TODAY'S LAWS & CUSTOMS:
• ROSH CHODESH OBSERVANCES
Today is the second of the two Rosh Chodesh ("Head of the Month") days for the month of "Iyar" (when a month has 30 days, both the last day of the month and the first day of the following month serve as the following month's Rosh Chodesh).
Special portions are added to the daily prayers: Hallel (Psalms 113-118) is recited -- in its "partial" form -- following the Shacharit morning prayer, and the Yaaleh V'yavo prayer is added to the Amidah and to Grace After Meals; the additional Musaf prayer is said (when Rosh Chodesh is Shabbat, special additions are made to the Shabbat Musaf). Tachnun (confession of sins) and similar prayers are omitted.
Many have the custom to mark Rosh Chodesh with a festive meal and reduced work activity. The latter custom is prevalent amongst women, who have a special affinity with Rosh Chodesh -- the month being the feminine aspect of the Jewish Calendar.
Links: The 29th Day; The Lunar Files
• COUNT "SEVENTEEN DAYS TO THE OMER" TONIGHT
Tomorrow is the seventeenth day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer for tomorrow's date tonight, after nightfall: "Today is seventeen days, which are two weeks and three days, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all day tomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day is Shavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Tifferet sheb'Tifferet -- "Harmony in Harmony"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" -- Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed, Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• CONSTRUCTION OF SECOND TEMPLE BEGINS (370 BCE)
Fifty three years following the destruction of the First Holy Temple (see Jewish History for the 9th of Av), Zerubabel and Joshua the High Priest began construction of the Second Temple, with permission from King Cyrus of Persia.
The offering of sacrifices had actually commenced a few months earlier, on the vacant lot where the 1st Temple stood, however it was only after the construction started on the 1st of Iyar that the Levites began accompanying the service with song and music.
The construction was later halted after the hostile Samaritans supplied false slanderous information to Cyrus about the Jews' intentions. The construction was resumed many years later, and completed 21 years later under the reign of King Darius (see Jewish History for the Third of Adar).
Link: The Second Temple
• PASSING OF R. MENACHEM MENDEL OF HORODOK (1788)
Chassidic master Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Horodok (1730?-1788), also known as Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Vitebsk, was one of the leading disciples of the second leader of the Chassidic Movement, Rabbi DovBer of Mezeritch. Upon the latter's passing in 1772, R. Menachem Mendel was regarded by his colleagues as the leader of the Chassidic community in Russia, and Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi considered him his rebbe and mentor. In 1777, R. Menachem Mendel led a group of 300 Chassidim to the Holy Land and established Chassidic communities in Safed and Teberias. Rabbi Menachem Mendel passed away on the 1st of Iyar of 1788, and is buried in Tiberias.
DAILY QUOTE:
"Blessed shall you be when you come in, and blessed shall you be when you go out" (Deuteronomy 28:6) -- May your departure from the world be as free of sin as was your entry into the world--Talmud, Bava Metzia 107a
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Emor, 5th Portion Leviticus 23:23-23:32 with Rashi
• Chapter 23
23. And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, כג. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
24. Speak to the children of Israel, saying: In the seventh month, on the first of the month, it shall be a Sabbath for you, a remembrance of [Israel through] the shofar blast a holy occasion. כד. דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם שַׁבָּתוֹן זִכְרוֹן תְּרוּעָה מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ:
a remembrance of [Israel through] the shofar blast: [On this Rosh Hashanah day,] a remembrance [before God of the Jewish people is evoked through the sounds of the shofar. And in order to enhance this remembrance, our Rabbis instituted the recitation] of Scriptural verses dealing with remembrance and Scriptural verses dealing with the blowing of the shofar (R.H . 32a), through which the remembrance of the binding of Isaac is recalled for them, [whereby Isaac was willing to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering according to God’s words (see Gen. 22:119), and] in whose stead a ram was offered up [whereby the shofar alludes to that ram’s horns, by which it was caught in a tree, thus making its appearance as Isaac’s replacement (see Gen. 22:13)]. — [Sifthei Chachamim, Gur Aryeh; R.H. 16a]
זכרון תרועה: זכרון פסוקי זכרונות ופסוקי שופרות, לזכור לכם עקידת יצחק שקרב תחתיו איל:
25. You shall not perform any work of labor, and you shall offer up a fire offering to the Lord. כה. כָּל מְלֶאכֶת עֲבֹדָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וְהִקְרַבְתֶּם אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה:
And you shall offer up a fire offering: The additional offerings stated in the Book of Num. (29:16).
והקרבתם אשה: המוספים האמורים בחומש הפקודים:
26. And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: כו. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
27. But on the tenth of this seventh month, it is a day of atonement, it shall be a holy occasion for you; you shall afflict yourselves, and you shall offer up a fire offering to the Lord. כז. אַךְ בֶּעָשׂוֹר לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי הַזֶּה יוֹם הַכִּפֻּרִים הוּא מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם וְהִקְרַבְתֶּם אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה:
But: Heb. אַךְ. Wherever the word אַךְ, “but,” or רַק, “only,” appear in the Torah, they denote an exclusion. [Thus,] Yom Kippur atones for those who repent, “but” it does not atone for those who do not repent. — [Shev. 13a]
אך: כל אכין ורקין שבתורה מיעוטין, מכפר הוא לשבים ואינו מכפר על שאינם שבים:
28. You shall not perform any work on that very day, for it is a day of atonement, for you to gain atonement before the Lord, your God. כח. וְכָל מְלָאכָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה כִּי יוֹם כִּפֻּרִים הוּא לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיכֶם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:
29. For any person who will not be afflicted on that very day, shall be cut off from its people. כט. כִּי כָל הַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תְעֻנֶּה בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה וְנִכְרְתָה מֵעַמֶּיהָ:
30. And any person who performs any work on that very day I will destroy that person from amidst its people. ל. וְכָל הַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה כָּל מְלָאכָה בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה וְהַאֲבַדְתִּי אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מִקֶּרֶב עַמָּהּ:
I will destroy: כָּרֵת (“excision” or “cutting off”) is stated [as a punishment] in many places [in Scripture] and I do not know what that means, when God says [explicitly] “I will destroy,” [coinciding with וְנִכְרְתָה in the preceding verse,] this teaches us כָּרֵת means only “destruction” [i.e., premature death, and not that the body is to be cut up or that the person is to be exiled]. — [See Be’er Basadeh on this verse and on 22:3 above; Torath Kohanim 23:180]
והאבדתי: לפי שהוא אומר כרת בכל מקום ואיני יודע מה הוא, כשהוא אומר והאבדתי, למד על הכרת שאינו אלא אבדן:
31. You shall not perform any work. [This is] an eternal statute throughout your generations in all your dwelling places. לא. כָּל מְלָאכָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם בְּכֹל משְׁבֹתֵיכֶם:
You shall not perform any work: [But has this not already been stated in verses 28 and 30 above? Yes, nevertheless this prohibition is repeated several times here, so that one who disobeys] transgresses many negative commandments, or to warn against work at night [that it is forbidden just] as [performing] work during the day [of the tenth of Tishri]. - [Yoma 81a; see Mizrachi and Divrei David]
כל מלאכה וגו': לעבור עליו בלאוין הרבה, או להזהיר על מלאכת לילה כמלאכת יום:
32. It is a complete day of rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves. On the ninth of the month in the evening, from evening to evening, you shall observe your rest day. לב. שַׁבַּת שַׁבָּתוֹן הוּא לָכֶם וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם בְּתִשְׁעָה לַחֹדֶשׁ בָּעֶרֶב מֵעֶרֶב עַד עֶרֶב תִּשְׁבְּתוּ שַׁבַּתְּכֶם:
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Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 1 - 9
• Chapter 1
This psalm inspires man to study Torah and avoid sin. One who follows this path is assured of success in all his deeds, whereas the plight of the wicked is the reverse.
1. Fortunate is the man that has not walked in the counsel of the wicked, nor stood in the path of sinners, nor sat in the company of scoffers.
2. Rather, his desire is in the Torah of the Lord, and in His Torah he meditates day and night.
3. He shall be like a tree planted by streams of water, that yields its fruit in its season, and whose leaf does not wither; and all that he does shall prosper.
4. Not so the wicked; rather, they are like the chaff that the wind drives away.
5. Therefore the wicked will not endure in judgement, nor sinners in the assembly of the righteous.
6. For the Lord minds the way of the righteous, but the way of the wicked will perish.
Chapter 2
This psalm warns against trying to outwit the ways of God. It also instructs one who has reason to rejoice, to tremble—lest his sins cause his joy to be overturned.
1. Why do nations gather, and peoples speak futility?
2. The kings of the earth rise up, and rulers conspire together, against the Lord and against His anointed:
3. “Let us sever their cords, and cast their ropes from upon us!”
4. He Who sits in heaven laughs, my Master mocks them.
5. Then He speaks to them in His anger, and terrifies them in His wrath:
6. “It is I Who have anointed My king, upon Zion, My holy mountain.”
7. I am obliged to declare: The Lord said to me, “You are my son, I have this day begotten you.
8. Ask of Me, and I will make the nations your inheritance, and the ends of the earth your possession.
9. Smash them with a rod of iron, shatter them like a potter’s vessel.”
10. Now be wise, you kings; be disciplined, you rulers of the earth.
11. Serve the Lord with awe, and rejoice with trembling.
12. Yearn for purity—lest He become angry and your path be doomed, if his anger flares for even a moment. Fortunate are all who put their trust in Him
Chapter 3
When punishment befalls man, let him not be upset by his chastisement, for perhaps--considering his sins—he is deserving of worse, and God is in fact dealing kindly with him.
1. A psalm by David, when he fled from Absalom his son.
2. Lord, how numerous are my oppressors; many rise up against me!
3. Many say of my soul, “There is no salvation for him from God—ever!”
4. But You, Lord, are a shield for me, my glory, the One Who raises my head.
5. With my voice I call to the Lord, and He answers me from His holy mountain, Selah.
6. I lie down and sleep; I awake, for the Lord sustains me.
7. I do not fear the myriads of people that have aligned themselves all around me.
8. Arise, O Lord, deliver me, my God. For You struck all my enemies on the cheek, You smashed the teeth of the wicked.
9. Deliverance is the Lord’s; may Your blessing be upon Your people forever
Chapter 4
This psalm exhorts man not to shame his fellow, and to neither speak nor listen to gossip and slander. Envy not the prosperity of the wicked in this world, rather rejoice and say: “If it is so for those who anger Him . . . [how much better it will be for those who serve Him!”]
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music, a psalm by David.
2. Answer me when I call, O God [Who knows] my righteousness. You have relieved me in my distress; be gracious to me and hear my prayer.
3. Sons of men, how long will you turn my honor to shame, will you love vanity, and endlessly seek falsehood?
4. Know that the Lord has set apart His devout one; the Lord will hear when I call to Him.
5. Tremble and do not sin; reflect in your hearts upon your beds, and be silent forever.
6. Offer sacrifices in righteousness, and trust in the Lord.
7. Many say: “Who will show us good?” Raise the light of Your countenance upon us, O Lord.
8. You put joy in my heart, greater than [their joy] when their grain and wine abound.
9. In peace and harmony I will lie down and sleep, for You, Lord, will make me dwell alone, in security.
Chapter 5
A prayer for every individual, requesting that the wicked perish for their deeds, and the righteous rejoice for their good deeds.
1. For the Conductor, on the nechilot,1 a psalm by David.
2. Give ear to my words, O Lord, consider my thoughts.
3. Listen to the voice of my cry, my King and my God, for to You I pray.
4. Lord, hear my voice in the morning; in the morning I set [my prayers] before you and hope.
5. For You are not a God Who desires wickedness; evil does not abide with You.
6. The boastful cannot stand before Your eyes; You hate all evildoers.
7. You destroy the speakers of falsehood; the Lord despises the man of blood and deceit.
8. And I, through Your abundant kindness, come into Your house; I bow toward Your holy Sanctuary, in awe of You.
9. Lead me, O Lord, in Your righteousness, because of my watchful enemies; straighten Your path before me.
10. For there is no sincerity in their mouths, their heart is treacherous; their throat is an open grave, [though] their tongue flatters.
11. Find them guilty, O God, let them fall by their schemes; banish them for their many sins, for they have rebelled against You.
12. But all who trust in You will rejoice, they will sing joyously forever; You will shelter them, and those who love Your Name will exult in You.
13. For You, Lord, will bless the righteous one; You will envelop him with favor as with a shield.
Chapter 6
This is an awe-inspiring prayer for one who is ill, to pray that God heal him, body and soul. An ailing person who offers this prayer devoutly and with a broken heart is assured that God will accept his prayer.
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music for the eight-stringed harp, a psalm by David.
2. Lord, do not punish me in Your anger, nor chastise me in Your wrath.
3. Be gracious to me, O Lord, for I languish away; heal me, O Lord, for my bones tremble in fear.
4. My soul is panic-stricken; and You, O Lord, how long [before You help]?
5. Relent, O Lord, deliver my soul; save me for the sake of Your kindness.
6. For there is no remembrance of You in death; who will praise You in the grave?
7. I am weary from sighing; each night I drench my bed, I melt my couch with my tears.
8. My eye has grown dim from vexation, worn out by all my oppressors.
9. Depart from me, all you evildoers, for the Lord has heard the sound of my weeping.
10. The Lord has heard my supplication; the Lord accepts my prayer.
11. All my enemies will be shamed and utterly terrified; they will then repent and be shamed for a moment.
Chapter 7
Do not rejoice if God causes your enemy to suffer—just as the suffering of the righteous is not pleasant. David, therefore, defends himself intensely before God, maintaining that he did not actively harm Saul. In fact, Saul precipitated his own harm, while David’s intentions were only for the good.
1. A shigayon 1 by David, which he sang to the Lord concerning Kush the Benjaminite.
2. I put my trust in You, Lord, my God; deliver me from all my pursuers and save me.
3. Lest he tear my soul like a lion, crushing me with none to rescue.
4. Lord, my God, if I have done this, if there is wrongdoing in my hands;
5. if I have rewarded my friends with evil or oppressed those who hate me without reason—
6. then let the enemy pursue and overtake my soul, let him trample my life to the ground, and lay my glory in the dust forever.
7. Arise, O Lord, in Your anger, lift Yourself up in fury against my foes. Stir me [to mete out] the retribution which You commanded.
8. When the assembly of nations surrounds You, remove Yourself from it and return to the heavens.
9. The Lord will mete out retribution upon the nations; judge me, O Lord, according to my righteousness and my integrity.
10. Let the evil of the wicked come to an end, but establish the righteous—O righteous God, Searcher of hearts and minds.
11. [I rely] on God to be my shield, He Who saves the upright of heart.
12. God is the righteous judge, and the Almighty is angered every day.
13. Because he does not repent, He sharpens His sword, bends His bow and makes it ready.
14. He has prepared instruments of death for him; His arrows will be used on the pursuers.
15. Indeed, he conceives iniquity, is pregnant with evil schemes, and gives birth to falsehood.
16. He digs a pit, digs it deep, only to fall into the trap he laid.
17. His mischief will return upon his own head, his violence will come down upon his own skull.
18. I will praise the Lord according to His righteousness, and sing to the Name of the Lord Most High
Chapter 8
This psalm is a glorious praise to God for His kindness to the lowly and mortal human in giving the Torah to the inhabitants of the lower worlds, arousing the envy of the celestial angels. This idea is expressed in the Yom Kippur prayer, “Though Your mighty strength is in the angels above, You desire praise from those formed of lowly matter.”
1. For the Conductor, on the gittit,1 a psalm by David.
2. Lord, our Master, how mighty is Your Name throughout the earth, You Who has set Your majesty upon the heavens!
3. Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings You have established might, to counter Your enemies, to silence foe and avenger.2
4. When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers, the moon and the stars which You have set in place—
5. what is man that You should remember him, son of man that You should be mindful of him?
6. Yet, You have made him but a little less than the angels, and crowned him with honor and glory.
7. You made him ruler over Your handiwork, You placed everything under his feet.
8. Sheep and cattle—all of them, also the beasts of the field;
9. the birds of the sky and the fish of the sea; all that traverses the paths of the seas.
10. Lord, our Master, how mighty is Your Name throughout the earth.
Chapter 9
One should praise God for saving him from the hand of the enemy who stands over and agonizes him, and for His judging each person according to his deeds: the righteous according to their righteousness, and the wicked according to their wickedness.
1. For the Conductor, upon the death of Labben, a psalm by David.
2. I will thank the Lord with all my heart; I will recount all Your wonders.
3. I will rejoice and exult in You; I will sing to Your Name, O Most High.
4. When my enemies retreat, they will stumble and perish from before You.
5. You have rendered my judgement and [defended] my cause; You sat on the throne, O righteous Judge.
6. You destroyed nations, doomed the wicked, erased their name for all eternity.
7. O enemy, your ruins are gone forever, and the cities you have uprooted—their very remembrance is lost.
8. But the Lord is enthroned forever, He established His throne for judgement.
9. And He will judge the world with justice, He will render judgement to the nations with righteousness.
10. The Lord will be a stronghold for the oppressed, a stronghold in times of trouble.
11. Those who know Your Name put their trust in You, for You, Lord, have not abandoned those who seek You.
12. Sing to the Lord Who dwells in Zion, recount His deeds among the nations.
13. For the Avenger of bloodshed is mindful of them; He does not forget the cry of the downtrodden.
14. Be gracious to me, O Lord; behold my affliction at the hands of my enemies, You Who raises me from the gates of death,
15. so that I may relate all Your praises in the gates of the daughter of Zion, that I may exult in Your deliverance.
16. The nations sank into the pit that they made; in the net they concealed their foot was caught.
17. The Lord became known through the judgement He executed; the wicked one is snared in the work of his own hands; reflect on this always.
18. The wicked will return to the grave, all the nations that forget God.
19. For not for eternity will the needy be forgotten, nor will the hope of the poor perish forever.
20. Arise, O Lord, let not man prevail; let the nations be judged in Your presence.
21. Set Your mastery over them, O Lord; let the nations know that they are but frail men, Selah.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 44
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Thursday, Iyar 1, 5774 • May 1, 2014
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 44
As explained in the previous chapters, the love and fear that lead to performance of Torah and mitzvot elevate them to the Supernal Sefirot. If the love and fear are “natural” — i.e., they do not result from contemplating G d’s greatness, but from the soul’s natural resources — then the Torah and mitzvot are elevated only as far as the World of Yetzirah, the World of emotion. For since the level of “natural” love and fear of G d belongs in that World, it follows that the Torah and mitzvot performed as a result of that level, will be elevated there as well.
However, if the love and fear are “intellectual” — created by one’s reflection on G d’s greatness — then the Torah and mitzvot performed as a result of this contemplation will be elevated to the Sefirot of the World of Beriah, the World where the Sefirah of Binah (“understanding”) is preeminent.
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to say that although the two above-mentioned loves (“My soul...” and “Like a son...”) are naturally found in a Jew’s soul, deriving as they do from the Patriarchs, still, when they are in a revealed state in one’s heart, they are able to elevate the Torah and mitzvot that result from them to the World of Beriah. Only when “natural” love remains concealed in the mind, is it restricted to elevating Torah and mitzvot no higher than Yetzirah. When, however, it is in a revealed state, they are elevated to the World of Beriah.
For while it is true that these loves are natural, yet in order for them to be revealed there must be profound contemplation on the theme of G d as our true Father and Source of life. Such contemplation gives this natural love the additional qualitative trait achieved by “intellectual” love, so that the Torah and mitzvot which result from this love are elevated to the World of Beriah, the World of knowledge. This is now going to be discussed:
והנה ב׳ בחינות אהבות אלו
The said two categories of love — that of “My soul...,” the love a Jew feels for G d upon realizing that He is his true life, and that which is “Like a son...,” loving G d as one’s true father —
אף שהן ירושה לנו מאבותינו, וכמו טבע בנפשותינו, וכן היראה הכלולה בהן, שהיא לירא מליפרד, חס ושלום, ממקור חיינו ואבינו האמיתי, ברוך הוא
though they are an inheritance unto us from our Patriarchs, and like a natural instinct in our souls (and so, too, as a natural instinct, is the fear that is comprised in them, namely the fear of being sundered, G d forbid, from the Source of our life and our true Father, blessed be He),
When one feels that G d is the true Source of his life he will fear to transgress, so as not to become separated from his source of life. The feeling of G d being one’s true father will likewise keep him from sinning, since he does not want to be torn away from his father.
Although both the above-mentioned degrees of love and fear are instinctively found within Jews,
אף על פי כן אינן נקראות בשם דחילו ורחימו טבעיים, אלא כשהן במוחו ומחשבתו לבד ותעלומות לבו, ואז מקומן בי׳ ספירות דיצירה, ולשם הן מעלות עמהן התורה והמצות הבאות מחמתן ובסיבתן
they are, nevertheless, not termed “natural” fear and love unless they be in the mind and thought alone and in the latency of the heart. Then their place is in the Ten Sefirot of Yetzirah, the place and level of the “natural” emotions, whither they raise up with them the Torah and mitzvot of which they have been the inspiration and cause.
These levels of love are the cause of the performance of one’s Torah and mitzvot, for they result from the portrayal of this love in his mind.
אבל כשהן בהתגלות לבו, נקראים רעותא דלבא בזהר
But when they (the two degrees of love) are in a manifest state in the heart, as a result of his contemplation, they are called in the Zohar, re‘uta delibba (“the heart’s desire” — a more exalted love than “natural” love),
ומקומן בי׳ ספירות דבריאה, ולשם הן מעלות עמהן התורה והמצות הבאות מחמתן
and their place is in the Ten Sefirot of Beriah, where they raise up with them the Torah and mitzvot of which they have been the cause, i.e., which have been performed with the ardor of this love.
The reason this is indeed so, notwithstanding the fact that they are “naturally” found with the soul of every Jew, is now given:
מפני שיציאתן מההעלם והסתר הלב אל בחינת גילוי היא על ידי הדעת, ותקיעת המחשבה בחוזק והתבוננות עצומה מעומקא דלבא יתיר ותדיר באין סוף ברוך הוא, איך הוא חיינו ממש ואבינו האמיתי, ברוך הוא
For their emergence from the latency and concealment of the heart into a state of revelation comes through the faculty of Daat, i.e., through a powerful fixation of the mind and an intense concentration — from the depths of the heart, powerfully and frequently — on the blessed Ein Sof, as to how He is our very life and our blessed true Father. And since his contemplation is so powerful and deep:
ומודעת זאת מה שכתוב בתיקונים כי בעולם הבריאה מקננא תמן אימא עילאה שהיא ההתבוננות באור אין סוף חיי החיים ברוך הוא, וכמאמר אליהו: בינה לבא, ובה הלב מבין
Moreover, what is written in the Tikkunim1 is well known, that “there, in the World of Beriah, nests the ‘Supernal Mother,’” i.e., the level of Binah of Atzilut, which in terms of man’s spiritual service, is the contemplation of the (infinite) light of the blessed Ein Sof, the Giver of life, blessed be He. And this is in accordance with the teaching of Elijah in Tikkunei Zohar,2 in the section beginning Patach Eliyahu: “Binah is the heart, and with it the heart understands.” This means to say that the meditation and understanding taking place in the mind illuminate the heart.
Since the contemplation of G dliness is related to the World of Beriah, the World which is illuminated by Binah of Atzilut, it follows that the various forms of love which are revealed through such contemplation have their place in that World as well, and it is there that they elevate one’s Torah and mitzvot.
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to say that the two kinds of love — “My soul...” and “Like a son...” — not only have the quality of love that results from contemplation, but they also have the quality of ahavah rabbah, the love that is granted from above. For they, too, are granted from above, inasmuch as Jews inherit them from the Patriarchs, as explained earlier.
Since these two kinds of love possess all these qualities, it would seem that they should suffice, and love born wholly of intellect is superfluous. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe concludes that a Jew should also strive to attain the love that results wholly from contemplating G d’s greatness, because of the reasons he will soon give.
ולא עוד, אלא שב׳ בחינות אהבות אלו הנזכרות למעלה הן כלולות מן בחינת אהבה רבה וגדולה ומעולה מדחילו ורחימו שכליים, אשר האהבה נקראת לעיל בשם אהבת עולם
Furthermore, these two categories of love that have been referred to above, the love of “My soul...” and the love of “Like a son...,” incorporate a quality of love which is greater and more sublime than intelligent fear and love, the kind that result from contemplating G d’s greatness, the love termed above ahavat olam; these two kinds of love also partake of the quality of ahavah rabbah, which is loftier than ahavat olam.
The Rebbe explains that ahavah rabbah is rooted in Atzilut, which is far superior to Beriah, where ahavat olam is rooted. The Alter Rebbe alludes to this by saying “Furthermore”: i.e., these loves not only have the qualities of “natural” love and “intellectual” love, found in the Worlds of Yetzirah and Beriah respectively, but they also have the quality of the love of ahavah rabbah found in the World of Atzilut. This tremendous quality notwithstanding, the Alter Rebbe concludes that it is necessary to achieve the love brought about wholly through contemplation, for this love is unique in its passion and yearning for G dliness.
FOOTNOTES
1. Tikkun 6.
2. Introduction to Tikkunei Zohar, 17a.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Iyar 1, 5774 • May 1, 2014
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 95
The Nullification of Vows
We are commanded to practice the Torah-mandated procedure in the event that a vow is to be annulled.
(This commandment is somewhat based on the verse [Numbers 30:3] "he shall not profane his word," from which the Sages deduce that the one who enacted the vow may not profane his own word, but others – such as a sage or rabbinical court – may do so. Nevertheless, the Talmud says that the "annulment of vows flies in the air, with no [explicit biblical] support...")
The Torah explicitly tells us that a husband and father can nullify vows, and tradition teaches that a sage, too, has the power to do so.
The Nullification of Vows
Positive Commandment 95
Translated by Berel Bell
The 95th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding the annulment of vows.
This does not mean that there is a commandment to annul vows, but rather that there are certain laws to be followed when doing so. You should keep this principle in mind whenever a mitzvah is enumerated — it does not necessarily mean that we are commanded to perform a certain action, but rather that a certain case [whenever it comes up,] must be judged according to certain laws.
The annulment of vows done by a father [to his daughter] and a husband [to his wife] is explained in the Torah1 in detail.
Furthermore, we know from the Oral Tradition that a Torah scholar can nullify anyone's vow or oath. This is hinted to in the verse,2 "He must not nullify his word." [The Sages3 explain,] "He may not nullify his word, but others may nullify it for him." The final conclusion is that there is no real source in Scripture [for the Torah scholar's power to annul a vow, and the verse quoted above is only a hint]. As our Sages4 put it, "The laws regarding the annulment of vows [by a Torah scholar] are flying in the air, with nothing to support them" — except in the Oral Tradition.
The details of this mitzvah are found in the tractate devoted to this subject, tractate Nedarim.
FOOTNOTES
1.Num. 30:4-17.
2.Num. 30:3.
3.Berachos 32a; Chagigah 10a.
4.Chagigah ibid.
________________________________________
Rambam:
• 1 Chapter: Mechirah Mechirah - Chapter Four Mechirah - Chapter Four
Halacha 1
Containers owned by a person can acquire articles on his behalf wherever he has permission to place them down. Once movable property enters this container, neither can retract; it is as if the article were lifted up or placed in his home.
Therefore, a person's containers cannot acquire articles on his behalf in the public domain or in a domain belonging to the seller unless the seller tells him, "Go, acquire the article with this container."
Similarly, if the purchaser first acquired the container and lifted it up, and afterwards placed it down in the domain of the purchaser and bought produce from him, once the produce is placed in this container, he acquires it. Since the seller derives satisfaction from selling the container, he does not object to the container being placed in his domain.
Halacha 2
Just as containers belonging to the purchaser do not acquire articles for him when placed in the seller's domain, so too, containers belonging to the seller do not acquire articles for the purchaser even when they are within the purchaser's domain.
Halacha 3
Mesirah may be used to acquire an article only in the public domain, or in a courtyard that is not owned by either the seller or the purchaser.
Meshichah may be used to acquire an article only in a corner off the public domain or in a courtyard that is owned jointly by the seller and the purchaser. Hagbahah may be used to acquire an article in any place.
Halacha 4
The following rule applies when an article that could be acquired through meshichah is located in the public domain, and is drawn by the purchaser into his own domain or into a corner of the public domain. As soon as he removes a portion of the article from the public domain, he acquires it. 5. When there is a load of produce in the public domain and, after having established a price, the purchaser draws it into his own domain or into a corner of the public domain he acquires it, even if he has not measured it.
Similarly, if, while in the public domain, the purchaser measures produce that he purchases, he acquires it, item by item, for as he measures it, he is lifting it up.
Halacha 6
If, by contrast, the seller measures the produce into containers belonging to the purchaser, the purchaser does not acquire it. For a purchaser's containers cannot acquire on his behalf in the public domain.
If the produce is located in a domain belonging to the purchaser, once the seller agrees to sell the produce, the purchaser acquires it, even if he does not measure it.
If the produce is located in a domain belonging to the seller, or in a domain belonging to a person to whom the seller has entrusted it, the purchaser does not acquire the produce until he lifts it up, or until he removes it from the seller's domain by renting its place, or the like, as we have explained.
Halacha 7
The following rules apply when the produce is located in a corner of the public domain or in a domain belonging to both the seller and the purchaser -or even if it is in a domain belonging to the purchaser, but in containers belonging to the seller- and the seller agreed to sell the produce,and has begun to measure it into containers belong to the seller. If the seller tells the purchaser: "I will sell you a torof produce for 30 sela," he can retract even at the last se'ah, because the produce is in his containers, and he has not completed the measurement. For the containers belonging to a seller do not acquire for a purchaser, even in the purchaser's domain.
If he told him: "I will sell you a kor of produce for 30 sela, i.e., each se'ah for a sela" the purchaser acquires each se'ah, one by one as it is measured.For since the seller mentioned the price for each individual se'ah, each of those units is a distinct entity. Whenever the seller lifts up a se'ah and pours it into the measure, the sale of this unit is concluded.
The rationale for this law is that the produce is not located in a domain belonging to the seller, nor is it in the public domain. If the produce was not held in the containers of the seller, the purchaser would acquire it once a price was agreed upon, since it is located in his domain even though it had not been measured, as has been explained in the previous halachah.
Halacha 8
Similar rules apply when a person sells wine or oil to a colleague in a corner of the public domain or in a courtyard belonging to both the seller and the purchaser, or in a domain belonging to the purchaser, and the measure belongs to the broker. Before the measure is filled, the liquid remains the seller's. Once the measure is filled, the liquid becomes the purchaser's. Neither of them can retract.
Halacha 9
Similar rules apply if produce is held in a corner of the public domain or in a courtyard belonging to both the seller and the purchaser, the measuring container does not belong to either of them, and the seller was measuring. Before the measure is filled, it remains in the possession of the seller. Once the measure is filled, however, it becomes the purchaser's.
Halacha 10
The following rules apply when the measure belongs to either the purchaser or the seller, and it has marks indicating the halfway point, thirds, quarters and the like. Once the produce reaches one of those markings, that portion is acquired even though the entire measure has not been filled. For every marking is considered to be a measure in its own right. For the measure belongs to one of them, and he relies on its markings.
Halacha 11
Maintain awareness of this significant general principle: When a person acquires movable property, he acquires it, if he establishes the price and afterwards lifts up the article. If first he lifts it up and puts it down, and then a price is established afterwards, he does not acquire it because he lifted it up at the outset. Instead, it is only when he lifts it up after a price is established, or performs meshichah on an object that is not ordinarily lifted up.
Halacha 12
When an object that has a standard and known price is sold, and the purchaser lifts it up, he acquires it, even though he and the seller agree on the price only after he lifts it up. Similarly, with regard to other means through which movable property is acquired. The acquisition must be made after the price of the article is established, unless there is a standard price for the article, as has been explained.
Halacha 13
For this reason, the following rules apply if a person draws donkey -drivers and the produce their beasts are carrying and porters bearing containers filled with produce into his home. If the produce is measured before a price is established - even if the purchaser is the one who measures - or they established the price and then the seller measures the produce, both the seller and purchaser are entitled to retract.Different rules apply if the purchaser unloaded the produce and brought it into his home. If a price was established and then the seller measured, neither can retract. For the seller had made a commitment to sell. If he measured before a price was established, both can retract, because he has not made a commitment to sell. This applies even if the purchaser measures.
Halacha 14
The following rules apply if a person takes utensils from a craftsman in order to inspect them to see whether he will purchase them. If they have a fixed price, and they are destroyed by forces beyond his control while in his possession, he is responsible for their value. The rationale is that since they are of a fixed value, they are considered to have entered his domain at the time he lifted them up.
The above applies under two conditions: a) he lifts the utensil up with the intent of acquiring it in its entirety, and b) the article being sold would be appreciated by a purchaser.
When, however, the seller is repelled by an article and seeks - and indeed pursues - an opportunity to sell it, it remains in the domain of the seller until a price is established and the purchaser lifts it up afterwards.
Halacha 15
All the above rules apply whether the purchaser himself performs meshichah on an object, lifts it up or manifests ownership over it, or tells another person to lift it up, perform meshichah or manifest ownership. The other person acquires for for the purchaser. This also applies with regard to other acts of acquisition.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 10, Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 11, Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 12
Nedarim - Chapter 10
Halacha 1
When a person takes a vow or an oath, saying: "I will not taste [food] today," he is forbidden only until nightfall.1 [If he said]: "I will not taste food for one day," he is forbidden [to eat] for a twenty-four hour period after taking his vow. Accordingly, even though he is permitted [to eat] after nightfall, one who takes a vow "not to taste [food] today" should not eat after nightfall until he asks a sage [to retract his vow]. [This is] a decree lest he take an oath another time not to eat for an entire day and eat after nightfall. For people at large do not know the difference between these two situations.
Halacha 2
When one takes a vow, saying: "I will not taste [food] a day," there is an unresolved question.2 [Hence] he is forbidden to [eat] for an entire day, as if he had said "for one day." If he eats after nightfall, he does not receive lashes.3
When one takes a vow, saying: "I will not taste [food] during this week,"4 he is forbidden to eat during the remainder of the week and on the Sabbath, but he is permitted on Sunday.5 [When he says:] "I will not taste [a type of food]6 for one week," he is forbidden to eat [that type of food] for seven full days. If he says "[I will not eat a type of food] a week," there is an unresolved question. [Hence] he is forbidden to [eat that type of food] for seven full days. If he eats after the Sabbath, he does not receive lashes, as we explained.7
Halacha 3
[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not drink [wine] during this month," he is forbidden in the remaining days of the month. He is, however, permitted on the day of the following Rosh Chodesh even if the month is lacking.8 [If he took a vow, saying]: "I will not drink [wine] for an entire month," he is forbidden for 30 full days. [If he said]: I will not drink [wine] for a month," he is forbidden for 30 full days because of the unresolved question.9
Halacha 4
[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not eat meat this year," even if there is only one day left in the year,10 he is forbidden only that day and is permitted to eat [meat] on Rosh HaShanah. For the beginning of the year with regard to vows is Rosh Chodesh Tishrei.11
[If he says:] "I will not eat [meat] for one year," he is forbidden for a complete year12 from day to day. If it is a leap year,13 he is forbidden in that year and in the extra month. [If he says]: "I will not eat [meat] for a year," he is forbidden for a complete year from day to day, because of the unresolved question as explained.14
Halacha 5
[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not drink wine this seven-year cycle," he is forbidden in the remaining years of the seven year cycle and in the Sabbatical year.15 He is not permitted until Rosh HaShanah of the year after the Sabbatical year.
[If he says:] "I will not drink wine for a seven-year cycle," he is forbidden for seven full years from day to day. [If he says: "I will not drink wine] this Jubilee cycle, he is forbidden in the remaining years of the Jubilee cycle and in the fiftieth year itself.16
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when one says:] "I will not drink wine until Rosh Chodesh Adar: If it was a leap year, but he did not know that it was a leap year when he took the vow, he is forbidden only until Rosh Chodesh Adar I.17 If he took the vow until the end of Adar, he is forbidden until the end of Adar II.18 If he did know that it was a leap year, he is forbidden until Rosh Chodesh Adar II.19
Halacha 7
When a person forbids himself from benefiting from a substance until Pesach, whether he said "until before Pesach" or "until Pesach," he is only forbidden until the holiday commences. If he says: "while it is Pesach,"20 he is forbidden until Pesach concludes. If he said: "until the wheat harvest" or "until the grape harvest," or "while it is the grape harvest" or "while it is the wheat harvest," he is forbidden only until that time arrives.21
Halacha 8
This is the general principle: Whenever there is a fixed time22 for a subject mentioned in a vow, he is forbidden only until that time comes. If he words [his vow] "as long as it is," he is forbidden until that time concludes. Whenever a subject does not have a fixed time - like the time of the wheat harvest or the grape harvest23 - whether he said "until" or "while it is," he is forbidden only until that time arrives.24
Halacha 9
When a person forbids himself [from benefiting from] a substance until the kayitz,25 he is forbidden until the people in his place begin bringing in baskets of figs. [If he vowed] until the katzir, [he is forbidden] until people will harvest wheat, but not barley.26
If he explicitly said: "...until the kayitz passes," he is forbidden until the majority of the people fold up the mats they have set aside to dry figs and grapes to produce dried figs and raisins.27 Everything depends on the local practice in the place where the person took his vow.28
Halacha 10
What is implied? If he took a vow in a valley and forbid himself [from benefiting] from a substance until the kayitz and then moved to a mountainous region,29 he should not pay attention to the time whether or not the fig harvest has begun in the place where he is at present. Instead, [he is concerned] with when it begins in the place where he took the vow and that is what he follows.30 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.31
Halacha 11
When a person forbids himself [from benefiting] from a substance until "the rains," he is forbidden until the rainy season which in Eretz Yisrael [begins] on Rosh Chodesh Kislev. When the time of the rainy season arrives, he is released [from his vow] whether it rains or not. If, however, it rained from the seventeenth of MarCheshvan, he is released.32
If he said: "...Until it rains," he is forbidden until it rains, provided it rains from the second phase of the preliminary rainy season.33 In Eretz Yisrael and in the places close to it, this is from the twenty-third of MarCheshvan onward. If he explicitly said: "...until the rains cease," he is forbidden until the conclusion of Pesach in Eretz Yisrael and in the places like it.34
Halacha 12
When a person has his wife bound by a vow in MarCheshvan, telling her: "You may not benefit from me from now until Pesach if you go to your father's house from now until Sukkot," she is forbidden to benefit from him immediately. [This is] a decree for perhaps she will go.35 If she went before Pesach and derived benefit from him before Pesach, he is liable for lashes.36
If Pesach passed, even though the stipulation has expired,37 it is forbidden for him to treat the vow casually and allow her to go [to her father's home] and derive benefit from him.38 Instead, he should treat her as if it is forbidden until Sukkot as he vowed. [This applies] even though he made the vow dependent on a time that has already passed. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If she went [to her father's home] after Pesach, she is not forbidden to benefit from him.39
Halacha 13
If he told her: "You may not benefit from me from now until Sukkot if you go to your father's house from now until Pesach," she is forbidden to benefit from him immediately.40 If she went [to her father's home] before Pesach and he gave her benefit, he is subject to lashes. She remains forbidden to him until Sukkot.41 After Pesach arrives, she is permitted to go to her father's house.42
FOOTNOTES
1.For that is the end of the day in halachic terms.
2.Nedarim 60a discusses this issue without reaching a conclusion.
3.I.e., for lashes are not given when there is a doubt.
4.The Rambam uses the Hebrew term Shabbat, which literally means "Sabbath." Nevertheless, his intent (and that of his source, Nedarim 60a) is obviously a week and not the holy day itself.
When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:3) uses the term shavua for "week," rather than Shabbat. The Turei Zahav 220:2 states that the Shulchan Aruch's ruling applies when the person taking the vow speaks in lashon hakodesh, "the holy tongue." If, however, he would speak in Yiddish and say di voch, "this week," the Sabbath is not included, because the term voch implies ordinary, weekdays that are different in nature than the holy Sabbath.
5.Even if a week has not passed since the vow was taken. The Radbaz states that the vow takes effect only when it is made during the week. If, however, it is made on the Sabbath, it takes effect only on the Sabbath itself, for the week has already concluded.
6.We are forced to say that he is referring only to one type of food. For if a person takes a vow that he will not eat at all for an entire week, the vow does not take effect, for it is impossible that he will fulfill it. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 1:7.
7.In the first clause of this halachah.
8.A month which is lacking is a month of 29 days [as opposed to a month of 30 days; see Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, chs. 1-3, which discusses the principles determining when a month is given only 29 days and when it is given 30].
The commentaries question why the Rambam (based on Nedarim 60b) speaks of the month being lacking. Seemingly, it is quite obvious that if there are only 29 days in a month, one would be permitted on Rosh Chodesh in the next month. The new month has already begun. A point that has to be made is that even if there are 30 days in a month, one is permitted to partake of wine on the thirtieth day. Since it is Rosh Chodesh of the coming month, the vow has concluded even though the date is the thirtieth of the previous month.
The Radbaz explains that this in fact is the Rambam's intent, even though his wording is somewhat difficult to explain in that manner. This interpretation is reflected in the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:4). The Or Sameach offers a different interpretation, stating that when a month has only 29 days, sometimes the conjunction of the sun and the moon does not take place until the first day of the new month. Even so, since it is already Rosh Chodesh, the vow is concluded.
9.As explained in the previous halachah.
10.I.e., he made the vow on the twenty-ninth of Elul.
11.Although Rosh Chodesh Nisan is considered the beginning of the year in certain contexts, this does not apply with regard to vows.
12.I.e., a full year on the Jewish calendar.
13.And a month is added. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, ch. 4.
14.In Halachah 2.
15.Like the Sabbath is the conclusion of the week, the Sabbatical year is the conclusion of the seven year cycle (Radbaz).
16.For the Jubilee year is considered as the conclusion of the 50 year cycle.
17.For his intent was Adar that follows Shvat.
18.For his intent was to remain forbidden for the entire time referred to as Adar. This applies whether he knew that it was a leap year or not (Radbaz).
19.There is a difference of opinion among the Sages (Nedarim 63a) which of the two months Adar is considered as Adar and which is the additional month. There are other authorities who follow a different version of the passage in Nedarim and maintain that he is always forbidden only until the beginning of Adar I.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:8) mentions the Rambam's view as a minority opinion. The commentaries note that in other places in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 43:28, Rama, Even HaEzer 126:7), the Rambam's view is not cited at all.
20.We have translated the expression to fit the meaning given it by the Rambam.
21.The rationale for this ruling is explained in the following halachah.
22.Like Pesach which lasts for seven days (eight in the Diaspora) as prescribed by the Torah.
23.There is no fixed time for the harvest's conclusion, for that depends on how plentiful it will be.
24.For we do not assume that he took a vow of undetermined length.
25.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 8:3), the Rambam defines this as referring to the period from the end of Tammuz until the end of Elul when figs ripen and are ready for harvesting.
26.The wheat harvest is several weeks after the barley harvest. Since wheat is the more important crop, it is given prominence (Kessef Mishneh).
27.The figs and grapes would be laid out upon the mats to dry in the sun.
28.As the Rambam explains in the following halachah.
29.A mountainous region is cooler in the summer than a valley and the figs there will ripen later.
30.For that was his intent when he took the vow. It does not matter if this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent one [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:13).
31.E.g., if he took a vow until the katzir in a place where the primary crop is barley, he is forbidden until the beginning of the barley harvest (ibid.:14).
32.The seventeenth of MarCheshvan begins the first phase of the rainy season. Although it is really an extension of the summer and not the beginning of the winter (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Pe'ah 7:5), rain at that time is not considered a chance occurrence and the vow is released. See Hilchot Ta'aniot 3:1-2 and Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 1:11 which also discuss these times for rain.
33.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam interprets the term reviah as referring to the time when rain descends, explaining that it is similar to the term used for impregnating a woman, because in both cases, the potential for life is granted.
34.For that is when the rains cease there. In the Diaspora, different laws apply with regard to all these expressions according to the local conditions.
35.And thus retroactively, she will be forbidden to derive benefit from the time the vow was taken. Had she been allowed to derive benefit, after she broke the vow, it would be a transgression.
36.For he allowed her to benefit from his property, thus committing a transgression. The woman is not liable for lashes (Radbaz). Others (Rashba, Rosh, Nedarim 57b) differ with the Rambam and maintain that the woman is liable for lashes.
37.For she did not benefit from him until Pesach.
38.The Merkevat HaMishneh explains that he should continue to withhold benefit from her, for that is the only way that he can insure that she will keep the vow. The Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam concerning the need for this safeguard and their view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:22).
39.For the time for the stipulation has passed.
40.As above.
41.I.e., even if he was subjected to lashes for one transgression.
42.Because the term of the vow was completed. This applies even if she broke the vow and went before Pesach (Radbaz).
Nedarim - Chapter 11
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply with regard to] a male minor who is twelve years and one day old1 and a female minor who is eleven years and one day old who took an oath or a vow, whether a vow forbidding something to them or a vow consecrating an article. We investigate them and ask them [questions]. If they know for Whose sake they took the vow2 or for Whose sake they consecrated [the article] or took the oath, their vows and their consecration are binding.3 If they do not know, their vows and their statements are of no consequence.
It is necessary to make an investigation throughout the entire twelfth year of a female minor and the entire thirteenth year of a male minor.4
Halacha 2
What is implied? A minor took a vow or consecrated [property] at the beginning of the year, they were questioned, it was discovered that they knew [for Whose sake the vow was taken], and the vow was maintained. If they took another vow, even at the end of this year, they must be questioned again [for the vow] to be maintained. We do not say: "Since they were knowledgeable at the beginning of the year, they no longer have to be questioned. Instead, we question them throughout the entire year.5
Halacha 3
Before this time, even when they say: "We know for Whose sake we took the vow or for Whose sake we consecrated it," their vows and their consecration are of no consequence. After this time [passes] and a male is thirteen years and one day and a female is twelve years and one day,6 even though they say: "We do not know for Whose sake we took the vow or for Whose sake we consecrated it,"7their vows and their consecration are binding even if they did not manifest physical signs of maturity.8 This is the time when vows [take effect] which is mentioned in all sources.9
Halacha 4
Since they reached the age of majority, their vows are binding even if they did not manifest physical signs of majority and [thus] are not considered as adults with regard to all matters. This concept is of Scriptural origin:10 that when a person close to the age of adulthood utters a vow, his consecration [of articles] and his vows are binding. Nevertheless, although the vows of these individuals are binding, if they desecrate their vows or take oaths and substitute for them, they are not punishable by lashes until they reach the age of majority and manifest signs of physical maturity.11
Halacha 5
If [such a minor] consecrated an article and an adult came and benefited from the article that he consecrated, [the adult] is liable for lashes.12 For [the minor's] vows are valid according to Scriptural Law, as explained.13
Halacha 6
When does the above statement - that the vows taken by a female twelve years and one day old are binding - apply? When she is neither in her father's domain14 or her husband's domain. If, however, she is in her father's domain, even if she comes of age and she is a maiden,15 her father may nullify16 all17 of the vows and oaths she takes on the day he hears of them, as [Numbers 30:6] states: "All of her vows and prohibitions18... [shall not stand...] because her father withheld her."
Halacha 7
Until when may her father nullify [her vows]? Until she fully comes of age.19 Once she fully comes of age, he may not nullify her [vows].20 Instead, all of her vows and oaths are like those of a widow or a divorcee, as [implied by Numbers 30:10]: "Everything that she forbade upon her soul [shall remain upon her]."
Halacha 8
When may a husband nullify his wife's vows and oaths? From the time she enters the chupah.21 He may continue to nullify her vows forever until he divorces her, with the bill of divorce reaching her hand.22
If there was an unresolved doubt concerning her divorce,23 he should not nullify her vows. If he gives her a bill of divorce conditionally24or one that takes effect at a later time,25 he should not nullify [her vows] in the interim.26Similarly, [when a woman] has heard that her husband died and remarried, but [in truth] her husband was alive27 or other similar situations [prevail],28neither her first husband, nor her second husband should nullify her vows.29 If she was forbidden [to her husband] by a negative commandment30 and needless to say, if she is forbidden only by a positive commandment,31 and her husband nullified her vows, her vows are nullified.32
Halacha 9
When a maiden33 has been consecrated, her vows may be nullified only by her father and the erus34 together.35 If one nullified [a vow] alone, it is not nullified. If her erus nullified [the vow] alone and she violated the vow before her father nullified it, she is not liable for lashes.36
Halacha 10
If (the erus) dies, she returns to her father's domain. Any vow she takes37 may be nullified by her father as was her status before consecration.38 If her father died after she was consecrated and she took a vow after his death, her erus cannot nullify it. For an erus cannot nullify his wife's vows [alone] until she enters the chupah.39
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply when] a consecrated maiden takes a vow, her father heard her vow, but not her erus,40 she was divorced that day and then consecrated by another person41 that day.42 Even if [she was divorced and consecrated] 100 times [that day], her father and her last erus may nullify the vows she took before her first erus. [The rationale is that] she never departed into her own domain for one moment,43 for throughout the entire time, she is in her father's domain, for she is still a maiden.
Halacha 12
When, by contrast, a married woman took a vow and her husband did not nullify it, he divorced her that day, and remarried her that day, he cannot nullify her vows,44 for she departed into her independent domain after she took her vow.45Although she took her vow in his domain and she is now in his domain, since she departed into her own domain in the interim, her vows are binding.
Halacha 13
[The following rule applies when] a consecrated maiden took a vow that was not heard by either her father or her erus,46 she was divorced, and then consecrated to someone else.47 Even several days after [she took the vow], when her father and her last erus hear about the vow that she took while consecrated to her first erus, they may nullify it, since her first erus did not hear it.
Halacha 14
[The following rule applies when] a consecrated maiden took a vow, her father alone heard it and nullified it, but the man to whom she was consecrated died before hearing it. If she was consecrated to another man - or to 100 other men - that day48 her father and her last erus may nullify her vow.49
Halacha 15
[The following rule applies when] the erus heard [her vow], nullified it and died and afterwards,50 her father heard and she was consecrated to another person that day.51 Her father and the second erus may nullify her vows.52
Halacha 16
If her father heard [that she took a vow], but the erus did not and the erus died that day or the erus also heard [about her vow] and nullified it or remained silent53 and then died that day, she returns to her father's domain and her father may nullify [her vows].54
If the erus heard [about her vow] and maintained it and died that day, or remained silent and died the following day,55 her father cannot nullify her vow.
Halacha 17
If the erus, divorced her after hearing [of her vow], there is an unresolved question whether the divorce is considered as silence and her father may nullify her vow together with a second erus who consecrates her that day.56 Or perhaps the divorce is like her first erus maintaining her vow, in which instance, the vow is maintained.57
Halacha 18
When the father heard the vow and nullified it and then died and then the erus heard [of the vow] or even if the erus heard of the vow before the death of the father,58 she is not transferred [entirely] to the domain of her erus. He cannot ever nullify the vow after the father's death, for an erus can nullify a vow only together [with the father].
Halacha 19
If the erus heard [the vow], nullified it, and died and then the father heard or the father heard and nullified it and the erus died before he heard it, the father cannot nullify these vows that were in the jurisdiction of the first erus except together with a second erus to whom she is consecrated that day,59 as we explained.60
Halacha 20
If a woman took a vow, her father nullified it alone, and her husband did not hear [of the vow] until he brought her into his domain,61 he cannot nullify [her vow]. For a husband cannot nullify a vow taken by the woman he consecrated after he marries her.62 Instead, [this must be done] before she enters his domain, when he nullifies it together with her father. For this reason,63 it was the practice of Torah Sages to tell their daughters before they left their domain:64 "All the vows which you took while in my household are nullified."
Halacha 21
Similarly, the husband would tell her before she enters his domain: "All of the vows that you took from the time I consecrated you65 until you entered my home are nullified." For a husband66 can nullify the vows of his wife even though he did not hear them.67
Halacha 22
If the father went with the agents of the husband68 or the father's agents went with the agents of the husband, her vows must still be nullified by her father and her husband jointly.69 If her father transferred her to the agents of her husband or her father's agents transferred her to her husband's agents, her father can no longer nullify her vows.70 Nor may the husband nullify them. For the husband cannot nullify vows that were taken before [he married her], as we explained.71
Halacha 23
When a woman is waiting for yivvum72 - even if the yevam already made a statement of his intent,73 and even if there is only one yevam and one yevamah74 - [the yevam] may not nullify her vows until he is intimate with her.75
Halacha 24
When a yevamah who is a maiden had been [merely] consecrated to [her deceased husband] and her father is alive, the yevam and her father do not nullify her vows together. Instead, her father alone is the one who nullifies any vow that she takes.76 Even if the yevam stated his intent to marry her, she is not considered as a consecrated maiden, for a statement of intent does not [establish] a complete [marriage bond between] a yevamah [and her yevam], as we explained.77
Halacha 25
When a maiden who was given in marriage by her father is widowed or divorced after marriage,78 she is like an orphan in her father's lifetime. Her father does not have the right to nullify her vows even if she is a maiden.79
Halacha 26
When a consecrated maiden takes a vow, but neither her father or her husband heard of her vows until she came of age80 or until she became like an orphan in her father's lifetime,81 her vows are binding; they cannot be nullified by her erus.82 [The rationale is that] she departed from her father's domain and he [and her erus] must nullify her vows together and she has not entered her husband's domain.83
FOOTNOTES
1.As explained by the commentaries, in this context, we follow the principle: "A portion of a day is considered as an entire day." Thus, directly after his twelfth birthday, as soon as a male child enters into his thirteenth year of life, these laws apply to him. Similar concepts apply with regard to a female minor.
2.For a vow must be taken for God's sake, as Numbers 30:3 states: "When a man will take a vow to God."
3.This is a unique concept that Niddah 45b derives from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:2. Although throughout Jewish law, until a male attains the age of thirteen and a female, the age of twelve, their actions are of no consequence according to Scriptural Law, an exception is made in this instance because of the above verse, as stated in Halachah 4.
4.As explained in the following halachah.
5.The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that Niddah, loc. cit., the source for this halachah, does not lead to such a conclusion. He suggests that perhaps the Rambam had a different version of that text. Yayin Malchut states that this resolution is reflected in the revised version of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6). In his initial explanation of the mishnah, he appeared to follow the same text as the popular version of the Talmud, but later in life, he revised that interpretation, accepting a different version of the text. The Rambam's rationale is that since we are speaking about a minor, it is possible that his level of understanding will fluctuate.
6.I.e., their thirteenth and twelfth birthdays arrive as stated in note 1.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6), the Rambam writes that the Torah made the age for which women become responsible for their vows less than the age men become responsible, generally, a woman's lifetime is less than that of a man.
7.If they manifested signs that they are mentally or emotionally incapable, this law does not apply. If, however, they are merely somewhat slow and do not understand the concept of vows, their vows are of consequence, because they have already reached the age when one becomes responsible for his or her actions.
8.I.e., two pubic hairs as stated in Hilchot Ishut 2:1.
9.There are others who maintain that the expression "the time when vows [take effect]" refers to a minor who understands the meaning of his vows as stated in Halachah 1. The Rambam prefers his interpretation, because it is dependent on time, the child's age, while the first interpretation is dependent on the child's knowledge (Yayim Malchut).
10.This is the subject of debate among the Rishonim, for some do not accept the Rambam's view.
11.For until the latter age, they are still minors, and minors are not liable for punishment for transgressions that they perform.
12.For violating the prohibition against benefiting from consecrated property (Hilchot Meilah 1:3).
13.In the previous halachah. Since the child's consecration is valid, the article has the status of a consecrated article according to Scriptural Law and a person who misappropriates it is liable.
14.I.e., her father died. Alternatively, she was married as a minor and then she was divorced or widowed (see Halachah 25). Otherwise, she remains in his domain until the age of twelve and a half, as stated in the following halachah.
15.I.e., from the age of twelve until the age of twelve and a half.
16.See Chapter 13, Halachah 2, which describes how the father nullifies his daughter's vow.
17.As the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:1) states, this applies even to vows taken dependent on the consent of others which cannot be repealed by a sage.
18.The HaEmek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.
19.I.e., reaches the age of twelve and a half after manifesting physical signs of maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:2).
20.Numbers 30:17 gives him this privilege "during her maidenhood," i.e., and not beyond that time period (Kessef Mishneh).
21.I.e, from the beginning of the second sage of the marriage relationship known as nissuin. At that time, he takes her into a private room and from that time onward, the couple live as man and wife (Hilchot Ishut 10:1). During the first stage of the marriage relationship (erusin), when the erus has merely consecrated his wife, he does not have the right to nullify her vows alone (see Halachah 9). (In the present era, it is customary to perform both these stages of marriage directly after each other.)
22.Implied is that if he sends the bill of divorce to her via an agent, he may nullify her vows until the bill of divorce enters her possession (Siftei Cohen 234:6, Turei Zahav 234:1).
23.I.e., he had a bill of divorce given to her and our Rabbis could not resolve if the manner in which the bill of divorce was given or written is effective. See Hilchot Gerushin 5:13 for an example.
The rationale for this law is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife's vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him (Yevamot 90b). In this instance, he is not concerned that she becomes unattractive (Radbaz).
24.See Hilchot Gerushin 8:1.
25.He tells her: "Here is your bill of divorce, but it does not take effect for 30 days" (ibid. 9:1).
26.I.e., in the days before the vow takes effect. The Siftei Cohen 234:8 states that even after the fact, the nullification does not take effect.
27.See Hilchot Gerushin 10:5 which describes this situation at length.
28.E.g., a woman who went through a divorce and then remarried, but then it was discovered that her divorce was invalid (ibid.:7). In both this and the previous instance, both husbands are required to divorce the woman.
29.The rationale for this and the previous laws is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife's vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him. In this instance, since he is obligated to divorce her, it is desirable that she become unattractive to him (Yevamot, loc. cit.).
30.I.e., a negative commandment that is not punishable by execution, death at the hand of heaven, or karet. See Hilchot Ishut 1:7.
31.E.g., marriages like that of a non-virgin to a High Priest, which are not prohibited by a negative commandment. Instead, the prohibition is understood, because there is a positive commandment instructing the opposite. See ibid.:8.
32.Although these marriages are forbidden, since they are still binding, the husband has this privilege.
33.I.e., a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half.
34.The term erus means "the man who consecrated her." The Rambam does not use this term, but instead, the term baal meaning "husband." We, however, have used the term erus, because the term baal usually implies that nisuin, the second stage of marriage, has already taken place.
35.Numbers 30:17 states: "These are the statutes... between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter in her youth." Nedarim 68a interprets the verse as referring to one woman, implying that the nullification of her vows is performed by her father and her erus together. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 9:9), the Rambam writes that from the Biblical text, it might appear that both the father and the erus have the right to nullify her vows independently. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that this is not so.
36.Nedarim 68a states that since one of the two has already nullified the vow, it is weak and its violation is not punishable by lashes.
37.Even the vows she took previously while consecrated [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:11)]. This applies even if she has a yevam (Halachah 24).
38.As stated in Halachah 6.
39.Before nissuin, an erus can nullify his wife's vows only together with her father and that is impossible in this instance. See also Halachah 16.
40.For if her first erus heard her vow and did not nullify it, her father can no longer nullify it together with her second erus. See Halachah 17.
41.Or consecrated again by her first erus [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:13)].
42.It is necessary that the divorce(s) and the consecration(s) take place on the same day the father heard of and nullified the vow. For if not, the woman's last erus will not have the right to nullify the vow, as indicated by Chapter 12, Halachah 17.
43.In contrast to the laws applying to a married woman, as stated in the following halachah.
44.Nor may her father nullify her vows, for once she marries, her father no longer has the right to nullify her vows.
45.Once a woman becomes independent for even one moment, her future husband cannot nullify the vows she took previously.
46.If, however, either her erus or her father heard her vow when it was taken, it cannot be nullified at a later date.
47.Since she remains partially in her father's domain, the divorce does not effect the right of her father and her present erus to nullify her vows.
48.The consecration and the nullification of the vow must take place on the day that the father heard of the vow and nullified it (Turei Zahav 234:22).
49.Since her first erus did not hear of her vow, the fact that he died before nullifying it does not deprive her last erus of that right. The father cannot nullify her vow alone, because it was taken when she was consecrated. Since her father nullified the vow, the right of her erus to nullify the vow is weak and of little substance. Accordingly, the right to nullify it cannot be transferred to the father alone, as in Halachah 16.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Tur which maintains that the second erus can never nullify a vow together with the father.
50.I.e., after the death of her erus.
51.But not on the following day. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation when the father heard of the vow on the same day as her first erus, for the nullification must be completed on the same day that he heard of the vow. If, however, her father does not hear about it until the following day and she was consecrated then, he and her new erus may nullify her vow then.
52.The Turei Zahav 234:13 maintains that the Rambam would also give her father the right to nullify the vow alone, because her first erus also heard the vow and did not maintain it (see the following halachah). The Rambam mentions her being consecrated by another person only to teach that if, this is indeed the situation, the second erus must also nullify the vow.
53.Since he did not maintain the vow and died before the day was completed, we say that there was a possibility that he would nullify it. Hence, her father is given the right to nullify it.
54.Since her erus no longer exists and he did not maintain the vow, the right to nullify is given to her father. In his gloss to Halachah 19, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between these two halachot by stating that this halachah refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. Halachah 19 refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it, as explained above.
55.Since he did not nullify it on the day that he heard it, he cannot nullify again. It is considered as if he maintained it. Once he maintained it, her father cannot nullify it.
56.I.e., combining Halachah 15 which states that the father and the second erus can nullify the vow and Halachah 16 which states that silence is equivalent to nullification. If she does not become consecrated again, the father can nullify the vow alone (Turei Zahav, loc. cit.).
57.And cannot be nullified afterwards.
58.But did not nullify it then.
59.If, however, he nullifies on a later date it is unacceptable, for the father must nullify the vow on the day he became aware of it.
60.Halachah 15. In his gloss to this halachah, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 16 by stating that Halachah 16 refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. This halachah refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it. Hence it cannot be transferred as explained in the notes to Halachah 15. This understanding is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16).
61.I.e., completed the second stage of the marriage, nissuin.
62.
See Halachah 8.
63.I.e., to enable all the vows concerning which he did not hear to be nullified.
64.I.e., before their marriage.
65.An erus may also nullify the vows that a woman took before he consecrated her (together with her father). We assume, however, that her father already nullified those vows (Siftei Cohen 234:21; Turei Zahav 234:11).
66.This also applies to her father. The husband and the father must, however, be capable of hearing. If they are deaf, they cannot nullify a vow (Chapter 12, Halachah 13).
67.Thus if both the father and the husband made these statements, the vows are nullified. In some manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah, these two halachot are combined as one.
68.Who were sent to bring her to her husband's home.
69.As long as her father is accompanying her, he is not considered to have transferred her to her husband's domain and hence, still has the right to nullify her vows.
70.I.e., even if the husband dies [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:12)].
71.See Halachah 20.
72.I.e., we are speaking about a widow whose husband dies childless who must be married by her deceased husband's brother. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25.
73.Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1).
74.And thus there is no question that she is designated for him.
75.At which point their marriage is consummated and she becomes his wife. Until then, even if he has stated his intent, according to Scriptural Law, she is not his wife and he cannot nullify her vows.
76.As stated in Halachah 10.
77.Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1).
78.I.e., she has already completed nissuin, the second stage of the marriage bond.
79.I.e., although from the standpoint of age, her father would still have the right to nullify her vows, since she married, she is given full independence. Hence, he no longer has this right.
80.As stated in Halachah 7, once she comes of age, her father no longer has any authority over her.
81.I.e., she was divorced or widowed after marriage, as stated in the previous halachah.
82.I.e., in the first situation, the man who consecrated her before she came of age. In the second situation, it refers to a second husband who consecrated her after she was divorced or widowed.
83.This occurs only after nissuin. Moreover, even after she enters her husband's domain, he cannot nullify her vows that were taken beforehand, as stated in Halachah 20.
Nedarim - Chapter 12
Halacha 1
A father [has the right to] nullify any1 vows and oaths [taken by his daughter only] on the day he hears of them,2 as [Numbers 30:6] states: "[But if her father withheld her on the day that he heard,] all of her vows and prohibitions3... [shall not stand]."
A husband,4 by contrast, may nullify only those vows and oaths that involve personal aggravation5 or they are matters that affect the marriage relationship6, e.g., she took an oath or a vow not to put on eye-paint or wear jewelry.7 [This is implied by ibid.:17]: "between a man and his wife."
Halacha 2
What is the difference between [the laws governing] vows that involve personal aggravation and those that affect the marriage relationship. With regard to vows that involve personal aggravation, his nullification has bearing for himself and for others.8 With regard to those involving the marriage relationship, his nullification has bearing for himself but not for others.9
Halacha 3
What is implied? She took a vow not to eat meat. He may nullify it and she will be permitted to eat meat if she is married to any other person forever. If she forbade marital intimacy with any man, he may nullify the vow with regard to himself10 and she may engage in intimacy with him. If, however, he dies or divorces her, she is forbidden to engage in intimacy with all other men. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 4
Whether the aggravation is of a minor nature or a major nature, for a short time or for a long time, the husband has the right to nullify all [such] vows.
Halacha 5
What is implied? She took a vow or an oath "not to bathe today," "not drink wine today," or "not to eat honey today,"11 he may nullify the vows. [This also applies if] she vowed "not to put on eye paint today" or "not to wear colored woven garments today."12 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Even if she took a vow [not to partake of] an unpleasant food13 or a type of food that she had never eaten,14 [her husband] may nullify it.
Halacha 6
When she took a vow not to partake of two loaves of bread and not partaking of one would cause her aggravation, but not partaking of the other would not cause her aggravation,15 her husband may nullify the one that would cause her aggravation and may not nullify the one that would not cause her aggravation.16
Halacha 7
When a woman takes a vow not to eat figs from her native country, [her husband] may nullify her vow, because this is a matter that affects the marriage relationship.17 For it is a major problem for him to undertake the difficulty of bringing her [figs] from another place. Therefore, if he dies, divorces her, or another person brings her figs from her native country, they are forbidden to her. For [a husband's] nullification [of a vow that] affects the marriage relationship does not have bearing for others.18
Halacha 8
Similarly, if she took an oath not to benefit from people at large, even though her husband is not included in the vow,19 he has the right to nullify it, because it affects the marriage relationship.20 Otherwise, he will have to give her food only from his own resources. Similarly, he may nullify [the vow] if she [takes a vow], forbidding her from benefiting from an entire nation,21 e.g., all the Jews or all the Ishmaelites.
Halacha 9
When a woman tells her husband: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," he need not nullify the vow.22 To what can the matter be compared? To one who forbids the owner of fruit from benefiting from his own fruit.23 Similarly, if he tells her: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," his statements are of no consequence, because he is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, clothing, and intimacy, as we explained in Hilchot Ishut.24
If, however, she told him: "Pleasure from intimacy with you is forbidden to me," he must nullify the vow.25 If he does not nullify it, it is forbidden for him to engage in relations with her, because we may not force a person to partake of food that is forbidden to him.
Halacha 10
If she said: "May my hands be sanctified to the One who made them," or she took a vow that he would not benefit from the labor of her hands,26 he is not forbidden to benefit from the labor of her hands, because her hands are on lien to him.27 Although [our Sages] declared:28 "Emancipation,29[the prohibition against] chametz,30and consecration31sever a lien," our Sages reinforced a husband's lien [on his wife's work and her earnings], preventing her from severing it, because it is of Rabbinic origin.32 He must, however, nullify the vow, lest he divorce her and then he be forbidden to remarry her.33
Halacha 11
If she took an oath or a vow that neither the father of her husband, his brothers, or any of his other relatives will benefit from her, he cannot nullify the vow.34 Similarly, he may not nullify her vow if she vows not to bring his animal35 water,36 straw for his cattle,37 or the like. [The rationale is that these vows] do not aggravate the soul, nor do they affect the marriage relationship, [since] they are not of the tasks that she is obligated to perform.38
Halacha 12
A husband and a father may nullify vows that have not taken effect and have not yet caused prohibitions for her.39 What is implied? She said, for example: "Wine will be forbidden to me if I go to this-and-this place."40 Even though she has not yet gone there and [thus the wine] is not yet forbidden, the vow may be nullified. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 13
A father or a husband who is deaf41 may not nullify vows.42 Even though a husband may nullify vows which he has not heard,43 when a person is fit to hear a vow, [the fact that he does not] hear it is not of consequence.44
Halacha 14
Neither a father, nor a husband who is intellectually or emotionally unstable may nullify a vow. A minor cannot establish a marriage bond;45 accordingly, he may not nullify a vow. A husband may nullify the vows of two of his wives simultaneously. Similarly, a father may nullify the vows of two of his daughters simultaneously.46
Halacha 15
The nullification of vows may be carried out throughout the entire day.47 [The right does not continue] for 24 hours.
What is implied? If she took a vow at the beginning of Sunday night, the vow may be nullified throughout that night and the entire day Monday.48 When she took a vow at the conclusion of the day, directly before nightfall. If he49 nullified the vow before nightfall, it is nullified. If he did not nullify it until after nightfall, he may not nullify it any longer.50
Halacha 16
What is meant by the Torah's words [Numbers 30:15]: "from one day to the next"?51 They teach that if she takes a vow at night, he may nullify it during the night. And he may nullify it throughout the following day, as we explained.52
If she took a vow and waited several days and only then, her father or her husband heard of it, he may nullify it on the day he heard of it. It is as if she took the vow on the day that he heard of it, as [implied by ibid.:6]: "On the day he heard of it," [i.e.,] and not only the day she took the vow.
Halacha 17
When a consecrated maiden took a vow and her father heard of it and nullified it and after several days her erus heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified, as [implied by ibid.:6-8]: "If her father prevented her on the day that he heard of it.... If she was married to a man with vows incumbent upon her.... If her husband heard of it. On the day, he heard of it...." From this we infer: Since her father nullified it and her erus heard of it, he must nullify it on the day the father heard of it. Similarly, if her erus heard [of the vow] and nullified it and after several days, the father heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified.53
How do we know that the verse is speaking about a consecrated maiden? Because further on, the passage [ibid.:11-12] states: "If she vows in her husband's home...54 her husband heard her and remained silent." We can infer that the husband spoken about previously is an erus., as we explained.
Halacha 18
When a father or a husband hears of a vow and remains silent in order to cause the woman aggravation,55 if the day passes without him nullifying or revoking [her vows], they are binding even if he did not have the intent of accepting them.
If she took a vow and her father or her husband nullified it, but without knowing of the nullification, she willfully violated her vow or oath, she is not liable. Although she had the intent of transgressing, since she committed a permitted act,56 she is exempt. Concerning this, [ibid.:6] states: "God will forgive her, although her father prevented her." She is given stripes for rebellious conduct,57 because she had the intent to transgress.
Halacha 19
When she takes a vow and violates her vow before her father or her husband nullifies it, she is liable - either for lashes58 or a sacrifice59 - for the transgression she committed even if he heard of it that day and nullified it.60
Halacha 20
If a father or a husband heard of [a woman's] vow, but remained silent, because he did not know that a father or a husband has a right to nullify her vows or he knew that he had a right to nullify her vow, but did not know that such a vow required nullification, when he learns of this, he may nullify [the vow]. The time when he gains this knowledge is equivalent to the time of the vow or the time he heard of it and he may nullify it for that entire day.
Halacha 21
[When a nullification is made in error,] one must return and nullify it again. [For example,] his wife took a vow and he thought that she was his daughter, and he nullified it with the intent that she was his daughter. She took a nazirite vow and he thought that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice and he nullified it with the intent that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice. She forbade herself to partake of figs and he thought she said grapes and nullified with the intent that she had forbade grapes. [In all such instances,] he must nullify the vow again when he learns of the vow and the identity of the woman taking the vow for the sake of this woman and this vow. [This can be inferred from ibid.:5]: "Her father did not prevent her"; [this indicates that he must have in mind] the woman taking the vow herself. "And her father heard her vow,"61 i.e., until he knows the vow that she took. He may nullify the vow throughout the entire day that he discovers this information.62
FOOTNOTES
1.I.e., he may nullify all vows, not merely those that a husband may nullify.
Rabbenu Asher and other Rishonim differ and maintain that the Sifri states that the father's rights are the same as the husband's. In a response attributed to the Rambam, he explains that although this view is stated in the Sifri, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Talmud and the simple meaning of the Biblical passage does not lead to such an inference. This leads to the conclusion that the statement of the Sifri is a minority opinion. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:58) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.
2.I.e., not necessarily on the day the vow was taken, but on the day he first heard of it.
3.The Emek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.
4.I.e., after nissuin, the second stage of the marriage relationship.
5.For Numbers 30:14 specifically mentions a husband's authority involving vows of this type. Vows that involve personal aggravation refer to vows that involve accepting a prohibition of a particular type of satisfaction.
6.Literally, those "between him and her."
7.Such conduct could arouse a husband's displeasure, for he will not be happy that his wife does not appear attractive.
The Shulchan Aruch (234:59) mentions other views which consider these vows as ones that involve personal aggravation as well as the Rambam's view that these are matters that affect the husband-wife relationship.
8.I.e., even if he divorces her, the vow is nullified.
9.The nullification applies only when they are married.
10.See Halachah 9 with regard to clarification when this vow must be nullified and when it need not be nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:83 quotes views that maintain that since the vow takes effect with regard to other men, it would also take effect with regard to him if he did not nullify it.
11.These are considered vows that involve personal aggravation.
12.These are considered vows affecting the marriage relationship.
13.Our translation follows the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. The Chatam Sofer explains that since it is forbidden to eat unpleasant foods on Yom Kippur - when fasting is described as aggravating one's soul - even unpleasant foods are included in this category.
The Turei Zahav 234:51, however, translates the term as "harmful foods," arguing that if the woman considered the food unpleasant and had no desire for it, it would not be considered as "aggravation" for her to be prevented from partaking of it.
14.Since she never partook of this food, there is room to say that no aggravation would be caused by prohibiting it. Hence it is necessary to emphasize that it is forbidden.
15.The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Asher's commentary to Nedarim 82b which explains that this refers to a situation where one loaf is made of fine flour and is attractive and one is made of coarse flour and is not. She will suffer aggravation from not eating the first, but not from not eating the second.
There is a slight difficulty with this explanation, because the previous halachah stated that a husband may nullify even a vow involving unpleasant food. It can be explained, however, that since her husband makes it possible for her to partake of the loaf of fine bread, she will have no aggravation over not partaking over the coarse bread. When, however, she is not able to partake of the unpleasant food, she has no similar alternative.
Alternatively, Rabbenu Asher explains that she is hungry and will be satisfied by eating one loaf. Hence, not eating that loaf will give her aggravation. Not eating the second one will not.
16.The Kessef Mishneh notes that when a sage absolves a vow, if he nullifies a portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Chapter 4, Halachah 11). This principle does not, however, hold true with regard to a vow nullified by a husband.
17.I.e., it is not a matter of aggravation, because she may eat figs. Nevertheless, obtaining the figs places a difficulty upon her husband. Although it also mentions the Rambam's view, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:60) appears to follow the view of other Rishonim who maintain that this is also considered a vow involving aggravation.
18.As stated in Halachah 2.
19.I.e., this point is obvious. Even if she does not say so explicitly, she may benefit from him without him having to nullify the vow.
20.The Mishnah (Nedarim 11:3) quotes Rabbi Yossi who rules that one may not nullify such a vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this is a minority view.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:64) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of other Rishonim who maintain that such a vow is considered one which involves personal aggravation.
21.Our translation is based on the Kessef Mishneh who states that the wording of the original is inexact.
22.I.e., even if he does not nullify the vow, it does not take effect.
23.See Chapter 5, Halachah 3. By agreeing to marriage, a woman gives her husband rights to marital intimacy that cannot be withheld.
24.Hilchot Ishut 12:2, based on Exodus 21:10.
25.Since the vow does not forbid anything to the man, it will take effect unless he nullifies it. See also parallels in Hilchot Ishut 14:7 and Chapter 1, Halachah 30, above.
Based on Chapter 3, Halachah 10, it must be concluded that we are referring to an instance where she said "Your body is forbidden to me," for satisfaction is not a tangible matter (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 234:57; Siftei Cohen 234:81). Tosafot maintains that even if he does not say "Your body...," we consider it as if he did. This intent is reflected in the wording chosen by the Shulchan Aruch.
26.I.e., in both cases, she is consecrating the future products of her labor to the Temple treasury. She must, however, be careful to phrase the vow in a manner that she is not consecrating an entity that does not exist. For then the vow would not be effective [Nedarim 85a; Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:71)]. See also Hilchot Arachin 6:28.
27.I.e., one of the rights given to a husband is the right to benefit from his wife's labor (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).
28.Ketubot 59b; Nedarim 86b.
29.Of a servant. If a servant was designated as security for a debt and was then freed by his master, he is a free man and is not in any way subjugated to the person who had the lien (Hilchot Malveh ULoveh 18:6).
30.If a Jew designated leavened products (chametz) as security for a loan to a gentile, when the prohibition against benefiting from chametz takes effect, the lien is no longer effective and the chametz reverts to the ownership of the Jew and he is obligated to destroy it.
31.If an ox was designated as security for a loan and then its owner, the borrower, consecrated it, the lien is severed and the lender must collect the debt from another source. See also Hilchot Arachin 7:5.
32.As in several other instances, our Sages reinforced their decrees, giving them more power than Scriptural Law (see Chapter 3, Halachah 9 for another example). The rationale is that if Rabbinic Law was not given this additional measure of strength, people might treat it lightly.
33.For her vow would take effect after the divorce and then, he would not be able to remarry her because he would then be forbidden to benefit from her work, including her performance of household tasks, thus creating an impossible situation.
See Turei Zahav 234:63 who explains why we mention this concern in this instance and not in others where it would seemingly apply.
34.For, as reflected by Hilchot Ishut 21:3, she is not under any obligation to perform work on behalf of these people.
35.I.e., the animal he rides upon.
36.As Hilchot Ishut 21:5 states, she is obligated to provide straw for his riding animal. She is not, however, obligated to provide water for it, for it is necessary to draw water from a spring or river and that is compromising to a woman's modesty (Kessef Mishneh). As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., the Rambam's ruling is based the version of Ketubot 61b cited by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard published text of the Talmud follows a different understanding.
37.She is obligated to provide straw for the animal he rides upon, for that is an expression of consideration for her husband's person. She has no such obligation with regard to his cattle, for those animals are necessary only for work and that is solely her husband's concern.
38.I.e., were she obligated to perform these tasks, her vow not to perform them would not take effect.
39.A sage, by contrast, may only absolve an oath or a vow after it takes effect (Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:14).
40.The Rambam's ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:28). The Kessef Mishneh and the Rama quote the ruling of Rabbenu Yerucham who maintains that this principle applies only with regard to vows that have not taken effect because the time when they are due to take effect has not come. If, however, they are dependent on a deed, they cannot be nullified until they take effect. See the comments of the Siftei Cohen 234:45 which discusses this issue.
41.This applies even if he is not both deaf and dumb [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)].
42.For Numbers 30:5 speak of her father hearing. Implied is that if he cannot hear, he cannot nullify the vow (Sifri to the verse).
43.Chapter 11, Halachah 21. This also applies with regard to her father, as indicated by Halachah 20 of that chapter.
44.Rabbenu Asher [quoted by Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)] differs and maintains that it is necessary for him to hear the vow.
45.See Hilchot Ishut 4:7; 11:6.
46.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.
47.I.e., until nightfall, as the Rambam continues to explain.
48.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.
49.I.e., neither a husband, nor a father.
50.For the day on which he heard the vow has passed.
51.Which seemingly implies a 24 hour period.
52.In the previous halachah.
53.I.e., according to the Rambam, regardless of who hears about the vow and nullifies it first, the father and the husband must both nullify it on the same day. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:5) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher who maintain that the father and the husband do not have to nullify the vow on the same day. As long as each one nullifies it on the day he hears of it, it is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:13 quotes the opinion of the Bayit Chadash who rules that we should be stringent and follow the Rambam's decision.
54.I.e., this obviously applies after nissuin, when the woman is living in her husband's home.
55.I.e., he intended to nullify her vow afterwards, but desired that she think that the vow is binding so that she will take the matter more seriously.
56.I.e., since the vow was nullified, there is no prohibition involved in the action.
57.A punishment instituted by the Rabbis.
58.If she transgressed willfully.
59.If she transgressed inadvertently.
60.In contrast to the repeal of a vow by a sage, when a father or a husband nullify a vow, they do not nullify it retroactively, only from the time of their actions onward. See the notes to Chapter 13, Halachah 2.
61.Significantly, the Sifri derives the same concept from a different verse.
62.For the day he discovers new information concerning the vow is equivalent to the day he hears of it.
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Hayom Yom:
• Thursday, Iyar 1, 5774 • 01 May 2014
"Today's Day"
Thursday, Iyar 1, Second day of Rosh Chodesh, 16th day of the omer, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: K'doshim, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 1-9.
Tanya: The said two (p. 235) to...Ahavat Olam ("eternal love") (p.237).
At a farbrengen during the days of sefira (at some time in the years 5651-5653, 1891-1893) someone said to my father, "The Alter Rebbe's chassidim were always keeping count." My father took a great liking to the saying, and he commented: "That idea characterizes man's avoda. The hours must be 'counted hours,' then the days will be 'counted days.' When a day passes one should know what he has accomplished and what remains yet to be done... In general, one should always see to it that tomorrow should be much better than today."
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Daily Thought:Demands
Do you think He created us because He wanted pristine, perfect beings? He desired that a glimmer of Himself should descend into a creature who cries and laughs and dances and bleeds; who fails as much as he succeeds; who chases after fleeting moments and is torn by figments of his own mind. He wanted to live in the petty world of such a being, and from within that place He will come to know His self that cannot be known.
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