Today's Laws & Customs:
Today in Jewish History:
• Alexander-Yannai's death celebrated (76 BCE)
Hashmonean King Alexander-Yannai (Jannaeus), an avowed enemy of the Jewish sages, died on this date. So great was his cruelty and the ruthlessness with which he persecuted the Sages and those loyal to them (some 50,000 were killed in the years 82-76 BCE), that the day of his death was declared a holiday.
• Passing of R. Zusha of Anipoli (1800)
Shevat 2 is the yahrtzeit (anniversary of the passing) of Chassidic Master Rabbi Meshulam Zusha of Anipoli (1718?-1800), a disciple of the 2nd leader of the Chassidic movement, Rabbi DovBer of Mezeritch.
Despite Rabbi Zusha's erudition and great piety, he was distinguished by his self-effacement and simple ways. A characteristic saying of his goes: "If it were offered to me to exchange places with Abraham our Father, I would refuse. What would G-d gain from this? He'd still have one Zusha and one Abraham..." His colleagues said of him that he was literally incapable of seeing anything negative in a fellow Jew.
Links: More about Rabbi Zusha
DAILY QUOTE:
The etrog has both a taste and an aroma; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who have both Torah learning and good deeds.... The date (the fruit of the lulav) has a taste but does not have an aroma; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who have Torah but do not have good deeds.... The hadas (myrtle) has an aroma but not a taste; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who have good deeds but do not have Torah.... The aravah (willow) has no taste and no aroma; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who do not have Torah and do not have good deeds.... Says G-d: "Let them all bond together in one bundle and atone for each other."[Midrash Rabbah, Vayikra 30:11]
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:• Alexander-Yannai's death celebrated (76 BCE)
Hashmonean King Alexander-Yannai (Jannaeus), an avowed enemy of the Jewish sages, died on this date. So great was his cruelty and the ruthlessness with which he persecuted the Sages and those loyal to them (some 50,000 were killed in the years 82-76 BCE), that the day of his death was declared a holiday.
• Passing of R. Zusha of Anipoli (1800)
Shevat 2 is the yahrtzeit (anniversary of the passing) of Chassidic Master Rabbi Meshulam Zusha of Anipoli (1718?-1800), a disciple of the 2nd leader of the Chassidic movement, Rabbi DovBer of Mezeritch.
Despite Rabbi Zusha's erudition and great piety, he was distinguished by his self-effacement and simple ways. A characteristic saying of his goes: "If it were offered to me to exchange places with Abraham our Father, I would refuse. What would G-d gain from this? He'd still have one Zusha and one Abraham..." His colleagues said of him that he was literally incapable of seeing anything negative in a fellow Jew.
Links: More about Rabbi Zusha
DAILY QUOTE:
The etrog has both a taste and an aroma; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who have both Torah learning and good deeds.... The date (the fruit of the lulav) has a taste but does not have an aroma; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who have Torah but do not have good deeds.... The hadas (myrtle) has an aroma but not a taste; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who have good deeds but do not have Torah.... The aravah (willow) has no taste and no aroma; so, too, do the people of Israel include individuals who do not have Torah and do not have good deeds.... Says G-d: "Let them all bond together in one bundle and atone for each other."[Midrash Rabbah, Vayikra 30:11]
DAILY STUDY:
Chumash: Bo, 5th Portion Exodus 12:21-12:28 with Rashii
• Chapter 12
21. Moses summoned all the elders of Israel and said to them, "Draw forth or buy for yourselves sheep for your families and slaughter the Passover sacrifice. כא. וַיִּקְרָא משֶׁה לְכָל זִקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם מִשְׁכוּ וּקְחוּ לָכֶם צֹאן לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתֵיכֶם וְשַׁחֲטוּ הַפָּסַח:
Draw forth: Whoever has sheep shall draw from his own.
משכו: מי שיש לו צאן ימשוך משלו:
or buy: Whoever has none shall buy from the market. — [from Mechilta]
וקחו: מי שאין לו יקח מן השוק:
for your families: A lamb for a parental house. — [from Mechilta 3]
למשפחתיכם: שה לבית אבות:
22. And you shall take a bunch of hyssop and immerse [it] in the blood that is in the basin, and you shall extend to the lintel and to the two doorposts the blood that is in the basin, and you shall not go out, any man from the entrance of his house until morning. כב. וּלְקַחְתֶּם אֲגֻדַּת אֵזוֹב וּטְבַלְתֶּם בַּדָּם אֲשֶׁר בַּסַּף וְהִגַּעְתֶּם אֶל הַמַּשְׁקוֹף וְאֶל שְׁתֵּי הַמְּזוּזֹת מִן הַדָּם אֲשֶׁר בַּסָּף וְאַתֶּם לֹא תֵצְאוּ אִישׁ מִפֶּתַח בֵּיתוֹ עַד בֹּקֶר:
hyssop: Heb. אֵזוֹב. A species of herb that has thin stalks.
אזוב: מין ירק שיש לו גבעולין:
a bunch of hyssop: Three stalks are called a bunch. — [Sukkah 13a]
אגדת אזוב: שלושה קלחין קרויין אגודה:
that is in the basin: Heb. בַּסַּף, in the vessel, like “silver pitchers (סִפּוֹת) ” (II Kings 12:14). [from Mechilta]
אשר בסף: בכלי, כמו (מלכים ב' יב יד) ספות כסף:
the blood that is in the basin: Why does the text repeat this? So that you should not say that [Scripture means] one immersion for [all] the three sprinklings. Therefore, it says again: “that is in the basin,” [to indicate] that every sprinkling shall be from the blood that is in the basin-for each touching an immersion [is necessary]. — [from Mechilta]
מן הדם אשר בסף: למה חזר ושנאו, שלא תאמר טבילה אחת לשלש המתנות, לכך נאמר עוד אשר בסף, ושתהא כל נתינה ונתינה מן הדם אשר בסף, על כל הגעה טבילה:
and you shall not go out, etc.: This tells [us] that once the destroyer is given permission to destroy, he does not discriminate between righteous and wicked. And night is the time that destroyers are given permission, as it is said: “in which every beast of the forest moves about” (Ps. 104:20). — [from Mechilta]
ואתם לא תצאו וגו': מגיד שמאחר שנתנה רשות למשחית לחבל אינו מבחין בין צדיק לרשע, ולילה רשות למחבלים הוא, שנאמר (תהלים קד כ) בו תרמוש כל חיתו יער:
23. The Lord will pass to smite the Egyptians, and He will see the blood on the lintel and on the two doorposts, and the Lord will pass over the entrance, and He will not permit the destroyer to enter your houses to smite [you]. כג. וְעָבַר יְהֹוָה לִנְגֹּף אֶת מִצְרַיִם וְרָאָה אֶת הַדָּם עַל הַמַּשְׁקוֹף וְעַל שְׁתֵּי הַמְּזוּזֹת וּפָסַח יְהֹוָה עַל הַפֶּתַח וְלֹא יִתֵּן הַמַּשְׁחִית לָבֹא אֶל בָּתֵּיכֶם לִנְגֹּף:
will pass over: Heb. וּפָסַח, and He will have pity. This may also be rendered: and He will skip over. See Rashi on verses 11 and 13.
ופסח: וחמל, ויש לומר ודלג:
and He will not permit the destroyer: Heb. וְלֹא יִךְתֵּן, lit., and will not give. [I.e.,] He will not grant him the ability to enter, as in “but God did not permit him (נְתָנוֹ) to harm me” (Gen. 31:7).
ולא יתן המשחית: ולא יתן לו יכולת לבא, כמו (בראשית לא ז) ולא נתנו א-להים להרע עמדי:
24. And you shall keep this matter as a statute for you and for your children forever. כד. וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה לְחָק לְךָ וּלְבָנֶיךָ עַד עוֹלָם:
25. And it shall come to pass when you enter the land that the Lord will give you, as He spoke, that you shall observe this service. כה. וְהָיָה כִּי תָבֹאוּ אֶל הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן יְהֹוָה לָכֶם כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֵּר וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת הָעֲבֹדָה הַזֹּאת:
And it shall come to pass when you enter: Scripture makes this commandment contingent upon their entry into the land, but in the desert, they were obligated only to bring one Passover sacrifice, the one they performed in the second year, [which they did] by divine mandate. — [from Mechilta]
והיה כי תבאו אל הארץ: תלה הכתוב מצוה זו בביאתם לארץ, ולא נתחייבו במדבר אלא בפסח אחד שעשו בשנה השנית ועל פי הדבור:
as He spoke: Now where did He speak? “And I will bring you to the land, etc.” (Exod. 6:8). — [from Mechilta]
כאשר דבר: והיכן דבר, והבאתי אתכם אל הארץ וגו' (שמות ו ח):
26. And it will come to pass if your children say to you, What is this service to you? כו. וְהָיָה כִּי יֹאמְרוּ אֲלֵיכֶם בְּנֵיכֶם מָה הָעֲבֹדָה הַזֹּאת לָכֶם:
27. you shall say, It is a Passover sacrifice to the Lord, for He passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt when He smote the Egyptians, and He saved our houses. And the people kneeled and prostrated themselves. כז. וַאֲמַרְתֶּם זֶבַח פֶּסַח הוּא לַיהֹוָה אֲשֶׁר פָּסַח עַל בָּתֵּי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמִצְרַיִם בְּנָגְפּוֹ אֶת מִצְרַיִם וְאֶת בָּתֵּינוּ הִצִּיל וַיִּקֹּד הָעָם וַיִּשְׁתַּחֲווּ:
And the people kneeled and prostrated themselves: [in thanksgiving] for the tidings of the redemption, the entry into the land [of Israel], and the tidings of the children that they would have. — [from Mechilta]
ויקד העם: על בשורת הגאולה וביאת הארץ ובשורת הבנים שיהיו להם:
28. So the children of Israel went and did; as the Lord commanded Moses and Aaron, so they did. כח. וַיֵּלְכוּ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֶת משֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן כֵּן עָשׂוּ:
So the children of Israel went and did: Now did they already do [it]? Wasn’t this said to them on Rosh Chodesh? But since they accepted upon themselves [to do it], Scripture credits them for it as if they had [already] done [it]. — [from Mechilta]
וילכו ויעשו בני ישראל: וכי כבר עשו, והלא מראש חודש נאמר להם, אלא מכיון שקבלו עליהם, מעלה עליהם כאלו עשו:
went and did: Scripture counts also the going, to give reward for the going and reward for the deed. — [from Mechilta]
וילכו ויעשו: אף ההליכה מנה הכתוב, ליתן שכר להליכה ושכר לעשיה:
as the Lord commanded Moses and Aaron: [This comes] to tell Israel’s praise, that they did not omit anything of all the commandments of Moses and Aaron. And what is the meaning of “so they did” ? Moses and Aaron also did so. — [from Mechilta]
כאשר צוה ה' את משה ואהרן: להגיד שבחן של ישראל, שלא הפילו דבר מכל מצות משה ואהרן. ומהו כן עשו, אף משה ואהרן כן עשו:
___________________________
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 10 - 17
• Chapter 10
This psalm tells of the wicked one’s prosperity and his boasting of it, until he says: “There is neither law nor judge. God pays no attention to the actions of mere mortals.”
1. Why, O Lord, do You stand afar, do You hide Yourself in times of distress?
2. The wicked man in his arrogance pursues the poor; they are caught by the schemes they have contrived.
3. For the wicked man glories in the desire of his heart, and the robber boasts that he has scorned the Lord.
4. The wicked one in his insolence [thinks], “He does not avenge”; all his thoughts are, “There is no God.”
5. His ways always succeed; Your retribution is far removed from before him; he puffs at all his foes.
6. He says in his heart, “I shall not falter; for all generations no evil will befall me.”
7. His mouth is full of oaths, deceit and malice; mischief and iniquity are under his tongue.
8. He sits in ambush near open cities; in hidden places he murders the innocent; his eyes stealthily watch for the helpless.
9. He lurks in hiding like a lion in his lair; he lurks to seize the poor, then seizes the poor when he draws his net.
10. He crouches and stoops, then the helpless fall prey to his might.
11. He says in his heart, “God has forgotten, He conceals His countenance, He will never see.”
12. Arise, O Lord! O God, lift Your hand! Do not forget the lowly.
13. Why does the wicked man scorn God? Because he says in his heart, “You do not avenge.”
14. Indeed, You do see! For You behold the mischief and vexation. To recompense is in Your power; the helpless place their trust in You; You have [always] helped the orphan.
15. Break the strength of the wicked; then search for the wickedness of the evil one and You will not find it.
16. The Lord reigns for all eternity; the nations have vanished from His land.
17. Lord, You have heard the desire of the humble; direct their hearts, let Your ear listen,
18. to bring justice to the orphan and the downtrodden, so that [the wicked] shall no longer crush the frail of the earth.
Chapter 11
This psalm declares that the suffering of the righteous one is for his own benefit, to cleanse him of his sins; whereas the wicked one is granted prosperity in this world-similar to the verse, "Wealth remains with its owner, to his detriment."
1. For the Conductor, by David. I have placed my trust in the Lord; [thus] how can you say of my soul, your mountain,1 that it flees like a bird?2
2. For behold, the wicked bend the bow, they have readied their arrow upon the bowstring, to shoot in darkness at the upright of heart.
3. They destroyed the foundations; 3 what [wrong] has the righteous man done?
4. The Lord is in His holy Sanctuary, the Lord's throne is in heaven, [yet] His eyes behold, His pupils probe [the deeds of] mankind.
5. The Lord tests the righteous, but He hates the wicked and the lover of violence.
6. He will rain down upon the wicked fiery coals and brimstone; a scorching wind will be their allotted portion.
7. For the Lord is righteous, He loves [the man of] righteous deeds; the upright will behold His countenance.
Chapter 12
This psalm admonishes informers, slanderers, and flatterers.
1. For the Conductor, upon the eight-stringed instrument, a psalm by David.
2. Help us, Lord, for the pious are no more; for the faithful have vanished from among men.
3. Men speak falsehood to one another; with flattering lips, with a duplicitous heart do they speak.
4. May the Lord cut off all flattering lips, the tongue that speaks boastfully-
5. those who have said, "With our tongues we shall prevail, our lips are with us, who is master over us!”
6. Because of the plundering of the poor, because of the moaning of the needy, the Lord says, "Now I will arise!" "I will grant deliverance," He says to him.
7. The words of the Lord are pure words, like silver refined in the finest earthen crucible, purified seven times.
8. May You, O Lord, watch over them; may You forever guard them from this generation,
9. [in which] the wicked walk on every side; when they are exalted it is a disgrace to mankind.
Chapter 13
A prayer for an end to the long exile. One in distress should offer this prayer for his troubles and for the length of the exile.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. How long, O Lord, will You forget me, forever? How long will You hide Your countenance from me?
3. How long must I seek counsel within my soul, [to escape] the grief in my heart all day? How long will my enemy be exalted over me?
4. Look! Answer me, O Lord, my God; give light to my eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death.
5. Lest my enemy say, "I have overcome him," [and] my oppressors rejoice when I falter.
6. I have placed my trust in Your kindness, my heart will rejoice in Your deliverance. I will sing to the Lord, for He has dealt kindly with me.
Chapter 14
This psalm speaks of the destruction of the two Holy Temples-the first by Nebuchadnezzar, and the second by Titus.
1. For the Conductor, by David. The fool says in his heart, "There is no God!" [Man's] deeds have become corrupt and abominable, no one does good.
2. The Lord looked down from heaven upon mankind, to see if there was any wise man who searches for God.
3. They have all gone astray together, they have become corrupt; there is none who does good, not even one.
4. Indeed, all the evildoers, who devour My people as they devour bread, who do not call upon the Lord, will [ultimately] come to know [the consequences of their actions].
5. There they will be seized with fright, for God is with the righteous generation.
6. You scorn the counsel of the lowly, that he puts his trust in the Lord.
7. O that out of Zion would come Israel's deliverance! When the Lord returns the captivity of His people, Jacob will exult, Israel will rejoice.
Chapter 15
This psalm speaks of several virtues and attributes with which one should conduct oneself. He is then assured that his soul will rest in Gan Eden.
1. A psalm by David. Who may abide in Your tent, O Lord? Who may dwell on Your holy Mountain?
2. He who walks blamelessly, acts justly, and speaks truth in his heart;
3. who has no slander on his tongue, who has done his fellowman no evil, and who has brought no disgrace upon his relative;
4. in whose eyes a despicable person is abhorrent, but who honors those who are God-fearing; who does not change his oath even if it is to his own detriment;
5. who does not lend his money at interest, nor accept a bribe against the innocent. He who does these things shall never falter.
Chapter 16
When one is in need, he should not implore God in his own merit, for he must leave his merits for his children.
1. A michtam,1 by David. Watch over me, O God, for I have put my trust in You.
2. You, [my soul,] have said to God, "You are my Master; You are not obligated to benefit me.”
3. For the sake of the holy ones who lie in the earth, and for the mighty-all my desires are fulfilled in their merit.
4. Those who hasten after other [gods], their sorrows shall increase; I will not offer their libations of blood, nor take their names upon my lips.
5. The Lord is my allotted portion and my share; You guide my destiny.
6. Portions have fallen to me in pleasant places; indeed, a beautiful inheritance is mine.
7. I bless the Lord Who has advised me; even in the nights my intellect admonishes me.2
8. I have set the Lord before me at all times; because He is at my right hand, I shall not falter.
9. Therefore my heart rejoices and my soul exults; my flesh, too, rests secure.
10. For You will not abandon my soul to the grave, You will not allow Your pious one to see purgatory.
11. Make known to me the path of life, that I may be satiated with the joy of Your presence, with the bliss of Your right hand forever.
Chapter 17
A loftily person should not ask God to test him with some sinful matter, or other things. If one has sinned, he should see to reform himself, and to save many others from sin.
1. A prayer by David. Hear my sincere [plea], O Lord; listen to my cry; give ear to my prayer, expressed by guileless lips.
2. Let my verdict come forth from before You; let Your eyes behold uprightness.
3. You have probed my heart, examined it in the night, tested me and found nothing; no evil thought crossed my mind; as are my words so are my thoughts.
4. So that [my] human deeds conform with the words of Your lips, I guard myself from the paths of the lawbreakers.
5. Support my steps in Your paths, so that my feet shall not falter.
6. I have called upon You, for You, O Lord, will answer me; incline Your ear to me, hear what I say.
7. Withhold Your kindness-O You who delivers with Your right hand those who put their trust in You-from those who rise up against [You].
8. Guard me like the apple of the eye; hide me in the shadow of Your wings
9. from the wicked who despoil me, [from] my mortal enemies who surround me.
10. Their fat has closed [their hearts]; their mouths speak arrogantly.
11. They encircle our footsteps; they set their eyes to make us stray from the earth.
12. His appearance is like a lion longing to devour, like a young lion lurking in hiding.
13. Arise, O Lord! Confront him, bring him to his knees; rescue my soul from the wicked [who serves as] Your sword.
14. Let me be among those whose death is by Your hand, O Lord, among those who die of old age, whose portion is eternal life and whose innards are filled with Your concealed goodness; who are sated with sons and leave their abundance to their offspring.
15. Because of my righteousness, I shall behold Your countenance; in the time of resurrection, I will be sated by Your image.
____________________________
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 19
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Thursday, 2 Shevat, 5775 • 22 January 2015
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 19
In the previous chapter the Alter Rebbe began to discuss the “hidden love of G‑d” inherent in every Jew, by virtue of which it is indeed “very near” to us to fulfill all the commandments out of a spirit of love and awe of G‑d. He stated that this love originates in the divine soul’s faculty of Chochmah where the light of Ein Sof is vested, and that it is this love which causes every Jew to choose death rather than repudiate his faith in G‑d. It was further explained that the divine soul, and thus also the love of G‑d intrinsic to it, is every Jew’s inheritance from the Patriarchs, who merited to bequeath it to their descendants, eternally.
Thus, of the four questions raised in the previous chapter concerning the “hidden love,” two have been answered: (1) What is the root of this love? (2) How did we come to inherit it?
Two questions remain: (1) What is the nature of this love (i.e., what does it strive for)? (2) How is fear of G‑d incorporated in it?
They will be dealt with in this chapter.
ולתוספת ביאור צריך לבאר היטב מה שכתוב: נר ה׳ נשמת אדם
To further elucidate [the nature of the “hidden love”], it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the verse,1 “The soul (Neshamah) of man is a candle of G‑d.”
פירוש: שישראל, הקרוים אדם, נשמתם היא למשל כאור הנר
This means that the souls of Jews, who are called “man”, (as our Sages remark,2 “You — the Jewish people — are called ‘man’”) are, by way of illustration, like the flame of a candle
שמתנענע תמיד למעלה בטבעו
whose nature it is always to flicker upwards;
מפני שאור האש חפ׳ בטבע ליפרד מהפתילה, ולידבק בשרשו למעלה ביסוד האש הכללי שתחת גלגל הירח, כמו שכתוב בע׳ חיים
for the flame of the fire intrinsically seeks to part from the wick that holds it, and to unite with its source above — in the universal element of Fire which is in the sublunar sphere, as is explained in Etz Chayim.
The four elements — Earth, Water, Air, and Fire — are so positioned that the higher and more ethereal elements surround and encompass the lower, coarser elements.
Earth is the coarsest of the elements; it is therefore physically the lowest. Water, the next highest element, should, by right, surround and be located above the earth: it is only because of G‑d’s kindness that the earth is above the waters, as it is written:3 “He spreads the earth over the waters, for His kindness is everlasting.” The element of Air is higher than Water and therefore surrounds it. Fire, the highest element, surrounds the entire atmosphere and is found in the sublunar sphere. The flame’s constant drawing upwards thus represents its desire to unite with its source.
ואף שעל ידי זה יכבה ולא יאיר כלום למטה, וגם למעלה בשרשו יתבטל אורו במציאות בשרשו
Although thereby — by parting from the wick and becoming part of its source — it would be extinguished, and would emit no light at all here below; also above, in its source, its identity would be lost within that of its source.
I.e., it would cease to be a luminary — for since a candle is ineffective in illuminating its environment when surrounded by the overwhelmingly greater brilliance of daylight, surely within the element of fire itself its identity is completely nullified. The flame’s striving to unite with its source cannot, therefore, be construed as seeking a higher form of existence. Furthermore, this desire for unification with its source which can be achieved only through self-annihilation, defies the axiom that “Every existing being desires its continued existence.” Logically, then, the flame ought not to draw upwards, to its source.
אף על פי כן, בכך הוא חפ׳ בטבעו
Yet this is what it “desires” by nature, i.e., it constantly strains upwards as though this were its conscious “desire”.
כך נשמת האדם, וכן בחינת רוח ונפש
Just as the candle constantly seeks to reunite with its source, so also the Neshamah of a Jew, and also the levels of Ruach and Nefesh.
Although the verse states that the Neshamah of man is the candle of G‑d, this comparison is not limited to one within whom the higher soul-level of Neshamah is actively revealed. The word Neshamah is used here in the broader sense of “soul”, which includes also the levels of Ruach and Nefesh; thus the analogy of the candle extends also to those within whom only the lower soul-level of Ruach or Nefesh is revealed.
חפצה וחשקה בטבעה ליפרד ולצאת מן הגוף, ולידבק בשרשה ומקורה בה׳ חיי החיים ברוך הוא
[The soul] naturally desires and yearns to separate itself and depart from the body, and to unite with its origin and source in G‑d, blessed be He, Who is the fountainhead of all life.
The soul whose very essence is life is thus especially drawn to G‑d, the Source of all life, and desires to sever its connection with the body which hinders its ability to become one with G‑d.
הגם שתהיה אין ואפס ותתבטל שם במציאות לגמרי, ולא ישאר ממנה מאומה ממהותה ועצמותה הראשון
Though thereby it would become null and naught, and its identity would there — in its source — be completely nullified, with nothing at all remaining of its original essence and self,
אף על פי כן זה רצונה וחפצה בטבעה
yet this is its will and desire by its nature.
Note the expression, “with nothing at all remaining of its original self.” Unity with its source would not cause the soul to cease to exist. On the contrary, this is the soul’s true quintessence. However, in this state the soul ceases to exist as it exists while clothed in the body — a distinct entity, with its own intellectual and emotional powers, and so on. Therefore it cannot be postulated that the soul’s yearning to unite with its essence merely represents a desire for self-elevation, for self-elevation is possible only where the original self remains. For example, a person may well strive to better himself — to become wiser, stronger, etc. — but he cannot strive to become something which is not himself (e.g., an angel). Why then should the soul desire to leave the body and unite with its source, since this union causes the cessation of its original self? Indeed, there is no rational explanation for this desire. It comes only as a result of the soul’s intrinsic nature.
The term “nature” is usually used derogatorily, in the sense that it denotes irrationality (phenomena lacking any rational basis are usually ascribed to “nature”). In our case, however, the term is used complimentarily, as it describes the soul’s supra-rational desire. This the Alter Rebbe now goes on to say:
וטבע זה הוא שם המושאל לכל דבר שאינו בבחינת טעם ודעת
“Nature” is an applied term for anything that is not in the realm of reason and comprehension.
וגם כאן הכוונה שרצון וחפ׳ זה בנפש אינו בבחינת טעם ודעת ושכל מושג ומובן, אלא למעלה מהדעת ושכל המושג והמובן
Here, too — with regard to the soul’s desire to unite with its source — the inference of the word “nature” is that the soul’s will and desire is not based on reason, knowledge and intelligence that can be understood, but rather is beyond the grasp and comprehension of rational intelligence,
והיא בחינת חכמה שבנפש, שבה אור אין סוף ברוך הוא
for this (nature) is the soul’s faculty of Chochmah and, as discussed in the previous chapter, Chochmah is a faculty that transcends comprehension — a faculty wherein the light of the blessed Ein Sof abides; and as a result, the soul is drawn to its Source, the Ein Sof, with a longing beyond comprehension.
Thus we see that the “nature” of the “hidden love,” i.e., its quest, is the longing of the soul to be united with its Source. The Alter Rebbe now goes on to explain the designation “hidden love.”
FOOTNOTES
1. Mishlei 20:27.
2. Yevamot 61a.
3. Tehillim 136:6.
____________________________
Rambam:
Daily Mitzvah N320 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Thursday, 2 Shevat, 5775 • 22 January 2015
Daily Mitzvah N320 Sefer Hamitzvot
Today's Mitzvah
Thursday, 2 Shevat, 5775 • 22 January 2015
Negative Commandment 320
Working on Shabbat
"You shall not do any manner of work"—Exodus 20:10.
We are forbidden from performing work on Shabbat.
Working on Shabbat
Negative Commandment 320
Translated by Berel Bell
The 320th prohibition is that we are forbidden to do melachah1 on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2, ["It is Shabbos to the L‑rd, your G‑d;] do not do any melachah."
If the act was intentional, but the court has insufficient proof, Scripture3 specifies the punishment as kores.4 If the act was intentional, and there is sufficient proof,5 the punishment is execution by s'kilah.6 If the act was unintentional, he must bring a sin-offering.7
The details of this commandment are discussed in the tractate Shabbos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Although melachah is commonly translated as "work," it actually indicates any one of 39 specific activities singled out by Torah tradition. Included among the 39 are such actions as writing, carrying outside, and tying a knot, even though they do not correspond to the English word "work."
2.Shmos 20:1. Devarim 5:14.
3.Ex. 31:14.
4.See Principle 14, where the Rambam defines kores as losing one's portion in the World to Come (unless the person does teshuvah before death). See also Hilchos Teshuvah, Chapter 8, Halachah. 1.
5.Literally, "the testimony was accepted." This phrase includes such requirements as prior warning of the defendant (hasra'a), testimony of at least 2 witnesses, etc. See N352.
6.Commonly translated as "stoning," it actually consisted of being thrown from a high platform. Only if the person did not die from the fall were actual stones used. See P229.
7.See P69. This offering is called a "fixed sin-offering" to distinguish it from the offering of adjustable value. See P72.
________________________________________
Working on Shabbat
"You shall not do any manner of work"—Exodus 20:10.
We are forbidden from performing work on Shabbat.
Working on Shabbat
Negative Commandment 320
Translated by Berel Bell
The 320th prohibition is that we are forbidden to do melachah1 on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement2, ["It is Shabbos to the L‑rd, your G‑d;] do not do any melachah."
If the act was intentional, but the court has insufficient proof, Scripture3 specifies the punishment as kores.4 If the act was intentional, and there is sufficient proof,5 the punishment is execution by s'kilah.6 If the act was unintentional, he must bring a sin-offering.7
The details of this commandment are discussed in the tractate Shabbos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Although melachah is commonly translated as "work," it actually indicates any one of 39 specific activities singled out by Torah tradition. Included among the 39 are such actions as writing, carrying outside, and tying a knot, even though they do not correspond to the English word "work."
2.Shmos 20:1. Devarim 5:14.
3.Ex. 31:14.
4.See Principle 14, where the Rambam defines kores as losing one's portion in the World to Come (unless the person does teshuvah before death). See also Hilchos Teshuvah, Chapter 8, Halachah. 1.
5.Literally, "the testimony was accepted." This phrase includes such requirements as prior warning of the defendant (hasra'a), testimony of at least 2 witnesses, etc. See N352.
6.Commonly translated as "stoning," it actually consisted of being thrown from a high platform. Only if the person did not die from the fall were actual stones used. See P229.
7.See P69. This offering is called a "fixed sin-offering" to distinguish it from the offering of adjustable value. See P72.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter a Day: Avodah Kochavim Avodah Kochavim - Chapter ThreeAvodah Kochavim - Chapter Three
Halacha 1
Whoever serves false gods willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, is liable for כרת. If witnesses who warned him were present, he is [punished by being] stoned to death. If he served [such gods] inadvertently, he must bring a fixed sin offering.
Halacha 2
The gentiles established various different services for each particular idol and image. These services do not [necessarily] resemble each other. For example, Pe'or is served by defecating before it. Marculis is served by throwing stones at it or clearing stones away from it. Similarly, other services were instituted for other idols.
One who defecates before Marculis or throws a stone at Pe'or is free of liability until he serves it according to the accepted modes of service, as [implied by Deuteronomy 12:30]: "[Lest one inquire about their gods, saying,] 'How did these nations serve their gods? I will do the same.'"
For this reason, a court must know the types of worship [practiced by gentiles], because an idolater is stoned to death only when we know that [he has worshiped a false god] in the mode in which it is traditionally worshiped.
Halacha 3
The warning [forbidding] such worship and the like is the verse [Exodus 20:5] which states: "Do not serve them."
When does the above apply? with regard to services other than bowing, slaughtering [an animal], bringing a burnt offering, and offering a libation. A person who performs one of these four services to any one of the types of false gods is liable, even though this is not its accepted mode of service.
How is this exemplified? A person who offers a libation to Pe'or or slaughters [an animal] to Marculis is liable, as [implied by Exodus 22:19]: "Whoever slaughters [an animal] to any deity other than God alone must be condemned to death."
[Liability for performing the other services can be derived as follows:] Slaughter was included in the general category of services [forbidden to be performed to false gods]. Why was it mentioned explicitly? To teach [the following]: Slaughter is distinct as one of the services of God, and one who slaughters to false gods is liable to be executed by stoning. Similarly, with regard to any service which is distinct as one of the services of God, if a person performs it in worship of other gods, he is liable.
For [a similar reason, Exodus 34:14] states: "Do not bow down to another god," to teach that one is liable for bowing down [to another god] even when this is not its accepted mode of service. The same applies to one who brings a burnt offering or pours a libation. Sprinkling [blood] is considered the same as pouring a libation.
Halacha 4
[Even if] one pours feces before it or pours a libation of urine from a chamber pot before it, one is liable. If one slaughters a locust before it, one is not liable, unless this is the mode of service of that deity. Similarly, if one slaughters an animal lacking a limb for it, one is not liable, unless this is the manner of service of this deity.
[The following rules apply when] a false god is worshiped by [beating with] a staff [before it]: If one breaks a staff before it, one is liable [for the worship of false gods], and [the deity] is forbidden. If one threw a staff before it, one is held liable, but [the deity] is not forbidden, because throwing a staff is not considered equivalent to sprinkling blood. The staff remains as it was, while the blood spatters [in different directions].
A person who accepts any one of the various false gods as a deity is liable for [execution by] stoning. Even one who lifted up a brick and said, "You are my god," or the like, is liable. Even if he retracted his statements in the midst of speaking and said, "This is not my God," his retraction is not significant and he should be stoned [to death].
Halacha 5
Anyone who serves a false god through its accepted mode of service - even if he does so in a derisive manner - is liable. What is implied? When a person defecates before Pe'or to repudiate it, or throws a stone at Marculis to repudiate it - since this is the manner of serving them - the person is liable and must bring a sacrifice [to atone for] his inadvertent transgression.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] a person serves a false deity out of love - i.e., he desires an image because its service is very attractive - or when one serves it out of his fear of it - i.e., he fears that it will harm him - as the [idol] worshipers fear [their deities as sources of] benefit and harm: If he accepts it as a god, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he serves it out of love or fear through its accepted mode of service or through one of the four services [mentioned above], he is not held liable.
One who embraces a false deity, kisses it, sweeps before it, mops before it, washes it, anoints it, dresses it, places shoes upon it, or performs any similar act of deference violates a negative commandment, as [implied by Exodus 20:5]: "Do not serve them." Such acts are also "service." The offender is, nevertheless, not liable for lashes, because [these services] are not [mentioned] explicitly [by the Torah].
If one of the above services was the accepted mode of worship [of a particular deity] and a person performed this service as an act of worship, he is liable [for execution].
Halacha 7
If a splinter becomes stuck in a person's foot before an idol, he should not bend down to remove it, because it appears that he is bowing down to the idol.
If money belonging to a person becomes scattered before an idol, he should not bow down and pick it up, because it appears that he is bowing down to the idol. Instead, he should sit down, and then pick it up.
Halacha 8
A person should not place his mouth over the mouths of statues which serve as fountains that are located before false deities in order to drink, because it appears that he is kissing the false deity.
Halacha 9
A person who has a false god made for himself - even though he, himself, did not actually fashion it, nor worship it - is [punished by] lashing, as [Exodus 20:5] states: "Do not make for yourself an idol or any representation."
Similarly, a person who actually fashions a false god for others, even for idolaters, is [punished by] lashing, as [Leviticus 19:4] states: "Do not make molten gods for yourselves." Accordingly, a person who actually fashions a false god1for himself receives two measures of lashes.
Halacha 10
It is prohibited to make images for decorative purposes, even though they do not represent false deities, as [implied by Exodus 20:23]: "Do not make with Me [gods of silver and gods of gold]." This refers even to images of gold and silver which are intended only for decorative purposes, lest others err and view them as deities.
It is forbidden to make decorative images of the human form alone. Therefore, it is forbidden to make human images with wood, cement, or stone. This [prohibition] applies when the image is protruding - for example, images and sculptures made in a hallway and the like. A person who makes such an image is [liable for] lashes.
In contrast, it is permitted to make human images that are engraved or painted - e.g., portraits, whether on wood or on stone - or that are part of a tapestry.
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply regarding] a signet ring which bears a human image: If the image is protruding, it is forbidden to wear it, but it is permitted to use it as a seal. If the image is an impression, it is permitted to wear it, but it is forbidden to use it as a seal, because it will create an image which protrudes.
Similarly, it is forbidden to make an image of the sun, the moon, the stars, the constellations, or the angels, as [implied by Exodus, ibid.]: "Do not make with Me [gods of silver...]" - i.e., do not make images of My servants, those who serve before Me on high. This [prohibition] applies even [to pictures] on tablets.
The images of animals and other living beings - with the exception of men - and similarly, the images of trees, grasses, and the like may be fashioned. This applies even to images which protrude.
Commentary Halacha 1
Whoever serves false gods willingly - i.e., if he is forced to worship false gods by another person, he is not held responsible for his act. It is nevertheless forbidden to consent to such pressure. One is obligated to sacrifice one's life rather than consent to such worship (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:2,4).
as a conscious act of defiance - as opposed to someone who worships inadvertently.
[The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the violation of the prohibitions against idolatry, the Sabbath laws (Hilchot Shabbat 1:1), and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, he states merely: "as a conscious act of defiance."
The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. Furthermre, they are transgressions which people at large would consider most severe. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, the Rambam does not think further repetition is necessary.]
is liable for כרת. - Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being "cut off in this world" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. Rather, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come.
If witnesses who warned him - See Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2.
were present - when he committed the offense and later testified in court,
he is [punished by being] stoned to death - as mentioned above, Chapter 2, Halachah 6.
If he served [such gods] inadvertently - He performed an act of idol worship without realizing that it was forbidden, or was not aware of the punishment involved (Hilchot Shegagot 2:2).
he must bring a fixed sin offering. - Though the sin offering brought to atone for idol worship differs from that brought to atone for other sins - see Numbers 15:27-31; Hilchot Shegagot 1:4 - the Rambam uses this term to differentiate it from a 18הלועáןברק דרויו - a guilt offering which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it.
Commentary Halacha 2
The gentiles established various different services for each particular idol and image. These services do not [necessarily] resemble each other. For example, Pe'or - See Numbers, Chapter 25, which describes the Jews' worship of this image. See also Sanhedrin 61a.
is served by defecating before it. Marculis - The Aruch identifies the Hebrew Marculis with the Greek god, Mercury. He notes that the form used to represent the deity and its manner of service resemble that found in Roman and Greek sources. See Tosafot, Sanhedrin 64a for a different interpretation.
is served by throwing stones at it - Note Halachah 5.
or clearing stones away from it. - Clearing away these stones leaves more room for others to throw. Hence, such an act is also considered to be service of the deity (Sanhedrin 64a).
Similarly, other services were instituted for other idols. One who defecates before Marculis or throws a stone at Pe'or is free of liability - for he did not serve the god in the service required for it, or through one of the four services which were accepted as modes of worship for all gods, as explained in the following halachah. One might think that a person would be held liable for serving one of these gods in the manner used to serve the other, since they are both served in an unbecoming manner. Sanhedrin 61a teaches us that, nevertheless, one is not liable.
until he serves it according to the accepted mode of service, as [implied by Deuteronomy 12:30]: "[Lest one inquire about their gods, saying,] 'How did these nations serve their gods? I will do the same.' - The Torah's inclusion of such a question implies that this knowledge is significant. A person who does not worship an idol in the accepted mode of service is not liable (Sanhedrin, ibid.).
For this reason, a court must know the types of worship [practiced by gentiles] - Note Chapter 2, Halachah 2, which forbids the study of idolatrous practices. Apparently, license to do so is granted the sages to allow them to gain the knowledge mentioned in this halachah. (See Sanhedrin 68a.)
because an idolater is stoned to death only when we know that [he has worshiped a false god] in the mode in which it is traditionally worshiped. - Thus, were the court not cognizant of the different modes of idol worship, they could not administer the appropriate punishment.
Commentary Halacha 3
The warning [forbidding] such worship and the like is the verse [Exodus 20:5] which states: "Do not serve them." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 6) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 29) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. It, to be distinguished from the prohibition against the belief in false gods (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 1), involves the performance of deeds of worship in service of false gods.
The Ramban (Hasagot L'Sefer HaMitzvot) considers the two prohibitions as one negative mitzvah. The Rambam's view, however, is justified by other authorities.
When does the above - that one is liable only when performing services with which a deity is worshiped
apply? with regard to services other than bowing - See Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which states that this means bowing one's face to the ground, whether bending, kneeling, or totally prostrate on the ground.
slaughtering [an animal], bringing a burnt offering, and offering a libation. - Since these four modes of worship are accepted services of the true God, using them to serve false gods is absolutely forbidden (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 6). Therefore,
A person who performs one of these four services to any one of the types of false gods is liable, even though this is not its accepted mode of service. - In Halachah 6, the Rambam discusses paying reverence or showing affection to false gods through services with which the true God is not worshiped.
How is this exemplified? A person who offers a libation to Pe'or or slaughters [an animal] to Marculis - despite the fact that they are served in other ways, as explained in the previous halachah
is liable, as [implied by Exodus 22:19]: "Whoever slaughters [an animal] to any deity - Note Rashi, Sanhedrin 60b, who explains that since the verse does not state, "Whoever worships a deity through sacrifice," we can conclude that the sacrifice of an animal is sufficient for one to be held liable, even when this is not the accepted mode of service.
other than God alone must be condemned to death." - He is stoned to death.
[Liability for performing the other services - pouring a libation and bringing a burnt offering, which are not explicitly forbidden by the Torah.
can be derived as follows:] Slaughter was included in the general category of services [forbidden to be performed to false gods]. Why was it mentioned explicitly? To teach [the following]: - This represents an example of the eighth of Rabbi Yishmael's thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis:
When a specific case is first included in a general category and then, singled out to instruct us regarding a new concept, we assume that it has been singled out not only to teach us concerning its own case, but rather for that new idea to be applied with regard to the totality of the general category.
Slaughter is distinct as one of the services of God - i.e., it is a particular case included in a general category
and one who slaughters to false gods is liable to be executed by stoning. - This is the new concept for which the Torah singled out this service to teach us. Following the above rule, we conclude
Similarly, with regard to any service which is distinct as one of the services of God, if a person performs it in worship of other gods, he is liable - for execution.
For [a similar reason, Exodus 34:14] states: "Do not bow down to another god" - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 5) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 28) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This prohibition also includes performing the other three services mentioned above.
In this instance as well, the Ramban (Hasagot L'Sefer HaMitzvot) considers this prohibition to be included within the first negative mitzvah, the prohibition against believing in false gods. The Rambam's view, however, is justified by other authorities.
to teach that one is liable for bowing down [to another god] even when this is not its accepted mode of service. - Bowing down is not considered to be one of the Temple services. Hence, it - as opposed to bringing a burnt offering or pouring a libation - cannot be derived from the prohibition against sacrificing, and requires a unique verse of its own.
The same applies to one who brings a burnt offering - be it an animal, incense, or any other substance
or pours a libation. Sprinkling [blood] - before an idol or on its altar
is considered the same as pouring a libation - and is forbidden even if this is not the accepted mode of service.Sanhedrin (ibid.) equates sprinkling blood with offering a libation, based on Psalms 16:4: "Do not pour their libations of blood."
Commentary Halacha 4
[Even if] one pours feces before it or pours a libation of urine from a chamber pot before it, one is liable. - These are considered as libations (Avodah Zarah 50b), for which one is held liable even if this is not the mode in which the deity is worshiped.
If one slaughters a locust before it, one is not liable - for there is no concept of ritual slaughter with regard to locusts. TheOr Sameach holds one liable when one sacrifices a locust on an altar before a false deity.
unless this is the mode of service of that deity - in which instance one would be held liable, based on the principles stated in Halachah 2.
Similarly, if one slaughters an animal lacking a limb for it - Note Avodah Zarah 51a which states that this leniency only applies to the slaughter of any animal lacking a limb. In contrast, one is held liable for the slaughter of an animal with a disqualifying physical blemish.
one is not liable - because even the gentiles do not offer sacrifices of such animals
The Ra'avad holds one liable even for the slaughter of such an animal or of a locust, explaining that although the Rambam's decision reflects certain opinions mentioned in the Talmud, the final decision is that one is held liable. He explains that such forms of slaughter are much closer to the concept of the slaughter for sacrifice than the offering of feces or urine are to the service of libation.
unless this is the manner of service of this deity - as explained above.
[The following rules apply when] a false god is worshiped by [beating with] a staff - Note the Ra'avad, who emphasizes that the following rules apply although the service of this deity does not involve breaking or throwing a staff
[before it]: - This interpretation is also followed by theShulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 139:3.
If one breaks a staff before it - since this activity resembles the slaughter of an animal
one is liable [for the worship of false gods] - To justify the seeming difficulty in the Rambam's decisions mentioned by the Ra'avad (see above), the Lechem Mishneh explains that since staffs figure in the worship of this deity, an act that resembles slaughter that is performed with a staff is significant. In contrast, animals lacking limbs and locusts are never used in the service of such deities; hence, their slaughter is of no consequence.
[Note, however, the Ramah, who explains that one is liable only when the deity is worshiped by breaking the stick.]
and [the deity] is forbidden. - to be used, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 4. This interpretation depends on the female construction of the word נאסרת. Other authorities quote the word in a masculine form and interpret it as a reference to the staff. Since it was used in the worship of a false god, it is forbidden, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 2.
If one threw a staff before it - since this activity resembles pouring a libation before an idol
one is held liable, but [the deity] - or the staff
is not forbidden - This decision makes the Rambam's line of reasoning difficult to follow. If throwing the staff is not comparable to sprinkling blood, why is one held liable for it? Accordingly, some commentaries have explained that this decision applies only when the deity is worshiped by throwing staffs. The Pri Chadash, however, differentiates between the liability of the worshiper (for which a sprinkling that spatters is not required) and the prohibition of the worship of the deity (for which it is).
because throwing a staff is not considered equivalent to sprinkling blood. The staff remains as it was - a single whole entity
while the blood spatters [in different directions]. - Since the reason that these services are considered significant even though the deity is not normally worshiped in this manner is that these services were performed in the Temple, the analogy must be complete. Thus, the entity poured or thrown before the deity must spatter, as blood spatters when sprinkled on the altar (Avodah Zarah, ibid.).
A person who accepts any one of the various false gods - which already exist
as a deity - even though he does not perform a deed of worship
is liable for [execution by] stoning. - The Rambam mentions that one is liable for stoning specifically. Generally, the term "liable" means "liable to bring a sacrifice." In this instance, however, a person who makes such a statement inadvertently is not obligated to bring a sacrifice. A sacrifice is only brought when one performs a deed in violation of the Torah's command (Hilchot Shegagot 1:2).
Even one who - creates a new false god for himself (Lechem Mishneh)
lifted up a brick - The Lechem Mishneh explains that this expression is merely a figure of speech. There is no need to perform a deed - lifting up the brick - for one to be held liable.
and said, "You are my god," or the like, is liable. - When two people do not witness this declaration, the death penalty may not be administered by the court. The person is, however, liable for karet (premature death at the hand of God) if he made his statements intentionally.
Even if he retracted his statements in the midst of speaking - As explained above (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), this term has a specific meaning, the amount of time it takes to say 18ךילעáםולש יבר.
and said, "This is not my God," his retraction is not significant - Although a retraction made in this amount of time is normally considered significant, different rules apply with regard to the acceptance of false gods. It is assumed that a person would never make such a statement unless he were fully aware of its ramifications.
and he should be stoned [to death].
Commentary Halacha 5
Anyone who serves a false god through its accepted mode of service - Regardless of the nature of that service
even if he does so in a derisive manner - i.e., both the act he performs and his intent in performing it is to abuse the false deity
is liable - for a sacrifice, as will be explained. This is an extension of the principle stated in Halachah 2.
What is implied? When a person defecates before Pe'or to repudiate it, or throws a stone at Marculis to repudiate it -Sanhedrin 64a relates that one of the Sages of the Talmud actually made such an error and threw a rock at a shrine of Marculis, with the intent of destroying it. When the matter was brought before his colleagues, they informed him of his mistake.
since this is the manner of serving them - the person is liable and must bring a sacrifice [to atone for] his inadvertent transgression. - Although he consciously performed an act which is considered to be worship of these gods, since his intent was not to serve them, he is not considered to be one who willfully serves idols. Hence, he is not punished by the court for his deed, nor is he obligated for karet by God. Since he, nevertheless, did perform an act of worship to these gods, he must bring a sacrifice for atonement.
The above represents the Kessef Mishneh's interpretation of this halachah. Many other authorities (see Tosafot, Sanhedrin 64a) disagree, and maintain that even in such circumstances, one could be held liable for capital punishment. For example, two witnesses who knew the law were present and warned the person against repudiating the idol in this fashion. He ignored their warning and performed the derisive act of worship. Although his intent was not to serve the deity, since he performed an act of worship despite the warning he was given, he is liable for execution.
Rav Kapach brings support for the Kessef Mishneh's view from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:6. There, the Rambam discusses a similar situation and states that a person who performs such service "is liable for a sin offering." In the original texts of that commentary, the Rambam stated that the person "is liable." The addition of the words "for a sin offering" appear to indicate that he is liable only for an offering, but not for punishment by the court. Note also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:4, where the Rambam states that a person who unknowingly worships a false god is not liable for his deeds.
Commentary Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] a person serves a false deity out of love - i.e., he desires an image because its service is very attractive - The commentaries note that the Rambam interprets "out of love" differently from "out of fear." "Out of love" refers to a love for the image and its service, while "out of fear" means fear of what the deity can do to the person.
Rav Kapach explains the Rambam's position, justifying the need for such a difference in interpretation. Most idolaters do not worship their images out of a genuine conviction that they are the true god, but rather for the benefit they feel this service will bring them. Therefore, were a person to serve an idol with this intent in mind, the Rambam would hold him liable. In contrast, were he to serve out of fear, he is not considered to be acting on his own volition, and hence is not held responsible.
or when one serves it out of his fear of it - i.e., he fears that it will harm him - as the [idol] worshipers fear [their deities as sources of] benefit and harm: - See Chapter 1, Halachot 1-2.
If he accepts it as a god - and serves it as an act of worship
he is liable to be stoned to death - as stated in Halachah 1.
If he serves it out of love or fear - without accepting it as a god - even though he served it
through its accepted mode of service - as mentioned in Halachah 2
or through one of the four services [mentioned above] - in Halachah 3,
he is not held liable - since he did not accept the deity as a god.
Although the Rambam's opinion is questioned by many other authorities, it is based on an established tradition of Talmudic interpretation. This halachah is based on Sanhedrin 61b. That passage is also quoted in Shabbat 72b. Rabbenu Chanan'el, one of the foremost commentators in the generations between the Geonim and the Rambam, interprets the latter passage using the same concepts _ and almost the same phraseology _ as employed by the Rambam here.
The Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's interpretation and explain that "out of love" and "out of fear" mean: motivated by the love or fear of the person who tries to influence one to worship the false deity. The Rambam cannot accept this interpretation, because in Hilchot Yesodei Torah 5:4, he states that a person who is forced to serve false gods is not held liable for his deeds (Kessef Mishneh).
The fact that a person is not held liable for such service does not at all minimize the seriousness of the prohibition involved. In no way is one allowed to serve false gods for such reasons. Even with regard to the Ra'avad's interpretation "out of fear" - i.e., out of fear of a person - the Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 150:3) prohibits performing any act that might be interpreted as idol worship - e.g., bowing to a ruler who is wearing an image.
One who embraces a false deity, kisses it, sweeps before it, mops before it, washes it, anoints it, dresses it, places shoes upon it, or performs any similar act of deference violates a negative commandment, as [implied by Exodus 20:5]: "Do not serve them." - This commandment is described in Halachot 2 and 3.
Such acts are also "service." The offender is, nevertheless, not - executed, as is one who worships a false deity, nor is he
punished by lashes, because [these services] are not [mentioned] explicitly [by the Torah]. - The Kessef Mishneh explains that punishment is not given because this prohibition is a 18ואל תוללכבש - i.e., it includes many different forbidden acts. Lashes are not given for the violation of such a prohibition, as stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3.
To explain: The prohibition, "Do not serve them," is twofold in nature. It prohibits the worship of a false deity through its accepted modes of service, as stated in Halachah 2. This is a sin punishable by death. The same prohibition also forbids these expressions of affection or reverence. These deeds are not, however, punishable by death because they are not acts of worship.
Since violation of this prohibition incurs a penalty of execution, it is not associated with the punishment of lashes. Since, in essence, this prohibition is not associated with lashes, even the many transgressions of a lesser nature which are also included within this prohibition are also not punishable in this manner (Rav Kapach).
If one of the above services - kissing, and the like
was the accepted mode of worship [of a particular deity] and a person performed this service as an act of worship - and not merely as an expression of emotion. The Lechem Mishneh questions the addition of the words "as an act of worship," noting that in Halachah 5, the Rambam holds one liable for performing the service with which Pe'or or Marculis was worshiped, even though one's intent was to repudiate the idols. Thus, it appears that once a person performs a service which is the accepted mode of worship, his intent is no longer significant.
The Pri Chadash resolves this difficulty, explaining that the extent of liability is different. In the previous halachah, the offender was liable for a sin offering alone, while here,
he is liable [for execution] - as stated in Halachah 2.
Commentary Halacha 7
If a splinter becomes stuck in a person's foot before an idol, he should not bend down to remove it, because it appears that he is bowing down to the idol. - Avodah Zarah 12a states that if the person turns his back or side to the idol, his bowing would not be considered to be an act of deference, and no prohibition is involved.
Even if no other people are present, this and the following prohibitions apply. Any prohibition that was instituted because of the impression which might be created (18ןיעáתיארמ) is forbidden even in a person's most private chambers.
If money belonging to a person becomes scattered before an idol, he should not bow down and pick it up, because it appears that he is bowing down to the idol. - From the commentaries' discussion of this law, it appears that if the person does bow down, he is not held liable for his actions. Kin'at Eliyahu questions the difference between this decision and Halachah 5, which holds a person who throws a stone to Marculis with the intent to repudiate it liable for a sin offering. He resolves that difficulty, explaining that in Halachah 5, the person intended to throw the stone at the idol. Since that act constitutes worship of this deity, he is held liable. In contrast, in our halachah the person did not bow down to the idol at all. The only reason the bowing is prohibited is that a mistaken impression might be created.
Instead, he should sit down, and then pick it up. - Avodah Zarah (ibid.) mentions a third prohibition, that a person should not bow down to drink from a spring that flows in front of an idol. The Kessef Mishneh notes that Rav Yitzchak Alfasi also omits this law, and explains that it was not contained in their text of the Talmud. (This is somewhat unlikely, since it is found in Rabbenu Chanan'el's text of Avodah Zarah.)
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1389) states that this law is included in the law mentioned in the following halachah. Hence, it is not mentioned explicitly by the Rambam.
Commentary Halacha 8
A person should not place his mouth over the mouths of statues which serve as fountains that are located before false deities in order to drink, because it appears - In the context of the discussion of this law, the Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 150:3) states an important general principle. Prohibitions which were instituted because of the impression which might be created (מראית עין) need not be upheld whenever there is a threat to human life.
that he is kissing the false deity. - This prohibition is also mentioned in Avodah Zarah (ibid.).
The commentaries have noted a slight difficulty in the Talmud's (and thus, the Rambam's) phraseology. The opening clause describes the statues as merely "located before false deities," while from the latter clause it appears that the statue itself is the false deity.
Commentary Halacha 9
A person who has a false god made for himself - even though he, himself, did not actually fashion it - i.e., he commissioned another person to make the idol for him.
nor worship it - i.e., although he commissioned the fashioning of the idol, he did not worship it or explicitly accept it as a god. Accordingly, he is not punished by execution as above. He is, nevertheless, considered to have violated a prohibition, and
is [liable for] lashes - The Lechem Mishneh questions this statement, noting that lashes are not given for a transgression which does not involve a deed, and that speech is not ordinarily considered to be a deed. He explains that since the craftsman fashions the idol on behalf of the person who commissioned him, he is considered to be the latter's agent. Therefore, the one who commissioned him is held responsible for his deed.
The commentaries question this explanation, noting that - with the exception of a few specific instances - the Torah never holds a person who commissions another individual to commit a sin liable, since the person who actually committed the sin is responsible for his actions. Also, the Rambam's phraseology here implies that one is held liable regardless whether the craftsman is a Jew or gentile, and a gentile is never given the halachic status of an agent.
The following are among the resolutions offered to this difficulty:
a) A hired worker's actions - whether positive or negative - are always attributed to his employer (Machaneh Efrayim, Hilchot Shutafim 8).
b) The verse prohibiting this act reveals that this is one of the few exceptions to the general rule mentioned above, and in this case, the person who commissioned the agent is held liable (Darchei HaMelech).
c) Commenting on Hilchot Sechirut 13:2, the Mishneh LaMelech explains that if it is possible to violate a particular prohibition by committing a deed, one is punished by lashes even when one violates it without committing a deed. The same concept can be applied here (S'deh Chemed).
d) The deed for which one is punished is not the command to make the idol, but rather its purchase or acquisition (Merchevat HaMishneh, Alfandari).
as [Exodus 20:5] states: "Do not make for yourself an idol or any representation." - The grammatical structure of this verse allows it to be interpreted, "Do not have an idol... made for you." Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 2) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 27) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Similarly, a person who actually fashions a false god for others, even for - gentile
idolaters - even when he merely acts as a craftsman and does not worship or believe in the idol himself.
is [liable for] lashes, as [Leviticus 19:4] states: "Do not make molten gods for yourselves." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 3) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 214) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Accordingly, a person who actually fashions a false god for himself - violates both of the above prohibitions. Therefore, he
receives two measures of lashes. - See Hilchot Sanhedrin 17:4 for a description of how punishment is administered when a person is liable for more than one measure of lashes.
Commentary Halacha 10
It is prohibited to make images for decorative purposes, even though they do not represent false deities - i.e., they were made as decorations and works of art, without any intent that they be worshiped.
as [implied by Exodus 20:23]: "Do not make with Me [gods of silver and gods of gold]." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 4) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 39) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
This refers even to images of gold and silver which are intended only for decorative purposes, lest others err and view them as deities. - The Rambam's statement sheds light on an interesting Rabbinic debate. The Sages of the Talmud often established "fences around the Torah" - i.e., safeguards to prevent the violation of Torah law. (See Avot 1:1.) There is a question whether the Torah itself instituted prohibitions for such a purpose - i.e., are there mitzvot that are instituted without a self-contained goal of their own, but merely to prevent the violation of other prohibitions? (See Lekach Tov 8.)
From the Rambam's statements here (see also Hilchot De'ot 7:8), it appears that he accepts such a premise. It appears that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in making statues per se. Nevertheless, since if such statues are made, the possibility exists that they may be worshiped, the Torah forbids us to make them.
It is forbidden to make decorative images of the human form alone. - As explained in the following halachah, this prohibition also applies to the sun, the moon, and other celestial beings. It is permitted to make an image of all creations of our world aside from man.
Avodah Zarah 43b derives this from the above verse. The Hebrew words translated as "Do not make with Me..." can also be rendered, "Do not make Me..." - i.e., do not make images in the human form, the form in which God has revealed himself (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De'ah 141:21).
Therefore, it is forbidden to make human images with wood, cement, or stone - or any other material. The Rambam mentioned these materials because they were commonly used in his time.
This [prohibition] applies when the image is protruding - for example, images and sculptures made in a hallway and the like. - The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 141) states that we are forbidden to make only a complete human statue. A bust of a head alone or a statue which is lacking any one of the body's limbs is not forbidden. Though the Shulchan Aruch (141:7) does not accept this view, it is shared by the Ramah.
A person who makes such an image is [liable for] lashes - but not by execution, since these statues were not worshiped as idols.
In contrast, it is permitted to make human images that are engraved or painted - e.g., portraits, whether on wood or on stone - or that are part of a tapestry. - Though the images on a tapestry protrude slightly, since they are not are a fully formed statue, there is no prohibition involved in making them. Note the contrast to the prohibition against making images of the celestial beings mentioned in the following halachah and commentary.
Commentary Halacha 11
[The following rules apply regarding] a signet ring - In ancient times, it was customary for rulers to seal their documents with a signet ring. (See Esther 8:8.) Wax would be poured on the document and the ring pressed into the wax, producing an imprint which is a reverse image of that on the ring.
which bears a human image: If the image is protruding, it is forbidden to wear it - on one's finger, because a protruding image is forbidden, as stated in the previous halachah.
but it is permitted to use it as a seal - for the human image it produces is sunken into the wax.
If the image is an impression, it is permitted to wear it - because there is not prohibition against such a human image
but it is forbidden to use it as a seal, because it will create an image which protrudes - which is forbidden.
Similarly, it is forbidden to make an image of the sun, the moon, the stars, the constellations - Our understanding of the Rambam's statements here can be enhanced by referring to his Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:3:
This does not mean a sphere which represents the sun or a hemisphere which represents the moon, but rather the images which the astrologers [i.e., those following Greek mythology] attribute to the stars,... e.g., Saturn is represented as an old dark man of venerable age, Venus is represented as a a beautiful maiden adorned with gold, and the sun is represented as a king with a diadem sitting in a chariot.
[These are forbidden because] they are falsehoods and the nature of falsehood is that it will surely spread.
Rav Kapach supports this interpretation by quoting BeMidbar Rabbah 2:6, which describes the pennant of the tribe of Issachar as having a picture of the sun and the moon. Were these images forbidden, it would be unlikely that Moshe would have told the tribe to depict them. Even if the decree was instituted in the later generations, it is not probable that the Rabbis would forbid images that had previously been used for a Torah purpose.
The Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 141:3) quotes the Rambam's opinion. The Turei Zahav 141:13 and the Siftei Cohen 141:8, however, note that the Rambam's statements which were quoted above (and the Ramah's statements) refer to a question whether one is allowed to keep images of the sun or moon that he finds. Here, the question is whether one is allowed to make such images oneself. From the discussion of the question in Avodah Zarah 43b, where the Sages question how Rabban Gamliel possessed forms of the moon, it would appear that there is a prohibition against making images of the sun and the moon themselves.
This interpretation, however, is also somewhat problematic, because the Rambam writes that there is no prohibition against making images of animals, and some of the constellations of the Zodiac are represented and referred to as animals. For example, one of the Zodiac constellations is a fish and Gittin 36a describes Rav as making a drawing of a fish. Another is a lion, which is one of the most popular images found in Jewish art.
or the angels - As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:3-5, the angels have no body or form. Hence, here, he is obviously referring to a form which a man has conceived of as appropriate for a particular angel. Alternatively, it could refer to the metaphoric imagery used by the prophets.
as [implied by Exodus, ibid.]: "Do not make with Me [gods of silver...]" - The Rambam (quoting Avodah Zarah, ibid.) mentions the above Biblical proof-text in connection with this prohibition. It would appear, however, from the fact that making such images is not punishable by lashes, that the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature. The reference to the verse must be understood as an asmachta (use of the Biblical verse as a support for a Rabbinic decree).
i.e., do not make images of - those who are "with Me" - i.e.,
My servants, those who serve before Me on high. _ This refers to the celestial beings and the angels. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 1, and Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:3.)
This [prohibition] - is more severe than the prohibition against making human images, and
applies even [to pictures] on tablets. - According to the Rambam's statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the difference between the prohibition against making these images and those of humans can be explained as follows: The prohibition against making human statues is Biblical in origin and is defined by the Torah itself. In contrast, the prohibition of making images of the celestial beings was a safeguard instituted by the Rabbis against Greek and Roman culture. It, therefore, applies to all images, whether pictures or statues, because both could influence people to stray from the Torah's ways.
According to the simple interpretation of the terms "sun" and "moon," the difference can be explained as follows: The sun and the moon, as we perceive them, appear against the background of the sky. Therefore, for a representation of them to be forbidden, it also need not protrude (Tosafot, 14Avodah Zarah, ibid.).
The images of animals and other living beings - with the exception of men - Avodah Zarah 42b also mentions a prohibition against making the image of a d'rakon which Rashi and others interpret as an animal similar to a serpent.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam describes this image as a fishlike man with fins and many scales, probably referring to the Greek god Neptune.
and similarly, the images of trees, grasses, and the like may be fashioned. This - leniency
applies even to images which protrude. - From these two halachot, particularly according to the Rambam's understanding as reflected in his Commentary on the Mishnah, we see that there is no conflict between Torah law and aesthetics. There are only two restrictions: realistic human statues (and according to some authorities, these must be complete, full-bodied statues) and depictions of pagan gods. Even according to the other opinions which forbid depictions of the sun, the moon, and the like, there is no prohibition against abstract portrayals of these entities. No other restrictions apply at all.
There is definitely a divergence between the approach to life that spawned much of the art forms of Western culture and a Torah lifestyle. Perhaps for that reason, many religious Jews have traditionally shunned participation in and patronage of the arts. In the present generation, however, a number of our Torah leaders have urged religious artists to dedicate themselves to expressing Torah ideas and values in a variety of art forms, explaining that:
a) Through these media, it is possible to reach many Jews who might never enter a synagogue or Torah center;
b) Everything in the world was created to be used by the Jews for a Torah purpose (Rashi, Genesis 1:1). This also applies to art. Using these art forms for Torah purposes expresses the true intent for their creation and endows them with a depth of meaning and inspiration - and in its deepest sense, a new wellspring of creativity.
According to Kabbalah, God's presence is more manifest in the sefirah of Tiferet ("Beauty") than in any other sefirah. Thus, the challenge confronting a Torah artist today is to use beauty as a medium to express Godly truth.
____________________________
Rambam:
• 3 Chapters a Day: Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Six, Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Seven, Shabbos Shabbos - Chapter Eight
Shabbos - Chapter Six
Halacha 1
It is forbidden for us to tell1 a gentile to perform work on the Sabbath on our behalf, although they are not commanded [to observe] the Sabbath.2 [This applies] even when the instructions were conveyed to them before the Sabbath and we do not require [the products of] their work until after the Sabbath.
The above is forbidden as a Rabbinical prohibition to prevent the people from regarding the Sabbath lightly, lest they perform [forbidden] labor themselves.3
Halacha 2
[The following rules4 apply] when a gentile performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath on his own accord:5 If he performed it on behalf of a Jew, it is forbidden to benefit from that labor6 until one waits the amount of time necessary to perform the labor on Saturday night.7
[The latter leniency is granted] provided the matter is not public notice - i.e., everyone knows that a particular task is being performed for a person on the Sabbath.8
If [the gentile] performed [the labor] for his own sake alone,9 it is permitted to benefit from it on the Sabbath.
Halacha 3
What is implied? If a gentile kindled a candle [for his own benefit], a Jew is also permitted to perform activity by its light.10 If [the gentile] kindled the light on behalf of the Jew, it is forbidden.11
Similarly, if a gentile made a ramp to descend from a ship [himself], a Jew may descend after him.12 If he made it for the Jew, it is forbidden.13 If he filled a trench with water to allow his animal to drink, a Jew may have his own animal drink afterwards. If he did so for the sake of the Jew, it is forbidden.14
If a [gentile] gathered grass to feed his animal, a Jew may bring his animal to eat from it15 provided that the gentile does not know this Jew. [If he does, it is forbidden,16] lest he bring more on his behalf at which point he would be performing a [forbidden] labor on behalf of a Jew. Similarly, whenever there is a possibility that the gentile will add more [on a Jew's behalf], [a Jew] should not benefit unless [the gentile] does not know [the Jew].17
Halacha 4
In contrast, when a matter concerns a situation where there is no concept of increasing or decreasing [one's efforts for the sake of the Jew] - e.g., a light or a ramp18 - since [the gentile] performed these activities for his own sake, a Jew may benefit from them afterwards on the Sabbath, even when [the gentile] knows him.
[The following laws apply when] a lamp is kindled at a gathering [of Jews and gentiles] on the Sabbath: If most of the people in attendance are Jewish, it is forbidden to benefit from the light, since the one who kindles it does so for the sake of the majority.19 If the majority are gentiles, it is permitted to benefit from the light. If the proportions are equal, it is forbidden.20.
If a fire broke out on the Sabbath and a gentile comes to extinguish it, we may not tell him, "Extinguish it,21" nor [must we tell him,] "Do not extinguish it,"22 for his resting is not our responsibility.23 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 5
[The following principles apply when] gentiles make a coffin, dig a grave, or bring flutes to play mourning dirges on behalf of a deceased person:
If this was done discreetly, one must wait until that activity could have been carried out on Saturday night, and then the person may be buried using the above. If, however, the grave was located in a public square, the coffin was placed upon it, and all those who pass by say, "This activity that the gentiles are performing on the Sabbath is for the sake of so and so," that Jew may never be buried using the above, for this is a matter of public knowledge.24
Another Jew, however, may be buried using the above, provided that the people wait the amount of time necessary for these activities to have been performed [after the Sabbath has concluded].25 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when] a gentile brings flutes on the Sabbath to mourn a deceased person: Even though he brought them from just outside the wall,26 we are required to wait the time it takes to bring them from a close place27 after the Sabbath has concluded, and afterwards we may mourn with them.28 [This restriction stems from our suspicion] that he brought them from another place at night, and then entered with them in the morning.
If one is certain that they were brought from another place on the Sabbath, one should wait [the amount of time] until it was possible to bring them from that place after [the conclusion of] the Sabbath.29 [The above leniencies apply] only when [the flutes were not brought] in a public square, as mentioned above.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply with regard to] a city inhabited by both Jews and gentiles that possesses a bathhouse that is open on the Sabbath: If the majority [of the bathers30] are gentiles, it is permitted to bathe in it on Saturday night immediately [after the conclusion of the Sabbath].
If the majority of the bathers are Jewish, one must wait [the time it takes] for the water to heat.31 [The rationale is that] the water was heated for the majority of [the city's bathers]. If [the numbers of Jews and gentiles are] equal, one must wait [the time it takes] for the water to heat.32 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 8
A Jew who instructs a gentile to perform a [forbidden] labor on his behalf on the Sabbath commits a transgression and should be given stripes for rebellion33 [as punishment]. Nevertheless, he is permitted to benefit from the labor on Saturday night after waiting the time it takes for the labor to have been performed.34
The following is the sole reason35 for which [the Sages] forbade using [the products of forbidden labor] until the time to perform the labor passes on Saturday night: If one permitted the use of [the products of forbidden labor] immediately [on Saturday night], a person might tell a gentile to perform a [forbidden] labor on his behalf, so that [after the conclusion of the Sabbath], it will be immediately available for him. Since, however, [the products of forbidden labor] are forbidden until the time it takes for the labor to have been performed passes, he will not instruct a gentile to perform this task. It does not bring him any benefit at all, for on Saturday evening he must wait the time it takes for the labor to have been performed on the Sabbath.
Halacha 9
A Jew is permitted to instruct a gentile to perform an activity that is not a [forbidden] labor36 and is prohibited from being performed on the Sabbath only as a sh'vut.37[This leniency applies] provided that this is necessary because of a minor infirmity,38 a very pressing matter,39 or a mitzvah.
Halacha 10
What is implied? On the Sabbath, a Jew may instruct a gentile to climb a tree or to swim across water to bring him a shofar or a knife for circumcision. Similarly, [one may instruct a gentile] to bring hot water from one courtyard to another to wash a child or a person experiencing difficulty,40 although an eruv was not made to join them.41 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 11
When a person buys a house in Eretz Yisrael from a gentile,42 he is permitted to tell the gentile to compose a deed of sale on the Sabbath.43 Giving the gentile instructions [to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath] is a Rabbinic prohibition, and because [of the importance] of settling Eretz Yisrael44the Sages did not enforce their decree in this instance.
Similarly, the above principles apply when one purchases a house from [a gentile] in Syria, for Syria is equivalent to Eretz Yisrael in this regard.45
Halacha 12
When a person contracts a gentile for a task and sets the price, the gentile [is considered] as acting in his own interests.46 [Therefore,] even if he performs the task on the Sabbath, it is permitted.47 Similarly, it is permissible to hire a gentile for a prolonged period, although he performs [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath.48
What is implied? When a person hires a gentile for a year or two as a scribe or as a weaver,49 it is permissible for the gentile to write or weave on the Sabbath. It is as though he contracted him to write a scroll or weave a garment, [in which case, he may] perform the task whenever he desires. [This leniency is granted] provided he does not pay him on a day to day basis.50
Halacha 13
When does the above51 apply? When the matter is discreet, and everyone52 is not aware that the [forbidden] labor being performed on the Sabbath is for the sake of a Jew. If, however, it53 is a matter that is well known, open, and of public knowledge,54 it is forbidden [for a gentile to perform such work]. A person who sees the gentile working does not know that he has been hired on a contractual55 basis and will say that so and so56 hired a gentile to work for him on the Sabbath.
Halacha 14
Therefore, [the following rules apply when] a person hires a gentile to build a courtyard or a wall or to harvest his field, or [hires him to work] at building his courtyard or planting a vineyard for him for a year or two:
If the project is located in a city57 or within its Sabbath limits, it is forbidden for the Jew to allow them to work on the Sabbath,58 because of [the impression this might create in the mind of] an observer who is unaware that they were hired on a contractual basis. If the project is located beyond the Sabbath limits, it is permitted, for there are no Jews who will see the laborers at work on the Sabbath.
Halacha 15
Similarly, it is permitted for a Jew to hire out his vineyard or his field to a gentile, although the latter will sow and plant them on the Sabbath, since an observer will know that they have been hired out or given [to the gentile] under a sharecropping agreement.59
[In contrast,] when an enterprise60 is known by the name of its Jewish owner and is not of the type that is hired out or contracted out under a profit sharing agreement by most people in that city, it is forbidden to be hired out to a gentile.61 The gentile will perform work in the establishment on the Sabbath, and [in the public's mind, the establishment] will be associated with the name of its Jewish owner.62
Halacha 16
It is permitted to lend63 and hire out64 utensils to a gentile although he will perform [forbidden] labors with them on the Sabbath,65 for we are not obligated to have our utensils rest [on the Sabbath].66 It is, however, forbidden to [lend or hire out] one's servant or livestock67 [to work on the Sabbath], for we are commanded that they rest.68
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply when a Jew] enters into a partnership with a gentile concerning labor, merchandise, or the operation of a storefront:69 If such a stipulation was made at the outset,70 it is permissible71 for the profits from the Sabbath - whether large or small - to be designated for the gentile alone, and the profits of another day to be given to the Jew alone in exchange.72
If, however, such conditions were not made at the outset, when [the two] come to divide the profits, the gentile should take all the profits of the Sabbath for himself alone, and then the remainder should be divided [equally].73 The [gentile] need not give [the Jew] anything extra for the Sabbath unless a stipulation to that effect was made at the outset.74 The same principles apply if [a Jew and a gentile] hired a field under a partnership arrangement.75
Halacha 18
If the stipulation [mentioned above] was not made, [the partners] came to divide the profits, and the profits of the Sabbath were not distinct, it appears to me76 that the gentile should take a seventh of the profits alone77 and the remainder should be divided equally.78
When a person gives a gentile money to invest, the two may divide the profits equally, despite the fact that the gentile engages in business dealings with these funds on the Sabbath.79 All of the Geonim80 concur with this ruling.
Halacha 19
A Jew should not give utensils to a gentile artisan to fashion81 on Friday, despite the fact that he has established a set price,82 unless there is time for him to remove them from [the Jew's] home before nightfall.83
Similarly, a person should not sell, lend, pawn, or give a present of his possessions to a gentile unless [the gentile] can leave the entrance of [the Jew's] house with that article before the Sabbath. As long as [the gentile] is in [the Jew's] house, no one knows when he gave it to him. Thus, should the gentile leave [the Jew's] house on the Sabbath with [the Jew's] possessions in his hand, it would appear that the object was lent, pawned, agreed to be worked on, or sold on the Sabbath.84
Halacha 20
[The following rules apply when] a person gives a gentile a letter to bring to another city. If he fixed a fee for conveying [the letter], it is permitted [even if the gentile conveys it on the Sabbath].85 [This leniency applies] even when [the Jew] gives [the letter] to [the gentile] on Friday at nightfall, provided [the gentile] leaves [the Jew's] home before the commencement of the Sabbath.
When a fee was not fixed [beforehand, the following rules apply]: If there is a designated person in the city86 who collects letters and sends them to other cities with his agents,87 it is permitted to give a gentile the letter,88 provided there is time [on Friday] for the letter to reach a house adjacent to [the city's] wall before [the commencement of] the Sabbath, lest the home of the gentile who collects and sends letters be located there.89
If there is no person designated to fulfill this function and the gentile to whom one gives the letter is the one who brings it to the other city, it is always forbidden to send a letter with a gentile90 unless one establishes a fixed price [beforehand].
Halacha 21
It is permissible for a gentile carrying his possessions to bring them into the Jew's house on the Sabbath.91 It is even permissible for [the Jew] to tell [the gentile], "Place them in this corner."92
One may invite a gentile to visit on the Sabbath and serve food93 for him to eat.94 If he took the food outside [the Jew's] home, there is no difficulty, for one is not obligated to see that he observes the Sabbath.95
Similarly, one may serve food to a dog in one's courtyard. If he takes it outside, there is no difficulty.
Halacha 22
When a person is carrying money while traveling on a journey and the Sabbath commences, he should give his wallet to a gentile to carry for him. On Saturday night, he may take it back from him. This is permitted even though he did not pay the gentile for his services96 and even though he gave it to him after nightfall.97
These leniencies are granted because a person becomes distraught over his money and cannot bear to discard it. If we do not allow him [to have a gentile carry it for him] - a matter forbidden merely by Rabbinic decree - we fear that he will come to carry it himself98and thus transgress one of the Torah's prohibitions.99
When do the above [leniencies] apply? With regard to one's wallet. In contrast, a person may not give an ownerless object that he discovered to a gentile [to carry for him].100 Instead, he should carry it less than four cubits at a time101 [until he reaches a place where he can deposit it].
Halacha 23
[The following rules apply when] a Jew performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath: If he willingly transgressed, it is forbidden for him to benefit from this labor forever.102 Other Jews103 may, however, benefit from this labor immediately after the conclusion of the Sabbath,104 as [can be inferred from Exodus 31:14]: "And you shall observe the Sabbath, for it is holy." [Our Sages105 commented,] "It is holy, but the fruits of labor performed on it are not holy."106
What is implied? When a Jew cooks [food] on the Sabbath in willful violation [of the Sabbath laws], other Jews may partake of it Saturday night. He, however, is forbidden to partake of it forever. If he cooked it without knowing of the prohibition he was violating, both he107 and others may eat it immediately after the conclusion of the Sabbath.108 The same principles apply in other similar situations.
Halacha 24
When produce was taken outside a city's Sabbath limits and then brought back without the knowledge of the prohibition involved, one may partake of it on the Sabbath, since nothing was done to the fruits themselves, and their state did not change. If they were brought back in willful violation of the prohibition involved,109 one may not partake of them until after the conclusion of the Sabbath.110
Halacha 25
When a person hires a worker to watch a cow or a baby, he should not pay him a wage for the Sabbath day.111 Therefore, [the worker] is not responsible for what happens on the Sabbath.112If a worker was hired on a weekly or annual basis, he is given full payment.113 Therefore, [the worker] is responsible for what happens on the Sabbath. [In the latter instance,] the worker should not say, "Pay me for the Sabbath," but rather, "Pay me for the year," or "Pay me for the ten days."114
FOOTNOTES
1.See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Machshirin 2:5-6), which states that it is forbidden even to hint to a gentile that one desires that he perform a forbidden labor on one's behalf. This ruling is accepted by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:22). Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 307:76 allow one to make an indirect hint in certain situations.
2.On the contrary, a gentile who observes the Sabbath is liable for death (Sanhedrin 58b, Hilchot Melachim 10:9).
3.The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:1-2) mention another reason for the prohibition against conveying such instructions on the Sabbath itself, so that one should not talk about mundane matters on the Sabbath.
[On the basis of this rationale, we can understand the lenient opinions mentioned in note 1. Since the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform work stems from the prohibition against speaking of mundane matters, there is room for leniency if the instruction is conveyed without speech.]
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 243:1 also mentions an opinion that maintains that a gentile performing a labor on behalf of a Jew on the Sabbath is considered as the Jews's agent. Hence, the Jew is held responsible for the work.
4.Examples of the principles mentioned in this halachah are given in Halachot 3-8.
5.I.e., even without receiving specific instructions from a Jew.
6.The entire Jewish people, not only the person for whom the forbidden labor was performed, are prohibited from benefiting from it (Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch 325:10).
7.See Halachah 8.
8.The Rambam's mention of this principle is significant. In the interpretation of Shabbat 24:3 - the Mishnah that serves as the basis for Halachah 8 - there are authorities (e.g., Rabbenu Nissim) who explain that the prohibition against benefiting from forbidden labors performed by a gentile in public on the Sabbath applies only in the specific context mentioned in that Mishnah: a grave, coffin, or flutes for mourning a deceased person.
A prohibition was instituted in these instances alone, for it is improper that a person's final resting be associated with the performance of labor on the Sabbath. In contrast, when a Sabbath prohibition is performed on behalf of a living person, one may benefit from it after the Sabbath.
From the Rambam's statements in this halachah, it is obvious that he does not allow such leniency. Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 325:21 and the Mishnah Berurah 325:73, which explain that if the situation requires it, Rabbenu Nissim's opinion can be relied on.
9.With this addition, the Rambam implies that if the gentile performs the forbidden labor for his own sake and with the intention that it also benefit a Jew, it is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 276:2.)
10.The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) states that one may also benefit from a lamp kindled by a gentile on behalf of a person who is ill.
11.The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if a gentile lights a lamp or a fire in a Jew's house on his own accord, the Jew is not required to leave his home. Although he should try not to benefit from the light, the fact that he receives benefit against his will is not of significance.
12.Shabbat 122a gives a classic example of this halachah. Rabban Gamliel and several other Sages descended from a ship on a ramp made by a gentile on the Sabbath.
13.Note the contrast between this pair of examples and the following pair, as explained in the following halachah.
14.The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 325:10) states that this prohibition applies only when one is drawing from a well in a private domain into the public domain, for this involves the transgression of a Torah prohibition. More leniency is allowed when water is drawn from a well in a private domain to a carmelit, for then merely a Rabbinic prohibition is involved. In such an instance, anyone other than the person for whom the water was drawn may benefit from it.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) mentions a more lenient perspective, which states that whenever it is possible for a Jew to accomplish an objective without performing a forbidden labor, he may benefit from a forbidden labor that a gentile performed for the Jew's sake, which made the objective easier to accomplish. For example, since a Jew could have descended to a well to drink water, he is allowed to drink water that a gentile brought from the well for him.
15.The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 325:11) explain that one may not give this grass to the animal or even lead him directly toward it, because the grass is muktzeh.
16.Not only for him, but for other Jews as well (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:10).
17.For then we may be certain that the gentile did not make an increase for the Jew's sake.
18.Once a lamp is lit or a ramp is laid down, many people can benefit from it. No additional effort is required on their behalf.
19.The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 276:2) state that, even in such circumstances, if the gentile uses the light for the performance of a specific activity, it is clear that he kindled it for his own purposes. Hence, it is permitted for other Jews to benefit from it afterwards.
20.The commentaries use this situation to exemplify the following principle: It is prohibited to benefit from the performance of a forbidden labor when it was performed for the sake of both a gentile and a Jew. (Note the Rambam's use of the expression "for his own sake alone" in Halachah 2).
Other commentaries (see Rashi, Shabbat 122a) offer different explanations for this ruling.
21.Although the situation may arouse fear, we are still forbidden to instruct a gentile specifically to perform a forbidden labor.
22.Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 7, one may say, "The person who extinguishes the fire will not suffer a loss," encouraging the gentile to do so.
From this law, Tosafot (Shabbat 122a) explains that a Jew is not obligated to prevent a gentile from carrying out a forbidden activity that benefits the Jew's property, if the gentile does so on his own initiative. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 325:13) accepts this principle, provided that the gentile does not do this on a continuous basis.
23.With this expression, the Rambam (quoting Shabbat 16:6) contrasts a gentile with one's children - even minors - and one's servants - even gentiles - for whom one is responsible that they rest on the Sabbath, as mentioned in Exodus 20:10.
24.Even though a Jew did not instruct a gentile to perform any of these activities, since they were performed on behalf of a Jew in public, they may never be used on his behalf.
25.The Ra'avad objects to requiring one to wait when the product of the gentile's efforts is to be used for the sake of an individual other than the one for which they were originally intended. He explains that in Halachah 8, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted, lest the person who benefits from the gentile's efforts instruct him to perform a forbidden labor. Needless to say, this does not apply in the situation under discussion, a burial.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 325:14) follows the Rambam's ruling. Although the rationale suggested by the Ra'avad is justifiable in this instance, the Rabbis did not accept it, in order to maintain a uniform policy regarding forbidden labor performed by a gentile on the Sabbath.
26.In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 23:4), the Rambam explains that if the flutes were brought from outside the city, they were brought from a public domain to a private domain. Hence, a transgression was involved, and it is necessary to wait for the time to pass that it would take to bring them after the conclusion of the Sabbath. We must, however, wait longer than the minimal amount of time it takes to bring them from outside the wall inside the wall, because of the suspicion mentioned by the Rambam. See also Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:10.
Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 151a) and others interpret this Mishnah as relating to the prohibition against bringing objects from beyond the Sabbath boundary. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 325:15-16) mentions both of these views.
27.Shulchan Aruch HaRav 325:22 and the Mishnah Berurah 325:76 explain this as referring to the Sabbath boundary - i.e., 2000 cubits.
28.The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:15) emphasizes that a more lenient ruling is given if the gentile did not bring the flutes through the public domain, and traveled via a carmelit instead. Since the gentile violated a Rabbinic prohibition and not a prohibition of the Torah itself, the flutes are permitted to be used immediately on Saturday night.
29.This can lead to both a more lenient and a more stringent ruling. If the place was within the Sabbath limits, one is required to wait less time. If the place is beyond the Sabbath limits, one is required to wait longer (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 325:22 and the Mishnah Berurah 325:77).
30.This addition was made on the basis of the Mishnah Berurah 326:38, which explains that the ruling depends, not on the proportion of the population of the city at large, but on that of the bathers. Since they are the ones who use the bath, the bath is considered as being heated for them.
31.In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Machshirin 2:5-6, the source for his halachah), the Rambam expounds on the principle stated in the following halachah to explain why it is necessary to wait until the water could have heated.
32.In this instance, it is considered as if the baths were heated for the sake of both the Jews and the gentiles, as explained in the notes to Halachah 4.
33.The punishment given for the violation of Rabbinic prohibitions.
34.Although Rabbenu Yerucham forbids ever benefiting from such work, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:20) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
35.This appears to differ from Rashi's interpretation (Beitzah 24b), which explains (with regard to the festivals) that the reason that one is required to wait until the time it takes to perform the forbidden labor after the festival passes is "so that one will not benefit from a [forbidden] labor performed on a festival." Seemingly, he would accept the same rationale with regard to the Sabbath.
36.The Rambam derives this principle from Eruvin 67b, which mentions that one is permitted to instruct a gentile to bring hot water to wash a child after circumcision, provided he does not have to pass through the public domain. The Rambam maintains that one can extrapolate from this instance to other similar cases. Although Tosafot, Gittin 8b, differs, the Rambam's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Orach (Orach Chayim 307:5) as well as the later Ashkenazic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:12, Mishnah Berurah 307:23).
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 276:2) states that there are authorities who allow one to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath so that a mitzvah can be performed. Although he does not accept this opinion, he allows for leniency in circumstances of great necessity.
37.In Chapter 21, Halachah 1, the Rambam defines sh'vut as an activity forbidden by the Sages because it resembles a forbidden labor or because it might lead to the performance of a forbidden labor.
The rationale behind this leniency is the principle that a Rabbinic prohibition is not instituted to support another Rabbinic prohibition. Since the activity in question is merely a Rabbinic prohibition, and the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform a forbidden activity on the Sabbath is Rabbinic in origin, the two Rabbinic prohibitions should not be associated.
38.In contrast to the situations mentioned in Chapter 2, here the Rambam is not speaking of a situation where the person is dangerously ill or even when there is a danger threatening one of the limbs of his body. Instead, the intent is situations that involve minor discomfort. Although a Jew himself is forbidden to perform certain activities that would relieve this uneasiness, a gentile is allowed to do so.
39.Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit., cites as an example of this principle, merchandise that would spoil if left in the rain. [See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:19) and commentaries.]
40. See Hilchot Milah 2:9. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 331:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 331:22 rely on the leniency mentioned by the Ramah cited in note 36 in this instance. Since the circumcision itself involves carrying out a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, other labors that are necessary for the mitzvah to be performed may be carried out by a gentile even when instructed by a Jew.
40.As stated above, Eruvin 67b mentions this instance with regard to circumcision. As explained above, the Rambam extends the leniency beyond the specific instance and applies it to other similar circumstances.
41.Carrying in courtyards with an eruv is discussed in Chapters 16 and 17.
42.The Magen Avraham 306:19-20 cites other authorities who state that a Jew should not complete the sale on the Sabbath. Even according to the Rambam, it appears that one is forbidden to give the gentile money on the Sabbath.
43.From the fact that this law is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:11), it is clear that it applies in the present era as well.
44.In contrast to the Ramban, the Rambam does not consider the settlement of Eretz Yisrael as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. There is, however, no question of the great importance he attaches to this activity. (See Hilchot Melachim, 5:9-12. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:3-4.)
45.In Hilchot Terumah 1:2-3, the Rambam defines Syria as the lands outside Eretz Yisrael conquered by King David. Generally, lands conquered by the entire Jewish people are included in Eretz Yisrael. In this instance, however, although David was a king and his wars were approved by the Sanhedrin, these lands did not become part of Eretz Yisrael, because he had not completed the conquest of all the lands of the Canaanite nations at that time. Nevertheless, because of the communal nature of his conquest, the Rabbis ordained that certain of the laws applicable within Eretz Yisrael should also apply there. Compare also to Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:3.
46.Since the gentile contractor has established a set price for his work, it does not matter when he performs the labor involved. Accordingly, he is considered as working for himself and not on behalf of the Jew.
The Rashba emphasizes that this leniency applies only when the gentile performs the task in question on his own premises. If he does so on premises belonging to a Jew, it is forbidden for him to work on the Sabbath even when the price is set beforehand. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 244:5, 252:2) quotes the Rashba's view.
47.The Jew may not, however, explicitly tell the gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath even if he is hired on a contractual basis (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 252:2).
48.The Rambam's decision is based on Mo'ed Katan 12a, which mentions a person hired on a weekly, monthly, or yearly basis - i.e., rather than receive a wage on an hourly basis, he is contracted to perform a particular task which his employer will present him from time to time.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this issue, maintaining that although a person who is hired on a weekly basis is not required to work on the Sabbath, the Jew receives a direct benefit from the fact that he does. Therefore, this is forbidden.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 244:5) accepts the Rambam's view. The Turei Zahav 244:5 emphasizes, however, that this ruling may be accepted only when the employer does not mind if the gentile does not work at any specific time. If he requires him to work a set number of hours, this is not acceptable.
(To explain the concept in contemporary terms: An employee who receives a weekly salary for a specific time commitment is not covered by this leniency. In contrast, an outside professional who is hired on a retainer basis is, for he is not bound by a time commitment to the employer.)
The Noda BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 38) explains the difference between the Rambam's and the Ra'avad's view as follows: In the case of a contractor, the gentile is the one who benefits from his working on the Sabbath. Although he is not obligated to work then, by doing so he earns a fee that he would not have received otherwise.
In contrast, when an employee is paid on a retainer basis, he receives no benefit from working on the Sabbath, for he receives the same wage regardless. Therefore, the Ra'avad considers this to be forbidden. The Rambam, however, permits this, since the employer receives no additional profit from the task being completed on the Sabbath. Were it not to be completed then, it would have been completed on the following day.
49.The Ramah (loc. cit.) emphasizes that if the gentile is hired as a jack of all trades, it is forbidden for him to work on the Sabbath. In such an instance, the Jew has a distinct benefit from his working on the Sabbath, since there will surely be other work for him to do on the following day.
50.In such an instance, the wage the gentile receives for the work performed on the Sabbath is distinct. Hence, it is forbidden.
51.This restriction applies both to the leniency allowing a gentile to work as a contractor and to that which allows him to work on a retainer basis.
52.The Magen Avraham 244:2 states that this wording implies that if several individuals know that the task is being performed for the sake of a Jew, but the matter is not public knowledge, there is no prohibition involved.
53.It is of no importance to us whether people see the work being performed or not. What is significant is that they know that this work is being performed for the sake of a Jew (Rabbenu Yerucham).
54."Public knowledge" refers to matters known within the Jewish community. As reflected by the following halachah, if the matter is known to gentiles but not to Jews, there is no difficulty.
55.See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 7:25, which states "People at large do not know the difference between a contractor and a hired worker. Hence, it is forbidden."
Note also the Be'ur Halachah 244, which questions whether a gentile is permitted to perform work on behalf of a Jew if it is common custom for these tasks to be performed by a contractor. In such a situation, it is unlikely that an observer would assume that the gentile was hired to work on a daily basis. Neverthess, as mentioned in the Mishnah Berurah 244:7, the Noda BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. I, Responsum 12), and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 244:8, the common custom is to allow such work to be performed.
56.From the wording the Rambam uses, one might infer that this restriction applies to a private individual. In contrast, if a community at large employs a gentile, it can be assumed that they hired him in a permitted manner. On this basis, there are opinions which allow a gentile contractor to perform services for the community on the Sabbath (Magen Avraham 244:8).
57.I.e., either the city in which the Jew contracting the gentile lives or another city populated by Jews.
58.Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 244:3), which states that if a gentile builds a house for a Jew on the Sabbath, it is proper not to enter it.
59.Since these arrangements are commonplace, an observer will not think that the gentile was employed as a hired worker.
60.The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 243:1) gives as examples a bathhouse or an oven. As explained in the following note, the inclusion of an enterprise in this category is dependent on the business practices common in that locale.
61.I.e., since the gentile will operate the enterprise on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to rent him the enterprise even on an annual or monthly basis.
As the Rambam mentions in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 1:8, the source for this halachah), the determination of which enterprises are included in this category is dependent on the local business practices. If it is commonplace for an enterprise to be rented out on an annual or monthly basis, an onlooker will not suppose that the gentile operating the enterprise is working for the Jew as a hired hand. (See also Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:2.)
62.Similarly, if it is publicized throughout the community that the enterprise has been hired to the gentile, there is no prohibition. (See Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit..)
63.One may not, however, lend a utensil to a gentile on the Sabbath itself. Similarly, when a utensil is lent on Friday, the gentile must have time to bring it out of the Jew's premises before the commencement of the Sabbath [Halachah 19, Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 246:2)].
64.The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) states that if a Jew receives payment for the Sabbath day, he must arrange to be paid on a weekly or monthly basis. It is forbidden to receive payment for the Sabbath as a distinct entity.
65.The Ra'avad, based on his interpretation of Shabbat 19a, states that it is forbidden to rent an article to a gentile on Friday, since it will appear that one is receiving a wage for the Sabbath. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that according to the Rambam, the passage the Ra'avad cites follows the opinion of the School of Shammai, which is not accepted as halachah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 246:1) mentions both opinions, and the Ramah states that it is customary to follow the Ra'avad's ruling.
66.Note the application of this principle in the first halachot of Chapter 3.
67.See Chapter 20, Halachah 1, which includes fowl, fish, and all other living beings in this prohibition.
68.Exodus 20:10 states "You shall not perform any labor, neither you, your son, your daughter, your servant, your maid-servant, or your beast." See also Exodus 23:12 and other sources. The nature of this p rohibition is discussed in Chapter 20.
69.In such a situation, although the Jew does not work on the Sabbath, if he benefited from his gentile partner's activity, the latter would be considered to be acting as his agent unless they make a stipulation clarifying the matter at the outset.
70."At the outset" means when the partnership was originally established. If such an agreement was not made at that time, and the Jew made such an offer to the gentile afterwards, there are difficulties, for it appears that the Jew is paying the gentile for working on the Sabbath by working one day in the middle of the week.
71.This leniency is not granted merely after the fact. On the contrary, it is a perfectly acceptable course of action according to Jewish law (Ba'er Heteiv 245:1).
72.Rabbenu Nissim emphasizes that the need for such a stipulation applies only in situations where one of the partners works one day and the other another day. If during the week both work together, the fact that the gentile works on the Sabbath does not cause the profits of that day to be forbidden for the Jew. The gentile knows that the Jew will not work on the Sabbath, nor will he work any more during the week. Therefore, the activity the gentile is performing is motivated by his own benefit. The fact that he gives a share to the Jew as well is of no consequence. The Ramah accepts this ruling (Orach Chayim 245:1).
73.Avodah Zarah 22a does not make a final ruling in this situation, and the Rambam follows the more stringent position. (Note a similar ruling, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 10:14.)
In contrast, Rabbenu Asher states that in such a situation, if the gentile willingly gives the Jew a share of the Sabbath profits, the Jew is allowed to keep it. The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that after the fact, one may rely on this ruling. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 245:2 rules more stringently and states that one may rely on Rabbenu Asher's opinion only in the case of a major loss.
74.The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 245:3) describes the procedure to follow when a Jew and gentile partner did not make such an agreement at the beginning of the partnership, and the Jew desires to do so afterwards.
75.Significantly, the Magen Avraham 245:1 differentiates between a field that requires work seven days a week and certain business establishments that do not require active effort on the part of their owner. For example, partners may own an oven and rent it out to others.
In the first instance, when the gentile works on the Sabbath, he appears to be working as the agent of the Jew. In the latter instance, by contrast, since there is no work required on the Sabbath, the gentile partner appears to be acting in his own interest by renting the establishment to others. Therefore, the Jew is allowed to receive a share of the profits.
76.This expression implies a ruling made by the Rambam that is not based on a previous Rabbinic source.
77.Thus, retroactively the Jew renounces his portion in the gentile's activity. Hence, the gentile is no longer considered to be acting as his agent (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 245:6).
78.The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 245:1) accepts the Rambam's ruling. As mentioned, in a case of severe loss, the Ramah allows leniency in accordance with the opinion of Rabbenu Asher mentioned in note 74.
79.In this instance, the Jew is not obligated to perform work at all. Hence, no one will say that the gentile is working as the Jew's agent (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:4). Furthermore, the gentile is not obligated to work on the Sabbath. Should he choose to do so, it is his own independent decision, which is not at all related to the Jew (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 245:16).
80.The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 245) cites a responsum of Rav Sherirah Gaon. (See also Teshuvat HaGeonim, Responsum 43.)
81.Or to fix, improve, or work on in any way.
82.Once a set price is established, there is no difficulty with the gentile's working on the utensil on the Sabbath. Since the same price would be paid whether the work is done on Saturday or another day, the gentile is considered to be working for himself if he decides to work on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, even though basis of the contractual arrangement is correct, this is forbidden, since the article was given to the gentile directly before the commencement of the Sabbath.
83.I.e., before the commencement of the Sabbath. Were the gentile to take the article from the Jew's home on the Sabbath, it would appear that he was working for him, as the Rambam states at the conclusion of this halachah.
84.As mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachah 12, these business transactions are forbidden on the Sabbath.
85.The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 247:1) emphasizes that one may not specify that the gentile should convey the article on the Sabbath.
86.We have translated both the words and as "city," since in other sources (see Hilchot Megillah, Chapter 1) we find them both used by the Rambam with that meaning. (More particularly, refers to a small city, while to a large metropolis.)
The Kessef Mishneh, however, interprets as referring to a province, and thus explains the halachah as referring to an instance where the person charged with conveying the letter travels from his city to another place.
87.I.e., a post office. Since the post office charges fixed prices for its services, there is no difficulty in having it convey mail on the Sabbath. Accordingly, there is no difficulty at present in sending mail before the Sabbath. On the Sabbath itself, however, it is forbidden to send mail, even by means of the post office.
88.I.e., this gentile does not bring the letter to its destination, but merely brings it to the post office. Nevertheless, since a fee has not been established for his services in bringing the letter to the post office, there must be enough time for him to do so before the commencement of the Sabbath. Otherwise, it would appear that he is acting as the Jew's agent.
89.The Rambam is referring to an instance where the gentile bringing the letter to the post office does not know the location of the post office. Nevertheless, since there is a post office in the city, there is no difficulty if there is time to reach the farthest point in the city before the commencement of the Sabbath.
90.For the gentile will be performing work on the Jew's behalf on the Sabbath. This ruling is based on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 19a. Rashi and the Tur (Orach Chayim 247) offer a different interpretation of that source, which allows one to send a letter with a gentile even when a fixed fee was not set, provided one sent it with him on Thursday or earlier.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 247:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling, while the Ramah follows that of the Tur.
91.Even though the gentile charges the Jew with watching his possessions, there is no prohibition (Maggid Mishneh). Similarly, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:22) mentions that a gentile may bring a Jew grain as payment for debts on the Sabbath.
92.Since this activity is being performed by the gentile for his own interests on his own volition, there is no prohibition against giving him instructions. A Jew may tell a gentile to perform labor for the gentile's own sake on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
93.In contrast, this is forbidden on a festival. In the latter instance, the possibility exists that for the sake of the gentile one may add to the food that one is cooking. Although one is permitted to cook for the sake of Jews on a festival, one may not do so for the sake of a gentile. In contrast, no cooking whatsoever is permitted on the Sabbath. Hence, there is no need for concern (Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:13).
94.One may not, however, give a gentile food with the intent that he take it out. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 325:1 and commentaries.)
95.The Mechilta, Parashat Bo, Chapter 9, derives this from the verse, "Six days shall you perform your work, and on the seventh day you shall rest." The mitzvah of resting on the seventh day concerns only "your work," and not that of a gentile. 97. As the Rambam writes in Chapter 21, Halachah 36, on the Sabbath a person is allowed to provide food only for animals that are dependent on him for their sustenance. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 324:11 and commentaries which question whether this also applies to a stray dog or not.)
96.Were the gentile to be paid a fixed fee, there would be no difficulty, because he would be carrying the wallet to earn the fee and not on behalf of the Jew.
97.As mentioned in Halachot 19 and 20, a gentile must generally remove any objects he has been given to take from a Jew's domain before the commencement of the Sabbath.
98.From the Rambam's statements, it appears that it is preferable for a person to have a gentile carry his wallet for him than for him to carry it himself less than four cubits at time. This and other related matters are discussed in Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7, and commentary.
99.We find several instances where the Sages relaxed the prohibitions they imposed for fear that as a result a person would lose control, and ignore Torah law entirely. Similarly, in this instance, they felt it preferable to allow a person to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on his behalf - a Rabbinic prohibition, so that he would not come to carry the wallet himself in the public domain - a prohibition of the Torah.
On the basis of this principle. The Sefer HaTerumah offers a further leniency. A person who is pursued by gentiles may take his money and hide it. The Rashba and others do not, however, agree to this extension.
100.Since this is money that did not belong to him originally, the person is less concerned about it. Hence, the Sages granted less leniency.
101.Many other authorities do not allow the finder to carry the object discovered at all. The Rambam's view is discussed in the notes on Chapter 20, Halachah 7.
102.This is also a Rabbinic prohibition. (See Shabbat 38a and also Ketubot 34a, which mentions three different opinions of the Sages on this matter.) The Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, which is the intermediate view. The person may, however, benefit from the sale of the proceeds of such labor (Mishnah Berurah 218:4).
103.Even a person for whom this labor was performed may benefit from it. Although this is forbidden with regard to other prohibitions, in this instance the Sages did not feel that such a restriction was necessary. It is unlikely that one Jew would ask another to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf, nor is likely that the person of whom such a request was made would agree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 218:1, Mishnah Berurah 218:5).
104.When a gentile performs a forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew (Halachah 8) and when food is left to warm in a forbidden fashion (Chapter 3, Halachah 9), a Jew is forbidden to benefit from these activities until enough time passes on Saturday night for the activity to have been performed. Nevertheless, these restrictions are punitive in nature, instituted so that one would not perform either of these forbidden activities. In contrast, as mentioned in the previous note, we do not suspect that one Jew will transgress the Sabbath laws on behalf of another individual. Hence, these restrictions were not applied under these circumstances.
105.Ketubot 34a.
106.The Hebrew, translated as "holy," also means "consecrated." Consecrated articles may not be used for mundane purposes.
107.Since the transgression was not willfully performed, the person is not prohibited from benefiting from his act.
108.The fruits of the forbidden activity are forbidden until Saturday night, lest one willfully perform a transgression and seek license to benefit from his activity on the grounds that the transgression was performed inadvertently.
This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah (Shabbat 38a, Ketubot, loc. cit.). Tosafot, however, quotes the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who allows one to benefit on the Sabbath itself from a forbidden activity performed without a willful desire to transgress. The Mishnah Berurah 318:7 mentions opinions that allow one to rely on Tosafot's opinion in a situation of necessity. This leniency is not, however, accepted by all authorities.
In regard to deriving benefit from the performance of an activity on the Sabbath which was forbidden by the Sages, see also Chapter 23, Halachah 8.
109.If they were brought back by a gentile, a deaf mute, a mentally incapable person, or a child, they are permitted, for these individuals are not obligated to keep the Sabbath prohibitions.
110.The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's opinion, noting that although there is a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah about the matter (see Eruvin 41b), Rav Pappa, one of the later Sages of the Talmud, adopted a more lenient opinion, allowing one to benefit from the produce if it was brought to its original place, even if this was done willfully. Significantly, the Rambam also quotes Rav Pappa's opinion in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 5:10. The Maggid Mishneh, however, supports the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the laws of the Sabbath are more stringent than those of the festivals in this context. (See also the distinction between the Sabbath and holidays made by the Tzafenat Paneach.)
The Maggid Mishneh also mentions an opinion of the Rashba which is more stringent than both the Rambam and the Ra'avad.
111.When a worker is paid for serving as a watchman on a daily basis, he may not take a wage for watching on the Sabbath. Although watching a cow or a child is not a forbidden activity, it is forbidden to receive payment for the Sabbath as a separate and independent entity.
112.Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:8, which states that although he does not have the responsibilities of a paid watchman on the Sabbath, he still has the responsibilities of an unpaid watchman.
113.I.e., the payment he receives can include recompense for the services rendered on the Sabbath, as long as the number of days he works is not considered individually, but rather he receives payment for a month's work as a lump sum.
114.I.e., he hires himself out for a ten day period. Each of these days may not be considered as an individual entity as above.
Alternatively, the Mishnah Berurah 306:18 explains that "Pay me for the ten days" can be interpreted as referring to a situation in which a worker accepted a monthly contract and left the job after working ten days. Since he worked on a monthly basis, he is entitled to payment for all ten days he worked, including the Sabbath. This, however, is a delicate manner, and the exact wording of the contract between an employer and employee should be checked with a Rabbinic authority to prevent any problems from arising in this regard.
It must be emphasized that the same principles also apply with regard to the rental of homes, or money lent at interest to a gentile. One may not receive payment for the Sabbath individually. Instead, one must receive payment on a weekly, monthly, or annual basis. Thus, problems may arise if interest is compounded daily and the Sabbath is included as one of the days. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:9.)
Shabbos - Chapter Seven
Halacha 1
With regard to the [forbidden] labors for which one is liable to be executed by stoning or to receive karet if one transgresses willingly, or for which one is obligated to bring a sin offering if one commits the transgression unknowingly, there are primary categories and [their] derivatives.
The sum of all the primary categories of [forbidden] labor are forty minus one. They include:
1) plowing,
2) sowing,
3) reaping,
4) collecting sheaves,
5) threshing,
6) winnowing,
7) separating,
8) grinding,
9) sifting,
10) kneading,
11) baking,
12) shearing,
13) whitening,
14) beating,
15) dyeing,
16) spinning,
17) making heddles,
18) mounting the warp,
19) weaving,
20) undoing woven fabric,
21) tying,
22) untying,
23) sewing,
24) tearing,
25) building,
26) demolishing,
27) beating with a hammer,
28) trapping,
29) slaughtering,
30) skinning,
31) processing [hides],
32) removing hair,
33) cutting [leather],
34) writing,
35) erasing,
36) ruling lines,
37) kindling a flame,
38) extinguishing a flame,
39) transferring from one domain to another.
Commentary Halacha
With regard to the [forbidden] labors for which one is liable to be executed by stoning - when a forbidden labor is performed in the presence of witnesses who administer a warning (Chapter 1, Halachah 1)or to receive karet if one transgresses willingly - when a forbidden labor is performed when witnesses are not present (ibid.)
or for which one is obligated to bring a sin offering if one commits the transgression unknowingly, - i.e., one intended to perform the forbidden labor, but was not aware that doing so was breaking the Sabbath laws.
there are primary categories and [their] derivatives. - In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), the Rambam explains that the primary categories are so defined because "they were part of the work of the Sanctuary, which is termed melachah [the term used for the Torah for forbidden labor]." The Rambam clarifies the definition of what constitutes a primary category and what constitutes a derivative in Halachot 2-6.
See Yereim (249) who notes that the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2) derives the existence of thirty nine categories of work from the exegesis of Exodus 38:2. There is a question if this difference in sources creates a difference in law as well. See also the preface to Eglei Tal, which questions whether the definition of the categories of forbidden labor are taken from the activities necessary for the offering of the sacrifices in the Sanctuary, or merely the activities necessary for construction of the Sanctuary. (In this context, see Rashi, Shabbat 73a, which states that the forbidden labor of baking was not practiced in the Sanctuary although one of the offerings was the showbread which was baked each week.)
The sum of all the primary categories of [forbidden] labor are forty minus one. - The commentaries question why the Rambam (and his source, Shabbat 7:2, use this expression, rather than merely stating "thirty-nine." Some draw attention to the parallel found in the Mishnah's description of the number of lashes given a transgressor (Makkot 3:10). Others explain that this expression indicates that there is a fortieth activity - the spiritual service of prayer and study - which must be performed on the Sabbath day.
They include: plowing - This and the ten labors that follow are described as sidura d'pat, the manner in which bread is baked. They were necessary to prepare the herbs used as dyes for the curtains of the Sanctuary. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.)
sowing, - Significantly, plowing is mentioned before sowing in the Mishnah. Shabbat 73b explains that this was done to teach that if the earth is hard, and it is necessary to re-plow the land after the first plowing, one is liable for the second plowing as well. The Rambam, however, follows the usual order of activities. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.)
reaping - As explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 3, this refers to reaping with a utensil. Severing produce by hand is considered merely a derivative. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 3.)
collecting sheaves - In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions that the reapers usually gather the grain in small sheaves. Others follow who collect these sheaves into larger bundles. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 5.)
According to one opinion in Shabbat 96b, there is an explicit reference to the prohibition of this labor on the Sabbath. Numbers, ch. 15, relates that a person was executed for collecting wood on the Sabbath. As the Rambam states Chapter 21, Halachah 11, this labor includes only the collection of produce. Gathering other substances - e.g., salt - is not included. It is, however, forbidden by Rabbinic decree.
threshing - applying pressure to grain to extract the kernel from its husk. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 7.)
winnowing - casting the mixture of kernels and husks to the wind. The wind will blow away the chaff, while the kernels that are heavier will fall to the ground.
separating - separating stones and the like from the kernels of grain. This is usually done by hand.
grinding - crushing the kernels into flour. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 15.)
sifting - the flour with a sifter. Shabbat 74a (see also Chapter 8, Halachah 11) notes that the three labors - winnowing, separating, and sifting - are similar. Nevertheless, because they represent three different activities performed in the construction of the Sanctuary, each one is considered a separate primary category of forbidden labor.
kneading - mixing the flour with water to create a dough. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 16.)
baking - This also includes cooking, roasting, or the like. In the construction of the Sanctuary, cooking was necessary for the preparation of dyes. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.)
shearing - This and the following twelve labors are necessary for the preparation of fabric. Shearing involves removing hair or wool from an animal, whether dead or alive. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 7.)
whitening - After the wool is removed from the animal, it is washed to remove dirt. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 10.)
beating - Unlike Rashi and others who interpret as combing the wool, in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah he translates the word into an Arabic term meaning "beat it with a stick." This activity is necessary as a preliminary stage of the preparation of flax to be spun into linen. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 12.)
dyeing - for most of the fabrics used in the curtains and roof-coverings of the Sanctuary were dyed. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 13.)
spinning - intertwining the fibers to make thread. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 15.)
making heddles - The Hebrew, literally means "house of string." In the weaving process, it refers to the following practice: Weaving involves passing the threads of the woof over and under each of the consecutive threads of the warp. In order to facilitate this process, two frames are made, each possessing many threads with a loop (referred to as a "heddle") in the middle of these threads. The threads of the warp are passed through these loops, one from one frame, and the next from the other, consecutively. When this is completed, the weaver lifts the two frames alternately. As he raises one up, he passes the woof through. In this manner, he is able to thread the woof through the entire warp at one time. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:2; Keilim 21:1.)
mounting the warp - See Chapter 9, Halachah 17-18, where the Rambam describes how a loom is set up. First, the threads of the warp are extended to the desired length and width. They are then attached to a rod on either side, and held taut. This is the activity referred to by this term.
weaving - passing the threads of the woof between the threads of the warp. (See Chapter 9, loc. cit.)
undoing woven fabric - See Chapter 9, Halachah 20.
tying - This refers to a permanent knot whose tying requires professional expertise. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 1.) In the construction of the Sanctuary, the chilazon which were used for dye were caught with nets that had to be tied (Shabbat 74b).
untying - This also includes untying only such knots. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 7.)
sewing - at least two stitches. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 9.)
tearing - in order to sew. Otherwise, one is not liable. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 10.) If a hole was found in one of the curtains of the Sanctuary, it was cut open and sewn close (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:4).
building - any structure; similarly, leveling the ground is included in this category. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 12.) The Kiryat Sefer gives as an example, the placement of the boards of the Sanctuary in their sockets.
demolishing - Here also the intent must be a constructive one: demolishing in order to rebuild. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 15.)
beating with a hammer - The Kiryat Sefer points to the fashioning of the menorah in the Sanctuary.
A craftsman finishing the fashioning of a utensil concludes his work by giving several taps with a hammer to smooth the utensil's surface. Thus, this labor also includes all activities performed to apply the finishing touch to an object - e.g., polishing and shining. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., and Chapter 10, Halachah 16.)
trapping - The Mishnah mentions the following seven categories as activities necessary to write a scroll. Leather hides were used to cover the roof of the Sanctuary. (See also Chapter 10, Halachah 19.)
slaughtering - Although this term is usually used to refer to ritual slaughter, the intent here is taking a life through any means. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 1.)
skinning - the hide of an animal to use for leather. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.)
processing [hides] - into leather. (See Chapter 11, loc. cit.) Significantly, the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) also includes salting the hides as a separate category of labor. Shabbat 75b, however, includes this activity in the category of processing hides and includes ruling parchment as the thirty-ninth category of labor.
removing hair - For leather or parchment, smooth skin is required. (See also Chapter 11, Halachah 5, 6.)
cutting [leather] - This refers to making an exact cut, so that the leather can be used for a purpose. Cutting indiscriminately is a destructive activity. Hence, one is not held liable. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 7.)
writing - two letters. This activity was necessary in the Sanctuary, for a mark was made on the boards so that the same boards could be matched to each other each time they were attached together. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.)
erasing - For if the builders of the Sanctuary erred in making a sign, they would erase it and write another in its place. In this instance as well, one is held liable only when one erases with the intent of writing two letters in this place. (See Chapter 11, loc. cit.)
ruling lines - For proper writing is possible only on ruled lines. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 17.) In the Sanctuary, this labor was performed to prepare the hides to be cut.
kindling a flame - This was necessary to cook the dyes. As the Rambam explains in Chapter 12, Halachah 1, one is liable for kindling a flame only when when desires to cook with it, use it for light, or desires ash. Otherwise, it is considered a destructive activity.
extinguishing a flame - Here also, one's intent must be constructive - e.g., to use the charcoal produced. In the Sanctuary, this was necessary to produce an even flame for the fashioning of the metal utensils (See Chapter 12, Halachah 2.)
transferring from one domain to another. - All the materials necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary were brought from the private domain to the public domain (Shabbat 96b). This forbidden labor is discussed in great length. (See Chapters 12-19.)
Halacha 2
All of these [forbidden] labors and all analogous activities are referred to as primary categories of labor. What is meant by an "analogous activity"? Plowing, digging, or making a groove [in the ground] are all considered to be primary categories of work. For each one involves digging in the ground and they all reflect a single activity.1
Halacha 3
Similarly, one who sows seeds, plants trees, extends trees,2 grafts [branches to] trees,3 or prunes trees:4 All of these [activities] are considered a single primary category of [forbidden] labor, [for] they share a commonality, since all these activities have a single intent:5 to cause [a plant] to grow.
Halacha 4
Similarly, a person who reaps grain or legumes, one who harvests grapes, dates, olives, or figs: All these [activities] are considered a single primary category of [forbidden] labor, [for] they share a commonality, since all these activities have a single intent:6 to remove produce from [the plant] on which it grows. [The same principle applies] with regard to other forbidden categories of labor.
Halacha 5
A derivative is a labor that resembles one of these categories of [forbidden] labor.7 What is implied? A person who cuts a vegetable into small pieces to cook is liable,8 for this activity resembles grinding. When a person grinds, he takes one [large] entity, and divides it into smaller parts. Anyone who performs an activity that resembles this is [performing] a derivative of the labor of grinding. Similarly, a person who takes a strip of metal and pulverizes it to use the powder9 acts as goldsmiths do;10 he is [performing] a derivative of the labor of grinding.
Halacha 6
Similarly, one who takes milk and inserts a [piece of intestine] in it so that it curdles is liable for [performing] a derivative of separating,11 for he separates the curds from the whey.
If one made cheese from it, one is liable for [performing a derivative of building]. Whenever one collects separate entities and bonds them together so that they form a single mass, [the activity] resembles building.
Similarly, each of the primary categories of [forbidden] labor [mentioned above] possesses derivatives,12 which are determined according to the principles explained above. From the nature of the [forbidden] labor performed on the Sabbath, one can determine in which category of [forbidden] labor it should be included, or which [forbidden] labor it is a derivative of.
Halacha 7
A person who willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, performs an activity that constitutes one of the primary categories of [forbidden] labor or one of the derivatives [of these categories] is liable for karet.13 If witnesses come, he should be stoned [to death].14 If [he performs such an activity] without being conscious of the transgression, he must bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.
If so, what is the difference between the primary categories of [forbidden] labor and the derivatives?15 There is no difference except with regard to sacrifices. When a person, without being conscious of the transgression involved, performs many activities, each of which constitutes a different primary category [of forbidden labor] in one period of lack of awareness,16 he is obligated to bring a sin offering for every such category17 [of forbidden labor].18
If he performs an activity that constitutes a primary category [of forbidden labor] and its derivatives in one period of lack of awareness, he is obligated to bring merely one sin offering.19
Halacha 8
What is implied? If a person plows, sows, and reaps on the Sabbath in a single period of lack of awareness, he is required to bring three sin offerings. Even if he performs all thirty-nine [forbidden] labors without knowing of the prohibition involved - e.g., he forgot that it is forbidden to perform these labors on the Sabbath - he is obligated to bring one sin offering for each and every [forbidden] labor.20
In contrast, if he ground [grain], cut a vegetable, and pulverized a strip of metal during a single period of lack of awareness, he is required to bring only one sin offering [for each Sabbath],21 for he performed only a single primary [forbidden] labor and its derivatives. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 9
When a person performs many labors corresponding to a single category of labor in one period of lack of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin offering.22
What is implied? When a person sowed, planted, extended, grafted, and pruned in a single period of lack of awareness, he is obligated to bring only a single sin offering, for all of these [activities] are included in the same primary category of labor. The same applies in all similar situations.
FOOTNOTES
1.In this and the following two halachot, the Rambam emphasizes how other activities that are analogous to the thirty-nine mentioned in the previous halachah are not considered as solely derivatives of the primary category of labor; they have the same status as the primary categories themselves. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) and in Halachah 9 of this chapter, he uses the term - "labors corresponding to a single category of labor" to describe such activities. This phrase is also used by the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:1 (although interpreted differently by other authorities).
The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rav Moshe Kohen as objecting to the Rambam's statements, for the Mishnah specifically states that there are thirty-nine such categories of forbidden labor, while according to the Rambam there would be far more. He thus considers all these other activities as derivatives.
The Maggid Mishneh does not see such a difficulty, explaining that, as the Rambam illustrates in the examples he cites in this and the following halachot, the activity being performed is basically the same as the primary category of labor. Thus it is not proper for such an activity to be called a derivative. Similarly, since these activities are identical in nature to the existing categories, it is not proper to consider them as being an additional category with regard to the total sum.
Kalkalat Shabbat adds that the activities that the Rambam mentions as analogous to the primary categories of labor are not counted as additional categories because they were not necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary.
2.One of the methods of agriculture common in the Talmudic period was to plant vines - and in certain instances, trees - by taking a branch from an existing vine or tree and, without severing it from its source, burying it in the ground. In this manner, it would sprout roots, and ultimately a new plant would grow from this base.
3.Taking branches from one tree and grafting them to another so that they will grow.
4.As the Rambam states in Chapter 8, Halachah 2, pruning a tree is beneficial in causing it to grow. He also explains this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sh'vi'it 4:5, "One cuts off [branches] at a specific place to improve the tree."
The Eglei Tal and others note that the Rambam (Hilchot Shemitah 1:3, based on Mo'ed Katan 3a) considers pruning merely a derivative of planting with regard to the concept of forbidden labor in the Sabbatical year, while in the present context it is considered in the same status as planting itself.
The Eglei Tal resolves this difficulty on the basis of the principle that with regard to the Sabbath, it is, "thoughtful work," that the Torah forbade. This principle does not apply with regard to the prohibitions against working the land in the Sabbatical year.
Accordingly, since the activities of planting and pruning are very different, pruning is considered only a derivative with regard to the Sabbatical year. With regard to the Sabbath labors, however, intent is of fundamental importance. Since the intent of both activities is the same - to enable the plant to grow - they are both given equal status.
5.With this statement, the Rambam explains the difference between the sets of activities mentioned in the previous halachah, and those mentioned in this halachah. Plowing, digging, and making a groove are very similar activities, but they differ in their objectives. The activities mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, do not resemble each other; nevertheless, they share the same intent.
6.The activities mentioned in this halachah differ from those mentioned in the previous halachah in that each of the activities in this halachah involves a different type of produce. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that they are all considered in the same status.
7.In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), the Rambam explains that a derivative is an activity that produces a result similar to that produced by one of the forbidden labors, but differs both in the intent and the nature of the activity.
8.See Chapter 21, Halachah 18. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, for the activity to be forbidden as a derivative of grinding, one must have the intent to cook it.
9.See Chapter 8, Halachah 15.
10.This phrase emphasizes that to be liable, one's intent in pulverizing the metal must be for a useful purpose. If one's intent is merely destructive in nature, one is not liable.
11.Note the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2), which states that with regard to both this activity and making cheese, one is liable for performing a derivative of kneading.
12.The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) states that one of the determinants of a primary category of forbidden labor is that it has derivatives. Perhaps it is to emphasize this point that the Rambam mentions derivatives for each of the thirty-nine categories of labor in the succeeding chapters. Even when the derivatives are not explicitly mentioned in the Talmud, he uses logic to define activities that fall in these categories. (See Merkevet HaMishneh.)
13.The Rambam is restating the principles stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, in terms of the concepts of primary categories of forbidden labor and their derivatives.
14.As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, a person is executed for the performance of a forbidden labor only if witnesses warn him of the nature of the prohibition beforehand.
15.The Rambam's question is: Since one incurs the same liabilities regardless of whether one performs an activity that itself constitutes a forbidden category of labor or merely a derivative, of what importance is the definition of such categories?
16.A person is obligated to bring a sin offering if he was unaware that the forbidden labor he performed involved a transgression, despite the fact that he performed it several times. Even if the period in which he is not conscious of the transgression lasts several weeks, he is obligated for only a single offering for each category of forbidden labor. (See Shabbat 7:1 and Hilchot Shegagot, Chapter 7.)
17.Since each category of forbidden labor involves a different subject of which he was unaware, he is required to bring a different sin offering for it.
18.As explained in the above- mentioned sources, a person is liable for the above only when he knows the day on which the Sabbath should be observed and is aware of the prohibition against work, but does not know of the prohibition involved in the performance of a (or several) forbidden labor(s). If, however, a person forgets the day on which the Sabbath should be observed, he is required to bring merely a single sin offering for each Sabbath he violated, regardless of how many forbidden labors he performed that day. Furthermore, a person who was totally unaware of the prohibition against working on the Sabbath is required to bring only one sin offering. This single sacrifice atones for all the Sabbaths that he did not observe.
19.For it is the lack of knowledge of a single category of labor that is involved. All of the violations stem from the lack of awareness of a single matter. The same ruling applies if one performs several derivatives of the same category of labor (Hilchot Shegagot 7:5). If, however, one performed derivatives of two different categories of labor, one is required to bring two sin offerings (loc. cit.:6).
20.In his gloss to Hilchot Shegagot 7:3, the Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which focuses on the following question: If the person is unaware of the entire concept of forbidden labor, how can we say that he is aware of the concept of Sabbath in general? Seemingly, he should be obligated for only a single sin offering. [I.e., when a person is aware of the concept of the Sabbath, but is unaware of a (or several) particular labor(s), every labor is considered an entity that requires his attention. Hence, a sacrifice is required for each labor. When, however, the entire concept of the Sabbath is unknown to him, there is but one matter of which he is unaware. Hence, only one sacrifice is necessary.]
Among the resolutions offered are that the person knew of the positive commandments associated with the Sabbath or that he knew of the prohibition associated with going beyond the Sabbath limits. Alternatively, he knew of the prohibition against forbidden labor, but did not know which labors where forbidden. From the Rambam's wording itself, another resolution can be offered: The person knew that the labors were forbidden, but did not know that they were punishable by karet.
21.The bracketed addition is based on Hilchot Shegagot 7:8-9, which explains that in these circumstances, one is required to bring a sin offering for every Sabbath on which one transgressed.
22.As mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 2, this refers to activities that so closely resemble the activities that constitute the primary categories of labor that they are also considered to be primary labors. Despite their having this distinction, since only a single category of forbidden labor is involved, only one sacrifice is required.
Shabbos - Chapter Eight
Halacha 1
A person who plows even the slightest amount [of earth] is liable.1 One who weeds around the roots of trees, cuts off grasses, or prunes shoots to beautify the land2 - these are derivatives of plowing. One is liable for performing even the slightest amount of these activities.
Similarly, one who levels the surface of a field - e.g., one who lowers a mound and flattens it or fills a vale - is liable for [performing a derivative of] plowing.3 [One is liable for performing] the slightest amount of these activities. Similarly, one who levels cavities [in the ground] to even the slightest degree is liable.
Halacha 2
A person who sows even the slightest amount is liable.4 A person who prunes a tree so that it grows performs an activity resembling sowing.5 In contrast, watering plants and trees on the Sabbath is considered merely a derivative of sowing.6 One is liable for even the slightest amount. Similarly, one who soaks the seeds of wheat, barley, and the like in water [performs] a derivative of sowing7 and is liable for even the slightest amount.
Halacha 3
One who reaps an amount the size of a dried fig is liable.8 Plucking [fruit] is considered a derivative of reaping.9 Similarly, any person who removes produce from where it is growing is liable for reaping. Therefore, a person who removes grass growing from a rock, a parasite plant that grows on shrubs, or grasses that grow on a barrel is liable, for this is the place where they grow.10
In contrast, a person who removes [fruit from a plant growing] in a flower pot that is not perforated is not liable, for this is not the [ordinary] place from which it grows.11 If, however, the flower pot has a hole the size of a small root, [the plant] is considered as growing in the ground12 and a person who picks fruit from it is liable.
Halacha 4
Whenever reaping from a plant causes it to grow larger - e.g., cattle-grass or beets - a person who harvests it without knowing of the prohibition involved is liable for two sin offerings: one because he [performed the labor of] reaping, and one because he [performed the labor of] planting.13 Similarly, a person who prunes [a tree] and desires to use [the branches he prunes] is liable for reaping and planting.
[The following rules apply to] a clod of earth on which grass is growing: If one lifted it from the earth and placed it on staves, one is liable for uprooting. If it was supported by staves and one placed it on the earth, one is liable for planting.14
When figs have dried out while on the tree, and similarly, [other] trees whose fruits have dried out - a person who picks them on the Sabbath is liable15 although they are considered to be detached [from the tree] with regard to the laws of ritual purity.16
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply to] one who uproots chicory or who prunes moist shoots:17 If he intends to use them as food [for human beings], the minimum measure [for which one is held liable for reaping] is the size of a dried fig.18 If he intends to use them as animal [fodder], the minimum measure is the amount necessary to fill the mouth of a young kid.19 If he intends to use them for kindling, the minimum measure is the amount necessary to cook an egg.20
[Similar measures apply with regard to the forbidden labor of] collecting food:21 If [one's intent is to use it] as [food for human beings], the minimum measure [for which one is held liable] is the size of a dried fig. [If one's intent is] for animal [fodder], the minimum measure is the amount necessary to fill the mouth of a young kid. [If one's intent is] for kindling, the minimum measure is the amount necessary to cook an egg.
Whenever the term "an egg" is used, the intent is an average-size chicken egg.22 Whenever the term "the amount necessary to cook an egg" is used, the intent is the amount necessary to cook a portion of an egg the size of a dried fig. A dried fig is one-third the size of an egg.23
[The forbidden labor of] collecting food applies only with regard to [collecting] the earth's produce.24
Halacha 6
A person who collects figs25 and makes a chain from them or one who pierces a hole through dates and passes a string through them until they are collected as a single entity performs a derivative26 of the forbidden labor of collecting sheaves. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Halacha 7
A person who threshes [an amount of grain the size of] a dried fig is liable. [The forbidden labor of] threshing applies only with regard to the earth's produce.27
Extracting produce from its shell28 is a derivative of threshing; [a person who performs this activity] is liable. The same applies in all similar situations. Similarly, a person who milks an animal is liable for extracting food.29
By the same token, a person who wounds an animal that has a hide30is liable for extracting,31 provided he requires the blood32that flows from the wound. If, however, his intent is merely to wound [the animal], he is not liable, because his activity is destructive in nature.33 One is not liable unless one extracts a quantity of blood or milk equivalent to the size of a dried fig.34
Halacha 8
When does the above apply? When one wounds an animal, a wild beast, a fowl, or the like. If one wounds a fellow man, by contrast, one is liable although one's intent is to injure, for [this activity generates] pleasure.35 It causes one's feelings to cool and one's anger to subside. Therefore, it is considered "constructive" in nature. Accordingly, even if one does not require the blood that one extracts, one is liable.36
Halacha 9
The eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah37 have hides whose status is analogous to those of animals, beasts, and fowl with regard to the Sabbath laws.38 Other small creatures and crawling animals are not considered to have a hide [whose status is significant with regard to the Sabbath laws]. Therefore, one who wounds them is not liable.39
One who wounds an animal, beast, fowl, or one of the above-mentioned eight creeping animals is liable whether he caused an open wound from which they bled or he made a bruise that caused internal bleeding.
Halacha 10
A person who squeezes fruit to extract its juice is liable for extracting. One is not liable until he extracts an amount of juice equivalent to the size of a dried fig. From the Torah itself, one is liable for pressing only grapes and olives.40
It is, [however,] permitted to squeeze a cluster of grapes directly into food, since a liquid that is absorbed into food is considered as food. Thus, one is considered to be extracting food from food.41 Nevertheless, if one squeezes these liquids into a vessel that does not contain food,42 this is considered pressing and one is liable.
[Similarly,] one who milks directly into food43 or one who sucks with his mouth is not liable.44 One is liable only when one milks into a container.45
Halacha 11
A person who winnows or separates [an amount of food the size of] a dried fig is liable.46 Causing milk to curdle is a derivative [of the category] of separating.
Similarly, a person who separates the dregs from liquids is liable for having performed a derivative of separating or a derivative of sifting.47 [The particular category of forbidden labor is not defined,] because the labors of winnowing, separating, and sifting resemble each other.48 [If so,] why were they reckoned as three [separate categories? Because every labor that was performed in the Sanctuary is counted as a separate category.
Halacha 12
A person who separates food from unwanted matter49 and one who separates one type of food from another food50 using a sifter or a strainer is liable. If one separates using a tray51 or a pot with compartments,52 one is not liable. It is permitted to separate food by hand to eat immediately.53
Halacha 13
A person who separates unwanted matter from food is liable,54 even if he does so using only one hand.55 A person who separates turmos beans from their shucks is liable, for the shucks sweeten them when they are cooked together. Therefore, one is considered to be taking unwanted matter from food and is held liable.56
A person who separates food from unwanted matter by hand and sets it aside [to serve] at a later time,57 even later on [the Sabbath] itself, is considered to have separated for the purpose of storage and is held liable.
If there were two types of food mixed together before a person, he may separate one from the other and place it aside to eat immediately. If he separated [one from the other] and set it aside [to serve] at a later time, even later on [the Sabbath] itself, he is liable - for example, one separated food in the morning to eat in the late afternoon.58
Halacha 14
A person who filters the dregs from wine, oil, water, or other liquids, using a utensil appropriate for this purpose59 is liable,60 provided he removes the dregs from an amount of liquid equivalent to the size of a dried fig. One may, however, filter wine61 that has no dregs, or clear water, with a handkerchief or with an Egyptian basket62 so they will become crystal clear.63
We may pour water over wine dregs64 so they will become clear.65 [Similarly,] we may place a raw egg in a mustard strainer so that it becomes clear.66
When one has mixed mustard on Friday, one may stir it by hand or with a utensil to make it fit to drink [on the Sabbath].67 Similarly, while wine is in the process of fermentation, one may pour out a barrel of wine together with the dregs over handkerchiefs, for the dregs have not been finely separated from the wine and they are still considered a single mixture.68 The same applies to mustard and all similar substances.69
Halacha 15
A person who grinds [an amount of grain the size of] a dried fig is liable. One who crushes spices or herbs in a mortar is performing the labor of grinding and is held liable.70
A person who cuts a vegetable that has been detached from its source [into small pieces] performs a derivative of the labor of grinding.71
Similarly, a person who saws wood in order to benefit from the sawdust, and similarly, one who files a piece of metal is liable72for filing even the slightest amount.73 A person who chops wood is not liable [for grinding] until he produces enough chips to cook an amount of egg the size of a dried fig.74
Halacha 16
A person who sifts [an amount of flour the size of] a dried fig is liable.75
A person who kneads [dough76 the size of] a dried fig is liable. Mixing earth [for use as cement] is a derivative of kneading. What is the minimum amount for which one is liable? The amount necessary to make a crucible for a goldsmith.77 The activity of mixing cement cannot be performed with ash, coarse sand, bran, or the like.78
A person who places sesame seeds, flax seeds, or the like in water is liable for kneading,79 because they become attached to each other.
FOOTNOTES
1.Since one can plant a seed in even the tiniest hole, even the smallest amount of plowing is considered significant (Shabbat 103a).
2.Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 12:2. Note Rashi and others, who offer different interpretations.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that if one's intent when performing these activities is to gather the growths one is cutting, one is liable for reaping. If one's intent is to improve the tree so that it will grow better, one is liable for sowing, as stated in the following halachah.
3.Note Shabbat 73b, which states that the Rambam's statements apply when these activities are performed outside. A person who performs these activities inside a house is liable for building. See Chapter 10, Halachah 12.
4.One is liable for sowing even the tiniest seed, since from it, a l arge plant can grow.
5.See Chapter 7, Halachah 3, and notes.
6.Since watering does not involve a seed, plant, or tree itself (as do all of the activities mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachah 2), it is considered merely a derivative of sowing.
7.In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that the source for his statements is Zevachim 94b, which mentions that one is liable for soaking seeds so they sprout. Others point to Shabbat 17b, which states that one is liable for soaking vetch, a type of bean fed to cattle.
8.Reaping is important because it provides food for us to eat. Since an amount smaller than a dried fig is not considered a significant measure of food, one is not held liable for reaping until one reaps that amount.
9.Plucking the fruit is considered merely as a derivative, because in contrast to reaping, which is done with a utensil, plucking is done by hand (Lechem Mishneh).
10.I.e., since these plants grow naturally in these places, one is held liable for removing them.
11.Such plants grow naturally in the ground. By planting them in a flower pot, one separates them from their normal place of growth. Hence, they are no longer considered to be connected to their source, and according to the Torah there is no prohibition against picking fruit from such a plant. There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 336:7- 8.)
12.It is able to receive nurture from the earth through the hole. (See Rashi, Shabbat 107b.) The above applies only in homes with earth floors where there is no interruption (except air) between the flower pot and the earth. See Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchasah, p. 326.
The difference between a flower pot that is perforated and one that is not perforated is relevant in many different contexts within Torah law. (See Hilchot Kilayim 1:2, 5:16; Hilchot Mechirah 3:16, and other sources.)
13.Although the person performed merely one activity, since this activity produces effects that parallel those accomplished by two separate forbidden labors, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each.
14.Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 81b) and others maintain that one is not held liable in this instance. Although such activity is forbidden by Rabbinic decree, since the connection between the flower pot and the ground was never interrupted, one is not considered to have uprooted the plant (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 336:12).
15.Since they remain attached to the tree, they are governed by the same rules as other fruit.
Tosafot (Shabbat 150b) maintains that this ruling applies only when the stems attaching the fruit to the tree are still fresh. If they have also dried out, one is not held liable for picking the fruit. (See Be'ur Halachah 336.)
16.See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 2:4-5.
17.Although the latter are most frequently used as fodder for animals, at times they are cooked and eaten by human beings. (See Sh'vi'it 7:5 and the Rambam's Commentary.)
18.As evident from the laws that follow, this is the minimum measure for which one is liable for all forbidden labors associated with food. Eating a lesser amount is not significant.
The Nodeh BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 34) notes that Shabbat 103a states that this measure applies when one gathers these substances in a field belonging to a colleague. When gathering in one's own field, by contrast, one is liable for even the slightest amount, since in doing so, one clears one's field, a derivative of the labor of plowing.
The Noda BiY'hudah explains that the Talmudic passage does not contradict the Rambam's decision. As mentioned in the previous halachot, one can be liable for transgressing two different forbidden labors when performing a single activity. Thus, as soon as one gathers any of these substances, one is liable for plowing. Should one one gather the amounts mentioned by the Rambam in this halachah, one is also liable for reaping.
19.Based on Shabbat 76a, it appears that a mouthful of a kid is slightly less than the size of a dried fig.
20.This is the smallest amount of kindling wood that will be useful for a person.
21.Although collecting food is a forbidden labor in its own right, the Rambam mentions it within the context of this halachah, because the measures for which one is held liable correspond exactly to those mentioned with regard to the previous law.
22.In contemporary measure, the size of an egg is determined as 57.6 cubic centimeters by Shiurei Torah and 100 cubic centimeters by Chazon Ish.
23.The Ra'avad states that this measure is not exact, and the actual amount is slightly larger. The difference between their opinions is based on the interpretation of Eruvin 80b and 82b. Similarly, their understanding of those passages affects their determination of many different significant measures in Torah law, for example, כדי אכילת פרס (the measure of time associated with the mitzvot and prohibitions connected with eating). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 368:3) mentions both opinions.
24.Thus excluding salt or similar substances (Shabbat 73b). (Note the Kessef Mishneh's comments regarding the proper text of that Talmudic passage.) As the Rambam states in Chapter 21, Halachah 11, there is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition against gathering salt.
The Hagahot Maimoniot (21:8) state that just as sheaves are collected in a field - the place where produce grows - similarly, all activities that are derivatives of this forbidden labor must take place in or near the field or orchards in which the produce grows. The Tur (Orach Chayim 240) and others also accept this ruling. From Chapter 21, Halachah 11, it appears that the Rambam also follows this approach.
25.Rav Moshe Kohen mentions that a person is liable only when he collects the fruit near the grooves of trees where they grow. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted outright by the later authorities. (See the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:15 and the Mishnah Berurah 340:38.)
26.The commentaries have not cited a direct source for the laws stated in this halachah [although there is a parallel in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2)]. Some cite this as an example of the Rambam's use of his own powers of deduction to determine derivatives for forbidden labors, so that every category of forbidden labor will be associated with derivatives.
27.Rav Moshe Kohen questions this statement, for the derivatives of a forbidden labor must resemble the forbidden labor itself. Thus it is difficult to understand how the Rambam can make such a statement and also state that one is liable for extracting food or for milking an animal.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Rivash (Responsa 121) state that an animal that lives on the land (as opposed to fish and other creatures that live in the sea) can be considered as produce of the earth, because it derives its life from the earth's produce.
The Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham, however, does not accept the basic premise of the question and explains that a derivative of a forbidden labor can differ drastically from the forbidden labor itself. Accordingly, even though threshing applies only with regard to produce, its derivatives can involve animals (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 18).
28.This applies to extracting kernels of grain from their husks or legumes from its pods. Nevertheless, the Eglei Tal allows one to remove the shells of onion and garlic, and Sh'vitat HaShabbat permits the removal of the hard shells of nuts.
29.The Rambam's opinion is also accepted by Rashi (Shabbat 95a) and other authorities. Rabbenu Tam and other Rishonim agree that milking is forbidden according to Torah law, but consider it a derivative of other categories of labor. The Ramban (Shabbat 145) considers this merely a Rabbinic prohibition.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:20), which states that one may tell a gentile to milk an animal. This leniency is permitted because the animal will suffer pain if it is not milked. Other leniencies are also granted on the basis of the Rambam's statements in Halachah 10.
The question of milking animals attracted much attention in the early years of agricultural development in Eretz Yisrael, when the question arose regarding milking herds of animals when a gentile was not available. (See K'tzot HaShulchan, Vol. VI, p. 34 ff. and other sources.)
30.This concept is defined in Halachah 9.
31.Although it is universally accepted that one is liable for drawing blood from an animal, the Rishonim differ under which category of forbidden work this prohibition falls. Rashi, Shabbat 107a, mentions an opinion that extracting blood falls into the category of dyeing. Tosafot, Shabbat 75a, Ketubot 6b, offers a different interpretation, explaining that it is included in the category of slaughtering.
32.To use as a remedy or as food for a dog or other animal (Shabbat 106a; the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 14:1).
33.See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.
34.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the minimum measures for liquids differ than those of foods. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's decision, explaining that since he considers these activities as derivatives of threshing, the minimum amount for which one is liable is the same as for threshing. It must be emphasized that according to the opinions of Rashi and Tosafot (see note 31), one is liable for extracting a quantity of blood smaller than the size of a dried fig.
35.This ruling depends on the Rambam's decision, Chapter 1, Halachah 7, where he states that one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Although the person is performing the forbidden labor for reasons very different from those that were involved in the construction of the Sanctuary, he is held liable because he is fulfilling his intent.
36.The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, based on his interpretation (which parallels that of Rashi) of Shabbat 105b. The Rambam, however, interprets this passage differently. (See the Maggid Mishneh.)
37.Leviticus 11:29,30 mentions that the carcasses of these animals convey ritual impurity. There are various different opinions regarding the meanings of the Hebrew names for the species mentioned there. The Living Torah offers the following interpretation: the weasel, the mouse, the ferret, the hedgehog, the chameleon, the lizard, the snail, and the mole.
38.The hides of these animals are tougher than the flesh beneath them. Therefore, there is a possibility that a wound will cause internal bleeding and that the blood will never be reabsorbed by the body.
39.The Rambam states that one is not liable for wounding other creeping animals even if one causes them to bleed. This decision is not accepted by most authorities (see Rashi and others, Chulin 46b), who maintain that one is not liable for causing these creatures to bleed internally. If, however, one causes external bleeding, one is liable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 316:8) accepts the opinion of the other authorities. This decision depends on the difference of opinion mentioned in note 31 as to the category of forbidden labor of which causing bleeding is a derivative. As mentioned, the Rambam considers this activity a derivative of the labor of threshing, and threshing involves removing a substance from a hard shell. Since the hides of the other crawling animals are not tough, causing them to bleed cannot be considered a derivative of this labor. According to the opinion that bleeding is a derivative of slaughtering, however, one is liable for making any animal bleed, regardless of the nature of its hide (Ziv HaMishneh).
The question whether one may kill creeping animals that are dangerous is discussed in Chapter 10, Halachah 25 and notes.
40.Rashi, Shabbat 143b, explains that the reason is that the primary purpose which grapes and olives are grown is for these liquids. With regard to other fruits, by contrast, it is not as common to use them for juice. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), it appears that the Rambam also accepts this rationale.
(Rabbenu Nissim gives another reason: The juices of other fruits are not considered as liquids, but as food. See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:4. The Pri Megadim and others consider these as two separate rationales.)
Note Chapter 21, Halachah 12, which states that there is a Rabbinic prohibition against squeezing other fruits that are frequently used for juice (Shabbat 144b gives as examples, berries and pomegranates). If, however, it is not common to use a fruit for juice, there is no prohibition at all against squeezing juice from it. Note also the discussion in the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 320) regarding squeezing lemons to make lemonade.
41.Rabbenu Chanan'el does not accept this leniency and maintains that one is liable. In a responsum, Rabbenu Asher states that a person who observes this stringency will be blessed (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 320).
42.It is prohibited to do this even if one ultimately intends to mix these beverages into food. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch Harav 320:6, which states that since one ultimately intends to mix the liquid into food, the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in nature.
43.The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this law applies only on a festival, but not on the Sabbath. Since the animal may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath, it is not considered as "food." Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 505) quotes this law with regard to the laws of festivals and not with regard to the Sabbath laws.
44.See Chapter 21, Halachah 14. Based on this leniency, there are authorities who allow one to suck the juice from grapes and other fruits. Other authorities forbid this. (See Ramah, Orach Chayim 320:1.)
45.The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:21 states that a person who milks an animal and lets the milk flow from the animal to the ground is not liable, for this is not the normal manner in which an animal is milked. This can be interpreted as the implication of the Rambam's words: "One is liable only when one milks into a container."
46.With regard to separation, this can also be interpreted as separating the unwanted matter (whether more or less than the size of a dried fig) to produce an amount of food the size of a dried fig (Minchat Chinuch). The Yeshu'ot Ya'akov 319:1 differs and maintains that both the food and the unwanted matter are counted when reckoning the amount equal to the dried fig.
47.See Halachah 14 and also Chapter 21, Halachah 17, for more particulars regarding the separation of dregs from liquids.
48.See the Eglei Tal, who questions whether these three activities can be combined. Thus, if one winnowed an amount of grain one third the size of a dried fig, and one separated and sifted the same amount, is one liable for a sin offering under such circumstances or not?
49.Primarily, the forbidden labor of separating involves separating unwanted matter from food. In the Sanctuary, it involved separating unwanted matter - pebbles and the like - from the herbs used for the dyes. Nevertheless, if one uses a utensil that is made for the purpose of separation, one is liable even when separating food from unwanted matter.
See also the Turei Zahav 319:12 who states that the prohibition against separation applies, not only to the separation of unwanted matter from food, but also to the separation of unwanted matter from substances other than food. This opinion is accepted by the later authorities.
50.In this instance, since one does not wish to partake of the other food, it is considered unwanted matter, and it is forbidden to separate the food one desires from it. When, however, one separates one portion of one type of food from another portion of the same food, one is never considered to be separating (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 319:4-5; Mishnah Berurah 319:15).
51.Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Keilim 16:3. Rashi translates this as a sieve. His interpretation is accepted by most authorities.
52.Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit:1.
53.The Ramah (Orach Chayim 319:1) explains that "immediately" means "for the purpose of the meal that one is attending." If one separates the food for use at a later time, one is liable, as stated in the following halachah.
54.As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, this is the primary form of the labor of separating.
55.The word "one" is not found in the authoritative Yemenite manuscripts. It is, however, included in the quotation of this halachah in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:4). The Mishnah Berurah 319:17 notes that some texts of the Shulchan Aruch also do not include it.
According to those versions that do include it, the intent is that using only one hand is not considered an abnormal way of performing this labor.
56.As explained in the notes on Chapter 3, Halachah 12, the turmos beans are very bitter and must be cooked seven times before they are edible. The shucks help absorb some of this bitterness. Hence, they are not considered as unwanted matter. (See Rashi, Shabbat 74a.)
57.One is not held liable for separating food in the process of eating, for the Torah's intent was surely not to prevent a person from eating in the normal manner. Separating food and setting it aside to be used later is not necessary to allow one to eat normally. Hence, it is considered in the category of this forbidden labor (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 1-2).
58.The Rambam's intent should not be misinterpreted: even if one decides to eat the food set aside at a second meal served earlier in the day, one is also held liable. It was merely common custom to eat two meals during the daytime on the Sabbath - one in the morning and one in the evening. (See Magen Avraham 319:6.)
59.The Rambam's words literally mean "their filter." The Shulchan Aruch 319:10 states "filter," seemingly implying all filters, even one not specifically made for that liquid.
60.See Halachah 11.
61.One must, however, do so in a manner slightly different from the way one filters these liquids during the week, as the Rambam states in Chapter 21, Halachah 17.
62.A basket made of woven palm branches.
63.The Rashba and other authorities differ with the Rambam, based on their interpretation of Shabbat 139b. According to the Rashba, one may filter even cloudy wine with a handkerchief or other strainer of this nature, since this is not the normal manner in which this activity is performed.
According to the Rambam, although one would not be liable for straining the wine in this manner, it would still be forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The only filtering that is permitted is filtering wine that is already fit to be drunk, so that it will become crystal clear. One might ask: Of what value is such an act? The answer is that precisely because most people would not consider this activity of value, and only the most spoiled individuals would require it, is it permitted. (According to the Rashba, such beverages may even be filtered with an ordinary filter.) Though the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:10) mentions the Rambam's view, the Rashba's ruling is favored.
64.The dregs were placed in a strainer on Friday, and one desires to pour the water over them on the Sabbath day (Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Shabbat 20:2).
65.To remove any residue of wine that might be left in the dregs (ibid.).
66.The intent is to mix the egg with mustard lying at the bottom of the strainer that has already been strained before the Sabbath (Shabbat 134a). In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 20:2), the Rambam states that when raw eggs are mixed with coarse foods, they cause the lighter matter to rise above the heavier, coarse matter. Thus, by mixing the egg with the mustard, one will cause it to undergo a further process of refinement. Nevertheless, this is not included in the forbidden labor of separating.
It must be noted that the Tur (Orach Chayim 319) explains that the problem in question in this instance is that the egg yolk will pass through the strainer, while the albumen will not. Nevertheless, this is not considered a derivative of the forbidden labor of separating. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:15) follows this interpretation.
67.Since the mustard is already strained and is fit to be used, there is no difficulty in stirring it further. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 12.)
68.Rashi, Shabbat 139b, explains that this straining process will not be very effective. Hence, it is permitted. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 319:14 focuses on the Rambam's words and explains that since the wine and the dregs are considered a single mixture, the forbidden labor of separation does not apply. The concept of separation applies when the desired entity and the dregs are distinct, and this is not true until the wine has completed the fermentation process.
69.I.e., although it is forbidden to strain mustard using a strainer on the Sabbath, one may strain it through a handkerchief (Or Sameach).
70.Indeed, in the construction of the Sanctuary, it was herbs that were crushed for use as dyes.
71.See Chapter 7, Halachah 5, Chapter 21, Halachah 18. In those halachot, the Rambam adds the expression "to cook it," implying that one is not liable for cutting vegetables one intends to eat raw. When the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:12) quotes this law, it omits the above term, leading to the conclusion that one is liable even for cutting vegetables that one desires to eat raw. For this reason, in his gloss the Ramah clarifies that one is liable only when one cuts the vegetables and then stores them for later use, if one partakes of them immediately, one is not liable.
72.See Chapter 7, Halachah 5.
73.Because any amount of the dust he desires will be useful for him. This is evident from Chapter 18, Halachah 5.
74.Since he intends to use the wood for kindling, he must have enough wood to perform an an activity of at least minimal importance. (See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.)
75.The Rambam does not mention derivatives for this category of forbidden labor, because, as mentioned in Halachah 11, sifting resembles the categories of separating and winnowing, and it is not clear which of these categories of forbidden labor the derivatives of these activities fall under.
76.This addition follows the opinion of the Minchat Chinuch. The Eglei Tal differs, maintaining that for a person to be liable, the flour used for the dough must be this size before water is added.
77.This measure is derived from Chapter 18, Halachah 11.
78.The forbidden labor of kneading involves adding water to a collection of granular substances - e.g., flour or cement - and mixing them until they cling together as a single mass. Since the substances mentioned in this clause of the halachah do not adhere to each other, one can never be held liable for performing this forbidden labor with them. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 21, Halachot 33-34, this opinion is not accepted by all authorities.
There is another difference of opinion among the Sages and later Rabbis pertinent to this matter. Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah (Shabbat 155b) mentions that kneading involves actually mixing the dough with one's hands. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that one is liable for kneading as soon as one pours water into flour. This opinion is accepted by some authorities (Sefer HaTerumot) and is referred to in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:16).
79.As mentioned in Halachah 2, if a person places seeds into water so they sprout, he is liable for performing a derivative of sowing. (See Mishnah Berurah 336:51 which states that this applies only when one has the intent that they sprout. A person who soaks seeds so that they soften is not liable.) If one pours water over the seeds mentioned in this halachah, one is liable for kneading.
____________________________
Hayom Yom:
Thursday, 2 Shevat, 5775 • 22 January 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: Va'eira, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 10-17.
Tanya: This will explain (p. 65)...to his service. (p. 67).
My father related: The maamar Va'eira...ushmi Hashem, discussing the idea that "none of them will be repelled" - (not the maamar with this title which is printed in Torah Or) acquired the name, "the frum - ('G-d-fearing')1 Va'eira." The Alter Rebbe would repeat it every three years, each time almost verbatim. The Tzemach Tzedek said, "Each time there was a new light." "My father commented: Or, light, is always the same, but maor, luminary, is always like something new.
FOOTNOTES
1. The maamar evoked self-introspection, teshuva, self-improvement, stirring those who studied it to become more G-d-fearing; in Yiddish, frum.
____________________________
Daily Thought:
Truth Concentrate
This Torah we were given is not of the world, neither is it something extraneous to it. Rather, it is the hidden essence, the primal thought from which all the cosmos and each thing within it extends. It is not about the world, it is the world—the world as its Creator sees it and knows it to be.
The sages of the Talmud told us that the Torah is the blueprint G‑d used to design His creation. There is not a thing that cannot be found there.
Even more, they told us, the Torah is far beyond the world, beyond time, beyond any sort of being. G‑d and His Torah are one, for His thoughts are not extraneous to Him, nor do they effect any change in Him, as do our thoughts. Rather, His thoughts, His wisdom, His desire—all are a simple oneness that does not change.
But He took that infinite wisdom and condensed it a thousandfold, a billionfold, and more, into finite, earthly terms that we could grasp—yet without losing a drop of its purity, of its intimate bond with Him. Then He put it into our hands to learn, to explore and to extend.
So now, when our mind grasps a thought of Torah, thoroughly, with utter clarity, we grasp that inner wisdom. And when we are completely absorbed in the process of thought, comprehension and application, our self and being is grasped by that infinite wisdom which is the essence of all things. We have grasped it, and it grasps us. In truth, we become that essence.[Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, Tanya, chapters 4 and 5.]
____________________________
Torah lessons: Chumash: Va'eira, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 10-17.
Tanya: This will explain (p. 65)...to his service. (p. 67).
My father related: The maamar Va'eira...ushmi Hashem, discussing the idea that "none of them will be repelled" - (not the maamar with this title which is printed in Torah Or) acquired the name, "the frum - ('G-d-fearing')1 Va'eira." The Alter Rebbe would repeat it every three years, each time almost verbatim. The Tzemach Tzedek said, "Each time there was a new light." "My father commented: Or, light, is always the same, but maor, luminary, is always like something new.
FOOTNOTES
1. The maamar evoked self-introspection, teshuva, self-improvement, stirring those who studied it to become more G-d-fearing; in Yiddish, frum.
____________________________
Daily Thought:
Truth Concentrate
This Torah we were given is not of the world, neither is it something extraneous to it. Rather, it is the hidden essence, the primal thought from which all the cosmos and each thing within it extends. It is not about the world, it is the world—the world as its Creator sees it and knows it to be.
The sages of the Talmud told us that the Torah is the blueprint G‑d used to design His creation. There is not a thing that cannot be found there.
Even more, they told us, the Torah is far beyond the world, beyond time, beyond any sort of being. G‑d and His Torah are one, for His thoughts are not extraneous to Him, nor do they effect any change in Him, as do our thoughts. Rather, His thoughts, His wisdom, His desire—all are a simple oneness that does not change.
But He took that infinite wisdom and condensed it a thousandfold, a billionfold, and more, into finite, earthly terms that we could grasp—yet without losing a drop of its purity, of its intimate bond with Him. Then He put it into our hands to learn, to explore and to extend.
So now, when our mind grasps a thought of Torah, thoroughly, with utter clarity, we grasp that inner wisdom. And when we are completely absorbed in the process of thought, comprehension and application, our self and being is grasped by that infinite wisdom which is the essence of all things. We have grasped it, and it grasps us. In truth, we become that essence.[Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, Tanya, chapters 4 and 5.]
____________________________
No comments:
Post a Comment