Monday, February 6, 2017

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Monday, 6 February 2017 - Today is: Monday, 10 Shevat, 5777 · 6 February 2017 - Yud Shevat.

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Monday, 6 February 2017 - Today is: Monday, 10 Shevat, 5777 · 6 February 2017 - Yud Shevat.
Torah Reading
Beshalach: Exodus 13:17 After Pharaoh had let the people go, God did not guide them to the highway that goes through the land of the P’lishtim, because it was close by — God thought that the people, upon seeing war, might change their minds and return to Egypt. 18 Rather, God led the people by a roundabout route, through the desert by the Sea of Suf. The people of Isra’el went up from the land of Egypt fully armed.

19 Moshe took the bones of Yosef with him, for Yosef had made the people of Isra’el swear an oath when he said, “God will certainly remember you; and you are to carry my bones up with you, away from here.”
20 They traveled from Sukkot and set up camp in Etam, at the edge of the desert. 21 Adonai went ahead of them in a column of cloud during the daytime to lead them on their way, and at night in a column of fire to give them light; thus they could travel both by day and by night. 22 Neither the column of cloud by day nor the column of fire at night went away from in front of the people.
14:1 Adonai said to Moshe, 2 “Tell the people of Isra’el to turn around and set up camp in front of Pi-Hachirot, between Migdol and the sea, in front of Ba‘al-Tz’fon; camp opposite it, by the sea. 3 Then Pharaoh will say that the people of Isra’el are wandering aimlessly in the countryside, the desert has closed in on them. 4 I will make Pharaoh so hardhearted that he will pursue them; thus I will win glory for myself at the expense of Pharaoh and all his army, and the Egyptians will realize at last that I am Adonai.” The people did as ordered.
5 When the king of Egypt was told that the people had fled, Pharaoh and his servants had a change of heart toward the people. They said, “What have we done, letting Isra’el stop being our slaves?” 6 So he prepared his chariots and took his people with him — 7 he took 600 first-quality chariots, as well as all the other chariots in Egypt, along with their commanders. 8 Adonai made Pharaoh hardhearted, and he pursued the people of Isra’el, as they left boldly.
Today's Laws & Customs:
• "Yud Shevat" Yahrtzeit observances
Chabad Chassidim observe the customs of the yahrtzeit (anniversary of the passing) of the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn (1880-1950), as established by his son-in-law, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902-1994), who succeeded him as Rebbe following his passing on the 10th of Shevat in 1950.
Link: A Letter from the Lubavitcher Rebbe outlining his suggested observances for Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak's first yahrtzeit.
Today in Jewish History:
• Passing of the Rashash (1777)
Rabbi Shalom Sharabi, known by his name's acronym, the RaShaSH, was born in Yemen, and as a young man immigrated to Israel. He was quickly recognized for his piety and scholarship, especially in the area of Jewish mysticism, and was appointed to be dean of the famed Kabbalistic learning center in the Old City of Jerusalem, the Yeshivat ha-Mekubbalim.
He authored many works, mostly based on the teachings of the great kabbalist, Rabbi Isaac Luria, the Ari. Rabbi Sharabi's most famous work is a commentary on the prayerbook, replete with kabbalistic meditations.
His mystical works are studied by kabbalists to this very day. He is also considered to be a foremost authority on Yemenite Jewish traditions and customs.
Link: The Kabbalah
• Passing of Rebbetzin Rivkah (1914) Rebbetzin Rivkah Schneerson was born in Lubavitch in 1833; her maternal grandfather was Rabbi DovBer, the 2nd Rebbe of Chabad-Lubavitch. In 1849 she married her first cousin, Rabbi Shmuel, who later became the fourth Lubavitcher Rebbe. For many years Rebbetzin Rivkah, who survived her husband by 33 years, was the esteemed matriarch of Lubavitch, and Chassidim frequented her home to listen to her accounts of the early years of Lubavitch. She is the source of many of the stories recorded in the talks, letters and memoirs of her grandson, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak (the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe). The Beth Rivkah network of girls' schools, founded by Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak in the 1940's, are named after her.
• Yahrtzeit of R. Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn (1950) The sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, passed away on Shabbat morning, the 10th of Shevat, of the year 5710 from creation (1950)
Links: A brief biography; more about Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak; works authored by Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak.
• Lubavitcher Rebbe formally assumes leadership (1951) At a gathering of Chassidim marking the first anniversary of the passing of the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, the late Rebbe's son-in-law, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, delivered a Chassidic discourse (maamar) entitled Basi L'Gani ("I Came into My Garden"), signifying his formal acceptance of the leadership of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement.
Links: A timeline biography of the Rebbe; Love According to the Rebbe (includes a description of the historic "statement" given by the Rebbe on Shevat 10, 1951); Leadership according to the Rebbe; 54 Years; 54 Ideas
Daily Quote:
A chassid creates an environment. If he does not, he had better check his own baggage carefully, to see whether his own affairs are in order. The very fact that he fails to create an environment should make him as broken as a splinter. He must demand of himself: What am I doing in this world?[Rabbi Sholom DovBer of Lubavitch (1860-1920)]
Today's Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Beshalach, 2nd Portion Exodus 14:9-14:14 with Rashi

• Exodus Chapter 14
9The Egyptians chased after them and overtook them encamped by the sea every horse of Pharaoh's chariots, his horsemen, and his force beside Pi hahiroth, in front of Ba'al Zephon. טוַיִּרְדְּפ֨וּ מִצְרַ֜יִם אַֽחֲרֵיהֶ֗ם וַיַּשִּׂ֤יגוּ אוֹתָם֙ חֹנִ֣ים עַל־הַיָּ֔ם כָּל־סוּס֙ רֶ֣כֶב פַּרְעֹ֔ה וּפָֽרָשָׁ֖יו וְחֵיל֑וֹ עַל־פִּי֙ הַֽחִירֹ֔ת לִפְנֵ֖י בַּ֥עַל צְפֹֽן:
10Pharaoh drew near, and the children of Israel lifted up their eyes, and behold! the Egyptians were advancing after them. They were very frightened, and the children of Israel cried out to the Lord. יוּפַרְעֹ֖ה הִקְרִ֑יב וַיִּשְׂאוּ֩ בְנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֨ל אֶת־עֵֽינֵיהֶ֜ם וְהִנֵּ֥ה מִצְרַ֣יִם | נֹסֵ֣עַ אַֽחֲרֵיהֶ֗ם וַיִּֽירְאוּ֙ מְאֹ֔ד וַיִּצְעֲק֥וּ בְנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל אֶל־יְהֹוָֽה:
Pharaoh drew near: Heb. וּפַרְעֹה הִקְרִיב, lit., and Pharaoh brought near. It [the verse] should have said: קָרַב. What is the meaning of הִקְרִיב ? He [Pharaoh] drew himself near and strove to go before them [his army], as he had stipulated with them. — ופרעה הקריב: היה לו לכתוב ופרעה קרב, מהו הקריב, הקריב עצמו ונתאמץ לקדם לפניהם, כמו שהתנה עמהם:
the Egyptians were advancing after them: Heb. נֹסֵעַ [in the singular]. With one accord, like one man. Alternatively, [in the singular it means that] and behold, Egypt was advancing after them, [denoting that] they [the Israelites] saw the heavenly prince of Egypt advancing from heaven to aid the Egyptians. [From] Tanchuma. נסע אחריהם: בלב אחד כאיש אחד. דבר אחר והנה מצרים נוסע אחריהם, ראו שר של מצרים נוסע מן השמים לעזור למצרים. תנחומא:
cried out: They seized the art of their ancestors [i.e., they prayed]. Concerning Abraham, it [Scripture] says: “to the place where he had stood before the Lord” (Gen. 19:27). 2 Concerning Isaac, [it is stated] “to pray in the field” (Gen. 24:63). Concerning Jacob, “And he entreated the Omnipresent” (Gen. 28:11). (See Judaica Press comm. digest on that verse.)-[from Mechilta; Tanchuma Beshallach 9] ויצעקו: תפשו אומנות אבותם. באברהם הוא אומר (בראשית יט כז) אל המקום אשר עמד שם, ביצחק (שם כד סג) לשוח בשדה, ביעקב (שם כח יא) ויפגע במקום:
11They said to Moses, Is it because there are no graves in Egypt that you have taken us to die in the desert? What is this that you have done to us to take us out of Egypt? יאוַיֹּֽאמְרוּ֘ אֶל־משֶׁה֒ הֲמִבְּלִ֤י אֵֽין־קְבָרִים֙ בְּמִצְרַ֔יִם לְקַחְתָּ֖נוּ לָמ֣וּת בַּמִּדְבָּ֑ר מַה־זֹּאת֙ עָשִׂ֣יתָ לָּ֔נוּ לְהֽוֹצִיאָ֖נוּ מִמִּצְרָֽיִם:
Is it because there are no graves: Heb. הִמִבְּלִי אֵין קְבָרִים. Is it because of the want? Namely that there are no graves in Egypt in which to be buried, that you have taken us out of there? Si por falyanze de non fosses in Old French [i.e., Is it for lack, that there are no graves?]. המבלי אין קברים: וכי מחמת חסרון קברים שאין קברים במצרים ליקבר שם לקחתנו משם. ש"י פו"ר פיילנצ"א ד"י נו"ן פושי"ש בלעז [האם בגלל מחסור של לא קברים]:
12Isn't this the thing [about] which we spoke to you in Egypt, saying, Leave us alone, and we will serve the Egyptians, because we would rather serve the Egyptians than die in the desert יבהֲלֹא־זֶ֣ה הַדָּבָ֗ר אֲשֶׁר֩ דִּבַּ֨רְנוּ אֵלֶ֤יךָ בְמִצְרַ֨יִם֙ לֵאמֹ֔ר חֲדַ֥ל מִמֶּ֖נּוּ וְנַֽעַבְדָ֣ה אֶת־מִצְרָ֑יִם כִּ֣י ט֥וֹב לָ֨נוּ֙ עֲבֹ֣ד אֶת־מִצְרַ֔יִם מִמֻּתֵ֖נוּ בַּמִּדְבָּֽר:
Isn’t this the thing [about] which we spoke to you in Egypt: When had they said [this]? "And they said to them, “May the Lord look upon you and judge’ ” (Exod. 5:21). [from Mechilta] אשר דברנו אליך במצרים: והיכן דברו, (שמות ה כא) ירא ה' עליכם וישפוט:
than die: Heb. מִמֻּתֵנוּ, than we should die. If it [מִמֻּתֵנוּ] were vowelized with a “melupum” (i.e., a “cholam,” [מִמּוֹתֵנוּ] as it is known that the grammarians called a “cholam” a “melupum.” See Rashi below on Exod. 19:24), it would be explained as: “than our death.” Now that it is vowelized with a “shuruk” [מִמֻּתֵנוּ], it is explained as “than we should die.” Likewise [in the verse], “If only we had died (מּוּתֵנוּ)” (Exod. 16:3), [means] that we would die. [Similarly,] “If only I had died (מּוּתֵי) instead of you” (II Sam. 19:1), referring to Absalom [means, I should have died]; [And מּוּתִי is similar to (קוּמִי) in the verse:] “for the day that I will rise up (קוּמִי)” (Zeph. 3:8); [and also similar to (ֹשוּבִי) in the verse] “until I return (ֹשוּבִי) in peace” (II Chron. 18:26), [which mean respectively] that I rise up, that I return. ממתנו: מאשר נמות, ואם היה נקוד מלאפו"ם היה נבאר ממיתתנו, עכשיו שנקוד בשור"ק נבאר מאשר נמות, וכן (להלן טז ג) מי יתן מותנו - שנמות, וכן (שמואל ב' יט א) מי יתן מותי, דאבשלום - שאמות, כמו (צפניה ג ח) ליום קומי לעד, (דברי הימים ב' יח כו) עד שובי בשלום, שאקום שאשוב:
13Moses said to the people, Don't be afraid! Stand firm and see the Lord's salvation that He will wreak for you today, for the way you have seen the Egyptians is [only] today, [but] you shall no longer continue to see them for eternity. יגוַיֹּ֨אמֶר משֶׁ֣ה אֶל־הָעָם֘ אַל־תִּירָ֒אוּ֒ הִתְיַצְּב֗וּ וּרְאוּ֙ אֶת־יְשׁוּעַ֣ת יְהֹוָ֔ה אֲשֶׁר־יַֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה לָכֶ֖ם הַיּ֑וֹם כִּ֗י אֲשֶׁ֨ר רְאִיתֶ֤ם אֶת־מִצְרַ֨יִם֙ הַיּ֔וֹם לֹ֥א תֹסִ֛פוּ לִרְאֹתָ֥ם ע֖וֹד עַד־עוֹלָֽם:
for the way you have seen the Egyptians, etc.: The way you have seen them-that is only today. It is [only] today that you have seen them, but you shall no longer continue [to see them]. כי אשר ראיתם את מצרים וגו': מה שראיתם אותם אינו אלא היום, היום הוא שראיתם אותם ולא תוסיפו עוד:
14The Lord will fight for you, but you shall remain silent. ידיְהֹוָ֖ה יִלָּחֵ֣ם לָכֶ֑ם וְאַתֶּ֖ם תַּֽחֲרִשֽׁוּן:
The Lord will fight for you: Heb. לָכֶם, for you, and similarly [the “lammed” in the verse], “because the Lord is fighting for them (לָהֶם)” (verse 25), and similarly [in the verse] “Will you contend for God (לָאֵל) ?” (Job 13:8). And similarly, "and Who spoke about me (לִי) (Gen. 24:7), and similarly, “Will you contend for the Baal (לַבַּעַל) ?” (Jud. 6:31). ה' ילחם לכם: בשבילכם. וכן (פסוק כה) כי ה' נלחם להם, וכן (איוב יג ח) אם לאל תריבון, וכן (בראשית כד ז) ואשר דבר לי וכן (שופטים ו לא) האתם תריבון לבעל:

• Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 55 - 59
• 
Chapter 55
David composed this psalm upon escaping from Jerusalem in the face of the slanderers, Doeg and Achitofel, who had declared him deserving of death. David had considered Achitofel a friend and accorded him the utmost honor, but Achitofel betrayed him and breached their covenant. David curses all his enemies, so that all generations should "know, and sin no more."
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music, a maskil by David.
2. Listen to my prayer, O God, do not hide from my pleas.
3. Pay heed to me and answer me, as I lament in my distress and moan-
4. because of the shout of the enemy and the oppression of the wicked; for they accuse me of evil and hate me passionately.
5. My heart shudders within me, and the terrors of death have descended upon me.
6. Fear and trembling penetrate me, and I am enveloped with horror.
7. And I said, "If only I had wings like the dove! I would fly off and find rest.
8. Behold, I would wander afar, and lodge in the wilderness forever.
9. I would hurry to find shelter for myself from the stormy wind, from the tempest.”
10. Consume, O Lord, confuse their tongue; for I have seen violence and strife in the city.1
11. Day and night they encircle her upon her walls, and iniquity and vice are in her midst.
12. Treachery is within her; fraud and deceit never depart from her square.
13. For it is not the enemy who taunts me-that I could bear; nor my foe who raises himself against me, that I could hide from him.
14. But it is you, a man of my equal, my guide and my intimate.
15. Together we took sweet counsel; we walked with the throng to the house of God.
16. May He incite death upon them, let them descend to the pit alive; for there is evil in their dwelling, within them.
17. As for me, I call to God, and the Lord will save me.
18. Evening, morning and noon, I lament and moan-and He hears my voice.
19. He redeemed my soul in peace from battles against me, because of the many who were with me.
20. May God-He who is enthroned from the days of old, Selah-hear and humble those in whom there is no change, and who do not fear God.
21. He extended his hands against his allies, he profaned his covenant.
22. Smoother than butter are the words of his mouth, but war is in his heart; his words are softer than oil, yet they are curses.
23. Cast your burden upon the Lord, and He will sustain you; He will never let the righteous man falter.
24. And You, O God, will bring them down to the nethermost pit; bloodthirsty and treacherous men shall not live out half their days; but I will trust in You.
FOOTNOTES
1.Jerusalem.
Chapter 56
David composed this psalm while in mortal danger at the palace of Achish, brother of Goliath. In his distress David accepts vows upon himself.
1. For the Conductor, of the mute dove1 far away. By David, a michtam, 2 when the Philistines seized him in Gath.
2. Favor me, O God, for man longs to swallow me; the warrior oppresses me every day.
3. My watchful enemies long to swallow me every day, for many battle me, O Most High!
4. On the day I am afraid, I trust in You.
5. [I trust] in God and praise His word; in God I trust, I do not fear-what can [man of] flesh do to me?
6. Every day they make my words sorrowful; all their thoughts about me are for evil.
7. They gather and hide, they watch my steps, when they hope [to capture] my soul.
8. Should escape be theirs in reward for their iniquity? Cast down the nations in anger, O God!
9. You have counted my wanderings; place my tears in Your flask-are they not in Your record?
10. When my enemies will retreat on the day I cry out, with this I will know that God is with me.
11. When God deals strictly, I praise His word; when the Lord deals mercifully, I praise His word.
12. In God I trust, I do not fear-what can man do to me?
13. My vows to You are upon me, O God; I will repay with thanksgiving offerings to You.
14. For You saved my soul from death-even my feet from stumbling-to walk before God in the light of life.
FOOTNOTES
1.David having fled from Jerusalem, is silenced by fear (Rashi/Metzudot).
2.A psalm that was especially precious to David
Chapter 57
David composed this psalm while hiding from Saul in a cave, facing grave danger. Like Jacob did when confronted with Esau, David prayed that he neither be killed nor be forced to kill. In the merit of his trust in God, God wrought wonders to save him.
1. For the Conductor, a plea to be spared destruction. By David, a michtam, when he fled from Saul in the cave.
2. Favor me, O God, favor me, for in You my soul took refuge, and in the shadow of Your wings I will take refuge until the disaster passes.
3. I will call to God the Most High; to the Almighty Who fulfills [His promise] to me.
4. He will send from heaven, and save me from the humiliation of those who long to swallow me, Selah; God will send forth His kindness and truth.
5. My soul is in the midst of lions, I lie among fiery men; their teeth are spears and arrows, their tongue a sharp sword.
6. Be exalted above the heavens, O God; let Your glory be upon all the earth.
7. They laid a trap for my steps, they bent down my soul; they dug a pit before me, [but] they themselves fell into it, Selah.
8. My heart is steadfast, O God, my heart is steadfast; I will sing and chant praise.
9. Awake, my soul! Awake, O harp and lyre! I shall awaken the dawn.
10. I will thank You among the nations, my Lord; I will praise You among the peoples.
11. For Your kindness reaches till the heavens, Your truth till the skies.
12. Be exalted above the heavens, O God; let Your glory be over all the earth.
Chapter 58
David expresses the anguish caused him by Avner and his other enemies, who justified Saul's pursuit of him.
1. For the Conductor, a plea to be spared destruction; by David, a michtam.
2. Is it true that you are mute [instead of] speaking justice? [Instead of] judging men with fairness?
3. Even with your heart you wreak injustice upon the land; you justify the violence of your hands.
4. The wicked are estranged from the womb; from birth do the speakers of falsehood stray.
5. Their venom is like the venom of a snake; like the deaf viper that closes its ear
6. so as not to hear the voice of charmers, [even] the most skillful caster of spells.
7. O God, smash their teeth in their mouth; shatter the fangs of the young lions, O Lord.
8. Let them melt like water and disappear; when He aims His arrows, may they crumble.
9. Like the snail that melts as it goes along, like the stillbirth of a woman-they never see the sun.
10. Before your tender shoots know [to become] hardened thorns, He will blast them away, as one [uprooting] with vigor and wrath.
11. The righteous one will rejoice when he sees revenge; he will bathe his feet in the blood of the wicked.
12. And man will say, "There is indeed reward for the righteous; indeed there is a God Who judges in the land."
Chapter 59
This psalm speaks of the great miracle David experienced when he eluded danger by escaping through a window, unnoticed by the guards at the door. The prayers, supplications, and entreaties he offered then are recorded here.
1. For the Conductor, a plea to be spared destruction, By David, a michtam, when Saul dispatched [men], and they guarded the house in order to kill him.
2. Rescue me from my enemies, my God; raise me above those who rise against me.
3. Rescue me from evildoers, save me from men of bloodshed.
4. For behold they lie in ambush for my soul, mighty ones gather against me-not because of my sin nor my transgression, O Lord.
5. Without iniquity [on my part,] they run and prepare-awaken towards me and see!
6. And You, Lord, God of Hosts, God of Israel, wake up to remember all the nations; do not grant favor to any of the iniquitous traitors, Selah.
7. They return toward evening, they howl like the dog and circle the city.
8. Behold, they spew with their mouths, swords are in their lips, for [they say], "Who hears?”
9. But You, Lord, You laugh at them; You mock all nations.
10. [Because of] his might, I wait for You, for God is my stronghold.
11. The God of my kindness will anticipate my [need]; God will show me [the downfall] of my watchful foes.
12. Do not kill them, lest my nation forget; drive them about with Your might and impoverish them, O our Shield, my Master,
13. [for] the sin of their mouth, the word of their lips; let them be trapped by their arrogance. At the sight of their accursed state and deterioration, [people] will recount.
14. Consume them in wrath, consume them and they will be no more; and they will know that God rules in Jacob, to the ends of the earth, Selah.
15. And they will return toward evening, they will howl like the dog and circle the city.
16. They will wander about to eat; when they will not be sated they will groan.
17. As for me, I shall sing of Your might, and sing joyously of Your kindness toward morning, for You have been a stronghold to me, a refuge on the day of my distress.
18. [You are] my strength, to You I will sing, for God is my stronghold, the God of my kindness.
Tanya: Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 22
• Lessons in Tanya

• Today's Tanya Lesson
• Monday, 10 Shevat, 5777 · 6 February 2017
• Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 22
• 
והנה רצון העליון בבחינת פנים הוא מקור החיים המחיה את כל העולמות
Now, the Supernal Will, of the quality of “Countenance”, i.e., the inner aspect of G‑d’s Will, which is directed toward the ultimate object of G‑d’s desire, is the source of life which animates all worlds.
ולפי שאינו שורה כלל על הסטרא אחרא, וגם בחינת אחוריים של רצון העליון אינו מלובש בתוכה ממש, אלא מקיף עליה מלמעלה, לכך היא מקום המיתה והטומאה, ה‘ ישמרנו
But since it is not bestowed on the sitra achra at all, and even the “hinder-part” of the Divine Will is not actually clothed within it but merely encompasses it from above, therefore it is the abode of death and impurity (May G‑d preserve us from them!).
כי מעט מזער אור וחיות שיונקת ומקבלת לתוכה מבחינת אחוריים דקדושה שלמעלה הוא בבחינת גלות ממש בתוכה, בסוד גלות השכינה הנ״ל
For the minute measure of light and life that it derives and that it absorbs internally from the external aspect of Divine holiness, is in a state of actual exile within it — as in the concept of the “exile of the Shechinah [within the kelipot]” described earlier.1
ולכן נקרא בשם אלקים אחרים
It is for this reason too that the kelipah is termed “other gods,” apart from the reason given above — namely, that the kelipot derive from אחוריים , the “hinder-part” of G‑d’s Will,
שהיא עבודה זרה ממש, וכפירה באחדותו של מלך מלכי המלכים הקב״ה
for it constitutes actual idolatry and a denial of the unity of G‑d, the Supreme King of kings — the Holy One, blessed be He.
The explanation of these two reasons is as follows: Every created being is animated by two types of Divine life-force. One is an internalized life-force, which is beamed to suit the character and capacity of each individual creature. It is this power that determines the character of each being; it becomes one with it and is felt by it — in fact, this internalized life-force constitutes its identity. The second type of life-force is of an encompassing, transcendental nature. It does not adapt itself to the individual character of each being, and is not clothed within it; rather, it animates from without, so to speak — from its own level, above the created being which it animates.
The kelipot, too, are animated by these two types of Divine life-force. The latter type, since it does not permeate them, does not conflict with their ego. The kelipot can thus consider themselves independent beings, even while acknowledging G‑d as the source of their vitality. They need not deny Him. With regard to this type of G‑dly life-force, the kelipot are called אלקים אחרים — “other gods,” only because they receive their life from the אחוריים , from the “hinder-part” of G‑d’s Will.
The kelipot cannot, however, acknowledge the former, internalized type of G‑dly life-force, while asserting at the same time that they are separate from G‑d. To do so would be self-contradictory; for, as explained, this kind of life-force constitutes the very identity of every created being. The kelipot therefore completely deny this life-force (and it is thus truly in a state of exile within them). It is thus with regard to this life-force that the kelipot are called אלהים אחרים — “other gods,” in the literal sense of the term — implying idolatry and a denial of G‑d’s unity.
This the Alter Rebbe now goes on to say:
כי מאחר שאור וחיות דקדושה הוא בבחינת גלות בתוכה, אינה בטילה כלל לגבי קדושת הקב״ה
For inasmuch as the light and life of holiness i.e., the internalized life-force are in a state of exile within the kelipah, it does not surrender itself at all to the holiness of G‑d.
ואדרבה מגביה עצמה כנשר, לומר אני ואפסי עוד, וכמאמר: יאור לי ואני עשיתני
On the contrary, it soars aloft like an eagle, saying2: “I am, and there is nothing beside me”; or, as in the statement of Pharaoh3: “The river is mine, and I have made myself!”
ולכן אמרו רז״ל שגסות הרוח שקולה כעבודה זרה ממש
That is why the Sages, of blessed memory, said that4 arrogance is truly tantamount to idolatry.
כי עיקר ושרש עבודה זרה הוא מה שנחשב לדבר בפני עצמו, נפרד מקדושתו של מקום, ולא כפירה בה’ לגמרי
For the essence and root of idolatry is that it is regarded as an independent entity, separate from the holiness of G‑d; idolatry does not imply an outright denial of G‑d;
כדאיתא בגמרא דקרו ליה אלקא דאלקיא
as it is stated in the Gemara5 that they of the realm of kelipah call Him “the G‑d of gods,” so that although they do not deny His supremacy, their statement nevertheless constitutes idolatry,
אלא שגם הם מחשיבים עצמם ליש ודבר בפני עצמו, ובזה מפרידים את עצמם מקדושתו של מקום, ברוך הוא, מאחר שאין בטלים לו יתברך
only because they consider themselves, too, to be separate entities and independent beings; and thereby they separate themselves from the holiness of G‑d, since they do not efface themselves before Him.
כי אין קדושה עליונה שורה אלא על מה שבטל לו יתברך, כנ״ל
For the supernal holiness rests only on that which is surrendered to Him, as explained above. 6
ולכן נקראים טורי דפרודא בזהר הקדוש
For this reason the Zohar7 calls the kelipot “peaks of separation” i.e., they are as haughty as the mountain peaks, and are thus separate from G‑d.
והרי זו כפירה באחדותו האמיתית, דכולא קמיה כלא חשיב, ובטל באמת לו יתברך
But this constitutes a denial of G‑d’s true unity, since His unity implies that8 “all is esteemed as nothing before Him,” and that all is utterly nullified before Him,
ולרצונו המחיה את כולם ומהוה אותם מאין ליש תמיד
and before His Will which animates them all, and which constantly brings them into being out of nothingness.
Arrogance, therefore, which is the aggrandizement of one’s own identity, is diametrically opposed to the surrender of one’s identity which is a corollary of the concept of G‑d’s unity. Arrogance thus represents a denial of the unity of G‑d, and for this reason the Gemara equates it with idolatry.
* * *
To summarize briefly the points made in this chapter: Through many and varied tzimtzumim the Divine Word brought into being kelipot and the sitra achra, who perceive themselves to be entities separate from G‑d. For this reason, G‑d’s Word is described in the Torah as speech, for the element of separation found in human speech (where the spoken word becomes separated from the speaker) is also present in the Divine “speech” of Creation. However, this separateness exists only in the perspective from which the created beings view their relationship with their source; from G‑d’s perspective there is no separation at all, for everything is united with Him and is contained within Him even after it is created.
With this, the Alter Rebbe concludes one step of the discussion begun in ch. 20. There he stated that in order to explain how all the commandments of the Torah are encapsulated in the two commandments concerning idolatry, it is first necessary to clarify the true meaning of idolatry. This in turn necessitated an in‑depth discussion of the meaning of the unity of G‑d, which idolatry denies. The Alter Rebbe has thus far explained that G‑d’s unity means not only that there is but one G‑d: rather G‑d is the only existing being. All else is as naught before Him. Thus, any feeling (such as the kelipot feel) of having an identity of one’s own, apart from G‑d, actually represents idolatry.
In the following two chapters the Alter Rebbe now resumes his discussion, explaining how the above concept of G‑d’s unity finds expression in all the mitzvot of the Torah.
——— ● ———
FOOTNOTES
1.Ch. 19.
2.Yeshayahu 47:8; Tzephaniah 2:15.
3.A compound of Yeshayahu 29:9 and 29:3.
4.Sotah 4b.
5.Menachot 110a.
6.Ch. 6.
7.I, 158a.
8.Zohar I, 11b.
• Rambam - Monday, 10 Shevat, 5777 · 6 February 2017
• Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
• 
Negative Commandment 248
Denying a Debt
"Do not deny"—Leviticus 19:11.
It is forbidden for a person to deny a debt that he owes or to deny that a person entrusted him an object for safekeeping.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
• Denying a Debt
Negative Commandment 248
Translated by Berel Bell
The 248th prohibition is that we are forbidden to falsely deny that we owe money or that we were entrusted with an object.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not deny."
It is explained2 that this refers to a financial claim. The Sifra says, "We learn what the punishment is from the verse,3 'If he denies [illegally withholding another person's money] and swears falsely [...he must pay the principal and add one-fifth.]' Which verse serves as the actual prohibition?4 The verse, 'Do not deny.' "
You are aware that one who [falsely] denies possession of an object he was entrusted with — even if he does not swear falsely — is invalid to act as a witness. This is because he has transgressed the mitzvah, "Do not deny."5
The details of this mitzvah are explained in a number of passages in tractate Sh'vuos.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 19:11.
2.Sanhedrin 86a.
3.Lev. 5:22.
4.Since every prohibition must have one verse which is the actual prohibition and another to dictate the punishment.
5.The Torah disqualifies a person from testifying only if he has violated a Biblical law. Since the person is disqualified even though he has not sworn falsely, we see that the prohibition applies even where there was no oath.
• Negative Commandment 249
Swearing Falsely in Denial of a Debt
"Do not lie to each other"—Leviticus 19:11.
It is forbidden to take a false oath in denial of a debt or any other financial obligation.
Full text of this Mitzvah »

• Swearing Falsely in Denial of a Debt
Negative Commandment 249
Translated by Berel Bell
Negative Commandment 250
The 249th prohibition is that we are forbidden to swear falsely regarding money that we owe.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not lie to one another."
If, for example, one [falsely] denies possessing an object he was entrusted with, he transgresses the prohibition, "do not deny."2 Should he swear falsely to substantiate his previous denial, he transgress the [present] prohibition "do not lie."
The Sifra says, "What does the Torah mean to teach us by saying 'do not lie'? The verse,3 'and he swears falsely' serves as the punishment. Which verse serves as the actual prohibition?4 The verse, 'do not lie.' "
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the fifth chapter of Sh'vuos, where it is explained that a person who makes a false oath in denying a financial claim transgresses two mitzvos — "do not swear falsely by My name"5 and "do not lie to one another."6
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 19:11.
2.N248.
3.Lev. 5:22.
4.See footnote 22.
5.Lev. 19:12.
6.I.e. N248 and N249.
• Rambam - 1 Chapter: Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh - Chapter Twelve
• Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh - Chapter Twelve
1
When an animal, a beast or a fowl has been bitten by a snake or another poisonous anima, or it ate a poison that could kill a person, and the nature of the poison has not changed in the animal's body, it is forbidden to partake of meat from that animal, because of the deadly danger involved.
For this reason, if an animal, a beast, or a fowl was found with its feet cut off, although it is permitted and it is not considered taref because its feet were cut off, it is forbidden because of the possible danger, unless it is checked, because of the possibility that a poisonous crawling animal bit it.
How should such meat be checked? If should be roasted in an oven. If the meat does not break into pieces or react differently from ordinary roasted meat, it is acceptable.
א
בהמה חיה או עוף שנשכן הנחש וכיוצא בו או שאכלו סם הממית האדם קודם שישתנה בגופו הרי אלו אסורים משום סכנת נפשות. לפיכך בהמה חיה ועוף שנמצאו חתוכי רגלים אע"פ שהן מותרין משום טריפה הרי אלו אסורין משום סכנה שמא אחד מזוחלי עפר נשכן עד שיבדקו. כיצד בודקן צולה אותן בתנור אם לא נתחתך הבשר ולא נשתנה משאר הצלי הרי אלו מותרין:
2
Similarly, figs, grapes, zucchini, squash, watermelons and cucumbers that have holes are forbidden, lest a snake or other poisonous animal have bitten them. This applies even if the produce was very large, and regardless of whether it was still growing or detached, even if it was placed within a container, as long as it has moisture, and it is discovered that it was bitten it is forbidden.
Even if one saw a bird or a rat sitting and making holes in the fruit, it is still forbidden. Perhaps they made the hole in the place of an existing hole.
ב
וכן ניקורי תאנים וענבים והקשואים והדילועין והאבטיחין והמלפפונות אפילו היו גדולים ביותר בין תלושין בין מחוברין ואפילו היו בתוך הכלי כל שיש בו ליחה ונמצא נשוך אסור שמא [א] נחש וכיוצא בו נשכו ואפילו ראה צפור או עכבר יושב ומנקר הרי אלו אסורין שמא במקום נקב ניקב:
3
When the stem of a grape or a fig has been removed, the produce is not considered to have been left uncovered. Therefore, a person may eat figs and grapes at night without concern.
A fig that had a hole, but dried to the extent that it can be considered a dried fig, and a date that had a hole and dries, are both permitted.
ג
תאנה או ענב שניטל העוקץ שלהן אין בהם משום גילוי. לפיכך אוכל אדם תאנים וענבים בלילה ואינו חושש. תאנה נקורה שיבשה ונעשת גרוגרת ותמרה נקורה שיבשה שתיהן מותרות:
4
It is forbidden for a person to place coins or dinarim in his mouth, lest there be the remnants of dried spittle from a leper or a metzora, or sweat on them. For all sweat from a person is like poisonous venom, except sweat from one's face.
ד
אסור לאדם ליתן [ב] מעות או דינרים לתוך פיו שמא יש עליהן רוק יבש של מוכי שחין או מצורעין או זיעה שכל זיעת אדם [ג] סם המות חוץ מזיעת הפנים:
5
Similarly, a person should not place the palm of his hand under his armpits, lest his hands have touched a leper or a poisonous substance, for "hands are active."
A person should not place a cooked dish under the couch on which he is reclining, even though he is in the midst of his meal, lest an entity that could harm him fall into the food without his noticing.
ה
וכן לא יתן אדם פס ידו תחת שחיו [ד] שמא נגע בידו במצורע או בסם רע שהידים עסקניות.  ולא יתן התבשיל תחת  המטה אף על פי שהוא עוסק בסעודה שמא יפול בו דבר המזיק והוא אינו רואהו:
6
Similarly, one should not stick a knife into an etrog or into a radish, lest a person fall on its point and die.
Similarly, it is forbidden for a person to pass under a wall that is leaning, or over a shaky bridge or to enter a ruin. Similarly, it is forbidden to enter all other places that are dangerous for these or other reasons.
ו
וכן לא ינעוץ הסכין בתוך האתרוג או בתוך הצנון שמא יפול אדם על חודה וימות. וכן א אסור לאדם לעבור תחת קיר נטוי או על גשר רעוע או ליכנס לחורבה. וכן כל כיוצא באלו משאר הסכנות אסור *לעבור במקומן:
7
Similarly, it is forbidden for a Jew to enter into privacy with a gentile, for they are suspect for bloodshed. Nor should one accompany gentiles on a journey. If a Jew encounters a gentile on a journey, he should make sure the gentile is at his right.
If they are making an ascent or a descent together, the Jew should be careful that he should be in the higher position and the gentile in the lower position, but not vice versa, lest the gentile fall on him with the intent of killing him. Nor should a Jew bend down before a gentile, lest he crush his skull.
ז
וכן אסור ליהודי להתייחד עם העובד כוכבים מפני שהן חשודים על שפיכות דמים. ולא יתלוה עמהן בדרך. פגע עובד כוכבים בדרך [ה] מחזירו לימינו. היו עולין במעלה או יורדים בירידה לא יהיה ישראל למטה ועובד כוכבים למעלה אלא ישראל למעלה ועובד כוכבים למטה שמא יפול עליו להמיתו ואל ישוח לפניו שמא ירוץ את גולגולתו:
8
If a gentile asks a Jew where he is going, he should give him a misleading answer, as Jacob gave a misleading answer to Esau, as Genesis 33:14 states: "Until I come to my master, in Seir."
ח
אם שאלו לאן אתה הולך ירחיב לו את הדרך כדרך שהרחיב יעקב לעשו שנאמר עד אשר אבוא אל אדוני שעירה:
9
It is forbidden to take medication from a gentile, unless there is no hope that the sick person will live. It is forbidden to be healed by a heretic, even if there is no hope that the person will live.
It is permitted to take a medication from a gentile for an animal, or for an external affliction - e.g., a compress or a bandage. If, however, the affliction involves a danger to life, it is forbidden to take medication from them. The general rule is: One should not take medication from a gentile for any affliction for which one may desecrate the Sabbath.
ט
אסור ליקח רפואה מן העובד כוכבים אלא אם כן נתייאשו ממנו שיחיה. ואסור להתרפאות [ו] מן האפיקורוס ואע"פ שנתייאשו ממנו שמא ימשכו אחריו. ומותר ליקח רפואה מן העובד כוכבים לבהמה או למכה שבגוף מבחוץ כגון מלוגמא ורטייה. ואם היתה מכה של סכנה אסור ליקח ממנו. וכל מכה שמחללין עליה את השבת אין מתרפאין מהם:
10
It is permitted to ask the opinion of a gentile doctor and follow his directives if he says: "This drug is good for you; you should perform these and these treatments." One should not take the prescription from him directly.
י
ומותר לשאול לרופא עובד כוכבים ויאמר לו סם פלוני יפה לך וכך וכך תעשה אבל לא יקח ממנו:
11
It is forbidden to have one's hair cut by a gentile in a private domain, lest the barber kill him. If the person whose hair is being cut is an important personage, it is permitted, because the gentile will be afraid to kill him.
It is also permitted for a person who creates an impression of being an important personage for a gentile barber, so that he will fear him and not kill him, to have his hair cut by him.
יא
ואסור להסתפר מהן ברשות היחיד שמא יהרגנו. אם היה אדם [ז] חשוב מותר מפני שמתיירא להרגו. ואם דימה לעובד כוכבים שהוא אדם חשוב כדי שיפחד ממנו ולא יהרגנו הרי זה מותר להסתפר ממנו:
12
It is forbidden to sell gentiles any weaponry. We may not sharpen weapons for them or sell them a knife, chains put on the necks of prisoners, fetters, iron chains, raw Indian iron, bears, lions, or any other object that could cause danger to people at large. One may, however, sell them shields, for these serve only the purpose of defense.
יב
אסור למכור לעובדי כוכבים כל כלי המלחמה ואין משחיזין להם את הזיין ואין מוכרין להן לא סכין ולא קולרין ולא כבלים [של ברזל] ולא שלשלאות של ברזל הינדואה ולא דובים ואריות ולא כל דבר שיש בו נזק לרבים אבל מוכרין להן תריסין שאינן אלא להגן:
13
Just as it is forbidden to sell such weaponry to a gentile, so too, is it forbidden to sell it to a Jew who will sell it to a gentile.
It is permitted to sell weapons to the soldiers of the country in which one lives, because they defend the Jewish inhabitants of the land.
יג
וכשם שאסרו למכור לעובד כוכבים כך אסרו למכור לישראל שמוכר לעובד כוכבים. ומותר למכור כלי זיין לחיל של בני המדינה מפני שהן מגינין על ישראל:
14
Every article that is forbidden to be sold to a gentile is also forbidden to be sold to a Jewish robber, for by doing so one reinforces a transgressor and causes him to sin.
Similarly, anyone who causes a person who is blind with regard to a certain matter to stumble and gives him improper advice, or who reinforces a transgressor - who is spiritually blind, for he does not see the path of truth, because of the desires of his heart - transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:14 states: "Do not place an obstacle in front of a blind man." When a person comes to ask advice from you, give him proper counsel.
יד
כל שאסור למכור לעובד כוכבים אסור למכור לישראל שהוא ליסטים מפני שנמצא מחזיק יד עוברי עבירה ומכשילו. וכן כל המכשיל עור בדבר והשיאו עצה שאינה הוגנת או שחיזק ידי עוברי עבירה שהוא עור ואינו רואה דרך האמת מפני תאות לבו הרי זה עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול הבא ליטול ממך עצה תן לו עצה ההוגנת לו:
15
It is forbidden to give good advice to a wicked gentile or servant. It is even forbidden to counsel him to observe a mitzvah if he perseveres in his wickedness. Daniel was subjected to a test solely because he advised Nebuchadnezzar to give charity, as Daniel 4:24 states: "O King, let my counsel be acceptable to you. Redeem your sins through charity."
טו
ואסור להשיא עצה טובה לעובד כוכבים או לעבד רשע. ואפילו להשיאו עצה שיעשה דבר מצוה והוא עומד ברשעו אסור. ולא נתנסה דניאל אלא על שהשיא עצה לנבוכדנצר ליתן צדקה שנאמר להן מלכא מלכי ישפר עלך
• Rambam - 3 Chapters: Shvuot Shvuot - Chapter 7, Shvuot Shvuot - Chapter 8, Shvuot Shvuot - Chapter 9
• 
Shvuot - Chapter 7
1
When a person issues a financial claim against a colleague which would require the latter to pay were he to admit [liability]1 and [the colleague] denies [his obligation] and takes an oath or the plaintiff administers an oath to him and he denies [any obligation]. [If he is lying,] the defendant is liable for an oath concerning a sh'vuat hapikadon.2
[The above applies] even if [the defendant] does not respond Amen.3 For with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon, one is liable whether he took the oath on his own initiative or another person administered the oath to him and he denied [any obligation], even though he did not respond Amen. For denying the claim after the plaintiff administered the oath is equivalent to responding Amen.4
א
התובע חבירו בממון שאם הודה בו יהיה חייב לשלם וכפר ונשבע, או שהשביעו התובע וכפר, הרי זה הנתבע הוא חייב בשבועת הפקדון אף על פי שלא ענה אמן, שבשבועת הפקדון אחד הנשבע מפי עצמו ואחד שהשביעו אחר וכפר אע"פ שלא ענה אמן חייב שכפירתו אחר שהשביעו התובע כעניית אמן.
2
[This does not apply] when [the plaintiff] lodges a claim which if acknowledged by the defendant, i.e., if he would admit that it is true, would not require him to make payment, e.g., he lodged a claim concerning a k'nas.5 For a person is not required to pay a k'nas based on his own admission.6 [In such an instance,] if a person denied [an obligation], he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui.7
ב
תבעו בממון שאם יודה לו ויאמר כן הדבר לא יהיה חייב לשלם, כגון שתבעו בקנס שאין אדם משלם קנס ע"פ עצמו, וכפר ונשבע, הרי זה פטור משבועת הפקדון וחייב משום שבועת ביטוי.
3
Similarly, if [the plaintiff] lodged a claim concerning landed property, a servant, or a promissory note, and [the defendant] denied [the claim] and took an oath, he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.
ג
וכן אם תבעו בקרקע או בעבד או בשטר וכפר ונשבע פטור משבועת הפקדון וחייב בשבועת ביטוי שהרי נשבע על שקר.
4
Why is one [who took an oath concerning such claims] exempt from [the obligations of a false] sh'vuat hapikadon? Behold, were he to have acknowledged [his obligation], he would have been held liable and [required] to pay what he denied. Because [Leviticus 5:21-22] states: "Concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery; he oppressed his colleague, or discovered a lost object." All of this concerns movable property which if he would admit his liability he would have to make financial restitution from his own domain.
This excludes landed property for it is not movable property. For landed property is always revealed before its owner8 and is always in their possession.9[Similarly,] it excludes servants, for an equation is established between servants and landed property.10 And it excludes promissory notes, for their actual substance is not of financial value.11
ד
ולמה נפטר משום שבועת הפקדון והרי זה אילו הודה חייב היה ומשלם מה שכפר, לפי שנאמר בפקדון או בתשומת יד או בגזל או עשק את עמיתו או מצא אבדה הכל מטלטלין שאם יודה בהן יוציא ממון מתחת ידו, ויצאו קרקעות שאין מטלטלין והרי הן לפני בעליהן ובחזקתן, ויצאו עבדים שהוקשו לקרקעות, ויצאו שטרות שאין גופן ממון.
5
[The above laws apply] whether one took an oath after the plaintiff lodged a claim against him or whether he took it on his own initiative even though a claim was not lodged against him.12
What his implied? He took the initiative and said: "Why are you following me? Do I have any money belonging to you? I am taking an oath that I am not in possession of any of your money." Since he denied [an obligation] and took an oath, [he is liable,] even though [the plaintiff] did not lodge a claim against him.
ה
אחד הנשבע אחר שתבעו בעל הממון, או הנשבע מעצמו אע"פ שלא תבעו, כיצד כגון שקדם ואמר למה אתה הולך אחרי כלום יש לך בידי ממון שבועה שאין לך בידי ממון, הרי זה חייב בשבועת הפקדון הואיל וכפר ונשבע ואע"פ שלא תבעו זה.
6
[One is liable] whether he took an oath to the person to whom he owes the money or to his agent who was given power of attorney. For a person's agent is equivalent to his own self.13
ו
אחד הנשבע לבעל הממון עצמו או לשלוחו הבא בהרשאתו ששלוחו של אדם כמותו.
7
One is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon unless he requires him to take an oath in a language that he understands.14
ז
ואינו חייב בשבועת הפקדון עד שישביעו בלשון שהוא מכירה.
8
When a person consciously takes a sh'vuat hapikadon, even though he takes a false oath and is warned by witnesses at the time he takes the oath, he is not liable for lashes, but instead must merely bring a guilt offering. For the Torah excluded him from those who are liable for lashes15 and obligated him to bring a guilt offering whether he transgressed willfully or inadvertently, as we explained.16
ח
הנשבע שבועת הפקדון במזיד אע"פ שנשבע לשקר והתרו בו עדים בשעת שבועתו אינו לוקה אלא מביא אשמו בלבד, שהרי הכתוב מוציאו מכלל חייבי מלקות וחייבו אשם בין בזדון בין בשגגה כמו שבארנו.
9
If one denied [an obligation] and took an oath [concerning it] four or five times or the plaintiff administered an oath to him four or fives times and he denied each one of them, he is liable for a guilt offering for each individual oath.17 [This applies] whether this took place in a court or outside the court.
[The rationale is that] were he to have admitted his obligation after making his denial, he would be liable to make restitution even though he made the denial in a court. Thus with each denial, he is making himself exempt from payment. Hence, he is liable for each individual oath.
ט
כפר ונשבע ארבא או חמש פעמים, או שהשביעו התובע ארבע וחמש פעמים והוא כופר על כל אחת ואחת בין בבית דין בין שלא בבית דין הרי זה חייב קרבן אשם על כל שבועה ושבועה, שאילו הודה אחר שכפר היה חייב לשלם אע"פ שכפר בבית דין ונמצא פוטר עצמו בכל כפירה וכפירה מן התשלומין לפיכך חייב על כל שבועה ושבועה.
10
If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article of ours that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one sacrifice.18
[If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have anything of yours, or of yours,... or of yours, in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].19
י
היו חמשה תובעין אותו ואומרין לו תן לנו פקדון שיש לנו בידך, שבועה שאין לכם בידי אינו חייב אלא קרבן אחד, שבועה שאין לך בידי לא לך ולא לך ולא לך חייב על כל אחת ואחת.
11
If his colleague told him: "Give me the entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice].20Even if the total of all the claims is [merely] a p'rutah, they are all included together and he is liable.21
יא
אמר לו חבירו תן לי פקדון ותשומת יד גזל ואבדה שיש לי בידך, שבועה שאין לך בידי אינו חייב אלא אחת, ואפילו היה לו פרוטה אחת מכולן הרי אלו מצטרפין וחייב.
12
[If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].22
יב
שבועה שאין לך בידי פקדון תשומת יד גזל ואבדה חייב על כל אחת ואחת.
13
[If the plaintiff says:] "Give me the wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine that you have in your possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice].23 [If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].
יג
תן לי חטים ושעורים וכוסמין שיש לי בידך, שבועה שאין לך בידי אינו חייב אלא אחת, שבועה שאין לך בידי חטים ושעורין וכוסמין חייב על כל אחת ואחת.
14
If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds to one of them: "[I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, stolen object, lost object, and [financial] deposit of yours, or of yours,... or of yours in my possession," he is liable for each claim [made] by each individual. Thus he is liable for 20 guilt offerings.24
יד
היו חמשה תובעין אותו ואומרין לו תן לנו פקדון גזל ואבדה ותשומת יד שיש לנו בידך, ואמר לאחד מהן שבועה שאין לך בידי פקדון וגזל ואבדה ותשומת יד ולא לך ולא לך ולא לך הרי זה חייב על כל טענה וטענה לכל אחד ואחד ונמצא זה חייב עשרים אשם.
15
If [the defendant] claims that he lost an entrusted object or denies [receiving it], he took an oath, and afterwards admitted [that it was in his possession], and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath, and then admitted [that it was in his possession], he must pay the principal and an additional fifth for each oath that he took.25 [This is derived from Leviticus 5:24 which literally translates as] "its fifths,"26 [implying that] the Torah took into account several fifths for [one sum of] principal.
What is implied? The principal was [worth] four [zuz]. One denied [receiving an entrusted article], took an oath, and then admitted [that he possessed it]. Afterwards, he claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made a second admission, and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made an admission another time. He is required to pay seven [zuz].27 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
טו
טען שאבד הפקדון או כפר בו ונשבע ואחר כך הודה, וחזר וטען שאבד ונשבע וחזר והודה משלם הקרן הראשון וחומש אחד על כל שבועה ושבועה שנאמר וחמישיתיו, התורה רבתה חומשין הרבה על קרן אחד, כיצד היה הקרן ארבעה וכפר ונשבע והודה וחזר וטען שאבד ונשבע וחזר והודה וחזר וטען שאבד ונשבע והודה משלם שבעה וכל כיוצא בזה.
16
A value less than a p'rutah is not considered as financially significant.28 Hence, if a person lodges a claim against a colleague for less than a p'rutah or for articles worth less than a p'rutah and [the defendant] denied the obligation and took an oath, he is exempt with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon29 and liable for a sh'vuat bitui.30
טז
פחות מפרוטה אינו ממון לפיכך התובע חבירו בפחות מפרוטה או בפחות משוה פרוטה וכפר ונשבע פטור משבועת הפקדון וחייב בשבועת ביטוי.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The qualifications the Rambam mentions here make a distinction between mammon, a financial claim, for which one is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon and k'nas, a fine, for which one is not liable, as stated in the following halachah.
2.
The term literally means "an oath concerning an entrusted object." Its meaning in a halachic context is explained in this and the subsequent halachot.
If one takes such an oath falsely, he is liable to pay an additional fifth of the principal and bring a guilt offering as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
3.
With regard to other oaths, it is necessary for the person to answer Amen as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1. Nevertheless, a sh'vuat hapikadon is a unique instance, as the Rambam continues to explain.
4.
If, however, he remains silent in response to the oath administered by the plaintiff, he is not liable even if he had denied his claim beforehand (Radbaz).
5.
A fine. In Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, the Rambam defines a fine as an instance where a person pays more or less than the monetary value of the damage he caused.
6.
See Hilchot Genevah 1:5. See also Chapter 8, Halachot 1-3, for illustrations of this concept.
7.
For he is taking a false oath regarding his past activity.
8.
In contrast to movable property which can be concealed.
9.
In contrast to movable property where possession may determine ownership in a situation of doubt, with regard to landed property, a person must display proof of ownership. See also Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 5:1; Hilchot Gezeilah 8:14; 9:1.
10.
See Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an, loc. cit.
11.
Instead, they only serve as proof of an obligation (ibid.).
12.
Note the contrast to an oath concerning testimony (Chapter 9, Halachah 6-7). The gloss of the Torah Temimah to the prooftext explains that since the verse speaks of "deny his [obligation to] a colleague," he is liable whether his colleague demands an oath of him or not.
13.
See Hilchot Shluchim 3:5, 7. See the Lechem Mishneh who emphasizes that the principal must have given the agent power of attorney to require an oath of the defendant. If, however, he merely gave the agent the authority to prosecute the claim, he may not require him to take an oath.
14.
For an oath can be taken in any language. Sotah 33a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 5:1.
15.
Neither is one who takes such a false oath liable for lashes for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
16.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 9, which explains that one is liable for a sacrifice whether he transgressed willingly or inadvertently. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 1, Halachah 8, one is not liable for lashes either because the transgression does not involve a deed, or because financial compensation must be given and a person is not held liable both for financial restitution and lashes.
17.
Note the contrast to an oath concerning testimony, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 18. He is also liable to pay an additional fifth of the principal for each false oath, as stated in Halachah 15.
18.
Since his response included all of them in one statement, it is considered only as one oath.
19.
Since he addressed each one individually, each statement is considered as an independent oath.
20.
Since his response included all of these items in one statement, it is considered only as one oath.
21.
In this instance, were they to have been considered individually, he would be exempt, for since each of the claims are less than a p'rutah, they are not significant individually. Nevertheless, since he included them in one statement, the sum is totaled as one and he is liable.
22.
Since he mentioned each item individually, each statement is considered as an independent oath and it is necessary that each claim concern the worth of a p'rutah.
23.
Although they are different species of grain, since he included them all in one statement, he is liable only once. Even though buckwheat is a subspecies of wheat, since it is mentioned individually, he is liable for it individually (Radbaz).
24.
I.e., this combines the principles stated in Halachot 10 and 12.
25.
Similarly, he is liable for a guilt offering for each oath as stated in Halachah 9.
26.
It says chamishitav rather than chamishoto.
27.
This figure can be explained as follows: The principal is four. He must pay an additional three, for each fifth is one fifth of the new total and not one fifth of the original principal (Chapter 11, Halachah 20). He is not, however, required to pay more than one for the second and third oaths, for one is required to pay one fifth of the principal and not a fifth of the fifths (Radbaz). Note, however, Hilchot Gezelah 7:12 which explains that if he already was held liable by a court for the additional fifth, it becomes considered as part of the principal.
28.
This principle is also reflected in Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 3:1 and Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:11. In Hilchot Shekalim 1:3, the Rambam defines a p'rutah as half a barleycorn of silver. Shiurei Torah defines this as 1/40th of a gram of silver.
29.
For such an oath concerns a financially significant claim and this does not. The Sifra derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 5:26.
30.
For he took a false oath, as in Halachot 2-3.

Shvuot - Chapter 8

1
A person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situation]: He stole an ox belonging to a colleague and slaughtered it or sold it.1 His colleague lodged a claim against him, telling him: "You stole my ox and you slaughtered it or sold it." [The defendant] responded: "I stole it, but did not slaughter it or sell it" and took an oath to support his claim.
[The reason for his exemption is that] were he to have acknowledged that he slaughtered or sold [the ox] on his own accord, he would not have been required to pay four and five times its worth for this is a fine, as explained in Hilchot Genevah.2 Thus it is as if he did not deny a financial obligation. Therefore he is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath, saying that he did not slaughter [the ox], when [in fact] he did.
א
הגונב שורו של חבירו וטבחו או מכרו, תבעו בעל השור ואמר לו גנבת שורי וטבחת או מכרת והוא אומר גנבתי אבל לא טבחתי ולא מכרתי ונשבע הרי זה פטור משבועת הפקדון, שאילו הודה מעצמו שטבח או מכר לא היה משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה מפני שהוא קנס כמו שיתבאר בהלכות גנבה, ונמצא זה כמו שלא כפר ממון ולפיכך פטור משבועת הפקדון וחייב בשבועת ביטוי שהרי נשבע על שקר שלא טבח והוא טבח.
2
Similarly, a person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situations]. A person lodged a claim against him saying: "Your ox killed my servant," and he denied the incident and took an oath.3 A servant lodged a claim against his master saying: "You knocked out my tooth" or "You blinded my eye."4 For if he acknowledged the claim, he would not be obligated to pay because it is a fine.5 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ב
וכן האומר לחבירו המית שורך את עבדי וכפר ונשבע והעבד שתבע רבו ואמר הפלת שני וסמית עיני וכפר ונשבע פטור משבועת הפקדון, שאילו הודה לא היה משלם מפני שהוא קנס אבל חייב בשבועת ביטוי וכן כל כיוצא בזה.
3
When a person lodges a claim against a colleague concerning a matter that involves both a fine which he would not be obligated to pay if he admits his liability on his own initiative as explained [above] and a financial claim which he is liable to pay on his own admission, he denies the entire claim, and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon.6
What is implied? A person lodged a claim [against a colleague,] telling him: "You raped or you seduced my daughter."7 [The defendant] responded: "I did not rape or seduce her" and took an oath to this effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For although he would not be required to pay the fine were he to have admitted [his guilt], he is obligated to pay for the embarrassment and damages even on his own admission.8
Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "You stole my ox," and he says, "I did not steal it" and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Although he would not obligated to make the double payment [for a stolen object] on the basis of his own admission,9 he would be obligated to pay the principal on the basis of his own admission.
ג
התובע את חבירו בדבר שיש בו קנס שאינו משלם אותו על פי עצמו כמו שבארנו, ויש בו ממון שהוא משלם אותו על פי עצמו וכפר בכל דבר ונשבע הרי זה חייב משום שבועת הפקדון, כיצד תבעו ואמר לו אנסת או פתית בתי והוא אמר לא אנסתי ולא פתיתי ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון, שאע"פ שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו אילו הודה היה משלם בשת ופגם על פי עצמו, וכן האומר לחבירו גנבת שורי והוא אומר לא גנבתי ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון שאע"פ שאינו משלם כפל בהודאתו משלם הוא את הקרן בהודאתו.
4
When a person tells a colleague: "You inflicted a wound upon me,"10 and [the defendant] denies it, or "Your ox killed my ox,"11 and [the defendant] denies it, taking an oath, [the defendant] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Had he admitted [his act], he would be obligated to make restitution.
ד
האומר לחבירו עשית בי חבורה והוא אומר לא עשיתי, המית שורך את שורי והוא אומר לא המית ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון שאילו הודה היה חייב לשלם.
5
[A watchman] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person entrusted his ox to an unpaid watchman, the ox died, and he lodged a claim against the watchman, saying: "Where is the ox I entrusted to you?" The watchman responded: "You did not entrust anything to me," "You entrusted it, but it was stolen," or "...lost"12 and took an oath [to that effect]. [The rationale is] that had he admitted and related the matter as it occurred, he would not have been liable to make financial restitution, because he is an unpaid watchman.13 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ה
נתן שורו לשומר חנם ומת השור, תבעו ואמר לו היכן שורי שהפקדתי אצלך אמר לו לא הפקדת אצלי כלום או שאמר לו הפקדת ונגנב או אבד ונשבע הרי זה פטור משבועת הפקדון, שאילו הודה ואמר הדבר כשהיה לא היה חייב לשלם ממון מפני שהוא שומר חנם, אבל חייב הוא משום שבועת ביטוי שהרי נשבע על שקר, וכן כל כיוצא בזה.
6
[Similarly, a person] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person lent his ox to a colleague and then demanded its return, saying: "Where is the ox you borrowed from me?" Now the ox had died, but the borrower said: "It was stolen" or "...lost" and took an oath to this effect. [The rationale is that] he did not free himself from making restitution by his denial and is nevertheless liable to pay whether the animal died, was stolen, lost, or taken captive because he was a borrower, as will be explained in the appropriate place.14 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ו
השאיל שורו לחבירו ותבעו ואמר לו היכן שורי ששאלת ממני והרי השור מת, ואמר לו השואל נגנב או אבד ונשבע על זה הרי זה פטור משבועת הפקדון, שהרי לא פטר עצמו מן התשלומין בכפירתו ומכל מקום חייב הוא לשלם בין מת או נגנב או אבד או נשבה מפני שהוא שואל כמו שיתבאר במקומו, אבל חייב הוא משום שבועת ביטוי שהרי נשבע על שקר וכן כל כיוצא בזה.
7
This is the general principle: Whoever does not free himself from financial responsibility unless he makes this denial is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he takes an oath. [This applies] whether he took the oath on his own initiative or the plaintiff administer the oath and he stated his denial even though he did not answer Amen nor utter the oath himself.
ז
זה הכלל כל שאינו פוטר עצמו מן התשלומין אלא בכפירה זו ונשבע בין מפי עצמו בין שהשביעו התובע וכפר הרי זה חייב בשבועת הפקדון אע"פ שלא ענה אמן ולא הוציא שבועה מפיו.
8
[A thief] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: He stole his colleague's ox. [The colleague] demanded payment, telling him: "You stole my ox."
[The thief] responded: "I did not steal it."
Why, then, is it in your possession?"
"You entrusted it to me [for safekeeping]" and he took an oath to that effect.15
[The rationale is that] had he admitting stealing it, he would have been liable to pay the value in any case.16 By saying now that it is an entrusted object, he exempts himself from liability for theft and for loss,17 i.e., were the ox to be lost or stolen after this admission, he is not obligated to pay.
ח
הגונב שור חבירו ותבעו ואמר לו שורי גנבת והוא אומר לא גנבתי, מה טיבו אצלך אתה הפקדתו אצלי ונשבע, חייב בשבועת הפקדון, שאילו הודה שגנבו היה חייב לשלם דמי השור מכל מקום ועכשיו שאמר פקדון הוא הרי פטר עצמו בכפירה זו מן הגנבה ומן האבדה שאם נגנב השור או אבד אחר הודאה זו היה פטור מלשלם.
9
Similarly, if he were to claim that he rented it and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability in the cases of injury or death. Similarly, if he claimed: "You lent it to me" and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability if it dies while performing its work, as will be explained in Hilchot Sheilah.18
ט
וכן אם טען ששכרו ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון שהרי פטר עצמו מן השבורה ומן המיתה, וכן אם טען ואמר השאלתו לי ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון שהרי פטר עצמו מן המיתה בשעת המלאכה כמו שיתבאר בהלכות השאלה.
10
Therefore if one says: "I did not steal it. Instead, you entrusted it to me...", "...hired me to watch it...", or "...lent it to me. Here is your ox. Take it." If he took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon,19for he admitted owing the principle and did not exempt himself from any liability with this denial.20
י
לפיכך אם אמר לא גנבתי אבל אתה הפקדתו אצלי או שכרתני לשומרו או השאלתהו לי והרי שורך לפניך קחהו ונשבע על זה הרי זה פטור משבועת הפקדון, שהרי הודה בקרן ולא פטר עצמו בכפירה זו מכלום.
11
Similarly, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he uses any of the following excuses and takes an oath to that effect: "You sold it to me, but I have not paid for it yet. If you want, take the money for it. If not, here is your ox," "You gave it to me as payment for work which I will perform for you. If you desire, I will perform the work. If you do not desire, take it and depart," "I found it wandering on the road and did not know that it was yours. Now that I know, take it and depart," or "It chased after my ox. Here, it's yours." He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.
יא
וכן אם אמר לו אתה מכרתו לי ועדיין לא נתתי דמיו אם תרצה קח דמיו או הרי שלך לפניך, או שאמר לו אתה נתתו לי בשכר מלאכה שאעשה לך אם תרצה שאעשה לך או קחנו ולך, תועה בדרך מצאתיו ולא ידעתי שהוא שלך עכשיו שידעתי קחנו ולך, או שאמר אחר פרתי רץ והרי הוא לפניך, ונשבע על כל טענה מאלו פטור משבועת הפקדון שהרי לא פטר עצמו מכלום, וחייב בשבועת ביטוי שהרי נשבע על שקר.
12
When a person is financially obligated to two partners, one demands payment from him, he denies his obligation and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon21 for he denied a financial obligation. If they both demanded payment from him and he admitted the entire obligation to one of them, but said: "I borrowed only from this one,"22 should he take an oath to this effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he did not free himself from any liability. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui.
יב
מי שהיה חייב ממון לשני שותפין ותבעו אחד מהן וכפר בו ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון שהרי כפר ממון, תבעוהו שניהם והודה בכל לאחד מהם ואמר לא לויתי אלא מזה לבדו ונשבע פטור משבועת הפקדון שהרי לא פטר עצמו מכלום אבל חייב בשבועת ביטוי.
13
Similarly, if there was a person who owed a debt supported by a promissory note, but he denied it and took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. [The rationale is that because of] the promissory note, [the person's] landed property is placed under lien. Thus the person is denying [an obligation involving] landed property. And as we have already explained,23 a person who denied a claim involving landed property is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.24
יג
וכן מי שהיתה עליו מלוה בשטר וכפר בה ונשבע פטור משבועת הפקדון, שהרי בשטר נשתעבד הקרקע ונמצא זה ככופר בקרקע, וכבר בארנו שהכופר בקרקע פטור משבועת הפקדון וחייב בשבועת ביטוי שהרי נשבע על שקר.
14
If a person owed a debt to which there were witnesses, he denied [his obligation], and took an oath [to that effect], he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For by denying his obligation, he freed himself from the liability of paying immediately. When the witnesses will come, he will be obligated to pay and thus his denial will not be effective.25 It is, however, effective in that perhaps the witnesses will not come, they will come and their testimony will not be substantiated,26 or they will be disqualified.27 Therefore28 he is liable.
יד
היתה עליו מלוה בעדים בלבד וכפר ונשבע חייב בשבועת הפקדון שהרי פטר עצמו בכפירתו מלשלם עתה, ואע"פ שכשיבואו העדים יתחייב לשלם ונמצא שלא הועיל לו כפירתו, הרי הועילה בעתה ושמא לא יבואו העדים או יבואו ולא תתקיים עדותן או יפסלו ולפיכך חייב.
FOOTNOTES
1.
In which instance, he is obligated to pay five times the value of the ox (Exodus 21:37).
2.
Hilchot Genevah 1:5. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2 above.
3.
In which instance, the owner of the ox is liable to pay a fine of 30 shekalim to the owner of the servant (Exodus 21:32).
4.
In which instance, the owner is required to free the servant (Exodus 21:26-27).
5.
For in these instances, the person is not paying the worth of the damage, but an arbitrary amount that could be either more or less.
6.
For he is denying a financial claim. The fact that it also includes a fine is not significant.
7.
I.e., a virgin girl between the ages of three and twelve and a half (Hilchot Na'arah Betulah 1:1).
8.
As explained in Hilchot Na'arah Betulah 2:1-2, a person who seduces a girl is required to pay a fine of 50 silver pieces, as stated in Exodus 22:15, for the embarrassment he causes her, and the damages due to her reduction in her value. A rapist must also pay for the pain he causes. The embarrassment and the damages are considered as financial obligations.
9.
For that is a fine.
10.
For the damages (more particularly, the unemployment assessment, the medical fees, and the allocation for embarrassment) he must pay his colleague for the wound are considered as a financial obligation and not as a fine (see Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:7; Hilchot To'en V'Nitan 1:16).
11.
Here as well, the damages one ox causes another are considered as a financial obligation. This applies with regard to an ox that has been distinguished as one which gores. If an ox is not known to have such a tendency, the half-payment for the damages that it causes is considered as a fine (see Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8).
12.
Since he would not have been liable had he told the truth, the fact that he took a false oath does not obligate him for a sh'vuat hapikadon.
13.
He is not liable in cases involving death or other losses due to forces beyond his control.
14.
Hilchot Sechirut 1:2; Hilchot Sheilah Ufikadon 1:1.
15.
On his own volition; he is under no obligation to do so.
16.
I.e., even if it dies or is destroyed by forces beyond his control.
17.
Since he reduces his liability through his statements, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon.
18.
Hilchot Sheilah UFikadon 1:1.
19.
He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui since he took a false oath.
20.
For he told the owner to take his ox.
21.
This applies even if he admits owing a portion of the debt to the other partner. Since he denied part of the debt, he is liable.
22.
I.e., he admitted the entire debt, but said that he owed it only to one person and not to both partners.
23.
Chapter 7, Halachot 2-3.
24.
The Radbaz notes that this statement is seemingly redundant; it is made more than ten times in this and the previous chapter. He explains that it would appear that taking a false sh'vuat hapikadon is more severe than taking a false sh'vuat bitui, yet the punishment for a false sh'vuat bitui, lashes, is more severe than that for a false sh'vuat hapikadon, bringing a sacrifice. Hence, it is necessary for the Rambam to state the point explicitly each time.
25.
And thus there is room to say that he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, as indicated by Halachah 7.
26.
I.e., it will be disqualified through the process of cross-examination.
27.
And thus be prevented from testifying.
28.
I.e., because his denial has an immediate - and perhaps long-term - effect, he is liable.

Shvuot - Chapter 9

1
When a plaintiff1 demands that witnesses testify concerning a matter that through their testimony alone2 will obligate the defendant to pay this plaintiff a financial claim involving moveable property,3 [the witnesses] denied [knowing] testimony and took an oath to this effect - whether in a court of law or outside of it - they are liable for sh'vuat haedut,4 for they caused the plaintiff a financial lost through their denial.
Similarly, if the plaintiff administered an oath to them and they denied the matter, [they are liable] even though they did not take an oath or answer Amen to the oath he [administered]. Since they denied the matter, they are liable, provided he administered the oath to them in court.5
א
התובע עדיו להעיד לו עדות שיתחייב הנתבע בעדותן לבדה ליתן לתובע זה ממון המטלטל, וכפרו בעדותן ונשבעו, בין שנשבעו בבית דין בין שנשבעו חוץ לבית דין הרי אלו חייבין משום שבועת העדות, שהרי הפסידוהו ממון בכפירתם, וכן אם השביעם התובע וכפרו בו אע"פ שלא נשבעו הן ולא ענו אמן אחר שבועתו כיון שכפרו הרי אלו חייבין, והוא שישביעם בבית דין.
2
The witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless they deny [knowing testimony] in court. Whether they took the oath or the oath was administered to them in court or outside the court, the denial must be in court alone, as [can be derived from Leviticus 5:1]: "If he will not testify, he will bear his sin." [Implied is that] in the place he will testify and [that testify] will have an effect,6there, if he does not testify, he will be liable.
ב
אין העדים חייבין בשבועת העדות עד שיכפרו בעדותן בבית דין, בין שנשבעו או השביען בבית דין בין שנשבעו או השביען חוץ לבית דין, והכפירה בבית דין בלבד, שנאמר אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו מקום שיגיד ויועיל הוא שאם לא יגיד שם יתחייב.
3
When the plaintiff demands [that the witnesses] testify concerning a claim that does not involve a financial obligation,7 concerns landed property, servants, or promissory notes, they deny [knowing testimony], and take an oath to that effect, they are not liable for a sh'vuat edut. For they are liable when denying testimony concerning financial claims that resemble an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery, or a lost oject which the verse8 mentions in this passage. This refers to moveable property which is itself of financial worth9 that were they to testify on [the plaintiff's] behalf, [the defendant] would have to pay.
ג
תבען בעדות שאינה מחייבת ממון או בעדות קרקעות או עבדים או שטרות וכפרו ונשבעו פטורין משבועת העדות, שאין חייבין אלא על כפירת עדות ממון שדומה לפקדון ותשומת יד וגזל ואבדה שפרטן הכתוב בפרשה שהן מטלטלין שגופן ממון וכשיעידו לזה יתן זה.
4
Similarly, when one administers an oath to witnesses who [can testify regarding] a fine and they deny [knowledge] of the matter, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] were the defendant to come and acknowledge his liability for the fine first,10 he would not be liable to pay even though the witnesses came afterwards and testified accordingly. Thus the witnesses did not make him liable through their testimony alone. Instead, it was their testimony together with the denial of the defendant that made him liable. Since their testimony would not be effective if he acknowledged [his liability], if they denied [knowing of] the matter and took an oath, they are not liable.
ד
וכן המשביע עדי קנס וכפרו פטורין משבועת העדות, מפני שאם קדם הנתבע והודה בקנס יפטר מלשלם ואע"פ שבאו העדים אחר כן והעידו, נמצאו העדים לא חייבו זה בעדותן לבדה אלא עדותן עם כפירת הנתבע היא המחייבת אותן והואיל ואם הודה לא תועיל עדותן אם כפרו בה ונשבעו פטורין.
5
[When a plaintiff administers an oath to witnesses, saying:] "I am making you take an oath that you come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so owes me a double payment"11 or a four- or five-fold payment12 and the witnesses deny [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut because of the principle which is a financial obligation,13 but not because of the double payment which is a fine.
Similarly, if he administered an oath that they testify that they testify that so-and-so raped or seduced his daughter and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut because of the [payment due] for embarrassment and damages.14For if the defendant acknowledged his obligation, he would have to pay these obligations, but not because of the fine. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ה
משביעכם אני שתבואו ותעידו לי שיש לי ביד פלוני תשלומי כפל ותשלומי ארבעה וחמשה וכפרו, חייבין בשבועת העדות מפני הקרן שהוא ממון לא מפני הכפל שהוא קנס, וכן אם השביעם שיעידו לו שאנס פלוני או פתה בתו וכפרו חייבין בשבועת העדות מפני הבושת והפגם שאם הודה בהם הנתבע משלם לא מפני הקנס וכן כל כיוצא בזה.
6
Witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut until they deny [knowledge of the matter] and take an oath after the plaintiff or his agent15 demand [that they testify]. If, however, they take an oath first, before a demand is made of them, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut.
ו
אין העדים חייבין בשבועת העדות עד שיכפרו וישבעו אחר תביעת בעל דין עצמו או שלוחו, אבל אם קדמו ונשבעו קודם שיתבעם פטורין משבועת העדות.
7
What is implied? [The witnesses] saw the plaintiff following after them, they told him: "Why are you following us? We are taking an oath that we do not know any testimony involving you," they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] the plaintiff did not make a demand of them. Instead, they took the oath first on their own initiative.16
Similarly, if the defendant administered an oath to them that if they knew testimony involving the plaintiff they should come and testify and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless the plaintiff makes them take the oath.17Needless to say, if he administered an oath that they should come to testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so money and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable. For the person making this demand is not the plaintiff himself. Similarly, if the oath preceded [their knowledge of] the testimony, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, as [implied by Leviticus 5:1]: "And he heard the voice of an oath [when] he was a witness." [It can be inferred that knowledge of] the testimony preceded the oath and not that the oath preceded the knowledge of the testimony.
ז
כיצד ראו התובע הולך אחריהן אמרו לו למה אתה בא אחרינו שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות הרי אלו פטורין משבועת העדות מפני שלא תבען התובע אלא הם קדמו ונשבעו בתביעת עצמן, וכן אם השביעם הנתבע שאם תדעו לזה שתובע אותו עדות שתבואו ותעידו לו וכפרו הרי אלו פטורין משבועת העדות עד שישביעם התובע, ואין צריך לומר אם השביעם שיבואו ויעידו שיש לפלוני ביד פלוני ממון וכפרו שהן פטורין שאין זה התובע בעל דין עצמו, וכן אם קדמה שבועה לעדות הרי אלו פטורין משבועת העדות שנאמר ושמעה קול אלה והוא עד שקדמה עדות לשבועה לא שקדמה שבועה לעדות.
8
What is implied? [The plaintiff says:] "I am administering to you an oath that if you will know of testimony concerning me that you come and testify," and the witnesses responded Amen and afterwards they observed a matter concerning him.18 If he demands that they testify and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut.
ח
כיצד משביע אני עליכם כשתדעו לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני ואמרו אמן וידעו לו עדות אחר כן ותבעם להעיד וכפרו בו הרי אלו פטורין משבועת העדות.
9
Witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut until the plaintiff singles them out and administers an oath to them or they take an oath.19
What is implied? A person stood up in a synagogue and said: "I am administering an oath to anyone who knows testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf." They all - including his witnesses - responded Amen. Afterwards, he demanded of his witnesses that they testify and they denied [knowledge of the matter]. They are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, because he did not single out the witnesses individually. If, however, he said: "I am administering an oath to all of those standing here that if they know testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf." [If] his witnesses were among those present and [then] they denied [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut, because he singled them out among the others.20
ט
אין העדים חייבים בשבועת העדות עד שייחד אותם התובע וישביעם או ישבעו, כיצד עמד בבית הכנסת ואמר משביע אני כל מי שידע לי עדות שיבא ויעיד לי וענו כולם אמן ועדיו בכללם ואחר כך תבע עדיו וכפרו בו הרי אלו פטורין משבועת העדות, מפני שלא ייחד עדיו בשבועה בפני עצמן, אבל אם אמר משביע אני כל העומדים כאן שאם ידעו לי עדות שיבואו ויעידו לי והיו עדיו בכללם וכפרו הרי אלו חייבין בשבועת העדות שהרי ייחדם בכלל אחרים.
10
Similarly, if he told the witnesses: "Come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so owes me a maneh" and then stands in a synagogue and said: "I am administering an oath to anyone who knows testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf," should they not come and testify, they are liable, because he made a demand of them previously. [This applies] provided they are present in the synagogue and a court is also there.21 If a court was not present, they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut if they answered Amen and deny [knowledge of the matter] while in a court of law.22 If they did not answer Amen, they are not liable.
י
וכן אם אמר לעדים בואו והעידו לי שיש לי מנה ביד פלוני, ואח"כ עמד בבית הכנסת והשביע כל מי שיודע לו עדות יבוא ויעיד ולא באו ולא העידו הרי אלו חייבין, שהרי תבען תחלה, והוא שיהיו אז בבית הכנסת ויהיה שם בית דין, אבל אם לא היו בפני בית דין אם ענו אמן חייבין בשבועת העדות כשיכפרו בעדותן בבית דין ואם לא ענו אמן אינן חייבין. 39
11
Whether one administers an oath to his witnesses or tells them "I am commanding you with an oath" or "I am binding you with an oath," they are liable provided he administers the oath23 with God's name or with one of the terms used to describe Him as explained.24
יא
אחד המשביע עדיו בשבועה, או שאמר להן מצוה אני עליכם בשבועה, אוסרכם אני בשבועה הרי אלו חייבין, והוא שישביעם בשם או בכינוי מן הכינוים כמו שבארנו.
12
The witnesses are not liable unless the oath is administered to them in a language that they understand.25
יב
ואין העדים חייבין עד שישביעם בלשון שהם מכירין אותה.
13
Thus you have learned that witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless ten conditions are [met]. They are:26
a) [The witnesses] must be charged [with testifying] by the plaintiff;
b) [The matter] must involve a financial claim;
c) It must involve movable property;
d) Their testimony alone, had it been given, would be sufficient to require the defendant to pay;
e) They must deny [knowledge of the matter] after the plaintiff charges them;
f) They must issue their denial in court;
g) God's name or a term used to describe Him must be mentioned in the oath;
h) The knowledge of the matter must precede the oath;
i) The witnesses must be singled out at the time of the oath or at the time they are charged;
j) The oath must be in a language that they understand.
יג
הנה למדת שאין העדים חייבין בשבועת העדות אלא ע"פ עשרה דברים ואלו הן: שיתבעם התובע, ושתהיה עדות ממון, ושיהיה ממון המטלטל, ושיתחייב הנתבע לשלם בעדותן לבד אם העידו, ושיכפרו אחר שתבען התובע, ושיכפרו בבית דין, ושתהיה שם שבועה בשם או בכינוי, ושתקדם ידיעת העדות לשבועה, ושייחד עדיו בעת השבועה או בעת התביעה, ושתהיה השבועה בלשון שהן מכירין אותה.
14
Whenever we have used the expression "they are not liable" [in this chapter], the intent is that they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. They are, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, provided they take the oath or answer Amen to an oath administered by a colleague, because they took a false oath.27
When, by contrast, one is liable for a sh'vuat haedut, he is only liable for a sh'vuat haedutand is not liable for a sh'vuat bitui, even though he took a false oath and did so intentionally. [The rationale is that] the Torah removed a sh'vuat haedut from the category of sh'vuat bitui to make a person who deliberately [takes a false oath] liable for a sacrifice for its violation just as one who took it inadvertently.28 He is not, however, liable for lashes, as [can be derived from Leviticus 5:5 which] states: "For one of these."29 A person who takes a [false] oath is liable for one type of oath, but not two. [We do not hold him liable for both] a sh'vuat haedut and a sh'vuat bitui.
יד
כל מקום שאמרנו פטור, פטור משבועת העדות אבל חייב בשבועת ביטוי והוא שנשבע או שענה אמן אם השביעו אחר שהרי נשבע על שקר, אבל המחוייב בשבועת העדות אע"פ שהוא נשבע על שקר ואע"פ שהוא מזיד אינו חייב משום שבועת ביטוי אלא משום שבועת העדות בלבד, שהרי הכתוב הוציא שבועת העדות מכלל שבועת ביטוי לחייב המזיד בה כשוגג בקרבן אבל לא במלקות שנאמר לאחת מאלה, במין אחד ממיני שבועות אתה מחייב הנשבע ואי אתה מחייבו בשני מינין עד שיהיה חייב בדין שבועת העדות ובדין שבועת ביטוי.
15
[When the plaintiff says: "I am administering] an oath to you unless you come and testify that so-and-so has an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, stolen property, and a lost object of mine in his possession," [and the witnesses respond: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only [sacrifice].30 [If they say: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, stolen property, and a lost object of yours in so-and-so's possession, they are liable for each [statement].31
טו
משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבאו ותעידו לי שיש לי ביד פלוני פקדון ותשומת יד גזל ואבדה, שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות אינן חייבין אלא אחת, שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות שיש לך ביד פלוני פקדון ותשומת יד גזל ואבדה חייבין על כל אחת ואחת.
16
[When the plaintiff says: "I am administering] an oath to you unless you come and testify that so-and-so has wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine in his possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice].32[If they answer: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in his possession," he is liable for each [statement].
טז
משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידו לי שיש לי ביד פלוני חטים ושעורים וכוסמין, שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות אינם חייבין אלא אחת, שבועה שאין אנו יודעים לך עדות שיש לך ביד פלוני חטים ושעורים וכוסמין חייבין על כל אחת ואחת.
17
Similarly, if many people charged them with testifying and they said: "[We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice]. [If they said:] "...concerning you, and you, and you," they are liable for each [statement], as explained with regard to sh'vuat hapikadon.33
יז
וכן אם תבעו אותן רבים להעיד להם ואמרו שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לכם עדות אינן חייבין אלא אחת, לא לך ולא לך ולא לך חייבין על כל אחת ואחת כדרך שבארנו בשבועות הפקדון.
18
When a person administers an oath to a colleague that he knows testimony concerning him and ultimately, it is discovered that he does not know testimony, [the colleague] is not liable, neither for a sh'vuat haedut34, nor for a sh'vuat bitui. [The rationale is that] a sh'vuat bitui involves only matters that have both a positive and negative dimension.35 Were the person to have said: "I am taking an oath that I do not know testimony concerning you," that would not be a sh'vuat bitui, but instead a sh'vuat haedut. Hence since the negative dimension of the statement is not a sh'vuat bitui, the positive dimension, taking an oath that one knows testimony, is not a sh'vuat bitui.36
יח
הנשבע לחבירו שהוא יודע לו עדות ונמצא שאינו יודע לו עדות הרי זה פטור ואין כאן לא שבועת העדות ולא שבועת ביטוי, מפני ששבועת ביטוי אינה אלא בדבר שיש בו לאו והן, ואם יאמר שבועה שאיני יודע לך עדות אין זה שבועת ביטוי אלא שבועת העדות, הואיל ולאו זה שיש בה אינה שבועת ביטוי, כך הן שבה שהוא הנשבע שיודע לו עדות אינו שבועת ביטוי.
19
It is clear that when a person takes an oath to a colleague that he testified on his behalf and he did not testify or that he did not testify and he testified, he is liable for a sh'vuat bitui;37there is no connection to a sh'vuat haedut at all.38
יט
דבר ברור הוא שהנשבע לחבירו שהעיד לו והוא לא העיד או שלא העיד לו והוא העיד הרי זה חייב משום שבועת ביטוי ואין כאן שבועת עדות כלל.
FOOTNOTES
1.
This excludes instances when an oath is not made in response to the plaintiff's demands, as stated in Halachah 7. And it excludes an instance when the matter was observed by two pairs of witnesses, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 15.
2.
This excludes a fine, because in that instance, the defendant does not become liable until he denies the obligation and the witnesses refute his denial. With regard to monetary claims, by contrast, once the witnesses testify, the defendant is liable regardless of whether he admits or disputes his liability. See Halachah 4.
3.
Halachah 3 explains that this phrase excludes promissory notes, landed property, and servants.
4.
This term literally means "the oath [concerning] testimony." As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 12, a person who takes this oath falsely is liable to bring an adjustable guilt offering.
5.
As reflected by Halachah 10, when the oath is administered by the plaintiff and the witnesses do not answer Amen, the oath must be administered in court. If, however, the witnesses take the oath on their own accord or they answer Amen, they are liable even if this takes places outside a court, provided the denial takes place within a court, as stated in the following halachah (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh; see also Chapter 10, Halachah 7 and notes).
6.
I.e., in court. See Halachah 10 and notes where this concept is discussed.
7.
E.g., he demanded that they testify that he was a priest or a Levite (Chapter 10, Halachah 3).
8.
Leviticus 5:21-22; see the explanations in Chapter 7, Halachah 4, and notes.
9.
In contrast to promissory notes.
10.
See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8.
11.
For a theft.
12.
For the theft and slaughter or sale of a sheep or a cow.
13.
For this must be paid even if he admits stealing himself.
14.
See Chapter 8, Halachah 3, and notes.
15.
This applies to a person who has been given power of attorney (see Chapter 7, Halachah 6). If he has not been given formal power of attorney, even if he is an agent acting on behalf of the principal, the oath he administers is not of consequence (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).
16.
As the Rambam writes in his Commentary to Mishnah (Sh'vuot 4:12), Leviticus 5:1 states "If he does not tell" but the word "not" is written lamed alef vav. This implies both lamed alef "not," and lamed vav "to him." Implied is that he must say no to him, i.e., in response to his demand.
17.
This can also be derived through the process of exegesis mentioned above. One can infer that the witnesses he must say no to him, to the plaintiff himself
18.
I.e., at the time the oath was administered, they did not have knowledge of testimony concerning the plaintiff, but afterwards they observed the matter under investigation.
19.
From the exegesis of the prooftext cited above, Sh'vuot 35a understands that the verse is speaking, not of people in general, but of persons singled out to serve as witnesses.
20.
Although he spoke to the group as a whole, the oath was directed to each of the persons individually.
Rabbenu Nissim mentions another concept related to this ruling. A plaintiff may administer an oath to a person even when he is not certain that the person in fact knows testimony concerning him.
21.
Since they did not take the oath or answer Amen, they are not liable unless the oath is administered in the presence of a court, as stated in Halachah 1.
22.
For their denial must be made in a court of law, as stated in Halachah 2.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's decision, explaining that the Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir (Sh'vuot 30a), but the Ra'avad maintains that the halachah should be decided according to the Sages who differ with rabbi Meir. Similarly, the Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam's postulate that if the witnesses do not answer Amen, the oath must be administered in a court.
The Radbaz justifies the Rambam's position, explaining that since the witnesses did not take the oath themselves or respond Amen, it is their denial of knowledge of the testimony that constitutes acceptance of the oath. Accordingly, just as the denial must be made in court, the oath must be administered in court. For it is inappropriate that the oath itself be administered outside the court, while its acceptance is required to be in court. See also Chapter 10, Halachah 17 and notes.
23.
Or includes God's name in any of the other expressions (Radbaz).
24.
See Chapter 2, Halachot 2-4.
25.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 7. This applies even if they answer Amen to the oath (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 7:1).
26.
All of these points have been discussed in the previous halachot.
27.
Although the Rambam's position is shared by many other Rishonim, there are others (e.g., Rashi, Sh'vuot 25b), who differ and maintain that since the oath involves testimony, one is never liable for a sh'vuat bitui even when he is not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. See Halachah 18 and notes.
28.
Sh'vuot 30a notes that with regard to all the other types of oaths, the Torah uses the expression "and it became concealed from him," but it does not use that expression with regard to a sh'vuat haedut. Implied is that even if the matter is not concealed, i.e., he transgresses deliberately, he is liable for a sacrifice. The Radbaz questions - without resolving - why the Torah gives the person a lesser punishment - a sacrifice - instead of lashes, when he purposefully violates this transgression.
29.
The same passage mentions both a sh'vuat haedut and a sh'vuat bitui. This verse teaches that one can be held liable for only one of these types of oaths. This also applies with regard to the other false oaths for which the Torah holds one liable. One can be held liable only for one.
30.
Because they included all the obligations in a single statement. Note the parallel to this and the subsequent laws in Chapter 7, Halachot 10-14.
31.
For they singled out each object individually.
32.
Although they are different species of grain, since he included them all in one statement, he is liable only once.
33.
Because they included all the obligations in a single statement. Note the parallel to this and the subsequent laws in Chapter 7, Halachot 10-14.
34.
For a sh'vuat haedut involves a situation when the witnesses refuse to testify.
35.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 1, and notes.
36.
Hence he is totally absolved from liability.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that one could raise a question based on Sh'vuat 25b. From that passage, it would appear that this and the concept stated in Halachah 14 are conflicting positions and one cannot accept both as halachah. Nevertheless, he explains that it is only in the preliminary stage of the Talmud's argument that the positions appear conflicting. After the Talmud cites the teaching derived from the prooftext, "for one of these," the two rulings can be reconciled. He cites other Rishonim who interpret the passage in this manner.
37.
For he is taking an oath regard a specific activity which he performed or did not perform in the past. Since it has both a positive and negative dimension, he is liable. The fact that this oath does not have a future dimension - for if one takes an oath that he will not testify, he is negating a mitzvah, and hence, it is an oath in vain (Chapter 5, Halachah 15) and not a sh'vuat bitui - does not prevent one from being liable for the oath referring to the past.
38.
For a sh'vuat haedut involves only the future.
39.
וכן אם אמר לעדים בואו והעידו לי וכו'. א"א המחבר הזה שנה משנתו כר"מ ואין הלכה כמותו אלא בין מפי עצמו בין מפי אחרים אינן חייבין עד שיכפרו בב"ד, ועוד בין לר"מ בין לרבנן מה צורך שיהיה הבית דין בבית הכנסת בשעת השבועה והלא אין מקפידין על השבועה באי זה מקום שתהיה ואין מקפידין אלא על הכפירה.
• Hayom Yom: Today's Hayom Yom
• Monday, 10 Shevat, 5777 · 6 February 2017
• "Today's Day"
• 
Shabbat, Sh'vat 10*, 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Bo, Shevi'i with Rashi.
Tehillim: 55-59.
Tanya: Ch. 19. To elucidate (p. 77)...in the heart. (p. 83).
(At this point in the Hebrew text appears an emendation of a passage in Torah Or, relevant only in Hebrew. Translator).
When my grandmother, Rebbetzin Rivka, was eighteen (in 5611, 1851) she fell ill and the physician ordered her to eat immediately upon awakening. She, however, did not wish to eat before davening; so she davened very early, then ate breakfast. When her father-in-law, the Tzemach Tzedek, learned of this he said to her: "A Jew must be healthy and strong. The Torah says about mitzvot, 'Live in them,' meaning bring vitality into the mitzvot. To be able to infuse mitzvot with vitality, one must be strong and joyful." Then he concluded: "You should not be without food. Better to eat for the sake of davening rather than to daven for the sake of eating;" he then blessed her with long life. [She was born in 5593 (1833) and passed away on Sh'vat 10, 5674 (1914)].
My father told this teaching of the Tzemach Tzedek to someone at yechidus, adding: "And this must be done with joy."
FOOTNOTES
*.This day marks the yahrzeit of the late Rebbe, R. Yosef Yitzchak, who passed away on Shabbat morning, 7:45 a.m., parshat Bo, 10 Sh'vat 5710 (1950), in New York, and is interred there. On that day, the Late Rebbe's son-in-law - the Rebbe of righteous memory - became the nassi and leader of our generation.
• Daily Thought:
The Mentor
Just as some people refuse to see their faults, so there are those who insist on digging too deep, persecuting themselves over every fault and making unreasonable demands upon their lives. Eventually they collapse from exhaustion, or worse, kick back with resentment.
This is why no person should go it alone. Everyone needs a mentor, someone who can look objectively and say, “This is where you are right now. This is what you can expect from yourself right now.”[See Hayom Yom, 26 Cheshvan; 20 Kislev 5737.]
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