TODAY'S LAWS & CUSTOMS:
• COUNT "EIGHTEEN DAYS TO THE OMER" TONIGHT
Tomorrow is the eighteenth day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer for tomorrow's date tonight, after nightfall: "Today is eighteen days, which are two weeks and four days, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all day tomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day is Shavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Netzach sheb'Tifferet -- "Ambition in Harmony"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" -- Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed, Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
TODAY IN JEWISH HISTORY:
• MAHARASH BORN (1834)
The fourth Rebbe of Chabad-Lubavitch, Rabbi Shmuel Schneersohn (1834-1882), known by the acrynom "Maharash", was born in the town of Lubavitch (White Russia) on the 2nd of Iyar of the year 5594 from creation (1834). His father, Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Lubavitch (the 3rd Chabad Rebbe, known as the "Tzemach Tzeddek") once remarked that Rabbi Shmuel's birthday, coinciding with the 17th day of the Omer Count, is defined by the Kabbalistic masters as Tifferet sheb'Tifferet ("Beauty of Beauty")
Although Rabbi Shmuel was the youngest of Rabbi Menachem Mendel's seven sons, he was chosen to succeed his father as "rebbe" and leader of Chabad in the movement's capital, Lubavitch (four of his brothers established branches of Chabad Chassidism in other towns in White Russia and Ukraine). In addition to leading his Chassidim, guiding and advising their spiritual and material lives and authoring many maamarim (discourses of Chassidic teaching), Rabbi Shmuel traveled extensively throughout Europe, meeting with government and business leaders to exert pressure on the Czarist regime to halt its instigation of pogroms against the Jews of Russia.
Rabbi Shmuel passed away at age 48 on the 13th of Tishrei, 5643 (1882).
Links: Rabbi Shmuel of Lubavitch
Selected Teachings of Rabbi Shmuel
Rabbi Shmuel's and His Disciples' Melodies
Rabbi Shmuel's Biography
DAILY QUOTE:
When the righteous wish to settle in tranquility, G-d says: "Is it not enough for the righteous what is prepared for them in the World to Come, that they also ask for a tranquil life in this world?"--Rashi's commentary on Genesis 37:1
DAILY STUDY:
CHITAS AND RAMBAM FOR TODAY:
Chumash: Emor, 6th Portion Leviticus 23:33-23:44 with Rashi
• Chapter 23
33. And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, לג. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
34. Speak to the children of Israel, saying: On the fifteenth day of this seventh month, is the Festival of Succoth, a seven day period to the Lord. לד. דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי הַזֶּה חַג הַסֻּכּוֹת שִׁבְעַת יָמִים לַיהֹוָה:
35. On the first day, it is a holy occasion; you shall not perform any work of labor. לה. בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ כָּל מְלֶאכֶת עֲבֹדָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ:
a holy occasion: [This expression mentioned in connection with Yom Kippur, means that you are to] sanctify it [the day] through [wearing] clean garments and through prayer, while [this expression mentioned in connection] with the other holy days, [means] sanctify it with food and drink, through [wearing] clean clothes and through [their own special] prayers. — [See Torath Kohanim 23:186] [Note that this Rashi belongs on verse 27. Therefore, it is obvious that it is referring to Yom Kippur, and the words, בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרים are completely unnecessary. Since the copyists believed it to be on verse 35, which deals with Succoth, they found it necessary to insert those words. See Divrei David.]
מקרא קדש: קדשהו בכסות נקיה ובתפלה, ובשאר ימים טובים במאכל ובמשתה ובכסות נקיה ובתפלה:
36. [For] a seven day period, you shall bring a fire offering to the Lord. On the eighth day, it shall be a holy occasion for you, and you shall bring a fire offering to the Lord. It is a [day of] detention. You shall not perform any work of labor. לו. שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תַּקְרִיבוּ אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם וְהִקְרַבְתֶּם אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה עֲצֶרֶת הִוא כָּל מְלֶאכֶת עֲבֹדָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ:
It is a [day of] detention: [i.e., God says to Israel,] “I have detained you [to remain] with Me.” This is analogous to a king who invited his sons to feast with him for a certain number of days, and when the time came for them to leave, he said: “My sons! Please, stay with me just one more day, [for] it is difficult for me to part with you!” [Similarly, after the seven days of Succoth, God “detains” Israel for one extra holy day.]
עצרת הוא: עצרתי אתכם אצלי כמלך שזימן את בניו לסעודה לכך וכך ימים, כיון שהגיע זמנן להפטר אמר בני בבקשה מכם, עכבו עמי עוד יום אחד, קשה עלי פרידתכם:
[you shall not perform] any work of labor: [I.e.,] even such work that is considered labor for you, that, if not done, would cause a monetary loss [is prohibited].
כל מלאכת עבדה: אפילו מלאכה שהיא עבודה לכם, שאם לא תעשוה יש חסרון כיס בדבר:
you shall not perform: One might think that even during the intermediate days of the Festival, work of labor is [also] prohibited. Scripture, therefore says here, “ It [is a day of detention,” [i.e., only on this eighth day is work prohibited, and not on the preceding weekdays of the Festival, when such work, which, if postponed, would cause a monetary loss, is permitted]. — [Torath Kohanim 23:187]
לא תעשו: יכול אף חולו של מועד יהא אסור במלאכת עבודה, תלמוד לומר היא:
37. These are God's appointed [holy days] that you shall designate them as holy occasions, [on which] to offer up a fire offering to the Lord burnt offering and meal offering, sacrifice and libations, the requirement of each day on its day; לז. אֵלֶּה מוֹעֲדֵי יְהֹוָה אֲשֶׁר תִּקְרְאוּ אֹתָם מִקְרָאֵי קֹדֶשׁ לְהַקְרִיב אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה עֹלָה וּמִנְחָה זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים דְּבַר יוֹם בְּיוֹמוֹ:
burnt offering and meal offering: the libations meal offering that is offered up with the burnt offering (see Num. 15:1-16). - [Men. 44b]
עלה ומנחה: מנחת נסכים הקריבה עם העולה:
the requirement of each day on its day: [I.e.,] according to the prescribed laws set out in the Book of Num. (chapter 29).
דבר יום ביומו: חוק הקצוב בחומש הפקודים:
the requirement of each day on its day: But if its day passes, [and the prescribed sacrifice for that day had not been offered,] this sacrifice is canceled [i.e., it can no longer be brought on a later day]. — [Torath Kohanim 23:189]
דבר יום ביומו: הא אם עבר יומו בטל קרבנו:
38. apart from the Lord's Sabbaths, and apart from your gifts, and apart from all your vows, and apart from all your donations that you give to the Lord. לח. מִלְּבַד שַׁבְּתֹת יְהֹוָה וּמִלְּבַד מַתְּנוֹתֵיכֶם וּמִלְּבַד כָּל נִדְרֵיכֶם וּמִלְּבַד כָּל נִדְבֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר תִּתְּנוּ לַיהֹוָה:
39. But on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, when you gather in the produce of the land, you shall celebrate the festival of the Lord for a seven day period; the first day shall be a rest day, and the eighth day shall be a rest day. לט. אַךְ בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי בְּאָסְפְּכֶם אֶת תְּבוּאַת הָאָרֶץ תָּחֹגּוּ אֶת חַג יְהֹוָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן שַׁבָּתוֹן וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי שַׁבָּתוֹן:
But on the fifteenth day… when you gather in the produce of the land, you shall celebrate the festiv: [by bringing] a peace offering as the [special] “Festival offering (חֲגִיגָה).” Now, one might think that this [Festival offering] overrides the Sabbath. Scripture, therefore, says here, “But (אַךְ)” [denoting an exclusion (see Rashi on verse 27 above; Torath Kohanim 23: 191), namely that this sacrifice may not be brought on the Sabbath], since it can be made up on any of the seven [days of the Festival].
אך בחמשה עשר יום תחגו: קרבן שלמים לחגיגה. יכול תדחה את השבת, תלמוד לומר אך, הואיל ויש לה תשלומין כל שבעה:
when you gather in the produce of the land: [This teaches us] that this seventh month must occur at the time of ingathering, [namely, in the fall]. From here, [we learn] that they were commanded to proclaim leap years [i.e., to add an extra, thirteenth month to the lunar year], for if there were no leap years, [the lunar years would eventually no longer coincide with the solar years, and] sometimes [the seventh month] would occur in midsummer or midwinter [not in the time of ingathering]. - [Torath Kohanim 23:192]
באספכם את תבואת הארץ: שיהא חדש שביעי זה בא בזמן אסיפה, מכאן שנצטוו לעבר את השנים, שאם אין העבור, פעמים שהוא בא באמצע הקיץ או החורף:
you shall celebrate: [by bringing] the Festival peace offering (see the first Rashi on this verse),
תחגו: שלמי חגיגה:
for a seven-day period: If one did not bring it on one [day of the Festival], he may still bring it on another. Now, one might think that we are obliged to bring it all seven days. Scripture, therefore, says, “celebrate it” (verse 41 below) [employing the singular form,] thus denoting only one day and no more. But why does Scripture say “seven”? [To give seven days] for making it up [if one did not bring it on the first day]. - [Chag. 9a]
שבעת ימים: אם לא הביא בזה יביא בזה. יכול יהא מביאן כל שבעה, תלמוד לומר וחגותם אותו, יום אחד במשמע, ולא יותר. ולמה נאמר שבעה, לתשלומין:
40. And you shall take for yourselves on the first day, the fruit of the hadar tree, date palm fronds, a branch of a braided tree, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God for a seven day period. מ. וּלְקַחְתֶּם לָכֶם בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן פְּרִי עֵץ הָדָר כַּפֹּת תְּמָרִים וַעֲנַף עֵץ עָבֹת וְעַרְבֵי נָחַל וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים:
the fruit of the hadar tree: [Scripture could have simply said, “ hadar fruit.” Since it adds the word “tree,” next to “fruit,” it teaches us that it is] a tree whose wood has the same taste as its fruit. — [Sukkah 35a] [Note that, according to Ramban, the fruit known in Aramaic as “ethrog,” is known in Hebrew as “ hadar.”
פרי עץ הדר: עץ שטעם עצו ופריו שוה:
hadar: [Refers to a fruit] “that resides (הַדָּר) ” on its tree from one year to the next, which is the ethrog. — [Sukkah 35a]
הדר: הדר באילנו משנה לשנה, וזהו אתרוג:
date-palm fronds: Heb. כַּפֹּת תְּמָרִים. [The word כַּפֹּת is written here with] a missing “vav” (ו) [thus implying the singular rather than the plural]. This teaches us that only one [date-palm frond is to be taken]. — [Sukkah 32a]
כפת תמרים: חסר וי"ו, למד שאינה אלא אחת:
a branch of a braided tree: [A tree] whose branches עֲנָפָיו are braided like cords עֲבוֹתוֹת and like ropes. And Scripture is referring here specifically to the הֲדַס (myrtle) tree, which is made in a braided-like form. — [Sukkah 32b]
וענף עץ עבת: שענפיו קלועים כעבותות וכחבלים, וזהו הדס העשוי כמין קליעה:
41. And you shall celebrate it as a festival to the Lord for seven days in the year. [It is] an eternal statute throughout your generations [that] you celebrate it in the seventh month. מא. וְחַגֹּתֶם אֹתוֹ חַג לַיהֹוָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים בַּשָּׁנָה חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי תָּחֹגּוּ אֹתוֹ:
42. For a seven day period you shall live in booths. Every resident among the Israelites shall live in booths, מב. בַּסֻּכֹּת תֵּשְׁבוּ שִׁבְעַת יָמִים כָּל הָאֶזְרָח בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל יֵשְׁבוּ בַּסֻּכֹּת:
resident: Heb. הָאֶזְרָח, [lit., “the resident.” The definite article here] signifies a resident [of the people of Israel, namely, a native Jew. Therefore, the next seemingly superfluous expression, namely,]
האזרח: זה אזרח:
among the Israelites: Comes to include converts [in this commandment]. — [Sukkah 28b]
בישראל: לרבות את הגרים:
43. in order that your [ensuing] generations should know that I had the children of Israel live in booths when I took them out of the land of Egypt. I am the Lord, your God. מג. לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:
I had the children of Israel live in booths: [These were] the clouds of glory [with which God enveloped the Jewish people in the desert, forming a protective shelter for them against wild beasts and enemies.] [See Num. 10:34 and Rashi on that verse.]- [Sukkah 11b]
כי בסכות הושבתי: ענני כבוד:
44. And Moses told the children of Israel [these laws] of the Lord's appointed [holy days]. מד. וַיְדַבֵּר משֶׁה אֶת מֹעֲדֵי יְהֹוָה אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
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Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 10 - 17
• Chapter 10
This psalm tells of the wicked one’s prosperity and his boasting of it, until he says: “There is neither law nor judge. God pays no attention to the actions of mere mortals.”
1. Why, O Lord, do You stand afar, do You hide Yourself in times of distress?
2. The wicked man in his arrogance pursues the poor; they are caught by the schemes they have contrived.
3. For the wicked man glories in the desire of his heart, and the robber boasts that he has scorned the Lord.
4. The wicked one in his insolence [thinks], “He does not avenge”; all his thoughts are, “There is no God.”
5. His ways always succeed; Your retribution is far removed from before him; he puffs at all his foes.
6. He says in his heart, “I shall not falter; for all generations no evil will befall me.”
7. His mouth is full of oaths, deceit and malice; mischief and iniquity are under his tongue.
8. He sits in ambush near open cities; in hidden places he murders the innocent; his eyes stealthily watch for the helpless.
9. He lurks in hiding like a lion in his lair; he lurks to seize the poor, then seizes the poor when he draws his net.
10. He crouches and stoops, then the helpless fall prey to his might.
11. He says in his heart, “God has forgotten, He conceals His countenance, He will never see.”
12. Arise, O Lord! O God, lift Your hand! Do not forget the lowly.
13. Why does the wicked man scorn God? Because he says in his heart, “You do not avenge.”
14. Indeed, You do see! For You behold the mischief and vexation. To recompense is in Your power; the helpless place their trust in You; You have [always] helped the orphan.
15. Break the strength of the wicked; then search for the wickedness of the evil one and You will not find it.
16. The Lord reigns for all eternity; the nations have vanished from His land.
17. Lord, You have heard the desire of the humble; direct their hearts, let Your ear listen,
18. to bring justice to the orphan and the downtrodden, so that [the wicked] shall no longer crush the frail of the earth.
Chapter 11
This psalm declares that the suffering of the righteous one is for his own benefit, to cleanse him of his sins; whereas the wicked one is granted prosperity in this world-similar to the verse, "Wealth remains with its owner, to his detriment."
1. For the Conductor, by David. I have placed my trust in the Lord; [thus] how can you say of my soul, your mountain,1 that it flees like a bird?2
2. For behold, the wicked bend the bow, they have readied their arrow upon the bowstring, to shoot in darkness at the upright of heart.
3. They destroyed the foundations; 3 what [wrong] has the righteous man done?
4. The Lord is in His holy Sanctuary, the Lord's throne is in heaven, [yet] His eyes behold, His pupils probe [the deeds of] mankind.
5. The Lord tests the righteous, but He hates the wicked and the lover of violence.
6. He will rain down upon the wicked fiery coals and brimstone; a scorching wind will be their allotted portion.
7. For the Lord is righteous, He loves [the man of] righteous deeds; the upright will behold His countenance.
Chapter 12
This psalm admonishes informers, slanderers, and flatterers.
1. For the Conductor, upon the eight-stringed instrument, a psalm by David.
2. Help us, Lord, for the pious are no more; for the faithful have vanished from among men.
3. Men speak falsehood to one another; with flattering lips, with a duplicitous heart do they speak.
4. May the Lord cut off all flattering lips, the tongue that speaks boastfully-
5. those who have said, "With our tongues we shall prevail, our lips are with us, who is master over us!”
6. Because of the plundering of the poor, because of the moaning of the needy, the Lord says, "Now I will arise!" "I will grant deliverance," He says to him.
7. The words of the Lord are pure words, like silver refined in the finest earthen crucible, purified seven times.
8. May You, O Lord, watch over them; may You forever guard them from this generation,
9. [in which] the wicked walk on every side; when they are exalted it is a disgrace to mankind.
Chapter 13
A prayer for an end to the long exile. One in distress should offer this prayer for his troubles and for the length of the exile.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by David.
2. How long, O Lord, will You forget me, forever? How long will You hide Your countenance from me?
3. How long must I seek counsel within my soul, [to escape] the grief in my heart all day? How long will my enemy be exalted over me?
4. Look! Answer me, O Lord, my God; give light to my eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death.
5. Lest my enemy say, "I have overcome him," [and] my oppressors rejoice when I falter.
6. I have placed my trust in Your kindness, my heart will rejoice in Your deliverance. I will sing to the Lord, for He has dealt kindly with me.
Chapter 14
This psalm speaks of the destruction of the two Holy Temples-the first by Nebuchadnezzar, and the second by Titus.
1. For the Conductor, by David. The fool says in his heart, "There is no God!" [Man's] deeds have become corrupt and abominable, no one does good.
2. The Lord looked down from heaven upon mankind, to see if there was any wise man who searches for God.
3. They have all gone astray together, they have become corrupt; there is none who does good, not even one.
4. Indeed, all the evildoers, who devour My people as they devour bread, who do not call upon the Lord, will [ultimately] come to know [the consequences of their actions].
5. There they will be seized with fright, for God is with the righteous generation.
6. You scorn the counsel of the lowly, that he puts his trust in the Lord.
7. O that out of Zion would come Israel's deliverance! When the Lord returns the captivity of His people, Jacob will exult, Israel will rejoice.
Chapter 15
This psalm speaks of several virtues and attributes with which one should conduct oneself. He is then assured that his soul will rest in Gan Eden.
1. A psalm by David. Who may abide in Your tent, O Lord? Who may dwell on Your holy Mountain?
2. He who walks blamelessly, acts justly, and speaks truth in his heart;
3. who has no slander on his tongue, who has done his fellowman no evil, and who has brought no disgrace upon his relative;
4. in whose eyes a despicable person is abhorrent, but who honors those who are God-fearing; who does not change his oath even if it is to his own detriment;
5. who does not lend his money at interest, nor accept a bribe against the innocent. He who does these things shall never falter.
Chapter 16
When one is in need, he should not implore God in his own merit, for he must leave his merits for his children.
1. A michtam,1 by David. Watch over me, O God, for I have put my trust in You.
2. You, [my soul,] have said to God, "You are my Master; You are not obligated to benefit me.”
3. For the sake of the holy ones who lie in the earth, and for the mighty-all my desires are fulfilled in their merit.
4. Those who hasten after other [gods], their sorrows shall increase; I will not offer their libations of blood, nor take their names upon my lips.
5. The Lord is my allotted portion and my share; You guide my destiny.
6. Portions have fallen to me in pleasant places; indeed, a beautiful inheritance is mine.
7. I bless the Lord Who has advised me; even in the nights my intellect admonishes me.2
8. I have set the Lord before me at all times; because He is at my right hand, I shall not falter.
9. Therefore my heart rejoices and my soul exults; my flesh, too, rests secure.
10. For You will not abandon my soul to the grave, You will not allow Your pious one to see purgatory.
11. Make known to me the path of life, that I may be satiated with the joy of Your presence, with the bliss of Your right hand forever.
Chapter 17
A loftily person should not ask God to test him with some sinful matter, or other things. If one has sinned, he should see to reform himself, and to save many others from sin.
1. A prayer by David. Hear my sincere [plea], O Lord; listen to my cry; give ear to my prayer, expressed by guileless lips.
2. Let my verdict come forth from before You; let Your eyes behold uprightness.
3. You have probed my heart, examined it in the night, tested me and found nothing; no evil thought crossed my mind; as are my words so are my thoughts.
4. So that [my] human deeds conform with the words of Your lips, I guard myself from the paths of the lawbreakers.
5. Support my steps in Your paths, so that my feet shall not falter.
6. I have called upon You, for You, O Lord, will answer me; incline Your ear to me, hear what I say.
7. Withhold Your kindness-O You who delivers with Your right hand those who put their trust in You-from those who rise up against [You].
8. Guard me like the apple of the eye; hide me in the shadow of Your wings
9. from the wicked who despoil me, [from] my mortal enemies who surround me.
10. Their fat has closed [their hearts]; their mouths speak arrogantly.
11. They encircle our footsteps; they set their eyes to make us stray from the earth.
12. His appearance is like a lion longing to devour, like a young lion lurking in hiding.
13. Arise, O Lord! Confront him, bring him to his knees; rescue my soul from the wicked [who serves as] Your sword.
14. Let me be among those whose death is by Your hand, O Lord, among those who die of old age, whose portion is eternal life and whose innards are filled with Your concealed goodness; who are sated with sons and leave their abundance to their offspring.
15. Because of my righteousness, I shall behold Your countenance; in the time of resurrection, I will be sated by Your image.
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 44
• Lessons in Tanya
• Today's Tanya Lesson
Friday, Iyar 2, 5774 • May 2, 2014
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 44
רק שאף על פי כן צריך לטרוח בשכלו להשיג ולהגיע גם לבחינת אהבת עולם הנזכרת למעלה, הבאה מהתבונה ודעת בגדולת ה׳
Nonetheless a person must strain his intellect to apprehend and attain also the above-mentioned1 level of ahavat olam, which stems from an understanding and knowledge of the greatness of G d,
As such it differs from the loves of “My soul...” and “Like a son...” which essentially are inherited, and are only revealed through contemplation.
כדי להגדיל מדורת אש האהבה ברשפי אש ושלהבת עזה ולהב העולה השמימה, עד שמים רבים לא יוכלו לכבות וגו׳ ונהרות לא ישטפוה וגו׳
in order to fan the blaze of the fiery love, with glowing coals and an intense fire and a flame that rises heavenwards, so that2 “not even many waters which are enemies of the love can extinguish it..., nor rivers quench it....”
Love created purely as a result of contemplation is more passionate and fiery than love which is essentially inherited, even when the inherited love is revealed through contemplation.
כי יש יתרון ומעלה לבחינת אהבה כרשפי אש ושלהבת עזה וכו׳ הבאה מהתבונה ודעת בגדולת אין סוף ברוך הוא, על שתי בחינות אהבה הנזכרות למעלה כאשר אינן כרשפי אש ושלהבת כו׳
For there is a superiority and excellence in the quality of love burning like fiery coals and an intense flame,... which comes from an understanding and knowledge of the greatness and transcendence of the blessed Ein Sof, over the two categories of love referred to above, when they are not like fiery coals3 and a blaze,... but merely result from feeling (or contemplating) G d’s closeness to a Jew, inasmuch as He is “the Source of our life” and “our true Father.” The superiority of this love is:
כיתרון ומעלת הזהב על הכסף וכו׳ כמו שכתוב לקמן
similar to the superiority and excellence of gold over silver, and so forth, as will be explained later.4
Not only is gold worth more than silver ounce for ounce, in which case a preponderance of silver would be more valuable, but gold is intrinsically of greater value in that it possesses a distinctive gleam which people find highly attractive.
So, too, with regard to love that results wholly from contemplation: it is not a higher level of love; on the contrary, the level of love that comes from above and is termed ahavah rabbah, “great love,” is the higher form of love. The superiority of love that results entirely from contemplation lies in its fiery passion and yearning of the soul. This is one reason why the two previously-mentioned kinds of love that Jews inherit do not suffice; they lack passion when compared to love emanating entirely from one’s intellect.
The Alter Rebbe now provides yet another reason why wholly contemplative love is necessary: It is important to attain contemplative love not only because of the superiority of the resulting passion, but because the contemplation is an end unto itself. By contemplating G d’s greatness, one fulfills the whole purpose of creation — that created beings should come to know and understand G d’s greatness.
וגם כי זה כל האדם ותכליתו
Besides, this is the whole man and his raison d‘etre:
למען דעת את כבוד ה׳ ויקר תפארת גדולתו, איש איש כפי אשר יוכל שאת, כמו שכתוב ברעיא מהימנא, פרשת בא: בגין דישתמודען ליה וכו׳ וכנודע
that one may know the glory of G d and the majestic splendor of His greatness, each according to the limit of his capacity, as is written in Ra‘aya Mehemna, Parshat Bo: “In order that they may know Him,” and so forth, as is known.
Thus, there is a special quality and purpose in contemplation (that leads to love) itself. Contemplation of G d’s greatness is exercised to a much greater degree in the love that is created from contemplation, than it is found in a love which is merely revealed through contemplation, as is the case in the two aforementioned kinds of love.
In order to merely reveal the love of “My soul...” by contemplating how G d is the “true Source of life,” or to reveal the love of “Like a son..,” by contemplating how G d is “our true Father,” one’s meditation need not be exceedingly profound. A much deeper understanding and more profound mode of meditation is necessary in order to create a love of G d based solely on intellectual comprehension.
As a result, the divine intention “that they may know Him” — that created beings come to know G dliness — is realized to a much greater extent through wholly contemplative love. This is the additional reason as to why the kinds of love inherited from the Patriarchs do not suffice, and it is necessary to exert oneself to attain a love of G d that stems entirely from contemplating His greatness.
FOOTNOTES
1. Ch. 43.
2. Shir HaShirim 8:7.
3. Commenting on the words “when they are not like fiery coals,” the Rebbe notes that it is indeed possible for the loves of “My soul...” and “Like a son...” to possess the quality and passion of “fiery coals.” This comes about when the contemplation which leads to the revelation of these two loves focuses [not on His nearness, but] on the transcendence of “our true Father” and the “Source of our life”; the majestic exaltedness of the Father arouses a thirsting and longing love in the son.
Briefly, the matter is as follows: There are two general modes of contemplating G dliness — contemplating His transcendence and exaltedness (or conversely, the distance of the worlds from G d), and contemplating G d’s close relationship with us. The former will result in the thirsting and longing love of “fiery coals,” while the latter will result in a Jew’s feeling close to G d. This love is known as “love similar to water.”
Each of these two modes of contemplation has two possible results: (1) it leads to the revelation of a love (or fear) that already exists in the soul (as an inheritance from the Patriarchs), or (2) it creates love (or fear).
The Rebbe concludes: “It is noteworthy that [love resulting from contemplating G d’s] transcendence must refer to a form of transcendence that has some relationship to the person; otherwise the result will be self-abnegation. The same is true with regard to [contemplating the world’s] distance [from G d]. Cf. references cited in note to Kuntres Etz HaChayim, ch. 2.”
4. In ch. 50.
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Rambam:
• Daily Mitzvah - Sefer Hamitzvos:
Friday, Iyar 2, 5774 • May 2, 2014
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 95
The Nullification of Vows
We are commanded to practice the Torah-mandated procedure in the event that a vow is to be annulled.
(This commandment is somewhat based on the verse [Numbers 30:3] "he shall not profane his word," from which the Sages deduce that the one who enacted the vow may not profane his own word, but others – such as a sage or rabbinical court – may do so. Nevertheless, the Talmud says that the "annulment of vows flies in the air, with no [explicit biblical] support...")
The Torah explicitly tells us that a husband and father can nullify vows, and tradition teaches that a sage, too, has the power to do so.
The Nullification of Vows
Positive Commandment 95
Translated by Berel Bell
The 95th mitzvah is that we are commanded regarding the annulment of vows.
This does not mean that there is a commandment to annul vows, but rather that there are certain laws to be followed when doing so. You should keep this principle in mind whenever a mitzvah is enumerated — it does not necessarily mean that we are commanded to perform a certain action, but rather that a certain case [whenever it comes up,] must be judged according to certain laws.
The annulment of vows done by a father [to his daughter] and a husband [to his wife] is explained in the Torah1 in detail.
Furthermore, we know from the Oral Tradition that a Torah scholar can nullify anyone's vow or oath. This is hinted to in the verse,2 "He must not nullify his word." [The Sages3 explain,] "He may not nullify his word, but others may nullify it for him." The final conclusion is that there is no real source in Scripture [for the Torah scholar's power to annul a vow, and the verse quoted above is only a hint]. As our Sages4 put it, "The laws regarding the annulment of vows [by a Torah scholar] are flying in the air, with nothing to support them" — except in the Oral Tradition.
The details of this mitzvah are found in the tractate devoted to this subject, tractate Nedarim.
FOOTNOTES
1.Num. 30:4-17.
2.Num. 30:3.
3.Berachos 32a; Chagigah 10a.
4.Chagigah ibid.
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Positive Commandment 92The Nazirite's Hair
"He shall let the locks of hair on his head grow"—Numbers 6:5.
A nazirite is commanded to allow the hair on his head to grow unimpeded.
he Nazirite's Hair
Positive Commandment 92
Translated by Berel Bell
The 92nd mitzvah is that a Nazirite is commanded to let his hair grow [for the duration of his Nazirite vow].
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "He must let his hair grow long."
In the words of the Mechilta, "The words,2 'he shall be holy' teach us that he should be in a state of holiness when it grows. The words, 'he must let [his hair] grow long' makes this a positive commandment. What is the source of the prohibition?3 The verse,4 'no cutting instrument shall come upon his head.' "
There it also says, "Who is covered by the positive commandment [and not covered by the prohibition]? One who rubs earth or applies depilatories on his head." The meaning of this statement: a Nazirite who places a depilatory on his head does not transgress a prohibition, since a cutting instrument was not used. He will, however, violate the positive commandment, "he must let his hair grow long," since he did not allow it to grow.
[This counts as a positive commandment because] according to our principles, a prohibition which stems from a positive commandment is counted as a positive commandment.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in a number of passages in tractate Nazir.
FOOTNOTES
1.Num. 6:5.
2.Ibid.
3.See N209 below.
4.Ibid.
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Negative Commandment 209Shaving a Nazirite
"A razor shall not go over his head"—Numbers 6:5.
A nazirite must not shave – even one hair off – his head with a razor. This prohibition also precludes another from shaving the nazirite's head.
Shaving a Nazirite
Negative Commandment 209
Translated by Berel Bell
The 209th prohibition is that a Nazirite is forbidden to cut his hair.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "No cutting instrument shall come upon his head."
The one who cuts the Nazirite's hair also receives lashes, since the one who cuts and the one whose hair is cut are both treated the same.2 The punishment of lashes applies as soon as one hair is cut.3
All the details of this mitzvah are explained in the tractate devoted to this subject [tractate Nazir].
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid.
2.Nazir 44a.
3.Ibid. 40a.
________________________________________
Rambam:• 1 Chapter: Mechirah Mechirah - Chapter Five
Mechirah - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
The exchange of any movable property brings about a binding transaction. What is implied? If a person exchanges a cow for a donkey, or wine for oil, once one performs meshichah or lifts up the article that he intends to acquire, the other person acquires the second form of movable propertystipulated in the exchange, wherever it is located. It is considered to have entered his domain, even though he has not performed meshichah upon it.
The above applies although both parties to the transaction are particular about the price, have determined how much this article is worth and how much the other article is worth, and exchanged them after making that determination.
Halacha 2
When a person exchanges a donkey for a cow and a lamb, if he performs meshichah on the cow but not on the lamb, the acquisition is not concluded, for he did not complete the meshichah. The same principle applies in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
When one is not precise about the amount of money involved in a transaction, the money is considered in the same way as other types of movable property, and its exchange brings about a binding transaction.
What is implied? A person scooped up coins without weighing them or counting them, but rather took an estimated amount, said: "Sell me your cow...," or "...this wine, for these coins," and gave him the coins, the transaction is completed; neither party may retract.' Since this is an uncommon situation, our Sages did not require the purchaser to perform meshichah.
Halacha 4
Similarly, movable property can be acquired without meshichah in the following situation. Reuven sold movable property to Shimon for 50 zuz. Shimon acquired the movable property and obligated himself to pay Reuven the price agreed upon. After Shimon became obligated to Reuven for these 50 zuz, he desired to sell wine, an animal, a servant or other similar movable property. Reuven told him: "Sell that object to me for the 50 zuz that you owe me for the sale," and Shimon agreed.
Reuven acquires the movable property regardless of where it is located, even though he neither performed meshichah nor lifted the object up. The rationale is that this also is an abnormal circumstance, and our Sages did not require meshichah.
When, by contrast, a person is in debt for reasons other than a sale, and his creditor tells him: "Sell me the movable property for the debt that you owe me," even though both agree, the transaction is not completed until he lifts up the object, performs meshichah on an object that is not usually lifted up, or acquires it through other means by which movable property can be acquired.
Halacha 5
Landed property, servants, livestock and all other movable property can be acquired through the kinyan referred to as chalifin. This way of finalizing a transaction is so commonly used that it is also referred to as kinyan.
The fundamental manner in which such a transaction is effected is as follows: The purchaser gives the seller any type of article and tells him: "Acquire this article in exchange for the courtyard,..." "...wine,..." "...animal,..."or "...servant that you sold me in exchange for this and this amount of money."
Once this statement is made, when the seller lifts up the article and acquires it, the purchaser acquires that landed property or that movable property even though he did not perform meshichah or pay the money. Neither of the parties involved can retract.
Halacha 6
Such a transaction may be completed only through the use of a utensil. A utensil is effective, however, even if it is not worth a p'rutah.
Such a transaction may not be completed using an article from which it is forbidden to benefit, nor with produce, nor with a coin.
Such a transaction may not be completed using an article belonging to the seller; only one belonging to the purchaser.
Halacha 7
When a third party transfers a utensil to the seller so that the purchaser will acquire merchandise that was designated, the purchaser acquires it.
Even though he transfers the utensil to him with the intent that it be returned, the transaction is binding, and the purchaser acquires the merchandise intended. For a gift that is given with the stipulation that it be returned is nevertheless considered a gift.
Moreover, even if the seller does not take hold of the entire utensil that was transferred to him in exchange for his merchandise, but rather holds a portion of it, and the person transferring the utensil to him holds the other portion, the purchaser acquires the merchandise, provided he holds a portion of the utensil that can itself be considered to be a utensil, or grabs it in a manner in which he would be able to pull the entire utensil from the hands of the person transferring it into his own possession.
Therefore, if the person transferred a portion of a garment to a purchaser, the purchaser must hold a portion of the garment the size of three fingerbreadths. Thus, if he cuts off the portion that he is holding, it would be considered a utensil in its own right. For a portion of a garment the size of three fingerbreadths is considered a garment, as has been explained with regard to the subject of the ritual impurity of garments. Similarly, if the seller holds on to a portion smaller than three fingerbreadths but could pull the entire garment into his possession, the purchaser acquires the merchandise being sold.
Halacha 8
The above concepts are reflected in the expression used in legal documents: "And we performed a kinyan with so and so with a utensil that is acceptable to be used to conduct a transaction."
"A utensil" excludes produce and the like. "That is acceptable" excludes objects from which it is forbidden to benefit. And "to be used to conduct a transaction" excludes a utensil belonging to the seller.
Halacha 9
This transaction need not be performed in the presence of witnesses. Instead, even if it was performed only in the presence of the seller and the purchaser, the transaction is finalized. For the only reason the Torah required witnesses with regard to monetary laws is to prevent a person from denying what transpired.
A seller, one who gives a gift, rents out an object, lends an object or the like does not require witnesses. Whenever the second party finalizes the transaction through one of the accepted practices - lifting the article up, meshichah, transferring it, chalifin, the payment of money, the transfer of a legal document or through manifesting ownership - the transaction is concluded, even when there are no witnesses present.
Halacha 10
Although a person who sells or gives an article confirms the transaction with a kinyan chalifin, both of them may retract as long as they are discussing the matter. This applies even when the kinyan was performed in the presence of witnesses. If they concluded discussing the matter, neither may retract even though the transaction was not observed by witnesses.
Just as the seller and the giver may retract, so too, the purchaser and the recipient may retract as long as they are discussing the matter. This leniency does not apply with regard to other kinyanim.
Halacha 11
There are many matters that do not require a kinyan, and indeed there is no reason to perform a kinyan with regard to them - e.g., a person who frees his slave, divorces his wife, appoints an agent, issues a protest with regard to a sale, nullifies a protest or waives a colleague's obligation to pay a debt or return an entrusted object. Similar laws apply to other analogous situations.
Halacha 12
It has become customary in the majority of places to perform a kinyan to confirm certain of the above matters and the like, even though it is not necessary. The witnesses say: "We performed a kinyan with so and so, confirming that he appointed so and so as an agent," "...waived the debt that so and so owed him," or "...nullified the protest he had issued concerning this bill of divorce," or the like.
Halacha 13
Such a kinyan, which is customarily performed with regard to these matters, is of no consequence except to demonstrate that the parties involved were not acting facetiously or in jest when making the statements, but had in fact made a resolution in their hearts before making the statements. Therefore, if a person says: "I am making my statements with a full heart, and I have resolved to do this," nothing else is necessary.
Halacha 14
A kinyan is of no consequence with regard to statements that are of no substance.
What is implied? If it is stated in a legal document: "We performed a kinyan with so and so, confirming that he will travel to sell merchandise with so and so," "...that they will form a craft partnership," "...that they will divide a field between themselves," or the like, this is considered a kinyan with regard to words, and it is of no consequence. The rationale is that the person did not transfer to his colleague a specific and known entity, neither the entity itself or the fruits of that known entity.
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Rambam:
• 3 Chapters: Nedarim Nedarim - Chapter 13, Nezirut Nezirut - Chapter 1, Nezirut Nezirut - Chapter 2
Nedarim - Chapter 13
Halacha 1
A man may nullify or accept the [vows] of his wife or daughter in any language, even though she does not understand it, for the woman need not hear the nullification or the acceptance [of her vow].1
Halacha 2
How does he nullify [the vow]? He says: "It is nullified," "It is void," "This vow is of no consequence,"2 or uses other terms that imply that the vow is nullified from the outset, whether in the woman's presence or in her absence.1
If, however, he tells her: "I cannot bear your taking a vow" or "This is not a vow," he did not nullify it.3 Similarly, if he tells his wife or his daughter: "[Your vow] is forgiven," "[It] is released," "[It] is absolved," or the like, his statements are of no consequence.4 For a father and a husband do not release a vow like a sage does, but instead, uproot the vow from the outset and nullify it.5
Halacha 3
How does one express his acceptance of a vow? He says to her: "I uphold your vow," "It was good that you vowed," "There is no one like you," "Had you not taken the vow, I would have administered it to you," or any analogous statement that implies that he is happy with this vow.
Halacha 4
When a person voids the vows of his wife or daughter, it is not necessary for him to say anything6 and all of the vows are nullified.
Halacha 5
What is meant by voiding? That he forces her to do something that she forbade herself to do.7 Nullification, by contrast, does not involve forcing her. Instead, he nullifies the vow verbally and allows her [to do as she desires]. If she desires, she may act [in violation of the vow]. If she desires, she need not.8
Halacha 6
What is implied? She took a vow or an oath not to eat or not to drink and he told her: "It is nullified for you." It is nullified and she is permitted to eat and to drink. If he took it and gave it to her, saying: "Take this and eat it," "Take this and drink," she may eat and drink and the vow is automatically nullified.9
Halacha 7
When a person nullifies the vows of his wife or daughter, he must make a verbal statement of nullification. If he nullifies it within his heart, [the vow] is not nullified. When, however, he voids [their vows], he does not have to make a verbal statement. Instead, he nullifies the vow in his heart and compels her to perform [the deed]. Whether she performs it or not, the vow is nullified.
Halacha 8
We may nullify vows on the Sabbath, whether for the sake of the Sabbath10 or not.11 On the Sabbath, however, one should not, however, tell [his wife or daughter]: "[Your vow] is nullified," as one would say during the week.12 Instead, he should nullify [the vow] in his heart and tell her: "Take this and eat it," "Take this and drink," or the like.
Halacha 9
When a person tells his wife or his daughter: "All the vows that you will take from now until I come from this and this place are upheld" or "...are nullified," his words are of no substance.13
If he appointed an agent to nullify her vows or to uphold them, his act is of no substance, as [implied by Numbers 30:14]: "Her husband will uphold them, her husband will nullify them." Similarly, her father must act on his own, not through an agent.
Halacha 10
[When a woman takes a vow,] forbidding herself to [partake of] figs and grapes, whether through a vow or through an oath, whether she forbade herself from [partaking of] all types of the species or she said: "These figs and these grapes," if [her husband] upheld [the vow] concerning figs and nullified that concerning grapes or upheld [the vow] concerning grapes and nullified that concerning figs, what he upheld is binding and what he nullified is nullified. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. With regard to the nullification of a vow, we do not say that when a portion of a vow has been nullified, the entire vow is nullified, as is said with regard to the absolution of vows.14
Halacha 11
When a man's wife takes a vow and he hears it and extends the vow to apply to him,15 he cannot nullify it. [The rationale is that] he [already] upheld it.16If he took a vow and she extended it and applied it to herself, he may nullify her vow, but his vow is binding.
Halacha 12
What is implied? He heard his wife or his daughter say: "I am a nazirite," and said: "And I am also," he cannot nullify [her vow]17 and they are both nazirites.18 If he said: "I am a nazirite," and she heard and said: "And so am I," he may nullify her vow and his vow is still binding.19 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 13
When a husband takes a vow and administers an identical vow to his wife, having made a certain decision to administer the vow to her, if she says Amen,20 he may not nullify it. If he took a vow and administered it to her as a question to see what she felt about it, e.g., he asked her "Do you desire to be like me [by taking] this vow or not?" If she says: Amen, he may nullify her vow.
Halacha 14
What is implied? He said: "I am a nazirite and so are you," i.e., you are a nazirite just like me. If she says Amen, he may not nullify her vow.21
If he says: "I am a nazirite. What do you say? Will you be a nazirite like me?" If she says Amen, he may nullify her vow.22 If he nullifies her vow, his vow is also nullified. It is as if he made his vow dependent on her vow.23
If she told him: "I am a nazirite. What about you?", if he answered Amen, he cannot nullify [her vow].24 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] a woman takes a vow and another person extends the scope of the vow to include himself, saying "And I [as well]." If her father or husband hears of the vow and nullifies it, her vow is nullified, but that of the person who extended the vow is not.25
Halacha 16
[The following rules apply concerning] a woman who is unmarried and not in her father's domain who says: "Meat will be forbidden to me after 30 days" and she marries within those 30 days. Even though she is in her husband's domain at the time the vow takes effect, he cannot nullify it. [The rationale is that] at the time the vow was taken she was not in his domain. Concerning such a situation, it was said [Numbers 30:10]: "The vow of a widow or a divorcee... shall remain standing." [This applies] even if she was consecrated to [her husband] at the time she took the vow, for a husband may not nullify26 [vows that were taken] before [the marriage is consummated], as we explained.27
Halacha 17
[The following rules apply if a woman] took a vow while under her husband's domain that meat will become forbidden to her after 30 days or that she will become a nazirite after 30 days and her husband nullified her vow, but he died or divorced her within those 30 days. Although she will be a divorcee or a widow when the vow will take effect, she is not bound by it, because [her husband] already nullified this vow for her.28
Halacha 18
When a widow or a divorcee says: "Wine will be forbidden to me when I marry," [if] she marries, her husband cannot nullify the vow.29 [If a married woman says]: "I will be forbidden [to eat] meat when I am divorced," her husband may nullify the vow. When she is divorced, she is permitted [to eat meat].30
Halacha 19
When a husband upholds [his wife's vow] in his heart, it has been upheld.31 If he nullifies it in his heart, it is not nullified, as we explained.32 Therefore, if he nullifies it in his heart, he can still retract and uphold it. If, by contrast, he upheld it within his heart, he cannot retract and nullify unless he retracts immediately thereafter.33 [That leniency is granted] so that his thoughts within his heart should not have greater power than the statements he makes.34
Halacha 20
When a person upholds the vows of his daughter or his wife and then changes his mind, he may appeal to a sage to absolve him of his acceptance [of the vow].35 He may then recant and nullify it for her that day.36 If, by contrast, he nullifies it for her and then changes his mind, he cannot appeal to a sage to absolve it so that he can retract and maintain it.37
Halacha 21
When a consecrated maiden takes a vow and only one of her father or husband upholds her vow, while the other nullifies, even if the one who upheld the vow approaches a sage and has his acceptance absolved, he cannot recant and nullify the vow38 together with the one who has already nullified it. [The rationale is that] the two may only nullify [the vow] together.39
Halacha 22
If a man tells his daughter or his wife: "It is upheld for you. It is upheld for you," [even] if he asks to have the first acceptance absolved, the second one takes effect.40
If he tells her: "It is upheld for you. It is nullified for you, but the acceptance will not take effect until after the nullification does," [the vow] is nullified, because the acceptance does not take effect after the nullification.41
If, however, he tells her: "It is upheld for you and nullified for you at the same time,"42 it is upheld.43 If he tells her: "It is upheld for you today," it is upheld forever.44 If he tells her: "It is nullified for you tomorrow," it is not nullified, for he upheld it today and he cannot nullify it on the following day.45If he tells her: "It is upheld for you for one hour," and the day passed without him nullifying it, he has upheld it. We do not say that this is like one who said: "It is nullified for you after an hour," because he never verbally expressed its nullification.46
If he told her: "It is upheld for you for one hour," and after an hour, he told her: "It is nullified for you," there is an unresolved question [as to the ruling].47 Therefore she is forbidden in [the matters] her vow [concerned].48 If, however, she violated her vow, she is not punished by lashes.49
Halacha 23
When a person takes vows in order to establish his character traits and correct his conduct, he is considered eager and praiseworthy. What is implied? If a person was a glutton and he [took a vow] forbidding meat for a year or two, a person was obsessed with wine and he [took a vow] forbidding himself from drinking wine for a prolonged period or he forbade himself from ever becoming intoxicated, a person would continually pursue illicit gain and was overexcited about wealth [took a vow] forbidding [accepting] presents or benefit from people in a particular country, similarly, a person who would be proud of his comely appearance and took a nazirite vow,50 or the like - all of these are paths in the service of God and concerning such vows and the like our Sages said:51 "Vows are a safeguard for restraint."52
Halacha 24
Although [taking vows] is an element of the service of God, a person should not take many vows involving prohibitions and should not habituate himself to taking them.53 Instead, he should abstain from those things from which one should abstain without taking a vow.
Halacha 25
Our Sages stated:54 "Anyone who takes a vow is considered as having built a private altar."55 If he transgressed and took a vow, it is a mitzvah to ask [a sage] to absolve it,56 so that he will not have an obstacle before him.
When does the above apply? With regard to vows involving prohibitions. With regard to vows involving the consecration of articles, it is a mitzvah to uphold them and not to ask for their absolution unless one is [financially] pressed, as [Psalms 116:14] states: "I will fulfill my vows to God."
Blessed be God who grants assistance.
FOOTNOTES
1.See Chapter 12, Halachah 18, which explains that even if the woman intended to transgress, if her father or husband nullified the vow beforehand, she is not liable.
2.Although the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:37) mentions the Rambam's view, it also mentions that of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that this last phrase is not effective in nullifying a vow.
3.For his wording does not imply that the vow is nullified.
4.I.e., although these expressions are effective for a sage when absolving a vow, they are not effective for a husband or a father.
5.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 13:8), the Rambam explains the statements he makes here. The term "nullify" implies nullifying an entity to the extent that it is as if it never existed. "Releasing," by contrast, implies that a connection existed, but it was released and will not have any effect in the future.
The Rambam's statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries for they appear to run contrary to the understandings of other authorities and the Rambam's own rulings. To explain: From Halachah 15 of this chapter and from Chapter 12, Halachah 19, it appears that until a father or a husband nullifies a vow, the vow is binding. Even when he nullifies it, the nullification affects only the future. See Hilchot Nazirut 9:11. When a sage absolves a vow, by contrast, it is as if the vow was never taken. See Hilchot Ishut 7:8-9, Hilchot Nazirut 3:10.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the terminology employed by the Rambam here can be explained as follows: A sage does not "uproot" a vow, he causes it to be considered as if a vow not taken originally. A father or a husband, by contrast, uproot a vow, causing an entity that did exist to be nullified.
6.I.e., the Rambam is making a distinction between hafarah, "nullification," and bittul, voiding as he proceeds to explain. See also his Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.,, where he elaborates on the distinction between these two activities.
7.E.g., if she took a vow not to drink wine, he causes her to drink wine.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that there is no concept of voiding a woman's vow by causing her to break it. Such concepts apply only with regard to servants. The Radbaz explains the Rambam's wording, stating that with regard to servants, it is necessary to actually compel them to break their vows. Such conduct is not appropriate with regard to one's wife or daughter. Nevertheless, if a husband or a father gently cause a woman to break their vow, that vow is nullified. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:39) mentions both views though it appears to favor the Ra'avad's view.
8.I.e., since the vow has been nullified, she is under no obligation to keep it. On the other hand, she is not obligated to perform the act forbidden by the vow..
9.Without him saying anything.
10.I.e., she took a vow not to wear jewelry or not to partake of a particular food.
11.Even though the vow has no connection to the Sabbath and it is forbidden to perform any activity for the weekdays on the Sabbath, we allow him to nullify it. The rationale is that, otherwise, he will not be able to nullify it on Saturday night, because the time for nullification will have already passed. As stated in Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:6, on the Sabbath, a sage may absolve only those vows that concern the Sabbath (Kessef Mishneh).
12.Because it is the Sabbath, it is preferable to change the wording one uses. Even if one uses this wording during the week, the vow is nullified, as indicated by Halachah 6.
13.This concept is also derived from the prooftext cited below. Until a vow comes into existence and can be upheld, it cannot be nullified (Turei Zahav 234:28).
14.See Chapter 4, Halachah 11, Chapter 8, Halachah 6. The rationale is that a sage nullifies the vow from the outset, causing it to be considered as if it were never taken. Therefore the entire vow is considered as a single entity. A husband, by contrast, nullifies a vow as it exists. Hence, each element of the vow can be considered independently.
The Rambam's ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:36). The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that a husband must also nullify the entire vow. Once a portion of a vow is upheld, the vow cannot be nullified.
15.See Chapter 3, Halachah 3, for an explanation regarding the convention of extending a vow.
16.For by attaching himself to her vow, he shows that he considers it a viable entity.
17.As Nedarim 3a states, the laws that apply to the nullification of other vows also apply to the nullification of nazirite vows.
18.For the reason mentioned in the previous halachah.
19.For his vow is not at all dependent on hers.
20.She must, however, state her consent, for he cannot compel her to take a vow against her will. See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
21.He is forbidden to nullify his wife's vow, because by doing so, his own vow would be nullified as stated in the conclusion of the halachah. Since he is forbidden to cause his own vow to be nullified, he is forbidden to nullify her vow (see Nazir 22b).
22.For his commitment is not dependent on hers at all. Even if she refuses to accept a nazirite vow, he is obligated to keep his vow. Hence, his right to nullify her vow is intact.
23.This refers to the first clause. It is as if he made his vow and her vow a single statement. Thus nullifying her vow would cause his vow also to be nullified. This is forbidden, because he is bound to uphold his vow. Nevertheless, after the fact, if he does nullify her vow, his vow is also nullified (Radbaz). See the Nekudot HaKessef [to Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:54)] who explains that the Rambam's version of Nazir 22b follows the Jerusalem Talmud and differs from the standard text of the Babylonian Talmud.
24.As stated in Halachah 11.
25.The rationale for this ruling is that the husband's nullification affects the vow only from the time he made it onward. It does not nullify it from the outset. Hence, any extension of a vow that was made before the vow is nullified is binding [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:51)].
26.I.e., alone, without the nullification of the father (Chapter 11, Halachah 10).
27.Chapter 11, Halachot 20, 22.
28.I.e., whether or not his nullification takes effect depends on their relationship at the time he nullifies the vow (Nedarim 89a).
29.Because he cannot nullify the vows that were taken before marriage, as explained above.
30.Here also, what is important is the woman's status at the time of the vow and not what her status will be when the vow takes effect.
31.As stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18, when a husband remains silent throughout the day, his wife's vow is upheld. This is a sign that his tacit acceptance of a vow is sufficient for it to be binding (Rabbenu Nissim).
32.As stated in Halachah 7, he must make a verbal statement of nullification. If, however, he voids his wife's vow, her nullification is not binding, as stated in Halachot 4-5.
33.This term has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
34.Since a person can nullify a vow or an oath if he retracts within this time, he may certainly retract his acceptance of his wife's oath in thought.
35.I.e., just as he can appeal to a sage to absolve him of a vow he took, so, too, he may absolve his acceptance of a vow.
36.I.e., the day he changed his mind, even if it is several days afterwards, is equivalent to the day he heard of his wife's vow. Since he cannot have his acceptance nullified unless he changes his mind, the days when he does not change his mind are considered equivalent to days when he does not know of the vow [Tur (Yoreh De'ah 234)].
There are other Rishonim who maintain that he can ask the sage to have his acceptance absolved only on the day he heard of the vow. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:49) mentions both vows without indicating which one should be favored. The Rama maintains that we should be stringent and follow the second view.
37.Upholding a vow is considered equivalent to taking a vow. Hence, just as a vow can be absolved, the acceptance of one can be absolved. The nullification of a vow, by contrast, cannot be considered as a vow and cannot be absolved. The Radbaz adds that if the person does not know that he can have his acceptance absolved, the day he finds out that information is equivalent to the day he heard of the vow.
38.The Siftei Cohen 234:16 states that this applies even if he has the acceptance absolved on the day he hears of the vow.
39.Even if the first one nullified the vow again so that they make a combined statement, their nullification is not accepted.
40.At the time he stated his acceptance of the vow a second time, his acceptance was of no consequence, because it was unnecessary. Nevertheless, after he nullifies his first acceptance, the second acceptance becomes significant.
41.As stated in Halachah 20.
42.The Radbaz states that this ruling applies even if he does not add the words "at the same time."
43.The two statements cancel each other out. It is as if he remained silent and the vow is therefore upheld. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's rationale is that since the nullification cannot take effect after the vow is upheld, it cannot take effect if it is made simultaneously with the upholding of the vow.
44.Since, as the Rambam states later on, he did not verbally express his nullification of the vow, it remains binding even after the day passes.
45.For a vow must be nullified on the day, the man heard about it. In his Nekudot HaKessef, the Siftei Cohen explains that the Rambam's wording implies that he may nullify it that day. The Turei Zahav 234:39-40, however, infers that he cannot nullify it at all once it takes effect for that day.
46.The instances cited by the Rambam are questions posed by Nedarim 69b, 70a. Since the Talmud continues asking questions, using one instance as a springboard for another, following the pattern of im timtzeh lomar, the Rambam concludes that each of the instances used as a basis for a further question is accepted as halachah (Kessef Mishneh).
47.This is the last of the series of instances concerning which the Talmud asks in that passage.
48.Lest her vow in fact be binding.
49.Because punishment is not given when we are uncertain whether a prohibition exists.
50.This requires him to allow his hair to grow untrimmed and thus will prevent him from beautifying his appearance. See Nedarim 9b which relates that Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach would almost never partake of the sacrifices of a nazirite. Once, however, he saw a particularly handsome young man who had taken a nazirite vow. He asked him why he had done so and the young man explained that, because of his good looks, he was being tempted by his evil inclination. To rise above the temptation, he took the nazirite vow. Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach praised him for his actions.
51.Avot 3:13.
52.In his commentary to that mishnah, the Rambam explains that "taking and maintaining vows to abstain from certain [undesirable] elements [of conduct] ingrains in a person the tendency to bridle the desires he seeks to curb. This tendency will continue and it will be easy for him to acquire the quality of restraint - i.e., the tendency to protect oneself from impurity." See also Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. III, the conclusion of ch. 48, which discusses the Divine service associated with taking and maintaining vows.
Nevertheless, the Rambam is not praising restraint as a mode of conduct that is always desirable. On the contrary, in Hilchot De'ot 3:1, he explains that a nazirite is called "a sinner" because he abstains from wine and states:
Our Sages directed man to abstain only from those things which the Torah denies him and not to forbid himself permitted things by vows and oaths. Thus our Sages (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 9:1) asked rhetorically: "Are not the things which the Torah has prohibited sufficient for you? [Why] must you add further prohibitions?"
In the instances mentioned here, however, the person taking the vow is not doing so because he thinks that abstinence is desirable. Instead, he wishes to develop self-control and inner discipline and feels that taking a vow is an effective means to encourage him to do so.
53.Lest he not keep the vow, and in this way transgress.
54.Nedarim 22a.
55.During the time the Sanctuary stood at Shilo and from the time the Temple was built in Jerusalem afterwards, it was forbidden to offer sacrifices on private altars. Similarly, taking a vow is considered undesirable and comparable to building such an altar. Rabbenu Nissim explains the comparison based on the passage from Hilchot De'ot cited above, i.e., just as a person who builds a private altar offers a sacrifice to God in an undesirable manner, so, too, a person who takes a vow adds a restriction that the Torah does not require him to observe.
56.As explained in ch. 4.
Nezirut - Chapter 1
Halacha 1
A nazirite vow is one of the types of vows involving prohibitions,1as [Numbers 6:2] states: "When one will take a nazirite vow...." It is a positive commandment for [a nazirite] to let the hair of his head grow,2 as [ibid.:5] states: "He shall let the mane of the hair of his head grow." If he cuts [his hair] in the midst of the days of his nazirite vow, he violates a negative commandment,3 as [ibid.] states: "A razor shall not pass over his head." Similarly, he is forbidden to contract ritual impurity from a corpse4 or eat those products of a grape vine which the Torah forbids him from eating5 throughout the entire span of his nazirite vow.6
Halacha 2
When [a nazirite] transgressed and cut his hair, became impure [due to contact with a corpse], or partook of wine grapes, he receives two sets of lashes:7one because of the prohibition "He shall not desecrate his word,"8 and one because of the prohibition that he transgressed from the unique prohibitions that apply to a nazirite.9
Halacha 3
When a person takes a nazirite vow and fulfills his vow according to the mitzvah, he has performed three positive commandments: a) "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth,"10 and he has acted [accordingly], b) "He shall let the mane of the hair of his head grow," and he has let it grow, and c) shaving and bringing his sacrifices,11 as [ibid.:18] states: "And the nazirite shall shave at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting."
Halacha 4
When a person says: "I will not depart from the world until I become a nazirite," he becomes a nazirite immediately, lest he die at that time. If he delays [implementing] his nazirite vow, he transgresses the prohibition:12 "Do not delay in paying it." Lashes are not given for the violation of this prohibition.13
Halacha 5
With regard to a nazirite vow, we do not say: [The vow does not take effect] until he makes a statement that every person would be able to understand [that] in his heart [he desired to take a nazirite vow]. Instead, since he made a decision in his heart to take a nazirite vow and verbally expressed concepts that suggest this intent, he is a nazirite although these concepts are distant and [their simple meaning] does not communicate the concept of a nazirite vow.14
Halacha 6
What is implied? A nazirite was passing in front of a person and he said: "I will be," he is a nazirite. Since in his heart, he intended to say that he will be like that person, [it is considered as if he made such a statement] even though he did not explicitly say: "I will be like him." Similarly, if he took hold of his hair15 and said: "I will become attractive," "I will grow my hair," "I will cultivate my hair,"16 "I will let my hair grow long," he is a nazirite, provided he made such a decision in his heart.
Halacha 7
If he says: "I am obligated to bring doves [as offerings],17 he is not a nazirite even if a nazirite is passing in front of him and even if he had the intent of becoming a nazirite. It is as if he did not say anything.18
Halacha 8
All nicknames for a nazirite vow are considered like a nazirite vow.
What is implied? In places where people mispronounce the words they use, if one says: "I am a nazik, a naziach, a paziach,19 he is a nazirite."
Halacha 9
If a person says: "I am a nazirite only with regard to grape seeds" or "...with regard to grape peels," "I am a nazirite with regard to shaving," or "I am a nazirite only with regard to impurity," he is a nazir in the complete sense and he must keep all the particular laws incumbent on nazirites even though his inten was to forbid himself only with regard to the particular he mentioned. Since the matter concerning which he took the nazirite vow is forbidden to nazirites, he is a nazirite in the full sense of the term.20
Halacha 10
If, however, one says: "I am a nazirite from dried figs," "...from cakes of dried figs," or the like, he is forbidden [to partake of] the article specified, but he is not a nazirite.21
Halacha 11
When a cup of wine was mixed22 for a person and given to he to drink and he said: "I am a nazirite from it," he is a nazirite in the complete sense.23 If he was a morose person, angry, or in mourning and the others were trying to have him drink to release his burden and he said: "I am a nazirite from this [cup]," he is forbidden to drink only that cup, but he is not a nazirite. [The rationale is that] his intent was only that he would not drink that cup.
Halacha 12
Similarly, if a drunken man was given a cup to make him totally inebriated and he said: "I am a nazirite from it," he is forbidden to drink only that cup, but he is not a nazirite. [The rationale is that his intent was] only that they should not have him become overly drunk. If he was as drunk as Lot24 his statements are of no consequence and he is not liable for any transgression that he performs. For when he reaches a state of inebriation equivalent to Lot's, he is not liable at all.25
Halacha 13
When a person says: "I am a nazirite on the condition that I can drink wine," "...become impure because of contact with the dead," or "...cut my hair,"26 he is a nazirite and is forbidden to perform all of the above. [The rationale is that] he made a stipulation against what is written in the Torah and whenever one makes a stipulation against what is written in the Torah, the stipulation is nullified.27
Halacha 14
When a person takes a nazirite vow and [afterwards] says: "I did not know that a nazirite was forbidden to partake of wine..., "...to become impure," or "...to cut hair. Had I known this, I would not have take the vow," he is a nazirite and is obligated in all these prohibitions. [The rationale is that] he knows that he is obligated in at least one of these [prohibitions] and as we explained,28 even if one took a [nazirite] vow, forbidding only one of these acts, he is forbidden in all of them.29
Halacha 15
If the person says: "I know that a nazirite is forbidden in all of the above, but I thought that it would be permitted for me to drink wine, because I cannot live without wine," or "[I thought that I would be permitted to become impure,] because I bury the dead," he is not a nazirite,30 because his vow is included in the category of vows made in error31 which need not be absolved by a sage, as we explained.32
Halacha 16
When a person says: "My hand is a nazirite" or "My foot is a nazirite," his words are of no consequence. If, however, he says: "My head is a nazirite" or "My liver is a nazirite," he is a nazarite." This is the general principle: Whenever a person designates as a nazirite an organ upon whose removal33 from a living person would cause him to die, he is a nazirite.34
Halacha 17
When a person says: "I will be a nazirite when a ben is born to me," if a son is born to him, he is a nazirite. If, however, a daughter, a tumtum,35 or an androgynus36 is born to him, he is not a nazirite.37
If he says: "I will be a nazirite when offspring is born to me," even if a daughter, a tumtum, or an androgynus is born to him, he is a nazirite. If his wife miscarries, he is not a nazirite. If she becomes pregnant again and gives birth, he is a nazirite.38
FOOTNOTES
1.Thus it is governed by the laws mentioned in the previous set of halachot. As mentioned in the beginning of Hilchot Nedarim, there are two types of vows: vows involving prohibitions and vows taking on an obligation to bring sacrifices. A nazirite vow also involves bringing sacrifices, as will be explained. Nevertheless, it is considered primarily a vow involving prohibitions (Radbaz).
2.Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 92) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 374) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
3.Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 209) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 373) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
4.Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 207-208) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 375-376) include two prohibitions involving this matter among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Chapter 5 which describes this prohibition.
5.This includes prohibitions against drinking wine and eating fresh grapes, raisins, grape seeds, and grape peels. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 202-206) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 368-372) include five prohibitions against partaking of these grape products among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
6.The Radbaz explains that the Rambam does not mention these prohibitions in the order that they are mentioned in the Torah, not in the order that they are mentioned in the Mishnah. The rationale is that the mitzvah of letting one's hair grow is mentioned first because it involves both a positive and a negative commandment.
7.For with his deed, he has violated two of the Torah's prohibitions.
8.Which applies with regard to the violation of all vows, as stated in Hilchot Nedarim 1:5.
9.If he violates his nazirite vow in several ways, e.g., he eats grapes and becomes impure, he receives lashes according to the number of violations involved (Radbaz).
10.I.e., the commandment to observe the vows one takes. See Hilchot Nedarim 1:4.
11.Which is done at the fulfillment of one's nazirite vow. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 93) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 377) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Chapter 8 which describes this procedure.
12.Deuteronomy 23:22. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim 1:1, this prohibition applies to any person who delays keeping the vows and pledges he makes. He does not, however, list this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot in these halachot, but instead, in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot (in the introduction to those halachot and in Chapter 14, Halachah 13).
See also Hilchot Arachin 6:33 which uses this law as support for the principle that a pledge to perform a mitzvah is considered as a vow.
13.For as stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, lashes are not given for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve a deed. Note, however, Chapter 5, Halachah 21.
14.This concept, which the Rambam illustrates in the following halachot, expresses the principle (see Nedarim 5b) that yadot nedarim, literally "handles of vows," are considered equivalent to vows themselves.
15.According to the Rambam, when he makes such statements while holding his hair, it is not necessary that a nazirite pass in front of him for his statement to be binding.
16.The Hebrew uses two expressions to communicate this and the previous concept. Our translations for these terms are taken from Rav Kappach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 1:1).
17.The offering a nazirite would bring if he became impure (see Numbers 6:10).
18.I.e., with regard to a nazirite vow. Since it is possible that his statement meant that he intended to offer the doves as a sacrifice, it is not considered as implying a nazirite vow. From the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), it appears that the person is liable to bring these doves as a voluntary offering. It is questionable if here the Rambam is negating that implication.
19.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam writes that gentiles who lived among the Jewish people would mispronounce the word nazir in this manner. As such, there would be some Jews who would make similar mistakes. See parallel concepts in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:5, Hilchot Nedarim 1:16.
20.I.e., since he used the term "nazirite" and the object which he mentioned is forbidden to nazirites, the nazirite restrictions all take effect. Note the contrast to the following halachah.
21.Because the term nazirite does not apply with regard to those objects.
22.I.e., in the Talmudic era, the wine was very strong. Hence it was customary to mix water into wine before serving it.
23.I.e., the situation is comparable to those described in Halachah 9.
24.Who became so drunk that he lost all consciousness of his actions. See Genesis, ch. 19.
25.I.e., he is considered like a mentally and emotionally incapable person (a shoteh). See Hilchot Ishut 4:18, Hilchot Mechirah 29:18.
26.I.e., he seeks to avoid keeping one or more of the obligations of the nazirite vow although he will keep the others.
27.This is a general principle applying in many aspects of Torah law, e.g., Hilchot Ishut 16:9.
28.In the previous halachah.
29.The Ra'avad states that if a person would approach a sage and ask him to absolve his nazirite vow on these grounds, the sage would certainly consent. We are speaking about an instance when the person seeks to have the vow nullified without consulting a sage because it was taken in error. The Radbaz states that the Rambam would also accept this ruling. The Kessef Mishneh, however, does not accept this explanation.
30.He need not observe any of the nazirite prohibitions, even the ones he had intended to observe.
31.The Ra'avad considers this as a vow which a person is prevented from keeping by forces beyond his control, citing Nazir 11b which appears to support this interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz state that while the actual wording of the Talmud fits the Ra'avad's interpretation, the Rambam's explanation can be justified. [Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 2:4), the Rambam uses the wording suggested by the Ra'avad.]
32.Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:6; Hilchot Nedarim 4:1.
33.The Or Sameach notes that the Rambam changes slightly the wording of his source, Nazir 21b, based on his ruling in Hilchot Shechitah 8:16. There the Rambam writes that if an animal is born without a liver it may live, but if it was born with a liver and then the liver was removed, it is treifah.
34.For it is considered as if he took the vow upon his entire person. Compare to Hilchot Arachin 2:1; Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:2; Hilchot Mechirah 27:8.
35.A person whose genital area is covered by a piece of flesh and it is impossible to detect his gender.
36.A person with both male and female sexual organs (Hilchot Ishut 2:24-25).
37.Although the term ben can be translated as "offspring," its specific meaning is "son." Hence the Rambam rules in this manner.
38.The fact that his wife miscarried in the interim does not negate the vow.
Nezirut - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
When a person takes a nazirite vow inadvertently,1 is compelled to take one by forces beyond his control,2 takes one in order to encourage a colleague,3 or takes one while making exaggerated statements,4 he is exempt as is the law concerning other vows.
When a person takes a nazirite vow and regrets having taking it, he may approach a sage and ask him [to absolve it]. He may release his nazirite vow in the same way he releases other vows.5
Halacha 2
[The following rules apply when a person] took a nazirite vow and went to brings his sacrifices for that vow with the intent that he will bring them on the completion of the days of his vow, but discovered that either all of the animals or one of them were stolen. If he took the nazirite vow before the animal was stolen, he is a nazirite.6 If he took the nazirite vow after [an animal] was stolen, lost, or died, he is not a nazirite. It is as if he took a nazirite vow in error.7
Halacha 3
When a person extends a nazirite vow,8 he is a nazirite, as we explained with regard to the laws concerning the extension of other vows.9
Halacha 4
If a nazirite was passing before him and he said: "I am like him," he is a nazirite.10 If a colleague of his took a nazirite vow and he said: "My mouth is like his mouth with regard to wine"11 or "My hair is like his hair with regard to cutting it,"12 he is a nazirite. Similarly, if he heard him [take a nazirite vow] and said: "And also I" immediately thereafter,13 [he is a nazirite]. And if a third person said: "And also I" immediately after the second person's statement - even if this continues for 100 individuals14 - they are all nazirites.
Halacha 5
If a person says: "I will be a nazirite when a son will be born to me," and his colleague says: "And also I," his colleague becomes a nazirite immediately.15
Halacha 6
When a person tells a colleague: "I will be a nazirite when a son will be born to you," and his colleague says: "And also I," [his colleague does not become] a nazirite. [The rationale is that] the latter person only had the desire to say that he would love for a son to be born to him to the same degree as the first does. For he is embarrassed in his presence.16
Halacha 7
When a person says: "I will be a nazirite when a son will be born to so-and so,"17 and his colleague heard his statement and said: "And also I," there is an unresolved question concerning the matter. Perhaps his colleague's intent was to become a nazirite like him18 or perhaps he wanted to say that he loved him like the other person did. When there is a question whether a nazirite vow takes effect, we rule leniently.19
Halacha 8
[A nazirite vow can take effect in the following situation.] Two people were walking on the road and saw another person approaching them. One of the said: "The person approaching us is Shimon." The other said: "He is Reuven." The first replied: "I will become a nazirite if it is Reuven" and the second responded: "I will become a nazirite if it is Shimon." If he reaches them and he is Reuven, [the first] is a nazirite. If it is Shimon, the second is a nazirite as per the vows. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If the person did not reach them, but instead turned backward and disappeared from their sight and they did not discover his identity, neither of them are nazirites.20
Halacha 9
Similarly, when a person says: "I will be a nazirite if there will be 100 kor21 in this grainheap," if when he goes to measure it, he discovers that [some of the produce] was stolen or lost, he is not a nazirite.22 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [The rationale is that] When there is a question about whether a nazirite vow takes effect, we rule leniently.
Halacha 10
All [of the people who took nazirite vow in the following situation] are nazirites. Several people] were walking on the road and saw a ko'i23from a distance. One said: "I will be a nazirite if that is a wild beast." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is a domesticated animal." Another said:24 "I will be a nazirite if that is not a wild beast." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is not a domesticated animal." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is neither a wild beast, nor a domesticated animal." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is both a wild beast and a domesticated animal." [The rationale is that] in certain matters,25 a ko'i resembles a wild beast. In other matters, it resembles a domesticated animal. In still other matters, it resembles both a wild beast and a domesticated animal and in still other matters, it resembles neither a domesticated animal, nor a wild beast.
Similar laws apply if they saw an androgynus and argued whether the person was a man or a woman and took vows similar to those mentioned with regard to a ko'i. They are all nazirities, because there are matters26 in which an androgynus resembles a man, matters where the resemblance is to a woman, matters in which there is no resemblance to either a man or a woman, and matters in which there is a resemblance to both a man and a woman.
Halacha 11
All of the above applies to the person's status with regard to the mitzvot and not with regard to his nature and physical characteristics. Similarly, the factors involving a ko'i apply with regard to the mitzvot and not with regard to its nature and physical characteristics.
What is implied? [When] a ko'i [is slaughtered, its] blood must be covered as the blood of a wild beast must.27 Its fat is forbidden as is the fat of a domesticated animal.28 It is considered a union of mixed species if it is mated with either a domesticated animal or a wild beast,29 as if it were neither a wild beast or a domesticated animal. And it must be ritually slaughtered as is required for both a domesticated animal or a wild beast. Similarly, there are other halachic considerations that apply with regard to it and they will all be explained in their appropriate place.30
Similarly, an androgynus becomes impure because of a seminal emission like a man and because of uterine bleeding like a woman.31 He cannot be sold as a Hebrew servant, [differing in this way] from both a man and a woman.32 And a person who kills him is executed like one who kills either a man or a woman. There are also other laws applying to him. Each one will be stated in its place.33
Halacha 12
Similar [laws apply]34 if [several people] saw a group of men approaching them which contained sighted people and blind people. One said: "I will be a nazirite if they are sighted people." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if they are not sighted people." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if they are blind." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if they are not blind." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if among them are sighted people and blind people." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if among them are those who are not sighted people and those who are not blind." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 13
When a minor reaches the age when his vows are of consequence35and he takes a nazirite vow, he is a nazirite and must bring his sacrifices36 even though he has not manifested signs of physical maturity, as he [must uphold] his other vows.
A father may administer a nazirite vow to his son who is underage even though he has not reached the age when his vows are of consequence. A woman, by contrast, may not administer a nazirite vow to her son.37 This is a concept conveyed by the Oral Tradition. It does not apply with regard to other vows.
Halacha 14
What is implied? A father told his son who was a minor: "You are a nazirite"; he said: "My son, so-and-so, is a nazirite;" or he said, [pointing to his son,] "He is a nazirite," and the son remained silent,38 the son is a nazirite. The father must have him conduct himself according to all the particulars of the nazirite laws.39 If [the son] becomes impure, he must bring the sacrifices [associated with the termination] of impurity. When he completes his nazirite vow, he must bring the sacrifices [required when a nazirite vow is completed in] purity.40
Halacha 15
If the son did not desire this and objected to the matter,41 his relatives objected,42 he cut off his hair, or his relatives cut off his hair - thus performing a deed that indicates that either he or his relatives did not desire the nazirite vow,43 he is not a nazirite.44 Until when may his father administer a nazirite vow to him? Until he attains majority,45 and becomes an adult.
Halacha 16
The concept of a nazirite vow does not apply to gentiles, for [Numbers 6:2]46 "Speak to the children of Israel."
Halacha 17
The concept of a nazirite vow does apply to women and servants.47A father or a husband may nullify a nazirite vow taken by a woman if he so desires as is the case with regard to other vows.48 With regard to a servant, [to nullify his nazirite vow,]49 his master must compel him to drink [wine] or become impure due to contact with the dead. If he does not compel him,50 he must observe the nazirite vow.
Halacha 18
When a servant takes other vows that involve personal aggravation or that prevent his performance of work or makes a valuation assessment,51 his master does not have to compel him [to act against the vow to nullify it].52 [The rationale is that the servant] is not the owner of his self and he cannot cause a vow to take effect regarding his person. To what can the matter be compared? To a person who [takes a vow] forbidding produce belonging to another person to the owner of that produce.53
If, however, a vow does not involve personal aggravation and it is not a matter which holds back work, [the master] cannot compel him [not to observe it].54
If a servant took a nazirite vow and his master told him: "It is nullified for you," [when] he receives his freedom,55 he is obligated to complete his nazirite vow.56 [The rationale is that] a servant must be compelled to nullify his vow. We do not nullify it verbally. If one nullifies it verbally, he is granted his freedom.
Halacha 19
When a servant took a nazirite vow and fled from or abandoned his master,57 he is forbidden to drink wine. [This measure was enacted so that] he would suffer difficulty and return to his master's domain.58
If he took a nazirite vow, completed it, and shaved,59 without his master knowing of this, and afterwards, was granted his freedom, he is considered to have satisfied the requirements of his nazirite vow.60 If, however, he took a nazirite vow, but did not shave, and was granted his freedom, he is not considered to have fulfilled his nazirite vow.61 If he became impure and then was granted his freedom, he must begin reckoning [the days of his nazirite vow] from the time he became impure.62
Halacha 20
Nazirite vows must be observed both while the Temple is standing and while the Temple was not standing. Therefore when a person takes a nazirite vow in the present era, he must observe it forever,63 because we do not have a Temple where he can go and offer his sacrifices at the conclusion of his nazirite vow.
Halacha 21
A nazirite vow may be observed only in Eretz Yisrael.64When a person takes a nazirite vow in the Diaspora, he is penalized and obligated to ascend to Eretz Yisrael65 and observe his nazirite vow there for as long as he vowed.66 Accordingly, when a person takes a nazirite vow in the Diaspora in the present era, we compel him to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and observe his nazirite vow there67 until he dies or until the Temple is built and he brings his sacrifices there at the conclusion of the span of his vow.
Halacha 22
Throughout the entire time he is in the Diaspora, he is forbidden to drink wine, to become impure due to contact with the dead, and to cut his hair.68 He must uphold all of the requirements stemming from a nazirite vow, despite the fact that the days are not counted for him. If he transgressed and drank [wine], cut his hair, or touched a corpse or the like,69 he is liable for lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.E.g., he said: "I will be nazirite if I ate today," and he was under the impression that he had not eaten, but in fact he had eaten (Nedarim 25b). See Hilchot Nedarim 8:3 and Chapter 1, Halachah 15.
2.I.e., people compelled him to take the nazirite vows. See Hilchot Nedarim 4:1.
3.He said: "I will be a nazirite if you do not eat at my home." See Hilchot Nedarim 4:3.
4.He said: "I will be a nazirite if I did not see an army as numerous as the Jewish people when they left Egypt." See Hilchot Nedarim 4:1; Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:5.
5.See Hilchot Nedarim 4:5.
6.We do not automatically say: Had he known that the animal would have been stolen he would not have taken the vow. If, however, he asks a sage to absolve the vow on this account, it is absolved. See Hilchot Nedarim 8:5; Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:12.
7.I.e., his vow was taken on a false assumption, for he believed that he possessed these animals. See Hilchot Nedarim 8:3.
8.I.e., as illustrated in the following halachah, he states that a nazirite vow taken by a colleague should also apply to him.
9.Hilchot Nedarim 3:3.
10.See Chapter 1, Halachah 5.
11.I.e., "just as he is forbidden to drink wine, so am I."
12.I.e., "just as he is forbidden to cut his hair, so am I."
13.This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Elecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
14.I.e., each one speaking immediately thereafter his colleague.
15.In contrast to the person who took the vow who does not become a nazirite until the child is born (Chapter 1, Halachah 17). This is the conclusion the Rambam derives from the discussion of the issue in Nazir 13a. The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation of the passage. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's understanding.
16.I.e., were he not to make such a statement, it would appear that he does not have genuine love for him. Because of the above, we say that his vow was not made sincerely and he never intended to become a nazirite.
17.In contrast to the situation described in the previous halachah, in this instance, the person mentioned in the nazirite vow was not present when the vow was taken.
18.Since the person was not present, we feel that it is less likely that his statements were made merely to make an impression (see Nazir 13a).
19.The rationale is that at the time of the completion of the vow, the person is required to offer sacrifices. Were his vow not to have taken effect, he would be slaughtering non-sacrificial animals in the Temple courtyard which is forbidden (Rabbenu Nissim).
20.Because as stated at the conclusion of the previous halachah, if there is a doubt where a nazirite vow is binding, we rule leniently.
21.A dry measure used in the Talmudic period equivalent to 30 se'ah (Hilchot Arachin 4:4).
22.For he desired the nazirite vow to take effect only if there was the said amount of grain in the grain heap.
23.A ko'i is a hybrid born from breeding a deer and a goat. There is an unresolved question among our Sages if it is considered as a domesticated animal (behemah) or a wild beast {(chayah) the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Bikkurim 2:8}. In Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13, he states that the term refers to any hybrid that comes from mating a domesticated animal with a wild beast.
24.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 5:6), the Rambam states that if one person made all these statements, he is obligated to fulfill an equivalent number of nazirite vows.
25.See the following halachah where the Rambam elaborates on these points.
26.See the following halachah where the Rambam elaborates on these points.
27.See Hilchot Shechitah 14:4.
28.See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13.
29.See Hilchot Kilayim 9:5.
30.See Hilchot Shechitah 12:8-9; Hilchot Bikkurim 9:5; 10:7; Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTumah 1:6, et al.
31.I.e., either semen or the secretion of a zav. See Hilchot Mita'amei Mishkav UMoshav 1:7; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah 3:7.
32.See Hilchot Avadim 4:1.
33.See Hilchot Tzitzit 3:9; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 6:8; Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 22:11, et al.
34.Note the Radbaz who offers an explanation why all three illustrations of the principle are necessary.
35.I.e., twelve for a male and eleven for a female. He or she must also be aware of the One for whose sake they are taking vows (Hilchot Nedarim 11:1-4).
36.The Ra'avad questions this ruling, noting that there are authorities who maintain that the obligation for a minor to keep his vow is Rabbinic in origin. According to their view, it would be forbidden for the minor to bring a sacrifice, for that would be bringing non-sacramental animals as offerings. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh maintain that those authorities follow a minority position.
37.The commentaries discuss this issue, noting that seemingly, the prophetess Chanah administered a nazirite vow to her son Samuel. They explain that although the inspiration for the vow came from Chanah, it was actually administered by Elkanah, Samuel's father.
38.I.e., his silence is considered as acceptance. If, however, he refuses to become a nazirite, he is not bound by his father's statements, as stated in the following halachah.
39.See Chapter 6, Halachot 3, 11.
40.See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.
41.The Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz refer to the difference of opinion between Rashi and Tosafot (Nazir 28b) whether the objection must be made immediately or whether they can be made throughout the span of the nazirite vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 4:6), the Rambam espouses the view shared by Tosafot that once the son began observing the nazirite vow, he cannot object to it.
42.The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 368) writes that if the child agrees to observe the nazirite vow, it is binding even if the relatives object.
43.See the Or Sameach who debates whether drinking wine is also considered a deed which registers the son's objections.
44.For his father's authority over him is not absolute.
45.Becomes thirteen years old and manifests signs of physical maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:2; see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
46.The verse which introduces the laws of a nazirite vow. By addressing the passage to Jews, the Torah indicates that it does not apply to gentiles.
47.Numbers 6:2 specifically mentions a woman taking a nazirite vow. With regard to servants, Nazir 62b explains how this concept can be explained by Biblical exegesis.
48.See Hilchot Nedarim, chs. 11-13.
49.We are speaking about a Canaanite servant who is his master's property. Accordingly, vows he takes are dependent on his master's consent as indicated by the following halachah.
50.I.e., with regard to a servant, a verbal nullification of the nazirite vow is not sufficient. The master must physically compel him not to observe it.
51.See Hilchot Arachin 1:2.
52.I.e., as the Rambam continues to explain, the vow is void without the master having to take any action at all.
53.According to the Rambam (based on Nazir 62b) , there are four different rulings with regard to vows or oaths a servant takes:
a) All oaths and valuation assessments that a servant takes are nullified automatically. The rationale is that "his body is not his property so that the oath he takes will be effective. With regard to oaths, [Numbers 30:3] states: 'forbid something upon one's soul.' [Implied is that the verse applies to] someone whose soul is his property. It excludes a servant who is someone else's property" (Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:6).
b) Vows other than a nazirite vow that are either aggravating or prevent the servant from working are automatically nullified. The rationale is that, with regard to an oath, Leviticus 5:4 states: "Whether he will do harm or do good." Implied is that he can take an oath - or a vow, because an association is established between vows and oaths - only when he has the choice of either doing good or doing harm to himself. This does not apply to these oaths. Since they harm his master, he has no right to take them.
c) Nazirite vows are not automatically nullified, because the association with vows does not apply with regard to them. Nevertheless, since the servant belongs to his master, the master has the right to nullify his vow.
d) Vows other than a nazirite vow that are neither aggravating nor prevent the servant from working must be fulfilled. The rationale is that in contrast to an oath in which the prohibition is incumbent on the servant (the gavra), for a vow, the prohibition falls upon the object (the cheftza). Since there is no harm to the master involved, such vows can take effect.
54.Since the master does not suffer any loss, there is no reason that the vow should not take effect.
55.When a master desires to nullify a vow taken by his servant, he must physically compel him to break it, as mentioned above. If he does not do so, but instead, verbally nullifies it, he is indicating that he no longer considers his servant as having that status, but has freed him. See parallels in Hilchot Avadim 8:17.
Based on a different version of Nazir 62b, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and does not agree that verbally nullifying a servant's vow is an indication that he must be freed. The commentaries support the Rambam's understanding.
56.For the verbal nullification made by his master is of no consequence.
57.Fleeing from his master is not equivalent to attaining his freedom (Radbaz).
58.The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, noting that Nazir 9:1 mentions that this issue is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yossi. Generally, in such instances, the halachah follows Rabbi Yossi and yet the Rambam follows Rabbi Meir's view. The Radbaz explains that the fact that Nazir 61a concludes by mentioning Rabbi Meir's view indicates that the halachah follows his opinion. The Kessef Mishneh suggests (- this, however, is not borne out by the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah -) that the Rambam's text of the mishnah read opposite to the standard version. Others support the Rambam's ruling, based on Tosafot who states that the halachah follows Rabbi Meir with regard to his decrees.
59.I.e., completed the process required of a nazirite at the conclusion of his vow.
60.We do not say that since the vow was fulfilled without the knowledge of his master, its fulfillment is of no consequence. Although his master could have nullified his vow, since in fact he did not do so, it is considered significant (Radbaz).
61.I.e., he must begin counting the days of his nazirite vow anew as a free man, without counting the days during which he observed as a servant.
The rationale why these days are not counted is that since he did not complete his vow (by shaving), the status of the vow is left open. For at any time, his master could compel him to drink wine and nullify his vow. As such, he is never considered to have completed a valid nazirite vow. Although the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, the commentaries justify his approach.
62.I.e., he does not bring a sacrifice as would a free man who became impure in the midst of his nazirite vow. Instead, he begins his nazirite vow anew when he becomes pure after he attains his freedom.
63.See Chapter 3, Halachah 12, for a description of how this vow is observed.
64.This is not a point of Scriptural Law. Instead, the rationale is that since our Sages decreed that the Diaspora - its earth and even its air - conveys ritual impurity, a nazirite cannot observe his vow there (Nazir 54a; see Hilchot Tuma'at Meit 11:1).
65.So that he can observe his nazirite vow in purity.
66.Nazir 19b, 20a relates that Queen Heleni took a vow that if her son would return safe from a war, she would be a nazarite for seven years. She observed her vow and came to the Temple to offer her sacrifices. The School of Hillel ruled that she should remain in Eretz Yisrael and observe her vow for another seven years, for the time she observed it in the Diaspora was not counted.
67.The Ra'avad questions what purpose will be served by ascending to Eretz Yisrael in the present era. We are all impure because of contact with a human corpse (or impurity that results from that) and there are no ashes from the red heifer to purify ourselves. If so, what difference is there between Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora? In neither place, will one be able to complete his nazirite vow in purity. Hence, the Ra'avad concludes, it is forbidden to take a nazirite vow in the present age, whether in the Diaspora or in Eretz Yisrael.
The Radbaz states that although we are ritually impure, abiding in the Diaspora increases that impurity. Hence, it is preferable for one who takes a nazirite vow to ascend to Eretz Yisrael. The Kessef Mishneh goes further and states that since a person can prevent himself from coming into contact with the ritual impurity associated with a corpse, there is no prohibition against taking a nazirite vow in the present age.
68.See the parallel in Chapter 6, Halachah 7, for parallels.
69.For even though we are all ritually impure at present, a nazirite who is impure who comes in contact with a corpse is liable for lashes for each time he comes in contact (Chapter 5, Halachah 17).
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Hayom Yom:
• Friday, Iyar 2, 5774 • 02 May 2014
"Today's Day"
Friday, Iyar 2, 17th day of the omer, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: K'doshim, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 10-17.
Tanya: Nonetheless a person (p. 237)...and as is known. (p. 237).
My grandfather (the Rebbe Maharash) was born on this day in 5593 (1833).
When he was seven years old he was once tested in his studies by his father, the Tzemach Tzedek. My grandfather did so well in the test that his teacher was enormously impressed. Unable to restrain himself he said to the Tzemach Tzedek, "Well, what do you say? Hasn't he done marvelously?" The Tzemach Tzedek responded: "What is there to be surprised about when tiferet-within-tiferet does well?"1
FOOTNOTES
1. There are seven midot or Divine attributes, the first (and major) three being chessed (kindness), gevura (severity) and tiferet (beauty). Each attribute contains elements of the others, chessed-within-chessed, gevura-within-chessed, etc. 49 combinations in all, corresponding to the 49 days of the omer. The Rebbe Maharash was born on Iyar 2, the day of tiferet-within-tiferet, an extraordinarily high spiritual level.
Thought:
Exploiting a Setback
Failure is wasted if you return only to the place you fell. If your plans fail, think bigger, aim higher.
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