Today in Jewish History:
• Maharam's Body Ransomed (1307)
The tragic saga of the imprisonment of Rabbi Meir ben Baruch ("Maharam") of Rothenburg came to a close when his body was ransomed, 14 years after his death, by Alexander ben Shlomo (Susskind) Wimpen.
"Maharam" (1215?-1293) was the leading Torah authority in Germany, and authored thousands of Halachic responsa as well as the Tosaphot commentary of the Talmudic tractate Yoma. In 1283 he was imprisoned in the Ensisheim fortress and held for a huge ransom, but he forbade the Jewish community to pay it (based on the Talmudic ruling that exorbitant sums should not be paid to free captives, as this would encourage the taking of hostages for ransom). For many years Maharam's disciple, R. Shimon ben Tzadok, was allowed to visit him in his cell and recorded his teachings in a work called Tashbetz.
Even after the Maharam's passing in 1293, his body was not released for burial until it was ransomed by R. Alexander, who was subsequently laid to rest at his side.
Links: A brief biography
• Passing of R. Leib Sarah's (1791)
Adar 4 is the yahrtzeit (anniversary of the passing) of Rabbi Leib Sarah's (1730-1791), a disciple of Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov. One of the "hidden tzaddikim," Rabbi Leib spent his life wandering from place to place to raise money for the ransoming of imprisoned Jews and the support of other hidden tzaddikim.
Link: More on R. Leib Sarah's
• Roman Ghetto Abolished (1798)
In 1555, Pope Paul IV segregated the Jews of Rome in a walled quarter surrounded by gates that were locked at night. The ghettoed Jews were then subjected to various forms of degradation as well as restrictions on their personal freedoms.
During the French Revolution, Italy was conquered by Napoleon Bonaparte. On the 4th of Adar (Tuesday, February 20, 1798) the Ghetto was legally abolished. It was reinstated, however, as soon as the Papacy regained control.
Daily Quote:
The time of prayer is a time of war[Zohar]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Tetzaveh, 2nd Portion Exodus 28:13-28:30 with Rashi
• Chapter 28
13You shall make settings of gold, יגוְעָשִׂיתָ מִשְׁבְּצֹת זָהָב:
You shall make settings: The minimum of settings is two. In this chapter, [the Torah] explains only part of what they [the settings] were needed for. In the chapter of the choshen, their explanation is completed for you. ועשית משבצות: מיעוט משבצות שתים, ולא פירש לך עתה בפרשה זו אלא מקצת צרכן, ובפרשת החושן גומר לך פירושן:
14and two chains of pure gold you will make them attached to the edges, after the manner of cables, and you will place the cable chains upon the settings. ידוּשְׁתֵּי שַׁרְשְׁרֹת זָהָב טָהוֹר מִגְבָּלֹת תַּעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם מַעֲשֵׂה עֲבֹת וְנָתַתָּה אֶת שַׁרְשְׁרֹת הָעֲבֹתֹת עַל הַמִּשְׁבְּצֹת:
chains: Heb. שַׁרְשְׁרֹת, [chains, equivalent to the Mishnaic], שַׁלְשְׁלָאוֹת. שרשרת זהב: שלשלאות:
attached to the edges: Heb. מִגְבָּלֹת. At the end of the edge (גְּבוּל) of the choshen, you shall make them. מגבלות: לסוף גבול החשן תעשה אותם:
after the manner of cables: In the style of braiding strands, not made with holes and links like those produced for cisterns, but like those made for censers, which are called enzenseyrs [in Old French]. מעשה עבות: מעשה קליעת חוטין, ולא מעשה נקבים וכפלים, כאותן שעושין לבורות, אלא כאותן שעושין לערדסקאות, שקורין אינצינשייר"ש בלעז [כלי קטורת]:
and you will place the… chains: of cables, made in the style of cables, on these two settings. This is not the place [i.e., the section] of the command for the making of the chains, nor the command for fastening them. The word ךְתַּעִשֶׂה stated here is not an imperative expression, and [the word] וְנָתַךְתָּה stated here is [also] not an imperative expression, rather [they are only] in the future tense. [This is so] because in the chapter of the choshen He commands them again concerning making them [the chains] and fastening them. It was written here only to let you know part of the need for the settings, which He commanded [you] to make with the ephod. He wrote this [here] for you, to inform you that you will need these settings so that when you make chains at the edge of the choshen, you will place them on these settings. ונתתה את שרשרות: של עבותות העשויות מעשה עבות על המשבצות הללו. ולא זה הוא מקום צוואת עשייתן של שרשרות, ולא צוואת קביעתן, ואין תעשה האמור כאן לשון צווי, ואין ונתתה האמור כאן לשון צווי, אלא לשון עתיד, כי בפרשת החשן חוזר ומצוה על עשייתן ועל קביעתן, ולא נכתב כאן אלא להודיע מקצת צורך המשבצות שצוה לעשות עם האפוד, וכתב לך זאת לומר לך המשבצות הללו יוזקקו לך לכשתעשה שרשרות מגבלות על החשן, תתנם על המשבצות הללו:
15You shall make a choshen of judgment, the work of a master weaver. You shall make it like the work of the ephod; of gold, blue, purple, and crimson wool, and twisted fine linen shall you make it. טווְעָשִׂיתָ חשֶׁן מִשְׁפָּט מַעֲשֵׂה חשֵׁב כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֵפֹד תַּעֲשֶׂנּוּ זָהָב תְּכֵלֶת וְאַרְגָּמָן וְתוֹלַעַת שָׁנִי וְשֵׁשׁ מָשְׁזָר תַּעֲשֶׂה אֹתוֹ:
a choshen of judgment: which atones for the perversion of justice (Zev. 88b). Another interpretation: [The choshen is referred to as] judgment because it clarifies its words [see Rashi on verse 30], and its promise comes true, dere(s)nement in Old French, [meaning] a clear statement. For [the word] מִשְׁפָּט has three usages: 1) the words of the pleas of the litigants, 2) the verdict, and 3) the punishment of the judgment, whether the punishment of death, the punishment of lashes, or the punishment of monetary payment. But this one [use of the word מִֹשְפָט] serves as an expression of the clarification of words, [meaning] that it explains and clarifies its words. חשן משפט: שמכפר על קלקול הדין. דבר אחר משפט, שמברר דבריו והבטחתו אמת, דיריישנימינ"ט בלעז [הוכחה] שהמשפט משמש שלש לשונות דברי טענות הבעלי דינים, וגמר הדין, ועונש הדין, אם עונש מיתה, אם עונש מכות, אם עונש ממון, וזה משמש לשון בירור דברים, שמפרש ומברר דבריו:
like the work of the ephod: The work of a master weaver and of five kinds [of material]. כמעשה אפוד: מעשה חושב ומחמשת מינין:
16It shall be square [and] doubled; its length one span and its width one span. טזרָבוּעַ יִהְיֶה כָּפוּל זֶרֶת אָרְכּוֹ וְזֶרֶת רָחְבּוֹ:
its length one span and its width one span: [It was] doubled, and [it was] suspended before him [the Kohen Gadol] against his heart, as it is said: “so that they will be over Aaron’s heart” (verse 30), suspended on the shoulder straps of the ephod, which come from behind him [the Kohen Gadol] over his shoulders and are folded over, descending somewhat in front of him. The choshen was suspended on them [the shoulder straps] by the chains and the rings, as is explained in the [section discussing the] matter [below, verses 22-29]. זרת ארכו וזרת רחבו: כפול ומוטל לו לפניו כנגד לבו, שנאמר (פסוק ל) והיו על לב אהרן, תלוי בכתפות האפוד, הבאות מאחוריו על כתפיו ונקפלות ויורדות לפניו מעט, והחשן תלוי בהן בשרשרות וטבעות, כמו שמפורש בענין:
17And you shall fill into it stone fillings, four rows of stones. One row: odem, pitdah, and bareketh; thus shall the one row be. יזוּמִלֵּאתָ בוֹ מִלֻּאַת אֶבֶן אַרְבָּעָה טוּרִים אָבֶן טוּר אֹדֶם פִּטְדָה וּבָרֶקֶת הַטּוּר הָאֶחָד:
And you shall fill into it: Since the stones fill the holes of the settings, which are prepared for them, [the Torah] calls them by an expression of filling. ומלאת בו: על שם שהאבנים ממלאות גומות המשבצות המתוקנות להן, קורא אותן בלשון מלואים:
18The second row: nofech, sappir, and yahalom. יחוְהַטּוּר הַשֵּׁנִי נֹפֶךְ סַפִּיר וְיָהֲלֹם:
19The third row: leshem, shevo, and achlamah. יטוְהַטּוּר הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לֶשֶׁם שְׁבוֹ וְאַחְלָמָה:
20And the fourth row: tarshish, shoham, and yashpheh; they shall be set in gold in their fillings. כוְהַטּוּר הָרְבִיעִי תַּרְשִׁישׁ וְשֹׁהַם וְיָשְׁפֵה מְשֻׁבָּצִים זָהָב יִהְיוּ בְּמִלּוּאֹתָם:
set in gold: The rows shall be [set in gold] in their fillings, encircled by settings of gold in the depth. According to the measure of the fullness of the thickness of the stone shall be the depth of the settings, no less and no more. משבצים זהב: יהיו הטורים במלואותם, מוקפים משבצות זהב בעומק שיעור שיתמלא בעובי האבן, זהו לשון במלואותם, כשיעור מלוי עביין של אבנים יהיה עומק המשבצות לא פחות ולא יותר:
21And the stones shall be for the names of the sons of Israel twelve, corresponding to their names; [similar to] the engravings of a seal, every one according to his name shall they be, for the twelve tribes. כאוְהָאֲבָנִים תִּהְיֶיןָ עַל שְׁמֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה עַל שְׁמֹתָם פִּתּוּחֵי חוֹתָם אִישׁ עַל שְׁמוֹ תִּהְיֶיןָ לִשְׁנֵי עָשָׂר שָׁבֶט:
every one according to his name: According to the order of their [the progenitors of the tribes] births shall be the order of the stones, odem for Reuben, pitdah for Simeon, and similarly for all of them. איש על שמו: כסדר תולדותם סדר האבנים, אודם לראובן, פטדה לשמעון, וכן כלם:
22You shall make for the choshen chains at the edges, of cable work, of pure gold. כבוְעָשִׂיתָ עַל הַחשֶׁן שַׁרְשֹׁת גַּבְלֻת מַעֲשֵׂה עֲבֹת זָהָב טָהוֹר:
for the choshen: Heb. עַל-הַחשֶׁן, for the choshen, to fasten them with its rings, as is explained below in the [section devoted to this] topic [below, verses 23-28]. על החשן: בשביל החשן, לקבעם בטבעותיו, כמו שמפורש למטה בענין:
chains: Heb. שַׁרְשֹׁת, a word related to [the word for] the roots (שָׁרְשֵׁי) of a tree, which are held to the tree, so it is held and inserted into the earth. These [chains] would also hold the choshen, for with them it [the choshen] would be suspended on the ephod. They are the two chains mentioned above (verse 14) in the [section devoted to the] topic of the settings. Menachem ben Saruk interpreted שַׁרְשְׁרֹת (verse 14) as well as an expression of roots (שָׁרָשִׁים). He said that the [second] “reish” (ר) is superfluous like the “mem” (מ) in שִׁלְשׁוֹם, [meaning] the day before yesterday (Exod. 5:8, 21:32, 36) [the word being derived from שָׁלשׁ, three], and the “mem” in רֵיקָם, empty (Gen. 31:42) [usually רֵיק, without the mem, is used] (Machbereth Menachem, p. 182). I do not agree with his statement, however, but [I hold that], שַׁרְשֶׁרֶת in Hebrew [of the Torah] is like שַׁלְשֶׁלֶת in the language of the Mishnah (Kelim 14:3). שרשת: לשון שרשי אילן המאחיזין לאילן להאחז ולהתקע בארץ, אף אלו יהיו מאחיזין לחשן, שבהם יהיה תלוי באפוד, והן שתי שרשרות האמורות למעלה (פסוק יד) בענין המשבצות. ואף שרשרות פתר מנחם בן סרוק לשון שרשים, ואמר שהרי"ש יתירה, כמו מ"ם שבשלשום, ומ"ם שבריקם. ואיני רואה את דבריו, אלא שרשרת בלשון עברית, כשלשלת בלשון משנה:
at the edges: Heb. גַּבְלֻת This is מִגְבָּלֹת mentioned above (verse 14), [signifying] that you shall insert them into the rings that will be on the edge (גְּבוּל) of the choshen. Every [instance of] גְּבוּל is an expression denoting an end, as(s) omayl in Old French, end, limit. גבלת: הוא מגבלות האמור למעלה (פסוק יד) שתתקעם בטבעות, שיהיו בגבול החשן, וכל גבול לשון קצה, אשומיי"ל בלעז [גבול]:
of cable work: Plaited. מעשה עבות: מעשה קליעה:
23You shall make for the choshen two golden rings, and you shall place the two rings on the two ends of the choshen, כגוְעָשִׂיתָ עַל הַחשֶׁן שְׁתֵּי טַבְּעוֹת זָהָב וְנָתַתָּ אֶת שְׁתֵּי הַטַּבָּעוֹת עַל שְׁנֵי קְצוֹת הַחשֶׁן:
for the choshen: Heb. עַל-הַחשֶׁן. For the choshen, in order to affix them onto it. It is, however, impossible to say that they [the two golden rings] shall be made on it [the choshen] from the outset, for if so, what is [the meaning of] what [the text] repeats and says, “and you shall place the two rings” ? Are they not already placed on it? At the beginning of the verse, Scripture should have written, “And you shall make on the ends of the choshen two golden rings.” Also, regarding the chains, you must interpret [the text] in this manner. על החשן: לצורך החושן, כדי לקבעם בו. ולא יתכן לומר שתהא תחלת עשייתן עליו, שאם כן מה הוא שחוזר ואומר ונתת את שתי הטבעות, והלא כבר נתונים בו, היה לו לכתוב בתחלת המקרא ועשית על קצות החשן שתי הטבעות זהב, ואף בשרשרות צריך אתה לפתור כן:
on the two ends of the choshen: On the two corners opposite the neck, on the right and on the left, which are opposite the shoulder straps of the ephod. על שני קצות החשן: לשתי פאות שכנגד הצואר, לימנית ולשמאלית הבאים מול כתפות האפוד:
24and you shall place the two golden cables on the two rings, at the ends of the choshen. כדוְנָתַתָּה אֶת שְׁתֵּי עֲבֹתֹת הַזָּהָב עַל שְׁתֵּי הַטַּבָּעֹת אֶל קְצוֹת הַחשֶׁן:
and you shall place the two golden cables: They are the chains for the edges, mentioned above (verse 22). [The Torah] did not delineate [there] where they were to be affixed on the choshen. Now it explains to you that they should be inserted into the rings. You should know that they are indeed [referring to] the first ones, for in the parsha of אֵלֶה פְּקוּדֵי [i.e., in Exod. 39:15-19, where the Torah relates how the choshen was made], they were not doubled. ונתתה את שתי עבתת הזהב: הן הן שרשרות גבלות הכתובות למעלה (פסוק כב) ולא פירש מקום קבוען בחשן, עכשיו מפרש לך שיהא תוחב אותן בטבעות, ותדע לך שהן הן הראשונות, שהרי בפרשת אלה פקודי לא הוכפלו:
25And the two ends of the two cables you shall place upon the two settings, and [these] you shall place upon the shoulder straps of the ephod, on its front part. כהוְאֵת שְׁתֵּי קְצוֹת שְׁתֵּי הָעֲבֹתֹת תִּתֵּן עַל שְׁתֵּי הַמִּשְׁבְּצוֹת וְנָתַתָּה עַל כִּתְפוֹת הָאֵפֹד אֶל מוּל פָּנָיו:
And the two ends: of the two cables, i.e., the two ends of each one. ואת שתי קצות: של שתי העבותות שני ראשיהם של כל אחת:
you shall place upon the two settings: They are the ones mentioned above, between the section dealing with the choshen and the section dealing with the ephod (verses 13 and 14), but [the Torah] did not explain their necessity or their place. Now it [the Torah] explains that he should insert into them the ends of the chains which are inserted into the rings of the choshen on the right and on the left beside the neck. The two ends of the right chain he inserts into the right setting, and similarly with the left one, the two ends of the left chain. תתן על שתי המשבצות: הן הכתובות למעלה (פסוק יד) בין פרשת החשן ופרשת האפוד, ולא פירש את צרכן ואת מקומן, עכשיו מפרש שיתקע בהן ראשי העבותות התחובות בטבעות [בראשי] החשן לימין ולשמאל אצל הצואר, שני ראשי השרשרת הימנית תוקע במשבצות של ימין, וכן בשל שמאל שני ראשי שרשרות השמאלית:
and [these] you shall place: the settings. ונתתה: המשבצות:
upon the shoulder straps of the ephod: One [setting] on this one [shoulder strap] and one on that one. Thus the shoulder straps of the ephod hold up the choshen so that it does not fall, and it is suspended on them. Yet the bottom edge of the choshen moves in and out and knocks on his [the Kohen Gadol’s] stomach and is not fastened to him well. Therefore, two more rings were needed for its lower part, as [the Torah] proceeds to explain. על כתפות האפוד: אחת בזו ואחת בזו, נמצאו כתפות האפוד מחזיקין את החשן שלא יפול, ובהן הוא תלוי, ועדיין שפת החשן התחתונה הולכת ובאה ונוקשת על כריסו, ואינה דבוקה לו יפה, לכך הוצרך עוד שתי טבעות לתחתיתו, כמו שמפרש והולך:
on its front part: [The front part] of the ephod, [meaning] that he should not place the settings on the side of the shoulder straps that is toward the robe, but instead [he should place the settings] on the upper side, which is toward the outside. That is called “on the front part” of the ephod, because the side that is not seen is not called the front [lit., the face]. אל מול פניו: של אפוד, שלא יתן המשבצות בעבר הכתפות שכלפי המעיל, אלא בעבר העליון שכלפי החוץ, והוא קרוי מול פניו של אפוד, כי אותו עבר שאינו נראה אינו קרוי פנים:
26You shall make two golden rings, and you shall place them on the two ends of the choshen, on its edge that is toward the inner side of the ephod. כווְעָשִׂיתָ שְׁתֵּי טַבְּעוֹת זָהָב וְשַׂמְתָּ אֹתָם עַל שְׁנֵי קְצוֹת הַחשֶׁן עַל שְׂפָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר אֶל עֵבֶר הָאֵפוֹד בָּיְתָה:
on the two ends of the choshen: [I.e.,] they are its two bottom corners, to its right and to its left. על שני קצות החשן: הן שתי פאותיו התחתונות לימין ולשמאל:
on its edge that is toward the inner side of the ephod: Here you have two signs [for the placement of the rings]: One, that he should put them on the two ends of its [the choshen’s] bottom, which is opposite the ephod, since its top is not opposite the ephod, for it is near the neck; whereas the ephod he placed on his waist. [The Torah] gives another sign, namely that he should not attach them on the choshen’s outer side, but on the inner side, as it is said: “inner.” This side is towards the side of the ephod, since the band of the ephod girds the Kohen [Gadol], and the apron is folded in front of the Kohen [Gadol] on his waist and on part of his stomach from either side until it is against the ends of the choshen, and its ends lie on it [the ephod]. על שפתו אשר אל עבר האפוד ביתה: הרי לך שני סימנין האחד שיתנם בשני קצות של תחתיתו שהוא כנגד האפוד, שעליונו אינו כנגד האפוד, שהרי סמוך לצואר הוא, והאפוד נתון על מתניו, ועוד נתן סימן שלא יקבעם בעבר החשן שכלפי החוץ, אלא בעבר שכלפי פנים שנאמר ביתה, ואותו העבר הוא לצד האפוד, שחשב האפוד חוגרו הכהן ונקפל הסינר לפני הכהן על מתניו, וקצת כריסו מכאן ומכאן עד כנגד קצות החשן, וקצותיו שוכבין עליו:
27And you shall make two golden rings and place them on the two shoulder straps of the ephod, from below, toward its front, adjacent to its seam, above the band of the ephod. כזוְעָשִׂיתָ שְׁתֵּי טַבְּעוֹת זָהָב וְנָתַתָּה אֹתָם עַל שְׁתֵּי כִתְפוֹת הָאֵפוֹד מִלְּמַטָּה מִמּוּל פָּנָיו לְעֻמַּת מַחְבַּרְתּוֹ מִמַּעַל לְחֵשֶׁב הָאֵפוֹד:
on the two shoulder straps of the ephod, from below: For the settings were placed on the upper ends of shoulder straps of the ephod, which were on his shoulders opposite his throat and were folded and descended in front of him. [Concerning] the rings, however, He commanded that they be placed on the second end [of the shoulder straps], which is attached to the ephod, and that is what [is meant when] it is said: “adjacent to its seam,” [i.e.,] near the place where they are attached to the ephod, slightly above the belt. The seam was adjacent to the belt, and these [rings] were placed slightly above where the shoulder straps begin to rise. That is [what is meant] when it is said: “above the band of the ephod.” They [these rings] were [placed] opposite the end of the choshen, and he inserted a blue cord in these rings and in the rings of the choshen. He fastened them with this cord to the right and to the left, so that the bottom of the choshen would not swing out in front and then come back and knock on his stomach, and thus it was well placed on the robe. על שתי כתפות האפוד מלמטה: שהמשבצות נתונות בראשי כתפות האפוד העליונים הבאים על כתפיו כנגד גרונו, ונקפלות ויורדות לפניו, והטבעות צוה ליתן בראשן השני, שהוא מחובר לאפוד, והוא שנאמר לעומת מחברתו, סמוך למקום חבורן באפוד למעלה מן החגורה מעט, שהמחברת לעומת החגורה, ואלו נתונים מעט בגובה זקיפת הכתפות, הוא שנאמר ממעל לחשב האפוד, והן כנגד סוף החשן, ונותן פתיל תכלת באותן הטבעות ובטבעות החשן, ורוכסן באותן פתילין לימין ולשמאל, שלא יהא תחתית החושן הולך לפנים וחוזר לאחור ונוקש על כריסו, ונמצא מיושב על המעיל יפה:
toward its front: On the outer side. ממול פניו: בעבר החיצון:
28And they shall fasten the choshen by its rings to the rings of the ephod with a blue cord, so that it may be upon the band of the ephod, and the choshen will not move off the ephod. כחוְיִרְכְּסוּ אֶת הַחשֶׁן מִטַּבְּעֹתָיו (כתיב מטבעתו)אֶל טַבְּעֹת הָאֵפוֹד בִּפְתִיל תְּכֵלֶת לִהְיוֹת עַל חֵשֶׁב הָאֵפוֹד וְלֹא יִזַּח הַחשֶׁן מֵעַל הָאֵפוֹד:
And they shall fasten: Heb. וְיִרְכְּסוּ, a word of joining. Similarly, “from bands of (מֵרֻכְסֵי) men” (Ps. 31:21), [meaning] bands of wicked men joined together. Similarly, “and the close mountains (וְהָרְכָסִים), a valley” (Isa. 40:4). [הַרְכָסִים refers to] mountains that are close to one another, so that it is impossible to descend into the valley except with great difficulty. Because of their proximity, the valley is steep and deep. These [mountains] will become a straight valley, where it will be easy to walk. וירכסו: לשון חבור, וכן (תהלים לא כא) מרכסי איש, חבורי חבלי רשעים, וכן (ישעיה מ ד) והרכסים לבקעה, הרים הסמוכים זה לזה שאי אפשר לירד לגיא שביניהם אלא בקושי גדול, שמתוך סמיכתן הגיא זקופה ועמוקה, יהיו לבקעת מישור ונוחה לילך:
so that it may be upon the band of the ephod: So that the choshen would be fastened to the band of the ephod. להיות על חשב האפוד: להיות החשן דבוק אל חשב האפוד:
will not move: Heb. וְלֹא-יִזַּח. יִזַּח is a word [meaning] severance. It is an Arabic expression, as is asserted by Dunash ben Labrat (Teshuvoth Dunash, p. 60, 61). ולא יזח: לשון ניתוק, ולשון ערבי הוא, כדברי דונש בן לברט:
29Thus shall Aaron carry the names of the sons of Israel in the choshen of judgment over his heart when he enters the Holy, as a remembrance before the Lord at all times. כטוְנָשָׂא אַהֲרֹן אֶת שְׁמוֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּחשֶׁן הַמִּשְׁפָּט עַל לִבּוֹ בְּבֹאוֹ אֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ לְזִכָּרֹן לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה תָּמִיד:
30You shall place the Urim and the Tummim into the choshen of judgment so that they will be over Aaron's heart when he comes before the Lord, and Aaron will carry the judgment of the children of Israel over his heart before the Lord at all times. לוְנָתַתָּ אֶל חשֶׁן הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֶת הָאוּרִים וְאֶת הַתֻּמִּים וְהָיוּ עַל לֵב אַהֲרֹן בְּבֹאוֹ לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה וְנָשָׂא אַהֲרֹן אֶת מִשְׁפַּט בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל לִבּוֹ לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה תָּמִיד:
the Urim and the Tummim: This [refers to the] inscription of the explicit Name, which he [Moshe] would place within the folds of the choshen, through which it would light up its words (מֵאִיר) and perfect (מְךְתַּמֵם) its words. [I.e., the Urim and Tummim explain their words, and their predictions never fail (on Yoma 73b).] In the Second Temple there was the choshen, because it was impossible for the Kohen Gadol to be missing [any of the original] garments, but that Name was not inside it. Because of that Name, it was called “judgment,” as it is said: “and he shall inquire for him through the judgment of the Urim” (Num. 27:21). את האורים ואת התומים: הוא כתב שם המפורש, שהיה נותנו בתוך כפלי החשן, שעל ידו הוא מאיר דבריו ומתמם את דבריו. ובמקדש שני היה החשן, שאי אפשר לכהן גדול להיות מחוסר בגדים, אבל אותו השם לא היה בתוכו, ועל שם אותו הכתב הוא קרוי משפט, שנאמר (במדבר כז כא) ושאל לו במשפט האורים:
the judgment of the children of Israel: [I.e., the solution of] the matter about which they [the Israelites] are judging and debating, whether or not to do something. According to the aggadic midrash (Lev. Rabbah 10:6) that the choshen atoned for the perverters of justice-it was called “judgment” because of [its] forgiveness for the [sins of] judgment. את משפט בני ישראל: דבר שהם נשפטים ונוכחים על ידו אם לעשות דבר או לא לעשות. ולפי מדרש אגדה שהחשן מכפר על מעוותי הדין, נקרא משפט על שם סליחת המשפט:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 23 - 28
• Chapter 23
When King David was in the forest of Cheret and nearly died of starvation, God provided nourishment for him with a taste of the World to Come. David then composed this psalm, describing the magnitude of his trust in God.
1. A psalm by David. The Lord is my shepherd, I shall lack nothing.
2. He lays me down in green pastures; He leads me beside still waters.
3. He revives my soul; He directs me in paths of righteousness for the sake of His Name.
4. Though I walk in the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for You are with me; Your rod and Your staff-they will comfort me.
5. You will prepare a table for me before my enemies; You have anointed my head with oil; my cup is full.
6. Only goodness and kindness shall follow me all the days of my life, and I shall dwell in the House of the Lord for many long years.
Chapter 24
If the fulfillment of one's prayer would result in the sanctification of God's Name, he should pray that God act for the sake of the holiness of His Name. One should also invoke the merit of his ancestors, for we know that "the righteous are greater in death than in life"
1. By David, a psalm. The earth and all therein is the Lord's; the world and its inhabitants.
2. For He has founded it upon the seas, and established it upon the rivers.
3. Who may ascend the mountain of the Lord, and who may stand in His holy place?
4. He who has clean hands and a pure heart, who has not used My Name in vain or sworn falsely.
5. He shall receive a blessing from the Lord, and kindness from God, his deliverer.
6. Such is the generation of those who search for Him, [the children of] Jacob who seek Your countenance forever.
7. Lift up your heads, O gates, and be lifted up, eternal doors, so the glorious King may enter.
8. Who is the glorious King? The Lord, strong and mighty; the Lord, mighty in battle.
9. Lift up your heads, O gates; lift them up, eternal doors, so the glorious King may enter.
10. Who is the glorious King? The Lord of Hosts, He is the glorious King for all eternity.
Chapter 25
The verses in this psalm are arranged according to the alphabet, excluding the letters Bet, Vav, and Kuf, which together equal the numerical value of Gehenom (purgatory). One who recites this psalm daily will not see the face of purgatory.
1. By David. To You, Lord, I lift my soul.
2. My God, I have put my trust in You. May I not be put to shame; may my enemies not gloat over me.
3. Indeed, may all who hope in You not be put to shame; let those who act treacherously without reason be shamed.
4. O Lord, make Your ways known to me; teach me Your paths.
5. Train me in Your truth and teach me, for You are the God of my salvation; I yearn for You all day.
6. O Lord, remember Your mercies and Your kindnesses, for they have existed for all time.
7. Do not recall the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions; remember me in accordance with Your kindness, because of Your goodness, O Lord.
8. Good and upright is the Lord, therefore He directs sinners along the way.
9. He guides the humble with justice, and teaches the humble His way.
10. All the paths of the Lord are kindness and truth for those who observe His covenant and testimonies.
11. For the sake of Your Name, O Lord, pardon my iniquity, for it is great.
12. Whoever is a God-fearing man, him will He teach the path that he should choose.
13. His soul will abide in well-being, and his descendants will inherit the earth.
14. The secret of the Lord is to those who fear Him; He makes His covenant known to them.
15. My eyes are always turned to the Lord, for He releases my feet from the snare.
16. Turn to me and be compassionate to me, for I am alone and afflicted.
17. The sufferings of my heart have increased; deliver me from my hardships.
18. Behold my affliction and suffering, and forgive all my sins.
19. See how numerous my enemies have become; they hate me with a violent hatred.
20. Guard my soul and deliver me; may I not be put to shame, for I place my trust in You.
21. Let integrity and uprightness guard me, for my hope is in You.
22. Redeem Israel, O God, from all its afflictions.
Chapter 26
In this psalm King David inundates God with prayers and acts of piety, because he envies those who are his spiritual superiors, saying, "If only I were on their level of piety and virtue!"
1. By David. Judge me, O Lord, for in my innocence I have walked, and in the Lord I have trusted-I shall not falter.
2. Try me, O Lord, and test me; refine my mind and heart.
3. For Your kindness is before my eyes, and I have walked constantly in Your truth.
4. I did not sit with men of falsehood, and with hypocrites I will not mingle.
5. I detested the company of evildoers, and with the wicked I will not sit.
6. I wash my hands in purity, and circle Your altar, O Lord,
7. to give voice to thanks, and to recount all Your wonders.
8. I love the shelter of Your House, O Lord, and the place where Your glory resides.
9. Gather not in my soul with sinners, nor my life with men of bloodshed,
10. In whose hands are schemes, and whose right hand is filled with bribes.
11. But I walk in my innocence; redeem me and show me favor.
12. My foot stands on level ground; in assemblies I will bless the Lord.
Chapter 27
King David acknowledges and praises God, placing his trust in Him because of his victories in war. "Nevertheless, it is not wars that I desire, for I cannot gain perfection with them. Only one thing do I ask: to abide day and night in the study hall studying Torah, to gain perfection so that my soul may merit the life of the World to Come."
1. By David. The Lord is my light and my salvation-whom shall I fear? The Lord is the strength of my life-whom shall I dread?
2. When evildoers approached me to devour my flesh, my oppressors and my foes, they stumbled and fell.
3. If an army were to beleaguer me, my heart would not fear; if war were to arise against me, in this I trust
4. One thing I have asked of the Lord, this I seek: that I may dwell in the House of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the pleasantness of the Lord, and to visit His Sanctuary.
5. For He will hide me in His tabernacle on a day of adversity; He will conceal me in the hidden places of His tent; He will lift me upon a rock.
6. And then my head will be raised above my enemies around me, and I will offer in His tabernacle sacrifices of jubilation; I will sing and chant to the Lord.
7. Lord, hear my voice as I call; be gracious to me and answer me.
8. In Your behalf my heart says, "Seek My countenance"; Your countenance, Lord, I seek.
9. Do not conceal Your countenance from me; do not cast aside Your servant in wrath. You have been my help; do not abandon me nor forsake me, God of my deliverance.
10. Though my father and mother have forsaken me, the Lord has taken me in.
11. Lord, teach me Your way and lead me in the path of righteousness, because of my watchful enemies.
12. Do not give me over to the will of my oppressors, for there have risen against me false witnesses, and they speak evil.
13. [They would have crushed me] had I not believed that I would see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living.
14. Hope in the Lord, be strong and let your heart be valiant, and hope in the Lord.
Chapter 28
A prayer for every individual, entreating God to assist him in walking the good path, to prevent him from walking with the wicked doers of evil, and that He repay the wicked for their wickedness and the righteous for their righteousness.
1. By David. I call to You, O Lord; my Strength, do not be deaf to me; for should You be silent to me, I will be like those who descend to the pit.
2. Hear the sound of my pleas when I cry out to You, when I raise my hands toward Your holy Sanctuary.
3. Do not draw me along with the wicked, with evildoers who speak of peace with their companions, though evil is in their heart.
4. Give them according to their deeds, and the evil of their endeavors; give them according to their handiwork, render to them their just deserts.
5. For they pay no heed to the acts of the Lord, nor to the work of His hands; may He destroy them and not rebuild them.
6. Blessed is the Lord, for He has heard the voice of my pleas.
7. The Lord is my strength and my shield; in Him my heart trusted and I was helped; my heart exulted, and with my song I praised Him.
8. The Lord is a strength to them; He is a stronghold of deliverance to His anointed.
9. Grant salvation to Your people and bless Your heritage; tend them and exalt them forever.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 30• Lessons in Tanya
• Daily Tanya
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 30
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 30
וכל שלא הגיע לידי מדה זו להלחם עם גופו מלחמה עצומה כזו
Anyone who has not attained this standard of waging such a strenuous war against his body,
עדיין לא הגיע לבחינת וערך מלחמת היצר הבוער כאש להבה
has not yet measured up to the quality and dimension of the war waged daily within the kal shebekalim against the evil nature which burns like a fiery flame,
להיות נכנע ונשבר מפני פחד ה׳
so that it (this powerful evil impulse) be humbled and broken through the fear of G‑d.
This, then, is the standard by which everyone must judge himself: Does he battle against his evil impulse (during prayer, and similarly in the other areas of divine service that the Alter Rebbe will soon discuss), as intensely as the kal shebekalim must battle against his?
וכן בענין ברכת המזון וכל ברכות הנהנין והמצות בכונה
So, too, with one’s kavanah in the Grace after Meals and in the benedictions, whether those said prior to eating, or those recited before performing amitzvah, all of which requires a battle with one’s evil impulse;
ואין צורך לומר כונת המצות לשמן
not to mention one’s intention in performing a mitzvah — that it be done (solely) for the sake of a mitzvah, i.e., for G‑d’s sake; this requires a still greater effort, and in this one will surely find himself wanting.
וכן בענין עסק לימוד התורה, ללמוד הרבה יותר מחפצו ורצונו לפי טבעו ורגילותו על ידי מלחמה עצומה עם גופו
Similarly with regard to the battle required in the matter of one’s occupation in Torah study, one must struggle to study far more than what is demanded by his innate or accustomed desire, by means of a mighty battle with his body.
When one studies Torah only as much as his natural inclination or habituated diligence dictates, he requires no effort or struggle at all. But in order to match the struggle of the kal shebekalim one must study far, far more than he would by nature or habit, as the Alter Rebbe continues:
כי הלומד מעט יותר מטבעו הרי זו מלחמה קטנה, ואין לה ערך ודמיון עם מלחמת היצר הבוער כאש
For to study a fraction more than is one’s wont entails but a minor tussle. It neither parallels nor bears comparison with the war of the kal shebekalim against his evil impulse which burns like fire,
דמקרי רשע גמור אם אינו מנצח יצרו, להיות נכנע ונשבר מפני ה׳
for which he is nonetheless called utterly wicked (rasha gamur), if he does not conquer his impulse so that it be subdued and crushed before G‑d.
Similarly, unless one struggles with his evil impulse to study much more than his nature or habit demands, he is no less wicked than the kal shebekalim.
But one may object to this reasoning. How, one may say, can I in all honesty compare my shortcomings to those of the kal shebekalim? I am lacking merely in the quality of the good that I do, whilst he actually and actively violates prohibitions enumerated in the Torah. To this the Alter Rebbe counters:
ומה לי בחינת סור מרע ומה לי בחינת ועשה טוב
What difference is there between the category of “turn away from evil” — in which the kal shebekalim fails, by active violation, and the category of “do good” — in which he fails, by neglecting to exert himself in prayer, Torah study and the like?
To be sure, there are differences between the two categories. Each has its own unique spiritual effects, its own specific intentions. But these differences pertain only to the person performing the mitzvah. The essential point in amitzvah, however, is that it is an expression of the Will of the Only and Unique G‑d, and in this there is no difference whatsoever between the two categories, as the Alter Rebbe continues.
הכל היא מצות המלך הקדוש, יחיד ומיוחד, ברוך הוא
Both are the commandments of the Holy King, the Only and Unique One, blessed be He.
The failings of the observant individual in the quality of his prayer, Torah study, and so on, are therefore comparable to the transgressions of the kal shebekalim.
וכן בשאר מצות, ובפרט בדבר שבממון
So, too, with other commandments requiring a struggle, one may find that he does not wage war adequately against his evil impulse, especially in matters involving money,
כמו עבודת הצדקה, וכהאי גוונא
such as the service (“labor”) of charity, i.e., giving charity in a manner involving “labor” — far more than in his wont, and the like.
ואפילו בבחינת סור מרע, יכול כל איש משכיל למצוא בנפשו שאינו סר לגמרי מהרע בכל מכל כל
Even in the category of “turn away from evil,” every thinking man can discover within himself that he does not turn completely and totally away from evil,
במקום שצריך למלחמה עצומה כערך הנ״ל, ואפילו פחות מערך הנ״ל
in a situation requiring a battle of the level i.e., magnitude described above, i.e., the battle required of the kal shebekalim, or even in a situation requiring a battle of a lesser magnitude.
כגון להפסיק באמצע שיחה נאה, או סיפור בגנות חברו
For example, he may find that he does not summon up the strength to stop in the middle of a pleasant gossip, or in the middle of relating a tale discrediting his fellow,
ואפילו גנאי קטן וקל מאד, אף שהוא אמת, ואפילו כדי לנקות עצמו
as he ought to do even if it is a very slight slur, and even if it be true, and even though his purpose in relating it is to exonerate himself
כנודע מהא דאמר רבי שמעון לאביו רבינו הקדוש: לאו אנא כתביה אלא יהודא חייטא כתביה, ואמר לו: כלך מלשון הרע עיין שם בגמרא, ריש פרק י׳ דבבא בתרא
as is known from what Rabbi Shimon said to his father Rabbeinu HaKadoshconcerning a problematic bill of divorce that was improperly ritten: “I did not write it, Yehudah the tailor wrote it,” where the slur was a minor one, and the purpose was self-vindication — and yet his father replied: “Keep away from slander.” (Note there in the Gemara, Tractate Bava Batra, 1 beginning of ch. 10.)
וכהאי גוונא כמה מילי דשכיחי טובא
The same applies to very many similar things which occur frequently.
There, too, one will find that he does not resist his evil impulse as he ought to, even in the category of “turn away from evil.”
ובפרט בענין לקדש עצמו במותר לו, שהוא מדאורייתא, כמו שכתוב: קדושים תהיו וגו׳, והתקדשתם וגו׳
This is especially true with regard to sanctifying oneself by refraining from indulgence in permitted matters — and this is a Biblical commandment, 2 derived from the verses: 3 “You shall be holy,” and “Sanctify yourselves,” etc.
וגם דברי סופרים חמורים מדברי תורה וכו׳
Moreover, even according to the opinion that this commandment is not of Biblical origin, yet4 “Rabbinic enactments are even stricter than Biblical laws,” etc. — and yet one will often find himself succumbing to self-indulgence when the temptation is strong and requires a battle to overcome it.
אלא שכל אלו וכיוצא בהן הן מעוונות שהאדם דש בעקביו
But all these and similar matters are among5 “the sins which people trample underfoot,” insensitive to their importance,
וגם נעשו כהיתר מחמת שעבר ושנה וכו׳
and which have come to be regarded as permissible because they are committed repeatedly. 6
All the above-mentioned calculations, then, can lead one to conclude that he is no better than the kal shebekalim. Like the kal shebekalim, he too fails to wage war against his evil impulse when it is required of him. Yet this still does not explain the requirement that one consider oneself lower than every man. In what way is he worse than the kal shebekalim? In answer, the Alter Rebbe continues:
אבל באמת אם הוא יודע ספר, ומחזיק בתורת ה׳, וקרבת אלקים יחפץ
In truth, however, if he is a scholar and upholds G‑d’s Torah, and wishes to be close to G‑d,
גדול עונו מנשוא, ואשמתו גדלה בכפלי כפליים במה שאינו נלחם ומתגבר על יצרו בערך ובחינת מלחמה עצומה הנ״ל
his sin is unbearably great and his guilt is increased manifold for his not waging war and not overcoming his impulse in a manner commensurate with the quality and nature of the war mentioned above that the kal shebekalim must face.
מאשמת קל שבקלים מיושבי קרנות הרחוקים מה׳ ותורתו
His guilt is far greater than the guilt of the kal shebekalim, the most worthless of the street-corner squatters, who are remote from G‑d and His Torah.
ואין אשמתם גדולה כל כך במה שאינם כובשים יצרם הבוער כאש להבה מפני פחד ה׳ המבין ומביט אל כל מעשיהם
Their guilt for not summoning up the fear of G‑d Who knows and sees all their actions, in order to restrain their impulse which burns like a fiery flame, is not as heinous
כאשמת כל הקרב הקרב אל ה׳ ואל תורתו ועבודתו
as the guilt of one who draws ever nearer to G‑d, His Torah and His service.
וכמו שאמרו רז״ל גבי אחר: שידע בכבודי וכו׳
As our Sages of blessed memory said of the apostate “Acher”, Elisha ben Avuyah: 7“Because he knew My glory...,” said G‑d; if despite this he still sinned, his guilt is far greater.
ולכן אמרו רז״ל על עמי הארץ שזדונות נעשו להם כשגגות
Therefore our Sages declared in regard to the illiterate that8 “Deliberate sins are regarded in their case as inadvertent acts,” since they are unaware of the gravity of their sins.
With a scholar, the reverse is true: an oversight due to lack of study is adjudged as being as grave as a deliberate sin.9 Thus, his failure to restrain his evil impulse is indeed worse than the failure of the kal shebekalim.
By contemplating this, the observant scholar will now be able to fulfill the instruction of the Mishnah (quoted at the beginning of this chapter): “Be lowly of spirit before every man.” Thereby he will crush his own spirit and the spirit of the sitra achra in his animal soul, enabling the light of his soul to permeate and irradiate his body, as explained in ch. 29.
FOOTNOTES
1. 164b.
2. See ch. 27.
3. Vayikra 19:2; 20:7.
4. Sanhedrin 88b.
5. Avodah Zarah 18a.
6. Yoma 86b.
7. Chaghigah 15a (in fourth marginal gloss by the Bach).
8. Bava Metzia 33b.
9. Avot 4:13.Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Adar 4, 5775 · February 23, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 355
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
"There shall be no indecent women among the daughters of Israel"—Deuteronomy 23:18.
It is forbidden for a man and woman to be intimate unless married to each other.
Out of Wedlock Intimacy
Negative Commandment 355
Translated by Berel Bell
Negative Commandment 356
The 355th prohibition is that we are forbidden from having relations with a woman without [giving her] a Kesubah and acquiring her (kiddushin).
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "There may not be any prostitutes among Jewish girls."
This same commandment is repeated, but using a different expression, in G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The Sifra says, " 'Do not defile your daughter' — this command is directed towards a man who hands over his unmarried daughter for sexual relations without marriage, as well as a girl who herself has sexual relations without marriage."
Now listen as I explain why the prohibition is repeated with this wording,3 and what the repetition adds. G‑d (exalted be He) has already instructed us in the Torah that a man who has relations with a virgin incurs none of the punishments4, regardless of whether he seduced or raped her. Rather, he must pay a monetary fine and marry the girl that he harmed, as explained in the Torah.5
Accordingly, a person might think that since the offender is only required to pay a fine, therefore this is looked upon as a purely financial case. Therefore, just as a person, if he wishes, is allowed to give away his money to another person, or to forgive a debt, so too, [he might think,] he may take his unmarried daughter and give her to a man to have relations with her. This would be like forgiving a debt due to him, since the 50 silver [shekels which the seducer or rapist must pay] go to the father. Alternatively, a person might think that [since this is purely a financial matter,] he may give his daughter on condition that the man pays a certain amount of money.
Therefore, the Torah prohibited this and said, "Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations." The monetary fine only refers to a case where the seduction or rape actually occurred. But it is still completely forbidden for them to engage in sexual relations, even when they both agree.
The Torah also reveals the reason for this prohibition: ["Do not defile your daughter with premarital relations,] and you will then not make the land sexually immoral, and the land [will not] be filled with perversion." The explanation of this: seduction and rape occur very rarely, but if the Torah allowed premarital relations when both parties agree, it would occur often and become widespread throughout the world.
This is a fine and wondrous explanation of this verse, and fits all the sayings of our Sages and laws of the Torah.
This prohibition, i.e. the prohibition of [having relations with] an unmarried woman, is punishable by lashes.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in Kesubos and Kiddushin.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 23:18.
2.Lev. 19:29.
3.Directed to the father, unlike the other verse, which is phrased as a general prohibition.
4.. Such as lashes or execution.
5.Ex. 22:15. Deut. 22:28. See P220, P218.
Tefilah and Birkat Kohanim - Chapter Nine
Halacha 1
The order of prayer is as follows:
In the morning, [while] all the people are sitting, the leader of the congregation descends before the ark in the midst of the people and recites the Kaddish. Everyone responds with all their strength: Amen. Yehei shemeih rabba mevarach le'alam ul'almei almaya. They answer "Amen" at the end of theKaddish.
Afterwards, [the chazan] declares: Barchu et Ado-nai hamevorach, and they answer: Baruch Ado-nai hamevorach le'olam va'ed. He then begins by reciting the Shema and its blessings out loud. They answer "Amen" after each blessing.
A person who knows how to recite the blessings and read [the Shema] with him should read [the blessings by himself] until he recites the blessing ga'al Yisrael.
Halacha 2
Immediately [afterwards], all stand and pray in a hushed tone. A person who does not know how to pray should stand in silence while the leader of the congregation prays in a hushed tone together with the others. Whoever concludes his prayers with the congregation should take three steps back and stand [still] in the place he reached when he stepped backwards.
Halacha 3
After the leader of the congregation takes three steps backwards and stands still, he begins and prays in a loud voice from the beginning of the blessings, in order to fulfill the obligation on behalf of those who did not pray.
Everyone - both those who did not fulfill their obligation [to pray] and those who fulfilled their obligation - stands, listens, and recites "Amen" after each and every blessing.
Halacha 4
[The leader of the congregation] recites Kedushah in the third blessing.
When the leader of the congregation reaches Kedushah, each individual may return to the place where he originally stood in prayer.
When the leader of the congregation reaches Modim and bows, everyone should also bow - but not bow exceedingly - and say:
We give thanks to You, God, our Lord, and Lord of all flesh, our Creator and the Creator of all existence. [We offer] blessings and thanks to Your great and holy name, for You have granted us life and sustained us. So may You continue to grant us life and sustain us, and gather our exiles into the courtyards of Your Sanctuary [so that we may] keep Your laws, serve You in truth, and fulfill Your will with a perfect heart, for we thankfully acknowledge You.
Whoever says Modim, modim should be silenced.
Halacha 5
After the leader of the congregation concludes the entire Shemoneh Esreh, he and the entire congregation should sit, fall on their faces, and lean over slightly, reciting supplicatory prayers while fallen on their faces.
Then, he and the entire congregation should sit, lift their heads, and recite a small amount of supplicatory prayer out loud while seated. Afterwards, the leader of the congregation alone should stand and recite Kaddish a second time. The congregation should answer as they did previously.
Afterwards, while he is standing, he recites V'hu rachum... and Tehillah [l'David]... The congregation remains seated and recites together with him. Afterwards, he recites [the following verses]: U'va l'Tzion go'el..., Va'ani zot..., V'attah kadosh... and V'kara zeh el zeh, v'amar: Kadosh... and completes theKedushah.
They respond: Kadosh, Kadosh three times. He then recites the Kedushah in an Aramaic translation. Afterwards, he recites [the verse] Vatisa'eni ruach and reads it in Aramaic, and then recites [the verse], Ado-nai yimloch le'olam va'edand reads it in Aramaic. [The Aramaic translations are intended] in order that the [common] people should understand.
Halacha 6
These verses [which are recited] before Kedushah and afterwards, together with their Aramaic translations, are referred to as "the order of Kedushah."
Afterwards, he recites supplicatory prayers and verses of mercy. He then recites the Kaddish. The people respond as is customary, and depart.
Halacha 7
One who says in his supplicatory prayers: "May He who showed mercy on a bird's nest prohibiting the taking of the mother together with the chicks, or the slaughter of an animal and its calf on the same day, also show mercy on us," or [makes other] similar statements should be silenced, because these mitzvot are God's decrees and not [expressions] of mercy. Were they [expressions] of mercy, He would not permit us to slaughter at all.
Also, a person should not be profuse in his mention of adjectives describing God, and say: "The great, mighty, awesome, powerful, courageous, and strong God," for it is impossible for man to express the totality of His praises. Instead, one should mention [only] the praises that were mentioned by Moses, of blessed memory.
Halacha 8
In the Minchah service, the leader of the congregation recites Ashrei yoshvei veitecha..., Tehillah l'David.... He and the congregation recite this while seated. [Then,] the leader of the congregation stands and recites Kaddish. They stand and respond in their normal manner. [Afterwards,] they all pray in a hushed tone.
Afterwards, the leader of the congregation prays out loud, as in the morning service, until he concludes the Shemoneh Esreh. Then, both he and the congregation fall on their faces, recite supplicatory prayers, lift their heads, and recite a few supplicatory prayers while seated, as in the morning service.
[The leader of the congregation] rises and recites Kaddish. The congregation responds in the normal manner and they depart to their affairs.
Halacha 9
In the evening, all the people sit, and [the leader of the congregation] stands and recites: V'hu rachum.... [He announces:] Barchu et Ado-nai hamevorach, and they answer: Baruch Ado-nai hamevorach le'olam va'ed. He then begins by reciting the Shema and its blessings out loud and recites Kaddish. [Afterwards,] they all stand and pray in a hushed tone.
When they conclude, [the leader of the congregation] recites Kaddish and they depart. He does not repeat the evening Shemoneh Esreh out loud, since the evening service is not obligatory. Therefore, he should not recite blessings in vain, for there is no one who is obligated [to recite these blessings] whose obligation he would fulfill [by his recitation].
Halacha 10
On the night of the Sabbath, after praying together with the congregation in a hushed tone, the leader of the congregation prays out loud. However, he does not recite all seven blessings, but rather one blessing that includes all seven. He states:
Blessed are You, God, our Lord and Lord of our fathers, the Lord of Abraham, the Lord of Isaac, and the Lord of Jacob, the great, mighty, and awesome God, the supreme God, who, in His mercies, creates heaven and earth.
He shielded our ancestors with His word. He resurrects the dead with His statements - the holy God, like whom there is none. He causes His people to rest on His holy Sabbath, for to them did He desire to grant rest. We will serve Him with awe and fear and give thanks to His name every day, continually, according to the blessings [appropriate for that day]. God who is worthy of thanks, Lord of peace, who sanctifies the Sabbath and blesses the seventh day and brings rest with holiness to a people satiated with delight in commemoration of the work of creation.
Our Lord, and Lord of our fathers, desire our rest.... Blessed are You, God, who sanctifies the Sabbath.
He shielded our ancestors with His word. He resurrects the dead with His statements - the holy God, like whom there is none. He causes His people to rest on His holy Sabbath, for to them did He desire to grant rest. We will serve Him with awe and fear and give thanks to His name every day, continually, according to the blessings [appropriate for that day]. God who is worthy of thanks, Lord of peace, who sanctifies the Sabbath and blesses the seventh day and brings rest with holiness to a people satiated with delight in commemoration of the work of creation.
Our Lord, and Lord of our fathers, desire our rest.... Blessed are You, God, who sanctifies the Sabbath.
He recites Kaddish and the people depart.
Halacha 11
Why did the Sages institute this [practice]? Because the majority of people come to recite the evening service on Friday night. It is possible that someone will come late, remain alone in the synagogue, and thus be endangered. Accordingly, the leader of the congregation repeats his prayers in order that the entire congregation will remain, [allowing] the one who came late to conclude his prayers and leave together with them.
Halacha 12
Therefore, when a festival, Rosh Chodesh or Yom Kippur coincides with the Sabbath, the leader of the congregation who recites the evening service does not mention the unique aspect of the day in this blessing. Instead, he concludes, "[Blessed are You, God,] who sanctifies the Sabbath," [mentioning] only [the Sabbath], because [on the other] days, there is no obligation [to recite] this blessing.
Halacha 13
On the Sabbaths and the festivals, after the leader of the congregation completes the recitation of the Shemoneh Esreh of the morning service out loud, he recites Kaddish and afterwards, Tehillah l'David. He recites Kaddish[again] and [the congregation] recites Musaf in a hushed tone. Afterwards, he recites the Musaf Shemoneh Esreh out loud, in the same manner as the morning service. He recites Kaddish after Musaf and the people depart.
We do not recite Kedushah and supplicatory prayers after the morning service. Instead, we recite them before the Minchah service. What is implied? We reciteTehillah l'David, the order of the day, and supplicatory prayers. [The leader of the congregation] recites Kaddish and the Minchah service is recited [in a hushed tone.] Afterwards, [the leader of the congregation] repeats the service out loud, and then recites Kaddish.
Halacha 14
On Rosh Chodesh and Chol Hamo'ed, one recites the order of kedushahbefore the Musaf prayer. On the night following the Sabbath, the order of the day is also recited after the evening service. [Then] one recites Kaddish and afterwards, Havdalah.
Ishut - Chapter Five
Halacha 1
When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated.1 [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin2 - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.
Halacha 2
If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, thekiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."
If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned,4 the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.
Halacha 3
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year,5with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer],6 the kiddushin are valid.
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple.7 If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.8
Halacha 4
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's."9
Halacha 5
When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.
When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, theterumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.10
Halacha 6
The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.
When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article,11 and it is known12 that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.
Halacha 8
When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.
If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.13
Halacha 9
When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated.14If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin.15 If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the kiddushin], she is consecrated.
Halacha 11
Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [thekiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.16
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.
If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.
Halacha 13
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note,17 she is not consecrated.
What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept askiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ]18 already spent that dinar and has derived benefit from it already.
Halacha 14
[A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral,19 she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.
Halacha 15
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.
What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.
Halacha 16
If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with thisp'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.22
Halacha 17
When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.23
Halacha 18
Halacha 19
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan,26 and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
Halacha 20
[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.
[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him].27 And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.
Halacha 21
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," thekiddushin are binding.28 Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.
Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding29 provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."
Halacha 22
[To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.30
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated.31 For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.
Halacha 23
When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.32
If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.33
Halacha 24
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with thisdinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.34
Halacha 25
[These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuz that are hidden in the wreath."
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status,37 [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.
Halacha 27
[Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful.
[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.
Halacha 28
If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.
Halacha 29
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.38
Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to the Torah, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p'rutah.
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| 2. |
The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.
From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.
In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Karo follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it as kiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)
The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding.
Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam's perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.
Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p'rutah must be given. Since according to Scriptural law the article has intrinsic worth, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context.
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| 3. |
See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.
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| 4. |
For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.)
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| 5. |
Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman.
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| 6. |
As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10, based on Kiddushin58a), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given.
|
| 7. |
See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:3.
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| 8. |
For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person's private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (SeeHilchot Me'ilah 6:3.)
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| 9. |
We are required to eat the produce of the second tithe in Jerusalem or redeem it and use the money to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Although one derives personal benefit from eating this produce, it is not considered to be one's own property.
|
| 10. |
In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah's decree - and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity - once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.
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| 11. |
A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner's despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner's property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article - for she is a third party - the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh).
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| 12. |
The Rambam's intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushin are invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda Biy'hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77).
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| 13. |
The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam's own addition. The Noda Biy'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.
The Edut BiY'hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushin are valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person's taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.
The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. TheChatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object's worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of the kiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.
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| 14. |
We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi, Kiddushin 52b). There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not he is obligated to return the value of the stolen property to her. The Rashba maintains that he is not required, while Rabbenu Nissim states that he is. (See the Ramah and commentaries, Even HaEzer 28:2.)
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| 15. |
For she merely accepted her own property.
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| 16. |
Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.
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| 17. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p'rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding.
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| 18. |
I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender's, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel 28:19.
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| 19. |
Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that the kiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it also quotes the other opinion.
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| 20. |
Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri, Ma'aseh Rokeach) explain that the Rambam's wording is precise. The expression "like interest" implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural law.
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| 21. |
The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra'avad. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam's interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushin are binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Ramah, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam's view.
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| 22. |
Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p'rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushinare binding (Kiddushin 46a).
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| 23. |
As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt. This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural law.
There are opinions that maintain that the woman is not consecrated. These opinions maintain that even after such a transfer has been made, the original creditor can nullify a debt that has been transferred through such a process. Since there is a possibility that the debt will be nullified, they maintain that the woman will not make the commitment required by kiddushin. (See Rabbenu Nissim and the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 28:13 and commentaries.)
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| 24. |
Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: "If ap'rutah's worth of the article remains..." - i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p'rutah's worth remains - the consecration is binding. See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries.
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| 25. |
If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.
Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman's property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make the kiddushin effective.
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| 26. |
Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah.
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| 27. |
I.e., it is not as if the man's entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan.
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| 28. |
Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.
The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman's suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman's offer of kiddushin. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed thekiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear.
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| 29. |
Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two - because the servant's owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself - the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above.
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| 30. |
Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.
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| 31. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by "an important person." Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21).
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| 32. |
Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.
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| 33. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushin are not binding.
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| 34. |
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemble chalifin (barter).
The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages' decree (Or Sameach).
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| 35. |
I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards to be consecrated she must explicitly express her consent. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs and maintains that in such an instance there is a doubt whether or not the kiddushin are binding, and the more stringent ruling must be followed in every instance. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:5).
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| 36. |
As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.
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| 37. |
In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, noting that Kiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10 and Hilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon's reasoning.
In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon's view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon's reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit.
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| 38. |
Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but - in the Talmudic era - it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil - in the Talmudic era - was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.
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Ishut - Chapter Six
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the kiddushin are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman.
Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard tokiddushin, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules.1
Halacha 2
These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements:2
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional;3
d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met.
Halacha 3
What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the dinar, the condition is valid, and the kiddushin are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 zuz, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 4
If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.
[The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time;4 she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all.
Halacha 5
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
Halacha 6
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.
Halacha 7
Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the dinar in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the kiddushin are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner.
Halacha 8
[The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with thisdinar. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your get. But if you do not eat it, the get is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the dinar or the get in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced.
Halacha 9
With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say:5 "Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"?6
When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you."
Halacha 10
What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding,7 for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations.
Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks,8 she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 11
If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of kiddushin or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
Halacha 12
If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.
Halacha 13
Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence.
Halacha 14
Some of the later geonim9 maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to kiddushin and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made.
It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither kiddushin nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great geonim of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it.10
Halacha 15
When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the kiddushin become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original]kiddushin.
What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 zuz this year, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her the dinar in Nisan, but gave her the 200 zuz that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second.
Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed.11
Halacha 16
When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this dinar if I give you 200 zuz,"12 when at a later date he gives her the 200 zuz she is consecrated. Retroactively, the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law.
Halacha 17
Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation,13 nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.14 Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation.
When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording al menat ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply.15 It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.
Halacha 18
What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 zuz," "here is your get on condition that you give me 200 zuz," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 zuz," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200zuz. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field.
[The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the kiddushin or the get in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.16
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
See Halachah 14 and notes.
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| 2. |
We find a conditional agreement in the Torah: Moses' granting the lands of Transjordan to the tribes of Reuven and Gad (Numbers 32:29-30). All these four rules were evident in Moses' phrasing of the stipulation. Accordingly, our Sages (Kiddushin 61a) consider this a prototype for all future conditional agreements.
|
| 3. |
This is the Rambam's interpretation of the requirement that in its Hebrew original states: שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. The Ra'avad (in his gloss on Halachah 4) interprets the phrase differently. He states that in the wording of the person making the stipulation, the stipulation must be stated before the result of its completion: e.g., "If you give me 200 zuz, you will be consecrated..., and if you do not give me that sum, you will not be consecrated." The Beit Shmuel 38:2 accepts the Ra'avad's interpretation and not that of the Rambam.
|
| 4. |
We have chosen a very loose translation. The Hebrew toch kedei dibbur has a precise connotation, meaning the amount of time it takes to say the words Shalom alecha rabbi umori.
|
| 5. |
Kiddushin 19b.
|
| 6. |
An exception is made with regard to financial matters, because with regard to these matters the Torah grants the person the right to waive monetary privileges that are due him. Privileges that are not monetary in nature may not be waived.
|
| 7. |
Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia, the conclusion of Chapter 7), the Ritba (Kiddushin19a) and the Mordechai (gloss on Bava Metzia 93a) maintain that even conjugal rights can be considered to be a financial consideration, for it is a matter of physical pleasure. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted as halachah. Instead, withholding conjugal relations is considered a matter of physical anguish. Hence a woman does not have the prerogative of waiving this right.
|
| 8. |
Deuteronomy 21:11-14 describes the right of a soldier to have relations with a female captive of war whom he desires. Once he has relations with her, he may no longer treat her as a servant.
|
| 9. |
The commentaries have pointed to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni HaCohen.
|
| 10. |
The Ra'avad, the Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam's reasoning. According to the position of these authorities, it is only one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the rules regarding conditional agreements were derived from the agreement made between Moses and the tribes of Reuven and Gad. They maintain that the need to repeat the condition applies only with regard tokiddushin, and was instituted only because of the severity of the establishment and annulment of the marriage relationship. With regard to other matters, however, there is no such requirement. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:9) follow the Rambam's view.
|
| 11. |
The above applies when the agreement is made verbally. If, however, a conditional sale or a present is recorded in a legal document, it is considered to be effective retroactively from the date stated in the document, although the stipulation is not carried out until much later.
Others maintain that the same principle applies with regard to a get, and if a date is included in a conditional bill of divorce, the divorce is retroactively effective from the date of the get, even though the stipulation is carried out much later. As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 8:1, the Rambam does not follow this approach. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 143:2.)
|
| 12. |
In such an instance, the stipulation need not be restated, as mentioned in the following halachah.
|
| 13. |
Since the condition does not have to be restated, there is also no need for the positive statement to precede the negative.
|
| 14. |
This follows the Rambam's interpretation of the Talmud's wording שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה, as explained in Halachah 2.
|
| 15. |
Tosafot and many subsequent Ashkenazic authorities do not accept this ruling. The difference of opinion is noted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4).
|
| 16. |
Among the other rationales offered are that the rules for a conditional agreement are derived from the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and in that instance that condition was phrased using the term "if," rather than "from this time onward" or "on condition that" (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The Ra'avad explains that stating a stipulation using the wording "if" nullifies the act the person performs. For a stipulation to have this power, it must be worded precisely. If, however, the wording "on condition that" or "from now onward" is used, the implication is that the act is not nullified, but is merely dependent on the fulfillment of the condition. Since the stipulation is not that powerful, its wording need not be as precise.
|
Ishut - Chapter Seven
Halacha 1
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated.1 If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated.2
[If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so thekiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.3
Halacha 2
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain."4 If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.5
Halacha 3
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.6
Halacha 4
[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him.
If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow akor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown.7 If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments.8 If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these."
If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these."
What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained.9 In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women,10 a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead.
This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as anisar11 even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.
Halacha 8
When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.12
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her,13 she is consecrated.
Halacha 9
If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes.14
When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.15
Halacha 10
[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated.
[If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuzafter 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.
Halacha 11
If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.16
Halacha 12
[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter,17 and] both [men] are considered as having establishedkiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her.18 The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days19 or afterwards.
[Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.
Halacha 13
When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and thesekiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of thekiddushin.20
If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.21
Halacha 14
When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again22until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin established by the second p'rutah.
If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude],"23 "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies,"24 she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.25
Halacha 15
Halacha 16
When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence.28 If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated.29 [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.
Halacha 17
When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar].
When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100].30 Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given.
Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated.31 [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [thekiddushin are valid, provided]32 he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire,33 and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.
Halacha 19
A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home.
[The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.
Halacha 20
When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid.34 Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.
Halacha 21
When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid.35 [If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found].
Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, the kiddushinare not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives the kiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].
Halacha 22
Halacha 23
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to thekiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence.38
Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to thekiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]39 even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her.
Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than ap'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate.
[The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.40
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father's consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra'avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:8) quotes the Rambam's wording.
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| 2. |
There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of "consent": a) to say "yes," b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra'avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.
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| 3. |
Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband. Were the father to indeed consent, she would be under obligation either to marry the deceased's brother, or have the obligation removed through chalitzah.
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| 4. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that the kiddushin would be void.
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| 5. |
I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her original kiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.
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| 6. |
Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people's knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present, or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer38:20) quotes the Rambam's decision.
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| 7. |
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation, and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field.
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| 8. |
The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)
Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving ענוי נפש, "the oppression of the soul" (cf. Numbers 30:14). Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.
In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving ענוי נפש; it also includes those בינו לבינה, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17). (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, andShulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, Chapter 234.)
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| 9. |
Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed.
|
| 10. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5).
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| 11. |
An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:1).
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| 12. |
She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.
This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.
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| 13. |
A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them. (See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 4.)
The kiddushin are binding only when the wise man nullifies the vows before the woman's intended husband discovers their existence. Once he discovers that she is bound by vows, the kiddushinare nullified even when she has the vows nullified afterwards (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer39:2).
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| 14. |
The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes," the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).
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| 15. |
The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason thekiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.
Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man's nullification and a physician's healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of the kiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of the kiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.
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| 16. |
From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man's kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman's acceptance of the secondkiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah and Tur, Even HaEzer 40:2.)
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| 17. |
Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying thekiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying "after 30 days," the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man's kiddushin would be binding.
Significantly, if a person made a similar statement with regard to a sale, the Rambam rules (Hilchot Mechirah 2:9) that this is a conditional statement. Thus, it appears that his ruling here is a stringency, accepted because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce.
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| 18. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this ruling, many later authorities do.
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| 19. |
Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce.
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| 20. |
The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond ofkiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel38:68, there are authorities who maintain that the kiddushin are not binding at all.
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| 21. |
For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.
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| 22. |
In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Karo rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated.
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| 23. |
This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant.
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| 24. |
I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman's sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may.
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| 25. |
Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time the kiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is "something that has not come into the world," for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.
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| 26. |
I.e., when a woman's husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite ofchalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed.
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| 27. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since the kiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect,kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:6) rules that even when a conditional statement is made, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. There are some manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that indicate that the Rambam also shared that view.
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| 28. |
For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist.
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| 29. |
The Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage.
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| 30. |
Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a).
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| 31. |
For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushin would be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 29:7.)
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| 32. |
The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling.
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| 33. |
The Rambam's wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. TheShulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel 31:1.)
Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk: Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily - e.g., a precious stone - a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert's appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone.
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| 34. |
For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. As such he is acting on his own initiative, and not as the agent of the principal.
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| 35. |
Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.
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| 36. |
Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.
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| 37. |
Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person's retraction is of no consequence.)
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| 38. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam's decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)
The Rashba accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to conditions involving money - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you give me 200 zuz." For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows" - he does not accept the Rambam's position. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam's ruling.
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| 39. |
I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establish kiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Ramah,Even HaEzer 38:35).
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| 40. |
In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)
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• Adar 4, 5775 · Monday, 23 February 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: T'ruma, Shlishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 23-28.
Tanya: And with every (p. 117)...by the tzaddikim (p. 117).
The initial preparations for delving into deep intellectual concepts, especially concepts of G-dliness, are (a) a strenuous effort of the body to be rid of one's delight in worldly matters, and (b) a strenuous effort of the soul to stimulate delight in intellectual pursuit in general, and in G-dly matters in particular.
Thursday Adar Sheini 4 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: P'kudei, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 23-28.
Tanya: Ch. 35. Let us (p. 155)...Torah and (Divine) service. (p.157).
When the Mitteler Rebbe would say Chassidus, there was a perfect hush. Still he would intersperse the Chassidus with, "Sha, sha!"
My father explained that this was to still the gushing of his intellect. With this he explained the expression in Zohar:1 The venerable sage whose mind is concealed, for it is still and tranquil.
FOOTNOTES
1. Zohar 3, 128b. See Likutei Sichot Vol. 1, p. 117.
Daily Thought:
Humble and Happy
Why is it that those who hardly think of themselves are always happy, while those most self-concerned can never truly celebrate anything?
Because the more space you occupy, the less room you leave for joy.
There are those who fill their entire space with self-concern. Nothing they receive, no degree of recognition, can match the space already occupied by their self-concern.
But those who make themselves small welcome in everything with joy. And if once in a while life does not provide its bounty—well, if you don‘t deserve anything anyways, what is there to be depressed about?
In fact, if you feel small enough, then you rejoice when you‘re lacking too. Because small people don‘t create big issues out of things that go wrong.
Make yourself small, and there will always be room for happiness.[Sefer Hamaamarim 5679, page 91, cited and elucidated in Maamar Chayei Sarah, 5741.]
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