explained גָּרָב not only to be a completely dry lesion but also to be synonymous with חֶרֶס)? The answer is that] when גָּרָב is mentioned alongside חֶרֶס [as in Deut. 28:27], then the term גָרָב means [with wet lesions on the surface, and the term חֶרֶס refers to dry lesions both on the surface and underneath (see Rashi there)]. However, when it is mentioned alongside יַלֶּפֶת, then חֶרֶס [the dry lesion], is called גָרָב. Thus is the matter explained in Bech. (41a).
ילפת: היא חזזית המצרית. ולמה נקראת ילפת שמלפפת והולכת עד יום המיתה, והוא לח מבחוץ ויבש מבפנים. ובמקום אחר קורא לגרב שחין הלח מבחוץ ויבש מבפנים, שנאמר (דברים כח כז) ובגרב ובחרס, כשסמוך גרב אצל חרס קורא לילפת גרב, וכשהוא סמוך אצל ילפת קורא לחרס גרב, כך מפורש בבכורות (מא א):
one who has crushed testicles: Heb. מְרוֹחַ אֶשֶׁךְ [This term is to be understood] according to the Targum [Onkelos] as מְרִיס פַּחֲדִין, meaning: his testicles are crushed, like, “the sinews of his testicles (פַּחִדָיו) are knit together” (Job 40:17).
מרוח אשך: לפי התרגום מריס פחדין, שפחדיו מרוססים, שביצים שלו כתותין. פחדין כמו (איוב מ יז) גידי פחדיו ישורגו:
21. Any man among Aaron the kohen's offspring who has a defect shall not draw near to offer up the Lord's fire offerings. There is a defect in him; he shall not draw near to offer up his God's food. כא. כָּל אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר בּוֹ מוּם מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן לֹא יִגַּשׁ לְהַקְרִיב אֶת אִשֵּׁי יְהֹוָה מוּם בּוֹ אֵת לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו לֹא יִגַּשׁ לְהַקְרִיב:
Any man…who has a defect [shall not draw near…]: [But has this prohibition not already been stated in verse 17? This verse, however, comes to] include other types of defects [not specified in our passage]. — [Torath Kohanim 21:54]
כל איש אשר בו מום: לרבות שאר מומין:
There is a defect in him: As long as he has the defect, he is unfit [for the Holy Service]. However, if his defect goes away, he is fit [to serve]. — [Torath Kohanim 21:55]
מום בו: בעוד מומו בו פסול, הא אם עבר מומו כשר:
his God’s food: Any food is termed לֶחֶם.
לחם אלהיו: כל מאכל קרוי לחם:
22. His God's food from the most holy and from the holy ones, he may eat. כב. לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו מִקָּדְשֵׁי הַקֳּדָשִׁים וּמִן הַקֳּדָשִׁים יֹאכֵל:
from the most holy: [This phrase] refers to [those sacrifices] with a higher degree of holiness;
מקדשי הקדשים: אלו קדשי הקדשים:
and from the holy ones, he may eat: These are the sacrifices with a lesser degree of holiness. Now, if sacrifices with a higher degree of holiness are mentioned [that a kohen with a defect may eat of them], why is it necessary to state [the same of] sacrifices with a lesser degree of holiness? [The answer is that] had they not been stated, I would have concluded [the following]: Indeed [a kohen] with a defect may eat of the sacrifices with a higher degree of holiness, since we find that these were allowed to [be eaten even by] a non- kohen , since Moses [who was not a kohen ,] ate of the flesh of the sacrifices of the investitures. Consequently, perhaps the most holy sacrifices carry with them this leniency]. The breast and thigh of sacrifices with a lesser degree of holiness, however, shall not be eaten [by a kohen with a defect], for we do not find an instance where a non- kohen takes a share of these!“ Therefore, Scripture states here ”or from the holy" [thereby permitting a kohen with a defect to eat from the sacrifices with a lesser degree of holiness as well]. In this way the matter is explained in [Tractate] Zevachim (101b).
ומן הקדשים יאכל: אלו קדשים קלים. ואם נאמרו קדשי הקדשים למה נאמרו קדשים קלים, אם לא נאמרו הייתי אומר בקדשי הקדשים יאכל בעל מום, שמצינו שהותרו לזר, שאכל משה בשר המלואים, אבל בחזה ושוק של קדשים קלים לא יאכל, שלא מצינו זר חולק בהן, לכך נאמרו קדשים קלים. כך מפורש בזבחים (קא ב):
23. But he shall not come to the dividing curtain, nor shall he draw near to the altar, for he has a defect, and he shall not desecrate My holy things, for I am the Lord Who sanctifies them. כג. אַךְ אֶל הַפָּרֹכֶת לֹא יָבֹא וְאֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ לֹא יִגַּשׁ כִּי מוּם בּוֹ וְלֹא יְחַלֵּל אֶת מִקְדָּשַׁי כִּי אֲנִי יְהֹוָה מְקַדְּשָׁם:
But [he shall not come] to the dividing curtain: to sprinkle the seven sprinklings [of blood] towards the dividing curtain. — [see Lev. 4:6]
אך אל הפרכת: להזות שבע הזאות שעל הפרכת:
[Nor shall he draw near] to the altar: [This refers to] the outer altar [(see Exod. 27:18) in the courtyard of the Sanctuary, as opposed to the inner incense altar (see Exod. 30:110) which was situated just outside the dividing curtain, all within the Holy enclosed area of the Sanctuary. Now, had our verse been referring to the inner altar, it would not have been necessary to specify the prohibition of the dividing curtain, for the dividing curtain was even closer in to the holy of holies. However, since it refers to the outer altar,] both [the altar and the curtain] are necessary to be written here; this matter is explained [in full] in Torath Kohanim (21:58).
ואל המזבח: החיצון. ושניהם הוצרכו להכתב, ומפורש בתורת כהנים:
And he shall not desecrate My Holy Services: for if [a kohen with a defect] did perform the Holy Service, [his service is considered] desecrated [and] thereby deemed invalid. — [Torath Kohanim 21:60]
ולא יחלל את מקדשי: שאם עבד, עבודתו מחוללת להפסל:
24. Moses told [this to] Aaron and his sons, and to all of the children of Israel. כד. וַיְדַבֵּר משֶׁה אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו וְאֶל כָּל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
Moses told: [Literally, our verse would read: “Moses spoke to Aaron and his sons, and to all of the children of Israel.” But what did he speak? He told them] this [entire] commandment [i.e., all the laws of the kehunah delineated in this passage].
וידבר משה: המצוה הזאת:
[to] Aaron and his sons, and to all the children of Israel: [But why command “all the children of Israel” about laws pertaining only to kohanim ?] So that the courts of law [comprising non- kohen judges] should warn kohanim [who have defects, to separate themselves from the Holy Service]. — [Midrash Hagadol, and see Torath Kohanim, Glosses of Gra]
אל אהרן ואל בניו ואל כל בני ישראל: להזהיר בית דין על הכהנים:
Chapter 22
1. The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: א. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
2. Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they shall separate themselves from the holy [sacrifices] of the children of Israel, which they sanctify to Me, so as not to desecrate My Holy Name. I am the Lord. ב. דַּבֵּר אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו וְיִנָּזְרוּ מִקָּדְשֵׁי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא יְחַלְּלוּ אֶת שֵׁם קָדְשִׁי אֲשֶׁר הֵם מַקְדִּשִׁים לִי אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
they shall separate themselves: The term נְזִירָה means only separation [from something]. Likewise, Scripture says, “and draws away (וְיִנָּזֵר) from following Me” (Ezek. 14:7), and, “they drew backwards (נָזֹרוּ)” (Isa. 1:4). [Thus, here, the meaning is that] when kohanim are in a state of uncleanness, they shall separate themselves (וְיִנָּזְרוּ) from the holy things. — [Torath Kohanim 22:62] Another explanation: [The commentators are at a loss to explain this expression, because the following comment easily agrees with the preceding one. See below.] “shall separate themselves from the holy [sacrifices] of the children of Israel which they sanctify to Me, so as not to desecrate My Holy Name.” [Now, the verse, in the order it is written, reads: “Aaron and his sons…shall separate themselves from the holy (sacrifices) of the children of Israel, so as not to desecrate My Holy Name-which they sanctify to Me.”] Transpose the verse and explain it [as follows]: shall separate themselves from the holy [sacrifices] of the children of Israel which they sanctify to Me, so as not to desecrate My Holy Name." [Another explanation] (see Sifthei Chachamim):
וינזרו: אין נזירה אלא פרישה, וכן הוא אומר (יחזקאל יד ז) וינזר מאחרי, (ישעיה א ד) נזורו אחור, יפרשו מן הקדשים בימי טומאתן. דבר אחר: וינזרו מקדשי בני ישראל אשר הם מקדישים לי ולא יחללו את שם קדשי, סרס המקרא ודרשהו, אשר הם מקדשים לי ולא יחללו את שם קדשי:
which they sanctify to Me: [This comes] to include offerings that the kohanim themselves sanctified [to the Holy Temple, offerings from which kohanim in the state of uncleanness shall also separate themselves]. [According to this explanation, no transposition is necessary, and the verse is to be explained as follows: When the kohanim are unclean, they must separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel, i.e., those consecrated by the children of Israel, and also from those consecrated by the kohanim themselves. Accordingly, the words, “another explanation,” appear at this point, not as they appear in the Mikraoth Gedoloth. According to Mizrachi and others, and according to all manuscripts and incunabula editions, these words do not appear at all. - [Torath Kohanim 22:64]
אשר הם מקדשים לי: לרבות קדשי כהנים עצמן:
3. Say to them: Throughout your generations, any man among any of your offspring who, while his defilement is still upon him, comes near to the holy sacrifices that the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord that soul shall be cut off from before me. I am the Lord. ג. אֱמֹר אֲלֵהֶם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם כָּל אִישׁ | אֲשֶׁר יִקְרַב מִכָּל זַרְעֲכֶם אֶל הַקֳּדָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר יַקְדִּישׁוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לַיהֹוָה וְטֻמְאָתוֹ עָלָיו וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מִלְּפָנַי אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
Any man…who…comes near [to the holy sacrifices]: The phrase “comes near” really means “eating.” And so we find that a warning against eating holy sacrifices while in a state of uncleanness, is expressed as “touching,” [as is written], “she shall not touch anything holy” (Lev. 12:4) [which is] a warning against eating [anything holy, while in a state of uncleanness]. And our Rabbis have learnt [that these terms mean “eating” in this context] by way of a hekesh [a rule of Scriptural exposition, whereby, via Rabbinical transmission, laws from two passages are linked through their appearance in the same verse (Mizrachi).] Now, it is impossible to say that one is liable [to the penalty of excision] if he [merely] touches [holy sacrifices while he is in the state of uncleanness], for we find the penalty of excision for eating [holy sacrifices while one is unclean] stated in the passage “Command Aaron” (Lev. 7:20-21) [and moreover, there, we find] the penalty of excision for eating mentioned twice, one next to the other (see Lev. 7:20-21), and, if one would be liable just for touching, it would be unnecessary for Scripture to mention liability for eating. In a similar vein, [this explanation that our verse here refers to eating and not touching,] is expounded in Torath Kohanim (22:69), [as follows]: “…But is there [a case of] one who touches [holy sacrifices], that he should be liable [to the penalty of excision?!] If so, why does Scripture say, ”comes near“? [Because it teaches us that for eating holy sacrifices, one incurs the penalty of excision] only when they become fit to be ”brought near“ as an offering-for one becomes liable only if one [eats holy sacrifices] while one is unclean, after the parts that makes the sacrifice permissible to be eaten has been offered up [i.e., only when the sacrificial fats have been offered up and the blood has been dashed, or the offering of the fistful of flour in a meal-offering, or the sanctification in a vessel of parts of other offerings (see Hagahoth Uvei-urei HaGra on Torath Kohanim ; Mizrachi), is the holy sacrifice allowed to be eaten by the kohanim, and not before]. Now, one may ask: [Since our verse, as well as the two verses in Lev. 7:20-21, are all referring to eating holy sacrifices when one is unclean,] why is it necessary for Scripture to mention three times the penalty of excision for kohanim [eating holy sacrifices] when they are in an unclean state? These have already been expounded upon in Tractate Shevuoth (7a): ”One of them is [needed] to state the general law; one of them is [needed] to state a particular case [namely, the peace-offering, in order to preclude the eating of certain clean foods that are not sacrificed on the altar which do not have the punishment of excision; and one of them is needed to teach us that…when the verse says, “he incurs guilt” (Lev. 5:2), and may bring a קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד, a sliding-scale sacrifice, Scripture is referring to…a person…who, while in an unclean state, enters the Sanctuary or eats of its holy sacrifices].
כל איש אשר יקרב: אין קריבה זו אלא אכילה, וכן מצינו שנאמרה אזהרת אכילת קדשים בטומאה בלשון נגיעה בכל קדש לא תגע (ויקרא יב ד), אזהרה לאוכל. ולמדוה רבותינו מגזירה שוה. ואי אפשר לומר שחייב על הנגיעה, שהרי נאמר כרת על האכילה בצו את אהרן (ויקרא ז כ - כא) שתי כריתות זו אצל זו, ואם על הנגיעה חייב לא הוצרך לחייבו על האכילה, וכן נדרש בתורת כהנים וכי יש נוגע חייב, אם כן מה תלמוד לומר יקרב, משיכשר לקרב, שאין חייבין עליו משום טומאה, אלא אם כן קרבו מתיריו. ואם תאמר שלש כריתות בטומאת כהנים למה, כבר נדרשו במסכת שבועות אחת לכלל ואחת לפרט וכו' (שבועות ז א):
while his defilement is still upon him: [meaning:] While the person is in a state of uncleanness. But I might think that Scripture is referring to the flesh, while the flesh is unclean,“ and the verse is speaking of someone in a clean state who eats unclean flesh [of holy sacrifices]. However, one is forced to learn the meaning of the verse from the literal meaning [of this phrase ”while its/his uncleanness is still upon it/him"]-i.e., the verse is speaking of something from which uncleanness can be removed, and this is a person, because a person can cleanse himself in a mikvah [while meat cannot be purified once it is defiled. — [Torath Kohanim 22:69; Zev. 43b]
וטמאתו עליו: וטומאת האדם עליו, יכול בבשר הכתוב מדבר, וטומאתו של בשר עליו, ובטהור שאכל את הטמא הכתוב מדבר, הרי כבר נאמר (ויק' ז יט) והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל, אלא על כרחך ממשמעו אתה למד, במי שטומאתו פורחת ממנו הכתוב מדבר, וזהו האדם שיש לו טהרה בטבילה:
shall be cut off: One might suggest that [the offender is to be “cut off”] from one place to another, i.e., he shall be cut off from his place [of abode] and exiled (Be’er Basadeh) to settle in another place. Scripture, therefore, continues, “I am the Lord”- [as if to say:] “I am in every place” [and even if someone is sent into exile, I am also in that other place. Hence, the “cutting off” here refers to excision of the soul, that he will die before his time (Be’er Basadeh)]. — [Torath Kohanim 22:69]
ונכרתה וגו': יכול מצד זה לצד זה, יכרת ממקומו ויתיישב במקום אחר, תלמוד לומר אני ה', בכל מקום אני:
4. Any man whatsoever among Aaron's offspring if he has tzara'ath or has had a discharge, he shall not eat of the holy sacrifices, until he cleanses himself. And one who touches anyone who has become unclean [by contact with a dead] person, or a man from whom semen issued, ד. אִישׁ אִישׁ מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן וְהוּא צָרוּעַ אוֹ זָב בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לֹא יֹאכַל עַד אֲשֶׁר יִטְהָר וְהַנֹּגֵעַ בְּכָל טְמֵא נֶפֶשׁ אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר תֵּצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ שִׁכְבַת זָרַע:
among Aaron’s offspring: I know only that Aaron’s offspring [are meant]. How do I know that he himself [and every Kohen Gadol (Ramban on verse 17, Rash MiShantz on Torath Kohanim) is also included]? Therefore, Scripture states [the apparently superfluous word “he” in the clause], “if he has tzara’ath ”; for one might think that since he is allowed to offer up holy sacrifices when he is an onen (Rashi Lev. 21:12 above), he would also be allowed to offer them up if he has tzara’ath or if he had a discharge. Scripture, therefore, says, “if he…” [to include Aaron and all other Kohanim Gedolim]. — [Torath Kohanim 22:70]
מזרע אהרן: אין לי אלא זרעו, גופו מנין, תלמוד לומר והוא צרוע, שיכול הואיל ומקריב אונן יקריב צרוע וזב, תלמוד לומר והוא:
until he cleanses himself: [This means] sunset [after his immersion]. Or, perhaps, it means only immersion [in a mikvah, and that suffices]? It says here, וְטָהֵר, and it says below (verse 7), וְטָהֵר, “When the sun has set, he becomes clean (וְטָהֵר).” Just as there (in verse 7), [it means] sunset, here too, [it means] sunset [that he may not eat holy things until the sun sets after his immersion]. — [Torath Kohanim 22:72]
עד אשר יטהר: ביאת השמש, או אינו אלא טבילה, נאמר כאן וטהר, ונאמר למטה וטהר (פסוק ז) ובא השמש וטהר, מה להלן ביאת שמש, אף כאן ביאת שמש:
anyone who has become unclean [by contact with a dead] person: Heb. טְמֵא נֶפֶשׁ, one who has become unclean by [contact with] a dead person.
בכל טמא נפש: במי שנטמא במת:
5. or a man who touches any creeping creature through which he becomes unclean or a person through whom he becomes unclean, whatever his uncleanness ה. אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בְּכָל שֶׁרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יִטְמָא לוֹ אוֹ בְאָדָם אֲשֶׁר יִטְמָא לוֹ לְכֹל טֻמְאָתוֹ:
[A man who touches] any creeping creature through which he becomes unclean: [The seemingly superfluous phrase “through which he becomes unclean” means,] the [minimum] size [of a part of a creeping creature] through which [contact] one is rendered unclean (Torath Kohanim 22:76) -namely, through the volume of a lentil. — [Chag. 11a]
בכל שרץ אשר יטמא לו: בשיעור הראוי לטמא, בכעדשה:
or a person: a corpse. - [Torath Kohanim 22:76] [That is to say, cleansing after contact with a dead body takes place only after immersion and sunset on the seventh day. — [Sifthei Chachamim]
או באדם: במת:
through whom he becomes unclean: The size through which [contact] one is rendered unclean-namely, the volume of an olive. [Oholoth 2:1]
אשר יטמא לו: כשיעורו לטמא, וזהו כזית:
whatever his uncleanness: [This comes] to include one who comes into contact with a man or woman who has had a discharge, or with a menstruating woman or with a woman who has given birth, [or with one who has tzara’ath]. — [Torath Kohanim 22:76]
לכל טומאתו: לרבות נוגע בזב וזבה, נדה ויולדת ובמצורע:
6. the person who touches it shall remain unclean until evening, and he shall not eat from the holy things unless he has immersed his flesh in water. ו. נֶפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תִּגַּע בּוֹ וְטָמְאָה עַד הָעָרֶב וְלֹא יֹאכַל מִן הַקֳּדָשִׁים כִּי אִם רָחַץ בְּשָׂרוֹ בַּמָּיִם:
The person who touches it: i.e., who touches any one of these unclean beings.
נפש אשר תגע בו: באחד מן הטמאים הללו:
7. When the sun sets, he becomes clean, and afterwards, he may eat of the holy things, for it is his food. ז. וּבָא הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ וְטָהֵר וְאַחַר יֹאכַל מִן הַקֳּדָשִׁים כִּי לַחְמוֹ הוּא:
and afterwards, he may eat of the holy things: This is expounded on in [Tractate] Yev. (74b) as referring to terumah, that [the purified kohen] may eat it after sunset [of the day of his cleansing].
ואחר יאכל מן הקדשים: נדרש ביבמות בתרומה, שמותר לאכלה בהערב השמש:
he may eat of the holy things: [meaning, some of the holy things,] but not all holy things [thus, our verse refers specifically to terumah, but not sacrificial flesh, which the kohen who was stricken with tzara’ath or had a discharge may not eat until he brings his sacrifices on the morrow]. — [see preceding Rashi]
מן הקדשים: ולא כל הקדשים:
8. He shall not eat a carcass or anything that was torn, thereby becoming unclean through it. I am the Lord. ח. נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה לֹא יֹאכַל לְטָמְאָה בָהּ אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
He shall not eat a carcass or anything that was torn, thereby becoming unclean through it: [Scripture] warned here regarding the [implications of one’s] uncleanness, as follows: If one ate a carcass of a clean bird, which [as explained (Rashi above 17:15),] does not defile through contact or by lifting it but defiles only when it is swallowed into the esophagus-this person is prohibited to eat holy things. Now, [a bird that had been torn (טְרֵפָה) and mortally wounded by a wild animal, if slaughtered properly, does not convey uncleanness. So why is it mentioned here?] We must say that וּטְרֵפָה is [stated only to teach us that the carcass of a bird conveys uncleanness only] of the species that can be prohibited because of טְרֵפָה, thus excluding the carcass of an unclean bird, whose species can never fall under the category of טְרֵפָה [because it is prohibited even if it was perfectly healthy]. — [Torath Kohanim 17:125126; see Rashi Lev . 17:15]
נבלה וטרפה לא יאכל לטמאה בה: לענין הטומאה הזהיר כאן, שאם אכל נבלת עוף טהור, שאין לה טומאת מגע ומשא אלא טומאת אכילה בבית הבליעה, אסור לאכול בקדשים. וצריך לומר וטרפה, מי שיש במינו טרפה, יצא נבלת עוף טמא שאין במינו טרפה:
9. They shall keep My charge and not bear a sin by [eating] it [while unclean] and thereby die through it since they will have desecrated it. I am the Lord Who sanctifies them. ט. וְשָׁמְרוּ אֶת מִשְׁמַרְתִּי וְלֹא יִשְׂאוּ עָלָיו חֵטְא וּמֵתוּ בוֹ כִּי יְחַלְּלֻהוּ אֲנִי יְהֹוָה מְקַדְּשָׁם:
They shall keep My charge: [and refrain] from eating teruman while one’s body is unclean. — [Sanh. 83a]
ושמרו את משמרתי: מלאכול תרומה בטומאת הגוף:
and thereby die through it: we learn that it is death by the hands of Heaven [which is meted out “through it,”] meaning that the sin of eating while unclean brings about the death penalty by itself without any other prerequisites, such as witnesses or warning. That could be only death by the hands of Heaven. - [Gur Aryeh ; Sanh. 83a; also see Sifthei Chachamim]
ומתו בו: למדנו שהיא מיתה בידי שמים:
10. No non kohen may eat holy things; a kohen's resident and his hireling may not eat holy things. י. וְכָל זָר לֹא יֹאכַל קֹדֶשׁ תּוֹשַׁב כֹּהֵן וְשָׂכִיר לֹא יֹאכַל קֹדֶשׁ:
No [non-kohen may] eat holy things: The text is referring to terumah, for the entire passage speaks of it (see Rashi verse 7).
לא יאכל קדש: בתרומה הכתוב מדבר, שכל הענין דבר בה:
a kohen’s resident and his hireling: [could be erroneously read as “a kohen who is a resident or a hireling.” However, the correct meaning here is:] The resident of a kohen or one who is hired by a kohen. [I. e., the word תּוֹשַׁב means “the resident of.”] Therefore, תּוֹשַׁב is vocalized with a patach [under the “shin,”] because it is in the construct state. [Had it been in the absolute state, simply meaning “resident,” the “shin” would have been vocalized with a kamatz .] Now, who is considered a “resident” [in this context]? This is a Hebrew slave whose ear has been bored [i.e., one who elected to remain a slave after six years, and resides with his master (see Exod. 21:16)], thereby becoming acquired [by his master] until the Jubilee year (see Rashi Exod. 21:6). And who is considered a hireling [in this context]? This is someone acquired for a [set] number of years [to be a Hebrew slave] and who is to be released after six years (see Exod. 21:2). The text comes to teach you here that he does not become his master’s physical property [and is, therefore, not permitted] to eat terumah . — [Torath Kohanim 22:86; Yev. . 70a]
תושב כהן ושכיר: תושבו של כהן ושכירו, לפיכך תושב זה נקוד פתח, לפי שהוא דבוק. ואיזהו תושב, זה נרצע שהוא קנוי לו עד היובל, ואיזהו שכיר, זה קנוי קנין שנים, שיוצא בשש, בא הכתוב ולמדך כאן שאין גופו קנוי לאדוניו לאכול בתרומתו:
11. And if a kohen acquires a person, an acquisition through his money, he may eat of it, and those born in his house they may eat of his food. יא. וְכֹהֵן כִּי יִקְנֶה נֶפֶשׁ קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ הוּא יֹאכַל בּוֹ וִילִיד בֵּיתוֹ הֵם יֹאכְלוּ בְלַחְמוֹ:
And if a kohen acquires a person: [This refers to] a Canaanite slave, whose body is acquired [by his master and may therefore eat from his master’s terumah].
וכהן כי יקנה נפש: עבד כנעני שקנוי לגופו:
and those born in his house: These are the children of the [non-Jewish] maidservants [who are the property of the master]. We learn also from this verse here that a kohen’s wife may eat terumah, since she too, is considered “an acquisition through his money” [for the Jewish marriage is technically attained through the acquisition of a woman by a man by giving her money or an object worth money, such as a ring] (see Keth. 57b). However, we learn other [cases, namely, about a kohen’s wife who had been acquired through other means, e.g., by contract or cohabitation,] from another verse in Scripture “Anyone who is clean in your household [may eat it]” (Num. 18:11) [the above being expounded] in [Sifrei 18:29; see Levush Haorah also Gur Aryeh.]
ויליד ביתו: אלו בני השפחות. ואשת כהן אוכלת בתרומה מן המקרא הזה, שאף היא קנין כספו. ועוד למד ממקרא אחר (במדבר יח יא) כל טהור בביתך וגו' בספרי:
12. And if a kohen's daughter is married to a non kohen, she may [no longer] eat of the separated holy things. יב. וּבַת כֹּהֵן כִּי תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ זָר הִוא בִּתְרוּמַת הַקֳּדָשִׁים לֹא תֹאכֵל:
married to a non-kohen: אִישׁ זָר [lit., “an alien man,” here, in the context of kehunah , this means] to a Levite or an Israelite. — [Torath Kohanim 22:92]
לאיש זר: ללוי ולישראל:
13. But if the kohen's daughter becomes widowed or divorced, and she has no offspring she may return to her father's household as in her youth [and] eat of her father's food, but no non kohen may eat of it. יג. וּבַת כֹּהֵן כִּי תִהְיֶה אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה וְזֶרַע אֵין לָהּ וְשָׁבָה אֶל בֵּית אָבִיהָ כִּנְעוּרֶיהָ מִלֶּחֶם אָבִיהָ תֹּאכֵל וְכָל זָר לֹא יֹאכַל בּוֹ:
[But if the kohen’s daughter] becomes widowed or divorced: from her non- kohen husband.
אלמנה וגרושה: מן האיש הזר:
and she has no offspring: from him.
וזרע אין לה: ממנו:
she may return [to her father’s household…(and) eat of her father’s food]: But, if she does have offspring from her non- kohen husband, she is prohibited to eat terumah as long as the offspring is alive. — [Yev. 87a-b]
ושבה: הא אם יש לה זרע ממנו אסורה בתרומה כל זמן שהזרע קיים:
But no non-kohen may eat of it: [This seemingly superfluous phrase] is stated only to exclude an onen [kohen, i.e., one whose relative has died on that day,] who is permitted [to eat] terumah. [see Rashi 21:12 above] [It is as if Scripture is saying here:] “I said that only a non- kohen(זָר) [is prohibited to eat terumah]-but not an onen .” [Yev. 68b]
וכל זר לא יאכל בו: לא בא אלא להוציא את האונן שמותר בתרומה. זרות אמרתי לך, ולא אנינות:
14. And if a man unintentionally eats what is holy, he shall add a fifth of it to it and give the kohen the holy thing. יד. וְאִישׁ כִּי יֹאכַל קֹדֶשׁ בִּשְׁגָגָה וְיָסַף חֲמִשִׁיתוֹ עָלָיו וְנָתַן לַכֹּהֵן אֶת הַקֹּדֶשׁ:
And if [a man] eats that which is holy: [This refers to] terumah .
כי יאכל קדש: תרומה:
and give the kohen the holy thing: something that is fit to become holy. He shall not pay him money, but non-consecrated fruits, which in turn become [consecrated as] terumah . — [Pes. 32a]
ונתן לכהן את הקדש: דבר הראוי להיות קדש, שאינו פורע לו מעות אלא פירות של חולין, והן נעשין תרומה:
15. And they shall not desecrate the holy things of the children of Israel, those that they have set aside for the Lord, טו. וְלֹא יְחַלְּלוּ אֶת קָדְשֵׁי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת אֲשֶׁר יָרִימוּ לַיהֹוָה:
And they shall not desecrate [the holy things of the children of Israel]: By allowing non- kohanim to eat of them. [see next Rashi]
ולא יחללו וגו': להאכילם לזרים:
16. thereby bringing upon themselves to bear iniquity and guilt, when they eat their holy things, for I am the Lord Who sanctifies them. טז. וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אוֹתָם עֲוֹן אַשְׁמָה בְּאָכְלָם אֶת קָדְשֵׁיהֶם כִּי אֲנִי יְהֹוָה מְקַדְּשָׁם:
thereby bringing upon themselves to bear-: [lit., “And they will cause them to bear (iniquity and guilt).”] They will cause themselves to bear iniquity when they [the non- kohanim] eat their holy things which were set aside for terumah , and were consecrated and consequently prohibited for them. Onkelos, however, who rendered: when they eat in uncleanness, unnecessarily rendered in this manner [because the verse deals with giving the terumah to non- kohanim, not with eating it in an unclean state].
והשיאו אותם: את עצמם יטענו עון באכלם את קדשיהם, שהובדלו לשם תרומה וקדשו ונאסרו עליהם. ואונקלוס שתרגם במיכלהון בסואבא, שלא לצורך תרגמו כן:
thereby bringing upon themselves to bear: Heb. וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אוֹתָם. This is one of the three instances in Scripture of אֶת [normally referring to a third party “him,” “them” etc.], which are expounded by Rabbi Ishmael to mean that the Torah is speaking of the persons themselves [i.e., the verb is reflexive]. Similarly, [the other two examples are]: יָבִיא אֹתוֹ בְּיוֹם מלֹאת יְמֵי נִזְרוֹ [lit., “On the day when his abstinence is completed, he shall bring him”] (Num. 6:13)- [meaning] that he should bring himself. Likewise, וַיִּקְבֹּר אוֹתוֹ בַגַּי [lit., “And he buried him in the valley” (Deut. 34:6), meaning that] Moses buried himself (see Rashi there). Thus is it expounded in Sifrei (Bamidbar 6:124).
והשיאו אותם: זה אחד משלשה אתים שהיה רבי ישמעאל דורש בתורה שמדברים באדם עצמו, וכן (במדבר ו יג) ביום מלאת ימי נזרו יביא אותו, הוא יביא את עצמו. וכן (דברים לד ו) ויקבור אותו בגיא, הוא קבר את עצמו, כך נדרש בספרי:
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Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 135 - 139
• Chapter 135
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Name of the Lord; offer praise, you servants of the Lord-
2. who stand in the House of the Lord, in the courtyards of the House of our God.
3. Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good; sing to His Name, for He is pleasant.
4. For God has chosen Jacob for Himself, Israel as His beloved treasure.
5. For I know that the Lord is great, our Master is greater than all supernal beings.
6. All that the Lord desired He has done, in the heavens and on earth, in the seas and the depths.
7. He causes mists to rise from the ends of the earth; He makes lightning for the rain; He brings forth the wind from His vaults.
8. It was He who struck down the firstborn of Egypt, of man and beast.
9. He sent signs and wonders into the midst of Egypt, on Pharaoh and on all his servants.
10. It was He who struck down many nations, and slew mighty kings:
11. Sichon, king of the Amorites; Og, king of Bashan; and all the kingdoms of Canaan.
12. And He gave their lands as a heritage, a heritage to His people Israel.
13. Lord, Your Name is forever; Lord, Your remembrance is throughout all generations.
14. Indeed, the Lord will judge on behalf of His people, and have compassion on His servants.
15. The idols of the nations are silver and gold, the product of human hands.
16. They have a mouth, but cannot speak; they have eyes, but cannot see;
17. they have ears, but cannot hear; nor is there breath in their mouth.
18. Like them will their makers become-all who trust in them.
19. House of Israel, bless the Lord; House of Aaron, bless the Lord;
20. House of Levi, bless the Lord; you who fear the Lord, bless the Lord.
21. Blessed is the Lord from Zion, who dwells in Jerusalem. Praise the Lord!
Chapter 136
This psalm contains twenty-six verses, corresponding to the twenty-six generations between the creation of the world and the giving of the Torah.
1. Praise the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is forever.
2. Praise the God of the supernal beings, for His kindness is forever.
3. Praise the Master of the heavenly hosts, for His kindness is forever.
4. Who alone performs great wonders, for His kindness is forever.
5. Who makes the heavens with understanding, for His kindness is forever.
6. Who spreads forth the earth above the waters, for His kindness is forever.
7. Who makes the great lights, for His kindness is forever.
8. The sun to rule by day, for His kindness is forever.
9. The moon and stars to rule by night, for His kindness is forever.
10. Who struck Egypt through its firstborn, for His kindness is forever.
11. And brought Israel out of their midst, for His kindness is forever.
12. With a strong hand and with an outstretched arm, for His kindness is forever.
13. Who split the Sea of Reeds into sections, for His kindness is forever.
14. And brought Israel across it, for His kindness is forever.
15. And cast Pharaoh and his army into the Sea of Reeds, for His kindness is forever.
16. Who led His people through the desert, for His kindness is forever;
17. Who struck down great kings, for His kindness is forever.
18. And slew mighty kings, for His kindness is forever.
19. Sichon, king of the Amorites, for His kindness is forever.
20. And Og, king of Bashan, for His kindness is forever.
21. And gave their land as a heritage, for His kindness is forever.
22. A heritage to Israel His servant, for His kindness is forever.
23. Who remembered us in our humiliation, for His kindness is forever.
24. And redeemed us from our oppressors, for His kindness is forever.
25. Who gives food to all flesh, for His kindness is forever.
26. Praise the God of heaven, for His kindness is forever.
Chapter 137
Referring to the time of the destruction of the Temple, this psalm tells of when Nebuchadnezzar would ask the Levites to sing in captivity as they had in the Temple, to which they would reply, "How can we sing the song of God upon alien soil?" They were then comforted by Divine inspiration.
1. By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat and wept as we remembered Zion.
2. There, upon the willows, we hung our harps.
3. For there our captors demanded of us songs, and those who scorned us-rejoicing, [saying,] "Sing to us of the songs of Zion.”
4. How can we sing the song of the Lord on alien soil?
5. If I forget you, Jerusalem, let my right hand forget [its dexterity].
6. Let my tongue cleave to my palate if I will not remember you, if I will not bring to mind Jerusalem during my greatest joy!
7. Remember, O Lord, against the Edomites the day of [the destruction of] Jerusalem, when they said, "Raze it, raze it to its very foundation!”
8. O Babylon, who is destined to be laid waste, happy is he who will repay you in retribution for what you have inflicted on us.
9. Happy is he who will seize and crush your infants against the rock!
Chapter 138
David offers awesome praises to God for His kindness to him, and for fulfilling His promise to grant him kingship.
1. By David. I will thank You with all my heart, in the presence of princes I shall praise You.
2. I will bow toward Your Holy Sanctuary, and praise Your Name for Your kindness and for Your truth; for You have exalted Your word above all Your Names.
3. On the day that I called out You answered me, You emboldened me, [You put] strength in my soul.
4. Lord, all the kings of the land will give thanks to You when they hear the words of Your mouth.
5. And they will sing of the Lord's ways, for the glory of the Lord is great.
6. For though the Lord is exalted, He sees the lowly; the High One castigates from afar.
7. If I walk in the midst of distress, keep me alive; against the wrath of my enemies stretch out Your hand, and let Your right hand deliver me.
8. Lord, complete [Your kindness] on my behalf. Lord, Your kindness is forever, do not forsake the work of Your hands.
Chapter 139
A most prominent psalm that guides man in the ways of God as no other in all of the five books of Tehillim. Fortunate is he who recites it daily.
1. For the Conductor, by David, a psalm. O Lord, You have probed me, and You know.
2. You know my sitting down and my standing up; You perceive my thought from afar.
3. You encircle my going about and my lying down; You are familiar with all my paths.
4. For there was not yet a word on my tongue-and behold, Lord, You knew it all.
5. You have besieged me front and back, You have laid Your hand upon me.
6. Knowledge [to escape You] is beyond me; it is exalted, I cannot know it.
7. Where can I go [to escape] Your spirit? And where can I flee from Your presence?
8. If I ascend to the heavens, You are there; if I make my bed in the grave, behold, You are there.
9. Were I to take up wings as the dawn and dwell in the furthest part of the sea,
10. there, too, Your hand would guide me; Your right hand would hold me.
11. Were I to say, "Surely the darkness will shadow me," then the night would be as light around me.
12. Even the darkness obscures nothing from You; and the night shines like the day-the darkness is as light.
13. For You created my mind; You covered me in my mother's womb.
14. I will thank You, for I was formed in an awesome and wondrous way; unfathomable are Your works, though my soul perceives much.
15. My essence was not hidden from You even while I was born in concealment, formed in the depths of the earth.
16. Your eyes beheld my raw form; all [happenings] are inscribed in Your book, even those to be formed in future days-to Him they are the same.
17. How precious are Your thoughts to me, O God! How overwhelming, [even] their beginnings!
18. Were I to count them, they would outnumber the sand, even if I were to remain awake and always with You.
19. O that You would slay the wicked, O God, and men of blood [to whom I say], "Depart from me!”
20. They exalt You for wicked schemes, Your enemies raise [You] for falsehood.
21. Indeed, I hate those who hate You, Lord; I contend with those who rise up against You.
22. I hate them with the utmost hatred; I regard them as my own enemies.
23. Search me, Lord, and know my heart; test me and know my thoughts.
24. See if there is a vexing way in me, then lead me in the way of the world.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 44
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Monday, Nissan 28, 5774 • April 28, 2014
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 44
In the previous chapter the Alter Rebbe explained that there are two broad categories in the love of G d, ahavah rabbah and ahavat olam. Ahavah rabbah cannot be attained by man unaided. It is granted as a gift from above when an individual merits it; reflection alone on G d’s greatness can in no way engender this level of love. Ahavat olam, however, results from intense and sustained meditation on the greatness of G d.
והנה כל מדרגת אהבה מב׳ מדרגות אלו, אהבה רבה ואהבת עולם, נחלקת לכמה בחינות ומדרגות לאין קץ, כל חד לפום שיעורא דיליה
Each of the two grades of love — ahavah rabbah and ahavat olam — is subdivided into limitless shades and gradations, in each individual according to his [spiritual] capacity,
כמו שכתוב בזהר הקדוש על פסוק: נודע בשערים בעלה, דא קודשא בריך הוא, דאיהו אתידע ואתדבק לכל חד לפום מה דמשער בלביה וכו׳
As it is written in the holy Zohar1 on the verse,2 “Her husband is known in the gates,” that “This refers to the Holy One, blessed be He, so called since He is the ”husband“ of the ”Congregation of Israel,“ Who makes Himself known and attaches Himself to every one according to the extent which one measures in one’s heart....”
Thus, two individuals may have the same general level of love of G d, yet their particular, individual levels of love will differ.
ולכן נקראים דחילו ורחימו: הנסתרות לה׳ אלקינו
Therefore, fear and love are called3 “the secret things [known] to the L rd our G d,” for people cannot know the varying degrees of love of G d harbored in the hearts of others,
ותורה ומצות הן הנגלות לנו ולבנינו לעשות כו׳
while the Torah and mitzvot are those things which are4 “revealed to us and to our children to do....”
They are found in all Jews equally,
כי תורה אחת ומשפט אחד לכולנו, בקיום כל התורה ומצות בבחינת מעשה
for we have all one Torah and one law, insofar as the fulfillment of all the Torah and mitzvot in actual performance is concerned. All Jews perform mitzvot in the very same manner; the greatest Jew and the smallest both put on the same tefillin.
מה שאין כן בדחילו ורחימו, שהם לפי הדעת את ה׳ שבמוח ולב
It is otherwise with fear and love, which vary according to the knowledge of G d in the mind and heart,
Here, Jews are not equal. He whose knowledge of G dliness is greater, will experience the love and fear of G d to a greater degree than his less knowledgeable colleague.
כנ״ל
as has been explained earlier, in ch. 42.
The Alter Rebbe explained in the previous chapter that ahavah rabbah cannot be attained alone, while ahavat olam can. He now goes on to explain that there is a manner of love of G d which incorporates the qualities of both ahavah rabbah and ahavat olam. It has the qualities of the former since it comes from above, and exists in the soul of every Jew in the form of an inheritance from the Patriarchs. However, in order for this love to be revealed, it is necessary for the individual to contemplate and comprehend G dliness, as is the case with ahavat olam, which is revealed through man’s service.
אך אחת היא אהבה הכלולה מכל בחינות ומדרגות אהבה רבה ואהבת עולם, והיא שוה לכל נפש מישראל, וירושה לנו מאבותינו
Yet there is one singular and unique love which incorporates something of all the distinctions and gradations of both ahavah rabbah and ahavat olam, and is found equally in every Jewish soul, as our inheritance from our Patriarchs.
והיינו מה שכתב הזהר על פסוק: נפשי אויתיך בלילה וגו׳
And that is what the Zohar says on the verse:5 “My soul, I desire You at night.”
The Zohar notes that the verse is grammatically anomalous. It should either say, “My soul desires You,” or alternatively, “I desire You.” Therefore the Zohar explains that “My soul” refers to G d, the Soul of all beings. In effect, the Jew says to G d: “You are my Soul, therefore I desire you.” And as the Zohar6 goes on to say:
דירחים לקודשא בריך הוא רחימותא דנפשא ורוחא, כמה דאתדבקו אילין בגופא, וגופא רחים לון וכו׳, וזה שכתוב: נפשי אויתיך, כלומר: מפני שאתה ה׳ נפשי וחיי האמיתים, לכך אויתיך, פירוש: שאני מתאוה ותאב לך כאדם המתאוה לחיי נפשו, וכשהוא חלש ומעונה מתאוה ותאב שתשוב נפשו אליו
“One should love G d with a love of the soul and the spirit, as they are attached to the body and the body loves them....” This is the interpretation of the verse: “My soul, I desire You,” which means, “Since you, G d, are my true soul and life, therefore do I desire You.” That is to say, “I long and yearn for You like a man who craves the life of his soul, and when he is weak and exhausted he longs and yearns for his soul to revive in him (lit., ‘to return to him’).
Truly, the pleasure of living is the greatest pleasure of all, and a man will forgo all manner of pleasure in order to stay alive. Nevertheless we do not feel the pleasure of simply being alive because “a constant pleasure is not felt to be pleasurable.” However, when a person is weak and tired, and his life-force is not as manifest as it should be, then he feels the desire to live and senses the pleasure of simply being alive.
וכן כשהוא הולך לישן מתאוה וחפץ שתשוב נפשו אליו כשיעור משנתו, כך אני מתאוה ותאב לאור אין סוף ברוך הוא, חיי החיים האמיתיים, להמשיכו בקרבי על ידי עסק התורה בהקיצי משנתי בלילה, דאורייתא וקודשא בריך הוא כולא חד
“Likewise when he goes to sleep, at which time his life-force is in a state of concealment, for7 ‘Sleep is one sixtieth of death,’ he longs and yearns for his soul to be restored to him when he awakens from his sleep. So do I long and yearn to draw within me the infinite light of the blessed Ein Sof, the Life of true life, through engaging in the [study of the] Torah when I awaken during the night from my sleep”; for the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, are one and the same.
Thus, the individual’s love of G d will encourage him in his Torah study, since He realizes that this will enable him to draw down the infinite light of the Ein Sof and become united with G d. Just as creation is renewed continuously (8“In His goodness He renews each day, continuously, the work of Creation”), Torah, too,9 “should be viewed every day as if it were new.” So, too, regarding the love and yearning for G d brought about through the study of Torah: he should experience this just as one yearns and desires for the full restoration of his vitality — a desire which is both revealed and powerful.
כמו שכתב הזהר שם: דבעי בר נש מרחימותא דקודשא בריך הוא למיקם בכל לילא לאשתדלא בפולחניה עד צפרא כו׳
So the Zohar says, (ibid.), “Out of love for the Holy One, blessed be He, a man should rise each night and exert himself in His service until the morning....”
This, then, is the love expressed in the phrase, “My soul, I desire You,” the innate love that a Jew feels when he realizes that G d is his true soul and Source of life. This love must be revealed — by pondering deeply and often how G d is the Source of all life, as will be explained later on in this chapter.
FOOTNOTES
1. Zohar I, 103b.
2. Mishlei 31:23.
3. Devarim 29:28.
4. Devarim 29:28.
5. Yeshayahu 26:9.
6. Zohar III, 68a.
7. Berachot 57b.
8. Siddur, morning prayers.
9. Cf. Rashi on Devarim 26:16.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Monday, Nissan 28, 5774 • April 28, 2014
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 94
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
"That which issues from your lips you shall keep and perform"—Deuteronomy 23:24.
We are commanded to carry through that which we pledge to do [or not to do].
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
Positive Commandment 94
Translated by Berel Bell
The 94th mitzvah is that we are commanded to fulfill every verbal obligation we have taken upon ourselves, whether an oath, a vow, a korban,1 etc.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "You shall be careful to carry out whatever you say."
Although our Sages have split up this verse and explained each word separately as referring to something different, the general meaning of everything they say is: it is a positive commandment for a person to fulfill every verbal obligation he has taken upon himself, and a prohibition not to do so. This will be explained in our discussion of the prohibitions.3
The Sifri says, "The verse, 'Whatever you say,' constitutes a positive commandment." You find it obvious that the words, "whatever you say" by themselves have no meaning whatsoever. The intention [of the Sifri] is therefore as I explained above — that the plain meaning of the verse is that a person is obligated to carry out his verbal commitments.
This commandment is stated a second time in G‑d's statement,4 "A person must fulfill all he has verbally said."
The details of this mitzvah — i.e. how exactly the person must fulfill his obligation, and how he can be released [from his obligation] when in doubt regarding his statement — are explained in a number of passages in Sh'vuos, Nedarim, the end of Menachos, as well as in Kinim.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, a sacrifice. When a person says, "a sacrifice that I won't eat something of yours," he means to say that he considers that person's food to be forbidden for him to eat just as a sacrifice is forbidden to him. This constitutes a vow not to eat that person's food.
2.Deut. 23:24.
3.N157.
4.Num. 30:3.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: Mechirah Mechirah - Chapter One Mechirah - Chapter One
'In the name of the Lord, eternal God'
"The beginning of wisdom: Acquire wisdom; with all your resources, gain understanding" (Proverbs 4:7)
THE TWELFTH BOOK
SEFER KINYAN The Book of Acquisition
This book contains five halachot, which are arranged in the following order:
Hilchot Mechirah - The Laws of Selling
Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah - The Laws of Acquisition and Gifts
Hilchot Sh'chenim - The Laws Governing Relations Between Neighbors
Hilchot Sh'luchin V'Shutafin - The Laws Governing Relations with Agents
and Partners
Hilchot Avadim - The Laws Governing Servants
Halacha 1
An article is not acquired merely through a verbal agreement. This applies even when witnesses testify that the principals have reached an agreement.
What is implied? A person says: "I am selling you this house," "I am selling you this wine," or "I am selling you this servant," and a price is fixed. The purchaser agrees and says: "I have purchased it," the seller says: "I have sold it," and they tell witnesses: "Serve as witnesses that so and so has sold and so and so has purchased", their words are of no consequence. It is as if they had never spoken to each other at all. The same applies with regard to a person who gives a gift and its recipient.
Halacha 2
If, however, the purchase is completed through one of the media by which property is transferred, the purchaser acquires the object. There is no need for witnesses; neither the seller or the purchaser may retract.
Halacha 3
How is an acquisition made? Landed property can be acquired in one of three ways: a) through the transfer of money, b) through the transfer of a deed of sale, or c) through chazakah (manifesting one's ownership).
Halacha 4
How is property acquired through the transfer of money? If one person sold another person a house or a field, and the purchaser gave him the money agreed upon, he acquires it. When does the above apply? In a place where it is not customary to write a deed of sale. In a place where it is customary to write a deed of sale, however, the purchaser does not acquire the property until a deed is composed.
Landed property cannot be acquired for less than a p'rutah's worth.
Halacha 5
If the purchaser makes the following stipulation: "If I desire, I will acquire it through the transfer of money, or if I desire I will acquire it through the transfer of a deed of sale," and gives money on the basis of this stipulation, it is established as a binding condition. Once the money has been paid, the seller cannot retract, because of the stipulation. The purchaser can, however, retract until the deed of sale is written.
Similar laws apply if the seller makes such a condition.
Halacha 6
When a person tells a colleague: "Give so and so a maneh and you will acquire my house," once the colleague makes the payment, he acquires the house. This is an extension of the laws applying to a guarantor.
Halacha 7
How is property acquired through the transfer of a deed of sale? The seller writes for the purchaser on a piece of paper, on a shard or on a leaf. "My field is given to you," or "My field is sold to you." Once the deed reaches the purchaser's hand, he acquires the field, even though there are no witnesses at all, and despite the fact that the document itself is of no financial value. When does the above apply? When a person sells his field because it is undesirable. With regard to other landed property, by contrast, even though the deed of sale reaches the purchaser's hand and is signed by witnesses, the purchaser does not acquire the property until he pays its price.
Halacha 8
How is property acquired through the manifestation of ownership? If a person sold a colleague a house or a field or gave him such properties as a gift, the purchaser or the recipient acquires the property when he locks the entrance to the property, encloses the property with even the slightest portion of a fence or breaks through even the slightest portion of one of the walls surrounding the property, provided his deeds bring him benefit.
When does the above apply? When the person manifests his ownership in the presence of the seller or the one who gives the gift. If, however, he does so outside the presence of the seller or the one who gives the gift, the seller or the giver must tell him: "Go, manifest possession over it and acquire it." If this statement is made, and afterwards the purchaser or the recipient manifests possession, he acquires the property even if he acts outside the presence of the previous owner.
Halacha 9
When a person sells a house to a colleague and gives him the key, it is as if he told him: "Go, manifest possession over it and acquire it." Similarly, if a person sells a colleague a cistern, once he gives him its bucket it is as if he told him: "Go, manifest possession over it and acquire it." When he manifests his possession, he acquires it.
Halacha 10
What is meant by saying that one who locks a property acquires it? For example, when a person sells a house or a courtyard whose entrance was open, and the purchaser locked the entrance and then opened it; the purchaser is considered to have acquired it, for he used it in a way that brings benefit.'
Halacha 11
What is meant by saying that one who encloses the property with even the slightest portion of a fence acquires it? For example, there was a fence that people could climb over easily, and the purchaser added a small portion to its height, making it ten handbreadths high thus causing it to be difficult to climb over. His deeds are of benefit and he acquires the property.
Similarly, if there was an opening in the fence that allowed people to enter only with difficulty, and the purchaser widened it even slightly, allowing people to enter easily, his deeds are of benefit and he acquires the property.
Halacha 12
If the purchaser placed down a rock in a way that causes benefit - e.g., he completed an irrigation channel that brought water to the field - or he removed a rock in a way that causes benefit - e.g., he opened a dammed irrigation ditch and let water flow into the field - he acquires it. The same applies in all analogous situations.
Halacha 13
The following rules apply when a person sells a colleague a field that is located next to one of that colleague's fields, or gives him such a field as a gift. Once the colleague breaks down the partition that separates the two fields from each other and makes them one large field, he acquires it.
If, however, he merely walks the length and breadth of the new property, this walking serves no benefit and it therefore does not serve as a manifestation of his ownership. When he sells him a path for vineyards, however, the purchaser does acquire it by walking, for that is its purpose.
Halacha 14
How wide is the path that a person acquires by walking? If it is defined by barriers, he acquires an area at least large enough to enable him to lift one foot up and place the other next to it. If it is not defined by barriers, he acquires a width sufficient to allow him to walk carrying a package of twigs on his head and turn around with it.
Halacha 15
If the property being sold is a rocky patch that cannot be enclosed with a fence and an entrance, nor can it be sowed, the way in which a person manifests his ownership and acquires it is to spread produce upon it, to have an animal stand there, or to use it in another way.
Halacha 16
When a person sells a field to a colleague, and the colleague enters and sows it, plows it and leaves it fallow, collects its produce, prunes it or the like, he acquires it, for he has manifested his ownership. Neither of them may retract.
Similarly, if the seller collects a basket of produce and gives it to the purchaser, the purchaser acquires the field. This is considered manifestation of ownership, for the seller revealed his intent of transferring ownership of the field to the purchaser in an outright way, so that its produce would be his.
Halacha 17
A gentile cannot acquire property by manifesting his ownership over it. He can acquire a property only through the transfer of a legal documentafter money has been paid. A Jew who comes on account of a gentile is considered like a gentile and can acquire property only through the transfer of a legal document.
Any entity that is attached to landed property is considered like landed property and can be acquired through the transfer of money, the transfer of a deed of sale or through chazakah.
If, however, the produce no longer needs the nurture of the land - e.g., grapes that are ready to be picked - it is considered movable property with regard to the laws of acquisition. And like movable property, the laws of deception apply with regard to their sale.
Halacha 18
Just as landed property itself is acquired through the transfer of money, the transfer of a deed of sale or chazakah, so too, the rental of land is finalized through the transfer of money alone, the transfer of a deed of sale alone, or chazakah, and neither party can retract. 19. When a person sells a colleague ten fields in ten different countries, the purchaser acquires them all by manifesting his ownership over one of them. Even if one of the fields was located on a high mountain and another in a valley - and thus the manner in which one is tilled differs from the other -nevertheless, by manifesting his ownership over one of them, the purchaser acquires them all.
Halacha 20
When does the above apply? When he pays for all of them. If, however, he does not pay for all of them, he acquires only a measure of property equal to the money that he pays. Therefore, if all the fields were given as a gift, he acquires them all.
Similarly, with regard to the rental of landed property, if a person manifests ownership over one of the properties he is renting, he acquires them all for the entire duration of the rental period.'
If a person is purchasing some properties and renting others, once he manifests his ownership over one property, whether that property be purchased or rented, he acquires them all.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 1, Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 2, Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 3
Nedarim - Chapter 1
Halacha 1
There are two categories of vows: The first is to forbid oneself [from benefiting] from entities permitted to him;1 e.g., he said: "The produce from this-and-this country is forbidden to me for 30 days" or "...forever." "This type of produce is forbidden to me" or "This produce is forbidden." Regardless of the language in which the prohibition is stated,2 they become forbidden to him, even though there is no oath at all, nor did it mention God's name or a term used to describe Him.3 Concerning this, the Torah [Numbers 30:3] states: "To cause a prohibition to take effect upon his soul," i.e., to cause permitted entities to become forbidden to him. Similarly, such a vow takes effect if he says: "They are forbidden to me." I call this category: "vows involving prohibitions."
Halacha 2
The second category is to obligate himself for a sacrifice that he is not required to bring. For example, he said: "I obligate myself [to bring] a burnt offering," "I obligate myself to bring a peace offering," "...a meal offering," or "This animal is a burnt offering," or "...a peace offering."
When he says: "I obligate myself [to bring]...", this is called a vow.4 When he says: "This is...", it is called a donation.5 Donations and vows are of the same type [of pledges], but [the one making the pledge] is responsible for a vow.6With regard to a donations, by contrast, he is not responsible.7 Concerning these the Torah states [Deuteronomy 12:17]: "Your vows which you pledge and your donations...." This category, I refer to as "vows of sanctification."
Halacha 3
The laws concerning the first category and its relevant matters are [the subject] we will discuss in these halachot. The laws concerning vows of sanctification and their particulars will be discussed in their appropriate place in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot.8
Halacha 4
It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for a person to carry out his oath or vow9 whether it be a vow involving prohibitions or a vow of sanctification, as [Deuteronomy 12:23] states: "Heed the utterances of your mouth and do as you vowed." And [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth."10
Halacha 5
When a person forbids himself from partaking of a particular type of food, e.g., he said: "Figs are forbidden to me," "Figs from such-and-such a country are forbidden to me," "These figs are forbidden to me," or the like, if he partakes of any amount of them, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law,11 as [Numbers, Ibid.] states: "He shall not desecrate his word."
There is no minimum measure [for the desecration of] a vow, for by taking a vow [not to partake of] a substance, it is as if one explicitly stated that he would not partake of even the slightest amount.12 If one said: "It is forbidden for me to eat the produce of this-and-this country" or "...to eat these fruit," he does not receive lashes unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion.
Halacha 6
If a person forbade himself from eating figs and grapes - whether in two vows or in one - the two can be combined to make up the measure of an olive-sized portion.13 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
When a person says: "This produce is considered like a sacrifice," or he tells a colleague: "Everything that I partake of with you is a sacrifice,"14 "...like a sacrifice," "or considered like a sacrifice for me," they are forbidden to him. For it is possible that a person will make a vow for a sacrifice and make an animal that is ordinary a sacrifice and thus be forbidden for him.15
Halacha 8
If, however, a person says: "This produce is considered for me...", "This type of produce is considered for me...", "What I will eat with so-and-so will be considered as pig meat," "...as a false deity," "...as nevelot and trefot," or the like, they are permitted and no vow takes effect. [The rationale is that] it is impossible for a person to make something that is not pig meat as pig meat.16
Halacha 9
This is the general principle [that applies] whenever anyone attempts to have permitted entities considered as forbidden entities: If he could have endowed that forbidden entity with its status by taking a vow,17 [the permitted entities] are forbidden. If he cannot endow it with its status by taking a vow,18 [the permitted entities] remain permitted.
Halacha 10
Sin-offerings and guilt-offerings cannot be brought as vows or as donations, as will be explained in the appropriate place.19 Nevertheless, it is possible for a person making a vow to offer them as a result of his vow. For a person who takes a nazirite vow must bring a sin offering,20 and if he becomes impure,21 he must bring a guilt offering, as will be stated.22 Accordingly, when one says: "This produce is considered for me like a sin-offering" or "...like a guilt-offering," or he says: "It is a sin-offering" or "It is a guilt-offering," it is forbidden. Needless to say, if he says: "It is a burnt-offering," "...a peace-offering," "...a meal-offering," or "...a thanksgiving-offering," it is forbidden, for all of these offerings can be brought as vows or as donations.23
Halacha 11
If, however, one says: "This produce is considered for me like the challah [brought] to Aaron" or "...like the terumah for him,"24 it is permitted. For there is no way that these can be brought as vows or as donations.25
Halacha 12
If one says: "This produce is considered for me like notar,"26"...like piggul,"27 or "...like sacrificial meat that has become impure,"28 it is forbidden. For the person has, nonetheless, made the substance like sacrificial meat.29
Halacha 13
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like the tithe-sacrifice of an animal,"30 it is forbidden, for the sanctity [of the tithe-sacrifices] is conveyed upon them by mortals.31 If he says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a firstborn,"32it is permitted, for the sanctity [of the firstborn] is not conveyed by mortals.33It cannot be designated [for another sacred purpose] with a vow, as [Leviticus 27:26] states: "A man should not consecrate it."34
Halacha 14
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a devotion offering for Above,"35 it is forbidden, for the devotion offering for Above are [set aside] for improvements within the Temple.36
[A vow takes effect and produce] becomes forbidden although the person did not mention a sacrifice [if he makes any of the following statements]: "[This produce] is considered for me like the donations for the chamber,"37 "...like the daily sacrifices," "...like the storage rooms,"38 "...like the wood,"39 "...like the fire-offerings,"40 "...like the altar," or "...like any of the utensils of the altar," e.g., he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like the altar rakes,"41 "...like the ewers [for the blood of the sacrifices],"42 "...like the altar forks,"43 or the like. [This law also applies] if he says: "This produce] is considered for me like the Temple,"44 "...like Jerusalem."45 [The rationale is that] all of these statements are similar to saying: "[This produce] is considered for me like a sacrifice."
Halacha 15
[When there was] sacrificial meat - even meat from a peace offering whose blood had been poured [on the altar] which is permitted to non-priests - before a person and he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like this meat," it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] he attached [his vow] to the fundamental element of the meat, and that was forbidden.46
[Different rules apply if] the meat was from a firstborn sacrifice. If its blood had not been poured [on the altar], [the produce] is forbidden.47 If it had been poured, it is permitted.
Halacha 16
There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.
What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban. Cherek, cheref, and cherech are all terms referring to a cherem (dedication offering).
Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We follow the language used by people at large in that place and at that time.48
Halacha 17
Just as a person can make a vow forbidding entities to himself with such terms, so, too, if he consecrates an entity with such terms, the entity is consecrated. Nicknames for such terms,49 however, are not binding50 whether for vows involving prohibitions or vows involving the consecration of property.
Halacha 18
If a person tells a colleague: "Whatever I eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food," "...will not be kosher," or "...will not be pure,"51 it is as if he told him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be like a sacrifice,"52 which is forbidden. Similarly, if he tells him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be an impure [sacrifice]," "...notar," or piggul,"53 it is forbidden.
Halacha 19
When a person tells a colleague: "Not ordinary food will I not eat from your [property]," it is as if he told him:54 "What I will eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food, but instead, like a sacrifice."55
Similarly, if he tells him: "The sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," or "Like a sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden [to eat from his property].56 If, by contrast, he tells him: "The sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," "Like a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "For a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," or "Not a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted in all of these instances.57 For all of these expressions do not have any implication other than he is taking an oath by a sacrifice that he will not eat from his [property] and taking an oath on a sacrifice is not binding. Alternatively, [his intent can be interpreted] as taking a vow that he will not partake of a sacrifice with him.
Halacha 20
[If he tells him:] "Ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Like ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat not with you," "Like ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," it is permitted for him [to eat from his property].58
Halacha 21
If, by contrast, he says: "No impure [sacrifices] will I eat from your [property]," "No notar, will I eat from your [property]," or "No piggul will I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden. [The vow takes effect, because] the intent of his statements appears to be: "What I will eat will be piggul or impure. Therefore, I will not eat from your [property]."59
Halacha 22
[If he says:] "By the Temple, I will eat from your [property]," "The Temple, I will eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will eat from your [property]," [the vow is effective,60 and] it is forbidden. "The Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," "Like the Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted.61 For this is like taking an oath by the Temple, that he will not eat from his [property]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 23
When a person tells a colleague, "I am taking a vow from you," his statement implies that he will not speak with him.62 "I am separate from you" implies that he will not do business with him. "I am distant from you" implies that he will not sit within four cubits of him. That same implication is conveyed by telling him: "I am ostracized from you" or "I am banned from you."63
If, however, says "I am taking a vow from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," "I am separate from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," or "I am distant from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he is forbidden to eat from his [property].64 If he eats an olivesized portion [of food] from any of his property, he is liable for lashes for [violating the prohibition]: "He shall not desecrate his word."
Halacha 24
If he tells him: "I am ostracized from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he may not eat from his [property, but] if he does, he is not liable for lashes.65 If he tells him: "I have drifted66 from you," he is forbidden to benefit from him.67
Halacha 25
When a person tells a colleague: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked who make nazirite vows, vows for a sacrifice, and oaths,68 if I eat from your [property]," should he eat [from his property], he is liable for all of the above.69
Similarly, if he says: "Let it be considered for me like the pledges of the upright who make nazirite pledges70 and donations for a sacrifice,71 if I eat from your [property," should he eat from his property,] he is liable.72
Halacha 26
If one says: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked..." or "...like the pledges of the upright73 that I will eat from your [property]," or "...if I eat from your property," he is forbidden [to do so], even if he did not make an explicit statement.74
If he said: "Like the vows of the upright," his statement is of no consequence, for the upright do not take vows to prohibit things out of anger. If he says: "I am like the vows of the wicked," and a nazirite was passing before him, he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow.75 If he says: "I am responsible, like the vows of the wicked," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice.76 "Like the vows of the wicked, I will not eat from it,"77 he is liable for an oath.78
Halacha 27
When a person takes a vow by the Torah, i.e., he says: "This produce is considered for me like this,"79 his statements are of no consequence80 and he need not ask a sage to release him from it.81 [An exception is made if] he is a common person so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.82
Halacha 28
If one took a vow by what was written in [the Torah], he is forbidden [to partake of the article mentioned in his vow], for [the Torah] contains statements involving prohibitions and vows.83 If he took it in his arm and took an oath on it, it is as if he took a vow by what was written in it.84
Halacha 29
When a person tells a colleague: "Let's get up and study a chapter [of Torah]," he is obligated to get up and study.85 Even though he did not use the wording of a vow, this is comparable to a vow.86
Halacha 30
When a person tells his wife: "You are considered to me as my mother," "...as my sister,"87 "...as orlah," or "...as mixed species in a vineyard,"88 it is as if one says concerning produce: "May it be like pig meat." Just as he is permitted to partake of that produce, as explained,89 so, too, he is permitted [to engage in relations] with his wife.
If, however, he tells her: "I am taking a vow, forbidding all pleasure from you"90or "The pleasure of relations with you is forbidden to me," she is forbidden to him, as will be explained.91
FOOTNOTES
1.For the intent of a vow is not to forbid what the Torah has prohibited, and certainly not to permit what the Torah has prohibited (Radbaz).
2.I.e., it need not be stated in Lashon HaKodesh (Biblical Hebrew).
3.As stated in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:2, an oath must mention God's name or one of the terms used to describe Him.
4.I.e., he is personally responsible to bring a sacrifice; there is no set animal designated for that purpose.
5.I.e., the animal is designated to be offered as a sacrifice; there is no obligation on the person.
6.I.e., if the animal which he originally intended to be sacrificed is lost, he must provide another one, because he accepted personal responsibility. See Halachot 25 and 26 with regard to the distinction between the two terms.
7.For it was only the one animal that was designated as a sacrifice.
8.See Chapters 6 and 9 of those halachot which explain the difference between these types of sacrifices. There are also occasional references to such vows in these halachot. See, for example, Halachah 17 of this chapter.
9.Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 575) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
10.Although there are two different verses which point to the same commandment, they are counted only as one mitzvah. For the verse from Deuteronomy could be interpreted as a reinforcement for the negative commandment mentioned in the following verse and the verse from Numbers can be interpreted as referring only to vows involving prohibitions (Radbaz). In his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban considers these as two separate mitzvot.
11.As is the punishment prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 157) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 407) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
12.As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, were the person to have mentioned "eating" in his vow, we would have interpreted the prohibition as involving an olive-sized portion, the minimum measure for eating that applies with regard to other prohibitions. Since he did not, the implication is that even the slightest amount is forbidden. Compare to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:1.
13.This does not apply with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:8). Even with regard to vows, it applies only when one uses the expression "eating." The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the law applies only when the two are included in the same oath. Their difference of opinion revolves around the understanding of Sh'vuot 22a.
14.I.e., the person wants to forbid himself from eating together with his colleague.
15.Just as a person cannot partake of a sacrifice until it is offered, so, too, he cannot partake of an entity forbidden by a vow. Just as the consecration of a sacrifice comes about because of a person's vow and his vow is what causes the sacrifice to become forbidden, so too, a vow causes an entity to be forbidden.
See Hilchot Meilah 4:9-10 which explains that with regard to the person forbidden by the vow, the article becomes like consecrated property. Hence, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice in atonement if he benefits from the article.
16.For these substances are inherently forbidden; they do not become prohibited because of man's statements. An animal consecrated as a sacrifice, by contrast, is inherently permitted. It is only man's statements that cause it to become forbidden.
17.As a person can cause a sacrifice to become forbidden.
The Rambam is explaining a fundamental principle with regard to vows. A vow becomes effective when a person establishes an equation between an entity (e.g., produce) and another entity (e.g., a sacrifice), provided it is possible for him to cause the latter entity to become forbidden on the basis of his vow alone.
18.I.e., objects which are inherently forbidden.
19.See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:8, Hilchot Shegagot 1:1. These sacrifices are required when a person transgresses a prohibition. If he does not transgress, he may not bring such a sacrifice and if he does transgress, he is compelled to do so. Offering it is not dependent on his vow.
20.Hilchot Nazirut 6:11; 8:1.
21.Due to contact with a human corpse (ibid. 7:2).
22.Ibid. 6:11; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:1.
23.And thus bringing them is obviously dependent on his making a vow.
24.Challah refers to a portion that must be separated from dough and given to a priest. Terumah refers to a portion of grain that must be separated and given to a priest. Since they may not be eaten by a non-priest, one might think that they could be the subject of a vow. Aaron is mentioned, because he is the progenitor of the priestly family.
25.A person is required to separate these portions from his dough or grain. Although the amount he gives and the designation of the priest to whom he gives them is dependent on his will, he is obligated to make the gift. The Ra'avad offers a different rationale for this law.
26.Sacrificial meat that was left after its prescribed time and hence, forbidden to be eaten.
27.Sacrifices that were offered with the intent that they be eaten at a time when it was forbidden to do so and hence, become forbidden to be eaten.
28.And is thus forbidden to be eaten.
29.It is beyond his capacity to make the object concerning which he is taking a vow bound by any of the prohibitions mentioned. Nevertheless, all of these prohibitions involve sacrificial meat and sacrificial meat is forbidden to be eaten before it was offered in a proper way, because of his oath as above. Hence, the vow can take effect.
30.As Leviticus 27:32 states, a person must bring every tenth animal born to his herd as a tithe offering. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
31.Although we are required to separate these offerings, the tithing process through which the holiness is conveyed upon the animal is a result of man's actions.
It is possible to differentiate between such offerings and terumah, for even before the terumah was separated, the grain was not permitted to be eaten, because it was tevel. The animals, by contrast, could have been slaughtered, before the tithe was separated (see Radbaz, quoting Rabbenu Asher).
32.Which is sanctified from birth and offered as a sacrifice.
33.Instead, it is sanctified from birth.
34.The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham who addresses the following question that was posed to him: The prooftext from Leviticus has been interpreted by the Sifri as teaching that a firstborn may not be consecrated as another sacrifice (see Hilchot Temurah 4:11 where the Rambam quotes this concept). Moreover, although the firstborn is intrinsically holy, it is a mitzvah to consecrate it for that sacrifice (quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Bechorot 1:5), and thus seemingly, the holiness is conveyed upon it by a mortal's actions.
Rav Avraham replies that since the holiness of the firstborn is inherent and it cannot be changed to that of another sacrifice, that is a proof that a vow cannot affect it. With regard to using a first born as the basis for a vow, see also Halachah 15 and notes.
35.See Hilchot Arachin V'Charamim 6:1 for a description of the nature of this pledge.
36.And are forbidden to be used for mundane purposes. Thus they represent an entity that was forbidden by man's pledge.
37.The Hebrew term terumat halishkah refers to the money collected from the half-shekel donations collected from the Jewish people and used for the communal sacrifices offered in the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2.
38.I.e., the chambers in the Temple. This and several of the following interpretations are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:3).
39.For the altar.
40.I.e., the portions of the sacrifices offered on the Temple altar.
41.Used to rake the ashes on the altar.
42.Used to collect the blood from the sacrifices and then pour it on the altar.
43.Used to move portions of the sacrifices around on the altar's fire, so that they would be consumed by it.
44.I.e., like the sacrifices offered in the Temple.
45.Like the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem.
46.Since fundamentally, before its blood was poured on the altar, the meat was forbidden, that is the factor that we consider. We do not take into consideration the fact that afterwards it became permitted. This ruling is the subject of an unresolved question in Nedarim 11b. Hence, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
47.For then it is forbidden to everyone. Hence one might say that just as his designation of the firstborn causes the meat to be forbidden, making a vow using a firstborn sacrifice as a basis is effective.
This ruling has created difficulty among the commentaries, because in Halachah 13 the Rambam ruled that a firstborn animal cannot be used as the basis of a vow. Similarly, as the Ra'avad points out, the Rambam's ruling does not appear to be consistent with either of the positions mentioned in Nedarim 12b, the source for this halachah. This leads the Kessef Mishneh to conclude that there was a printing error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is "[the produce] is permitted." He states that he found an ancient text that reads this way. Similarly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read in that manner, omitting the last phrase entirely.
The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham defends the ruling in the existing text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining that there is a difference between a firstborn sacrifice and the meat of a firstborn sacrifice.
48.For this is representative of the person's intent. Taking this concept further, the Rama Yoreh De'ah 207:1) quotes opinions that maintain that this surely applies to vows made in gentile languages. And conversely, he also mentions views that maintain that if someone makes a vow using the wording of our Sages without understanding what he is saying, it does not take effect.
49.Nedarim 10b gives examples: miknamna, miknachna, and miknasna.
50.For they are very distant from the original wording [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 207:1)]. Kin'at Eliyahu states that apparently, they also would not have been recognized universally as having the desired intent.
51.The Rambam states this expression twice: once in Aramaic and once in Lashon HaKodesh.
52.I.e., the opposite of ordinary food is sacrificial food that is consecrated. Similarly with regard to his statement about impure food, we assume that his intent is an impure sacrifice in which instance, his vow is effective. Although it is possible that his intent is impure terumah (in which instance, his vow would not be binding), we follow the principle (Chapter 2, Halachah 7): Whenever there is a doubt concerning the effectiveness of a vow, we rule stringently (Rabbenu Nissim).
53.See Halachah 11 for a definition of these terms.
54.I.e., we interpret his statement as the Rambam explains.
55.And hence, forbidden to be eaten (Nedarim 11b).
56.Even though none of these expressions is precise, they are still close enough to imply that his intent is that he is forbidding eating with his colleague like a sacrifice is forbidden.
57.I.e., his oath is not binding, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain.
58.Because he does not mention a sacrifice in any of these expressions. The Ra'avad mentions that from Nedarim 11a, it would appear that some of these expressions would involve a vow. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's rulings.
59.Based on Nedarim 10b, the Lechem Mishneh explains that we offer this interpretation, because we assume that a person will not make statements unnecessarily. Hence, since his statements could be interpreted as implying a vow, we offer such an interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh struggles with the meaning of the Rambam's words and suggests that perhaps an error crept into the text.
60.For he is forbidding himself from eating with his colleague, like he is forbidden to partake of the Temple's sacrifices.
61.Concluding with a negative expression implies that this is his intent, as in Halachah 19 (Radbaz). In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's wording.
62.This and the subsequent statements of this clause do not imply that he is forbidden to partake of the other person's food.
63.For this restriction applies when a person is under a ban of ostracism (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:4).
The Turei Zahav 206:1 mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that these vows are not effective at all.
64.He may, however, speak to him (Radbaz).
Although the person does not mention the terms "prohibition" or "sacrifice" in his vow, since his intent is obviously to prohibit himself from benefiting from the other person, that prohibition takes effect. This reflects the principle (Nedarim 3a): "The handles of vows are as vows." The intent is that even a statement that, like a handle to a cup, is merely an auxiliary to a vow is binding like a vow itself. See also a responsum authored by the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which explains that even when the intent of one's statements are not entirely clear, as in the present instance, they may constitute a vow, provided their intent is somewhat clear. This principle is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:1).
65.From Nedarim 7a, it appears that this expression creates an unresolved question whether the one taking the vow was merely promising not to come within four cubits of the other person or whether he intended to forbid partaking of that person's property. Because of the doubt, he is forbidden to partake of the property, but is not given lashes.
66.The term the Rambam uses relates to the Hebrew words na and nad which mean "wander" and "roam." Nevertheless, Nedarim 7a states that all authorities agree that this expression creates a binding commitment.
67.Since he does not use the words "eat" or "partake," we assume that he intended to create a more encompassing prohibition.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the expression means that he is not allowed to partake of his property in his presence. That interpretation is also discussed by the Kessef Mishneh.
68.The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person (Halachah 2). See also Chapter 13, Halachah 25, which states that it is undesirable to make vows.
69.I.e., he must accept a nazirite vow, bring a burnt offering, and is liable for lashes for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
70.See Chapter 13, Halachah 23.
71.The term the Rambam refers to "donations," i.e., animals which the person designates as a sacrifices, but if lost do not create a lien on his person (Halachah 2).
72.To uphold a nazirite vow and to bring a sacrifice. He is not, however, liable for an oath, because he did not mention an oath in his statements, since the upright do not take oaths casually.
73.In either case, his statement implies a binding commitment for the wicked make vows and the upright make pledges.
74.I.e., he did not explicitly attach his vow to a sacrifice. This is another example of "the handles of vows" mentioned above (Radbaz).
75.Since the nazirite was passing before him, we assume that this was his intent.
76.This applies even when an animal is not in his sight, for this appears to be his intent (Radbaz).
77.I.e., a loaf of bread [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:4)].
78.I.e., if he partakes of the food, he is liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
79.I.e., a Torah scroll.
80.For the holiness of a Torah scroll is inherent. It is not established by man's actions.
81.See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Sh'vuot, ch. 6, which describe this practice.
82.I.e., the vow is not binding. Nevertheless, we make it appear that it is and require him to seek to be released for the reason stated by the Rambam. See the parallels in Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13 and Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:4-5.
83.The Rambam's explanation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:3). With regard to oaths, by contrast, his intent is focused on God's name.
84.Since he knows what is written in the Torah and is holding it in a reverent manner, we assume that he is not making his statements in vain. Hence, we interpret them as referring to an option for which he would be liable.
85.Nedarim 8a derives this concept from Ezekiel 3:22-23 which states: "And He said to me: "Arise and go out to the valley and there I will speak to you. I arose and I went out to the valley and there the glory of God was standing." Since God promised to reveal Himself to Ezekiel, He kept his word, appearing even before Ezekiel arrived there.
86.From Nedarim 8a, it appears that although this statement establishes a binding commitment, it does not have the full power of a vow. The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 213:2) consider this statement as an actual vow.
The Rambam's perspective appears to be that a vow involves making an object forbidden. This instance where the person accepts a commitment upon himself bears a closer resemblance to the obligation incurred when making an oath. Nevertheless, since the person did not employ the wording associated with an oath, it is not binding as an oath. Nonetheless, since a mitzvah is involved, a binding commitment is established.
87.With whom it is forbidden for him to engage in relations.
88.Of which it is forbidden to partake. See Leviticus 19:23, Deuteronomy 22:9.
89.Halachot 8-9. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 13.
90.A man is obligated to give his wife conjugal rights. Hence, he is not allowed to forbid himself from engaging in relations with her. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the vow also involves satisfaction that he could forbid him, it also includes this form of satisfaction.
91.For he did not forbid relations, but instead, the satisfaction relations bring him. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
Nedarim - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
[The same laws apply] whether one took the vow on his own [volition] or another person states a vow for him and he answers Amen or says something which like Amen implies that he accepts the matter.1
Halacha 2
A person who takes an oath is not forbidden [to partake of] the entity which he forbade to himself until he makes a verbal statement to that effect2 and his statements must match his intent, as we explained with regard to oaths.3
If, by contrast, one intended to take a nazirite vow and instead, vowed to bring a sacrifice, [intended to vow to bring] a sacrifice and instead, took a nazirite [vow], [intended to take] an oath and instead, [took] a vow, [intended to take] a vow and instead, [took] an oath, intended to say "figs" and instead, said "grapes," both are permitted to him.4 There is no vow.
Halacha 3
When a person takes a vow dependent on the intent of others, it is like he took an oath dependent on the intent of others.5 Similarly, if one takes a vow and retracts6 immediately thereafter or someone rebuked him immediately thereafter and he accepted their statement, he is permitted [to use the article mentioned].7 The laws applying to all these matters with regard to vows are the same as those applying to oaths.8
Halacha 4
[The following laws apply when] a person issued a stipulation before he made a vow, saying: "I am retracting from any vow that I will take from now until ten years in the future," "They are nullified," or other similar statements, and then took a vow: If he remembered the stipulation at the time he made the vow, the vow is effective, for by taking the vow, he nullified the stipulation.9 If, however, he did not remember the stipulation until after he made the vow, the vow is nullified10 even if [immediately after taking the vow], he brought the stipulation to mind and maintained it. Although he did not verbalize his retraction at the time [he made the vow], the retraction preceded the vow and he verbalized it beforehand.11 There is an authority who rules stringently and says that he must remember the stipulation immediately thereafter taking the vow.12
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] one made a stipulation [similar to that mentioned above]13 for a year or for ten years and afterwards took a vow, remembering at the time that he took the vow that he had made a stipulation, but forgetting the subject of that stipulation or what it involved. If [when taking the vow], he said:14 "I am acting according to my original intention,"15 his vow is not effective, for he has nullified it. If he does not make such a statement, he has nullified the stipulation and upheld the vow, for, at the time he took the vow, he remembered that there was a stipulation and, nevertheless, took the vow.16
Halacha 6
There are some of the Geonim who maintain that all of these statements are applicable only with regard to vows and not to oaths,17 but there is an authority who maintains that the laws pertaining to vows and oaths are the same in this regard. Thus one may issue a stipulation nullifying an oath [beforehand] in the same manner as was stated with regard to vows.18
Halacha 7
[When a person takes] a vow whose object is not clear,19 we rule stringently.20 If he interprets them, there is room for both leniency and stringency.
What does this imply? If one says: "Let this produce be considered as salted meat and as wine poured as a libation for me," we ask him what his intent was. If he explained himself, saying "My intent was that salted meat refers to sacrificial meat21 and wine poured as a libation refers to libations poured on the Temple altar," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].22 If, however, he says: "My intent was a sacrifice offered to a false deity23 and wine poured as a libation to it," he is permitted.24 If he took the vow without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 8
Similar principles apply when one says: "This produce is considered as cherem (a dedication offering) for me." If [his intent was] a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple, he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].25 If [his intent] was a dedication offering for the priests, he is permitted, because [these offerings] become [the priests'] personal possessions and are not forbidden [to others].26 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 9
[If he states:] "May they be considered like the tithes for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the tithe taken from animals, [it becomes] forbidden, because these are sacrifices that he consecrates through his actions, as we explained.27 [If his intent was] the tithe taken from grain, it is permitted.28 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 10
[If he states:] "May they be considered like terumah for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the money donated for the sacrificial offerings,29 it is forbidden. If his intent was terumah [separated from] the grain heap, it is permitted.30 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 11
When does the above31 apply? In a place where the terms used have these two possible meanings. In a place where the term cherem without any further definition is used only to refer to the dedication offerings for the upkeep of the Temple,32 if he says: "[This produce is considered] as cherem for me," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].33 Similarly, if their custom was to use the term cherem without any further definition to refer only to dedication offerings given the priests, he is permitted. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations, for with regard to vows, we follow the connotations understood by the people in that place in that era.34
Halacha 12
[The ensuing rules apply] in all situations analogous to those exemplified: i.e., situations when a person takes a vow which appears to everyone to involve a prohibition, but he says: "My intent was for this and this specific instance,"35 for example, he takes a vow based on a cherem,36but [afterwards] said: "My intent was a sea cherem, i.e., a fishing net,"37 he took a vow based on an offering, but said: "My intent was an offering brought to the king," He told a colleague: "Myself is like a sacrifice for you," and then explained: "My intent was only to forbid him from [benefiting from] a bone38that I set aside so that I could take a vow as a lark," he took a vow that his wife could not benefit from him and then explained that his intent was his first wife whom he had divorced.
[In all the above situations,] if the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].39 If the one who took the vow is a common person, we make it appear to him that it is a vow, yet we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow.40 Whether he is a Torah scholar or a common person, we rebuke him and teach him not to conduct himself in this manner with regard to vows and not to take vows as a lark or a caper.
Halacha 13
Similarly, when a person tells his wife: "You are considered as my mother to me," or he says: "Let this produce be considered as pig meat for me," the vow is not effective, as we explained.41 If the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].42 If the one who took the vow is a common person, he must ask a sage [for the vow to be released]. We make it appear to him that his wife is forbidden to him and that the produce is forbidden,43 but we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow in order that people not act frivolously with regard to vows.44
Halacha 14
Although declaring property ownerless is not a vow,45 it resembles a vow, for the person is forbidden to retract.
What is meant by declaring property ownerless? A person says: "This property is free for everyone"46 to acquire. It applies to both movable property and landed property.
What is the law [applying to property] declared ownerless? Whoever comes first and acquires it,47 becomes the owner. He acquires it as his own and it becomes his. Even the person who declared the property ownerless has the same rights as others with regard to it. If he comes first and acquires it, it becomes his.48
Halacha 15
When a person declares his property ownerless [so that it can be acquired by] the poor, but not by the rich, it is not ownerless.49 He must declare it ownerless for everyone like the produce of the Sabbatical year.
When a person declares his servants ownerless, those past majority acquire themselves.50 With regard to those below majority, whoever comes first and takes hold of them acquires them as is the law with regard to other movable property.51
Halacha 16
When a person declares landed property ownerless, whoever comes first and manifests his ownership52 over it acquires it.
According to Scriptural Law, even when a person declares his property ownerless in the presence of one person, it becomes ownerless and one is not required to tithe its produce,53 as will be explained in its place.54 According to Rabbinic decree, however, [property] is not ownerless until one declares as such in the presence of three people so that one can acquire it and two can act as witnesses.
Should one say: "This is ownerless and this," there is an unresolved doubt whether the second entity is ownerless.55 If he said: "...and this is like this" or "...and also this," he has associated the second entity [with the first], and it is definitely ownerless.
Halacha 17
When a person declares his field ownerless and no one else acquires it,56 during the first three days, he may retract.57 After these three days, he may not retract unless he comes first and acquires it.58 He is like one acquiring ownerless property.59 [There is no difference] between him and another person.
Halacha 18
When a person says: "This field is declared ownerless for one day," "...for one week," "...for one month," "...for one year," or "...for one seven-year cycle," he may retract before he or another person acquires it.60 Once it is acquired, whether by the person himself or by someone else, he may not retract.
Why does he have the right to retract before it was acquired? Because this is an uncommon matter. [Generally,] a person will not declare [property] ownerless for a limited time.
Halacha 19
When a person comes and watches over ownerless property, looking at it so that another person will not take it, he does not acquire it by looking at it. Instead, he must lift it up if it were movable property61 or manifest ownership over it if it were landed property,62 as purchasers acquire property.63
FOOTNOTES
1.See the parallels in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:1.
2.I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions "the expression of her lips," implying that one must express his intent verbally.
3.Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term "expression" implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one's thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one's thoughts, it is not an "expression" (Kiryat Sefer).
4.The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them.
5.See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:15.
6.He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 210:3)].
7.See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17-18. As mentioned there, the term "immediately thereafter" has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made.
8.For Numbers 30:3 associates the two together (Kessef Mishneh). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:1).
9.For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (see Nedarim 23b).
10.Kiryat Sefer explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: "He shall not desecrate his word," that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect.
11.Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz.
12.Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:2) mentions the Rambam's view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority's view. The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it.
As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidrei prayer recited at the beginning of Yom Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De'ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.
13.In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:3)].
14.In one of his response, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart.
15.I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement.
16.I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.
17.For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God's name must be invoked. (See Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach.
18.The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for the nullification of vows rite recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei prayer mention oaths as well as vows.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person's original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague's statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.
19.I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi, Nedarim 18b).
20.We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid.). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4.
21.For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13).
22.For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9).
23.For the gentiles would also salt their offerings.
24.For there is no way, he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9).
25.For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed.
26.Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden.
27.Chapter 1, Halachah 13.
28.For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people. Moreover, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir who rules that ordinary people may not partake of these tithes, they are not forbidden due to a vow. Instead, it was forbidden to partake of the grain before they were separated and once, they were separated, they remain forbidden (Ritba, Nedarim 18b).
29.Terumat halishkah in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used.
30.See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.
31.That we explore the person's intention.
32.Nedarim 18b explains that in the Galilee, it was not common for priests to live. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple.
33.For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests.
34.See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
35.I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a permitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect.
36.I.e., he said: "Let this produce be like a cherem."
37.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15 which employs such a term.
38.The Hebrew word atzmi means "myself," but it can also mean "my bone." Initially, it was thought that the person's intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was "his bone."
39.His word can be accepted when he says: "This was my intent." Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5.
40.I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required.
41.Chapter 1, Halachah 30.
42.For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters.
43.The Rama (loc. cit.) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters.
44.If the common person was allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.
45.This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz, Ketzot HaChoshen 273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances.
Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one's own ownership over or does it involves transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless.
46.Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim 7a). See the following halachah.
47.Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19.
48.I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).
See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.
49.This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit.).
50.I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:13).
51.Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.
52.Through a formal kinyan, e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence.
53.Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 273:7) states that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law.
54.See Hilchot Terumah 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one's own, not those acquired from ownerless property.
55.Nedarim 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:12).
56.If, however, another person acquires, it becomes that person's property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh).
57.According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding.
58.Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:13).
59.And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh).
60.I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz).
61.Performing the kinyan of hagba'ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective.
62.Performing the kinyan of chazzakah.
63.See Hilchot Mechirah 1:3, 3:1.
Nedarim - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
There are four differences between a vow and a sh'vuat bitui:
a) With regard to a sh'vuat bitui, one oath cannot take effect while another is already in effect,1 and with regard to vows, a vow can take effect while another is already in effect.
b) When one attempts to extend the scope of an oath taken previously, he is not liable,2 and with regard to vows, one is.
c) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect only with regard to actions that are left to one's choice,3 while vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice.
d) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect with regard to entity of substance and an entity that is not of substance, 4 while vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance.
Halacha 2
What is meant by the statement that a vow can take effect while another is already in effect? If a person says: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat this loaf [of bread]," [repeats]: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat it," he is liable [to bring a sacrifice] for every oath that he takes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
What is meant by the statement that one who extends the scope of a vow taken previously is liable? He heard his colleague take a vow and said: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter,5 he is forbidden [to partake of] the substance that his colleague deemed forbidden.6 If a third person heard the second person say: "And I am like you," and he also said: "I am like you," [he is also forbidden]. Even if there are one hundred and each one says: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter the statements of the previous one," they are all forbidden.
Halacha 4
Similarly, when one says: "This meat is considered forbidden to me,' and even after several days7 says: "This bread is like this meat," [the prohibition] is extended to the bread and it becomes forbidden. If afterwards, he said: "And this honey is like this bread, and this wine is like this honey," even if he mentions 100 [substances], they are all forbidden.
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when a person's] father or teacher died on a particular day and he took a vow to fast that day8 and [actually] fasted.9 If after years past, he said: "Let this day10 be considered as the day on which my father - or my teacher - died," he is forbidden to eat on that day. For he attached this day [to his existing vow] and caused it to be forbidden as the day which is forbidden for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 6
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice? When a person says: "Matzah is forbidden to me on Pesach night," "Dwelling in a sukkah on that holiday is forbidden to me," or "I am forbidden to take hold of tefillin," they are forbidden to him. If he ate matzah, dwelled in a sukkah, or took tefillin, he is liable for lashes.11 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: "I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat matzah on Pesach night," is obligated to bring a sacrifice.12 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath.13 When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him.14 Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai.
Halacha 8
When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a sh'vuat bitui, [Leviticus 5:4] states: "Whether he will do harm or do good," i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained,15 e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall do everything uttered by his mouth," without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition.
Halacha 9
When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast16 for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained.17 Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur18 falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary.19 Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 10
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance? If one says: "My speech is like a sacrifice for you,"20 he is not forbidden to speak to him, because speech is not an entity of substance. Similarly, if he tells him: "My speech is forbidden to you," it is not like his saying: "my produce is forbidden to you," or "My produce is like a sacrifice for you," in which instance, [the produce] would be forbidden.
Therefore, if a person tells a colleague: "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not speak with you," "...that I will not act on your behalf," or "...that I will not go with you," or he told his wife, "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not be intimate with you," his vow does not take effect in all these instances. For this is as if he is saying: "My speech, going, actions, or intimacy is like a sacrifice, and none [of these are] entities of substance.21
Halacha 11
When, by contrast, a person says: "Let my mouth be forbidden to speak, my hands to act, my feet to walk, and my eyes to sleep," his vow is effective with regard to them.22 Therefore if a person tells a colleague: "My mouth is like a sacrifice with regard to speaking with you, my hands [are so] with regard to acting on your behalf, and my feet [are so] with regard to going with you," he becomes forbidden.
Similarly, one who tells a colleague: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I speak to so-and-so" or "...if I don't speak to so-and-so," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice if he violates this commitment. Similarly, if he took a vow in which he said: "[If] I spoke [to so-and-so, I must bring a sacrifice]" or "[If] I did not speak..." or the like, [he is liable]. For these are not vows in which he accepts prohibitions upon himself23 whose ground rules we are explaining here, but vows of dedication.24
Halacha 12
Although when a person takes a vow concerning entities that are not of substance and forbids them, the vow does not take effect with regard to them, we do not rule that he should act as if they are permitted. [Instead,] since he willingly [took a vow] forbidding them to him, [according to Rabbinic decree]25 the vow took effect with regard to them. Although they are not forbidden, we give him an opportunity [to ask for the vow's release] from another vantage point and then release the vow, so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.26
FOOTNOTES
1.See Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:9-10. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachah 2.
2.See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:8-9. The reverse rulings with regard to vows are described in Halachot 3-5.
3.See Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:14-16. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachot 6-9.
4.This concept can be explained as follows: As stated in Halachah 6, an oath creates a prohibition on the person taking the oath (the gavra), i.e., the article is essentially permitted, he has accepted a prohibition on himself not to partake of it. Hence, it is not significant whether the article is of substance or not. With regard to vows, by contrast, the article itself (the cheftzah) becomes forbidden. Hence, for that prohibition to take effect, the article must be of substance (Radbaz). See Halachah 10 for an illustration of how this principle is effective with regard to vows.
5.This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Elecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
6.I.e., he is extending the scope of his colleague's vow, so that it includes not only his colleague, but he himself.
Here also the concept can be explained according to the above difference. Since an oath involves an obligation on the person taking the oath (gavra), it cannot be extended to include another individual, for each person must take his own oath. With regard to a vow, by contrast, since the prohibition caused by the vow is associated with a substance (cheftzah), another person can also extend the prohibition to himself (Rabbenu Nissim).
7.In this instance, it is not necessary to make the statement immediately thereafter the first vow. Since the meat is visible before us, one can attach a vow to it. With regard to the previous halachah, by contrast, we are speaking about a subject that cannot be seen. Hence, unless the statements are made immediately after each other, there is no way we can be certain of the meaning of the statement: "And I am like you" (Radbaz).
8.This is a common practice in many communities.
9.If, however, he never fasted on that day, he cannot attach another day to this vow (Chazon Yechezkel).
10.I.e., any given day.
11.For breaking his vow. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 215:1) mentions a view that maintains that the person should be given corporal punishment for taking such a vow and should be compelled to ask to have the vow released.
12.For he can fulfill the mitzvah and bring the sacrifice (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 2:2).
13.I.e., the prohibition involves the gavra, the person himself. It cannot take effect if he is already bound to act otherwise.
14.I.e., the prohibition involves the cheftzah, the article. Once it is forbidden, it is forbidden to fulfill the mitzvah by partaking of it or using it, for a positive commandment does not supercede a negative commandment. It would be a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression which is a forbidden act (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
15.Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:16.
16.Despite the fact that by doing so he negates the mitzvah of taking pleasure in the Sabbath and festivals. The Ra'avad clarifies that the matter is dependent on the wording he used in his oath. If on the Sabbath, he said: "I will fast today," he is forbidden to keep his vow.
17.In the three preceding halachot.
18.When it is a mitzvah to eat in preparation for the fast (Rosh HaShanah 9a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 604:1).
19.In contrast to the Sabbath and festivals where the obligation to eat is of Scriptural origin. This is a general principle in Talmudic Law. There are times when our Sages gave their decrees greater power than Scriptural Law, for Scriptural Law is revered by the people at large and does not require reinforcement. If, by contrast, Rabbinic Law was abrogated in such instances, it might lead people to take leniencies even when uncalled for (see Ta'anis 17b; Kessef Mishneh). The Radbaz explains that if keeping one's vow was allowed to override a Rabbinic decree, then there would be no point in making such decrees. For people could nullify them by taking vows. For example, a person could take a vow to drink ordinary gentile wine.
The Kessef Mishneh also explains that although the obligation to eat on Rosh Chodesh and the day preceding Yom Kippur is also of Rabbinic origin, since our Sages found an allusion to it in the Torah, it is less likely that people will treat it lightly.
20.I.e., he takes a vow against the other person listening to his speech.
21.If, however, he states: "The satisfaction that I receive from any of the above is forbidden," his vow is effective, for the satisfaction is considered substantial. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
22.For these organs are objects of substance (Nedarim 13b).
23.And apply only to entities of substance.
24.Which are described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, chs. 6 and 9. See also Chapter 1 where the Rambam makes a distinction between these two types of vows.
25.See Nedarim 15a. Similarly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:1), the Rambam writes that the prohibition against desecrating one's word applies with regard to these vows. Compare to Chapter 4, Halachah 4.
26.See Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13.
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Hayom Yom:
• Monday, Nissan 28, 5774 • 28 April 2014
"Today's Day"
Monday, Nissan 28, 13th day of the omer, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: K'doshim, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 135-139.
Tanya: Ch. 44. Each of (p. 231)...until the morning... (p. 233).
Chassidim asked the Alter Rebbe: "Which is the superior avoda, love of G-d or love of Israel?" He replied: "Both love of G-d and love of Israel are equally engraved in every Jew's neshama, ruach, and nefesh.1 Scripture is explicit: 'I have loved you, says the L-rd.'2 It follows that love of Israel is superior - for you love whom your beloved loves."
FOOTNOTES
1. Different levels or aspects of the soul. The two loves thoroughly permeate the soul on every level.
2. Malachi 1:2.
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Daily Thought:
Impossible Fusion
Why not remain broken? When broken, you can achieve the highest heights. When you are nothing, you can receive everything. Because you are not made only to receive. You must also face the real world and challenge its chutzpah over and over. To do that, you need supreme wholeness, as though you were Adam in the Garden before his fall. And if you should say, “But it is impossible! It is beyond the capacity of a created being to be both something and nothing at once.” You are right. It is impossible. That is precisely the advantage of the human being. That is why G‑d created you: To join heaven and earth, Nothingness and Being. To make the impossible a reality.
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