Today in Jewish History:
• Birth and Passing of Judah (1565 and 1466 BCE)
Judah, the fourth son of Jacob and Leah, was born in Charan on the 15th of Sivan, of the year 2196 from creation (1565 BCE). He passed away on the same date 119 years later, in Egypt.
Judah took the leadership role both in selling Joseph into slavery and in the brothers' later attempts to find him and free him, and to protect Benjamin. On his deathbed, Jacob conferred the leadership of Israel upon Judah, proclaiming: "The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the legislator from between his feet, until Shiloh (the Moshiach) comes..." The royal house of David, as well as many of the great sages and leaders of Israel throughout the generations of Jewish history, trace their lineage to Judah.
Judah had five sons: Er and Onan, who died without children; Shelah; and his twins from Tamar, Peretz and Zerach. Their descendants formed the Tribe of Judah, the most populous and prestigious of the twelve tribes of Israel.
After the death of King Solomon in 797 BCE, the people of Israel split into two kingdoms: ten tribes formed the Kingdom of Israel in the north, with Shomron (Samaria) as the capital; only the tribes of Judah and Benjamin remained loyal to Solomon's son, Rechavam, and formed the Kingdom of Judea in the south, in the areas surrounding the capitol Jerusalem. Eventually, the Northern Kingdom was conquered by Assyria and the ten tribes living there were exiled and lost to the Jewish people; the inhabitants of Judea were also exiled (to Babylonia) but subsequently returned to the Holy Land and rebuilt Jerusalem and the Holy Temple. Over time, the terms "Judean" and "Jew"--which originally referred to a member of the tribe of Judah--became synonymous with "Israelite" and was used to refer to the descendants of all of Jacob's twelve sons--i.e., the Jewish people.
Links:
More on Judah
Reuben and Judah; a Contrast
On Leadership On the essence of the Jewish leader
• Sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe arrested (1927)
Shortly after midnight of the 15th of Sivan of 1927, the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn (1880-1950), was arrested by agents of the GPU (Soviet Secret Police) and Yevsketzia ("Jewish section" of the Communist Party) for leading the underground network of rabbis, teachers and emissaries working to preserve and disseminate Jewish learning and observance throughout the Soviet Empire.
Link: The Rebbe's Prison Diary
Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak of Lubsavitch
Daily Quote:
And G‑d said: “. . . Abraham shall be a great people . . . Because I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him that they shall keep the way of G‑d, to do charity and justice.”[Genesis 18:17–19]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Behaalotecha, 3rd Portion Numbers 9:1-9:14 with Rashi
• Chapter 9
1The Lord spoke to Moses in the Sinai Desert, in the second year of their exodus from the land of Egypt, in the first month, saying: אוַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה בְמִדְבַּר סִינַי בַּשָּׁנָה הַשֵּׁנִית לְצֵאתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן לֵאמֹר:
In the first month: The portion at the beginning of the Book [of Numbers] was not said until Iyar. [From this], you learn that there is no chronological order in the Torah. But why did Scripture not begin with this [chapter]? For it is a disgrace to Israel that throughout the forty years the children of Israel were in the desert, they brought only this Passover sacrifice alone. — [Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:18] בחדש הראשון: פרשה שבראש הספר לא נאמרה עד אייר, למדת שאין סדר מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה. ולמה לא פתח בזו, מפני שהוא גנותן של ישראל, שכל ארבעים שנה שהיו ישראל במדבר לא הקריבו אלא פסח זה בלבד:
2The children of Israel shall make the Passover sacrifice in its appointed time. בוְיַעֲשׂוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַפָּסַח בְּמוֹעֲדוֹ:
in its appointed time: Even [if it were to fall] on Sabbath; “in its appointed time” [also implies,] even [if the majority of the people were] in a state of ritual uncleanness. — [Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:14, 15] במועדו: אף בשבת. במועדו אף בטומאה:
3On the afternoon of the fourteenth of this month, you shall make it in its appointed time; in accordance with all its statutes and all its ordinances you shall make it. גבְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם תַּעֲשׂוּ אֹתוֹ בְּמֹעֲדוֹ כְּכָל חֻקֹּתָיו וּכְכָל מִשְׁפָּטָיו תַּעֲשׂוּ אֹתוֹ:
in accordance with all its statutes: These are the commandments directly relating to its body-an unblemished male lamb in its first year. — [Pes. 95a] ככל חקתיו: אלו מצות שבגופו, שה תמים זכר בן שנה:
and all its ordinances: These are the commandments that relate to its body from elsewhere, such as the seven days for [eating] unleavened bread and for disposing of leaven. (Another version: The commandments relating to its body-an unblemished male lamb in its first year; those which relate to its body from elsewhere- [it must be] roasted over fire, its head with its legs and its innards. And those which have no relation to its body-unleavened bread and disposing of leaven. — [Rashi on Pes. 95a] וככל משפטיו: אלו מצות שעל גופו ממקום אחר, כגון שבעת ימים למצה ולביעור חמץ. [מצות שבגופו, שה תמים זכר בן שנה. שעל גופו, צלי אש ראשו על כרעיו ועל קרבו. שחוץ לגופו, מצה וביעור חמץ]:
4Moses spoke to the children of Israel [instructing them] to make the Passover sacrifice. דוַיְדַבֵּר משֶׁה אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לַעֲשׂת הַפָּסַח:
Moses spoke: What does this teach us? Has not Scripture already said, “And Moses told… of the Lord’s appointed [holy days].” (Lev. 23:44) ? However, when he heard the portion dealing with the festivals at Sinai, he related it to them, and then he exhorted them again when the time came to perform them. — [Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:17] וידבר משה וגו': מה תלמוד לומר, והלא נאמר (ויקרא כג, מד) וידבר משה את מועדי ה', אלא כששמע פרשת מועדים מסיני, אמרה להם, וחזר והזהירם בשעת מעשה:
5So they made the Passover sacrifice in the first month, on the afternoon fourteenth day of the month in the Sinai Desert; according to all that the Lord had commanded Moses, so did the children of Israel do. הוַיַּעֲשׂוּ אֶת הַפֶּסַח בָּרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם בְּמִדְבַּר סִינָי כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֶת משֶׁה כֵּן עָשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
6There were men who were ritually unclean [because of contact with] a dead person, and therefore could not make the Passover sacrifice on that day. So they approached Moses and Aaron on that day. ווַיְהִי אֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ טְמֵאִים לְנֶפֶשׁ אָדָם וְלֹא יָכְלוּ לַעֲשׂת הַפֶּסַח בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא וַיִּקְרְבוּ לִפְנֵי משֶׁה וְלִפְנֵי אַהֲרֹן בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא:
approached Moses and Aaron: While the two were sitting in the study hall, they came and asked them. It is [however] inconceivable that they approached them one after the other [in this order], for if Moses did not know, how should Aaron know?- [Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:20] לפני משה ולפני אהרן: כששניהם יושבין בבית המדרש באו ושאלום. ולא יתכן לומר זה אחר זה, שאם משה לא היה יודע, אהרן מנין לו:
7Those men said to him, "We are ritually unclean [because of contact] with a dead person; [but] why should we be excluded so as not to bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed time, with all the children of Israel? זוַיֹּאמְרוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים הָהֵמָּה אֵלָיו אֲנַחְנוּ טְמֵאִים לְנֶפֶשׁ אָדָם לָמָּה נִגָּרַע לְבִלְתִּי הַקְרִיב אֶת קָרְבַּן יְהֹוָה בְּמֹעֲדוֹ בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
Why should we be excluded: He [Moses] told them, “Sacrifices cannot be offered in a state of ritual uncleanness.” They replied, “Let ritually clean kohanim sprinkle the blood for us, and let ritually clean people eat the flesh.” He said to them, “Wait, and I will hear… ” like a disciple who is confident of hearing from his teacher’s mouth. Fortunate is the mortal who is so confident, for whenever he wished, he could speak with the Shechinah . This portion should really have been said through Moses, like the rest of the Torah, but these people merited that it be said through them, for merit is brought about through the meritorious. - [Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1: 22] למה נגרע: אמר להם אין קדשים קרבים בטומאה. אמרו לו יזרק הדם עלינו בכהנים טהורים ויאכל הבשר לטהורים. אמר להם עמדו ואשמעה, כתלמיד המובטח לשמוע מפי רבו. אשרי ילוד אשה שכך מובטח, שכל זמן שהיה רוצה היה מדבר עם השכינה. וראויה היתה פרשה זו להאמר ע"י משה כשאר כל התורה כולה, אלא שזכו אלו שתאמר על ידיהן, שמגלגלין זכות ע"י זכאי:
8Moses said to them, "Wait, and I will hear what the Lord instructs concerning you." חוַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם משֶׁה עִמְדוּ וְאֶשְׁמְעָה מַה יְּצַוֶּה יְהֹוָה לָכֶם:
9The Lord spoke to Moses saying: טוַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
10Speak to the children of Israel saying, Any person who becomes unclean from [contact with] the dead, or is on a distant journey, whether among you or in future generations, he shall make a Passover sacrifice for the Lord. ידַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי יִהְיֶה טָמֵא | לָנֶפֶשׁ אוֹ בְדֶרֶךְ רְחֹקָה לָכֶם אוֹ לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם וְעָשָׂה פֶסַח לַיהֹוָה:
On a distant journey: Heb. רְחֹקָה. There is a dot over the word, to teach us that he does not really have to be far away, but even if he was merely outside the threshold of the Temple courtyard throughout the time allowed for the slaughtering [of the Passover sacrifice] (Pes. 93, Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:24). On the second Passover, one may keep both leavened bread and unleavened food in the home, and there is no festival. The consumption of leaven is not forbidden except while he eats it [the sacrifice]. — [Pes. 95a] או בדרך רחקה: נקוד עליו, לומר לא שרחוקה ודאי, אלא שהיה חוץ לאסקופת העזרה כל זמן שחיטה. פסח שני מצה וחמץ עמו בבית ואין שם יום טוב, ואין איסור חמץ אלא עמו באכילתו:
11In the second month, on the fourteenth day, in the afternoon, they shall make it; they shall eat it with unleavened cakes and bitter herbs. יאבַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשֵּׁנִי בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם יַעֲשׂוּ אֹתוֹ עַל מַצּוֹת וּמְרֹרִים יֹאכְלֻהוּ:
12They shall not leave over anything from it until the next morning, and they shall not break any of its bones. They shall make it in accordance with all the statutes connected with the Passover sacrifice. יבלֹא יַשְׁאִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר וְעֶצֶם לֹא יִשְׁבְּרוּ בוֹ כְּכָל חֻקַּת הַפֶּסַח יַעֲשׂוּ אֹתוֹ:
13But the man who was ritually clean and was not on a journey, yet refrained from making the Passover sacrifice, his soul shall be cut off from his people, for he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed time; that person shall bear his sin. יגוְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הוּא טָהוֹר וּבְדֶרֶךְ לֹא הָיָה וְחָדַל לַעֲשׂוֹת הַפֶּסַח וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מֵעַמֶּיהָ כִּי | קָרְבַּן יְהֹוָה לֹא הִקְרִיב בְּמֹעֲדוֹ חֶטְאוֹ יִשָּׂא הָאִישׁ הַהוּא:
14If a proselyte dwells with you, and he makes a Passover sacrifice to the Lord, according to the statutes of the Passover sacrifice and its ordinances he shall make it. One statute shall apply to you, to the proselyte and to the native-born citizen. ידוְכִי יָגוּר אִתְּכֶם גֵּר וְעָשָׂה פֶסַח לַיהֹוָה כְּחֻקַּת הַפֶּסַח וּכְמִשְׁפָּטוֹ כֵּן יַעֲשֶׂה חֻקָּה אַחַת יִהְיֶה לָכֶם וְלַגֵּר וּלְאֶזְרַח הָאָרֶץ:
If a proselyte dwells with you, and he makes a Passover sacrifice: I might think that anyone who converts should immediately make a Passover sacrifice. Therefore, Scripture teaches us, “One statute [shall apply to you, to the proselyte and to the native-born citizen].” And this is its meaning: If a proselyte dwells with you, and he comes (Reggio ed. - and the time comes) to make a Passover sacrifice with his friends,“according to the statutes of the Passover sacrifice and its ordinances he shall make it.” - [Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:30] וכי יגור אתכם גר ועשה פסח: יכול כל המתגייר יעשה פסח מיד, תלמוד לומר חקה אחת וגו', אלא כך משמעו, וכי יגור אתכם גר ובא עת לעשות פסח עם חביריו כחקה וכמשפט יעשה:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 77 - 78
• Chapter 77
1. For the Conductor, on the yedutun,1 by Asaph, a psalm.
2. [I raise] my voice to God and cry out; [I raise] my voice to God and He will listen to me.
3. On the day of my distress I sought my Lord. My wound oozes at night and does not abate; my soul refuses to be consoled.
4. I remember God and I moan; I speak and my spirit faints, Selah.
5. You grasped my eyelids; I am broken, I cannot speak.
6. I think of olden days, of ancient years.
7. During the night I recall my music, I meditate with my heart, and my spirit searches:
8. Is it for eternity that my Lord forsakes [me], nevermore to be appeased?
9. Has His kindness ceased forever? Has He sealed the decree for all generations?
10. Has God forgotten mercy? Has He in anger restrained His compassion forever?
11. I said, "It is to ter- rify me that the right hand of the Most High changes.”
12. I remember the deeds of Yah, when I remember Your wonders of long ago.
13. I meditate on all Your works, and speak of Your deeds.
14. O God, Your way is in sanctity; what god is as great as God?
15. You are the God Who works wonders; You make Your might known among the nations.
16. You redeemed Your people with a mighty arm, the children of Jacob and Joseph, Selah.
17. The waters2 saw You, O God, the waters saw You and trembled; even the deep shuddered.
18. The clouds streamed water, the heavens sounded forth, even Your arrows flew about.
19. The sound of Your thunder was in the rolling wind; lightning lit up the world; the earth trembled and quaked.
20. Your way was through the sea, Your path through the mighty waters; and Your footsteps were not known.3
21. You led Your people like a flock, by the hand of Moses and Aaron
Chapter 78
This psalm recounts all the miracles that God wrought for Israel, from the exodus of Egypt to David's becoming king over Israel.
1. A maskil1 by Asaph. Listen, my people, to my teaching; incline your ear to the words of my mouth.
2. I will open my mouth with a parable, I will utter riddles of long ago;
3. that which we have heard and know [to be true], and that our fathers have told us.
4. We will not withhold from their children, telling the final generation the praises of the Lord, and His might, and the wonders He has performed.
5. He established a testimony in Jacob, and set down the Torah in Israel, which He commanded our fathers to make known to their children,
6. so that the last generation shall know; children yet to be born will rise and tell their children,
7. and they shall put their hope in God, and not forget the works of the Almighty; and they shall guard His commandments.
8. And they shall not be like their fathers, a wayward and rebellious generation, a generation that did not set its heart straight, and whose spirit was not faithful to God.
9. The children of Ephraim, armed archers, retreated on the day of battle.2
10. They did not keep the covenant of God, and refused to follow His Torah.
11. They forgot His deeds and His wonders that He had shown them.
12. He performed wonders before their fathers, in the land of Egypt, in the field of Zoan.3
13. He split the sea and brought them across; He erected the waters like a wall.
14. He led them with a cloud by day, and all night long with the light of fire.
15. He split rocks in the wilderness, and gave them to drink as if from the abundant depths.
16. And He brought forth flowing waters from the rock, and caused waters to descend like rivers.
17. Yet they again continued to sin against Him, to provoke the Most High in the parched land.
18. And they tested God in their hearts, by requesting food for their craving.
19. They spoke against God; they said, "Can God set a table in the wilderness?
20. True, He hit the rock and waters flowed, streams gushed forth; but can He also give bread? Will He prepare meat for His people?”
21. And so the Lord heard and was enraged; a fire was kindled against Jacob; wrath, too, flared against Israel.
22. For they did not believe in God and did not trust in His salvation,
23. [though] He had commanded the skies above, and opened the doors of heaven.
24. He had rained upon them manna to eat, and given them grain of heaven.
25. Man ate the bread of angels; He sent them [enough] provisions to satiate.
26. He drove the east wind through the heaven, and led the south wind with His might.
27. He rained meat upon them like dust, winged birds like the sand of seas;
28. and He dropped them inside His camp, around His dwellings.
29. And they ate and were very satiated, for He brought them their desire.
30. They were not yet estranged from their craving, their food was still in their mouths,
31. when the wrath of God rose against them and slew their mighty ones, and brought down the chosen of Israel.
32. Despite this, they sinned again, and did not believe in His wonders;
33. so He ended their days in futility, and their years in terror.
34. When He slew them they would seek Him, they would return and pray to God.
35. They remembered that God is their rock, God the Most High, their redeemer.
36. But they beguiled Him with their mouth, and deceived Him with their tongue.
37. Their heart was not steadfast with Him; they were not faithful to His covenant.
38. Yet He is compassionate, pardons iniquity, and does not destroy; time and again He turns away His anger, and does not arouse all His wrath.
39. He remembered that they were but flesh, a spirit that leaves and does not return.
40. How often they provoked Him in the desert, and grieved Him in the wasteland!
41. Again and again they tested God, and sought a sign from the Holy One of Israel.
42. They did not remember His hand, the day He redeemed them from the oppressor;
43. that He set His signs in Egypt, and His wonders in the field of Zoan.
44. He turned their rivers to blood, and made their flowing waters undrinkable.
45. He sent against them a mixture of beasts which devoured them, and frogs that destroyed them.
46. He gave their produce to the grasshopper, and their toil to the locust.
47. He killed their vines with hail, and their sycamores with biting frost.
48. He delivered their animals to the hail, and their livestock to fiery bolts.
49. He sent against them His fierce anger, fury, rage, and affliction; a delegation of messengers of evil.
50. He leveled a path for His anger, and did not spare their soul from death; He delivered their animals to pestilence.
51. He struck every firstborn in Egypt, the first fruit of their strength in the tents of Ham.4
52. He drove His nation like sheep, and guided them like a flock in the desert.
53. He led them in security and they did not fear, for the sea covered their enemies.
54. And He brought them to the boundary of His holy place, this mountain which His right hand acquired.
55. He drove out nations before them, and allotted them an inheritance [measured] by the cord; He settled the tribes of Israel in their tents.
56. Yet they tested and defied God, the Most High, and did not keep His testimonies.
57. They regressed and rebelled like their fathers; they turned around like a deceptive bow.
58. They angered Him with their high altars, and provoked Him with their idols.
59. God heard and was enraged, and He was utterly disgusted with Israel;
60. And He abandoned the Tabernacle of Shilo, the Tent where He had dwelled among men.
61. He put His might into captivity, and His glory into the hand of the oppressor.
62. He delivered His nation to the sword, and was enraged with His inheritance.
63. Fire consumed His young men, and His maidens had no marriage song.
64. His priests fell by the sword, and their widows did not weep.5
65. And the Lord awoke like one who had been asleep, like a warrior shouting [to sober himself] from wine.
66. He beat His enemies into retreat, and dealt them eternal disgrace.
67. He was disgusted with the tent of Joseph, and did not choose the tribe of Ephraim.
68. He chose the tribe of Judah, Mount Zion which He loves.
69. And He built His Sanctuary [permanent as] the heavens; like the earth, He established it forever.
70. And He chose David His servant, and took him from the sheep corrals.
71. From following the nursing ewes, He brought Him to shepherd His nation Jacob, Israel His inheritance.
72. And he tended them with the integrity of his heart, and led them with the skill of his hands.
Tanya: Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, Chapter 5• Lessons in Tanya
• Tuesday, Sivan 15, 5775 · June 2, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Shaar Hayichud Vehaemunah, Chapter 5
Thanks to G‑d’s attribute of Gevurah and His capacity for tzimtzum — so the Alter Rebbe explained in the foregoing chapter — created beings live in the illusion that they possess an independent and tangible existence: they are unaware of the Divine life-force continuously found within them.
Being thus insensitive to the force that animates them, they are able to think of themselves as existing independently of their source. They fail to perceive that in truth they are but a diffusion of the rays of their source, like the diffusion of the sun’s rays as they are found within the sun.
At first glance this is incomprehensible: G‑d “desires to act with goodness,” to treat His creatures benevolently. Why, then, did He first plan to create the world through the attribute of strict justice?
According to what has been explained above, this is entirely understandable: In order for created beings to believe that they possess independent existence there must be the process of tzimtzum, which is an expression of the stern attribute of Gevurah. Without it, all of creation would be completely nullified within its source.
G‑d, however, desired that created beings maintain that they possess independent existence, in order for them to be able to serve Him and ultimately be rewarded for their service. Thus, it is specifically Gevurah and tzimtzum that enable them to realize the ultimate purpose of creation.
The original plan for creation, therefore, was that it should be dominated by the attribute of stern judgment. When, however, G‑d saw that if He created the world in this manner it could not endure, He tempered it by the attribute of mercy.
Why, indeed, would the world not be able to endure otherwise? — Because if creation had come about under such auspices alone, the life-force of holiness would have been utterly hidden. Accordingly, the spiritual task of revealing G‑dliness in such a world would have been inordinately arduous. G‑d therefore involved the attribute of mercy in the creation of the world, so that holiness and G‑dliness could be revealed within it.
It was stated in the previous chapter that both the expansive and creative attribute of Chesedand the concealing and constrictive attribute of Gevurah transcend the grasp of created beings. Here the Alter Rebbe adds that these attributes transcend even the comprehension of those souls that proceed from the level of Atzilut. Even so lofty a soul as Moses‘, which is a soul of the World of Atzilut, cannot fathom the Supernal attributes which are One with G‑d Himself.
The fact that they are Supernal attributes also helps us understand how they are able to combine, when by definition they are opposites. Within the “Side of Supernal Holiness” there is no dissonance, G‑d forbid, for all its components are complementary and integrated. At that level, Chesed and Gevurah, though opposed by nature, coexist and conjoin as “two opposites within a unity.” This is possible because of their complete and total union with G‑d.
I.e., an or pnimi, a degree of illumination that can be internalized and comprehended, issues forth from the firmament. Being comprehensible, this level of perception is likened to food, which is ingested internally.
We thus see that the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah of the World of Atzilut transcend not only the comprehension of created beings, but even souls of the level of Atzilut cannot comprehend them. Only as a reward are the souls in Gan Eden enabled to comprehend a mere diffusion of these two attributes.
Commentary of the Rebbe on End of Chapter Four and Chapter Five
...The entire fifth chapter of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah as well as the conclusion of the fourth chapter do not at all appear to advance our understanding of the concept of Divine Unity.
Ch. 4 concludes by explaining that the life-force is termed or (“light”) and the tzimtzum is termedkelim (“vessels”). It goes on to state that the kelim originate from the five consonants מנצפ"ך, and that they have an additional, even higher source: Gevurah of Atik. Correspondingly, Chesed ofAtik is the source of the attribute of Chesed [of Atzilut].
At first glance, these seem to be strictly kabbalistic concepts that have absolutely no bearing on our understanding of Divine Unity, especially as the Alter Rebbe endeavors to explain it in a manner that will make it “very near to you.”
(Although the conclusion of ch. 4 is enclosed in brackets, the Alter Rebbe nevertheless chose to incorporate it in the body of Tanya rather than relegating it to a marginal note (as with many comments in the first part of the book, as well as in the second part8). This indicates that even the bracketed text must be directly related to the general theme of this work.)
The same question applies to the whole of the fifth chapter: it deals throughout with matters that seemingly have no connection with the concept of Divine Unity. The Alter Rebbe first explains aMidrash, then the level of Moses‘ apprehension of Divinity, and finally the level of Gan Eden.Since none of this seems to be related to Divine Unity, why did the Alter Rebbe include it inShaar HaYichud VehaEmunah?
It is indeed true that many subjects obliquely alluded to in Tanya are not directly related in their simple context to making its stated goal “very near,” nor do they appear to be directly related to the subject of “Unity and Faith.” (Witness the many points quoted from Tanya and explained in various chassidic discourses at length, whereas in Tanya itself they are only hinted at.)
Nevertheless, these are matters which are only alluded to obliquely. Those topics, however, that are plain for all to see, must clearly be connected to the overall theme of the book.
This is similar to the written Torah in general, and especially according to the commentary ofRashi on the Chumash. Although many interpretations are alluded to there on the homiletical and mystical levels of Remez, Derush and Sod, it is nevertheless a principle sanctioned by law that in the revealed context “a verse does not depart from its plain meaning.” And it is this Pshat,this plain or literal meaning, that the commentary of Rashi seeks to explain.
The same is true of Tanya, which is the Written Torah of Chassidut. Although all aspects of Torah are to be found within it, it always retains its simple meaning (as Pshat is to be understood in the context of the esoteric dimension of Torah).
Hence all subjects appearing in Tanya must be connected with the general theme of the book. They must all be “very nigh”; they must all explain “Unity and Faith”; and they must do so in a manner that enables one to “train a child” in them all. Those subjects that do not meet these criteria never found their way into Tanya. In the words of the Rebbe Rashab, of blessed memory,9 “Tanya is like the Chumash..., which is understood.”
Accordingly, it is very difficult to understand how the topics discussed at the conclusion of ch. 4 and throughout ch. 5 found a place in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah. We must therefore say that they deepen our understanding of the theme of Unity, as shall soon be explained.
The third chapter goes on to explain that since these creative letters are constantly found within the created being, it is always in a state of absorption within them, similar to the light of the sun within the sun-globe. The created being is thus completely nullified out of existence.
The reason that the created being perceives itself as possessing independent existence is explained by the Alter Rebbe in the fourth chapter. Only because of the tzimtzum, by which G‑d conceals and contracts His life-force so that the created being should not be aware of it, does that being appear — and perceive itself — to be a separate entity. “If, however, the eye were permitted to see..., then the physicality, materiality and tangibility of the creature would not be seen by our eyes at all.”
However, this does not suffice. Although it is true that G‑d caused this concealment, yet man, as an intelligent being, should surely use his mind’s eye to see through the concealment; his understanding should inevitably lead him to the realization and the sensation that he is completely nullified within his source.
The Alter Rebbe answers this question by stating (in ch. 3) that a created being feels that he exists because “we do not comprehend nor see with our physical eyes the power of G‑d and the ‘breath of His mouth’ which is in the created thing.” Thus it is man’s very corporeality that blinds him to the Divine life-force contained within every created being.
This whole subject as explained until the end of the fourth chapter poses numerous difficulties regarding fundamental aspects of Divine Unity. And without the explanations furnished at the end of the fourth chapter and the whole of the fifth chapter these questions cannot be answered.
(a) Each creature is animated by different letters from among the Ten Utterances, for, as explained in ch. 1, the life-force descends through numerous combinations and substitutions of these Divine creative letters until it is clothed in each particular creature. It would therefore seem that there exists (G‑d forbid) a multiplicity of G‑dliness, with the number of letters equalling the number of creatures. In fact, the multitude of letters is even greater than the number of created beings, for, as explained in ch. 1, many letters are invested within each creature. This seeming multitude of G‑dliness would appear to be the very antithesis of Divine Unity.
Moreover, the above question specifically arises out of the Alter Rebbe’s explanation!
There are those who mistakenly understood the doctrine of tzimtzum in a literal sense, as if G‑d actually removed His Presence from this world. If we were to assume their view then there would be no problem, for we could then say (as they do) the following: G‑d is indeed a complete Unity, but his relation to the proliferation in the created universe is that of a king who sits in his palace and gazes at a garbage heap outside.
However, according to the explanation in Tanya — that “Forever, O G‑d, Your word stands firm in the heavens,” i.e., that letters of the Ten Utterances are clothed within each individual creature — there arises the question: how can there possibly be a multiplicity in G‑dliness?
We cannot answer that the multiplicity results from the attribute of Gevurah of the Divine NameElokim. For as explained in ch. 4 (until the bracketed ending), the tzimtzum which comes from the Name Elokim adds nothing to creation itself: it merely acts as a barrier and concealment so that the life-force will not be felt by the created being. (This prevents the creature from being wholly nullified within its source, enabling it instead to feel its own separate and distinct existence.) The life-force itself emanates strictly from the utterance of the Divine NameHavayah. (This is also why in ch. 3 the Alter Rebbe likens the created being to the sun’s rays, and the life-force to the sun itself — for the source of the life-force within the creature (i.e., the letters) is the “sun” of Havayah.)
It would thus seem that the multiplicity in the universe does not result from the Name Elokim, a name which utilizes the plural form, but from the Name Havayah itself. This would seem to imply that in Havayah as well there is multiplicity. This prompts the question: “How many suns (Divine Presences) are there?” [Cf. Likutei Amarim, end of ch. 35.]
(b) According to the Alter Rebbe’s explanation, created beings are in reality found within their source. They perceive themselves as existing separately from it merely because of the concealment of the tzimtzum; in reality, however, they are G‑dliness. Therefore, “if the eye were permitted to see,” we would perceive that they are G‑dly.
This gives rise to a cataclysmic question regarding the entire essence of Torah and mitzvot.
The purpose of Torah and mitzvot is to draw down G‑dliness into the physical substances with which the mitzvot are performed. This is what is meant by the teaching that only by performing amitzvah does the physical object become holy. Indeed, this concept is implicit in the recitation of blessings before the performance of mitzvot, for the Hebrew word for blessing (ברכה) implies the drawing down of G‑dliness within the object with which the mitzvah is performed.
The mitzvah of tefillin, for example (and so, too, all other mitzvot, all of which are likened totefillin), is intended to draw down G‑dliness into the physical parchment and ink, etc.
Now, since the parchment is G‑dly (even before the performance of the mitzvah), how is it possible for a mitzvah originating in the “Torah of truth” to imply by its effect (and by its inherent truth) that the parchment is in fact mundane, and only by virtue of what is inscribed on it, and so on, does it begin to become G‑dly? In fact it is G‑dly even before this; it is only the corporeal eyes of man that fail to perceive it to be so.
We mortals fail to perceive the truth. Torah, however, is truth, and its mitzvot are true. How, then, can there possibly be a mitzvah (and the very fact that there is such a mitzvah indicates the truth of the matter) of taking parchment and transforming it into G‑dliness, when in reality it was G‑dly even before it was used for a mitzvah?
This difficulty too springs from the explanation of Tanya. Were we to say that the doctrine oftzimtzum is to be understood (as its erroneous exponents understand it) in its literal sense — as if G‑d literally withdrew His Presence from creation, thereafter gazing upon creation from a distance like the proverbial king through his palace window — then there would be no difficulty.
However, according to the concept of Unity as explained here in Tanya, whereby the King Himself is found in the place of the parchment or whatever, then the difficulty manifests itself. For according to this explanation the place itself and all its aspects are themselves G‑dliness.
If so, what is the meaning of Torah study and performing precepts? What is the point of studying the law that applies to “one who exchanges a cow for a donkey,” what is the point of performing a mitzvah involving parchment and ink, when in reality there is no cow and no donkey, no parchment and no ink, but everything is G‑dliness? What is the significance of Torah andmitzvot?
(c) The question now becomes even greater. The reason we perceive the world to exist as an independent entity is that we view it with “physical eyes,” and “the eye [was not] permitted to see,” and so on; i.e., our tangible corporeality prevents us from beholding the truth.
It would therefore be logical to assume that tzaddikim, inasmuch as they are not hindered by the concealment occasioned by corporeal flesh and inasmuch as they transcend materiality, should be able to perceive the truth — that the world truly does not exist, for everything is G‑dliness alone. Those tzaddikim who are at the level of the World of Yetzirah or Beriah, and surely the truly great tzaddikim who have become a “chariot of Atzilut” (as explained in Likutei Amarim, ch. 39), should not be subject to the restrictions of the concealment. With regard to them the above question becomes even stronger: What is the meaning of Torah and mitzvot forthem? Since the G‑dliness manifest in this world is revealed to them, there would seem to be no need for them (G‑d forbid) to perform Torah and mitzvot!
The Alter Rebbe explains at the conclusion of ch. 4 that the tzimtzum and concealment of life-force is termed kelim (“vessels”), while the life-force itself is called or (“light”). He then goes on to explain that “the kelim are verily the letters.”
This seems to contradict what was explained in the previous chapters. Earlier on, in the first chapter, the Alter Rebbe writes that the letters are the life-force of created beings. Here, however, he says that the life-force is the light, while the letters are the vessels, which contract and conceal the life-force. How is this to be reconciled with his previous statement that the letters are the life-force that reveal, as opposed to the kelim, which conceal?
But in truth, not only is the present statement not a contradiction to what was stated earlier: it is actually an explanation of the previous statement that the letters are the life-force.
The question was raised earlier that since the letters are the life-force of creatures, it would seem that there is a multiplicity of G‑dliness. For since tzimtzum itself is not a party to creation (but only conceals the Creator from the created), the multitude of letters is thus caused not bytzimtzum but by Elokut, by G‑dliness Itself. The question then is: How can there possibly be a multitude of G‑dliness?
The Alter Rebbe answers this in the bracketed text by stating that “the tzimtzum and concealing of the life-force is called kelim.” One of the novel insights contained in this statement is thattzimtzum is an actual entity.
Just as kelim are more than just a concealment of the light, being entities unto themselves, so, too, with regard to the tzimtzum and concealment which are deemed to be kelim; they too are an entity. And it is this entity that brings about the contraction and concealment of the light (just as an actual vessel, being an entity, conceals that which is found within it).
We are now able to understand the multiplicity of letters. The multitudinous letters are not intrinsic to the light itself; they are a result of its passage through the tzimtzum of the kelim.
This is illustrated by the well-known comparison with the sun’s rays that pass through white, green or red glass. The light itself remains simple, unaffected by its passage. However, there is an evident change with regard to its effect; after passing through red glass the light functions as red light, through green glass — as green light, and so forth.
This is what the Alter Rebbe means when he says that “the kelim are verily the letters”; i.e., the shaping of the life-force into letters is not a function of the life-force itself, for “the life-force itself is called or (light)” — and light itself is simple, transcending any particular form or shape. (For light is rooted in the “ ’sun‘ of Havayah,” and in the Name Havayah there can be no multiplicity, heaven forbid, as has been explained earlier.) The letters contained in the life-force result from the kelim, which cause the light clothed in them to be shaped (with regard to their effect).
Accordingly, the second question, regarding the relevance of Torah and mitzvot, is answered as well. Were tzimtzum to be a non-entity and only constitute a state of concealment, its sole purpose being to hide and act as a barrier to the light, then created beings that emerge as a result of this tzimtzum would in reality not exist at all. (It would only seem to corporeal eyes that they enjoy a true state of existence.)
Since tzimtzum does, however, constitute an entity — the entity of kelim, it possesses existence. As such, its effect in concealing is similar to its effect when bringing letters into being.
Regarding the latter, it was explained earlier that the effect of tzimtzum on the light was that it caused it to assume the “shape” of letters, even though the light itself is not affected; its effect exists only in relation to created beings. Thus it is similar to the sun’s rays which do not really change in themselves, although the effect of the colored glass on them is to produce red or green light, and so on.
The same is true with regard to the effect of tzimtzum in concealing the life-force so that it will not be perceived by created beings. The concealment itself is a real entity. It is true that in relation to the light, the tzimtzum does not conceal at all. From the perspective of created beings, however, the tzimtzum is truly an existing entity. It therefore follows that [since they were created through it] they have true tangible existence as well.
What does this have to do with his previous statement that the tzimtzum and concealment is termed kelim, and so on?
By stating the above the Alter Rebbe forestalls a formidable problem: How is it possible for thetzimtzum to conceal the light? If we were to hold that the tzimtzum merely prevents the light from being revealed within creation, then there would be no problem. However, in the bracketed text the Alter Rebbe teaches us a novel concept — that the tzimtzum results from the kelim. Now since they are a separate entity distinct from the light, the question arises: How is it possible for the kelim (a distinct and separate entity from light) to effect a change, as it were, in the light?
The question is even greater: Light is the attribute of Chesed; tzimtzum is the attribute ofGevurah. In the order of the Sefirot, Chesed precedes Gevurah (qualitatively as well). How canGevurah possibly cause a change in an attribute which is spiritually superior to it?
The Alter Rebbe therefore explains that the root of the letters is the “five degrees of Gevurahthat divide and separate the breath and voice....” I.e., the Alter Rebbe is teaching us that the concept of letters is not found only within the Sefirot of Atzilut, but far higher, until ultimately the source of the Gevurot is the “supernal Gevurah of Atik Yomin,” while “correspondingly, the source of [the various levels of Divine] kindness is also Chesed of Atik Yomin.” Thus, bothGevurah and Chesed are rooted in Atik Yomin.
Since both attributes are rooted in Atik Yomin, the meaning of which is “removed (נעתק) and separated from ‘days’ [i.e., the attributes of Atzilut],” it follows that because of their common source they are indeed not opposites: they are one. For, as the Alter Rebbe will soon explain (in chs. 6 and 7), even in Atzilut “He and His attributes are One.” How much more certainly must this be the case insofar as they exist in their source in Atik Yomin, which is far superior to Atzilut. It is therefore possible for the light of Chesed to be modified by the tzimtzum of Gevurah.
One reason the Alter Rebbe does so is that it enhances our understanding of the entire concept of tzimtzum. This will be understood after several prefatory remarks.
This Midrash is generally thought to be saying that G‑d originally planned that the world be conducted with the attribute of Gevurah, stern judgment. However, when He saw that the world could not endure this, He combined with it the attribute of mercy.
The wording of the Midrash, however, is not “to conduct the world” but “to create the world.” Clearly the Midrash refers to G‑d’s manner of creation — that He had originally planned to create the world solely through the attribute of Gevurah.
The question thus becomes: How is it possible for creation to come about from the attribute ofGevurah, an attribute of tzimtzum? I.e., how is it possible for tzimtzum to bring about creation, when (simplistically) tzimtzum is a non-entity, its function being only to contract and constrain the Divine life-force. How can the non-entity of tzimtzum create?
This serves to prove that tzimtzum is indeed an entity, for as explained previously tzimtzumcorresponds to kelim.
This, then, is what the Midrash means when it says, “Originally it arose in [G‑d’s] thought to create the world through the attribute of stern judgment.” G‑d’s initial intention was that creation come about by means of the kelim, through the power of the light vested in them — that creation result from the letters that are formed in the light through its being clothed in kelim.
Accordingly, we will also understand the continuation of this passage — that “He associated the attribute of mercy in it[s creation]” refers to “the revelation of G‑dliness through the tzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles....” Why must this necessarily be the explanation of the role of the attribute of mercy?
In light of the above, this is clearly understood: Since the “attribute of stern judgment” refers to the letters, we must therefore say that the “attribute of mercy” refers to the light as it transcends the shape of letters. This light finds expression in “the revelation of G‑dliness through thetzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles...”— by effecting a change in the course of nature. (The letters cause each individual creature to have its own characteristics and nature; a change in nature must necessarily derive from the spiritually superior light.)
In explaining that the attribute of mercy refers to “the revelation of G‑dliness through thetzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles,” the Alter Rebbe adds the words “recorded in the Torah.” At first glance, it is unclear what this phrase means; does the Alter Rebbe refer specifically to the Written Torah, or is the Oral Torah included as well? Furthermore, the miracles that occurred after the forty-year sojourn of the Jewish people in the desert; that occurred after the first Holy Temple (concluding the events and miracles recorded in the Written Torah); that occurred even after the Talmud (the Oral Torah) had been finally recorded; up to and including the miracles10 “witnessed by our own eyes and not by a stranger,” i.e., the miracles that occurred on the 12th and 13th of Tammuz 5687;11 — all these are “revelations of G‑dliness” emanating from the “attribute of mercy.” Why then does the Alter Rebbe specify the miracles “recorded in the Torah”?
The Alter Rebbe added this phrase in order to answer two very strong questions:
(a) Since the world was created from the letters (for which reason each individual creature has its own character and nature), how is it possible that there be revealed within the world (through signs and miracles that transcend nature) a light which is superior to letters? Inasmuch as the world was created through the letters, one would expect it to be incapable of housing a light that transcends letters, which would still continue to exist as tangible entities.
(b) As mentioned earlier, the Midrash addresses itself not to the manner in which the world is conducted, but to the manner of its creation. G‑d first intended to create the world through the attribute of stern justice. Thereafter — but prior to the actual creation — G‑d combined in it, i.e., within creation, the attribute of mercy. Thus the act of creation is brought about by the attribute of mercy as well as by the attribute of stern judgment.
This leads to the following question:
“The revelation of G‑dliness through the tzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles” took place long after creation. What then does the Midrash mean by stating that “He associated the attribute of mercy in it[s creation],” when this attribute was only revealed long after creation?
It is in order to answer these two questions that the Alter Rebbe adds the words, “recorded in the Torah.” One of the meanings of this phrase is: The G‑dliness that is revealed throughtzaddikim and miracles (which emanate from the light that is superior to the letters, as has already been explained), — this too was first recorded in the Torah. It follows that it is found in creation as a whole, inasmuch as creation proceeds from the Ten Utterances recorded in the Torah, as explained above (at the end of the first chapter of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah).
Accordingly, we will also understand why the Midrash states that “Originally it arose in [G‑d’s]thought to create the world through the attribute of stern judgment”; it was only in thought that G‑d considered creating the world solely with the attribute of stern judgement, that is, from the letters themselves bereft of the light that transcends the kelim. When it came to actual creation, however, i.e., when it came to the speaking of the Ten Utterances that brought about creation, these letters were invested with the light that transcends kelim.
Since the letters contain this light, signifying the negation of the tzimtzum of these letters, it is then possible that at the appropriate time — preordained when the Utterances were first spoken — there occur the signs and miracles that signify the negation of the tzimtzum as found below.
Thus, all these miracles were not something that came about later; rather, they emanate from the light and G- dliness that transcend kelim and that were invested within the letters. This degree of G‑dliness is then revealed at a later time through the tzaddikim and through signs and miracles.
This, then, is what is explained here in Tanya — that at the very moment of creation G‑d combined and vested within creation the attribute of mercy; that in the letters of the Ten Utterances which are enclothed within every creature there is invested the light that transcends the kelim, this light to be later revealed through the signs and miracles.
The above question applies primarily to Moses. His soul was always in a state of total revelation, and not at all concealed by his body, for it was completely penetrated and elevated by his Divine service. For a person such as Moses, for whom there is no concealment of G‑dliness, what is the meaning of Torah and mitzvot?
And with regard to Moses himself, the question stems not so much from his qualities in general as it does from the distinctive nature of “his prophetic vision.” Moses was unique among prophets in that not only his soul, but his very body too was equally a fit receptacle for prophecy. His body was not only able to understand G‑dliness, it could actually perceive the G‑dly prophetic vision. This being so, the question becomes all the more demanding of an answer: What is the meaning of Torah and mitzvot to so lofty an individual as Moses?
The Alter Rebbe answers this by saying: “Even the comprehension of Moses...in his prophetic vision did not extend to the World of Atzilut.” This means to say, that even for an individual as great as Moses the world could be said to exist. True it is that this manner of existence was ever so much higher than our own conception of existence, but existence it was. Torah and mitzvotthus applied to Moses as well, so that he could transform this existence (of his world) into G‑dliness.
Although [Moses was of the World of Atzilut, and] the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah as they exist within Atzilut are G‑dly attributes and wholly at one with G‑d Himself, and thus Gevurahdoes not conceal Chesed, nevertheless, Moses‘ comprehension “did not extend to the World ofAtzilut, except through its being clothed in the World of Beriah.”
This, however, does not suffice. While it is true that Moses‘ comprehension of (the Chesed andGevurah of) Atzilut extended to the degree that it clothed itself in the World of Beriah, it is only in the World of Beriah that creation first takes place. Moses was therefore able to see in prophetic vision the limitlessness of G‑dliness (as explained in ch. 4). And surely Moses did not behold creation there with corporeal eyes.
G‑d’s Gevurah even after being clothed in Beriah still remains G‑d’s Gevurah. Since Moses was not subject to the concealment inherent in corporeal eyes, he was able to perceive the attribute of Gevurah as clothed in the World of Beriah; he did not perceive a concealing attribute ofGevurah: he perceived a luminous Gevurah. The question thus remains: What was the meaning of Torah and mitzvot for Moses?
The Alter Rebbe answers this by adding that the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah as they were clothed in the World of Beriah were not themselves apprehended by Moses, but “but only insofar as they were clothed in attributes which are of lower levels than themselves, viz., the attributes of Netzach, Hod and Yesod.”
Thus when Moses apprehended Chesed and Gevurah of Atzilut, he apprehended Chesedinsofar as it is clothed in Netzach, Gevurah insofar as it is clothed in Hod, and both of them insofar as they are clothed in Yesod. Since his comprehension of Chesed and Gevurah related to them only insofar as they were garbed in the concealing cloak of Netzach, Hod and Yesod, therefore even for Moses the world was endowed with existence. It was, to be sure, a very rarefied form of existence, but it was existence nonetheless. Torah and mitzvot thus applied to him as well.
Now according to that which was just explained, how can it be possible to “derive pleasure from the radiance of the Divine Presence” in any of the Worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah or Asiyah?
The Alter Rebbe therefore explains that in Gan Eden there is an apprehension of the “spreading forth of the life-force and light which issues from these two attributes, Chesed andGevurah”; i.e., in Gan Eden one is able to comprehend the life-force as it spreads forth fromChesed and Gevurah themselves, without the intermediacy of Netzach, Hod and Yesod. (The “spreading forth ” is to be understood as explained in Iggeret HaKodesh, Epistle 19.) This comprehension, the Alter Rebbe goes on to say, is “the food of the souls”; i.e., it is internalized, like food which is ingested internally.
However, this gives rise to yet another question: Would we not expect Gan Eden itself to be nullified out of existence, inasmuch as the radiance of the Divine Presence is revealed there? Moreover, Gan Eden has to do with comprehension.13 How does it relate to the emotive attributes of Chesed and Gevurah?
In answer to this the Alter Rebbe states: “For from the diffusion of these two attributes, a firmament is spread.... Within this is the secret of the twenty-two letters of the Torah.” Within these letters of the Torah which bring all created beings into existence, was clothed the Divine light which transcends the tzimtzum of these letters, as explained earlier.
From the perspective of Torah, these two attributes — the revelation of Chesed and the concealment of Gevurah — do not contradict one another. This is because Torah encompasses them both, [as the Alter Rebbe goes on to say:] “as it is written, ‘From His right hand [He gave] unto them a fiery Law.’ ” Torah is thus composed both of “right” (Chesed) and “fire” (Gevurah). It is therefore possible for these two opposites to coexist — Gan Eden existing as an entity, and within it, the revealed radiance of the Divine Presence.
The question of how Gan Eden, which is intellectual perception, relates to Chesed andGevurah, which are emotive, is answered by the Alter Rebbe when he states: “For this firmament is the secret of knowledge (Daat).” This means to say that the one intellectual faculty of Daat encompasses both emotive attributes of Chesed and Gevurah, and yet Daat is a faculty of intellect.
But another matter remains to be understood. Gan Eden comprises two aspects: (a) In Gan Eden there is Torah study (see Likutei Amarim, ch. 41); (b) Though in Gan Eden there is no performance of mitzvot (as alluded to in the verse, במתים חפשי), there is, however, reward for prior performance.
Now it is understandable how Torah can be found in Gan Eden, for as explained previously, Torah is comprised of the harmonious conjoining of Chesed and Gevurah. Mitzvot, however, are individualized.
For it is known14 that Torah is likened to blood and the mitzvot to bodily organs; whereas blood courses throughout all parts of the body, the organs are separate from one another, each with its own individual function.
Since, from the perspective of mitzvot, Chesed and Gevurah are two separate attributes, it would seem that from this perspective Gan Eden could not possibly exist, inasmuch as it is a composite of both Chesed and Gevurah. Furthermore, if the light elicited by the performance of precepts would indeed be drawn down, this light being a manifestation of Chesed, would this not cause the very existence of Gan Eden, whose source is Gevurah, to be completely nullified?
The Alter Rebbe therefore says, “and the commandments are [their] garments.” Since themitzvot comprise both Chesed and Gevurah, which are two distinct attributes, it is indeed impossible for the light elicited by the mitzvot to permeate [the souls in Gan Eden] inwardly, for if it were to do so they would be nullified out of existence.
For this reason, the reward in Gan Eden for the performance of mitzvot is granted only in the protective and auxiliary manner of a garment; this light is not drawn down into the souls in a permeating manner.
Torah, however, which is comprised of the conjoining of Chesed and Gevurah, is truly “food” for the souls in Gan Eden. It permeates them without causing their nullification, unlike the mitzvot, which are merely “garments”.
According to all the above-mentioned questions, whose answers are provided by the Alter Rebbe beginning with the bracketed text in ch. 4, and continuing until the final bracket of ch. 5, this difficulty finds the following simple resolution:
The bracketed text beginning near the conclusion of ch. 4 extends until the end of ch. 5. The worthy typesetter, however, seeing two brackets at the end of ch. 5, assumed that one of them was surely superfluous — not taking into consideration that one of them possibly marked the conclusion of the bracketed passage beginning in ch. 4.
Excerpted from a Sichah delivered on Shabbat, Parshat Mishpatim, 5727.
Being thus insensitive to the force that animates them, they are able to think of themselves as existing independently of their source. They fail to perceive that in truth they are but a diffusion of the rays of their source, like the diffusion of the sun’s rays as they are found within the sun.
והנה על זה אמרו רז״ל
Concerning this i.e., concerning the concept that all of creation came about through the process of tzimtzum, which enables created beings to believe that they enjoy an independent form of existence, our Sages, of blessed memory, said:1
בתחלה עלה במחשבה לברוא את העולם במדת הדין
“Originally it arose in [G‑d’s] thought to create the world through the attribute of stern judgment,through the attribute of tzimtzum and Gevurah;
ראה שאין העולם מתקיים
He saw, however, that in this manner the world could not endure,
שתף בו מדת רחמים
so He associated the attribute of mercy in it[s creation].“At first glance this is incomprehensible: G‑d “desires to act with goodness,” to treat His creatures benevolently. Why, then, did He first plan to create the world through the attribute of strict justice?
According to what has been explained above, this is entirely understandable: In order for created beings to believe that they possess independent existence there must be the process of tzimtzum, which is an expression of the stern attribute of Gevurah. Without it, all of creation would be completely nullified within its source.
G‑d, however, desired that created beings maintain that they possess independent existence, in order for them to be able to serve Him and ultimately be rewarded for their service. Thus, it is specifically Gevurah and tzimtzum that enable them to realize the ultimate purpose of creation.
The original plan for creation, therefore, was that it should be dominated by the attribute of stern judgment. When, however, G‑d saw that if He created the world in this manner it could not endure, He tempered it by the attribute of mercy.
Why, indeed, would the world not be able to endure otherwise? — Because if creation had come about under such auspices alone, the life-force of holiness would have been utterly hidden. Accordingly, the spiritual task of revealing G‑dliness in such a world would have been inordinately arduous. G‑d therefore involved the attribute of mercy in the creation of the world, so that holiness and G‑dliness could be revealed within it.
דהיינו: התגלות אלקות על ידי צדיקים, ואותות ומופתים שבתורה
That is, i.e., “He combined with it the attribute of mercy” means: the revelation within the world of G‑dliness and of supernatural power through the tzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles recorded in the Torah.It was stated in the previous chapter that both the expansive and creative attribute of Chesedand the concealing and constrictive attribute of Gevurah transcend the grasp of created beings. Here the Alter Rebbe adds that these attributes transcend even the comprehension of those souls that proceed from the level of Atzilut. Even so lofty a soul as Moses‘, which is a soul of the World of Atzilut, cannot fathom the Supernal attributes which are One with G‑d Himself.
והנה על זה אמרו בזהר, דלעילא, בסטרא דקדושה עילאה, אית ימינא ואית שמאלא, דהיינו חסד וגבורה
Regarding this, i.e., regarding the fact that the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah transcend intellect, it was stated in the Zohar:2 “Above, in the ‘Side of Supernal Holiness,’ i.e., in the World of Atzilut, which is far superior to the three lower Worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, there is right and left,” namely, Chesed and Gevurah.
פירוש: דשתיהן הן מדות אלקות למעלה משכל הנבראים והשגתם
This statement was surely not written simply to inform us that Chesed and Gevurah exist, for this is already well-known; rather: This means that both — Gevurah as well as Chesed — are attributes of G‑dliness that transcend the intellect and comprehension of created beings,The fact that they are Supernal attributes also helps us understand how they are able to combine, when by definition they are opposites. Within the “Side of Supernal Holiness” there is no dissonance, G‑d forbid, for all its components are complementary and integrated. At that level, Chesed and Gevurah, though opposed by nature, coexist and conjoin as “two opposites within a unity.” This is possible because of their complete and total union with G‑d.
דאיהו וגרמוהי חד בעולם האצילות
for3 “He and His attributes are One in the World of Atzilut,” both Chesed and Gevurah being thus wholly united with Him.
ואף השגת משה רבינו עליו השלום בנבואתו לא היתה בעולם האצילות
Even the comprehension of Moses our Teacher (peace unto him) in his prophetic vision did not extend to the World of Atzilut itself,
אלא על ידי התלבשותו בעולם הבריאה
except through its being clothed in the World of Beriah;
ואף גם זאת, לא בשתי מדות אלו, חסד וגבורה
and even then, [his comprehension of the World of Atzilut did] not [extend] to these two attributes, viz., Chesed and Gevurah,4
אלא על ידי התלבשותן במדות שלמטה מהן במדרגה, שהן מדות נצח הוד יסוד
but only insofar as they were previously clothed in attributes which are of lower levels than themselves, viz., the attributes of Netzach (“victory”, “eternity”), Hod (“splendor”), and Yesod(“foundation”), the attribute of Netzach being merely an offshoot of Chesed, and Hod an offshoot of Gevurah, so that through them Chesed and Gevurah percolate down into Yesod,which in turn transmits its influence to yet lower levels.
(כמו שכתוב בשער הנבואה)
(5as is explained in Shaar HaNevuah) concerning the level of Moses‘ prophecy.
רק שמתן שכרם של צדיקים בגן עדן הוא השגת התפשטות החיות ואור, הנמשך משתי מדות אלו, חסד וגבורה
It is only the tzaddikim in Gan Eden who are granted the reward of comprehending the spreading forth of the life-force and light which issues from these two attributes, Chesed andGevurah.
והוא מזון נשמות הצדיקים שעסקו בתורה לשמה בעולם הזה
This comprehension of the spreading forth of life-force and light which issues from these two attributes is the “food” of the souls of the tzaddikim who, in this world, engaged in the study of Torah for its own sake.
כי מהתפשטות שתי מדות אלו, נמתח רקיע על הנשמות שבגן עדן
For from the diffusion of these two attributes, a firmament i.e., an or makkif, a transcendental (lit., “encompassing”) degree of illumination is spread over the souls in Gan Eden, and it is this firmament that empowers them to receive this diffusion.
ורקיע זה נקרא רזא דאורייתא
This firmament is called Raza deOrayta (“the secret of the Torah”); i.e., the mystical dimension of the Torah.
ובו סוד כ״ב אותיות התורה, הנתונה משתי מדות אלו
Within this firmament is the secret of the twenty-two letters of the Torah (which derive from an even higher level than the rational and comprehensible aspect of the Torah), which was given as an expression of these two attributes,
כדכתיב: מימינו אש דת למו
as it is written,6 “From His right hand [He gave] unto them a fiery Law.” The “right hand” represents Chesed, while “fiery” alludes to the element of Gevurah that is present in the Torah.
ומרקיע זה נוטף טל למזון הנשמות
From this firmament, from this transcendental illumination, drops dew, symbolic of the esoteric insights of the Torah, as food for the souls,I.e., an or pnimi, a degree of illumination that can be internalized and comprehended, issues forth from the firmament. Being comprehensible, this level of perception is likened to food, which is ingested internally.
דהיינו ידיעת סוד כ״ב אותיות התורה
i.e., a knowledge of the secret of the twenty-two letters of the Torah.
כי הרקיע הזה הוא סוד הדעת
For this firmament is the secret and level of knowledge (Daat), and the “dew” that issues forth from it is the knowledge of the secret of the twenty-two letters of the Torah,
והתורה היא מזון הנשמות בגן עדן, והמצות הן לבושים
and the Torah is the “food” of the souls in Gan Eden, and the commandments are [their] “garments”,
כמבואר כל זה (בזהר ויקהל דף ר״ט ור״י, ובעץ חיים שער מ״ד פרק ג׳)
as all this is explained (7in Zohar, Vayakhel, pp. 209-210, and in Etz Chayim, Shaar 44, ch. 3).We thus see that the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah of the World of Atzilut transcend not only the comprehension of created beings, but even souls of the level of Atzilut cannot comprehend them. Only as a reward are the souls in Gan Eden enabled to comprehend a mere diffusion of these two attributes.
Commentary of the Rebbe on End of Chapter Four and Chapter Five
...The entire fifth chapter of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah as well as the conclusion of the fourth chapter do not at all appear to advance our understanding of the concept of Divine Unity.
Ch. 4 concludes by explaining that the life-force is termed or (“light”) and the tzimtzum is termedkelim (“vessels”). It goes on to state that the kelim originate from the five consonants מנצפ"ך, and that they have an additional, even higher source: Gevurah of Atik. Correspondingly, Chesed ofAtik is the source of the attribute of Chesed [of Atzilut].
At first glance, these seem to be strictly kabbalistic concepts that have absolutely no bearing on our understanding of Divine Unity, especially as the Alter Rebbe endeavors to explain it in a manner that will make it “very near to you.”
(Although the conclusion of ch. 4 is enclosed in brackets, the Alter Rebbe nevertheless chose to incorporate it in the body of Tanya rather than relegating it to a marginal note (as with many comments in the first part of the book, as well as in the second part8). This indicates that even the bracketed text must be directly related to the general theme of this work.)
The same question applies to the whole of the fifth chapter: it deals throughout with matters that seemingly have no connection with the concept of Divine Unity. The Alter Rebbe first explains aMidrash, then the level of Moses‘ apprehension of Divinity, and finally the level of Gan Eden.Since none of this seems to be related to Divine Unity, why did the Alter Rebbe include it inShaar HaYichud VehaEmunah?
It is indeed true that many subjects obliquely alluded to in Tanya are not directly related in their simple context to making its stated goal “very near,” nor do they appear to be directly related to the subject of “Unity and Faith.” (Witness the many points quoted from Tanya and explained in various chassidic discourses at length, whereas in Tanya itself they are only hinted at.)
Nevertheless, these are matters which are only alluded to obliquely. Those topics, however, that are plain for all to see, must clearly be connected to the overall theme of the book.
This is similar to the written Torah in general, and especially according to the commentary ofRashi on the Chumash. Although many interpretations are alluded to there on the homiletical and mystical levels of Remez, Derush and Sod, it is nevertheless a principle sanctioned by law that in the revealed context “a verse does not depart from its plain meaning.” And it is this Pshat,this plain or literal meaning, that the commentary of Rashi seeks to explain.
The same is true of Tanya, which is the Written Torah of Chassidut. Although all aspects of Torah are to be found within it, it always retains its simple meaning (as Pshat is to be understood in the context of the esoteric dimension of Torah).
Hence all subjects appearing in Tanya must be connected with the general theme of the book. They must all be “very nigh”; they must all explain “Unity and Faith”; and they must do so in a manner that enables one to “train a child” in them all. Those subjects that do not meet these criteria never found their way into Tanya. In the words of the Rebbe Rashab, of blessed memory,9 “Tanya is like the Chumash..., which is understood.”
Accordingly, it is very difficult to understand how the topics discussed at the conclusion of ch. 4 and throughout ch. 5 found a place in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah. We must therefore say that they deepen our understanding of the theme of Unity, as shall soon be explained.
* * *
The first chapter of this book explains how each individual created being has within it letters of the Ten Divine Utterances, which continuously create it and provide it with life.The third chapter goes on to explain that since these creative letters are constantly found within the created being, it is always in a state of absorption within them, similar to the light of the sun within the sun-globe. The created being is thus completely nullified out of existence.
The reason that the created being perceives itself as possessing independent existence is explained by the Alter Rebbe in the fourth chapter. Only because of the tzimtzum, by which G‑d conceals and contracts His life-force so that the created being should not be aware of it, does that being appear — and perceive itself — to be a separate entity. “If, however, the eye were permitted to see..., then the physicality, materiality and tangibility of the creature would not be seen by our eyes at all.”
However, this does not suffice. Although it is true that G‑d caused this concealment, yet man, as an intelligent being, should surely use his mind’s eye to see through the concealment; his understanding should inevitably lead him to the realization and the sensation that he is completely nullified within his source.
The Alter Rebbe answers this question by stating (in ch. 3) that a created being feels that he exists because “we do not comprehend nor see with our physical eyes the power of G‑d and the ‘breath of His mouth’ which is in the created thing.” Thus it is man’s very corporeality that blinds him to the Divine life-force contained within every created being.
This whole subject as explained until the end of the fourth chapter poses numerous difficulties regarding fundamental aspects of Divine Unity. And without the explanations furnished at the end of the fourth chapter and the whole of the fifth chapter these questions cannot be answered.
* * *
The following are the questions:(a) Each creature is animated by different letters from among the Ten Utterances, for, as explained in ch. 1, the life-force descends through numerous combinations and substitutions of these Divine creative letters until it is clothed in each particular creature. It would therefore seem that there exists (G‑d forbid) a multiplicity of G‑dliness, with the number of letters equalling the number of creatures. In fact, the multitude of letters is even greater than the number of created beings, for, as explained in ch. 1, many letters are invested within each creature. This seeming multitude of G‑dliness would appear to be the very antithesis of Divine Unity.
Moreover, the above question specifically arises out of the Alter Rebbe’s explanation!
There are those who mistakenly understood the doctrine of tzimtzum in a literal sense, as if G‑d actually removed His Presence from this world. If we were to assume their view then there would be no problem, for we could then say (as they do) the following: G‑d is indeed a complete Unity, but his relation to the proliferation in the created universe is that of a king who sits in his palace and gazes at a garbage heap outside.
However, according to the explanation in Tanya — that “Forever, O G‑d, Your word stands firm in the heavens,” i.e., that letters of the Ten Utterances are clothed within each individual creature — there arises the question: how can there possibly be a multiplicity in G‑dliness?
We cannot answer that the multiplicity results from the attribute of Gevurah of the Divine NameElokim. For as explained in ch. 4 (until the bracketed ending), the tzimtzum which comes from the Name Elokim adds nothing to creation itself: it merely acts as a barrier and concealment so that the life-force will not be felt by the created being. (This prevents the creature from being wholly nullified within its source, enabling it instead to feel its own separate and distinct existence.) The life-force itself emanates strictly from the utterance of the Divine NameHavayah. (This is also why in ch. 3 the Alter Rebbe likens the created being to the sun’s rays, and the life-force to the sun itself — for the source of the life-force within the creature (i.e., the letters) is the “sun” of Havayah.)
It would thus seem that the multiplicity in the universe does not result from the Name Elokim, a name which utilizes the plural form, but from the Name Havayah itself. This would seem to imply that in Havayah as well there is multiplicity. This prompts the question: “How many suns (Divine Presences) are there?” [Cf. Likutei Amarim, end of ch. 35.]
(b) According to the Alter Rebbe’s explanation, created beings are in reality found within their source. They perceive themselves as existing separately from it merely because of the concealment of the tzimtzum; in reality, however, they are G‑dliness. Therefore, “if the eye were permitted to see,” we would perceive that they are G‑dly.
This gives rise to a cataclysmic question regarding the entire essence of Torah and mitzvot.
The purpose of Torah and mitzvot is to draw down G‑dliness into the physical substances with which the mitzvot are performed. This is what is meant by the teaching that only by performing amitzvah does the physical object become holy. Indeed, this concept is implicit in the recitation of blessings before the performance of mitzvot, for the Hebrew word for blessing (ברכה) implies the drawing down of G‑dliness within the object with which the mitzvah is performed.
The mitzvah of tefillin, for example (and so, too, all other mitzvot, all of which are likened totefillin), is intended to draw down G‑dliness into the physical parchment and ink, etc.
Now, since the parchment is G‑dly (even before the performance of the mitzvah), how is it possible for a mitzvah originating in the “Torah of truth” to imply by its effect (and by its inherent truth) that the parchment is in fact mundane, and only by virtue of what is inscribed on it, and so on, does it begin to become G‑dly? In fact it is G‑dly even before this; it is only the corporeal eyes of man that fail to perceive it to be so.
We mortals fail to perceive the truth. Torah, however, is truth, and its mitzvot are true. How, then, can there possibly be a mitzvah (and the very fact that there is such a mitzvah indicates the truth of the matter) of taking parchment and transforming it into G‑dliness, when in reality it was G‑dly even before it was used for a mitzvah?
This difficulty too springs from the explanation of Tanya. Were we to say that the doctrine oftzimtzum is to be understood (as its erroneous exponents understand it) in its literal sense — as if G‑d literally withdrew His Presence from creation, thereafter gazing upon creation from a distance like the proverbial king through his palace window — then there would be no difficulty.
However, according to the concept of Unity as explained here in Tanya, whereby the King Himself is found in the place of the parchment or whatever, then the difficulty manifests itself. For according to this explanation the place itself and all its aspects are themselves G‑dliness.
If so, what is the meaning of Torah study and performing precepts? What is the point of studying the law that applies to “one who exchanges a cow for a donkey,” what is the point of performing a mitzvah involving parchment and ink, when in reality there is no cow and no donkey, no parchment and no ink, but everything is G‑dliness? What is the significance of Torah andmitzvot?
(c) The question now becomes even greater. The reason we perceive the world to exist as an independent entity is that we view it with “physical eyes,” and “the eye [was not] permitted to see,” and so on; i.e., our tangible corporeality prevents us from beholding the truth.
It would therefore be logical to assume that tzaddikim, inasmuch as they are not hindered by the concealment occasioned by corporeal flesh and inasmuch as they transcend materiality, should be able to perceive the truth — that the world truly does not exist, for everything is G‑dliness alone. Those tzaddikim who are at the level of the World of Yetzirah or Beriah, and surely the truly great tzaddikim who have become a “chariot of Atzilut” (as explained in Likutei Amarim, ch. 39), should not be subject to the restrictions of the concealment. With regard to them the above question becomes even stronger: What is the meaning of Torah and mitzvot forthem? Since the G‑dliness manifest in this world is revealed to them, there would seem to be no need for them (G‑d forbid) to perform Torah and mitzvot!
* * *
It was in order to answer all these questions that the Alter Rebbe wrote the end of ch. 4 and the whole of ch. 5, as shall soon be explained.The Alter Rebbe explains at the conclusion of ch. 4 that the tzimtzum and concealment of life-force is termed kelim (“vessels”), while the life-force itself is called or (“light”). He then goes on to explain that “the kelim are verily the letters.”
This seems to contradict what was explained in the previous chapters. Earlier on, in the first chapter, the Alter Rebbe writes that the letters are the life-force of created beings. Here, however, he says that the life-force is the light, while the letters are the vessels, which contract and conceal the life-force. How is this to be reconciled with his previous statement that the letters are the life-force that reveal, as opposed to the kelim, which conceal?
But in truth, not only is the present statement not a contradiction to what was stated earlier: it is actually an explanation of the previous statement that the letters are the life-force.
The question was raised earlier that since the letters are the life-force of creatures, it would seem that there is a multiplicity of G‑dliness. For since tzimtzum itself is not a party to creation (but only conceals the Creator from the created), the multitude of letters is thus caused not bytzimtzum but by Elokut, by G‑dliness Itself. The question then is: How can there possibly be a multitude of G‑dliness?
The Alter Rebbe answers this in the bracketed text by stating that “the tzimtzum and concealing of the life-force is called kelim.” One of the novel insights contained in this statement is thattzimtzum is an actual entity.
Just as kelim are more than just a concealment of the light, being entities unto themselves, so, too, with regard to the tzimtzum and concealment which are deemed to be kelim; they too are an entity. And it is this entity that brings about the contraction and concealment of the light (just as an actual vessel, being an entity, conceals that which is found within it).
We are now able to understand the multiplicity of letters. The multitudinous letters are not intrinsic to the light itself; they are a result of its passage through the tzimtzum of the kelim.
This is illustrated by the well-known comparison with the sun’s rays that pass through white, green or red glass. The light itself remains simple, unaffected by its passage. However, there is an evident change with regard to its effect; after passing through red glass the light functions as red light, through green glass — as green light, and so forth.
This is what the Alter Rebbe means when he says that “the kelim are verily the letters”; i.e., the shaping of the life-force into letters is not a function of the life-force itself, for “the life-force itself is called or (light)” — and light itself is simple, transcending any particular form or shape. (For light is rooted in the “ ’sun‘ of Havayah,” and in the Name Havayah there can be no multiplicity, heaven forbid, as has been explained earlier.) The letters contained in the life-force result from the kelim, which cause the light clothed in them to be shaped (with regard to their effect).
Accordingly, the second question, regarding the relevance of Torah and mitzvot, is answered as well. Were tzimtzum to be a non-entity and only constitute a state of concealment, its sole purpose being to hide and act as a barrier to the light, then created beings that emerge as a result of this tzimtzum would in reality not exist at all. (It would only seem to corporeal eyes that they enjoy a true state of existence.)
Since tzimtzum does, however, constitute an entity — the entity of kelim, it possesses existence. As such, its effect in concealing is similar to its effect when bringing letters into being.
Regarding the latter, it was explained earlier that the effect of tzimtzum on the light was that it caused it to assume the “shape” of letters, even though the light itself is not affected; its effect exists only in relation to created beings. Thus it is similar to the sun’s rays which do not really change in themselves, although the effect of the colored glass on them is to produce red or green light, and so on.
The same is true with regard to the effect of tzimtzum in concealing the life-force so that it will not be perceived by created beings. The concealment itself is a real entity. It is true that in relation to the light, the tzimtzum does not conceal at all. From the perspective of created beings, however, the tzimtzum is truly an existing entity. It therefore follows that [since they were created through it] they have true tangible existence as well.
* * *
After the Alter Rebbe concludes his explanation that the tzimtzum and concealment of the life-force is termed kelim, which “are verily the letters,” he goes on to add that these letters derive from the five letters מנצפ"ך, which are the “five degrees of Gevurah.” He also states that their source in turn is the supernal Gevurah of Atik Yomin, etc.What does this have to do with his previous statement that the tzimtzum and concealment is termed kelim, and so on?
By stating the above the Alter Rebbe forestalls a formidable problem: How is it possible for thetzimtzum to conceal the light? If we were to hold that the tzimtzum merely prevents the light from being revealed within creation, then there would be no problem. However, in the bracketed text the Alter Rebbe teaches us a novel concept — that the tzimtzum results from the kelim. Now since they are a separate entity distinct from the light, the question arises: How is it possible for the kelim (a distinct and separate entity from light) to effect a change, as it were, in the light?
The question is even greater: Light is the attribute of Chesed; tzimtzum is the attribute ofGevurah. In the order of the Sefirot, Chesed precedes Gevurah (qualitatively as well). How canGevurah possibly cause a change in an attribute which is spiritually superior to it?
The Alter Rebbe therefore explains that the root of the letters is the “five degrees of Gevurahthat divide and separate the breath and voice....” I.e., the Alter Rebbe is teaching us that the concept of letters is not found only within the Sefirot of Atzilut, but far higher, until ultimately the source of the Gevurot is the “supernal Gevurah of Atik Yomin,” while “correspondingly, the source of [the various levels of Divine] kindness is also Chesed of Atik Yomin.” Thus, bothGevurah and Chesed are rooted in Atik Yomin.
Since both attributes are rooted in Atik Yomin, the meaning of which is “removed (נעתק) and separated from ‘days’ [i.e., the attributes of Atzilut],” it follows that because of their common source they are indeed not opposites: they are one. For, as the Alter Rebbe will soon explain (in chs. 6 and 7), even in Atzilut “He and His attributes are One.” How much more certainly must this be the case insofar as they exist in their source in Atik Yomin, which is far superior to Atzilut. It is therefore possible for the light of Chesed to be modified by the tzimtzum of Gevurah.
* * *
In light of the above, we will understand why the Alter Rebbe opens ch. 5 by quoting the Midrashic statement, “Originally it arose in [G‑d’s] thought to create the world through the attribute of stern judgment.” Since this Midrash does not seem to offer any further explanation of the topic at hand, why quote it at all?One reason the Alter Rebbe does so is that it enhances our understanding of the entire concept of tzimtzum. This will be understood after several prefatory remarks.
This Midrash is generally thought to be saying that G‑d originally planned that the world be conducted with the attribute of Gevurah, stern judgment. However, when He saw that the world could not endure this, He combined with it the attribute of mercy.
The wording of the Midrash, however, is not “to conduct the world” but “to create the world.” Clearly the Midrash refers to G‑d’s manner of creation — that He had originally planned to create the world solely through the attribute of Gevurah.
The question thus becomes: How is it possible for creation to come about from the attribute ofGevurah, an attribute of tzimtzum? I.e., how is it possible for tzimtzum to bring about creation, when (simplistically) tzimtzum is a non-entity, its function being only to contract and constrain the Divine life-force. How can the non-entity of tzimtzum create?
This serves to prove that tzimtzum is indeed an entity, for as explained previously tzimtzumcorresponds to kelim.
This, then, is what the Midrash means when it says, “Originally it arose in [G‑d’s] thought to create the world through the attribute of stern judgment.” G‑d’s initial intention was that creation come about by means of the kelim, through the power of the light vested in them — that creation result from the letters that are formed in the light through its being clothed in kelim.
Accordingly, we will also understand the continuation of this passage — that “He associated the attribute of mercy in it[s creation]” refers to “the revelation of G‑dliness through the tzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles....” Why must this necessarily be the explanation of the role of the attribute of mercy?
In light of the above, this is clearly understood: Since the “attribute of stern judgment” refers to the letters, we must therefore say that the “attribute of mercy” refers to the light as it transcends the shape of letters. This light finds expression in “the revelation of G‑dliness through thetzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles...”— by effecting a change in the course of nature. (The letters cause each individual creature to have its own characteristics and nature; a change in nature must necessarily derive from the spiritually superior light.)
In explaining that the attribute of mercy refers to “the revelation of G‑dliness through thetzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles,” the Alter Rebbe adds the words “recorded in the Torah.” At first glance, it is unclear what this phrase means; does the Alter Rebbe refer specifically to the Written Torah, or is the Oral Torah included as well? Furthermore, the miracles that occurred after the forty-year sojourn of the Jewish people in the desert; that occurred after the first Holy Temple (concluding the events and miracles recorded in the Written Torah); that occurred even after the Talmud (the Oral Torah) had been finally recorded; up to and including the miracles10 “witnessed by our own eyes and not by a stranger,” i.e., the miracles that occurred on the 12th and 13th of Tammuz 5687;11 — all these are “revelations of G‑dliness” emanating from the “attribute of mercy.” Why then does the Alter Rebbe specify the miracles “recorded in the Torah”?
The Alter Rebbe added this phrase in order to answer two very strong questions:
(a) Since the world was created from the letters (for which reason each individual creature has its own character and nature), how is it possible that there be revealed within the world (through signs and miracles that transcend nature) a light which is superior to letters? Inasmuch as the world was created through the letters, one would expect it to be incapable of housing a light that transcends letters, which would still continue to exist as tangible entities.
(b) As mentioned earlier, the Midrash addresses itself not to the manner in which the world is conducted, but to the manner of its creation. G‑d first intended to create the world through the attribute of stern justice. Thereafter — but prior to the actual creation — G‑d combined in it, i.e., within creation, the attribute of mercy. Thus the act of creation is brought about by the attribute of mercy as well as by the attribute of stern judgment.
This leads to the following question:
“The revelation of G‑dliness through the tzaddikim, and through the signs and miracles” took place long after creation. What then does the Midrash mean by stating that “He associated the attribute of mercy in it[s creation],” when this attribute was only revealed long after creation?
It is in order to answer these two questions that the Alter Rebbe adds the words, “recorded in the Torah.” One of the meanings of this phrase is: The G‑dliness that is revealed throughtzaddikim and miracles (which emanate from the light that is superior to the letters, as has already been explained), — this too was first recorded in the Torah. It follows that it is found in creation as a whole, inasmuch as creation proceeds from the Ten Utterances recorded in the Torah, as explained above (at the end of the first chapter of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah).
Accordingly, we will also understand why the Midrash states that “Originally it arose in [G‑d’s]thought to create the world through the attribute of stern judgment”; it was only in thought that G‑d considered creating the world solely with the attribute of stern judgement, that is, from the letters themselves bereft of the light that transcends the kelim. When it came to actual creation, however, i.e., when it came to the speaking of the Ten Utterances that brought about creation, these letters were invested with the light that transcends kelim.
Since the letters contain this light, signifying the negation of the tzimtzum of these letters, it is then possible that at the appropriate time — preordained when the Utterances were first spoken — there occur the signs and miracles that signify the negation of the tzimtzum as found below.
Thus, all these miracles were not something that came about later; rather, they emanate from the light and G- dliness that transcend kelim and that were invested within the letters. This degree of G‑dliness is then revealed at a later time through the tzaddikim and through signs and miracles.
This, then, is what is explained here in Tanya — that at the very moment of creation G‑d combined and vested within creation the attribute of mercy; that in the letters of the Ten Utterances which are enclothed within every creature there is invested the light that transcends the kelim, this light to be later revealed through the signs and miracles.
* * *
One question, however, still remains: What of those great tzaddikim who are on the level of a “chariot of Atzilut,” for whom the corporeal eye of created beings does not conceal G‑dliness? How do Torah and mitzvot apply to them? It is concerning this that the Alter Rebbe goes on to explain “the comprehension of Moses our Teacher (peace unto him) in his prophetic vision.”The above question applies primarily to Moses. His soul was always in a state of total revelation, and not at all concealed by his body, for it was completely penetrated and elevated by his Divine service. For a person such as Moses, for whom there is no concealment of G‑dliness, what is the meaning of Torah and mitzvot?
And with regard to Moses himself, the question stems not so much from his qualities in general as it does from the distinctive nature of “his prophetic vision.” Moses was unique among prophets in that not only his soul, but his very body too was equally a fit receptacle for prophecy. His body was not only able to understand G‑dliness, it could actually perceive the G‑dly prophetic vision. This being so, the question becomes all the more demanding of an answer: What is the meaning of Torah and mitzvot to so lofty an individual as Moses?
The Alter Rebbe answers this by saying: “Even the comprehension of Moses...in his prophetic vision did not extend to the World of Atzilut.” This means to say, that even for an individual as great as Moses the world could be said to exist. True it is that this manner of existence was ever so much higher than our own conception of existence, but existence it was. Torah and mitzvotthus applied to Moses as well, so that he could transform this existence (of his world) into G‑dliness.
Although [Moses was of the World of Atzilut, and] the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah as they exist within Atzilut are G‑dly attributes and wholly at one with G‑d Himself, and thus Gevurahdoes not conceal Chesed, nevertheless, Moses‘ comprehension “did not extend to the World ofAtzilut, except through its being clothed in the World of Beriah.”
This, however, does not suffice. While it is true that Moses‘ comprehension of (the Chesed andGevurah of) Atzilut extended to the degree that it clothed itself in the World of Beriah, it is only in the World of Beriah that creation first takes place. Moses was therefore able to see in prophetic vision the limitlessness of G‑dliness (as explained in ch. 4). And surely Moses did not behold creation there with corporeal eyes.
G‑d’s Gevurah even after being clothed in Beriah still remains G‑d’s Gevurah. Since Moses was not subject to the concealment inherent in corporeal eyes, he was able to perceive the attribute of Gevurah as clothed in the World of Beriah; he did not perceive a concealing attribute ofGevurah: he perceived a luminous Gevurah. The question thus remains: What was the meaning of Torah and mitzvot for Moses?
The Alter Rebbe answers this by adding that the attributes of Chesed and Gevurah as they were clothed in the World of Beriah were not themselves apprehended by Moses, but “but only insofar as they were clothed in attributes which are of lower levels than themselves, viz., the attributes of Netzach, Hod and Yesod.”
Thus when Moses apprehended Chesed and Gevurah of Atzilut, he apprehended Chesedinsofar as it is clothed in Netzach, Gevurah insofar as it is clothed in Hod, and both of them insofar as they are clothed in Yesod. Since his comprehension of Chesed and Gevurah related to them only insofar as they were garbed in the concealing cloak of Netzach, Hod and Yesod, therefore even for Moses the world was endowed with existence. It was, to be sure, a very rarefied form of existence, but it was existence nonetheless. Torah and mitzvot thus applied to him as well.
* * *
According to the above it would seem that within the three lower Worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah andAsiyah, the comprehension of G‑dliness is an impossibility: all that there can be is G‑dly revelation. This, however, is not the case. For as explained in ch. 39 of Tanya, the distinctive quality of Gan Eden (whose place is in Beriah; ibid.) lies in the fact that there it is possible to12“derive pleasure from the radiance of the Divine Presence”; the Divine Presence itself becomes revealed and accessible to comprehension, making it possible that pleasure be derived from it.Now according to that which was just explained, how can it be possible to “derive pleasure from the radiance of the Divine Presence” in any of the Worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah or Asiyah?
The Alter Rebbe therefore explains that in Gan Eden there is an apprehension of the “spreading forth of the life-force and light which issues from these two attributes, Chesed andGevurah”; i.e., in Gan Eden one is able to comprehend the life-force as it spreads forth fromChesed and Gevurah themselves, without the intermediacy of Netzach, Hod and Yesod. (The “spreading forth ” is to be understood as explained in Iggeret HaKodesh, Epistle 19.) This comprehension, the Alter Rebbe goes on to say, is “the food of the souls”; i.e., it is internalized, like food which is ingested internally.
However, this gives rise to yet another question: Would we not expect Gan Eden itself to be nullified out of existence, inasmuch as the radiance of the Divine Presence is revealed there? Moreover, Gan Eden has to do with comprehension.13 How does it relate to the emotive attributes of Chesed and Gevurah?
In answer to this the Alter Rebbe states: “For from the diffusion of these two attributes, a firmament is spread.... Within this is the secret of the twenty-two letters of the Torah.” Within these letters of the Torah which bring all created beings into existence, was clothed the Divine light which transcends the tzimtzum of these letters, as explained earlier.
From the perspective of Torah, these two attributes — the revelation of Chesed and the concealment of Gevurah — do not contradict one another. This is because Torah encompasses them both, [as the Alter Rebbe goes on to say:] “as it is written, ‘From His right hand [He gave] unto them a fiery Law.’ ” Torah is thus composed both of “right” (Chesed) and “fire” (Gevurah). It is therefore possible for these two opposites to coexist — Gan Eden existing as an entity, and within it, the revealed radiance of the Divine Presence.
The question of how Gan Eden, which is intellectual perception, relates to Chesed andGevurah, which are emotive, is answered by the Alter Rebbe when he states: “For this firmament is the secret of knowledge (Daat).” This means to say that the one intellectual faculty of Daat encompasses both emotive attributes of Chesed and Gevurah, and yet Daat is a faculty of intellect.
But another matter remains to be understood. Gan Eden comprises two aspects: (a) In Gan Eden there is Torah study (see Likutei Amarim, ch. 41); (b) Though in Gan Eden there is no performance of mitzvot (as alluded to in the verse, במתים חפשי), there is, however, reward for prior performance.
Now it is understandable how Torah can be found in Gan Eden, for as explained previously, Torah is comprised of the harmonious conjoining of Chesed and Gevurah. Mitzvot, however, are individualized.
For it is known14 that Torah is likened to blood and the mitzvot to bodily organs; whereas blood courses throughout all parts of the body, the organs are separate from one another, each with its own individual function.
Since, from the perspective of mitzvot, Chesed and Gevurah are two separate attributes, it would seem that from this perspective Gan Eden could not possibly exist, inasmuch as it is a composite of both Chesed and Gevurah. Furthermore, if the light elicited by the performance of precepts would indeed be drawn down, this light being a manifestation of Chesed, would this not cause the very existence of Gan Eden, whose source is Gevurah, to be completely nullified?
The Alter Rebbe therefore says, “and the commandments are [their] garments.” Since themitzvot comprise both Chesed and Gevurah, which are two distinct attributes, it is indeed impossible for the light elicited by the mitzvot to permeate [the souls in Gan Eden] inwardly, for if it were to do so they would be nullified out of existence.
For this reason, the reward in Gan Eden for the performance of mitzvot is granted only in the protective and auxiliary manner of a garment; this light is not drawn down into the souls in a permeating manner.
Torah, however, which is comprised of the conjoining of Chesed and Gevurah, is truly “food” for the souls in Gan Eden. It permeates them without causing their nullification, unlike the mitzvot, which are merely “garments”.
* * *
The Rebbe concludes that according to the above discussion another difficulty (not quite incidental) will be resolved, namely: Where is the concluding bracket at the end of ch. 4? (Even in the first edition of Tanya this bracket is missing.)According to all the above-mentioned questions, whose answers are provided by the Alter Rebbe beginning with the bracketed text in ch. 4, and continuing until the final bracket of ch. 5, this difficulty finds the following simple resolution:
The bracketed text beginning near the conclusion of ch. 4 extends until the end of ch. 5. The worthy typesetter, however, seeing two brackets at the end of ch. 5, assumed that one of them was surely superfluous — not taking into consideration that one of them possibly marked the conclusion of the bracketed passage beginning in ch. 4.
Excerpted from a Sichah delivered on Shabbat, Parshat Mishpatim, 5727.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | See Rashi on Bereishit 1:1; Bereishit Rabbah 12:15. |
| 2. | I, 53a. |
| 3. | Introduction to Tikkunei Zohar. |
| 4. | Note of the Rebbe: “According to that which is explained in Iggeret HaKodesh (Epistle 19), it is clear that this does not preclude [comprehension of] a higher level (for there have been souls whose comprehension has reached up to Chochmah and Binah). Rather, the comprehension of Chesed and Gevurah (the source of creation and its tzimtzum), which is the matter at hand, became possible only through their being clothed in Netzach, Hod andYesod.” |
| 5. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
| 6. | Devarim 33:2. |
| 7. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
| 8. | Chs. 9 and 12. |
| 9. | He‘arot VeKitzurim, p. 126. |
| 10. | Cf. Iyov 19:27. |
| 11. | I.e., the release of the previous Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, from incarceration and capital sentence in Leningrad in 1927. |
| 12. | Iggeret HaKodesh, Epistle 5. |
| 13. | Tanya, ch. 39, et passim. |
| 14. | Explained at length in Likkutei Torah, Parshat Bamidbar. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:Tuesday, Sivan 15, 5775 · June 2, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 120
Leaving Sacrificial Meat Uneaten
"You shall leave none of it until the morning"—Leviticus 22:30.
It is forbidden to leave over sacrificial meat past the deadline when it may be eaten.
Leaving Sacrificial Meat Uneaten
Leaving Sacrificial Meat Uneaten
Negative Commandment 120
Translated by Berel Bell
And the 120th prohibition is that we are forbidden from leaving over any part of the Thanksgiving offering (todah) until the morning [of the next day].
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "[It must be eaten on the same day] with nothing left over until the [next] morning." From this offering we derive the principle for the other offerings: that whatever remains after the time designated for their consumption becomes nosar.2 One then is obligated to burn it, since this is a lav she'nitak l'aseh,3 and burning it is a positive commandment, as we explained in Positive Commandment 91.
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 22:30.
2.See N131.
3.A prohibition that has a corresponding positive commandment to rectify the prohibited act.
Shofar, Sukkah, vLulav - Chapter Four
Halacha 1
These are the required measurements of a sukkah: Its height should not be less than ten handbreadths nor more than twenty cubits. Its area should not be less than seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths. [There is no maximum limit to] its area, and one may increase it [to include] a number of millim.
A sukkah which is less than ten handbreadths high, smaller than seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths [in area], or taller than twenty cubits - even [if the increase or decrease] is of the slightest amount - is invalid.
Commentary Halacha 1
These are the required measurements of a sukkah: Its height - I.e., the height of its inner space, without including the height of the s'chach (Eruvin 3b)
should not be less than ten handbreadths - anything less is not considered to be a dwelling fit for human habitation (See Sukkah 4a.) Sukkah 4b-5a derives the concept as follows: The ark and the kaporet covering it were ten handbreadths high. This constituted a line of demarcation between the place where the Shechinah was manifest and the area below it. Thus, we see that a height of ten handbreadths is sufficient for an independent area.
Rabbenu Manoach establishes a closer relationship between the above concept and a sukkah, noting that Exodus 25:20 describes how the wings of the cherubs "shall shield the kaporet," using the verb סככים, which has the same root as the word s'chach. The beginning of the height of the cherub's "shield," ten cubits, is the minimum of the height for our s'chach.
nor more than twenty cubits. - Any structure more than twenty cubits high can only be built as a permanent dwelling. Hence, it is unfit to serve as a sukkah, which must be of a temporary nature. (See Sukkah 2a and the Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah.)[ It must be noted that any structure less than 20 cubits high can serve as a sukkah even if its walls are of a permanent nature.]
A cubit is 48 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 57.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.
Its area should not be less than seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths. - the minimum size necessary to contain a person's head, the majority of his body [6 handbreadths by six handbreadths], and a small table [a handbreadth by a handbreadth] (Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 2:8). A handbreadth is 8 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, and 9.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.
The Rambam explains the requirement of seven handbreadths by seven hand breadths as follows: The first three hand breadths are not of consequence because of the principle of l'vud and four additional handbreadths are required since the smallest area of halachic consequence is four cubits by four cubits (Commentary, to the Mishnah, Sukkah 1:1).
If the sukkah is not seven handbreadths in either length or width, it is invalid, even if its area equals 49 square handbreadths. If it is round in shape, it must be sufficiently large to encompass a square seven by seven (See Halachah 7). This size is required because if either of the dimensions were less, it would not be considered a dwelling fit for human habitation (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 634:1-2; Magen Avraham; Taz).
[There is no maximum limit to] its area - The commentaries point to Sukkah27b: "All Israel is fit to sit in one sukkah," as the source for this statement. A sukkah large enough to contain "all Israel" must possess a sizable area.
and one may increase it [to include] a number of millim. - A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.
A sukkah which - does not meet the above requirements and
is less than ten handbreadths high, smaller than seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths in area, or taller than twenty cubits - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 633:2-5) mentions a number of techniques by which a sukkah of this size can be made kosher, by decreasing the height of its inner space.
even [if the increase or decrease] is of the slightest amount - is invalid.
Halacha 2
A sukkah which does not possess three walls is invalid. However, if it has two complete walls perpendicular to each other in the shape of [the Greek letter]gamma, it is sufficient to construct a third wall that is [only] slightly more than a handbreadth wide and place it within three handbreadths of one of the two walls. Also, one must construct the likeness of an entrance, since it does not possess three complete walls.
We have already explained in Hilchot Shabbat that wherever the term "a likeness of an entrance" is used, it may be a rod on one side, another rod on the opposite side, and a third above, even though it does not touch them.
Commentary Halacha 2
A sukkah which does not possess three walls is invalid. - Though Sukkah6b mentions Rabbi Shimeon's opinion, which requires four walls, all authorities accept the more lenient view. The Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 1:1) explains that their difference of opinion is based on the exegesis of Isaiah 4:6:
There will be a sukkah that will serve as a shadow from the heat during the day, a place of refuge, and a cover from storm and from rain.
The Sages maintain that the verse refers to three different activities, and hence require three walls. Rabbi Shimeon counts "a cover from storm and from rain" as two different activities, and hence requires four walls.
However, if it has two complete walls - i.e., walls of at least seven handbreadths long, so that the minimum requirements for the sukkah's area mentioned in the previous halachah can be met
perpendicular to each other in the shape of [the Greek letter], gamma -Rabbenu Manoach notes that a gamma has the same shape as the Hebrew letter dalet (see accompanying drawing) and asks why the Sages did not use that letter to refer to the intended shape. He explains that the very letters of the Hebrew alphabet are endowed with holiness. Hence, the Sages did not want to use them as an example to refer to a mundane matter.
it is sufficient to construct a third wall that is [only] slightly more than a handbreadth wide and place it within three handbreadths - Sukkah 16b teaches that whenever there is a gap of three handbreadths or less between two entities, the principle of l'vud applies. The gap is considered to be closed and the two parts connected. Thus, the third wall is considered to be more than four handbreadths long, hence spanning more than half of the length required for the third wall. Therefore, it is acceptable (Rabbenu Nissim).
of one of the two walls. - See the accompanying diagram.
The Rabbis have posed an abstract question: Is the minimum requirement for a sukkah three walls (including one which is incomplete), or must a sukkah have four walls, however, the Torah was lenient enough to consider a sukkah of this nature as comparable to one of four walls.
The Marcheshet brings support for the latter view, quoting Sukkah 7b, which states that since the third wall only a handbreadth in size is considered to be a wall with regard to the laws of sukkah, it is also considered to be a wall with regard to the laws regarding a private domain on the Sabbath. In the latter instance, four walls are necessary.
Also, one must construct the likeness of an entrance - to complete this third wall. This is necessary...
since it - the sukkah
does not possess three complete walls. - However, if the three walls are complete - i.e., at least seven handbreadths in length - as in the accompanying diagram, no "likeness of an entrance" is required.
The Bayit Chadash (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 430) explains that the requirement of a "likeness of an entrance" is a Rabbinic ordinance, and, according to Torah law, a sukkah is acceptable as long as the third wall is a handbreadth as required.
We have already explained in Hilchot Shabbat - 16:19
that wherever the term "a likeness of an entrance" is used, it may be a rod on one side, another rod on the opposite side, and a third above -The Ramah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 630:2) states that if the two rods reach the s'chach, a third rod is unnecessary. (See Mishnah Berurah 630:12.)
even though it does not touch them. - as depicted on page 67.
Halacha 3
If the two walls were parallel to each other and there was an open space between them, one should construct a wall slightly more than four handbreadths wide and place it within three handbreadths of one of the two walls; then, [the sukkah] is kosher. However, it is necessary to construct "the likeness of an entrance."
If the rods of the s'chach of the sukkah extend beyond the sukkah and one wall extends with them, they are considered to be [part of] the sukkah.
Commentary Halacha 3
If the two walls - each being seven handbreadths or more long
were parallel to each other and there was an open space between them, one should construct a wall slightly more than four handbreadths wide -as depicted in the accompanying diagram.
Since the two walls are not connected, the third wall which "connects" them must be longer (Sukkah 7a).
and place it within three handbreadths - so that it will be considered l'vud.
of one of the two walls; then, [the sukkah] is kosher. - The third wall is considered to be seven cubits long itself - the four cubits of actual length and the three cubits between it and the wall that are added to it, because of the principle of l'vud (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 1:1).
However, it is necessary to construct "the likeness of an entrance" -between the wall of four handbreadths and the wall further removed from it.
This opinion is not universally accepted; and some authorities do not require a "likeness of an entrance" for such a sukkah. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 630:3) quotes the Rambam's opinion as halachah.
The Ramah mentions that the "likeness of an entrance" is required only when the third wall needs the principle of l'vud for it to be considered seven handbreadths long. However, if the wall is actually seven handbreadths or more long, nothing more is necessary.
If the rods of the s'chach of the sukkah extend beyond the sukkah and one wall extends with them, - As portrayed in the accompanying diagram, the sukkah has two walls, each at least seven handbreadths long, joined to each other at a right angle. The third wall is also joined to the other at a right angle; however, its length exceeds that of the wall opposite it, and thus, the fourth side of the sukkah, which remains open, slants at an angle.
they are considered to be [part of] the sukkah. - sitting under the extension is considered to be the same as sitting under the portion enclosed by three walls. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 631:7.)
Halacha 4
Walls which are connected to the roof of the sukkah, but do not reach the earth: If they are more than three handbreadths above the earth, they are invalid; if the distance is less than that, they are kosher.
[The following rules apply] should the walls be connected to the earth, without reaching the s'chach: If they are ten handbreadths high, they are kosher even though are removed several cubits from the roof, provided they are positioned below the end of the roof. If the roof was separated from the wall by more than three handbreadths, it is invalid; less than this amount is kosher.
If one suspended a partition which is slightly more than four handbreadths high at a distance of less than three handbreadths from the earth and a distance of less than three handbreadths from the roof, it is kosher.
Commentary Halacha 4
Walls - at least seven handbreadths high
which are connected to the roof of the sukkah, but do not reach the earth - See accompanying diagram.
If they are more than three handbreadths above the earth, they are invalid - Sukkah 16a records a difference of opinion between the Sages whether a "hanging partition" - i.e., a partition that is not connected to the earth - is kosher. The halachah does not accept such a partition, because animals can crawl under it. (See Shabbat 97a.) Nevertheless...
if the distance is less than that - three handbreadths
they are kosher - Because of the principle of l'vud, it is considered as if they actually reach the ground.
[The following rules apply] should the walls be connected to the earth, without reaching the s'chach: - See the accompanying diagram.
If they are ten handbreadths high - they are considered to be a viable partition. Therefore...
they are kosher even though they are removed several cubits from the roof - We say גוד אסיק מחיצתא - "Pull up and raise the partition;" i.e., it is considered as if the partition has been extended upward and reaches thes'chach. See Sukkah 4b for an additional discussion of this concept.
Though this concept is accepted, we do not say מחיצתא גוד אחית - "Pull down and extend the partition." Hence, in the first clause of this halachah, the partition is not acceptable until it reaches three cubits of the ground.
[It is possible to distinguish between the two cases as follows. A partition on the ground that must be extended upward serves as a functional divider. In contrast, a partition hanging downward cannot adequately fulfill its purpose unless it reaches within three handbreadths of the ground. (See also the Or Sameach's resolution of a difficulty arising from Eruvin 79a.)]
provided they - the walls
are positioned below the end of the roof - i.e., the s'chach, so that thes'chach covers them.
Furthermore, the walls may even be slightly removed from the s'chach. (SeeShulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 630:9.)
If the roof - the s'chach
was separated from the wall by more than three handbreadths, it is invalid - for then the distance is too great for the s'chach to be considered the roof of these walls. In such an instance, not only is sitting under the open portion of no halachic import, the entire sukkah is invalid. Nevertheless, a sukkah in which the distance is...
less than this amount is kosher - because of the principle of l'vud. This concept also applies when the walls are as high as the s'chach. Even though the walls extend beyond the s'chach the sukkah is kosher. Nevertheless, one should not sit under the open portion.
If one suspended a partition which is slightly more than four handbreadths high at a distance of less than three handbreadths from the earth - and thus, it is viewed as connected to the earth because of the principle of l'vud.
and a distance of less than three handbreadths from the roof, - and thus, it is viewed as connected to the s'chach because of the principle of l'vud.
it is kosher. - Sukkah 16b explains that even though we must rely on the principle of l'vud twice, the sukkah is still kosher.
Halacha 5
When a person constructs his sukkah among the trees, using the trees as walls, it is kosher if:
a) they are strong enough - or he tied them and reinforced them so that they would be strong enough - that they would not be shaken by the wind at all times; andb) he filled [the space] between the branches with hay and straw, tying them so that they will not be shaken by the wind.
[This is necessary,] for any partition that cannot stand before a normal land wind is not considered to be a partition.
Commentary Halacha 5
When a person constructs his sukkah among the trees - This halachah does not deal with the problem of the branches and leaves of the trees interfering with the s'chach. That issue is dealt with in Chapter 5, Halachah 12. Rabbenu Manoach and others have also raised questions whether the s'chachshould be supported by the trees. (See the commentary on the following halachah.)
using the trees as walls, it is kosher if - the following two conditions are met
a) they are strong enough - by nature
or he tied them and reinforced them so that they would be strong enough - that they would not be shaken by the wind at all times; - even if the wind is not strong enough to uproot them, it should not cause them to sway back and forth
and b) he filled [the space] between the branches - this translation of the word אמיר is taken from Isaiah 17:6.
with hay and straw - weaving them together so that the wall would be a solid continuum (Sukkah 24b)
tying them - the hay and straw fillers
so that they will not be shaken by the wind.
[This is necessary,] for any partition that cannot stand before a normal -However, a sukkah's inability to stand before a hurricane wind does not invalidate it.
land wind - in contrast to sea winds, which are more powerful (Sukkah 23a)
is not considered to be a partition. - This law also has implications with regard to the Sabbath laws. (See Hilchot Shabbat 16:15, 24.)
Halacha 6
If a person constructs his sukkah on top of a wagon or on the deck of a ship, it is kosher, and one may ascend to it on the festival. If one constructs it on the treetops or on a camel's back, it is kosher, but one may not ascend to it on the festival, because climbing on a tree or animal is forbidden on a festival.
If some of the walls were the result of human activity and some were trees, we consider [its structure]. We may ascend to any [sukkah] where, if the trees were taken away, it would be able to stand with the walls that were built by man alone.
Commentary Halacha 6
If a person constructs his sukkah on top of a wagon - although the wagon moves and is not fixed in one place (Rashi, Sukkah 22b)
or on the deck of a ship - Sukkah 23a relates:
A person who constructs his sukkah on the deck of a ship: Rabban Gamliel deems it invalid; Rabbi Akiva deems it kosher.Once Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva were traveling on a ship. Rabbi Akiva arose and constructed a sukkah on the ship's deck. The next morning, the wind came and blew it over. Rabban Gamliel asked Rabbi Akiva: "Akiva, where is your Sukkah?"
As apparent from the narrative, such a sukkah need not be strong enough to withstand sea winds. However, even according to Rabbi Akiva, it must be strong enough to withstand normal land winds, as explained in the previous halachah.
it is kosher, and one may ascend to it on the festival. - i.e., on the first day of Sukkot in Eretz Yisrael and on the first and second days in the diaspora.
If one constructs it on the treetops or on a camel's back, it is kosher -Sukkah 23a explains that Rabbi Yehudah objected to the use of such a sukkah, explaining that since it was not fit to be used on all seven days of the holiday (because of the prohibition against using it on the first day), it should not be used at all.
Our halachah follows Rabbi Meir's opinion. He accepts Rabbi Yehudah's motivating principle, but explains that in the case at hand, there is no inherent difficulty with using such a sukkah throughout the holiday. The only reason it is not used on the first day is an external factor - a Rabbinic decree - which should not affect the halachic status of the sukkah itself.
but one may not ascend to it on the festival - Surely, this prohibition also applies on the Sabbath.
From the Rambam's words, it appears that the restriction applies when the floor of the sukkah is actually in the tree. In contrast, Rashi (Shabbat 154b), Tosafot, Sukkah 22b and the Maggid Mishneh explain that even if the sukkah is on the ground and only the s'chach is supported by the tree, it is forbidden to use such a sukkah on the festival, lest one place utensils on the s'chach, and thus make use of the tree.
The Magen Avraham (628:6) quotes this opinion, but states that at present it is no longer customary to place articles on the s'chach. Therefore, it is permitted to use such a sukkah. His opinion is quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 628:7, and the Mishnah Berurah 628:17, with one qualification. At the outset, it is desirable not to use an article as support for s'chach unless it is, itself, fit to be used as s'chach. Hence, since the trees themselves are not fit to be used ass'chach, they should not be used as its supports.
because climbing on a tree or animal is forbidden on a festival. - Beitzah5:2 relates:
All the [prohibitions] which we are obligated [to observe as] sh'vut...on the Sabbath, we are obligated [to observe] on a festival. These are [the activities prohibited] as sh'vut: We do not climb a tree; we do not ride an animal...
In his commentary on that Mishnah, the Rambam writes:
"We do not climb a tree" - a decree lest we uproot [it];"we do not ride an animal" - a decree lest we break off a branch to lead it.
If some of the walls were the result of human activity and some were trees, we consider [its structure]. We may ascend to any [sukkah] where, if the trees were taken away, it would be able to stand with the walls that were built by man alone. - The Rambam quotes this general principle from the Mishnah, Sukkah 23a. The Mishnah adds examples to express the concept more clearly:
Two [walls] that were the result of human activity and one [wall] from the tree, or two [walls] from the tree and one [wall] that is a result of human activity.
Halacha 7
A sukkah that does not possess a roof is invalid. To what does this refer? A sukkah whose walls are joined to each other like a hut; alternatively, when the side of the sukkah is placed against the wall. However, if it has a roof, even only a handbreadth in width, or if one lifted the side of the sukkah close to the wall a handbreadth above the ground, it is kosher.
A round sukkah - if its circumference is large enough to contain a square seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths, it is kosher even though it has no corners.
Commentary Halacha 7
A sukkah that does not possess a roof is invalid - because a dwelling even of a temporary nature must have a roof.
To what does this refer? A sukkah whose walls are joined to each other like a hut - Rashi (Sukkah 19b) explains that this is a reference to a hunter's hut. See Diagram A;
alternatively, when the side of the sukkah is placed against the wall. -See Diagram B.
However, if it - the sukkah
has a roof, even only a handbreadth in width - between the two walls, as depicted in Diagram C. As long as it has a roof at least a handbreadth wide, the remainder of the roof may be slanted.
or if one lifted the side of the sukkah close to the wall a handbreadth above the ground - so that handbreadth is considered to be a wall, as depicted in the diagram below.
it is kosher. - for the fact that the roof is slanted does not disqualify the sukkah.
The Kessef Mishneh, Rabbenu Manoach, and others explain that though leniency is taken and such a sukkah is allowed, it must still possess all the dimensions required of a kosher sukkah mentioned in Halachah 1 of this chapter. Accordingly, at least six handbreadths of the slanted roof must itself be kosher for use as s'chach, and it must be more than 16 handbreadths long, so that it will be of the required height. When the Sukkah meets these qualifications, one is permitted to eat and sleep within it. (See also Ramah,Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 631:10.)
A round sukkah - if its circumference is large enough to contain a square seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths, it is kosher even though it has no corners. - Sukkah 7b records an opinion which disqualifies such a sukkah because it is not fit for use as a permanent dwelling. Nevertheless, the halachah does not follow this view.
On this basis, we can understand the placement of this law. On the surface, it would be more appropriate to state this law as part of Halachah 1, which describes the dimensions of a sukkah. However, the Rambam structured the order of his halachot according to their motivating principles. Thus, the first clause of the halachah describes the construction of a sukkah whose shape causes it to be deemed unacceptable even as a temporary dwelling. In contrast, this clause describes a sukkah whose shape is abnormal, but acceptable for temporary purposes.
Halacha 8
Should one place s'chach over an exedrah which has projections [extending from its pillars], it is kosher, regardless of whether the projections can be seen from the inside - although they cannot be seen from the outside - or whether they can be seen from the outside - although they cannot be seen from the inside.
Commentary Halacha 8
Should one place s'chach over an exedrah - A structure frequently employed in Roman architecture, and which was quite common in Jewish homes as well. There were a number of possible forms of this structure. Our halachah (in contrast to Hilchot Shabbat 17:35) deals with the following structure: A roof is placed between two walls, and within this roof a hollow place is left to allow sunlight to enter. Pillars are placed at each of the corners of the hole. The question is whether such a structure can serve as a sukkah if one placed s'chach over the hole. See diagram A.
which has projections [extending from its pillars] - At times these pillars were ornamented with artistic projections. See the diagrams below.
it is kosher, - Because of the projections, the opening of the ceiling is considered to be a third wall extending over the entire width of the exedrah and reaching the ground (Sukkah 18b) Thus, greater leniency is granted in this instance than in Halachah 3 of this chapter, where a partition four handbreadths in width is required.
Needless to say, as evident from Halachah 5:14, the walls of the exedrahcannot be more than four cubits removed from the s'chach.
regardless of whether the projections can be seen from the inside - of the Sukkah - although they cannot be seen from the outside - See diagram B.
or whether they can be seen from the outside - of the
Sukkah - although they cannot be seen from the inside. - See diagram C.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 630:8) quotes the Rambam's statements as halachah. However, the Ramah advises against constructing a sukkah in this manner.
Halacha 9
If it does not have projections [extending from its pillars] it is not valid, because it resembles a sukkah constructed in an alley, because it has [walls on] only the two sides of the exedrah. The middle of the exedrah does not have a wall and there are no projections opposite it.
Commentary Halacha 9
If it - the sukkah constructed in the exedrah
does not have projections [extending from its pillars] - as explained in the previous halachah
it is not valid, because it resembles a sukkah constructed in an alley -which is described in Halachah 3.
because it has [walls on] only the two sides of the exedrah. The middle of the exedrah does not have a wall and there are no projections opposite it. - Hence, the principle that the opening of the roof is considered to be a third wall, reaching to the ground, is not applied in this instance. Rabbenu Manoach notes that different principles apply in this context from those in the laws of eruvin, but explains that there is a basic difference between the two contexts. Here, the two walls were not constructed for the sake of the sukkah. In contrast, in the laws of eruvin, the walls were constructed for the sake of creating an enclosure.
Halacha 10
Should a person place s'chach over an alleyway which possesses a lechi or a well which possesses pasim, it is considered a kosher sukkah only on the Sabbath of the festival. Since this lechi and these pasim are considered to be partitions with regard to the Sabbath laws, they are also considered to be partitions with regard to the laws of sukkah.
Commentary Halacha 10
Should a person place s'chach over an alleyway which possesses a lechi - Hilchot Shabbat 17:2 states:
How is one permitted [to carry articles] in a closed alleyway?One constructs a lechi (vertical pole) [at the entrance] to the fourth side or one lays a beam (korah) across [the span of the fourth side].
Rabbenu Manoach explains that although the alleyway is closed on three sides, were it not for the special provisions mentioned in this halachah, it would not be acceptable, because in this instance the s'chach is placed more than four cubits away from the end of the alleyway. Hence, generally, as explained in Chapter 5, Halachah 14, such a sukkah would not be acceptable.
or a well which possesses pasim, - Hilchot Shabbat 17:27 states:
When a total of eight pasim [partitions] are constructed around a well, two connected to each other at each of its corners, they are considered to be walls. Thus, even though on each side the open portion exceeds the closed, since the four corners are closed, it is permitted to fill up water from the well and to water an animal.What is the height of each of these pasim? Ten handbreadths; their length must be at least six handbreadths and between each pas, there should be...no more than thirteen and one third cubits.
Thus, there are no complete walls to this structure, and without the special provision granted by this halachah, it would not be acceptable.
Sukkah 7b explains that each of these situations possesses an advantage over the other: The alley possesses an advantage in that it has two complete walls. In contrast, the well possesses an advantage in that it has partitions of some sort on each of its four sides. Hence, it is necessary to state both these laws, and neither could be derived from the other.
it is considered a kosher sukkah only on the Sabbath of the festival - TheTzafenat Paneach explains this as applying only to the days which precede the Sabbath. However, once the sukkah is acceptable on the Sabbath, it is also deemed kosher for the remaining days of the festival. (This view is not accepted by other authorities.)
Since this lechi and these pasim are considered to be partitions with regard to the Sabbath laws - On the Sabbath, one is allowed to carry only within an enclosed domain. Since the situations mentioned in this halachah are not actual enclosures and achieve that status only because of a Rabbinic ordinance, the application of these principles is confined to the Sabbath itself. Thus, on the Sabbath...
they are also considered to be partitions with regard to the laws of sukkah - and the sukkah is considered to be enclosed by three walls as required. However, throughout the remainder of the holiday, when the Rabbinic ordinances are not in effect, they are not considered to be enclosed structures. Hence, they are not acceptable as a sukkah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 630:7) quotes these laws as halachah. (Also see the Ramah's notes.)
Halacha 11
Should a person implant four poles in the four corners of the roof and places'chach upon them, it is kosher. Since he placed the s'chach [above] the edge of the roof, we consider that the lower walls ascend to the edge of the s'chach.
Commentary Halacha 11
Should a person implant four poles in the four corners of the roof and place s'chach upon them - See the accompanying diagram.
it is kosher. Since he placed the s'chach [above] the edge of the roof, we consider that the lower walls ascend to the edge of the s'chach - because of the principle of גוד אסיק מחיצתא, it is considered as if the walls of the house have been extended upward, as explained in Halachah 5.
This halachah is based on the statements of Sukkah 4b. There are differences in the versions of the relevant passage possessed by the Rambam and Rav Sherirah Gaon, on the one hand, and those possessed by other Sages, on the other hand. Because of those textual differences, the Ra'avad, Rabbenu Manoach, and others have questioned the Rambam's decision. (See Maggid Mishneh.)
These differences caused the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 630:6) to reject the Rambam's decision. The Mishnah Berurah 630:31 states that even according to the Rambam, the poles must be placed exactly at the edge of the roof. If they are placed further in, even when they are within three handbreadths of the edge, the sukkah is not acceptable.
Halacha 12
A sukkah which has many entrances and many windows in its walls is kosher even though the open portion exceeds the closed portion, provided there is no opening larger than ten cubits.
If there is an opening larger than ten cubits, it is necessary that the closed portion exceed the open portion, even though [the opening] is constructed in the form of an entrance.
Commentary Halacha 12
A sukkah which has many entrances and many windows in its walls is kosher even though the open portion - Any open portion less than three handbreadths in length is considered to be closed, based on the principle ofl'vud (Hilchot Shabbat 16:17). The Magen Avraham 630:1 explains that regarding the laws of sukkah, this principle applies only when one constructs four walls. However, if the sukkah has only three walls, the principle of l'vudcannot be applied, to consider spaces less than three handbreadths in length to be closed.
exceeds the closed portion, provided there is no opening larger than ten cubits. - Sukkah 7a states:
[The laws governing] a wall of a sukkah resemble [those governing] the wall [of an enclosure] on the Sabbath...There is an additional [stringency to the laws] of the Sabbath that does not apply to a sukkah. On the Sabbath, [a wall] is permitted only when the enclosed portion is greater than the open portion. This does not apply to a sukkah.
The Rambam describes the laws governing a wall on the Sabbath as follows (Hilchot Shabbat 16:16):
Every wall whose open portion exceeds its enclosed portion is not considered to be a wall. However, if the open portion is equal to the closed portion, it is permitted, provided that none of the open portions exceeds ten cubits.
Based on the above, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh explain that just as concerning the laws of the Sabbath, the closed portion of a wall must exceed its open portion, so, too, concerning two of the walls of the sukkah. The leniency allowing a wall of the sukkah to be counted as a wall even though the open portion exceeds the closed portion applies only concerning the third wall. Just as other leniencies (see Halachot 2 and 3) are granted concerning the third wall, this leniency is also allowed.
Others explain that the intent is that even when the open portion of all four walls exceeds the closed portion, the sukkah is kosher, while on the Sabbath such an enclosure is not acceptable. This interpretation of the Talmud's statements is advanced by Rabbenu Asher and is quoted as halachah by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 630:5.
If there is an opening larger than ten cubits, it is necessary that the closed portion exceed the open portion even though [the opening] is constructed in the form of an entrance. - Hilchot Shabbat (ibid.) states:
If the open portion is constructed in the form of an entrance, even if it is more than ten cubits long it does not negate the wall, provided the open portion does not exceed the closed portion.
However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:10, 630:5) follows the opinion of Tosafot and other authorities, who are willing to accept a wall as kosher even though it has a wide opening, provided it is constructed in the form of an entrance.
The Sefer Hashlamah presents a third view, accepting an open portion more than ten cubits long in the form of an entrance as part of the wall of a sukkah, but not concerning the laws of the Sabbath.
The Ramah concludes his discussion of this halachah by stating that since these laws are somewhat complicated, it has become customary to build whole walls without any open portions. If one has only a minimum amount of wood, it is preferable to build three complete walls, rather than to construct four walls leaving open spaces.
Halacha 13
A sukkah whose inner space exceeds twenty cubits [is not acceptable]. Should one reduce it [by placing] pillows and coverings [on the floor], it is not considered to be reduced. [This applies even if] one considered them a permanent part of the sukkah. If one reduced the space using straw and considered it as a permanent part of the sukkah, [the space] is considered to be reduced.
Needless to say, the above applies if one used earth and considered it to be a permanent part of the sukkah. However, if one [merely brought in] earth with no specific intention, [its space] is not considered to be reduced.
If it was twenty cubits high, but branches [from the s'chach descend within the twenty cubits, [the following principle applies:] If its shade would be greater than its open portion because of these branches alone, it is considered as having thick s'chach and is kosher.
Commentary Halacha 13
A sukkah whose inner space - the space between the ground and thes'chach.
exceeds twenty cubits [is not acceptable]. - as stated in Halachah 1. Indeed, the question may be raised: Why did the Rambam state these two halachot so far removed from each other?
Should one reduce it - the sukkah's inner space
[by placing] pillows and coverings on the floor], it is not considered to be reduced - for these are merely temporary additions that will later be removed.
[This applies even if] one considered them a permanent - The Maggid Mishneh interprets "permanent" literally. However, the Mishnah Berurah 633:11 explains that according to one opinion, the definition of "permanence" is for the duration of the Sukkot holiday. (See also Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 358:2.)
part of the sukkah. - Most people would not consider leaving these articles in the sukkah permanently. Accordingly, a particular individual's desire to do so is not taken into consideration, and the space is not considered to be reduced (Sukkah 4a).
If one reduced the space using straw and considered it to be a permanent part of the sukkah, [the space] is considered to be reduced. -However, if one laid straw on the floor of the sukkah without having such an intention, the space is not considered to be reduced (ibid.). In his commentary on Ohalot 15:6, the Rambam writes: "In general, one will have in mind to remove straw."
The Mishnah Berurah 633:13 emphasizes that one should not reduce the space of the sukkah on the first day of the festival because of the holiday prohibitions. (See also Rabbenu Manoach.)
Needless to say, the above applies if one used earth and considered it to be a permanent part of the sukkah. However, if one [merely brought in] earth with no specific intention, [its space] is not considered to be reduced. - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 633:4) quotes these decisions as halachah and adds that one must verbally express the desire to make the earth or straw part of the sukkah. The Mishnah Berurah (ibid.) states that many later authorities considered an unspoken intention as sufficient.
If it - the inner space of a sukkah
was twenty cubits high - and, therefore, unacceptable
but branches [from the s'chach descend within the twenty cubits, [the following principle applies:] If its shade would be greater than its open portion - this is the minimum measure required by the Mishnah (Sukkah 1:1) for s'chach to be kosher.
because of these branches alone - i.e., were the upper portion of the s'chachto be removed, the branches which hang down would create sufficient shade
it is considered as having thick s'chach - i.e., the s'chach is considered to begin at the low branches and to have been piled high.
and is kosher. - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 663:2) quotes this law as halachah.
Halacha 14
When [a sukkah is more than twenty cubits high, but] one builds a bench next to the middle wall extending across its entire span - if the width of the bench is equal to the minimum width of a sukkah, it is kosher.
Should one build the bench next to the middle wall along [one] side, if there are four cubits between the bench and the [opposite] wall, it is unacceptable. If there are fewer than four cubits, it is kosher.
Should one build the bench in the middle [of the sukkah], if there are more than four cubits from the edge of the bench to any of the sides [of the sukkah], it is not acceptable. If there are fewer than four cubits, it is kosher. It is considered as if the walls touch the bench, and the distance from the bench to the s'chachis less than twenty cubits.
If one constructs a pillar [within a sukkah whose s'chach is more than twenty cubits high, the following rule applies]: Even though it is of the minimum size required of a sukkah, it is unacceptable, because its walls are not discernible. Thus, it is as if there is kosher s'chach above the pillar without any walls.
Commentary Halacha 14
When [a sukkah is more than twenty cubits high, but] one builds a bench next to the middle wall extending across its entire span - and there are fewer than twenty cubits between the bench and the s'chach
if the width of the bench is equal to the minimum width of a sukkah -seven handbreadths, as in Halachah 1 above. See Diagram A.
it is kosher. - Rashi (Sukkah 4a) maintains that not only the area above the bench, but the entire sukkah is kosher, as evident from the last clause of Halachah 3. Though Rabbenu Nissim and other authorities maintain that only the area above the bench may be used as a sukkah, the Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 633:5) accepts Rashi's view.
Should one build the bench next to the middle wall along [one] side, if there are four cubits between the bench and the [opposite] wall, it is unacceptable - because the area around the bench is surrounded by only two walls.
If there are fewer than four cubits, it is kosher. - because of the principle explained in the latter clause. In this instance as well, there is a disagreement between the Rabbis whether the entire sukkah is kosher or only the area above the bench. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 633:6) follows the view that only the area above the bench is acceptable for use as a sukkah. See Diagram B.
Should one build the bench in the middle [of the sukkah], if there are more than four cubits from the edge of the bench to any of the sides [of the sukkah] - that wall is too far removed from the bench to be considered to be a wall around it. Hence,
it - the sukkah in its totality, even the area above the bench...
is not acceptable - for in this instance, the sukkah must have four walls.
If there are fewer than four cubits, - between the bench and the walls of the sukkah...
it is kosher. It is considered as if the walls touch the bench i.e., the area from the bench to the wall is considered to be an extension of the wall. Thus, this halachah is the converse of the principle of דופן עקומה (Dofen Akumah - literally, a crooked wall) mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 14.
There and in his commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 1:10), the Rambam explains that the principle of Dofen Akumah allows us to consider materials on the roof of the sukkah which are unacceptable as s'chach to be extensions of the wall, thus creating an L-shaped - i.e., "crooked" - wall.
Here, the Rambam explains that the opposite is also true. As long as there are no more than four cubits between the bench and the wall, the ground of the sukkah can also be considered to be an extension of its wall. (See Kessef Mishneh.)
and - Since...
the distance from the bench to the s'chach is less than twenty cubits. -as required in Halachah 1, the area above the bench is considered as having four walls and kosher s'chach.
If one constructs a pillar - ten handbreadths or more high, because otherwise, the pillar could never be considered to be a significant domain (Maggid Mishneh).
[within a sukkah - removed four cubits or more from the walls. (Otherwise, it would be considered to be kosher because of the principles mentioned above.)
whose s'chach is more than twenty cubits high, the following rule applies]: Even though it is of the minimum size required of a sukkah -seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths
it is unacceptable - Sukkah 4b explains that Abbaye desires to consider such a sukkah to be kosher, based on the principle of גוד אסיק מחיצתא mentioned in Halachah 11 - i.e., the walls of the pillar would be considered as extending upward until the s'chach. Ravva answered him that, in this instance, that principle cannot be applied...
for - in contrast to those of a house
its - the pillar's
walls are not discernible. - See the Chiddushim of Rav Chayim Soloveichik, Halachah 11.
Thus, it is as if there is kosher s'chach above the pillar without any walls.
Halacha 15
[The following rule applies] when [the inner space of the sukkah] was less than ten [handbreadths high] and one dug [into the ground of the sukkah] to create an [inner space] of ten [handbreadths]: If there are three handbreadths from the edge of the pit until the wall [of the sukkah], it is not acceptable. If there is less than that [amount], it is kosher, because any [distance] less than three [handbreadths] is considered to be [insignificant, and the two entities are considered to be] adjacent [to each other], as explained in Hilchot Shabbat.
Commentary Halacha 15
[The following rule applies] when [the inner space of the sukkah] was less than ten [handbreadths high] - the minimum height required by Halachah 1.
and one dug [into the ground of the sukkah] to create - a pit at least seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths (Rabbenu Manoach, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 633:10) with...
an [inner space] of ten [handbreadths] - between it and the s'chach.
If there are three handbreadths from the edge of the pit until the wall [of the sukkah], it is not acceptable. - One might assume that as long as there are less than four cubits between the edge of the pit and the sukkah, the sukkah would be kosher, because of the principle mentioned in the previous halachah; i.e., the ground of the sukkah would be considered to be an extension of the wall. Nevertheless, Sukkah 4a differentiates between the two cases. In the situation described in the previous halachah, the wall was of the proper size; the only question was its proximity to the sukkah. In this instance, there is no halachically acceptable wall to begin with.
If there is less than that [amount], it is kosher - The Mishnah Berurah633:29 quotes authorities who maintain that only the area within the pit is kosher, and one does not fulfill the mitzvah of eating or sleeping in the sukkah by performing these activities in the portion covered by the s'chach outside the pit.
because any [distance] less than three [handbreadths] is considered to be [insignificant and the two entities are considered to be] adjacent [to each other], as explained in Hilchot Shabbat - 14:7, which explains the principle of l'vud mentioned above.
Halacha 16
The walls of the sukkah are kosher [although made] from all [substances]. All that is necessary is a barrier of any kind. Even living beings [may serve that purpose. Thus,] a person can create a wall [of the sukkah] by using a colleague so that he can eat, drink, and sleep in the sukkah, for which his colleague is serving as a wall [even] on the holiday.
The above applies when one employs the person as a wall without his conscious knowledge. However, it is forbidden to create [a wall by using a person] when the latter is conscious of the fact on the holiday. Nevertheless, it is permitted during the other days of the festival.
Similarly, a person may create a fourth wall from utensils on the holiday. However, he should not create a third wall using utensils on the holiday, because, [by doing so], he is making the sukkah fit for use, and it is forbidden to create [even] a temporary tent on the holiday.
Commentary Halacha 16
The walls of the sukkah are kosher [although made] from all [substances]. - The Mishnah (Sukkah 12b) mentions many substances which are not acceptable as s'chach (as mentioned in the following chapter), and concludes "all are fit to be used as walls."
All that is necessary is a barrier of any kind. - The Ramah (Orach Chayim630:1) explains that one should take care not to use substances that have an unpleasant odor or substances that will shrivel during the holiday, and thus cause the walls to be less than the required measure.
Even living beings [may serve that purpose. - The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 630:11) states that an animal used for this purpose must be tied so that it will not run away.
Thus,] a person can create a wall [of the sukkah] by using a colleague so that he can eat, drink, and sleep in the sukkah, for which his colleague is serving as a wall - The Tzafnat Paneach raises the question whether the person serving as the wall can also fulfill the mitzvah of eating in such a sukkah. He quotes a number of passages from which one might infer that he may.
[even] on the holiday. - The latter term refers to the first day of Sukkot - and in the Diaspora, the second day - and the day of Shemini Atzeret, when the laws prohibiting work and the Rabbinic ordinances extending those restrictions must be observed.
The above applies when one employs the person as a wall without his conscious knowledge. However, it is forbidden to create [a wall by using a person] - The Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh explain that this refers only to the third wall of the sukkah. If a sukkah has three kosher walls, a person may employ a colleague to serve as the fourth wall on the holiday, even though the latter is conscious of what he is doing. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 630:12) states this as halachah.
when the latter is conscious of the fact on the holiday. - Hilchot Shabbat16:23 states:
It is permitted to create a barrier of men, one standing next to the other, on the Sabbath, as long as the people who are standing are not conscious of the fact that they are serving as a barrier.
Although it is forbidden to create an enclosure on the Sabbath, since the person serving as the barrier is unaware of what he is doing, no transgression is involved. It is his intention, and not that of the person using the sukkah, which is significant (Ra'avad). In contrast, when the person serving as the wall is conscious of his acts, it is considered as if he has created a structure of substance (Magen Avraham 630:19).
The Magen Avraham (ibid.) also states that leniency is granted only when humans serve as the walls. It is absolutely forbidden to create a wall using an animal on the holiday.
Nevertheless, it is permitted during the other days of the festival - with the exception of the Sabbath; i.e., there is no essential difficulty with the use of such a sukkah, the only problem is the Rabbinic prohibition mentioned above.
Similarly, a person may create a fourth wall - Since a sukkah is kosher when it possesses only three walls, the addition of the fourth wall is not halachically significant. We are allowed to add to a temporary structure on the Sabbath.
from utensils on the festival. However, he should not create a third wall using utensils - It is permitted to create a utensil from human beings, because one does not normally create an enclosure in such a manner. In contrast, an enclosure is frequently made from utensils (Rabbenu Manoach).
on the holiday, because, [by doing so], he is making the sukkah fit for use, and it is forbidden to create [even] a temporary tent on the holiday.
Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
When a person sets aside money for a sin-offering and dies, the money should be [thrown] to the Mediterranean Sea.1 Similarly, when a person sets aside money for a sin-offering, the money is lost, another sin-offering is offered in its place, and then the [initial] money is found after atonement was achieved, [the money should be thrown] to the Mediterranean Sea.2
Halacha 2
When a person sets aside money for a sin-offering, the money is lost, and he set aside other money in its stead, but did not have the opportunity to purchase a sin-offering with the later funds before the first funds were found, he should purchase a sin-offering with the combined funds.3 The remainder should be used for freewill offerings.4
Halacha 3
When a person sets aside money for a sin-offering, the money is lost, and he set aside [an animal] as a sin-offering in its stead, but before he sacrificed it, the [original] funds were found and the [animal was discovered] to have a disqualifying physical blemish, it should be sold and he should purchase a sin-offering with the combined funds.5 The remainder should be used for freewill offerings.
Halacha 4
When a person set aside [an animal] as a sin-offering, it was lost, he set aside money in its stead, but was not able to purchase [an animal] as a sin-offering with it before the [first] animal was found, but it [was discovered] to have a disqualifying physical blemish, it should be sold and he should purchase a sin-offering with the combined funds. The remainder should be used for freewill offerings.
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
If he set aside [an animal for] a sin-offering or the money for a sin-offering, because he thought that he was obligated [to bring one] and then he discovered that he was not so obligated, [the animal or the money] is of ordinary status; it is not consecrated.8
If he set aside two [animals for] sin-offerings or the money for two [animals] because he thought was obligated to bring both and then it was discovered that he was only liable to bring one, he should bring one as a sacrifice and the other should be used for freewill offerings.9
Halacha 7
When he picks up coins in his hand or was in the process of collecting them and said: "I will bring my sin-offering from these," the remainder are not consecrated.10Similarly, it appears to me11 that an inference can be drawn [from this ruling] to [similar situations involving] other sacrifices and the remainder are not considered as consecrated.12
Halacha 8
When a person sets aside money for a meal-offering of a sinner13 and brings a meal-offering from those funds, or he set aside a meal-offering itself, and [in either of the above instances, money] was left over, the remainder should be used to bring a freewill meal-offering.14Any extra [meal15 left after] the tenth of the ephah that is brought by the High Priest as his chavitin offering16 should be left to rot.17Similarly, the remainder [of meal left after preparing] the bread for a thanksgiving offering or the bread for a nazirite's offering18 should be left to rot.19
Halacha 9
[Any money] left over [from that set aside to purchase] pairs of doves for zavim, zavot or for women after childbirth,22 sin-offerings, or guilt-offerings should be used for freewill offerings. They should be offered as burnt-offerings, as explained.23
[Any money] left over [from that set aside to purchase] burnt-offerings should be used for burnt-offerings, [to purchase] peace-offerings, for peace-offerings, [to purchase] meal-offerings, for meal-offerings, [to purchase] a Paschal sacrifice, for peace-offerings,24[to purchase] nazirite-offerings, for nazirite-offerings,25 [to purchase] the offerings for a particular nazirite, for [freewill] offerings to be brought by that nazirite.26
When does the ruling that [money] left over [from that set aside to purchase] a sin-offering should be used for freewill offerings apply? With regard to a fixed sin-offering. When, however, one was obligated to bring an adjustable guilt offering27 and set aside money for a sin-offering of an animal and became poor, he should bring a fowl instead.28He may transfer the holiness from those funds to the fowl and benefit from them.29 Similarly, if he set aside money for a fowl and became poor, he should bring a [meal-offering] of a tenth of an ephahinstead.30 He may transfer the holiness from those funds to [the meal] and benefit from them.
Halacha 10
If a person set aside an animal [for an adjustable guilt-offering], it contracted a disqualifying physical blemish, [and he became poor],31 it may be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a fowl.32 If, however, he set aside a fowl [for such an offering], it was disqualified, [and he became poor], he may not sell it and bring a tenth of an ephah from the proceeds of the sale, for a fowl [that was consecrated] may not be redeemed, as stated in [Hilchot] Issurei HaMizbeiach.33
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply to] all those obligated by the Torah34 to bring pairs of doves35 who set aside money for those doves. If they desired to use all the money for sin-offerings of fowl alone, they may.36 If they desire to use it for burnt-offerings of fowl, they may. Even if they had [originally] said: "This is the money for my sin-offering and this is the money for my burnt-offering," he may mix the money together and buy the two offerings together, or use the money solely for sin-offerings, or solely for burnt-offerings. [The rationale is that the identity of] pairs of doves is designated only when purchased by the owners or when offered by a priest.37
Halacha 12
Therefore if one set aside money for a pair of doves without making a determination and died, all of the money that was undetermined should be used for freewill offerings. [The rationale is that] it is all fit to used for a burnt-offering.38
Halacha 13
[The following laws apply when someone] was obligated to bring a sin-offering and he said: "I pledge a burnt-offering," and set aside money saying: "This is for my obligation." If he desires, he may use them to bring an animal as a sin-offering or he may use them to bring an animal as a burnt-offering.39 If he died and left the money, it should be taken to the Mediterranean Sea.40
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The ruling is comparable to that governing an animal set aside as a sin-offering whose owner died mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 1. Since this money was set aside to be used for a sin-offering, it may not be used for any other purpose. Hence, it should be cast in a place where no one will benefit from it. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 4:2).
Although the term Yam HaMelech is generally translated as "the Dead Sea," it literally means "the Salt Sea." In several places in his Commentary to the Mishnah, however, the Rambam interprets the term as referring to the Mediterranean.
|
| 2. |
I.e., this ruling is comparable to that governing an animal set aside as a sin-offering which was lost and the owner attained atonement through the sacrifice of another animal, as stated in Chapter 4,op. cit.
|
| 3. |
Since both sets of money were set aside for the purchase of a sin-offering, they should be used primarily for that purpose. It is preferable to purchase a more expensive animal for a sin-offering than to have more money left over to purchase burnt-offerings.
|
| 4. |
Since the money was not used as of yet and the person did not yet gain atonement, any funds that remain can be used for another purpose.
|
| 5. |
For the same reasoning as in the previous halachah.
|
| 6. |
He should not, combine the two to purchase a single offering.
|
| 7. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 5.
|
| 8. |
For the consecration was made in error and hence is not binding. See Chapter 4, Halachah 20.
|
| 9. |
I.e., with regard to money, the money should be used to purchase freewill offerings. With regard to an animal, the animal should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish. It should then be sold and the proceeds used for freewill offerings (Kessef Mishneh). Since he did not specify which of the animals should be associated with the particular sin and he is liable for one sin-offering, the remaining animal is not considered to have been consecrated in error (Rav Yosef Corcus).
|
| 10. |
Since he said, "from these," the implication is that all of the coins were not consecrated, only those necessary to purchase the animal for the sin-offering.
|
| 11. |
This phrase introduces a conclusion drawn by the Rambam through logic that is not based on any explicit prior Rabbinic source. The rationale is that when bringing a sin-offering it is likely that the person feels remorse and is willing to give more to attain atonement. Nevertheless, none of the extra money is consecrated. It follows logically that this principle should also apply with regard to a freewill offering in which instance the donor may not be as powerfully motivated.
|
| 12. |
The Ra'avad accepts the Rambam's conclusion with regard to sacrifices that one is obligated to bring, but differs with regard to burnt-offerings and peace-offerings that one gives of his own volition. In those instances, he maintains that the extra money should be used for those sacrifices. The Kessef Mishneh, however, substantiates the Rambam's approach.
|
| 13. |
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 12:4; Hilchot Shegagot 10:4.
|
| 14. |
Note the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 2:5) which states that since we are speaking about what remains after bringing a sin-offering, it should be used to bring freewill burnt-offerings.
|
| 15. |
I.e., in this and the following situations, the person required to bring a meal-offering brought more than the required amount.
|
| 16. |
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:2.
|
| 17. |
For the concept that the remainder of what was set aside should be used for burnt-offerings was stated with regard to sin-offerings and not these types of sacrifices (Menachot 108a).
|
| 18. |
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 9:5 which states that the bread are integral parts of these two types of offerings.
|
| 19. |
The rationale is that these breads are not considered as independent sacrifices, but as elements of the thanksgiving or nazirite offerings. Hence they were consecrated - and may only be used for - those sacrifices.
|
| 20. |
For wine libations are sacrifices of the highest degree of sanctity. Hence the laws governing them are the same as those governing sin-offerings and guilt-offerings.
|
| 21. |
Hilchot Shekalim 3-13.
|
| 22. |
The requirement for these individuals to bring doves as sacrifices is mentioned in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:3.
|
| 23. |
Ibid. 2:2-3, and in several instances in this and the previous chapter.
|
| 24. |
For they are both sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 2:5)].
|
| 25. |
See Hilchot Nizirut 9:1 which states: "[The following rules apply when a person] sets aside money for the sacrifices of [poor] nazirites, those sacrifices were offered, and there is money left over. He should bring sacrifices of other nazirites with those funds." In his Commentary to the Mishnah,op. cit., the Rambam interprets this teaching as referring to nazirites who desire to pool their offerings.
|
| 26. |
Since the money was designated for the offerings of that particular person, it cannot be used for the sacrifices of another nazirite.
|
| 27. |
See Hilchot Shegagot 1:3 and ch. 10, which explains that there are certain transgressions for which the atonement offering required varies according to the transgressor's financial capacity.
|
| 28. |
As obligated of a person who violated these sins but did not have the means to purchase an animal as a sacrifice.
|
| 29. |
Keritot 27b derives this law through a process of Biblical exegesis.
|
| 30. |
As obligated of a person who violated these sins but did not have the means to purchase doves as a sacrifice.
|
| 31. |
The bracketed additions are based on Hilchot Shegagot 10:11.
|
| 32. |
Even though the animal had already been purchased for the sacrifice, since it was disqualified and his status changed, he is allowed to use the proceeds from its sale to bring a lesser offering.
|
| 33. |
Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 6:4. This applies only to a fowl itself. Money set aside for a fowl may be redeemed, as stated in the previous halachah.
|
| 34. |
I.e., the individuals mentioned at the beginning of Halachah 9.
|
| 35. |
Generally, a pair of doves includes one to be offered as a burnt-offering and one as a sin-offering.
|
| 36. |
The person must, however, bring another dove(s) for the other burnt- or sin-offerings, he or she is obligated to bring.
|
| 37. |
I.e., if the owners specify which doves are to be offered for which specific offering, the fowl is designated for that purpose. Alternatively, if such a distinction was not made, they become designated by the priest at the time he offers them (Keritot 28a; see Chapter 8, Halachah 8).
|
| 38. |
Were, however, the fowl to have been designated for sin-offerings, they would be consigned to die, as evident from Halachah 1. See also the previous chapter.
|
| 39. |
The Ra'avad differs and, based on Nazir 27a, maintains that the text should read: "He should not bring a sin-offering.... He should not bring a burnt-offering." He also explains that this version is preferable, for, otherwise, there would be no reason why the money mentioned in the following clause should be consigned to be destroyed. Seemingly, there is no difference between that clause and the situation mentioned in the previous halachah.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam had a different version of that text. Because of the difficulties, the Ra'avad raised, the Kessef Mishneh suggests a third version: If he desires to bring a sin-offering, he should. If he desires to bring a burnt-offering, he should not.
|
| 40. |
According to the Rambam, since he has an obligation to bring a sin-offering and did not clarify his intent, we must accept the possibility that the money is associated with a sin-offering and must be done away with, as stated in Halachah 1.
|
Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 6
Halacha 1
If one of [the animals designated as] a sin-offering that was consigned to death or an ox that was condemned to be stoned1 becomes intermingled with any other sacrificial animals - even in a ratio of one to a myriad - they should all be consigned to death.2 [The rationale is that] living animals are important and are never considered insignificant [in a mixture].3
Halacha 2
If [sacrificial animals] became intermingled with [animals that are] forbidden to be offered on the altar,6 they should all be allowed to pasture until they contract disqualifying physical blemishes. They should then be sold and the proceeds from the sale of the most choice animal among them7 should be used to bring sacrifices from the type in which [the forbidden animal] became intermingled.8
Halacha 3
If sacrificial animals become intermingled with unblemished ordinary animals, the ordinary animals in the mixture should be sold as sacrifices of that type, and they should all be sacrificed.
What is implied? If four animals that were designated as peace-offerings became intermingled with four unblemished ordinary animals, the four ordinary animals9 should be sold to someone who is obligated to bring peace-offerings and they should all be offered as peace-offerings. Similar laws apply with regard to burnt-offerings and guilt-offerings.
The proceeds of the sale are considered as ordinary money, for they are the proceeds of the sale of ordinary animals.
Halacha 4
When an ox that was consecrated became intermingled with ordinary animals, the largest among them is considered as the consecrated one10 and the others should be sold for sacrifices of that type.11 If sacrifices of the most sacred order became intermingled with animals consecrated for the same purpose,12 each one should be offered for the sake of its owner, even though none [of the owners] recognize their sacrificial animal.
When does the above apply? With regard to sacrifices to be brought by women in which there is no obligation for semichah.13 With regard to sacrifices to be brought by men, since each one of them is obligated to perform semichah on his sacrifice,14 these animals should not be offered until each one gives his portion [in the sacrificial animal] to his colleague15 or until they all become blemished and are sold. [In that instance,] each one should then bring a sacrificial animal equal in value to the more select of that type.
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
Just as we may not reduce the time [in which sacrifices] may be eaten,18so too, we may not limit the people eligible to partake of them,19 nor the place where they can be eaten.20 Instead,21 what should be done? All [of the sacrificial animals of mixed identity] should be allowed to pasture until they contract a disqualifying physical blemish. Then each one should be sold individually. He should purchase a sacrifice for each type of the value of the most choice animal. He must suffer the loss22 from his own resources.
Halacha 7
Even though the person already sacrificed the burnt-offering or the peace-offering which he was obligated to bring,23 he should nevertheless bring a different burnt-offering and peace-offering from the proceeds [of the sale] of the mixture.
Halacha 8
When a sin-offering becomes intermingled with a peace-offering, [the two] should be allowed to pasture until they contracted disqualifying physical blemishes and were redeemed. He for should bring a peace-offering of the value of the most choice animal and a sin-offering of the value of the most choice animal. If he took the initiative and offered another [animal as a] sin-offering for the sin-offering that was set aside for him first,24 they should all be consigned to death.25
Halacha 9
Similarly, if money for a sin-offering becomes mixed together with money for a guilt-offering, one should take two animals and transfer the holiness of the money for the sin-offering wherever it is on [the animal set aside as] a sin-offering and transfer the holiness of the money for the guilt-offering on [the animal set aside as] a guilt-offering.
Halacha 10
When a thanksgiving-offering becomes mixed with an animal exchanged for it,28 they should both be offered and the bread [that accompanies the thanksgiving-offering] should be waved with [both of] them.29
If a thanksgiving-offering becomes mixed with other sacrificial animals, even if the person offered [another animal as] his thanksgiving-offering, all [the sacrificial animals] should be allowed to pasture until they contract a blemish. He should then bring another thanks-offering of the value of the most choice animal and the other offering of the value of the most choice animal.30
Halacha 11
If [a thanksgiving-offering] becomes mixed with a nazirite's ram, they should both be sacrificed31 and the bread waved with them.
Halacha 12
When a firstborn offering becomes intermingled with a Paschal sacrifice, they should both be allowed to pasture until they contract a disqualifying physical blemish, and then eaten as a [blemished] firstborn offering.32
Why aren't they sacrificed?33 Because a Paschal sacrifice may be eaten by any person until midnight34 and the firstborn offering is eaten for two days and is eaten only by priests. [We follow the principles that] we do not cause sacrifices to be disqualified35 and we do not reduce the amount of people eligible to partake of them.36
Halacha 13
Similarly, when a tithe offering becomes intermingled with a Paschal sacrifice, when they contract a disqualifying physical blemish, they should be eaten according to the prescriptions regarding a tithe offering.37 When a firstborn and a tithe offering become intermingled, they may be eaten [as ordinary meat]38after contracting a disqualifying physical blemish.39
Halacha 14
Similarly, when other sacrificial animals become intermingled with a firstborn or a tithe offering, they should be allowed to pasture until they contract a disqualifying physical blemish. They may be eaten according to the restrictions applying to a firstborn offering or a tithe offering that became blemished.
Halacha 15
When a guilt-offering became intermingled with a peace-offering, even though only the fats and the organs are offered and the meat is eaten, they should not be offered.40 Instead, they should be allowed to pasture until they contract a disqualifying blemish and bring a guilt-offering of the value of the more choice one and a peace-offering of the value of the more choice one. [The owner should] suffer the loss of the difference [between the value of these animals and the animals lost] from his own resources. If he took the initiative and offered his guilt-offering first, they should both [be allowed to pasture until they become blemished and sold, with the proceeds] used for freewill offerings.41
Halacha 16
It is possible for sacrificial animals of any type to become intermingled with other sacrificial animals of the same species with the exception of [animals consecrated] as sin offerings and [those consecrated as] guilt-offerings, because guilt offerings may be brought only from male sheep42 and sin-offerings are brought from female sheep.43
Halacha 17
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply with regard to] any animal found between Jerusalem and Migdal Eder46 or that radius to any other direction.47 If it is a female [that can be estimated to be] a year old, it is placed in a closed room to die, lest it be a sin-offering.48 If it [appears to be] two years old, it should be brought as a peace-offering49 and bread should be brought with it, lest it be a thanksgiving-offering.50
If a male that [appears to be] two years old is found, there is no way of correcting the situation, for it is possible that it is a guilt-offering whose owner has not yet received atonement.51
If one found a male animal that is a year old, he should allow it to pasture until it becomes blemished, bring two animals in its stead and make a stipulation, stating: "If the [blemished animal] was a burnt-offering, this is designated as a burnt-offering in place of it. If it was a peace-offering, this is a peace-offering in place of it."52 He then offers the first as a burnt-offering. Its accompanying offerings53 should be brought from communal funds.54 The other should be brought as a peace-offering together with bread, lest it be a thanksgiving-offering.
What should be done with the animal that was found? It should be eaten after it contracts a blemish. For even if it was a firstborn offering or a tithe offering, it could be eaten after it was blemished.55 If it was a Paschal sacrifice whose time had passed, it is considered as a peace-offering. And during the time the Paschal sacrifice [must be offered], everyone is careful regarding it.56 If one might ask: Maybe it is a guilt-offering of a nazirite or a person purified fromtzara'at?57 These are not frequently found. Therefore [the Sages] showed no concern about them.
Halacha 19
If sacrifices became intermingled with other sacrifices after the animals were slaughtered, they should be eaten according to the laws pertaining to the more severe category.58 If [such sacrifices] became intermingled with sacrificial animals that were disqualified or ordinary animals that were slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard,59 they should [be left] until their form is no longer recognizable60 and then be taken to the place where sacrifices are burnt.
Halacha 20
Halacha 21
When a limb from a blemished [sacrificial] animal becomes mixed with the limbs of sacrificial animals - even one in a thousand63 - they should all be taken to the place where sacrifices are burnt.64 Even if all the limbs [of the sacrifices] were offered except for one, it should be burnt in the Temple Courtyard in the place where sacrificial animals that were disqualified are burnt.
Halacha 22
When pieces [of meat] from sacrifices of the most sacred order become mixed with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness or those which are eaten for one day65 become mixed with those eaten for two days, they should be eaten according to the prescriptions of the more severe of the two.
Halacha 23
When a piece [of meat] from a sin-offering that has become impure becomes intermingled with 100 pieces of meat from a pure sin-offering or a slice of the showbread that has become impure becomes intermingled with 100 slices of the showbread that are pure, [the mixture] may be considered acceptable,66 as we explained in [Hilchot] Terumot.67
Halacha 24
If, however, a piece [of meat] from a sin-offering became mixed with 100 pieces of ordinary meat or a piece of the showbread which is pure becomes mixed with 100 pieces of ordinary bread, [the mixture] should not be considered as acceptable.68 Instead, the entire mixture should be eaten by priests, as is true with regard to any mixture of consecrated food and ordinary food.69
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
For killing a human; see Exodus 21:29-32; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, ch. 10. As stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:6, such an animal is unfit for sacrifice on the altar. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 8:1), the Rambam states that, in this context, the term also applies to an ox that was sodomized by - or forced to participate in sexual relations with - a Jew, for it is also condemned to be executed.
|
| 2. |
For it is possible that every animal is that animal condemned to die.
|
| 3. |
I.e., according to Scriptural Law, a forbidden substance is considered as insignificant if mixed with a larger volume of permitted substances (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:1). Even according to Rabbinic Law, it is considered insignificant if mixed with more than sixty times its volume in most situations (ibid.:5). Nevertheless, this situation is an exception for the reason stated by the Rambam.
|
| 4. |
For their designated purpose.
|
| 5. |
This is a general principle applicable in many contexts, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 24; Chapter 3, Halachah 22; and Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:4. Thus the fact that as an initial preference the animal should not have been sacrificed is not significant, for according to Scriptural Law, the presence of the forbidden animal is nullified. Hence, after the fact, the sacrifice is acceptable.
|
| 6. |
E.g., animals that were set aside for sacrifice to false deities, an animal given to a prostitute, or one exchanged for a dog. See a full listing of such animals in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:11.
|
| 7. |
For perhaps the sacrificial animal was the most choice.
|
| 8. |
After selling the animals, the person obligated to bring the offerings must say: "The holiness of the sacrificial animal is transferred to these funds" and with those funds, he should purchase a new sacrificial animal.
|
| 9. |
Even though the owner does not know which four animals they are, he may sell them (Rav Yosef Corcus). To avoid the difficulty mentioned in the following halachah, however, the owners must specify which animals are being given to the purchaser.
|
| 10. |
And should be sacrificed for the purpose for which the animal was consecrated originally.
|
| 11. |
For it is possible that any one of them is the consecrated animal.
|
| 12. |
E.g., burnt-offerings with burnt-offerings.
|
| 13. |
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 3:5
|
| 14. |
Although, after the fact, the sacrifice is acceptable if semichah is not performed, as an initial preference, one should not offer it unless that rite could be performed.
|
| 15. |
Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions the Rambam's statements here, noting that in Hilchot Meilah 4:8, the Rambam rules that a person cannot sell an animal set aside as a peace-offering or as a burnt-offering. By the same reasoning, it would seem that it would be forbidden to make the exchange mentioned here.
|
| 16. |
I.e., in the example given above, to offer both of them as a burnt-offering.
|
| 17. |
See the explanation of this principle in Halachah 12. This rationale is given by Zevachim 8:3 with regard to a peace-offering and a guilt-offering that became mixed together, for it is possible that the meat of one of the animals will not be finished during the first night and will therefore be disqualified, lest it be that of the guilt-offering. This is undesirable, because perhaps it is from the peace-offering and thus it will be disqualified, before its appropriate time (for peace-offerings may be eaten on the following day as well).
This explanation of this concept is slightly different for a mixture of a peace-offering and a burnt-offering, since a burnt-offering is not eaten at all. Instead, in that instance, offering the peace-offering as a burnt-offering is forbidden, based on Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:4 which states that it is forbidden to offer the meat of sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity on the altar. As a result, the meat of the sacrifice is disqualified.
|
| 18. |
As explained in the previous note. See also Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 10:12.
|
| 19. |
For example, a firstborn offering which may be eaten only by priests, became mixed with a tithe offering that can be eaten be anyone.
|
| 20. |
Sacrifices of the most sacred order may be eaten only in the Temple Courtyard, while sacrifices of lesser sanctity may be eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem.
|
| 21. |
I.e., for this reason, we do not merely take one animal for one type of sacrifice and another for the other.
|
| 22. |
The difference between the price of the most choice animal and the other animal.
|
| 23. |
Using another animal so that he will not delay the fulfillment of his obligation.
|
| 24. |
I.e., before these animals became blemished.
|
| 25. |
As is the law with regard to an animal set aside as a sin-offering that was lost and another was offered in its place (Chapter 4, Halachah 1). Since the animal cannot be sacrificed because its identity is unknown, it is as if it was lost (see Rav Yosef Corcus who discusses this issue). Since it is not known which one of the mixture was consigned to death, both are given that fate.
|
| 26. |
As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1, with regard to money set aside for a sin-offering that was lost.
|
| 27. |
Rambam LeAm states that this refers to the money that remains after some of the money was used to purchase a sin-offering.
|
| 28. |
I.e., he desires to transfer its holiness to the other animal, in which instance, we follow the rule (Leviticus 27:33): "It and the animal exchanged for it shall be holy."
|
| 29. |
There is an obligation to wave the thanksgiving-offering together with its bread (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 9:6-7). When an animal designated as a thanksgiving-offering is exchanged for another animal, the holiness of the original offering is not nullified. Nevertheless, the second animal should also be offered as a sacrifice, but bread should not be offered together with it (Chapter 12, Halachah 8). In this instance, since we do not know which is the original animal and which is the one exchanged for it, the bread should be waved with both of them.
|
| 30. |
The Ra'avad states that bread should not be brought with the second thanksgiving-offering. TheKessef Mishneh states that, since the thanksgiving-offering had already been brought, this is obvious. The Ra'avad mentioned the matter only lest one will think that it is parallel to the situation described in the first clause.
|
| 31. |
The forearm of the nazirite's ram may be eaten only by the priests (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot10:4). Thus to a certain extent, the amount of people eligible to partake of the sacrifice is being reduced (see Ra'avad), because a thanksgiving-offering can be eaten by everyone (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot). Nevertheless, since only one limb is involved, it is not considered significant (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 32. |
A blemished firstborn animal may be eaten as ordinary meat. There are, however, some restrictions that apply; see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:12; Hilchot Bechorot 1:18.
Pesachim 98b states that one should also transfer the holiness of the blemished Paschal sacrifice to another animal and offer it as a peace-offering. The Rambam mentions this point in his restatement of the law in Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:8.
|
| 33. |
For they are both sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity. As Pesachim 98b relates even if there is company of priests, they should not offer these animals on the fourteenth of Nisan for the reason stated by the Rambam.
|
| 34. |
I.e., according to Rabbinic decree (Hilchot Korban Pesach 8:15).
|
| 35. |
As the firstborn offering could be, if forced to be eaten within the time restrictions of the Paschal sacrifice.
|
| 36. |
As would be done with regard to the people eligible to partake of the Paschal sacrifice.
|
| 37. |
After contracting a blemish, a animal set aside as a tithe offering may be eaten as ordinary meat. There are, however, some restrictions which apply; see Hilchot Bechorot 6:6. As above, the holiness of the Paschal sacrifice must be transferred to another animal.
|
| 38. |
But only by a priest.
|
| 39. |
In this instance, there is no obligation to offer an animal in their stead.
|
| 40. |
For doing so would reduce the amount of time in which the peace-offering could be partaken.
|
| 41. |
This ruling combines that of Halachah 9 with regard to sin-offerings with that of Chapter 4, Halachah 14.
|
| 42. |
Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 1:10.
|
| 43. |
Ibid.:9.
|
| 44. |
One arbitrarily being taken for one sacrifice and the other, for the second sacrifice.
|
| 45. |
Thus even though as an initial preference, the animals should not have been sacrificed because of the confusion about their identities, after the fact, the sacrifices are acceptable.
|
| 46. |
A small town not far from Jerusalem.
|
| 47. |
I.e., since it was found close to Jerusalem, we must consider the possibility that it had been consecrated for a sacrifice. Hence, it must be treated as a sacrificial animal with regard to all the possible consequences.
|
| 48. |
We suspect that its owner had attained atonement through another sacrifice. Hence the animal is consigned to death, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 1.
|
| 49. |
At this age, it is unacceptable to be offered as a sin-offering or a burnt-offering. We do not suspect that it was lost earlier and wandered aimlessly until this time.
|
| 50. |
Although a thanksgiving-offering must be eaten by midnight, while a peace-offering may be eaten for an extra day, the Rambam's wording does not imply that a second animal should be brought. Instead, he should bring one animal and stipulate: "If it is a peace-offering,.... If it is a thanksgiving offering..." (Kessef Mishneh). The Lechem Mishneh, however, states that one could infer fromKiddushin 55b, that two offerings should be brought.
|
| 51. |
And thus it could not be used for another purpose. If the owner had attained atonement, it should be allowed to pasture until it becomes blemished as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 14.
|
| 52. |
For a male animal of that age could be consecrated for either of these types of sacrifices.
|
| 53. |
The meal, oil, and wine.
|
| 54. |
Shekalim 7:5 states that originally our Sages would obligate the person who found the animal to bring the accompanying offerings from his own resources. The financial burden, however, was apparently too great and the people would abandon the animals they found so that they would not be obligated in this manner. When the Sages realized this, they ordained that the accompanying offerings be brought by the community.
|
| 55. |
Without having to be redeemed.
|
| 56. |
So it would not have been lost.
|
| 57. |
For these individuals also must bring male animals that are a year old.
|
| 58. |
In the previous halachot, the Rambam favored the alternative of letting the intermingled animals pasture until they contract a blemish so that none of the sacrifices will be placed under unnecessary restrictions. In this instance, since the animals have already been slaughtered, this alternative is no longer viable (Rav Yosef Corcus).
|
| 59. |
The meat of the latter two types of animals is forbidden to be eaten.
|
| 60. |
In practice, this phrase, used by the Talmud in several instances (Pesachim 34b, et al), is interpreted (Rashi, Menachot 46b) as meaning "to be left overnight." For it is forbidden to burn sacrifices until they have been disqualified.
|
| 61. |
The meat from the burnt-offering may not be eaten and the meat from the sin-offering may not be burnt on the altar. Hence, the mixture should be left overnight, at which point, it is disqualified and consigned to be burnt.
|
| 62. |
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 7:3.
|
| 63. |
Since the limbs of the disqualified animals are significant entities, their presence is never nullified in the mixture.
|
| 64. |
And burnt there. The rationale is that since the limbs of the blemished animals are forbidden to be eaten and forbidden to be burnt on the altar, the entire mixture must also be done away with.
|
| 65. |
I.e., if sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness that are only eaten for one day (thanksgiving offerings) become mixed with other sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness, which (with the exception of the Paschal sacrifice) are all eaten for two days and one night. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Zevachim 8:3).
|
| 66. |
The rationale is that there is enough acceptable meat or bread to render the presence of the unacceptable meat or bread insignificant.
Some commentaries have suggested that, based on Yevamot 81b, we are forced to say that this is speaking about small pieces of meat that are not significant enough to be used to honor guests. If they are larger and significant, their presence in the mixture is never nullified. However, it is more likely that since the concept that significant pieces of meat are nullified is a Rabbinic safeguard, it was not applied in this instance (see Lechem Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh to the law from Hilchot Terumah cited in the following note).
|
| 67. |
Hilchot Terumot 14:14.
|
| 68. |
Since there is an option for the entire mixture to be eaten by priests, there is no reason for leniency.
|
| 69. |
The commentaries note that the Rambam's ruling here is in direct contradiction to his ruling inHilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:13 where he states that when a piece of the showbread becomes intermingled with pieces of ordinary bread, the mixture is permitted if there is 101 times the amount of ordinary bread.
In his gloss to Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot, the Kessef Mishneh explains that here, the Rambam is speaking about pieces of the showbread that are ritually pure. Hence the entire mixture should be eaten by the priests. In Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot, by contrast, we are speaking about pieces of the showbread that are impure. If the showbread was a significant part of the mixture, the entire mixture would have to be burnt. Since it is not significant, we considered its existence negated.
(As evident from a comparison to that source, the laws governing sacrificial foods are more stringent than those applying to terumah.
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Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 7
Halacha 1
Whenever anyone who is unacceptable to perform Temple service performs the rite of melikah,1 the melikah is unacceptable. [Nevertheless,] even though the dove [killed by such a melikah] is unacceptable, it is not considered as anevelah2 of a kosher fowl with regard to the laws of ritual impurity.3
Similarly, if one performed melikah at night or slaughtered an ordinary dove in [the Temple Courtyard] or a consecrated dove outside [the Temple Courtyard], they are not nevelot.4
Halacha 2
If one performed melikah on turtle-doves before they reached the appropriate age or on young doves who passed the appropriate age5 or on a dove whose wing shriveled, whose eye was lost6 or whose leg was cut off,7 it is considered as a nevelah in all contexts. This is the general principle: Any disqualifying factor that takes place after [a dove] entered the Temple Courtyard8 disqualifies it, but does not render it a nevelah. If the disqualifying factor did not take place after it was brought into the Temple Courtyard, [the dove] is a nevelah in all contexts.
Halacha 3
For this reason, when a person performs melikah and the animal is discovered to be tereifah,9 he performed melikah with a knife,10 or performed melikah on an ordinary dove in [the Temple Courtyard] or a consecrated dove outside [the Temple Courtyard],11 they are considered as a nevelah in all contexts. Formelikah permits and purifies only a dove that is acceptable to [be offered on] the altar.12
Halacha 4
In contrast, if melikah was performed on a dove that was sodomized, set aside for pagan sacrifice, worshiped, given to a prostitute as her fee, exchanged for a dog, was a tumtum13 or an androgynus,14 it is considered as a nevelah in all contexts. It causes a person's garments to become impure when it [enters his] gut.15 The rationale is that the holiness [of a sacrifice] does not fall upon them16and thus it is not considered as having been disqualified [after entering] the Temple Courtyard.
Halacha 5
We already explained in [Hilchot] Ma'aseh Hakorbanot,17 that [the blood from] a sin-offering of fowl is presented on the lower [half of the altar] and [the blood from] a burnt-offering of fowl is presented on the upper [half of the altar].18When [the blood from] a sin-offering of fowl is presented on the upper [half of the altar], it is unacceptable. [This applies] whether the blood was presented in the manner of a sin-offering19 or in the manner of a burnt-offering,20 whether it was offered for the sake of a burnt-offering or for the sake of a sin-offering.
Halacha 6
Similarly, when [the blood from] a burnt-offering of fowl was presented on the lower [half of the altar], even if he performed melikah on one of the signs of ritual slaughter21 on the lower half and the other sign on the upper half, it is unacceptable. [This applies] whether the melikah was performed in the manner of a burnt-offering or in the manner of a sin-offering,22 whether it was offered for the sake of a sin-offering or for the sake of a burnt-offering.
Halacha 7
When melikah was performed on a sin-offering of a fowl on the lower half of the altar in the manner as it should be performed for a burnt-offering for the sake of a sin-offering, as it should be performed for a sin-offering for the sake of a burnt-offering,23 or as it should be performed for a burnt-offering for the sake of a burnt-offering,24 it is unacceptable.
Halacha 8
Similarly, when a burnt-offering of a fowl was presented on the upper [half of the altar] in the manner as it should be performed for a sin-offering for the sake of a burnt-offering or as it should be performed for a sin-offering for the sake of a sin-offering, it is unacceptable. If, however, he performs it as it should be performed for a burnt-offering for the sake of a sin-offering, it is acceptable,25but it is not considered as if the owner fulfilled his obligation.26
Halacha 9
All of these fowl that are disqualified because of the place [in the altar] where their blood was presented, because of the difference in the manner in which [melikah] is performed, or the intent for which they are offered, are not considered as a fowl that has become a nevelah with regard to the laws of ritual impurity. Similarly, when a sin-offering or a burnt-offering of fowl becomespiggul,27 impure,28 or notar29 it does not cause impurity in one's gut30 as does a fowl that has become a nevelah, for all of these became disqualified [after having entered] the Temple Courtyard.31
Halacha 10
When a sin-offering of fowl is brought because of a doubt, it should be offered as required, but not eaten.32 Instead, it should be burnt like all other sacrificial animals that become disqualified.33
When is such a sacrifice brought because of a doubt? When there is an unresolved question whether a woman is a zavah,34 impure because of childbirth,35or the like. There is no concept of an animal being brought as a sin-offering because of a doubt, because if a person is unsure whether or not he committed a sin, he should bring a conditional guilt-offering, as will be explained in Hilchot Shegagot.36
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply when] a sin-offering of fowl is brought because of a doubt and then it is discovered that the woman is definitely obligated to bring [the sacrifice]. If she realized this before melikah was performed on the [the dove], it should be offered with certainty and eaten.37 If she did not discover this until after melikah was performed, the sprinkling and presentation of its blood [on the altar] should be completed. Then it should be burnt,38 so that it will not be said that a sin-offering of fowl brought because of a doubt is eaten. For at the outset, [this offering] was brought because of a doubt.
Halacha 12
If, after melikah was performed, she discovered that she was not obligated to bring a sacrifice, it should be buried.39
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The process of snipping of the head of a sacrificial dove. See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 7:8.
|
| 2. |
An animal that dies without ritual slaughter.
|
| 3. |
A person who eats the corpse of a kosher fowl that was not slaughtered according to Torah Law contracts ritual impurity as stated in Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 3:1.
|
| 4. |
In all of these instances, it is forbidden to partake of the meat of these doves. For melikah is acceptable only during the day (see Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 4:1), ordinary doves slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard are considered as tereifah (Hilchot Shechitah 2:1-2), and sacrificial doves slaughtered outside the Temple Courtyard are disqualified (see Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 3:9). Nevertheless, since melikah is a valid process for killing sacrificial doves and the doves that were slaughtered in the wrong locations were slaughtered properly, the corpses do not convey impurity as a corpse of a nevelah would.
|
| 5. |
As stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:2, young doves are acceptable as offerings only when they are still underdeveloped, before they begin to sprout yellow feathers and turtle-doves are acceptable only after they pass this stage of development.
|
| 6. |
I.e., not merely blinded, but having lost the eye.
|
| 7. |
And thus was disqualified as a sacrifice, as other doves which have lost a limb or organ (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:1.
|
| 8. |
Our translation is based on Rashi, Zevachim 68b. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim7:5), the Rambam defines the term as meaning disqualification due to the intent of the priest, a factor which disqualifies him from performing service, or because of the place the offering was slaughtered.
|
| 9. |
A dove which is tereifah is not acceptable as a sacrifice (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:1).
|
| 10. |
Melikah may only performed with the priest's hands.
|
| 11. |
See Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 3:12.
|
| 12. |
I.e., melikah is not an acceptable means of slaughter. It is acceptable only for sacrificial doves. Therefore when it is performed on a dove that is not acceptable as a sacrifice or in a place where a sacrifice is unacceptable, it is considered as if the animal has merely been killed.
|
| 13. |
An animal whose sexual organ is covered by a mound of flesh and thus its gender cannot be determined.
|
| 14. |
An animal which has both male and female sexual organs. All of the animals mentioned above are not acceptable as sacrifices, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, chs. 3-4.
|
| 15. |
As stated in Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 3:1, a person and his garments do not become impure from eating a nevelah of a kosher fowl until he swallows it. While it is in his mouth, he and his garments are pure.
|
| 16. |
Since these types of animals are fundamentally unacceptable, they are not considered as sacrificial animals. See Hilchot Issurei HaMizbeiach 3:10.
|
| 17. |
Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 6:20; 7:6.
|
| 18. |
As mentioned in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1, after purification, a zav (a male with discharges resembling, but not identical with gonorrhea), a zavah (a woman with vaginal bleeding outside her menstrual cycle) and a woman after childbirth, are required to bring a pair of doves, one as a sin-offering and one, as a burnt-offering. The remainder of this chapter and the three subsequent chapters deal with the possibilities that a dove designated as a sin-offering becomes intermingled with one designated as a burnt-offering.
A convert also must bring a pair of two doves and they are offered as burnt-offerings, but since this is a rare occurrence, it is not taken into consideration [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Kinnim 1:2)].
|
| 19. |
As described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 6:20.
|
| 20. |
As described in ibid. 7:6.
|
| 21. |
Ritual slaughter involves slitting two "signs" - the windpipe and the gullet. These two organs must also be slit during melikah.
|
| 22. |
In addition to the place on the altar where the blood of the two is offered, there are two differences between the way melikah is performed for a burnt-offering and for a sin-offering:
a) The head of the dove may not be severed while performing melikah on a sin-offering. For a burnt-offering, by contrast, there is an obligation that the head be separated.
b) The blood of a burnt-offering is squeezed out on the wall of the altar. The blood of a sin-offering, by contrast, is sprinkled on the altar.
|
| 23. |
For a sin-offering is not acceptable if it is not offered for the proper intent (see Chapter 15, Halachah 1).
|
| 24. |
I.e., not only is the offering unacceptable as a sin-offering; it is also unacceptable as a burnt-offering (Radbaz).
|
| 25. |
For a burnt-offering is acceptable even if it is not offered for the proper intent.
|
| 26. |
See also Hilchot Meilah 3:7.
|
| 27. |
As will be explained in chs. 14-16, when a person slaughters an animal with the intent of partaking of its meat at times other than those which are permitted, the sacrifice is considered as piggul and it is forbidden to partake of its meat.
|
| 28. |
As stated in ibid.:12, when sacrificial meat becomes impure, it is forbidden to partake of it.
|
| 29. |
As explained in Chapter 18, Halachot 9-10, when sacrificial meat is left beyond the time when it should be eaten, it is called notar and it is forbidden to partake of it.
|
| 30. |
As stated in Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 3:1, a person and his garments do not become impure from eating a nevelah of a kosher fowl until he swallows it. While it is in his mouth, he and his garments are pure.
|
| 31. |
Our translation is based on Rashi, Zevachim 68b. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim7:5), the Rambam defines the term as meaning disqualification due to the intent of the priest, a factor which disqualifies him from performing service, or because of the place the offering was slaughtered.
|
| 32. |
The sacrifices may not be eaten, for if the women were not obligated to bring them, the doves are considered as ordinary animals slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard which are forbidden to be eaten (see Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:6-7).
Hilchot Shegagot 11:2 explains that the women the Rambam mentions are allowed to bring the sacrifices because of a doubt even though it is forbidden to offer a sin-offering if one is not liable, because their purification process is not completed until the sacrifice is offered. Hence they are granted this leniency to allow them to become ritually pure.
|
| 33. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 20; Chapter 19, Halachah 10.
|
| 34. |
A woman had a series of vaginal secretions, but there is a doubt whether they render her a zavahor not.
|
| 35. |
A woman becomes impure because of childbirth even when she miscarries. There are times when there is a question whether a miscarriage is serious enough to render her impure or not.
|
| 36. |
Hilchot Shegagot 8:1.
|
| 37. |
As would an ordinary sin-offering.
|
| 38. |
As it would have been originally.
|
| 39. |
So that no one will benefit from it. None of the remaining rites should be performed, since there is no need to bring the offering.
Keritot 26b explains that this is a Rabbinic safeguard. According to Scriptural Law, it is permitted to benefit from the dove, as long as its blood was not presented on the altar.
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• Tuesday, Sivan 15, 5775 · 02 June 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: Beha'alotecha, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 77-78.
Tanya: (The Tzimtzum and (p. 299)...the Esoteric Wisdom.) (p. 299).
At first the Alter Rebbe would deliver extremely brief expositions that aroused a storm within the listener's heart, and greatly inflamed his emotions. These were calledd'rachim, "pathways."
Later his talks were a little more extended, and these were called igrot, "missives."
In the next stage of development, his talks were termed torot, "teachings," and these formed the basis for the maamarim in Torah Or and Likutei Torah.
Later came somewhat longer teachings called k'tavim, "writings." These were expositions with comparatively broad intellectual elaboration.
Daily Thought:
Chutzpah
The sages said about chutzpah, “Damned is the one who has it, and damned is the one who does not.”
Chutzpah makes a man into an idol. But without it, how can he change the world?
Our conscious mind must know it is nothing, and the power G‑d has placed in our heart may then burst forth.[Maamarei Admor Hazaken Haketzarim, p. 370; Behar-Bechukotai 5731:2.]
____________________________
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