Thursday, February 18, 2016

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Friday, February 19, 2016 - Today is: Friday, Adar I 10, 5776 · February 19, 2016 · Candle Lighting · Light Candles before sunset

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Friday, February 19, 2016 - Today is: Friday, Adar I 10, 5776 · February 19, 2016 · Candle Lighting · Light Candles before sunset
Daily Quote:
One whom people are pleased with, G-d is pleased with him; but one whom people are not pleased with, G-d is not pleased with him[Ethics of the Fathers 3:10]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Tetzaveh, 6th Portion Exodus 29:38-29:46 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Exodus Chapter 29
38And this is what you shall offer upon the altar: lambs in their first year, two a day, continually. לחוְזֶ֕ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּ֑חַ כְּבָשִׂ֧ים בְּנֵֽי־שָׁנָ֛ה שְׁנַ֥יִם לַיּ֖וֹם תָּמִֽיד:
39The one lamb you shall offer up in the morning and the other lamb you shall offer up in the afternoon. לטאֶת־הַכֶּ֥בֶשׂ הָֽאֶחָ֖ד תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה בַבֹּ֑קֶר וְאֵת֙ הַכֶּ֣בֶשׂ הַשֵּׁנִ֔י תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה בֵּ֥ין הָֽעַרְבָּֽיִם:
40And one tenth of fine flour, thoroughly mixed with a quarter of a hin of crushed [olive] oil, and a libation of one quarter of a hin of wine, for the one lamb. מוְעִשָּׂרֹ֨ן סֹ֜לֶת בָּל֨וּל בְּשֶׁ֤מֶן כָּתִית֙ רֶ֣בַע הַהִ֔ין וְנֵ֕סֶךְ רְבִיעִ֥ת הַהִ֖ין יָ֑יִן לַכֶּ֖בֶשׂ הָֽאֶחָֽד:
And one-tenth of fine flour: A tenth of an ephah, [the volume of] forty-three and one-fifth eggs. ועשרון סולת: עשירית האיפה, ארבעים ושלש ביצים וחומש ביצה:
of crushed [olive] oil: Crushed is not stated as being obligatory, but [simply] to make it acceptable. Since it says: “crushed for lighting” (Exod. 27:20), implying “for [use as] lighting” but not [to be used] for meal offerings, I would possibly think [that the verse means] to disqualify it for meal offerings. Therefore, the Torah states here, “crushed.” Consequently, “crushed for lighting” was stated only to exclude meal offerings, that they do not require crushed [oil], for even oil ground in a mill is acceptable for them. -[from Men. 86b] בשמן כתית: לא לחובה נאמר כתית אלא להכשיר, לפי שנאמר (לעיל כז כ) כתית למאור, ומשמע למאור ולא למנחות, יכול לפסלו למנחות, תלמוד לומר כאן כתית, ולא נאמר (שמות כז כ) כתית למאור אלא למעט מנחות שאין צריך כתית, שאף הטחון בריחים כשר בהן:
a quarter of a hin: Three logs. רבע ההין: שלשה לוגין:
and a libation: for the basins, as we learned in tractate Succah (48a): Two silver basins were at the top of the altar, and they were perforated like two fine nostrils. He [the kohen] would pour the wine into it [these basins], and it would flow and exit through the “nostril” and fall on the roof of the altar, from where it would descend [through holes in the altar] to the foundations, in the altar of the Temple, and in the copper altar it would descend from the altar to the ground. ונסך: לספלים, כמו ששנינו במסכת סוכה (מח א) שני ספלים של כסף היו בראש המזבח, ומנוקבים כמין שני חוטמין דקים, נותן היין לתוכו והוא מקלח ויוצא דרך החוטם ונופל על גג המזבח, ומשם יורד לשיתין במזבח בית עולמים, ובמזבח הנחשת יורד מן המזבח לארץ:
41And the other lamb you shall offer up in the afternoon; you shall offer [it] up like the meal offering of the morning and its libation, as a spirit of satisfaction, a fire offering to the Lord. מאוְאֵת֙ הַכֶּ֣בֶשׂ הַשֵּׁנִ֔י תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה בֵּ֣ין הָֽעַרְבָּ֑יִם כְּמִנְחַ֨ת הַבֹּ֤קֶר וּכְנִסְכָּהּ֙ תַּֽעֲשֶׂה־לָּ֔הּ לְרֵ֣יחַ נִיחֹ֔חַ אִשֶּׁ֖ה לַֽיהֹוָֽה:
as a spirit of satisfaction: This is stated regarding the meal offering, for the meal offering of libations is entirely burned, and the order of their sacrifice is: first the limbs [of the burnt offering] and afterwards the meal offering, as it is said: “burnt offering and meal offering” (Lev. 23:37). לריח ניחח: על המנחה נאמר, שמנחת נסכים כולה כליל, וסדר הקרבתן האיברים בתחלה ואחר כך המנחה, שנאמר (ויקרא כג לז) עולה ומנחה:
42It shall be a continual burnt offering for your generations, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting before the Lord, where I will arrange meetings with you, to speak to you there. מבעֹלַ֤ת תָּמִיד֙ לְדֹרֹ֣תֵיכֶ֔ם פֶּ֥תַח אֹֽהֶל־מוֹעֵ֖ד לִפְנֵ֣י יְהֹוָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר אִוָּעֵ֤ד לָכֶם֙ שָׁ֔מָּה לְדַבֵּ֥ר אֵלֶ֖יךָ שָֽׁם:
continual: Daily, without a day intervening. תמיד: מיום אל יום, ולא יפסיק יום בינתים:
where I will arrange meetings with you: When I arrange a time to speak to you, I will arrange it to come there. Some of our Rabbis derive from here that since the time the Mishkan was erected, the Holy One, blessed is He, spoke to Moses from above the copper altar. Others, however, say that [He spoke to Moses] from above the ark cover, as it is said: “and I will speak with you from atop the ark cover” (Exod. 25:22), and “where I will arrange meetings with you,” stated here, is not stated about the altar but about the Tent of Meeting mentioned in the verse. -[from Baraitha Melecheth HaMishkan, ch. 14] אשר אועד לכם: כשאקבע מועד לדבר אליך שם אקבענו לבא. ויש מרבותינו למדים מכאן, שמעל מזבח הנחשת היה הקב"ה מדבר עם משה משהוקם המשכן, ויש אומרים מעל הכפרת, כמו שנאמר (שמות כה כב) ודברתי אתך מעל הכפורת, ואשר אועד לכם האמור כאן אינו אמור על המזבח, אלא על אהל מועד הנזכר במקרא:
43There I will arrange meetings with the children of Israel, and it will be sanctified by My glory. מגוְנֹֽעַדְתִּ֥י שָׁ֖מָּה לִבְנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וְנִקְדַּ֖שׁ בִּכְבֹדִֽי:
There I will arrange meetings: I will arrange to speak with them [the children of Israel], as a king who arranges a place to speak there with his servants. ונועדתי שמה: אתועד עמם בדבור, כמלך הקובע מקום מועד לדבר עם עבדיו שם:
and it will be sanctified: [I.e.,] the Mishkan [will be sanctified]. ונקדש: המשכן:
by My glory: Heb. בִּכְבֹדִי. That My Shechinah will dwell in it. The aggadic midrash, however, says: Do not read בִּכְבֹדִי, but בִּמְכֻבָּדַי, with My honored ones. Here He hinted to him [Moses] about the death of Aaron’s sons on the day it [the Mishkan] was erected. This is what Moses [meant when he] said, “This is what the Lord spoke, saying, ‘With those close to Me I will be sanctified’” (Lev. 10:3). Now where did He speak? “And it will be sanctified by My glory.” -[from Sifra, Lev. 10:3; Zev. 115b] בכבודי: שתשרה שכינתי בו. ומדרש אגדה אל תקרי בכבודי, אלא [בכבודי], במכובדים שלי, כאן רמז לו מיתת בני אהרן ביום הקמתו, וזהו שאמר משה (ויקרא י ג) הוא אשר דבר ה' לאמר בקרובי אקדש, והיכן דבר, ונקדש בכבודי:
44I will sanctify the Tent of Meeting and the altar, and I will sanctify Aaron and his sons to serve Me [as kohanim]. מדוְקִדַּשְׁתִּ֛י אֶת־אֹ֥הֶל מוֹעֵ֖ד וְאֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּ֑חַ וְאֶת־אַֽהֲרֹ֧ן וְאֶת־בָּנָ֛יו אֲקַדֵּ֖שׁ לְכַהֵ֥ן לִֽי:
45I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel and I will be their God. מהוְשָׁ֣כַנְתִּ֔י בְּת֖וֹךְ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וְהָיִ֥יתִי לָהֶ֖ם לֵֽאלֹהִֽים:
46They will know that I, the Lord, am their God, Who brought them out of the land of Egypt in order that I may dwell in their midst; I am the Lord, their God. מווְיָֽדְע֗וּ כִּ֣י אֲנִ֤י יְהֹוָה֙ אֱלֹ֣הֵיהֶ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֨ר הוֹצֵ֧אתִי אֹתָ֛ם מֵאֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרַ֖יִם לְשָׁכְנִ֣י בְתוֹכָ֑ם אֲנִ֖י יְהֹוָ֥ה אֱלֹֽהֵיהֶֽם:
in order that I may dwell in their midst: With the intention that I dwell in their midst. לשכני בתוכם: על מנת לשכון אני בתוכם:
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Tehillim: Chapters 55 - 59
Hebrew text
English text
• Chapter 55
David composed this psalm upon escaping from Jerusalem in the face of the slanderers, Doeg and Achitofel, who had declared him deserving of death. David had considered Achitofel a friend and accorded him the utmost honor, but Achitofel betrayed him and breached their covenant. David curses all his enemies, so that all generations should "know, and sin no more."
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music, a maskil by David.
2. Listen to my prayer, O God, do not hide from my pleas.
3. Pay heed to me and answer me, as I lament in my distress and moan -
4. because of the shout of the enemy and the oppression of the wicked; for they accuse me of evil and hate me passionately.
5. My heart shudders within me, and the terrors of death have descended upon me.
6. Fear and trembling penetrate me, and I am enveloped with horror.
7. And I said, "If only I had wings like the dove! I would fly off and find rest.
8. Behold, I would wander afar, and lodge in the wilderness forever.
9. I would hurry to find shelter for myself from the stormy wind, from the tempest.”
10. Consume, O Lord, confuse their tongue; for I have seen violence and strife in the city.1
11. Day and night they encircle her upon her walls, and iniquity and vice are in her midst.
12. Treachery is within her; fraud and deceit never depart from her square.
13. For it is not the enemy who taunts me-that I could bear; nor my foe who raises himself against me, that I could hide from him.
14. But it is you, a man of my equal, my guide and my intimate.
15. Together we took sweet counsel; we walked with the throng to the house of God.
16. May He incite death upon them, let them descend to the pit alive; for there is evil in their dwelling, within them.
17. As for me, I call to God, and the Lord will save me.
18. Evening, morning and noon, I lament and moan-and He hears my voice.
19. He redeemed my soul in peace from battles against me, because of the many who were with me.
20. May God-He who is enthroned from the days of old, Selah-hear and humble those in whom there is no change, and who do not fear God.
21. He extended his hands against his allies, he profaned his covenant.
22. Smoother than butter are the words of his mouth, but war is in his heart; his words are softer than oil, yet they are curses.
23. Cast your burden upon the Lord, and He will sustain you; He will never let the righteous man falter.
24. And You, O God, will bring them down to the nethermost pit; bloodthirsty and treacherous men shall not live out half their days; but I will trust in You.
FOOTNOTES
1.Jerusalem.
Chapter 56
David composed this psalm while in mortal danger at the palace of Achish, brother of Goliath. In his distress David accepts vows upon himself.
1. For the Conductor, of the mute dove1 far away. By David, a michtam, 2 when the Philistines seized him in Gath.
2. Favor me, O God, for man longs to swallow me; the warrior oppresses me every day.
3. My watchful enemies long to swallow me every day, for many battle me, O Most High!
4. On the day I am afraid, I trust in You.
5. [I trust] in God and praise His word; in God I trust, I do not fear-what can [man of] flesh do to me?
6. Every day they make my words sorrowful; all their thoughts about me are for evil.
7. They gather and hide, they watch my steps, when they hope [to capture] my soul.
8. Should escape be theirs in reward for their iniquity? Cast down the nations in anger, O God!
9. You have counted my wanderings; place my tears in Your flask-are they not in Your record?
10. When my enemies will retreat on the day I cry out, with this I will know that God is with me.
11. When God deals strictly, I praise His word; when the Lord deals mercifully, I praise His word.
12. In God I trust, I do not fear-what can man do to me?
13. My vows to You are upon me, O God; I will repay with thanksgiving offerings to You.
14. For You saved my soul from death-even my feet from stumbling-to walk before God in the light of life.
FOOTNOTES
1.David having fled from Jerusalem, is silenced by fear (Rashi/Metzudot).
2.A psalm that was especially precious to David
Chapter 57
David composed this psalm while hiding from Saul in a cave, facing grave danger. Like Jacob did when confronted with Esau, David prayed that he neither be killed nor be forced to kill. In the merit of his trust in God, God wrought wonders to save him.
1. For the Conductor, a plea to be spared destruction. By David, a michtam, when he fled from Saul in the cave.
2. Favor me, O God, favor me, for in You my soul took refuge, and in the shadow of Your wings I will take refuge until the disaster passes.
3. I will call to God the Most High; to the Almighty Who fulfills [His promise] to me.
4. He will send from heaven, and save me from the humiliation of those who long to swallow me, Selah; God will send forth His kindness and truth.
5. My soul is in the midst of lions, I lie among fiery men; their teeth are spears and arrows, their tongue a sharp sword.
6. Be exalted above the heavens, O God; let Your glory be upon all the earth.
7. They laid a trap for my steps, they bent down my soul; they dug a pit before me, [but] they themselves fell into it, Selah.
8. My heart is steadfast, O God, my heart is steadfast; I will sing and chant praise.
9. Awake, my soul! Awake, O harp and lyre! I shall awaken the dawn.
10. I will thank You among the nations, my Lord; I will praise You among the peoples.
11. For Your kindness reaches till the heavens, Your truth till the skies.
12. Be exalted above the heavens, O God; let Your glory be over all the earth.
Chapter 58
David expresses the anguish caused him by Avner and his other enemies, who justified Saul's pursuit of him.
1. For the Conductor, a plea to be spared destruction; by David, a michtam.
2. Is it true that you are mute [instead of] speaking justice? [Instead of] judging men with fairness?
3. Even with your heart you wreak injustice upon the land; you justify the violence of your hands.
4. The wicked are estranged from the womb; from birth do the speakers of falsehood stray.
5. Their venom is like the venom of a snake; like the deaf viper that closes its ear
6. so as not to hear the voice of charmers, [even] the most skillful caster of spells.
7. O God, smash their teeth in their mouth; shatter the fangs of the young lions, O Lord.
8. Let them melt like water and disappear; when He aims His arrows, may they crumble.
9. Like the snail that melts as it goes along, like the stillbirth of a woman-they never see the sun.
10. Before your tender shoots know [to become] hardened thorns, He will blast them away, as one [uprooting] with vigor and wrath.
11. The righteous one will rejoice when he sees revenge; he will bathe his feet in the blood of the wicked.
12. And man will say, "There is indeed reward for the righteous; indeed there is a God Who judges in the land."
Chapter 59
This psalm speaks of the great miracle David experienced when he eluded danger by escaping through a window, unnoticed by the guards at the door. The prayers, supplications, and entreaties he offered then are recorded here.
1. For the Conductor, a plea to be spared destruction, By David, a michtam, when Saul dispatched [men], and they guarded the house in order to kill him.
2. Rescue me from my enemies, my God; raise me above those who rise against me.
3. Rescue me from evildoers, save me from men of bloodshed.
4. For behold they lie in ambush for my soul, mighty ones gather against me-not because of my sin nor my transgression, O Lord.
5. Without iniquity [on my part,] they run and prepare-awaken towards me and see!
6. And You, Lord, God of Hosts, God of Israel, wake up to remember all the nations; do not grant favor to any of the iniquitous traitors, Selah.
7. They return toward evening, they howl like the dog and circle the city.
8. Behold, they spew with their mouths, swords are in their lips, for [they say], "Who hears?”
9. But You, Lord, You laugh at them; You mock all nations.
10. [Because of] his might, I wait for You, for God is my stronghold.
11. The God of my kindness will anticipate my [need]; God will show me [the downfall] of my watchful foes.
12. Do not kill them, lest my nation forget; drive them about with Your might and impoverish them, O our Shield, my Master,
13. [for] the sin of their mouth, the word of their lips; let them be trapped by their arrogance. At the sight of their accursed state and deterioration, [people] will recount.
14. Consume them in wrath, consume them and they will be no more; and they will know that God rules in Jacob, to the ends of the earth, Selah.
15. And they will return toward evening, they will howl like the dog and circle the city.
16. They will wander about to eat; when they will not be sated they will groan.
17. As for me, I shall sing of Your might, and sing joyously of Your kindness toward morning, for You have been a stronghold to me, a refuge on the day of my distress.
18. [You are] my strength, to You I will sing, for God is my stronghold, the God of my kindness.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 29

Lessons in Tanya
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• Daily Tanya
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 29
• Friday, Adar I 10, 5776 · February 19, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 29
והסיבה היא גסות הקליפה, שמגביה עצמה על אור קדושת נפש האלקית, ומסתרת ומחשיכה אורה
The cause of this deficiency is the arrogance of the kelipah of the animal soul, which exalts itself above the holiness of the light of the divine soul, so that it obscures and darkens its light.
ולזאת צריך לבטשה ולהשפילה לעפר
Therefore, one must crush it and cast it down to the ground, just as in the previously quoted analogy the beam is splintered so that it will catch fire.
The Alter Rebbe now proceeds to explain how this is accomplished. He points out that the personality of the Beinoni is his animal soul. (When a Beinoni says “I,” he is referring to his animal soul.) Thus, by crushing his own spirit, he crushes the sitra achra, and thereby enables the light of the soul and intellect to penetrate himself.
דהיינו לקבוע עתים להשפיל עצמו, להיות נבזה בעיניו נמאס, ככתוב
This means that one must crush the sitra achra and cast it to the ground bysetting aside appointed times for humbling oneself and considering himself1 “despicable and contemptible,” as it is written.
ולב נשבר רוח נשברה היא הסטרא אחרא, שהיא היא האדם עצמו בבינונים
Now2 “A broken heart [leads to] a broken spirit,” the “spirit” being thesitra achra which, in the case of Beinonim, is the very man himself.
שנפש החיונית המחיה הגוף היא בתקפה כתולדתה בלבו, נמצא היא היא האדם עצמו
For in his heart the vital soul which animates the body is in its full strength as it was at birth; hence it is indeed the very man himself.
ועל נפש האלקית שבו, נאמר: נשמה שנתת בי טהורה היא, שנתת בי דייקא, מכלל שהאדם עצמו איננו הנשמה הטהורה, כי אם בצדיקים
With regard to the divine soul within him it is said: 3 “The soul which You gave within me is pure.” The word “(within) me” cannot be understood as referring to the body alone: the body cannot speak for itself as a complete man. Thus, it must refer also to the (animating) soul. Therefore, the words “(which You gave) within me” imply that the man himself who is saying these words is not identified with the “pure soul”; i.e., the divine soul is a thing apart, which has been “placed within” this “me” — the body and animal soul — except in the case of tzaddikim.
שבהם הוא להפך: שנשמה הטהורה שהיא נפש האלקית הוא האדם, וגופם נקרא בשר אדם
With them the contrary is true: the man himself is the “pure soul,” i.e, the divine soul, while their body is called “the flesh of man” i.e., secondary to the man himself — the divine soul.
FOOTNOTES
1.
A play [on words] in Tehillim 15:4.
2.
Cf. Tehillim 51:19.
3.
Morning liturgy; Berachot 60b.
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Rambam:

• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Friday, Adar I 10, 5776 · February 19, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 161
The High Priest Marrying a Widow
"A widow... he not marry"—Leviticus 21:14.
A High Priest is forbidden to marry a widow.
(Actually, it is forbidden for a High Priest to have sexual relations with a widow—even without marriage. Thus, if he marries a widow and has relations with her, he transgresses two prohibitions.)
Full text of this Mitzvah »
The High Priest Marrying a Widow
Negative Commandment 161
Translated by Berel Bell
The 161st prohibition is that the Kohen gadol — and only he1 — is forbidden from marrying a widow.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "He must not marry a widow, a divorcee, a chalalah or a zonah."
The Torah repeats the prohibition regarding the divorcee, chalalah and zonah for a Kohen gadol [even though he, as a Kohen, is already prohibited by virtue of the previous prohibitions] to cover the case described in tractate Kiddushin. That is, if the same woman was a widow, divorcee, zonah and chalalah — a Kohen gadol who had relations with her would receive four sets of lashes, and a regular Kohen who had relations with her would receive three sets. The statement there is, " 'a widow, a divorcee, a chalalah or a zonah' — if these [disqualifications] happened in order, he is punished for each separately." They thereby explain that this refers to one woman [with all four disqualifications].
When the Sages said, "in order," they meant that these disqualifications occurred [to her] in the order given in the verse, i.e. first she was widowed; then [she remarried and was subsequently] divorced; then became a chalalah3; and then a zonah.4
The reason we are forced to say this [i.e. that the four disqualifications happened in this order], because we wish to find a case where he receives four sets of lashes for one woman in one act of intercourse. There is, however, a principle that a single act can not entail more than one prohibition, unless it is an issur mosif,5 an issur kollel,6 or an issur bas achas,7 as we explained in our commentary on tractate K'risus.8 If the [four disqualifications] occur in this order, each will be an issur mosif, as we explained there.9
If, however, [the prohibitions were associated with] different women — i.e. he had relations with [four different women,] one widow, one chalalah, one zonah, and one divorcee — it is obvious that he would receive lashes for each separate case.10
However, someone might ask the following question: "since we have a principle that one does not receive [more than one set of] lashes for a 'collective prohibition,'11 why should he receive lashes for each one [of the four]? They are all included in one statement?!"
You should know that because of this question, the Torah repeats the prohibition regarding a divorcee, zonah, and chalalah when mentioning the Kohen gadol. This teaches us that regarding them, he is just like a regular Kohen, who receives lashes for each prohibition individually.
[And how do we know this itself — that they count separately for the regular Kohen? The proof is as follows:] the regular Kohen receives lashes for each separately because since one of them was singled out, we learn that all count separately. It is [singled out in] the statement,12 "[they shall not marry a woman who is a zonah or a chalalah;] they shall not marry a woman who has been divorced from her husband." Since the divorcee was singled out,13 and he is lashed separately for this, [we derive that] so too he is lashed separately for the zonah and separately for the chalalah.
This is the meaning of the statement of our Sages in tractate Kiddushin,14 "just as the divorcee is singled out from the chalalah and zonah for a regular Kohen, so too are they separated for the Kohen gadol." There it is also explained that if they were different women, he receives lashes for each one separately, whether or not they were in this order.
We have therefore explained that each of these counts as a separate mitzvah, and therefore one receives lashes for each one separately.
It is also explained there that the regular Kohen never receives lashes unless he marries her and has relations with her, as they said, "if he had relations,15 he receives lashes, if he did not have relations,16 he does not receive lashes. [How do we know this?] One statement explains the other:17 Why does it say, 'he must not marry'? In order that, 'he must not profane.' "18
These four mitzvos are fully explained in tractates Yevamos and Kiddushin.
FOOTNOTES
1.As opposed to a regular Kohen.
2.Lev. 21:14.
3.Through marrying a Kohen, who was forbidden to her since she was divorced.
4.Through having relations with a non-Jew, for example, or incestual relations. A Kohen gadol who thereafter had relations with this woman would receive four sets of lashes.
5.An "extended prohibition," i.e. more people are affected by the second prohibition. For example, as a widow, only a Kohen gadol could not marry her, whereas a regular Kohen could. When she later remarries and divorces, she becomes prohibited to a regular Kohen as well. Therefore, the Kohen gadol who marries her gets two prohibitions.
6.An "inclusive prohibition," i.e. more objects are affected by the second prohibition. For example, one who eats non-kosher food on Yom Kippur would be guilty of two prohibitions. This is because the first prohibition covers only non-kosher food. The second, Yom Kippur, is more inclusive, covering kosher food as well.
7.A "simultaneous prohibition," i.e. that both prohibitions came into existence at the same time. For example, someone tore a limb from an animal, rendering the animal treifa in the process. The meat became eiver min hachai (N182) and treifa (N181) simultaneously, and the person who eats it is therefore guilty of two prohibitions.
8.Ch. 3, Mishneh 4.
9.When she was a widow, she was prohibited only to a Kohen gadol. Once she is divorced, she is also prohibited to a regular Kohen, but is still allowed to eat terumah. When she becomes a chalalah, she may no longer eat terumah. When she becomes a zonah, she would become prohibited even to her non-kohen husband, since a married woman who has relations with another man becomes prohibited to her husband. Therefore, each of the four prohibitions adds to the previous one. If, on the other hand, she was first divorced and then widowed, nothing would be added and the Kohen would receive only one set of lashes.
10.I.e. the Gemara doesn't give the only case where he is punished four times, only the case which isn't obvious.
11.One statement that includes several related prohibitions. For example, the prohibition (Lev. 2:11), "you may not burn any leaven or honey as a fire-offering to G‑d," counts as only one prohibition, rather than one for offering leaven and another for offering honey. So too, one might ask, all the prohibitions here should be counted as part of one prohibition, since they are part of one statement.
12.Lev. 21:7.
13.It does say, for example, "they shall not marry a woman who is a zonah or a chalalah, or a divorcee."
14.77b.
15.After marriage.
16.But just married her.
17.Rather than creating a totally separate prohibition, subjecting him to lashes even if there were no relations.
18.The Gemara explains that the word "profane" refers to him having relations with her. Lev. 21, verse 14 states, "he must not marry a widow, a divorcee, etc." and verse 15 states, "he will then not profane his children." Since the verses are connected, we see that the prohibition of marriage is bound to the problem of profaned children (i.e. chalalim). Therefore, marriage alone without relations is not enough to transgress the violation. This, however, applies only to a regular Kohen, not the Kohen gadol. See N162 below.
     -------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 162
Relations between a High Priest and a Widow
"Neither shall he profane his seed among his people"—Leviticus 21:15.
It is forbidden for a High Priest to have sexual relations with a widow.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Relations between a High Priest and a Widow
Negative Commandment 162
Translated by Berel Bell
The 162nd prohibition is that the Kohen gadol is forbidden from having relations with a widow, even without marriage.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "he will then not profane his children."
The explanation of this is that a regular Kohen is prohibited from marrying [a divorcee, chalalah, or zonah], as it is written,2 "they shall not marry," meaning kiddushin.3 Nevertheless, he does not receive lashes unless he has relations with her, as explained above.4 If, however, he had relations with her without marriage — although it is prohibited and he invalidates her [i.e. makes her a chalalah] — he does not receive lashes, since it is not explicitly mentioned.
Regarding a Kohen gadol, though, there are two distinct prohibitions: one being "he must not marry," i.e. the prohibition of marriage; and the second, "he will then not profane his children," i.e. having relations even without marriage.
Tractate Kiddushin says,5 "Rava agrees regarding a Kohen gadol and a widow — that if he has relations without marrying her, he receives lashes. [The reason is that] the verse says, 'he will then not profane his children,' but he did."
It also says there, "a Kohen gadol [who marries and has relations] with a widow receives two sets of lashes: one for 'he must not marry,' and one for, 'he will then not profane his children.' "
This prohibition applies exclusively to [relations with] a widow,6 because she is the only one prohibited to the Kohen gadol and permitted to a regular Kohen. Therefore, with this act of relations she first became a chalalah and prohibited to a regular Kohen.7
Regarding [a Kohen gadol with] a divorcee, zonah, or chalalah, however, the law is just like that of a regular Kohen [and he does not receive lashes for having relations if there was no marriage]. This is because they were all invalid for a regular Kohen to begin with, and were only repeated regarding a Kohen gadol for the reason mentioned above.8
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 21:15.
2.Ibid. 21:7.
3.See note to P.
4.N161.
5.78a.
6.Although the children become chalalim not only when a Kohen gadol has relations with a widow, but also when he (or a regular Kohen) has relations with a divorcee, etc. It would therefore seem that the verse, "he will then not profane his children," hence this prohibition, should not apply only to a widow.
7.8.[8]. In N161.
     ------------------------------------
Positive Commandment 38
A High Priest's Wife
"He shall marry a woman in her virgin state"—Leviticus 21:13.
A High Priest is commanded to marry a virgin.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
A High Priest's Wife
Positive Commandment 38
Translated by Berel Bell
The 38th mitzvah is that the Kohen gadol is commanded to marry a young1 virgin.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "he must marry a virgin."
In explanation of this, our Sages said,3 "Rabbi Akiva would declare a child illegitimate even if a positive commandment was violated." They explained this statement that, for example, "a Kohen gadol had relations with a non-virgin, who is forbidden to him by virtue of a positive commandment." [It is termed a positive commandment rather than a prohibition] because of our principle, "a prohibition which is derived from a positive commandment is considered a positive commandment." It is clear from this discussion that this is considered a positive commandment [and therefore included among the 613].
The Sages also said, "he is commanded regarding a virgin."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the sixth chapter of Yevamos and in passages in Kesubos and Kiddushin.
FOOTNOTES
1.He must marry her within 6 months after she reaches puberty. See Hilchos Issurei Biyah, 17:13.
2.Lev. 21:13.
3.Kesubos 30a.
     ------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 160
A Priest Marrying a Divorcee
"Neither shall they take a woman divorced by her husband"—Leviticus 21:7.
It is forbidden for a priest to marry a divorcee.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
A Priest Marrying a Divorcee
Negative Commandment 160
Translated by Berel Bell
The 160th prohibition is that a Kohen is forbidden to marry a divorcee.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "They shall not marry a woman who has been divorced from her husband."
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. ibid.
     -------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 158
A Priest Marrying a "Zonah"
"They shall not take a wife who is a zonah"—Leviticus 21:7.
A priest may not marry a woman who in the past had sexual relations with a man whom she is forbidden to marry [e.g. a non-Jew or next of kin].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
A Priest Marrying a "Zonah"
Negative Commandment 158
Translated by Berel Bell
The 158th prohibition is that a Kohen is forbidden to marry a zonah.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "They shall not marry a woman who is a zonah or a chalalah.3"
Should he have relations with her [after they marry4], he is punished by lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, "a prostitute." Here the term refers to a woman who has had relations with a man who would be prohibited for her to marry. Therefore a woman who had relations with a non-Jew, for example, becomes a zonah and a Kohen may not marry her.
2.Lev. 21:7.
3.See next mitzvah.
4.See N161 below. Hilchos Issurei Biyah, 17:2.
     -------------------------------------
Negative Commandment 159
A Priest Marrying a "Profaned" Woman
"They shall not take a wife who is... profaned"—Leviticus 21:7.
A priest may not marry a chalalah [a woman who in the past had sexual relations with a priest whom she is forbidden to marry because of his priestly status (e.g., she was a divorcee)], or the daughter born from a relationship between a priest and achalalah.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
A Priest Marrying a "Profaned" Woman
Negative Commandment 159
Translated by Berel Bell
The 159th prohibition is that a Kohen is forbidden to marry a chalalah.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "They shall not marry a woman who is a zonah or a chalalah."
Should he have relations with her [after they marry], he is punished by lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, "a profaned woman." This term refers to a woman whose status has been affected by one of these priestly marriage prohibitions, e.g. should a Kohen marry a divorced woman (which violates N360), both the woman and her daughter get the status of a chalalah.
2.Lev. ibid.
     ------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Shemita Shemita - Chapter 5 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Shemita - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
The produce of the Sabbatical year is designated for the sake of eating, drinking,1smearing oneself [with oil],2 kindling lamps, and dyeing. According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that the word tihiyeh3 implies that it may be used even for kindling lamps, and dyeing.4
Halacha 2
What is meant by [the license to use the produce of the Sabbatical year] for eating and drinking? One should eat those foods that are normally eaten and drink the beverages that are normally drunken, as is the law with regard toterumah and the second tithe.5
Halacha 3
He should not change the natural function of produce as he does not with regard to terumah and the second tithe, i.e., something that is normally eaten raw should not be eaten cooked. Something that is normally eaten cooked should not be eaten raw. For this reason, animal fodder6 should not be cooked, nor should one press himself to eat a cooked dish that has spoiled or bread that has become moldy, as he does not eat such foods that areterumah or the second tithe.7
Halacha 4
We do not cook vegetables from the Sabbatical year in oil that is terumah lest it disqualify it.8 If one cooked a little and ate it immediately, it is permitted,9because he did not leave it aside so that it become disqualified.
Halacha 5
Produce that is set aside for human consumption should not be fed to domesticated animals, beasts, and fowl. If an animal went under a fig tree under its own initiative and began eaten the fruit, we do not require [the owner] to bring it back, for [Leviticus 25:7] states: "And for the animal and the beast in your land shall be all the produce to eat."10
Halacha 6
What is meant by [the license to] smear oneself [with produce from the Sabbatical year]? One may smear oneself with produce with which it is common to smear oneself. He should not smear wine or vinegar, but he may smear oil.11 We do not place fragrant herbs in oil,12 nor should one apply oil in a bathhouse.13 He may, however, apply oil outside and then enter.14
Halacha 7
Oil from the Sabbatical year should not be used to seal an oven or a range,15nor should it be applied to a shoe or a sandal.16 One should not apply [such oil] with impure hands.17 If the oil fell on his flesh, he may rub it in with impure hands.18 One should not apply [such] oil to his foot while it is in a shoe,19 He may, however, smear [such oil] on his foot and put on a shoe or smear his entire body and then roll on a new [leather] mat.20
Halacha 8
What is meant by [the license to] kindle a lamp [with produce from the Sabbatical year]? One may kindle a lamp with oil from the Sabbatical year itself. If one sold [oil from the Sabbatical year] and used the proceeds21 to purchase other oil or exchanged [oil from the Sabbatical year] for other oil,22they are both forbidden to be used for kindling, for we may not use money received in return for the produce of the Sabbatical year for kindling.23
One should not place oil directly into a fire.24 Instead, one should light it in a lamp.25
Halacha 9
What is meant by [the license to use produce from the Sabbatical year] for dyeing? Produce which is ordinarily used as dye even though it is also used as food for people may be used as dye for man's sake.26 We may not, however, use the produce of the Sabbatical year - even animal fodder - as dye for the sake of an animal. For the holiness of the Sabbatical year does not rest on dye for animals.
Halacha 10
The holiness of the Sabbatical year falls on [natural] detergents - e.g., boritand ehel,27 - and we may launder with them,28 as [Leviticus 25:6] states: "And [the produce that grows] while the land is resting shall be yours," i.e., for all your needs. Nevertheless, the fruit of the Sabbatical year should not be used as a detergent,29 nor should it be used to produce a compress,30 for [the above verse] states: "...shall be yours to eat,"31 i.e., and not for a compress, nor to sprinkle,32 induce regurgitation, soak flax, or use as a detergent.
Halacha 11
A great principle was stated with regard to the produce of the Sabbatical year: Whatever is distinguished as being for human consumption, e.g., wheat, figs, grapes, and the like, should not be used as a compress or a bandage, even for a person, as implied by the phrase: "yours to eat," i.e., whatever is distinguished as being for you, should be used as food33 and not for medicinal purposes. Anything that is not distinguished as being for human consumption, e.g., soft thorns and brambles, may be used as a compress for a person, but not for an animal.34
If it is not distinguished as being for either of the above purposes - e.g.,za'ater, oregano,35 and thyme,36 [the ruling depends] on the person's intent. If he thought to use it as kindling wood, it is considered as kindling wood.37 If he intended that it be used as food [for humans], it is considered as produce.38
If it is distinguished as being for both of the above purposes, we treat it with both the stringencies incumbent on food for humans - and compresses are not made with it - and those incumbent on animal fodder - that they may not be cooked.39
Halacha 12
It is permitted to sell food for humans and animal fodder and use the proceeds to purchase food for humans. We may not, however, sell animal fodder to purchase other animal fodder.40 Needless to say, we may not sell food for humans to purchase animal fodder. If [animal fodder] was purchased with [such produce] or food for humans was exchanged for animal fodder, [the animal fodder] is considered like food for humans and it may not be used to make a compress for a person.
Halacha 13
The produce of the Sabbatical year may not be transported from Eretz Yisraelto the Diaspora, not even to Syria.41 It cannot be fed to a gentile,42 nor to a hired worker.43 If he was hired for an entire week, an entire year, or an entire month or an agreement regarding his food was established, he is considered as a member of one's household and he may be fed [the produce of the Sabbatical year]. We may feed a guest44 the produce of the Sabbatical year.45
Halacha 14
The court does not allot produce of the Sabbatical year to a woman,46because this is considered as paying a debt with the produce of the Sabbatical year.47 She may, however, take her livelihood from [produce of the Sabbatical year] in her husband's possession.48
Halacha 15
We do not harvest the produce of the Sabbatical year when it is not yet ripe.49[This is derived from Leviticus 25:12 which states:] "And you shall partake of its produce," [implying that the fruits] may not be eaten until they are considered as produce.50 One may, however, partake of a small amount of them in the field while they are underdeveloped, as one partakes [of such produce] in other years.51 One should not bring the produce into one's home until it reaches the stage when the obligation to separate tithes takes effect.52
Halacha 16
From when is it permitted to partake of the fruit of trees in the field in the Sabbatical year? With regard to underdeveloped figs, when their surface will become shiny,53 he may eat his bread with them in the field. The same applies in all analogous situations With regard to underdeveloped grapes,54 when sap flows in them, they may be eaten in the fields. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
With regard to olives, when a se'ah of olives would produce a revi'it of a log55of oil, one may break them open56 and eat them in the fields.57 [If such an amount of olives] would produce half a log [of oil], one may crush them and smear oneself in the field. [If they reach the stage where they] produce one third [of the amount they ordinarily produce], it is permitted to bring them to his home, because they have reached a third of their growth.
Halacha 17
It is permitted to cut down trees for their wood in the Sabbatical year, before they produce fruit. Once they have begun to produce fruit, however, they should not be cut down, for doing so spoils [the fruit], and [the fruit of the Sabbatical year is granted] "to eat,"58 and not to spoil.59 If it produced fruit and they reached the stage at which an obligation to separate tithes exists, it is permitted to cut them down, for it has already produced its fruit and the laws of the Sabbatical year no longer apply to it.60
Halacha 18
From when is it forbidden to cut down a tree in the Sabbatical year?61 For carobs, when a chain of carobs will be formed.62 For grapes, when the fruit produces seeds. For olives, when they bud. For all other fruit trees, when they produce underdeveloped fruit.
It is forbidden to cut off underdeveloped clusters of dates63 in the Sabbatical year, because one is spoiling the fruit. If these clusters will not produce dates, merely buds, it is permitted to cut off those clusters.64
Halacha 19
We may not use hay and straw of the Sabbatical year for kindling,65 because it is fit for animal fodder.66 We may, however, use the wastes of olives and grapes of the Sabbatical year for fuel.67
Halacha 20
When a bathhouse has been heated with hay and straw of the Sabbatical year, it is permitted to bathe there68 [even] when payment is required.69 An important person, however, is forbidden to do so, lest they also mix other [herbs]70 into the kindling for him, so that it will produce a fragrant scent.71Thus they will destroy the produce of the Sabbatical year.72
Halacha 21
The holiness of the produce of the Sabbatical year does not fall on the types of shells and seeds that are permitted to non-priests with regard to terumah.73Instead, they are considered like wood, unless they are fit for dyeing.74 The holiness of the Sabbatical year falls on the hearts of palms.75
Halacha 22
[The following rules apply when a person] places spices from the Sabbatical year in a wrapping and inserts them into cooked food. If their flavor is nullified,76 they are permitted.77 If they retain their flavor, the holiness of the Sabbatical year is still invested in them.
Halacha 23
Straw and hay from the Sabbatical year should not be placed in a pillow or in mud.78 If one did place them there, they are considered as if they have been destroyed.79 When an oven has been heated with straw and hay from the Sabbatical year, it should be allowed to cool.80
Once the second wave of rains81 descend in the eighth year, we are allowed to benefit from straw and hay of the Sabbatical year and use it for kindling.82
FOOTNOTES
1.
Drinking is considered as eating (Yoma76b).
2.
See Hilchot Sh'vitat Esor 1:4-5; Hilchot Terumot 11:1, Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 3:10 which equate smearing oneself with oil and drinking.
3.
Leviticus 25:7 states: "And for the animal and the beast in your land shall (tihiyeh) be all the produce to eat." The Sifra derives the above concept from this verse.
4.
For these activities also bring direct benefit to man.
5.
See Hilchot Terumah, ch. 11, and Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, ch. 3, for more particulars concerning these laws.
6.
Which is usually eaten raw.
7.
See Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 3:11 which states: "We do not require a person to eat bread that has become moldy or oil that has become rancid. Instead, as soon as it has become spoiled to the point that it is not fit for human consumption, its holiness has departed from it."
8.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it8:7), the Rambam describes this concept as follows: When terumah becomes ritually impure, it is disqualified and forbidden to be eaten. Now if the oil becomes ritually impure, it will disqualify the vegetable that was cooked in it and require that it be destroyed. Thus one will have caused the produce of the Sabbatical year to be destroyed unnecessarily.
9.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's wording should not be interpreted as implying that only after the fact, once one has cooked the vegetable in the oil, one may partake of it. Instead, this is permitted at the outset.
10.
Implying that the produce of the Sabbatical year may be eaten by animals.
11.
Even though oil is primarily used as food, it is also common to smear it on one's flesh (Radbaz). Wine or vinegar, by contrast, are generally not applied as ointments. SeeHilchot Ma'aser Sheni, loc. cit.
12.
Because doing so removes it from the category of food and makes it oil for smearing (Hilchot Terumah 11:3).
13.
For applying oil that is holy in a place where people are unclothed is an act of disrespect.
14.
Since the oil is already absorbed in one's skin.
15.
For this will be using it for a purpose other than a person's direct physical benefit.
16.
This strengthens the sandal, but does not provide a person with direct physical benefit.
17.
The intent is not necessarily impure hands, but any hands that one has not watched carefully to make sure that they are pure. For if one touches oil with such hands, it becomes impure by Rabbinic decree (Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 8:8-10). Making the oil impure would reduce the number of people who could partake of it. Hence, it is improper to do so.
18.
For once the oil has been applied to one's flesh, there is no difficulty in it becoming impure, because its sacred quality is divested. See parallels in Hilchot Terumah11:7.
19.
Because the oil will be applied to the shoe directly.
20.
Even though the oil will be applied indirectly to the shoe or the mat, that does not present a difficulty, because as above, once it has been applied to his flesh, its sacred quality is divested.
21.
As stated in Halachah 12, it is permitted to sell produce of the Sabbatical year that is fit for human consumption and use the proceeds to purchase other food. One may not, however, use such proceeds for other purposes even though they benefit man.
22.
In which instance, the oil for which the oil from the Sabbatical year was exchanged receives the status of produce of the Sabbatical year (see Chapter 6, Halachot 6-7).
23.
One may use oil from the Sabbatical year for kindling, because this is a function for which that produce is ordinarily used. Nevertheless, oil is considered primarily as food fit for human consumption. Hence, the proceeds from its sale or exchange may be used for that purpose alone.
24.
It is not common practice to pour oil into a fire. Hence, although license is given to kindle with oil, one may do so only in the ordinary manner.
25.
For this is the ordinary practice.
26.
As the continuation of the Rambam's words imply, the dye is then considered as imbued with the holiness of the Sabbatical year.
27.
Two plants with natural alcalic properties that make them fit for use as detergents.
28.
For this is their primary use.
29.
Since fruit is primarily used as food, it is improper to use it for any other purpose.
30.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it8:1), the Rambam explains the derivation of the word milugma. It is a composite of the words molei lugma, meaning "cheekful." It was common to chew kernels of wheat, figs, or other produce, and then place them on wounds. Since the primary use of such produce is food, it cannot be used for these purposes.
31.
The explanation is dependent on the principle stated in the following halachah.
32.
Liquids were occasionally sprinkled over wounds to induce clotting.
33.
And for no other purpose, even if it is beneficial to man.
34.
I.e., it may be used for a purpose that brings man benefit.
35.
Our translation is based on Rav Kappach's notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.). Others render it as "hyssop."
36.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that these are herbs that are used both as spices and for medicinal purposes.
37.
And the holiness of the Sabbatical year does not rest upon it.
38.
And is infused with that holiness.
39.
This represents a change in the Rambam's thinking from his initial version of his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) in which he states that the stringency involved with animal fodder is that it can only be eaten during the time the produce is available in the field. In the final version of the Commentary to the Mishnah, he adopts the position stated here that is based on the Jerusalem Talmud.
40.
As stated in the notes to Halachah 8, when the produce from the Sabbatical year is sold, the proceeds from the sale may be used only for the purchase of food for humans.
41.
This is a decree imposed so that there will not be a dearth of produce in Eretz Yisrael. See Chapter 7, Halachah 12, which states what should be done if such produce is brought to the Diaspora.
42.
This is derived from Leviticus 25:6 which states that the produce of the Sabbatical year "shall be yours to eat." Implied is that it is for "you" and not for gentiles.
43.
This is referring to a worker hired only for a day(s). Since he is hired for only a short time, it appears as if the person is paying his debt with the produce of the Sabbatical year which is forbidden, see Chapter 6, Halachah 11.
44.
Rav Yosef Corcus states that this and the above clause even refer to a gentile guest or worker.
45.
This is not considered as paying a debt.
46.
This halachah is referring to a woman whose husband traveled to a distant place without leaving his wife adequate support. If she approaches the court, the court expropriates property belonging to her husband and sells it to provide for her support. See Hilchot Ishut 12:16.
47.
For the husband is liable for her support.
48.
Since she has access to the household provisions, it is not considered as if someone is paying the debt to her (Rav Yosef Corcus).
49.
I.e., before it reaches one third of its growth. Until that point, they are unfit to be eaten [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shivi'it 4:7)].
50.
I.e., until they have ripened.
51.
For it is also common practice to taste a small amount of fruit in the field even in its very early stages of ripening (ibid.).
52.
I.e., until the produce reaches one third of its development (Hilchot Ma'aserot 2:3). That would reflect a further stage of development.
53.
At that time, their surface becomes smooth and there is a certain amount of sap inside them [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shivi'it 4:7)]. At this stage of development, it is ordinary practice for a person in the field to taste a small amount of the fruit.
54.
Our translation of the terms in this clause is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shivi'it 4:8).
55.
revi'it of a log is 86 cc according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cc according to Chazon Ish.
56.
This is the ordinary way in which olives are eaten [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shivi'it 4:9)], for there is a bitter liquid beneath this covering.
57.
At this stage of development, the amount of oil produced is not significant enough for one to smear himself with it.
58.
Leviticus 25:6. As stated in Halachah 10, this phrase is also an exclusion, preventing the use of the produce for other purposes.
59.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Shivi'it4:10), the Rambam writes that cutting the trees down at this stage of the fruits' development is forbidden, because it is tantamount to theft. For the fruit was granted to people at large and by cutting down the tree, other people are prevented from harvesting it.
60.
It was permitted to harvest the fruit from this stage of development. Since people already had the opportunity of harvesting it and failed to do so, it is not forbidden to destroy the tree.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam clarifies that we are speaking about a situation where the tree does not produce a large amount of produce and hence, it is permitted to cut it down and use it for wood. Otherwise, it is forbidden to cut down a fruit tree. See Hilchot Melachim 6:8-9.
61.
I.e., when does the initial stage of development mentioned in the previous halachah begin for various tapes of fruit.
62.
The interpretation of this clause offered by standard published text of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) is somewhat confusing. See Rav Kappach's translation. It is the source for our translation of the following clauses.
63.
Our translation is dependent on the gloss of the Radbaz and Rav Kappach's notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:9).
64.
The Radbaz explains that this is referring to a species of dates that never produces edible fruit, but the clusters themselves are eaten like hearts of palms.
65.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that this license is derived through a process of deduction. Shivi'it 9:7 states that the hay and straw of the Sabbatical year may not be used for kindling until the second rain of the eighth year descends. Thus one can obviously conclude that it was forbidden to use them previously.
66.
Hence it should be used for that purpose; see Halachah 3.
67.
For they are not useful for any other purposes.
68.
Seemingly, this halachah contradicts the preceding one. Since it is forbidden to use hay and straw from the Sabbatical year for kindling, one would think that it is forbidden to bathe in water heated through such a fire. Why then is bathing in such a bathhouse permitted?
The Kessef Mishneh first states that license to use the bathhouse is only granted after the fact. At the outset, one should not use such hay and straw for this purpose. Alternatively, he explains - as does the Radbaz - that there is no difficulty in using such hay and straw for this purpose, for just as animal fodder of the Sabbatical year can be used to make a compress for a person (Halachah 11), it can be used to heat a bath for him.
69.
The Kessef Mishneh offers this interpretation, resolving the question posed by the Ra'avad who had objected to granting license to use such hay and straw when payment is taken, for that resembles selling the produce of the Sabbatical year as merchandise which is forbidden (Chapter 6, Halachah 1). The Kessef Mishneh explains that the prohibition against selling the produce of the Sabbatical year involves only selling food.
70.
That are fit to be eaten [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shivi'it 8:11)].
71.
The Rambam is explaining the rationale for the restriction stated in the above mishnah. Others maintain that the rationale is that an important person should not rely on the leniency and, instead, should be stringent not to derive even such benefit from the produce of the Sabbatical year.
72.
Instead of using them as food.
73.
See Hilchot Terumah 11:10-11. The Radbaz explains that this can be derived from a logical inference. If leniency was granted with regard to terumah which is punishable by death, surely, it should be granted with regard to the Sabbatical year, for its prohibitions are not punishable as severely.
74.
In which instance the holiness of the Sabbatical year falls upon them, as stated in Halachah 9.
75.
For there are many who eat this type of produce as food, while it is soft. See Hilchot Berachot 8:6. Needless to say, if it hardens to the point it is no longer edible, it is considered as mere wood (Radbaz).
76.
Since the spices were placed in a wrapping, they could be removed from the food after it was cooked. Their status depends on whether their flavor is retained or not.
77.
The holiness of the Sabbatical year does not rest upon them, for they no longer are considered as food.
78.
I.e., to use the mud for building. Since the straw and hay are fit for use as animal fodder, it is improper to use them for purposes that do not bring direct benefit to man or animals.
79.
Because they are no longer suitable for use as animal fodder. The Ra'avad [based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Shivi'it 9:7)] states that one must actually sleep on the pillow, for the status of the straw to change. The commentaries note, however, that theTosefta (Shivi'it 5:11) does not make such a qualification.
80.
I.e., one should not cook in it while it is hot, so as not to benefit from the kindling of the produce of the Sabbatical year. The license granted in Halachah 20 is not appropriate here, because in this instance, the person is not receiving direct benefit from the burning of the straw (Radbaz).
81.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah8:1), the Rambam explains that, in Eretz Yisrael, there is one wave of rain at the end of the summer. Afterwards at the beginning of the winter - i.e., depending on the year, between the seventeenth of Cheshvan and the first of Kislev, there is a second wave of rains which are very important for the success of the crops of that land.
82.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Shivi'it 9:7) explains that from the time the rain descends, the straw in the field is no longer fit for an animal to eat. Therefore, there is no longer any restriction on using the straw in one's home.
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• 3 Chapters: Issurei Biah Issurei Biah - Chapter Eighteen, Issurei Biah Issurei Biah - Chapter Nineteen, Issurei Biah Issurei Biah - Chapter Twenty • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Issurei Biah - Chapter Eighteen
Halacha 1
Based on the Oral Tradition, we learned that the term zonah1 used by the Torah refers to one who is not a nativeborn Jewess,2 a Jewish woman who engaged in relations3 with a man she was forbidden to marry, violating a prohibition that is universally applicable,4 or a woman who engaged in relations with a challal5 even though she is permitted to marry him.6
Accordingly, a woman who engages in relations with an animal, even though she is liable for execution by stoning is not deemed as a zonah, nor is she disqualified from marrying into the priesthood,7 for she did not engage in relations with a man. [Similarly, when] a man engages in relations with a woman in the niddah state even though she is liable for kerait, she is not deemed as a zonah, nor is she disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, for she is not forbidden to marry him.
Halacha 2
Whenever a person has relations with an unmarried woman, even if she is a harlot who wantonly makes herself available to everyone, although she is liable for lashes,8 she is not deemed as a zonah, nor is she disqualified from [marrying] into the priesthood. For she is not forbidden to marry [the people with whom she engaged in relations].
[When, by contrast, a woman] engages in relations with a man with whom relations are forbidden by a negative commandment that is universally applicable - the transgression is not specific to priests - or with whom they are forbidden by a positive commandment, she is forbidden to marry him, she is azonah.9Needless to say, [this applies if she engages in relations with a man] who is forbidden to her as an ervah, a gentile, or a servant.
Halacha 3
Similarly, a female convert or a freed [maid-servant] - even if she was converted or freed when she was less than three years old10 - since she is not a native-born Jewess, she is deemed a zonah and is forbidden to [marry] a priest.
On this basis, [our Sages said: A woman who has relations with] a gentile, anetin,11 a mamzer,12 an Ammonite or Moabite convert, a first- or second-generation Egyptian or Edomite convert,13 a man with maimed testicles or a severed member,14 or a challal who has relations with a [nativeborn] Jewess causes her to be considered as a zonah and to be forbidden to [marry into] the priesthood. If she was a priest's daughter, she is disqualified from [partaking of] terumah.15 Similarly, a yevamah who engaged relations with a man other than her yevam becomes a zonah.16
An aylonit17 is permitted to [marry] a priest. She is not a zonah.
Halacha 4
When a man engages in relations with one of the shniot18or the like, e.g., a man who engages in relations with a relative of the woman with whom he performed chalitzah or with the woman he performed chalitzah, he does not caused her to be deemed a zonah. For she is not forbidden to him according to Scriptural Law, as we explained in Hilchot Yibbum.19
Halacha 5
We thus learned that a woman's being deemed as a zonah is not dependent on her engaging in forbidden relations, for when a man engages in relations with a niddah or a harlot or when a woman engages in relations with an animal, the woman has engaged in forbidden relations and yet she is not deemed a zonah. When, by contrast, [a woman] marries a challal, she engages in relations that are permitted, as will be explained,20 and yet she is deemed a zonah. Thus the matter is dependent on the spiritual blemish alone. According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that the spiritual blemish comes only from a man who is forbidden to her or a challal, as we explained.
Halacha 6
Whenever a woman engages in relations that cause her to be deemed azonah, she becomes disqualified as soon as the man's organ enters her21whether she engages in relations against her will or willingly, whether in conscious violation or inadvertently, whether through vaginal or anal intercourse. [This applies] provided she is at least three years old and the man with whom she engages in relations is nine years old or more.22Therefore when a married woman engages in adultery, whether against her will or willingly, she is disqualified from [marrying into] the priesthood.23
Halacha 7
When the wife of a priest is raped, [if her husband engages in relations with her afterwards,] he is punished by lashes because of her defilement. [This is derived from Deuteronomy 24:4]: "Her first husband who sent her away cannot return and take her as a wife after she has been defiled."24 All [women] were governed by the general principle: If they engaged in [adulterous] relations, they are forbidden to their husbands. The Torah singles out an exception: the wife of an Israelite who was raped.25 She is permitted to her husband, as [implied by Numbers 5:13]: "And she was not seized." The wife of a priest remains forbidden, because she is a zonah.26
Halacha 8
When the wife of an Israelite is raped, although she is permitted to her husband,27 she is forbidden to [marry into] the prietshood.28
When the wife of a priest tells her husband: "I was raped or inadvertently, I engaged in relations with another man," or one witness testifies against her that she committed adultery whether willingly or unwillingly, she is not forbidden to him.29[The rationale is that we suspect] that perhaps she set her eyes on another [man].30 If he considers her as trustworthy, or he considers the witness as trustworthy and he accepts his word,31 he should divorce her so that there is no doubt regarding the matter.32
Halacha 9
Although the wife of a priest who tells her husband: "I was raped," is permitted to her husband as explained, she is forbidden to any other priest33 after her husband dies.34 For she has acknowledged that she is a zonah and caused herself to be forbidden, making herself a prohibited entity.
Halacha 10
When a priest35 consecrates a woman, whether a minor or past majority, and afterwards engages in relations with her and claims that she had engaged in relations previously,36 she is forbidden to him because of the doubt involved:37 perhaps she engaged in relations before she was consecrated or perhaps it was afterwards.38 When, by contrast, an Israelite makes such a claim, there are two doubts involved:39 Maybe [the forbidden relations] preceded the consecration or maybe they came afterwards. Even if we say that they came afterwards, maybe she was raped or maybe she participated willingly. For a raped woman is permitted to an Israelite, as we explained.40
Halacha 11
Therefore if a girl's father consecrated her to an Israelite when she was less than three years old and [when they married, the Israelite] claimed that he discovered that she had engaged in relations previously, she is forbidden to him because of the doubt. For there is only one doubt involved: Maybe the relations were against her will41 or maybe she engaged willingly.42 When there is a doubt concerning a Scriptural prohibition involved, [we rule] stringently.
Halacha 12
Any woman who was given [a sotah] warning43 by her husband, entered into privacy [with the man she was warned against], but did not drink the sotahwaters is forbidden to [marry] a priest,44 because there is an unresolved question whether or not she is a zonah.45 [This applies] whether she did not wish to drink [the waters],46 her husband did not wish to compel her to drink the waters,47 there was testimony that prevented her from drinking,48 the warning was delivered by the court,49 or she was one of the woman who is not fit to drink.50 Whatever the reason that she did not drink, she is forbidden to [marry into] the priesthood because of the doubt [that has been created].
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply if we] saw that an unmarried woman engaged in relations with a man who then departed. She is asked: "Who is the man with whom you engaged in relations?" If she says, "He is an acceptable man,"51her word is accepted. Moreover, even if we see that she is pregnant and we ask her: "From whom did you conceive?" and she says, "From an acceptable man," her word is accepted and she is permitted [to marry] a priest.52
Halacha 14
When does the above apply? When the place where she engaged in relations was on a thoroughfare or in a carriage in the fields where everyone passes by,53 and most of the passersby are acceptable and most of the inhabitants of the city from which these passersby departed are acceptable. [The rationale for this stringency is that] our Sages elevated the standards required with regard to lineage54 and required two majorities.55
If, by contrast, most of the people passing by would disqualify her, e.g., they were gentiles, mamzerim, or the like, even if most of the inhabitants of the city from which they came were acceptable, we are suspect regarding her [status]. Perhaps she engaged in relations with a person who would disqualify her. Hence, the initial and preferred option is for her not to marry a priest.56 If she marries one, she need not divorce.57 [This ruling also applies] if most of the inhabitants of the locale were unacceptable even though most of the passersby were acceptable.
Halacha 15
If we saw that she engaged in relations in a city or she became pregnant in a city, [more stringent rules apply]. Even if there was only one gentile, challal, servant, or the like58 dwelling in the city, the initial and preferred option is that she not marry a priest. [The rationale is that] whenever entities are in their permanent locale, [probability is not taken into consideration. Instead, all doubts] are considered as equally balanced.59 If she already married [a priest], she need not be divorced because she says: "I engaged in relations with an acceptable man."60
Halacha 16
When a woman is dumb, deaf,61 she says: "I don't know the identity of the man with whom I engaged in relations," or she was a minor that cannot differentiate between a man who is acceptable and one who is not, she is considered as a zonah of questionable status.62 [After the fact,] if she married a priest, she must be divorced63 unless there is a twofold majority of men with whom she could have engaged in relations that are acceptable.64
Halacha 17
When a woman taken captive is redeemed and she is three years old or more,65 she is forbidden to [marry] a priest, because there is a question whether she is a zonah. Perhaps a gentile engaged in relations with her.
If there is a witness that a gentile did not enter into seclusion with her, she is acceptable to the priesthood.66 Even a servant, a maid-servant, or a relative67is acceptable with regard to this testimony. [Moreover,] when two women who were taken captive give testimony on behalf of each other, their word is accepted.68[The rationale is] that all the prohibitions involving questionable situations are of Rabbinic origin.69 Therefore they ruled leniently with regard to a woman taken captive.
Halacha 18
Similarly, a minor who states [that a woman was not touched by her captors] in the course of conversation.70 An incident occurred with regard to a child who was captured together with his mother. In the course of conversation, he said: "My mother and I were captured by the gentiles. When I went out to draw water from the well, I was thinking about my mother. [When I went] to gather wood, I was thinking about my mother." Our Sages [permitted] her to marry a priest because of his words.71
Halacha 19
A husband's word is not accepted if he testifies72 that his wife who was taken captive was not defiled.73 Similarly, her maid-servant may not testify on her behalf.74 A maid-servant belonging to her husband, however, may testify on her behalf. And statements made by her maid-servant in the midst of conversation are accepted.75
Halacha 20
When a priest testifies that a woman who had been taken captive is pure, he may not marry her. [We suspect that] he focused his attention on her.76 If he redeemed her and testified on her behalf, he may marry her, for if he did not know that she was pure, he would not have paid money on her behalf.77
Halacha 21
When a woman says: "I was taken captive, but I am pure," her word is accepted. [The rationale is] that the mouth that forbid her granted her license.78[This applies] even if there is one witness who testifies that she was taken captive.79 If, however, there are two witnesses who testify that she was taken captive, her word is not accepted unless one person testifies that she is pure.
If there were two witnesses who testified that she was taken captive, one witness who testifies that she was defiled and another who contradicts his statements and testifies that she is pure and that a gentile did not enter into seclusion with her until she was redeemed, she is permitted.80 [This applies] even if the one who testifies that she is pure is a woman or a maid-servant.
Halacha 22
When a woman stated: "I was taken captive, but I am pure," and a court granted her license to marry [a priest], she may marry [one] as an initial and preferred option. Her license is not revoked [even if] afterwards two witnesses come and testify that she was taken captive.81 Even if her captor enters afterwards and we see that she is a captive under his dominion, her license [to marry a priest] is not revoked. We provide her with protection until she is redeemed.82
Halacha 23
If two witnesses came and stated that [a woman] was defiled, even if she had married and even if she bore children [to her husband, the priest], she must be divorced.83 If one witness came and testified [that she was defiled], his testimony is of no consequence.84
If the woman says, "I was taken captive, but I am pure, and I have witnesses that I am pure," we do not say: "Let us wait until the witnesses come." Instead, we grant her license [to marry into the priesthood] immediately. Moreover, even if a rumor is circulated that there are witnesses that she was defiled,85we grant her license [to marry into the priesthood] until the witnesses come. [The rationale is that] we are lenient with regard to a woman taken captive.
Halacha 24
When a father states: "I consecrated my daughter and I had her divorced,"86[as long as] she is a minor," his word is accepted.87 "I consecrated my daughter and I had her divorced while she was a minor," when she is past majority, his word is not accepted with regard to her being considered as a divorcee.88
[When he says,] "She was held captive and I redeemed her," his word is not accepted whether she is a minor or past majority. For the Torah deems him trustworthy only with regard to having her forbidden because of marriage, for it is written [Deuteronomy 22:16]: "I gave my daughter to this man,"89 but not to have her disqualified as a zonah.90
Halacha 25
When the wife of a priest is forbidden to him because she was taken captive, [we grant a leniency]. Since [the prohibition was instituted because] of a doubt,91 she is permitted to dwell together with him in the same courtyard, provided his children and the members of his household will always be there to watch him.92
Halacha 26
[The following laws apply when] a city was held under siege and conquered. If the gentiles surrounded the city from all sides so that it was impossible for [even] one woman to escape93 without being seen and placed under their dominion, all of the women in [the city] are forbidden [to marry into] the priesthood. They are considered as if they were held captive for perhaps they were raped by gentiles. [The only exception] are those less than three years old as explained.94
Halacha 27
If it was possible for one of the woman to escape without being detected or there was one hiding place in the city - even if it could hold only one woman - it saves all [the women from being deemed forbidden].95
Halacha 28
How does it save [the women from being deemed forbidden]? The word of every woman who claims "I am pure" is accepted. Since she could have said: "I escaped when the city was conquered," or "I was in a hiding place and I was saved," her word is accepted if she says: "I did not escape, nor did I hide, but I was not defiled."96
Halacha 29
When does the above apply? With regard to a battalion from that country who settle in the city and are not afraid. Therefore we fear that they raped the women. With regard to a battalion from another country, which swept through the city, pillaged and passed on, the women are not forbidden.97 [The rationale is that] they do not have time to rape, because they are busy gathering spoil and fleeing.98 If, however, they took the women captive and they were under their dominion, they are forbidden [to the priesthood]99 even though Jews pursue [the battalion] and rescued [the women] from them.100
Halacha 30
When a woman was imprisoned because of financial matters, she is permitted [to marry into the priesthood].101 When she is imprisoned with regard to matters involving capital punishment, she is forbidden to the priesthood.102Therefore if her husband is a priest, she is forbidden to him.103
When does the above apply? When the Jews have power over the gentiles and they are afraid of them. When, by contrast, the gentiles are in power, even when a woman is imprisoned because of financial matters, she is forbidden since she was taken under the dominion of the gentiles104 unless there is a witness who testifies on her behalf as is the law regarding a woman taken captive, as explained above.105
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term literally means "a promiscuous woman." Halachically, however, it has a specific meaning as the Rambam continues to explain. This concept is relevant because a priest is forbidden to marry a zonah as mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter.
2.
Even if she is a virgin, and even if she converts (Halachah 3).
3.
Even against her will. It is the fact of the relations, not her intent, that causes her to be placed in this category. See Halachot 5-6.
4.
Even a prohibition that stems from a positive commandment, as mentioned in Halachah 3.
5.
A child born from a relationship forbidden to a priest, as mentioned in Chapter 19, Halachot 5-6. As mentioned in the notes to the following halachah, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's view.
6.
There is no prohibition against a challalmarrying any Jewish woman, even the daughter of a priest (see Chapter 19, Halachah 11).
7.
She may even marry a High Priest (if she engaged in anal intercourse with an animal), as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 14.
8.
As stated in Hilchot Ishut 1:4.
9.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, offering a more lenient view, explaining that although a woman who enters into relations with any of the above individuals is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, these relations do not cause her to be considered as a zonah and she and a priest are not punished by lashes if they engage in relations. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 6:8) quotes the Rambam's view.
10.
At that age, even if she had engaged in relations, her hymen would regenerate and she would be considered as a virgin (Ketubot 11b). Nevertheless, she is not considered as a native-born Jewess.
The Ra'avad rules that such a woman is not considered as a zonah. Nevertheless, she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, based on the interpretation of Ezekiel 44:22advanced by Kiddushin 78a which states that a priest must marry only from "the seed of the House of Israel." Note the discussion of this difference of opinion by the Maggid Mishneh. See also Chapter 19, Halachah 12, which states that as long as converts marry among each other, their descendants are forbidden to marry into the priesthood.
11.
See Chapter 12, Halachot 22-23, which defines this term and the prohibition against such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.
12.
See Chapter 15 which describes the prohibition of such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.
13.
See Chapter 12, Halachot 18-21, which describes the prohibition of such converts marrying a native-born Jewess.
14.
See Chapter 16 which describes the prohibition of such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.
15.
Leviticus 22:12 states "When the daughter of a priest is [possessed] by a foreigner, she may not partake of the terumah of holiness."Yevamot 68a states: "Since she engaged in relations with someone who is forbidden to her, she is disqualified."
16.
Since she is forbidden to marry anyone other than her yevam relations with any other man cause her to be considered as azonah.
17.
The term aylonit refers to a woman who does not have female physical characteristics. Her breasts do not protrude, she stiffens during sexual relations, and her lower abdomen does not resemble that of a woman. She is considered incapable of giving birth (Hilchot Ishut 2:4-6).
18.
These refer to distant relatives whom the Rabbis forbade as safeguards to Scriptural prohibitions. See Hilchot Ishut 1:6 for a list of these prohibitions.
19.
See Hilchot Yibbum 1:12-13 which explains that once a woman is obligated to undergochalitzah, there is no Scriptural prohibition against engaging in relations with her or her relatives. Nevertheless, our Sages instituted these prohibitions as safeguards.
20.
Chapter 19, Halachah 16.
21.
We are translating the term heara; see Chapter 1, Halachah 10.
22.
For below these ages, any sexual contact in which these individuals engage is not significant, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 13-14.
23.
I.e., if the woman's husband dies after the adulterous relations without divorcing her, she may not marry a priest. Alternatively, as the Rambam continues to explain in the subsequent halachot, if she is the wife of the priest, she may not remain married to him.
24.
As the Rambam implies, the prohibition indicated by this verse is not explicitly referring to a woman married to a priest. Instead, halachically (see Hilchot Gerushin11:14), it is interpreted as referring to all married women who are defiled by adultery. The wife of an Israelite who was raped is an exception, but not the wife of a priest.
The commentaries question the exactness of the Rambam's statements here, because in this instance two separate prohibitions - the prohibition against relations with one's defiled wife and the prohibition against a priest engaging in relations with a zonah - are involved. See the Maggid Mishneh for a discussion of the issue. See also Chapter 1, Halachah 22.
25.
See Hilchot Ishut 24:19.
26.
I.e., despite the fact that she is not held responsible for the adulterous relations, they create a spiritual blemish that prevents her from marrying a priest.
27.
For the adulterous relations were carried out against her will.
28.
After her husband dies.
29.
Testimony is not considered binding unless it is made by two witnesses. Thus the testimony of one witnesses is not of consequence. Similarly, a person's testimony cannot be used against himself. Hence, the woman's own testimony is not of consequence.
There is one instance where the testimony of one witness is significant. When the husband issued a sotah warning to his wife. See Hilchot Ishut 24:18).
30.
And seeks to be released from her husband so that she may engage in relations with him.
31.
And thus he believes that his wife committed adultery.
32.
For since he believes either his wife or the witness, he will be consenting to a transgression each time he enters into relations with her. Accordingly, he has a moral and spiritual obligation to divorce her (Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.)
33.
The Beit Shmuel 6:25 states that the Rambam's ruling applies only as an initial and preferred option. After the fact, if she marries a priest, they may remain husband and wife unless he believes her statements.
34.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, explaining that since the woman's statements were rejected, they are considered of no consequence afterwards. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's ruling and it is accepted as law by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:13).
The Ra'avad's rationale is that if the woman is able to provide an satisfactory explanation why she originally stated that she was forbidden, her word is accepted, as is the case with regard to other similar situations. The Maggid Mishneh does not accept this logic. See Chelkat Mechokek 6:12 and Beit Shmuel 6:26 which discuss this issue.
35.
In contrast to an Israelite, as the Rambam continues to explain.
36.
The husband's word is accepted as stated in Hilchot Ishut 11:8-15. The rationale is that we operate on the presumption that a man will not take on the expense and trouble of making a wedding and then forfeit it because of a spurious claim.
37.
Since the doubt involves a Scriptural prohibition, we rule stringently.
38.
For if the relations took place afterwards, even if she was raped, she is forbidden to her husband as a zonah.
39.
And when there are two doubts involved, even when a Scriptural prohibition is concerned, we rule leniently.
40.
See Halachah 7.
41.
Although a minor who willfully commits adultery is not punished, she is forbidden to her husband (Chapter 3, Halachah 2).
42.
Since she was consecrated before the age of three, even if she had engaged in relations beforehand, her hymen would have regenerated. Thus there is only one doubt involved.
43.
A formal warning delivered in the presence of witnesses not to enter into privacy with a specific man (Hilchot Sotah 1:1).
44.
I.e., if her first husband dies without divorcing her.
45.
Drinking the waters would have tested her virtue. Since she did not undergo this test, the matter is unresolved and hence she is forbidden to a priest.
46.
See Hilchot Sotah 2:1, 3:2 which imply that the refusal to drink the waters is tantamount to an admission of guilt.
47.
In such an instance, the woman is forbidden to her original husband, but he must pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah(Hilchot Sotah 2:1).
48.
Hilchot Sotah 1:14 states that if even one witness testifies that he saw the woman commit adultery after receiving the sotahwarning, she becomes forbidden to her husband.
49.
Hilchot Sotah 1:10 states that, when a husband is unable to supervise his wife's moral behavior, the court may issue such a warning on his behalf. In such an instance, however, the woman is not compelled to drink the sotah waters.
50.
Hilchot Sotah 2:2 lists fifteen women who are not given the option of drinking the sotahwaters.
51.
I.e., neither a mamzer, nor a gentile, nor another individual who would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.
52.
This represents the legal abstract. Our Sages, however, applied stringencies as indicated by the following halachah.
53.
This factor is necessary to allow for us to apply the principle: "Whenever an entity is separated, it is considered as having been separated from the majority." When, as stated in Halachah 15, the relations occur in a place where an entity is kevua, in its fixed place, we do not follow the majority.
54.
Compare to Chapter 15, Halachah 11, which states that when the lineage of the child is involved, the woman's word is accepted even when the majority of the men are not acceptable. The rationale for the difference is that with regard to the child, there is no alternative. If the child is not deemed acceptable, he or she will not be able to marry within the Jewish people. If, however, the woman's word is not accepted, she will still be able to marry anyone other than a priest (Maggid Mishneh).
55.
I.e., instead of requiring a simple majority as is the usual standard.
56.
This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 6:17). That source, however, also cites the view of the Tur and otherRishonim which maintains that if she states that the person with whom she engaged in relations are acceptable and the majority of the people are acceptable, she may marry into the priesthood at the outset. The Beit Shmuel 6:31 also cites a third, more lenient view.
57.
After the fact, we rely on the halachic abstract stated in the previous halachah. This applies even if most of the people are unacceptable (Beit Shmuel 6:32).
58.
I.e., persons who would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.
59.
The Kessef Mishneh explains the Rambam's ruling as follows: When the woman goes to the unacceptable man for relations, he is considered as in his established place and hence, the doubt is considered equally balanced. Even when the unacceptable man comes to the woman for relations - in which instance, he has been separated from his natural place, and hence the principles of probability should apply - we rule stringently. This is a safeguard, lest one rule leniently when the woman goes to the man.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 6) rules more leniently, maintaining that if the man comes to the woman, we follow the principles of probability. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:18) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.
60.
And after the fact, we rely on her word.
61.
In these two instances, we assume that she lacks the intellectual sophistication to know the status of the man with whom she engaged in relations.
62.
In all instances, the initial and preferred option is for her not to marry into the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh). A child born from these relations is considered a mamzerof questionable status, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 12.
63.
Since a question of Scriptural Law which cannot be clarified is involved, we rule stringently.
64.
In such an instance, we are not concerned with the doubt because of the high probability that the man was acceptable.
65.
The minimum age from which time onward sexual relations are significant.
66.
As the Rambam proceeds to explain, since the prohibition is of Rabbinic origin, we do not follow the Scriptural requirements applying to witnesses. Therefore although ordinarily the testimony of two acceptable witnesses is required, in this instance, we accept the testimony of only one witness and moreover, accept testimony from witnesses - women, servants, and relatives - who would ordinarily be disqualified.
67.
There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether the testimony of a woman's son or daughter is acceptable. If they mention the matter in the course of conversation, their word is accepted as evident from the following halachah, If, however, a son or a daughter deliver testimony on their mother's behalf, most authorities maintain that the testimony is not accepted (see Chelkat Mechokek 7:1; Beit Shmuel 7:3).
68.
Even though one could argue that each one is lying on the other's behalf.
69.
Whenever there is a question whether or not a Scriptural prohibition applies, we rule stringently. This principle, however, is a point of Rabbinic Law. According to Scriptural Law, since the prohibition is not definitely established, one need not observe it.
70.
A minor is not acceptable as a witness. Nevertheless, if he makes statements in the course of his conversation which indicate that a woman - his mother or any other woman - was not molested by her captors, those statements can serve as evidence to grant the woman license to marry a priest.
The rationale is that these statements are considered to reflect the truth. We suspect that the child is telling us a representative account of what happened. Hence, since the prohibition was instituted only because of doubt, such statements are sufficient to allay our suspicions. With regard to the principle of accepting statements made in the course of conversation, see Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 13, and commentaries.
There are authorities (Rabbenu Nissim) who maintain that a child's word is also accepted when he gives testimony directly. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:1) also quotes that view although he appears to favor the above perspective.
71.
Because the implication is that his mother was not molested.
72.
Or if he makes the statements in the course of conversation (Maggid MishnehBeit Shmuel 7:4). The Rama (Even HaEzer 7:2), however, mentions opinions that grant leniency when he makes such statements in the course of conversation.
73.
The rationale is based on the principle: "A person may not give testimony on his own behalf" [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:2)].
74.
For we fear that she may lie to cover up for her.
75.
For we do not assume that she will know that these statements may be used to advance the cause of her mistress.
76.
We suspect that he desired to marry her and therefore testified that she was not defiled even though he did not have definite information to that effect. Although we enforce this stringency with regard to the priest himself, we accept his testimony with regard to others and allow her to marry another priest (Chelkat Mechokek 7:6, Beit Shmuel 7:7).
77.
For other persons might come and testify that she was defiled in which instance, he would be forced to divorce her. Hence were he not sure that the matter was true, he would not risk forfeiting his money (Ketubot36b).
78.
We would forbid her from marrying a priest only because of her own statements and in those very statements, she maintains that she is pure.
79.
For the testimony of one witness is not halachicly significant. Based on Rashi (Ketubot 23b), the Beit Shmuel 7:8 states that this applies even if the witness testifies that the woman was defiled.
80.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if the witness who testified that she was defiled testified first. Although one might think that once the first witness testifies, her status would be established as forbidden, our Sages ruled leniently with regard to a woman taken captive.
81.
Had the witnesses made their statements first, the woman would not have been granted this license. Nevertheless, once she is given permission to marry into the priesthood, that permission is not rescinded unless there are witnesses that she was defiled.
82.
I.e., watchmen who will observe her and prevent her from being raped by her captors. Although she did not enjoy this protection beforehand, we grant it to her at present.
All of the particulars in this halachah are taken from an actual incident that took place. As Ketubot 23a relates, the daughters of the Sage Shmuel were taken captive. They were transported to Eretz Yisrael. They told their captors to wait for them outside and entered the court of Rabbi Chaninah and said: "We were taken captive, but we are pure." The Sages permitted them to marry into the priesthood.
83.
For testimony delivered by two witnesses establishes a halachic reality which must be reckoned with.
84.
The Chelkat Mechokek 7:9 and the Beit Shmuel 7:12 states that even if the witness came after she was given license to marry into the priesthood, but before she actually married, his testimony is of no consequence and the license is not rescinded. This applies even if witnesses had also come and testified that she had been held captive.
85.
The Chelkat Mechokek 7:11 quotes the Ritbah who maintains that this ruling applies even if the rumor was substantiated in court. As long as there is not actually testimony, her status remains unchanged.
86.
As is his right until she reaches maturity [Hilchot Ishut 3:11 (see also 9:10).
87.
And she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood.
88.
For his word is accepted only as long as the matter is in his hands (see Kiddushin 64a).
89.
Since he has the right to consecrate her and effect her divorce, his word is accepted with regard to her status.
90.
The Beit Shmuel 7:15 explains that we do not accept his word based on the principle ofmiggo. To explain: one might think that since the father's word would be accepted were he to claim that he consecrated her and had her divorced, we accept his word if he claims that she was taken captive, for had he desired to lie, he could have claimed that she was divorced. We do not follow that argument, because the statement that she was taken captive involves a more encompassing prohibition, causing her to be forbidden to partake of terumah as well as being forbidden to marry a priest.
91.
I.e., the prohibition was instituted because we suspect that she was defiled. The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 7) states that, based on the Rambam's statements, if there are witnesses that the woman was defiled, this leniency is not granted.
92.
And see that the couple do not engage in intimacy.
93.
This ruling (as continued in the following three halachot) reflects the Rambam's interpretation of Ketubot 27b. There are several other interpretations of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:10) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of dissenting authorities. See also Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 12:24 which states a ruling dependent on the same passage.
94.
See Halachah 17.
95.
Even if the woman admits that she did not escape or hide, her word is accepted, based on the principle of miggo. As stated in the following halachah, had she desired to lie, instead of saying merely that she was not molested, she could have claimed to have escaped or have hidden.
96.
See the Chelkat Mechokek 7:15 which state that the Rambam's words imply that the woman must come to court and make these statements to be granted license to marry into the priesthood. They also mention Rabbenu Nissim's view that does not require this measure, but instead permits all women in these situations to marry into the priesthood automatically.
97.
As mentioned above, there are opinions that differ and maintain that even when the battalion is from another country, the women are forbidden.
98.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains that even when the conquering army is from another country, if they remain in the city for a longer period, the women are forbidden from marrying into the priesthood. We suspect that since there was no immediate pressure to flee, the soldiers may have raped the local women.
99.
As are any women taken captive by gentiles as stated above.
100.
Since our Sages forbade women taken captive, that prohibition is universally enforced, regardless of the length of time the women were in captivity (Kessef Mishneh).
101.
I.e., we do not suspect that she was raped, because the gentiles will fear to rape her lest they be forced to forfeit the money owed them [Ramah (Even HaEzer 7:11)]. These laws apply not only to jails, but instances when women are held captive by men for other reasons.
102.
I.e., we fear that she was raped by her jailers.
103.
If, however, the husband is an Israelite, there is no prohibition. We do not fear that the women would try to save her life by seducing her jailers or accepting their advances. Were that to be the case, the relations would be considered voluntary and thus she would be prohibited to her husband.
The Rambam's ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:11). The Ramah quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and other Ashkenazic authorities who maintain that a woman would be forbidden to even an Israelite husband for the reasons stated above. He does, however, mention more lenient views.
104.
The commentaries question if these laws apply with regard to contemporary prison conditions when it is less likely for the prison staff to ravage women held under their jurisdiction.
105.
Halachah 17.

Issurei Biah - Chapter Nineteen

Halacha 1
What is meant by a challalah? [A woman] born from [relations] forbidden to the priesthood.1 Similarly, any woman who is forbidden to the priesthood who engaged in relations with a priest becomes a challalah. A priest who commits a transgression himself, however, is not deemed a challal.2
Halacha 2
[The above applies] whether she engaged in relations by coercion or inadvertently3 or whether it was vaginal or anal intercourse, as soon as the male organ enters her, she becomes a challalah. [This applies] provided the priest is nine years of age or older and the woman forbidden him is three years of age or older.4
Halacha 3
What is implied? When a priest who is nine years old engages in relations with a divorcee or with a zonah or a High Priest enters into relations with such women or with a widow, or marries a non-virgin and enters into relations with her,5 these women become challalot for all time. If they conceive a child from such relations, whether from relations with the priest who caused them to be deemed a challalah or whether with another priest, the offspring are challalim.
When, however, a priest consecrates a woman who is forbidden to the priesthood and she is widowed or divorced from the consecration, she does not become a challalah.6 If she marries, even if she does not engage in relations, she becomes a challalah even if it is discovered that she is a virgin.7
Halacha 4
When a High Priest marries a woman past majority or one who lost her signs of virginity through means other than intercourse, she does not become achallalah.8 Similarly, if he enters into relations with a non-virgin outside the context of marriage, she does not become a challalah.9
Halacha 5
When a priest engages in relations with one of the women forbidden as anervah with the exception of a woman in the niddah state or with one of the woman who is forbidden because of a negative commandment that is universally applicable causes her to be deemed a zonah, as explained.10If he - or another priest - engage in relations with her a second time, she becomes a challalah11 and her offspring from [a priest] are challalim.
Accordingly, if a priest engages in relations with a woman who is obligated to undergo yibbum and she conceived from their first relations, the offspring is acceptable to marry into the priesthood. [The rationale is that] the prohibition [against relations with such a woman] is not restricted to the priesthood. She becomes a zonah as we explained.12 If he engaged in relations with her a second time and she conceived and gave birth, she becomes a challalah and her offspring are challalim, for [these relations]13 are forbidden exclusively to the priesthood.
Halacha 6
Similarly, when a priest engages in relations with a convert or a freed maid-servant, he causes her to become a challalah14 and his offspring from her arechallalim.15 When a priest engages in relations with a woman in the niddahstate, the offspring are acceptable and are not challalim. For the prohibition [against relations with] a woman in the niddah state is universally applicable and is not exclusive to the priesthood.
Halacha 7
When a priest marries a divorcee who is pregnant - whether with his child or that of another man - and she gives birth after she became a challalah, the child is acceptable, for it was not conceived from forbidden seed.16
Halacha 8
We have already explained,17 that a woman who has undergone chalitzah is forbidden to a priest by Rabbinic decree. Therefore, when a priest engages in relations with such a woman, she becomes a challalah and her offspring,challalim. All of this is based on Rabbinic decree. When, by contrast, a priest engages in relations with one of the shniot,18 she is acceptable19 and his descendants from her are acceptable, for these prohibitions are universally applicable and are not exclusive to the priesthood.
Halacha 9
When a priest engages in relations with a woman whose status as a zonah is questionable, e.g., a woman concerning whose status as a convert or as a freed maid-servant is questionable, when he engages in relations with a woman whose status as a divorcee is questionable,20 or a High Priest engages in relations with a woman whose status as a widow is questionable,21 the woman is deemed as a challalah of questionable status and her offspring are considered challalim of questionable status.
Halacha 10
Thus there are three categories of challalim: a challal according to Scriptural Law, a challal according to Rabbinic decree, a person whose status as achallal is a matter of question.
Anyone whose status as a challal is a matter of question must observe the severities incumbent on the priesthood and those incumbent on ordinary Israelites.22 He may not partake of terumah.23 He may not become impure due to contact with the dead24 and he must marry a woman fit to marry a priest. If he partakes of terumah, becomes impure, or marries a divorcee, he is given stripes for rebellious conduct. The same laws apply to a challal by Rabbinic decree.
When, however, a person is definitely a challal according to Scriptural Law, he is like [any other] non-priest. He may marry a divorcee and become impure due to contact with a corpse. [This is derived from Leviticus 21:1 which] states: "Speak to the priests, the descendants of Aaron." [Implied is that the prohibition that follows25 does not apply] even to the descendants of Aaron unless they are priests.
Halacha 11
A male priest who is forbidden to marry a zonah and a challalah is forbidden to marry a female convert and freed maid-servant for they are equivalent tozonot as we explained.26 A woman of the priestly family, however, is permitted to marry a challal, a convert, or a freed servant. For women of acceptable lineage were not forbidden against marrying men of unacceptable lineage.27 [This is derived from the phrase "the descendants" [- literally, the sons -] of Aaron," i.e., sons and not daughters. Thus a convert is permitted to marry a female mamzer28 and also, the daughter of a priest.
Halacha 12
When converts and/or freed servants marry among themselves and give birth to a daughter - even after several generations - this daughter is forbidden to marry a priest,29 for the seed of a native-born Jew has not intermingled with them. If one married such a woman, she need not be divorced since she was both conceived and born in holiness.30 When, however, a convert or a freed servant marries a native-born Jewess or a native-born Jew marries a female convert or a freed slave, their daughter is acceptable to marry into the priesthood at the outset.
Halacha 13
When an Ammonite convert31 or a second generation Egyptian convert32marry a native-born Jewess, the intimate relations they share involve a transgression and the women become zonot as we explained.33Nevertheless, their daughters may marry into the priesthood as an initial and preferred option.34
Halacha 14
When a challal marries an acceptable woman, his descendants from her arechallalim. This also applies to the son of his son's son35and indeed, even for 1000 generations. For the male son of a challal is a challal for all time. If the offspring is female, she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, because she is a challalah.
When, however, an Israelite marries a challalah, the offspring are acceptable.36 Therefore if one of the offspring is female, she may marry into the priesthood at the outset.
Halacha 15
Priests, Levites, and Israelites are permitted to marry among each other.37The status of the child is determined by that of the father.38 [Similarly,] Levites, Israelites, and challalim are permitted to marry among each other and the status of the child is determined by that of the father. [This is derived fromNumbers 1:18]: "And they established the lineage of their families, according to their father's household." [Implied is that] the household of one's father is one's family and not the household of one's mother.
Halacha 16
Levites, Israelites, challalim, converts, and freed servants are permitted to marry among each other. When a convert or a freed servant marries the daughter of a Levite, the daughter of an Israelite, or a challalah, the offspring is an Israelite.39 When an Israelite, a Levite, or a challal marry a female convert or a freed maid-servant, the status of the child is determined by that of the father.40
Halacha 17
We operate under the presumption that all families are of acceptable lineage and it is permitted to marry their descendants as an initial and preferred option.41 Nevertheless, if you see two families continuously quarreling with each other, you see one family that is always involved with strife and controversy, or you see a person who frequently quarrels with people at large and is very insolent, we suspect [their lineage]. It is fitting to distance oneself from such people for these are disqualifying characteristics.
Similarly, a person who always slurs the lineage of others, casting aspersions on the ancestry of families or individuals, claiming that they are mamzerim, we are suspicious that he himself is a mamzer. Similarly, if he calls others servants, we suspect that he is a servant. For whoever denigrates others, denigrates them with a blemish that he himself possesses.
Similarly, whenever a person is characterized by insolence and cruelty, hating people and not showing kindness to them, we seriously suspect that he is a Gibeonite. For the distinguishing signs of the holy nation of Israel is that they are meek, merciful, and kind. With regard to the Gibeonites, [II Samuel 21:2] states: "The Gibeonites are not of the Jewish people." For they acted extremely brazenly and would not be appeased. They did not show mercy to the sons of [King] Saul, nor did they show kindness to the Jews to forgive the descendants of their king,42 while [the Jews] had shown them kindness and allowed them to live.43
Halacha 18
When [the purity of] a family's [lineage] has been disputed, i.e., two individuals testify44 that a mamzer or a challal has intermingled with that family or there are servants among them,45 the matter is questionable. If the family are priests, one should not marry a woman from them until he46 investigates the lineage of four - actually eight47- of her maternal ancestors: her mother, her maternal grandmother, the mother of her maternal grandfather, the maternal grandmother of her maternal grandfather. Similarly, he must investigate the lineage of her paternal grandmother, the mother of her paternal grandmother, the mother of her paternal grandfather, and the mother of the mother of her paternal grandfather.
Halacha 19
If the family whose lineage was disputed were Levites or Israelites, it is necessary to check [the lineage of] another pair of women. Thus one must check ten maternal ancestors.48 [The rationale is that unacceptable people] intermarry among Levites and Israelites more frequently than among priests.
Halacha 20
Why is it necessary to check the lineage only of the woman's maternal [ancestors]? Because whenever men argue with each other, one will malign the other with a blemish that exists in his lineage. Thus if he was unacceptable, the matter would have been made known.49 Women, by contrast, do not malign [each other] with regard to blemishes in their lineage.50
Halacha 21
Why must a man make an investigation when he desires to marry a woman from a family concerning whom the presumption of acceptable lineage has been impaired and yet a woman who desires to marry into this family is not required to make an investigation? Because woman of acceptable lineage were not warned against marrying [men of] unacceptable lineage.51
Halacha 22
Whenever a person is called a mamzer, a netin a challal, or a servant and he remains silent, we suspect [the lineage of] him and his family52 and do not marry women from this [family] unless an investigation was made as we explained.53
Halacha 23
When there is a suspicion that a person concerning whom there is a question whether he is a challal married into a family,54 every widow from that family is forbidden to a priest at the outset.55 [After the fact,] if she married [a priest], she need not be divorced because there are two questions involved: Maybe this is the widow of that challal56 or maybe it is not? Even if you say that she was his widow, maybe he was a challal or maybe he was not?57
If, however, a person who was definitely a challal married into a family, every woman58 from that family is forbidden to a priest until he conducts an investigation. If he marries [such a woman without an investigation], she must be divorced. The same laws59 apply if a person regarding whom there is a question whether he is a mamzer or a person who is definitely mamzerbecame intermingled in the family. For the same prohibition applies to the priesthood with regard to the wife of a challal and the wife of a mamzer, as we explained.60
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., the women mentioned in Chapter 17, Halachah 1.
2.
The fact that he engaged in forbidden relations does not detract from the essential holiness endowed to him by his priestly lineage.
3.
For the spiritual blemish brought about by the forbidden relations has an effect regardless of her intent or lack of it.
4.
For only when the male and the female are these respective ages are their relations considered significant.
5.
Note the contrast to the following halachah. Although a non-virgin is forbidden only on the basis of a positive commandment (Chapter 17, Halachah 13), offspring from such a relationship are challalim.
6.
Needless to say, a divorcee may not marry a priest. The Rambam is emphasizing that if she is divorced, in addition to the prohibition of a divorcee, she is also prohibited as achallalah.
7.
For as Ketubot 11a states, a woman who is divorced after marriage is considered as if she has engaged in relations. The Chelkat Mechokek 7:23 and the Beit Shmuel 7:36 discuss this ruling, mentioning views that differ slightly.
8.
For after the fact, he is allowed to remain married to such a woman, as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 15.
9.
For the prohibition forbidding her to him applies only within the context of marriage (Chapter 17, Halachah 2). Although he performs a transgression for entering into intimacy without the intent of marriage (seeHilchot Ishut 1:4), that prohibition is not restricted to the priesthood and offspring are deemed challalim, only when the prohibition against the relations is exclusive to the priesthood.
10.
Chapter 18, Halachah 1.
11.
Since she became a zonah, the prohibition against relations with her is exclusive to the priesthood.
12.
Chapter 18, Halachah 2. For the relations do involve a transgression.
13.
I.e., relations with a zonah.
14.
For they are forbidden exclusively to the priesthood, as stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 3.
15.
Even if they are conceived during the first time the couple engage in relations [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:14)]. The rationale is that even before the priest engages in relations with such women, they are deemed as zonot.
16.
As Kiddushin 77a states, the determination of whether a child is deemed as a challal or not depends on whether it was conceived through a transgression or not. The mother's status at the time of birth is not significant.
17.
In Chapter 17, Halachah 7.
18.
Relatives forbidden by Rabbinic decree as listed in Hilchot Ishut 1:6.
19.
See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.
20.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:20) quotes the Rambam's ruling. The Tur and the Rama state that the same laws apply to a woman who underwent a chalitzahceremony of questionable validity. Based on the distinction between such a woman and a woman whose status is a divorcee is questionable which the Rambam makes in Chapter 17, Halachah 7, the Beit Shmuel7:40 maintains that the Rambam would not accept such an addition.
21.
See Chapter 17, Halachah 12.
22.
Otherwise, there is a possibility that he will be violating prohibitions of Scriptural origin.
23.
Lest he is an Israelite to whom this is forbidden. See Hilchot Terumah 6:7.
24.
Lest he is a priest to whom this is forbidden.
25.
The prohibition against contact with a corpse.
26.
Chapter 18, Halachah 3.
27.
I.e., those forbidden to the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh). See, however, Halachah 21 and notes.
28.
See Chapter 15, Halachah 7.
29.
Kiddushin 78b states that after the destruction of the Temple, the priests accepted this stringency upon themselves.
30.
Note the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 7), theChelkat Mechokek 7:29 and the Beit Shmuel7:42 who note that the Rambam requires the girl to be both conceived and born within the Jewish people.
31.
Who is forbidden to marry a native-born Jewess (Chapter 12, Halachah 18).
32.
Who is likewise forbidden (ibid.:19).
33.
Chapter 18, Halachah 3. As Yevamot 36a states, the women themselves may not marry a priest, but their daughters may.
34.
For a female Ammonite is permitted and a third generation Egyptian is permitted.
35.
We have not used the term grandson or great grandson, because if a female descendant is involved, the next generation are not challalim.
36.
Neither the son, nor the daughter are considered challalim.
37.
E.g., there is no restriction against a priest marrying the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite.
38.
Thus in the instance mentioned in the previous note, the offspring would be considered as priests.
39.
I.e., neither a Levite or a challal.
40.
Thus the offspring of a Levite are Levites and the offspring of challalim are challalim.
41.
The Rambam is stating that it is not necessary to investigate thoroughly the lineage of a family before marrying into them. If it is a common presumption that a family is of acceptable lineage, one may marry a family member at the outset. When we know nothing of the lineage of the family, there are some authorities [Remo as quoted by theTur (Even HaEzer 2)] who maintain that we do question his lineage and require proof that he is acceptable. Others (Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim) differ and maintain that even if we do not know anything about a family's lineage, we assume that they are acceptable. See the discussion of the issue by Beit Shmuel 2:3.
The debate concerns the practice in the Talmudic age and in subsequent eras when Jewish observance was strong. At present, particularly in contemporary communities when there are many non-observant Jews and non-halachic divorce and similar problems are rampart, it is customary for Rabbinic courts to be careful and investigate the lineage of people before performing a marriage.
42.
As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 12, Halachah 23, as related in II Samuel, ch. 21, there was a famine for three years in Eretz Yisrael. Through prophetic vision, David learned that the reason for the famine was Saul's oppression of the Gibeonites (exactly what Saul did to oppress them is a matter of discussion among the Rabbis). David asked the Gibeonites what they desired to be appeased for this oppression. They answered that they wanted to slay seven of his descendants. David handed over seven of Saul's descendants to them and they hung them and left their corpses on the gallows. For this act of cruelty, David decreed that they should never marry among the Jewish people.
43.
Joshua, Chapter 9, relates that after the Jews' conquest of Jericho and Ai, the inhabitants of Gibeon:
Acted cunningly... They took old sacks upon their donkeys, old and rent wine bottles... old, worn and patched shoes... and came to Joshua at Gilgal. They told him:... "We have come from a distant country. Therefore, make a covenant with us." Joshua made a covenant with them... and the princes of the congregation swore to them.
After the ruse was discovered, Joshua and the people honored the covenant and allowed the Gibeonites to live. Moreover, they even came to their defense when they were attacked by other Canaanite nations.
44.
The Beit Shmuel 2:6 cites the opinion of Rashi (Kiddushin 76a) which maintains that even if the two people cast aspersions on the family's lineage without delivering formal testimony, such investigations must be made.
45.
We are not concerned that a servant intermingled among them, for even if a servant did conceive a child with a woman from a priestly family, the child is acceptable. Our suspicion is that one of the priests had relations with a maid-servant and she bore him a son or daughter who was raised as a member of the priest's family (Chelkat Mechokek 2:2).
46.
See Halachah 21and notes which discuss whether a woman is required to make such an investigation or not.
47.
I.e., the obligation is to check the lineage of four women: her mother, the mother of her maternal grandfather, her paternal grandmother, and the paternal grandmother of her paternal grandfather. Nevertheless, to verify the acceptability of the lineage of these women, it is necessary to verify that their mothers are also of acceptable lineage, thus reaching a total of eight (Rabbenu Nissim).
48.
I.e., one must add the mother of her maternal grandmother and the maternal grandmother of her paternal grandmother (Merkevet HaMishneh).
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's statements, noting that fromKiddushin 76a, it would appear that one would have to check the lineage of twelve or sixteen women.
49.
I.e., after the blemish was mentioned in quarrels, it would become a matter of public knowledge and investigated accordingly.
50.
Hence, their blemished lineage would not be public knowledge.
51.
The Rambam's statements (based on his interpretation of Kiddushin 76b) have attracted the attention of the commentaries who raise a basic question: The prohibition against marrying an unacceptable partner (e.g., a mamzer) applies equally to men and women (see Chapter 1, Halachah 1). Why then is a woman not warned with regard to this matter?
The Maggid Mishneh (quoting Rashi's commentary to Kiddushin 76a) states that here, the Rambam intent is that since the Torah did not forbid a woman of the priestly family from marrying a challal, our Sages did not require a woman to make an investigation even when there is a question whether her future husband is entirely unacceptable.
According to Rashi who interprets "disputing a family's lineage" (Halachah 18) as merely casting aspersions, this interpretation is tenable. After all, we have no hard and fast evidence that the man's lineage is unacceptable. But according to the Rambam, who defines that term as referring to testimony delivered in court, the original question remains. Since there is a firm possibility that a Scriptural prohibition is involved, why shouldn't a woman be required to make an investigation? Among the resolutions offered is that of the Chelkat Mechokek 2:5 is that the Rambam would require an investigation even when a woman desires to marry. Nevertheless, the investigation need not include all of the eight (or ten) women mentioned by the Rambam. Such thoroughness is required only when a man seeks to marry.
See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Halachah 18 and the Chelkat Mechokek 2:3 which cite differing opinions which also require a woman to make a full-fledged investigation of the lineage of a man she desires to marry if there are questions concerning his lineage.
52.
We assume that he would not remain silent when his lineage is slurred unless there was some truth to the assertions.
The Ra'avad states that the Rambam's statement (taken from Ketubot 14b) held true only in the Talmudic era when a person who insulted a colleague's lineage was placed under a ban of ostracism. Hence when a person remained silent instead of appealing to the court, we could assume that he was admitting to the accuser's assertion. In the present era, by contrast, there is no punishment given for making such slurs. Hence, the insulted person would have no benefit in bringing the matter to the court's attention. Accordingly, it is preferable to remain silent.
The Ramban and the Rashba explain that the Rambam's words apply with regard to a family concerning which there already exist doubts with regard to their lineage. When, by contrast, their lineage is considered unblemished, it is preferable for them to remain silent. Rabbenu Nissim states that the insulted person's silence is considered significant only when it is common for him to protest other matters. If, however, he usually remains silent, the fact that he does so in this situation as well is of no consequence. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 2:4) quotes the Rambam's words and the Rama quotes the latter views.
53.
As explained in Halachot 18-19. The investigation is sufficient to clarify any difficulties, for the suspicion created by his silence is not a more serious factor than the testimony of the witnesses mentioned in Halachah 18 (Maggid Mishneh).
54.
I.e., there is a report that a man of questionable status married into a family, but the identity of that man and that of his wife are not known.
55.
One might think that because of the multiple doubt involved the woman would be permitted at the outset. Nevertheless, because of the stringency of the laws of proper lineage, this leniency is not taken.
56.
And as is stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 1, a woman who engaged in relations with achallal is forbidden to the priesthood.
57.
Since there is a multiple doubt (sefek sefeikah), the woman is permitted.
58.
I.e., both widows and daughters (Kessef Mishneh).
59.
I.e., the first clause applies to a person's whose status as a mamzer is a matter of question and the second clause to whose unacceptable status is definite (Kessef Mishneh).
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro mentions opinions that rule more stringently and forbid marriage even when there is a report that a person about whom a question was raised whether or not he is a mamzermarried into a family. In his Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 2:5), however, he quotes the Rambam's view.
60.
Chapter 18, Halachah 1.

Issurei Biah - Chapter Twenty

Halacha 1
[The status of] all of the priests of the present era1 is accepted on the basis of a prevailing assumption.2 They may only eat sacred food that is eaten [within] the boundaries [of Eretz Yisrael],3 provided it is terumah mandated by virtue of Rabbinic decree [alone].4 [Even] terumah mandated by Scriptural Law andchallah mandated by Scriptural Law, by contrast, may be eaten only by a priest whose lineage is established.
Halacha 2
What is meant by a priest whose lineage is established? Anyone concerning whom two witnesses5 testify that he is a priest, the son of so-and-so the priest, and the descendant of so-and-so the priest, extending back until we reach a person whose lineage need not be checked, i.e., a priest who served at the altar. [Such a person's lineage need not be verified, because] were the High Court not to have made investigations about him, they would not have allowed him to perform service [in the Temple].6
Accordingly, we do not investigate the lineage of anyone who served at the altar or who served on the Sanhedrin. For only priests, Levites, and Israelites of acceptable lineage are appointed to the Sanhedrin.7
Halacha 3
In the present era, even in Eretz Yisrael,8 challah does not have the status of a Scriptural commandment. [This is derived from Numbers 15:18:] "When you come into the land...."9 [Implied is when] all of you enter and not when only a portion enter.10 When Ezra ascended [to Eretz Yisrael], the entire people did not ascend.
Similarly, in the present era, terumah is a Rabbinic commandment.11Therefore it is eaten by the priests of our era [whose lineage is established merely] by presumption.
Halacha 4
When two witnesses testify that they saw a person partaking of terumahmandated by Scriptural Law, his lineage is established. We do not elevate a person [to the level that his priestly] lineage is [considered as] established based on the fact that he delivers the Priestly Blessing [to the people], reads the Torah first,12 or is given terumah in the granaries,13 or because of the testimony of one witness.
Halacha 5
When a priest whose lineage was established says: "This son of mine is a priest," we do not consider [the son as a priest whose] lineage is established14on the basis of his statement unless he brings witnesses who testify that the child is his son.15
Halacha 6
[The following laws apply when] a priest whose lineage has been established departs to another country together with his wife whom we know to be of acceptable lineage. If he comes together with her and children who relate to them as parents and says: "This is the woman who departed together with me and these are her children," he does not have to bring witnesses to testify about the woman or the children.
[If he says:] "She died and these are her children," he must bring witnesses who testify that these are his children.16 He need not bring witnesses that his wife was of acceptable lineage, for her status as being acceptable was already established when she departed from us.
Halacha 7
When a priest whose lineage was established goes out to another country and comes together with his wife and his sons, saying: "I married this woman and these are her sons," he must bring proof that the woman is acceptable. He does not have to bring witnesses that these are her sons, provided the children relate to her as a mother.
If he comes together with two wives and brings proof regarding one, he is required to bring proof about the sons, even though the children are young and relate to her as a mother. For perhaps they are the sons of the other women, but relate to the woman whose lineage is established as a mother.
Halacha 8
If he comes together with sons and says: "I married a woman and she died. These are her sons," he must bring witnesses that the woman was acceptable and that these are her sons." These laws also apply with regard to an Israelite of established lineage and a Levite of established lineage. Afterwards, we can testify with regard to this son so that he will be fit for theSanhedrin.17
Halacha 9
We do not elevate a person's lineage [based on mention in] a document to the priesthood. What is implied? If it is stated in a document: "So-and-so, the priest, borrowed from so-and-so this-and-this amount," and witnesses sign below, we do not operate under the assumption that this priest is of acceptable lineage. For perhaps, they signed only with regard to the loan.18
With regard to what does the above apply? With regard to considering the person as a priest of acceptable lineage. [Different principles apply] with regard to the presumption that he is a priest like the other priests of the present age and license to partake of terumah and challah mandated by Rabbinic decree and to be given other sacred articles [granted priests within] the boundaries [of Eretz Yisrael].19 [These privileges are granted on the basis of] mention in a legal document, the testimony of one witness, or the fact that a person recites the priestly blessing or reads the Torah first.
Halacha 10
Similarly, whenever a priest says: "My son is a priest," his word is accepted with regard to feeding him terumah20 and having him accepted as a priest.21He need not bring proof regarding his sons or his wife.
Halacha 11
When two people come to a particular city, one says: "I and my colleague are priests," and the other says, "I and my colleague are priests," their word is accepted and they are both considered as priests22 even though it appears that they are in collusion.23
Similarly, if one witness says: "I saw this person recite the Priestly Blessing," "...eat terumah, "...received terumah in the granary," or "...read first from the Torah and a Levi read after him,"24 he is considered a priest on the basis of this statement. Similarly, if one testified that a person read second from the Torah after a priest, he is considered as a Levite.
Halacha 12
If one delivers testimony in court saying that he saw a person and his brothers divide terumah left to them by their father the priest, we do not consider him a priest because of this testimony. Perhaps he is a challal and took his portion of the inheritance of terumah in order to sell it.
Halacha 13
In the present era, when a person comes and says: "I am a priest," his word is not accepted and we do not consider him a priest on the basis of his own statements. He should not read from the Torah first, recite the Priestly Blessing,25or partake of sacred food that is eaten [within] the boundaries [ofEretz Yisrael] unless there is one witness who corroborates his statements.
He does, however, cause himself to be forbidden [to marry] a divorcee, azonah, and a challalah; nor may he become impure because of contact with a corpse.26 If he marries such a woman or becomes impure, he receives lashes.27 A woman [who may not marry into the priesthood] who engages in relations with him is deemed a challalah of questionable status.28
Halacha 14
If the person makes these statements in the course of conversation, his word is accepted.29
What is implied? An incident once took place with regard to a person who was speaking in the midst of conversation, saying: "I remember that when I was an infant and was being carried on my shoulders by father, they took me out of school,30removed my outer garment, and had me immerse in the mikveh to partake of terumah in the evening. My colleagues separated themselves from my and called me: 'Yochanan, who eats challot.' Our holy teacher31 had him considered a priest on the basis of these statements.
Halacha 15
An adult's word is accepted if he says: "I remember when I was a child32 and I saw so-and-so immerse himself in a mikveh and partake of terumah in the evening." He is considered a priest on the basis of this statement.
In the present era, when a person comes and says: "I am a priest," and a witness testifies on his behalf, saying: "I know that his father is a priest," we do not consider him as a priest on the basis of this testimony. [We fear that] perhaps he is a challal.33 Instead, [the witness] must testify that the person himself is a priest. If, however, the father's identity as a priest is an established fact or two witnesses come and testify that the person's father is a priest, because of his father, we assume [that he is a priest].
Halacha 16
When the identity of a person's father as a priest has been established, but there is a rumor34 that he is the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who performed chalitzah, we entertain suspicions and do not treat him as a priest. If one witness comes and testifies that he is acceptable, we treat him as a priest because of his statements.35 If two witnesses come afterwards and testify that he is a challal, we remove him from the priesthood.36
If another witness comes and testifies that he is acceptable, we treat him as a priest, because the last witness is joined together with the first.37 Thus there are two witnesses testifying that he is acceptable and two testifying that he is unacceptable. Both pairs of witness and the rumor are voided, for two witnesses have the same legal power as 100.38 And the person remains a priest based on the status of his father.39
Halacha 17
[The following law applies] when a woman [remarried] without waiting three months after [the death of] her [first] husband40 and gave birth. If it is not known whether the child was conceived by the first - and born after nine months - or conceived by the second - and born after seven - and one of them was a priest and the other, an Israelite, the child is a priest of questionable status.
Similarly, if a son of a priest became intermingled with a child of an Israelite41and they grow to maturity, they are both considered priests of questionable status. They must observe the stringencies incumbent on Israelites and the stringencies incumbent on priests: They may only marry women fit to marry into the priesthood. They may not become impure through contact with the dead, nor may they partake of terumah. If they marry a divorcee, they are forced to divorce and they do not receive lashes.42
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply] if the sons of two priests become intermingled or the wife of a priest married a second priest without waiting three months after the death of her first husband and it is not known whether the child was conceived by the first - and born after nine months - or conceived by the second - and born after seven. The stringencies that would apply as if he was the son of both men must be observed: He must observe the rights of aninut43because of [both44 of] them45 and they [both] observe the rights of aninutbecause of him.46 He may not become impure because of them, nor may they become impure because of him.47 He may serve in the priestly watch48 of both of them, but does not receive a portion.49 If they are both from the same priestly watch and the same beit av,50 he receives one portion.51
Halacha 19
When does the above apply? When the relationships with both [priests] involve marriage. If, however, one is a licentious relationship, our Sages decreed that [the son's] priestly privileges are suppressed entirely, because he does not have definitive knowledge of the identity of his father. [This is supported by Numbers 25:13]:52 "He and his descendants who follow him will possess [the covenant of priesthood]." [Implied is that] his descendants will be able to trace their identity to him.
Halacha 20
What is implied? There were ten priests. One of them departed and engaged in relations [with a woman without revealing his identity]. The son is definitely a priest.53 Nevertheless, since he does not know his father's identity and cannot trace his lineage to him, his priestly privileges are suppressed entirely. He may not serve [in the Temple], partake [of sacrificial foods], or receive an allotment [from the sacrifices]. If, however, he becomes impure because of contact with a corpse or he marries a divorcee, he receives lashes, for there is no question of leniency.54
FOOTNOTES
1.
When the priests do not serve in the Temple and there is no Sanhedrin to verify their lineage.
2.
I.e., they are regarded as priests by people at large even though there is no definite proof of their lineage.
3.
I.e., in contrast to sacrificial meat which may be eaten only in the Temple courtyard or within the city of Jerusalem depending on the type of sacrifice involved.
4.
As explained in Halachah 3, in the present age, the mitzvah of terumah has the status of a Rabbinic commandment. As reflected by the commentaries to Hilchot Terumah2:1, according to the Rambam, Scriptural Law requires us to separate terumah from all types of produce usually eaten by humans. The mitzvah does not apply only to the grain, grapes, and olives singled out byDeuteronomy 18:4.
5.
Note the Maggid Mishneh who elaborates, explaining that although generally, the testimony of one witness is sufficient with regard to issues involving Scriptural prohibitions, an exception is made with regard to terumah.
6.
See the conclusion of the tractate of Middotand Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 6:11, which describes the manner in which the lineage of the priests was checked.
7.
See Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:1.
8.
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Bikkurim5:5,7, in the Biblical era, there was a distinction between the mitzvah of challah as observed in Eretz Yisrael and as observed in the Diaspora. For according to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisrael.
9.
The continuation of the verse describes the mitzvah to separate challah.
10.
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Terumah1:26 and Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:16, after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael by Assyrians and the Babylonians the sanctity of the land was nullified and there was no obligation to keep the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael. When Ezra led the people back to Eretz Yisrael after the 70 years of the Babylonian exile, the majority of the people did not accompany him. (Moreover, he did not conquer the land.) Hence, his sanctification of Eretz Yisrael was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, he and his court ruled that those mitzvot should be observed as a Rabbinic ordinance.
This reflects the Rambam's view. Although other Rishonim (Ra'avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen) differ and maintain that Ezra's settlement of the land was sufficient to sanctify it according to Scriptural Law, the Rambam's approach is accepted by most authorities.
11.
The Rambam maintains that the laws regarding terumah and the tithes are derived from those applying to challah (Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Terumah 1:26).
12.
In the Talmudic era - as is still the practice in certain communities - when a person was given an aliyah, he would read the Torah himself, rather than have it read for him by others.
13.
Although all of these practices are signs of the priesthood, we do not consider them as conclusive evidence of a priest's lineage.
14.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's words could be interpreted to mean that the child is considered a priest with regard to marriage. Nevertheless, he does not possess the advantage of being considered of established lineage unless testimony is given.
15.
The father's statement is, however, sufficient to have considered as a priest with regards to matters applicable in the present age, as stated in Halachah 10.
16.
More precisely, that they are the sons borne him by his deceased wife.
17.
And his daughters fit to marry priests.
18.
And did not pay attention to the fact the person was described as a priest.
19.
E.g., the sheep exchanged in place of a donkey, the first shearing of a sheep, and the like.
20.
This refers even to terumah mandated by Scriptural Law. Ketubot 25b explains that this ruling is based on the principle of miggo. If the priest desired to transgress, he could feed his son terumahwithout having him declared a priest. See also Halachah 3.
21.
To be given an aliyah first and to bless the people.
22.
For the testimony of one witness is effective.
23.
And there is room to suspect that each is lying on the others behalf.
24.
If a Levi did not read after him, the fact that he read first is not significant. For perhaps there were no priests present and an Israelite was called instead or he was given the honor because of his stature as a Torah scholar.
25.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the above are forbidden him, because - as stated in Halachah 9 - when an observer sees a person performing such acts, he may consider that person a priest.
Rav Moshe Cohen and the Rama (Even HaEzer 3:1) maintain that, in the present era, it is customary to accept a person's word if he claims to be a priest. For the only serious problem with regard to observance is partaking of terumah and we do not separate terumah in the present age. Note the Chelkat Mechokek 3:1 who raises questions regarding the license for this person to recite the Priestly Blessing. See also the Maggid Mishneh who mentions that this custom was also practiced in his era. He strongly protests against it, calling it "an erroneous custom."
26.
Since he considers himself a priest, it is as if he has taken a vow not to perform these activities.
27.
The commentaries have questioned this statement, for it has not been formally established that the person is a priest. Nevertheless, since he considers himself a priest, as far as he is concerned, the warning given him will be have been of substance and the punishment deserved. Hence he is given the lashes. The woman is not given lashes, for as far as she is concerned, the matter is not definitely established (Maggid Mishneh).
28.
Hence if another priest engages in relations with her, he is not given lashes. Her offspring are also challalim of questionable status and her daughter may not marry into the priesthood (Maggid MishnehChelkat Mechokek 3:3).
29.
He is allowed to partake of terumahmandated by Rabbinic decree, for his statements are given the weight of the testimony of one witness.
30.
This is proof that he was not a servant, for servants are not taught the Torah (Tosafot, Ketubot 26a).
31.
Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi.
32.
Generally, for testimony to be valid, the person observing the matter must be acceptable as a witness. In this instance, however, formal testimony is not required. Hence leniency is shown. (See Hilchot Edut14:3).
33.
This applies even if there are no rumors that the person's mother is not acceptable (Maggid Mishneh). The Chelkat Mechokek3:9 quotes other authorities who are more lenient.
34.
We are not speaking about mere hearsay, but a rumor that is substantiated by the court.
35.
For the testimony of one witness is powerful enough to negate the rumor.
36.
Because the testimony of one witness is of no consequence in the face of the testimony of two witnesses.
37.
The fact that the two witnesses do not testify at the same time is not significant (Hilchot Edut 4:4).
38.
I.e., the intent is that once two witnesses give testimony in court, their statement is given the weight of established fact and needs no further corroboration. Since the statements of the two pairs of witnesses contradict each other, they are both nullified. Nevertheless, the statements of the witnesses who testify that he is acceptable also have the power to nullify the rumor.
39.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if he is considered acceptable only with regard to terumah mandated by Rabbinic Law or also with regard to terumah mandated by Scriptural Law. The Beit Shmuel 3:14 states that the Rambam is also referring to terumahmandated by Rabbinic Law.
40.
A woman is required to wait for such an interim so that the lineage of her children will be established definitively.
41.
I.e., as infants, the identity of the children became confused and the doubt was never clarified.
42.
They are not given lashes, because it is not certain that they violated a Scriptural commandment. They should, however, be given "stripes for rebellious conduct," because of their disregard of the restrictions the Rabbis placed upon them [Perisha (Even HaEzer 3)].
43.
This term refers to the state of acute morning that applies immediately after the death of one's close relative. See Hilchot Evel 4:6. It is particularly relevant to priests, for one is forbidden to serve in the Temple or partake of sacrificial foods in a state ofaninut (Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 2:6-10 ).
44.
Yevamot 100b notes a difficulty in the use of the plural in both this and the following clause. Since the ordinary way the mother of this priest could have married a second priest is when her first husband died, how is it possible to speak about the son mourning for that first husband or that first husband mourning for him?
The Talmud answers that this is speaking about a situation where the mother thought she was consecrated to the first husband, but in fact was not. This is not considered a licentious relationship warranting the stringencies mentioned in the following halachah. A formal divorce, however, is not required and hence the woman may marry another priest.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, one can also interpret the passage as referring to a woman whose father died in her childhood and who was married by Rabbinic decree. Until she attains majority, she may dissolve that marriage through the rite of mi'un. In such an instance, a formal divorce is not required. If she conceives a child, dissolves her marriage, and then marries another priest, the situation mentioned in this halachah may apply.
45.
For perhaps that person is his father. Rashi (Yevamot, loc. cit.) interprets this statement as referring to the restrictions placed upon priests for aninut. Since it is possible that the person who died is his father, he should not risk the violation of a Scriptural commandment. With regard to the customs concerning aninut mentioned in Hilchot Evel(one of them being that one does not perform any of the Torah's mitzvot), by contrast, Kinat Eliyahu raises a question: Should one refrain from performing a mitzvah because perhaps the person who died was his father?
46.
For perhaps he is their son.
47.
There is a Scriptural prohibition against a priest becoming impure. That prohibition does not apply when one is certain that the person who died is one's relative. In this instance, however, neither the father or son is certain.
48.
The priests were divided into 24 watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week in a cycle of rotation (Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 4:3). This priest has the right to serve during the week allotted to both of the individuals suspected of being his father.
49.
In this instance, we are speaking of expropriating property (a share in the sacrifices) from the other priests. Hence we follow the principle: When a person seeks to expropriate property, the burden of proof is upon him.
50.
Each priestly watch was divided into sevenbatei av, family groupings, who would serve in the Temple one day of the seven (Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 4:11).
51.
For he is certainly entitled to one portion.
52.
Yevamot, loc. cit., explains that this interpretation is not of Scriptural origin. Instead, the law is a Rabbinic decree. Our Sages, however, found a Biblical verse that supported their ruling.
53.
Because all the individuals suspected of being his father were priests.
54.
For he is definitely a priest and must observe the prohibitions incumbent upon them.
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Hayom Yom:

English Text | Video Class

• 
"Today's Day"
Friday, Adar I 10, 5776 · 19 February 2016
Monday 10 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Tetzaveh, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 55-59.
Tanya: The cause being (p. 125)..."The flesh of man." (p. 125).
At birkat hamazon, before washing the fingers,1 say al naharot bavel, lamnatzei'ach bin'ginot, avarcha, zeh cheilek (p. 88).
When tachanun is not said, say shir hamaalot b'shuv, livnei korach, avarcha, zeh cheilek.
After washing the fingers say vay'dabeir eilai (p. 89).
FOOTNOTES
1. See Kislev 4.
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Daily Thought:
Galut
It is not so much that we need to be taken out of exile. That, a Moses can do.
It is that the exile must be taken out of us. For that, each one must find Moses within.
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CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Tuesday, February 16, 2016 - Today is: Tuesday, Adar I 7, 5776 · February 16, 2016
Today's Laws & Customs:
• Sanctification of the Moon
Once a month, as the moon waxes in the sky, we recite a special blessing called Kiddush Levanah, "the sanctification of the moon," praising the Creator for His wondrous work we call astronomy.
Kiddush Levanah is recited after nightfall, usually on Saturday night. The blessing is concluded with songs and dancing, because our nation is likened to the moon—as it waxes and wanes, so have we throughout history. When we bless the moon, we renew our trust that very soon, the light of G‑d's presence will fill all the earth and our people will be redeemed from exile.
Though Kiddush Levanah can be recited as early as three days after the moon's rebirth, the kabbalah tells us it is best to wait a full week, till the seventh of the month. Once 15 days have passed, the moon begins to wane once more and the season for saying the blessing has passed.
Links:
Brief Guide to Kiddush Levanah: Thank G‑d for the Moon!
More articles on Kiddush Levanah from our knowledgebase.
Today in Jewish History:
• Moses' Birth & Passing (1393 and 1273 BCE)
Moses was born in Egypt on the 7th of Adar of the year 2368 from creation (1393 BCE). According to one opinion, the year of Moses' birth was a "leap year", and he was born in the first Adar.
Moses passed away on his 120th birthday -- Adar 7, 2488 (1273 BCE)
Links:
A brief biography
The Birth of a Leader
The HeadMoses Disappears
More on Moses
Daily Quote:
For Israel is a child, and I love him
[Hosea 11:1]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Tetzaveh, 3rd Portion Exodus 28:31-28:43 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Exodus Chapter 28
31And you shall make the robe of the ephod completely of blue wool. לאוְעָשִׂ֛יתָ אֶת־מְעִ֥יל הָֽאֵפ֖וֹד כְּלִ֥יל תְּכֵֽלֶת:
the robe of the ephod: upon which the ephod is placed as a belt. את מעיל האפוד: שהאפוד נתון עליו לחגורה:
completely of blue wool: Heb. כְּלִיל ךְתְּכֵלֶת. All of it [the robe] was blue, without any other kind [of color or material] combined with it. כליל תכלת: כולו תכלת, שאין מין אחר מעורב בו:
32Its opening at the top shall be turned inward; its opening shall have a border around it, the work of a weaver. It shall have [an opening] like the opening of a coat of armor; it shall not be torn. לבוְהָיָ֥ה פִֽי־רֹאשׁ֖וֹ בְּתוֹכ֑וֹ שָׂפָ֡ה יִֽהְיֶה֩ לְפִ֨יו סָבִ֜יב מַֽעֲשֵׂ֣ה אֹרֵ֗ג כְּפִ֥י תַחְרָ֛א יִֽהְיֶה־לּ֖וֹ לֹ֥א יִקָּרֵֽעַ:
Its opening at the top: Heb. פִי רֹאשׁוֹ The opening of the robe at its top; that is the opening of the collar. והיה פי ראשו: פי המעיל שבגבהו הוא פתיחת בית הצואר:
shall be turned inward: Heb. בְּתוֹכוֹ, folded inward. As the Targum [Onkelos] renders: כָּפִיל לְגַוִּהּ, folded inward, so that its fold should be a border for it. It was woven, not [sewn] with a needle. בתוכו: כתרגומו כפיל לגויה, כפול לתוכו להיות לו לשפה כפילתו, והיה מעשה אורג ולא במחט:
like the opening of a coat of armor: We learn [here] that their coats of armor had the opening folded inward [i.e., like a coat of mail]. כפי תחרא: למדנו שהשריונים שלהם פיהם כפול לתוכן:
it shall not be torn: [I.e.,] in order that it would not be torn, and the one who tears it transgresses a negative commandment, for this is [counted] in the number of the negative commandments in the Torah. Likewise, “and the choshen will not move” (verse 28), and likewise, “they shall not be removed from it” (Exod. 25:15), mentioned regarding the poles of the ark. -[from Yoma 72a] לא יקרע: כדי שלא יקרע, והקורעו עובר בלאו, שזה ממנין לאוין שבתורה, וכן (פסוק כח) ולא יזח החשן, וכן (שמות כה טו) לא יסורו ממנו. הנאמר בבדי הארון:
33And on its bottom hem you shall make pomegranates of blue, purple, and crimson wool, on its bottom hem all around, and golden bells in their midst all around. לגוְעָשִׂ֣יתָ עַל־שׁוּלָ֗יו רִמֹּנֵי֙ תְּכֵ֤לֶת וְאַרְגָּמָן֙ וְתוֹלַ֣עַת שָׁנִ֔י עַל־שׁוּלָ֖יו סָבִ֑יב וּפַֽעֲמֹנֵ֥י זָהָ֛ב בְּתוֹכָ֖ם סָבִֽיב:
pomegranates: They were round and hollow, like a sort of pomegranate, shaped like hens’ eggs. רמוני: עגולים וחלולים היו כמין רמונים העשויים כביצת תרנגולת:
and golden bells: Heb. וּפַּעִמֹנֵי זָהָב. [Golden] bells with the clappers inside them. ופעמוני זהב: זגין עם ענבלין שבתוכם:
in their midst all around: [I.e.,] between them all around. [Meaning] between two pomegranates, one bell was attached and suspended on the bottom hem of the robe. בתוכם סביב: ביניהם סביב, בין שני רמונים פעמון אחד דבוק ותלוי בשולי המעיל:
34A golden bell and a pomegranate, a golden bell and a pomegranate, on the bottom hem of the robe, all around. לדפַּֽעֲמֹ֤ן זָהָב֙ וְרִמּ֔וֹן פַּֽעֲמֹ֥ן זָהָ֖ב וְרִמּ֑וֹן עַל־שׁוּלֵ֥י הַמְּעִ֖יל סָבִֽיב:
A golden bell and a pomegranate: A golden bell and a pomegranate beside it. פעמון זהב ורמון פעמון זהב ורמון: אצלו:
35It shall be on Aaron when he performs the service, and its sound shall be heard when he enters the Holy before the Lord and when he leaves, so that he will not die. להוְהָיָ֥ה עַל־אַֽהֲרֹ֖ן לְשָׁרֵ֑ת וְנִשְׁמַ֣ע ק֠וֹל֠וֹ בְּבֹא֨וֹ אֶל־הַקֹּ֜דֶשׁ לִפְנֵ֧י יְהֹוָ֛ה וּבְצֵאת֖וֹ וְלֹ֥א יָמֽוּת:
so that he will not die: From the negative you deduce the positive. If he has them [the garments], he will not be liable to death, but if he enters [when he is] lacking one of these garments, he is liable to death by the hands of Heaven. -[from Tanchuma Buber, Acharei 7] ולא ימות: מכלל לאו אתה שומע הן, אם יהיו לו לא יתחייב מיתה, הא אם יכנס מחוסר אחד מן הבגדים הללו חייב מיתה בידי שמים:
36And you shall make a showplate of pure gold, and you shall engrave upon it like the engraving of a seal: Holy to the Lord." לווְעָשִׂ֥יתָ צּיץ זָהָ֣ב טָה֑וֹר וּפִתַּחְתָּ֤ עָלָיו֙ פִּתּוּחֵ֣י חֹתָ֔ם קֹ֖דֶשׁ לַֽיהֹוָֽה:
a showplate: It was like a sort of golden plate, two fingerbreadths wide, encircling the forehead from ear to ear. -[from Shab. 63b] ציץ: כמין טס של זהב היה, רוחב שתי אצבעות, מקיף על המצח מאוזן לאוזן:
37And you shall place it upon a cord of blue wool and it shall go over the cap, and it shall be opposite the front side of the cap. לזוְשַׂמְתָּ֤ אֹתוֹ֙ עַל־פְּתִ֣יל תְּכֵ֔לֶת וְהָיָ֖ה עַל־הַמִּצְנָ֑פֶת אֶל־מ֥וּל פְּנֵֽי־הַמִּצְנֶ֖פֶת יִֽהְיֶֽה:
upon a cord of blue wool: But elsewhere, it says: “And they placed upon it a cord of blue wool” (Exod. 39:31). Moreover, here it is written: “and it shall go over the cap,” whereas below it says: “It shall be upon Aaron’s forehead.” (verse 38). [A clue to the solution is] in [tractate] Shechitath Kodashim (Zev. 19a) [where] we learn: “His hair was visible between the showplate and the cap, where he would place the tefillin.” [Thus] we learn that the cap was above, on the crown of the head, and it was not deep [enough] for the entire head up to the forehead to fit into it. The showplate was below [the cap], and the cords were in holes and hanging on it at its two ends and in its center. [Thus, there were] six [cords] in these three places: [one] cord on top, one from outside, and one from inside opposite it. He tied the three ends from behind the nape of his neck. Thus, the combination of the length of the plate and the cords of its ends encircled the crown. The middle cord, which was on his head, was tied with the ends of the two [other cords], and it passed along the surface of the width of the head from above. Thus, it is was like a sort of hat. Concerning the middle cord it says: “and it shall go over the cap.” He would place the showplate on his head like a sort of hat over the cap, and the middle cord would hold it so that it would not fall, and the plate was suspended opposite his forehead. [Thus,] all the verses are explained: the cord was on the showplate, the showplate on the cord, and the cord was on the cap from above. על פתיל תכלת: ובמקום אחר הוא אומר (שמות לט לא) ויתנו עליו פתיל תכלת, ועוד כתיב כאן והיה על המצנפת, ולמטה הוא אומר (פסוק לח) והיה על מצח אהרן, ובשחיטת קדשים שנינו (זבחים יט א) שערו היה נראה בין ציץ למצנפת, ששם מניח תפילין, למדנו שהמצנפת למעלה בגובה הראש ואינה עמוקה ליכנס בה כל הראש עד המצח, והציץ מלמטה, והפתילים היו בנקבים ותלויין בו בשני ראשים ובאמצעיתו ששה בשלושה מקומות הללו, פתיל מלמעלה, אחד מבחוץ, ואחד מבפנים כנגדו, וקושר ראשי הפתילים מאחורי העורף שלשתן, ונמצאו בין אורך הטס ופתילי ראשיו מקיפין את הקדקד, ופתיל האמצעי שבראשו קשור עם ראשי השנים, הולך על פני רוחב הראש מלמעלה, ונמצא עשוי כמין כובע, ועל פתיל האמצעי הוא אומר והיה על המצנפת, והיה נותן הציץ על ראשו כמין כובע על המצנפת, והפתיל האמצעי מחזיקו שאינו נופל, והטס תלוי כנגד מצחו, וניתקיימו כל המקראות פתיל על הציץ, וציץ על הפתיל, והפתיל על המצנפת מלמעלה:
38It shall be upon Aaron's forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the holy things that the children of Israel sanctify, for all their holy gifts. It shall be upon his forehead constantly to make them favorable before the Lord. לחוְהָיָה֘ עַל־מֵ֣צַח אַֽהֲרֹן֒ וְנָשָׂ֨א אַֽהֲרֹ֜ן אֶת־עֲוֹ֣ן הַקֳּדָשִׁ֗ים אֲשֶׁ֤ר יַקְדִּ֨ישׁוּ֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל לְכָל־מַתְּנֹ֖ת קָדְשֵׁיהֶ֑ם וְהָיָ֤ה עַל־מִצְחוֹ֙ תָּמִ֔יד לְרָצ֥וֹן לָהֶ֖ם לִפְנֵ֥י יְהֹוָֽה:
and Aaron shall bear: Heb. וְנָשָׂא [This is] an expression of forgiveness. Nevertheless, it does not move from its apparent [literal] meaning. Aaron shall indeed bear the burden of iniquity; thereby, it [the iniquity] is removed from the holy things. ונשא אהרן: לשון סליחה, ואף על פי כן אינו זז ממשמעו, אהרן נושא את המשא של עון, נמצא מסולק העון מן הקדשים:
the iniquity of the holy things: to appease [God] for the blood and the fat [of the sacrifices] that were offered up in [a state of] uncleanness, as we learned: Which iniquity does he bear? If [it is] the iniquity of פִּגּוּל, it was already said: “it will not be accepted” (Lev. 19:7). [I.e., if the one who performed the sacrificial service intended to partake of the flesh outside the area designated for this sacrifice, the sacrifice is rendered פִּגּוּל, meaning an abominable thing. It consequently may not be eaten or offered up. The showplate on the Kohen Gadol’s forehead does not make the פִּגּוּל acceptable.] If [it is] the iniquity of נוֹתָר, [i.e.,] leftover sacrificial flesh, it was already said: “it will not be credited” (Lev. 7:18). [I.e., if the one who performed the sacrificial service intended to partake of the flesh after the time allotted for eating the flesh of this sacrifice, it is disqualified, and the showplate does not render it acceptable. Likewise,] we cannot say that it will atone for the iniquity of the kohen who offered up the sacrifice while unclean, for it says [here]: “the iniquity of the holy things,” not the iniquity of those who offer them up. Consequently, it does not appease except to render the sacrifice acceptable. -[from Men. 25a] את עון הקדשים: לרצות על הדם ועל החלב שקרבו בטומאה, כמו ששנינו (פסחים טז א) אי זה עון הוא נושא, אם עון פיגול, הרי כבר נאמר (ויקרא יט ז) לא ירצה, ואם עון נותר, הרי נאמר (ויקרא ז יח) לא יחשב, ואין לומר שיכפר על עון הכהן שהקריב טמא, שהרי עון הקדשים נאמר, ולא עון המקריבים, הא אינו מרצה אלא להכשיר הקרבן:
It shall be upon his forehead constantly: It is impossible to say that it should always be on his forehead, for it was not on him except at the time of the service. But [it means that] it will always make them [the sacrifices] favorable Even when it is not on his forehead, namely if the Kohen Gadol was not ministering at that time. Now, according to the one who says that [only] when it was on his forehead it appeased [and made the sacrifices acceptable], and otherwise, it did not appease, “upon his forehead constantly” is interpreted to mean that he must touch it [the showplate] while it is upon his forehead, so that he would not take his mind off it. -[from Yoma 7b] והיה על מצחו תמיד: אי אפשר לומר שיהא על מצחו תמיד, שהרי אינו עליו אלא בשעת העבודה, אלא תמיד לרצות להם, אפילו אינו על מצחו, שלא היה כהן גדול עובד באותה שעה. ולדברי האומר (יומא ז ב) עודהו על מצחו מכפר ומרצה, ואם לאו אינו מרצה, נדרש על מצחו תמיד, מלמד שמשמש בו בעודו על מצחו, שלא יסיח דעתו ממנו:
39You shall make the linen tunic of checker work, and you shall make a linen cap; and you shall make a sash of embroidery work. לטוְשִׁבַּצְתָּ֙ הַכְּתֹ֣נֶת שֵׁ֔שׁ וְעָשִׂ֖יתָ מִצְנֶ֣פֶת שֵׁ֑שׁ וְאַבְנֵ֥ט תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה מַֽעֲשֵׂ֥ה רֹקֵֽם:
You shall make…of checker work: Make them [the tunics] of boxes, and all of them [shall be made] of linen. ושבצת: עשה אותה משבצות משבצות, וכולה של שש:
40For Aaron's sons you shall make tunics and make them sashes, and you shall make them high hats for honor and glory. מוְלִבְנֵ֤י אַֽהֲרֹן֙ תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה כֻתֳּנֹ֔ת וְעָשִׂ֥יתָ לָהֶ֖ם אַבְנֵטִ֑ים וּמִגְבָּעוֹת֙ תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה לָהֶ֔ם לְכָב֖וֹד וּלְתִפְאָֽרֶת:
For Aaron’s sons you shall make tunics: These four garments and no more: a tunic, a sash, the hats, which are [the same as] the cap, and the pants written below (verse 42) for all of them. ולבני אהרן תעשה כתנת: ארבעה בגדים הללו ולא יותר כתונת, ואבנט, ומגבעות היא מצנפת, ומכנסים הכתובים למטה בפרשה (פסוק מב):
41With these you shall clothe Aaron, your brother, and his sons along with him, and you shall anoint them and invest them with full authority and sanctify them so that they may serve Me [as kohanim]. מאוְהִלְבַּשְׁתָּ֤ אֹתָם֙ אֶת־אַֽהֲרֹ֣ן אָחִ֔יךָ וְאֶת־בָּנָ֖יו אִתּ֑וֹ וּמָֽשַׁחְתָּ֨ אֹתָ֜ם וּמִלֵּאתָ֧ אֶת־יָדָ֛ם וְקִדַּשְׁתָּ֥ אֹתָ֖ם וְכִֽהֲנוּ־לִֽי:
With these you shall clothe Aaron: [I.e., with] those [garments] stated in connection with Aaron: a choshen, an ephod, a robe, a checker work tunic, a cap, a sash, a showplate, and pants mentioned further on in connection with them all. והלבשת אתם את אהרן: אותם האמורים באהרן חשן ואפוד ומעיל וכתונת תשבץ, מצנפת ואבנט וציץ ומכנסים, הכתובים למטה בכולם:
and his sons along with him: [with] those [garments] mentioned in connection with them. ואת בניו אתו: אותם הכתובים בהם:
and you shall anoint them: [i.e.,] Aaron and his sons, with the anointing oil. ומשחת אותם: את אהרן ואת בניו בשמן המשחה:
and invest them with full authority: Heb. וּמִלֵאתָ אֶת-יָדָם, [lit., and you shall fill their hands.] Every [mention of] “filling of the hands” is an expression of initiation. When he [a person] begins something [such as a position] that he will be in possession of from that day on [it is referred to as “filling” a position]. In Old French, when they appoint a person to be in charge of something, the ruler puts in his hand a leather glove, called guanto [gant in modern French], and thereby he grants him authority over the matter. They call this transmission revestir, invest, transmit [this glove], and this is the [expression] “filling of the hands.” ומלאת את ידם: כל מלוי ידים לשון חנוך, כשהוא נכנס לדבר להיות מוחזק בו מאותו יום והלאה הוא מלוי, ובלשון לעז כשממנין אדם על פקידת דבר, נותן השליט בידו בית יד של עור שקורין גנ"ט בלעז [כפפה], ועל ידו הוא מחזיקו בדבר, וקורין לאותו מסירה ריוישטי"ר בלעז [להסמיך] והוא מלוי ידים:
42And make for them linen pants to cover the flesh of [their] nakedness; they shall reach from the waist down to the thighs. מבוַֽעֲשֵׂ֤ה לָהֶם֙ מִכְנְסֵי־בָ֔ד לְכַסּ֖וֹת בְּשַׂ֣ר עֶרְוָ֑ה מִמָּתְנַ֥יִם וְעַד־יְרֵכַ֖יִם יִֽהְיֽוּ:
And make for them: For Aaron and for his sons. ועשה להם: לאהרן ולבניו:
linen pants: Thus [we have] eight garments for the Kohen Gadol and four for the ordinary kohen. מכנסי בד: הרי שמונה בגדים לכהן גדול, וארבעה לכהן הדיוט:
43They shall be worn by Aaron and by his sons when they enter the Tent of Meeting or when they approach the altar to serve in the Holy, so they will not bear iniquity and die. It shall be a perpetual statute for him and for his descendants after him. מגוְהָיוּ֩ עַל־אַֽהֲרֹ֨ן וְעַל־בָּנָ֜יו בְּבֹאָ֣ם | אֶל־אֹ֣הֶל מוֹעֵ֗ד א֣וֹ בְגִשְׁתָּ֤ם אֶל־הַמִּזְבֵּ֨חַ֙ לְשָׁרֵ֣ת בַּקֹּ֔דֶשׁ וְלֹֽא־יִשְׂא֥וּ עָוֹ֖ן וָמֵ֑תוּ חֻקַּ֥ת עוֹלָ֛ם ל֖וֹ וּלְזַרְע֥וֹ אַֽחֲרָֽיו:
They shall be worn by Aaron: All these garments [shall be] worn by Aaron, [i.e.,] those that are appropriate for him. והיו על אהרן: כל הבגדים האלה על אהרן הראויין לו:
and by his sons: those mentioned in connection with them. ועל בניו: האמורים בהם:
when they enter the Tent of Meeting: To the Temple [proper], and so to the Mishkan. בבואם אל אוהל מועד: להיכל, וכן למשכן:
and die: while lacking [the proper] garments is liable to death [by the hands of Heaven]. -[from Tanchuma, Acharei Moth 6] ומתו: הא למדת, שהמשמש מחוסר בגדים במיתה:
a perpetual statute for him: Wherever it says חֻקַתעוֹלָם, “a perpetual statute,” it means a decree that is [in effect] immediately and for [future] generations [as well]. [This statute is] to make invalid [the sacrifice if any requirement is missing]. -[See Men. 19a.] חקת עולם לו: כל מקום שנאמר חקת עולם, הוא גזירה מיד ולדורות, לעכב בו:












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Daily Tehillim: Chapters 39 - 43
Hebrew text
English text
• Chapter 39
David's prayer bewailing his suffering. But it is not suffering itself that pains him, rather he is saddened by its disturbing his Torah study. For man's days are few, "and if not now, when (will he study)?" for he may die, today or tomorrow. He therefore requests that his suffering be removed, to enable him to study Torah and acquire a place in the World to Come.
1. For the Conductor, for yedutun,1 a psalm by David.
2. I said that I would guard my ways from sinning with my tongue; I would guard my mouth with a muzzle, [even] while the wicked one is before me.
3. I became mute with stillness, I was silent [even] from the good, though my pain was crippling.
4. My heart grew hot within me, a fire blazed in my utterance, as I spoke with my tongue.
5. O Lord, let me know my end and what is the measure of my days, that I may know when I will cease.
6. Behold, like handbreadths You set my days; my lifetime is as naught before You. But all is futility, all mankind's existence, Selah.
7. Only in darkness does man walk, seeking only futility; he amasses riches and knows not who will reap them.
8. And now, what is my hope, my Lord? My longing is to You.
9. Rescue me from all my transgressions; do not make me the scorn of the degenerate.
10. I am mute, I do not open my mouth, for You have caused [my suffering].
11. Remove Your affliction from me; I am devastated by the attack of Your hand.
12. In reproach for sin You chastened man; like a moth, You wore away that which is precious to him. All mankind is nothing but futility, forever.
13. Hear my prayer, O Lord, listen to my cry; do not be silent to my tears, for I am a stranger with You, a sojourner like all my forefathers.
14. Turn from me, that I may recover my strength, before I depart and I am no more.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument (Metzudot).
Chapter 40
The psalmist speaks of the numerous wonders that God wrought for the Jewish people, asking: "Who can articulate His might? I would relate and speak of them, but they are too numerous to recount!" He created the world and split the sea for the sake of Israel, [yet] He desires no sacrifices, only that we listen to His voice.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. I put my hope in the Lord; He turned to me and heard my cry.
3. He raised me from the turbulent pit, from the slimy mud, and set my feet upon a rock, steadying my steps.
4. He put a new song in my mouth, a hymn to our God; multitudes will see and fear, and will trust in the Lord.
5. Fortunate is the man who has made the Lord his trust, and did not turn to the haughty, nor to those who stray after falsehood.
6. You have done much, O You, Lord my God-Your wonders and thoughts are for us; none can compare to You; should I relate or speak of them, they are too numerous to recount!
7. You desired neither sacrifice nor meal-offering, but [obedient] ears You opened for me; You requested neither burnt-offering nor sin-offering.
8. Then I said, "Behold, I come with a Scroll of the Book written for me."1
9. I desire to fulfill Your will, my God; and Your Torah is in my innards.
10. I proclaimed [Your] righteousness in a vast congregation; behold I will not restrain my lips-O Lord, You know!
11. I did not conceal Your righteousness within my heart; I declared Your faithfulness and deliverance; I did not hide Your kindness and truth from the vast congregation.
12. May You, Lord, not withhold Your mercies from me; may Your kindness and truth constantly guard me.
13. For countless evils surround me; my sins have overtaken me and I cannot see; they outnumber the hairs of my head, and my heart has abandoned me.
14. May it please You, Lord, to save me; O Lord, hurry to my aid.
15. Let those who seek my life, to end it, be shamed and humiliated together; let those who desire my harm retreat and be disgraced.
16. Let those who say about me, "Aha! Aha!" be desolate, in return for their shaming [me].
17. Let all those who seek You exult and rejoice in You; let those who love Your deliverance always say, "Be exalted, O Lord!”
18. As for me, I am poor and needy; my Lord will think of me. You are my help and my rescuer; my God, do not delay!
FOOTNOTES
1.Upon recovery, David expresses thanks, not through sacrifices, by dedicating himself to Torah (Radak).
Chapter 41
This psalm teaches many good character traits, and inspires one to be thoughtful and conscientious in giving charity-knowing to whom to give first. Fortunate is he who is thoughtful of the sick one, providing him with his needs.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. Fortunate is he who is thoughtful of the poor, [for] the Lord will save him on the day of evil.
3. The Lord will guard him and keep him alive; he will be praised throughout the land; You will not deliver him to the desires of his enemies.
4. The Lord will support him on the bed of illness; You will turn him over in his bed all throughout his sickness.
5. I said, "Lord, be gracious to me! Heal my soul, for I have sinned against You!”
6. My foes say that evil [awaits] me: "When will he die, and his name perish?”
7. And if one comes to see [me], he speaks insincerely, for his heart gathers iniquity for himself, and when he goes out he speaks of it.
8. Together they whisper against me-all my enemies; against me they devise my harm, [saying]:
9. "Let his wickedness pour into him; now that he lies down, he shall rise no more.”
10. Even my ally in whom I trusted, who ate of my bread, has raised his heel over me.
11. But you, Lord, be gracious to me and raise me up, and I will repay them.
12. With this I shall know that You desire me, when my enemies will not shout gleefully over me.
13. And I, because of my integrity, You upheld me; You set me before You forever.
14. Blessed is the Lord, the God of Israel, to all eternity, Amen and Amen.
Chapter 42
This psalm awakens the hearts of the Children of Israel who do not feel the immense ruin, loss, and bad fortune in their being exiled from their Father's table. Were they wise, they would appreciate their past good fortune in coming thrice yearly, with joy and great awe, to behold God during the festivals, free of adversary and harm. May God place mercy before us from now to eternity, Amen Selah.
1. For the Conductor, a maskil1 by the sons of Korach.
2. As the deer cries longingly for brooks of water, so my soul cries longingly for You, O God!
3. My soul thirsts for God, for the living God. When will I come and behold the countenance of God?
4. My tears have been my bread day and night, when they say to me all day, "Where is your God?”
5. These do I recall, and pour out my soul from within me: how I traveled [to Jerusalem] in covered wagons; I would walk leisurely with them up to the House of God, amid the sound of rejoicing and thanksgiving, the celebrating multitude.
6. Why are you downcast, my soul, and why do you wail within me? Hope to God, for I will yet thank Him for the deliverances of His countenance.
7. My God! My soul is downcast upon me, because I remember You from the land of Jordan and Hermon's peaks, from Mount Mitzar.2
8. Deep calls to deep3 at the roar of Your channels; all Your breakers and waves have swept over me.
9. By day the Lord ordains His kindness, and at night His song is with me, a prayer to the God of my life.
10. I say to God, my rock, "Why have You forgotten me? Why must I walk in gloom under the oppression of the enemy?”
11. Like a sword in my bones, my adversaries disgrace me, when they say to me all day, "Where is your God?”
12. Why are you downcast, my soul, and why do you wail within me? Hope to God, for I will yet thank Him; He is my deliverance, [the light of] my countenance, and my God.
FOOTNOTES
1.A psalm intended to enlighten and impart knowledge. (Metzudot)
2.My heart aches when I remember the pilgrims from lands east of Jordan, and those from distant Hermon and Mitzar, who would travel to Jerusalem for the festivals (Radak)
3.Before one misfortune has ended, another is already upon us; as if one calls the other to come (Metzudot).
Chapter 43
A significant prayer concerning the magnitude of the troubles we have suffered at the hands of the impious nations. May it be God's will to send Moshiach and Elijah the Prophet, who will lead us to the Holy Temple to offer sacrifices as in days of old.
1. Avenge me, O God, and champion my cause against an impious nation; rescue me from the man of deceit and iniquity.
2. For You are the God of my strength; why have You abandoned me? Why must I walk in gloom under the oppression of the enemy?
3. Send Your light and Your truth, they will guide me; they will bring me to Your holy mountain and to your sanctuaries.
4. Then I will come to the altar of God-to God, the joy of my delight-and praise You on the lyre, O God, my God.
5. Why are you downcast, my soul, and why do you wail within me? Hope to God, for I will yet thank Him; He is my deliverance, [the light of] my countenance, and my God.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 27
Lessons in Tanya
• English Text
Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
Video Class
• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Tuesday, Adar I 7, 5776 · February 16, 2016
• Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 27
• ומקדושה זו נמשכת קדושה עליונה על האדם למטה לסייעו סיוע רב ועצום לעבודתו יתברך
From this holiness, a sublime holiness issues forth upon man below, to assist him with a great and powerful aid in his service of G‑d.
וזהו שאמרו רז״ל: אדם מקדש עצמו מעט למטה, מקדשין אותו הרבה מלמעלה
This is what our Sages meant when they said: 1 “If a man consecrates himself in a small measure here below, he is sanctified greatly from above.”
לבד מה שמקיים מצות עשה של תורה: והתקדשתם וכו׳, כשמקדש עצמו במותר לו
This is apart from the fact that when one sanctifies himself in permissible matters, he thereby fulfills the positive commandment of the Torah: 2 “Sanctify yourselves, and be holy.”
Hence, apart from the consolation previously offered the Beinoni — that through “turning away from evil” by combating evil thoughts and desires, he affords G‑d a pleasure that tzaddikim cannot — his battle with the sitra achra also contains a positive quality in the category of “doing good,” that is likewise not present in the divine service of tzaddikim. 3 This positive quality is the fulfillment of the mitzvah: “Sanctify yourselves…,” which applies only to Beinonim, not to tzaddikim.For the intention of the commandment is that even one’s personal, permissible, and mundane matters should not be attended to out of the desire of one’s animal soul, but for the sake of G‑d. This directive cannot apply to tzaddikim, who are unencumbered by desires of the animal soul, as the Alter Rebbe continues:
ופירוש והתקדשתם: שתעשו עצמכם קדושים
The meaning of “Sanctify yourselves” is: “You shall make yourselves holy.”
כלומר: אף שבאמת אינו קדוש ומובדל מסטרא אחרא
That is to say, although in truth one is not holy and separated from the sitra achra,
כי היא בתקפה ובגבורתה כתולדתה בחלל השמאלי
for the sitra achra of his animal soul is still, as at birth, at its full strength and might, in the left part of his heart — the seat of the animal soul and evil inclination,
The word kedushah (“holiness”) means “setting apart,” i.e., separation from the unholy. 4 The verse thus means: One should sanctify himself even if he must yet make himself holy and separate from the sitra achra, for at his present level his heart still desires those things that derive from it,
רק שכובש יצרו ומקדש עצמו
yet if even while at this level he subdues and masters his evil impulse and makes himself “holy”, separate from the sitra achra, then, continues the verse:
והייתם קדושים
“You will be holy.”
The words “be holy” which, in their simple sense, voice a command, can also be understood as conveying a promise,
כלומר: סופו להיות קדוש ומובדל באמת מהסטרא אחרא
meaning that ultimately he will be truly “holy” and removed from the sitra achra,
על ידי שמקדשים אותו הרבה מלמעלה
through his being “greatly sanctified from above,” as quoted earlier from the Gemara,
ומסייעים אותו לגרשה מלבו, מעט מעט
and through his being aided from above to expel [the sitra achra] from his heart, little by little, so that even in his heart he will no longer have any desire for anything originating in the realm of the sitra achra.
FOOTNOTES
1.Cf. Yoma 39a.
2.Vayikra 20:7.
3.Based on a comment by the Rebbe.
4.Cf. Rashi on Vayikra 19:2.
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Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Tuesday, Adar I 7, 5776 · February 16, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"Negative Commandment 348
Bestiality (for a man)
"And with no animal shall you cohabit"—Leviticus 18:23.
It is forbidden for a man to engage in sexual relations with an animal.
Bestiality (for a man)
Negative Commandment 348
Translated by Berel Bell
The 348th prohibition is that we are forbidden from having sexual relations with an animal, whether it be male or female.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "do not perform any sexual act with an animal."
One who transgresses this prohibition intentionally is punished by s'kila; if he does not receive stoning,2 he is punished by kares; and if it was done unintentionally, he must bring a sin-offering.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 18:23.
2.E.g. there were no witnesses.

Negative Commandment 349Bestiality (for a woman)
"And a woman shall not stand in front of an animal to cohabit with it"—Leviticus 18:23.
It is forbidden for a woman to engage in sexual relations with an animal.
Bestiality (for a woman)
Negative Commandment 349
Translated by Berel Bell
The 349th prohibition is that women are forbidden from allowing animals to have sexual relations with them.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "A woman shall not give herself to an animal and allow it to mate with her."
This counts as a separate commandment distinct from the previous one. [The proof of this is that] the prohibition on males from having relations with animals does not itself prohibit women from allowing animals to have relations with them, would it not be for a separate prohibition.
In the first chapter of Kerisus,2 our Sages say, "there are 36 mitzvos in the Torah which are punishable by kares." They enumerate them, and include both a man and a woman committing bestiality. [These are counted separately,] even though the Sages only enumerate general categories, as we explained in our commentary.3 We have therefore proven that this mitzvah counts as a separate prohibition.
One who transgresses this prohibition intentionally is punished by stoning; if it was done intentionally but there was no acceptable testimony, she receives kares; and if it was done unintentionally, she must bring a sin-offering.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid.
2.Ch.1, Mishneh 1.
3.In his Commentary to the Mishneh, the Rambam comments on the prohibition of having relations with a woman and her daughter, which is listed as one of the 36. Although relations with a woman and her granddaughter, etc. are also prohibited, the Mishneh just lists the one general idea of "parents" and "offspring" — counting it as just one of the 36 categories. Nevertheless, the two mitzvos mentioned here are listed separately, and count as two of the 36.

Negative Commandment 350Male Homosexuality
"You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; this is an abomination"—Leviticus 18:22.
It is forbidden for a man to engage in homosexual relations.
Male Homosexuality
Negative Commandment 350
Translated by Berel Bell
The 350th prohibition is that [a male] is forbidden from having relations with another male.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not lie with a man as you would with a woman, since this is a disgusting perversion." The same prohibition is repeated a second time,2 "there shall not be a prostitute among Jewish men."
This is the proper explanation of the repetition — that it was added to give additional stress, not to give a separate prohibition for the passive partner. From the statement, "do not lie," one derives the prohibition for both parties.
In3 tractate Sanhedrin,4 it is explained that Rabbi Yishmael is the one who interprets the verse, "there shall not be a prostitute" as a prohibition to the passive partner. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yishmael, one who both has relations with a male and allows a male to have relations with him in the same helam5 must bring two sin-offerings. But Rabbi Akiva says, "[a separate verse] is not necessary [to make a prohibition on the passive partner]. The Torah says, 'do not lie (lo sishkav) with a man' — it can also be read, 'do not allow another to lie with you (lo sishacheiv).' " Therefore, according to him, one who both has relations with a male and allows a male to have relations with him in the same helam must only bring one sin-offering. The reasoning given is "lo sishkav and lo sishacheiv are one prohibition," and according to him, "there shall not be a prostitute" comes only to add stress. This is similar to the prohibition,6 "do not commit adultery," which is the same prohibition of a married woman,7 "do not lie carnally with your neighbor's wife." We explained many similar cases in the Ninth Introductory Principle.
One who transgresses this prohibition [intentionally] is punished by stoning; if it was done intentionally but he did not receive stoning, he receives kares; and if it was done unintentionally, he must bring a sin-offering.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 18:22.
2.Deut. 23:18.
3.The Rambam now proceeds to prove that this counts as only one prohibition, and not two.
4.54b.
5.Literally, a "concealment." One brings a sin-offering only if the transgression was done unintentionally. If one does the same prohibited act many times without realizing that the act was forbidden, only one sin-offering is brought.
This is known as helam echad, one concealment. However, if two different prohibitions are done, even in the same helam, two offerings must be brought.
6.N347.
7.Lev. 18:20.

Negative Commandment 351Father-Son Incest
"You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father"—Leviticus 18:7.
It is forbidden for a man to engage in homosexual relations with his father. One who does so transgresses two prohibitions: the general prohibition against homosexuality as well as this specific prohibition.
Father-Son Incest
Negative Commandment 351
Translated by Berel Bell
The 351st prohibition is that one is forbidden from having [homosexual] relations with one's father.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "do not commit a sexual offense against your father."
One who transgresses this prohibition also is punished by stoning. One who has relations with his father is therefore guilty of homosexual relations2 and of relations with one's father.
In tractate Sanhedrin,3 the verse "do not commit a sexual offense against your father" is explained as meaning, "literally, your father."4 On this they ask, "but this is already prohibited from the verse, 'do not lie with a man'! They answer, "[this verse comes] to make him guilty of two offenses, like Rav Yehudah said, 'a non-Jew who has relations with his father is guilty of two offenses.' " There they explain, "it is sensible to say that Rav Yehudah was really referring to the law of a Jew who has done the act unintentionally, and who must bring a sacrifice. He used the expression, "non-Jew" as a euphemism."5 Therefore, if he had relations with his father unintentionally, he would bring two sin-offerings just as one who unintentionally committed two types of sexual prohibitions. This is not the case with [homosexual relations with] another male, where only one sin-offering would be brought.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 18:7.
2.N350 above.
3.54a.
4.Rather than translating "a sexual offense against your father" as incest with one's mother, which would automatically be an offense against one's father.
5.Rav Yehudah didn't even want to mention a Jew in reference to such an act.
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• 1 Chapter: Shemita Shemita - Chapter 2 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Shemita - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
A person should not remove waste materials from his courtyard and place them in his field in the Sabbatical year, because it appears that he is fertilizing his field so that it will be improved for him to sow it.1 If he did remove them, but made a waste heap, it is permitted.2
He should not make a waste heap in his field until the time when it is common to fertilize the fields as is done when tilling the land passes, i.e., when the bitter3 [apples] become [very dried out and] knotted. He should not make a waste heap that contains less than 150 se'ah of waste, so that it will be obvious that it is a waste heap.4 If he wishes to add to it, he may. If he has a small amount [of waste matter placed in his field before the beginning of the Sabbatical year], he can continue to increase it [throughout the Sabbatical year]. One should not make more than three waste heaps in an area large enough to sow a se'ah of grain.5
Halacha 2
When a person desires to make waste heaps throughout his entire field, three in each area large enough to sow a se'ah, he may.6 If he desires to combine his waste into one large waste heap,7 he may.
Halacha 3
When a person would place waste on a rock, dug out three handbreadths of the earth and then made a heap of waste, or built [a platform] three handbreadths high above the earth and placed the waste upon them, there is no required measure. Even if he made several waste heaps in an area large enough to sow a se'ah of grain, it is permitted. [The rationale is] it is obvious that his intent is not to improve the land,8 but rather to collect his waste.9
Halacha 4
A person is permitted to remove waste from a corral of sheep and place it in his field as [is permitted to] all those who collect waste.10
When a person makes a corral in his field in the Sabbatical year,11 he should not make it larger than an area it takes to sow two se'ah.12 [When it is that size,] he may bring his sheep into it. When they have fertilized the entire corral, he may leave one wall of the corral and make another corral on its side, [and then bring his sheep there]. In this manner, he can fertilize a portion of his field large enough to sow four se'ah.
Halacha 5
If, however, his entire field was only large enough to sow four se'ah, he should leave a portion [unfertilized], because of the impression that might be created.13 [In this way,] everyone will know that the sheep deposited their wastes there and fertilized it and they will not say that the person fertilized his entire field in the Sabbatical year.
Halacha 6
A person should not open a quarry in his field14 at the outset in the Sabbatical year, lest it be said that he intended to improve his field by removing the rocks from it. If he began before the Sabbatical year and quarried from it 27 blocks - each block being one cubit by one cubit and one cubit high or larger - from a group of stones that were three cubits by three cubits and three cubits high, it is permitted to extract from it all one desires during the Sabbatical year.15
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when there is] a stone wall that is ten handbreadths or more high and one desired to remove all the stones. If it contained ten or more stones, each one at least [large enough to require] two people to carry it, he may take them,16 for an observer will know that he is taking them because he needs the stones.17 If the wall was less than ten handbreadths high, there were less than ten stones or the stones were smaller [and did not require] two people to carry it, he may take them, but must leave [a row] a handbreadth high above the ground.18
Halacha 8
When does the above19 apply? When he intends to improve his field20 or he began to remove the stones in the Sabbatical year. If, however, he did not intend to improve his field21 or began removing them before the Sabbatical year,22 he may take everything he desires23 during the Sabbatical year, clearing away [the stones] until he reaches the earth. Similarly, if he was removing the stones from a colleague's field, even though he was a contractor,24 he may clear them away until he reaches the earth.25
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when, in a field, there are] stones that would be dislocated by a plow or which were covered [by earth] and then uncovered. If there are two stones that are each large enough to require two people to carry them, it is permitted to remove them.26If they are smaller than this, he should not take them.27
Halacha 10
When a person removes stones from his field because he needs the stones [for construction], he should remove the upper ones and leave those in contact with the earth. Similarly, if he has a pile of pebbles or of stones in his field, he should take the upper one's and leave those in contact with the earth. If there is a large rock or straw beneath them, he may take all of them.28
Halacha 11
A person should not fill a groove in the ground with earth or level it with earth, because he is improving his land.29 He may, however, make a divider before the groove, [separating it from the remainder of his field].30 He may take any stone [in the groove] that he can pick up if he stretches out his hand while he is standing at the edge of the groove.31
Halacha 12
It is permitted to bring stones carried on one's shoulder - i.e., two or three are carried on one's shoulder at a time - from any place, whether from a colleague's field or from one's own field. Similarly, a contractor32 may bring stones, even small ones, from any place whether from the field he hired33 or from a field that he did not hire.
Halacha 13
[The following laws apply when there is] an open space [in a wall separating one's property from the public domain] that was filled with earth.34 If its [stones] do not create an obstacle block for people in the public domain, it is forbidden to rebuild it.35 If they create a stumbling block for people36 or it was not filled with earth, but instead open to the public domain,37 it is permitted to rebuild it.38
Halacha 14
It is forbidden for a person to build a wall between his field and his colleague's field in the Sabbatical year. He may, however, build a wall between his field and the public domain.39 [When he builds the wall,] he is permitted to dig deeply until he reaches a stone.40 He may remove the earth and gather it in his field41 in the same manner as waste is gathered.42 Similarly, if a person dug out a cistern, a trench, or a storage cavity in the Sabbatical year, he may gather the earth in the same manner as all those who dig.
FOOTNOTES
1.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 4, fertilizing is a task forbidden by Rabbinic Law.
2.
Because it does not appear that he is preparing to fertilize his field immediately.
3.
Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 3:1)]. There he explains that although matok, the name the Mishnah uses, means "sweet," this fruit has a bitter taste and that term is used as a euphemism. Some have identified this species with the colocynth, a wild gourd with a very bitter flavor. The Radbaz identifies it with a bitter species of grass.
4.
Any thing smaller might convey the impression that he is fertilizing his field.
5.
Hilchot Shabbat 16:3 defines an area in which a se'ah of grain is sown as 50 cubits by 50 cubits. In this instance as well, if he makes more than three waste heaps, it might appear that his intent is to fertilize the field.
6.
I.e., we are not concerned that an onlooker might think that he is fertilizing his field.
7.
I.e., create one very large waste heap that encompasses a greater area than the three waste heaps in a 2500 sq. cubit area.
8.
By fertilizing it, for the waste is not in direct contact with the earth.
9.
For use after the Sabbatical year.
10.
I.e., according to the guidelines established in the previous halachot. Those halachot dealt with removing waste from one's home and courtyard. In this halachah, the Rambam is adding that the same rules also apply with regard to the waste from corrals. To establish this conceptual flow, the Rambam changes the order of the clauses in the mishnah (Sh'vi'it 3:4). The Radbaz offers this explanation to rebut the Ra'avad's objections.
11.
The Ra'avad cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Sh'vi'it 3:4) which emphasizes that the person's intent should not be to fertilize his field, but to take care of his sheep. When he does that, he can have a portion of his field fertilized as a by-product.
12.
100 by 50 cubits.
13.
I.e., when an observer will see that the entire field was not fertilized, he will realize that the person did not fertilize it by hand, because then there would be no purpose in leaving part of it unfertilized.
14.
The Radbaz explains that the Rambam's ruling applies whether the quarry is open or underground. There are, he explains, other opinions that maintain that if the quarry is open, there is no obligation to begin extracting the stones before the Sabbatical year.
15.
Provided one's intent is genuinely to quarry stone and not to improve the field (Radbaz).
16.
I.e., all the stones, even those smaller than the size specified.
17.
When a person is taking many stones of this size, the effort involved clearly indicates that he is intending to use them for building and not merely to improve his field.
18.
So that he will not have prepared his field by removing the stones.
19.
That he must leave a row of stones a handbreadth high above the earth.
20.
By leaving an additional area that he could sow in the following year.
21.
The Radbaz asks: We see that our Sages forbade certain activities because of the impression that an observer might derive. If so, what does the owner's intent matter? An observer may think that he is intending to clear his field. For this reason, he explains that the owner must perform an activity that makes it obvious that he is intending to use the stones for building, for example, using them for construction that is presently being performed on his property.
22.
This indicates that he was not using the Sabbatical year to perform whatever work that was possible in his field.
23.
I.e., even small stones and even when he tears down a wall that is less than ten handbreadths high.
24.
I.e., a person who hires out the field for his own purposes. See Halachah 12 and the Rambam's commentary to its source (Sh'vi'it3:9).
25.
Because he would not take the stones unless they would benefit him. Needless to say, one may not destroy a wall in a colleague's field at whim. Thus even when the owner knows that the wall is being torn down, as long as it is being torn down to be used for building, it is permitted to do so.
26.
For, as above, the size of these stones indicates that they will be used for building. The implication is that not only is the person allowed to remove these two large stones, he is allowed to remove all the stones in the field (Radbaz). Needless to say, this leniency is granted only when he genuinely intends to use the stones for construction, not when he desires to clear his field.
One might ask: Why are only two stones required to be of this size in this instance, while in Halachah 8, ten large stones are required?
Among the answers given is that in this instance, since the stones are scattered over a larger area, their removal is less likely to be noticed by an observer. In Halachah 8, by contrast, since the stones are all located in one place, an observer will see that they have been removed (Pe'at HaShulchan).
27.
Lest an observer think that he is intending to clear his field.
28.
For if he desired to clear his field, he would take the large stone or straw that is beneath them as well.
29.
And such work is forbidden in the Sabbatical year.
30.
Our translation and the bracketed addition are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 3:8).
31.
If, however, he must descend into the groove to pick up a stone, it is forbidden to remove it, lest an impression be created that the person is seeking to improve his field and make the groove fit for sowing (ibid.).
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, offering a different interpretation of his source (Sh'vi'it, loc. cit.). [The Ra'avad's interpretation is paralleled by Rabbenu Shimshon's understanding of that mishnah.] The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer different explanations that reinforce the Rambam's understanding.
32.
A person who had hired the field. See Halachah 8.
33.
Even though he hired the field, it is not his own and we do not suspect that he will transgress to improve it. The Ra'avad understands Sh'vi'it 3:9, the Rambam's source differently, seeing it as interrelated to the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah.
34.
I.e., rather than being rebuilt with stone.
35.
For an onlooker will think that the person is rebuilding it for the purpose of improving his field and enabling him to sow it the following year. See the explanations in the notes to the following halachah.
36.
For an observer will understand that he is rebuilding it to remove an obstacle for people at large. (Alternatively, when there are obstacles for people at large, we do not enforce restrictions instituted only because of the possibility that an observer will derive a mistaken impression.)
37.
In this situation, by closing it, he is creating a divider between his field and the public domain.
38.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, maintain that since there is a gap in the fence separating his field from the public domain, he is allowed to rebuild it in all instances. The Ra'avad and the Kessef Mishneh note that the Jerusalem Talmud (the conclusion of ch. 3 of Sh'vi'it ) supports the Rambam's position.
39.
Building a wall between one's own field and a colleague's is prohibited lest an onlooker think that one is preparing the land in order to sow one's field. Alternatively, we fear that the person may change his mind and sow the land (Radbaz). A person is, however, permitted to build a wall between his own field and the public domain to set off his property from the public domain. Alternatively, it is not common to sow the land next to the public domain, so there is no need for the above suspicions.
In the previous halachah, repairing a wall between one's field and the public domain is prohibited when the open space is filled with earth. Here, since it is entirely open, a wall may be built, as in the latter clause of that halachah.
40.
Since he digs until a stone, but does not remove the stone, it is clear that his intent is not to improve his field, for one cannot sow on a stone.
41.
But not in the public domain. See Sh'vi'it3:10.
42.
See Halachot 1-3.
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• 3 Chapters: Issurei Biah Issurei Biah - Chapter Nine, Issurei Biah Issurei Biah - Chapter Ten, Issurei Biah Issurei Biah - Chapter Eleven • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Issurei Biah - Chapter Nine
Halacha 1
According to Scriptural Law,1 a woman does not become impure as a niddahor a zavah until she experiences a physical sensation,2 menstruates, and discovers blood which emerges within her flesh as we explained.3 She becomes impure from the time she menstruates and onward only.4
If she does not experience a physical sensation, but conducts an internal examination, and discovers bleeding within the vaginal channel, we operate under the presumption that it was accompanied by a physical sensation,5 as explained previously.6
Halacha 2
According to Rabbinic Law, whenever a woman discovers a bloodstain on her flesh7 or on her clothes,8 she is impure, as if she discovered bleeding within [the vaginal channel] on her flesh. [This applies] even if she did not experience a physical sensation [and] even if she conducted an internal examination and did not discover bleeding.9 This impurity is [because of our] doubt;10 perhaps the stain came from uterine bleeding.
Halacha 3
Similarly, according to Rabbinic Law: Whenever a woman discovers bleeding at a time other than her veset11 and whenever she discovers a bloodstain, she is impure retroactively for 24 hours.12 If she conducted an internal examination within this time and discovered that she was pure, she is impure retroactively until the time of the inspection.13
Although she is impure retroactively, she does not cause a man who engages in relations with her to become impure, as we explained.14 Nor may she begin counting her "days of niddah" or counting because of the stain except from the time she discovered the bleeding or the stain.
Whenever a woman discovers a stain, her reckoning [of her veset] is confused. For it is possible that the bleeding came from the uterus and herveset must be recalculated.15
Halacha 4
When a woman discovers bleeding at the time of her veset, she does not become impure retroactively. Instead, [the impurity begins] at the time [of discovery]. Similarly, a woman who is pregnant, nursing, a virgin,16 or elderly do not become impure retroactively.
What is meant by a pregnant woman? A woman whose pregnancy has become obvious, i.e., she is three months pregnant.17 What is meant by a woman who is nursing? A woman within 24 months of childbirth, even if her child died, she weaned him, or gave him to a nursemaid.18
Halacha 5
[The term] "virgin" refers to a girl who has never menstruated even through she experienced uterine bleeding because of marriage19 or because of birth.20
The term "elderly woman" refers to a woman who did not menstruate for 90 days near her old age.21 When is she considered elderly? When she is called an old woman [by others] and she does not protest.
[The laws that apply when] a pregnant, nursing, or elderly woman [discovers] a stain are the same as when she discovers bleeding. She does not become impure retroactively. With regard to a virgin who has never menstruated and who is still a minor, a stain that is discovered is pure until she menstruates on three successive months.
Halacha 6
What is the difference between a stain which is found on a woman's flesh and one found on her clothing? There is no minimum measure for a stain found on a woman's flesh.22 A stain on a garment, by contrast, does not render a woman impure unless it is the size of half a Cilikean bean (a gris)23 which is equivalent to a square large enough to contain nine lentils, i.e., three rows of three. If it is smaller than this, she is pure.24
If [a stain] is composed of small spots, they are not considered as a single entity.25 If it is extended, it is considered as a single entity.26
Halacha 7
[When] a stain is discovered on an article that is not susceptible to ritual impurity, the woman is pure and she need not be concerned about it.
What is implied? If a woman sat on a utensil made of stone,27 earth, animal dung, on fish skin, on the outside of an earthenware utensil,28 or on a cloth that is smaller than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths29 and blood was discovered on the above, she is pure. Even if she inspected earth,30 then sat on it, and when she arose, a stain was discovered, she is pure. For our Sages did not decree that a woman would be impure when a stain was discovered on an article that is not susceptible to ritual impurity.31 Nor did they decree [that a stain discovered on an article susceptible to ritual impurity renders a woman] impure unless that article is white.32 If, however an article is colored, we are not concerned with a stain. For this reason, our Sages ordained that a woman should wear colored garments33 so that she be protected from problems arising due to stains.
Halacha 8
[A woman] does not become impure because of a bloodstain found on every place on her body, only due to those found opposite her genital area.
What is implied? If a stain is found on her heel, she is impure. For perhaps she touched her genital area when she sat.34 Similarly, she is impure if a stain was found on her calves or on the inner side of her ankles, [the portions of her legs] that will touch each other when she stands with her feet and calves together. If it is found on the tip of her toe, she is impure. Perhaps [blood] dripped from the uterus to her foot when she walked.
Similarly, if blood is found in any place where her menstrual blood could have spattered when she walked, she is impure. Similarly, if blood is found on her hands, even on the backs of her fingers, she is impure. For the hands are active.35 If, however, blood is found on the outer or side portions of her calves and, needless to say, if it is found from her thighs upward,36 she is pure. For this is certainly blood that was spattered on her from another place.37
Halacha 9
When a bloodstain that is found on a woman's body is long like a strand or round, or made up of small drops, the length of the stain was across the width of her thigh, it looks like it came from below upward,38 since it is opposite her genital area, she is impure. We do not say: Had it dripped from her body, it would not be found in such a form.39 Instead, we are stringent with regard to all blood that is found in these places, even though there is a doubt concerning it.
Halacha 10
A stain that is found below the belt on a woman's garment40 renders her impure.41 If it is above the belt, she is pure. If it is found on her sleeve, if it could reach her genital area,42 she is impure. If not, she is pure.
Halacha 11
If she would remove her garment and cover herself with it at night, she is impure wherever blood is found.43 Similarly, if blood is found anywhere on her girdle, she is impure.
Halacha 12
If a woman wears one tunic for three days or more during a time that is not part of her "days of niddah" and inspected it and discovered three stains or one stain that contains the measure of three stains,44 there is a doubt whether she is a [major] zavah.45 For it is possible that each day, she stained the garment.46
Similarly, if she wore three garments that had been inspected47 for three days in her "days of zivah" and discovered a stain in each of them, there is a doubt whether she is a [major] zavah.48 [This applies] even if the stains are one opposite the other.49
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply if] she found one stain that did not contain the measure of three stains.50 If she inspected herself throughout bein hashamashot51 of the first day and found that she was pure, but did not inspect her clothes and on the third day, discovered this stain which is not the measure of three stains, she need not worry about being a zavah.52
If she did not inspect herself throughout bein hashamashot, she must suspect that she is a zavah. [The rationale is that] she did not inspect her garment and continued wearing it for three days during her "days of zivah."53
Halacha 14
If she discovered a stain on her garment on one day and then experienced bleeding for two successive days or experienced bleeding for two [successive] days and discovered a stain on the third day, there is a doubt whether she is a [major] zavah.54
Halacha 15
When a woman discovers a stain and then discovers bleeding, she associates the stain with the bleeding for a 24-hour period.55 [This applies] whether she inspected herself at the time she discovered the stain and found herself to be pure or whether she did not inspect herself. If, however, she discovers one stain after another stain within 24 hours, she does not associate one stain with the other unless she carried out an inspection in the interim. If, however, she carried out an inspection and found herself to be pure between [the discovery of the first] stain and the second, they should not be associated with regard to the counting of zivut.56
Halacha 16
What is implied? She discovered a stain on Friday during the first hour of the day and then she discovered menstrual bleeding at any time until the first hour of the day on the Sabbath, she does not count [her impurity] from [the time she discovered] the stain. Instead, she associates the stain with the bleeding. [This applies] even if she did not inspect herself [after discovering the stain] and did not know whether she was impure or not. Thus if she discovers bleeding on Sunday and on Monday, she is a [major] zavah.57
If, however, she discovered bleeding during the second hour on the Sabbath, she is considered as if she was impure for two days: Friday because of the stain she discovered and the Sabbath because of the bleeding, because there are more than 24 hours between them. Hence, if she discovers bleeding on Sunday, she must suspect that she is a zavah.58
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply if] she did not experience bleeding on the Sabbath, but instead discovered a stain during the first hour on the Sabbath. If she inspected herself on Friday and discovered that she was pure, she only counts from [the time of] the later stain [that was discovered] on the Sabbath, because they both were discovered within the same 24 hour period. If she did not inspect herself and did not know whether or not she was in fact pure between the two, she begins counting from Friday. Thus if she discovers bleeding on Sunday, she must suspect that she is a zavah.59
Halacha 18
If she discovered the second stain during the second hour of the Sabbath day, she is considered as impure for two days, for the two are not within the same 24 hour period. [This applies] whether she inspected herself or did not inspect herself. [In such a situation,] if she discovers bleeding on Sunday after 24 hours have passed, she must suspect that she is a zavah.60
[The following laws apply if] she discovered a third stain during the first hour on Sunday. If she inspected herself and discovered that she was pure, they are not considered as coming in succession61 and she need not suspect that she is a zavah. If she does not carry out such an inspection, she must suspect that she is a zavah.62
Halacha 19
[The following rules apply] whenever there is a stain that causes a woman to be considered impure and there is a factor to which she could attribute the stain, saying: "The stain came because of this factor."63 If [the stain] is found on a garment, she is pure. For our Sages did not say that one should rule stringently regarding these matters, only leniently.64 If the stain is found on her flesh, she is impure because of the doubt and she may not attribute the stain to the external factor.65 If she has a greater reason to attribute a stain on her flesh [t an outside factor] than one on her clothes,66 she may attribute even a stain on her flesh [to the factor] and she is pure despite the doubt.
Halacha 20
What is implied? If she slaughtered an animal, a beast, or a fowl, became occupied with stains, sat next to people who were, or passed through a marketplace of butchers and blood was found on her outer garment, she is pure. She may attribute the stain to these factors for it is [likely] to have come from them.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply if] the stain was found on her flesh alone. If the stain is at her belt or lower, she is impure.67 If she turned upside down and flipped,68 even [a stain] from her belt and above renders her impure.69 For if the blood had come from slaughtering or from the market, it would also have been found on her garments. Since it was found on her flesh and not on her garments, she is impure.
Halacha 22
If she has a wound, even if it is covered by a scab, if it could be opened and discharge blood70 and blood was found on her flesh, she may attribute the stain to her wound.71 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 23
When a stain is found on both her garments and her flesh, she may attribute it with all [the external factors] possible.72 And she may explain that [the stain was caused by] a louse, for perhaps when she sat down, a louse was killed and this blood came from the louse.73
Until when [does the above apply]? [When the stain is no larger than] a gris. If, however, the stain is larger than a gris, she may not attribute it to a louse. [This applies] even if there is a crushed louse on the stain. Since the stain is larger than a gris, she may not attribute it to a louse.74
Halacha 24
Similarly, she may attribute the stain to her son or her husband.75If they were occupied with blood, their hands were soiled, or they had a wound, she may attribute the stain to them saying that they touched her without her knowing it and the blood came from them.76
Halacha 25
We do not consider the possibility that blood was [transferred] from one place to another to attribute a stain to it. What is implied? If a woman had a wound on her shoulder and a stain was discovered on her calf,77 we do not say: Maybe she touched the wound with her hand and then touched this other portion of her body.78 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We attribute neither stains on her body, nor those on her garment [to such wounds].79
Halacha 26
[The following laws apply when] two women were occupied with [slaughtering] one fowl and it contained only an amount of blood equal in size to a sela. If a stain the size of a sela is found on both of them, they are both impure.80
If a woman was occupied with blood that could produce a stain no larger than a gris and a stain the size of two grisim was found on her, she may attribute agris to the blood with which she was occupied with and a gris to a louse.81 If, however, the stain was larger than two grisim, she is impure.
Halacha 27
If she was occupied with red [blood], she may not attribute a black [stain] to it. If she was occupied with a fowl that had many different colors of blood and one of them was found on her, she may attribute [the stain] to [the fowl].
If she was wearing three outer garments, if there is an external factor to which she could attribute [a stain], she may attribute even [a stain] on the bottom garment to it.82 If she [knows of] no external factor to attribute it to, she may not attribute it to any factor, even if it is found only on the upper one.83
What is implied? If she passed through a butcher's market place, even if the stain is found only on the bottom garment, she may attribute it to the blood of the butcher's. If she did not pass through a butcher's market or the like, even if the stain is only on the upper garment, she is impure. If she is in doubt whether or not she passed through [such a place] or whether or not she was occupied [with an object that could produce a stain], she may not attribute it [to an external factor].84
Halacha 28
When a city has pigs [that roam freely] or [such animals] enter it at all times, [a woman] need not be concerned with stains that are found on her outer garment.85
Halacha 29
When a woman lent her garment to a niddah, whether a Jewess or a gentile woman,86 and then put it on before checking it,87 she can attribute a stain she finds upon it to the niddah who wore it.88
[Similarly,] if she lent [a garment] to a minor zavah on a day that she is impure,89 one who is experiencing [the post-birth] blood of purity,90 or to [a woman who was] a virgin and is experiencing [hymeneal] bleeding [which is] pure, she may attribute the stain to them.91
[A different ruling applies,] however, if she lent [a garment] to a minor zavahon the day she is watching or a major zavah during her seven "spotless" days, put it on before checking it and then discovered a stain. [In such an instance,] the halachic status of both is impaired., the lender and the borrower. For perhaps this one caused the stain or perhaps the other did.92
If she lent [the garment] to a woman who is watching herself because of the discovery of a stain, she may not attribute the stain to her. [The rationale is that] we do not attribute one stain to another.93
Halacha 30
[The following law applies when a woman] inspected her outer garment and then inspected herself94 and discovered that she was pure and afterwards, lent that garment to a colleague. If the borrower wore the garment and then a stain was discovered upon it when she returned it, the borrower is impure. She cannot attribute the stain to the owner, because the owner inspected it before she lent it to her.
Halacha 31
[The following laws apply when] a tall woman wears an outer garment belonging to a short woman and a stain is discovered upon it. If [the place where the stain is located] reaches her genital area, she is impure.95 If it does not, she is pure, because [it is probable] that the stain came from the short woman.
Halacha 32
When three woman wore one garment in succession and afterwards, a stain was found upon it, [they are all impure].96 Similarly, if they slept in one bed together97 and a blood [stain] was found under one, they are all impure.98
If one of them inspected herself immediately99 and found herself impure, the [other] two are pure.100
Halacha 33
[The following principle applies when, in the above situation, the women] all inspected themselves and discovered that they were pure. A woman who is not likely to discover bleeding may attribute the stain to one who is likely to discover bleeding. Thus the one who is unlikely [to discover bleeding] will be pure and the one who is likely will be impure.
What is implied? If one of the woman is pregnant and another is not pregnant, the pregnant101 woman is pure102 and the one who is not pregnant is impure. If one was nursing103 and one was not nursing, the one who is nursing is pure.104 If one is an elderly woman,105 and one is not elderly, the elder woman is pure.106 If one has not experienced menstrual bleeding107 and one has, the one who has no experience is pure.108 If they are all pregnant, all elderly, all nursing, or all have not experienced menstrual bleeding, they are all impure.109
Halacha 34
[The following laws apply when] three women ascended from the foot of a bed,110 and went to sleep. If a blood[stain] was discovered under the middle one, all three are impure.111 If [a stain] was discovered under112 the innermost one, she and the woman to her side are impure and the outermost one is pure.113 If [the stain] was under the outermost, she and the woman to her side are impure and the innermost is pure. If, however, they did not ascend from the foot of the bed, and thus they have no order, if a blood[stain] is discovered under any one of them, they are all impure.
Halacha 35
When does the above apply? When the woman all inspected themselves and found themselves to be pure. Thus none of them could attribute [the stain] to the other as we explained. If, however, one of them inspected herself and discovered that she was pure, the woman who is pure can attribute the stain to the one who did not check, and that woman is impure.
Halacha 36
Whenever a stain is found on a garment and there is no external source to attribute it to, it, [nevertheless,] does not cause a woman to be considered impure until it is proven to be blood.114 If a doubt arises for [the experts]115whether [a stain] was blood or [simply] red dye, they [wash the stain] with [the following] seven cleaning agents in order. If it is washed away or its color becomes weaker,116 it is a bloodstain and [the woman] is considered impure. If the stain remains the same color, it is a dye and [she] is pure.117
Halacha 37
These are the seven cleaning agents in the order [in which they should be used]: the saliva of a person who has not eaten, beans that have been chewed, urine that has become sour, lye,118 natron,119 cumin powder,120 and bleach.121 [The garment] must be rubbed three times with each cleansing agent and it must be passed back and forth while being rubbed.
If a person did not use these cleansing agents in the above order or used them all at once, his deeds are of no consequence.122 If he used the last substances before the first ones, the fact that he used the last ones - i.e., the first ones in the proper order - is significant. He may then use [merely] the last ones - which he used first - so that he will have used all seven in order.
Halacha 38
What is meant by "the saliva of a person who has not eaten"? [Saliva taken from a person who did not eat from the beginning of the night and slept the second half of the night and gave this saliva before he ate the next morning. [Moreover,] he must not have spoken excessively for the first three hours of the day. If, however, a person arose and repeated his studies before three hours of the day passed, his saliva is not placed in this category. For speaking nullifies the power of the saliva and causes it to be like water.
What is meant by beans that have been chewed? Beans that have been chewed thoroughly until a large quantity of saliva has been mixed with them. What is meant by urine that has soured? Urine that is three days old or more.
Halacha 39
[The following laws apply to] any woman who becomes impure because of a stain. If she discovers the stain during her "days of niddah," she must consider herself a niddah because of the doubt. She must remain [impure] for seven days and immerses herself on the eighth night. Afterwards, she is permitted to her husband.
If she discovered [the stain] during her "days of zivah," because of the doubt, she must consider herself as a minor zavah or a major zavah as clarified in this chapter.123 She must remain [impure] for one day if she is a minor zavahor count seven "spotless" days if there is a doubt whether she is a majorzavah.
All this stems from Rabbinic decree as we explained.124 Therefore if a man engages in relations with such a woman in conscious violation, he is given stripes for rebellious conduct125 and he is not obligated to bring a sacrifice.126
FOOTNOTES
1.
In contrast to Rabbinic Law as defined by the following halachah.
The Turei Zahav 190:1 interprets the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh as stating that even if we are certain that a woman experienced uterine bleeding, if she did not experience the physical sensations that accompany menstruation, she is not impure according to Scriptural Law.
2.
The physical sensation described here is not the heaviness, nausea, or stomach contractions which sometimes precipitate a woman's menstrual bleeding. [These sensations are also halachicly significant, but are related to another aspect of theniddah laws - the determination of vesetos, the time when her menstruation could be expected to begin (see Chapter 8, Halachah 2).] Instead, here the intent is either: a) an awareness of the opening of the uterus, or b) shivers or shudders as in a state of shock. Certain authorities also speak of a third sensation: that of a flow of moisture in the uterine channel. See the commentaries to Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 183:1). It must be emphasized that today, many authorities rule that a woman is unable to identify these sensations.
3.
Chapter 5, Halachah 2.
4.
I.e., according to Scriptural Law, she does not become impure retroactively.
5.
Carrying out the internal examination, however, prevented her from feeling that sensation.
6.
Chapter 5, Halachah 5, which states that the discovery of bleeding in the vaginal channel renders her impure.
7.
As clarified in Halachah 8.
8.
As clarified in Halachot 9-11.
9.
We do not say that the fact that she did not discover any internal signs of bleeding indicates that the bleeding originated elsewhere.
10.
Since we are speaking about a Rabbinic institution and there is doubt involved, there is some room for leniency as will be explained.
The Kessef Mishneh questions why we do not consider this a question of multiple doubt (s'fek s'feika) in which case we rule leniently. In this instance, it is possible that the blood came from her flesh and it is possible that it came from an outside source. And even if it came from her flesh, it is possible it came from the uterus and it is possible it came from the ovaries.
The Kessef Mishneh offers two resolutions: a) because of the serious nature of the prohibition involved, our Sages were stringent despite the multiple doubt;
b) when the woman has no outside factors to which the blood can be attributed, our Sages ruled stringently and maintained that it is considered as if the bleeding is definitely from her flesh. Thus there is only one doubt: whether the bleeding comes from the uterus or the ovaries.
Kin'at Eliyahu offers a third resolution: Essentially, there is one question involved? Did the bleeding originate in the uterus or elsewhere? Where elsewhere - the ovaries or an outside source - does not multiply the doubt involved.
11.
If she discovers bleeding at the time of herveset, we assume that she began menstruating then, since that is when she ordinarily menstruates, as stated in the following halachah. Otherwise, we assume she began menstruating beforehand.
12.
I.e., any articles that she touched within that time are considered as if they are ritually impure. We assume that she began menstruating before she discovered the bleeding and therefore consider her impure retroactively.
13.
I.e., we reduce the time of impurity from 24 hours, because she conducted an internal examination in the interim. Nevertheless, we still follow the basic premise that she is considered impure retroactively.
14.
Chapter 8, Halachah 13. Note Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 3:8 which states that although the man who engages in relations with her is not governed by the severe rules that apply to one who had relations with a niddah, he is still considered ritually impure for touching the woman.
15.
As stated in Chapter 8, a woman must calculate the day on which she is expected to begin menstruated. In this instance, she cannot do so, for she does not know whether to begin counting anew from the time she discovered the stain or perhaps her original cycle has not changed.
16.
These terms are defined in this and the following halachah. The rationale is that these women are not expected to menstruate. Hence, we do not show concern for the possibility that they menstruated at an earlier time.
17.
Even if she discovers her pregnancy earlier, she must take the bleeding into consideration until three months.
18.
Conversely, although a woman continues nursing beyond this times, she is not granted this leniency (Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 4:1).
19.
I.e., hymeneal bleeding.
20.
As stated in Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 4:3, this principle applies the first two times she menstruates.
21.
I.e., once three months pass without her menstruating, we assume that she will no longer menstruate according to a set pattern.
22.
She becomes impure no matter how small it is.
23.
gris is half a bean. Cilik is a place where beans grow very large [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim17:112)]. Most contemporary experts consider this to be the size of an American dime.
24.
It is possible that the blood came from a louse that was inadvertently killed (see Halachah 23). Since the question is one of Rabbinic Law, we rule leniently and consider the woman pure. When, however, the stain is on her flesh, we rule stringently, because lice are not usually found on one's flesh (Kessef Mishneh).
The distinction between a stain on one's body and on one's clothes is not accepted by all authorities. Ra'avad, Ramban, and Rashba differ and maintain that there is no difference between the two. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:6) quotes both opinions without stating which one is favored.
25.
I.e. unless one of the spots is the size of agris, the woman is considered pure. We are not concerned with the combined area of the spots.
26.
In this instance, if the combined area of the stain is the size of a gris, the woman is considered as impure.
27.
All of the following are examples of articles that are not susceptible to ritual impurity. The Rambam discusses all of these types of utensils in Hilchot Keilim. Commenting on the citation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 190:10), the Rama (andPitchei Teshuvah 190:19) also give the example of a toilet seat as an article that is not susceptible to ritual impurity.
28.
For an earthenware utensil only contracts ritual impurity from its inside.
29.
A cloth of this size is considered too small to serve any purpose and hence, is not considered as a garment or utensil.
30.
And found there were no bloodstains on it.
31.
As mentioned above, the designation of a woman as impure because of a stain that is discovered is a Rabbinic decree. When our Sages instituted the decree, they allowed for leniency in certain instances.
32.
Niddah 61b relates that originally our Sages thought to prohibit women from wearing colored garments as part of the mourning customs introduced because of the destruction of the Temple. Afterwards, they reconsidered and recommended that they wear such garments as the Rambam explains.
33.
On days other than her seven "spotless" days.
34.
In the Talmudic era, people would sit on rugs on cushions on the ground and when sitting in this manner, it is possible that a woman's foot will touch her genital area.
35.
And it is possible that unknowingly, she touched a place on her body where there was menstrual blood (Maggid Mishneh).
36.
When restating this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 190:11) uses the wording "if it is found above her genital area." It also states that if a woman lifted her legs above her waist, she is impure even if a stain is found on the upper portion of her body.
37.
I.e., we assume that the blood came from an external source. For it is not ordinary that her menstrual blood would spatter to these portions of her body.
38.
I.e., the shape of the stain appeared to indicate that the blood was spattered upward, rather than dripped downward.
39.
I.e., even when the shape of the stain appears to indicate that it came from an external source, as long as its position leaves open the possibility that it came from uterine bleeding, we rule stringently.
40.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:12) rules that this law applies even when the stain is found on only the external part of her garment.
41.
For the possibility exists that it came as a result of uterine bleeding. See Halachot 19-20 which explain that when there is justified reason to suspect that the stain came from an external source, she is pure, even though the stain is found on the lower portion of her garment.
42.
Even when she bends (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba).
43.
Because it is possible that she and the blanket both shifted position while she was sleeping.
44.
I.e., it is three times the size of a gris.
45.
She must wait seven "spotless" days before engaging in relations. She brings the sacrifice required of a zavah, but because of the doubt concerning her status, it is not eaten.
46.
Three stains are sufficient to render her a major zavah. She is not, however, definitely given this status, for it is possible that the three stains came on one day.
47.
I.e., she wore the three garments at the same time, one on top of the other.
48.
For it is possible that she experienced bleeding on three successive days.
49.
And thus it is likely that the three stains came from the same bleeding. Nevertheless, since we are not certain of this, she is considered a zavah because of the doubt.
50.
I.e., it is smaller than three times the size of a gris.
51.
Bein hashamashot refers to the time between sunset and the appearance of the stars. The intent is not that a woman should continue to inspect herself throughout this entire time. Instead, what is meant is that she should insert a small cloth into her vagina and leave it there for this entire time.
52.
For she will have verified that she had not experienced bleeding on the first day.
53.
Since she was wearing the garment for three days, the possibility exists that she experienced bleeding for three days, but all the stains were in the same place.
54.
Since on one of the days, she became impure because of a stain without feeling the physical sensations associated with menstruation, her impurity is not of Scriptural status. For to be considered as a zavahaccording to Scriptural Law, she must experience these physical sensations.
55.
If the bleeding was discovered within 24 hours of the stain, we assume that the stain came about because of the subsequent bleeding and therefore she is governed by the same laws that would apply had she experienced only the bleeding as stated in Halachah 16.
56.
The Rambam's ruling is dependent on his understanding of Niddah 53b. The Ra'avad does not accept the Rambam's interpretation of this passage and harshly dismisses the Rambam's conclusions. TheMaggid Mishneh both supports and explains the Rambam's position.
57.
But if she does not discover blood on Monday, she is not a major zavah, i.e., we pay no attention to the stain that she discovered on Friday.
(Any time the term zavah is mentioned subsequently in this chapter, she is considered as a zavah.)
58.
She is not definitely placed in that category, because one of the days is associated with a stain, as stated in Halachah 14.
59.
Because she experienced either a stain or bleeding on three consecutive days..
60.
Because she experienced either a stain or bleeding on three consecutive days..
61.
I.e., instead of being concerned that she discovered stains on three consecutive days, she associates the stain of the Sabbath and that of Sunday and counts them only as one.
62.
For each of the stains is considered individually.
63.
The principles mentioned in this halachah are illustrated in the halachot that follow.
64.
Since the impurity associated with a stain is a matter of Rabbinic Law, we follow the principle: Whenever there is a doubt involved a matter of Rabbinic Law, we rule leniently [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah190:18)].
65.
Since the stain is found on her flesh and not on her clothes, we assume that it is more likely to come from the uterus than from an external factor.
66.
E.g., she has a wound on her flesh.
67.
Provided the stain is found on a portion of her body from which the blood could have dripped from the uterus as stated in Halachah 8.
68.
This phrase was not found in the texts of theMishneh Torah possessed by the Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh. Therefore they raised objections to the Rambam's ruling.
69.
Ordinarily, however, such a stain does not alter her status even though it is found on her flesh alone.
70.
E.g., if it was scratched [Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 190:18)].
71.
And thus her status does not change. Note, however, Halachah 25.
72.
For we can assume that it came from the outside first to her garments and then to her flesh. Hence she may attribute the blood to any of the factors mentioned in Halachah 20, as if the blood was found on her garments alone.
73.
This applies even if she did not see that she killed a louse. If she knows that she killed an insect and it is possible that it produced a stain larger than a gris, she may attribute the stain to that [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 8:2)].
74.
For it is an accepted principle that a louse contains no more than a gris of blood. Hence if the stain is larger, that is an indication that the blood came from another source. Note Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah190:28) which rules leniently and explains that it is possible that there were two lice here, one which she killed previously and the one which is found crushed on her garment.
75.
As indicated by the Rambam's explanation, even if she did not know that they touched her with soiled hands, if their hands were soiled, she may assume that this is the fact. For it is likely for a husband to touch his wife and a child to touch his mother.
76.
If, however, their hands are not soiled, we do not attribute a stain to them unless the blood could have spattered upon her [Maggid MishnehShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:19)].
77.
It is highly improbable that blood dripped from her shoulder to her calf.
78.
There are instances where we postulate that a person's hands are active and the possibility exists that one transferred impurity from one place to another. Nevertheless, this concept is used only to lead to a stringency, not as a source for leniency.
79.
The Maggid Mishneh states that if it is possible that the garment passed over the wound when it was removed, we can attribute a stain on a garment to such a wound. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah190:16) quotes this conclusion.
80.
Since the fowl did not contain enough blood to produce two stains of this size, we assume that one came from another source and attribute it to menstrual bleeding. Since we don't know which of the women was soiled by the fowl and which was not, we rule that they are both impure.
The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 190) rules that this law applies only when the two women come to inquire about their status together. If they come one after the other, he rules that they are both considered pure. The Turei Zahav 190:17 differs, maintaining that although the ruling of the Bayit Chadashhas parallels in other contexts, the logic should not be applied in this instance. TheNekudot HaKessef, however, accepts the ruling of the Bayit Chadash.
81.
As stated in Halachah 23. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 190:26) states that although there are opinions which rule that a woman is impure in such an instance, we follow the more lenient view, for the entire issue is one of Rabbinic Law.
82.
Although there is reason to say that if the stain came from the outside, it would certainly be found on the outer garment as well, we still rule leniently, because there is the possibility that the outer garment was raised up at the time the blood was spattered.
83.
Thus had the stain come from the woman's body, it would be far more likely to be found on the lower garment.
84.
Although we rule leniently in questions involving stains, that is when we know that there is definitely a factor that could cause a stain involved. In this instance, we are not certain that there is indeed such a factor involved.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 190:22) adds that this ruling applies only in a city where there is a set place for butchering and the like. In places where these activities are carried out in many different places, a woman can attribute a stain to such a factor even if she is not certain that she passed such a place.
85.
For the pigs eat small crawling animals and spatter their blood on passersby. Needless to say in most modern cities, this law does not apply.
86.
According to Scriptural Law, the laws ofniddah do not apply to gentile woman, but according to Rabbinic Law, every gentile women is considered as if she is a niddah. The Maggid Mishneh quotes opinions which maintain that even if the gentile woman is not known to be a niddah, the stain can still be attributed to her, because her halachic status is that of a niddah. This opinion is also reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 190:41). Even according to this conception, the gentile woman must be of the age that it is possible that she will experience menstrual bleeding. See Halachah 33 for further clarification regarding the fundamental principle on which this halachah is based.
87.
The Rambam's wording teaches us another concept: We are not concerned about stains on clothing unless the clothes were checked first (Maggid Mishne).
88.
Since the niddah and the gentile woman are already impure and will not suffer any difficulty if the stain is attributed to them, we indeed consider them as the source of the bleeding.
89.
The day on which she experienced uterine bleeding.
90.
This was the law in the era of the Talmud when the laws of "the blood of purity" were observed after childbirth. As will be explained in Chapter 11 and notes, at present, this leniency is no longer observed.
91.
In all these instances, attributing the stain to the borrower does not change her halachic status. The minor zavah is impure and the woman after childbirth and the virgin are pure regardless of the stain.
As stated in Chapter 11, the concept of a minor zavah does not apply in the present age and instead, she is considered as equivalent to a major zavah. Hence a stain can certainly be attributed to her. The laws concerning a woman with hymeneal bleeding or a woman after childbirth are different, for in the present age, we do not consider such woman as ritually pure. Instead, uterine bleeding - and even a stain - renders them ritually impure. Accordingly, since the status of these woman will be impaired because of the discovery of the stain, there is reason to assume that it should not be attributed to them alone, but instead, both the borrower and the lender should be considered impure as in the following clause. {See the Tur(Yoreh De'ah 190) which cites such views.} The commentaries explain, however, that according to the Rambam, this law applies even in the present era. Indeed, it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah190:42) and the Shulchan Aruch only quotes laws that apply in the present era.
The Siftei Cohen 190:54 explains that even though the halachic status of these women changed in the present era, their physical tendency did not change. They frequently experience uterine bleeding and hence, we attribute the stain to them.
92.
Both the lender and the borrower are not likely to experience uterine bleeding and for both, it will impair their halachic status. Since we do not know which one is responsible for the stain, both share the resulting halachic liability.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, loc. cit.) differ with the Rambam's ruling and maintain that the owner of the garment is pure. Since the status of the woman who is seeking to attain ritual purity is already impaired when compared to that of the owner, the stain is attributed to her alone despite the fact that her status will become further impaired by this ruling.
93.
Although a woman is considered impure because of a stain, we do not consider it a certain enough sign of uterine bleeding to attribute another stain to it.
94.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 190:40) omits mention of the fact that the woman inspected herself as well as her garment.
95.
I.e., the owner is definitely impure; in this instance, the borrower is also impure, because it is possible that the stain comes from her.
96.
Since there is no reason to attribute the stain to one more than the other and they all share the same halachic status, they are all considered as impure.
97.
With their bodies intertwined [see Maggid MishnehShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah190:50) based on Niddah 61a].
98.
Based on Niddah, loc. cit., the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) interpret this as referring to an instance when the woman all climbed into the bed from the same side. See Halachah 34.
99.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret this as meaning that she inspected herself within the same day or night as the stain was discovered. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:51) states that the inspection must be made immediately thereafter.
100.
For we assume that the woman who found herself impure is the source of the stain.
The commentaries question if this clause applies only with regard to the bed or also with regard to the garment. The Maggid Mishneh asserts that it applies to the garment as well. The Kessef Mishneh, however, argues against his position.
101.
See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.
102.
For she is unlikely to experience uterine bleeding.
103.
For we assume that the woman who found herself impure is the source of the stain.
The commentaries question if this clause applies only with regard to the bed or also with regard to the garment. The Maggid Mishneh asserts that it applies to the garment as well. The Kessef Mishneh, however, argues against his position.
104.
See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.
105.
See Halachah 5 for the definition of this term in the present context.
106.
See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.
107.
This is the meaning of the term betulah in this context. See Halachah 5.
108.
See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.
109.
Since there is no reason to favor one over the other, we rule stringently with regard to all of them.
110.
And thus each one did not pass over the place where the other slept. See the notes to Halachah 32.
111.
Because either of the woman on the sides could have shifted position slightly and the blood have come from her.
112.
If, however, the stain was discovered on the top sheet, they are all impure, because the top sheet is likely to shift position during their sleep.
113.
For it is unlikely that one twisted and turned to that degree.
114.
The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's words as follows: If a stain that appears to be blood is discovered, a woman must consider herself impure. If, however, there is a question in the minds of the experts whether or not she is truly impure, they could verify the woman's status through the test the Rambam mentions. It is not, as the Ra'avad appeared to understand that the Rambam maintained, that a woman should not consider herself impure unless she verified that the stain was blood through the process described. This interpretation is quoted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah190:31). See also Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav, ch. 4.
115.
I.e., the sages to whom women would turn to determine whether a stain was blood or not.
116.
See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 9:6).
117.
The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam concerning this point, maintaining that the seven cleansing agents are used to help purify a garment, not to determine whether a woman is pure. As explained in Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav, loc. cit., the Rambam also appreciates the role of these cleansing agents in restoring the ritual impurity of a garment. If, however, the cleansing agents are not effective, it becomes obvious that the stain is not blood. Hence, not only the garment, but also the woman is considered as pure.
118.
We have given the popular translation. In his edition of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 9:6), Rav Kappach identifies the Arabic term used by the Rambam as a cleaning agent made from the plant "althaea officinalis."
119.
Again, we have used the common translation. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 2:1), the Rambam defines the term is referring to a blue stone that becomes dissolved in water easily and which is used to clean hair and garments.
120.
Again, we have used the common term. Rav Kappach (loc. cit.) defines the Arabic term used by the Rambam as referring to a plant known as anabis setifera.
121.
Rav Kappach (loc. cit.) defines the Arabic term used by the Rambam as referring to a plant known as saponaria officinalis.
122.
I.e., the fact that the stain remains is not considered evidence that it is not blood.
Note Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:31) which states that because we are unsure of the identity of some of these seven cleansing agents, we do not employ this examination process in the present age.
123.
Halachot 12-18.
124.
Halachah 2.
125.
The punishment given for violating a Rabbinic commandment.
126.
If he engaged in relations with her inadvertantly.

Issurei Biah - Chapter Ten

Halacha 1
Every woman who gives birth is impure like a niddah, even if she did not suffer uterine bleeding.1 [This applies whether] a woman gives birth to a living child or one which is still born, and even is she miscarries [and discharges a fetus]. If [the fetus is] male, she remains impure [for seven days as is required after giving birth to] a male.2 If it is female, she remains impure [for fourteen days as is required after giving birth to] a female.
[The above applies,] provided the form [of the fetus] is complete. And the form of a fetus will never become complete in less than forty days. [This applies] to both a male and a female.
Halacha 2
If a woman miscarries within forty days, she is not impure because of birth.3[This applies] even on the fortieth day.
If a woman miscarried on the forty-first day after relations,4 there is a doubt whether she is considered as having miscarried.5 [Hence,] she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female and those applying to a niddah.6 If the human form could be barely detected in the fetus without it being clear and obvious, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female.7 This is called a developed8 embryo.
Halacha 3
What is meant by a developed embryo? At the beginning of the formation of the human body, it is the size of a lentil. His two eyes are like the two eyes9of a fly, [slightly] separate from each other. His two nostrils are like two eyes of a fly that are close to each other. Its mouth is a hairsbreadth open and its hands and feet are not distinct.
If its form becomes more defined than this, but it still cannot be distinguished as either male or female, we do not check it in water, but in oil. For the oil will burnish it. One should bring a wood chip with a smooth edge and use it to probe the genital area [of the fetus] from above downward. If there is an obstruction, it can be determined as male.10 If the genital area appears like a split barley corn, it is a female and need not be checked. A woman is not granted the leniency of "the blood of purity" for such underdeveloped embryos; the fetus must have hair on its head.
Halacha 4
When a woman discharges a white mass and when cut open a bone is found within, she is impure, because of birth.11 If she discharges an embryo filled with water, blood, worms,12 or flesh, since it is not developed,13the woman need not suspect [that she is impure] because of birth.14
Halacha 5
When a child is born through Cesarean section, the mother is not impure because of birth. She [need] not [observe] the days of impurity, [nor is she granted] days of purity. [This is derived from Leviticus 12:2]: "When a woman will conceive and give birth to a male...." [The laws of that passage apply] only when she gives birth from the place she conceives.
When a woman has difficulties in giving birth and [ultimately,] gives birth through Cesarean section, the blood from the birth throes which emerges from the womb is considered as the blood of zivah or the blood of niddah.15 The blood that emerges from the operation is itself impure.16 If no blood emerged from the womb, the woman is pure. Although the blood that emerges from the operation is impure, the woman does not become impure unless she suffers bleeding from her vagina.17
Halacha 6
When a fetus is cut up inside a woman's womb,18 whether it emerged according to the order of the limbs, e.g., first a foot emerged, then a calf, and then a thigh, or it emerged in an abnormal order, the woman is not considered impure until the majority of the body emerges.19 If its entire head comes out intact, it is as if the majority [of the body] emerged.20 If it was not cut up and it emerged in the ordinary manner, it is considered as having been born when its forehead emerges, even though it was cut up afterwards.21
Halacha 7
If a fetus sticks out its hand22 [from the womb] and then returns it, its mother is impure due to birth as a result of Rabbinic decree.23 The woman does not receive "days of purity" until the entire fetus - or [at least] the majority - emerges as we stated.24
Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when] a woman miscarries and discharges something resembling an animal, beast, or fowl.25 If its face resembles that of a human,26it is considered as a birth even though the remainder of the body resembles an animal, beast, or fowl. If it is male, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male. If it is female, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a female. If it cannot be determined whether it is male or female, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female.
If its face does not resemble that of a human, it is not considered as a fetus and its mother is not impure due to birth.27 [This applies] even though the remainder of the body resembles that of a human, its hands and feet resemble those of a human, and it is male or female.
Halacha 9
What is meant by the human form of a face? That the forehead, eyebrows, eyes, cheeks, and the contour of the jaw share the human form. Even if the mouth, the ears, and the nose resemble that of an animal or a beast, [the fetus] is considered as a birth.
Halacha 10
When a woman miscarries and discharges something resembling a snake, the mother is impure due to birth.28 [The rationale is that] the form of its eye is round like that of a human. When a woman miscarries and discharges a human form that has wings of flesh, the mother is impure due to birth.
[The following rules apply when a fetus] is created with one eye and one thigh. If they are on the side, it is considered as half a human and the mother is impure due to birth. If they are in the center, the mother is pure, because this is another creature.
Halacha 11
[The following laws apply when a fetus] is created with its windpipe closed, its body lacking [form] from the navel downward, but instead is a mass of flesh, its skull being merely a mass of flesh, its face was amorphous and its features could not be distinguished, it has two backs and two backbones, the contours of the head of the fetus she discharged could not be distinguished, or the contours of its hand could not be distinguished, the mother is not impure due to birth.29
If, however, she miscarried and discharged a hand or a foot that was cut off, we operate under the assumption that it came from a complete fetus and it is included in the sum of the majority of its limbs.30
Halacha 12
There are times when from the remainder of the blood from which a fetus is formed will coagulate and form a mass that resembles the tongue of an ox. It is wound around a portion of the fetus and is called a sandal. A sandal will never be formed without a fetus. If a similar mass is formed without a fetus, it is not called a sandal.Most fetuses will not have a sandal with them.
There are times when a pregnant woman will receive a blow on her stomach and the fetus will be damaged and will become like this sandal. There are time when the [resulting sandal] will retain its facial features and there are times when the fetus will dry up and change its appearance and blood from elsewhere will coagulate upon it to the extent that its facial features cannot be recognized.
Accordingly, when a woman miscarries and discharges a male fetus together with a sandal, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female. For perhaps this sandal was a female fetus. [The Sages] ruled stringency and considered her impure due to a [female] fetus even though it did not possess any facial features. [The rationale is that] she is impure due to birth regardless because of the fetus [discharged] with it.
Halacha 13
The thick membrane that is like a goatskin in which the fetus is formed and which surrounds the fetus and the sandal - if there is a sandal with it - is called the placenta. When the time comes for the fetus to emerge, it tears it and emerges. At the beginning of its creation, it resembles a thread of the woof that is hollow like a trumpet and thick like the craw of a chicken. A placenta must be at least a handbreadth in size.31
Halacha 14
When [a woman] miscarries and discharges a placenta, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female. [The intent is] not that a placenta is a fetus, but there will not be a placenta without a fetus.
If she discharged a fetus and then discharged a placenta, we show concern about the placenta and it is considered as a fetus. We do not say: "This is the placenta of the fetus that miscarried." For we associate the discharge of the placenta only with a viable birth.
Accordingly, if the woman gave birth to a viable child and then discharged a placenta - even after 23 days32 - we assume that [the placenta] came as a result of the child. We do not suspect that there was a second fetus. [Instead, we assume] that the child tore through the placenta and emerged.
Halacha 15
[When a woman] discharges a placenta and afterwards bears a viable child, we suspect that the placenta came as the result of another fetus.33 We do not associate it with the child that was born afterwards, for it is not usual for the placenta to emerge before the fetus.34
If a portion of the placenta emerges on Sunday and a portion emerges on Monday, we count [her days of impurity] from the first day and we count her days of purity only from the second day as a stringency.35
Halacha 16
If [a woman] miscarries and discharges something resembling an animal, beast, or fowl and a placenta is connected to it, we do not suspect that there is [another] fetus.36 If they are not connected to [the placenta], we treat it with severity as if there were two fetuses. For we say that maybe the fetus that was carried in this placenta became effaced, and maybe the placenta of this fetus that appears like an animal or beast became effaced.37
Halacha 17
In all instances when we are concerned that [the emergence of] a placenta [indicates that a fetus emerged previously], a woman is not given days of purity.38
[The following laws apply to] every [woman] who miscarries and discharges something that does not resemble a human fetus39 or a fetus that is within 40 days of conception whose form has thus not been completed.40 If [the emergence of] the fetus was accompanied by bleeding, the woman is either aniddah or a zavah.41 If it emerged dry, without any bleeding, she is pure.42
Halacha 18
When a woman gives birth to twins - a boy and a girl - she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a female.43 If she gives birth to a tumtum44 or anandrogynus,45 she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female.46 If she gives birth to twins, one that is male and one that is atumtum or an androgynus, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female.47 If one [of the twins] is female and one is a tumtum or an androgynus, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a female.48 For the gender of a tumtum and an androgynus is a matter of doubt: Maybe they are male or maybe female.49
Halacha 19
When a woman is known to be pregnant miscarries and it is not known what she miscarried, e.g., she passed a river and miscarried there, miscarried into a pit, or miscarried and a beast dragged away the fetus, we assume that she discharged a human fetus.50 Hence, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female.51 If, however, she was not known to be pregnant, miscarried, and did not know what she miscarried, she is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female and those applying to a niddah.52
Halacha 20
What are the laws that apply wherever we said: "She is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female"? She is forbidden to her husband for fourteen days like a woman who gives birth to a female. The status of the first seven is definite;53 that of the latter seven is doubtful.54
We do not grant her any "days of purity" beyond the fortieth day [from the birth] as is the law with regard to one who gives birth to a male.55 If she discovers menstrual bleeding between the fortieth and eightieth days from birth, it is not "pure blood."56 Instead, because of the doubt, we consider it asniddah bleeding, or zivah bleeding if it comes in the "days of zivah," as we explained.57
Similarly, if she discovers [uterine bleeding] on the eighty-first day alone, she is considered as a niddah because of the doubt.58 She must observe the seven days of niddah. [The rationale is that] perhaps she gave birth to a female and her "days of niddah" do not begin until after the conclusion [of the days of purity], as we explained.59
Halacha 21
What are the laws that apply wherever we said: "She is governed by the laws that apply to the birth of a male and a female and those applying to a niddah"? She is forbidden to her husband for fourteen days like a woman who gives birth to a female. If she discovers blood on the eighty-first day, there is a doubt whether she is a niddah.60
Similarly, if she discovered uterine bleeding on the seventy-fourth day and the eighty-first day, there is a doubt whether she is a niddah.61 Similarly, if she discovered [uterine bleeding] on the forty-first day, there is a doubt whether she is a niddah even though she discovered bleeding on the thirty-fourth day. She is forbidden to her husband until the forty-eighth day, as is the law for a woman who gives birth to a male.62
We do not grant her any "pure days" at all, like a niddah. [The following rules apply with regard to] any bleeding that she discovers from the day on which she miscarried until the eightieth day beginning from seven days after she miscarried. If it is discovered in her "days of niddah, she is a niddah, because of the doubt. And if it is discovered in her "days of zivah," she is a zavah, because of the doubt. For throughout the days after birth, [the previous patterns concerning] the expected times of menstruation do not apply.63
Similarly, if she discovers uterine bleeding on the eighty-first day, her situation is still problematic and she must consider herself a niddah because of the doubt as explained [above]. [This applies] even if she discovers bleeding for only one day. When she establishes a pattern of menstruation after eighty days, her difficulties will cease and she will be either definitely a niddah or definitely a zavah.64 Similarly, from the time she miscarried for seven days, she will be definitely impure [like] a niddah65 if she miscarried in the midst of her days of niddah, as we explained.66
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Chapter 5, Halachah 13, the Rambam rules that when a woman discharges a piece of flesh from the vagina, it must be accompanied by bleeding. For discharging that piece of flesh is not considered as giving birth. With regard to giving birth (or miscarrying), however, the Torah deems a woman is impure, whether or not the birth is accompanied by bleeding.
2.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 2.
3.
A miscarriage is usually accompanied by uterine bleeding. Thus the woman will become impure (as a niddah or as a zavah). However, the unique laws that apply to childbirth do not apply to her.
Even if she had conceived previously, until she reaches the fortieth day, the embryo is not given the halachic status of a fetus and none of the laws applying to childbirth apply.
4.
I.e., the forty-first day after she immersed herself in the mikveh and engaged in relations that night.
5.
I.e., it is possible that she conceived after engaging in relations that night, but we are not certain. Hence, her status is doubtful.
6.
Since it is possible that the fetus was male, it is possible that it was female, and it is possible that it was not considered a fetus in the halachic sense at all, the woman must take all these possibilities into consideration. See Halachah 21 which defines the laws incumbent on a woman in this situation.
7.
In this instance, it is clear that the embryo had developed into a fetus. Hence the laws that apply to ordinary uterine bleeding need not be considered. Nevertheless, since we are uncertain whether the fetus is male or female, the woman must take both of these factors into consideration. See Halachah 20 which describes the laws that a woman must follow in such a situation.
8.
Rekem, the root of the term merukam, means "embroidered." Implied is that the form of the embryo is beginning to take shape.
9.
Alternatively, as two drops of a fly's discharge.
10.
For ultimately, the male organ will grow there.
11.
For we assume that the mass was a dead fetus. The fact that it contains a bone indicates that it had developed sufficiently to acquire the features mentioned in the previous halachah. Obviously, certain factors had caused the fetus to be crushed and the features obliterated.
12.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 3:3) which interprets the Hebrew as referring to "flesh that appears to be cut in the form of worms."
13.
I.e., developed to the point it possesses the features mentioned in the previous halachah.
14.
Moreover, if there is no apparent blood on the discharge, she is not impure as a niddah(the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.; see also Chapter 5, Halachah 13).
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:3) states that in the present age, we follow the approach of the Rashba who rules that we are not knowledgeable enough to make the fine distinctions necessary to define when an embryo is developed or not. Hence, a woman should always consider herself impure because of birth.
15.
Depending on the day of her cycle on which the blood emerged.
Although the Torah considered the blood that emerges during birth pure (Chapter 6, Halachah 1), that apples when the woman gives birth in an ordinary manner, and not when she gives birth by Cesarean section (Rashi, Niddah 41a).
16.
The blood itself is impure, because the uterus itself is impure and it conveys impurity on the blood. Therefore anyone who touches the blood is impure until the evening. The blood does not, however, convey impurity on the woman unless it comes into contact with her after it emerges from her body.
17.
Niddah, loc. cit., derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 20:18.
18.
I.e., the woman was unable to birth the baby and the doctors saw that to save the woman's life, the fetus would have to be killed and taken out limb by limb.
19.
I.e., the point brought out by this halachah is not whether the woman becomes impure, but when the impurity takes effect. The Siftei Cohen 194:9 states that the law stated by the Rambam applies according to Scriptural Law. According to Rabbinic decree, she is impure as soon as one limb emerges.
20.
Although the Mishnah (Niddah 3:5) uses the phrase "the majority of the head," the Rambam maintains that the entire head must emerge for this law to apply. See the Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh.
21.
I.e., complications arouse and it was necessary to cut up the fetus to remove it from the womb entirely.
22.
The Maggid Mishneh questions whether the same laws apply with regard to a foot. TheTur states that they do, while the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:11) quotes the Rambam's ruling verbatim.
23.
Although Genesis 38:28 states: "And when she was giving birth, he stuck out a hand,"Niddah 28a rules that this should not be interpreted as an implication that sticking out a hand is considered as giving birth. Instead, according to Scriptural Law, the woman does not become impure until the majority of the body of the fetus emerges.
24.
I.e., as implied by the previous halachah.
25.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah3:2), the Rambam explains that although it is abnormal for a woman to discharge a fetus with such an appearance, there are exceptional situations from time to time. These and the forms mentioned in the following halachot are definite possibilities.
26.
As defined in the following halachah.
27.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this law also applies in the present era, as indicated by Chapter 11, Halachah 12. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro differs, citing the Ra'avad and the Ramban and explaining that the Rabbis of the present era did not feel that they were expert enough to determine if the face of a fetus resembled that of a man or not. Hence they ruled that woman is impure. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah194:3), he follows this approach.
Note also Halachah 17 which states that if the discharge of such a fetus is accompanied by bleeding, the woman is impure even if the fetus does not resemble a human.
28.
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that in the previous two halachot, he stated that for a fetus to be considered as having a human form, it must have the majority of a human facial form intact, not merely the eyes. The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the eye of a snake resembles that of a human much more closely than that of other animals. Hence, there is room for the Rambam's ruling.
29.
This ruling is based on Niddah23b which states that any fetus that is created in a manner that is not fit for its soul to be created (i.e., it is not viable) does not cause the mother to be impure due to birth. Since a fetus with these defects would not live, the mother is not impure. See the Kessef Mishneh which questions the details of certain of the examples cited by the Rambam.
30.
As stated in Halachah 6, when the majority of the limbs of a fetus emerge, the mother is considered as impure due to birth. The present halachah is stating that if previously many of the limbs of a fetus emerged and then the mother discharged this cut off hand or foot, it is not considered as part of a separate fetus, but instead, part of the fetus that already emerged. Hence, if together with the limbs that previously emerged, it equals the majority of the fetus, the woman is impure (Maggid Mishneh).
From Rabbi Akiva Eiger's interpretation ofNiddah 28a, the source for this halachah, the following explanation can be given. When a woman discharges a cut off hand or foot, even if we have not seen the remainder of the fetus, we assume that she discharged them already. Hence, she is considered impure. We do not suspect that maybe the fetus she discharged was not viable.
31.
Implied is a leniency. If a woman discharges something resembling a placenta, but which is smaller than a handbreadth, she is not impure due to birth. The Maggid Mishnehquotes Ramban and Rashba who rule that in the present age, we are stringent and rule her impure even if it is smaller than a handbreadth lest an error be made.
32.
Based on Niddah 27a, it appears that this is the maximum number of days granted between a birth and the emergence of the placenta.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro notes that there are authorities who maintain that the 23 days include the day of the birth, while the Rambam maintains that the day of the birth is not included. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:3), he quotes the Rambam's ruling.
33.
I.e., the woman had been carrying two fetuses. The emergence of the fetus indicates that she had miscarried and discharged one previously.
34.
Since the fetus is carried within the placenta, in a viable birth, the placenta will never emerge before the fetus carried within it.
35.
I.e., as soon as the first portion of the placenta emerges, the woman becomes impure. Nevertheless, her days of purity do not begin until the appropriate time (7 or 14 days) passes after the second day. And they end after 40 or 80 days from the first day, not from the second day.
36.
As stated in Halachah 8, the discharge of these type of creatures does not render the woman impure. When she discharges a placenta that is connected to them, we assume that they were carried within the placenta. Hence, just as they do not render the woman impure, the placenta also does not.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah194:7) cites this law without qualification, theSiftei Cohen 194:7 states that just as we are stringent in the present era with regard to the law stated in Halachah 8, we are stringent with regard to this law and rule that the woman is impure.
37.
I.e., we are concerned with the possibility that the woman was carrying two fetuses. Although only one fetus - the animal-formed one - and one placenta emerged, we suppose that originally there was another fetus and another placenta and they were effaced. We assume that the fetus that was effaced was ordinary and hence, the woman is considered as impure.
38.
I.e., the forty or eighty day period when uterine bleeding does not render a woman impure is not granted in this situation, for we suspect that perhaps the woman never in fact gave birth.
39.
As mentioned in Halachah 8.
40.
As mentioned in Halachah 2.
41.
The ruling depends on the day of her personal cycle on which the woman miscarries: Is it one of the days of niddah or one of the days of zivah?
42.
This ruling depends on our Sages' statement (Niddah 21a) that it is possible for the uterus to open without the woman experiencing any bleeding.
This statement is the subject of a difference of opinion in the Talmud and there are someRishonim who follow the other position and therefore rule that the woman is impure. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:2) follows this view and rules that even if the woman does not notice any bleeding, she must assume that bleeding did in fact take place.
43.
I.e., she must observe 14 days of impurity and then is given 66 days of purity. We do not restrict her to 26 days because of the birth of the boy.
44.
A person whose genital area is covered by a mass of flesh and thus it is impossible to determine his or her gender.
45.
A person who has both male and female sexual organs. There is an unresolved halachic question with regard to the classification of such a person's gender.
46.
Since there is a doubt concerning the issue, the woman must observe the stringencies resulting from either option.
47.
Since it is possible that the tumtum or theandrogynus is - or is considered as - a female, the woman must also take the laws governing the birth of a female into consideration.
48.
For even if the tumtum or androgynus was considered as a male, there would be no need for any further severity as stated at the beginning of the halachah.
49.
In particular, there is a difference between the two. With regard to a tumtum, the child has a specific gender, we simply are not able to identify it. With regard to anandrogynus, by contrast, the doubt involves the child's halachic status.
50.
And not one of the forms mentioned in Halachah 8.
51.
Because we do not know the gender of the fetus, she must take both possibilities into consideration.
52.
For it is possible that she was less than 40 days pregnant, in which instance the fetus is not considered as being born, and she is governed by the laws applying to a niddah, as stated in Halachah 2.
53.
For even if the fetus was male, she would be impure for this time.
54.
For we do not know that the fetus was female.
55.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah3:3), the Rambam explains the rationale for this ruling. There is a question of Scriptural Law involved. Whenever doubt arises in such a situation, we follow the more stringent approach.
56.
As would be the ruling was she to have given birth to a female. As explained in Chapter 11, Halachah 6, today
57.
In Chapter 7, Halachah 12, the Rambam writes that "that any bleeding that a woman discovers after the completion of the days associated with childbirth marks the beginning of her days of niddah." Accordingly, the first time a woman in such a situation discovers uterine bleeding between the fortieth and eightieth day after birth, there is a doubt whether she is a niddah. If she discovers bleeding a second time, the question of whether the doubt involves theniddah or zivah state depends on the day when the bleeding is discovered.
58.
I.e., she is not merely a minor zavah.
Apparently, the Rambam's intent is speaking about a woman who discovered uterine bleeding between the fortieth and eightieth day after birth and then a second time on the eighty-first day and according to the niddah-zivah cycle, the eighty-first day is a day ofzivah. (For example, she discovered uterine bleeding previous on the seventieth day.). In that instance, there is a doubt whether she is considered a niddah, for if the fetus was female, this would be considered the beginning of the niddah cycle, or a zavah, for if the fetus was male, her cycle would have begun earlier. See the following halachah and notes.
According to this interpretation, however, the word "alone" which the Rambam adds appears to be in error.
59.
Chapter 7, Halachah 12.
60.
The Rambam is speaking about a situation when a woman discovers uterine bleeding for the first time after a miscarriage. Ordinarily, her niddah cycle would start at that time. Nevertheless, since the possibility exists that her miscarriage did not involve a fetus, she must continue her previous reckoning of the "days of niddah" and the "days of zivah."
61.
If the fetus was male, the bleeding on the seventy-fourth day would have been considered the beginning of her "days ofniddah" and the eighty-first day, the beginning of her "days of zivah." Thus she would be only a minor zavah. Nevertheless, there is also a possibility that the fetus was female. In such an instance, any bleeding before the eighty-first day is insignificant and the eighty-first day begins the niddah cycle. Hence we rule more stringently and consider her a niddah, because of the doubt.
62.
This would be the law were we certain that she had miscarried a male fetus. Her status is doubtful, for it is possible that her miscarriage is not considered a birth at all. In that instance, the bleeding would be eitherniddah or zivah bleeding, depending on her cycle.
63.
I.e., were we to know for certain that she had given birth, there would be no concept of days of niddah and days of zivah. Hence, in the present situation, although the woman must observe the stringencies of niddah andzivah, it is only because of the doubt.
64.
Depending on the day of her cycle on which the bleeding is discovered.
65.
Either because of the miscarriage or because the bleeding is considered as blood of niddah. Either way, she is definitely impure for seven days.
66.
In Halachah 20.

Issurei Biah - Chapter Eleven

Halacha 1
All of what was said with regard to [the laws of] niddahzivah, and childbirth applies with regard to Scriptural Law. [The Jews] would follow these laws when the Supreme Sanhedrin held sessions and it included great sages who were familiar with [the types of] blood. If a doubt arose [for the lesser judges] with regard to the discovery of blood or the days of niddah and zivah, they could ascend to the Supreme Sanhedrin and ask them. As the Torah promised concerning them [Deuteronomy 17:8]: "If a matter of judgment is unknown to you concerning one type of blood or another, or one judgment and anotherו [you shallו ascend to the place that Godו shall choose]."1
["Concerning one type of blood or another"] means "between the blood ofniddah and the blood of zivah. In that era, Jewish women would be careful concerning this matter and would pay attention to their monthly patterns and would always count the "days of niddah" and the "days of zivah."
Halacha 2
It is very difficult to keep track of the counting of the dates. Many times doubts will arise. For even if a woman discovered bleeding on the day she was born, she must begin counting the "days of niddah" and the "days of zivah," as we explained.2 Therefore a girl cannot become impure as a zavah until she is ten days old. For if she discovered bleeding on the day that she was born, she would be a niddah for seven days. [Then to be a zavah, she would have to discover bleeding] on the three days directly following the "days of niddah." Thus [she would be] ten days [old].
Thus we learned that she begins counting the "days of niddah" and the "days of zivah" from the first time she discovers uterine bleeding throughout her entire life. [This applies] even if [the first time] she discovers bleeding is when she is a minor.
Halacha 3
During the era of the Sages of the Gemara, many doubts arose with regard to the appearance of blood3 and the reckoning of the pattern of menstruation. For it was not within the potential of all women to calculate the "days of niddah" and the "days of zivah." Therefore our Sages ruled stringently concerning this matter and decreed that a woman should consider all her days as "days ofzivah" and consider any bleeding that she discovers as zivah bleeding because of the doubt.4
Halacha 4
In addition, Jewish women accepted a further stringency upon themselves. They accepted the custom that wherever Jews live, whenever a Jewish woman discovers [uterine] bleeding, even if she does not discover more than a drop the size of a mustard seed and the bleeding ceases immediately, she must count seven "spotless" days.5 [This stringency applies] even if she discovered the bleeding during her "days of niddah."6
Whether the bleeding continued for one day, two days, an entire seven days, or longer, when the bleeding ceases, she counts seven "spotless" days as is required of a major zavah and immerses on the night of the eighth day despite the fact that there is a doubt whether she is a zavah.7 Or she may immerse during the day on the eighth day in a pressing situation, as explained.8Afterwards, she is permitted to her husband.
Halacha 5
Similarly, every women who gives birth in the present age is considered as one who gives birth while a zavah and she must count seven "spotless" days, as we explained.9
It is the commonly accepted custom in Babylon, in "the cherished land,"10Spain, and the West,11 that if a woman discovers bleeding in the days after childbirth,12 she must count seven "spotless" days after the bleeding stopped. [This applies] even if she first counted seven "spotless" days and immersed [after giving birth].
We do not grant her any pure days at all. Instead, whenever a woman discovers bleeding whether it is bleeding associated with childbirth or "pure blood," it is all impure. She must count seven "spotless" days after the bleeding ceases.
Halacha 6
This law was instituted in the era of the Geonim. They decreed that there be no concept of "pure" blood. For the stringency that women accepted upon themselves in the era of the Sages of the Talmud applies only to a woman who discovers bleeding that would render them impure. [In this instance, they accepted the custom of] waiting seven days. Blood which she discovers during her "days of purity" after counting [seven "spotless" days], by contrast, is not a matter of concern [according to Scriptural Law]. For the days of purity are not subject [to concern] with regard to niddah or zivah as we explained.13
Halacha 7
We have heard that in France,14 even today, relations are allowed [despite] "pure" bleeding as was the law in the Talmudic era after [the woman] counts [seven "spotless" days] and immerses herself because of the impurity resulting from giving birth in the zivah state. This matter is dependent on local custom.15
Halacha 8
Similarly, [stringencies were adopted] with regard to the laws of hymeneal bleeding in the present age. Even if a minor is below the age when she could be expected to menstruate and never discovered uterine bleeding, [her husband] must separate after engaging in the relations which are a mitzvah.16
Whenever she discovers hymeneal bleeding,17 she is impure. When the bleeding ceases, she must count seven "spotless" days [before immersing herself].
Halacha 9
Moreover, whenever a girl is asked to marry and consents, she must count seven "spotless" days after she consents to marry.18 Afterwards, [she immerses and] becomes permitted to her husband.19 [The rationale is that] she might have desired a man and released a drop [of blood] without being aware of it. Whether she is a mature woman or a minor, she must wait seven "spotless" days after she consents to marry. Afterwards, she immerses and may engage in relations.
Halacha 10
All of these matters are additional stringencies that have been practiced by Jewish women from the era of the Sages of the Talmud [onward]. One should never deviate from it. Therefore every women who consents when asked to marry should not marry until she counts [these days] and immerses herself. If she marries a Torah scholar, she may marry immediately and then count after marriage and immerse. [The rationale is that] a Torah scholar will know that she is forbidden and observe [the restriction]. He will not approach her until she immerses.20
Halacha 11
The laws applying to [the discovery of] stains in the present era [follow the principles] we explained.21 There is no innovation in this regard, not are there any [new] customs. Instead, any stain which we ruled was pure, is considered pure. And when [a woman discovers] any of the stains which we ruled were impure - [even] of the stain was not of the size that would generate concern for zivut - she must count seven ["spotless"] days, after the day of the discovery of the stain. For the discovery of a stain is not identical with the discovery of bleeding.22
Halacha 12
All the statements we made concerning a woman who miscarried [and discharged a creature that does not resemble a human fetus]23 and [hence] is pure also apply in the present age.24
Similarly, when a woman discovers a white or green blood-like secretion25or if she discharges a red mass of flesh that is not accompanied by bleeding,26she is pure even in the present age. For the stringency involves only one who discovers impure bleeding and the above are not considered as impure bleeding.
Halacha 13
Similarly, if she had a wound from which blood was flowing27 or blood was released with her urine,28 she is pure. Innovations [in practice] were made only with regard to all women who discover impure bleeding as explained [above] and also that all different shades of blood are considered impure.29
Halacha 14
In certain places, the practice is that a woman must consider herself a niddahfor seven days even though her bleeding lasted only one day. [Then] after these seven, she must count seven "spotless" days. This is not a [proper] custom.30 Instead, it is an error on the part of the one who ruled in this manner and is not worthy of being given any consideration.31 Instead, [the law is that if a woman experiences] one day of menstrual bleeding, she should count seven "spotless" days afterwards and immerse on the night [following] the eighth day,32 which is the second day after her ["days of] niddah." She is [then] permitted to her husband.
Halacha 15
Similarly, in certain places, the practice is - and support for this is found in the responsa of some of the Geonim - for a woman who gives birth to a male not to engage in relations until the conclusion of forty days and for one who gives birth to a female [to refrain] until after eighty days33 even though they discovered bleeding only during the [first] seven days. This is not a [proper] custom. Instead, these responsa are in error and indeed [the observance of this practice] in these places is of a heretical nature.34 They learned this interpretation from the Sadducees.35 It is a mitzvah to compel [these people] to remove [this improper custom] from their hearts and to return them to [the observance of] the words of the Sages who require only the counting of seven "spotless" days as explained.
Halacha 16
A woman does not ascend from her state of ritual impurity and cease being considered as an ervah until she immerses herself in a mikveh that is halachicly acceptable while there are no substances intervening between her flesh and the water.36 In Hilchot Mikveot, we will explain what defines amikveh as acceptable and what disqualifies it, the manner in which one should immerse, and the laws concerning intervening substances.
If, by contrast, she washes in a bath - even if all the water in the world passes over her - her state is the same after washing as before washing [and a man who engages in relations with her is liable] for kereit. For there is no way of ascending from a state of ritual impurity to one of purity except through immersing in the waters of a mikveh, a spring, or a sea which is like a spring, as will be explained in Hilchot Mikveot.
Halacha 17
In the present age, although the seven "spotless" days [are observed only because of] doubt,37 if a woman immerses herself during them, it is as if she did not immerse herself.38 If she immerses herself on the seventh day,39the immersion is valid even though it is forbidden to do so at the outset, lest one engage in relations on the seventh day after the immersion.40 [The rationale is that] she immersed in the appropriate time even were she to have definitely been a zavah.41
Halacha 18
It is forbidden to a person to embrace his wife during these seven "spotless" days. [This applies] even if she is clothed and he is clothed.42 He should not draw close to her, nor touch her, not even with his pinky. He may not eat together with her from the same plate.43 The general principle is he must conduct himself with her during the days she is counting as he does in her "days of niddah." For [relations with her] are still punishable by kereit until she immerses herself, as we explained.44
Halacha 19
niddah may perform any task which a wife would perform for her husband except washing his face, hands, and feet, pouring him a drink, and spreading out his bed in his presence.45 [These were forbidden as] decrees, lest they come to sin.46
For this reason, she should not eat with him from the same plate, nor should he touch her flesh, lest this lead to sin. Similarly, she should not perform these three tasks for him during her seven "spotless" days. It is permitted for a woman to adorn herself during her "days of niddah," so that she does not become unattractive to her husband.
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., to the Temple in Jerusalem. See Hilchot Mamrim, chs. 1 and 4, which discuss the authority of the Supreme Sanhedrin and how it served as the final governing body for Jewish Law.
2.
Chapter 4, Halachah 4.
3.
As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 7-12, in the Talmudic era, our Sages felt capable of distinguishing between different shades of red and were able to identify some shades as pure and others as impure. In the Rambam's era and certainly in later ages, the Rabbis felt incapable of making such distinctions.
4.
The Maggid Mishneh relates that the Rambam did not clarify his statements concerning this Rabbinic ordinance because it was only a temporary measure. It does not reflect Scriptural Law, nor does it reflect Rabbinic Law as practice, because it was later supplanted by the stringency Jewish women accepted upon themselves as stated in the following halachah.
To explain: Niddah 66a relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi ordained that any woman who discovers uterine bleeding should wait six "spotless" days before immersing herself . If, however, she discovers bleeding for three consecutive days, she must wait seven "spotless" days. Thus if the bleeding had come in her days of niddah, she would have waited the seven days required by Scriptural Law (the day she discovered the bleeding and the six "spotless" days). And if the bleeding had come in her days of zivah, all that is required by Scriptural Law is for her to wait one spotless day. This is the ordinance to which the Rambam referred.
5.
The stringency implied by this practice is that even if bleeding is sighted for only one day, the woman counts seven "spotless" days.
6.
According to Scriptural Law, there is no need for her to count seven "spotless" days in such a situation. Instead, she may immerse after the seventh day regardless. Nevertheless, women accepted this stringency upon themselves.
7.
I.e., according to Scriptural Law, a zavahmay immerse herself during the day on the seventh day. She need not wait until evening. Nevertheless, since a niddah is required to wait until the evening to immerse herself, women standardized their conduct and ordained that all immersion be performed at night unless there are extenuating circumstances. Note, however, Halachah 17.
8.
Chapter 4, Halachah 8.
9.
Chapter 7, Halachah 5.
According to Scriptural Law, if a women is not a zavah when she gives birth, she may immerse herself after seven or fourteen days, even if she was bleeding the entire time. In the Talmudic era, however, it became customary to observe the stringency described by the Rambam. The rationale is that since every discovery of bleeding renders her a zavah, she is always considered as having given birth in that state (Maggid Mishneh).
When quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 194:1) emphasizes that this practice does not supplant Scriptural Law. Thus if a woman counts seven "spotless" days directly after giving birth to a girl, she must still wait the fourteen days required by the Torah before immersing.
10.
Eretz Yisrael.
11.
Morocco and North Africa.
12.
The Hebrew term used by the Rambam has a specific meaning, the days between the seventh and fortieth days after a woman gives birth to a male or the days between the fourteenth and eightieth days after she gives birth to a female.
13.
Chapter 7, Halachah 7.
14.
Whose halachic tradition differed from that of the Sephardic community in many particulars.
15.
The Rambam is referring to one of the principles mentioned in his introduction to theMishneh Torah: Laws ordained by the Sages of the Talmud must be accepted universally throughout the Jewish community. Laws ordained by later authorities are subject to the halachic review of the local authorities.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 194:1) writes that it has already become universal Jewish practice to forbid relations when a woman discovers bleeding during her days of purity.
16.
I.e., the first time the couple engage in relations. As explained in Chapter 5, Halachot 18-25, according to Scriptural Law, hymeneal bleeding does not represent any difficulty for it is not at all related to niddah orzivah. Hence, according to Talmudic Law, when the wife is a minor, the couple may engage in relations until the hymeneal bleeding ceases. Even a girl who gets married at the age of twelve is granted certain leniency. The later Rabbis, however, required all couples to separate because of hymeneal bleeding.
The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that the groom may complete relations and withdraw while erect even if he knows that bleeding has commenced. Although our Rabbis ordained this stringency, they did not apply it to the first time the couple engaged in relations.
He also states that even if no bleeding is discovered, if the bride was a virgin, we assume that there was a slight amount of blood that was not noticed and rule that she is impure. These laws are quoted byShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 193:1).
17.
I.e., if all the hymeneal blood was not released during the first time the couple engaged in relations and bleeding was discovered after subsequent relations.
18.
The day after she consents is the first of these seven days. If she becomes engaged and there is a considerable time between the engagement and the marriage, the days are counted from the time wedding preparations are made in earnest (Maggid Mishneh;Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 192:1-2).
19.
This stringency applies to a young girl who never menstruated or an older girl who already experienced seven "spotless" days after her last menstruation.
20.
The Kessef Mishneh and the Maggid Mishneh maintain that the Rambam would agree that not only relations, but also remaining alone with one's wife is forbidden in this situation. The Ra'avad and the Tur(Yoreh De'ah 192) infer that the Rambam is not paying heed to this prohibition. Hence, they differ with his ruling.
21.
In Chapter 9.
22.
The Rambam is saying that for a stain a woman is not required to make a hefsek taharah or count seven days. Instead, it is sufficient for her to count six "spotless" days as described in Halachah 3 and notes. For as he explains, the discovery of a stain is not the same as the discovery of bleeding.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the laws applying to the discovery of bleeding also apply with regard to the discovery of a stain. The Maggid Mishneh offers theoretical support for the Rambam's approach, but states that since other Rishonim follow the Ra'avad's view, we should be stringent and accept it. This opinion is followed by Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 188:3, 190:1).
23.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 15; Chapter 10, Halachah 8.
24.
The Rambam maintains that the Rabbis did not issue a decree concerning such a situation, nor was this included in the stringency which Jewish women accepted upon themselves. The Ra'avad differs, explaining that in the present era, we are not knowledgeable concerning the distinctions between the forms which our Sages made. Hence, because of the doubt, we rule that a woman is impure after any miscarriage.
In this instance as well, the Ra'avad's view is accepted by the Ramban and the Rashba and is cited as halachah by Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 194:3).
25.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 6. This ruling is accepted by all authorities.
26.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 13. This ruling is also disputed by the Ra'avad and otherRishonim. For they maintain that it is impossible for the uterus to open without there being any bleeding. This view is accepted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah194:2).
27.
See Chapter 4, Halachah 20.
28.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 17. Other Rabbis also do not require stringency with regard to these matters in the present age.
29.
As stated in Halachah 3, the later Rabbis felt incapable of distinguishing between different shades of red as the Sages of the Talmud were capable of doing.
30.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 196:11) also mentions the practice cited by the Rambam. He also negates it saying: "There is not reason for the practiceו. A person who is lenient earns a reward and hastens his [involvement in] the mitzvah."
31.
Although the halachic authorities are unanimous in their support of the Rambam's ruling. The custom he quotes has a Rabbinic source in Midrash Tanchuma, Parshat Metzora, sec. 7.
32.
The Rama (loc. cit.) mentions that the Ashkenazic custom is not to begin counting seven until thje fifth day after the woman discovered menstrual bleeding.
33.
By this practice, they distort the meaning of Leviticus, ch. 12, as interpreted in Chapter 4, Halachah 5.
34.
For as indicated by the association with the Sadducees, they undermine the authority of the Oral Law.
35.
A deviant sect which tried to sway our people from Jewish practice by denying the authority of the Oral Law.
36.
For an immersion can be disqualified when there are substances intervening between one's flesh and the waters of a mikveh. SeeHilchot Mikveot 1:7 and the laws that follow.
37.
As explained in Halachot 3 and 4 and notes.
38.
Since a niddah or a zavah does not change her state if she immerses herself before the required time, we apply this same ruling to a woman in the present age.
39.
I.e., after sunrise.
40.
We fear that she may discover uterine bleeding after engaging in relations, but before nightfall, and thus nullify the entire seven "spotless" days. In that instance, her immersion is of no consequence.
41.
For according to Scriptural Law, a zavahmay immerse at this time, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 11. And if the woman is a niddah, she may certainly immerse according to Scriptural Law, for the time of her impurity has passed.
42.
This and the following restrictions were imposed lest they lead to relations, as the Rambam states in the following halachah.
43.
The Ra'avad states: "Our custom is that [they may not eat] even on the same table." The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 195:3) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling, but offers the following leniency. One may place an object between the two to make a distinction.
44.
In Halachah 16.
45.
Implied is that if he is not present, she may make his bed. Outside his presence, making his bed is a household task. In his presence, it could suggest an invitation for intimacy. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, ch. 195) and commentaries for a further delineation of stringencies that must be observed until a woman purifies herself.
46.
I.e., relations.
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Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class
• "Today's Day" • Tuesday, Adar I 7, 5776 · 16 February 2016
Friday 7 Adar I 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: T'ruma, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 39-43.
Tanya: And from this (p. 119)...little by little. (p. 121).
It is imperative that every Jew know that he is an emissary of the Master of all, charged with the mission - wherever he may be of bringing into reality G-d's will and intention in creating the universe, namely, to illuminate the world with the light of Torah and avoda. This is done through performing practical mitzvot and implanting in oneself fine character traits.
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• 
Daily Thought:
Adulthood
Three things you must know to be an adult:
• Don’t fool yourself.
• Don’t fool others.
• Don’t let others fool you.
—and do it all without trying to impress anybody.[
Rabbi Shalom DovBer of Lubavitch, to his son before his bar mitzvah. Sefer Ha'Sichot 5704, page 36.]
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