Today in Jewish History:
• Purim Saragossa (1421)
A noxious plot was brewing against the Jewish community of Saragossa, but they were completely unaware of the looming danger. They were spared, however, thanks to a handful of synagogues beadles who acted on a dream they all had. The resulting salvation on the 17th of Shevat was celebrated by Saragossan Jews, and dubbed "Purim Saragossa."
A Hebrew Megillah (scroll) was penned, describing the details of the miraculous story. To this day, this scroll is read in certain communities on Purim Saragossa.
Link: Purim Saragossa
Daily Quote:
From the time that G-d said to our father Abraham, "Go from your land..." and "Abraham went on, journeying southward", began the process of "birurim" -- of extracting the sparks of holiness that are scattered throughout the universe and buried within the material existence... By the decree of Divine providence, a person wanders about in his travels to those places where the sparks that are to be extracted by him await their redemption...[Rabbi Sholom DovBer of Lubavitch (1860-1920)]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Yitro, 4th Portion Exodus 19:1-19:6 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 19
1In the third month of the children of Israel's departure from Egypt, on this day they arrived in the desert of Sinai. אבַּחֹ֨דֶשׁ֙ הַשְּׁלִישִׁ֔י לְצֵ֥את בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מֵאֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרָ֑יִם בַּיּ֣וֹם הַזֶּ֔ה בָּ֖אוּ מִדְבַּ֥ר סִינָֽי:
on this day: On the New Moon (Mechilta, Shab. 86b). It could have said only, “on that day.” What is the meaning of "on this day"? That the words of the Torah shall be new to you, as if they were given just today. — [from Tanchuma Buber, p. 73] ביום הזה: בראש חודש. לא היה צריך לכתוב אלא ביום ההוא, מהו ביום הזה, שיהיו דברי תורה חדשים עליך כאלו היום נתנו:
2They journeyed from Rephidim, and they arrived in the desert of Sinai, and they encamped in the desert, and Israel encamped there opposite the mountain. בוַיִּסְע֣וּ מֵֽרְפִידִ֗ים וַיָּבֹ֨אוּ֙ מִדְבַּ֣ר סִינַ֔י וַיַּֽחֲנ֖וּ בַּמִּדְבָּ֑ר וַיִּֽחַן־שָׁ֥ם יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל נֶ֥גֶד הָהָֽר:
They journeyed from Rephidim: Why did [Scripture] have to repeat and explain from where they had journeyed? Did it not already state (Exod. 17:1) that they were encamped in Rephidim? It is known that they journeyed from there. But [it is repeated] to compare their journey from Rephidim to their arrival in the Sinai desert. Just as their arrival in the Sinai desert was with repentance, so was their journey from Rephidim with repentance. — [from Mechilta] ויסעו מרפידים: למה הוצרך לחזור ולפרש מהיכן נסעו, והלא כבר כתב שברפידים היו חונים, בידוע שמשם נסעו, אלא להקיש נסיעתן מרפידים לביאתן למדבר סיני, מה ביאתן למדבר סיני בתשובה, אף נסיעתן מרפידים בתשובה:
and Israel encamped there: Heb. וַיִחַן, [the singular form, denoting that they encamped there] as one man with one heart, but all the other encampments were [divided] with complaints and with strife. — [from Mechilta] ויחן שם ישראל: כאיש אחד בלב אחד, אבל שאר כל החניות בתרעומת ובמחלוקת:
opposite the mountain: [This means] to its east. And wherever you find [the word] “opposite (נֶגֶד),” it means facing the eastern side. — [from Mechilta] [This signifies that they were facing west, toward the eastern side of Mount Sinai.] נגד ההר: למזרחו, וכל מקום שאתה מוצא נגד, פנים למזרח:
3Moses ascended to God, and the Lord called to him from the mountain, saying, "So shall you say to the house of Jacob and tell the sons of Israel, גוּמשֶׁ֥ה עָלָ֖ה אֶל־הָֽאֱלֹהִ֑ים וַיִּקְרָ֨א אֵלָ֤יו יְהוָֹה֙ מִן־הָהָ֣ר לֵאמֹ֔ר כֹּ֤ה תֹאמַר֙ לְבֵ֣ית יַֽעֲקֹ֔ב וְתַגֵּ֖יד לִבְנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
Moses ascended: on the second day (Shab. 86a), and all his ascents were early in the morning, as it is said: “And Moses arose early in the morning” (Exod. 34:4). ומשה עלה: ביום השני. וכל עליותיו בהשכמה היו, שנאמר (שמות לד ד) וישכם משה בבקר:
So shall you say: With this language and in this order. — [from Mechilta] כה תאמר: בלשון הזה וכסדר הזה:
to the house of Jacob: These are the women. Say it to them in a gentle language. — [from Mechilta] לבית יעקב: אלו הנשים, תאמר להן בלשון רכה:
and tell the sons of Israel: The punishments and the details [of the laws] explain to the males, things that are as harsh as wormwood. -[Mechilta, Shab. 87a] ותגיד לבני ישראל: עונשין ודקדוקין פרש לזכרים. דברים הקשין כגידין:
4You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, and [how] I bore you on eagles' wings, and I brought you to Me. דאַתֶּ֣ם רְאִיתֶ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר עָשִׂ֖יתִי לְמִצְרָ֑יִם וָֽאֶשָּׂ֤א אֶתְכֶם֙ עַל־כַּנְפֵ֣י נְשָׁרִ֔ים וָֽאָבִ֥א אֶתְכֶ֖ם אֵלָֽי:
You have seen: This is not a tradition that you have. I am not sending you this [message] with words; I am not calling witnesses to testify before you, but you [yourselves] have seen what I did to the Egyptians. They were liable to Me for many sins before they attacked you, but I did not exact retribution from them except through you. — [from Mechilta] אתם ראיתם: לא מסורת היא בידכם, ולא בדברים אני משגר לכם, לא בעדים אני מעיד עליכם, אלא אתם ראיתם אשר עשיתי למצרים, על כמה עבירות היו חייבין לי קודם שנזדווגו לכם, ולא נפרעתי מהם אלא על ידכם:
and [how] I bore you: Heb. וָאֶשָׂא. This is [alluding to] the day that the Israelites came to Rameses-because the Israelites were scattered throughout the land of Goshen. And in a short time, when they came to start on their journey and leave, they all gathered in Rameses (Mechilta). Onkelos, however, rendered וָאֶשָׂא as וְאַטָלִיתיַתְכוֹן, and I caused you to travel, like וָאַסִּיעַ אֶתְכֶם He [Onkelos] amended [the translation of] the passage in a way respectful to the One above. ואשא אתכם: זה יום שבאו ישראל לרעמסס, שהיו ישראל מפוזרין בכל ארץ גושן, ולשעה קלה כשבאו ליסע ולצאת נקבצו כלם לרעמסס. ואונקלוס תרגם ואשא, ונטלית יתכון, כמו ואסיע אתכם, תיקן את הדבר דרך כבוד למעלה:
on eagles’ wings: Like an eagle, which carries its young on its wings, for all other birds place their young between their feet since they fear another bird flying above them. The eagle, however, fears only man, lest he shoot an arrow at it, because no other bird flies above it. Therefore, it places them [its young] on its wings. It says, “Rather the arrow pierce me and not my children.” I [God] too did that: “Then the angel of God…moved, …And he came between the camp of Egypt, etc.” (Exod. 14:19, 20), and the Egyptians shot arrows and catapult stones, and the cloud absorbed them. — [from Mechilta] על כנפי נשרים: כנשר הנושא גוזליו על כנפיו, שכל שאר העופות נותנים את בניהם בין רגליהם, לפי שמתיראין מעוף אחר שפורח על גביהם, אבל הנשר הזה אינו מתירא אלא מן האדם, שמא יזרוק בו חץ, לפי שאין עוף אחר פורח על גביו, לכך נותנן על כנפיו, אומר מוטב יכנס החץ בי, ולא בבני. אף אני עשיתי כן, (שמות יד יט) ויסע מלאך הא-להים וגו' (שם כ) ויבא בין מחנה מצרים וגו', והיו מצרים זורקים חצים ואבני בליסטראות והענן מקבלם:
and I brought you to Me: As the Targum [Onkelos renders: and I brought you near to My service]. [This is to avoid ascribing corporeality to God.] ואבא אתכם אלי: כתרגומו:
5And now, if you obey Me and keep My covenant, you shall be to Me a treasure out of all peoples, for Mine is the entire earth. הוְעַתָּ֗ה אִם־שָׁמ֤וֹעַ תִּשְׁמְעוּ֙ בְּקֹלִ֔י וּשְׁמַרְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־בְּרִיתִ֑י וִֽהְיִ֨יתֶם לִ֤י סְגֻלָּה֙ מִכָּל־הָ֣עַמִּ֔ים כִּי־לִ֖י כָּל־הָאָֽרֶץ:
And now: If now you accept upon yourselves [the yoke of the commandments], it will be pleasant for you in the future, since all beginnings are difficult. — [from Mechilta] ועתה: אם עתה תקבלו עליכם יערב לכם מכאן ואילך, שכל התחלות קשות:
and keep My covenant: which I will make with you concerning the observance of the Torah. ושמרתם את בריתי: שאכרות עמכם על שמירת התורה:
a treasure: Heb. סְגֻלִֵֶַָָָּה, a beloved treasure, like “and the treasures (וּסְגְלִֵּת) of the kings” (Eccl. 2:8), [i.e., like] costly vessels and precious stones, which kings store away. So will you be [more of] a treasure to Me than the other nations (Mechilta). Now don’t think (lit., and do not say) that you alone are Mine, and [that] I have no others besides you. So what else do I have, that [My] love for you should be made evident? For the whole earth is Mine, but they [the other nations] mean nothing to Me. סגלה: אוצר חביב, כמו (קהלת ב ח) וסגלת מלכים, כלי יקר ואבנים טובות שהמלכים גונזים אותם. כך אתם תהיו לי סגולה משאר אומות, ולא תאמרו אתם לבדכם שלי ואין לי אחרים עמכם, ומה יש לי עוד שתהא חבתכם נכרת:
For the whole earth is Mine: but they [the other nations] mean nothing to Me. כי לי כל הארץ: והם בעיני ולפני לכלום:
6And you shall be to Me a kingdom of princes and a holy nation.' These are the words that you shall speak to the children of Israel." ווְאַתֶּ֧ם תִּֽהְיוּ־לִ֛י מַמְלֶ֥כֶת כֹּֽהֲנִ֖ים וְג֣וֹי קָד֑וֹשׁ אֵ֚לֶּה הַדְּבָרִ֔ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר תְּדַבֵּ֖ר אֶל־בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
And you shall be to Me a kingdom of princes: Heb., מַמְלֶכֶתכֹּהִנִים, princes, as it is said: “and David’s sons were chief officers (כֹּהִנִים)” (II Sam. 8:18). -[from Mechilta] ואתם תהיו לי ממלכת כהנים: שרים כמה דאת אמר (שמואל ב' ח יח) ובני דוד כהנים היו:
These are the words: No less and no more. — [from Mechilta] אלה הדברים: לא פחות ולא יותר:
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Daily Tehillim: Chapters 83 - 87
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 83
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 83
A prayer regarding the wars against Israel in the days of Jehoshaphat, when the nations plotted against Israel.
1. A song, a psalm by Asaph.
2. O God, do not be silent; do not be quiet and do not be still, O God.
3. For behold, Your enemies are in uproar, and those who hate You have raised their head.
4. They plot deviously against Your nation, and conspire against those sheltered by You.
5. They say, "Come, let us sever them from nationhood, and the name of Israel will be remembered no more.”
6. For they conspire with a unanimous heart, they made a covenant against You-
7. the tents of Edom and the Ishmaelites, Moab and the Hagrites,
8. Geval and Ammon, and Amalek; Philistia with the inhabitants of Tyre.
9. Assyria, too, joined with them, and became the strength of the sons of Lot, Selah.
10. Do to them as to Midian; as to Sisera and Yavin at the brook of Kishon,
11. who were destroyed at Ein Dor, and were as dung for the earth.
12. Make their nobles like Orev and Ze'ev, all their princes like Zevach and Tzalmuna,1
13. who said, "Let us inherit the dwellings of God for ourselves.”
14. My God, make them like whirling chaff, like straw before the wind.
15. As a fire consumes the forest, and a flame sets the mountains ablaze,
16. so pursue them with Your tempest and terrify them with Your storm.
17. Fill their faces with shame, and they will seek Your Name, O Lord.
18. Let them be shamed and terrified forever; let them be disgraced and perish.
19. And they will know that You, Whose Name is the Lord, are alone, Most High over all the earth.
FOOTNOTES
1.These were the Midianite leaders who were captured (see Judges 7:25)
Chapter 84
In this psalm of prayers and entreaties, the psalmist mourns bitterly over the destruction of Temple from the depths of his heart, and speaks of the many blessings that will be realized upon its restoration. Fortunate is the one who trusts it will be rebuilt, and does not despair in the face of this long exile.
1. For the Conductor, on the gittit,1 a psalm by the sons of Korach.
2. How beloved are Your dwellings, O Lord of Hosts!
3. My soul yearns, indeed it pines, for the courtyards of the Lord; my heart and my flesh [long to] sing to the living God.
4. Even the bird has found a home, and the swallow a nest for herself, where she lays her young on the [ruins of] Your altars, O Lord of Hosts, my King and my God.
5. Fortunate are those who dwell in Your House; they will yet praise You forever.
6. Fortunate is the man whose strength is in You; the paths [to the Temple] are in his heart.
7. For those who pass through the Valley of Thorns, He places wellsprings; their guide will be cloaked in blessings.2
8. They go from strength to strength; they will appear before God in Zion.
9. O Lord, God of Hosts, hear my prayer; listen, O God of Jacob, forever.
10. See our shield,3 O God, and look upon the face of Your anointed one.
11. For better one day in Your courtyards than a thousand [elsewhere]. I would rather stand at the threshold of the house of my God, than dwell [in comfort] in the tents of wickedness.
12. For the Lord, God, is a sun and a shield; the Lord bestows favor and glory; He does not withhold goodness from those who walk in innocence.
13. O Lord of Hosts! Fortunate is the man who trusts in You.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument crafted in Gath (Metzudot).
2.God provides water for the pilgrims to Jerusalem, leading them to bless their guides for choosing a water-laden route (Metzudot)
3.Remember the Temple [and rebuild it](Metzudot).
Chapter 85
In this prayer, lamenting the long and bitter exile, the psalmist asks why this exile is longer than the previous ones, and implores God to quickly fulfill His promise to redeem us. Every individual should offer this psalm when in distress.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by the sons of Korach.
2. O Lord, You favored Your land; You returned the captives of Jacob.
3. You forgave the iniquity of Your people, and covered all their sin forever.
4. You withdrew all Your fury, and retreated from Your fierce anger.
5. Return us, O God of our salvation, and annul Your anger toward us.
6. Will You forever be angry with us? Will You draw out Your anger over all generations?
7. Is it not true that You will revive us again, and Your people will rejoice in You?
8. Show us Your kindness, O Lord, and grant us Your deliverance.
9. I hear what the Almighty Lord will say; for He speaks peace to His nation and to His pious ones, and they will not return to folly.
10. Indeed, His deliverance is near those who fear Him, that [His] glory may dwell in the land.
11. Kindness and truth have met; righteousness and peace have kissed.
12. Truth will sprout from the earth, and righteousness will peer from heaven.
13. The Lord, too, will bestow goodness, and our land will yield its produce.
14. Righteousness shall walk before him, and he shall set his footsteps in [its] path.
Chapter 86
This psalm contains many prayers regarding David's troubles, and his enemies Doeg and Achitophel. It also includes many descriptions of God's praise. Every individual can offer this psalm when in distress.
1. A prayer by David. Lord, turn Your ear, answer me, for I am poor and needy.
2. Guard my soul, for I am pious; You, my God, deliver Your servant who trusts in You.
3. Be gracious to me, my Lord, for to You I call all day.
4. Bring joy to the soul of Your servant, for to You, my Lord, I lift my soul.
5. For You, my Lord, are good and forgiving, and exceedingly kind to all who call upon You.
6. Lord, hear my prayer and listen to the voice of my supplications.
7. On the day of my distress I call upon You, for You will answer me.
8. There is none like You among the supernal beings, my Lord, and there are no deeds like Yours.
9. All the nations that You have made will come and bow down before You, my Lord, and give honor to Your Name,
10. for You are great and perform wonders, You alone, O God.
11. Lord, teach me Your way that I may walk in Your truth; unify my heart to fear Your Name.
12. I will praise You, my Lord, my God, with all my heart, and give honor to Your Name forever.
13. For Your kindness to me has been great; You have saved my soul from the depth of the grave.
14. O God, malicious men have risen against me; a band of ruthless men has sought my soul; they are not mindful of You.
15. But You, my Lord, are a compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger and abounding in kindness and truth.
16. Turn to me and be gracious to me; grant Your strength to Your servant, and deliver the son of Your maidservant.
17. Show me a sign of favor, that my foes may see and be shamed, because You, Lord, have given me aid and consoled me.
Chapter 87
Composed to be sung in the Holy Temple, this psalm praises the glory of Jerusalem, a city that produces many great scholars, eminent personalities, and persons of good deeds. It also speaks of the good that will occur in the Messianic era.
1. By the sons of Korach, a psalm, a song devoted to the holy mountains [of Zion and Jerusalem].
2. The Lord loves the gates of Zion more than all the dwelling places of Jacob.
3. Glorious things are spoken of you, eternal city of God.
4. I will remind Rahav Egypt and Babylon concerning My beloved; Philistia and Tyre as well as Ethiopia, "This one was born there.”
5. And to Zion will be said, "This person and that was born there"; and He, the Most High, will establish it.
6. The Lord will count in the register of people, "This one was born there," Selah.
7. Singers as well as dancers [will sing your praise and say], "All my inner thoughts are of you."
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, Chapter 22
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, Chapter 22
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson
Wednesday, Shevat 17, 5776 · January 27, 2016
Likutei Amarim, Chapter 22
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Wednesday, Shevat 17, 5776 · January 27, 2016
Likutei Amarim, Chapter 22
In the previous chapter the Alter Rebbe contrasted human speech and Divine speech. He pointed out that human speech is marked by two characteristics: (1) it reveals to the hearer that which was previously hidden in the speaker’s thoughts; (2) the spoken word becomes a distinct entity, separate from the speaker. Divine speech, however, cannot become separate from G‑d, since nothing exists “outside” G‑d. G‑d’s Word, even after being “spoken” and revealed (whether in Creation or in prophecy), is thus still united with Him, and nullified before Him, to the same degree that a word spoken by a human being is united with the speaker before he speaks, while the word was still within its source, viz., the desire or understanding that prompted the thought that ultimately produced the spoken word.
In this chapter the Alter Rebbe goes on to say that since, after all, the Torah does use the term “speech” with regard to Divine revelation, we must say that Divine speech contains, to some extent at least, the second characteristic of human speech as well (i.e., that it becomes separated from the speaker). He explains that this is in fact so, but only with respect to the beings created by Divine “speech” — they perceive G‑d’s Word that created them, and consequently also themselves, as being separate from G‑d. This is specifically the case with the kelipot and the sitra achra, which represent a denial of G‑d’s unity.
רק שהתורה דברה כלשון בני אדם, ונקרא בתורה דבורו של מקום ברוך הוא בשם דבור ממש כדבורו של אדם
Yet1 “the Torah employs human language,” and in the Torah the “Word” of G‑d is actually called “speech”, like the speech of a human being which is characterized by separation from the speaker; indicating that, in some way at least, G‑d’s “Word” is also separated from Him.
לפי שבאמת כך הוא דרך ירידת והמשכת החיות לתחתונים
For in truth it is so — that G‑d’s Word is separated from Him; not indeed with respect to Himself, but only with respect to the various creations, as will soon be explained; and this separation comes about by way of the descent and flow of the life-force to the lower planes.
בצמצומים רבים ועצומים, מינים ממינים שונים, להבראות מהם ברואים רבים, מינים ממינים שונים
This descent is accomplished through many powerful contractions with each successive contraction increasingly veiling the Divine life-force; and these contractions are of various kinds, in order that many diverse creatures may be created through them.
Thus the diversity found in creation stems from the diverse contractions of the creative power.
וכל כך גברו ועצמו הצמצומים והסתר פנים העליונים
Indeed, so great and powerful are the contractions and the concealment of the “Supernal Countenance,”i.e., the inner, deeper aspect of the Divine life-force is so heavily veiled,
עד שיוכלו להתהוות ולהבראות גם דברים טמאים וקליפות וסטרא אחרא
that even unclean things, and kelipot and the sitra achra, can come into being and be created.
No amount of contractions could give rise to kelipot. Even at its lowest level, the Divine life-force would not ordinarily produce creations that deny G‑d. It is the quality and intensity of the tzimtzumim, rather than their numerousness, that permits the kelipot to come into being,
ולקבל חיותם וקיומם מדבר ה׳ ורוח פיו יתברך, בהסתר פנים וירידת המדרגות
and to receive their life and existence from the Divine Word and the breath of His mouth, through the concealment of His Countenance and through the downward gradations.
ולכן נקראים אלהים אחרים מפני שיניקתם וחיותם אינה מבחינת פנים אלא מבחינת אחוריים דקדושה
For this reason the kelipot are called אלהים אחרים — “other gods,” for their nurture and vitality which they draw from the realm of holiness — since every existing being draws its life-force from holiness — does not derive from the “Countenance”, i.e., the inner aspect of the Divine Will, but from the אחוריים — the2 “hinder-part” of holiness, i.e., the external, superficial aspect of the Divine Will.
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to explain the terms “Countenance” and “hinder-part” as relating to the Divine Will. The explanation in brief: An “inner” will is a direct, pleasurable yearning for the object of one’s desire. An “external” will is one that is, as it were, “forced”; i.e., the object is desired only as a means to an end — the fulfillment of the “inner” will — and not as an end in itself.
ופירוש אחוריים: כאדם הנותן דבר לשונאו שלא ברצונו, שמשליכו לו כלאחר כתפו, כי מחזיר פניו ממנו משנאתו אותו
The meaning of “hinder-part” is exemplified in the act of a person who gives something unwillingly to his enemy with an ulterior motive; he throws the object to him over his shoulder, while he turns his face away from him, out of his hatred for him.
For one’s bodily actions express the feelings of his soul. Thus, when the act of giving is motivated by an external will, the giver turns away his face, which is where the inner facets of one’s soul express themselves.
כך למעלה: בחינת פנים הוא פנימית הרצון העליון וחפצו האמיתי, אשר חפץ ה׳ להשפיע חיות לכל הקרוב אליו מסטרא דקדושה
So too on high, the term “Countenance” represents the3 inner quality of the Supernal Will and its true desire; namely, the desire of G‑d to dispense life to all who belong to the realm of holiness, who are close to Him.
אבל הסטרא אחרא והטומאה היא תועבת ה׳ אשר שנא
But the sitra achra, and so too unholiness, is4 “an abomination before G‑d, which He hates.”
ואינו משפיע לה חיות מפנימית הרצון וחפצו האמיתי אשר חפץ בה, חס ושלום
He does not give it life from His inner Will and true desire as if He delighted in it, Heaven forbid,
כי אם כמאן דשדי בתר כתפוי לשונאו שלא ברצונו
but in the manner of one who unwillingly throws something over his shoulder to his enemy. This He does not out of His inner Will,
רק כדי להעניש את הרשעים וליתן שכר טוב לצדיקים דאכפיין לסטרא אחרא
but merely to punish the wicked who subjugate themselves to the kelipot, and derive their power from them, and to grant a rich reward to the righteous who subdue the sitra achra.
In order that there may be freedom of choice for one to be either righteous or wicked, the existence of the sitra achra is necessary, and for this reason G‑d gives it life.
וזה נקרא בחינת אחוריים דרצון העליון, ברוך הוא
This is called the “hinder-part” of the Supernal Will.
Thus we see that the kelipot are designated אלהים אחרים — “other gods,” because they derive from אחוריים, the “hinder-part” of the Divine Will.
והנה רצון העליון בבחינת פנים הוא מקור החיים המחיה את כל העולמות
Now, the Supernal Will, of the quality of “Countenance”, i.e., the inner aspect of G‑d’s Will, which is directed toward the ultimate object of G‑d’s desire, is the source of life which animates all worlds.
ולפי שאינו שורה כלל על הסטרא אחרא, וגם בחינת אחוריים של רצון העליון אינו מלובש בתוכה ממש, אלא מקיף עליה מלמעלה, לכך היא מקום המיתה והטומאה, ה‘ ישמרנו
But since it is not bestowed on the sitra achra at all, and even the “hinder-part” of the Divine Will is not actually clothed within it but merely encompasses it from above, therefore it is the abode of death and impurity (May G‑d preserve us from them!).
כי מעט מזער אור וחיות שיונקת ומקבלת לתוכה מבחינת אחוריים דקדושה שלמעלה הוא בבחינת גלות ממש בתוכה, בסוד גלות השכינה הנ״ל
For the minute measure of light and life that it derives and that it absorbs internally from the external aspect of Divine holiness, is in a state of actual exile within it — as in the concept of the “exile of theShechinah [within the kelipot]” described earlier.5
ולכן נקרא בשם אלהים אחרים
It is for this reason too that the kelipah is termed “other gods,” apart from the reason given above — namely, that the kelipot derive from אחוריים , the “hinder-part” of G‑d’s Will,
שהיא עבודה זרה ממש, וכפירה באחדותו של מלך מלכי המלכים הקב״ה
for it constitutes actual idolatry and a denial of the unity of G‑d, the Supreme King of kings — the Holy One, blessed be He.
The explanation of these two reasons is as follows: Every created being is animated by two types of Divine life-force. One is an internalized life-force, which is beamed to suit the character and capacity of each individual creature. It is this power that determines the character of each being; it becomes one with it and is felt by it — in fact, this internalized life-force constitutes its identity. The second type of life-force is of an encompassing, transcendental nature. It does not adapt itself to the individual character of each being, and is not clothed within it; rather, it animates from without, so to speak — from its own level, above the created being which it animates.
The kelipot, too, are animated by these two types of Divine life-force. The latter type, since it does not permeate them, does not conflict with their ego. The kelipot can thus consider themselves independent beings, even while acknowledging G‑d as the source of their vitality. They need not deny Him. With regard to this type of G‑dly life-force, the kelipot are calledאלהים אחרים — “other gods,” only because they receive their life from the אחוריים , from the “hinder-part” of G‑d’s Will.
The kelipot cannot, however, acknowledge the former, internalized type of G‑dly life-force, while asserting at the same time that they are separate from G‑d. To do so would be self-contradictory; for, as explained, this kind of life-force constitutes the very identity of every created being. The kelipot therefore completely deny this life-force (and it is thus truly in a state of exile within them). It is thus with regard to this life-force that the kelipot are called אלהים אחרים — “other gods,” in the literal sense of the term — implying idolatry and a denial of G‑d’s unity.
This the Alter Rebbe now goes on to say:
כי מאחר שאור וחיות דקדושה הוא בבחינת גלות בתוכה, אינה בטילה כלל לגבי קדושת הקב״ה
For inasmuch as the light and life of holiness i.e., the internalized life-force are in a state of exile within thekelipah, it does not surrender itself at all to the holiness of G‑d.
ואדרבה מגביה עצמה כנשר, לומר אני ואפסי עוד, וכמאמר: יאור לי ואני עשיתני
On the contrary, it soars aloft like an eagle, saying6: “I am, and there is nothing beside me”; or, as in the statement of Pharaoh7: “The river is mine, and I have made myself!”
ולכן אמרו רז״ל שגסות הרוח שקולה כעבודה זרה ממש
That is why the Sages, of blessed memory, said that8 arrogance is truly tantamount to idolatry.
כי עיקר ושרש עבודה זרה הוא מה שנחשב לדבר בפני עצמו, נפרד מקדושתו של מקום, ולא כפירה בה’ לגמרי
For the essence and root of idolatry is that it is regarded as an independent entity, separate from the holiness of G‑d; idolatry does not imply an outright denial of G‑d;
כדאיתא בגמרא דקרו ליה אלקא דאלקיא
as it is stated in the Gemara9 that they of the realm of kelipah call Him “the G‑d of gods,” so that although they do not deny His supremacy, their statement nevertheless constitutes idolatry,
אלא שגם הם מחשיבים עצמם ליש ודבר בפני עצמו, ובזה מפרידים את עצמם מקדושתו של מקום, ברוך הוא, מאחר שאין בטלים לו יתברך
only because they consider themselves, too, to be separate entities and independent beings; and thereby they separate themselves from the holiness of G‑d, since they do not efface themselves before Him.
כי אין קדושה עליונה שורה אלא על מה שבטל לו יתברך, כנ״ל
For the supernal holiness rests only on that which is surrendered to Him, as explained above. 10
ולכן נקראים טורי דפרודא בזהר הקדוש
For this reason the Zohar11 calls the kelipot “peaks of separation” i.e., they are as haughty as the mountain peaks, and are thus separate from G‑d.
והרי זו כפירה באחדותו האמיתית, דכולא קמיה כלא חשיב, ובטל באמת לו יתברך
But this constitutes a denial of G‑d’s true unity, since His unity implies that12 “all is esteemed as nothing before Him,” and that all is utterly nullified before Him,
ולרצונו המחיה את כולם ומהוה אותם מאין ליש תמיד
and before His Will which animates them all, and which constantly brings them into being out of nothingness.
Arrogance, therefore, which is the aggrandizement of one’s own identity, is diametrically opposed to the surrender of one’s identity which is a corollary of the concept of G‑d’s unity. Arrogance thus represents a denial of the unity of G‑d, and for this reason the Gemara equates it with idolatry.
* * *
To summarize briefly the points made in this chapter: Through many and varied tzimtzumim the Divine Word brought into being kelipot and the sitra achra, who perceive themselves to be entities separate from G‑d. For this reason, G‑d’s Word is described in the Torah as speech, for the element of separation found in human speech (where the spoken word becomes separated from the speaker) is also present in the Divine “speech” of Creation. However, this separateness exists only in the perspective from which the created beings view their relationship with their source; from G‑d’s perspective there is no separation at all, for everything is united with Him and is contained within Him even after it is created.
With this, the Alter Rebbe concludes one step of the discussion begun in ch. 20. There he stated that in order to explain how all the commandments of the Torah are encapsulated in the two commandments concerning idolatry, it is first necessary to clarify the true meaning of idolatry. This in turn necessitated an in‑depth discussion of the meaning of the unity of G‑d, which idolatry denies. The Alter Rebbe has thus far explained that G‑d’s unity means not only that there is but one G‑d: rather G‑d is the only existing being. All else is as naught before Him. Thus, any feeling (such as the kelipot feel) of having an identity of one’s own, apart from G‑d, actually represents idolatry.
In the following two chapters the Alter Rebbe now resumes his discussion, explaining how the above concept of G‑d’s unity finds expression in all the mitzvot of the Torah.
——— ● ———
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Berachot 31b. |
| 2. | This teaching is based on the similarity betweend אחרים and אחוריים |
| 3. | This teaching is based on the similarity betweend פנים and פנימיות. |
| 4. | Devarim 12:31. |
| 5. | Ch. 19. |
| 6. | Yeshayahu 47:8; Tzephaniah 2:15. |
| 7. | A compound of Yeshayahu 29:9 and 29:3. |
| 8. | Sotah 4b. |
| 9. | Menachot 110a. |
| 10. | Ch. 6. |
| 11. | I, 158a. |
| 12. | Zohar I, 11b. |
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Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Wednesday, Shevat 17, 5776 · January 27, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 213
Marriage
"When a man takes a wife and is intimate with her"—Deuteronomy 24:1.
It is a mitzvah for a man to marry a woman through kiddushin. Kiddushin is accomplished through one of three methods: a) The man giving the women an object of value [for the purpose of marriage]. b) The man giving the woman a marriage contract [a document upon which is written, "With this document I am marrying you"]. c) Through the man being intimate with the woman.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Wednesday, Shevat 17, 5776 · January 27, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 213
Marriage
"When a man takes a wife and is intimate with her"—Deuteronomy 24:1.
It is a mitzvah for a man to marry a woman through kiddushin. Kiddushin is accomplished through one of three methods: a) The man giving the women an object of value [for the purpose of marriage]. b) The man giving the woman a marriage contract [a document upon which is written, "With this document I am marrying you"]. c) Through the man being intimate with the woman.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Marriage
Positive Commandment 213
Translated by Berel Bell
The 213th mitzvah is that we are commanded to acquire [by kiddushin1] a woman before2 marrying her [n'suin]: either by giving her something3 [of sufficient value]; by giving her a document [of marriage]; or by having marital relations [for the purpose of kiddushin]. This is the mitzvah of kiddushin.
This mitzvah is hinted to in the Torah in the verse,4 "When a man acquires a woman and has relations with her...." This implies that he can acquire her through having relations.
[That a document may be used is alluded to in the verse5 which states that after receiving a writ of divorce,] "She leaves...and may marry another man." [Since the divorce and the marriage are described together, they can be compared:] just as she leaves by means of a document, so too she may marry by means of a document.
So too, the use of money may be derived from the verse6 regarding a Jewish maidservant,7 [that upon reaching puberty, she goes free,] "without money." Our Sages explain,8 "There is no money received by this master, but another master does receive money. Who is this? The girl's father [who receives money when his daughter gets married]."9
However, only kiddushin by means of relations has the validity of a law m'dioraysa,10 as explained in many places in Kesuvos,11 Kiddushin,12 and Niddah.13 All the details of this law have been thoroughly explained in the designated tractate, i.e. Kiddushin.
Our Sages stated explicitly14 that kiddushin by means of relations is a Torah law. This statement proves that kiddushin counts as a law of the Torah.
FOOTNOTES
1.In Jewish law, there are two steps to a marriage, kiddushin and n'suin. After the first step, they are considered husband and wife, but they may not yet live together as such until after n'suin. During Talmudic times there was a twelve-month period between the two stages, but today they are performed together.
2.See Chinuch, mitzvah 539; Yad Halevi P213:1 (that this is also the Rambam's intention here); Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Ishus, Ch. 1, end of Halachah 2 (as to the Rambam's description of this mitzvah as n'suin). According to Kapach, 5731, this phrase could be translated, "acquire a woman in order to live as husband and wife" (kinyan shel ishus).
3.This could be money or an object.
4.Deut. 24:1.
5.Deut. 24:2.
6.Ex. 21:11.
7.See P233.
8.Kiddushin 4a.
9.The Talmud compares the two parties who, at different times, could have control over the girl: her father, and her master, who has purchased her as a servant. The master, as the verse relates, need not receive money in order for her to be released from his control. Upon reaching puberty, she automatically goes free.
However, since only the case of the master is described in the verse, the Talmud derives that in the other case (the father), he does receive money when she is released from his control (i.e. through kiddushin). We therefore see that marriage can be effected by means of giving money.
10.According to many, the Rambam later changed his mind. See Haga'os Haramach, Kesef Mishneh, and other commentaries to Hilchos Ishus, beg. of Ch.1. Sefer Nashim, Kapach edition, 5747, note 5 (p.13). Sefer Hamitzvos, Kapach, 5731, P213, footnote 17.
11.3a.
12.Ch. 1, Mishneh 1.
13.Ch. 5, Mishneh 4.
14.Kiddushin 9b.
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• 1 Chapter: Maaser Sheini Maaser Sheini - Chapter 5 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 5
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
When a man redeems his produce for the second tithe for himself - whether it is from his own crops, he acquired it as an inheritance, or it was given to him while tevel as we explained,1 he must add a fifth [of the new total].2 [Thus] if it was worth four, he should give five,3 as [Leviticus 27:31] states: "If a man will redeem from his tithes, he shall add a fifth to it."
Halacha 2
When a woman redeems produce for the second tithe that she separated, she is not required to add a fifth. According to the Oral Tradition,4 we have learned: "If a man [will redeem from] his tithes," excluding a woman. Similarly, if a man redeems [money used to] redeem produce from the second tithe for himself,5 he must add a fifth.
Halacha 3
When a person redeems the produce of his second tithe and adds a fifth, and then redeems the money itself a second time, he must add a second fifth of the principal alone. He need not add a fifth for the original fifth.6
Halacha 4
When the fifth of the produce of the second tithe is not worth a p'rutah, [the person redeeming it] need not add a fifth.7 Similarly, when the worth of the produce of the second tithe is unknown,8 it is sufficient for him to say: "The holiness of the produce and its fifth are transferred to this sela."9Whenever a person does not redeem produce from the second tithe with his own money, he need not add a fifth.10 [When one redeems] produce from the second tithe that is demai, he need not add a fifth.11
Halacha 5
When a person is redeeming produce of the second tithe and he has other produce from the second tithe that was not redeemed whose fifth is not worth a p'rutah, it is sufficient for him to say: "The holiness of it and its fifth are transferred to the money [set aside] originally."12 [This leniency is granted,] because it is impossible to require a person to be precise with his money.13
Halacha 6
When a person redeems produce from the second tithe for more than its worth, that additional value is not considered as money from the second tithe.14
Halacha 7
When the owner of the produce bids a sela to redeem it and another person also bids a sela, the owner is given precedence, because he is required to add a fifth. If, however, the owner bids a sela and another person bids a selaand a p'rutah, that other person is given precedence, because he increases the principal.15
Halacha 8
It is permitted to act "guilefully" with regard to the redemption of produce of the second tithe.16 What is implied? A person may tell his son or daughter who are beyond majority or his Hebrew servant:17 "Here is this money. Use it to redeem this produce from the second tithe," so that they will not have to add a fifth. He should not say, however: "Use them to redeem it for me."18 Similarly, he is not required to add a fifth if he tells them: "Redeem it for me using your money."19
Halacha 9
He should not, however, give money to redeem [the produce] to one of his sons or daughters who are below majority20 or to his Canaanite servants or maid-servants, because they do not have an independent financial capacity.21If he gave the money to his Hebrew maidservant,22 his words are effective if [the obligation to separate] the second tithe from this produce is Rabbinic in origin, e.g., produce grew in a flowerpot without a hole.23 [The rationale is that] a Hebrew maidservant is a minor and a minor can acquire property for others only with regard to matters of Rabbinic Law.24
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
Two brothers,27 two partners, a father and his son, may redeem produce from the second tithe for each other so that they will not have to add a fifth. When a woman brings produce from the second tithe to her husband's home,28 the husband does not acquire it as his own, since it belongs to the Most High, as we explained.29 Therefore, if he redeems it,30 he need not add a fifth.
Halacha 12
A person who redeems produce from the second tithe for himself who paid the principal, but did not pay the additional fifth should not partake of [the produce] until he pays the fifth. [This applies] even on the Sabbath.31 [And it applies] even though the payment of the fifth does not hold back the transfer of holiness [from the produce to the coins]. Indeed, that transfer takes place. [This restriction is] a decree, lest the person be negligent and fail to pay.
Halacha 13
Halacha 14
When a person exchanges a sela of money35 from the second tithe - whether in Jerusalem or outside the city - he should not exchange it entirely for brass coins. Instead, it should be divided into a shekel's worth of silver coins and ashekel's worth of brass coins.
Halacha 15
It is permissible to transfer the holiness of money of the second tithe together with produce from the second tithe to money,36 provided the produce is worth less than a dinar.37 If, however, [the produce] is worth a dinar, its holiness should not be transferred together with that of money. Instead, [it should be transferred] by itself. What is implied? A person possessed produce that was worth a dinar and three dinarim that were of the second tithe, he may not transfer the holiness of the entire amount to one sela.38 If, however, he has a half a dinar of produce and a half a dinar of money, he may transfer the holiness of both to one dinar.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
See Chapter 3, Halachah 17. Otherwise, it is forbidden to give the second tithe as a present.
|
| 2. |
Although the produce of the second tithe belongs to God, as it were, since the person partakes of it, the Torah considers as his, with regard to the obligation to add a fifth (Bava Kama 69b).
|
| 3. |
This is true in all instances that the Torah requires that a fifth be added.
|
| 4. |
Kiddushin 24a.
|
| 5. |
Using it to purchase peace sacrifices or the like.
|
| 6. |
For example, if the produce was worth 4, the person redeeming it must originally pay 5 and then, if he must pay an additional 1. He need not pay an additional 1.2.
|
| 7. |
Because anything less than a fifth is not considered as financially significant. According to the Rambam, he must, however, redeem the produce. Rashi (Bava Metzia 54b), by contrast, maintains that it need not be redeemed at all.
|
| 8. |
The Radbaz distinguishes between this instance and Chapter 4, Halachah 20, which states that when the value of produce is unknown, it should be assessed by three experts, explaining that that halachah is speaking about an instance where the produce has genuine worth, but it can only be determined by experts, not a common person. This halachah, by contrast, is speaking about an instance where its worth is not known at all.
|
| 9. |
This is acceptable, for as mentioned above, after the fact, the transfer of holiness from produce to money is acceptable even if the money is not of equal worth as the produce.
|
| 10. |
The Jerusalem Talmud (ma'aser Sheni 4:3) derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:31.
|
| 11. |
Since the obligation to redeem the second tithe of demai is merely Rabbinic in origin, this added stringency was not imposed.
|
| 12. |
The reason why it is acceptable to use the money used to redeem other produce is explained in the following halachah and notes. This leniency is granted because the obligation to set aside the second tithe from such produce is Rabbinic in origin as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 9. We grant him this leniency rather than require him to bring that produce to Jerusalem or to wait until he has enough other produce so that the fifth will be worth a p'rutah [Rashi (Bava Metzia 53b)].
|
| 13. |
And we assume that, as a safeguard, a person will be somewhat generous in the money he sets aside in redemption of the second tithe, setting aside a little more than the worth of the produce. The holiness of the produce whose fifth is worth less than a p'rutah is transferred to that extra amount (ibid.; Radbaz).
|
| 14. |
In contrast, when a person redeems consecrated money for more than its worth, the extra amount is considered as consecrated [the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aser Sheni 4:3)].
|
| 15. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 4:3; based on the Jerusalem Talmud), the Rambam explains that an increase in the principal is favored over a lesser amount of principal but a greater total, because there are "guileful" means to avoid paying the additional fifth as will be explained.
|
| 16. |
I.e., the intent of the person's "guile" is to avoid paying the additional fifth.
|
| 17. |
All three of these individuals have an independent financial capacity. Hence, they are not considered as acting on behalf of the owner.
|
| 18. |
For then it appears that they are acting on his behalf.
|
| 19. |
For then the other people are considered as acting on their own initiative, even though he gave them instructions. This applies even if the owner of the produce gives the other person an equivalent amount of money, but that person does not use it to redeem the produce.
|
| 20. |
As indicated by Hilchot Terumah 4:5, this is speaking about an instance where the child has reached the age when his vows are significant. In such an instance, his actions are effective even with regard to matters of Scriptural Law.
|
| 21. |
See Hilchot Avadim 5:3, et al.
|
| 22. |
In this instance, she will ultimately have an independent financial capacity when she comes of age. Nevertheless, at present, because she is a minor, she can act on behalf of others only with regard to matters of Rabbinic Law.
|
| 23. |
See Hilchot Terumah 5:14-16.
|
| 24. |
See Hilchot Lulav 8:10 and Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:7 which explain that a minor can acquire for his or her self, but cannot do so on behalf of another person.
|
| 25. |
Once, however, the second tithe has been separated, it cannot be given as a present - except to be eaten immediately thereafter - for it is considered as "the property of the Most High." Hence, the person who "owns" it on the earthly plane does not have the authority to give it to someone else (Chapter 3, Halachah 17, and Halachah 1 of the present chapter).
|
| 26. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 4:5), the Rambam explains that here also the owner desires to redeem the produce without paying the additional fifth. Nevertheless, we are speaking about an instance where he is in his field and does not have money at hand. Hence, none of the techniques mentioned in Halachah 8 are effective. What can he do? He can give the produce to another person and redeem it for him. Thus the produce is being redeemed by a person other than its owner at that time. Hence a fifth need not be added.
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| 27. |
I.e., even if they are partners in other matters. As Chasdei David emphasizes, this leniency does not, however, apply to the redemption of produce which is owned in partnership.
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| 28. |
When a woman marries, all of the property she owns is given to her husband to use. On the other hand, as the Rambam continues to explain, she is not the owner of the produce of the second tithe and hence, her husband also does not become its owner.
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| 29. |
Chapter 3, Halachah 17.
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| 30. |
With his own money. As mentioned in Halachah 2, a woman is never required to add a fifth when redeeming produce for herself. If, however, she redeems produce for her husband with her own money, she is required to add a fifth (Radbaz).
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| 31. |
In which instance, it is a mitzvah to delight in food and drink.
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| 32. |
As mentioned above, the second tithe must be redeemed with silver. Now gold is much more valuable than silver so that by exchanging the silver for gold, the person will be lightening his load considerably.
See Ma'aser Sheni 2:7 which states that Rabbi Akiva made such a transfer on behalf of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua.
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| 33. |
As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 5, generally, a person cannot transfer the holiness of money of the second tithe to other money, in this and the following halachah, exceptions are made for they are to the benefit of the second tithe: making the money easier to transport and to use.
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| 34. |
The addition of this word is based on the gloss of the Radbaz.
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| 35. |
I.e., a sela is a coin of relatively large value. It is easier to shop for food with smaller coins. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 2:9).
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| 36. |
As mentioned above, although generally, a person cannot transfer the holiness of money of the second tithe to other money, an exception is made here, because of the produce that is included in the transfer.
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| 37. |
The rationale is that when the produce is worth less than a dinar, it is not fit to be redeemed. (For a coin less than a dinar is small and of comparatively little value.) Hence it is to the benefit of the produce from the second tithe that the money be redeemed with it (Kessef Mishneh; based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Ma'aser Sheni 2:8).
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| 38. |
A sela is four dinarim.
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• 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Two, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Three, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Four • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Two
Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Two
Halacha 1
From the day of a girl's birth until she becomes twelve years old, she is called a k'tanah (minor) and/or a tinoket (baby). Even if several [pubic] hairs grow [on her body] during this time, they are [not significant according to Jewish law and are] considered to be merely hairs growing from a mole. If, however, two hairs grow in the pubic area after she becomes twelve years old [her status changes, and] she is considered a na'arah (maiden).
Halacha 2
Growing two pubic hairs at this age is referred to as the lower sign [of physical maturity]. Once a girl manifests this sign [of physical maturity], she is referred to as a maiden for six months. From the last day of these six months and onward, she is referred to as a bogeret (mature woman). The difference between the stages of maidenhood and maturity is only six months.
Halacha 3
From the time a girl reaches the age of twelve years and one day1 until the age of twenty, if she does not grow two pubic hairs, she is still considered to be a child, even if she manifests the physical signs of barrenness.
If [during this period], she grows two pubic hairs, even if [this occurs] in her twentieth year, she is considered to be a maiden for six months. Only afterwards is she be considered to be a mature woman.
Halacha 4
Should a woman be less than thirty days below the age of twenty, not have grown two pubic hairs, and have manifested [all] the physical signs of barrenness,2 she is deemed an aylonit (a barren woman).
If she does not manifest all the sign of barrenness, she is still considered to be a child until she grows two pubic hairs or until she reaches the age of 35 years and one day.
Halacha 5
Should a woman reach this age without growing two pubic hairs, she is deemed barren even though she does not manifest physical signs of barrenness. A barren woman does not [go through the six-month] period of maidenhood. Instead, directly after having been considered a child, she is considered to be a mature woman.
Halacha 6
The following are the physical signs of barrenness: a) she lacks [protruding] breasts; b) she stiffens during sexual relations; c) her lower abdomen does not resemble a woman's, d) her voice is deep and cannot be differentiated from that of a man.
All three, a maiden, a mature woman and a barren woman, are referred to by the term gedolah [adult woman]. [Unlike children, they are held responsible for their conduct.]
Halacha 7
[In addition to growing pubic hairs,] a woman has signs of physical maturity that are manifest in her upper body. They are referred to as "upper signs." Among them are:
a) when the woman stretches her hand backward, a crease forms in the place of her breast; b) the color of the tip of the breast becomes darker; c) when a person places his hand on the end of the breast and it remains depressed slightly before rising; d) creases form at the end of the breast, and a nipple takes shape; my teachers taught that the formation of creases is sufficient; e) the breasts protrude; f) they become erect; g) the mound of Venus forms above the woman's genitals, below her stomach; h) the flesh of this mound becomes soft and not hard. These are eight signs.
Halacha 8
If one or even all of these signs of maturity appear in a woman before she becomes twelve years of age, no attention is paid to it. When she becomes twelve years old and one day, and she manifests the lower sign of physical maturity, no attention is paid to [the presence or lack of] these [upper] signs of physical maturity [and she is considered to be a maiden].
If she does not manifest the lower sign of physical maturity, but she does manifest one of these [upper] signs, there is doubt whether she should be considered a child or a maiden, and the more stringent perspective is followed [with regard to all halachic questions] concerning her. If she manifests all these [upper] signs, she is definitely considered to be an adult. For it is impossible for her to manifest all these signs [and yet not have had two pubic hairs grow]. We assume these hairs have grown, but they have dropped off.
Halacha 9
When a woman gives birth after reaching the age of twelve years, she is deemed an adult, even though she did not manifest either upper or lower signs of maturity. [Giving birth to] children is a sign of maturity.
Halacha 10
A male, from birth until the age of thirteen, is called a katan (minor) and/or atinok (baby). Even if several [pubic] hairs grow [on his body] during this time, they are [not significant according to Jewish law] and are considered to be merely hairs growing from a mole. If, however, two hairs grow in the pubic area after he attains the age of thirteen years and one day, [his status changes, and] he is considered a gadol (adult male) and/or an ish (man).
Halacha 11
Should a child reach this age without growing two pubic hairs, he is still considered a minor until he reaches the age of twenty years less thirty days, even though he manifests signs of impotency. Should he reach the age [of twenty years less thirty days] and not have grown either pubic hairs or hairs of the beard [the following rules apply]. If he manifests one of the physical signs of impotency, he is considered impotent (a saris), and he is considered to be an adult with regard to all matters.
If he does not manifest any of the signs of impotency, he is still considered to be a minor until he grows two pubic hairs or until he reaches the age of thirty five years and one day.
Halacha 12
If he reaches this age, he is considered impotent, although he did not manifest any of the signs of impotency. If he reached the age of twenty years less thirty days without growing two pubic hairs, but did grow two hairs on his beard, he is not considered to be impotent, even if he manifests one sign of impotency, until he either manifests all the signs of impotency or reaches the age of thirty five years and one day.
Halacha 13
These are the signs of impotency: a) One lacks a beard, b) his hair grows inadequately, c) his flesh is hairless, d) his urine does not produce vapor, e) his urine does not flow in an arc, f) his semen is off color, g) his urine does not ferment, h) when he washes in the winter, his flesh does not produce steam, and i) his voice is high pitched and cannot be differentiated from that of a woman.
Halacha 14
An impotent person of this type is referred to as a s'ris chamah [one who became impotent because of fever].3 When, however, the genitals of a male have been cut, severed or crushed, as the gentiles do, the person is called as'ris adam [one who became impotent as a result of human activity]. When such a person reaches the age of thirteen and one day, he is considered to be an adult, for he will never manifest signs of maturity.
Halacha 15
When a male reaches the age of thirteen and one day and does not grow any pubic hairs, but manifests the upper signs of physical maturity,4 doubt exists whether he is considered to be an adult or a minor. If, however, his pubic area was not inspected, but he manifests signs of physical maturity in his upper body, he is presumed to be an adult.
Halacha 16
Whenever the term "two pubic hairs" is mentioned with regard to a male or a female, the intent is that the hairs are long enough to be bent in half, with their point touching their base. If they grow to the extent that they can be cut by scissors, but are not [long enough] that they can be bent in half with their point touching their base, [there is doubt regarding the decision], and the more stringent ruling is always followed.
Therefore, when a boy's or girl's pubic hairs have grown to the point that they can be cut by scissors, the individual is considered to be an adult with regard to those matters concerning which the ruling would be more stringent if he or she were so classified. And with regard to those matters concerning which the ruling would be more stringent if he [or she] were classified as a minor, the individual is so classified because the pubic hairs are not long enough to be bent in half with their point touching their base.
Halacha 17
These two hairs must be located in the pubic area. The entire pubic area is appropriate for the signs to be located. There is no difference whether they are located in the upper area, the lower area or on the sexual organ itself.
The two hairs must be located in a single place, and there must be a follicle at their base. If both of them stem from the same follicle, it is acceptable. If two follicles are located next to each other without hairs growing from them, they are, nevertheless, considered a sign. We follow the presumption that a follicle will not exist without hair. [Surely,] there were hairs [that grew from the follicle], and they fell.
Halacha 18
As we have explained, when a girl grows two pubic hairs before she is twelve, or a boy grows two pubic hairs before he is thirteen, they are considered to be merely hairs growing from a mole. Even if these hairs remain in their place after the boy reaches the age of thirteen, or the girl reaches the age of twelve, they are not considered signs of physical maturity.
Halacha 19
When does the above apply? When the child was inspected [before attaining the age of majority], and the hairs were deemed to be hairs growing from a mole. If, however, no such inspection was made until they reached the age of majority, and afterwards an inspection was made and two hairs were discovered, they are considered acceptable signs of physical maturity. We do not say that perhaps the hairs grew before the child reached majority, and they are merely hairs growing from a mole.
Halacha 20
Whenever a girl is inspected for [signs of physical maturity] - whether during her twelfth year, after she became twelve or when she is older - the inspection is carried out by trustworthy, ethical women. Even when an inspection has been conducted by one woman, her word is accepted with regard to whether or not [the girl has manifested signs of physical maturity].5
Halacha 21
Whenever the term "years" is mentioned with regard to [the age of] a male or a female, endowment evaluations,6 or any other matter, the intent is not lunar years, nor solar years, but rather the years as reckoned by the Jewish court to [juxtapose the solar and lunar calendars], whether ordinary years or leap years, as established by the [Jewish] court, as explained in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh. This is the intent whenever the subject of years is mentioned with regard to religious matters.
Halacha 22
We do not rely on the testimony of women regarding a child's age, nor on that of relatives. Instead, the matter is determined by the testimony of two men who are fit to testify in court.
Halacha 23
When a father says, "My son is nine years and one day old," or "My daughter is three years and one day old,"7 his word is accepted with regard to the obligation of bringing a sacrifice [if sexual relations were carried out without knowledge of the sin involved], but not with regard to administering stripes [for rebellion] or other punishments.
If the father says, "My son is thirteen years and one day old," or "My daughter is twelve years and one day old," his word is accepted with regard to vows, endowment evaluations, property forsworn [and transferred to the priests],8 or the consecration of property, but not with regard to administering lashes or other punishments.
Halacha 24
A person who possesses both a male sexual organ and a female sexual organ is called an androgynous. There is doubt whether such a person should be classified as a male or as a female; there is no physical sign that can ever enable such a distinction to be made.
Halacha 25
A person who possesses neither a male sexual organ nor a female sexual organ, but instead, his genital area is a solid mass, is called a tumtum. There is also doubt with regard [to this person's status]. If an operation is carried out and a male [organ is revealed], he is definitely considered to be a male. If a female [organ is revealed], she is definitely considered to be a female.
When a tumtum or an androgynous reaches the age of twelve years and one day, they are assumed to be adults.9 Whenever these terms are mentioned, the intent is individuals of this age.
Halacha 26
Whenever the terms cheresh and chereshet are used, they refer to a male or female deaf mute, respectively. If, however, a person can speak but cannot hear, or can hear but cannot speak, he is considered to be an ordinary person.10 A male or a female who is intellectually competent, being neither a deaf mute nor emotionally disturbed, is referred to as a pike'ach or a pikachat, respectively.
Halacha 27
We have thus defined twenty terms in these two chapters: kiddushin, ervah, sh'niyah, issurei lavin, issurei aseh, k'tanah, na'arah, bogeret, aylonit, gedolah, lower sign of maturity, upper sign of maturity, katan, s'ris chamah, s'ris adam, gadol, androgynous, tumtum, chershim, pik'chim. Keep these terms in mind at all times; do not forget their meaning, so that their intent will not have to be explained whenever they are mentioned.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The intent in this halachah, and similarly, whenever the term "...years old and one day" is mentioned, is not that an additional day must pass after the woman's twelfth birthday. Rather, the intent is that she has completed twelve complete years of life and begun the following day.
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| 2. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer) differs with the Rambam on two points: a) the girl need only be 19 and one month, not 19 and eleven months (Chapter 155) and b) that she need manifest only one, but not all signs of barrenness (Chapter 44, 172).
With regard to the first issue, the Shulchan Aruch appears to favor the Tur's view, although that of the Rambam is also mentioned. With regard to the second issue, the Shulchan Aruch appears to follow the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Tur.
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| 3. |
Our translation follows the interpretation of the Shulchan Aruch. Yevamot 80a interprets this as meaning, "one who never saw the light of the sun while fit."
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| 4. |
I.e., he grows hairs of the beard and in his underarms; his voice changes; his hair grows adequately; and his flesh is not silky (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
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| 5. |
Although the testimony of women is not generally accepted in court, an exception is made in this instance because of modesty. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:15) quotes the Rambam's wording. Nevertheless, the Beit Shmuel 155:23 states that a woman's testimony can be accepted only with regard to making a more stringent ruling, but not a more lenient one.
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| 6. |
See Leviticus, Chapter 27.
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| 7. |
If a male is less than nine years old, or a female is less than three years old, they are not fit to engage in sexual relations. Even if they do, in fact, engage in relations, these are of no halachic significance. Hence, if a boy above the age of nine engages in sexual relations with a married woman, the woman is liable. Similarly, if a man engaged in relations with a three-year old girl who was married, the man is liable.
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| 8. |
See Leviticus, Chapter 27; Hilchot Arachin 6:1.
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| 9. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating that it is necessary for these individuals to manifest physical signs of maturity before they are classified as adults. The Maggid Mishnehstates that it appears that the Rambam is saying that there is no need for these individuals to manifest such signs. Needless to say, at the age of twelve these individuals are not considered to be adults with regard to the mitzvot incumbent upon males.
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| 10. |
Because a deaf mute's ability to communicate and respond is so limited, such a person is considered to be mentally incompetent and is not held responsible for his conduct, nor is he able to enter into a marriage contract, according to Scriptural law.
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Ishut - Chapter Three
Halacha 1
How is the bond of kiddushin established with a woman? If the man [desires to establish] the kiddushin by [the transfer of] money, [he must give] a p'rutah, either in coin or its worth.
[Before giving it], he tells her, "You are consecrated unto me...," "You are betrothed to me...," or "You become my wife through this." He must give her [the money or the item] in the presence of witnesses.
It is the man who makes the statement that implies that he acquires the woman as his wife, and it is he who gives her the money.
Halacha 2
If she gave him [money] and told him: "Behold, I am consecrated to you," "Behold, I am betrothed to you," "I am your wife," or [she used] any other expression that implied acquisition, the marriage bond is not established. Similarly, if she gave [him money] and he made the statement, the marriage bond is not established.1 If he gave [her money] and she made the statement [the matter is unresolved,]2 and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.3
Halacha 3
If the man establishes the marriage bond with [the transfer of] a legal document, [the following rules apply:] He should write on paper, on a shard, on a leaf or on any other article4 he desires: "You are consecrated unto me...," "You are betrothed to me...," or any similar expression. He must then give her the document in the presence of witnesses.5
Halacha 4
The document must be written for the sake of the woman who is being married, as must a bill of divorce,6 and it must be written with her consent.7 If it was not written for her sake, or if it was written for her sake, but was written without her consent, the marriage bond is not established. [This applies] even when he gives her [the document] with her consent in the presence of witnesses.
Halacha 5
If the man establishes the marriage bond through sexual relations, he should tell the woman, "You are consecrated unto me...," "You are betrothed to me...," or "You become my wife through these relations," or choose a similar statement. He must enter into privacy with her in the presence of witnesses and engage in relations.8
When a person establishes a marriage bond through sexual relations, one may assume that his intent is on the conclusion of the relations;9 when the relations are concluded, the marriage bond is established. Regardless of whether the couple engage in vaginal or anal intercourse, the marriage bond is established.
Halacha 6
The statements that the man makes when he consecrates [his wife] must imply that he acquires her as a wife, and not that he gives himself to her. What is implied?
Should he tell her, or write in the document he gives her: "I am your husband," "I am your betrothed," "I am your man," or the like, the marriage bond is not established at all. If he tells her or writes to her: "Behold, you are my wife," "Behold, you are my betrothed," "Behold, you are acquired by me," "Behold, you are mine," "Behold, you are my possession," "Behold, you are my designated one,"10 "Behold, you are within my property," "Behold, you are bound to me," or the like, the marriage bond is established.
Halacha 7
Should he tell her, or write to her: "You are set aside for me," "You are earmarked for me," "You are my helper," "You are my counterpart," "You are my rib," "You are closed off for me," "You are below me," "You are my captive," "You have been taken by me," [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
The above applies only when the man was [previously] speaking to the woman about establishing a marriage bond. If he was not speaking to the woman about such a matter, these words are of no consequence.
Halacha 8
A man may consecrate a woman by making statements in any language that she understands, provided that, in that language, his statements mean that he is acquiring her, as explained.
If a man was speaking to a woman about consecrating her and she consented, and he immediately gave her [something] in her hand to consecrate her or engaged in sexual relations [with that intent], without [making a statement] clarifying [his purpose], it is sufficient. Since they were speaking about this matter, it is not necessary for him to be explicit.
Similarly, a man need not tell witnesses who observe kiddushin or divorce, "You are my witnesses."11 As long as he has divorced or consecrated a woman in their presence, she is consecrated or divorced.
Halacha 9
When a man tells a woman, "Become consecrated to my half," she is consecrated. To what can this be compared? To his saying, "May you become my wife, and also another woman." And so, she has only half a man.
If, however, he said: "Half of you is consecrated to me," she is not consecrated. For a woman cannot be consecrated to two men. Similarly, if he says, "Behold, you are consecrated to me and to him," the woman is not consecrated.
Halacha 10
If he told her: "Behold, half of you is consecrated to me with a p'rutah, and half of you [is consecrated to me with another] p'rutah," or if he told her: "Behold, half of you is consecrated to me with half a p'rutah, and your other half [is consecrated to me with another] half a p'rutah," she is consecrated.12
If he told her: "Behold, half of you is consecrated to me with a p'rutah today, and half of you [is consecrated to me with another] p'rutah tomorrow," or if he told her: "Your two halves are consecrated to me with a p'rutah,"13 "Your two daughters are consecrated to my two sons with this p'rutah," "Your daughter is consecrated to me, and your cow is sold to me with this p'rutah," or "Your daughter... and your land... with a p'rutah" - in all of these circumstances, [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
Halacha 11
A father may consecrate his daughter without her knowledge while she is a minor. Even when she is a na'arah,14 he still possesses this right, as [implied by Deuteronomy 22:16]: "I gave my daughter to this man."
[The money received as] kiddushin belongs to her father. Similarly, he has the right to [any ownerless property] she finds, [the wages she receives for] her labor, and [the money she receives as stipulated in] her ketubah if she is divorced or widowed before the marriage bond is consummated. He is entitled to all these until she becomes a bogeret.
Therefore, a father is entitled to receive kiddushin on behalf of his daughter from the day she was born until she becomes a bogeret. Even if she is a deaf mute or intellectually incompetent, if her father consecrates her [to another man], she is his wife.
If a girl is older than three years and one day, she can be consecrated through sexual relations with her father's consent. Should she be below this age, if her father has her consecrated through sexual relations, the marriage bond is not established.15
Halacha 12
After a daughter becomes a bogeret, her father has no rights over her; she is like all other women, and she can be consecrated only with her own consent.
Similarly, if her father had her married, the marriage bond was consummated [nisu'in],16 and then she was widowed or divorced, [even] in her father's lifetime, she is considered to be independent, despite the fact that she is still a minor. Once a woman enters nisu'in, her father no longer has any authority over her.
Halacha 13
When a girl receives kiddushin without her father's knowledge before she reaches the age of majority, the marriage bond is not established.17 [This applies] even when the father consents subsequently.18 Moreover, if she is widowed or divorced after these kiddushin, she is not forbidden [to marry] a priest.19
Both she and her father can prevent [the marriage bonds from taking effect].20Regardless of whether she was consecrated in the presence of her father or not, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] there is doubt whether or not the girl is abogeret: Whether her father consecrated her without her consent, or she consecrated herself without her father's consent, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. Therefore, [to marry another man,] she must receive a get given because of the doubt.
A man may appoint an agent to consecrate a wife for him. [This applies] if he specifies a particular woman, or gives the agent the authority to consecrate any woman. Similarly, a woman past the age of majority21 may appoint an agent to receive kiddushin for her. [This applies] if she specifies [that they be given by] a particular man, or gives the agent the authority to receive them from any man. Similarly, a father may appoint an agent to accept thekiddushin of his daughter as long as she is under his authority.
A man may tell his daughter who is below the age of majority, "Go out and receive your kiddushin."22
Halacha 15
When an agent is appointed to receive kiddushin, he must be appointed in the presence of two witnesses.23 When, by contrast, a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, there is no need for the appointment to be made in the presence of witnesses. For the only purpose witnesses would serve with regard to the agency of the man is to make known the truth of the matter.24Therefore, if the agent and the principal acknowledge the appointment, there is no need for witnesses, [as in parallel cases, such as] an agent appointed to bring a get25 or an agent appointed to separate terumah.26
In all matters, a principal's agent is regarded as the principal himself, and there is no need to appoint witnesses.
Halacha 16
An agent may serve as a witness. Therefore, if a person appointed two men as agents to consecrate a woman, and they did so, they serve both as agents and as witnesses. Hence, there is no need for them to consecrate her in the presence of two other witnesses.27
Halacha 17
All are fit to serve as agents [in this capacity] except a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual and a minor - for they are not responsible - and a gentile, because he is not a member of the covenant. [The latter exclusion is based on Numbers 18:28, which] states: "And so shall you set aside, and you...." [This is interpreted as] including an agent. [Our Sages commented:] Just as you are members of the covenant, your agents must be members of the covenant, thus excluding a gentile.
A [Canaanite] servant, although he is acceptable as an agent with regard to financial matters, is not acceptable as an agent with regard to kiddushin andgittin, because the laws of marriage and divorce do not apply to him.
Halacha 18
An agent appointed by a man to consecrate a woman should tell her: "Behold, you are consecrated to so and so by virtue of this money" or "...by virtue of this legal document."
If an agent of the woman receives the kiddushin, the [man consecrating her] should tell [the agent]: "So and so who appointed you is consecrated to me," and the agent should reply, "I have consecrated her to you," "I have betrothed her to you," "I have given her to you as a wife," or the like.
Similarly, when a man consecrates a girl by [giving kiddushin to] her father, he should tell him, "Behold, your daughter so and so is consecrated to me," and the father should reply: "I have consecrated her to you." If the father or the agent says "yes," or even if he remains silent, it is sufficient. If they were discussing the matter, and the man gave the kiddushin to the father or to the agent without making any statement, it is sufficient, and the kiddushin are effective.
If the kiddushin are established by virtue of [the transfer of] a legal document, he must have the document written with the consent of the father or of the agent. In all matters pertaining to kiddushin, the same laws that apply to the man and the woman, apply when [the kiddushin are established by] the [man's] agent and [the woman's] agent or [her] father.
Halacha 19
It is a mitzvah for a man to consecrate his wife by himself, rather than to charge an agent [with this matter]. Similarly, it is a mitzvah for a woman to [receive] kiddushin herself rather than to charge an agent with receiving them for her.
Although a father has the option of consecrating his daughter to anyone he desires while she is a minor or while she is a maiden, it is not proper for him to act in this manner. Instead, our Sages enjoined that a person should not consecrate his daughter while she is a minor until she matures and says, "I would like [to marry] so and so."
Similarly, it is not proper for a man to consecrate a girl below the age of majority. Nor should one consecrate a woman until one sees her and deems her fitting, lest she not find favor in his eyes, and he divorce her, or sleep with her while hating her.
Halacha 20
Kiddushin established by virtue of sexual relations are effective according to Scriptural law. Similarly, kiddushin established by virtue [of the transfer] of a legal document are effective according to Scriptural law. Just as [the transfer of a legal document] concludes a divorce, as [Deuteronomy 24;1] states: "And he shall write her a scroll of divorce," so too, [the transfer of a legal document] concludes [the establishment of the marriage bond].
[The effectiveness of the transfer of] money stems from Scriptural law,28 but its interpretation is based on Rabbinic law. [Deuteronomy, ibid.,] states "When a man takes a wife," and our Sages29 explained: This [process of] acquisition involves [the transfer of] money, as implied by [Genesis 23:13]: "I have given the money for the field; take it from me."
Halacha 21
Although this is the essence of the principle, it has already become universal Jewish custom to consecrate [a marriage bond] through [the transfer of] money or objects that are worth money. If one desires to consecrate [a woman] by [giving her] a legal document, one may, but at the outset one should not consecrate [a woman] through sexual relations.
If a man consecrates [a woman] through sexual relations, he is given stripes for rebelliousness,30 so that the Jewish people will not extend beyond the limits of modesty in this manner. Nevertheless, the kiddushin are binding.
Halacha 22
Similarly, a man who consecrates a woman without establishing an engagement previously, or a man who consecrates a woman in the marketplace, is given stripes for rebelliousness, although his kiddushin are binding. [This was instituted] lest such a practice accustom people to licentious conduct and invite a comparison to a harlot, as existed before the giving of the Torah.
Halacha 23
Whenever a man consecrates a woman,31 whether by himself or via an agent, either he32 or his agent should recite a blessing before the consecration, as one recites a blessing before performing any of the mitzvot. [After reciting the blessing,] he should consecrate [the woman].
If he consecrates a woman without reciting a blessing, he should not recite the blessing afterwards. It would be a blessing in vain, for the activity has already been performed.33
Halacha 24
Which blessing is recited?
Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who has sanctified us with His mitzvot and separated34 us from illicit relationships, who has forbidden the arusot to us, and permitted to us those who are married35 by [the rites of] chuppah and kiddushin. Blessed are You, God, who sanctifies Israel.
This is the blessing of erusin. The people have established the custom of reciting this blessing over wine or beer. If there is wine available, one should recite the blessing over the wine, recite the blessing of consecration afterwards, and then consecrate the woman.36 If there is no wine or beer available, one should recite [the blessing of consecration] by itself.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
For it is the man's actions that must precipitate the inception of the marriage bond, as implied byDeuteronomy 24:1: "When a man takes a wife." Note, however, Chapter 5, Halachah 22, which mentions an exception to this principle.
|
| 2. |
Mishneh LaMelech offers two explanations of the doubt involved: a) We are unsure of his intent. Since he did not specify that he was giving the woman the money for the sake of kiddushin, it is possible that he gave her the money for another reason. This interpretation appears to be supported by the rulings of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:8) that in such a circumstance, the marriage bond is established if previously the man and the woman were speaking about getting married, or if the man confirmed the woman's statements. Halachah 8 appears to support this explanation.
b) The second view is that the doubt is one of principle: The Sages did not define whether the obligation that a man precipitate the marriage bond requires merely his giving money, or also making the statement. According to this conception, the doubt would remain even in the two situations mentioned by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch.
|
| 3. |
I.e., the woman cannot marry another man until she receives a bill of divorce. Nevertheless, if another man engages in relations with her, he is not executed for adultery.
|
| 4. |
The man may not, however, write the document on a leaf attached to a tree, or any other item that must be severed, for this is unacceptable when writing a bill of divorce. (See the following halachah and notes.)
|
| 5. |
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if it is necessary for the man to make a verbal statement of intent as well. (See Beit Shmuel 32:3.) The Or Sameach points to Halachah 18 as proof that a statement is required, but Kin'at Eliyahu notes that Halachah 7 appears to indicate that a verbal statement is unnecessary.
|
| 6. |
The acceptability of a legal document for the establishment of kiddushin from the association between marriage and divorce created by Deuteronomy 24:2: "When she leaves his household, she may go and become [married] to another man." Kiddushin 5a states that this verse indicates that just as she "leaves" through a bill of divorce, she can "become" through a bill of kiddushin. Hence, all the particulars that apply to a get (a bill of divorce) apply to a bill of kiddushin.
|
| 7. |
This requirement does not apply with regard to a bill of divorce and is a point of debate inKiddushin 9b. The opinion the Rambam cites maintains that since the woman is being acquired through this document, she must consent to its being written. Because of the debate in the Talmud, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 32:1) differs with the Rambam and maintains that the matter is unresolved, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt, and [the stringencies required had] the marriage bond been established [must be followed].
|
| 8. |
Although the man must enter into privacy with the woman in the presence of witnesses, and must make the statement of intent in the presence of witnesses, the relations themselves should be private, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 16, and Hilchot Gerushin 10:18. It must be noted that this represents a change in the Rambam's thinking. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin1:1), he originally stated that the relations must also be observed by witnesses for the marriage bond to be established. Nevertheless, in the later texts of the Commentary on the Mishnah the Rambam amended the text according to the above conception.
|
| 9. |
The term "the conclusion of sexual relations" (g'mar bi'ah) in Hebrew is somewhat of a misnomer. It refers not to the man's withdrawal from the woman, nor to ejaculation, but to a far earlier stage: the insertion of the penis in its entirety into the vagina (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 1:10).
|
| 10. |
Leviticus 19:20 associates this term with establishing relations with a maid-servant, as explained in Chapter 4, Halachah 17. Therefore, there is doubt among the Rabbis if it can be used in establishing the marriage bond with an ordinary woman. Thus, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer27:3) states that if this expression is used the matter is unresolved, and the status of thekiddushin is in doubt.
|
| 11. |
With regard to the acknowledgement of a debt, such a statement is necessary. (See Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 6:6-8, 7:1-2.)
|
| 12. |
The Ra'avad and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:7) differ and maintain that the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. It is only with regard to stringencies that the kiddushin are considered to be valid.
|
| 13. |
This clause serves as the basis for the Ra'avad's objection to the Rambam's decisions above.
|
| 14. |
At which time, the girl has the right to accept kiddushin from a man herself.
|
| 15. |
For until the age of three, a woman is not considered to be fit for sexual relations.
|
| 16. |
This refers to the second stage of the marriage relationship, as explained in Chapter 11 onward.
|
| 17. |
This and the other laws in this halachah apply when a girl is either a k'tanah or a na'arah (has reached the age of twelve), but not a bogeret (twelve and a half).
|
| 18. |
Since the kiddushin were not effective at the time they were given, the father's subsequent consent is of no significance. This point is, however, disputed by some of the later authorities. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 37:11.)
|
| 19. |
No priest may marry a divorcee, nor may a High Priest marry a widow. Nevertheless, because these kiddushin are not effective, these prohibitions do not apply.
|
| 20. |
According to the Maharik (Responsum 30[32]), this applies when the kiddushin were given in her father's presence, but he remained silent. In both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch(ibid.), Rav Yosef Karo differs and explains that according to the Rambam, the father must consent at the time of (or before) the kiddushin. If he desires to prevent the kiddushin at that time, he may. If he consents, the girl getting married can still prevent the kiddushin from taking place. For since her father charged her with this matter, even if he consented to the match it is dependent on her. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Terumot 8:16.)
|
| 21. |
A woman below the age of majority does not have the authority to appoint an agent.
|
| 22. |
Among the explanations that are given for why this is acceptable: a) If the father had said, "Give an animal food, and my daughter will be consecrated to you," the kiddushin would be binding. When he tells the daughter to receive kiddushin, it is as if he makes a statement that it is acceptable to him that the man who consecrates her gives her the money (Ra'avad, Ramban).
b) Although a minor may not normally serve as an agent, this instance is an exception. Since thekiddushin are being given for her benefit, the girl is entitled to act in this capacity (Rabbenu Asher). The Beit Shmuel 37:7 states that the Rambam subscribes to this view.
|
| 23. |
The rationale is that since the marriage bonds are established through the acceptance of thekiddushin, witnesses must be present to acknowledge the agent's appointment, for "no matters involving forbidden sexual relations [are established if] fewer than two witnesses are present (Yevamot 88a)."
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 35:3) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if all concerned acknowledge the appointment of the agent, the kiddushin are effective. He therefore rules that in such a situation, the woman needs to receive a get before she can marry another man.
|
| 24. |
The Rambam's statements are based on the comparison to an agent appointed to bring a woman a get. The Ra'avad objects to the comparison, because a get is a formal legal document, and possession of it serves to verify the person's agency. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.
|
| 25. |
Hilchot Gittin 6:4. This ruling itself is not accepted by all authorities, as noted in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:13).
|
| 26. |
Hilchot Terumah 4:1.
|
| 27. |
As clarified by the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 35:2), this ruling applies only when: a) the kiddushin are established by the transfer of a legal document worth less than a p'rutah, or b) the kiddushin are established by the transfer of money, and the woman admits receiving the money.
|
| 28. |
Our translation follows the Rambam's later emendations to the Mishneh Torah. The earlier version of the text states: "The effectiveness of [the transfer of] money stems from Rabbinic law." See the discussion of this concept in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 2.
|
| 29. |
Kiddushin 4b.
|
| 30. |
The punishment given for transgressing a Rabbinic decree.
|
| 31. |
Today, it is customary for the consecration to be made under the wedding canopy (chuppah), and the blessing is recited at this time.
|
| 32. |
The Rambam's wording implies that the blessing should be recited by the groom himself. At present, the current custom in both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities is to have the Rabbi conducting the marriage ceremony recite the blessing, lest a groom who does not know how to recite the blessing be embarrassed by his lack of knowledge. (See Hagahot Maimoniot.)
|
| 33. |
In Darchei Moshe (Even HaEzer 34), the Ramah states that one may recite the blessing afterwards as well. Nevertheless, in his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch, he does not make such a statement. The current custom in both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities is to recite the blessing before the kiddushin.
|
| 34. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 34:1) states that the blessing should read: "and commanded us concerning," rather than "and separated us from." This is the common practice today.
|
| 35. |
The Beit Shmuel 34:3 and others state that the blessing should read "those who are married to us." This is the custom in many communities.
|
| 36. |
At present, the custom is for the officiating Rabbi to recite the blessing over the wine and then the blessing of consecration. He then has the groom and bride drink from the wine, and afterwards the groom consecrates the bride.
|
Ishut - Chapter Four
Halacha 1
A woman may be consecrated only voluntarily. If one forces a woman to be consecrated, she is not consecrated. When a man, by contrast, is forced to consecrate [a woman], she is consecrated.1
A man may consecrate many women at one time, provided that he does so by [transferring] money, and there is enough money to give each one a p'rutah. One of these [women] or another person may accept the money on behalf of them all, [provided] they consent.
Halacha 2
When a person [desires to] consecrate a woman, and with her consent gives the kiddushin to another woman, and tells the latter "And you as well," or uses another similar expression, they are both consecrated.2
When, however, the man places [the kiddushin] in the hand [of the second woman] and says, "And you," there is doubt whether or not the kiddushin are valid. Perhaps his intent was only to clarify her feelings. It was as if he asked her, "What would you say about this?" Therefore, she accepted the kiddushin, for she thought he was still asking her about her intent. For this reason, [the question is unresolved,] and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
Halacha 3
If he told her, "Become consecrated to me with this dinar," and she took it and threw it in front of him or to the sea, into a fire or into anything that will cause it to be destroyed, she is not consecrated.3
Halacha 4
[In the above instance, if] the woman told the man, "Place [the kiddushin] on [this] rock," she is not consecrated. If the rock belonged to her, she is consecrated. If the rock belonged to both of them, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
If he told her, "Be consecrated to me with this loaf of bread," and she told him, "Give it to a poor person," she is not consecrated. [This applies] even if she supports the poor person in question.
[If she told him,] "Give it to a dog," she is not consecrated.6 If the dog belonged to her, she is consecrated. If [the dog] was chasing after her and she told him, "Give it to this dog," [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
Halacha 5
[The following laws apply when a man] was selling produce, utensils or the like, and a woman came and asked him: "Give me some of these." If he asked her, "If I give them to you, will you be consecrated to me?" and she said, "Yes," she is consecrated when he gives [the items] to her. If, however, she replied to him: "[Just] give them to me," "Heave them over," or another reply that means "Don't fool around with me regarding such matters, just give me [what I asked for]," she is not consecrated although he gave her [what she asked for].
A similar [decision is rendered] if [a man] was drinking wine and [a woman] asked him, "Give me a cup," and he asks her, "If I do, will you be consecrated to me with it?" If she replies, "[Just] let me drink," "Give me," "Serve me drink," or "Dish it out," she is not consecrated. Her words imply: "Just give me a drink, and don't fool around with me regarding such matters."
Halacha 6
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of a single witness, hiskiddushin] are of no consequence. [This applies] even when both [the man and the woman] acknowledge [that the kiddushin were given].7 Surely this applies when [a man] consecrates [a woman] without any witnesses at all [observing the act].
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Scriptural law, she is not consecrated. [When he consecrates her in the presence of] individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law,8 or in the presence of witnesses regarding whom there is doubt whether or not they are acceptable according to Scriptural law, [the following rules apply:] If he desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in the presence of acceptable witnesses. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him [to enable her to marry others], because of the doubt.9 [This ruling applies] even when the woman denies [the matter], contradicting the witnesses and saying that she was never consecrated.
This ruling applies with regard to all situations in which the status of thekiddushin is in doubt. If [the man] desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in a manner that is unequivocally acceptable. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him, because of the doubt.
Halacha 7
When a minor consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are of no consequence. When, by contrast, a male past the age of majority consecrates a girl below the age of majority who is an orphan,10 or who has left her father's authority,11[different rules apply]: If she is below the age of six, even if she is one who shows deep understanding of secret matters,12 and can differentiate and discern, she is not married, and there is no need for mi'un.13
If she is more than ten years old, even when she is very foolish, since she willingly accepted the kiddushin, she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law] and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]. If she is between the ages of six and ten, [the rabbis] must evaluate her ability to discern. If she is able to differentiate and discern with regard to matters of marriage and kiddushin, [the marriage is binding according to Rabbinic law] and mi'un is necessary. If she lacks [this degree of discernment], she is not consecrated [at all], and need not perform mi'un [to nullify the marriage].
Halacha 8
What is meant by the statement that she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law], and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]? If she was consecrated but no longer desires to remain with her husband, she must perform mi'un in the presence of two witnesses. She should say: "I no longer desire him." Afterwards, she leaves [the relationship] without a divorce, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin.14
Why does she leave [the relationship] without a divorce? Because the consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushin are finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term.15 There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mi'un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce.
Halacha 9
When a male deaf mute marries a mentally competent woman, or a female deaf mute marries a mentally competent man, the marriage bond is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. Therefore, if a mentally competent man consecrates the wife of a deaf mute man who is herself mentally competent, she is considered to be consecrated to the mentally competent man. He must give her a get, and she is permitted to remain married to her deaf mute husband.16
When, by contrast, a mentally incompetent man consecrates a mentally competent woman, or a mentally competent man consecrates a mentally incompetent woman, the marriage bond is not at all binding - neither according to Scriptural law nor according to Rabbinic law.17
Halacha 10
When a sexually impotent male - whether a s'ris chamah or a s'ris adam - consecrates [a woman], and similarly, when [a man] consecrates an aylonit, the kiddushin are absolutely binding.18
Halacha 11
When a tumtum or an androgynous consecrates a woman, or when either of these individuals has been consecrated by a man, there is doubt whether these kiddushin are binding, and because of the doubt, a get is required.19
Halacha 12
When a person consecrates one of the women forbidden as arayot, his act is of no consequence. For kiddushin are not binding with regard to these forbidden relationships, with the exception of [kiddushin given] a niddah. When a man consecrates a niddah, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. It is, nevertheless, improper to do so.20
Halacha 13
When a married woman accepts kiddushin from another man in the presence of her husband, she is considered to be consecrated to the second man. For a woman's word is accepted when she tells her husband to his face that he had divorced her. We assume it axiomatically that a woman would not act so brazenly in her husband's presence [unless it were true].21
If, however, the other person consecrates her outside her husband's presence, these kiddushin are not considered to be binding unless she brings proof that she was divorced before she was consecrated. As long as she is outside her husband's presence, it is possible that she will act brazenly.
Halacha 14
When a man consecrates one of the shniyot or a woman forbidden because of a negative commandment [not associated with karet] or because of a positive commandment, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. [The same ruling applies when] a yavam consecrates a woman who was married to the same man as his yevamah.22
There is one exception to the above principle: when a person other than [theyavam] consecrates a yevamah, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. For our Sages were unsure whether the kiddushinof a yevamah are valid, like those of others in which the relationship is forbidden by merely a negative commandment, or whether the kiddushin are of no consequence, as in the case of an incestuous relationship.
In all the situations mentioned above, although the man who gave thekiddushin is forbidden to consummate the marriage, he must terminate it by giving a get.
Halacha 15
[When] a man consecrates a gentile woman or a [Canaanite] maidservant, thekiddushin are of no consequence; the woman's status is the same after receiving the kiddushin as beforehand. Similarly, when a gentile or a [Canaanite] servant consecrates a Jewish woman, the kiddushin are of no consequence.
When an apostate Jew consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are absolutely valid, despite the fact that he willingly worships a false deity. The woman must receive a get from him.23
Halacha 16
When a man consecrates a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman,24 she is not completely consecrated until she becomes [totally] free. Once she becomes free, the kiddushin are [automatically] completed, like thekiddushin of a minor who comes of age. There is no need for her to be consecrated again.
If another man consecrates such a woman after she was granted her freedom [before the person who consecrated her originally consummates their marriage], there is doubt regarding the matter,25 and the status of both theirkiddushin is in doubt.
Halacha 17
What then is a shifchah charufah [a betrothed maidservant] as described by the Torah [Leviticus 19:20]? A woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman, who was consecrated by a Hebrew servant.
When a male who is half a servant and half a free man consecrates a woman, [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
Halacha 18
When a drunk gives [a woman] kiddushin, they are valid, even if he is very drunk. If he reaches a state of drunkenness comparable to that of Lot,26 thekiddushin are of no consequence. This matter requires ample deliberation.
Halacha 19
When a man gives money worth less than a p'rutah as kiddushin, thekiddushin are not valid. When a man consecrates a woman with food or with a utensil worth less than a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt; perhaps the kiddushin are worth a p'rutah in another place.
From this one can deduce that whenever a person consecrates a woman with an article worth money, if it is worth a p'rutah in that country the kiddushin are definitely binding. If it is not worth a p'rutah [there], the status of the kiddushinis in doubt [as above].27
It appears to me that if [a man] consecrated [a woman] with cooked food, a vegetable that will not be preserved or the like, and the item is not worth ap'rutah in that place, the kiddushin are not binding at all. For by the time this item reaches another place, it will spoil and be worthless. This is a reasonable inference; one may rely on it.
Halacha 20
When [a man] consecrates a woman with less than a p'rutah's worth, or he consecrates two women with a p'rutah, the women are not consecrated. [This applies] even when he sends wedding presents [worth more than a p'rutah] afterwards. Similarly, when a minor consecrates a woman, the kiddushin are not valid, despite the fact that he sent marriage presents after he had attained majority. [This ruling was delivered because the presents] were sent because of the original kiddushin, which were invalid [and therefore are not considered to be significant in their own right].
Halacha 21
When [a man] consecrates a woman by [giving her] money or a legal document, he does not have to place the kiddushin in her hand. Instead, if she consents that he throw them to her and he does so, she is consecrated, whether he throws them into her hand, her bosom, her courtyard or her field.28
If she is standing in a domain belonging to her [prospective] husband, he must place them in her hand or in her bosom. If she is standing in a domain that belongs to both of them, and he threw kiddushin to her with her consent, but they did not reach her hand or her bosom, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. Even when she tells him, "Put the kiddushin down in this place," if the place belongs to both of them the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.29
Halacha 22
[The following rules apply when the two] are standing in the public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them, and he throws kiddushin to her: If they are closer to him, she is not consecrated. If they are closer to her, she is consecrated. If they are halfway between the two of them, or if there is doubt whether they were closer to him or to her,30 and they were lost before they reached her hand, there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.
What is meant by "closer to him," or "closer to her"? A situation in which he can guard [the kiddushin] and she cannot is considered as "closer to him." One in which she can guard them and he cannot is considered to be "closer to her."31 One in which they can both guard them or neither can guard them is considered to be "halfway between the two of them."
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Bava Batra 48b states that since it was possible for a man to divorce his wife without her consent (in Talmudic times), there was no need for the Sages to abrogate the man's kiddushin. Even if he was forced into consecrating the woman, he could end their relationship at will. With regard to the woman, by contrast, since she cannot initiate a divorce, our Sages abrogated the marriage bond when she was compelled to establish it against her will.
|
| 2. |
The first woman is consecrated based on the principle stated in the following halachah, that a woman may tell a person to give the kiddushin to an agent acting on her behalf. The second woman is consecrated, because she accepted the kiddushin in silence, which is interpreted as acquiescence.
|
| 3. |
The fact that she discarded the kiddushin is a clear indication of her rejection of his proposal.
|
| 4. |
Telling the person to give the kiddushin to someone else also indicates that she does not desire them, nor the consequences of accepting them (Tosafot, Kiddushin 8b).
|
| 5. |
I.e., that the recipient should act as her agent.
|
| 6. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 30:11) quotes the opinion of the Tur, who maintains that if at the outset the woman says, "Put money down in this place and I will be consecrated to you," or "Give food to this dog and I will be consecrated to you," the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. Since the man spent money because of her wishes, one might presume that this can be compared to the law stated in the previous halachah. Nevertheless, since the kiddushin were not given to a person, it is possible that the comparison is not in place, and the kiddushin are not definitely binding. (See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21.)
|
| 7. |
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 42:2) quotes an opinion that requires stringency in such an instance, but states that leniency should be granted if following the stringent view will cause a woman great difficulty in getting married.
Although the need for witnesses with regard to marriage and divorce is derived from an analogy (gezerah shavah) to claims of monetary law, a difference exists between the two. With regard to a financial claim, no witnesses are necessary if both litigants agree regarding a matter.
As stated in this halachah, this concept does not apply with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce. Two rationales are given for this matter:
a) When the man and woman agree with regard to the establishment of a marriage bond, they are limiting the privileges of others, for they are unable to consecrate the woman. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, the rights of others are not restricted (Rashba).
b) There is a fundamental difference between the function of witnesses in cases involving financial matters and their function with regard to wedding and divorce. With regard to financial matters, the function of witnesses is to clarify the truth (eidei berur). With regard to marriage and divorce, by contrast, the witnesses' function is to notarize the event (eidei kiyyum). For a marriage bond to be established - or broken - even when the husband and wife agree that the event took place, witnesses must observe the proceedings (Tumim 90:14, Tzaphnat Paneach, Kallei HaTorah).
|
| 8. |
This ruling sheds light on a theme of larger scope: the interrelation between Rabbinic law and Scriptural law. For the fact that a woman needs a get to marry another person appears to indicate that according to Scriptural law, the kiddushin are effective.
|
| 9. |
Many of the manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state that the obligation to give a get is of Rabbinic origin. This view would appear to be supported by the Rambam's ruling in Chapter 5, Halachah 1.
|
| 10. |
If she is not an orphan and has never been married, the right to consecrate her belongs to her father, not to her.
|
| 11. |
I.e., she was married, the marriage was consummated, and then she was either divorced or widowed. In this and the above instance, the girl does not have sufficient authority to create a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, a bond that is binding according to Rabbinic law may be established, as the halachah continues to explain.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 155:2) quotes opinions that maintain that the above applies only when the girl's marriage was arranged by her brother or her mother. If she arranged the marriage herself, it is not binding, even according to Rabbinic law. The Ra'avad mentions a third opinion, which states that for a girl between the ages of six and ten, the marriage must be arranged by her family to be binding. After the age of ten, it is binding even if she arranged it herself.
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| 12. |
Our translation is based on the commentary of Metzudot on Isaiah 3:3.
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| 13. |
The annulment of a marriage that a girl below the age of majority initiates, as explained in the following halachah.
When a girl is below the age of six, we assume that she does not have sufficient understanding of the nature of marriage to make a commitment that is binding in any way.
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| 14. |
Chapter 11, Halachah 8.
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| 15. |
As the Rambam states in Hilchot Gerushin 11:6, if the girl reaches majority before she states that she desires to nullify the marriage bond, Rabbinic law requires her to receive a get before she marries another person. If she continues living with her husband and they engage in sexual relations after she attains majority, the marriage bond is binding according to Scriptural law.
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| 16. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, stating that the woman should not be allowed to remain married to her deaf mute husband. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that since the marriage of a deaf mute is a Rabbinic institution, our Sages did not impose the same restrictions that would apply had the marriage been effective according to Scriptural law.
Others state that the Rambam's ruling applies only when the mentally competent man merely consecrated the deaf mute's wife. If he consummated the marriage (nisu'in), the deaf mute is forbidden to continue living with her after her divorce.
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| 17. |
Our Sages differentiated between the marriage of a deaf mute and that of a mentally incompetent person as follows: the marriage of a deaf mute may be harmonious and has the possibility of enduring. The marriage of a mentally incompetent person, by contrast, will surely be plagued by friction and will not endure. For a mentally competent will never be comfortable living with a mentally incompetent person. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 6 and Yevamot 112b.)
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 44:2) states that this is a sensitive matter, for it is difficult to determine when a person is completely incompetent or not.
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| 18. |
All the terms mentioned in this halachah are explained in Chapter 2. Although s'ris adam (a person who has been castrated) is forbidden to marry, if he violates this prohibition, the marriage bond is binding and a get is required for severing the relationship. With regard to an aylonit, see Chapter 24, Halachot 1-2, and the accompanying notes.
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| 19. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 44:5) quotes the Tur as stating that an androgynous is considered to be a male, and the kiddushin that he gives are binding.
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| 20. |
This ruling is relevant in the present age, for it is frequent that a woman is a niddah at the time of a marriage. A wedding should never be planned to coincide with the woman's niddah state. Nevertheless, since weddings are often planned well in advance, and women's menstrual cycles are flexible, it is possible that the calculations will be in error, and the wedding will be scheduled for the time when the woman is a niddah. In such a situation, the commonly accepted ruling is to hold the wedding. Nevertheless, restrictions are placed on the couple's being in private until the woman purifies herself. Needless to say, sexual relations are forbidden.
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| 21. |
The Ra'avad states that the woman's word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive a get from the second person. She is not allowed to marry him, nor may she collect herketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:2) states that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam's ruling rests is no longer a viable support.
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| 22. |
The situation is as follows: A man who was married to two women died while childless. As required by Deuteronomy, Chapter 5, one of his brothers (the yavam) marries one of his widows (theyevamah). Afterwards, neither the yavam nor any other of the deceased's brothers is allowed to marry the deceased's second wife. (See Hilchot Yibbum 1:12.)
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| 23. |
Rav David Cohen (Section 9, Responsum 1) states that the intent is that we are obligated to force the apostate to divorce his wife, lest he cause her to violate Torah law.
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| 24. |
E.g., a Canaanite maidservant who was owned in partnership by two masters. One granted the woman her freedom, but the other did not.
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| 25. |
Our translation follows the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, who explains that there is a question whether or not the kiddushin of the first person are valid. Nevertheless, if the couple marry and consummate their relationship, this establishes their wedding bond.
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| 26. |
Who was totally unaware of what he was doing (Genesis, Chapter 19).
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| 27. |
The commentaries (see Beit Shmuel 31:6) debate the status of the kiddushin when one knows for a fact that they are worth a p'rutah in another place. Some maintain that they are absolutely binding, and others maintain that their status remains doubtful.
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| 28. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 30) states that the woman's field or courtyard must be protected. It is possible to state that this is the Rambam's opinion as well, and he relies on the statements he makes in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9 regarding giving a present (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate between the two and explain that the laws governingkiddushin are more lenient. The Beit Shmuel 30:3 maintains that this is the view of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 30:1). See Chelkat Mechokeik 30:2.
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| 29. |
Although this would not be acceptable with regard to a business transaction (Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 4), an exception is made here, because of the possibility that the man lent the woman rights to his share of the property.
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| 30. |
See the Beit Shmuel 29:9, which interprets this as meaning that two pairs of witnesses observed the throwing of the kiddushin, one maintained that the kiddushin were able to be guarded by the man, and one that they were able to be guarded by the woman. If, however, there was only one pair of witnesses, and they were unsure whether the woman could guard them, the kiddushin are not effective, because it is as if they were given without being observed by witnesses.
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| 31. |
The Makneh states that the Rambam relies on his statements in Hilchot Gerushin 5:13, which state that the woman must be able to bend over and take the object. Others do not make such a stipulation.
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Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Wednesday, Shevat 17, 5776 · 27 January 2016
"Today's Day"
Shabbat Sh'vat 17 5703
During the reading of the Song of the Red Sea, we stand. Haftora: U'Devora isha nevee'a.
Torah lessons: Chumash: B'shalach, Shevi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 83-87.
Tanya: Ch. 22. Yet since (p. 89)...out of nothing. (p. 93).
There is a custom of eating black buckwheat on this Shabbat.
On Shabbat B'shalach 5621 (1861) the Tzemach Tzedek said the maamar R'u ki Hashem printed in Likutei Torah. Shortly afterward he said to his son, my grandfather: On Shabbat B'shalach 5565 (1805) my grandfather said this maamar. Afterwards he sent for me and told me that in 5529 (1769) when he was in Mezritch the Maggid had summoned him to his room and had said:
On Shabbat B'shalach 5516 (1756) the Baal Shem Tov said a Maamar on Vayashav hayam...l'eitano,1 "The Red Sea returned to its strength," quoting the Rabbinic play on the last word, l'eitano - litnao, meaning to its condition or agreement.2 In 5521 (1761), a year after the Baal Shem Tov's passing, my Rebbe (the Baal Shem Tov) came to me, said the maamar, and added an explanation of the subject "doing His will" in contrast to "doing His word." And today my Rebbe again came to me to repeat the maamar.
Then the Maggid repeated the maamar to the Alter Rebbe, adding an interpretation of "River Ginai, part for me,"3 which is similar to k'riat yam suf, the splitting of the Red Sea.
The Tzemach Tzedek concluded: Today the Baal Shem Tov, the Maggid and the Alter Rebbe came to me, each repeating the maamar in his own style.
Several hours later the Tzemach Tzedek called my grandfather again and told him an interpretation of the maamar.
FOOTNOTES
1. Sh'mot 14:27.
2. At creation G-d made an agreement, or condition, with the Red Sea that it would part for Israel.
3. Chulin 7a, where R. Pinchas ben Yair asked the river to part and let him pass to perform a mitzva.---------------------• Daily Thought:
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Wednesday, Shevat 17, 5776 · 27 January 2016
"Today's Day"
Shabbat Sh'vat 17 5703
During the reading of the Song of the Red Sea, we stand. Haftora: U'Devora isha nevee'a.
Torah lessons: Chumash: B'shalach, Shevi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 83-87.
Tanya: Ch. 22. Yet since (p. 89)...out of nothing. (p. 93).
There is a custom of eating black buckwheat on this Shabbat.
On Shabbat B'shalach 5621 (1861) the Tzemach Tzedek said the maamar R'u ki Hashem printed in Likutei Torah. Shortly afterward he said to his son, my grandfather: On Shabbat B'shalach 5565 (1805) my grandfather said this maamar. Afterwards he sent for me and told me that in 5529 (1769) when he was in Mezritch the Maggid had summoned him to his room and had said:
On Shabbat B'shalach 5516 (1756) the Baal Shem Tov said a Maamar on Vayashav hayam...l'eitano,1 "The Red Sea returned to its strength," quoting the Rabbinic play on the last word, l'eitano - litnao, meaning to its condition or agreement.2 In 5521 (1761), a year after the Baal Shem Tov's passing, my Rebbe (the Baal Shem Tov) came to me, said the maamar, and added an explanation of the subject "doing His will" in contrast to "doing His word." And today my Rebbe again came to me to repeat the maamar.
Then the Maggid repeated the maamar to the Alter Rebbe, adding an interpretation of "River Ginai, part for me,"3 which is similar to k'riat yam suf, the splitting of the Red Sea.
The Tzemach Tzedek concluded: Today the Baal Shem Tov, the Maggid and the Alter Rebbe came to me, each repeating the maamar in his own style.
Several hours later the Tzemach Tzedek called my grandfather again and told him an interpretation of the maamar.
FOOTNOTES
1. Sh'mot 14:27.
2. At creation G-d made an agreement, or condition, with the Red Sea that it would part for Israel.
3. Chulin 7a, where R. Pinchas ben Yair asked the river to part and let him pass to perform a mitzva.---------------------• Daily Thought:
Feminine Bread
A man’s way is to serve your impoverished soul ideas—perhaps you will be wise enough to translate those ideas into deeds.
But a woman goes straight for the stomach and the core. She tells you, “This is who you are, and this is what you must do to be who you are.”
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