This email is dedicated by Yonatan and Rebecca Porges, in loving memory of their beautiful infant daughter Avigayil Chaya Porges "Many waters cannot quench love; rivers cannot sweep it away." Shlomo 8:7
Today in Jewish History:
• War on Benjamin (1188 BCE)
Armies of the Tribes of Israel converged upon the tribe of Benjamin in the aftermath of the "Concubine at Givah" incident, in a war which nearly brought about the extinction of the Benjaminites (as related in the Book of Judges, chapters 19-21).
Daily Quote:
Rabbi Yossei the son of Judah of Kfar HaBavli would say: One who learns Torah from youngsters, whom is he comparable to? To one who eats unripe grapes and drinks [unfermented] wine from the press. One who learns Torah from the old, whom is he comparable to? To one who eats ripened grapes and drinks aged wine.
Said Rabbi Meir: Look not at the vessel, but at what it contains. There are new vessels that are filled with old wine, and old vessels that do not even contain new wine.[Ethics of the Fathers, 4:20]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Mishpatim, 3rd Portion Exodus 22:4-22:26 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 22
4If a man leads his animals into a field or a vineyard, or lets his animal loose and it eats in another's field, the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall pay. דכִּ֤י יַבְעֶר־אִישׁ֙ שָׂדֶ֣ה אוֹ־כֶ֔רֶם וְשִׁלַּח֙ אֶת־בְּעִיר֔וֹ(כתיב בעירה) וּבִעֵ֖ר בִּשְׂדֵ֣ה אַחֵ֑ר מֵיטַ֥ב שָׂדֵ֛הוּ וּמֵיטַ֥ב כַּרְמ֖וֹ יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
If leads his animals: These terms denote an animal as [it says] (Numbers 20:4) "we and our cattle" אנחנו ובעירנו כי יבער. את בעירה ובער: כולם לשון בהמה, כמו (במדבר כ ד) אנחנו ובעירנו:
If leads his animals: Heb. יַבְעֶר, [i.e.,] leads his animals into his neighbor’s field or vineyard, and it damages it [the property] in one of these two [ways]: either by sending (שִׁלּוּחַ) his animal or by eating (בִּעוּר). Our Sages explained [that] וְשִׁלַח refers to the damages [made by] the treading of the foot, and וּבִעֵר refers to the damages of the tooth, which eats and destroys [someone’s property]. -[From B.K. 2b] כי יבער: יוליך בהמותיו בשדה וכרם של חבירו ויזיק אותו באחת משתי אלה או בשלוח בעירה, או בביעור. ופירשו רבותינו שלוח הוא נזקי מדרך כף רגל, ובער הוא נזקי השן האוכלת ומבערת:
in another’s field: Heb. בִּשְׂדֵה אַחֵר, in another person’s field. The vowelization of בִּשְׂדֵה with the sheva under the “sin” denotes the construct state. Hence, it means “in the field of another,” rather than “in another field.” Since the noun is missing, Rashi explains that it means “another person’s field.” -[Mizrachi] בשדה אחר: בשדה של איש אחר:
the best of his field… he shall pay: They [judges] assess the damage, and if he [the owner of this animal] comes to pay him [the owner of the land] the amount of his damage with land, he must pay him from the best of his fields. If his damage was [worth] a sela, he must give him the value of a sela from the best [land] that he has. Scripture teaches you that for the injured party, they assess [the damage] with the best land. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 6b] מיטב שדהו ישלם: שמין את הנזק, ואם בא לשלם לו קרקע דמי נזקו, ישלם לו ממיטב שדותיו אם היה נזקו סלע יתן לו שוה סלע מעידית שיש לו. למדך הכתוב, שהניזקין שמין להם בעידית:
5If a fire goes forth and finds thorns, and a stack of grain or standing grain or the field be consumed, the one who ignited the fire shall surely pay. הכִּֽי־תֵצֵ֨א אֵ֜שׁ וּמָֽצְאָ֤ה קֹצִים֙ וְנֶֽאֱכַ֣ל גָּדִ֔ישׁ א֥וֹ הַקָּמָ֖ה א֣וֹ הַשָּׂדֶ֑ה שַׁלֵּ֣ם יְשַׁלֵּ֔ם הַמַּבְעִ֖ר אֶת־הַבְּעֵרָֽה:
If a fire goes forth: Even by itself. [From B.K. 22b] כי תצא אש: אפילו מעצמה:
and finds thorns: Heb. קֹצִים, chardons in French, [meaning] thistles. ומצאה קוצים: קרדונ"ש בלעז [קוצים]:
and a stack of grain… be consumed: That it [the fire] caught onto the thorns until it reached a stack of grain or standing grain still attached to the ground. ונאכל גדיש: שליחכה בקוצים עד שהגיעה לגדיש או לקמה המחוברת לקרקע:
or the field: That it [the fire] scorched the furrow that he had plowed, and he had to plow it a second time. -[From B.K. 60a] או השדה: שליחכה את נירו וצריך לניר אותה פעם שנייה:
the one who ignited the fire shall surely pay: Although he ignited it within his own property, and it spread by itself through thorns that it found, he is liable to pay because he did not guard his burning coal so that it would not go forth and inflict damage. שלם ישלם המבעיר: אף על פי שהדליק בתוך שלו והיא יצאה מעצמה על ידי קוצים שמצאה, חייב לשלם, לפי שלא שמר את גחלתו שלא תצא ותזיק:
6If a man gives his neighbor money or articles for safekeeping, and it is stolen from the man's house, if the thief is found, he shall pay twofold. וכִּֽי־יִתֵּן֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֜הוּ כֶּ֤סֶף אֽוֹ־כֵלִים֙ לִשְׁמֹ֔ר וְגֻנַּ֖ב מִבֵּ֣ית הָאִ֑ישׁ אִם־יִמָּצֵ֥א הַגַּנָּ֖ב יְשַׁלֵּ֥ם שְׁנָֽיִם:
and it is stolen from the man’s house: According to his words. וגנב מבית האיש: לפי דבריו:
if the thief is found, he shall pay twofold: The thief shall pay twofold [the value of the object] to its [original] owners. -[From B.K. 63b] אם ימצא הגנב: ישלם הגנב שנים לבעלים:
7If the thief is not found, the homeowner shall approach the judges, [to swear] that he has not laid his hand upon his neighbor's property. זאִם־לֹ֤א יִמָּצֵא֙ הַגַּנָּ֔ב וְנִקְרַ֥ב בַּֽעַל־הַבַּ֖יִת אֶל־הָֽאֱלֹהִ֑ים אִם־לֹ֥א שָׁלַ֛ח יָד֖וֹ בִּמְלֶ֥אכֶת רֵעֵֽהוּ:
If the thief is not found: And this custodian, who is the owner of the house, comes. אם לא ימצא הגנב: ובא השומר הזה שהוא בעל הבית:
approaches -: the judges to litigate with this one [the owner] and to swear to him that he did not lay his hand upon his [property]. -[From B.K. 63b] ונקרב: אל הדיינין לדון עם זה ולישבע לו שלא שלח ידו בשלו:
8For any sinful word, for a bull, for a donkey, for a lamb, for a garment, for any lost article, concerning which he will say that this is it, the plea[s] of both parties shall come to the judges, [and] whoever the judges declare guilty shall pay twofold to his neighbor. חעַל־כָּל־דְּבַר־פֶּ֡שַׁע עַל־שׁ֡וֹר עַל־חֲמ֩וֹר֩ עַל־שֶׂ֨ה עַל־שַׂלְמָ֜ה עַל־כָּל־אֲבֵדָ֗ה אֲשֶׁ֤ר יֹאמַר֙ כִּי־ה֣וּא זֶ֔ה עַ֚ד הָֽאֱלֹהִ֔ים יָבֹ֖א דְּבַר־שְׁנֵיהֶ֑ם אֲשֶׁ֤ר יַרְשִׁיעֻן֙ אֱלֹהִ֔ים יְשַׁלֵּ֥ם שְׁנַ֖יִם לְרֵעֵֽהוּ:
For any sinful word: [i.e.,] that he is found to be lying in his oath, for witnesses testify that he himself stole it, and the judges declare him guilty because of [the testimony of] the witnesses. על כל דבר פשע: שימצא שקרן בשבועתו, שיעידו עדים שהוא עצמו גנבו, וירשיעוהו א-להים על פי העדים:
shall pay twofold to his neighbor: The text teaches you that if one puts forth a claim concerning an item entrusted to him, saying that it was stolen from him, and it is discovered that he himself stole it, he must make twofold restitution. When [is this so]? Only if he swore [that he did not take it] and afterwards witnesses came [and testified that he had taken it for himself,] for so have our Rabbis, of blessed memory, interpreted: “and the homeowner approaches the judges” (verse 7). This approaching means [to make] an oath [that the custodian swore that the article was stolen]. You say [that he approaches] for an oath, or perhaps it means [he approaches] only for litigation. [In this case, if] he comes to litigate and he denies [any responsibility] by saying that it [the object] was stolen, then is he immediately liable for twofold restitution if witnesses come [and testify] that it is in his possession? [The answer is that since the expression] laying a hand is mentioned here (in verse 7), and below, laying a hand is [also] mentioned: “the oath of the Lord shall be between the two of them provided that he did not lay his hand upon his neighbor’s property.” (verse 10). Just as [“lay his hand” written] further denotes an oath, so does [“laid his hand” written] here denote an oath. -[From Mechilta, B. K. 63b] ישלם שנים לרעהו: למדך הכתוב, שהטוען בפקדון לומר נגנב הימנו, ונמצא שהוא עצמו גנבו, משלם תשלומי כפל. ואימתי בזמן שנשבע ואחר כך באו עדים, שכך דרשו רבותינו ז"ל ונקרב בעל הבית אל הא-להים, קריבה זו שבועה היא. אתה אומר לשבועה, או אינו אלא לדין, שכיון שבא לדין וכפר לומר נגנבה, מיד יתחייב כפל, אם באו עדים שהוא בידו. נאמר כאן שליחות יד, ונאמר למטה שליחות יד (פסוק י) שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם אם לא שלח ידו, מה להלן שבועה אף כאן שבועה:
concerning which he will say that this is it: According to its [the verse’s] simple meaning, concerning which the witness will say that this is it, [i.e., the article] about which you swore [was stolen but really] is in your possession. The pleas of both parties must be brought to the judges and they [the judges] will interrogate the witnesses, and if they [the witnesses] are acceptable and they [the judges] declare this custodian guilty, he must pay twofold [to the owner]. If they declare the witnesses guilty, namely that they were found collusive, they must pay twofold to the custodian. Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, however, interpreted כִּי הוּא זֶה, that this is it, to mean that [the judges] do not demand an oath of him [the custodian] unless he admitted part [of the claim against him], saying, “I owe you this much, but the rest was stolen from me.” -[From B.K. 106b] אשר יאמר כי הוא זה: לפי פשוטו אשר יאמר העד כי הוא זה שנשבעת עליו הרי הוא אצלך. עד הדיינין יבא דבר שניהם ויחקרו את העדים, ואם כשרים הם וירשיעוהו לשומר זה, ישלם שנים, ואם ירשיעו את העדים, שנמצאו זוממין, ישלמו הם שנים לשומר. ורבותינו ז"ל דרשו כי הוא זה, ללמד שאין מחייבין אותו שבועה אלא אם כן הודה במקצת לומר כך וכך אני חייב לך, והמותר נגנב ממני:
9If a man gives his neighbor a donkey, a bull, a lamb, or any animal for safekeeping, and it dies, breaks a limb, or is captured, and no one sees [it], טכִּֽי־יִתֵּן֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֜הוּ חֲמ֨וֹר אוֹ־שׁ֥וֹר אוֹ־שֶׂ֛ה וְכָל־בְּהֵמָ֖ה לִשְׁמֹ֑ר וּמֵ֛ת אֽוֹ־נִשְׁבַּ֥ר אֽוֹ־נִשְׁבָּ֖ה אֵ֥ין רֹאֶֽה:
If a man gives his neighbor a donkey, a bull: The first section was stated concerning an unpaid custodian. Therefore, [the Torah] exempted him [the custodian] from theft, as it is written: “and it is stolen from the man’s house… If the thief is not found, the homeowner approaches the judges” (verses 6-7) for an oath. [Thus] you learn that he exempts himself with this oath. This section, [however,] is stated concerning a paid custodian. Therefore, he is not exempt if it [the deposit] was stolen, as it is written: “But if it is stolen from him, he shall pay” (verse 11). But in the case of an accident beyond his control, such as if it [the animal] died by itself or if it broke a limb, or if it was forcibly captured by bandits, and no one [was there to] see it [and] to testify concerning the matter [if he swears that this is the case, then he is exempt]. — [From B.M. 94b] כי יתן איש אל רעהו חמור או שור: פרשה ראשונה נאמרה בשומר חנם, לפיכך פטר בו את הגנבה, כמו שנאמר (פסוק ו) וגונב מבית האיש, אם לא ימצא הגנב ונקרב בעל הבית לשבועה, למדת שפוטר עצמו בשבועה זו. ופרשה זו אמורה בשומר שכר, לפיכך אינו פטור אם נגנבה, כמו שכתוב (פסוק יא) אם גנוב יגנב מעמו ישלם, אבל על האונס, כגון מת מעצמו, או נשבר או נשבה בחזקה על ידי לסטים, ואין רואה שיעיד בדבר:
10the oath of the Lord shall be between the two of them provided that he did not lay his hand upon his neighbor's property, and its owner shall accept [it], and he shall not pay. ישְׁבֻעַ֣ת יְהֹוָ֗ה תִּֽהְיֶה֙ בֵּ֣ין שְׁנֵיהֶ֔ם אִם־לֹ֥א שָׁלַ֛ח יָד֖וֹ בִּמְלֶ֣אכֶת רֵעֵ֑הוּ וְלָקַ֥ח בְּעָלָ֖יו וְלֹ֥א יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
the oath of the Lord shall be: He must swear that it is so, as he says [that it was beyond his control] and that he did not lay his hand upon it to use it for himself. Because if he laid his hand upon it, and afterwards, something beyond his control happens to it, he is liable for [any damage resulting from] accidents. שבועת ה' תהיה: ישבע שכן הוא כדבריו, והוא לא שלח בה יד להשתמש בה לעצמו, שאם שלח בה יד, ואחר כך נאנסה, חייב באונסים:
and its owner shall accept: the oath. [from B.K. 106a] ולקח בעליו: השבועה:
and he shall not pay: The custodian [shall not pay] him anything. ולא ישלם: לו השומר כלום:
11But if it is stolen from him, he shall pay its owner. יאוְאִם־גָּנֹ֥ב יִגָּנֵ֖ב מֵֽעִמּ֑וֹ יְשַׁלֵּ֖ם לִבְעָלָֽיו:
12If it is torn apart, he shall bring witness for it; [for] the torn one he shall not pay. יבאִם־טָרֹ֥ף יִטָּרֵ֖ף יְבִאֵ֣הוּ עֵ֑ד הַטְּרֵפָ֖ה לֹ֥א יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
If it is torn: By a ferocious beast. אם טרף יטרף: על ידי חיה רעה:
he shall bring witness for it: He shall bring witnesses [to testify] that it [the animal] was torn [apart] in a way that was beyond his control, and he is exempt. -[From B.K. 10b, 11a] יבאהו עד: יביא עדים שנטרפה באונס, ופטור:
[for] the torn one he shall not pay: [The Torah] does not say, “[for] a torn one he shall not pay,” but, “[for] הטרפה לא ישלם: אינו אומר טרפה לא ישלם, אלא הטרפה, יש טרפה שהוא משלם ויש טרפה שאינו משלם. טרפת חתול ושועל ונמיה משלם. טרפת זאב, ארי ודוב ונחש אינו משלם. ומי לחשך לדון כן, שהרי כתיב ומת או נשבר או נשבה, מה מיתה שאין יכול להציל, אף שבר ושביה שאין יכול להציל:
the: torn one.” For one type of torn animal he pays, and for another type of torn animal he does not pay. For an animal torn [apart] by a cat, a fox, or a marten, he must pay, but for an animal torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear, or a snake, he does not pay. Now who whispered to you to reason that way? [The proof is] that it is written: “and it dies, breaks a limb, or is captured” (verse 9). Just as with death, he cannot save it, so it is with breaking a limb and captivity, that he cannot save [it. But in the case of less ferocious beasts, like a fox, since the shepherd could have saved his charge, he is liable]. -[From Mechilta] :
13And if a person borrows [an animal] from his neighbor and it breaks a limb or dies, if its owner is not with him, he shall surely pay. יגוְכִֽי־יִשְׁאַ֥ל אִ֛ישׁ מֵעִ֥ם רֵעֵ֖הוּ וְנִשְׁבַּ֣ר אוֹ־מֵ֑ת בְּעָלָ֥יו אֵֽין־עִמּ֖וֹ שַׁלֵּ֥ם יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
And if a person borrows: This [verse] comes to teach you concerning a borrower, that he is liable for incidents beyond his control. וכי ישאל: בא ללמדך על השואל שחייב באונסין:
if its owner is not with him: If the owner of the bull is not with the borrower doing his work. -[From B.M. 95b] בעליו אין עמו: אם בעליו של שור אינו עם השואל במלאכתו:
14If its owner is with him, he shall not pay; if it is a hired [animal], it has come for its hire. ידאִם־בְּעָלָ֥יו עִמּ֖וֹ לֹ֣א יְשַׁלֵּ֑ם אִם־שָׂכִ֣יר ה֔וּא בָּ֖א בִּשְׂכָרֽוֹ:
If its owner is with him: Whether he [the animal’s owner] is with him [the borrower] doing the same work, or if he was with him doing a different work. If he [the animal’s owner] was with him [the borrower] at the time of the loan, he [the owner] need not be with him at the time the limb was broken or the animal died [to make him exempt from payment]. -[From B.M. 95b] אם בעליו עמו: בין שהוא באותה מלאכה, בין שהוא במלאכה אחרת, היה עמו בשעת שאלה, אינו צריך להיות עמו בשעת שבירה ומיתה:
if it is a hired [animal]: If the bull was not borrowed but hired, [and] it came to be hired into the hands of this hirer [for a fee] not through lending And he [the hirer] does not have complete benefit [of the animal] for he used it through its hire, and he does not have the status of a borrower to be liable for accidents beyond his control. [The Torah, however,] did not specify what his status is, whether he is judged like an unpaid custodian or like a paid custodian. Therefore, the Sages of Israel differed concerning him: How does a hirer pay [in the case of an accident]? Rabbi Meir says: Like an unpaid custodian. Rabbi Judah says: Like a paid custodian. -[From B.M. 90b] אם שכיר הוא: אם השור אינו שאול אלא שכור, בא בשכרו ליד השוכר הזה ולא בשאלה, ואין כל הנאה שלו, שהרי על ידי שכרו נשתמש, ואין לו משפט שואל להתחייב באונסין. ולא פירש מה דינו, אם כשומר חנם או כשומר שכר, לפיכך נחלקו בו חכמי ישראל, שוכר כיצד משלם, רבי מאיר אומר כשומר חנם. רבי יהודה אומר כשומר שכר:
15If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and lies with her, he shall provide her with a marriage contract as a wife. טווְכִֽי־יְפַתֶּ֣ה אִ֗ישׁ בְּתוּלָ֛ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹֽא־אֹרָ֖שָׂה וְשָׁכַ֣ב עִמָּ֑הּ מָהֹ֛ר יִמְהָרֶ֥נָּה לּ֖וֹ לְאִשָּֽׁה:
If a man seduces: Heb. יְפַךְתֶּה, he speaks to her heart until she yields to him. And so is its Aramaic translation: וַאִרֵי יְשַׁדֵּל. שִׁדּוּל in Aramaic is the equivalent of פִּךְתּוּי in Hebrew [and both signify persuasion]. וכי יפתה: מדבר על לבה עד ששומעת לו, וכן תרגומו וארי ישדל. שדול בלשון ארמי כפתוי בלשון עברי:
he shall provide her with a marriage contract: He shall stipulate for her a dowry, as is the custom of a man to his wife, that he writes for her a kethubah, and he shall marry her. -[From Mechilta] מהר ימהרנה: יפסוק לה מוהר כמשפט איש לאשתו, שכותב לה כתובה וישאנה:
16If her father refuses to give her to him [in marriage], he shall weigh out money according to the dowry of the virgins. טזאִם־מָאֵ֧ן יְמָאֵ֛ן אָבִ֖יהָ לְתִתָּ֣הּ ל֑וֹ כֶּ֣סֶף יִשְׁקֹ֔ל כְּמֹ֖הַר הַבְּתוּלֹֽת:
according to the dowry of the virgins: which is fixed at fifty silver shekels in the case of one who seizes a virgin and forcibly lies with her, as it is said: “The man who lay with her shall give the maiden’s father fifty silver shekels” (Deut. 22:29). -[From Keth. 10a] כמהר הבתולות: שהוא קצוב חמשים כסף אצל התופס את הבתולה ושוכב עמה באונס שנאמר (דברים כב כט) ונתן האיש השוכב עמה לאבי הנער חמשים כסף:
17You shall not allow a sorceress to live. יזמְכַשֵּׁפָ֖ה לֹ֥א תְחַיֶּֽה:
You shall not allow a sorceress to live: But she shall be executed by the court. [This law applies equally to] both males and females, but the text speaks of the usual, and those who practice sorcery are usually women. -[From Mechilta, Sanh. 67a] מכשפה לא תחיה: אלא תומת בבית דין, ואחד זכרים ואחד נקבות, אלא שדבר הכתוב בהווה שהנשים מצויות מכשפות:
18Whoever lies [carnally] with an animal shall surely be put to death. יחכָּל־שֹׁכֵ֥ב עִם־בְּהֵמָ֖ה מ֥וֹת יוּמָֽת:
Whoever lies [carnally] with an animal shall surely be put to death: by stoning. A male who has carnal relations with an animal [is just as liable] as a female who has carnal relations with an animal, concerning whom it is written: “their blood is upon them [meaning they will be killed]” (Lev. 20:16). -[From Sanh. 53, 54]) See Rashi on Exod. 21:17. כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת: בסקילה, רובע כנרבעת, שכתוב בהן (ויקרא כ טז) דמיהם בם:
19He who slaughters [a sacrifice] to the gods shall be destroyed, except to the Lord alone. יטזֹבֵ֥חַ לָֽאֱלֹהִ֖ים יָֽחֳרָ֑ם בִּלְתִּ֥י לַֽיהֹוָ֖ה לְבַדּֽוֹ:
to the gods: Heb. לָאֱלֹהִים, to pagan deities. If it were vowelized לֵאלֹהִים [the “lammed” with a “tzeirei”], it would have to specify [which deities] and [it would need to be explained and] written אִחֵרִים, other [gods]. Now that it says לָאֱלֹהִים, it does not have to specify [which gods are meant] because every “lammed,” “beth,” and “hey” prefixed to a word, if it is vowelized with a “chataf” (meaning a “sheva” ), such as לְמֶלֶ, to a king, לְמִדְבָּר, to a desert, לְעִיר, to a city, one must specify to which king, to which desert, to which city. Similarly, [with a “beth” or “lammed”] לִמְלָכִים, to kings, and לִרְגָלִים, to festivals, punctuated with a “chirik,” must be specified to which ones. If it is not specified all kings are meant. So too, לֵאלֹהִים means all gods, even the divine, but when it is vowelized with a “pattach,” like לַמֶּלֶ, to the king, לַמִּדְבָּר, to the desert, לָעִיר, to the city, [The “pattach” and the “kamatz” are in one category in this context. There is also another way to explain this, as is written in Dikdukei Rashi. See that source.] it is known about which king he is speaking, and so לָאֱלֹהִים, to the gods, to those concerning which you were warned elsewhere. Similarly, “There is none like You among the gods” (Ps. 86:8). Since it is not specified, it had to be vowelized with a “pattach”. לא-להים: לעבודה זרה. אלו היה נקוד לא-להים היה צריך לפרש ולכתוב אחרים, עכשיו שאמר לא-להים, אין צריך לפרש אחרים, שכל למד ובית המשמשות בראש התיבה אם נקודה בחטף, כגון למלך, למדבר, לעיר, צריך לפרש לאיזה מלך, לאיזה מדבר, לאיזה עיר, וכן למלכים, לרגלים צריך לפרש לאיזה, ואם אינו מפרש, כל מלכים במשמע, וכן לא-להים כל א-להים משמע, אפילו קדש, אבל כשהיא נוקדה פת"ח, כמו למלך, למדבר, לעיר נודע באיזה מלך, באיזו מדבר ובאיזה עיר מדבר, וכן לא-להים, לאותן שהוזהרתם עליהם במקום אחר, כיוצא בו (תהלים פו ח) אין כמוך בא-להים, לפי שלא פירש הוצרך לנקד פתח:
shall be destroyed: Shall be put to death. Now why does it say “shall be destroyed” ? Is the death penalty not mentioned elsewhere: “And you shall take that man or that woman [and you shall stone them… so that they will die], etc.” (Deut. 17:5) ? Since [there the Torah] did not specify for which type of worship he is liable to death, so that you do not say that for all types of worship one is liable to death, [the Torah] came and specified to you here: “He who slaughters [a sacrifice] to the gods shall be destroyed,” to inform you that just as slaughtering is a type of worship performed inside [the Temple] to Heaven, I also include one who burns [incense or parts of an animal] or performs libations, which are types of worship performed inside [the Temple], and [people] are liable for performing them for idolatry whether or not it is customary to worship that particular deity in that manner. However, [for] other types of worship-for example, if one sweeps, sprinkles water on the sand floor before it [the idol], embraces it or kisses it-he is not liable to death, but he is warned against it [i.e., he is liable to receive lashes]. -[From Mechilta, Sanh. 60b] יחרם: יומת. ולמה נאמר יחרם, והלא כבר נאמר בו מיתה במקום אחר (דברים יז ה) והוצאת את האיש ההוא או את האשה ההיא וגו', אלא לפי שלא פירש על איזו עבודה חייב מיתה, שלא תאמר כל עבודות במיתה, בא ופירש לך כאן זובח לא-להים יחרם, לומר לך, מה זביחה עבודה הנעשית בפנים לשמים, אף אני מרבה המקטיר והמנסך והמשתחוה, שהן עבודת בפנים וחייבים עליהם לכל עבודה זרה בין שדרכה לעבדה בכך, בין שאין דרכה לעבדה בכך, אבל שאר עבודות, כגון מכבד והמרבץ והמגפף והמנשק, אינו במיתה, אלא באזהרה:
20And you shall not mistreat a stranger, nor shall you oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. כוְגֵ֥ר לֹֽא־תוֹנֶ֖ה וְלֹ֣א תִלְחָצֶ֑נּוּ כִּֽי־גֵרִ֥ים הֱיִיתֶ֖ם בְּאֶ֥רֶץ מִצְרָֽיִם:
And you shall not mistreat: By taunting with words, contralier in Old French, [meaning] to vex, like “And those who taunt you (מוֹנַיִ), I will feed their flesh” (Isa. 49:26). -[From Mechilta, Jonathan] וגר לא תונה: אונאת דברים, קונטרליי"ר בלעז [לקנטר], כמו (ישעיה מט כו) והאכלתי את מוניך את בשרם:
nor shall you oppress him: by robbing [him of his] money. -[From Mechilta, Jonathan] ולא תלחצנו: בגזילת ממון:
for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: If you taunt him, he can also taunt you and say to you, “You too emanate from strangers.” Do not reproach your neighbor with a fault that is also yours (Mechilta, B.M. 59b). Every expression of a stranger (גֵּר) means a person who was not born in that country but has come from another country to sojourn there. כי גרים הייתם: אם הוניתו, אף הוא יכול להונותך ולומר לך אף אתה מגרים באת, מום שבך אל תאמר לחברך. כל לשון גר, אדם שלא נולד באותה מדינה, אלא בא ממדינה אחרת לגור שם:
21You shall not oppress any widow or orphan. כאכָּל־אַלְמָנָ֥ה וְיָת֖וֹם לֹ֥א תְעַנּֽוּן:
You shall not oppress any widow or orphan: The same applies to all people, but the Scripture speaks of the usual situation, since they [widows and orphans] are weak and [they] are frequently oppressed. -[From Mechilta] כל אלמנה ויתום לא תענון: הוא הדין לכל אדם, אלא שדבר הכתוב בהווה, לפי שהם תשושי כח ודבר מצוי לענותם:
22If you oppress him, [beware,] for if he cries out to Me, I will surely hear his cry. כבאִם־עַנֵּ֥ה תְעַנּה אֹת֑וֹ כִּ֣י אִם־צָעֹ֤ק יִצְעַק֙ אֵלַ֔י שָׁמֹ֥עַ אֶשְׁמַ֖ע צַֽעֲקָתֽוֹ:
If you oppress him: This is an elliptical verse. It threatens [punishment], but does not delineate his punishment. [This is] similar to “Therefore, whoever kills Cain…!” (Gen. 4:15). It threatens, but does not delineate his punishment. Here too, “If you oppress him” is an expression of a threat: If you oppress him [the orphan], you will ultimately receive what is coming to you. Why? “For if he cries out to Me, etc.” אם ענה תענה אתו: הרי זה מקרא קצר, גזם ולא פירש עונשו, כמו (בראשית ד טו) לכן כל הורג קין גזם ולא פירש עונשו אף כאן אם ענה תענה אותו, לשון גזום, כלומר סופך ליטול את שלך, למה, כי צעק יצעק אלי וגו':
23My wrath will be kindled, and I will slay you with the sword, and your wives will be widows and your children orphans. כגוְחָרָ֣ה אַפִּ֔י וְהָֽרַגְתִּ֥י אֶתְכֶ֖ם בֶּחָ֑רֶב וְהָי֤וּ נְשֵׁיכֶם֙ אַלְמָנ֔וֹת וּבְנֵיכֶ֖ם יְתֹמִֽים:
and your wives will be widows: From the implication of what is said-“and I will slay you” -do I not know that your wives will be widows and your children orphans? Rather, this is another curse, namely that the wives will be bound in living widowhood -there will be no witnesses to their husbands’ deaths, and [thus] they will be forbidden to remarry. The children will be orphans because the court will not allow them to have their fathers’ property, since they do not know whether they died or were captured. -[From Mechilta, B.M. 38b] והיו נשיכם אלמנות: ממשמע שנאמר והרגתי אתכם, איני יודע שנשיכם אלמנות ובניכם יתומים, אלא הרי זו קללה אחרת, שיהיו הנשים צרורות כאלמנות חיות, שלא יהיו עדים למיתת בעליהן ותהיינה אסורות להנשא והבנים יהיו יתומים, שלא יניחום בית דין לירד לנכסי אביהם לפי שאין יודעים אם מתו אם נשבו:
24When you lend money to My people, to the poor person [who is] with you, you shall not behave toward him as a lender; you shall not impose interest upon him. כדאִם־כֶּ֣סֶף | תַּלְוֶ֣ה אֶת־עַמִּ֗י אֶת־הֶֽעָנִי֙ עִמָּ֔ךְ לֹא־תִֽהְיֶ֥ה ל֖וֹ כְּנשֶׁ֑ה לֹֽא־תְשִׂימ֥וּן עָלָ֖יו נֶֽשֶׁךְ:
When you lend money to My people: Rabbi Ishmael says: Every אִם in the Torah is optional except three, and this is one of them. -[From Mechilta] אִם usually means “if,” which refers to something optional, denoting an incident that may or may not occur. Rashi on Exod. 20:22explains that in this case, lending money to the needy is obligatory, as inDeut. 15:8. Therefore, in this verse, אִם means “when.”] אם כסף תלוה את עמי: רבי ישמעאל אומר כל אם ואם שבתורה רשות, חוץ משלושה וזה אחד מהן:
to My people: [If a member of] My people [i.e., an Israelite,] and a gentile [apply for a loan], [the member of] My people takes preference; [if] a poor person and a rich person [apply for a loan], the poor person takes preference; [if] the poor of your city and the poor of another city [apply for a loan], the poor of your city take preference (Mechilta, B.M. 71a), and this is its meaning: “When you lend money,” lend it to “My people” and not to a gentile, and to which of My people? “To the poor person.” And to which poor person? To the one who is “with you.” [I.e., if you have enough money to lend to only one person, lend it to a Jew rather than to a non-Jew. Even if the gentile will pay interest, and you are not allowed to take interest from the Jew, you must lend the money to the Jew (B.M. 71a).] Another meaning: to My people: That you shall not behave toward him [the borrower] in a demeaning manner when you lend to him, for he is [a member of] My people. -[From Tanchuma 15] את עמי: עמי וגוי, עמי קודם. עני ועשיר, עני קודם. עניי עירך ועניי עיר אחרת, עניי עירך קודמין. וזה משמעו אם כסף תלוה, את עמי תלוהו, ולא לגוי ולאיזה מעמי, את העני, ולאיזה עני לאותו שעמך. דבר אחר את העני, שלא תנהג בו מנהג בזיון בהלוואה, שהוא עמי:
to the poor person [who is] with you: Look at yourself as if you were a poor person.) -[From Tanchuma 15] את העני עמך: הוי מסתכל בעצמך כאלו אתה העני:
you shall not behave toward him as a lender: You shall not demand it of him forcibly (Tanchuma 9, Exod. Rabbah 31:6). If you know that he does not have [the money to repay you], do not appear to him as if you have lent to him, but as if you have not lent to him; i.e., do not embarrass him. -[From B.M. 75b] לא תהיה לו כנשה: לא תתבענו בחזקה, אם אתה יודע שאין לו, אל תהי דומה עליו כאלו הלויתו, אלא כאילו לא הלויתו, כלומר לא תכלימהו:
interest: Heb. נֶשֶׁ, lit., biting. Interest, which is like the biting of a snake, which bites by making a small wound in a person’s foot, and he [the person] does not feel [the wound], and suddenly, it spreads and swells up as far as his crown. So it is with interest. He does not feel it, and it is not noticeable until the interest accumulates and it costs him a considerable sum of money. -[From Tanchuma 9, Exod. Rabbah 31:6] נשך: רבית שהוא כנשיכת נחש, שנושך חבורה קטנה ברגלו ואינו מרגיש, ופתאום הוא מבצבץ ונופח עד קדקדו, כך רבית, אינו מרגיש ואינו ניכר עד שהרבית עולה ומחסרו ממון הרבה:
25If you take your neighbor's garment as security, until sunset you shall return it to him, כהאִם־חָבֹ֥ל תַּחְבֹּ֖ל שַׂלְמַ֣ת רֵעֶ֑ךָ עַד־בֹּ֥א הַשֶּׁ֖מֶשׁ תְּשִׁיבֶ֥נּוּ לֽוֹ:
If you take… as security: Heb. חָבֹל ךְתַּחְבֹּל. No expression of חִבָלָה means security given at the time of the loan, but [that which] is exacted from the debtor when the debt becomes due and he [the debtor] does not pay (B.M. 114). (חָבֹל ךְתַּחְבֹּל the Torah repeats the taking of the security [implying that one may take security] even many times. The Holy One, blessed is He, said: “How much you owe Me! Yet your soul ascends to Me every night, gives an account, is found guilty before Me, and I return it to you. You too, take and return, take and return.” ) -(Tanchuma 16.) אם חבל תחבל: כל לשון חבלה אינו משכון בשעת הלואה, אלא שממשכנין את הלוה, כשמגיע הזמן ואינו פורע. חבול תחבול כפל לך בחבלה, עד כמה פעמים, אמר הקב"ה כמה אתה חייב לי, והרי נפשך עולה אצלי כל אמש ואמש ונותנת דין וחשבון ומתחייבת לפני, ואני מחזירה לך, אף אתה טול והשב טול והשב:
until sunset you shall return it to him: [For] the entire day you shall return it to him until the sun sets, and when the sun sets you may again take it until the next morning arrives. This verse speaks of a garment worn by day, which he does not need at night. -[From Mechilta, B.M. 114b] עד בא השמש תשיבנו לו: כל היום תשיבנו לו עד בא השמש, וכבוא השמש תחזור ותטלנו, עד שיבא בקר של מחר, ובכסות יום הכתוב מדבר, שאין צריך לה בלילה:
26for it is his only covering; it is his garment for his skin. With what shall he lie? And it shall be [that] if he cries out to Me, I will hear because I am gracious. כוכִּ֣י הִ֤וא כְסוּת֙וֹ (כתיב כסותה) לְבַדָּ֔הּ הִ֥וא שִׂמְלָת֖וֹ לְעֹר֑וֹ בַּמֶּ֣ה יִשְׁכָּ֔ב וְהָיָה֙ כִּֽי־יִצְעַ֣ק אֵלַ֔י וְשָֽׁמַעְתִּ֖י כִּֽי־חַנּ֥וּן אָֽנִי:
for it is his only covering: This is a cloak. -[From Mechilta] כי הוא כסותה: זו טלית:
his garment: This is a shirt. -[From Mechilta] שמלתו: זו חלוק:
With what shall he lie?: [This comes] to include a spread. -[From Mechilta] במה ישכב: לרבות את המצע:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 108 - 112
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 108
• English text• Chapter 108
1. A song, a psalm by David.
2. My heart is steadfast, O God; I will sing and chant praises even with my soul.
3. Awake, O lyre and harp; I shall awaken the dawn.
4. I will thank You among the nations, Lord; I will sing praises to You among the peoples.
5. Indeed, Your kindness reaches above the heavens; Your truth reaches to the skies.
6. Be exalted upon the heavens, O God, [show] Your glory upon all the earth.
7. That Your beloved ones may be delivered, help with Your right hand and answer me.
8. God spoke in His holiness that I would exult, I would divide portions [of the enemies' land], I would measure the Valley of Succot.
9. Mine is Gilead, mine is Manasseh, and Ephraim is the stronghold of my head, Judah is my prince.
10. Moab is my washbasin, I will cast my shoe upon Edom, I will shout over Philistia.
11. Who brings me to the fortified city? Who led me unto Edom?
12. Is it not God, Who has [until now] forsaken us, and did not go forth, O God, with our armies?
13. Give us help against the adversary; futile is the help of man.
14. Through God we will do valiantly, and He will trample our oppressors.
Chapter 109
David composed this psalm while fleeing from Saul. At that time he faced many enemies who, despite acting friendly in his presence, spoke only evil of him; he therefore curses them bitterly.
1. For the Conductor, by David, a psalm. O God of my praise, be not silent.
2. For the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful have opened against me; they spoke to me with a false tongue.
3. They have surrounded me with words of hate, and attacked me without cause.
4. In return for my love they hate me; still, I am [a man of] prayer.
5. They placed harm upon me in return for my favor, and hatred in return for my love.
6. Appoint a wicked man over him; let an adversary stand at his right.
7. When he is judged may he go out condemned; may his prayer be considered a sin.
8. May his days be few; may another take his position.
9. May his children be orphans and his wife a widow.
10. May his children wander about and beg; may they seek charity from amid their ruins.
11. May the creditor seize all that he has, and may strangers plunder [the fruits of] his labor.
12. May he have none who extends him kindness, and may none be gracious to his orphans.
13. May his posterity be cut off; may their name be erased in a later generation.
14. May the iniquity of his fathers be remembered by the Lord, and the sin of his mother not be erased.
15. May they be before the Lord always, and may He cut off their memory from the earth.
16. Because he did not remember to do kindness, and he pursued the poor and destitute man and the broken-hearted, to kill [him].
17. He loved the curse and it has come upon him; he did not desire blessing, and it has remained far from him.
18. He donned the curse like his garment, and it came like water into his innards, like oil into his bones.
19. May it be to him like a cloak in which he wraps himself, as a belt with which he girds himself always.
20. This is from the Lord for the deeds of my enemies, and [for] those who speak evil against my soul.
21. And You, God, my Lord, do [kindness] with me for the sake of Your Name; for Your kindness is good, rescue me!
22. For I am poor and destitute, and my heart has died within me.
23. Like the fleeting shadow I am banished, I am tossed about like the locust.
24. My knees totter from fasting, and my flesh is lean without fat.
25. And I became a disgrace to them; they see me and shake their heads.
26. Help me, Lord, my God, deliver me according to Your kindness.
27. Let them know that this is Your hand, that You, Lord, have done it.
28. Let them curse, but You will bless; they arose, but they will be shamed, and Your servant will rejoice.
29. May my adversaries be clothed in humiliation; may they wrap themselves in their shame as in a cloak.
30. I will thank the Lord profusely with my mouth, and amid the multitude I will praise Him,
31. when He stands at the right of the destitute one to deliver him from the condemners of his soul.
Chapter 110
This psalm records the response of Eliezer, servant of Abraham (to those who asked how Abraham managed to defeat the four kings). He tells of Abraham killing the mighty kings and their armies. Read, and you will discover that the entire psalm refers to Abraham, who merited prominence for recognizing God in his youth.
1. By David, a psalm. The Lord said to my master, "Sit at My right, until I make your enemies a stool for your feet.”
2. The staff of your strength the Lord will send from Zion, to rule amid your enemies.
3. Your people [will come] willingly on the day of your campaign; because of your splendid sanctity from when you emerged from the womb, you still possess the dew of your youth.
4. The Lord has sworn and will not regret: "You shall be a priest forever, just as Melchizedek!”
5. My Lord is at your right; He has crushed kings on the day of His fury.
6. He will render judgement upon the nations, and they will be filled with corpses; He will crush heads over a vast land.
7. He will drink from the stream on the way, and so will hold his head high.
Chapter 111
This psalm is written in alphabetical sequence, each verse containing two letters, save the last two verses which contain three letters each. The psalm is short yet prominent, speaking of the works of God and their greatness.
1. Praise the Lord! I will give thanks to the Lord with all my heart, in the counsel of the upright and the congregation.
2. Great are the works of the Lord, [yet] available to all who desire them.
3. Majesty and splendor are His work, and His righteousness endures forever.
4. He established a memorial for His wonders, for the Lord is gracious and compassionate.
5. He gave food to those who fear Him; He remembered His covenant always.
6. He has declared the power of His deeds to His people, to give them the inheritance of nations.
7. The works of His hands are true and just; all His mandates are faithful.
8. They are steadfast for ever and ever, for they are made with truth and uprightness.
9. He sent redemption to His people, [by] commanding His covenant forever; holy and awesome is His Name.
10. The beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; sound wisdom for all who practice it-His praise endures forever.
Chapter 112
This psalm, too, follows alphabetical sequence, each verse containing two letters, save the last two which contain three letters each. It speaks of the good traits man should choose, and of how to give charity-the reward for which is never having to rely on others.
1. Praise the Lord! Fortunate is the man who fears the Lord, and desires His commandments intensely.
2. His descendants will be mighty on the earth; he will be blessed with an upright generation.
3. Wealth and riches are in his house, and his righteousness endures forever.
4. Even in darkness light shines for the upright, for [He is] Compassionate, Merciful, and Just.
5. Good is the man who is compassionate and lends, [but] provides for his own needs with discretion.
6. For he will never falter; the righteous man will be an eternal remembrance.
7. He will not be afraid of a bad tiding; his heart is steadfast, secure in the Lord.
8. His heart is steadfast, he does not fear, until he sees his oppressors [destroyed].
9. He has distributed [his wealth], giving to the needy. His righteousness will endure forever; his might will be uplifted in honor.
10. The wicked man will see and be angry; he will gnash his teeth and melt away; the wish of the wicked will be ruined.
---------------------
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 23
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 23
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson
Tuesday, Shevat 23, 5776 · February 2, 2016
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 23
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson
Tuesday, Shevat 23, 5776 · February 2, 2016
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 23
ומזה יוכל המשכיל להמשיך עליו יראה גדולה בעסקו בתורה
|
From this explanation of the lofty stature of Torah study the wise man will be able to draw upon himself a sense of great awe as he engages in the study of the Torah, 1
כשיתבונן איך שנפשו ולבושיה שבמוחו ובפיו הם מיוחדים ממש בתכלית היחוד ברצון העליון ואור אין סוף ברוך הוא ממש המתגלה בהם
when he considers how his soul and its “garments” of thought and speech that are found in his brain and mouth are truly fused in perfect unity with the Divine Will and the infinite light of Ein Sof that is manifest in them i.e., in the soul and its garments when he studies Torah.
מה שכל העולמות עליונים ותחתונים כלא חשיבי קמיה וכאין ואפס ממש, עד שאינו מתלבש בתוכם ממש, אלא סובב כל עלמין בבחינת מקיף להחיותם עיקר חיותם, רק איזו הארה מתלבשת בתוכם מה שיכולים לסבול שלא יתבטלו במציאות לגמרי
This infinite light manifest in one’s Torah study is of such a lofty level that all the upper and lower worlds are truly as naught in comparison with it; are in fact as absolutely nothing at all, so much so that they can only bear to have a minute glow of it clothed in them without their reverting to nothingness altogether. Their main life-force which they receive from it, however, is not clothed within them, but animates them from the outside, so to speak, in a transcendent, encompassing manner.
When he considers that the very same Divine light that is completely beyond the capacity of all the worlds manifests itself openly in his Torah study, the thinking man will naturally experience a sense of awe when he studies Torah.
וזהו שכתוב: ויצונו ה’ את כל החוקים האלה ליראה את ה‘ וגו’
This is the meaning of the verse, 2 “And G‑d commanded us [to fulfill] all these statutes, in order to fear G‑d.”
According to this verse, observing the mitzvot would appear to be the first step, and this leads to the fear of G‑d. Logically, however, the performance of G‑d’s commandments would seem to be a result of one’s fear of Him, and not vice versa. The Alter Rebbe therefore explains that the above verse speaks of a higher level of awe than that which is a prerequisite for performing the commandments. This level can only be attained as a result of one’s observance of the commandments.
Now if the commandments lead one to a higher level in the fear of G‑d, surely the study of the Torah leads one to a still higher level. This the Alter Rebbe now discusses.
ועל יראה גדולה זו אמרו: אם אין חכמה אין יראה, והתורה נקראת אצלה תרעא לדרתא, כמו שכתוב במקום אחר
(Regarding this great fear our Sages said, 3 “If there is no wisdom there is no fear.” In this context, “wisdom” represents Torah study, and “fear” — the higher level of the awe of G‑d which can be reached only by way of the Torah. By contrast, the statement, “If there is no fear, there is no wisdom,” refers to the lower level of fear which is a prerequisite for Torah study, as stated above. In relation to this level of fear, the Torah is called4 “a gateway to the dwelling,” i.e., the sole means of entering the dwelling, viz., the higher level of fear, as is explained elsewhere.)
אלא דלאו כל מוחא סביל דא יראה כזו. אך גם מאן דלא סביל מוחו כלל יראה זו, לא מינה ולא מקצתה, מפני פחיתות ערך נפשו בשרשה ומקורה במדרגות תחתונות דעשר ספירות דעשיה, אין יראה זו מעכבת בו למעשה, כמו שכתוב לקמן
Not every mind, however, can sustain such a fear. Yet even he whose mind cannot bear such a fear, nor even a minute part of it, because the root and source of his soul derives from an inferior level — the lower gradations of the Ten Sefirot of the World of Asiyah, — even he should not be deterred from the actual performance of the Torah and the mitzvot for want of this fear, as will be explained further. 5
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The point of the following discussion of the awe of G-d that Torah study engenders in the student, and its relevance here, are explained by the Rebbe as follows: The Alter Rebbe has pointed out that the level of union with G-d's Will found in the study of the Torah is greater than the union attained through other mitzvot. He now goes on to say that as a result of this superior quality, the study of the Torah is superior in yet another respect, viz., it creates in the student a greater awe of G-d than that which the mitzvot create in those who perform them. In fact, this latter quality is more important than the former. Since the goal of all the mitzvot (and their attendant union with G-d's Will) is to lead us to fear Him (as the Alter Rebbe will quote shortly), the superiority of Torah over mitzvot in the attainment of this goal is more important than its intrinsic superiority - in union with G-d's Will. The relevance of this subject here lies in the fact that the entire discussion of the qualities of Torah and mitzvot is intended to show how "it is very near to you .... in your mouth and heart ......" (see our introduction to chapter 18). Clearly, the greater one's awe of G-d, the more is it "very near to you." |
| 2. | Cf. Devarim 6:24. |
| 3. | Avot 3:17. |
| 4. | Shabbat 31b; Yoma 72b. |
| 5. | Ch. 41. |
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Tuesday, Shevat 23, 5776 · February 2, 2016
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Tuesday, Shevat 23, 5776 · February 2, 2016
• Daily Mitzvah P212
• Positive Commandment 212 (Digest)
Reproduction
"Be fruitful and multiply"—Genesis 1:28.
We are commanded to reproduce in order to perpetuate the human species. For this reason, a groom on the night of his wedding is exempt from the biblical obligation to recite the Shema, for his mind is presumably preoccupied with the impending mitzvah that he will perform.
This mitzvah is only mandatory for males.
The 212th mitzvah is that we are commanded to be fruitful and to multiply, and to have the intention of perpetuating the species. This is known as the mitzvah of pirya v'rivya (be fruitful and multiply).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "Be fruitful and multiply."
Our Sages2 have explained that a groom who has wed a virgin is exempt from the mitzvah of reciting the Shema3 [before consummating the marriage]; and have given the reason that he is "occupied with a mitzvah."4
The details of this mitzvah and its oblibations are found in the sixth chapter of Yevamos.5
Women are exempt from this mitzvah, as our Sages said explicitly,6 "Men have the obligation to be fruitful and multiply, not women."7
Rabbi Berel Bell is a well-known educator, author and lecturer. He and his family reside in Montreal, Canada.
From "Sefer Hamitzvot in English," published by Sichos in English.
FOOTNOTES
1.Gen. 1:28. 9:7. See Heller, note 6. Kapach 5731, note 6.
2.. Berachos 16a.
3.See P10.
4.From this expression, we see that this is a mitzvah, and therefore is included in the count of 613.
5.61b.
6.Yevamos 65b.
7.Although women are not obligated in this mitzvah, when they bear children, they nevertheless receive the special reward associated with this special mitzvah just as the man. See Ran, Kiddushin, Ch. 2.; Likkutei Sichos, 8:214. 14:41-42.
--------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Maaser Sheini Maaser Sheini - Chapter 11 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 11
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 11
Halacha 1
Halacha 2
This declaration is made only after the year in which the tithe for the poor is separated,5 as [Deuteronomy 26:12-13] states: "When you complete tithing, and you shall declare before God your Lord: 'I have removed all the sacred substances from the house...'"
Halacha 3
When is this declaration made? On the afternoon of the last festival6 of the Pesach holiday7 of the fourth and seventh year, as [the prooftext] states: "When you complete tithing...," i.e., on the festival when all the tithes are completed. Pesach of the fourth year will not arrive before all of the produce - both those that grow from the earth and those that grow from trees - have been tithed.
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
[The proper way of performing] the mitzvah is to recite the declaration in the Temple, as [implied by] the phrase: "before God." [Nevertheless,] if he made the declaration in any other place, he fulfilled his obligation.
Halacha 7
A person may not make this declaration until he has disposed of all the agricultural presents in his possession.15 For in the declaration he states: "I have removed all the sacred substances from the house."16 On the day before the final day of the Pesach festival,17 one must remove [the lasts of the presents] and on the following day, the declaration is made.
Halacha 8
What must one done? If he has terumah or terumat ma'aser in his possession, he should give them to a priest. The first tithe should be given to a Levite and tithe of the poor to the poor. If produce that was definitely from the second tithe or neta reva'i18 or money from their redemption remained in his possession, he must destroy it and cast it in the sea or burn it.19 If the second tithe of demai remains in his possession, he is not obligated to destroy it.20 If the first fruits remain in his possession, they may be destroyed in any place.
Halacha 9
When does the obligation to burn and remove apply? When there remains in his possession [fresh] produce that one cannot consume before the commencement of the holiday. If, however, cooked food from the second tithe or neta reva'i remain, it need not be removed, for cooked food is considered as if it was removed.21 Similarly, wine and spices are considered as if they were removed.22
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
When produce belonging to a person was distant from him [when] the time for its removal arrived,25 he should designate the presents [appropriately]26 and transfer them to their owners by giving them together with land.27Alternatively, [he may give them to] someone who will acquire them for their owners. He may then recite the declaration the following day.
[The rationale is] that transferring movable property to a person together with landed property is a present that has been strengthened. He may not, however, transfer [the produce from] the tithes to them via an exchange,28because it resembles a sale and [the Torah] speaks of giving, not selling, the tithes, terumah, and the other presents.29
Halacha 12
What source teaches that he cannot recite the declaration until he removes all the presents [from his possession]? [It is written:] "I have removed all the sacred substances from the house." "The sacred substances" refers to the second tithe and neta reva'i which are called "sanctified."30 "From the house" refers to challah, for it is a present given to the priests in one's home.31 [The prooftext continues:] "I gave it to the Levite" - this refers to the first tithe. "And I also gave it" - this implies that it was preceded by another present, i.e., the great terumah and terumat ma'aser. "To the stranger, the orphan, and the widow" - this refers to the tithe given to the poor, leket, shichachah, and pe'ah. [The latter three are mentioned] even though [the failure to give them] does not prevent recitation of the declaration.32
Halacha 13
The presents must be separated according to the desired order33 and afterwards, the declaration is made, as [implied by the continuation of the verse:] "according to all Your mitzvot which You commanded me." Thus if he gives the second tithe before the first tithe, he cannot recite this declaration.34
If a person's tevel is burnt, he cannot make this declaration, for he did not separate the presents or give them to the people designated. In the era when the first tithe was given to the priests,35 the declaration was not made, [because it contains the words:] "I gave it to the Levite."
Halacha 14
When a person possesses only the second tithe, he should make the declaration, for the fundamental dimension of the declaration concerns the [second] tithe.36 Similarly, if he possesses only the first fruits, he should make the declaration, for [the prooftext] states: "I removed the holy substances" and the first type of produce that is holy is the first fruits.37 When, however, a person only possesses terumah, he does not recite the declaration,38because terumah [in and of itself] does not require a declaration except as part of all the presents [together].
Halacha 15
[The prooftext continues:] "I did not violate your commandments,"39 i.e., he did not separate from one species for another, nor from produce that has been reaped for produce that is still attached to the ground, nor from produce that is attached, nor from produce from the present year for that of the previous year, nor from produce of the previous year for that of the present year.40
[The prooftext continues:] "I did not forget," I did not forget to bless Him and recall His name with regard to them.41 "I did not partake of it in a state of acute mourning";42thus if he partakes of it in a state of acute mourning, he does not recite the declaration. "I did not partake of it in a state of impurity," thus if he separates it in a state of acute mourning, he does not recite the declaration. "I did not give of it to a corpse." This implies that he did not use [money from the redemption of the tithes] for a coffin or shrouds, nor did he give it to other people in a state of mourning. "I heeded the voice of God my Lord," i.e., I brought it to the Temple.43 "I performed everything that You commanded me," I rejoiced. And I shared that rejoicing with others with it, as [Deuteronomy 26:11]: "And you share rejoice in all the good."
Halacha 16
[The passage continues:] "Look down from Your holy habitation heaven... as You swore to our ancestors, a land flowing with milk and honey." This is a prayer that the fruits be flavorful.
Halacha 17
Israelites and mamzerim44 may make this declaration, but not converts and freed slaves, because they do not have an ancestral portion in Eretz Yisrael45and in the declaration one says: "And the land that You gave us." Priests and Levites may make the declaration. Although they did not receive a portion in the division of the land, they were granted cities in which to dwell.46
Blessed be God who grants assistance.
FOOTNOTES
1.
In other contexts, the term used by the Rambam here (and by the previous Rabbinic sources) usually means "confession." Among the reasons why this term is used is because the fact that theterumah and the tithes are given to the priests and Levites is a result of the Jews' sin. Had that not occurred, these agricultural separations would have been given to the firstborn.
2.
I.e., in the Temple.
3.
See Halachah 12.
4.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 131) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 607) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
5.
The third and the sixth years of the seven year cycle.
6.
Rashi and others, by contrast, maintain that this declaration should be made on the first day of the Pesach holiday. The Rambam's opinion is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aser Sheni 5:10) which states that the Jews were given the opportunity to partake of the second tithe throughout the Pesach holiday so that they would have ample resources with which to celebrate and partake of this food. For that same reason, the declaration is delayed until the afternoon.
7.
For on Sukkot, there are still many fruits from the sixth year in the field (Radbaz; Siftei Cohen 331:159).
8.
A declaration made at night is unacceptable.
9.
From sunrise to sunset. The above statement that it is made in the afternoon was a leniency intended to provide a person with latitude.
10.
For, as stated in Hilchot Terumah 1:1, the laws of terumah and the other agricultural requirements apply even if the Temple is not standing.
11.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the mitzvah to make a declaration applies only in the Temple. The Radbaz supports the Rambam's ruling, explaining that it is based on the Halachah 6. Since, after the fact, one fulfills his obligation if he makes the declaration outside the Temple, when there is no Temple, there is no choice but to accept that alternative.
12.
It must, however, be an exact translation. Note the contrast to the declaration made when bringing the first fruits (Hilchot Bikkurim 3:10).
13.
I.e., this is the desirable manner of performing the mitzvah (Siftei Cohen331:161).
14.
Not the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 607) which states that the Rambam is speaking about a situation where one person speaks out loud and the others fulfill their obligation by listening.
15.
The Minchat Chinuch and others question why the removal of the presents from one's property is not considered as an independent mitzvah.
16.
And if he still possessed these presents, he would be lying. See the following halachot.
17.
The standard published text of Ma'aser Sheni 5:6 states "The day before the first holiday of the Pesach festival." The Rambam apparently had a different version of that mishnah. The Kessef Mishnehjustifies the Rambam's version, explaining that on the passage from the Jerusalem Talmud cited above which explains that the declaration was delayed so that the people would be able to partake of the presents during the festival indicates that they would not have to remove the presents from their possession until the festival's conclusion.
18.
This halachah is based on Ma'aser Sheni5:6. That mishnah does not mention neta reva'i. Nevertheless, the Rambam adds it because all the laws that apply to the second tithe apply to it (Kessef Mishneh).
19.
Thus there are two types of biur, removal of agricultural presents: giving presents to those to whom they are supposed to be given and destroying, those which one keeps for oneself (ibid.).
20.
Since the obligation to separate it was imposed only because of a doubt, we rule leniently.
21.
For if it is left for any significant amount of time, it will spoil [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 5:6)].
22.
For they also will spoil if left for any significant amount of time.
23.
One third of its growth, as stated in Hilchot Ma'aserot 2:5.
24.
Since the produce has not reached this stage of development, there is no obligation to tithe it. Hence, it need not be removed or included in the declaration.
25.
Ma'aser Sheni 5:9 relates that once when the time to remove produce arrived, Rabban Gamliel was on a sea journey and could not physically give the produce to anyone else. He therefore transferred the presents to other sages in the manner described here. Since Rabbi Elazar ben Arach was a priest, he gave him terumah, Rabbi Yehoshua was a Levite and so he gave him the tithes, and since Rabbi Akiva was a collector of gifts for the poor, he gave him the tithes for the poor.
26.
And specify in which portion of the grainheap they are located.
27.
See Hilchot Mechirah, ch. 6, which describes how this transfer of property operates. This means of transfer is used, because this is the only way the ownership produce can be given to these individuals without an actual physical transfer.
28.
The term "exchange" is translated the Hebrew kinyan chilipin, a legal act that formalizes a transaction. See Hilchot Mechirah, ch. 5, for a description. Although this legal act is frequently employed, it is not appropriate in this instance, because the gift would resemble a sale and not a present.
29.
As stated in Deuteronomy 26:13.
30.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
31.
I.e., it is not given until the grain is made into dough [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 5:10)].
32.
The commentaries have pointed out a difference between leket, shichachah, andpe'ah and the other presents. For the Torah does not prescribe giving the latter three to the poor, but rather leaving them for them.
33.
See Hilchot Terumah 3:23 with regard to the desired order of the presents.
34.
For he cannot say: "As You commanded me," since by deviating from the desired order, he did not fulfill the mitzvot "as commanded." Indeed, he committed a transgression.
35.
When Ezra led the Jews back to Eretz Yisrael after the Babylonian exile, by and large, the Levites did not accompany him. Therefore, he punished them, decreeing that the tithes should be given to the priests instead (Hilchot Ma'aser 1:4). From the Rambam's statements here and also in that source, some have inferred that Ezra's decree applied only in his generation and not in later eras. This conclusion is not, however, borne out by his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid. 5:15)].
36.
Of them all, it is the only one that must be destroyed as stated in Halachah 8.
37.
And it must also be removed from one's possession.
38.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the same rule applies to the first tithe. For neither of them must be removed from one's possession at a given time.
39.
Although the Rambam explains the details of this declaration, the intent is not that one should explain it while reciting it. Instead, he should merely read the passage as it is stated in the Torah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni5:13)].
40.
See Hilchot Terumah 5:18; 5:9, 5:11, andHilchot Ma'aser 1:12 which explains that separating the presents in such a manner is forbidden.
41.
Some interpret this as referring to the recitation of a blessing when making the separations. The commentaries question these interpretations, however, because the blessings were instituted by the Rabbis and here we are speaking of the exegesis of a Biblical verse. Others maintain that it refers to reciting grace after partaking of the grain, for that is a Scriptural command.
42.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 5ff.
43.
This refers to the first fruits. The second tithe need not be brought to the Temple.
44.
A child born out of an adulterous or incestuous union. Even though they are forbidden to marry, they are considered heirs and are granted their ancestral heritage.
45.
Although they may purchase land in Eretz Yisrael, they were not granted an ancestral heritage when the land was divided among the tribes and thus there is no portion ofEretz Yisrael that is theirs in an ultimate sense. For during the Jubilee year, any purchased land will return to its owner. Note the contrast to the declaration concerning the first fruits which they are required to make (Hilchot Bikkurim 4:3).
46.
As related in Numbers, ch. 35, in addition to the six cities of refuge, the Levites were given 42 cities that were scattered throughout the entire land of Eretz Yisrael.
---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Twenty, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Twenty One, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Twenty Two • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download•
Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Twenty
Halacha 1
Our Sages decreed that a man give a certain portion of his holdings to his daughter as a dowry.1 This is referred to as parnasah. When [a man] marries off his daughter, he should provide her with at least the wardrobe that is given to the wife of a poor Jewish man, as we have explained.2
When does the above apply? When [the bride's] father is poor. If he is wealthy, he should provide for his daughter according to his standards.
Halacha 2
If a father explicitly tells the prospective husband that his daughter does not possess anything, and that [his intent is that] he marry her although she does not possess a wardrobe, [the bride] is not entitled to anything of her father's.
[In such a situation, the prospective] husband should not say: "When she comes to my home, I will provide her with a wardrobe." Instead, he should provide her with a wardrobe while she is living in her father's home.
Halacha 3
When a father dies and leaves [at least one son and] a daughter [she is provided with a dowry from his estate]. We estimate what the father would have desired to give the daughter as a dowry, and she is given [that sum].
How is it possible to arrive at such an estimate? [We survey the habits of] his friends and acquaintances, his business affairs and his standard of living. If he married off a daughter during his lifetime, we base our estimate [on what she was given]. If the court is unable to determine what he would have desired [to give his daughter], she is given a tenth of his estate as a dowry.3
Halacha 4
When a man leaves [a son and] many daughters, the first [daughter] who desires to marry4 is given a tenth of the estate. The second [daughter to marry] receives a tenth of what was left after providing the first [daughter with her dowry]. And the third daughter receives a tenth of what was left after providing the second [daughter].
If all [a man's] daughters come to marry at the same time, [money is set aside for them according to the above pattern,] even if there are ten daughters [or more]. Afterwards, [all the allotments are pooled], and then divided equally among the daughters. The remainder of the estate is given to the sons.
Halacha 5
The allotment of a tenth [of the estate] as a dowry is not one of the provisions of the ketubah. Therefore, even according to the enactment of the later Sages,5 it is only to be collected from landed property.6 It may, however, be collected from rent due for landed property.7 If, however, [a girl's] brothers desire to give her money in lieu of a tenth of the landed property, they have that right.
Halacha 6
With regard to this allotment of a tenth [of the estate], the daughter is considered to be a creditor of her brothers. Therefore, she is entitled to collect it from property of intermediate quality. An oath is not required of her.
If her brothers die, she is entitled to collect it from their sons, [expropriating] property of inferior quality, and an oath8 is required of her. For she is collecting property from heirs, and [it is an accepted principle that] a person who comes to collect property from heirs may collect only from that of inferior quality and is required to take an oath [before doing so], as will be explained in the laws of loans.9
Halacha 7
Halacha 8
When a man has [several daughters, but] no sons, [his estate] is divided equally [among his daughters at the time of his death]. Although he married off the older daughters during his lifetime [and provided them with dowries], we do not grant dowries to the younger daughters and then divide the estate.
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when a man] has died, leaving two daughters and a son. The older daughter received a tenth of the estate as a dowry, but before the younger daughter had collected her dowry, the son died [without leaving any heirs], and [the two sisters] inherited the entire estate. [In this situation,] the younger sister is not entitled to her tenth of the estate.12 Instead, the entire estate is divided equally, but the older sister is granted the tenth [she had received previously].13
Halacha 10
When a man gives an order at the time of his death: "Do not give my daughters a dowry from my estate," his words are heeded. [The rationale is that a dowry] is not one of the provisions of a ketubah.14
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply when] a man dies, leaving a widow and a daughter. It has already been explained15 that the support of a man's widow16 takes precedence over the support of his daughter. Similarly, if the daughter marries, she is not entitled to collect her tenth [of the estate], because of [the obligation to] support the widow.17
Even if the daughter dies after she marries, her husband is not entitled to inherit the dowry that should have been given her.18 For the entire estate is considered to be in the possession of the widow so that she can derive her sustenance.
Halacha 12
When an orphan girl is married off by her brothers or her mother as a child with her consent, and she is given 50 or 100 zuz as a dowry, she is entitled to collect the dowry that is due her - according to the estimation of her father's desires or one tenth of the landed property19 [of his estate] - from them after she attains the age of majority.
Halacha 13
When a daughter marries after she reaches majority - whether as a na'arah or as a bogeret - and does not demand her dowry, she forfeits her dowry. If, however, she protested at the time of her marriage, she may collect her due whenever she desires.
[A further point must be considered when] she reaches the age of bagrut and remains in her father's house - regardless of whether she reaches bagrut after his death, or [he died] when she had already reached the age of bagrut.22 If her brothers have already ceased providing her with her sustenance, which is their prerogative, as we have explained,23 and [the girl] remained silent and did not demand her dowry, she forfeits her dowry. If she protests, she does not forfeit her dowry.
If, however, her brothers had not ceased providing her with her sustenance [although] she reached bagrut, she is not considered to have forfeited her dowry as long as they continue to provide her with her sustenance, even though she did not protest. For she can claim that she did not demand her dowry because [her brothers] are supporting her although they are not obligated to do so,24 and she has not yet married.25
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when a man] stated - whether while making an oral will before death or while healthy - that his daughter should be given a specific sum of money as a dowry, and that this sum should be used to purchase landed property, and [then] died [afterwards].
When the money is in the possession of a third party and the daughter states: "Give the money to my husband and let him do with it as he desires," [the third party should do as follows]. If [the daughter] has reached the age of majority and has married, she is granted this prerogative.26If she is [past majority, but merely] consecrated, the third party should follow the instructions he was given.27 And if she is a minor, even if she is already married, her request is not heeded.28Instead, the third party should carry out her father's instructions.29
FOOTNOTES
1.
Ketubot 52b states that an allusion to this concept can be found in Jeremiah 29:6: "Give your daughters to men." "Is it possible for a father to initiate marriage proceedings?" our Sages ask. And they explain that the intent of the verse is that a man should provide his daughter with a dowry attractive enough for a man to desire her.
2.
I.e., 50 zuz, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 1.
3.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that one tenth is the average, but that if a man is known to be generous, his daughter may be given more than a tenth. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 113:1) mentions the opinion of certain authorities who maintain that a girl should never be given more than a tenth of the estate, but states that the common practice is not to follow this view.
4.
The dowry is given to the daughter only when she prepares to marry, not beforehand. Nevertheless, she is given a tenth of the value of the estate at the time of her father's death, regardless of its present value (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 113:4).
5.
I.e., even according to the Sages who ordained that the payment of the money due a woman by virtue of her ketubah may come from movable property (Chapter 16, Halachah 8), the payment of the dowry is from landed property alone. Note, however, the opinion of Tosafot (Ketubot 51a), who differ and maintain that this allotment may also be collected from movable property.
6.
Based on the wording of Halachah 12, theMaggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's opinion is that the movable property in the estate is not included in the calculation of the size of the estate on which the amount of the dowry is based. Rav Moshe HaCohen and Rabbenu Asher differ, emphasizing that although the dowry allotment is not collected from movable property, the movable property is included in this appraisal. Both authorities agree, however, that if an assessment is made of the amount that the father would have given his daughter, that assessment includes the movable property in the estate.
7.
This refers to rent due the father for landed property that was uncollected at the time of his death. The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if the heirs have already collected the rental fee, they are not obligated to give it to their sister.
8.
That she has not received any of the estate.
9.
Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1, 19:1.
10.
The rationale is that it is known that a girl is entitled to receive a dowry, and the purchasers of the property of the estate should have taken precautions before buying the property.
11.
Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 18:1.
12.
Ketubot 69a explains that the rationale for this ruling is that the daughter has received a far larger portion of the estate than she could have hoped for.
13.
The Rambam's opinion is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 113:8). The Ramah quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the second daughter is given her dowry and then the estate is divided.
14.
The provisions of the ketubah - e.g., the support of the daughters - become binding at the time of the marriage, and the man's statements have no effect regarding them (Chapter 19, Halachah 13). The dowry, by contrast, is a gift that we assume a man would make. Therefore if he explicitly states that he does not desire that it be made, his wishes are heeded.
15.
Chapter 19, Halachah 21.
16.
The Chelkat Mechokek 113:17 and the Beit Shmuel 113:16 state that the same ruling applies with regard to the daughters. I.e., if there are older daughters who wish to collect their dowry and marry, and younger daughters who still have to receive support from the estate, the younger daughters are entitled to object to the property's being given to their sisters. The rationale is that the support for the widow and for the daughters is considered to be a debt owed by the estate, while their dowry is considered to be a debt owed by the heirs.
17.
Once the widow has remarried or received payment for her ketubah, the daughter is entitled to inherit the tenth of the estate that should have been given to her. Even when she has already married, her brothers are required to give her these funds from the remainder of the estate.
18.
At times a woman's husband is considered to be a purchaser of the property he inherits from his wife, and at times an heir. If he were considered to be a purchaser, he would be entitled to take possession of the dowry due his wife, for a widow is not entitled to collect her support from property that has been sold. Nevertheless, in this instance, out of consideration for the widow, our Sages considered him like an heir, and thus enabled the widow to continue receiving her sustenance (Bava Batra 139b).
19.
The Maggid Mishneh cites this phrase as proof that the tenth of the estate set aside as a dowry is expropriated from landed property alone.
20.
See the following halachah.
21.
And thus the fact that she did not object at the time of the marriage is not significant. The Maggid Mishneh adds that even if the girl did not object immediately at the time she reached majority, she is entitled to object afterwards. This decision is quoted by the Ramah (Even HaEzer 113:7).
22.
Rabbenu Asher writes that a girl who reached the age of bagrut in her father's lifetime is not entitled to a dowry from her brothers. The later Ashkenazic authorities (see Beit Shmuel 113:19) state, however, that this ruling is not applied.
23.
Chapter 19, Halachah 10.
24.
Hence, she is ashamed to come to them with this request (Ketubot 68b).
25.
Implied is that once a bogeret marries without demanding her dowry, she has forfeited it even though her brothers continue to provide her with her sustenance (Maggid Mishneh). In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo writes that if the brothers of a na'arah continue to provide her with her sustenance after marriage, she does not forfeit her dowry, even if she does not protest. Although his wording in theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 113:7) is slightly problematic, the later authorities explain that this is his intent. A source for both the statements of the Maggid Mishnehand the Kessef Mishneh can be seen in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 6:6).
26.
We assume that the father's intent was that the money should be entrusted to a third party only until after her marriage (Rashi,Ketubot 69b).
27.
For it is a mitzvah to carry out the directives of a person who dies, even if he was healthy at the time he gave these directives (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:5).
28.
We assume that the father's intent was to safeguard his daughter and her husband against wasting the funds intended for them.
29.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 54:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling. The Ramah refers to this ruling in Choshen HaMishpat252:2, which states that this applies only if the funds were specifically entrusted to the third party for this purpose by the deceased at the time he made this statement. If they came into his possession afterwards, the concept that it is a mitzvah to carry out the directives of a person who dies does not apply.
Ishut - Chapter Twenty One
Halacha 1
A husband is entitled to [any ownerless objects] discovered by [his] wife,1 and the proceeds of her labor.2 What [type of work] must she perform on his behalf? Everything follows the custom of the country. In a place where it is customary for women to weave, she should weave. [In a place where they] embroider, she should embroider. [In a place where they] spin wool or flax, she should spin.
If it is not customary for women in that place to perform these labors, he may compel her only to spin wool; [wool, but not flax,] because flax damages [a woman's] mouth and lips. [This occupation is chosen because] spinning is a task designated for women, as [implied by Exodus 35:25]: "And all the skilled women put their hands to spinning...."
Halacha 2
If a woman exerts herself and produces more than would be expected of her,3her husband is entitled to the extra amount.4
Even when her husband5 is very wealthy and even when the woman has several maids, she may not sit idle, without work. For idleness leads to lewdness. [Her husband] may not, however, compel her to work for the entire day. Instead, according to the extent of his wealth, her obligation to work is minimized.
Halacha 3
When a mantakes a vow that prevents his wife from doing any work at all, he is obligated to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her]ketubah. [The rationale is that] idleness leads to lewdness.6
Every wife is obligated [to perform the following household tasks] on behalf of her husband: to wash his face, feet and hands, to pour him beverages, to make his bed,7 and to do his bidding - e.g., to bring him water or a utensil, to remove an article from his presence, or to perform similar tasks. She is not, however, required to do the bidding of his father or his son.
Halacha 4
These tasks should be performed only by a man's wife alone.8 Even if she possesses several maids, these tasks are performed for a man only by his wife.
Halacha 5
There are other tasks that a woman performs for her husband when they are poor; they are: to bake bread in an oven9 - Ezra ordained that a woman get up early and bake bread so that there will be bread available to give the poor.
She should cook food, wash clothes, nurse her child, place straw before her husband's beast10 - but not before his cattle - and grind [flour].
What does grinding [flour] involve? [Not that the woman actually operates the mill herself,] but that she stays at the mill, sifts11the flour and prods the animal [who turns the mill], so that [the operation of] the mill will not be hampered. If it is the [local] custom, for women to grind [flour] using a hand mill, [a woman] should grind [flour in this manner].
Halacha 6
When does the above apply? With regard to a poor [couple]. If, however, a woman brings a maid to [the household] or property with which a maid could be purchased, or if the man possesses a maid or funds with which a maid could be purchased, the wife is not required to grind [flour], to bake, to do laundry or to place straw before her husband's beast.
If the wife brings two maids to [the household] or property with which two maids could be purchased, or if the man possesses two maids or is [wealthy] enough to purchase two maids, the wife is not required to cook or to nurse her child. Instead, she gives him to a maid to nurse.12
Halacha 7
Thus, there are five tasks that every woman must perform on behalf of her husband: to spin [thread], to wash his face, hands and feet, to pour beverages for him, to make his bed and to do his bidding. And there are six tasks that some women perform and some women do not perform. They are: to grind [flour], to cook, to bake, to do laundry, to nurse, and to place straw before her husband's beast.
Halacha 8
All the tasks that a woman must perform on behalf of her husband must also be performed by a woman while she is in the niddah state, with the exception of pouring beverages, making his bed and washing his face, hands and feet. [The rationale for the exceptions is that] this is a decree, [enacted] lest [sexual] thoughts arise, and the husband be prompted to engage in relations.
Therefore, when she is in the niddah state, she should make his bed when he is not present. When pouring a beverage for him, she should not place it in his hand as is her usual practice, but rather leave it on the ground, on a utensil or on a table, and he will take it.13
Halacha 9
When a woman breaks utensils while performing household tasks,14 she is not held liable. This ruling does not reflect the dictates of the law, but is instead an enactment [of our Sages]. For if this were not the case, there would never be peace in a household. For a woman would be overly cautious and would refrain from performing many tasks, and there would thus be strife between [the couple].15
Halacha 10
Whenever a woman refrains from performing any of the tasks that she is obligated to perform, she may be compelled to do so, even with a rod.16 When a husband complains that [his wife] does not perform [her required tasks], and [the wife] claims that she does, [the dispute should be clarified by having] a [neutral] woman dwell with them or [by asking] the neighbors.17 The judges should clarify the matter in the best way they see fit.
Halacha 11
During the time a woman nurses her child, she is not compelled to perform as many tasks [as usual], and wine and foods that are beneficial to nursing are added to her support.
If, despite the fact that she was allotted the foods appropriate for her, she desires to eat more or desires to eat other foods, because of the craving in her stomach, she is entitled to eat everything she desires [provided she pays for the additional food] from her own funds. The husband cannot prevent her, saying: "Perhaps she will overeat or eat harmful foods18 and the child will die." [The rationale is] that the physical pain the woman feels takes priority.
Halacha 12
When a woman bears twins, she cannot be compelled to nurse both of them. Instead, she is required to nurse one, while the husband is required to hire a nursemaid for the second child.19
If a woman desires to nurse another woman's child together with her own, her husband may object and restrict her to nursing only her own child.20
Halacha 13
Although a woman takes a vow not to nurse her child, she may be compelled to do so until the child - whether a boy or a girl - is 24 months old.21
If a woman desires to nurse her child, but her husband objects, claiming that this will mar her beauty, she is given this prerogative, for it is painful for her to part from her child.22 [This law applies] even if she owns several maids.
Halacha 14
If she is poor and would thus be obligated to nurse her child, but her husband is rich, and it is appropriate that his wife not be obligated to nurse his child - if his wife does not desire to nurse, he must hire a nursemaid or buy a maid, even if he did not possess any maidservants beforehand. [The rationale is] that the woman's social standing rises together with that of her husband and does not descend with his.
Halacha 15
If a woman claims that [her husband] is of [a social standing that] requires him to hire or purchase a maid, and he claims that he is not, the burden of proof is on the woman. [The husband] is not [required] to take an oath.
Halacha 16
When a woman is divorced, she cannot be compelled to nurse [her child]. If she desires to nurse the child, [her ex-husband] must pay her a wage.23 If she does not desire [to nurse], she should give the son to his father, and he should care for him.24
When does the above apply? When she did not nurse the child long enough for him to recognize her. If, however, [the child is able] to recognize his mother, even if [the child] is blind,25 he should not be separated from his mother because of the [possible] danger [the separation will cause] the child.26 Instead, the woman is compelled to nurse the child for a wage until he reaches the age of 24 months.
Halacha 17
[A husband] is not [obligated to] support his divorcee, even when she is nursing his child. In addition to the wage she receives [as a nursemaid], he must, however, provide her with those things that the child needs for clothing, food, drink, salves and the like. A woman who is pregnant is not entitled to any [payment] at all [from her ex-husband].
[The following rules apply after the 24] months have been completed, and the child has been weaned. If the divorcee desires that her son remain in her custody, he is not separated from her until he completes his sixth year [of life].27 Instead, his father is compelled to provide him with his sustenance while he lives with his mother.
After the child completes his sixth year, the father has the right to say: "If [my son] is in my custody, I will support him. If, however, he continues to live with his mother,28 I will not give him anything."29
A mother, by contrast, is given custody of her daughter forever, even after [she passes] the age of six.30
Halacha 18
What is implied? If the father is [wealthy enough] to be obligated to give charity, the money necessary for his daughter's support should be expropriated from him and used to support the daughter, while she is in her mother's custody.
Even if the mother marries another [man], her daughter remains in her custody, and the father is obligated to provide for her sustenance until his death, as an act of charity. [Moreover, even if the girl's] father dies, she is entitled to receive her sustenance from his estate, as a provision of [her mother's] ketubah, although she remains in his mother's custody.
If a mother does not want her children - either males or females - to remain in her custody after she weans them, she has this prerogative, and she can give their father their custody, or make them wards of the community if there is no father, and [the community] must care for them.31
FOOTNOTES
1.
Ketubot 47a states that since a woman's husband supports her, he might object if she were granted ownership over the items that she discovers. The Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 6:1) offers a slightly different explanation: that if women were entitled to the objects that they discover, a woman might conceal her earnings and later claim that the funds came to her for ownerless objects that she discovered.
2.
As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, in exchange for the obligation incumbent on the man to support his wife, our Sages granted him the right to the income she generates.
3.
There are two interpretations of "more than would be expected of her": a) that she worked overtime, more hours than common custom requires, b) that she performed several tasks at one time.
4.
There are authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that a woman is entitled to keep the additional amount she earns. The Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer80) states that it is not Ashkenazic custom to require a woman to give her husband any of her additional earnings.
5.
Literally, "he is." Many manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torahstate "he and she are," instead of "he is."
6.
Hence, rather than compel a woman to follow a course of conduct that will lead to wanton behavior, Ketubot 59b requires the husband to divorce his wife.
7.
The commentaries discuss whether the intent is to make her husband's bed or to make all the beds in the house. The difference is with regard to a rich woman, who could have maids perform household services. She is, nevertheless, obligated to make her husband's bed as a reflection of their personal closeness. The question is whether this applies to making the other beds in the house. Ketubot 61a uses the expression "makes the bed for him," indicating that the emphasis is on the husband's bed.
8.
I.e., they are a reflection of their personal closeness.
9.
In contrast to bread baked in a pan or over coals - i.e., the woman must bake in an ordinary manner (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
10.
I.e., the animal on which he rides. This reflects the version of Ketubot 61b possessed by the Sephardic authorities. The Shitah Mekubetzet explains that this is included in a woman's household duties, because those duties involve tasks that affect her husband's person. The standard printed text of that Talmudic passage reverses the decisions regarding his beast and cattle. (See the rationale offered by Rashi.)
11.
Alternatively, guards the flour (Tur, Even HaEzer 80).
12.
The commentaries mention the importance of selecting a Jewish nursemaid. For milk that comes from non-kosher food will breed undesirable tendencies in the son's character.
13.
The Rambam does not mention washing her husband, because his wife is forbidden to touch him while in the niddah state. (SeeHilchot Issurei Bi'ah 11:18-19.)
14.
The Chelkat Mechokek 80:29 states that based on the Jerusalem Talmud, this law applies even when she breaks household articles while she is not in the midst of her household chores.
15.
While he accepts the Rambam's ruling, the Ra'avad offers a different rationale. The commentaries, however, justify the Rambam's view.
16.
Rav Kapach emphasizes that the Rambam's intent is not that the husband should beat his wife himself, but that he should bring her to the court, which should administer corporal punishment if they see fit.
The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that it is unheard of to compel a woman by corporal punishment. Instead, her support should be cut back until she accepts her household duties. The Rashba offers other options - to place her under a ban of ostracism or to sell her ketubah and use the proceeds to hire a maid.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 80:15) mentions that the woman is compelled to perform her tasks, but omits reference to the means of compulsion employed. The Ramah quotes the opinion of the Rambam together with that of the Ra'avad and the Rashba, but appears to favor the latter views.
17.
The woman is not required to support her claim with an oath, because a pattern of the husband's complaining and the woman's being compelled to take an oath would arise, and peace would not reign within the household (Chelkat Mechokek 80:28).
18.
Although a woman is enjoined not to eat foods that would harm her milk supply, she is allowed to do so if she feels physical pain, because her needs take priority over those of the child. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo objects to the Rambam's ruling; in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 80:11), he quotes dissenting views together with that of the Rambam, without favoring either view.
Note the Chelkat Mechokek 80:22, who emphasizes that when there is a real danger to the child's life, and no danger to the mother, the woman must adjust her diet to help the child.
19.
Rabbenu Asher states that she is required to nurse both children, but this view is not accepted by the later authorities.
20.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 80:14) quotes the Tur, which states that a husband may even prevent a woman from nursing her own child who was born to her from a previous husband.
21.
Implied in the marital contract is that the woman will nurse her children. Hence, she may not object.
22.
Rashi (Ketubot 61a) mentions another rationale: having milk without nursing causes pain.
23.
For a father is obligated to pay for his child's sustenance until the age of six, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 14.
24.
The husband cannot, however, be compelled to pay for a nursemaid if the mother is given custody.
25.
For even a blind child can recognize his mother from her smell and the flavor of her milk.
26.
The pain of separation from his mother could cause the child to undergo travail that might lead to weakness. Rashi (Ketubot 59b) states that it is possible that the infant might reject another nursemaid and hence starve to death.
27.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, explaining that a father is obligated to begin educating his child at an early age, and this is impossible when the child is in the mother's custody. The Maggid Mishnehrefutes that argument, explaining that the amount of teaching that the father is obligated to give the child can be communicated at visits.
It must be emphasized, however, that the Rambam is referring to a situation in which the mother shares the same standards of observance as the father. If that is not the case, and the mother's observance is lacking, the father should be given the right to custody.
28.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that if a son desires to stay in his mother's custody, and the mother is willing to support him, he is entitled to do so. (See Chelkat Mechokek 82:9.)
29.
At present, there are many courts that require the father to continue supporting his son, even if he desires to remain with his mother.
30.
For her mother is more prepared to train her to grow up as a woman.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 82:7) states that this law applies only when the court feels that it is in the daughter's best interests to remain in her mother's custody. If, however, it appears that the daughter's interests will be served better when she is in her father's custody, he is awarded that privilege.
31.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this implies that a woman does not have any responsibility to raise her children. TheMa'aseh Rokeach maintains that if the mother has means, she is required to provide for her children's support and cannot cast the burden on the community. She need not, however, raise them in her home, lest this deter other men from desiring to marry her. This latter opinion is not, however, mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 82:8) or its commentaries when dealing with this situation.
Ishut - Chapter Twenty Two
Halacha 1
The husband takes precedence over any other person with regard to the inheritance of his wife's estate.1
When does the husband acquire this right? When his wife leaves her father's domain, even though she has not entered the chuppah.2 Since the woman has entered her husband's domain, he [has the right] to inherit [her estate].
Halacha 2
What is implied? When a woman has been consecrated and her father hands her over to her husband or to his agents, or the agents of the woman's father hand her over to her husband or to his agents, and the woman dies on the way, before she enters the chuppah, her husband inherits her estate, even though her dowry is still in her father's home.3
Similarly, if the father or his agents went together with the husband, and the husband entered into privacy in a courtyard together with [his bride] with the intent of marriage,4 and afterwards she dies, her husband inherits [her estate].
If, however, [the woman and] her husband or his agents are still accompanied by her father or his agents on their journey to the husband's house, her father inherits [her estate] if she dies, even if her dowry is already in her husband's home. [This law applies even if the woman] and her husband entered a courtyard together to spend the night, as travelers lodge together in one inn.5[The rationale is that] she is accompanied by her father or his agents, and [her husband] has not entered into privacy with her for the sake of marriage.
Halacha 3
Halacha 4
Although a man marries a woman with whom he is forbidden [to have relations], if she dies [during his lifetime], he inherits her estate when his consecration of her is binding.8 Similarly, a man who marries a k'tanah [after her father's death]9 inherits her estate if she dies in his lifetime, even though his consecration of her is not binding entirely.
When, by contrast, a mentally capable man marries a deaf mute, he is not entitled to inherit her estate when she dies.10 When, however, a deaf mute marries a mentally capable woman and dies, he should inherit her estate. For she is capable of understanding and married him voluntarily. [In doing so,] she gave him a right to her property.11
Halacha 5
When a k'tanah was consecrated with her father's consent, but married without his consent - whether in his presence or outside his presence - her father has a right to object, as we have explained.12 [In such a situation,] if the girl dies, her husband should not inherit her estate, even if the father remains silent, unless he expressed his consent to her marriage.
Halacha 6
The geonim ruled that when a woman falls sick and asks her husband to divorce her so that he will not inherit her estate, her words are of no consequence, [even if] she [agrees to] forfeit her ketubah. Even if she says: "I hate him and no longer desire to live with him," her words are not heeded, and she is not judged as a woman who rebels against her husband.13 This is a desirable ruling.
Halacha 7
During a woman's lifetime, her husband enjoys the benefits of all the property she owns, regardless of whether it is classified as nichsei tzon barzel ornichsei m'log. If she dies in her husband's lifetime, her husband inherits everything.
Therefore, if the woman sold property classified as nichsei m'log after she married, even if she became the owner of that property before she became consecrated, her husband may expropriate the income from that property from the purchasers throughout his wife's lifetime. He may not, however, expropriate the land itself, for he has no right to the land itself, if it is classified as nichsei m'log, until his wife dies.14
If she dies in his lifetime, he may expropriate the land from the purchasers15without paying them for it.16 If the actual money that [the woman] took from the purchasers still exists, however, it must be returned to the purchasers. The husband cannot say: "Perhaps this money was found [by my wife]" [and on that basis take it as his own].17
Halacha 8
When does the above apply? With regard to property about which the husband knew.18 When, however, a woman inherits property in another country without her husband's knowledge and sells it, the sale is binding.19
Similarly, if a woman sells [property]20 between her consecration and the consummation of the marriage bond, the sale is binding. For the husband has no right to his wife's property until their marriage is consummated.
Halacha 9
When a woman signs over all21 of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if she becomes a widow, this present is nullified - as will be explained in Hilchot Matanah22 - her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.
[The rationale is] that she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband's lifetime, the recipient of the present acquires full title to it.
Moreover, [the same laws apply] even if she gave away a portion of her property - or all her holdings - before she married and wrote [in the deed of transfer] to the recipient: "Acquire the property from this time onward, [dependent] on my consent."23 [Although] the recipient does not acquire complete ownership until the woman expresses her consent,24 her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.25
Halacha 10
While a woman is waiting for her yavam [to marry her according to the rite ofyibbum], she may sell or give as a present property that she acquires during the time she is in this status.26 Until he marries the yevamah, the yavam has no right to benefit from the property, even the nichsei tzon barzel,27 that she brought to his [deceased] brother's household.
If the yevamah dies in this status, her heirs from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log28 and half of her nichsei tzon barzel.29 Her husband's heirs inherit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah30 and the remaining half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and they are responsible for her burial.31
Halacha 11
The money due a yevamah by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a lien on her [late] husband's estate. Therefore, a yavam is not entitled to sell any of his brother's property32 - neither before yibbum nor after yibbum.
If he sells the deceased's property, gives it away as a present, divides it with his brothers - whether before yibbum or after yibbum - his actions are of no consequence. For it is already obligatory to make this property available to the widow so that she can collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubahfrom it.
Halacha 12
When a man marries his yevamah at a time when there is produce growing on the land left by her husband, this produce should be sold,33 and the proceeds used to purchase land from which the yavam will derive the benefit that accrues.
Halacha 13
When, [by contrast, the deceased] left produce that was already harvested, money or movable property, it becomes the property of the yavam. He may use it as he sees fit, and [the yevamah's] objections are of no consequence.
[The rationale is that the woman's right] to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from movable property stems only from an enactment of thegeonim, and this enactment does not have the power to prevent [the yavamfrom taking possession] of his brother's property,34 and cause him to be restrained from dealing with them because of this lien.
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] a yevamah's [first husband was not obligated to] grant her a ketubah35 or [when] she waived her ketubah in his favor. Theyavam acquires his brother's estate and may sell [portions of it] or give them away as he desires. When he marries his yevamah, he is obligated to compose a ketubah for 100 [zuz]. All of his property will be considered as being on lien for the ketubah, [i.e., the same laws apply to her] as apply to other women who have a ketubah.36
Halacha 15
Halacha 16
[Should the husband] sell movable property that is classified as nichsei tzon barzel39 - although he is not allowed to make such a sale - the sale is binding.40
If both [the husband and the wife] sell nichsei m'log, the sale is binding,41regardless of whether the purchaser purchased the property from the husband first and then from the wife, or if he first purchased it from the wife and then from the husband.
Halacha 17
Similarly, when a woman sells her nichsei m'log to her husband or gives them to him as a present, the sale or the gift is binding. She cannot rationalize her actions by saying, "[This was not my true intent.] I did it [only] to appease my husband."42 With regard to other property, however, she may offer such a rationalization.
Halacha 18
What is implied? When a woman sells her nichsei tzon barzel to her husband or gives them to him as a present, her husband does not acquire this property. [This applies to] landed property and movable property [in this category], to a field that was designated for her from which [she could collect the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, a field belonging to her that was specifically mentioned in her ketubah or a field that [her husband mentioned in her ketubah] as his present to her [to be included in her dowry].43
[In all the above instances,] even though [the husband] formalized the transaction with his wife through an act of contract that she voluntarily agreed to, she has the prerogative of recanting whenever she desires.44 [We assume that] she gave the present or made the sale only for the sake of maintaining peace in her home.45
Halacha 19
It appears to me that a woman is not entitled [to nullify her statements, based on the rationale]: "I did it [only] to appease my husband," when her nichsei tzon barzel were lost or stolen, and she waived the debt in favor of her husband. [This applies even when the commitment] is formalized in the presence of witnesses.48
To what can this be compared? To a man and a woman who formalized an agreement in which she forgoes the responsibility [he had taken for property that had been classified as nichsei tzon barzel] and considers it insteadnichsei m'log.49 For the husband is not bringing a proof for the sake of taking possession or maintaining possession of property, merely to free himself of the obligation to pay a claim [his wife will issue].50
If, by contrast, she gives him movable property that exists and was considered to be nichsei tzon barzel, the husband does not acquire it. For the wife may rationalize her conduct saying: "I did this to appease my husband."
Halacha 20
When a husband sells [the right to] the benefits from landed property [that belongs to his wife, to another person, while the legal owner of the property remains his wife, the sale] is of no consequence. [The rationale is that] the reason our Sages granted a man [the right to] the benefit that accrues from his wife's property is [to afford him additional income] so that he will spend more generously on the household expenses.51
[Based on that rationale,] if he sells the benefit to be derived [from the landed property to another person] and takes the money and invests it in a business [which offers profit], he is given that prerogative.
Halacha 21
[The following laws apply if] the woman possesses financial resources [that she brings to the household]. If they are nichsei tzon barzel, her husband may use them for commercial enterprises.52
If they are nichsei m'log - regardless of whether she brought them to the household at the time of marriage or she inherited them or received them as a present53 [- landed property should be purchased with them, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues].54 [Similarly,] if she inherited or was given movable property, it should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
Halacha 22
Halacha 23
[The following law applies when] a woman inherits servants [while she is married]. Even if they are old, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household.
[The following law applies when] she inherits olive trees or vines, but did not [inherit] the land on which these trees were planted. If they produce enough to pay for their upkeep, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. If they do not, they should be sold as firewood, land should be purchased with the proceeds, from which the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
Halacha 24
When [a married woman] inherits produce that is still attached to the land [on which it is growing], it becomes her husband's [property].57 When the produce has been uprooted from the land, it should be sold and used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
When, however, a husband divorces his wife, and there was produce that was still attached to the ground, it belongs to the woman. If it has already been reaped, it belongs to the man.58
Halacha 25
A husband is obligated to provide for the sustenance and all the needs of the servants59 and livestock that belong to his wife and are classified as nichsei m'log. They must work for him, and he is entitled to the benefit that accrues. Therefore, a baby born to a maid classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband. And a calf born to a cow that is classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband.
If, however, the husband divorces his wife and she desires to pay the worth of a child born from a maidservant who is classified as nichsei m'log and take the child as her property because this brings honor to her family's household, she is given that prerogative.60
Halacha 26
[The following laws apply when] a woman brings two utensils or two maidservants to the household and has them classified as nichsei tzon barzel. They were [originally] evaluated at 1000 zuz; afterwards, their value increased and they were evaluated at 2000 zuz. If the woman's husband divorces her, she is entitled to one [utensil or maidservant] for the 1000 zuzthat she is owed. With regard to the other - if she desires to pay its value and take it because of the honor it brings to her father's household, she has that prerogative.
Halacha 27
When a man gives a present to his wife - regardless of whether he gave her landed property, or he gave her money and she bought landed property - her husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from the present [that was given].61
Similarly, when a man gives a woman a present on the condition that her husband not be entitled to derive the benefits from it, but rather the benefits that accrue will belong to the wife to be used for whatever she desires,62 [the provision is binding, and] the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from this present.
Similarly, if a woman sells the rights to her ketubah [in the event of her divorce or her husband's death],63 the money she receives belongs to her, and her husband is not entitled to derive the benefit that accrues from it.
Halacha 28
When a calf born from cattle that was classified as nichsei m'log is stolen, and the thief is apprehended and forced to pay twice the amount, the woman receives the extra payment. [The rationale is that] this is not the benefit that our Sages granted [the husband].64
Halacha 29
[The following rules apply when] a husband sells landed property [that he owns] to his wife. If the husband knew about the funds with which she purchased the land previously, the sale is binding,67 and the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from that land.
If, however, [the existence of] these funds was concealed, she does not acquire the land. For the husband may [explain that he did not really intend to complete the sale]. [His intent was] to reveal the existence of funds that his wife had hidden. The funds that were revealed should be used to purchase landed property,68 from which the husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue.69
Halacha 30
When funds or movable property are discovered in a woman's possession, and she claims that they were given her as a present, while her husband claims that they stem from the fruits of her labor and hence belong to him, it is the woman's claim that is accepted.70 [The husband] may, however, have a ban of ostracism [conditionally] issued against anyone who makes false statements.71[The funds should be used] to purchase landed property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefit that accrues.72
If the woman claims that the funds were given to her with the provision that her husband have no control over them, but rather that they be used for whatever purpose she desires, she must bring proof [that such a provision was made].73 [The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that a husband has the right to the benefits from all the funds found in a woman's possession, unless she brings proof otherwise.
Halacha 31
If [a wife] tells [her husband]: "You gave me [these funds] as a present," she is required to take a Rabbinic oath that her husband gave her [the funds]. [After she takes that oath,] her husband is not entitled to the benefit [from the property purchased with these funds].74
Halacha 32
One should not accept an article for safekeeping that was given by a wife, a servant or a minor.75 If one transgressed and accepted [an article given by] a woman, one should return it to the woman.76 If she dies, one should return it to her husband.77
If one accepted [an article given by] a servant, one should return it to the servant. If he dies, one should return it to his master. If one accepted [an article given by] a minor, one should purchase a Torah scroll with the proceeds or an article that will provide [the minor] with benefit.78
[The following rules apply] with regard to all [the abovementioned individuals], if at the time of their death, they say: "The article I gave for safekeeping belongs to so and so." If the person caring for the article operates under the presumption that the person who entrusted it to him is true to his word, he should carry out the command he was given. If not, he should give [the article] to the person's heirs.
Halacha 33
[The following rules apply when] a woman has financial resources sufficient [to purchase property] from which the husband would derive the benefits [but they disagree with regard to the property fit to purchase]; he suggests that this type of property be purchased, and she desires that another type be purchased. A property should be purchased that brings a large revenue and requires little upkeep,79 regardless of whether this is the article desired by [the husband] or by [the wife]. We do not purchase any article that does not renew itself,80 lest the entire property be used and the principal lost.
Halacha 34
[The following rule applies when] a woman brings to her husband's household a goat [that she is entitled] to milk, a sheep [that she is entitled] to shear or a date palm whose fruit [she is entitled to take], although she is entitled only to these benefits [and not to the principal]. [Her husband] is entitled to [these benefits] although the principal is dwindling.81
Similarly, if she brought utensils or articles of clothing to his household that were classified as nichsei m'log, he may use them, wearing them or using them as spreads or as covers until the articles themselves are destroyed. If he divorces [his wife], he is not required to pay for any nichsei m'log that became worn out.
Halacha 35
The geonim [issued the following] ruling. A husband takes responsibility for the diminished value of nichsei tzon barzel. Nevertheless, if [such property] exists [at the time a woman's ketubah is due for payment,] and still serves its initial purpose, the woman must take it regardless of its condition at that time.82
If they are no longer fit to serve their initial purpose, it is as if they were stolen or lost, and the husband is obligated to pay the value appraised originally at the time of the marriage.
This is the common custom. Whenever a man marries, he accepts responsibility for [the woman's] dowry as contingent on this custom.83 On the basis of this custom, just as the husband does not pay for the depreciation of the article, so too, he does not take the appreciation of the property if it increases in value.
A husband has the right to compel some of the servants and maidservants who belong to his wife to serve him84 in the home of another woman he has married.85 [This applies] regardless of whether the servants are classified asnichsei m'log or nichsei tzon barzel. The husband may not, however, take these servants to another city without his wife's consent.
FOOTNOTES
1.
As explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 3 and notes, this is one of the four privileges our Sages granted a husband as part of the marriage contract. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 1:8.)
2.
The second phase of marriage, nisu'in, does not start until the woman enters thechuppah, and it is only at that time that the marriage contract takes effect. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, as explained in the following halachot and notes.
3.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 57:1) cites the opinion of the Tur and other Ashkenazic authorities, which is that the husband does not have a right to inherit his wife's dowry until it enters his possession.
4.
Moreover, if the courtyard belongs to the husband, it is assumed that the couple entered for the sake of marriage, even when they do not explicitly state so. This is the view of all authorities, and the Maggid Mishneh explains that it is also shared by the Rambam.
5.
If the courtyard belonged to her, this intent is understood even when it is not explicitly stated.
6.
This law applies even if the widow is still a minor, as reflected in Chapter 3, Halachah 12.
7.
Once she is met by her husband or his agents, however, he is entitled to inherit her estate.
8.
See Chapter 1, Halachot 6 and 7; Chapter 4, Halachah 14.
9.
Or after she becomes divorced or widowed in her father's lifetime (Chapter 4, Halachot 7 and 8).
10.
The rationale is that she is not entitled to aketubah (Chapter 11, Halachah 4). Moreover, since she is not responsible for her actions, she has no right to transfer her property.
11.
Although the Ra'avad objects to this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:3) quotes the Rambam's view.
12.
Chapter 3, Halachah 13.
13.
See Chapter 14, Halachah 8.
14.
The advantage in the purchaser's continuing to own the land itself is that if the husband dies before his wife, her sale is binding, and the land becomes the purchaser's property. From this time onward, he is entitled to benefit from the land as well.
Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam on this issue and maintains that the husband has the right to take the property from the purchaser, even during his wife's lifetime. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:9) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah quotes that of Rabbenu Asher.
15.
Even the Ramah and Rabbenu Asher accept this ruling.
16.
There is a difference of opinion with regard to this matter among the geonim, but all the later authorities accept this view. The rationale is that the husband's right to the land supersedes that of the purchaser. The money that the purchaser paid is considered to have become a debt owed him by the woman's estate, and the husband is not required to pay his wife's debts.
17.
A husband is entitled to any ownerless object discovered by his wife. His claim is not accepted, however, if he states that money that appears to have come from the sale of property came from the discovery of a lost object. There is no need for witnesses to testify that this is the money from the sale. It is sufficient that it appears to be so. If, however, the money has been changed into a different coinage or currency, the husband is not required to return it (Maggid Mishneh).
18.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot8:2), the Rambam states that this refers to property located in the bride and groom's city or the surrounding locale, as opposed to property owned by her in more distant locales. It is questionable, however, if the same geographic restrictions apply in today's global village.
19.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:11) states that preferably, a woman should not sell this property, because her husband is entitled to inherit it.
The commentaries explain that when the husband knows of his wife's financial holdings, it is an implicit part of the marriage contract - and perhaps part of his intent in entering into the marriage relationship - that he will inherit this property. When, however, he is unaware of her ownership of property, this motive cannot be given as the reason for his desire to enter this relationship.
It must be added that as soon as the husband becomes aware of this property, it is considered to be part of the woman'snichsei m'log and is bound by all the laws pertaining to such property (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12). Moreover, if the woman dies without selling this property, her husband is entitled to inherit it, although he was never aware of his wife's ownership of it during her lifetime.
20.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 90) states that the woman has the full right to sell any property that she owned before she was consecrated. With regard to property that she acquired after she was consecrated, it is preferable that she not sell it - but if she sells it, the husband has no claim to it.
21.
As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, slightly different rules apply if the woman signed over only a portion of her property.
22.
Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:12. It is clearly obvious that the woman's intent in giving the present is to protect her holdings from being inherited by her husband.
23.
In his gloss on Ketubot 79a, Rabbenu Nissim explains that the Rambam equates this provision with the one mentioned in the previous clause. The only difference between the two is one of tact. The provision in this clause is more gently worded, so that the intent to free the woman's holdings from her husband is less obvious.
24.
Unlike the Rambam, Rabbenu Asher and other authorities maintain that the woman need not explicitly mention her consent to the present. All that is necessary is that she refrain from nullifying it.
25.
Rabbenu Nissim asks, according to the approach of the Rambam (in contrast to the approach of Rabbenu Asher mentioned in the previous note): If the woman did not explicitly mention her consent to the present before her death, why does her husband have no right to inherit her property? The provision on which the present was based was never fulfilled.
Seemingly, this property can be compared to a woman's property of which her husband was unaware. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the husband has the right to inherit such property, and thus he should also inherit the property mentioned in this clause.
Rabbenu Nissim explains that since the Rambam maintains that a husband's right to inherit his wife's property is a Rabbinical ordinance, there is room for leniency when, as in the present case, it is obvious that the woman did not desire her husband to inherit her estate. Obviously motivated by the same question, but unwilling to offer such a resolution, Rav David Arameah explains that the Rambam's ruling applies in an instance when the woman in fact expressed her consent to the present before her death.
26.
As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 8, preferably a woman should not sell property she acquires after her consecration. One might think that the same principle applies to a yevamah, for she also shares a bond to her yavam. There is, however, a distinction between the two: a woman who is consecrated will most likely be married, while a yevamah may be freed from her obligation through chalitzah. Hence, there are no restrictions placed upon her with regard to the sale of her holdings.
27.
The difference between nichsei m'log andnichsei tzon barzel is that with regard tonichsei m'log, the object itself belongs to the woman, while the property regarded asnichsei tzon barzel is considered to belong to her late husband. He was, however, obligated to pay his wife for the value designated at the time of marriage (Chapter 16, Halachah 1).
Since the nichsei tzon barzel are considered to belong to the yevamah's late husband's estate, one might think that the yavam would have a right to them. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that he is given this right only after marriage.
As mentioned by the Ra'avad and theMaggid Mishneh, most authorities differ with the Rambam on this point. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the yavam is entitled to half of the benefit that accrues from thenichsei tzon barzel. This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer160:6). (The Rambam's opinion is also quoted, but it appears that the other opinion is favored.) The Ramah mentions the opinion of the Ra'avad which goes even further and gives the yavam rights to half the benefits of nichsei m'log that the yevamahacquired while she was married to her deceased husband.
28.
For this property belongs to her outright.
29.
A division is necessary because this property is considered to belong to theyevamah's late husband, as explained above. Therefore, his heirs have a claim to it. Nevertheless, since he died in his wife's lifetime, and she did not receive payment for this property, her own heirs also have a claim.
This ruling is also disputed by other authorities, who maintain that all the nichsei tzon barzel are considered the property of the husband's heirs, together with the woman's ketubah. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah quotes that of the other authorities.
The Ramah also adds that these laws do not apply in the Ashkenazic community in the present era - or in other communities - where the rite of yibbum is not practiced, and instead, the yevamah is freed from her obligation through the rite of chalitzah. Since the yevamah will not marry the yavam, he has no rights with regard to her property.
30.
I.e., both the essential requirement of theketubah and any additional amount added by her deceased husband.
31.
For our Sages associated a woman's burial with the inheritance of her ketubah (Chapter 12, Halachah 14).
32.
Even if the value of the property left by the deceased brother is many times the value of the woman's ketubah, none of the property may be sold, lest the remaining property be destroyed and the woman have difficulty collecting the money due her by virtue of herketubah from the purchasers (Ketubot 81b).
33.
I.e., since the produce requires the land, it is considered as if it were landed property, and the money received from the sale has the same status as the landed property mentioned in the previous halachah.
34.
The Maggid Mishneh, the Rivash (Responsa 365 and 366), and the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 168:5) emphasize that the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the husband did not follow the suggestion (Chapter 16, Halachah 8) of stating explicitly in the ketubah that the woman may collect from movable property the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (There are other authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that even if the provision is not stated explicitly in the woman's ketubah, the movable property should be sold and land purchased.)
35.
E.g., he died after he consecrated her, but before he consummated the marriage - in which instance, the woman is obligated to undergo either yibbum or chalitzah, and yet her deceased husband was not obligated to grant her a ketubah.
36.
Since she has no claim to her deceased husband's property, she is not judged by the laws pertaining to a yevamah, but rather by those pertaining to other women.
37.
If she sells the land to her husband, the sale is rescinded because she can claim that she did not sell it willingly; she did so only to appease her husband (Bava Batra 49b). If she sells the land to others, the sale is rescinded because her husband has a right to benefit from her property, and she cannot take away this right from him without his consent. If, however, the husband agrees to her sale, it is binding, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3).
Note the ruling of the Ramah (Even HaEzer90:13), who writes that if the husband dies, the sale made by the woman is effective retroactively. (But see also the gloss of theBeit Shmuel 90:46.)
38.
With regard to nichsei m'log, it is obvious that the husband's sale is of no consequence, for the woman owns this type of property. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, which are considered to be the husband's property, there are authorities (e.g., the Ra'avad) who differ with the Rambam and maintain that the sale is valid until the time comes when the woman desires to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
The commentaries support the Rambam's opinion, explaining that even though the woman has the potential to expropriate the property afterwards by force of law, the sale should be nullified. For women are not comfortable presenting claims in court. If the sale were allowed to remain binding, the only way the woman could receive her due would be by lodging a legal claim. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:13) quotes the Rambam's view.
39.
If the woman is divorced, she is entitled to this property. Hence, the husband does not have the prerogative of selling it.
40.
The husband is allowed to destroy this property through frequent use. Therefore, the woman does not rely on receiving this property, and thus if he sells it the sale is binding (Maggid Mishneh, gloss on Hilchot Mechirah 30:5; Chelkat Mechokek 90:45).
This is the opinion of the Rambam and Rabbenu Tam, and is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:14). Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba and others differ and maintain that the sale is of no consequence. Their view is quoted by the Ramah.
41.
Although both the husband and his wife have a share in the property, since the purchaser dealt with both of them, the sale is binding.
42.
Since this property itself belongs to her, there is no reason for her husband to become upset if she does not desire to sell it to him.
43.
See Chapter 23, Halachah 11; Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if similar laws apply when a woman waives her claim to property mentioned in her ketubah in favor of her husband. The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher maintain that her deed is of consequence, while the Rashba and the Ramban state that it is not. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam subscribes to the latter view.
44.
The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that until the woman recants, the transaction is binding. The Beit Meir, however, objects, explaining that the Rambam's wording inHilchot Mechirah 30:3 does not indicate such a distinction.
45.
Her husband will pressure her by saying, "You are either planning my death or considering a divorce. Otherwise, you would not hesitate to sell this property to me" (Bava Batra 49b, 50a).
46.
Even if he has a deed or witnesses that testify to the claim, his wife may also negate his claim based on the above rationale.
47.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:16) states that if the woman explicitly accepts responsibility for the field if expropriated from the husband, then the transaction is binding.
48.
Based on the Rambam's statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, it is questionable why witnesses are necessary. See Chelkat Mechokek 90:1, Beit Shmuel 90:6.
49.
A husband is not obligated to pay for nichsei m'log that have been destroyed, lost or stolen, while in such situations, he is obligated to pay the original value for nichsei tzon barzel. Thus, by changing the status of her property, the woman is in effect waiving a financial obligation due her from her husband.
There is reason to say that just as a woman can say that she was forced to give or sell this property to her husband to appease him, she could also say that she was also forced to waive her husband's obligation in the loss or theft of this property. The Rambam, however, does not accept this rationale. Since this obligation is due only after the husband's death or divorce, there is nothing pressuring her husband to pay it. If he demands that his wife waive this obligation, she may refuse, asking him: "Is it because you want to divorce me that you are asking me to waive this obligation?" (Maggid Mishneh).
50.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling. Nevertheless, it is the Rambam's decision which is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:18).
51.
If, at the outset, the husband sold the rights to benefit from the property for a lump sum, it is possible that all that money would be spent in a short period of time and that afterwards, there would be nothing left for household expenses (Chelkat Mechokek85:41).
52.
For their value is explicitly stated in the woman's ketubah and will be returned to her in the event of divorce or her husband's death.
53.
For money that a woman acquires while married is automatically considered to benichsei m'log.
54.
In this way, the woman is assured that the principal will remain hers. If the husband desires to use the money for commercial enterprises, he may afterwards sell the right to benefit from the property, as mentioned in the previous halachah.
55.
E.g., people other than her husband. If her husband himself injures her, he is not entitled to benefit from the proceeds of her property, as mentioned in Halachah 28.
56.
Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:15. As stated in that source, the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds to which his wife has no right.
57.
Although in most instances, produce that is still attached to land is considered equivalent to landed property, an exception is made in this case, because the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from his wife's property.
58.
For he is entitled to receive all the benefit from her property throughout the duration of their marriage.
59.
See Hilchot Avadim 9:7, which states that a husband does not have the prerogative of telling a servant: "Work for me, but I will not provide for your sustenance."
60.
The Rambam's wording implies that the concept of maintaining the honor of one's household applies only with regard to the children of one's servants, and not to the offspring of one's livestock. See the Beit Shmuel 85:38, which quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis on this issue.
61.
Bava Batra 51b states that a person who gives a present gives with a generous spirit. Therefore, we may assume that the husband gives the gift to his wife without wanting to restrict her in any way.
62.
The specific wording of the provision that the giver must make is discussed in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13.
63.
The person purchasing the rights to the woman's ketubah is taking a risk, because it is possible that she will die in her husband's lifetime and then he will not receive anything.
64.
Our Sages entitled a husband to derive the benefit that would ordinarily accrue from property belonging to his wife - e.g., produce that grows on a field, rent from a home, labor from a servant. They did not grant him rights to benefits that arise from abnormal circumstances.
65.
The Rambam does not mention two other payments that a person who inflicts an injury would ordinarily pay: shevet - reimbursement for the wages that were not earned during the period of convalescence, because the husband is entitled to his wife's wages - and ripui - payment for the medical treatment required, because a husband is always required to pay for his wife's medical care.
66.
Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:16. This differs from instances in which the injury is inflicted by other parties, in which case the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds, to which his wife has no right.
67.
The husband cannot claim that the funds belonged to him, but since he could not take them from his wife in any other way, he sold the property to her as a ruse. This applies even if he makes a definite claim (ta'anat bari) that the funds belong to him (Chelkat Mechokek 85:22,24).
68.
This ruling depends on the halachah to follow, which states that a woman's claim is accepted with regard to money found in her possession.
69.
The Rambam's ruling is cited by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 85:9). The Ramah mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the husband makes a definite claim that the hidden funds belong to him, his claim is accepted.
70.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 6:1) states that a present will be spoken about. Therefore, the woman will be afraid to claim that she was given a present unless the claim was true.
71.
He cannot, however, require his wife to take an oath unless he lodges a definite claim against her (Maggid Mishneh).
72.
If, however, a woman was given responsibility to deal freely with the property belonging to her husband's household, and she claims that funds discovered in her possession belong to her privately, her claim is not accepted (Bava Batra 52b; Ramah,Even HaEzer 85:12).
73.
Although the giving of a present will become public knowledge, the details of the present might not. Therefore, the woman is required to substantiate her statements. Otherwise, we assume that this present was given without any extraordinary conditions (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
The Maggid Mishneh mentions the opinion of the Rashba, who differs and maintains that the woman's claim is also accepted in this instance as well. This opinion is mentioned by the later authorities.
74.
The rationale is that a woman will not be brazen enough to make false statements in her husband's presence with regard to a matter that he knows to be true (Maggid Mishneh).
75.
For the likelihood is that the article belongs to the husband, master or father, respectively. It is forbidden to assist a person who takes property that is not his or her own. Moreover, if no one accepts the article for safekeeping, it is likely that it will be returned (Bava Batra 51b).
76.
For there is no proof that the article was stolen.
77.
For even if the article is rightfully hers, he inherits her property.
78.
The entrusted article should not be given to the minor, for it is possible that he will not care for it properly and it will be destroyed (Rashbam, Bava Batra 52a).
79.
In every society, the nature of the type of article purchased depends on the conditions prevalent at that time (Chelkat Mechokek85:33).
80.
The Hebrew literally means "whose bark is renewed" - i.e., reaping the benefits one year will not prevent them from being reaped in the future.
81.
I.e., in this instance, the goat's milk is not sold and the money used to purchase property that produces benefit, but rather the goat's milk is used for the household.
82.
Even if they are worth substantially less than they were originally.
83.
As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, at different times and in different countries, other customs have prevailed. It is the prevalent custom in one's own locale that is binding.
84.
The servants may be compelled to serve the husband; they may not, however, be compelled to serve his second wife (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 85).
85.
For having the woman's servants serve her husband in his other wife's home, also elevates the woman's own standard of living (Ketubot 80b).
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video ClassA
• Tuesday, Shevat 23, 5776 · 02 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Friday Sh'vat 23 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Yitro, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 108-112.
Tanya: From this the intelligent (p.97)...as will be explained later. (p. 99).
Once, as the Alter Rebbe stepped out of his room, he overheard his wife remarking to several women, "Mine1 says..."
The Rebbe said: "With one mitzva I am yours; with how many are we G-d's!" With these words he fell onto the doorpost indveikut.2 On "awakening" from the dveikut he said: "Go out and see"3 - to step out of self and perceive the Divine, comes from (the following words in that verse) "daughters of Zion," Malchut arousing z'a.4 The Future will bring the fulfillment of "A valorous woman is her husband's crown."5
FOOTNOTES
1. "Mine" is understood in Yiddish to refer to one's husband or wife.
2. Profound concentration, a communion with the Divine that removes one from physical awareness.
3. Shir Hashirim 3:11.
4. Malchut (lit. "royalty") is the tenth attribute, for which the moon is a metaphor, having no light of its own but reflecting (see "Tzemach Tzedek and Haskala Movement" p. 110, Note 3). Malchut then, is a "feminine" attribute, receiving. Z'a or z'er anpin, the "minor visage," represents the earlier six attributes, starting with chessed, gevura, (kindness, severity) etc. The six act through malchut which makes them effective. The "stepping out of self," negation of ego, and the resultant "perceiving the Divine" are elicited by the "daughters of Zion," the "feminine" aspect, malchut.
5. Mishlei 12:4. While apparently the feminine attribute is recipient, its true status will in the future be revealed as Crown, transcendent, higher than the highest attributes of intellect, as the crown encompasses the head.
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video ClassA
• Tuesday, Shevat 23, 5776 · 02 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Friday Sh'vat 23 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Yitro, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 108-112.
Tanya: From this the intelligent (p.97)...as will be explained later. (p. 99).
Once, as the Alter Rebbe stepped out of his room, he overheard his wife remarking to several women, "Mine1 says..."
The Rebbe said: "With one mitzva I am yours; with how many are we G-d's!" With these words he fell onto the doorpost indveikut.2 On "awakening" from the dveikut he said: "Go out and see"3 - to step out of self and perceive the Divine, comes from (the following words in that verse) "daughters of Zion," Malchut arousing z'a.4 The Future will bring the fulfillment of "A valorous woman is her husband's crown."5
FOOTNOTES
1. "Mine" is understood in Yiddish to refer to one's husband or wife.
2. Profound concentration, a communion with the Divine that removes one from physical awareness.
3. Shir Hashirim 3:11.
4. Malchut (lit. "royalty") is the tenth attribute, for which the moon is a metaphor, having no light of its own but reflecting (see "Tzemach Tzedek and Haskala Movement" p. 110, Note 3). Malchut then, is a "feminine" attribute, receiving. Z'a or z'er anpin, the "minor visage," represents the earlier six attributes, starting with chessed, gevura, (kindness, severity) etc. The six act through malchut which makes them effective. The "stepping out of self," negation of ego, and the resultant "perceiving the Divine" are elicited by the "daughters of Zion," the "feminine" aspect, malchut.
5. Mishlei 12:4. While apparently the feminine attribute is recipient, its true status will in the future be revealed as Crown, transcendent, higher than the highest attributes of intellect, as the crown encompasses the head.
---------------------
•
CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Today is: Monday, Shvat 22, 5776 · February 1, 2016
• Passing of Kotzker Rebbe (1859)
Passing of Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Kotzk (1787-1859), renowned Chassidic leader, and forerunner of the "Ger" Chassidic dynasty.
• Rebbetzin Chaya Mushka Schneerson's Yahrtzeit (1988)
Rebbetzin Chaya Mushkah Schneerson (b. 1901), wife of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, passed away on the 22nd of Shevat of the year 5748 (1988). For more on the Rebbetzin, see link below. Chabad's annual international conference of sheluchot (woman "emissaries") is held on or near this date.
Links: An on-line biography; more on the Rebbetzin
Daily Quote:
Better that you not vow, than that you should vow and not fulfill[Ecclesiastes 5:4]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Mishpatim, 2nd Portion Exodus 21:20-22:3 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 21
20And should a man strike his manservant or his maidservant with a rod, and [that one] die under his hand, he shall surely be avenged. כוְכִֽי־יַכֶּה֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶת־עַבְדּ֜וֹ א֤וֹ אֶת־אֲמָתוֹ֙ בַּשֵּׁ֔בֶט וּמֵ֖ת תַּ֣חַת יָד֑וֹ נָקֹ֖ם יִנָּקֵֽם:
And should a man strike his manservant or his maidservant: The text is referring to a Canaanite slave, or perhaps it is referring only to a Hebrew [slave]? To clarify this, the Torah says: “because he is his property” (verse 21). Just as his property is his permanent acquisition, so is the slave [in question] one who is his permanent acquisition. Now, was he [the one who kills his slave] not included in “He who strikes a man and he dies” (above, verse 12) ? This verse was written [lit., came] to exclude him [the owner of the slave] from the general rule [concerning murder], to be judged with the law of “a day or two days” (verse 21), that if he did not die under his hand but lingered an entire twenty-four-hour period, he is exempt. -[From Mechilta] וכי יכה איש את עבדו או את אמתו: בעבד כנעני הכתוב מדבר. או אינו אלא בעברי, תלמוד לומר כי כספו הוא, מה כספו קנוי לו עולמית, אף עבד הקנוי לו עולמית. והרי היה בכלל (פסוק יב) מכה איש ומת, אלא בא הכתוב והוציאו מן הכלל, להיות נדון בדין יום או יומים, שאם לא מת תחת ידו ושהה מעת לעת פטור:
with a rod: The verse refers to [a rod] that has sufficient [weight and strength] to kill [someone]. Or perhaps that is not so, but [the master is liable] even if it [the rod] does not have sufficient [weight and strength] to kill? Therefore, the Torah says concerning an Israelite: “Or if he strikes him with a stone that can be held in the hand, from which he may die” (Num. 35:17). (“Or if he strikes him with a wooden instrument that can be held in the hand, from which he may die” ) (Num. 35:18). -[Mizrachi version] Now could the matter not be understood by a kal vachomer [an inference from a major to a minor case], that if [in the case of] an Israelite [victim], [a case] which is treated more stringently, one is not liable unless he struck him [the victim] with an article that has sufficient [weight and strength] to kill and the blow is on an organ which could cause death, how much more should it be so [in the case of] a slave, [a case] which is treated more leniently? -[From Mechilta] בשבט: כשיש בו כדי להמית הכתוב מדבר. או אינו אלא אפילו אין בו כדי להמית, תלמוד לומר בישראל (במדבר לה יז) ואם באבן יד אשר ימות בה הכהו, והלא דברים קל וחומר מה ישראל חמור אין חייב עליו, אלא אם כן הכהו בדבר שיש בו כדי להמית, ועל אבר שהוא כדי למות בהכאה זו, עבד הקל לא כל שכן:
he shall surely be avenged: [with] death by the sword [decapitation], and so does the Torah say: “a sword avenging the vengeance of the covenant” (Lev. 26:25). -[From Mechilta, Sanh. 52b] נקם ינקם: מיתת סייף, וכן הוא אומר (ויקרא כו כה) חרב נוקמות נקם ברית:
21But if he survives for a day or for two days, he shall not be avenged, because he is his property. כאאַ֥ךְ אִם־י֛וֹם א֥וֹ יוֹמַ֖יִם יַֽעֲמֹ֑ד לֹ֣א יֻקַּ֔ם כִּ֥י כַסְפּ֖וֹ הֽוּא:
But if he survives for a day or two he shall not be avenged: If one day[’s survival] exempts him [from punishment], then would not [survival of] two days be even more obvious? [Why then, is the word יומים written?] Rather [it must be that we are speaking of] one day which is as two days, and what [kind of day] is that? A full, twenty-four hour period. אך אם יום או יומים יעמוד לא יקם: אם על יום אחד הוא פטור, על יומים לא כל שכן, אלא יום שהוא כיומים, ואיזה, זה מעת לעת:
he shall not be avenged, because he is his property: But if someone else struck him, even if he lingered for twenty-four hours before he died, he [the other person] is liable [to incur the death penalty]. לא יקם כי כספו הוא: הא אחר שהכהו, אף על פי ששהה מעת לעת קודם שמת, חייב:
22And should men quarrel and hit a pregnant woman, and she miscarries but there is no fatality, he shall surely be punished, when the woman's husband makes demands of him, and he shall give [restitution] according to the judges' [orders]. כבוְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָֽצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִֽהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵֽעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים:
And should men quarrel: with one another, and [one] intended to strike his fellow, and [instead] struck a woman. [From Sanh. 79a] וכי ינצו אנשים: זה עם זה, ונתכוין להכות את חבירו והכה את האשה:
and hit a pregnant woman: Heb. נְגִיפָה וְנָגְפוּ is only an expression of pushing and striking, as [in the following phrases:] “lest you strike ךְתִּגֹף your foot with a stone” (Ps. 91:12); “and before your feet are bruised (יִתְנְַָפוּ) ” (Jer. 13:16); “and a stone upon which to dash oneself (נֶגֶף) ” (Isa. 8:14). ונגפו: אין נגיפה אלא לשון דחיפה והכאה, כמו (תהלים צא יב) פן תגוף באבן רגלך, (ירמיה יג טז) ובטרם יתנגפו רגליכם, (ישעיה ח יד) ולאבן נגף:
but there is no fatality: with the woman. -[From Sanh. 79a, Jonathan] ולא יהיה אסון: באשה:
he shall surely be punished: to pay the value of the fetuses to the husband. They assess her [for] how much she was valued to be sold in the market, increasing her value because of her pregnancy. -[From B.K. 49a] I. e., the court figures how much she would be worth if sold as a pregnant slave when customers would take into account the prospect of the slaves she would bear, and her value as a slave without the pregnancy. The assailant must pay the difference between these two amounts. -[B.K. 48b, 49a] ענוש יענש: לשלם דמי ולדות לבעל שמין אותה, כמה היתה ראויה למכר בשוק להעלות בדמיה בשביל הריונה:
he shall surely be punished: Heb. יֵעָנֵשׁ עָנוֹשׁ. They shall collect monetary payment from him, like וְעָנְשׁוּ [in the verse] “And they shall fine (וְעָנְשׁוּ) him one hundred [shekels of] silver” (Deut. 22:19). [From Mechilta] ענוש יענש: יגבו ממון ממנו, כמו (דברים כב יט) וענשו אותו מאה כסף:
when the woman’s husband makes demands of him: When the husband sues him [the assailant] in court to levy upon him punishment for that. כאשר ישית עליו וגו': כשיתבנעו הבעל בבית דין להשית עליו עונש על כך:
and he shall give [restitution]: The assailant [shall give] the value of the fetuses. ונתן: המכה דמי ולדות:
according to the judges: Heb. בִּפְלִלִים, according to the verdict of the judges. -[From Mechilta] בפלילים: על פי הדיינים:
23But if there is a fatality, you shall give a life for a life, כגוְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִֽהְיֶ֑ה וְנָֽתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ:
But if there is a fatality: with the woman. ואם אסון יהיה: באשה:
you shall give a life for a life: Our Rabbis differ on this matter. Some say [that he must] actually [give up his] life, and some say [that he must pay] money, but not actually a life, and if one intends to kill one person and kills another, he is exempt from the death penalty and must pay his [the victim’s] heirs his value, as [it would be if] he were sold in the marketplace. -[From Mechilta, Sanh. 79] ונתתה נפש תחת נפש: רבותינו חולקין בדבר. יש אומרים נפש ממש, ויש אומרים ממון, אבל לא נפש ממש, שהמתכויון להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור ממיתה ומשלם ליורשיו דמיו, כמו שהיה נמכר בשוק:
24an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, כדעַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן שֵׁ֖ן תַּ֣חַת שֵׁ֑ן יָ֚ד תַּ֣חַת יָ֔ד רֶ֖גֶל תַּ֥חַת רָֽגֶל:
an eye for an eye: If [a person] blinds his neighbor’s eye, he must give him the value of his eye, [which is] how much his price to be sold in the marketplace has decreased [without the eye]. So is the meaning of all of them [i.e., all the injuries enumerated in the following verses], but not the actual amputation of a limb, as our Rabbis interpreted it in the chapter entitled הַחוֹבֵל, he who assaults. -[From B.K. 83b, 84a] עין תחת עין: סימא עין חבירו נותן לו דמי עינו, כמה שפחתו דמיו למכור בשוק, וכן כולם, ולא נטילת אבר ממש, כמו שדרשו רבותינו בפרק החובל (בבא קמא פד א):
25a burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a bruise for a bruise. כהכְּוִיָּה֙ תַּ֣חַת כְּוִיָּ֔ה פֶּ֖צַע תַּ֣חַת פָּ֑צַע חַבּוּרָ֕ה תַּ֖חַת חַבּוּרָֽה:
a burn for a burn: Heb. כְּוִיָּה, a burn caused by fire. [Rashi probably alludes to מִכְוַת-אֵשׁ in Lev. 13:24.] Until now [the Torah] spoke of an injury that decreases the value [of the victim], and now of [an injury] that does not decrease the [victim’s] value [as a slave] but causes pain, for instance if he [the assailant] burned him [the victim] on his nails with a spit, they [the judges] compute how much [money] a person like him would be willing to take to endure such pain. -[From B.K. 84a, Mechilta] כויה תחת כויה: מכות אש, ועד עכשיו דבר בחבלה שיש בה פחת דמים, ועכשיו בשאין בה פחת דמים, אלא צער, כגון כוואו בשפוד על צפרנו אומדים כמה אדם כיוצא בזה רוצה ליטול להיות מצטער כך:
a wound: Heb. פֶּצַע, a wound that bleeds, where he wounded his [victim’s] flesh, navredure in Old French, all according to what it [the wound] is. If it decreases his value, he [the assailant must] pay [for the] damage; if he falls into idleness, he [must] pay for idleness, and for healing, shame, and pain. This verse is superfluous [because there is no difference between a wound and a burn. Whatever damage he inflicts he must pay]. In [the chapter] הַחוֹבֵל (B.K. 84a), our Rabbis interpreted it as making one liable for [the victim’s] pain even where there is [permanent] damage [which he must pay for], because although he pays him [the victim] the value of his hand, we do not exempt him from the [payment compensating for the victim’s] pain, reasoning that since he [the assailant] purchased his [the victim’s] hand [by giving the victim payment for its value], he may amputate it with whatever he wants. We say, however, that he should amputate it with a medication that lessens the pain. However, [if] he cut it off with [an] iron [implement] and caused him pain [he must give the victim compensation]. -[From B.K. 85a] פצע: היא מכה המוציאה דם, שפצע את בשרו, נברדור"א בלעז, [פציעה] הכל לפי מה שהוא אם יש בו פחת דמים נותן נזק, ואם נפל למשכב נותן שבת ורפוי ובשת וצער. ומקרא זה יתר הוא, ובהחובל דרשוהו רבותינו לחייב על הצער אפילו במקום נזק, שאף על פי שנותן לו דמי ידו, אין פוטרין אותו מן הצער לומר הואיל וקנה ידו יש עליו לחתכה בכל מה שירצה, אלא אומרים יש לו לחתכה בסם, שאינו מצטער כל כך, וזה חתכה בברזל וצערו:
a bruise: Heb. חַבּוּרָה. This is a blow in which blood collects but does not come out. It only reddens the flesh on that spot. The term חַבּוּרָה is equivalent to tache in Old French [meaning] a spot, like “or a leopard its spots (חִבַרְבֻּרֹתָיו) ” (Jer. 13:23). Its Aramaic translation is מַשְׁקוֹפֵי, an expression of beating, batedure in Old French, [meaning] beating, knocking, and so, שְׁדֻפוֹתקָדִּים (Gen. 41:23) [is translated by Onkelos as:] קִדּוּם שְׁקִיפָן, [which means] “beaten by the [east] wind,” and similarly, “on the lintel (עַל הַמַשְׁקוֹף)” (Exod. 12:7), [is given this appellation] because the door bangs against it [the lintel]. [See commentary on Exod. 12:7.] חבורה: היא מכה שהדם נצרר בה ואינו יוצא, אלא שמאדים הבשר כנגדו ולשון חבורה [טי"א] בלעז [כתם], כמו (ירמיה יג כג) ונמר חברברותיו ותרגומו משקופי, לשון חבטה בטדור"א בלעז [מכה], וכן ושדופת קדים (בראשית מא ו) שקיפן קידום, חבוטות ברוח, וכן על המשקוף (לעיל יב כג) על שם שהדלת נושק עליו:
26And if a man strikes the eye of his manservant or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall set him free in return for his eye, כווְכִֽי־יַכֶּ֨ה אִ֜ישׁ אֶת־עֵ֥ין עַבְדּ֛וֹ אֽוֹ־אֶת־עֵ֥ין אֲמָת֖וֹ וְשִֽׁחֲתָ֑הּ לַֽחָפְשִׁ֥י יְשַׁלְּחֶ֖נּוּ תַּ֥חַת עֵינֽוֹ:
the eye of his manservant: [This refers to] a Canaanite, but a Hebrew [slave] does not go out with [the loss of his] tooth or [his] eye as we have stated on “she shall not go out as the slaves go out” (Exod. 21:7). את עין עבדו: כנעני, אבל עברי אינו יוצא בשן ועין, כמו שאמרנו אצל לא תצא כצאת העבדים (פסוק ז):
in return for his eye: And so it [the law] is with the twenty-four tips of limbs: [i.e.,] the fingers and toes, the two ears and the nose, and the רֹאֹש הַגְּוִיָה, which is the male organ. Why were [both] a tooth and an eye mentioned [when the Torah could have mentioned only one]? Because if it had mentioned an eye and did not mention a tooth, I would say that just as an eye was created with him [at birth], so [does this apply to] everything that is created with him, but a tooth was not created with him [at birth]. [Therefore, I would say that if the master knocked out his slave’s tooth, the slave would not be freed.] If it mentioned a tooth and did not mention an eye, I would say [that] even [if the master knocked out] a baby tooth, which would be replaced [by the natural growth of another tooth, the slave would be freed]. Therefore, it mentions the eye [which cannot be replaced, to teach us that if the master knocks out a baby tooth, the slave is not freed]. -[From Kid. 24a] תחת עינו: וכן בכ"ד ראשי אברים אצבעות הידים והרגלים. ושתי אזנים והחוטם וראש הגויה, שהוא גיד האמה. ולמה נאמר שן ועין, שאם נאמר עין ולא נאמר שן, הייתי אומר מה עין שנברא עמו אף כל שנברא עמו, והרי שן לא נברא עמו, ועם נאמר שן ולא נאמר עין, הייתי אומר אפילו שן תינוק שיש לה חליפין, לכך נאמר עין:
27and if he knocks out the tooth of his manservant or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall set him free in return for his tooth. כזוְאִם־שֵׁ֥ן עַבְדּ֛וֹ אוֹ־שֵׁ֥ן אֲמָת֖וֹ יַפִּ֑יל לַֽחָפְשִׁ֥י יְשַׁלְּחֶ֖נּוּ תַּ֥חַת שִׁנּֽוֹ:
28And if a bull gores a man or a woman and [that one] dies, the bull shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten, and the owner of the bull is clear. כחוְכִֽי־יִגַּ֨ח שׁ֥וֹר אֶת־אִ֛ישׁ א֥וֹ אֶת־אִשָּׁ֖ה וָמֵ֑ת סָק֨וֹל יִסָּקֵ֜ל הַשּׁ֗וֹר וְלֹ֤א יֵֽאָכֵל֙ אֶת־בְּשָׂר֔וֹ וּבַ֥עַל הַשּׁ֖וֹר נָקִֽי:
And if a bull gores: [This law refers to] either a bull or any domestic animal, beast, or bird, but the text spoke of what usually occurs [i.e., bulls usually gore]. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 54b] וכי יגח שור: אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה וחיה ועוף אלא שדיבר הכתוב בהווה:
and its flesh shall not be eaten: From the implication of what was stated: “the bull shall surely be stoned,” do I not know that it will become carrion [i.e., meaning not killed according to halachah], and carrion is forbidden to be eaten. For what purpose, then, does the Torah state: “and its flesh shall not be eaten” ? [To inform us] that even if one slaughtered it [according to halachah] after it was sentenced, it is forbidden to be eaten. How do we know that no benefit may be derived from it [this animal sentenced to death]? Therefore, the Torah says: “and the owner of the bull is clean (נָקִי) ”, as one says to his friend, “So-and-so lost his property [lit., was cleaned out (נָקִי) of his property], and he has no benefit at all from it” (B.K. 41a). This is its midrashic meaning. Its simple meaning is as its apparent meaning. Since it says concerning a habitual gorer: “and also its owner shall be put to death,” it had to say that in the case of a tame [bull]: “and the owner of the bull is clean [i.e., clear of any charges].” [The tame bull (ךְתָּם) is the bull that did not gore habitually, but only once or twice. In the case of the bull that killed a person, this bull is put to death, but the owner is clear; i.e., he does not have to pay ransom. Should the bull gore three people and kill all of them, it is called מוּעָד, warned. The fourth time it gores someone it is liable to death, and its owner is also liable to death by the hands of Heaven. In order to clear himself of this punishment he must pay ransom, as is delineated in verses 29 and 30.] ולא יאכל את בשרו: ממשמע שנאמר סקול יסקל השור, איני יודע שהוא נבלה, ונבלה אסורה באכילה, אלא מה תלמוד לומר ולא יאכל את בשרו, שאפילו שחטו לאחר שנגמר דינו, אסור באכילה. בהנאה מנין, תלמוד לומר ובעל השור נקי, כאדם האומר לחבירו יצא פלוני נקי מנכסיו ואין לו בהם הנאה של כלום, זהו מדרשו. ופשוטו כמשמעו לפי שנאמר במועד וגם בעליו יומת, הוצרך לומר בתם ובעל השור נקי:
29But if it is a [habitually] goring bull since yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner had been warned, but he did not guard it, and it puts to death a man or a woman, the bull shall be stoned, and also its owner shall be put to death, כטוְאִ֡ם שׁוֹר֩ נַגָּ֨ח ה֜וּא מִתְּמֹ֣ל שִׁלְשֹׁ֗ם וְהוּעַ֤ד בִּבְעָלָיו֙ וְלֹ֣א יִשְׁמְרֶ֔נּוּ וְהֵמִ֥ית אִ֖ישׁ א֣וֹ אִשָּׁ֑ה הַשּׁוֹר֙ יִסָּקֵ֔ל וְגַם־בְּעָלָ֖יו יוּמָֽת:
since yesterday and the day before yesterday: This implies [a total of] three gorings. [From Mechilta, B.K. 23b] מתמל שלשם: הרי שלש נגיחות -:
and its owner has been warned: Heb. וְהוּעַד, a word denoting a warning in front of witnesses (Mechilta, B.K. 24a), like “The man warned us repeatedly (הָעֵד הֵעִד) ” (Gen. 43:3). והועד בבעליו: - לשון התראה בעדים, כמו (בראשית מג ג) העד העיד בנו האיש:
and it puts to death a man, etc.: Since it stated: “if [a bull] gores,” I know only that [the bull is liable to death] if it kills him [its victim] by goring [with its horns]. If it killed him through biting, shoving, or kicking, how do we know [that it must be killed]? Therefore, the Torah states: “and it puts to death,” [implying that in whatever way it kills its victim, the bull is liable to death]. -[based on Mechilta] והמית איש וגו': לפי שנאמר וכי יגח, אין לי אלא שהמיתו בנגיחה, המיתו בנשיכה, דחיפה, רביצה, בעיטה מנין, תלמוד לומר והמית [מכל מקום]:
and also its owner shall be put to death: By the hands of Heaven [and not through a court]. I might think that it [this verse] means [that he is liable to death] by the hands of man [i.e., through the court]. Therefore, the Torah states: “The assailant shall surely be put to death; he is a murderer” (Num. 35:21), [implying that] for his [act of] murder you [must] kill him, but you do not kill him [i. e., anyone] for his bull’s [act of] murder. -[From Sanh. 15b] וגם בעליו יומת: בידי שמים. יכול בידי אדם, תלמוד לומר (במדבר לה כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא, על רציחתו אתה הורגו, ואי אתה הורגו על רציחת שורו:
30insofar as ransom shall be levied upon him, he shall give the redemption of his soul according to all that is levied upon him. לאִם־כֹּ֖פֶר יוּשַׁ֣ת עָלָ֑יו וְנָתַן֙ פִּדְיֹ֣ן נַפְשׁ֔וֹ כְּכֹ֥ל אֲשֶׁר־יוּשַׁ֖ת עָלָֽיו:
insofar as ransom shall be levied upon him: Heb. (אִם). This (אִם) is not [meant as a] conditional, but it is like “When (אִם) you lend money” (Exod. 22:24), a word meaning “that.” His sentence is that the court levy ransom upon him. אם כפר יושת עליו: אם זה אינו תלוי, והרי הוא כמו (לקמן כב כד) אם כסף תלוה, לשון אשר, זה משפטו, שישיתו עליו בית דין כופר:
he shall give the redemption of his soul: [This means] the value of the victim [as a slave]. This is the view of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The value of the damager, [i.e., the owner of the goring bull]. -[From Mechilta] ונתן פדיון נפשו: דמי ניזק, דברי רבי ישמעאל, רבי עקיבא אומר דמי מזיק:
31Or if it gores a young boy or a young girl, according to this ordinance shall be done to him. לאאוֹ־בֵ֥ן יִגּח אוֹ־בַ֣ת יִגָּ֑ח כַּמִּשְׁפָּ֥ט הַזֶּ֖ה יֵעָ֥שֶׂה לוֹ:
Or if it gores a young boy: Heb. בֵן, lit., a son A son who is a minor. או בן יגח: בן שהוא קטן:
or a young girl: Heb. בַת, lit., a daughter who is a minor. Since it says (verse 29): “and it puts to death a man or a woman,” I may think that he (the bull) is liable only for [killing] adults. Therefore, the Torah states: “Or if it gores a young boy, etc.” to make one liable for minors as [for] adults. -[From Mechilta, Mechilta d’Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, B.K. 43b, 44a] או בת: שהיא קטנה. לפי שנאמר והמית איש או אשה, יכול אינו חייב אלא על הגדולים, תלמוד לומר או בן יגח וגו', לחייב על הקטנים כגדולים:
32If the bull gores a manservant or a maidservant, he shall give silver [in the amount of] thirty shekels to his master, and the bull shall be stoned. לבאִם־עֶ֛בֶד יִגַּ֥ח הַשּׁ֖וֹר א֣וֹ אָמָ֑ה כֶּ֣סֶף | שְׁלשִׁ֣ים שְׁקָלִ֗ים יִתֵּן֙ לַֽאדֹנָ֔יו וְהַשּׁ֖וֹר יִסָּקֵֽל:
…a manservant or a maidservant -: Canaanites. -[From Mechilta] אם עבד או אמה: כנעניים:
thirty shekels: This is a decree of the Scriptures [that the bull’s owner pay thirty shekels] whether he [the dead slave] was worth a thousand zuz or whether he was worth no more than a dinar. The weight of the shekel is four pieces of gold, which equal half an ounce according to the official weight of Cologne. שלשים שקלים יתן: גזירת הכתוב הוא, בין שהוא שוה אלף זוז, בין שאינו שוה אלא דינר. והשקל משקלו ארבע זהובים שהם חצי אונקיא למשקל הישר של קולוניי"א:
33And if a person opens a pit, or if a person digs a pit and does not cover it, and a bull or a donkey falls into it, לגוְכִֽי־יִפְתַּ֨ח אִ֜ישׁ בּ֗וֹר א֠וֹ כִּֽי־יִכְרֶ֥ה אִ֛ישׁ בֹּ֖ר וְלֹ֣א יְכַסֶּ֑נּוּ וְנָֽפַל־שָׁ֥מָּה שּׁ֖וֹר א֥וֹ חֲמֽוֹר:
And if a person opens a pit: which was covered, and he uncovered it. וכי יפתח איש בור: שהיה מכוסה וגלהו:
or if… digs: Why was this stated? If he is liable for opening [a pit that had already been dug], is it not [true that he would be] even more [guilty] for digging [a new pit]? But this is to include a digger [who digs deeper] after a digger, that he is liable. [I.e., if one digs a pit nine handbreadths deep, which is capable of injuring an animal but not killing it, and another digs one handbreadth more, making the open pit capable of killing an animal, the second digger is liable in all cases.] -[From B.K. 51a] או כי יכרה: למה נאמר, אם על הפתיחה חייב, על הכרייה לא כל שכן, אלא להביא כורה אחר כורה שהוא חייב:
and does not cover it: intimating that if he covered it, he is exempt [from paying for any damages that could occur], and the text speaks of one who digs in a public domain. -[From B.K. 55b] ולא יכסנו: הא אם כסהו, פטור, ובחופר ברשות הרבים דבר הכתוב:
and a bull or a donkey: The same applies to all domestic animals and beasts, for wherever it says: “a bull and a donkey,” we [can] derive [that it applies to all domestic animals] through a גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה, similar wording of שׂוֹר שׁוֹר, [which is] from [the law concerning the] Sabbath, as it is stated: “In order that your bull and your donkey rest” (Exod. 23:12). Just as there [referring to the Sabbath] every domestic animal and beast is like the bull [in reference to the law], for it says elsewhere [regarding the Sabbath] (Deut. 5:14) “[…you shall not perform any kind of work, neither you, nor your son…] and all your animals,” here, too, all animals and beasts are like the bull [in reference to the law]. The bull and the donkey are mentioned only [for us to understand that] for a bull [that falls into a pit the owner is liable] but not for a man [who falls into a pit], and [he is liable for] a donkey but not for utensils. -[From B.K. 10b] שור או חמור: הוא הדין לכל בהמה וחיה, שבכל מקום שנאמר שור וחמור, אנו למדין אותו שור שור משבת, שנאמר למען ינוח שורך וחמורך (שמות כג יב); מה להלן כל בהמה וחיה כשור. שהרי נאמר במקום אחר וכל בהמתך (דברים ה יג) אף כאן, כל בהמה וחיה כשור, ולא נאמר שור וחמור אלא שור, ולא אדם, חמור, ולא כלים:
34the owner of the pit shall pay; he shall return money to its owner, and the dead body shall be his. לדבַּ֤עַל הַבּוֹר֙ יְשַׁלֵּ֔ם כֶּ֖סֶף יָשִׁ֣יב לִבְעָלָ֑יו וְהַמֵּ֖ת יִֽהְיֶה־לּֽוֹ:
the owner of the pit: [This refers to] the creator of the obstacle [i.e., the pit], although the pit is not his, for he made it in a public domain, Scripture made him its owner, insofar as he is liable for its damages. -[From B.K. 29b] בעל הבור: בעל התקלה, אף על פי שאין הבור שלו, שעשאו ברשות הרבים, עשאו הכתוב בעליו להתחייב עליו בנזקין:
he shall return money to its owner: Heb. יָשִׁיב. [The word] יָשִׁיב [is written] to include [anything] worth money, even bran. -[From B.K. 7a] (See Exod. 22:4: “the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” which Rashi explains to mean that damages are paid from the best land. Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua in the Talmud (B.K. 7b) solves this apparent discrepancy by concluding that it applies only if the defendant prefers to pay the damages with land, but if he prefers to pay with movable objects, everything is deemed the best, because if it cannot be sold here, it can be sold elsewhere.) [Addendum to Rashi] [It can therefore be easily converted to cash.] כסף ישיב לבעליו: ישיב, לרבות שוה כסף, ואפילו סובין:
and the dead body shall be his -: [The dead animal will belong to] the one [owner] who sustained the damage. They assess the carcass, and he [the owner] takes it for its value, and the damager pays him in addition to it [the carcass] payment for his damage. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 10b] והמת יהיה לו: לניזק, שמין את הנבלה ונוטלה בדמים ומשלם לו המזיק עליה תשלומי נזקו:
35And if a man's bull strikes his friend's bull and it dies, they shall sell the live bull and divide the money received for it, and they shall also divide the dead body. להוְכִֽי־יִגֹּ֧ף שֽׁוֹר־אִ֛ישׁ אֶת־שׁ֥וֹר רֵעֵ֖הוּ וָמֵ֑ת וּמָ֨כְר֜וּ אֶת־הַשּׁ֤וֹר הַחַי֙ וְחָצ֣וּ אֶת־כַּסְפּ֔וֹ וְגַ֥ם אֶת־הַמֵּ֖ת יֶֽחֱצֽוּן:
And if… strikes: Heb. יִגֹּף, shove, either with its horns, or with its feet, or whether he bit him with his teeth All are included in נְגִיפָה, for נְגִיפָה is only an expression of striking. -[From Mechilta] וכי יגף: ידחוף, בין בקרניו, בין בגופו, בין ברגליו, בין שנשכו בשניו, כולן בכלל נגיפה הם, שאין נגיפה אלא לשון מכה:
a man’s bull: Heb. שׁוֹר-אִישׁ, a bull [belonging to] a man. שור איש: שור של איש:
they shall sell the live bull, etc.: Scripture speaks of [two bulls] of equal value a bull worth two hundred [zuz] that killed a bull worth two hundred [zuz]. Whether the carcass is worth much or worth little, when this one takes half [the value of] the live [bull] and half [the value of] the dead one, the result is that each one sustains half the damage that death inflicted upon him. We learn that the tame [bull] pays half the damage, for from the equal ones [the bulls of equal value] you learn [how it is with] the unequal ones [bulls of unequal value], for the law of the tame bull is to pay half the damage, not more or less. Or perhaps, even if they were unequal when they were alive, Scripture mandates that they sell them both [and divide the proceeds of the sale between them]? [This cannot be true since] if you say that sometimes the damager would gain very much, or sometimes the victim would receive much more than the amount of the complete damage, for half the value of the damaging bull [may] exceed the entire value of the bull that was damaged. If you say that, the [law regarding the] tame bull is more stringent than the [law regarding the] habitual gorer [which is illogical]. You are compelled to say that Scripture is referring only to the ones [bulls] of equal value. It teaches you that the tame bull pays half the damage, and from the [law concerning] equal ones, you learn about the unequal ones, that for the one who is awarded half the damage they [the court] assess the carcass, and the decrease of its value due to the death, [and] he receives half the depreciation and leaves (B.K. 34a). Now why did Scripture state it in this language? To teach [us] that the tame bull pays only with its body, and if it gored and subsequently died, the one [owner] who sustained the damage receives only the carcass, and if it does not equal half his damage, he has a loss. Or if a bull worth a maneh [one hundred zuz] gored a bull worth five hundred zuz, he [the owner] receives only the bull, for the tame bull did not become obligated to obligate its owner to pay from the best of his property (B.K. 16b). ומכרו את השור וגו': בשוים הכתוב מדבר, שור שוה מאתיים שהמית שור שוה מאתיים, בין שהנבלה שוה הרבה, בין שהיא שוה מעט, כשנוטל זה חצי החי וחצי המת, וזה חצי החי וחצי המת, נמצא כל אחד מפסיד חצי נזק [שהזיקה המיתה, למדנו שהתם משלם חצי נזק, שמן השוין אתה למד לשאינן שוין] כי דין התם לשלם חצי נזק לא פחות ולא יותר. או יכול אף בשאינן שוין בדמיהן כשהן חיים, אמר הכתוב וחצו את שניהם, אם אמרת כן, פעמים שמזיק משתכר הרבה, כשהנבלה שוה לימכר לנכרים הרבה יותר מדמי שור המזיק, ואי אפשר שיאמר הכתוב, שיהא המזיק נשכר. או פעמים שהניזק נוטל הרבה יותר מדמי נזק שלם, שחצי דמי שור המזיק שוין יותר מכל דמי שור הניזק, ואם אמרת כן, הרי תם חמור ממועד, על כרחך לא דבר הכתוב אלא בשוין. ולמדך שהתם משלם חצי נזק, ומן השוין תלמד לשאינן שוין, שהמשתלם חצי נזקו שמין לו את הנבלה, ומה שפחתו דמיו בשביל המיתה, נוטל חצי הפחת והלך, ולמה אמר הכתוב בלשון הזה ולא אמר ישלם חציו, ללמד שאין התם משלם אלא מגופו, ואם נגח ומת, אין הנזוק נוטל אלא הנבלה, ואם אינה מגעת לחצי נזקו, יפסיד. או שור שוה מנה שנגח שור שוה חמש מאות זוז, אינו נוטל אלא את השור, שלא נתחייב התם לחייב את בעליו לשלם מן העליה:
36Or if it was known that it was a [habitually] goring bull since yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner does not watch it, he shall surely pay a bull for a bull, and the dead body shall be his. לוא֣וֹ נוֹדַ֗ע כִּ֠י שׁ֣וֹר נַגָּ֥ח הוּא֙ מִתְּמ֣וֹל שִׁלְשֹׁ֔ם וְלֹ֥א יִשְׁמְרֶ֖נּוּ בְּעָלָ֑יו שַׁלֵּ֨ם יְשַׁלֵּ֥ם שׁוֹר֙ תַּ֣חַת הַשּׁ֔וֹר וְהַמֵּ֖ת יִֽהְיֶה־לּֽוֹ:
Or if it was known: Or if it was not tame, but it was known that it was a [habitually] goring bull today and from yesterday and the day before yesterday, totaling three gorings. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 23b] או נודע: או לא היה תם, אלא נודע כי שור נגח הוא היום, ומתמול שלשום, הרי שלש נגיחות:
he shall surely pay a bull: The complete damage. [Midrash Hagadol from Mechilta d’Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai] שלם ישלם שור: נזק שלם:
and the dead body shall be his: [I.e.,] the victim’s, and in addition to that, the damager must complete it until the victim is paid his entire damage [due to him]. -[From B.K. 10b. 53b] והמת יהיה לו: לניזק, ועליו ישלים המזיק, עד שישתלם ניזק כל נזקו:
37If a man steals a bull or a lamb and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle for the bull or four sheep for the lamb. לזכִּ֤י יִגְנֹֽב־אִישׁ֙ שׁ֣וֹר אוֹ־שֶׂ֔ה וּטְבָח֖וֹ א֣וֹ מְכָר֑וֹ חֲמִשָּׁ֣ה בָקָ֗ר יְשַׁלֵּם֙ תַּ֣חַת הַשּׁ֔וֹר וְאַרְבַּע־צֹ֖אן תַּ֥חַת הַשֶּֽׂה:
five cattle, etc.: Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said: The Omnipresent was considerate of people’s honor. [For] a bull, which walks with its [own] feet, and the thief was not disgraced by carrying it on his shoulder, he pays fivefold. [For] a lamb, which he [the thief] carries on his shoulder, he pays [only] fourfold because he was disgraced by it. Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great the power of work is. [For the theft of] a bull, which caused [the owner] to stop working, he [the thief] pays five. [For the theft of] a lamb, which did not cause [the owner] to stop working, [the thief pays] four. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 79b, Tosefta B.K. 7:3] חמשה בקר וגו': אמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי חס המקום על כבודן של בריות, שור שהולך ברגליו ולא נתבזה בו הגנב לנושאו על כתפו, משלם חמישה, שה שנושאו על כתפו, משלם ארבעה הואיל ונתבזה בו. אמר רבי מאיר בא וראה כמה גדולה כחה של מלאכה, שור שבטלו ממלאכתו משלם חמשה שה שלא בטלו ממלאכתו ארבעה:
for the bull…for the lamb: Scripture repeated them [i.e., the mentioning of the bull and the lamb] to tell [you] that the rule of fourfold and fivefold payments applies only to a bull and a lamb. [From B.K. 67b] תחת השור תחת השה: שנאן הכתוב לומר, שאין מדת תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה נוהגת אלא בשור ושה בלבד:
Exodus Chapter 22
1If, while breaking in, the thief is discovered, and he is struck and dies, [it is as if] he has no blood. אאִם־בַּמַּחְתֶּ֛רֶת יִמָּצֵ֥א הַגַּנָּ֖ב וְהֻכָּ֣ה וָמֵ֑ת אֵ֥ין ל֖וֹ דָּמִֽים:
If, while breaking in: [I.e.,] when he was breaking into the house. אם במחתרת: כשהיה חותר את הבית:
he has no blood: [This signifies that] this is not [considered] murder. It is as though he [the thief] was [considered] dead from the start. Here the Torah teaches you [the lesson]: If someone comes to kill you, kill him first. And this one [the thief] has come to kill you, because he knows that no one [can] hold himself back and remain silent when he sees people taking his money. Therefore, he [the thief] has come with the acknowledgement that if the owner of the property were to stand up against him, he [the owner] would kill him [the thief]. -[From Sanh. 72a] אין לו דמים: אין זו רציחה, הרי הוא כמת מעיקרו. כאן למדתך תורה אם בא להרגך, השכם להרגו, וזה להרגך בא שהרי יודע הוא, שאין אדם מעמיד עצמו וראה שנוטלין ממונו בפניו ושותק, לפיכך על מנת כן בא, שאם יעמוד בעל הממון כנגדו יהרגנו:
2If the sun shone upon him, [it is as if] he has blood; he shall surely pay. If he has no [money], he shall be sold for his theft. באִם־זָֽרְחָ֥ה הַשֶּׁ֛מֶשׁ עָלָ֖יו דָּמִ֣ים ל֑וֹ שַׁלֵּ֣ם יְשַׁלֵּ֔ם אִם־אֵ֣ין ל֔וֹ וְנִמְכַּ֖ר בִּגְנֵֽבָתֽוֹ:
If the sun shone upon him: This is nothing but a metaphor [meaning] if the matter is clear to you that he [the thief] is peaceably disposed toward you-similar to the sun, which represents peace in the world-so it is obvious to you that he has not come to kill [you]. Even if the owner of the money rises against him, for instance, if a father breaks in to steal his son’s property, it is known that the father has mercy on his son, and he has not come with the idea of murdering [him]. -[From Sanh. 72a, Mechilta] אם זרחה השמש עליו: אין זה אלא כמן משל אם ברור לך הדבר שיש לו שלום עמך, כשמש הזה שהוא שלום בעולם, כך פשוט לך שאינו בא להרוג, אפילו יעמוד בעל הממון כנגדו, כגון אב החותר לגנוב ממון הבן, בידוע שרחמי האב על הבן, ואינו בא על עסקי נפשות:
he has blood: He [the thief] is considered as a live person, and it is [considered] murder if the property owner kills him. דמים לו: כחי הוא חשוב ורציחה היא, אם יהרגהו בעל הבית:
he shall surely pay: The thief [shall pay] the money he stole, and he is not liable to death. [The thief is considered to have been sentenced to death in cases where the property owner is allowed kill him. In these cases the thief is exempt from any monetary obligation incurred when he dug into the house. In cases where the property owner may not kill him, however, the thief is not considered liable to death, and thus must pay for what he stole.] Onkelos, who rendered: “If the eye of witnesses fell upon him,” adopted another view, saying that if witnesses discovered him [the thief] before the property owner came, and when the property owner came against him, they warned him not to kill him, [the thief is considered as if] he has blood; i.e., he [the owner] is liable for him [the thief] if he kills him, because since [he has committed his crime when] people can see him, this thief has not come with the intention to murder, and he would not kill the property owner.
שלם ישלם: הגנב ממון שגנב, ואינו חייב מיתה. ואונקלוס שתרגם אם עינא דסהדיא נפלת עלוהי, לקח לו שטה אחרת, לומר שאם מצאוהו עדים קודם שבא בעל הבית, וכשבא בעל הבית נגדו, התרו בו, שלא יהרגהו, דמים לו, חייב עליו אם הרגו, שאחר שיש רואים לו, אין הגנב הזה בא על עסקי נפשות, ולא יהרוג את בעל הממון:
3If the stolen article is found in his possession whether a bull, a donkey, or a lamb live ones he shall pay twofold. גאִם־הִמָּצֵא֩ תִמָּצֵ֨א בְיָד֜וֹ הַגְּנֵבָ֗ה מִשּׁ֧וֹר עַד־חֲמ֛וֹר עַד־שֶׂ֖ה חַיִּ֑ים שְׁנַ֖יִם יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
If the stolen article is found in his possession: Heb. בְיָדוֹ, lit., in his hand, [meaning] in his possession, [meaning] that he neither slaughtered nor sold [it]. -[From Mechilta] אם המצא תמצא בידו: ברשותו, שלא טבח ולא מכר:
whether a bull, a donkey: Everything is included in the [obligation to make a] twofold payment, whether it is a living thing or something that is not alive, for it says elsewhere (verse 8): “for a lamb, for a garment, for any lost article,… [he] shall pay twofold to his neighbor.” -[From B.K. 62b] ומשור עד חמור: כל דבר בכלל תשלומי כפל בין שיש בו רוח חיים בין שאין בו רוח חיים, שהרי נאמר במקום אחר (פסוק ח) על שה על שלמה על כל אבדה וגו' ישלם שנים לרעהו:
live ones he shall pay twofold: And he shall not pay him dead ones, but either live ones or the value of live ones. -[From Mechilta] חיים שנים ישלם: ולא ישלם לו מתים, אלא חיים או דמי חיים:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 106 - 107
• Hebrew text
• English text
•
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 23
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
Daily Thought:
Unslavery
It is not business, not money, nor career, nor human relationships that tear our souls from us, and us from our G‑d. There is as much beauty in any of those as there is in any tree from the Garden of Eden, as much divinity as in any holy temple. G‑d, after all, is found wherever you care to look for Him.
It is the way we lock ourselves inside each of these, begging them to take us as their slave; the way we sacrifice upon their altars our dignity as human beings.
Whatever matter of this world you enter, stay higher, stay beyond. Remain free.
---------------------CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Today is: Monday, Shvat 22, 5776 · February 1, 2016
Torah Reading: Mishpatim: Exodus 21:1 “These are the rulings you are to present to them:
2 “If you purchase a Hebrew slave, he is to work six years; but in the seventh, he is to be given his freedom without having to pay anything. 3 If he came single, he is to leave single; if he was married when he came, his wife is to go with him when he leaves. 4 But if his master gave him a wife, and she bore him sons or daughters, then the wife and her children will belong to her master, and he will leave by himself. 5 Nevertheless, if the slave declares, ‘I love my master, my wife and my children, so I don’t want to go free,’ 6 then his master is to bring him before God; and there at the door or doorpost, his master is to pierce his ear with an awl; and the man will be his slave for life.
7 “If a man sells his daughter as a slave, she is not to go free like the men-slaves. 8 If her master married her but decides she no longer pleases him, then he is to allow her to be redeemed. He is not allowed to sell her to a foreign people, because he has treated her unfairly. 9 If he has her marry his son, then he is to treat her like a daughter. 10 If he marries another wife, he is not to reduce her food, clothing or marital rights. 11 If he fails to provide her with these three things, she is to be given her freedom without having to pay anything.
12 “Whoever attacks a person and causes his death must be put to death. 13 If it was not premeditated but an act of God, then I will designate for you a place to which he can flee. 14 But if someone willfully kills another after deliberate planning, you are to take him even from my altar and put him to death.
15 “Whoever attacks his father or mother must be put to death.
16 “Whoever kidnaps someone must be put to death, regardless of whether he has already sold him or the person is found still in his possession.
17 “Whoever curses his father or mother must be put to death.
18 “If two people fight, and one hits the other with a stone or with his fist, and the injured party doesn’t die but is confined to his bed; 19 then, if he recovers enough to be able to walk around outside, even if with a cane, the attacker will be free of liability, except to compensate him for his loss of time and take responsibility for his care until his recovery is complete.
Today in Jewish History:• Passing of Kotzker Rebbe (1859)
Passing of Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Kotzk (1787-1859), renowned Chassidic leader, and forerunner of the "Ger" Chassidic dynasty.
• Rebbetzin Chaya Mushka Schneerson's Yahrtzeit (1988)
Rebbetzin Chaya Mushkah Schneerson (b. 1901), wife of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, passed away on the 22nd of Shevat of the year 5748 (1988). For more on the Rebbetzin, see link below. Chabad's annual international conference of sheluchot (woman "emissaries") is held on or near this date.
Links: An on-line biography; more on the Rebbetzin
Daily Quote:
Better that you not vow, than that you should vow and not fulfill[Ecclesiastes 5:4]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Mishpatim, 2nd Portion Exodus 21:20-22:3 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 21
20And should a man strike his manservant or his maidservant with a rod, and [that one] die under his hand, he shall surely be avenged. כוְכִֽי־יַכֶּה֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶת־עַבְדּ֜וֹ א֤וֹ אֶת־אֲמָתוֹ֙ בַּשֵּׁ֔בֶט וּמֵ֖ת תַּ֣חַת יָד֑וֹ נָקֹ֖ם יִנָּקֵֽם:
And should a man strike his manservant or his maidservant: The text is referring to a Canaanite slave, or perhaps it is referring only to a Hebrew [slave]? To clarify this, the Torah says: “because he is his property” (verse 21). Just as his property is his permanent acquisition, so is the slave [in question] one who is his permanent acquisition. Now, was he [the one who kills his slave] not included in “He who strikes a man and he dies” (above, verse 12) ? This verse was written [lit., came] to exclude him [the owner of the slave] from the general rule [concerning murder], to be judged with the law of “a day or two days” (verse 21), that if he did not die under his hand but lingered an entire twenty-four-hour period, he is exempt. -[From Mechilta] וכי יכה איש את עבדו או את אמתו: בעבד כנעני הכתוב מדבר. או אינו אלא בעברי, תלמוד לומר כי כספו הוא, מה כספו קנוי לו עולמית, אף עבד הקנוי לו עולמית. והרי היה בכלל (פסוק יב) מכה איש ומת, אלא בא הכתוב והוציאו מן הכלל, להיות נדון בדין יום או יומים, שאם לא מת תחת ידו ושהה מעת לעת פטור:
with a rod: The verse refers to [a rod] that has sufficient [weight and strength] to kill [someone]. Or perhaps that is not so, but [the master is liable] even if it [the rod] does not have sufficient [weight and strength] to kill? Therefore, the Torah says concerning an Israelite: “Or if he strikes him with a stone that can be held in the hand, from which he may die” (Num. 35:17). (“Or if he strikes him with a wooden instrument that can be held in the hand, from which he may die” ) (Num. 35:18). -[Mizrachi version] Now could the matter not be understood by a kal vachomer [an inference from a major to a minor case], that if [in the case of] an Israelite [victim], [a case] which is treated more stringently, one is not liable unless he struck him [the victim] with an article that has sufficient [weight and strength] to kill and the blow is on an organ which could cause death, how much more should it be so [in the case of] a slave, [a case] which is treated more leniently? -[From Mechilta] בשבט: כשיש בו כדי להמית הכתוב מדבר. או אינו אלא אפילו אין בו כדי להמית, תלמוד לומר בישראל (במדבר לה יז) ואם באבן יד אשר ימות בה הכהו, והלא דברים קל וחומר מה ישראל חמור אין חייב עליו, אלא אם כן הכהו בדבר שיש בו כדי להמית, ועל אבר שהוא כדי למות בהכאה זו, עבד הקל לא כל שכן:
he shall surely be avenged: [with] death by the sword [decapitation], and so does the Torah say: “a sword avenging the vengeance of the covenant” (Lev. 26:25). -[From Mechilta, Sanh. 52b] נקם ינקם: מיתת סייף, וכן הוא אומר (ויקרא כו כה) חרב נוקמות נקם ברית:
21But if he survives for a day or for two days, he shall not be avenged, because he is his property. כאאַ֥ךְ אִם־י֛וֹם א֥וֹ יוֹמַ֖יִם יַֽעֲמֹ֑ד לֹ֣א יֻקַּ֔ם כִּ֥י כַסְפּ֖וֹ הֽוּא:
But if he survives for a day or two he shall not be avenged: If one day[’s survival] exempts him [from punishment], then would not [survival of] two days be even more obvious? [Why then, is the word יומים written?] Rather [it must be that we are speaking of] one day which is as two days, and what [kind of day] is that? A full, twenty-four hour period. אך אם יום או יומים יעמוד לא יקם: אם על יום אחד הוא פטור, על יומים לא כל שכן, אלא יום שהוא כיומים, ואיזה, זה מעת לעת:
he shall not be avenged, because he is his property: But if someone else struck him, even if he lingered for twenty-four hours before he died, he [the other person] is liable [to incur the death penalty]. לא יקם כי כספו הוא: הא אחר שהכהו, אף על פי ששהה מעת לעת קודם שמת, חייב:
22And should men quarrel and hit a pregnant woman, and she miscarries but there is no fatality, he shall surely be punished, when the woman's husband makes demands of him, and he shall give [restitution] according to the judges' [orders]. כבוְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָֽצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִֽהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵֽעָנֵ֗שׁ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֨ר יָשִׁ֤ית עָלָיו֙ בַּ֣עַל הָֽאִשָּׁ֔ה וְנָתַ֖ן בִּפְלִלִֽים:
And should men quarrel: with one another, and [one] intended to strike his fellow, and [instead] struck a woman. [From Sanh. 79a] וכי ינצו אנשים: זה עם זה, ונתכוין להכות את חבירו והכה את האשה:
and hit a pregnant woman: Heb. נְגִיפָה וְנָגְפוּ is only an expression of pushing and striking, as [in the following phrases:] “lest you strike ךְתִּגֹף your foot with a stone” (Ps. 91:12); “and before your feet are bruised (יִתְנְַָפוּ) ” (Jer. 13:16); “and a stone upon which to dash oneself (נֶגֶף) ” (Isa. 8:14). ונגפו: אין נגיפה אלא לשון דחיפה והכאה, כמו (תהלים צא יב) פן תגוף באבן רגלך, (ירמיה יג טז) ובטרם יתנגפו רגליכם, (ישעיה ח יד) ולאבן נגף:
but there is no fatality: with the woman. -[From Sanh. 79a, Jonathan] ולא יהיה אסון: באשה:
he shall surely be punished: to pay the value of the fetuses to the husband. They assess her [for] how much she was valued to be sold in the market, increasing her value because of her pregnancy. -[From B.K. 49a] I. e., the court figures how much she would be worth if sold as a pregnant slave when customers would take into account the prospect of the slaves she would bear, and her value as a slave without the pregnancy. The assailant must pay the difference between these two amounts. -[B.K. 48b, 49a] ענוש יענש: לשלם דמי ולדות לבעל שמין אותה, כמה היתה ראויה למכר בשוק להעלות בדמיה בשביל הריונה:
he shall surely be punished: Heb. יֵעָנֵשׁ עָנוֹשׁ. They shall collect monetary payment from him, like וְעָנְשׁוּ [in the verse] “And they shall fine (וְעָנְשׁוּ) him one hundred [shekels of] silver” (Deut. 22:19). [From Mechilta] ענוש יענש: יגבו ממון ממנו, כמו (דברים כב יט) וענשו אותו מאה כסף:
when the woman’s husband makes demands of him: When the husband sues him [the assailant] in court to levy upon him punishment for that. כאשר ישית עליו וגו': כשיתבנעו הבעל בבית דין להשית עליו עונש על כך:
and he shall give [restitution]: The assailant [shall give] the value of the fetuses. ונתן: המכה דמי ולדות:
according to the judges: Heb. בִּפְלִלִים, according to the verdict of the judges. -[From Mechilta] בפלילים: על פי הדיינים:
23But if there is a fatality, you shall give a life for a life, כגוְאִם־אָס֖וֹן יִֽהְיֶ֑ה וְנָֽתַתָּ֥ה נֶ֖פֶשׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ:
But if there is a fatality: with the woman. ואם אסון יהיה: באשה:
you shall give a life for a life: Our Rabbis differ on this matter. Some say [that he must] actually [give up his] life, and some say [that he must pay] money, but not actually a life, and if one intends to kill one person and kills another, he is exempt from the death penalty and must pay his [the victim’s] heirs his value, as [it would be if] he were sold in the marketplace. -[From Mechilta, Sanh. 79] ונתתה נפש תחת נפש: רבותינו חולקין בדבר. יש אומרים נפש ממש, ויש אומרים ממון, אבל לא נפש ממש, שהמתכויון להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור ממיתה ומשלם ליורשיו דמיו, כמו שהיה נמכר בשוק:
24an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, כדעַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן שֵׁ֖ן תַּ֣חַת שֵׁ֑ן יָ֚ד תַּ֣חַת יָ֔ד רֶ֖גֶל תַּ֥חַת רָֽגֶל:
an eye for an eye: If [a person] blinds his neighbor’s eye, he must give him the value of his eye, [which is] how much his price to be sold in the marketplace has decreased [without the eye]. So is the meaning of all of them [i.e., all the injuries enumerated in the following verses], but not the actual amputation of a limb, as our Rabbis interpreted it in the chapter entitled הַחוֹבֵל, he who assaults. -[From B.K. 83b, 84a] עין תחת עין: סימא עין חבירו נותן לו דמי עינו, כמה שפחתו דמיו למכור בשוק, וכן כולם, ולא נטילת אבר ממש, כמו שדרשו רבותינו בפרק החובל (בבא קמא פד א):
25a burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a bruise for a bruise. כהכְּוִיָּה֙ תַּ֣חַת כְּוִיָּ֔ה פֶּ֖צַע תַּ֣חַת פָּ֑צַע חַבּוּרָ֕ה תַּ֖חַת חַבּוּרָֽה:
a burn for a burn: Heb. כְּוִיָּה, a burn caused by fire. [Rashi probably alludes to מִכְוַת-אֵשׁ in Lev. 13:24.] Until now [the Torah] spoke of an injury that decreases the value [of the victim], and now of [an injury] that does not decrease the [victim’s] value [as a slave] but causes pain, for instance if he [the assailant] burned him [the victim] on his nails with a spit, they [the judges] compute how much [money] a person like him would be willing to take to endure such pain. -[From B.K. 84a, Mechilta] כויה תחת כויה: מכות אש, ועד עכשיו דבר בחבלה שיש בה פחת דמים, ועכשיו בשאין בה פחת דמים, אלא צער, כגון כוואו בשפוד על צפרנו אומדים כמה אדם כיוצא בזה רוצה ליטול להיות מצטער כך:
a wound: Heb. פֶּצַע, a wound that bleeds, where he wounded his [victim’s] flesh, navredure in Old French, all according to what it [the wound] is. If it decreases his value, he [the assailant must] pay [for the] damage; if he falls into idleness, he [must] pay for idleness, and for healing, shame, and pain. This verse is superfluous [because there is no difference between a wound and a burn. Whatever damage he inflicts he must pay]. In [the chapter] הַחוֹבֵל (B.K. 84a), our Rabbis interpreted it as making one liable for [the victim’s] pain even where there is [permanent] damage [which he must pay for], because although he pays him [the victim] the value of his hand, we do not exempt him from the [payment compensating for the victim’s] pain, reasoning that since he [the assailant] purchased his [the victim’s] hand [by giving the victim payment for its value], he may amputate it with whatever he wants. We say, however, that he should amputate it with a medication that lessens the pain. However, [if] he cut it off with [an] iron [implement] and caused him pain [he must give the victim compensation]. -[From B.K. 85a] פצע: היא מכה המוציאה דם, שפצע את בשרו, נברדור"א בלעז, [פציעה] הכל לפי מה שהוא אם יש בו פחת דמים נותן נזק, ואם נפל למשכב נותן שבת ורפוי ובשת וצער. ומקרא זה יתר הוא, ובהחובל דרשוהו רבותינו לחייב על הצער אפילו במקום נזק, שאף על פי שנותן לו דמי ידו, אין פוטרין אותו מן הצער לומר הואיל וקנה ידו יש עליו לחתכה בכל מה שירצה, אלא אומרים יש לו לחתכה בסם, שאינו מצטער כל כך, וזה חתכה בברזל וצערו:
a bruise: Heb. חַבּוּרָה. This is a blow in which blood collects but does not come out. It only reddens the flesh on that spot. The term חַבּוּרָה is equivalent to tache in Old French [meaning] a spot, like “or a leopard its spots (חִבַרְבֻּרֹתָיו) ” (Jer. 13:23). Its Aramaic translation is מַשְׁקוֹפֵי, an expression of beating, batedure in Old French, [meaning] beating, knocking, and so, שְׁדֻפוֹתקָדִּים (Gen. 41:23) [is translated by Onkelos as:] קִדּוּם שְׁקִיפָן, [which means] “beaten by the [east] wind,” and similarly, “on the lintel (עַל הַמַשְׁקוֹף)” (Exod. 12:7), [is given this appellation] because the door bangs against it [the lintel]. [See commentary on Exod. 12:7.] חבורה: היא מכה שהדם נצרר בה ואינו יוצא, אלא שמאדים הבשר כנגדו ולשון חבורה [טי"א] בלעז [כתם], כמו (ירמיה יג כג) ונמר חברברותיו ותרגומו משקופי, לשון חבטה בטדור"א בלעז [מכה], וכן ושדופת קדים (בראשית מא ו) שקיפן קידום, חבוטות ברוח, וכן על המשקוף (לעיל יב כג) על שם שהדלת נושק עליו:
26And if a man strikes the eye of his manservant or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall set him free in return for his eye, כווְכִֽי־יַכֶּ֨ה אִ֜ישׁ אֶת־עֵ֥ין עַבְדּ֛וֹ אֽוֹ־אֶת־עֵ֥ין אֲמָת֖וֹ וְשִֽׁחֲתָ֑הּ לַֽחָפְשִׁ֥י יְשַׁלְּחֶ֖נּוּ תַּ֥חַת עֵינֽוֹ:
the eye of his manservant: [This refers to] a Canaanite, but a Hebrew [slave] does not go out with [the loss of his] tooth or [his] eye as we have stated on “she shall not go out as the slaves go out” (Exod. 21:7). את עין עבדו: כנעני, אבל עברי אינו יוצא בשן ועין, כמו שאמרנו אצל לא תצא כצאת העבדים (פסוק ז):
in return for his eye: And so it [the law] is with the twenty-four tips of limbs: [i.e.,] the fingers and toes, the two ears and the nose, and the רֹאֹש הַגְּוִיָה, which is the male organ. Why were [both] a tooth and an eye mentioned [when the Torah could have mentioned only one]? Because if it had mentioned an eye and did not mention a tooth, I would say that just as an eye was created with him [at birth], so [does this apply to] everything that is created with him, but a tooth was not created with him [at birth]. [Therefore, I would say that if the master knocked out his slave’s tooth, the slave would not be freed.] If it mentioned a tooth and did not mention an eye, I would say [that] even [if the master knocked out] a baby tooth, which would be replaced [by the natural growth of another tooth, the slave would be freed]. Therefore, it mentions the eye [which cannot be replaced, to teach us that if the master knocks out a baby tooth, the slave is not freed]. -[From Kid. 24a] תחת עינו: וכן בכ"ד ראשי אברים אצבעות הידים והרגלים. ושתי אזנים והחוטם וראש הגויה, שהוא גיד האמה. ולמה נאמר שן ועין, שאם נאמר עין ולא נאמר שן, הייתי אומר מה עין שנברא עמו אף כל שנברא עמו, והרי שן לא נברא עמו, ועם נאמר שן ולא נאמר עין, הייתי אומר אפילו שן תינוק שיש לה חליפין, לכך נאמר עין:
27and if he knocks out the tooth of his manservant or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall set him free in return for his tooth. כזוְאִם־שֵׁ֥ן עַבְדּ֛וֹ אוֹ־שֵׁ֥ן אֲמָת֖וֹ יַפִּ֑יל לַֽחָפְשִׁ֥י יְשַׁלְּחֶ֖נּוּ תַּ֥חַת שִׁנּֽוֹ:
28And if a bull gores a man or a woman and [that one] dies, the bull shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten, and the owner of the bull is clear. כחוְכִֽי־יִגַּ֨ח שׁ֥וֹר אֶת־אִ֛ישׁ א֥וֹ אֶת־אִשָּׁ֖ה וָמֵ֑ת סָק֨וֹל יִסָּקֵ֜ל הַשּׁ֗וֹר וְלֹ֤א יֵֽאָכֵל֙ אֶת־בְּשָׂר֔וֹ וּבַ֥עַל הַשּׁ֖וֹר נָקִֽי:
And if a bull gores: [This law refers to] either a bull or any domestic animal, beast, or bird, but the text spoke of what usually occurs [i.e., bulls usually gore]. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 54b] וכי יגח שור: אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה וחיה ועוף אלא שדיבר הכתוב בהווה:
and its flesh shall not be eaten: From the implication of what was stated: “the bull shall surely be stoned,” do I not know that it will become carrion [i.e., meaning not killed according to halachah], and carrion is forbidden to be eaten. For what purpose, then, does the Torah state: “and its flesh shall not be eaten” ? [To inform us] that even if one slaughtered it [according to halachah] after it was sentenced, it is forbidden to be eaten. How do we know that no benefit may be derived from it [this animal sentenced to death]? Therefore, the Torah says: “and the owner of the bull is clean (נָקִי) ”, as one says to his friend, “So-and-so lost his property [lit., was cleaned out (נָקִי) of his property], and he has no benefit at all from it” (B.K. 41a). This is its midrashic meaning. Its simple meaning is as its apparent meaning. Since it says concerning a habitual gorer: “and also its owner shall be put to death,” it had to say that in the case of a tame [bull]: “and the owner of the bull is clean [i.e., clear of any charges].” [The tame bull (ךְתָּם) is the bull that did not gore habitually, but only once or twice. In the case of the bull that killed a person, this bull is put to death, but the owner is clear; i.e., he does not have to pay ransom. Should the bull gore three people and kill all of them, it is called מוּעָד, warned. The fourth time it gores someone it is liable to death, and its owner is also liable to death by the hands of Heaven. In order to clear himself of this punishment he must pay ransom, as is delineated in verses 29 and 30.] ולא יאכל את בשרו: ממשמע שנאמר סקול יסקל השור, איני יודע שהוא נבלה, ונבלה אסורה באכילה, אלא מה תלמוד לומר ולא יאכל את בשרו, שאפילו שחטו לאחר שנגמר דינו, אסור באכילה. בהנאה מנין, תלמוד לומר ובעל השור נקי, כאדם האומר לחבירו יצא פלוני נקי מנכסיו ואין לו בהם הנאה של כלום, זהו מדרשו. ופשוטו כמשמעו לפי שנאמר במועד וגם בעליו יומת, הוצרך לומר בתם ובעל השור נקי:
29But if it is a [habitually] goring bull since yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner had been warned, but he did not guard it, and it puts to death a man or a woman, the bull shall be stoned, and also its owner shall be put to death, כטוְאִ֡ם שׁוֹר֩ נַגָּ֨ח ה֜וּא מִתְּמֹ֣ל שִׁלְשֹׁ֗ם וְהוּעַ֤ד בִּבְעָלָיו֙ וְלֹ֣א יִשְׁמְרֶ֔נּוּ וְהֵמִ֥ית אִ֖ישׁ א֣וֹ אִשָּׁ֑ה הַשּׁוֹר֙ יִסָּקֵ֔ל וְגַם־בְּעָלָ֖יו יוּמָֽת:
since yesterday and the day before yesterday: This implies [a total of] three gorings. [From Mechilta, B.K. 23b] מתמל שלשם: הרי שלש נגיחות -:
and its owner has been warned: Heb. וְהוּעַד, a word denoting a warning in front of witnesses (Mechilta, B.K. 24a), like “The man warned us repeatedly (הָעֵד הֵעִד) ” (Gen. 43:3). והועד בבעליו: - לשון התראה בעדים, כמו (בראשית מג ג) העד העיד בנו האיש:
and it puts to death a man, etc.: Since it stated: “if [a bull] gores,” I know only that [the bull is liable to death] if it kills him [its victim] by goring [with its horns]. If it killed him through biting, shoving, or kicking, how do we know [that it must be killed]? Therefore, the Torah states: “and it puts to death,” [implying that in whatever way it kills its victim, the bull is liable to death]. -[based on Mechilta] והמית איש וגו': לפי שנאמר וכי יגח, אין לי אלא שהמיתו בנגיחה, המיתו בנשיכה, דחיפה, רביצה, בעיטה מנין, תלמוד לומר והמית [מכל מקום]:
and also its owner shall be put to death: By the hands of Heaven [and not through a court]. I might think that it [this verse] means [that he is liable to death] by the hands of man [i.e., through the court]. Therefore, the Torah states: “The assailant shall surely be put to death; he is a murderer” (Num. 35:21), [implying that] for his [act of] murder you [must] kill him, but you do not kill him [i. e., anyone] for his bull’s [act of] murder. -[From Sanh. 15b] וגם בעליו יומת: בידי שמים. יכול בידי אדם, תלמוד לומר (במדבר לה כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא, על רציחתו אתה הורגו, ואי אתה הורגו על רציחת שורו:
30insofar as ransom shall be levied upon him, he shall give the redemption of his soul according to all that is levied upon him. לאִם־כֹּ֖פֶר יוּשַׁ֣ת עָלָ֑יו וְנָתַן֙ פִּדְיֹ֣ן נַפְשׁ֔וֹ כְּכֹ֥ל אֲשֶׁר־יוּשַׁ֖ת עָלָֽיו:
insofar as ransom shall be levied upon him: Heb. (אִם). This (אִם) is not [meant as a] conditional, but it is like “When (אִם) you lend money” (Exod. 22:24), a word meaning “that.” His sentence is that the court levy ransom upon him. אם כפר יושת עליו: אם זה אינו תלוי, והרי הוא כמו (לקמן כב כד) אם כסף תלוה, לשון אשר, זה משפטו, שישיתו עליו בית דין כופר:
he shall give the redemption of his soul: [This means] the value of the victim [as a slave]. This is the view of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The value of the damager, [i.e., the owner of the goring bull]. -[From Mechilta] ונתן פדיון נפשו: דמי ניזק, דברי רבי ישמעאל, רבי עקיבא אומר דמי מזיק:
31Or if it gores a young boy or a young girl, according to this ordinance shall be done to him. לאאוֹ־בֵ֥ן יִגּח אוֹ־בַ֣ת יִגָּ֑ח כַּמִּשְׁפָּ֥ט הַזֶּ֖ה יֵעָ֥שֶׂה לוֹ:
Or if it gores a young boy: Heb. בֵן, lit., a son A son who is a minor. או בן יגח: בן שהוא קטן:
or a young girl: Heb. בַת, lit., a daughter who is a minor. Since it says (verse 29): “and it puts to death a man or a woman,” I may think that he (the bull) is liable only for [killing] adults. Therefore, the Torah states: “Or if it gores a young boy, etc.” to make one liable for minors as [for] adults. -[From Mechilta, Mechilta d’Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, B.K. 43b, 44a] או בת: שהיא קטנה. לפי שנאמר והמית איש או אשה, יכול אינו חייב אלא על הגדולים, תלמוד לומר או בן יגח וגו', לחייב על הקטנים כגדולים:
32If the bull gores a manservant or a maidservant, he shall give silver [in the amount of] thirty shekels to his master, and the bull shall be stoned. לבאִם־עֶ֛בֶד יִגַּ֥ח הַשּׁ֖וֹר א֣וֹ אָמָ֑ה כֶּ֣סֶף | שְׁלשִׁ֣ים שְׁקָלִ֗ים יִתֵּן֙ לַֽאדֹנָ֔יו וְהַשּׁ֖וֹר יִסָּקֵֽל:
…a manservant or a maidservant -: Canaanites. -[From Mechilta] אם עבד או אמה: כנעניים:
thirty shekels: This is a decree of the Scriptures [that the bull’s owner pay thirty shekels] whether he [the dead slave] was worth a thousand zuz or whether he was worth no more than a dinar. The weight of the shekel is four pieces of gold, which equal half an ounce according to the official weight of Cologne. שלשים שקלים יתן: גזירת הכתוב הוא, בין שהוא שוה אלף זוז, בין שאינו שוה אלא דינר. והשקל משקלו ארבע זהובים שהם חצי אונקיא למשקל הישר של קולוניי"א:
33And if a person opens a pit, or if a person digs a pit and does not cover it, and a bull or a donkey falls into it, לגוְכִֽי־יִפְתַּ֨ח אִ֜ישׁ בּ֗וֹר א֠וֹ כִּֽי־יִכְרֶ֥ה אִ֛ישׁ בֹּ֖ר וְלֹ֣א יְכַסֶּ֑נּוּ וְנָֽפַל־שָׁ֥מָּה שּׁ֖וֹר א֥וֹ חֲמֽוֹר:
And if a person opens a pit: which was covered, and he uncovered it. וכי יפתח איש בור: שהיה מכוסה וגלהו:
or if… digs: Why was this stated? If he is liable for opening [a pit that had already been dug], is it not [true that he would be] even more [guilty] for digging [a new pit]? But this is to include a digger [who digs deeper] after a digger, that he is liable. [I.e., if one digs a pit nine handbreadths deep, which is capable of injuring an animal but not killing it, and another digs one handbreadth more, making the open pit capable of killing an animal, the second digger is liable in all cases.] -[From B.K. 51a] או כי יכרה: למה נאמר, אם על הפתיחה חייב, על הכרייה לא כל שכן, אלא להביא כורה אחר כורה שהוא חייב:
and does not cover it: intimating that if he covered it, he is exempt [from paying for any damages that could occur], and the text speaks of one who digs in a public domain. -[From B.K. 55b] ולא יכסנו: הא אם כסהו, פטור, ובחופר ברשות הרבים דבר הכתוב:
and a bull or a donkey: The same applies to all domestic animals and beasts, for wherever it says: “a bull and a donkey,” we [can] derive [that it applies to all domestic animals] through a גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה, similar wording of שׂוֹר שׁוֹר, [which is] from [the law concerning the] Sabbath, as it is stated: “In order that your bull and your donkey rest” (Exod. 23:12). Just as there [referring to the Sabbath] every domestic animal and beast is like the bull [in reference to the law], for it says elsewhere [regarding the Sabbath] (Deut. 5:14) “[…you shall not perform any kind of work, neither you, nor your son…] and all your animals,” here, too, all animals and beasts are like the bull [in reference to the law]. The bull and the donkey are mentioned only [for us to understand that] for a bull [that falls into a pit the owner is liable] but not for a man [who falls into a pit], and [he is liable for] a donkey but not for utensils. -[From B.K. 10b] שור או חמור: הוא הדין לכל בהמה וחיה, שבכל מקום שנאמר שור וחמור, אנו למדין אותו שור שור משבת, שנאמר למען ינוח שורך וחמורך (שמות כג יב); מה להלן כל בהמה וחיה כשור. שהרי נאמר במקום אחר וכל בהמתך (דברים ה יג) אף כאן, כל בהמה וחיה כשור, ולא נאמר שור וחמור אלא שור, ולא אדם, חמור, ולא כלים:
34the owner of the pit shall pay; he shall return money to its owner, and the dead body shall be his. לדבַּ֤עַל הַבּוֹר֙ יְשַׁלֵּ֔ם כֶּ֖סֶף יָשִׁ֣יב לִבְעָלָ֑יו וְהַמֵּ֖ת יִֽהְיֶה־לּֽוֹ:
the owner of the pit: [This refers to] the creator of the obstacle [i.e., the pit], although the pit is not his, for he made it in a public domain, Scripture made him its owner, insofar as he is liable for its damages. -[From B.K. 29b] בעל הבור: בעל התקלה, אף על פי שאין הבור שלו, שעשאו ברשות הרבים, עשאו הכתוב בעליו להתחייב עליו בנזקין:
he shall return money to its owner: Heb. יָשִׁיב. [The word] יָשִׁיב [is written] to include [anything] worth money, even bran. -[From B.K. 7a] (See Exod. 22:4: “the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” which Rashi explains to mean that damages are paid from the best land. Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua in the Talmud (B.K. 7b) solves this apparent discrepancy by concluding that it applies only if the defendant prefers to pay the damages with land, but if he prefers to pay with movable objects, everything is deemed the best, because if it cannot be sold here, it can be sold elsewhere.) [Addendum to Rashi] [It can therefore be easily converted to cash.] כסף ישיב לבעליו: ישיב, לרבות שוה כסף, ואפילו סובין:
and the dead body shall be his -: [The dead animal will belong to] the one [owner] who sustained the damage. They assess the carcass, and he [the owner] takes it for its value, and the damager pays him in addition to it [the carcass] payment for his damage. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 10b] והמת יהיה לו: לניזק, שמין את הנבלה ונוטלה בדמים ומשלם לו המזיק עליה תשלומי נזקו:
35And if a man's bull strikes his friend's bull and it dies, they shall sell the live bull and divide the money received for it, and they shall also divide the dead body. להוְכִֽי־יִגֹּ֧ף שֽׁוֹר־אִ֛ישׁ אֶת־שׁ֥וֹר רֵעֵ֖הוּ וָמֵ֑ת וּמָ֨כְר֜וּ אֶת־הַשּׁ֤וֹר הַחַי֙ וְחָצ֣וּ אֶת־כַּסְפּ֔וֹ וְגַ֥ם אֶת־הַמֵּ֖ת יֶֽחֱצֽוּן:
And if… strikes: Heb. יִגֹּף, shove, either with its horns, or with its feet, or whether he bit him with his teeth All are included in נְגִיפָה, for נְגִיפָה is only an expression of striking. -[From Mechilta] וכי יגף: ידחוף, בין בקרניו, בין בגופו, בין ברגליו, בין שנשכו בשניו, כולן בכלל נגיפה הם, שאין נגיפה אלא לשון מכה:
a man’s bull: Heb. שׁוֹר-אִישׁ, a bull [belonging to] a man. שור איש: שור של איש:
they shall sell the live bull, etc.: Scripture speaks of [two bulls] of equal value a bull worth two hundred [zuz] that killed a bull worth two hundred [zuz]. Whether the carcass is worth much or worth little, when this one takes half [the value of] the live [bull] and half [the value of] the dead one, the result is that each one sustains half the damage that death inflicted upon him. We learn that the tame [bull] pays half the damage, for from the equal ones [the bulls of equal value] you learn [how it is with] the unequal ones [bulls of unequal value], for the law of the tame bull is to pay half the damage, not more or less. Or perhaps, even if they were unequal when they were alive, Scripture mandates that they sell them both [and divide the proceeds of the sale between them]? [This cannot be true since] if you say that sometimes the damager would gain very much, or sometimes the victim would receive much more than the amount of the complete damage, for half the value of the damaging bull [may] exceed the entire value of the bull that was damaged. If you say that, the [law regarding the] tame bull is more stringent than the [law regarding the] habitual gorer [which is illogical]. You are compelled to say that Scripture is referring only to the ones [bulls] of equal value. It teaches you that the tame bull pays half the damage, and from the [law concerning] equal ones, you learn about the unequal ones, that for the one who is awarded half the damage they [the court] assess the carcass, and the decrease of its value due to the death, [and] he receives half the depreciation and leaves (B.K. 34a). Now why did Scripture state it in this language? To teach [us] that the tame bull pays only with its body, and if it gored and subsequently died, the one [owner] who sustained the damage receives only the carcass, and if it does not equal half his damage, he has a loss. Or if a bull worth a maneh [one hundred zuz] gored a bull worth five hundred zuz, he [the owner] receives only the bull, for the tame bull did not become obligated to obligate its owner to pay from the best of his property (B.K. 16b). ומכרו את השור וגו': בשוים הכתוב מדבר, שור שוה מאתיים שהמית שור שוה מאתיים, בין שהנבלה שוה הרבה, בין שהיא שוה מעט, כשנוטל זה חצי החי וחצי המת, וזה חצי החי וחצי המת, נמצא כל אחד מפסיד חצי נזק [שהזיקה המיתה, למדנו שהתם משלם חצי נזק, שמן השוין אתה למד לשאינן שוין] כי דין התם לשלם חצי נזק לא פחות ולא יותר. או יכול אף בשאינן שוין בדמיהן כשהן חיים, אמר הכתוב וחצו את שניהם, אם אמרת כן, פעמים שמזיק משתכר הרבה, כשהנבלה שוה לימכר לנכרים הרבה יותר מדמי שור המזיק, ואי אפשר שיאמר הכתוב, שיהא המזיק נשכר. או פעמים שהניזק נוטל הרבה יותר מדמי נזק שלם, שחצי דמי שור המזיק שוין יותר מכל דמי שור הניזק, ואם אמרת כן, הרי תם חמור ממועד, על כרחך לא דבר הכתוב אלא בשוין. ולמדך שהתם משלם חצי נזק, ומן השוין תלמד לשאינן שוין, שהמשתלם חצי נזקו שמין לו את הנבלה, ומה שפחתו דמיו בשביל המיתה, נוטל חצי הפחת והלך, ולמה אמר הכתוב בלשון הזה ולא אמר ישלם חציו, ללמד שאין התם משלם אלא מגופו, ואם נגח ומת, אין הנזוק נוטל אלא הנבלה, ואם אינה מגעת לחצי נזקו, יפסיד. או שור שוה מנה שנגח שור שוה חמש מאות זוז, אינו נוטל אלא את השור, שלא נתחייב התם לחייב את בעליו לשלם מן העליה:
36Or if it was known that it was a [habitually] goring bull since yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner does not watch it, he shall surely pay a bull for a bull, and the dead body shall be his. לוא֣וֹ נוֹדַ֗ע כִּ֠י שׁ֣וֹר נַגָּ֥ח הוּא֙ מִתְּמ֣וֹל שִׁלְשֹׁ֔ם וְלֹ֥א יִשְׁמְרֶ֖נּוּ בְּעָלָ֑יו שַׁלֵּ֨ם יְשַׁלֵּ֥ם שׁוֹר֙ תַּ֣חַת הַשּׁ֔וֹר וְהַמֵּ֖ת יִֽהְיֶה־לּֽוֹ:
Or if it was known: Or if it was not tame, but it was known that it was a [habitually] goring bull today and from yesterday and the day before yesterday, totaling three gorings. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 23b] או נודע: או לא היה תם, אלא נודע כי שור נגח הוא היום, ומתמול שלשום, הרי שלש נגיחות:
he shall surely pay a bull: The complete damage. [Midrash Hagadol from Mechilta d’Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai] שלם ישלם שור: נזק שלם:
and the dead body shall be his: [I.e.,] the victim’s, and in addition to that, the damager must complete it until the victim is paid his entire damage [due to him]. -[From B.K. 10b. 53b] והמת יהיה לו: לניזק, ועליו ישלים המזיק, עד שישתלם ניזק כל נזקו:
37If a man steals a bull or a lamb and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle for the bull or four sheep for the lamb. לזכִּ֤י יִגְנֹֽב־אִישׁ֙ שׁ֣וֹר אוֹ־שֶׂ֔ה וּטְבָח֖וֹ א֣וֹ מְכָר֑וֹ חֲמִשָּׁ֣ה בָקָ֗ר יְשַׁלֵּם֙ תַּ֣חַת הַשּׁ֔וֹר וְאַרְבַּע־צֹ֖אן תַּ֥חַת הַשֶּֽׂה:
five cattle, etc.: Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said: The Omnipresent was considerate of people’s honor. [For] a bull, which walks with its [own] feet, and the thief was not disgraced by carrying it on his shoulder, he pays fivefold. [For] a lamb, which he [the thief] carries on his shoulder, he pays [only] fourfold because he was disgraced by it. Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great the power of work is. [For the theft of] a bull, which caused [the owner] to stop working, he [the thief] pays five. [For the theft of] a lamb, which did not cause [the owner] to stop working, [the thief pays] four. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 79b, Tosefta B.K. 7:3] חמשה בקר וגו': אמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי חס המקום על כבודן של בריות, שור שהולך ברגליו ולא נתבזה בו הגנב לנושאו על כתפו, משלם חמישה, שה שנושאו על כתפו, משלם ארבעה הואיל ונתבזה בו. אמר רבי מאיר בא וראה כמה גדולה כחה של מלאכה, שור שבטלו ממלאכתו משלם חמשה שה שלא בטלו ממלאכתו ארבעה:
for the bull…for the lamb: Scripture repeated them [i.e., the mentioning of the bull and the lamb] to tell [you] that the rule of fourfold and fivefold payments applies only to a bull and a lamb. [From B.K. 67b] תחת השור תחת השה: שנאן הכתוב לומר, שאין מדת תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה נוהגת אלא בשור ושה בלבד:
Exodus Chapter 22
1If, while breaking in, the thief is discovered, and he is struck and dies, [it is as if] he has no blood. אאִם־בַּמַּחְתֶּ֛רֶת יִמָּצֵ֥א הַגַּנָּ֖ב וְהֻכָּ֣ה וָמֵ֑ת אֵ֥ין ל֖וֹ דָּמִֽים:
If, while breaking in: [I.e.,] when he was breaking into the house. אם במחתרת: כשהיה חותר את הבית:
he has no blood: [This signifies that] this is not [considered] murder. It is as though he [the thief] was [considered] dead from the start. Here the Torah teaches you [the lesson]: If someone comes to kill you, kill him first. And this one [the thief] has come to kill you, because he knows that no one [can] hold himself back and remain silent when he sees people taking his money. Therefore, he [the thief] has come with the acknowledgement that if the owner of the property were to stand up against him, he [the owner] would kill him [the thief]. -[From Sanh. 72a] אין לו דמים: אין זו רציחה, הרי הוא כמת מעיקרו. כאן למדתך תורה אם בא להרגך, השכם להרגו, וזה להרגך בא שהרי יודע הוא, שאין אדם מעמיד עצמו וראה שנוטלין ממונו בפניו ושותק, לפיכך על מנת כן בא, שאם יעמוד בעל הממון כנגדו יהרגנו:
2If the sun shone upon him, [it is as if] he has blood; he shall surely pay. If he has no [money], he shall be sold for his theft. באִם־זָֽרְחָ֥ה הַשֶּׁ֛מֶשׁ עָלָ֖יו דָּמִ֣ים ל֑וֹ שַׁלֵּ֣ם יְשַׁלֵּ֔ם אִם־אֵ֣ין ל֔וֹ וְנִמְכַּ֖ר בִּגְנֵֽבָתֽוֹ:
If the sun shone upon him: This is nothing but a metaphor [meaning] if the matter is clear to you that he [the thief] is peaceably disposed toward you-similar to the sun, which represents peace in the world-so it is obvious to you that he has not come to kill [you]. Even if the owner of the money rises against him, for instance, if a father breaks in to steal his son’s property, it is known that the father has mercy on his son, and he has not come with the idea of murdering [him]. -[From Sanh. 72a, Mechilta] אם זרחה השמש עליו: אין זה אלא כמן משל אם ברור לך הדבר שיש לו שלום עמך, כשמש הזה שהוא שלום בעולם, כך פשוט לך שאינו בא להרוג, אפילו יעמוד בעל הממון כנגדו, כגון אב החותר לגנוב ממון הבן, בידוע שרחמי האב על הבן, ואינו בא על עסקי נפשות:
he has blood: He [the thief] is considered as a live person, and it is [considered] murder if the property owner kills him. דמים לו: כחי הוא חשוב ורציחה היא, אם יהרגהו בעל הבית:
he shall surely pay: The thief [shall pay] the money he stole, and he is not liable to death. [The thief is considered to have been sentenced to death in cases where the property owner is allowed kill him. In these cases the thief is exempt from any monetary obligation incurred when he dug into the house. In cases where the property owner may not kill him, however, the thief is not considered liable to death, and thus must pay for what he stole.] Onkelos, who rendered: “If the eye of witnesses fell upon him,” adopted another view, saying that if witnesses discovered him [the thief] before the property owner came, and when the property owner came against him, they warned him not to kill him, [the thief is considered as if] he has blood; i.e., he [the owner] is liable for him [the thief] if he kills him, because since [he has committed his crime when] people can see him, this thief has not come with the intention to murder, and he would not kill the property owner.
שלם ישלם: הגנב ממון שגנב, ואינו חייב מיתה. ואונקלוס שתרגם אם עינא דסהדיא נפלת עלוהי, לקח לו שטה אחרת, לומר שאם מצאוהו עדים קודם שבא בעל הבית, וכשבא בעל הבית נגדו, התרו בו, שלא יהרגהו, דמים לו, חייב עליו אם הרגו, שאחר שיש רואים לו, אין הגנב הזה בא על עסקי נפשות, ולא יהרוג את בעל הממון:
3If the stolen article is found in his possession whether a bull, a donkey, or a lamb live ones he shall pay twofold. גאִם־הִמָּצֵא֩ תִמָּצֵ֨א בְיָד֜וֹ הַגְּנֵבָ֗ה מִשּׁ֧וֹר עַד־חֲמ֛וֹר עַד־שֶׂ֖ה חַיִּ֑ים שְׁנַ֖יִם יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
If the stolen article is found in his possession: Heb. בְיָדוֹ, lit., in his hand, [meaning] in his possession, [meaning] that he neither slaughtered nor sold [it]. -[From Mechilta] אם המצא תמצא בידו: ברשותו, שלא טבח ולא מכר:
whether a bull, a donkey: Everything is included in the [obligation to make a] twofold payment, whether it is a living thing or something that is not alive, for it says elsewhere (verse 8): “for a lamb, for a garment, for any lost article,… [he] shall pay twofold to his neighbor.” -[From B.K. 62b] ומשור עד חמור: כל דבר בכלל תשלומי כפל בין שיש בו רוח חיים בין שאין בו רוח חיים, שהרי נאמר במקום אחר (פסוק ח) על שה על שלמה על כל אבדה וגו' ישלם שנים לרעהו:
live ones he shall pay twofold: And he shall not pay him dead ones, but either live ones or the value of live ones. -[From Mechilta] חיים שנים ישלם: ולא ישלם לו מתים, אלא חיים או דמי חיים:
---------------------
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 106 - 107
• Hebrew text
• English text
•
Chapter 106
The psalmist continues the theme of the previous psalm, praising God for performing other miracles not mentioned previously, for "who can recount the mighty acts of God?" Were we to try, we could not mention them all!
1. Praise the Lord! Praise the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is everlasting.
2. Who can recount the mighty acts of the Lord, or proclaim all His praises?
3. Fortunate are those who preserve justice, who perform deeds of righteousness all the time.
4. Remember me, Lord, when You find favor with Your people; be mindful of me with Your deliverance;
5. to behold the prosperity of Your chosen, to rejoice in the joy of Your nation, to glory with Your inheritance.
6. We have sinned as did our fathers, we have acted perversely and wickedly.
7. Our fathers in Egypt did not contemplate Your wonders, they did not remember Your abundant kindnesses, and they rebelled by the sea, at the Sea of Reeds.
8. Yet He delivered them for the sake of His Name, to make His strength known.
9. He roared at the Sea of Reeds and it dried up; He led them through the depths, as through a desert.
10. He saved them from the hand of the enemy, and redeemed them from the hand of the foe.
11. The waters engulfed their adversaries; not one of them remained.
12. Then they believed in His words, they sang His praise.
13. They quickly forgot His deeds, they did not wait for His counsel;
14. and they lusted a craving in the desert, they tested God in the wilderness.
15. And He gave them their request, but sent emaciation into their souls.
16. They angered Moses in the camp, and Aaron, the Lord's holy one.
17. The earth opened and swallowed Dathan, and engulfed the company of Abiram;
18. and a fire burned in their assembly, a flame set the wicked ablaze.
19. They made a calf in Horeb, and bowed down to a molten image.
20. They exchanged their Glory for the likeness of a grass-eating ox.
21. They forgot God, their savior, Who had performed great deeds in Egypt,
22. wonders in the land of Ham, awesome things at the Sea of Reeds.
23. He said that He would destroy them-had not Moses His chosen one stood in the breach before Him, to turn away His wrath from destroying.
24. They despised the desirable land, they did not believe His word.
25. And they murmured in their tents, they did not heed the voice of the Lord.
26. So He raised His hand [in oath] against them, to cast them down in the wilderness,
27. to throw down their progeny among the nations, and to scatter them among the lands.
28. They joined themselves to [the idol] Baal Peor, and ate of the sacrifices to the dead;
29. they provoked Him with their doings, and a plague broke out in their midst.
30. Then Phineas arose and executed judgement, and the plague was stayed;
31. it was accounted for him as a righteous deed, through all generations, forever.
32. They angered Him at the waters of Merivah, and Moses suffered on their account;
33. for they defied His spirit, and He pronounced [an oath] with His lips.
34. They did not destroy the nations as the Lord had instructed them;
35. rather, they mingled with the nations and learned their deeds.
36. They worshipped their idols, and they became a snare for them.
37. They sacrificed their sons and daughters to demons.
38. They spilled innocent blood, the blood of their sons and daughters whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan; and the land became guilty with blood.
39. They were defiled by their deeds, and went astray by their actions.
40. And the Lord's wrath blazed against His people, and He abhorred His inheritance;
41. so He delivered them into the hands of nations, and their enemies ruled them.
42. Their enemies oppressed them, and they were subdued under their hand.
43. Many times did He save them, yet they were rebellious in their counsel and were impoverished by their sins.
44. But He saw their distress, when He heard their prayer;
45. and He remembered for them His covenant and He relented, in keeping with His abounding kindness,
46. and He caused them to be treated mercifully by all their captors.
47. Deliver us, Lord our God; gather us from among the nations, that we may give thanks to Your Holy Name and glory in Your praise.
48. Blessed is the Lord, the God of Israel, forever and ever. And let all the people say, "Amen! Praise the Lord!"
Chapter 107
This psalm speaks of those who are saved from four specific perilous situations(imprisonment, sickness, desert travel, and sea travel) and must thank God, for their sins caused their troubles, and only by the kindness of God were they saved. It is therefore appropriate that they praise God and tell of their salvation to all.
1. Give thanks to the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is everlasting.
2. So shall say those redeemed by the Lord, those whom He redeemed from the hand of the oppressor.
3. He gathered them from the lands-from east and from west, from north and from the sea.
4. They lost their way in the wilderness, in the wasteland; they found no inhabited city.
5. Both hungry and thirsty, their soul languished within them.
6. They cried out to the Lord in their distress; He delivered them from their afflictions.
7. He guided them in the right path to reach an inhabited city.
8. Let them give thanks to the Lord, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man,
9. for He has satiated a thirsting soul, and filled a hungry soul with goodness.
10. Those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death, bound in misery and chains of iron,
11. for they defied the words of God and spurned the counsel of the Most High-
12. He humbled their heart through suffering; they stumbled and there was none to help.
13. They cried out to the Lord in their distress; He saved them from their afflictions.
14. He brought them out of darkness and the shadow of death, and sundered their bonds.
15. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His kindness, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man,
16. for He broke the brass gates and smashed the iron bars.
17. Foolish sinners are afflicted because of their sinful ways and their wrongdoings.
18. Their soul loathes all food, and they reach the gates of death.
19. They cried out to the Lord in their distress; He saved them from their afflictions.
20. He sent forth His command and healed them; He delivered them from their graves.
21. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His kindness, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man.
22. Let them offer sacrifices of thanksgiving, and joyfully recount His deeds.
23. Those who go down to the sea in ships, who perform tasks in mighty waters;
24. they saw the works of the Lord and His wonders in the deep.
25. He spoke and caused the stormy wind to rise, and it lifted up the waves.
26. They rise to the sky, plunge to the depths; their soul melts in distress.
27. They reel and stagger like a drunkard, all their skill is to no avail.
28. They cried out to the Lord in their distress, and He brought them out from their calamity.
29. He transformed the storm into stillness, and the waves were quieted.
30. They rejoiced when they were silenced, and He led them to their destination.
31. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His kindness, and [proclaim] His wonders to the children of man.
32. Let them exalt Him in the congregation of the people, and praise Him in the assembly of the elders.
33. He turns rivers into desert, springs of water into parched land,
34. a fruitful land into a salt-marsh, because of the wickedness of those who inhabit it.
35. He turns a desert into a lake, and parched land into springs of water.
36. He settles the hungry there, and they establish a city of habitation.
37. They sow fields and plant vineyards which yield fruit and wheat.
38. He blesses them and they multiply greatly, and He does not decrease their cattle.
39. [If they sin,] they are diminished and cast down through oppression, misery, and sorrow.
40. He pours contempt upon distinguished men, and causes them to stray in a pathless wilderness.
41. He raises the needy from distress, and makes their families [as numerous] as flocks.
42. The upright observe this and rejoice, and all the wicked close their mouth.
43. Let him who is wise bear these in mind, and then the benevolent acts of the Lord will be understood.
---------------------Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 23
• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson
Monday, Shevat 22, 5776 · February 1, 2016
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 23
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Today's Tanya Lesson
Monday, Shevat 22, 5776 · February 1, 2016
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 23
ומאחר שרצון העליון המיוחד באין סוף ברוך הוא בתכלית היחוד, הוא בגילוי לגמרי ולא בהסתר פנים כלל וכלל בנפש האלקית ולבושיה הפנימים, שהם מחשבתה ודבורה, באותה שעה שהאדם עוסק בדברי תורה
Now, since the Divine Will, which is in perfect unity with G‑d Himself, stands completely revealed in the divine soul and in its inner garments — i.e., its thought and speech — while a person occupies himself with words of Torah, and there is nothing obscuring the Divine Will at that time, for when one studies Torah, the Divine Will and wisdom contained in it come into full expression in one’s soul and its faculties of thought and speech,
הרי גם הנפש ולבושיה אלו מיוחדים ממש באין סוף ברוך הוא באותה שעה בתכלית היחוד
it follows that at that time, the soul and these garments of thought and speech are also truly united with G‑d,
כיחוד דבורו ומחשבתו של הקב״ה במהותו ועצמותו כנ״ל
with a unity comparable to that of G‑d’s speech and thought with His essence and being as explained above. 1
כי אין שום דבר נפרד כי אם בהסתר פנים כנ״ל
For nothing is separate from G‑d, except insofar as His Countenance is concealed.
Only then can created beings perceive themselves as distinct entities (as explained in ch. 22). Since there is no such concealment when one studies the Torah, one attains thereby a perfect unity with G‑d — a unity comparable to that of G‑d’s speech and thought with Himself prior to their revelation as “speech” and “thought”, but as they are contained within Himself.
ולא עוד אלא שיחודם הוא ביתר שאת ויתר עז מיחוד אור אין סוף ברוך הוא בעולמות עליונים
Moreover, their unity i.e., the unity of the divine soul and its faculties with G‑d, that is attained through Torah study is even more exalted and more powerful than the unity of G‑d’s infinite light with the upper (spiritual) worlds.
מאחר שרצון העליון הוא בגילוי ממש בנפש ולבושיה העוסקים בתורה, שהרי הוא הוא התורה עצמה
For the Divine Will is actually manifest in the soul and its garments that are engaged in Torah study, since it is identical with the Torah being studied.
וכל העולמות העליונים מקבלים חיותם מאור וחיות הנמשך מהתורה שהיא רצונו וחכמתו יתברך, כדכתיב: כולם בחכמה עשית
All the worlds receive their vitality by way of the light and life derived from the Torah which is G‑d’s Will and wisdom; as it is written, 2 “Through wisdom You have made them all.”
G‑d’s wisdom is thus the source of vitality for all the worlds.
ואם כן החכמה, שהיא התורה, למעלה מכולם
Thus it follows that G‑d’s wisdom, i.e., the Torah, transcends them all.
It must be above all the worlds, since it is their source.
והיא היא רצונו יתברך הנקרא סובב כל עלמין, שהיא בחינת מה שאינו יכול להתלבש בתוך עלמין, רק מחיה ומאיר למעלה בבחינת מקיף
In fact the Torah, G‑d’s Will, is described as “encompassing” all the worlds, meaning that it is at a level that cannot become clothed within the worlds, but rather animates and illuminates them as if from a distance, from above, in a transcending and “encompassing” manner, 3
והיא היא המתלבשת בנפש ולבושיה בבחינת גילוי ממש כשעוסקים בדברי תורה
and it is this level which transcends all the worlds that is clothed in a truly revealed form in one’s soul and his soul-garments, when he studies Torah,
ואף על גב דאיהו לא חזי כו‘ ומשום הכי יכול לסבול משום דלא חזי, מה שאין כן בעליונים
even although he does not see it. 4 I.e., when one studies Torah he is unable to consciously experience the unity of his soul with G‑d which is attained thereby, yet his soul feels it.(5In fact, this is precisely why he can endure such a unity with G‑d, precisely because he cannot feel it — unlike the supernal worlds where G‑dliness is not obscured as it is in this world, and they cannot therefore endure such a unity with G‑d without becoming completely nullified and losing their identities entirely.)
ובזה יובן למה גדלה מאד מעלת העסק בתורה יותר מכל המצות, ואפילו מתפלה שהיא יחוד עולמות עליונים
This discussion of the exalted unity with G‑d attained through Torah study, which is even greater than that accomplished by performing the mitzvot, explains why Torah study is so much loftier than all the other commandments, including even prayer, which effects unity within the supernal worlds.
והא דמי שאין תורתו אומנתו צריך להפסיק, היינו מאחר דמפסיק ומבטל בלאו הכי
(6Although the law requires of anyone whose Torah study is not his entire occupation that he interrupt his study for prayer, 7 which would seem to indicate that prayer surpasses Torah study, this is so only because he would in any case pause and interrupt his studies.)
Thus it is not the law which causes him to interrupt. The law merely states that the interruption which he would have made regardless, be made at the time designated for prayer; and as soon as he interrupts his studies, he is automatically obliged to pray. 8
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Ch. 21. |
| 2. | Tehillim 104:24. |
| 3. | See below, chs. 41, 46, 48 and 51. |
| 4. | Cf. Megillah 3a. |
| 5. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
| 6. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
| 7. | Shabbat 11a; Rambam, Hilchot Tefillah 6:8; R. Shneur Zalman, Shulchan Aruch 106:4. |
| 8. | This interpretation is based on a note by the Rebbe. |
---------------------
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Monday, Shevat 22, 5776 · February 1, 2016
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Negative Commandment 262
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
"He shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or conjugal rights"—Exodus 21:10.
The Torah tells us that if a man marries a Jewish slave-girl, he may not torment her by denying her appropriate food, clothing, or conjugal rights. Rather, he must accord her the rights due to all "the daughters [of Israel]." Thus it is clear that this precept applies to all wives.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Monday, Shevat 22, 5776 · February 1, 2016Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Negative Commandment 262
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
"He shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or conjugal rights"—Exodus 21:10.
The Torah tells us that if a man marries a Jewish slave-girl, he may not torment her by denying her appropriate food, clothing, or conjugal rights. Rather, he must accord her the rights due to all "the daughters [of Israel]." Thus it is clear that this precept applies to all wives.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
A Husband's Obligations towards His Wife
Negative Commandment 262
Translated by Berel Bell
The 262nd prohibition is that one who purchases a Jewish maidservant and then marries her is forbidden from afflicting her. When I say "from afflicting her," I mean that he may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights (sh'eirah, k'susah, onasah) with the intention of afflicting her and causing her anguish.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "He may not diminish her food, clothing, or conjugal rights."
This same prohibition also applies to one who has married any Jewish woman; he also is prohibited from afflicting her in any of these three areas, with the intention of causing her anguish and distress.
The source for this is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He) regarding the Jewish maidservant [whose master marries her and] whose food, clothing, and conjugal rights may not be withheld, "She must be treated exactly as other [married] women." From here we learn that the [proper] treatment of all married women is that one may not diminish their food, clothing, and conjugal rights.
Our Sages explained this in the Mechilta: "What does the verse, '[She must be treated] exactly as other [married] women' teach us [about the treatment of the maidservant]? It appears to come here to teach us something; but rather it ends up being taught about."3
There it is also explained that sh'eirah refers to food; k'susah is meant literally [i.e. clothing], and onasah refers to conjugal rights.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 21:10.
2.Ex. 21:9.
3.By saying that a maidservant must be treated like a regular married woman, it would seem that we know something about the regular woman that we don't know about the maidservant. In reality, however, the opposite is true: we learn from verse 10 that a maidservant's food, clothing, and conjugal relations may not be diminished. By saying in verse 9 that the maidservant is treated like a regular woman, we learn that the same applies to a regular woman.
-------------------------------------
• 1 Chapter: Maaser Sheini Maaser Sheini - Chapter 10 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 10
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class• Maaser Sheini - Chapter 10
Halacha 1
[The restrictions of] neta reva'i applies to all [plants to which] the prohibition oforlah applies.1 And all [plants] that are exempt from orlah are not obligated forneta reva'i, as [Leviticus 19:23-24] states: "For three years [your plants] will be orlah.... In the fourth year..."2
Halacha 2
When a person plants a fruit tree with the intent that it serve as a hedge for a garden or he planted it to use it as lumber and not for its fruit, it is exempt from the prohibition of orlah.3 If he planted it to serve as a hedge and then change his mind and thought to use its fruit or he planted it for the sake of its fruit and then thought to use it as a hedge, since an intent that obligates it was involved, he is liable.4 If he planted it for three years as a hedge and afterwards, intended to use it for food, the laws of neta reva'i do not apply,5because whenever the laws of orlah do not apply, the laws of neta reva'i do not apply.
Halacha 3
When one planted a tree with the intent that inner side will produce food and the outer side will serve as a hedge or the lower portion will produce food and the upper portion will serve as a hedge,6 the portion that was intended for food is liable in the prohibitions of orlah and the portion intended as a hedge or for lumber is exempt. For the matter is dependent on the intent of the one who plants it.
The prohibition of orlah applies to only the caper berries of the caper tree, but its leaves are permitted.7
Halacha 4
When a person plants trees for the sake of people at large8 in his own field, the prohibition of orlah applies. For the term "And you shall plant..."9[used in the prooftext cited above] implies even for the sake of people at large.
When does the above apply? In Eretz Yisrael. In the Diaspora, by contrast, [such trees] are exempt.10
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
[Trees] that grow on their own accord in rocky terrain18 are exempt.19 Even one who plants trees in an unsettled place is exempt, provided the tree does not produce enough fruit so that it would be worthwhile for a person to care for its produce until he brings it to a settled land.20 If, however, the tree produces enough that it is worthwhile to maintain it, the prohibition of orlah applies to it.
Halacha 7
When a person plants a tree for the sake of a mitzvah, e.g., he plants an esrog21 tree [to fulfill] the mitzvah of lulav [and esrog] or an olive tree [to produce oil] for the Menorah,22 the prohibition of orlah applies.23 If he consecrated [a tree] and then planted it, it is exempt.24 If he planted it and then consecrated it, the prohibition of orlah applies.25
Halacha 8
Halacha 9
When a tree is planted in a house, the prohibition of orlah applies. Trees planted by gentiles before our ancestors entered the [Holy] Land28 were exempt.29 After our ancestors entered the land, the prohibition applies even to [trees] planted by gentiles,30 as Leviticus 19:23] states: "When you enter the land and you plant...." [The prohibition begins from] the time of the entry into the land.
Halacha 10
Halacha 11
[With regard to] the prohibition of orlah, [planting a tree refers to] planting a seed,34 a bough from a tree, or uprooting the entire tree from one place and planting it in another.35 We begin counting [the three years] from the time of the planting.36
[The following laws apply if] a tree was shaken from its place, but not uprooted and then one filled the surrounding area with earth.37 If it could live without the surroundings having been filled with earth,38 is exempt. If not, it is considered as if it was uprooted and replanted and the prohibition does apply.
Halacha 12
Similarly, when a tree was uprooted and there remained a root, even one as thin as a needle over which embroiderers wind thread,39 if one returned it to its original place and replanted it, it is exempt [from the prohibitions of orlah], because it could live.40
[The following rules apply if] the tree was uprooted entirely together with the clod of earth41 to which its roots were attached and he replanted it as it is, together with that earth. If it could live from that clod of earth even if it was not replanted, it is as if it was not uprooted. If not, [the laws of orlah] apply.
Halacha 13
Halacha 14
Whether one plants a tree, one extends one,44 or grafts it, [the laws of orlah] apply. When does the above apply? When one cut off a bough from the tree and planted it in the earth or grafted it to another plant. If, however, one extended a branch of an elder plant and then implanted it in the earth or grafted it onto another tree,45 [leaving] the bough connected to the elder tree, [the new growth] is exempt [from the prohibition of orlah].
Halacha 15
If the new growth which was originally extended grew and produced fruit and, afterwards, the source from which it was connected to the elder tree was separated, we count [the years of orlah] from the time that it was separated.46The fruit [that was growing on the tree before it was separated] is, however, permitted, because it grew while permitted. If he left [the fruit on the new tree] after the connection to the original tree was severed until their growth increased by a two-hundredth,47 the fruit is forbidden.48
Halacha 16
When a young tree49 was grafted on to an elder tree and there were fruit on the younger tree, the fruit on the younger tree50 are forbidden even if the fruit increases 200 times its size.51 For the basic fruit that comes from a forbidden entity52 cannot be elevated by the new permitted substances that grow.
Halacha 17
[The following rule applies when] a branch was extended from a tree and implanted in the earth and afterwards, the tree itself was entirely uprooted and it derives its nurture only from the branch implanted in the earth. The tree is considered as if it was planted at this time and the prohibition of orlah applies to it.53 [The three years] are counted for the tree and for whatever grew from the implanted branch from the time it was uprooted.54
Halacha 18
When a person extended a branch and implanted it in the earth and it grew, he then extended and implanted a branch from the new growth and it grew, and then he extended and implanted a branch from the third growth - and continued doing so even for 100 implants each connected with each other - since the connection with the primary plant has not been severed, all [of the fruit]55 is permitted.56 If [the connection to] the original plant is severed,57 [theorlah years] are counted from the time of the severance.
Halacha 19
A tree which grows from a stump is exempt from the prohibitions of orlah.58 [If it grows] from the roots,59 the prohibition of orlah applies.60
The prohibition of orlah applies to a dwarf vine which is less than a handbreadth high throughout its entire life,61 because it looks like a tree that is one year old. When does the above apply? To one tree or to [a group of five, planted in a pattern where] two are planted opposite another pair and a fifth is planted behind them.62 If, however, an entire vineyard is less than a handbreadth high, it would be a matter of common knowledge and its age is calculated in the same way as other trees.
Halacha 20
We may plant a branch from a tree that is orlah,63 but we may not plant a nut that is orlah, because it is produce and it is forbidden to benefit from it, as we explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.64 If one transgressed and planted a nut that is orlah, [the tree] that grows from it is permitted like other trees.65
Halacha 21
Similarly, one may not graft underdeveloped clusters of dates,66 because they are considered as food. If one transgressed and grafted them, the fruits are permitted. [The rationale is that] whenever an entity has two causes, one forbidden67and one which is permitted,68 since it comes as a result of both of them, it is permitted. Therefore [a plant] that grows from fruit that is orlah is permitted, because its growth was caused by the forbidden fruit and the earth which is permitted.
FOOTNOTES
1.
This is speaking about plants within Eretz Yisrael. As mentioned above, according to the Rambam, the laws of neta reva'i do not apply in the Diaspora (Kessef Mishneh).
2.
Since the Torah mentions them in direct sequence with each other, we assume that it is referring to the same type of trees in both instances.
3.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah1:1), the Rambam explains that this concept is alluded to by Leviticus 19:23. When that verse states the prohibition against orlah, it says: "When you plant a tree of which you eat...," i.e., for the prohibition to apply, one must have the intent of partaking of the tree's fruit.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:23) states that it must be evident that the owner did not desire to grow the trees for their fruit, e.g., he planted them to close together to grow fruit properly.
4.
The three years of orlah are counted from the time the tree is planted regardless of when he thought of using it for food (Radbaz).
5.
Similarly, the prohibition of orlah does not apply, because he did not have the intent of growing it for its fruit until the three years in which the prohibition of orlah would apply were completed.
6.
The converse is also true. Even when the lower portion is prohibited because it was intended for food and the upper portion is permitted, because it was intended to be used as a hedge, we do not say that the lower portion causes the upper portion to be forbidden. Even though it grows from it, it remains permitted [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah294:23; Siftei Cohen 294:34).
7.
Although they are edible, they are not considered as food to this extent. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:3) differs and accepts the Rambam's ruling only in the Diaspora. In Eretz Yisrael, even the leaves are considered as food.
8.
I.e., he does not plant the trees in order to partake of the food himself, but to leave it as ownerless, for any passers by to partake of them (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:2)].
9.
More particularly, Pesachim 23a and theSifra (as quoted in the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah) derive this concept from the word lachem in that prooftext.
10.
The rationale for this ruling is that there is a difference of opinion concerning this ruling and we follow the general principle (Berachot36a): Whenever a Sage rules leniently with regard to the situation in Eretz Yisrael, we follow his opinion in the Diaspora."
11.
In all the situations mentioned in this halachah, there is reason to think that the prohibition of orlah does not apply. When trees are planted in the public domain, the land is not his. Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Orlah 2:1), we can conclude that we are speaking about an instance where the person plants for his own self. If he plants trees in the public domain for people at large, the prohibition of orlah does not apply.
12.
One might think that since the ship is not connected to the ground, the prohibition oforlah does not apply. Instead, however, the ship is considered as a large flowerpot in which instance, a tree planted within it is obligated in the laws of orlah, as stated in Halachah 8.
13.
Since no one planted them, one might think the prohibition of orlah does not apply.
14.
If, however, trees grow by their own accord in the public domain, they are ownerless and the prohibition of orlah does not apply [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:2)].
15.
I.e., and afterwards, a Jew purchased the tree from him (ibid.).
The above explanation is taken from Rav Kappach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah and is also reflected in one of the Rambam's responsa. In Rav Kappach's notes, he explains that this represents an emendation of his original text (which is printed in the standard translations of the Commentary to the Mishnah). Those texts state that even if a gentile raises a tree himself, the prohibition of orlah apply. That view is followed by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:8).
16.
Since a gentile is not obligated in any of the mitzvot, one might think the prohibition oforlah does not apply. See also Halachah 9.
17.
We are not speaking about a person who steals land, because the ownership of the land is never stolen. At all times, it and the trees that grow on it are the property of the original owner (Bava Kama 117a). Instead, we are speaking about a person who stole a sapling and planted it. Whether or not the owner despairs of his loss, the prohibition oforlah apply.
18.
This law is taken from the Jerusalem Talmud (Orlah 1:1), only the standard versions of that text read chorshin, "forests," instead of torshin, "rocky terrain." Rav Yosef Corcus suggests that the version of the Jerusalem Talmud available to the Rambam read like his text here. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh suggest emending the text here to read like the standard version of the Jerusalem Talmud.
19.
This applies even if the rocky terrain is a person's private property. We are forced to say that for the previous halachah already mentioned a tree that grew on its own accord in the public domain (Radbaz).
The rationale for this law is that since the soil is not good, the trees will not grow well and will only produce a minimal amount of fruit. Hence, it is considered as if one has planted these trees for purposes other than their fruit and the prohibition of orlah does not apply as stated in Halachah 2.
20.
Even if the person who planted the tree shows concern for the tree's fruit, he is not considered to have planted a tree for the purpose of fruit, for the nature of the situation prevents us from considering it as such.
21.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 294:24) mentions both planting a lulav and an esrog. That version is also acceptable, because the tree used for the lulav must be a date palm whose species produce edible fruit.
22.
The candelabrum in the Temple.
23.
For even though he is not seeking personal benefit from the fruit, he is seeking to use it for a mitzvah. Thus his intent is on the fruit itself.
24.
Because the prohibition of orlah does not apply to consecrated property.
25.
Because as soon as the tree was planted, the prohibition of orlah took effect. The obligation to observe them is not nullified by the consecration of the tree.
26.
Whether of wood or earthenware (Radbaz).
27.
A smaller plant that is planted in a flowerpot without a hole does not derive nurture from the ground. A tree's roots, by contrast, have more power and can derive nurture from the ground even when there is no hole [Jerusalem Talmud (Orlah 1:2)].
28.
Before the conquest of the land by Joshua.
29.
This law is not merely a historical point. It shares an element of contemporary relevance. At present, all of the agricultural laws relevant to Eretz Yisrael are observed only by virtue of Rabbinic decree. It will not be until the entire Jewish people return in the era of Mashiach, that these mitzvot will have the status of Scriptural commandments (seeHilchot Terumah 1:26 and notes). Thus the prohibition of orlah does not apply to trees planted by gentiles in Eretz Yisrael at present. If such trees are less than three years of age when Mashiach leads the entire people back into the land, the laws oforlah will not apply to them (Rambam LeAm).
30.
If the plant for the sake of a Jew, as stated in the notes to Halachah 5.
31.
As stated in Halachah 14, grafting is equivalent to planting.
32.
It is forbidden for a Jew to make such a graft. Once it is made, however, a Jew can benefit from the fruit. He must, however, wait the three orlah years (Radbaz).
33.
See Hilchot Melachim 10:10 which states that, with a few exceptions, if a gentile desires, he may observe any of the mitzvot of the Torah and he receives a reward for doing so.
34.
The Radbaz mentions that in warmer climates, it is possible for a tree to grow from a seed to the point that it can produce fruit in three years. In his Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III., ch. 37, the Rambam states that the Torah mentions three years because it speaks about the majority of instances where trees are grown by planting boughs from other trees.
35.
Rambam LeAm questions why it is necessary for the Rambam to mention "another place." Even if he replanted the tree in its original place, the laws of orlah spply.
36.
I.e., in the case of a replanted tree, we do not consider the years it grew in its previous place.
37.
Replanting it, as it were.
38.
I.e., if the connection via its roots was strong enough to sustain it without filling the earth in around its roots.
39.
See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:4; Keilim 11:15; 13:5) for a more particular definition of this term.
40.
That thin root would be sufficient to provide it with its nurture even if one would not have replanted it.
41.
The Rambam, quoting Orlah 1:3, uses the term sela, usually translated as "rock" for the clod of earth, because the earth hardens around the mass of roots, as he explains in his Commentary to the Mishnah.
42.
The Rambam's wording implies that if the stump of the tree is above the earth, the laws of orlah do not apply. The commentaries have noted that this ruling appears to conflict with his ruling in Hilchot Shemitah 3:8.
43.
For this is considered like a new tree. See also Halachah 19.
44.
Havrachah, translated as "extending," is a technique that was used particular with regard to vines. After a vine had grown for a long time, the head of the vine is planted in the ground where it grows new roots and thus has the potential to better nurture the new growth. As evident from the continuation of the halachah, sometimes the connection to the original vine is severed and it continues to grow as entirely independent plant. Other times, the connection is allowed to continue and then it is considered only as an extension of the original plant. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:5) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 294:16).
45.
Thus the grafted branch will be receiving nurture from two sources (ibid.).
46.
For severing the connection is considered like planting it.
47.
See Hilchot Kilayim 5:22 which explains how this measure is calculated.
48.
For the prohibition of orlah is nullified in a mixture one/twohundredth the size of the forbidden matter. In the instance mentioned above, once the connection to the original tree is severed, everything which grows is considered as orlah. Thus the fruit remaining on the tree has both permitted and forbidden elements to its existence. If it grows more than the amount stated above, the prohibited substance within it is not nullified and it causes the entire fruit to become forbidden.
49.
I.e., one that was not yet three years old.
50.
Which are forbidden because they are orlah.
51.
From the Rambam's wording [which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah294:22), the Siftei Cohen 294:32 infers that the new fruit that grows on the grafted branch afterwards is permitted.
52.
I.e., since at the outset, this fruit was forbidden, its fundamental nature is considered as forbidden and everything added to it is incidental.
53.
Since its original connection to the earth was severed, the tree is considered as having been planted at this time.
54.
For until then, whatever grew from the implanted branch was considered as part of the original tree and the years of orlah were never counted for it. Even though the years of orlah were counted for the original tree, since it is now being considered as part of the implanted branch, we must count the years of orlah again.
55.
Even from the later implants.
56.
Because they are all considered as part of the original plant.
57.
The implanted plants are considered as new entities and the prohibition of orlah applies to them.
58.
For the new growth is considered as an extension of the previous tree.
59.
I.e., it did not have a portion that projects above the ground (Bava Batra 82a).
60.
For it is considered as an entirely new tree.
61.
This is a Rabbinic decree, enacted for the reason stated by the Rambam.
62.
This was a common pattern to plant trees and was referred to as "a small vineyard" (Hilchot Kilayim 7:7). Even though it is a separate entity, because it is small, it is subject to the above Rabbinic decree.
63.
Because the prohibition against orlah applies only to the fruit and not to the plant as a whole [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah1:9)].
64.
Chapter 10, Halachah 9.
65.
It is even permitted to partake of its fruit, as explained in the following halachah.
66.
Our translation is taken from Rav Kappach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.). The standard published text of that work and similarly, the gloss of the Radbaz to this halachah understands the term differently.
67.
The date cluster.
68.
The permitted date tree.
---------------------
• 3 Chapters: Ishut Ishut - Chapter Seventeen, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Eighteen, Ishut Ishut - Chapter Nineteen • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Seventeen
Audio: Listen | Download• Ishut - Chapter Seventeen
Halacha 1
[The following laws apply when] a person dies after having been married to several wives. Whichever of his wives was married first has the right to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah [before the others]. None may collect [her due] without taking an oath.1
The [wives who married] last are entitled to [collect their due] only from what remains after [those who married previously collect theirs].2 Even the last wife [to collect] must take an oath [before] she collects what remains.3
Similarly, when there is [also] a promissory note [owed by the husband's estate], if the promissory note was dated before [the ketubot], the promissory note should be collected first. If the ketubot were each dated before [the promissory note], the woman should collect [her due] first, and the person owed the promissory note [should collect from] the remainder.
Halacha 2
When does the above apply? When the land from which [the wives and the creditor] desire to collect was owned by [the deceased] at the time he married the women and took the loan. For [in such a situation], the law is that whoever's document is dated first takes precedence.
If, however, a man married several women in succession, and borrowed money - whether before marrying the women or afterwards - and [then - i.e.,] after marrying and borrowing he purchased land - it should be divided among all of them equally, for all their liens took effect at the same time. At the time he purchased the land, each one established a lien on it. None has precedence over the others.4
Halacha 3
Similarly, if all the ketubot and promissory notes were dated on one day - or at a specific time, in a place where it is customary to [include] the time [of a legal document] - it should be divided among all of them equally; none has precedence over the others.
Under all circumstances, [if one of the creditors or one of the wives] took possession of movable property [belonging to the estate as payment for] the loan or ketubah, the property that they took should not be expropriated from him or her. For no creditor has precedence over another with regard to movable property.5
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when] a person divorces his wife at the time he has an outstanding promissory note, and his creditor and his divorcee come to collect [their due]. If the husband owns [enough] money and land to settle the debt and the obligations stemming from the ketubah, the creditor should be awarded the money,6 and his divorcee should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the landed property.7
If all [the husband] possesses is land that is not of sufficient value to settle both debts, and neither [his divorcee nor his creditor] has a prior claim to this land, it should be given [toward the payment of the debt owed to] the creditor. If any [land] remains [after the settlement of the debt], it should be given to the divorcee. If nothing remains, the divorcee must yield to the creditor. [The rationale is that] the creditor suffered a loss; he [lent] money [to the husband]. The woman, by contrast,did not lose anything. For more than a man desires to marry, a woman desires to be married.
Halacha 5
Similarly, if a man dies leaving a widow and a creditor, and land to which neither of them has a prior claim, the widow must yield to the creditor, and he collects the debt owed him first.
Halacha 6
Since the geonim ordained8 that a woman and a creditor may collect their due from movable property, and as is well known, no creditors are given precedence with regard to movable property9 [the following rules apply]. If the husband did not leave enough movable property to settle both accounts, the creditor is allowed to collect the entire debt [owed him] first. If anything remains [after the settlement of the debt] for the wife to receive [by virtue of] her ketubah, it should be given to her. If nothing remains, the wife must yield.
Halacha 7
[The following rule applies when] nichsei tzon barzel were recorded in a woman's ketubah and she claims that they were lost or taken by her husband. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, a woman is regarded like any other creditor.10
Therefore, she is required to take an oath that she did not take possession of them, give them away or forego the obligation [to her husband]. Afterwards, she receives a share in the estate together with the other creditors.
Halacha 8
When a person who has many wives and who dies or divorces them when none of them has a claim of higher priority to his property than the others, and his holdings are not of sufficient value to pay them each the money due them by virtue of their ketubot, how are his holdings divided? If his holdings are sufficiently valuable to provide only the wife with the ketubah of the least value, or if they are less valuable than that, all of his wives divide [his holdings] equally.
If his holdings are more valuable than that, they should be divided equally to provide the wife with [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah of the least value. Afterwards, the remainder is divided among the remaining wives according to the same pattern.
What is implied? [To explain by example:] A man was married to four wives. The ketubah of the first was for 400 [zuz], that of the second for 300, that of the third for 200, and that of the first for 100. The total sum is thus 1000 [zuz]. [The following rules apply] if he divorces all of them or dies. If his holdings are worth 400 [zuz] or less, they divide his holdings equally, and each receives 100 or less. If his holdings are worth 800 [it would be improper to divide them equally]. For if they were divided equally, the fourth wife would receive 200 [zuz], and [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah is only 100.
What is done instead? 400 [zuz] are set aside and divided equally, each receiving 100. Thus, the fourth wife has received [the full amount due her by virtue of] her ketubah and she withdraws [from the suit]. Thus, 400 [zuz] are left for three wives, each of whom has already received 100 zuz]. If the 400 were divided equally among the three of them [it would be unfair]. For the third wife would receive 233 and [the amount due her by virtue of] her ketubah was only 200. Therefore, 300 [zuz] are separated from the 400, and these are divided equally among the three. Thus, the third wife receives her 200 and withdraws [from the suit]. There remain two wives and 100 [zuz]. This sum is divided equally between the first and second wife. Thus, the first and second wife each received 250 zuz; the third wife received 200; and the fourth wife, 100. This pattern of allocation is followed even when there are 100 [wives].11
Halacha 9
A person who guarantees the value of a woman's ketubah is not obligated to pay [her the money due her in the event that her husband's holdings are not sufficient if he dies or divorces her]. [This applies] even when he affirmed his commitment with a contractual act.12 [The rationale is that] his [intent is to] perform a mitzvah,13 and he did not cause the woman to lose anything.14
If, however, a person guarantees the ketubah of his son and affirms his commitment with a contractual act,15 he is obligated to pay. For a father will make a binding commitment on behalf of his son and decide to obligate himself.
A person who underwrites a ketubah, by contrast, is obligated to pay, even though he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. What is meant by a person who underwrites a ketubah? One who tells a woman: "Marry this man. I will give [the money for] this ketubah." If, however, he says: "I will guarantee this ketubah," "I will pay this ketubah," "I am obligated for it" or the like, he is not liable unless he is the father [of the groom].
When a person divorces a wife [whose ketubah has been underwritten in the above fashion], he must first take a vow16 that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect her ketubah from the underwriter or the [husband's] father, if he guaranteed it. [This precaution was instituted,] lest the husband remarry her,17 and thus the two will [have acquired] the property of [the underwriter] through subterfuge.
Halacha 10
Similarly, a person who consecrates his property and then divorces his wife must take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah] from the person who redeems the property from the Temple treasury.18 [This precaution was instituted,] lest the two attempt to deceive the Temple treasury.19
When, however, a person divorces his wife, and she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah] from the [property that was sold to] purchasers, he is not required to take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Instead, she must take the oath required of her, and then she [is entitled to] collect [her due]. If afterwards she desires, she may return to her husband. For the purchasers know that the property was under lien to theketubah of a woman, and they caused themselves the loss by taking property that was under such a lien.
Halacha 11
When a husband sold his property, and afterwards the woman agreed to [her husband's] act and wrote the purchaser: "I have no claim against you," she may, nevertheless, collect [the money due her by virtue of her ketubah by expropriating this property].20 [This applies] even when she affirmed [her commitment] with a contractual act.21 [The rationale is] that she wrote this [statement to the purchaser] only so that there will not be strife between her and her husband. She can [therefore excuse herself,] saying: "I was [merely intending] to please my husband."22
[A different rule applies, however, when the purchaser] enters into an agreement with the woman that she foregoes her lien on this property [before purchasing it from her husband]. If this agreement is affirmed with a contractual act, and afterwards the husband sells the property [to him], [the woman is not entitled to] expropriate this property.23
Similarly, [a woman is not entitled to expropriate property sold by her husband in the following circumstance]. Her husband sold a property [on a previous occasion, and at that time] asked his wife to write the purchaser, "I have no claim to this property," and the woman refused, causing the sale to be nullified.24 [If,] afterwards, the husband sells [property] - whether the same field he had sold previously or another field - to another person, and after the husband's sale the woman agreed, [made a commitment] that she has no claim to this field and affirmed it with a contractual act, she may not expropriate it. For she cannot say, "I did this [merely] to please my husband," since on the previous occasion, when she did not want [to waive her rights], she did not follow her husband's desires.
Halacha 12
[The above ruling is also relevant in the following situation.] A man had two wives. He sold a field, and the purchaser had entered into a contractual act with one of [the husband's] wives, waiving her lien to this field in a manner in which the agreement was effective and the woman no longer had the privilege of claiming, "I did this [merely] to please my husband." Afterwards, the husband died or divorced both his wives.
The second wife may expropriate the property from the purchaser, for she did not enter into any agreement with him. The first wife may then expropriate [the property] from the second wife, for she had a prior claim to it, and she waived her lien only with regard to the purchaser [and not with regard to anyone else]. When the property comes into the possession of the first [wife], the purchaser may expropriate it from her, since she made an agreement with him. [The second wife can then expropriate it from the purchaser,] and the cycle continues until they reach a compromise among themselves.25
Halacha 13
[In the event of her husband's death,] a widow - regardless of whether she was widowed from erusin or nisu'in - may take the oath [required of her], sell land belonging to her husband and collect [the money due her by virtue of] herketubah. [The sale may be carried out] in a court of expert judges, or in a court whose judges are not expert,26 provided it consists of three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of land. The responsibility for the sale falls on the estate belonging to the heirs.27 A divorcee, by contrast, may sell [her ex-husband's property] only in a court of expert judges.28
Whenever a woman has property sold in court, she must have it sold after a public announcement has been made. In the laws of loans,29 the guidelines for the sale [of property] will be explained. When, by contrast, a woman sells property without the participation of the court,30 a public announcement [of the sale] need not be made. It is, nevertheless, necessary [to consult] with three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation [of property].
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] a widow sells [her husband's] landed property privately in order to collect the money due her by virtue of herketubah:31 If she sold the property at its proper value, the sale is binding.32 [All that is necessary is for] her to take the oath required of widows after the sale.33
The above applies when she sells the property to another individual. If she takes it as her own after evaluating it, her act is of no significance.34 [This applies even when] she had announced the sale of the property [and received no better offer].
Halacha 15
[In the above situation,] if the woman's ketubah was for 200 [zuz], and she sold [property] that was worth 100 [zuz] for 200,35 or property that was worth 200 for 100,36 she has received the value of her ketubah and is no longer owed anything. She must, however, take the oath required of a widow.
If her ketubah was for 100 [zuz] and she sold [property] worth 101 [zuz] for 100, the sale is nullified.37 [This applies] even if she says, "I will [accept the loss and] return the [outstanding] dinar to the heirs."
Halacha 16
If her ketubah was for 400 zuz and she sold [four pieces of property], three that were each worth 100 [zuz] for 100 [zuz] each, and one that was worth 101 zuz for 100 [zuz - the final sale is nullified, but the [first three] are all binding.
Halacha 17
A woman has the privilege of selling [the rights to] her ketubah or giving [them] as a present.38 If her husband dies or divorces her, [the purchaser or the recipient] is entitled to come and collect [the money due her by virtue of herketubah].39 If she dies in the lifetime of her husband or [after his death, but] before she takes the oath [required of widows], he is not entitled to anything.
Halacha 18
Although a woman sold [the rights to] a portion of her ketubah, used them as security [for a loan] or gave them as a present, she may sell landed property belonging to her husband and collect the remainder of [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [This sale may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men.
[A woman] may sell [portions of her husband's property] many times. [These sales may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of property.
Halacha 19
When a woman sells [the rights to] her ketubah - whether to another person or to her husband - she does not forfeit the other privileges of her ketubah.40 [As such,] if she has a son, [and she dies before her husband does,] he inherits the worth of her ketubah - [although it] was sold from his father's estate - in addition to his share [in the estate, as will be explained].41
If, by contrast, a woman waives her ketubah in favor of her husband, she forfeits all the privileges associated with her ketubah. [Her husband] is not required to provide her even with her subsistence.42
The waiver of a ketubah [in favor of the woman's husband] need not [be affirmed by] a contractual act nor [be observed by] witnesses,43 just as the forfeiture [of any obligations] does not require affirmation by] a contractual act nor [the observation of] witnesses. Through one's words alone [the forfeiture is binding], provided the statement is made seriously, [in a manner that] can be relied upon, rather than facetiously, as a joke, or rhetorically.44
FOOTNOTES
1.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot10:4), the Rambam explains that this oath differs from the oath that all widows take before collecting from an estate, as mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 4, and must be taken even when the wives are not obligated to take that oath. The woman must take this oath for the other widows, stating that she did not collect any money from their husband's estate previously. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16), however, states that the first widow takes an oath to the second, the second to the third, the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the heirs.
2.
This procedure is followed even if doing so prevents one of the wives from collecting all that is due her. Indeed, even if there is nothing left for her at all, this order should be followed.
3.
This ruling follows the opinion of ben Nanas in the above-mentioned mishnah. It involves a reversal of opinion for the Rambam, who, in his Commentary on the Mishnah favored the view of the other Sages.
4.
This refers to a situation where the property owned by the estate is sufficient to cover all the obligations. Otherwise, the creditor takes precedence over the widows, as explained in Halachot 4-5 (Maggid Mishneh).
5.
If one of the wives or creditors did not wait for the formal deposition of the estate's property, but took possession of some of the movable property on his or her own initiative, they are allowed to retain possession. For in contrast to landed property, the ownership of movable property is not a matter of public knowledge. Hence a creditor does not know whether another creditor preceded him, and therefore no creditor is given the right to collect his due from such property.
As reflected in the rulings of the Tur and theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:2), this ruling applies only when the movable property was not acquired together with and via the acquisition of landed property (kinyan agav). In the latter situation, the ownership of the movable property also becomes public knowledge, and therefore the order in which the liens were established is significant.
The Ramah quotes the opinion of the Mordechai, who states that, in the latter instance, if one of the widows seizes possession of the property, it should be expropriated from her.
6.
For it was money that he gave him.
7.
For a woman relies on the fact that she will ultimately be able to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the landed property in her husband's estate (Ketubot86a).
8.
See Chapter 16, Halachah 7.
9.
See the notes on Halachah 3 with regard to a kinyan agav.
10.
The term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property that the woman brought to the household, for which the husband obligated himself to pay a fixed value. In this instance, since the woman, like a creditor, gave up something of value, she is considered on a higher level of precedence than usual.
11.
This pattern is also followed in the allocation of a person's holdings when they are not sufficient to pay the debts he owes, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh, Chapter 20. The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's approach and follows the minority view that the Rambam cites in that source, which maintains that the money should be divided proportionately. The Rambam's view is followed by most otherRishonim (Rashi, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:18).
12.
Bava Batra 174b explains that the guarantor is not serious about his commitment. He feels that the couple needs only a small push to get married, and that is his intent, rather than making a serious financial commitment. Even a contractual act, which in other contexts serves as an indication of seriousness of purpose, is not sufficient in this instance.
The Ra'avad and the Tur (Even HaEzer102) differ, and maintain that if a guarantor affirms his commitment with a contractual act, he is liable. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:6) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Ra'avad.
13.
I.e., he brought about the marriage between the couple.
14.
As can be deduced from the Rambam's wording, the Maggid Mishneh states that if a person guarantees a woman's nedunyah(the goods she brought to the household), his commitment is binding. For in this instance, the woman did give up something of value.
15.
In this instance as well, the Ra'avad and theTur differ and hold the father liable, even when he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:6) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah cites that of the Ra'avad.
16.
Moreover, this vow must be taken al da'at rabbim, based on the judgement of the public, and it thus cannot be nullified (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 102:7).
17.
I.e., after the woman collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from him.
18.
The woman may not collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the property while it is the possession of the Temple treasury. After it is redeemed, however, she may collect her due from the property. The person who redeems the property must, however, be advised that the property is on lien to a woman's ketubah. (See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 18:7; Hilchot Arachin VaCharamin 7:14-15.)
19.
I.e., the woman will collect her husband's property because it is on lien on herketubah. Afterwards, she will remarry her husband, and he will be able to use his property, because of his rights as the woman's husband.
20.
The sale is valid, however, until the woman seeks to claim the property. If, by contrast, the husband sells property that belonged to the woman, or property from which she was designated to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, the sale is nullified immediately (Maggid Mishneh). (See Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.)
21.
Note the Ramah (Even HaEzer 90:17), who states that if the woman received money from the purchaser, her commitment is binding.
22.
I.e., the woman is saying that her commitment was not sincere and was made only to satisfy her husband.
23.
Since she entered into the agreement with the purchaser before her husband made the sale, she cannot excuse herself by saying that she made her statements only to please her husband.
24.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the reason for this phrase. When this law is cited in theTur and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer90:17), this phrase is omitted. Nevertheless, based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:5), the Ma'aseh Rokeach maintains that, according to the Rambam, a sale must have been nullified in order for the woman's commitment to be binding later on.
25.
A three-way compromise would obviously be most desirable. Nevertheless, any compromise between two of the three parties that causes one to renounce his right to expropriate the property is sufficient to stop the cycle (Chelkat Mechokek 100:26).
26.
Our Sages understood that the necessity to pursue judicial proceedings is a cause of hardship and embarrassment for women. They felt that rather than subject his wife to such distress, any husband would willingly grant her the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah by selling his property without appearing in court (Ketubot97b).
Therefore, rather than require her to take the matter to a formal court, they enabled her to resolve the issue by having the property evaluated by three acquaintances who possess the qualities mentioned above. Although these men would not be considered capable of participating in an ordinary court, an exception was made in this case. If, however, the widow has already remarried, she is required to undergo the ordinary judicial procedure.
27.
I.e., should the property be expropriated by a creditor of the deceased, his heirs must reimburse the purchaser.
28.
With regard to a divorcee, by contrast, our Sages (op. cit.) felt that her ex-husband would not be disturbed by her being subjected to hardship when this is necessary to protect his own interests.
Although there are Rishonim who maintain that the provision made for a widow also applies to a divorcee, the Rambam's ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:3).
29.
See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 12:8,10, which explains that public announcements that a property will be sold are made daily for thirty days (or on Mondays and Thursdays, for a period of sixty days).
30.
I.e., without the participation of a formal court.
31.
I.e., without even the participation of the three acquaintances mentioned in the previous halachah.
32.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer103:1) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it does mention other opinions that differ.
33.
It would appear that the Rambam requires her merely to take the oath required of all widows before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. In this instance, theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:4) requires the woman to take an additional oath, stating that she did not sell the property for less than its worth.
34.
The Maggid Mishneh and Chelkat Mechokek103:11 state that, according to the Rambam, if the woman has the property evaluated by three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the value of property, she is allowed to take the property as her own. Other opinions differ and maintain that this is possible only when the property is evaluated by a proper Rabbinical court.
35.
When selling the property, the woman is considered to be the agent of the heirs, and the profit belongs to them and not to her (Ketubot 98b).
36.
In this instance, the woman must accept the loss herself, because she took property that was worth the full value of her ketubah.
37.
For she has no right to sell any property that is worth more than her ketubah.
38.
The requirement of a ketubah was instituted so that the husband will not consider divorce a light matter, because of the severity of the financial obligation that will result. This remains true even if the woman does not receive the money herself.
39.
As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam's words, the woman must first take the oaths required of her as if she herself were to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
40.
I.e., her rights to support, medical attention and the like.
41.
Chapter 19, Halachah 2.
42.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that the woman is not entitled to her subsistence even during her husband's lifetime, while they remain married. (Note Chapter 10, Halachah 10, which states that if a woman waives her ketubah in favor of her husband, he must write her a new ketubah.) TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:9) quotes the opinion that even during the husband's lifetime, he is not required to support his wife, but appears to favor the view of otherRishonim (Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba), who grant a woman the right to support during her husband's lifetime in such a situation.
See also Chapter 19, Halachah 12, which discusses another consequence of a woman's waiver of her ketubah in favor of her husband.
43.
In contrast to their role with regard to marriage and divorce, in financial matters witnesses are necessary only to confirm what happened. Their presence does not make a transaction or a commitment binding, nor hinder it from becoming so. (SeeHilchot Mechirah 5:9.)
44.
See Hilchot Mechirah 5:11-13.
Ishut - Chapter Eighteen
Halacha 1
A widow is entitled to receive support from the estate [inherited by her husband's] heirs as long as she remains a widow, unless she collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.1 From the time she demands payment for her ketubah in court, however, she is no longer entitled to receive her subsistence.2
Similarly, if she sold [the rights to] her entire ketubah, gave them as security [for a loan] or made her ketubah an ipotiki for another person - i.e., she told him "Collect your debt from here" - she is not entitled to receive her subsistence from the heirs.3 [The above applies] whether these exchanges were made in a court of expert judges or outside a court, or whether they were made in her husband's lifetime or after his death.
Halacha 2
Just as the woman receives her subsistence from her husband's estate after his death, so, too, is she granted a wardrobe, household utensils and [the right to continue] living in the dwelling she lived in during her husband's lifetime.7She may continue to make use of the pillows, spreads, servants and maidservants that she made use of during her husband's lifetime.
If the dwelling falls, the heirs are not required to rebuild it.8 [Even] if the widow asked, "Allow me to rebuild it at my own expense," she is not granted this option. Similarly, she may not repair it, nor have the walls sealed [and painted].
She must [continue to] dwell in it in the condition it [was in her husband's passing], or she must leave [and find other accommodations]. Should the heirs sell the dwelling in which a widow is living, their deed is of no consequence.
Halacha 3
If the dwelling [in which she was living fell] or her husband had been renting a dwelling, [the estate must] provide her with a dwelling appropriate to her social standing. Similarly, her subsistence and the wardrobe given her are granted according to her social standing.
If her husband's social standing exceeded her own, she is granted the above according to his social standing. For a woman's [social standing] ascends according to [her husband's] social standing, but does not descend [according to his]. [This applies] even after his death.
Halacha 4
[The widow is given her subsistence as a member of] the household at large. What is the intent of [the latter term]? When five people who would each require a kav of food when they eat alone [live] in the same house and eat together [their needs are reduced]. Four kabbim will be sufficient for them. The same applies with regard to other necessary household [supplies].
Therefore, if a widow says: "I will not leave my father's house. Ascertain the amount of support I deserve for my subsistence and give it to me there," the heirs have the right to tell her: "If you desire to dwell with us, you will receive [a full measure of] support. If not, we will give you only your share as a member of the household at large."
If she explains [that she desires not to live with them] because she is young, and they are young [and the situation would be immodest, her claim is accepted]. [The heirs are required] to provide her with support sufficient for her as she lives alone, while she lives in her father's home.
[Any money] remaining from [the funds granted for] the support of a widow or from her wardrobe belongs to the heirs.9
Halacha 5
[The following laws apply when] a widow becomes sick. If she requires medical treatment that is of an undefined nature, it is considered as support for her subsistence, and the heirs must provide her with it.10 If, however, she requires medical treatment of a limited nature, the treatment [should be paid for by deducting it] from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.
If she is taken captive, the heirs are not required to redeem her. [This applies] even if she is a yevamah [and it is a mitzvah for her late husband's brother to marry her]. [Indeed,] even when she was taken captive during her husband's lifetime [and he was thus obligated to redeem her], if he dies while she is in captivity, there is no obligation to redeem her from his estate. Instead, she must be redeemed from her private funds, or she must collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and redeem herself.
Halacha 6
When a widow dies, her late husband's heirs are responsible for her burial. If, however, she had already taken the oath required of a widow [before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah], her heirs inherit herketubah, and they are required to bury her, and not her late husband's heirs.11
[Her late husband's] heirs are entitled to the income [from the work] of the widow. If the heirs tell the widow, "Take the income you generate in exchange for [receiving] your subsistence," their words are of no substance. If, however, she desires such an arrangement, she is given this prerogative.12
Halacha 7
All the household tasks that a wife performs on behalf of her husband, a widow must perform on behalf of his heirs, with the exception of pouring them drinks, making their beds and washing their face, hands and feet.13
Halacha 8
An ownerless article discovered by a widow and the benefit that accrues from the property that the woman brought to her husband's household belong to the woman herself; the heirs [to her husband's estate] have no right to them at all.14
Halacha 9
The property that [a woman brought to the household as] her nedunyah may be taken by the woman without her having to take an oath.15 The heirs to her husband's estate have no claim with regard to it, except if the nichsei tzon barzel have increased in value during her husband's lifetime. [In this instance,] the increase belongs to the husband16 [and is given to his heirs].
[Even] if a widow dies without taking the oath [required of her], her heirs inherit her nedunyah, even if it is nichsei tzon barzel. If, however, it has increased in value, the increase must go to her husband's heirs.
Halacha 10
When a woman seizes movable property [belonging to her husband's estate, so that she can sell it and use the money] for her subsistence, the property should not be removed from her possession.17 [This applies regardless of] whether she took possession of the movable property during her husband's lifetime or afterwards. Even if she takes possession of a talent of gold18 [it is not removed from her possession].
Instead, the court documents what she has taken into her possession and defines the amount she should be given for her subsistence. Calculations are made, and she is allowed to derive her subsistence from [the property] in her possession until she dies or until she is no longer entitled to support for her subsistence. [At that time,] the heirs are granted the remainder.
Halacha 11
Similarly, if she took possession of movable property during her husband's lifetime [to provide] for [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she may collect [the money due her] from this [property after he dies]. If, however, she took possession of it after her husband's death [to provide] for [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she may not collect [her due] from it.19
Halacha 12
20The geonim ordained that a woman may collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and every obligation due her as a stipulation of herketubah from the movable property [in her husband's estate]. Based on this [provision], a woman may receive her subsistence from [the sale of] movable property [from her husband's estate].
Nevertheless, if her husband left movable property and she did not take possession of it, the heirs take possession of it, and they must provide her with her subsistence. She has no right to prevent them from taking possession, by saying: "Have the movable property held in the court [so that] I can derive my subsistence from it, lest it become depleted,21 and I will have no means of support." Even if an explicit stipulation was made [by her husband at the time her ketubah was composed] that she could derive her subsistence from this movable property, she cannot prevent [the heirs] from taking possession of it.22 This is the ruling that is universally followed in all courts.
Halacha 13
If, however, her husband left landed property, she has the right to prevent the heirs from selling it. If they do sell it, however, she does not have the right to expropriate [the property] from the purchasers. A widow and a man's daughters may derive their subsistence only from the property that remains in his estate. [In this regard, they have no claim to property that was sold.]23
Halacha 14
If the deceased left many wives, they all have equal rights to receive their subsistence. [This applies] even when he married them one after the other. For the concept of a prior claim does not exist with regard to a claim for support.24
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply with regard to] a widow who has an obligation to marry a yavam.25 During the first three months,26 she derives her subsistence from her deceased husband's estate.27 If it can be determined that she is pregnant, or if it was known that she was pregnant when her husband died, she continues to derive her support [from his estate] until she gives birth. If she bears a viable child, she may continue to derive her subsistence throughout her widowhood as other women do.
If after three months have passed, it is [either] not evident that she is pregnant or she miscarries, she is not entitled to support from either her husband's estate or from her yavam. Instead, she must file a suit against her yavameither to marry her or [to free her of her obligation through] chalitzah.
Halacha 16
If she filed a suit against her yavam either to marry her or [to free her of her obligation through] chalitzah, he appeared in court and then fled or became ill, or if the yavam lives overseas,28 the woman is entitled to derive her support from the property of the yavam without taking any oath at all.29
Halacha 17
Halacha 18
Should a person designate a portion of land to be used for support of his wife after his death, by saying: "This particular place will be for [my wife's] support,"32 he has granted her additional rights with regard to her support.
If the income [from this land] is less than the support due her, she is entitled [to collect] the remainder from the other portions of his estate. If the income [from those portions of land] is less than the support due her, she is entitled to the entire amount.
If, however, he told her, "Your support will come from this particular place," and she remained silent,33 her sole source of support is the income from that particular place. [Her husband] has specificied [the source for] her support.
Halacha 19
There are those who have ruled that when a widow comes to the court to ask for support she should be allotted support without requiring her to take an oath.34 This ruling should not be followed; they have misunderstood [the situation, erroneously associating it with that of] a woman whose husband left on an overseas journey.35
My teachers36 ruled that she should not be allotted support until she takes an oath in court.37 For she is coming to collect from property in the possession of heirs, and anyone who collects property in the possession of heirs may do so only after an oath has been taken. My own conception [also] follows [this approach], and it is proper to rule accordingly.
Halacha 20
When a woman comes to the court to collect support for her subsistence, an oath is administered to her at the outset. The property is then sold without being publicized, and an allotment is made for her subsistence.38
Similarly, she is entitled to sell property for her subsistence without involving a court of expert judges; three trustworthy individuals are sufficient, and the sale need not be publicized. Similarly, if she sells property by herself for its appropriate value to provide for her subsistence, the sale is binding.39 When the heirs come and require her to take an oath, she must take the oath.
Halacha 21
How much property is sold to provide for her subsistence? Enough to provide for her support for six months,40 but not for longer than that. The sale is made on the condition that the purchaser give the widow an allotment for food every thirty days.41 Afterwards, another parcel of property is sold for another six months.
The property should continue to be sold in this manner until all that remains from the estate is [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. She should collect this sum and complete her dealings with the court.42
Halacha 22
When the court allots a widow support for her subsistence, they do not reckon the money she earns until the heirs come and demand it. [If such a demand is made,] and the woman has earned money, they are entitled to it. If not, they have no further claim against her.
I maintain [however] that if the heirs are below majority, the court should make a reckoning with the widow with regard to [her income].43 Just as she is allotted a subsistence, the court declares that her income [should be given to the orphans].
Halacha 23
When a widow does not manifest possession of her ketubah, she is not granted money for her subsistence. [The rationale is that] perhaps she waived her ketubah [in favor of her husband] or sold it or gave it as security [for a loan].44
Even when the heir[s] do not issue such a claim against her, the court makes this claim on their behalf and tells her: "Bring your ketubah, take the required oath and collect [the money for] your subsistence." [This law applies] unless it is not customary [in a particular locale] to compose a document recording theketubah.45
Halacha 24
[The following laws apply when] a woman and her husband traveled overseas, and she returned, claiming [her husband] died. If she desires, she is entitled to receive her subsistence from her husband's estate, as are other widows. If she desires, she may collect [the money due her by virtue of] herketubah.46
If she claims, "My husband divorced me," her word is not accepted.47 She is, however, entitled to derive her subsistence from his estate until she receives a sum equal to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [The rationale is] that if she is still his wife, she is entitled to receive her subsistence [from his holdings]. If he divorced her, she is entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, [provided] she manifests possession of her ketubah. Therefore, she may collect the support for her subsistence until she receives [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. [From this point on,] she has completed her dealings with the court.
Halacha 25
[The following laws apply when] there is doubt whether a woman was divorced, and her husband died [afterwards]. She is not entitled to receive her subsistence from his estate, for property cannot be expropriated from an heir on the basis of a doubtful claim.48 During her husband's lifetime, by contrast, she is entitled to her subsistence until she is divorced in a complete and binding manner.49
Halacha 26
If a poor50 widow waits two years before she sues for support - or if a rich widow waits three years - it can be assumed that she has waived her claim to support for the previous years.51Therefore, she is not granted support for that period. From the time she issues a claim onward, however, she is entitled to support.
If, however, she waited even one day less [before presenting her claim], she is not considered to have waived her claim, and she may collect her support for the previous years.
Halacha 27
[The following rules apply when] a widow demands support for her subsistence from the heirs, and they claim to have paid her, while she claims that she did not receive payment. Until she remarries, the burden of proof is on the orphans. [If they do not support their claim], the widow is entitled to take a rabbinical oath and collect the money due her.52 If she has already remarried, the burden of proof is upon her. [If she does not support her claim,] the heirs are entitled to take a rabbinic oath that they paid her [and are freed of obligation].53
Halacha 28
The laws governing the extra sum added by the husband to the ketubah are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. Therefore, if a widow demands payment of this additional amount - or sells it, waives payment of it [in favor of her husband] or gives it as security - together with the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, she is not entitled to support for her subsistence.
If she demanded payment for a portion and left a portion uncollected,54 it is as if she demanded payment for a portion of the fundamental requirement of theketubah and left a portion uncollected.55
Whenever a woman sells or waives payment of her ketubah without making any further specification, she is considered to have sold or waived this additional amount together with the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. For the term ketubah is universally used to refer to both these items.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Rashi (Gittin 35a) states that as long as the widow does not contemplate remarriage, she is showing honor to her deceased husband, and therefore our Sages ordained that she should receive her subsistence from his estate. However, by demanding payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, she indicates that she is seeking to remarry. From that time onward, her deceased husband's estate is no longer obligated to support her.
The option whether to continue receiving her subsistence or to demand payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is hers. The heirs cannot compel her to receive the money due her by virtue of herketubah and cease giving her support (Ketubot 95b; Maggid Mishneh).
2.
The Beit Shmuel 93:13 explains that if the woman asks for payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and the heirs refuse to pay her or are unable to do so, she is still entitled to support.
3.
In all these instances, it is considered as if she has already collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
4.
In this instance, however, the heirs have the right to pay her the remainder of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and thus prevent her from continuing to collect her subsistence from the estate. If this provision were not granted, every widow would collect all the money due her by virtue of herketubah except for the final p'rutah, and continue to receive support (Rabbenu Asher, quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 93:10.).
5.
In the present age, this law applies even when the woman has merely become engaged to a new husband (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 93, as quoted by the Ramah,Even HaEzer 93:7).
6.
Even if she has not collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
7.
Nevertheless, the dwelling becomes the property of the heirs, and they are also entitled to live there. The widow is, however, granted a place of dignity in the household (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer94:1).
8.
Nor are they required to give her a room in it if they rebuild it themselves. Instead, they may rent her a different dwelling, as stated in the following halachah.
9.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that these funds are granted to the widow, but the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 95:5) follows the Rambam's ruling.
10.
The heirs may, however, fix a price with the physician for the widow's treatment, and then she becomes responsible for the financial burden (Ketubot 52b; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 79:2).
11.
The rationale is, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, that the burial of the woman was granted her in return for the husband's right to inherit her ketubah. If her heirs can collect the money due her by virtue of herketubah, they are required to bury her. If not, since the money for her ketubahremains within the husband's estate, his heirs are responsible for her burial.
Although this is the Rambam's view, the Ra'avad and Rabbenu Nissim do not accept it. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 89:4) mentions the Rambam's view and states that it was not accepted by the other authorities.
12.
The same laws apply with regard to her husband during his lifetime, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4.
13.
These tasks are acts of endearment, appropriate only for a wife to her husband.
14.
Although a husband is granted these rights (Chapter 12, Halachah 3), his heirs are not. The husband is granted the rights to the objects his wife finds so that strife will not arise between them. That rationale is not considered with regard to his heirs (Ketubot96a).
With regard to the rights to her property: as mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, our Sages associated the rights to a woman's property with her redemption from captivity. Since the heirs are not obligated to redeem her, they are not entitled to this privilege.
15.
The property that a woman brings to her household belongs to her. Her husband has merely the right to derive benefit from it; he is not the owner. With regard to this property, she is treated like any of the other creditors of the estate, and no oath is required of her.
16.
Nichsei tzon barzel is property that the husband has had evaluated, and it is the value of the article for which he obligates himself or his estate. Nevertheless, if the property itself exists, it is given to the woman. If the property has increased in value, however, the husband - and therefore his heirs - are entitled to the increase.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:1) state that this law refers only in an instance where the property that the woman brought to the household - or an article exchanged for it - is still intact. Otherwise, she is required to take an oath before collecting the money paid in lieu of the property.
17.
Although the movable property in her husband's estate is not under lien for her subsistence, it is not taken away from her if she takes possession of it. As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, the above applies with regard to the Talmudic era. As stated in the following halachah, it is customary at present to consider movable property as under lien to all a husband's obligations.
There are some Rishonim who differ with the Rambam and equate the provisions for the widow's subsistence with the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (See the following halachah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:20) follows the Rambam's view.
18.
I.e., a sum that will last far longer than thirty days - the length of time for which the court sells property to provide her with her subsistence - or perhaps more than the worth of the woman's entire ketubah.
19.
Instead, it must be returned to the heirs.
Tosafot (Ketubot 96a) explains the distinction between a woman's taking possession of movable property to collect for her subsistence and the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah as follows. Our Sages ordained that a woman may collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from property that had belonged to her husband and was sold. Therefore, it is likely that the woman will ultimately receive her due. As such, she is required to return the movable property. With regard to her subsistence, however, no such provision was made. Hence, she is given an alternative, to take possession of movable property.
As explained in the following note, according to the Kessef Mishneh and others this law describes the practices of the Talmudic age and not those of the present era.
20.
K'nesset HaGedolah explains that, contrary to the standard published texts of theMishneh Torah, Halachah 12 begins here. This is not a continuation of the previous halachah, because there is a difference with regard to the laws governing movable property between the practices of the Talmudic age and those of the present era.
21.
For if the heirs sell it, the woman has no claim to the proceeds of the sale, nor may she expropriate the property from the purchasers. Similarly, if the heirs destroy the movable property, she has no claim against them. From an ethical perspective, however, the heirs are enjoined not to sell this movable property.
22.
The Chelkat Mechokek 93:36 states that if a specific clause was included in the ketubahregarding this matter, although the widow cannot nullify the sale she has a right to receive her subsistence from its proceeds.
23.
The Rashba states that if a clause was added to the ketubah specifically stating that the woman has the right to collect her subsistence from movable property after her husband's death, then she is allowed to expropriate the landed property from the purchasers (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Even HaEzer 93:21).
24.
Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed texts substitute "movable property" for "claim for support." Apparently, this version reached the Ra'avad who objects, and states - as is the halachah - that the principle applies with regard to landed property as well.
25.
I.e., her husband died childless, and he had a brother who is commanded to marry his widow.
26.
This time period is granted in order to determine whether the woman was made pregnant by her husband before he died. If three months pass without pregnancy becoming noticeable, we can assume that a child was not conceived.
27.
Until she gives birth or miscarries, she is not entitled to remarry, lest she become bound by the obligation of yibbum. Since it is because of her husband that she may not remarry, his estate is required to provide for her (Rashi, Yevamot 41b).
28.
The Maggid Mishneh states that the latter two clauses - that the yavam became sick or that he lived overseas - apply also only if the yavam had previously appeared in court. If, however, he has never appeared in court, he is not under any obligation.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 160:1) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the yavam is obligated to support her in the latter instances only when he consented to marry her. If he desired to perform chalitzah, he is under no obligation to her.
29.
There is no need for her to take an oath that the yavam had not given her property. For since they have not established a relationship, such suspicions are unfounded (Ketubot 107b).
30.
Who should not perform the mitzvah ofyibbum until he attains majority.
31.
Since he is forbidden to marry her, he is not required to support her. Nor is she entitled to support from her husband's estate. Yevamot41b says that it is as if she is penalized from heaven.
32.
The Rambam is referring to statements made by a dying man with regard to the allocation of his property. If these statements are observed by witnesses, they are binding. This practice, referred to as amatnat sh'chiv me'ra (the oral will of a dying man) is described in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:2).
33.
I.e., since it is possible that the woman will suffer a loss, she has the right to protest. If, however, she remained silent, we assume that she accepted her husband's decision.
34.
The reference is to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who ruled this way in a responsum. His opinion is favored also by the Ra'avad, the Ramban, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher.Ketubot 105a states that the woman should take an oath "at the end and not at the beginning." They explain that this refers to a woman whose husband has died. The woman should take the oath when she comes to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and not when she comes asking for support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:19) appears to favor this view, and the Ramah states that it should be followed.
35.
See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.
36.
Rav Yosef Migash.
37.
They interpret Ketubot (loc. cit.) to be referring to a woman whose husband traveled overseas. She should not take an oath at the outset - i.e., when she comes to collect her subsistence - but rather at the end, if her husband comes and requires this of her. See Chapter 12, Halachah 21.
The dissenting authorities refute this interpretation, explaining that it is far more reasonable to require an oath of a woman when her husband is alive than after his death, for after his death it is very likely that the woman will soon take an oath to collect her ketubah.
38.
In contrast to the sale of property so that the woman can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Chapter 17, Halachah 13), in this instance the sale need not be publicized. The rationale is that the woman needs the money for her subsistence immediately and should not be required to wait.
39.
Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Ramban differ with the Rambam on this point. Although their opinion is also mentioned by theShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:25), it appears that the Rambam's opinion is favored.
40.
In this manner, a large amount of property is sold. If a smaller amount were sold, the parcel of land would be too small to fetch a proper price.
41.
I.e., the purchaser gives the widow only enough money to support herself for thirty days at a time. The rationale is that if she remarries or seeks to collect her ketubah, she is no longer entitled to receive support for her subsistence. Since there is the possibility that this will happen at any given time, she is given support for only a limited period of time. In the event that she remarries, the remainder of the money left from the sale is given to the heirs (Rashi,Ketubot 97a).
42.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is simply proper advice for the woman. For she can sell all the land necessary to provide her with the money due her by virtue of her ketubah at one time, while to collect her subsistence she must sell the land in small parcels. If she chooses, however, she may take the latter alternative.
43.
Since the heirs are orphans, the court is obligated to look after their interests. Therefore, it is obligated to ensure that the woman's earnings are given to them.
44.
In all these cases, the widow is no longer entitled to receive support from her deceased's husband's estate, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18.
45.
In this instance, since the probability is that the woman would not have been given a document recording her ketubah, the fact that she does not have such a document in her possession is not considered detrimental to her position.
46.
See Chapter 16, Halachah 31.
47.
See Hilchot Gerushin 12:1.
48.
Since her status is questionable, she is not entitled to support. For this is granted only to a man's wife and not to his divorcee.
49.
Since divorce is dependent on the husband's initiative, as long as a woman's status is in question - and for that reason she may not marry another person - he is required to continue to support her (Rashi,Ketubot 97b).
50.
Ketubot 96a mentions two years and three years, stating that the difference is between a rich widow (who can afford to wait) and a poor one; alternatively, between a brash widow (who is not embarrassed to appear in court) and a modest one (who will hesitate before coming). The Rambam does not mention the second opinion at all (although generally, when the Talmud mentions two opinions, he rules according to the second opinion), nor does the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 93:14). Rabbenu Asher and the Chelkat Mechokek 93:26, however, do mention the latter opinion.
51.
The Rashba maintains that if, however, the woman took property as security, or if she borrowed money to be repaid with the money she will receive for her support, she is still entitled to receive the money retroactively. This opinion is cited by theMaggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch(op. cit.).
52.
As long as she has not remarried, the property of her husband's estate is considered under lien to her and in her possession. Hence, she is given this privilege.
53.
For once she remarries, the property is considered to be in the possession of the heirs. Hence, they are given this privilege.
54.
The same law applies if the widow demanded payment of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, but did not demand payment for the additional amount.
55.
See Halachah 1.
Ishut - Chapter Nineteen
Halacha 1
Halacha 2
What is implied? A man married a woman whose ketubah and nedunyah were together valued at 1000 [zuz]. She bore a son, and then she died within [her husband's] lifetime. Afterwards, the man married another woman whoseketubah and nedunyah were together valued at 200 [zuz]. She bore a son, and then she died within [her husband's] lifetime. Afterwards, the man died, leaving an estate worth 2000 [zuz].
His first wife's son should inherit 1000 [zuz] by virtue of his mother's ketubah, and his second wife's son should inherit 200 [zuz] by virtue of his mother'sketubah, and the remainder they should [both] inherit and [divide] equally. Thus, the first wife's son will receive 1400 [zuz], and the second wife's son will receive 600 [zuz].
Halacha 3
When does the above apply? When [the estate] is worth at least one dinarmore than the amount [due the children by virtue of their mothers'] ketubot. If, however, there is not a dinar or more remaining [in the estate],3 the entire estate should be divided equally [without applying the provision mentioned above].
[The rationale is that] if [the children of one of the mothers] will inherit [what is due them by virtue of] their mother's ketubah, [the other mother's children] will inherit [what is due them by virtue of] their mother's ketubah, and at least onedinar will not remain to be divided among the heirs, then this provision [which is of Rabbinic origin] will supersede [entirely] the equal division of the estate among the children that is required by Scriptural law.
Halacha 4
The same law applies to a man who married many wives, whether one after the other or several at one time. If they have all died in his lifetime, and they have all borne male children from this man, if his estate contains at least adinar more than the ketubot of all his wives, each of the [sets of] sons inherits the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah. The remainder [of the estate] is divided equally.
Halacha 5
[Should the estate not be large enough to satisfy the obligations of bothketubot and the additional dinar,] and the heirs say: "We will increase the value of our father's estate so that there will be more than a dinar [in addition to the value of the ketubot]," so that they can collect [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah, their request is not accepted. Instead, the estate should be evaluated in court according to its value at the time of their father's death [and the decision rendered on the basis of this figure].
Even if the value of the estate increases or decreases [in the time between] the death of their father and the actual division of the property, [the decision whether to grant the heirs their mothers' ketubot] depends only on the value of the estate at the time of their father's death.
Halacha 6
If the value of the estate was a dinar or more than the sum of the two ketubot, each of the sons inherits the money due his mother by virtue of her ketubah. Even if there is a promissory note due against the estate for the amount that exceeds the value of the ketubot, it is not considered to have reduced [the value of the estate].
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when a man] was married to two wives. One died within his lifetime and one died afterwards, and he has sons from both wives. Although the value of the estate he left does not exceed the value of the twoketubot, the sons of the [wife who died after her husband's death] have the right to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah first, [provided] she took the oath required of a widow before she died.
[The rationale is] that they do not inherit their mother's ketubah by virtue of this provision, but rather through the Torah's laws of inheritance.4 Afterwards, the sons of the wife [who died during her husband's lifetime] inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of her] ketubah on the basis of this provision. If anything remains in the estate afterwards, it should be divided equally.5
If [the woman who died after her husband] died before she was able to take the oath [required of her], only the sons of [the woman who died in her husband's lifetime] are entitled to inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah.6 The remainder is divided equally.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when a man] was married to two wives, fathered sons with both of them and then died. If the wives died after the father did, but after taking the oath [required of widows], each of their sons is entitled to inherit [the money due his mother by virtue of] her ketubah according to the Torah's laws of inheritance, and not by virtue of this provision. Therefore, in this instance it is not significant whether the estate is more valuable than the sum of the two ketubot or not. [The claim of] the heirs of the wife married first takes precedence over the claim of the wife married afterwards.
If neither of the wives took [the required] oath, the sons [of both women] divide the entire estate equally. Neither has the right to inherit [his mother's] ketubah, for a widow is not entitled to her ketubah until she takes the [required] oath.7
Halacha 9
[In the above instance,] if one of the widows took the [required] oath and one did not, the sons of the one who took the oath inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah first, and then the remainder of the estate is divided equally [among all the heirs].8
Whenever [a son] inherits [the money due his mother by virtue of] her ketubahafter she died in his father's lifetime, he does not have the right to expropriate property that was sold to others; [he inherits] only property in the possession of the estate.
Halacha 10
Among the provisions of the ketubah is that after the death of their father, [his wife's] daughters have the right to receive support for their sustenance from their father's estate9 until they become consecrated10 or until they reach the age of bagrut.11
If a daughter reaches the age of bagrut but has not been consecrated, or if she is consecrated before she reaches the age of bagrut,12 she is not entitled to receive her sustenance.
When a daughter receives her sustenance from her father's estate after his death, her earnings and the ownerless objects she discovers belong to her, not to her brothers.13
Halacha 11
An allotment of support, garments and living quarters should be made for a man's daughters from his estate, just as it is made for his widow. His [landed property] may be sold to provide his daughters with their sustenance and garments without a public announcement, just as it is sold to provide for his widow's sustenance and garments.
[There is, however, one difference between the two.] The allotment to the widow is made according to her social standing and that of her husband, while his daughters are given only their necessities. The daughters are not, however, required to take an oath.14
Halacha 12
A man's sons are not entitled to inherit [the money due their mother by virtue of] her ketubah, nor are his daughters entitled to receive their sustenance according to the provisions mentioned above unless they manifest possession of the document [recording their mother's] ketubah.15 If, however, they do not manifest possession of the document, they are not entitled to anything, for it is possible that their mother waived her ketubah [in favor of her husband]. In a locale where it is not customary to record the ketubah in a document, however, the children are entitled to [the benefits stemming from] these provisions.
Halacha 13
When, shortly before his passing, a man orders that one of the provisions of [his wife's] ketubah be ignored - e.g., he said: "My daughters should not derive their sustenance from my estate," "My widow should not derive her sustenance from my estate," or "My sons should not inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah" - his words are of no consequence.16
[Although] person gives his entire estate to others through an oral will17 [all the provisions of his wife's ketubah must be met]. [The rationale is] that the transfer of property through an oral will does not take effect until after death, as will be explained.18Thus, the mandate of the will and the obligations of the estate due to the provisions [of the ketubah] take effect simultaneously. Therefore, the widow and [the deceased's] daughters receive support for their sustenance from the estate, and [the deceased's] sons inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah if she dies during her husband's lifetime.19
Halacha 14
A daughter of a girl who nullifies her marriage through mi'un is considered like any other daughter, and she is entitled to support for her sustenance [after her father's death].20 Nevertheless, the daughter of a yevamah,21 the daughter of a sh'niyah,22 the daughter of one's arusah,23 and the daughter of a woman who has been raped24 are not entitled to support for their sustenance after their father's death by virtue of this provision. During their father's lifetime, however, he is obligated to support them like any of his other sons and daughters.
Halacha 15
A man who consecrates a girl who is receiving her sustenance from her brothers is obligated to provide her with support from the time of consecration onward. [Although a husband is ordinarily required to support his wife only after nisu'in, an exception is made in this instance, because] the girl is not entitled to support from her brothers after she becomes consecrated. Nor is she past the age of majority, when she is capable of providing for her own sustenance, but rather she is a minor, or a na'arah.25 [Hence, her husband is obligated to support her, because] a manwould not desire that the woman he consecrated be put to shame [by having to] wander and beg [for her support].26
Halacha 16
Should a daughter marry and then leave her husband through the rite of mi'un, or be divorced, or be widowed - even if she is obligated to marry a yavam - since she returns to her father's home and has not reached the age of bagrut, she is entitled to support from her father's estate until she reaches the age ofbagrut or until she becomes consecrated.27
Halacha 17
When a mandies leaving both sons and daughters, the sons inherit his estate,28 and it is their responsibility to provide their sisters with support until they reach the age of bagrut, or until they become consecrated.
When does this apply? When the estate is large enough to provide both the sons and the daughters with their sustenance until the daughters reach the age of bagrut. This is called an ample estate.
If, however, the estate contains only a lesser amount, the funds necessary to support the daughters until they reach the age of bagrut are set aside,29 and the remainder is given to the sons. If the estate contains only enough to provide for the support of the daughters, the daughters are entitled to their sustenance until they reach bagrut or until they become consecrated, and the sons should beg for their support.30
Halacha 18
When does the above apply? When the estate contains landed property. If, however, the estate contains movable property, since it is only by virtue of the ordinance of the geonim that the daughters are entitled to derive their support from the movable property, the sons and the daughters should receive their support equally from this meager estate. For with regard to movable property, [the daughters] were given the right to be considered like the sons, but not superior to them. The geonim have ruled in this manner.31
Halacha 19
If [a man] left an ample estate of landed property, and afterwards [the value of the estate decreased until] it became meager, the heirs have already acquired [the property].32
If [the estate was deemed] meager [in value] at the time of the man's death, and [the value increased afterwards]33 to the point that it is considered ample, the heirs are given the right to inherit it. Even if the value did not increase, if the sons sold an estate that was considered meager, the sale is binding.34
Halacha 20
If the estate was ample but a debt was owed, or [the man] had made a provision with his wife, [promising] to support her daughter [from a previous marriage], the debt or [the obligation to] support the widow's daughter35 does not prevent the estate from being considered ample.36 Instead, the sons inherit the entire estate. [It is their responsibility] to pay the creditor his debt, to support the widow's daughter for the time stipulated and to support their sisters until they reach majority, or until they become consecrated and leave their domain.37
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when a man] left a widow and a daughter, either from her or from another wife, and his estate is not large enough to provide support for both of them. The widow should derive her support from the estate, and the daughter should beg [for alms].38
Similarly, I maintain that support for [a man's] daughter takes precedence over [his] sons' inheritance of their mother's ketubah if she died in her husband's lifetime, although both [rights] are provisions of the ketubah. [This can be derived by making] an inference from a more serious responsibility to a less serious one: If the inheritance [of a man's estate to which the sons are entitled] by virtue of Scriptural law is superseded by [the obligation to provide] the daughter with her support, how much more so should [the sons'] inheritance of [their mother's] ketubah, which is only a Rabbinic ordinance, be superseded by [the obligation to provide] the daughter with her support.
Halacha 22
When a man dies and leaves older daughters and younger daughters, without leaving a son, we do not say that the younger daughters should be granted their sustenance until they reach the age of bagrut, and then the entire estate should be divided equally. Instead, the entire estate should be divided equally [immediately].
FOOTNOTES
1.
This and the laws that follow are relevant only in situations where a man has children from two different wives and he did not divorce the wives before their death. When a man's wives die before he does, he inherits their nedunyah and is not required to pay them the money due them by virtue of theirketubot. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that a woman's children should benefit from her investment in the household and the commitment made to her. Hence, before the father's estate is divided among all the heirs, the children of each of his wives are entitled to receive the monies mentioned above.
2.
Note the statements of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 111:16), who states that this practice is not followed in the present age. The rationale is that the practice was instituted in the Talmudic era to encourage a father to give his daughter a generousnedunyah. (For because of this practice, he can be assured that the money he gives will remain within his family.) In the present age, however, this encouragement is not necessary, for it has become customary for parents to endow their daughters generously before marriage.
3.
As the Rambam stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 7, the children's inheritance of the money due their mother by virtue of herketubah applies only when there is enough landed property remaining in the estate to pay for both ketubot.
From the wording of the Rambam, it would, nevertheless, appear that it is sufficient that the additional dinar be movable property; it need not be landed property. This indeed is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:14). If this is the intent, it would reflect a change in the Rambam's decision from his ruling in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:3).
4.
I.e., once the woman took the oath required of her, the money due her by virtue of herketubah is considered to be justly hers. Her children then inherit her property.
5.
In this instance, they are entitled to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of herketubah even if the estate is not large enough to allow for the division of the inheritance according to Scriptural law afterwards (Ketubot 91a; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 111:8).
6.
Since the woman did not take the oath required of a widow, there is room to suspect that her husband already gave her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or that she took possession of it herself. Therefore, her sons are not entitled to collect her ketubah.
7.
Nor are the sons entitled to inherit the money due their mothers by virtue of theirketubot based on the provision mentioned above, because this is applicable only when the woman dies in her husband's lifetime.
8.
The sons of the widow who did not take the oath are not entitled to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah.
9.
See Chapter 21, Halachah 18, which states that the daughters are granted this right even when their father divorced their mother before his death, and they took up residence with their mother.
10.
Once the daughter is consecrated by a husband, her support is no longer the responsibility of her father's estate. (See also Halachah 15.)
11.
During a man's lifetime, he is required only to provide his daughters with their sustenance until the age of six (Chapter 12, Halachah 14). After his death, however, they are entitled to support until the age of twelve and a half.
12.
From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that he maintains that a girl forfeits her right to support if she becomes consecrated while she is a minor. This ruling is not universally accepted by the Rishonim. The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Chananel and the Rashba as saying that she does not forfeit this right in such an instance. The Tur (Even HaEzer 112) mentions a third view: that if she consecrates herself, she forfeits her support, but if her brothers are involved in her consecration, she is still entitled to support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer112:3) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah mentions the other opinions.
13.
Although during his lifetime, her father is entitled to her earnings and the objects she discovers, this right is not given to his sons. The rationale is that the father would prefer for his daughter to receive her own earnings than to have them given to his sons.
14.
Although a widow is not required to take an oath when collecting her support, this is because she is required to take an oath when she collects the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Therefore, one might think that a daughter would be required to take such an oath. Indeed, the Beit Shmuel112:15, based on the statements of Tosafot, requires that such an oath be taken.
15.
The Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishnehquestion the Rambam's ruling with regard to the support the man's daughters receive for their sustenance. They maintain that this support is not dependent on whether the mother receives the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (and therefore, the waiver of that payment has no effect). The Rambam's opinion appears to be based on his statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, in which he states that a woman who waives payment of her ketubah forgoes all the provisions of her ketubah. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention this issue, and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 112:1) cites the opinion of the Ra'avad.
16.
The rationale is that the obligation took effect at the time of his marriage, and he is incapable of negating it at a later time.
17.
An oral will refers to a person's disposition of his property verbally before his death. As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapter 8, our Sages ordain that such a disposition of property is acceptable.
18.
Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:8. (See alsoHilchot Nachalot 8:9.)
19.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam with regard to the rights of a person's sons and daughters. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:17) follows the Rambam's view.
20.
This ruling has been contested by other authorities on several grounds. First, the Ra'avad challenges the Rambam, asking: how is it possible for a girl who nullifies her marriage through mi'un to have a child? By definition, mi'un is possible when a girl is ak'tanah, a minor (see Chapter 4, Halachah 7), and while she is a minor it is impossible for her to conceive a child. He explains thatKetubot 53b is speaking about a girl who leaves her husband through mi'un - she is entitled to return to her deceased father's home and receive support for her sustenance.
Second, the Maggid Mishneh accepts the fact that a girl can conceive a child while a minor, but asks: Since the mother nullifies the marriage through mi'un, it is as if her husband had never had any obligations to her at all. Her ketubah and all of its provisions are nullified entirely. Why then is his estate liable for the support of his daughter after his death? See the Beit Shmuel 112:11 for a possible explanation.
21.
When a man dies childless, his brother (theyavam) inherits his entire estate, and that estate is responsible for the ketubah of theyevamah (the widow who is married by theyavam). If a yevamah bears a girl, the deceased brother's estate is not liable for the girl's support after her father's (theyavam's) death, for she is not the daughter of the deceased brother. Nor is the yavam'sestate responsible for her support, for he never gave a ketubah to the yevamah.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:5), which states that if the deceased brother did not leave an estate, the yavam must give the yevamah aketubah from his own property. Hence, in this instance, his estate becomes liable for the support of his daughters.
22.
Since the mother's marriage is forbidden, our Sages did not grant her a ketubah.Ketubot 54a questions whether they also did not grant her the rights stemming from theketubah's provisions, including her daughter's right to support in this instance. Since the question is left unresolved, her daughter is not granted this privilege.
23.
Who was born before the couple entered the phase of nisu'in (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). Since the ketubah takes effect only afternisu'in, this daughter is not entitled to support.
24.
The term anusah refers to a virgin who was raped. The rapist is required to marry her and is forbidden to divorce her (Deuteronomy 22:28). Since he is forbidden to divorce her, she is not granted a ketubah. Our Sages (ibid.) question whether or not she was not granted the provisions of aketubah. This question is also left unresolved, and her daughter is not granted the privilege of deriving her livelihood from her father's estate. Similarly, the daughter of a woman who was raped and never married by the rapist is not entitled to support from her father's estate.
25.
The Beit Shmuel 112:6 interprets the Rambam's wording as implying that after the girl reaches the age of bagrut, she is required to support herself.
The Beit Shmuel also mentions that otherRishonim interpret Ketubot 53b, the source for this halachah, differently. According to their interpretation, the husband is not liable for the girl's support. If the husband desires, continues the Beit Shmuel, he may rely on this opinion.
26.
It is as if he had made a commitment to support her when he consecrated her.
27.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:4) cites the Rambam's view. The Ramah differs, however, citing the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that from the time a girl becomes consecrated after her father's death, and onward, she is not entitled to support from his estate.
28.
The estate is given to them, and they may use it as they see fit. They are, however, forbidden to sell the property except in an extreme situation - e.g., to use the proceeds to redeem captives (Ramah, Even HaEzer112:11). Moreover, if the court sees that the sons are spending lavishly and abusing the resources of the estate, they should set aside the daughters' portion.
29.
They are entrusted to a guardian appointed by the court.
30.
For it is more common for males to beg for alms than for females to do so (Ketubot67a). This principle is also followed with regard to the distribution of charity. If there is a needy male and a needy female, and the communal fund cannot provide both of them with their needs, the female is given priority (Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 8:15).
31.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 112:12) states that according to the custom to include within the ketubah a clause stating that the obligations of the estate are binding on movable property as well, the estate is considered to be meager and the support for the daughters is set aside.
32.
I.e., the property should remain in the possession of the sons, and they must continue to provide for their sisters' sustenance. It is not expropriated from the sons and given to a guardian.
33.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions a difference of opinion with regard to the interpretation of the word "afterwards." Rashi (Ketubot 91a) maintains that this means "after the man's death, but before the matter is brought to the court and a guardian appointed." Others (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rashba) maintain that even after a guardian is appointed, the property can be given to the heirs if its value increases.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:14) quotes the Rambam's wording without relating to this issue. The Ramah mentions the latter view.
34.
The opinion of Tosafot, et al. is that even if the property has been entrusted to a guardian, if it is sold by the heirs the sale is binding. The Ramah (loc. cit.), however, appears to follow the view that the sale is binding only before the property has been entrusted to a guardian.
According to Rabbenu Asher, the daughters have no lien on the money received from the sale. Although Rav Hai Gaon differs, it appears that Rabbenu Asher's view is favored (Chelkat Mechokek 112:30).
35.
See Chapter 23, Halachah 17.
36.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:15) states that the payment of the money due the widow by virtue of her ketubah is, however, considered in determining whether the estate is ample or not.
37.
This ruling entitles the sons to derive their sustenance from the estate together with the daughters until the funds are depleted.
38.
According to the Rambam, the property set aside for the widow's support should be given to a third party, and he should follow the guidelines set in Chapter 18, Halachah 21 (Maggid Mishneh).
There are opinions that maintain that property is set aside for the widow's support only when there is a son and a daughter, and the estate is too meager to support both of them. In that instance, since property is being set aside for the daughters' support, and the widow takes precedence over the daughters, property is also set aside for her. When property is not required to be set aside for the daughters, it is not set aside for the widow's support either. Instead, she, the daughters and the sons, all derive their sustenance from the estate together.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:4) mentions both opinions, and the Beit Shmuel93:9 states that the latter view is favored by most authorities. This difference of opinion also leads to another (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 112:15): Does the obligation to support the widow cause the estate to be considered meager or not? According to the Rambam it does, but according to the other authorities it does not.
---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Monday, Shevat 22, 5776 · 01 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Thursday Sh'vat 22* 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Yitro, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 106-107.
Tanya: Now, since at (p. 97)...his studies anyway). (p. 97).
There are two sorts of statutes: a) statutes that create life, and b) statutes created by life. Human laws are created by life so they vary from land to land according to circumstances. The A-lmighty's Torah is a G-dly law that creates life. G-d's Torah is the Torah of truth, the same in all places, at all times. Torah is eternal.
FOOTNOTES
*. This day marks the passing, in 5748 (1988) of the Rebbetzin Chaya Mushka o.b.m., daughter of the Previous Rebbe o.b.m. She was the wife, for sixty years, of the Rebbe of righteous memory.---------------------
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Monday, Shevat 22, 5776 · 01 February 2016
"Today's Day"
Thursday Sh'vat 22* 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Yitro, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 106-107.
Tanya: Now, since at (p. 97)...his studies anyway). (p. 97).
There are two sorts of statutes: a) statutes that create life, and b) statutes created by life. Human laws are created by life so they vary from land to land according to circumstances. The A-lmighty's Torah is a G-dly law that creates life. G-d's Torah is the Torah of truth, the same in all places, at all times. Torah is eternal.
FOOTNOTES
*. This day marks the passing, in 5748 (1988) of the Rebbetzin Chaya Mushka o.b.m., daughter of the Previous Rebbe o.b.m. She was the wife, for sixty years, of the Rebbe of righteous memory.---------------------
• Daily Thought:
The Sung Unhero
Your most heroic acts are those of which you may not even be aware.
Like the time you could have gotten even with the guy in the next cubicle, and nobody would have known. And you really wanted to. But you didn’t, just because it’s not right.
You may not have been impressed—you may even have been disappointed with yourself. But the angels burst into song, as all your world rose up a notch. It may have been the most elevating act of a lifetime.
Heroic acts are not heroic if they’re second nature. It’s when you break out of your nature that you enter the realm of the divine.
---------------------
No comments:
Post a Comment