Torah Reading:
Yitro: Exodus 18:1 Now Yitro the priest of Midyan, Moshe’s father-in-law, heard about all that God had done for Moshe and for Isra’el his people, how Adonai had brought Isra’el out of Egypt. 2 After Moshe had sent away his wife Tzipporah and her two sons, Yitro Moshe’s father-in-law had taken them back. 3 The name of the one son was Gershom, for Moshe had said, “I have been a foreigner in a foreign land.” 4 The name of the other was Eli‘ezer [my God helps], “because the God of my father helped me by rescuing me from Pharaoh’s sword.” 5 Yitro Moshe’s father-in-law brought Moshe’s sons and wife to him in the desert where he was encamped, at the mountain of God. 6 He sent word to Moshe, “I, your father-in-law Yitro, am coming to you with your wife and her two sons.”
7 Moshe went out to meet his father-in-law, prostrated himself and kissed him. Then, after inquiring of each other’s welfare, they entered the tent. 8 Moshe told his father-in-law all that Adonai had done to Pharaoh and the Egyptians for Isra’el’s sake, all the hardships they had suffered while traveling and how Adonai had rescued them. 9 Yitro rejoiced over all the good that Adonai had done for Isra’el by rescuing them from the Egyptians. 10 Yitro said, “Blessed be Adonai, who has rescued you from the Egyptians and from Pharaoh, who has rescued the people from the harsh hand of the Egyptians. 11 Now I know that Adonai is greater than all other gods, because he rescued those who were treated so arrogantly.” 12 Yitro Moshe’s father-in-law brought a burnt offering and sacrifices to God, and Aharon came with all the leaders of Isra’el to share the meal before God with Moshe’s father-in-law.
Today in Jewish History:• Twelve Jews Burnt at Auto De Fe in Peru (1639)
With the inquisition having arrived on American shores, twelve Jews were burnt in an auto de fe in Lima, Peru, on the 18th of Shevat 5399 (1639). Of the sixty-three Jews who were condemned at the time to various punishments, eleven were burnt alive at the stake, along with the body of a twelfth, who had committed suicide during the trial.
Amongst those burnt was Manuel Bautista Perez, reported to have been the richest man in Peru at the time, as well as Francisco Maldonado de Silva, a surgeon, poet, and philosopher who was seized in Chile in 1627, and remained in the dungeons of the Inquisition for nearly twelve years. His devotion to his faith never wavered; while in prison he even converted two Catholics to Judaism!
Daily Quote:
I am the L‑rd your G‑d . . .[Exodus 20:2]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Yitro, 5th Portion Exodus 19:7-19:19 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 19
7Moses came and summoned the elders of Israel and placed before them all these words that the Lord had commanded him. זוַיָּבֹ֣א משֶׁ֔ה וַיִּקְרָ֖א לְזִקְנֵ֣י הָעָ֑ם וַיָּ֣שֶׂם לִפְנֵיהֶ֗ם אֵ֚ת כָּל־הַדְּבָרִ֣ים הָאֵ֔לֶּה אֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוָּ֖הוּ יְהוָֹֽה:
8And all the people replied in unison and said, "All that the Lord has spoken we shall do!" and Moses took the words of the people back to the Lord. חוַיַּֽעֲנ֨וּ כָל־הָעָ֤ם יַחְדָּו֙ וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ כֹּ֛ל אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּ֥ר יְהוָֹ֖ה נַֽעֲשֶׂ֑ה וַיָּ֧שֶׁב משֶׁ֛ה אֶת־דִּבְרֵ֥י הָעָ֖ם אֶל־יְהוָֹֽה:
and Moses took the words of the people back…: on the next day, which was the third day, for he ascended early in the morning (Shab. 86a). Did Moses [really] have to [bring back to God an] answer? Rather, the text comes to teach you etiquette from Moses-he did not say, “Since He Who sent me knows, I do not have to reply.” -[from Mechilta] וישב משה את דברי העם וגו': ביום המחרת, שהוא יום שלישי, שהרי בהשכמה עלה. וכי צריך היה משה להשיב, אלא בא הכתוב ללמדך דרך ארץ ממשה שלא אמר, הואיל ויודע מי ששלחני, איני צריך להשיב:
9And the Lord said to Moses, "Behold, I am coming to you in the thickness of the cloud, in order that the people hear when I speak to you, and they will also believe in you forever." And Moses relayed the words of the people to the Lord. טוַיֹּ֨אמֶר יְהֹוָ֜ה אֶל־משֶׁ֗ה הִנֵּ֨ה אָֽנֹכִ֜י בָּ֣א אֵלֶ֘יךָ֘ בְּעַ֣ב הֶֽעָנָן֒ בַּֽעֲב֞וּר יִשְׁמַ֤ע הָעָם֙ בְּדַבְּרִ֣י עִמָּ֔ךְ וְגַם־בְּךָ֖ יַֽאֲמִ֣ינוּ לְעוֹלָ֑ם וַיַּגֵּ֥ד משֶׁ֛ה אֶת־דִּבְרֵ֥י הָעָ֖ם אֶל־יְהוָֹֽה:
in the thickness of the cloud: Heb. בְּעַב הֶעָנָן, in the thickness of the cloud, and that is the opaque darkness (עִרָפֶל) [mentioned in Exod. 20:18]. — [from Mechilta] בעב הענן: במעבה הענן וזהו ערפל:
and…in you forever: Also in the prophets who will follow you. — [from Mechilta] וגם בך: גם בנביאים הבאים אחריך:
And Moses relayed, etc: on the following day, which was the fourth day of the month. — [from Jonathan] ויגד משה וגו': ביום המחרת שהוא רביעי לחודש:
the words of the people, etc.: [Namely] a response to this statement I have heard from them [the Israelites], that they want to hear [directly] from You. [They maintain that] there is no comparison between one who hears [a message] from the mouth of the messenger and one who hears [it] from the mouth of the king [himself]. [They say,] “We want to see our King!” -[from Mechilta] את דברי העם וגו': תשובה על דבר זה שמעתי מהם שרצונם לשמוע ממך אינו דומה השומע מפי השליח לשומע מפי המלך, רצוננו לראות את מלכנו:
10And the Lord said to Moses, "Go to the people and prepare them today and tomorrow, and they shall wash their garments. יוַיֹּ֨אמֶר יְהוָֹ֤ה אֶל־משֶׁה֙ לֵ֣ךְ אֶל־הָעָ֔ם וְקִדַּשְׁתָּ֥ם הַיּ֖וֹם וּמָחָ֑ר וְכִבְּס֖וּ שִׂמְלֹתָֽם:
And the Lord said to Moses: If [it is] true that they compel [Me] to speak with them, go to the people. ויאמר ה' אל משה: אם כן, שמזקיקין לדבר עמם, לך אל העם:
and prepare them: Heb. וְקִדַָּשְׁךְתָּם, and you shall prepare them (Mechilta), that they should prepare themselves today and tomorrow. וקדשתם: וזימנתם, שיכינו עצמם היום ומחר:
11And they shall be prepared for the third day, for on the third day, the Lord will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. יאוְהָי֥וּ נְכֹנִ֖ים לַיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁ֑י כִּ֣י | בַּיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁלִשִׁ֗י יֵרֵ֧ד יְהוָֹ֛ה לְעֵינֵ֥י כָל־הָעָ֖ם עַל־הַ֥ר סִינָֽי:
And they shall be prepared: Separated from women. — [from Mechilta] והיו נכנים: מובדלים מאשה:
for on the third day: which is the sixth of the month, and on the fifth [of the month], Moses built the altar at the foot of the mountain, and the twelve monuments, the entire episode stated in the section of וְאֵלֶה הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים (Exod. 24), but there is no sequence of earlier and later incidents in the Torah. — from Mechilta] ליום השלישי: שהוא ששה בחדש. ובחמישי בנה משה את המזבח תחת ההר ושתים עשרה מצבה, כל הענין האמור בפרשת ואלה המשפטים, (שמות כד ד) ואין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה:
before the eyes of all the people: [This] teaches [us] that there were no blind [persons] among them, for they were all cured. — [from Mechilta] לעיני כל העם: מלמד שלא היה בהם סומא, שנתרפאו כולם:
12And you shall set boundaries for the people around, saying, Beware of ascending the mountain or touching its edge; whoever touches the mountain shall surely be put to death.' יבוְהִגְבַּלְתָּ֤ אֶת־הָעָם֙ סָבִ֣יב לֵאמֹ֔ר הִשָּֽׁמְר֥וּ לָכֶ֛ם עֲל֥וֹת בָּהָ֖ר וּנְגֹ֣עַ בְּקָצֵ֑הוּ כָּל־הַנֹּגֵ֥עַ בָּהָ֖ר מ֥וֹת יוּמָֽת:
And you shall set boundaries: Set boundaries for them as a sign that they should not come nearer [to the mountain] than the boundary. והגבלת: קבע להם תחומין לסימן, שלא יקרבו מן הגבול והלאה:
saying: The boundary says to them, “Beware of going up from here on,” and you shall warn them about it. לאמר: הגבול אומר להם, השמרו מעלות מכאן והלאה, ואתה תזהירם על כך:
or touching its edge: Even the edge of it. ונגע בקצהו: אפילו בקצהו:
13No hand shall touch it, for he shall be stoned or cast down; whether man or beast, he shall not live. When the ram's horn sounds a long, drawn out blast, they may ascend the mountain." יגלֹֽא־תִגַּ֨ע בּ֜וֹ יָ֗ד כִּֽי־סָק֤וֹל יִסָּקֵל֙ אֽוֹ־יָרֹ֣ה יִיָּרֶ֔ה אִם־בְּהֵמָ֥ה אִם־אִ֖ישׁ לֹ֣א יִֽחְיֶ֑ה בִּמְשֹׁךְ֙ הַיֹּבֵ֔ל הֵ֖מָּה יַֽעֲל֥וּ בָהָֽר:
or cast down: From here [it is derived] that those liable to death by stoning are [first] cast down from the stoning place, which was as high as two heights [of a man]. — [from Sanh. 45a] cast down-Heb. יִיָרֶה, shall be ירה יירה: מכאן לנסקלין שהם נדחין למטה מבית הסקילה, שהיה גבוה שתי קומות:
cast down: to the earth, like “He cast (יָרָה) into the sea” (Exod. 15:4). יירה: יושלך למטה לארץ, כמו (שמות טו ד) ירה בים:
When the ram’s horn sounds a long, drawn-out blast: When the ram’s horn sounds a long, drawn-out blast,this is the sign of the Shechinah’s withdrawal and the cessation of the voice [of God]. As soon as the Shechinah withdraws, they are permitted to ascend [the mountain]. — [from Mechilta] במשך היבל: כשימשוך היובל קול ארוך הוא סימן סלוק שכינה והפסקת הקול, וכיון שנסתלק הם רשאין לעלות:
the ram’s horn: Heb. הַיוֹבֵל. That is a shofar of a ram, for in Arabia, they call a ram “yuvla.” And this shofar was from Isaac’s ram [the ram that Abraham sacrificed instead of Isaac]. (Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 31). היבל: הוא שופר של איל, שכן בערביא קורין לדכרא יובלא, ושופר של אילו של יצחק היה:
14So Moses descended from the mountain to the people, and he prepared the people, and they washed their garments. ידוַיֵּ֧רֶד משֶׁ֛ה מִן־הָהָ֖ר אֶל־הָעָ֑ם וַיְקַדֵּשׁ֙ אֶת־הָעָ֔ם וַיְכַבְּס֖וּ שִׂמְלֹתָֽם:
from the mountain to the people: [This] teaches [us] that Moses did not turn to his [own] affairs, but [went directly] from the mountain to the people. — [from Mechilta] מן ההר אל העם: מלמד שלא היה משה פונה לעסקיו אלא מן ההר אל העם:
15He said to the people, "Be ready for three days; do not go near a woman." טווַיֹּ֨אמֶר֙ אֶל־הָעָ֔ם הֱי֥וּ נְכֹנִ֖ים לִשְׁל֣שֶׁת יָמִ֑ים אַל־תִּגְּשׁ֖וּ אֶל־אִשָּֽׁה:
Be ready for three days: For the end of three days. That is the fourth day, for Moses added one day of his own volition. This is the view of Rabbi Jose [who says that the Torah was given on the seventh of Sivan]. According to the one who says that the Ten Commandments were given on the sixth of the month, however, Moses did not add anything, and “for three days” has the same meaning as “for the third day.” [from Shab. 87a] היו נכנים לשלשת ימים: לסוף שלושה ימים, הוא יום רביעי שהוסיף משה יום אחד מדעתו, כדברי רבי יוסי, ולדברי האומר בששה בחדש ניתנו עשרת הדברות לא הוסיף משה כלום. לשלשת ימים, כמו (פסוק יא) ליום השלישי:
do not go near a woman: [to have intimacy with her] for all these three days [of preparation], in order that the women may immerse themselves on the third day and be pure to receive the Torah. If they have intercourse within the three days, the woman could [involuntarily] emit semen after her immersion and become unclean again. After three days have elapsed [since intercourse], however, the semen has already become putrid and is no longer capable of fertilization, so it is pure from contaminating the [woman] who emits it. — [from Shab. 86a] אל תגשו אל אשה: כל שלושת ימים הללו כדי שיהו הנשים טובלות ליום השלישי ותהיינה טהורות לקבל תורה שאם ישמשו תוך שלשת ימים, שמא תפלוט האשה שכבת זרע לאחר טבילתה ותחזור ותטמא, אבל מששהתה שלושה ימים כבר הזרע מסריח ואינו ראוי להזריע וטהור מלטמא את הפולטת:
16It came to pass on the third day when it was morning, that there were thunder claps and lightning flashes, and a thick cloud was upon the mountain, and a very powerful blast of a shofar, and the entire nation that was in the camp shuddered. טזוַיְהִי֩ בַיּ֨וֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁ֜י בִּֽהְיֹ֣ת הַבֹּ֗קֶר וַיְהִי֩ קֹלֹ֨ת וּבְרָקִ֜ים וְעָנָ֤ן כָּבֵד֙ עַל־הָהָ֔ר וְקֹ֥ל שֹׁפָ֖ר חָזָ֣ק מְאֹ֑ד וַיֶּֽחֱרַ֥ד כָּל־הָעָ֖ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר בַּמַּֽחֲנֶֽה:
when it was morning: [This] teaches [us] that He preceded them [on Mount Sinai], which is unconventional for a flesh and blood person to do, [i.e.,] having the teacher wait for the pupil. And so we find in Ezekiel (3:22, 23), “‘Arise, go out to the plain, etc.’ So I arose and went out to the plain, and behold, there the glory of the Lord was standing.” -[from unknown Midrashic source] בהית הבקר: מלמד שהקדים על ידם מה שאין דרך בשר ודם לעשות כן, שיהא הרב ממתין לתלמיד, וכן מצינו ביחזקאל (יחזקאל ג כב) קום צא אל הבקעה וגו', (שם כג) ואקום ואצא אל הבקעה והנה שם כבוד ה' עומד:
17Moses brought the people out toward God from the camp, and they stood at the bottom of the mountain. יזוַיּוֹצֵ֨א משֶׁ֧ה אֶת־הָעָ֛ם לִקְרַ֥את הָֽאֱלֹהִ֖ים מִן־הַמַּֽחֲנֶ֑ה וַיִּתְיַצְּב֖וּ בְּתַחְתִּ֥ית הָהָֽר:
toward God: [This expression] tells [us] that the Shechinah came out toward them like a bridegroom going out toward a bride. This is [the meaning of] what is stated: “The Lord came from Sinai” (Deut. 33:2), and it does not say, “came to Sinai.” -[from Mechilta] לקראת הא-להים: מגיד שהשכינה יצאה לקראתם, כחתן היוצא לקראת כלה, וזהו שנאמר (דברים לג ב) ה' מסיני בא, ולא נאמר לסיני בא:
at the bottom of the mountain: According to its simple meaning, at the foot of the mountain. Its midrashic interpretation is, however, that the mountain was uprooted from its place and turned over them like a vat. — [from Shab. 88a] בתחתית ההר: לפי פשוטו ברגלי ההר. ומדרשו שנתלש ההר ממקומו ונכפה עליהם כגיגית:
18And the entire Mount Sinai smoked because the Lord had descended upon it in fire, and its smoke ascended like the smoke of the kiln, and the entire mountain quaked violently. יחוְהַ֤ר סִינַי֙ עָשַׁ֣ן כֻּלּ֔וֹ מִ֠פְּנֵ֠י אֲשֶׁ֨ר יָרַ֥ד עָלָ֛יו יְהוָֹ֖ה בָּאֵ֑שׁ וַיַּ֤עַל עֲשָׁנוֹ֙ כְּעֶ֣שֶׁן הַכִּבְשָׁ֔ן וַיֶּֽחֱרַ֥ד כָּל־הָהָ֖ר מְאֹֽד:
the entire Mount Sinai smoked: Heb. עָשַׁן. This word עָשַׁן is not a noun, because the “shin” is vowelized with a “pattach.” But [it is] the past tense of a [singular] verb in the form פָּעַל, like אָמַר, said, שָׁמַר, watched, שָׁמַע, heard. Therefore, its targum is ךְתָּנַן כּוֹלֵית, and [Onkelos] did not translate ךְתְּנָנָא [which would mean: was all smoke]. All [instances of] עָשָׁן in Scriptures are vowelized with a “kamatz” because they are nouns. עשן כלו: אין עשן זה שם דבר, שהרי נקוד השי"ן פת"ח, אלא לשון פעל, כמו אמר, שמר, שמע, לכך תרגומו תנן כוליה, ולא תרגם תננא, וכל עשן שבמקרא נקודים קמ"ץ מפני שהם שם דבר:
the kiln: [used for the baking] of lime. I could think that it means [Mount Sinai smoked] like the kiln and no more. Therefore, [to clarify this,] Scripture states: “[the mountain was] blazing with fire up to the heart of the heaven” (Deut. 4:11) [meaning that the fire was far greater than in a lime kiln]. Why then does the Torah say "kiln"? In order to explain to the [human] ear what it is able to hear, [i.e., to give the reader a picture that can be imagined]. He gives the creatures [humans] a sign familiar to them. Similar to this [is the description in reference to God:] “He shall roar like a lion” (Hos. 11:10). Who but Him gave strength to the lion? Yet the Scriptures compare Him to a lion? But we describe Him and compare Him to His creatures in order to explain to [humans] what the ear is able to hear. Similar to this [is], “And its sound [the voice of God] was like the sound of abundant waters” (Ezek. 43:2). Now who gave the water a sound but He? Yet you describe Him and compare Him to His creatures in order to explain to [humans] what the ear is able to hear. — [from Mechilta] הכבשן: של סיד, יכול ככבשן זה ולא יותר, תלמוד לומר (דברים ד יא) בוער באש עד לב השמים. ומה תלמוד לומר כבשן, לשבר את האוזן, מה שהיא יכולה לשמוע, נותן לבריות סימן הניכר להם. כיוצא בו (הושע יא י) כאריה ישאג, וכי מי נתן כח בארי, אלא הוא, והכתוב מושלו כאריה, אלא אנו מכנין ומדמין אותו לבריותיו, כדי לשבר את האוזן מה שיכולה לשמוע. וכיוצא בו (יחזקאל מג ב) וקולו כקול מים רבים, וכי מי נתן קול למים, אלא הוא, ואתה מכנה אותו לדמותו לבריותיו, כדי לשבר את האוזן:
19The sound of the shofar grew increasingly stronger; Moses would speak and God would answer him with a voice. יטוַֽיְהִי֙ ק֣וֹל הַשֹּׁפָ֔ר הוֹלֵ֖ךְ וְחָזֵ֣ק מְאֹ֑ד משֶׁ֣ה יְדַבֵּ֔ר וְהָֽאֱלֹהִ֖ים יַֽעֲנֶ֥נּוּ בְקֽוֹל:
grew increasingly stronger: It is customary for mortals that the longer one blows long notes [on a horn], the weaker and fainter its sound becomes. Here, however, it constantly grew stronger. Now why at the beginning was this so [i.e., a weak sound]? In order to let their ears hear what they were able to hear [and not shock them suddenly]. — [from Mechilta] הולך וחזק מאד: מנהג הדיוט כל זמן שהוא מאריך לתקוע קולו מחליש וכוהה, אבל כאן הולך וחזק מאוד. ולמה כך מתחלה, לשבר אזניהם מה שיכולין לשמוע:
Moses would speak: When Moses would speak and make the Decalogue heard to Israel-for they heard from the mouth of God only “I am…” and “You shall not have” (Mak. 24a)-the Holy One, blessed be He, would assist him [Moses] by giving him strength so that his voice would be strong and audible. — [from Mechilta] משה ידבר: כשהיה משה מדבר ומשמיע הדברות לישראל שהרי לא שמעו מפי הגבורה אלא (שמות כ ב) אנכי ולא יהיה לך והקב"ה מסייעו לתת בו כח להיות קולו מגביר ונשמע:
would answer him with a voice: [This means] He would answer him concerning the voice, [and not with a voice. The ב in בְקוֹל is used], similar to [the ב in בָאֵשׁ in the phrase:] “that will answer with fire” (I Kings 18:24). [בָאֵשׁ means] concerning the fire, [i.e., signifying] to bring it [the fire] down [from Heaven]. — [from Mechilta] יעננו בקול: יעננו על דבר הקול, כמו (מלכים א' יח כד) אשר יענה באש, על דבר האש להורידו:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 88 - 89
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 88
The psalmist weeps and laments bitterly over the maladies and suffering Israel endures in exile, which he describes in detail.
1. A song, a psalm by the sons of Korach, for the Conductor, upon the machalat le'anot; 1 a maskil2 for Heiman the Ezrachite.
2. O Lord, God of my deliverance, by day I cried out [to You], by night I [offer my prayer] before You.
3. Let my prayer come before You; turn Your ear to my supplication.
4. For my soul is sated with affliction, and my life has reached the grave.
5. I was reckoned with those who go down to the pit, I was like a man without strength.
6. [I am regarded] among the dead who are free, like corpses lying in the grave, of whom You are not yet mindful, who are yet cut off by Your hand.
7. You have put me into the lowest pit, into the darkest places, into the depths.
8. Your wrath has weighed heavily upon me, and all the waves [of Your fury] have constantly afflicted me.
9. You have estranged my friends from me, You have made me abhorrent to them; I am imprisoned and unable to leave.
10. My eye is afflicted because of distress; I call to You, O Lord, every day; I have stretched out my hands [in prayer] to You.
11. Do You perform wonders for the deceased? Do the dead stand to offer You praise? Selah.
12. Is Your kindness recounted in the grave, your faithfulness in the place of perdition?
13. Are Your wondrous deeds known in the darkness [of the grave], or Your righteousness in the land of oblivion?
14. But, I, to You, O Lord, I cry; each morning my prayer comes before You.
15. Why, O Lord, do You forsake my soul? Why do You conceal Your countenance from Me?
16. From my youth I have been afflicted and approaching death, yet I have borne the fear of You which is firmly established within me.
17. Your furies have passed over me; Your terrors have cut me down.
18. They have engulfed me like water all day long, they all together surrounded me.
19. You have estranged from me beloved and friend; I have been rejected by my intimates.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument(Metzudot).
2.A psalm intended to enlighten and impart knowledge(Metzudot).
Chapter 89
This psalm speaks of the kingship of the House of David, the psalmist lamenting its fall from power for many years, and God's abandonment and spurning of us.
1. A maskil1 by Eitan the Ezrachite.
2. I will sing of the Lord's kindness forever; to all generations I will make known Your faithfulness with my mouth.
3. For I have said, "The world is built with kindness; there in the heavens You establish Your faithfulness.”
4. I have made a covenant with My chosen one; I have sworn to David, My servant:
5. "I will establish Your descendants forever; I will build your throne for all generations," Selah.
6. Then the heavens will extol Your wonders, O Lord; Your faithfulness, too, in the congregation of the holy ones.
7. Indeed, who in heaven can be compared to the Lord, who among the supernal beings can be likened to the Lord!
8. The Almighty is revered in the great assembly of the holy ones, awe-inspiring to all who surround Him.
9. O Lord, God of Hosts, who is mighty like You, O God! Your faithfulness surrounds You.
10. You rule the vastness of the sea; when its waves surge, You still them.
11. You crushed Rahav (Egypt) like a corpse; with Your powerful arm You scattered Your enemies.
12. Yours are the heavens, the earth is also Yours; the world and all therein-You established them.
13. The north and the south-You created them; Tabor and Hermon sing of [the greatness] of Your Name.
14. Yours is the arm which has the might; strengthen Your hand, raise high Your right hand.
15. Righteousness and justice are the foundation of Your throne; kindness and truth go before Your countenance.
16. Fortunate is the people who know the sound of the shofar; Lord, they walk in the light of Your countenance.
17. They rejoice in Your Name all day, and they are exalted through Your righteousness.
18. Indeed, You are the splendor of their might, and in Your goodwill our glory is exalted.
19. For our protectors turn to the Lord, and our king to the Holy One of Israel.
20. Then You spoke in a vision to Your pious ones and said: "I have granted aid to [David] the mighty one; I have exalted the one chosen from among the people.
21. I have found David, My servant; I have anointed him with My holy oil.
22. It is he whom My hand shall be prepared [to assist]; My arm, too, shall strengthen him.
23. The enemy shall not prevail over him, nor shall the iniquitous person afflict him.
24. And I will crush his adversaries before him, and will strike down those who hate him.
25. Indeed, My faithfulness and My kindness shall be with him, and through My Name his glory shall be exalted.
26. I will set his hand upon the sea, his right hand upon the rivers.
27. He will call out to Me, 'You are my Father, my God, the strength of my deliverance.’
28. I will also make him [My] firstborn, supreme over the kings of the earth.
29. I will maintain My kindness for him forever; My covenant shall remain true to him.
30. And I will bestow [kingship] upon his seed forever, and his throne will endure as long as the heavens last.
31. If his children forsake My Torah and do not walk in My ordinances;
32. if they profane My statutes and do not observe My commandments,
33. then I will punish their transgression with the rod and their misdeeds with plagues.
34. Yet I shall not take away My kindness from him, nor betray My faithfulness.
35. I will not abrogate My covenant, nor change that which has issued from My lips.
36. One thing I have sworn by My holiness-I will not cause disappointment to David.
37. His seed will endure forever and his throne will be [resplendent] as the sun before Me.
38. Like the moon, it shall be established forever; [the moon] is a faithful witness in the sky for all time.”
39. Yet You have forsaken and abhorred; You became enraged at Your anointed.
40. You annulled the covenant with Your servant; You have profaned his crown [by casting it] to the ground.
41. You shattered all his fences; You turned all his strongholds into ruin.
42. All wayfarers despoiled him; he has become a disgrace to his neighbors.
43. You have uplifted the right hand of his adversaries; You have made all his enemies rejoice.
44. You also turned back the blade of his sword, and did not sustain him in battle.
45. You put an end to his splendor, and toppled his throne to the ground.
46. You have cut short the days of his youth; You have enclothed him with long-lasting shame.
47. How long, O Lord, will You conceal Yourself-forever? [How long] will Your fury blaze like fire?
48. O remember how short is my life span! Why have You created all children of man for naught?
49. What man can live and not see death, can save his soul forever from the grave?
50. Where are Your former deeds of kindness, my Lord, which You swore to David in Your faithfulness?
51. Remember, my Lord, the disgrace of Your servants, that I bear in my bosom from all the many nations;
52. that Your enemies have disgraced, O Lord, that they have disgraced the footsteps of Your anointed.
53. Blessed is the Lord forever, Amen and Amen.
FOOTNOTES
1.A psalm intended to enlighten and impart knowledge(Metzudot).
---------------------
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 23
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 23
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Thursday, Shevat 18, 5776 · January 28, 2016
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 23
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Thursday, Shevat 18, 5776 · January 28, 2016
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 23
In the previous chapters the Alter Rebbe explained that from G‑d’s perspective nothing is ever separate from Him. For the Divine “Word” which creates everything is unlike a word spoken by a human being. The latter becomes separated from the speaker, while the former remains always within its source — G‑d. It is only from the subjective viewpoint of the created beings that they are considered as separate, independent entities. They are able to regard themselves as such because they receive the Divine life-force which animates them by way of many tzimtzumim and through the concealment of the Divine “Countenance”, i.e., the concealment of the inner, ultimate aspect of G‑d’s Will.
The logical corollary to this idea is that anything in which the Divine Will stands revealed, is completely nullified before G‑d, and absolutely one with Him. In this chapter the Alter Rebbe applies this idea to the Torah and the mitzvot, in which G‑d’s Will is manifest. He demonstrates how one can unite with G‑d’s Will and wisdom, and thereby with G‑d Himself, through study of the Torah and observance of the mitzvot.
ועם כל הנ״ל יובן ויבואר היטב בתוספת ביאור מה שאמרו בזהר, דאורייתא וקודשא בריך הוא כולא חד
In light of all that has been said above, we can better understand and more fully and clearly elucidate the statement in the Zohar1 that “The Torah and G‑d are entirely one,”
ובתיקונים פירשו דרמ״ח פיקודין אינון רמ״ח אברין דמלכא
and the commentary in the Tikkunei Zohar2 that “The 248 commandments are the 248 ‘organs’ of the [Divine] King.”
Just as every organ in the human body is a repository for the particular faculty of the soul that is vested in that organ (e.g., the eye is the receptacle for the faculty of sight, and the ear for the faculty of hearing), so too is every commandment a channel and a repository for the Divine Will that is vested and expressed in that particular commandment. (The commandments in general represent G‑d’s Will, and each individual mitzvah is an expression of a particular aspect of this Will.)
It should be noted, however, that according to this analogy the mitzvot are no more than G‑d’s “organs”. An organ of the body is not one with the soul. True, when any particular soul-power is vested in its corresponding organ, they function together as one. But they remain two separate entities that have been joined together. By the same token, the mitzvot are not actually one with G‑d: they are merely (as it were) joined to Him. Yet the Torah, whose whole purpose is to explain themitzvot, is “entirely one with G‑d,” as quoted earlier from the Zohar. What is the meaning of this greater unity with G‑d found in the Torah (and in the act of Torah study), that surpasses even the unity in the mitzvot and in their fulfillment? This the Alter Rebbe now goes on to explain.
לפי שהמצות הן פנימיות רצון העליון וחפצו האמיתי, המלובש בכל העולמות העליונים ותחתונים להחיותם
For the mitzvot constitute G‑d’s innermost Will and His true desire, which is clothed in all the upper and lower worlds, thereby giving them life.
All the worlds are a product of G‑d’s Will. He desired that they exist, and this desire is what brought them into being. However, this desire is but an external manifestation of His underlying, internal Will — the desire for mitzvot. Why, in fact, does G‑d desire that the worlds exist? Because He desires that the mitzvot be performed — and this is possible only when there is someone to perform them, and when there are objects with which to perform them. To this end G‑d created all the worlds.
This can be illustrated by the analogy of a man who travels abroad on business. Naturally, he travels because he wishes to do so. But his “internal” (i.e., ultimate) desire in the journey, his underlying motive, lies in the profit he expects to reap. When we probe still deeper, we find that the desire for profit is itself an external expression of an even more “internal” desire — the desire for the things which he will be able to buy with the proceeds of his business. Here lies the true object of his pleasure. It is this desire which creates the desire for profit, which leads in turn to his desire to travel. So too in the case of the worlds and the mitzvot. G‑d’s external Will, His desire that the worlds exist, is motivated by His desire for the true object of His pleasure — the mitzvot. Thus, the mitzvot represent His innermost will. It is for their sake that G‑d gives life to all the worlds.
כי כל חיותם ושפעם תלוי במעשה המצות של התחתונים כנודע
The very life and sustenance of all the worlds is dependent upon the performance of the mitzvot by the creatures of the lower worlds, as is known — that performing a mitzvah draws G‑dly life and sustenance into all the worlds.
ונמצא שמעשה המצות וקיומן הוא לבוש הפנימי לפנימית רצון העליון
It follows that the performance and fulfillment of the mitzvot is the innermost garment for the innermost aspect of G‑d’s Will,
שממעשה זה נמשך אור וחיות רצון העליון להתלבש בעולמות
since it is due to this performance of the mitzvot that the light and life of the worlds issues forth from the Divine Will, to be clothed in them —
I.e., since G‑d desires the worlds only as a vehicle for the performance of the mitzvot, as explained above, and it is only for this reason that He animates the worlds.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Cf. I, 24a; II, 60a; Tikkunei Zohar 21b. |
| 2. | Tikkun 30. |
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Thursday, Shevat 18, 5776 · January 28, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 355
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
"There shall be no indecent women among the daughters of Israel"—Deuteronomy 23:18.
It is forbidden for a man and woman to be intimate unless married to each other.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Thursday, Shevat 18, 5776 · January 28, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 355
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
"There shall be no indecent women among the daughters of Israel"—Deuteronomy 23:18.
It is forbidden for a man and woman to be intimate unless married to each other.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
Negative Commandment 355
Translated by Berel Bell
The 355th prohibition is that we are forbidden from having relations with a woman without [giving her] a Kesubah and acquiring her (kiddushin).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "There may not be any prostitutes among Jewish girls."
This same commandment is repeated, but using a different expression, in G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The Sifra says, " 'Do not defile your daughter' — this command is directed towards a man who hands over his unmarried daughter for sexual relations without marriage, as well as a girl who herself has sexual relations without marriage."
Now listen as I explain why the prohibition is repeated with this wording,3 and what the repetition adds. G‑d (exalted be He) has already instructed us in the Torah that a man who has relations with a virgin incurs none of the punishments4, regardless of whether he seduced or raped her. Rather, he must pay a monetary fine and marry the girl that he harmed, as explained in the Torah.5
Accordingly, a person might think that since the offender is only required to pay a fine, therefore this is looked upon as a purely financial case. Therefore, just as a person, if he wishes, is allowed to give away his money to another person, or to forgive a debt, so too, [he might think,] he may take his unmarried daughter and give her to a man to have relations with her. This would be like forgiving a debt due to him, since the 50 silver [shekels which the seducer or rapist must pay] go to the father. Alternatively, a person might think that [since this is purely a financial matter,] he may give his daughter on condition that the man pays a certain amount of money.
Therefore, the Torah prohibited this and said, "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The monetary fine only refers to a case where the seduction or rape actually occurred. But it is still completely forbidden for them to engage in sexual relations, even when they both agree.
The Torah also reveals the reason for this prohibition: ["Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations,] and you will then not make the land sexually immoral, and the land [will not] be filled with perversion." The explanation of this: seduction and rape occur very rarely, but if the Torah allowed premarital relations when both parties agree, it would occur often and become widespread throughout the world.
This is a fine and wondrous explanation of this verse, and fits all the sayings of our Sages and laws of the Torah.
This prohibition, i.e. the prohibition of [having relations with] an unmarried woman, is punishable by lashes.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in Kesubos and Kiddushin.
Footnotes
1.Deut. 23:18.
2.Lev. 19:29.
3.Directed to the father, unlike the other verse, which is phrased as a general prohibition.
4.. Such as lashes or execution.
5.Ex. 22:15. Deut. 22:28. See P220, P218.
--------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Maaser Sheini Maaser Sheini - Chapter 6
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 6
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when] ordinary money and money from the second tithe become scattered [in the same place]. If he gathered from both sides, what he gathers belongs to the second tithe until he reaches the original amount and then the remainder is ordinary produce.1 If he mixed the coins together2 and grabbed a handful or gathered only from one side, he should calculate the percentage proportionately.3
What is implied? There were 200 coins of the second tithe and 100 ordinary coins. They became scattered. He mixed them and picked them all up, but found only 270, 180 are the second tithe and 90 are ordinary coins. This is the general principle. Those that are gathered are considered as the second tithe. Those that are mixed together are divided according to the percentage.
He should4 make a stipulation and say: "If those in my hand are from the second tithe, the remainder are ordinary money and if they are ordinary money, the holiness from the coins from the second tithe wherever they are is transferred to them."
Halacha 2
When a sela of the second tithe becomes mixed with a sela of ordinary money, one should bring coins - even brass coins5 - worth a sela and say: "Wherever the sela of the second tithe is, its holiness is transferred to these coins." Afterwards, he should chose the better6 of the two [selaim] and transfer the holiness of the brass coins to it. Thus the better selahas been become the money of the second tithe.
Halacha 3
When [a father] tells his son: "Produce from the second tithe is found in this corner," and is found in another corner, it is ordinary produce.7 If he told him: "A maneh there,"8 and 200 were discovered, the remainder is ordinary money.9 "There are 200," and only a maneh was discovered, it is ordinary money.10 If he left a maneh and discovered 200 or 200 and discovered amaneh, the entire amount is ordinary money.11 [This applies] even if the money is found in two wallets.12
Halacha 4
If his father told him: "I have a pouch [with produce] from the second tithe at home," and [the son] found three pouches, the greater one is [considered as containing produce from] the second tithe13 and the remainder are [considered as containing produce containing] ordinary produce. Nevertheless, he should not make use of [the produce from] the smaller pouches until he transfers their holiness to the greater one.14
Halacha 5
[The following laws apply when] a person loses his power of speech. If he was asked: "Is your produce from the second tithe in this-and-this place?" and he nodded his head, he should be tested three times like he is tested with regard to a bill of divorce.15[If it is proven that he understands what he is being told,] his words have consequence.
Halacha 6
If one was told in a dream: "The produce from the second tithe of your father that you are seeking is in this-and-this place," [the statements are of no consequence.16This applies even] if he found the produce there like he was told. For words communicated in a dream are of no significance at all.17
Halacha 7
Although a person tells his sons: "Even if you are dying, do not touch [what is in] that corner,"18 if money is found there, it is considered as ordinary money.19[Different laws apply if] he buried money in their presence and told them: "It belongs to so-and-so" or "It is from the second tithe." If it appears that he is speaking with guile,20we do not pay attention to his words. If it appears that he is serious, his words are given weight.21
Halacha 8
When a person finds a container22 with the letter mem written on it, its contents23 [are considered as] the second tithe.24 When there is a daletwritten on it, its contents are considered demai; a tet, tevel; kuf, for a sacrifice. If the container was metal,25 the container and its contents were consecrated for a sacrifice. For in dangerous times,26 they would write one letter from the name [as a sign].
Halacha 9
When coins - even golden dinarim, together with silver, and [brass] coins27 - are found in Jerusalem, they are considered as ordinary money. [The rationale is that] the streets of Jerusalem are swept every day.28 If a shard upon which was written ma'aser,29 it is considered as the second tithe.30
When does the above apply? During the majority of the days of the year. On the pilgrimage festivals, by contrast, all [the money found] is considered as from the second tithe.31
Halacha 10
Money which is found in front of a seller of livestock in Jerusalem are always32 considered as from the second tithe. We operate under the assumption that the majority of the clients are bringing money from the second tithe and using it to purchase animals.33 [Money] which is found on the Temple Mount is always considered as ordinary funds. We operate under the assumption that it came from the Temple treasury and the treasurers had already transferred its holiness to an animal.34
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply when] money is found in a chest that had been used for both ordinary produce and the second tithe. If the majority of the people who placed money [in the chest placed money] from the second tithe, the money is considered as from the second tithe. If the majority placed ordinary money, the money is considered as ordinary money.35 If the ratio is half and half, the money is considered as ordinary money.36
Halacha 12
When one find produce between produce of the second tithe and produce that is terumah, it should be included among the type to which it is closest.37 If it is equidistant [from both], it should be eaten according to the stringencies that apply to both. Thus it is forbidden to non-priests; one must wash his hands [before partaking of it],38and must wait until sunset [on the day of one's purification before partaking of it]39like terumah. [Similarly,] it is forbidden to one in an acute state of mourning40 and must be brought [to Jerusalem] as required of the second tithe.
Similar principles apply with regard to coins that are found between ordinary coins and coins from the second tithe.
Halacha 13
When produce that is from the second tithe of demai and produce that is definitely from the second tithe are mixed together, [the mixture] must be eaten according to the more stringent requirements.41
Halacha 14
When produce from the second tithe becomes mixed with ordinary produce, [the mixture] should be eaten in a state of ritual purity in Jerusalem or the second tithe should be redeemed. Therefore if such a mixture takes place in Jerusalem,42 even the smallest amount of the same species43 becomes forbidden [to be eaten as ordinary produce]. Since the produce is in Jerusalem, it is considered as an entity that can be permitted44 and should be eaten in a state of ritual purity.
Halacha 15
When a person sows produce from the second tithe after it had entered Jerusalem,45 the produce which grows is considered as produce from the second tithe.46If he sows it before it enters Jerusalem,47 the produce which grows is considered as ordinary produce even if its seed does not decompose. [Preferably, however,] it should be redeemed at the time it was sown.48
Halacha 16
When produce from the second tithe is mixed with other substances, it is considered as nullified when mixed with a simple majority.49
To which produce from the second tithe does this apply? To produce that entered Jerusalem and then departed from there and afterwards, the walls of the city fell. Thus it is impossible to return it to [the holy city] and it is impossible to redeem since it has already entered that place. [This applies] even though [its fifth] is not worth a p'rutah.50It is a substance that has no way to be permitted and is there nullified by a simple majority, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Ma'achalot.51
FOOTNOTES
1.
And if some coins are lost, the loss is deducted from the ordinary coins [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 2:5)]. The rationale is that it is possible that the coins of only one type were lost. As a stringency, we assume that it was the ordinary coins that were lost.
2.
Before they fell (ibid.).
3.
Since they were all mixed together, it is not likely that the loss was suffered by one type of coin alone.
The Radbaz maintains that even if the coins were mixed together after they fell, the money should be divided proportionally, because there is no way of knowing which type of coins one has in hand.
4.
This applies in both instances, whether they are scattered or mixed together [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.)].
5.
It is, however, preferable to use silver (Radbaz). The Meiri differs and maintains that it is preferable to redeem the coins with brass.
6.
As mentioned previously, in that time, the mintage of coins were not entirely standard and sometimes there were some fluctuations of weight. Also, some coins could have been affected by wear and tear.
7.
Since it was not found in the place where he told him it was located, we assume that the produce from the second tithe was lost and this is new produce.
8.
100 silver pieces.
9.
I.e., we assume that his father did not mention the ordinary money that was there, but rather informed him only of the money that was from the second tithe, because only those funds were important from a ritual perspective.
10.
We assume that the money from the second tithe was taken and that these are different funds.
11.
Since the amount he discovered was not the same amount that he put there, we assume that the original funds were taken and that these are new funds. In this instance, the person placed the funds there himself. Hence, there is a difference between this instance and the first clause in which he was conveyed the information by his father.
The Ra'avad notes that the Rambam's ruling appears to be a departure from the ruling of the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 4:12) which states that all of the 100 are the second tithe. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's ruling is based on Beitzah 10b which follows this line of thinking.
12.
In such an instance, one would have reason to think that one wallet contains the money that is the second tithe and the other ordinary money.
13.
This is a stringency since it was not known which of the pouches contained the produce of the second tithe.
14.
Lest in fact it had been the smaller ones that contain the produce from the second tithe.
15.
See Hilchot Gerushin 2:16 which explains that a person who has lost his ability to speak, but is of sound mind is asked three questions which require different answers, i.e., two positive and one negative or vice versa. If he answers them correctly, the court concludes that he is mentally sound and continues asking him concerning the bill of divorce. See also Hilchot Mechirah 29:3.
16.
And the produce is considered as ordinary produce.
17.
See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 10:7.
18.
I.e., "even if you are dying of hunger do not take the money to spend on your own needs."
19.
I.e., we do not say that the father meant that the money was from the second tithe and should not be used for ordinary purposes.
20.
So that he does not appear to be rich or so that his sons don't waste the money immediately.
21.
See also Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 10:5.
22.
An earthenware container, as indicated by the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 4:10).
23.
Either money or produce.
24.
The mem stands for ma'aser, "tithes." We do not think that the intent is the first tithe or the tithe for the poor, for the consumption of these is not restricted to a specific group.
25.
In which instance, the container itself has value and we assume he consecrated it as well. In contrast, an earthenware container is not valuable and would not be consecrated.
26.
I.e., in the era of Roman persecution when the Romans tried to stamp out the observance of the mitzvot and the Jews were afraid to write out the entire word.
27.
Such a mixture might give the impression that this money was set aside for the second tithe, for generally people do not hold different types of coins together (Rav Yosef Corcus).
28.
Generally, we assume that the money found in Jerusalem is ordinary money, because during the majority of the year, there are not that many pilgrims there. Thus we assume that the money fell from one of the inhabitants of Jerusalem. One might, however, object and say that perhaps the money fell from one of the pilgrims during the festivals (see below), but was not discovered until afterwards. Our Sages (Bava Metzia 26a) resolve that query by explaining that since - as a precaution, to remove dead lizards or other objects that impart ritual impurity - the streets of Jerusalem are swept every day, we can assume that any money lost on the festivals would already have been discovered and these are ordinary funds.
29.
"Tithes," i.e., the second tithe, for it is the only money of the tithes that may not be used in an ordinary manner.
30.
We do not suspect that perhaps the person was carrying ordinary money and the shard from a container in which he had once stored money from the second tithe [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 4:9)].
31.
For then the majority of people in Jerusalem are pilgrims. They bring the money from the second tithes that they collected throughout the year to purchase food in Jerusalem. Thus at that time, most of the money circulating in Jerusalem is from the second tithe.
32.
I.e., not only during the pilgrimage festivals, but throughout the year.
33.
Animal could be purchased with the funds from the second tithe and this indeed was the practice of the majority of the pilgrims [see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 1:4)]. Even during the remainder of the year, there were some pilgrims who came to Jerusalem and they were the majority of the purchasers of animals for slaughter.
34.
People were not allowed to bring money to the Temple Mount (Hilchot Beit HaBechirah7:2). Hence it is most likely that the money found there came from the Temple treasury. Now the priests would not take the money from the Temple treasury until they transferred its holiness to an animal. Hence we can assume that the holiness of the money had already been transferred and the status of the money found was ordinary [see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 7:2)].
35.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that this situation is discussed in greater detail in Pesachim 7a and questions why the Rambam does not cite all the particulars mentioned there.
36.
The Ra'avad states that we should rule stringently and consider the majority as from the second tithe. The Radbaz also suggests that they should be considered as from the second tithe and redeemed on other money.
37.
See parallels in Hilchot Shekalim 3:15;Hilchot Gezeilah ViAveidah 15:18.
38.
As required by Hilchot Terumah 11:7.
39.
See ibid. 7:2.
40.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
41.
The Radbaz states that this is also speaking about a situation where the mixed produce is equidistant from the other two. Chasdei David emphasizes that the Rambam does not say "according to the stringencies that apply to both," because there are no stringencies in the laws applying to the second tithe of demai over produce that is definitely from the second tithe. The stringencies applying to produce that is definitely from the second tithe are mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachot 8-9, Chapter 5, Halachah 4, and Chapter 11, Halachah 8.
42.
Where it is forbidden to redeem produce from the second tithe (Chapter 2, Halachah 8).
43.
Our translation differs from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah and is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings. Note the Kessef Mishnehwhich offers an alternative explanation.
See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:12 which states that the stringency governing an entity that can be permitted applies only to mixtures of the same species.
44.
Because no prohibition will be violated if, as the Rambam continues, the entire mixture will be eaten in a state of ritual impurity.
45.
When it can no longer be redeemed.
46.
And must be treated with all the restrictions incumbent on such produce. This applies even if the seed from which the produce grows decomposes.
47.
At which point it can still be redeemed.
48.
Preferably, one should redeem it so that one is not nullifying a prohibition by leaving it in the ground, for this should not be done as an initial preference (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot16:12). After the fact, however, the prohibition is nullified.
49.
As opposed to other prohibited substances that require 60 or more times the amount of the prohibited substance.
50.
In which instance, the obligation to separate the second tithe is merely Rabbinic in origin (see Chapter 2, Halachah 9, and notes).
51.
Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:11 places restrictions on nullifying substances that can become permitted. Implied is that if a substance cannot become permitted, no such restrictions apply.
---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Five, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Six, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Seven• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Five
Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated.1 [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin2 - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.
Halacha 2
If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, thekiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."
If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned,4 the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.
Halacha 3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year,5 with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer],6 the kiddushin are valid.
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple.7 If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.8
Halacha 4
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's."9
Halacha 5
When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.
When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, the terumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.10
Halacha 6
The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.
When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article,11 and it is known12 that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.
Halacha 8
When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.
If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.13
Halacha 9
When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated.14If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin.15 If, however, she explicitly agreed [to thekiddushin], she is consecrated.
Halacha 11
Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the kiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.16
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.
If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.
Halacha 13
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note,17 she is not consecrated.
What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept askiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ]18 already spent that dinarand has derived benefit from it already.
Halacha 14
[A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral,19 she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.
Halacha 15
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.
What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.
Halacha 16
If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with thisp'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.22
Halacha 17
When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.23
Halacha 18
Halacha 19
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan,26 and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
Halacha 20
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him].27 And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
Halacha 21
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," thekiddushin are binding.28 Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.
Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding29 provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."
Halacha 22
[To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.30
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated.31 For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.
Halacha 23
When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.32
If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.33
Halacha 24
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with thisdinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.34
Halacha 25
[These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuzthat are hidden in the wreath."
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status,37 [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.
Halacha 27
[Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful.
[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, thekiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.
Halacha 28
If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.
Halacha 29
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.38
Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to the Torah, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p'rutah.
2.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.
From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.
In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Karo follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it askiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)
The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding.
Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam's perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.
Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p'rutah must be given. Since according to Scriptural law the article has intrinsic worth, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context.
3.
See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.
4.
For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.)
5.
Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman.
6.
As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10, based onKiddushin 58a), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given.
7.
See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:3.
8.
For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person's private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me'ilah 6:3.)
9.
We are required to eat the produce of the second tithe in Jerusalem or redeem it and use the money to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Although one derives personal benefit from eating this produce, it is not considered to be one's own property.
10.
In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah's decree - and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity - once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.
11.
A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner's despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner's property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article - for she is a third party - the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh).
12.
The Rambam's intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushinare invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda Biy'hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77).
13.
The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam's own addition. The Noda Biy'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.
The Edut BiY'hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushinare valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person's taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.
The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. The Chatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object's worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of thekiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.
14.
We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi,Kiddushin 52b). There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not he is obligated to return the value of the stolen property to her. The Rashba maintains that he is not required, while Rabbenu Nissim states that he is. (See the Ramah and commentaries, Even HaEzer 28:2.)
15.
For she merely accepted her own property.
16.
Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.
17.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p'rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding.
18.
I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender's, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel28:19.
19.
Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that thekiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it also quotes the other opinion.
20.
Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri,Ma'aseh Rokeach) explain that the Rambam's wording is precise. The expression "like interest" implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural law.
21.
The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin 6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra'avad. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam's interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushinare binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Ramah, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam's view.
22.
Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p'rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushin are binding (Kiddushin 46a).
23.
As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt. This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural law.
There are opinions that maintain that the woman is not consecrated. These opinions maintain that even after such a transfer has been made, the original creditor can nullify a debt that has been transferred through such a process. Since there is a possibility that the debt will be nullified, they maintain that the woman will not make the commitment required by kiddushin. (See Rabbenu Nissim and the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer28:13 and commentaries.)
24.
Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of theMishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: "If a p'rutah's worth of the article remains..." - i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p'rutah's worth remains - the consecration is binding. See theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries.
25.
If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.
Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman's property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make thekiddushin effective.
26.
Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah.
27.
I.e., it is not as if the man's entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan.
28.
Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.
The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman's suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman's offer of kiddushin. The Ramah (Even HaEzer29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed the kiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear.
29.
Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two - because the servant's owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself - the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above.
30.
Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.
31.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by "an important person." Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21).
32.
Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.
33.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushinare not binding.
34.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemblechalifin (barter).
The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages' decree (Or Sameach).
35.
I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards to be consecrated she must explicitly express her consent. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs and maintains that in such an instance there is a doubt whether or not the kiddushin are binding, and the more stringent ruling must be followed in every instance. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:5).
36.
As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.
37.
In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, noting thatKiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10 andHilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon's reasoning.
In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon's view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon's reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit.
38.
Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but - in the Talmudic era - it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil - in the Talmudic era - was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.
Ishut - Chapter Six
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the kiddushin are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman.
Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard tokiddushin, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules.1
Halacha 2
These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements:2
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional;3
d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met.
Halacha 3
What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the dinar, the condition is valid, and the kiddushin are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 zuz, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 4
If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.
[The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time;4she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all.
Halacha 5
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
Halacha 6
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
Halacha 7
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the dinar in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the kiddushin are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with thisdinar. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your get. But if you do not eat it, the get is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the dinaror the get in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced.
Halacha 9
With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say:5 "Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"?6
When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you."
Halacha 10
What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding,7 for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations.
Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks,8 she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 11
If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of kiddushin or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
Halacha 12
If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
Halacha 13
Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence.
Halacha 14
Some of the later geonim9 maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to kiddushin and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made.
It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither kiddushin nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great geonim of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it.10
Halacha 15
When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the kiddushin become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original] kiddushin.
What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 zuzthis year, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her thedinar in Nisan, but gave her the 200 zuz that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second.
Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed.11
Halacha 16
When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this dinar if I give you 200 zuz,"12 when at a later date he gives her the 200 zuz she is consecrated. Retroactively, the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law.
Halacha 17
Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation,13 nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.14 Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation.
When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording al menat ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply.15 It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.
Halacha 18
What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 zuz," "here is your get on condition that you give me 200 zuz," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 zuz," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200zuz. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field.
[The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the kiddushin or the get in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.16
FOOTNOTES
1.
See Halachah 14 and notes.
2.
We find a conditional agreement in the Torah: Moses' granting the lands of Transjordan to the tribes of Reuven and Gad (Numbers 32:29-30). All these four rules were evident in Moses' phrasing of the stipulation. Accordingly, our Sages (Kiddushin 61a) consider this a prototype for all future conditional agreements.
3.
This is the Rambam's interpretation of the requirement that in its Hebrew original states: שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. The Ra'avad (in his gloss on Halachah 4) interprets the phrase differently. He states that in the wording of the person making the stipulation, the stipulation must be stated before the result of its completion: e.g., "If you give me 200 zuz, you will be consecrated..., and if you do not give me that sum, you will not be consecrated." TheBeit Shmuel 38:2 accepts the Ra'avad's interpretation and not that of the Rambam.
4.
We have chosen a very loose translation. The Hebrew toch kedei dibbur has a precise connotation, meaning the amount of time it takes to say the words Shalom alecha rabbi umori.
5.
Kiddushin 19b.
6.
An exception is made with regard to financial matters, because with regard to these matters the Torah grants the person the right to waive monetary privileges that are due him. Privileges that are not monetary in nature may not be waived.
7.
Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia, the conclusion of Chapter 7), the Ritba (Kiddushin 19a) and the Mordechai (gloss on Bava Metzia 93a) maintain that even conjugal rights can be considered to be a financial consideration, for it is a matter of physical pleasure. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted as halachah. Instead, withholding conjugal relations is considered a matter of physical anguish. Hence a woman does not have the prerogative of waiving this right.
8.
Deuteronomy 21:11-14 describes the right of a soldier to have relations with a female captive of war whom he desires. Once he has relations with her, he may no longer treat her as a servant.
9.
The commentaries have pointed to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni HaCohen.
10.
The Ra'avad, the Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam's reasoning. According to the position of these authorities, it is only one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the rules regarding conditional agreements were derived from the agreement made between Moses and the tribes of Reuven and Gad. They maintain that the need to repeat the condition applies only with regard to kiddushin, and was instituted only because of the severity of the establishment and annulment of the marriage relationship. With regard to other matters, however, there is no such requirement. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:9) follow the Rambam's view.
11.
The above applies when the agreement is made verbally. If, however, a conditional sale or a present is recorded in a legal document, it is considered to be effective retroactively from the date stated in the document, although the stipulation is not carried out until much later.
Others maintain that the same principle applies with regard to a get, and if a date is included in a conditional bill of divorce, the divorce is retroactively effective from the date of the get, even though the stipulation is carried out much later. As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 8:1, the Rambam does not follow this approach. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 143:2.)
12.
In such an instance, the stipulation need not be restated, as mentioned in the following halachah.
13.
Since the condition does not have to be restated, there is also no need for the positive statement to precede the negative.
14.
This follows the Rambam's interpretation of the Talmud's wording שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה, as explained in Halachah 2.
15.
Tosafot and many subsequent Ashkenazic authorities do not accept this ruling. The difference of opinion is noted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4).
16.
Among the other rationales offered are that the rules for a conditional agreement are derived from the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and in that instance that condition was phrased using the term "if," rather than "from this time onward" or "on condition that" (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The Ra'avad explains that stating a stipulation using the wording "if" nullifies the act the person performs. For a stipulation to have this power, it must be worded precisely. If, however, the wording "on condition that" or "from now onward" is used, the implication is that the act is not nullified, but is merely dependent on the fulfillment of the condition. Since the stipulation is not that powerful, its wording need not be as precise.
Ishut - Chapter Seven
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated.1 If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated.2
[If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so thekiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.3
Halacha 2
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain."4 If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.5
Halacha 3
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.6
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him.
If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow akor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown.7 If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments.8 If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these."
If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these."
What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained.9 In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women,10 a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead.
This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as anisar11 even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.
Halacha 8
When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.12
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her,13 she is consecrated.
Halacha 9
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes.14
When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.15
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated.
[If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuzafter 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 11
If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.16
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter,17 and] both [men] are considered as having establishedkiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her.18 The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days19 or afterwards.
[Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.
Halacha 13
When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and thesekiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of thekiddushin.20
If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.21
Halacha 14
When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again22 until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushinestablished by the second p'rutah.
If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude],"23 "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies,"24 she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.25
Halacha 15
Halacha 16
When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence.28If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated.29 [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.
Halacha 17
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar].
When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100].30 Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given.
Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated.31 [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [the kiddushin are valid, provided]32 he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire,33 and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.
Halacha 19
A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home.
[The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.
Halacha 20
When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid.34 Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.
Halacha 21
When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid.35[If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found].
Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, thekiddushin are not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives thekiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].
Halacha 22
Halacha 23
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to thekiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence.38
Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to thekiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]39even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her.
Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than a p'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate.
[The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.40
FOOTNOTES
1.
It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father's consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra'avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer38:8) quotes the Rambam's wording.
2.
There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of "consent": a) to say "yes," b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra'avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.
3.
Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband. Were the father to indeed consent, she would be under obligation either to marry the deceased's brother, or have the obligation removed through chalitzah.
4.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that thekiddushin would be void.
5.
I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her originalkiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.
6.
Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people's knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present, or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer38:20) quotes the Rambam's decision.
7.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation, and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field.
8.
The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)
Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving ענוי נפש, "the oppression of the soul" (cf. Numbers 30:14). Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.
In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving ענוי נפש; it also includes those בינו לבינה, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17). (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, andShulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, Chapter 234.)
9.
Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed.
10.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5).
11.
An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah,Kiddushin 1:1).
12.
She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.
This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.
13.
A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them. (See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 4.)
The kiddushin are binding only when the wise man nullifies the vows before the woman's intended husband discovers their existence. Once he discovers that she is bound by vows, the kiddushin are nullified even when she has the vows nullified afterwards (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer39:2).
14.
The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes," the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).
15.
The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason the kiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.
Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man's nullification and a physician's healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of thekiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of thekiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.
16.
From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man's kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin 59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman's acceptance of the second kiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah and Tur,Even HaEzer 40:2.)
17.
Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying thekiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying "after 30 days," the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man's kiddushin would be binding.
Significantly, if a person made a similar statement with regard to a sale, the Rambam rules (Hilchot Mechirah 2:9) that this is a conditional statement. Thus, it appears that his ruling here is a stringency, accepted because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce.
18.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruchdoes not quote this ruling, many later authorities do.
19.
Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce.
20.
The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond of kiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 38:68, there are authorities who maintain that thekiddushin are not binding at all.
21.
For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.
22.
In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Karo rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated.
23.
This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant.
24.
I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman's sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may.
25.
Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time thekiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is "something that has not come into the world," for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.
26.
I.e., when a woman's husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite of chalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed.
27.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since thekiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect, kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:6) rules that even when a conditional statement is made, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. There are some manuscripts of theMishneh Torah that indicate that the Rambam also shared that view.
28.
For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist.
29.
The Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh and theKessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage.
30.
Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a).
31.
For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushinwould be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 29:7.)
32.
The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling.
33.
The Rambam's wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel31:1.)
Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk: Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily - e.g., a precious stone - a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert's appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone.
34.
For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. As such he is acting on his own initiative, and not as the agent of the principal.
35.
Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.
36.
Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.
37.
Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person's retraction is of no consequence.)
38.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam's decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)
The Rashba accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to conditions involving money - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you give me 200 zuz." For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows" - he does not accept the Rambam's position. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam's ruling.
39.
I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establishkiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Ramah, Even HaEzer 38:35).
40.
In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Thursday, Shevat 18, 5776 · 28 January 2016
"Today's Day"
Sunday Sh'vat 18 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Yitro, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 88-89.
Tanya: Ch. 23. In the light (p. 93)...clothed in the worlds. (p. 93).
The Tzemach Tzedek told his son, my grandfather, that the maamar Umareihem uma'asseihem in Torah Or, Yitro, is the first discourse the Maggid delivered when he assumed leadership of the chassidim, on Shavuot 5521 (1761). The Alter Rebbe heard the maamar from R. Mendel Horodoker,1 author of Pri Haaretz, who had been present that Shavuot in 5521. However, the Alter Rebbe expounded the maamar in his own style.
FOOTNOTES
1. See "Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi," index on "Menachem Mendel of Vitebsk."---------------------
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Thursday, Shevat 18, 5776 · 28 January 2016
"Today's Day"
Sunday Sh'vat 18 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Yitro, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 88-89.
Tanya: Ch. 23. In the light (p. 93)...clothed in the worlds. (p. 93).
The Tzemach Tzedek told his son, my grandfather, that the maamar Umareihem uma'asseihem in Torah Or, Yitro, is the first discourse the Maggid delivered when he assumed leadership of the chassidim, on Shavuot 5521 (1761). The Alter Rebbe heard the maamar from R. Mendel Horodoker,1 author of Pri Haaretz, who had been present that Shavuot in 5521. However, the Alter Rebbe expounded the maamar in his own style.
FOOTNOTES
1. See "Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi," index on "Menachem Mendel of Vitebsk."---------------------
• Daily Thought:
Untraditional Life
These words that I command you today should be upon your heart.
[Deuteronomy 6:6].
Every day, the words of the Torah must be new to you.
Sifri, Rashi.
Tradition is not life. Tradition preserves life. But it does not give life.
Goals are not life. Goals inspire life. But they are not life.
Life is here in this moment now. To be alive, every moment must be a moment that never happened before.
Which means that Torah must not be about tradition. It cannot be grounded on a memory of the past. Those are important, truly vital. But a Torah life cannot be built upon them.
Real life, Torah life, is about who you are now, where the core of your soul lies at this very moment.
For if it is not about the moment now, then it is not your life. And if it is not your life, then what is?[
Maamar Tziyon BeMishpat 5736.]
No comments:
Post a Comment