Sunday, June 7, 2015

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Tuesday, May 5, 2015 - Today is: Tuesday, Iyar 16, 5775 · May 5, 2015 - Omer: Day 31 - Tifferet sheb'Hod

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Tuesday, May 5, 2015 - Today is: Tuesday, Iyar 16, 5775 · May 5, 2015 - Omer: Day 31 - Tifferet sheb'Hod
Today's Laws & Customs:
• Count "Thirty-Two Days to the Omer" Tonight
Tomorrow is the thirty-second day of the Omer Count. Since, on the Jewish calendar, the day begins at nightfall of the previous evening, we count the omer for tomorrow's date tonight, after nightfall: "Today is thirty-two days, which are four weeks and four days, to the Omer." (If you miss the count tonight, you can count the omer all day tomorrow, but without the preceding blessing).
The 49-day "Counting of the Omer" retraces our ancestors' seven-week spiritual journey from the Exodus to Sinai. Each evening we recite a special blessing and count the days and weeks that have passed since the Omer; the 50th day isShavuot, the festival celebrating the Giving of the Torah at Sinai.
Tonight's Sefirah: Netzach sheb'Hod -- "Ambition in Humility"
The teachings of Kabbalah explain that there are seven "Divine Attributes" --Sefirot -- that G-d assumes through which to relate to our existence: Chessed,Gevurah, Tifferet, Netzach, Hod, Yesod and Malchut ("Love", "Strength", "Beauty", "Victory", "Splendor", "Foundation" and "Sovereignty"). In the human being, created in the "image of G-d," the seven sefirot are mirrored in the seven "emotional attributes" of the human soul: Kindness, Restraint, Harmony, Ambition, Humility, Connection and Receptiveness. Each of the seven attributes contain elements of all seven--i.e., "Kindness in Kindness", "Restraint in Kindness", "Harmony in Kindness", etc.--making for a total of forty-nine traits. The 49-day Omer Count is thus a 49-step process of self-refinement, with each day devoted to the "rectification" and perfection of one the forty-nine "sefirot."
Links:
How to count the Omer
The deeper significance of the Omer Count
Today in Jewish History:
• The Manna (1313 BCE)
Manna, the "bread from heaven" which sustained the Children of Israel during their 40 years of wandering through the desert, began to fall on the 16th of Iyar of the year 2448 from creation--one month after the Exodus (see "Today in Jewish History" for yesterday, Iyar 15).
Links:
The Manna (the Torah's account with readings from Talmud, Midrash and Commentaries)
Our Daily Bread (meditations on earning a living)
Bread From Heaven
More on the manna
• Romans Razed Jerusalem Wall (70)
In the year 70 CE (3830 from Creation), Titus and the Roman army laid siege upon Jerusalem, greatly weakening its defenders. On the 16th of Iyar, the Romans razed the middle wall of Jerusalem. The city was later burned, its inhabitants massacred, and the Temple destroyed on the 9th of Av.
Link: Destruction of the Second Temple - Historical Background
• "Nuremberg Laws" Passed in Hungary (1939)
The Nazi Nuremberg Laws, depriving Jews the rights citizenship, were passed by the government of Nazi Germany in 1935. In 1939, on the 16th of Iyar, the laws went into effect in Nazi-allied Hungary.
• Dachau Liberated (1945)
Dachau was the first Nazi concentration camp and the model for the other concentration camps. During the war, 200,000 Jews were housed in Dachau. More than 30,000 were killed and tens of thousands died due to the conditions and spread of disease in the camp.
The camp was freed by the 45th Infantry Division of the U.S. Seventh Army on the 16th of Iyar, 1945. It was the second concentration camp to be liberated following the end of WWII.
The U.S. troops forced the citizens of the local community to come to the camp, observe the conditions, and help clean the facilities.
Daily Quote:
Our Rebbe revives the dead. What is a corpse? Something cold and unfeeling. Life is movement, warmth, excitement. Is there anything as frozen in self-absorption, as cold and unfeeling as the mind? And when the cold-blooded mind understands, comprehends, and is excited by a G-dly idea - is this not a revival of the dead?[The disciples of Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Emor, 3rd Portion Leviticus 22:17-22:33 with Rashi
• 
Chapter 22
17And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, יזוַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
18Speak to Aaron and to his sons and to all the children of Israel and say to them: Any man whatsoever from the house of Israel or from the strangers among Israel who offers up his sacrifice for any of their vows or for any of their donations that they may offer up to the Lord as a burnt offering יחדַּבֵּר אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו וְאֶל כָּל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִן הַגֵּר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר יַקְרִיב קָרְבָּנוֹ לְכָל נִדְרֵיהֶם וּלְכָל נִדְבוֹתָם אֲשֶׁר יַקְרִיבוּ לַיהֹוָה לְעֹלָה:
their vows: [when a person declares:] “It is incumbent upon me” [i.e., a personal commitment to bring a burnt offering," and therefore, if the animal he set aside is lost or blemished, he must fulfill his vow with a replacement animal, whereas]; נדריהם: הרי עלי:
their donations: [when a person declares:] “Behold, [I hereby consecrate] this [animal for a burnt offering,” since the declaration falls on the animal rather than on the person, if the consecrated animal is lost or blemished, the person is not responsible]. — [Meg. 8a] נדבותם: הרי זו:
19to be favorable for you, [it shall be] an unblemished, male, from cattle, from sheep, or from goats. יטלִרְצֹנְכֶם תָּמִים זָכָר בַּבָּקָר בַּכְּשָׂבִים וּבָעִזִּים:
to be favorable for you: [God is saying here:] “Bring Me something that is worthy to appease (לִרְצוֹת) for you before Me, that will make you favorable (רָצוֹן) before Me.” [This word לִרְצֹנְכֶם has the meaning of] apaisement in French [like “appeasement” in English]. And what [animal] is worthy of attaining God’s appeasement? לרצנכם: הביאו דבר הראוי לרצות אתכם לפני, שיהא לכם לרצון אפיימני"ט בלע"ז [פיוס]. ואיזהו הראוי לרצון:
an unblemished, male, from cattle, from sheep, or from goats: But with burnt-offerings of birds, no unblemished or male [birds] are required, and it is not rendered invalid if it has a defect unless a limb is missing. — [Torath Kohanim 22:106] תמים זכר בבקר בכשבים ובעזים: אבל בעולת העוף אין צריך תמות וזכרות, ואינו נפסל במום אלא בחסרון אבר:
20Any [animal] that has a blemish, you shall not offer up, for it will not be favorable for you. ככֹּל אֲשֶׁר בּוֹ מוּם לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ כִּי לֹא לְרָצוֹן יִהְיֶה לָכֶם:
21And if a man offers up a peace offering to the Lord for declaring a vow or as a donation from cattle or from the flock to be accepted, it shall be unblemished. It shall not have any defect in it. כאוְאִישׁ כִּי יַקְרִיב זֶבַח שְׁלָמִים לַיהֹוָה לְפַלֵּא נֶדֶר אוֹ לִנְדָבָה בַּבָּקָר אוֹ בַצֹּאן תָּמִים יִהְיֶה לְרָצוֹן כָּל מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה בּוֹ:
for declaring a vow: For verbally designating [a particular animal. If he designated it merely in his mind, this does not obligate him as a vow]. — [Sifthei Chachamim] לפלא נדר: להפריש בדיבורו:
22[An animal that has] blindness, or [a] broken [bone], or [a] split [eyelid or lip], or [one that has] warts, or dry lesions or weeping sores you shall not offer up [any of] these to the Lord, nor shall you place [any] of these as a fire offering upon the altar to the Lord. כבעַוֶּרֶת אוֹ שָׁבוּר אוֹ חָרוּץ אוֹ יַבֶּלֶת אוֹ גָרָב אוֹ יַלֶּפֶת לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֵלֶּה לַיהֹוָה וְאִשֶּׁה לֹא תִתְּנוּ מֵהֶם עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ לַיהֹוָה:
[An animal that has] blindness: עַוֶּרֶת. [This is] a noun, the feminine equivalent of עִוָּרוֹן, that the animal shall not have the defect of blindness. עורת: שם דבר של מום עורון בלשון נקבה, שלא יהא בו מום של עורת:
or [a] broken [bone]: [lit., “or broken,” i.e., the animal] shall not be [broken]. או שבור: לא יהיה:
or [a] split [eyelid or lip]: חָרוּץ [lit. cut], an eyelid that was split or notched, and similarly, its lip which was split or notched. — [Torath Kohanim 22:113] חרוץ: ריס של עין שנסדק או שנפגם, וכן שפתו שנסדקה או נפגמה:
or [one that has] warts: Verrue [wart] in French. יבלת: ורוא"ה בלע"ז [יבלת]:
or dry lesions: Heb. גָרָב, a type of lichen, as יַלֶּפֶת (see Rashi on 21:20). The יַלֶּפֶת is similar to “And Samson grasped (וַיִּלְפֹּת)” (Jud. 16:29) for it bonds (מְלַפֶּפֶת) itself to him until the day of [his] death, for it has no cure. — [Bech. 41a] גרב: מין חזזית וכן ילפת. ולשון ילפת, כמו (שופטים טז כט) וילפת שמשון, שאחוזה בו עד יום מיתה, שאין לה רפואה:
you shall not offer up [(any of) these]: [This prohibition is stated] three times [here and in verses 20 and 25], as an admonition against (a) consecrating them, (b) slaughtering them and (c) dashing their blood. — [Temurah 6b] לא תקריבו: שלש פעמים, להזהיר על הקדשן ועל שחיטתן ועל זריקת דמן:
nor shall you place [(any) of these] as a fire-offering: [This is] an admonition against the burning them [on the altar]. — [Temurah 6b; Torath Kohanim 22:116] ואשה לא תתנו: אזהרת הקטרתן:
23As for an ox or sheep that has mismatching limbs or uncloven hooves you may make it into a donation, but as a vow, it will not be accepted. כגוְשׁוֹר וָשֶׂה שָׂרוּעַ וְקָלוּט נְדָבָה תַּעֲשֶׂה אֹתוֹ וּלְנֵדֶר לֹא יֵרָצֶה:
mismatching limbs: i.e., one limb bigger than its [normal] counterpart. — [see Rashi on verse 21:18 above and Sifthei Chachamim there; Bech. 40a] שרוע: אבר גדול מחבירו:
uncloven hooves: its hooves are uncloven [i.e., resembling those of a horse or donkey]. — [Bech. 40a] וקלוט: פרסותיו קלוטות:
you may make it into a donation: [i.e., it may be sold and its money donated] to the maintenance of the Holy Temple. נדבה תעשה אתו: לבדק הבית:
but as a vow: for the altar. — [Torath Kohanim 22:118] ולנדר: למזבח:
it will not be accepted: What consecration comes to grant acceptance (לִרְצוֹת) ? I must say the consecration for the altar. - [Torath Kohanim 22:118][See Sifthei Chachamim, Mizrachi, and Nachalath Yaakov] לא ירצה: איזהו הקדש בא לרצות, הוי אומר זה הקדש המזבח:
24[Any animal whose testicles were] squashed, crushed, pulled out, or severed, you shall not offer up to the Lord, and in your land, you shall not do [it]. כדוּמָעוּךְ וְכָתוּת וְנָתוּק וְכָרוּת לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ לַיהֹוָה וּבְאַרְצְכֶם לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ:
[Any animal] whose testicles were squashed, crushed, pulled out, or severed: [These terms refer to damage] to the testicles or the membrum. — [Bech. 39b] ומעוך וכתות ונתוק וכרות: בביצים או בגיד:
squashed: Heb. וּמָעוּךְ, its testicles were squashed by hand. מעוך: ביציו מעוכין ביד:
crushed: וְכָתוּת, more severely crushed than מָעוּךְ. כתות: כתושים יותר ממעוך:
pulled out: Heb. נָתוּק, torn off by hand, until the threads upon which they are suspended snapped, but they are still contained within the scrotum, and the scrotum was not torn off. נתוק: תלושין ביד עד שנפסקו חוטים שתלויים בהן, אבל נתונים הם בתוך הכיס, והכיס לא נתלש:
or severed: Heb., וְכָרוּת, severed with an instrument, but still contained within the scrotum. וכרות: כרותין בכלי ועודן בכיס:
squashed: Heb. וּמָעוּךְ [Onkelos] renders this as וְדִימְרִיס, which is its equivalent in Aramaic, an expression of crushing. ומעוך: תרגומו ודימריס, זה לשונו בארמית, לשון כתישה:
crushed: וְכָתוּת, [Onkelos] renders this as וְדִירְסִיס, like, “[and he will smite] the great house into splinters (רְסִיסִים)” (Amos 6:11), little pieces; likewise, קָנֶה הַמְרֻסָּס, meaning “a reed that is broken into pieces” (Shab. 80b). וכתות: תרגומו ודירסיס, כמו (עמוס ו יא) הבית הגדול רסיסים, בקיעות דקות, וכן (שבת פ ב) קנה המרוסס:
and in your land, you shall not do: this thing, to castrate any livestock or wild animal, even of an unclean species. This is why [our verse] says here “in your land” -to include any species found in your land. — [Torath Kohanim 22:121] for it is impossible to say that castration is prohibited only in Eretz Israel [“your land,”] because [the prohibition of] castration is an obligation [associated with] the body [of a person], and every commandment associated with the body [of a person] applies both in the Land [of Israel] and outside the Land [of Israel]. - [Kid. 36b] ובארצכם לא תעשו: דבר זה, לסרס שום בהמה וחיה ואפילו טמאה, לכך נאמר בארצכם, לרבות כל אשר בארצכם, שאי אפשר לומר לא נצטוו על הסרוס אלא בארץ, שהרי סרוס חובת הגוף הוא, וכל חובת הגוף נוהגת בין בארץ בין בחוצה לארץ:
25And from the hand of a gentile you shall not offer up as food for your God any of these [blemished animals], for their injury is upon them, there is a defect on them; they will not be accepted for you. כהוּמִיַּד בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹהֵיכֶם מִכָּל אֵלֶּה כִּי מָשְׁחָתָם בָּהֶם מוּם בָּם לֹא יֵרָצוּ לָכֶם:
from the hand of a gentile: [lit., “and from the hand of a foreigner,” i.e.,] if a non-Jew brought a sacrifice and handed it over to the kohen to offer it up to Heaven, you shall not offer up on his behalf any blemished animal. And even though blemished animals are not deemed invalid as sacrifices from the children of Noah [i.e., by all non-Jews] unless they have a limb missing-that [rule] applies [only] to private altars in the fields. However, on the altar in the Mishkan, you shall not offer them up (Temurah 7b). You shall, however, accept an unblemished animal from them. That is why Scripture states earlier in this passage (verse 18 above), אִישׁ אִישׁ, “Any man whatsoever,” [where this double expression comes] to include non-Jews, who make vows and donations like Israelites. — [Temurah 2b] ומיד בן נכר: נכרי שהביא קרבן ביד כהן להקריבו לשמים לא תקריבו לו בעל מום. ואף על פי שלא נאסרו בעלי מומין לקרבן בני נח אלא אם כן מחוסרי אבר, זאת נוהגת בבמה שבשדות, אבל על המזבח שבמשכן לא תקריבוה, אבל תמימה תקבלו מהם, לכך נאמר למעלה איש איש (לעיל פסוק יח), לרבות את הנכרים שנודרים נדרים ונדבות כישראל:
their injury: Heb. מָשְׁחָתָם, [as Onkelos renders it:] חִבּוּלְהוֹן, “their injury.” משחתם: חבולהון:
they will not be accepted for you: to atone for you. לא ירצו לכם: לכפר עליכם:
26And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: כווַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה לֵּאמֹר:
27When an ox or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall remain under its mother for seven days, and from the eighth day onwards, it shall be accepted as a sacrifice for a fire offering to the Lord. כזשׁוֹר אוֹ כֶשֶׂב אוֹ עֵז כִּי יִוָּלֵד וְהָיָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תַּחַת אִמּוֹ וּמִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה לְקָרְבַּן אִשֶּׁה לַיהֹוָה:
When [an ox or a sheep or a goat] is born: [The expression “is born” comes] to exclude [from sacrifice an animal] delivered by Caesarean section. - [Chul. 38b] כי יולד: פרט ליוצא דופן:
28An ox or sheep you shall not slaughter it and its offspring in one day._ כחוְשׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד:
it and its offspring: [This prohibition] applies to the female [i.e., the mother] animal, namely, that it is prohibited to slaughter a mother animal and its male or female offspring [on the same day]. The prohibition does not apply, however, to males [i.e., to the father animals], and it is permissible to slaughter the father animal along with its male or female offspring [on the same day]. — [Chul. 78b] אתו ואת בנו: נוהג בנקבה, שאסור לשחוט האם והבן או הבת, ואינו נוהג בזכרים, ומותר לשחוט האב והבן [או האב והבת]:
[you shall not slaughter] it and its offspring: Also included [in this prohibition is slaughtering] its offspring and [then] it. — [Chul. 82a] אתו ואת בנו: אף בנו ואותו במשמע:
29And when you slaughter a thanksgiving offering to the Lord, you shall slaughter it so that it should be acceptable for you. כטוְכִי תִזְבְּחוּ זֶבַח תּוֹדָה לַיהֹוָה לִרְצֹנְכֶם תִּזְבָּחוּ:
you shall slaughter it so that it should be acceptable for you: From the very beginning of your slaughtering, take care that it should be “acceptable for you.” And what makes it acceptable?" לרצנכם תזבחו: תחלת זביחתכם הזהרו שתהא לרצון לכם. ומהו הרצון:
It shall be eaten on that day: [Now, although it has already been stated that thanksgiving-offerings must be eaten on the day of sacrificing (Lev. 7:15), the Torah repeats this here] exclusively to warn us that the slaughtering must be performed on this condition. Do not slaughter it with the intention of eating it on the next day, for if you have this invalidating intention in mind, the sacrifice will not be “acceptable for you” (Torath Kohanim 22:135) [Indeed, it will be rejected (פִּגּוּל; see Rashi Lev. 7:18)]. Another explanation of לִרְצֹנְכֶם is: “knowingly.” From here, [we learn that] if someone slaughtered an animal in an incidental manner [i.e., according to Rashi , without intending to slaughter, just to pick up the knife or to throw it. According to Tosafoth, if he did not intend to slaughter, but only to sever the organs, or if he thought that it was an ordinary animal, and did not realize that it was to be slaughtered as a holy sacrifice], then [even though the animal is fit to be eaten as ordinary non-consecrated meat, nevertheless,] regarding being slaughtered as a holy sacrifice, it is deemed unfit. — [Chul. 13a] Now, although Scripture has already stated [that a sacrifice is “not acceptable” if, while slaughtering, one intended to eat it after its permissible time] in the case of sacrifices that may be eaten for two days (see Lev. 7:18), it specifies it again regarding those sacrifices that must be eaten on the same day (see Rashi Lev. 7:15), namely, that they [too] must be slaughtered with the intention of eating them within their permissible time. ביום ההוא יאכל: לא בא להזהיר אלא שתהא שחיטה על מנת כן, אל תשחטוהו על מנת לאכלו למחר, שאם תחשבו בו מחשבת פסול לא יהא לכם לרצון. דבר אחר לרצונכם, לדעתכם, מכאן למתעסק שפסול בשחיטת קדשים. ואף על פי שפרט בנאכלים לשני ימים, חזר ופרט בנאכלין ליום אחד שתהא זביחתן על מנת לאכלן בזמנן:
30It shall be eaten on that day; do not leave it over until morning. I am the Lord. לבַּיּוֹם הַהוּא יֵאָכֵל לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
It shall be eaten on that day: [As explained above (see preceding Rashi)], Scripture states this here only to warn us that the slaughtering must be performed with this intention. For if it meant to fix the time limit for eating it, this has already been stated, “And the flesh of his thanksgiving peace-offering [shall be eaten on the day that it is offered…]” (Lev. 7:15). - [Torath Kohanim 7:113] ביום ההוא יאכל: לא בא להזהיר אלא שתהא שחיטה על מנת כן, שאם לקבוע לו זמן אכילה, כבר כתוב (ויקרא ז טו) ובשר זבח תודת שלמיו וגו':
I am the Lord: Know Who decreed this matter, and do not perceive it as unimportant. אני ה': דע מי גזר על הדבר ואל יקל בעיניך:
31You shall keep My commandments and perform them. I am the Lord. לאוּשְׁמַרְתֶּם מִצְו‍ֹתַי וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
You shall keep [My commandments]: This refers to learning [God’s commandments and “keeping” them organized and memorized in one’s heart] ושמרתם: זו המשנה:
and perform them: meaning [putting them into] action. — [Mizrachi; Torath Kohanim 22:136] ועשיתם: זה המעשה:
32You shall not desecrate My Holy Name. I shall be sanctified amidst the children of Israel. I am the Lord Who sanctifies you, לבוְלֹא תְחַלְּלוּ אֶת שֵׁם קָדְשִׁי וְנִקְדַּשְׁתִּי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲנִי יְהֹוָה מְקַדִּשְׁכֶם:
You shall not desecrate [My Holy Name]: By transgressing My commandments intentionally. Now, is it not already implied by the verse “ You shall not desecrate [My Holy Name,” that if you do not transgress, God’s Name will be sanctified? So] what do we learn by Scripture adding “I shall be sanctified [amidst the children of Israel]?” [It teaches us:] Surrender your life [and do not transgress God’s commandments], and [thus] sanctify My Name. Now, one might think [that this commandment applies even] in private [i.e., if he is not in the presence of ten or more Jews]. Scripture, therefore, says here “[I shall be sanctified] amidst the children of Israel” [i.e., one is obliged to sacrifice one’s life to avoid transgressing God’s commandments only in the presence of ten or more Jews]. And when one sacrifices oneself, one shall do so with the willingness to die, anyone who [submits to] sacrifices himself while assuming [that God will surely perform] a miracle [for him and save his life], for this person, God does not perform a miracle, for so we find in [the case of] Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah, that [when the evil Nebuchadnezzar threatened to throw them into a fiery furnace], they did not submit themselves on the condition [that God would perform] a miracle, as Scripture says, “[Behold, there is our God Whom we worship; He can save us from the burning, fiery furnace and from your hands, O king!] But if not, let it be known to you, O king [that we will not worship your god, neither will we prostrate ourselves to the golden image that you have set up]!” (Dan. 3:1718). [We see here that whatever the outcome,] whether [God would] rescue [them] or not- [they declared, regardless] “Let it be known to you, O king [that we will not prostrate ourselves…]!” - [Torath Kohanim 22:137] ולא תחללו: לעבור על דברי מזידין. ממשמע שנאמר ולא תחללו, מה תלמוד לומר ונקדשתי, מסור עצמך וקדש שמי. יכול ביחיד, תלמוד לומר בתוך בני ישראל, וכשהוא מוסר עצמו, ימסור עצמו על מנת למות, שכל המוסר עצמו על מנת הנס, אין עושין לו נס, שכן מצינו בחנניה מישאל ועזריה שלא מסרו עצמן על מנת הנס, שנאמר (דניאל ג יח) והן לא, ידיע להוא לך מלכא די לאלהך לא איתנא פלחין וגו', מציל ולא מציל, ידיע להוא לך וגו':
33Who took you out of the land of Egypt, to be a God to you. I am the Lord. לגהַמּוֹצִיא אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לִהְיוֹת לָכֶם לֵאלֹהִים אֲנִי יְהֹוָה:
Who took you out [of the land of Egypt]: on this very condition [i.e., to be willing to sacrifice your lives in sanctification of My Holy Name. — [Torath Kohanim 22:138] [And do not think that since it is an obligation, you will not receive reward for sacrificing yourselves, for] המוציא אתכם: על מנת כן:
I am the Lord: faithful to give reward [to those who fulfill My Torah. — [Torath Kohanim 22:138] אני ה': נאמן לשלם שכר:
Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 79 - 82
• Chapter 79
In this psalm, Asaph thanks God for sparing the people and directing His wrath upon the wood and stones (of the Temple). Still he cries bitterly, mourning the immense destruction: The place where the High Priest alone was allowed to enter-and only on Yom Kippur-is now so desolate that foxes stroll through it!
1. A psalm by Asaph. O God, nations have entered Your inheritance, they defiled Your Holy Sanctuary; they turned Jerusalem into heaps of rubble.
2. They have rendered the corpses of Your servants as food for the birds of heaven, the flesh of Your pious ones for the beasts of the earth.
3. They spilled their blood like water around Jerusalem, and there is no one to bury [them].
4. We became the object of disgrace to our neighbors, ridicule and scorn to those around us.
5. Until when, O Lord! Will You be angry forever? Will Your jealousy burn like fire?
6. Pour Your wrath upon the nations that do not know You, upon the kingdoms that do not call Your Name,
7. for they devoured Jacob and desolated His abode.
8. Do not recall our former sins; let Your mercies come swiftly towards us, for we have fallen very low.
9. Help us, God of our deliverance, for the sake of the glory of Your Name; save us and pardon our sins for the sake of Your Name.
10. Why should the nations say, "Where is their God?" Let there be known among the nations, before our eyes, the retribution of the spilled blood of Your servants.
11. Let the groan of the prisoner come before You; liberate those condemned to death, as befits the greatness of Your strength.
12. Repay our neighbors sevenfold into their bosom, for the disgrace with which they reviled You, O Lord.
13. And we, Your people, the flock of Your pasture, will thank You forever; for all generations we will recount Your praise.
Chapter 80
An awe-inspiring prayer imploring God to draw near to us as in days of old.
1. For the Conductor, on the shoshanim, 1 a testimony by Asaph, a psalm.
2. Listen, O Shepherd of Israel, Who leads Joseph like sheep. Appear, You Who is enthroned upon the cherubim.
3. Arouse Your might before Ephraim, Benjamin and Menashe, for it is upon You to save us.
4. Return us, O God; cause Your countenance to shine, that we may be saved.
5. O Lord, God of Hosts, until when will You fume at the prayer of Your people?
6. You fed them bread of tears, and gave them tears to drink in great measure.
7. You have made us an object of strife to our neighbors; our enemies mock to themselves.
8. Return us, O God of Hosts; cause Your countenance to shine, that we may be saved.
9. You brought a vine out of Egypt; You drove out nations and planted it.
10. You cleared space before it; it took root and filled the land.
11. Mountains were covered by its shade, and its branches became mighty cedars.
12. It sent forth its branches till the sea, and its tender shoots to the river.
13. Why did You breach its fences, so that every passerby plucked its fruit?
14. The boars of the forest ravage it, and the creepers of the field feed upon it.
15. O God of Hosts, please return! Look down from heaven and see, and be mindful of this vine,
16. and of the foundation which Your right hand has planted, and the son whom You strengthened for Yourself.
17. It is burned by fire, cut down; they perish at the rebuke of Your Presence.
18. Let Your hand be upon the man of Your right hand, upon the son of man whom You strengthened for Yourself.
19. Then we will not withdraw from You; revive us, and we will proclaim Your Name.
20. O Lord, God of Hosts, return us; cause Your countenance to shine that we may be saved.
Chapter 81
This psalm was chanted in the Holy Temple on Rosh Hashanah, a day on which many miracles were wrought for Israel.
1. For the Conductor, upon the gittit,1 by Asaph.
2. Sing joyously to God, our strength; sound the shofar to the God of Jacob.
3. Raise your voice in song, sound the drum, the pleasant harp, and the lyre.
4. Blow the shofar on the New Month, on the designated day of our Holy Day;
5. for it is a decree for Israel, a ruling of the God of Jacob.
6. He ordained it as a precept for Joseph when he went forth over the land of Egypt; I heard a language which I did not know.
7. I have taken his shoulder from the burden; his hands were removed from the pot.2
8. In distress you called and I delivered you; [you called] in secret, and I answered you with thunderous wonders; I tested you at the waters of Merivah, Selah.
9. Hear, My people, and I will admonish you; Israel, if you would only listen to Me!
10. You shall have no alien god within you, nor shall you bow down to a foreign deity.
11. I am the Lord your God who brought you up from the land of Egypt; open wide your mouth, [state all your desires,] and I shall grant them.
12. But My people did not heed My voice; Israel did not want [to listen to] Me.
13. So I sent them away for the willfulness of their heart, for following their [evil] design.
14. If only My people would listen to Me, if Israel would only walk in My ways,
15. then I would quickly subdue their enemies, and turn My hand against their oppressors.
16. Those who hate the Lord would shrivel before Him, and the time [of their retribution] shall be forever.
17. I would feed him [Israel] with the finest of wheat, and sate you with honey from the rock.
Chapter 82
This psalm admonishes those judges who feign ignorance of the law, dealing unjustly with the pauper or the orphan, while coddling the rich and pocketing their bribes.
1. A psalm by Asaph. God stands in the council of judges; among the judges He renders judgment:
2. How long will you judge wickedly, ever showing partiality toward the evildoers?
3. Render justice to the needy and the orphan; deal righteously with the poor and the destitute.
4. Rescue the needy and the pauper; deliver them from the hand of the wicked.
5. But they do not know, nor do they understand; they go about in darkness, [therefore] all the foundations of the earth tremble.
6. I said that you are angels, supernal beings, all of you;
7. but you will die as mortals, you will fall like any prince.
8. Arise, O God, judge the earth, for You possess all the nations.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 48
Lessons in Tanya
• Tuesday, 
Iyar 16, 5775 · May 5, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 48
By way of illustration, the Alter Rebbe will now draw an analogy from the physical earth which is composed of the inanimate and vegetable worlds. These two categories are the least significant of the four categories — man, animal, the vegetative and the inanimate — and the divine life-force found within them is contracted to a greater degree than the life-force found within animal and man. Nevertheless, Scripture attests that the whole world is full of G‑d’s glory — because it encompasses these two categories, and does not pervade them.
והמשל בזה, הנה הארץ הלזו הגשמית, אף שמלא כל הארץ כבודו
To illustrate this point, consider this material world. Even though “The whole world is full of His glory,”
והיינו אור אין סוף ברוך הוא, כמו שכתוב: הלא את השמים ואת הארץ אני מלא, נאם ה׳
namely, not only with a minute glimmer of G‑dliness, but with the [infinite] light of the blessed Ein Sof, as it is written:1 “‘Do I not fill heaven and earth?’ says the L‑rd,”
אף על פי כן, אין מתלבשת בתוכה בבחינת גילוי ההשפעה רק חיות מעט מזער, בחינת דומם וצומח לבד
nevertheless only very limited vitality, of no more than the category of what is revealed in the inanimate and vegetable worlds, is clothed within [this world] in the form of “revealed” influence,
וכל אור אין סוף ברוך הוא נקרא סובב עליה, אף שהוא בתוכה ממש
while all the light of the blessed Ein Sof which fills the world itself in a concealed manner is described as “encompassing” it, even though it actually pervades it,
מאחר שאין השפעתו מתגלית בה יותר, רק משפיעה בה בבחינת הסתר והעלם
since its influence is no more revealed in it than it is revealed within the inanimate and vegetable worlds, but affects it in a hidden and concealed manner;
וכל השפעה שבבחינת הסתר נקרא מקיף מלמעלה
and any influence of a concealed nature is referred to as “encircling from above,”
כי עלמא דאתכסיא הוא למעלה במדרגה מעלמא דאתגליא
for alma d‘itkasya, the “hidden world,” is on a higher plane than alma d’itgalya, the “revealed world.”
G‑dliness drawn down in a concealed manner (“from the hidden world”) is on a higher plane than that which is drawn down in a revealed manner (“from the revealed world”). Emanating as it does from a higher level, this mode of divine influence is said to be “encircling from above.”
ולקרב אל השכל יותר הוא בדרך משל
Let us make this more intelligible by means of an example.
A further example is needed in order to clarify this paradox — how G‑dliness simultaneously pervades the world and yet remains aloof from it, encircling and encompassing it (as it were) from above, and not being revealed within it.
כמו האדם שמצייר בדעתו איזה דבר שראה או שרואה
When a person forms an image in his mind of something that he has seen or sees,
הנה אף שכל גוף עצם הדבר ההוא, וגבו ותוכו ותוך תוכו, כולו מצוייר בדעתו ומחשבתו, מפני שראהו כולו או שרואהו
even though the entire body and essence of that thing, both its exterior and interior and its very core, are completely mirrored in his mind and thought, for he has seen it or is seeing it in its entirety,
הנה נקראת דעתו מקפת הדבר ההוא כולו
this is expressed by saying that his mind encompasses that object completely,and, just as in the mind’s frame of reference, so, too, regarding the perspective of the visualized object:
והדבר ההוא מוקף בדעתו ומחשבתו
and that thing is enveloped by his mind and thought.
רק שאינו מוקף בפועל ממש, רק בדמיון מחשבת האדם ודעתו
But it is not encompassed in actual fact, only in the imagination of the man’s thought and mind.
Since man’s thought is limited, he cannot actually encompass the object itself; he only encompasses its image as it exists within his mind.
אבל הקב״ה, דכתיב ביה: כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם גו׳
G‑d, however, of Whom it is written:2 “For My thoughts are not your thoughts,...” so that it is utterly impossible for us to grasp His thought process, —
הרי מחשבתו ודעתו, שיודע כל הנבראים, מקפת כל נברא ונברא מראשו ועד תחתיתו, ותוכו ותוך תוכו, הכל בפועל ממש
His Thoughts and His Mind, which knows all created beings, encompasses each and every created thing, from its head i.e., from its highest level to its end i.e., to its lowest level, and its inside and very core, all in actual reality, and not as with the thought of mortal man.
The Alter Rebbe now gives an example of G‑d’s thought and knowledge encompassing a specific object.
FOOTNOTES
1.Yirmeyahu 23:24.
2.Yeshayahu 55:8.
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Tuesday, Iyar 16, 5775 · May 5, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 80
Redeeming Firstborn Sons
"Give to Me the firstborn of your sons"—Numbers 22:28.
We are commanded to "redeem" male firstborn and to give the redemption money – fivesela'im – to the priest.
The obligation to redeem the firstborn son lies with the boy's father; the mother is not obligated in this mitzvah.
Redeeming Firstborn Sons
Positive Commandment 80
Translated by Berel Bell
The 80th mitzvah is that we are commanded to redeem a first-born male and to give the redemption value to a kohen.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,1 "Give Me the first-born of your sons." The explanation of this "giving" is that we must redeem him as if the kohen already owns him. We acquire the child from the kohen by giving him five selah.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "You must redeem a first-born male child."
This mitzvah is called pidyon haben. Women are not obligated in this mitzvah; it is the child's mitzvah which the father must fulfill, as explained in Kiddushin.3
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate B'choros.
Levites are exempt from this mitzvah.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:28.
2.Num. 18:15.
3.29a.

Positive Commandment 81
Redeeming Firstborn Donkeys
"The firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb"—Exodus 34:20.
We are commanded to redeem a firstborn male donkey with a lamb—which is given to the priest. (Unless the owner wishes to give the priest the monetary value of the donkey.)
Levites are exempt from this mitzvah.
Redeeming Firstborn Donkeys
Positive Commandment 81
Translated by Berel Bell
The 81st mitzvah is that we are commanded to redeem a first-born donkey with a sheep, and to give the sheep to a kohen — unless we give the monetary value.1
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "The first-born of a donkey you shall redeem with a sheep."
The details of this mitzvah are also explained in tractate B'choros.
Levites are also exempt from this mitzvah.
FOOTNOTES
1.If one desire, money may be given, since the Torah gives him the option of giving a sheep for the owner's convenience. See Hilchos B'chorim, Ch. 12, Hal. 11.
2.Ibid. 34:20.

• 1 Chapter: Eruvin Eruvin - Chapter Four

Eruvin - Chapter Four

Halacha 1
When the inhabitants of a courtyard eat at the same table1 - even though they have their own individual dwellings - they are not required to establish an eruv; they are considered to be the inhabitants of a single household.
Just as the presence of a person's wife, the members of his household, or his servants does not cause him to be forbidden [to carry], nor does their presence make an eruv necessary, so too, these individuals are considered to be the members of a single household, for they all eat at the same table.2
Halacha 2
Similarly, if [the inhabitants of this courtyard] must establish an eruv together with the inhabitants of another courtyard, they are required to bring only one loaf to the place where the eruv is established.3
Similarly, if the eruv is established in their [house], they do not have to contribute to the eruv, just as the house in which an eruv is placed does not have to contribute a loaf of bread. [The rationale for both these laws is] that all these dwellings are considered to be a single dwelling.
Halacha 3
Similarly, the inhabitants of a courtyard who established an eruv together are considered to be [the members of] a single household.4 If it is necessary for them to establish an eruv together with the inhabitants of another courtyard, they are required to bring only one loaf to the place where the eruv is established. Similarly, if the eruv is established in their [house], they do not have to contribute a loaf of bread.
Halacha 4
When five people collect an eruv5 [for one courtyard] with the intent of bringing it to the place where an eruv will be established [together with the inhabitants of another courtyard],6 it is not necessary for all five to bring the bread there. Moreover, all th at is necessary is to bring a single loaf of bread. Since the eruvwas collected, all [the inhabitants of the courtyard] are considered to be the members of a single household.
Halacha 5
When a father and his son, or a teacher and his student7are dwelling in the same courtyard, it is not necessary for them to establish an eruv; they are considered to be a single household. Although at times they eat at a single table and at times they do not eat [together], they are considered to be a single household.
Halacha 6
[The following rules apply to] brothers, each of whom has a house of his own, and who do not eat at their father's table, and to wives and servants who do not eat at their husband's or master's table at all times, but rather they [occasionally] eat at his table in payment for the work they do for him,8 or as an expression of his favor for a specific amount of time, such as a person who enjoys a colleague's hospitality for a week or a month.9
If there are no other people dwelling together with them in the courtyard, they are not required to establish an eruv. If they establish an eruv with [the inhabitants of] another courtyard, a single eruv suffices for them. If the eruv is established in [one of] their [homes], they are not required to contribute a loaf of bread.
If there are other people living in the courtyard together with them, each of them is required to contribute a loaf of bread [for the eruv] like the other inhabitants of the courtyard. [The rationale is that] they do not eat at one table at all times.
Halacha 7
[The following rules apply when] five groups spend the Sabbath together in a single large hall: If a partition that reaches the ceiling10 separates each of the groups [from the others], it is as if each group has a room of its own, or is in a loft of its own. In such an instance, every group must contribute a loaf of bread. If, however, the partition does not reach the ceiling, a single loaf11of bread is sufficient for all of them. For they are all considered to be the members of a single household.
Halacha 8
When a person owns one [of the following] structures12 - a gatehouse that people frequently walk through, an exedra,13a porch, a barn, a shed for straw, a shed for wood, or a storehouse - in a courtyard belonging to a colleague, he does not cause [his colleague] to be forbidden to carry. [Our Sages decreed that the presence of a person causes carrying] to be forbidden unless an eruvis established, only when the person possesses a dwelling in the courtyard in which he will [ordinarily] eat [a meal of] bread. The [possession of a] place to sleep, by contrast, does not cause carrying to be forbidden.
For this reason, even if a person decided to eat his meals consistently in a gatehouse or an exedra, his presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden, because this is not considered a dwelling.14
Halacha 9
[The following rules apply when] there are ten dwellings, one within the other:15[The inhabitants of] the innermost dwelling and the one before it are required to provide the eruv. The eight outer dwellings, by contrast, are not required to contribute to the eruv. [The rationale is that] since many people walk through them, they are regarded as a gatehouse. [As mentioned above,] a person who lives in a gatehouse [does not cause others to be forbidden to carry].16
[The person living in] the ninth [house] does not have many people passing through his property - only one. Therefore, his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden unless he contributes to the eruv.
Halacha 10
[The following rulings apply in the situation to be described:] There are two courtyards [each containing several houses] and three houses [in between them]. The houses have entrances to each other, and [the outer two houses]17have entrances to the courtyards.
The inhabitants of one courtyard brought their eruv through the house that had an entrance for them and placed it in the middle house. Similarly, the inhabitants of the other courtyard brought their eruv through the house that had an entrance for them and placed it in the middle house.
[The inhabitants of] these three houses do not have to contribute a loaf of bread [to the eruv [for the following reasons]: The middle house is the house in which the eruv was placed. The two houses on its side are each considered to be a gatehouse for the inhabitants of the courtyard.
Halacha 11
[Different rules apply, however, if the situation changes. For example,] there are two courtyards [each containing several houses] and two houses [in between them] with entrances to each other. [The inhabitants of one courtyard] bring their eruv through the house that is open to them and place it in the second house, which is adjacent to the other courtyard.
[The inhabitants of the other courtyard also] bring their eruv through the entrance that is open to them and place it in the other house [which is adjacent to the other courtyard]. In such a situation, [the inhabitants of] neither [of the courtyards are considered to have] established an eruv. For each of them has placed his eruv in the gatehouse of another courtyard.18
Halacha 12
Although one of the inhabitants of a courtyard is in the midst of his death throes,19 even when [it is obvious] that he will not survive the day, his presence causes the other inhabitants of the courtyard to be forbidden [to carry] until they grant him [by proxy]20 a share in a loaf of bread and include him in the eruv.
Similarly, when a minor [owns a house in the courtyard], although he is incapable of eating an amount of food the size of an olive, his presence causes [carrying] to be forbidden until [the inhabitants of the courtyard] include him in the eruv. [The presence of] a guest, by contrast, does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden, as explained above.21
Halacha 13
[The following rules apply when] one of the inhabitants of a courtyard leaves his home and spends the Sabbath in another courtyard, even in a courtyard adjacent [to the one in which his home is located]: If he had no thought of returning to his home on the Sabbath, he does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden.22
When does the above apply? With regard to a Jew.23 With regard to a gentile, by contrast, he causes [carrying] to be forbidden even when he spends the Sabbath in another city,24 unless his domain is rented from him. [The rationale is] that it is possible for him to return on the Sabbath.
Halacha 14
When the owner of a courtyard rents houses in the courtyard to others and [stipulates that] he may [continue] to leave articles or types of merchandise in each of these homes, [the presence of the renters] does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden. Since he still has authority in each of the houses, everyone is considered to be his guest.25
When does the above apply? When he left an article that may not be carried26on the Sabbath - e.g., tevel27 or slabs of metal,28 in these homes. When, by contrast, he leaves articles that may be carried in each of the homes, [the presence of the renters] causes [carrying] to be forbidden unless they establish an eruv. For it is possible that he will remove them [on the Sabbath], and then he will be left without any authority [in these dwellings].
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] the inhabitants of a courtyard forgot and did not establish an eruv. They may not remove articles from their homes to the courtyard, nor from the courtyard to their homes. However, concerning articles that were left in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath:29 [the inhabitants] may carry such articles throughout the courtyard and all its extensions.30
[The following rules apply when] there is a porch31 or an upper storey [that opens out to a courtyard],32 and the inhabitants of the courtyard have established an eruv for themselves and the inhabitants of the porch have established an eruv for themselves:33 Regarding articles that were left in their homes at the beginning of the Sabbath, the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey are permitted to carry them throughout the porch and all of its extensions or throughout the upper storey and all of its extensions. The inhabitants of the courtyard may carry within the courtyard and all its extensions, [but they are forbidden to carry from the courtyard to the upper storey or the porch, or from the upper storey or the porch to the courtyard unless an eruv is established].
Similarly, if one person lives in the courtyard, and another person lives in the upper storey, and they forgot to establish an eruv, the owner of the upper storey may carry within the upper storey and all of its extensions, and the owner of the courtyard may carry within the courtyard and all of its extensions. [They may not, however, carry from one domain to the other without an eruv].
Halacha 16
What is implied? When there is a rock or a mound within the courtyard that is less than ten handbreadths high, it is considered to be [important to] both the courtyard and the porch, and [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to bring articles there from their homes.
If [the rock or the mound] is ten handbreadths high and is less than four handbreadths removed from the porch, it is considered to be an extension of the porch, for they are of similar [height]. Therefore, the inhabitants of the porch may carry on it.
If it is four or more handbreadths removed from the porch, even when it is ten [handbreadths high] it is considered to be an extension of both the courtyard and the porch, since both can use it by throwing [objects onto it]. Therefore, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to bring articles there from their homes until they establish an eruv.
When there is a pillar four [or more] handbreadths wide in front of the porch [it is considered to be a divider]. [Therefore, the presence of] the porch does not cause [carrying] to be forbidden within the courtyard, for a separation has been made between [one domain and the other].
Halacha 17
When projections protrude from the walls [of the courtyard], all those that are below ten handbreadths high are considered to be extensions of the courtyard, and may be used by the inhabitants of the courtyard. All those that are within ten handbreadths of the upper storey may be used by the inhabitants of the upper storey.
The remainder, those that are located more than ten handbreadths above the ground and more than ten handbreadths below the upper storey, are forbidden to them both. Neither may use them for articles from the homes unless an eruvis established.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply to] a cistern located in [such] a courtyard: If it is filled with produce that was tevel - and hence is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath - or with objects of a similar kind, it and the enclosure around it,34 are regarded like a rock or a mound in a courtyard.35 If [the enclosure] is ten handbreadths high and close to the porch, it is considered to be an extension of the porch.
If, by contrast, it is filled with water,36 neither the inhabitants of the courtyard nor the inhabitants of the porch may bring [water] to their homes from it unless they establish an eruv.
Halacha 19
[The following rules apply when] there are two courtyards, one lying behind the other, and the inhabitants of the inner courtyard enter and exit by passing through the outer courtyard: When [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard have established an eruv, but [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard have not, [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard may carry [within their domain], but [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard may not.37
When [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard have established an eruv, but [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard have not, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to carry; [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard because they did not establish an eruv, and the inhabitants of the outer courtyard because the people who pass through [their domain] did not establish an eruv [even within their own domain].38
If [the inhabitants of] both domains have established separate eruvin,39 they may each carry within their own domain; they may not carry from one [domain] to the other.
Halacha 20
[If the inhabitants of both domains have established separate eruvin,] but one of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard forgot to join in the eruv [in his domain], the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are still permitted to carry.40
When, by contrast, one of the inhabitants of the inner courtyard forgot to join in the eruv [in his domain], [not only are the inhabitants of the inner courtyard forbidden to carry, the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard are also forbidden to do so. [This restriction is instituted] because the inhabitants of the inner courtyard whose eruv is not acceptable pass through their [domain].
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when] both courtyards establish a single eruv: If theeruv is placed in the outer courtyard, and one of the inhabitants - whether an inhabitant of the outer courtyard or of the inner courtyard - forgets to join in theeruv, [all] the inhabitants of both courtyards are forbidden [to carry]41 unless he subordinates [the ownership of] his domain to them. [This is possible for, as we explained,42 one may subordinate the ownership of a domain in one courtyard to [people dwelling in] another.
[Different rules apply when] the eruv is placed in the inner courtyard: If one of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard did not join in the eruv, [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard are forbidden to carry. [The inhabitants of] the inner courtyard, by contrast, are permitted to carry within their own [domain].43 If one of the inhabitants of the inner courtyard did not join in the eruv, [all the inhabitants of] both [courtyards] are forbidden [to carry]44 unless he subordinates [the ownership of] his domain to them.
Halacha 22
If [only] one person45 was dwelling in one [of these] courtyards and [only] one person was dwelling in the other, there is no need for them to establish aneruv;46 each one is permitted to carry in his courtyard.
If, however, a gentile dwells in the inner courtyard, even though he is merely a single [household], he is considered as many individuals, and [his presence] causes [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyard to be forbidden to carry until his domain is rented.47
Halacha 23
[The following laws apply when there are] three courtyards with entrances to each other, and there are many people dwelling in each courtyard: When [the inhabitants of] the two outer courtyards have established an eruv together with [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard,48 [the inhabitants of] the inner courtyard are permitted to carry within the outer courtyards, and [the inhabitants of] the outer courtyards are permitted to carry within the inner courtyard, but the inhabitants of the two outer courtyards may not carry in the other outer courtyard unless all three join in a single eruv.
If a single individual dwells in each courtyard, there is no need for them to establish an eruv, although many individuals pass through the outer courtyard.49 [The rationale is that] each of these individuals is permitted to carry in his own domain. If, however, there are two individuals living in the inner courtyard [different rules apply]. Since [these individuals] are forbidden to carry in their own domain until they establish an eruv, they cause the single individuals in the middle and in the outer domains to be forbidden [to carry] unless the two inhabitants of the inner domain establish an eruv.
This is the governing principle: When a person who is forbidden to carry in his own domain passes through another domain, his passage causes carrying to be forbidden there. When, by contrast, the person may carry in his own domain, his passage through another domain does not cause carrying to be forbidden there.
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when] there are two balconies positioned over a body of water, and one is positioned above the other: Although [the inhabitants of] each of them have constructed a partition ten handbreadths high descending [to the water],50 if the two balconies are within ten handbreadths of each other,51 it is forbidden for [their inhabitants] to draw water unless they establish a single eruv. [The rationale is that, because of their closeness] they are considered to be a single balcony.52
If the distance between the upper balcony and the lower balcony is more than ten handbreadths, and [the inhabitants of] each have established separateeruvin, they are both permitted to draw [water].
Halacha 25
If [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] did not make a partition, but the inhabitants of the lower [balcony] did, even [the inhabitants of] the lower balcony are forbidden to draw [water]. [The rationale is that] the buckets of the upper [balcony], which are forbidden, pass through their domain.53
If [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] have made a partition, but [the inhabitants of] the lower [balcony] have not, [the inhabitants of] the upper balcony are permitted to draw water,54 but [the inhabitants of] the lower balcony are forbidden.55
If the inhabitants of the lower [balcony] joined together with [the inhabitants of] the upper [balcony] in the construction of the partition, [the inhabitants of] both are forbidden to draw water56 until they establish a single eruv.
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply to a building] with three storeys, one above the other; the upper and the lower storeys belong to one individual, and the middle storey belongs to another: One may not lower articles from the top storey to the bottom storey through the middle storey.57 For we may not pass articles from one domain to another domain via a third domain. One may, however, lower articles from the top [storey] to the lower [storey] [if] they do not [pass] through the middle [storey].58
Halacha 27
[The following rules apply when] two buildings face each other and there is a courtyard below them into which water is poured.59 They should not pour water into the courtyard unless they join together in a single eruv.
If [the inhabitants of one building]60 dig a pit in the courtyard into which to pour water, while [the inhabitants of the other building] do not, those who dig the pit may pour water into it. The others are forbidden to pour water into the courtyard unless they join together in a single eruv.
If [the inhabitants of both buildings] each dig a pit, each may pour water into the pit they have dug, even though they did not establish an eruv.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's wording is not to be understood literally; if people eat in the same room, even if they eat at different tables - indeed, even if they eat their own food - they are not required to establish an eruv. These concepts are also reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:7) and quoted as halachah by the Ramah (Orach Chayim370:4).
The most common application of this concept today would be a hotel or a bungalow colony, where many people eat in the same dining room, and yet have their own private rooms or dwellings.
2.
This highlights the principle that it is the place where a person eats, and not where he sleeps, that is most significant in defining his place of residence.
3.
In Chapter 1, Halachah 15, the Rambam states that every household participating in the eruv is required to contribute a loaf of bread. Nevertheless, in this instance, since all the inhabitants of the courtyard are considered to be members of a single household, only one loaf is required.
4.
Although they eat in separate places, joining together in the eruv causes them to be considered as if they share the same table.
5.
I.e., they collected loaves of bread from each household in the courtyard.
6.
The Shem Yosef explains that this latter phrase represents the new concept contributed in this halachah, as opposed to the previous one. Although the eruv was originally collected for the purpose of establishing an eruv with the inhabitants of another courtyard, the collection itself causes the inhabitants to be considered members of a single household.
7.
Although the Rambam uses a singular term, the same law applies to many sons or many students.
8.
The Rambam's comparison of these individuals to hired workers reflects his interpretation of the expression במקבלי פרס in Eruvin 73a. The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation, and his view is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 370:5- 6).
9.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is not that the presence of a guest causes carrying to be forbidden when there are others living in the same courtyard. For as explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, and in Halachah 12 of this chapter, a guest's presence makes no difference in this context. Rather, the point of the comparison above is to emphasize the intermediate status of these individuals. On one hand, like guests, they are at times considered to be members of the person's household. On the other hand, since they have their own dwellings and often eat there, there is reason to consider them as having separate households.
10.
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba, who explains that it is sufficient for the partitions to reach within three handbreadths of the ceiling, since, based on the principle of l'vud, when they are that close it is considered as if they reached the ceiling itself. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim370:3) quotes this ruling.
11.
I.e., they must make an eruv. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) differs and (following the interpretation of Tosafot, Eruvin 72a and Rabbenu Asher) does not require an eruv at all unless they want to join with others outside the hall.
The Shulchan Aruch, however, emphasizes that we are speaking about temporary partitions, either curtains or pieces of wood. If the partitions are permanent, they are considered as having separate dwellings, and an eruv is required.
12.
All these structures have one thing in common - they are not ordinary dwellings where a person will eat his meals on a regular basis.
13.
A Greek structure with two or three walls and a roof with a sky-light.
14.
For these structures are not fit to serve as dwellings. In contrast, were a person to eat continually in a barn, a wood shed, or a shed for straw, these are considered to be dwellings, and an eruv is necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 370:1; see Chapter 1, Halachah 16).
15.
I.e., to get to the inner dwellings, one must pass through the outer ones.
16.
The Mishnah Berurah 370:52 extends this principle and applies it to people renting separate rooms in a single home. If the rooms lead through each other, the inhabitants of the outer rooms do not have to contribute to the eruv.
17.
But not the middle house. See the accompanying diagram.
18.
And an eruv that was placed in a gatehouse is not acceptable, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 16.
19.
This reflects a general principle in Torah law. Until a person actually stops breathing, he is considered to be alive. There is no difference in his status regarding any of the Torah's laws.
20.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.
21.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
22.
The rationale is that a dwelling without an owner is not considered to be a dwelling (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 371:1; Mishnah Berurah 371:1).
23.
For it is unlikely that a Jew will return to his home on the Sabbath. Moreover, even if he did so, we apply the principle that since carrying was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
24.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions a more lenient view, which states that if the gentile spends the Sabbath at a place that is more than a day's journey from home, the inhabitants are allowed to carry, because it is impossible for him to arrive on the Sabbath. This ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:1).
The Ramah grants a further leniency and permits the inhabitants to carry when the gentile stays in another courtyard in the same city. If the gentile returns to his home on the Sabbath, the Turei Zahav 371:2 permits the inhabitants to continue to carry. The Mishnah Berurah 371:8, by contrast, rules that this is forbidden.
25.
Note the ruling of the Ramah (Orach Chayim 370:2), which states that this decision applies only when there are no other inhabitants in the courtyard besides the owner and the persons to whom he rented dwellings, or the eruv was brought into the house of the owner.
26.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) adds that this applies also when the articles are too heavy to be lifted on the Sabbath.
27.
Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated. These tithes may not be separated on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 23:9,14), nor is it permitted to carry such produce on the Sabbath (loc. cit. 25:19).
28.
Since this metal has not been fashioned into a useful article, it is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath (loc. cit.:6).
29.
See the Be'ur Halachah 372, which explains there are authorities who differ with regard to whether one is permitted to carry an article within a courtyard when an eruv has not been established - if that article hads been placed in one of the homes at the commencement of the Sabbath, but was inadvertently taken from the home and placed in the courtyard. Although the Rambam would appear to forbid carrying the article, Rashi (Shabbat 130b) and Tosafot (Eruvin 91b) maintain that carrying it is permitted within the courtyard.
30.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.
31.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:3), the Rambam describes a porch as an intermediate level, at least ten handbreadths high, through which stairs lead to the courtyard.
32.
I.e., the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey descend through a stairwell into the courtyard, and from the courtyard they proceed to the public domain. The Rabbis consider the stairwell equivalent to an entrance. Hence, they liken the situation to one in which two courtyards are positioned adjacent to each other with an entrance between them.
33.
I.e., unless an eruv is established, the inhabitants of these domains are forbidden to carry within the others' domains and within the property shared by both.
34.
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9.
35.
I.e., since the cistern is filled with objects that are forbidden to be carried, it is not given any special importance, and instead is considered like any other large, distinct object in the courtyard.
36.
It is, by nature, fit to be used by the inhabitants of both domains. Therefore, neither is entitled to do so, unless they establish an eruv.
37.
The rationale for these rulings is obvious; the concept is mentioned primarily to show the contrast with the subsequent clauses of the halachah. Unlike the inhabitants of the inner courtyard, who can reach their own dwelling only by passing through the outer courtyard, there is no reason for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.
38.
This ruling reflects the principle stated in Halachah 23, that when people are forbidden to carry within their own domain, they cause carrying to be forbidden in the domain through which they pass. Had the inhabitants of the inner courtyard established an eruv for themselves, they would not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as reflected in the following clause.
39.
Similarly, if the single courtyard belongs to a single individual, or the owners are considered to be members of a single household - e.g., a father and his children, their presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh).
40.
For their eruv is still intact and there is no necessity for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.
41.
The eruv is not acceptable for the inner courtyard, because it is not located within the courtyard itself, and it is not acceptable for the outer courtyard, because one of the inhabitants of the courtyard did not participate.
42.
Chapter 2, Halachah 5.
43.
For all the inhabitants of this courtyard have joined together in a single eruv. Although they had desired to join together with the inhabitants of the outer courtyard, the failure for this desire to be fulfilled does not cause them to forfeit their initial advantage as a domain joined by an eruv. (SeeEruvin 75b.)
44.
In this instance, the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are forbidden to carry because one of their number has failed to join in the eruv. This in turn causes carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as explained above.
45.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:10), the Rambam explains that this can refer to members of an extended household - e.g., a father and his children.
46.
Needless to say, to carry from one courtyard to the next, an eruv is necessary.
47.
Our Sages explained that gentiles are less private about the details of their personal dwellings than the Jews. Thus many people will know of the gentile's presence and the fact that his domain was not rented, but they may not know that only one Jew lives in the outer courtyard. Therefore, they might not realize that this is an exception, and generally, when one courtyard leads to another, an eruv is required (Eruvin 75b). Although when one Jew lives in a courtyard together with a gentile, he is generally not required to rent his domain (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), an exception is made in this instance.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 382:17) mentions this as a singular opinion, and the Mishnah Berurah 382:59 states that it is not shared by most authorities. Some have noted that the Rambam himself uses a plural form of the word "rent," and they interpret this as referring to an instance where two Jews live in the outer courtyard.
48.
I.e., the inhabitants of the inner courtyard have established two eruvin, one with each of the outer courtyards.
49.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that these two clauses refer to different situations. The first clause refers to a situation in which all three courtyards have entrances to the public domain, while this clause refers to a situation where only the outermost courtyard has an entrance to the public domain, and the inhabitants of this courtyard must pass through it.
Based on the Hagahot MaimoniotMerkevet HaMishneh explains that the fundamental aspect of this ruling is the interpretation of Rabbi Shimeon's statements that the inhabitants of the middle courtyard are permitted to carry in either of the outer courtyards (Eruvin 45b, 48b). Although these statements were made regarding a situation in which only one courtyard opened up to the public domain, one can extrapolate that the same ruling would apply when all three open to the public domain.
50.
See Hilchot Shabbat 15:15, which interprets this law as referring to a balcony with a hole in its floor, from which water is drawn and through which it is poured. The partition need not extend the full distance from the balcony to the water. As long as it extends either ten handbreadths below the balcony or ten handbreadths above the water, drawing water and pouring water through the hole in the balcony are permitted.
51.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains this as referring to two balconies positioned one on top of the other. Each balcony has a hole in it, and these holes are also aligned one on top of the other.
52.
The Ra'avad states that, based on Eruvin 88a, this ruling would appear to apply only when the two balconies are not directly above each other. The Ra'avad's position is shared by Rashi and the Rashba, while the Rambam's interpretation appears to be shared by Rabbenu Chanan'el. Although the Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam's position, most authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 355:5) follow the Ra'avad's view.
53.
I.e., the Rambam applies the principle stated in Halachah 23 - about people passing from one domain to another - to the buckets used to draw water that pass from domain to domain. In this instance, as well, the Ra'avad, Rashi, and others interpret Eruvin (loc. cit.), the source for this halachah, differently, and their interpretation is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
54.
The fact that their buckets pass through the area of the lower domain is of no consequence.
55.
For they have no partition.
56.
Since they both have a share in the partition, they are considered as full partners in a single domain. Hence, it is necessary that they be joined together in an eruv.
57.
I.e., through a hole in the building.
58.
E.g, from a porch to a porch.
59.
As evident from Hilchot Shabbat 15:16-17, this refers to a courtyard larger than four cubits by four cubits. It is forbidden to pour water into a smaller courtyard unless one digs a pit, as reflected in the second clause of this halachah.
60.
The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:11).
• 3 Chapters: Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 9, Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 10, Bikkurim Bikkurim - Chapter 11

Bikkurim - Chapter 9

Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment for anyone1 who slaughters a kosher domesticated animal to give a priest the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw,2 as [Deuteronomy 18:50] states: "This is the judgment [due] the priests...." These are universally known as "presents."
This mitzvah is practiced at all times, whether at the time the Temple is standing or not, whether in Eretz Yisrael or in the Diaspora,3 with regard to ordinary animals and not consecrated ones.
Halacha 2
There is an obligation to separate the above-mentioned presents from all consecrated animals that had a permanent blemish4 before they were consecrated and were redeemed.5 If, by contrast, they had a temporary blemish6 before their consecration or they were consecrated when they were unblemished, but afterwards, they became blemished,7 and they were redeemed, they are exempt from these presents.8
Halacha 3
If there is an unresolved doubt whether an animal is a firstborn,9 there is certainly an obligation to give the presents [from it to the priest].10 [The rationale is:] If it is a firstborn, it must be given to a priest in its entirety. If it is not a firstborn, the presents must be given to a priest.
If a question arises with regard to the status of two animals11 and a priest took one because of the doubt, the second one is exempt from the presents. [The rationale is that] it is considered as an animal which a priest acquired and then gave to its owners, because of its blemish.12
If, however, there is an unresolved doubt whether an animal is the tithes of the herd,13 it is exempt in all situations. [The rationale is that] when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague,14 the burden of proof is on him.15
Halacha 4
When an animal that was consecrated and then disqualified because of a blemish16 became mixed with other animals - even one with 100 - if one person owns all of them,17 they are all exempt [from the obligation of the presents]. [The rationale is that the status of] each one is doubtful and when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.18 If one person was slaughtering all the animals, only one [set of] presents is exempt.19
Halacha 5
We are required to separate presents only from a kosher domesticated animal,20 [as indicated by Deuteronomy, loc. cit., which] states: "If it be an ox or a sheep."21 If a hybrid is born from a sheep and a goat, there is an obligation for presents to be given.22 We separate all23 the presents from a ko'i24even though its status is undetermined.
When a male deer mates with a goat and it gives birth, there is an obligation [to give] half the presents [to a priest]. [This is derived from the above prooftext]: "If it be... a sheep," i.e., even if it is only part sheep.25 [When, by contrast,] a male goat mates with a deer, the offspring is exempt from the presents.26
Halacha 6
Whether a person slaughters an animal for consumption by Jews, by animals, by dogs, or for medical purposes, there is an obligation [to give] the presents.27
Halacha 7
There is an obligation [to separate the presents from] an animal belonging to partners, as [the above prooftext] states: "those who slaughter28 the animal."
Halacha 8
When a person purchases an animal with the produce of the Sabbatical year, he is obligated to [give] presents [to a priest].29
Priests and Levites are exempt from the presents, as [the above prooftext] states: "from the people." It is questionable whether the Levites are considered as part of "the people" or not. Therefore [the presents] are not taken from them.30 If, however, a priest took them, he need not return them.31
Halacha 9
When does the above32 apply? When one slaughters for his own sake. [Different laws apply to] a priest who is butcher, who slaughters [animals] and sells them in the marketplace. We grant him two or three weeks.33 Afterwards, we expropriate the presents from him and grant them to other priests.34
If he established a butcher shop to sell meat, we do not wait at all. Instead, we expropriate the presents from him immediately. If he refrains from giving them, we place him under a ban of ostracism35 until he gives them.
Halacha 10
A person who slaughters an animal for the sake of a priest or a gentile is exempt from [the obligation to give presents].36
A person who enters into a partnership with a priest [in the ownership of an animal] must mark his portion, so that he will leave the presents in the portion of the priest. If he does not mark his portion, he is obligated [to give] these presents, because the fact that the priest is his partner is not a matter of public knowledge.37Accordingly, if the priest was standing with him in the butcher store and dealing and negotiating with him,38 he is not required to mark [his portion].39
When a person enters a partnership with a gentile [in the ownership of an animal], he need not mark his portion.40 [The rationale is that] as a rule, a gentile will speak excessively and inform everyone that he is [the Jew's] partner, even if [the Jew] is not present at the time of the sale.
Halacha 11
[If, when negotiating a partnership agreement41 regarding the ownership of an animal,] a priest stipulates to [his partner, an Israelite,] that they are partners with the exception of the presents, the presents belong to the priest. Since the priest stipulated "with the exception of...," he left himself the portion of [the animal containing] the presents. Hence, they are his.42
If, however, the priest told the Israelite: "...on the condition that the presents are mine," the presents belong to the Israelite and he may give them to any priest he desires. Even though [the priest] stipulated that they were his, [the animal] is not exempt from [the obligation to give] the presents.43 For by saying "on the condition that...," he did not leave himself [the ownership of] the presents. Since he did not leave himself a share in their ownership, he did not acquire them through this stipulation.44
Halacha 12
If a priest was a partner in [the ownership of] the head, he is exempt from [giving] the jaw. If he is a partner in the front leg, he is exempt from the fore leg. If he is a partner in the digestive organs, he is exempt from the maw.45
If the priest told [the Israelite]: "The entire animal is mine, but the head is yours," he is obligated to give the jaw, for the portion that must be given belongs to the Israelite.
Halacha 13
[The following laws apply when] a gentile converts and he is in the process of having an animal slaughtered. If it was slaughtered before he converted, he is exempt.46 If [it was slaughtered] after he converted, he is obligated. If there is a doubt concerning the matter, [we follow the principle]: When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.47
Halacha 14
It is permitted to partake [of the meat] of an animal from which the presents were not separated. [The situation] is not analogous to tevel48 [The rationale is that] the presents due to be given the priests are separate and distinct.49It is forbidden for an Israelite to partake of the presents themselves without the permission of a priest. If he transgresses and partakes of them, damages them, or sells them, he is not liable to make financial restitution.50 [The rationale is that] this is money that has no known plaintiff.51 A person who purchases them - even though he is forbidden to do so - is permitted to partake of them, because when the presents to the priests are stolen, the theft effect a change in ownership.
Halacha 15
If one tells a butcher: "Sell me the digestive organs of a cow," and there were presents52 among them, [the purchaser] should give them to a priest,53but [the seller] need not decrease the price [accordingly].54 If [the purchaser] bought [the organs] by weight, he should give them to the priest and deduct their value from the butcher's [due].55
Halacha 16
When a person sends meat to a friend and there were presents56 in [the parcel], the recipient need not be concerned that [the sender] transgressed and stole them.57
In a place where there are no priests,58 one should determine their financial value and partake of them, [so as not to cause] a priest a loss.59 He should then give the money to any priest he desires.
Halacha 17
If a person wants to give the presents to only one priest, he may do so. If he wants to divide them [and give them to several], he should not give half the maw or half the foreleg to one [priest]. Instead, he should give the foreleg to one, the maw to another, and the jaw to two others. [This is inferred fromDeuteronomy 18:4]: "And you shall give it to him," i.e., give him a portion that is a significant present.60 If [he is giving presents] from an ox, he may divide them into portions,61 provided each portion is a significant present.
Halacha 18
What is meant by the foreleg? The right foreleg,62 The portion from the upper-joint until the ankle joint; two limbs, one connected with the other. The jaw refers to the jaw bones until the large ring of the protrusion of the gullet with the tongue between the bones.63 All of this is given to the priest.
Halacha 19
[When giving the jaw and the foreleg to the priest,] we do not pour boiling water on the hide [to remove the hair], nor do we skin it. Instead, we give it to [the priest] with its skin and wool. [We give a priest] the maw with the fat upon it64and the fat within it. The priests have already accepted the custom of leaving the fat of the maw for the owner.65
Halacha 20
A women of the priestly family may partake of the presents even if she is married to an Israelite, because they are not consecrated. Moreover, her husband may partake of the presents for her sake.
challalah,66 by contrast, may not partake of the presents, because challalim67are not in the category of priests.68 If a priest desires to sell the presents, to give them as gifts, even to a gentile, or to feed them to the dogs, he may, for they are not consecrated at all.69
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when there is] a priest whose friends [continually] give him presents. If he desires to transfer ownership of them to a friend who is an Israelite,70 he may, even though they did not enter [the priest's] domain. Thus [the priest's] friends may slaughter [their animals] and give the presents to the Israelite who acquired them. [This applies] provided the Israelite is in difficult straits and does not have the means to buy meat and the priest who transfers the meat to him is his friend. If, however, the priest is the Israelite's attendant or his hired worker or employee, he may not transfer ownership [of the presents] until they enter his domain.71 [This is a safeguard,] lest he compel him to do so.
Halacha 22
A priest should not grab the presents, nor should he even request them verbally. Instead, if he is given them72 in a respectful manner, he may take them.73 When there are many priests at the slaughter house, the modest ones withdraw and the gluttons take them. [Even though] a priest is modest, [if] it is not known that he is a priest, he should take [the presents] to let it be known to everyone that he is a priest.
The priests should only eat the presents as they are roasted, with mustard on them,74 for [Numbers 18:8] states [that the gifts to the priests75 were given them]: "for distinction." Hence, [they should] be eaten in a manner befitting a king.
FOOTNOTES
1.
I.e., other than a priest or Levite (see Halachah 8).
2.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 143) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 506) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Chulin 134b states that the priests merited these gifts in recognition of the heroism of Pinchas in stopping the Jews' lewd behavior with the Midianite women.
3.
This is a matter of debate among the commentaries. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:21) quote the Rambam's view, but also mention the opinion of Rashi and Rabbenu Meir of Rutenberg who maintain that this mitzvah is not practiced in the Diaspora. They conclude that this latter view is observed. The Sefer HaChinuch, loc. cit., writes that in the abstract, he agrees that the law should be observed in the present era as well, but "we do not have the power to compel the butchers to observe it." See also the Responsa of the Chatam Sofer, sec. 301, where he writes that he would observe this mitzvah.
4.
These blemishes are listed in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, ch. 7, Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach, ch. 2.
5.
Since they are permanently blemished at the time of their consecration, it is obvious that they will ultimately be redeemed and used for ordinary purposes, not as a sacrifice. Hence it is never considered that their actual bodies became consecrated. Once they are redeemed, they are like any ordinary property. Hence the obligation to separate the presents falls upon them (Radbaz).
6.
Such blemishes are listed in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 2:7.
7.
Even permanently.
8.
In such a situation, the consecration of the animal encompasses its actual body. The rationale is that in the first instance mentioned in this clause, the blemish is not permanent. Hence, it does not block the consecration. And in the second instance, the blemish comes after the consecration already took effect. And since the consecration affected the actual bodies of the animals, it continues to have an effect even after the animals have been redeemed. They are considered aspesulei hamukdashim and are exempt from this obligation (Radbaz, based on Bechorot 15a).
9.
A sheep that had not given birth before gave birth to two offspring, a male - which would be separated as a firstborn - and a female which would not - and it is not known which of them was born first. See Hilchot Bechorot 5:1. Alternatively, a firstborn animal became mixed together with other animals [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:20).
10.
A priest to whom a firstborn animal is given is not obligated to separate the presents and give them to another priest. In the instance described above, the Israelite who is the owner of the animal may retain possession of it, for we follow the principle: "When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him." Thus since a priest cannot prove that the animal was a firstborn, it remains the property of the owner. Nevertheless, he must give the presents to a priest based on the rationale presented by the Rambam.
11.
E.g., a sheep that had not given birth before gave birth to two males. Thus one of them is certainly the firstborn and must be given to a priest. The question is which one. Hence the weaker one is given to the priest and the other one remains the property of its owner, but may not be slaughtered until it receives a disqualifying blemish (Hilchot Bechorot, loc. cit.).
12.
I.e., in exchange for giving the priest the weaker animal, the priest forfeits his claim on the other animal. Hence, although there is a possibility that it is an ordinary animal and the presents must be given to the priest, to obtain those presents, the priest is required to prove that claim and he cannot. Hence, the owner may retain possession.
13.
Which the owner must offer as a sacrifice (Hilchot Bechorot 6:4). Were this to be the case, he would not be required to give the presents to a priest.
14.
In this instance, the priest desires to expropriate the presents.
15.
I.e., we cannot obligate him to give the presents to a priest, because unlike the firstborn, the priest has no claim to the animal as a whole.
16.
It is exempt from the obligation to separate the presents as stated in Halachah 2.
17.
Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text differs slightly.
18.
In this instance, the priest desires to expropriate the presents.
19.
Because he knows that only one animal was consecrated and then disqualified.
20.
If, however, he slaughters a kosher wild animal (e.g., a deer) or a kosher fowl, he is not required to give the presents to the priest.
21.
More particularly, the Hebrew term seh can refer either to a sheep or a goat.
22.
For even though it is a hybrid, it is definitely a domesticated animal and hence, there is an obligation for presents to be given.
23.
Not only half.
24.
Generally - and indeed, this interpretation is indicated by the standard published text of Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13 - a ko'i is defined as: "a mixed species that comes from the mating of a kosher domesticated animal and a kosher wild beast." Accordingly, the Tur (Yoreh De'ah 61) questions the Rambam's ruling for it appears to contradict his own statements in the continuation of this halachah. Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh to the Mishneh Torah and his Beit Yosefto the Tur) explains that the Rambam understands the term ko'i as referring to an independent species that we do not know whether to classify as a domesticated animal or as a wild beast. He maintains that the proper version of Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot is "any animal whose classification as a domesticated animal or as a beast is doubtful is a ko'i" and he maintains that Hilchot Shechitah 14:4 serves as proof of this interpretation.
25.
Chulin 132a explains that since it is only part sheep, only part of the presents are granted. We do not take the species of the father of the animal into consideration.
26.
For, as in the previous law, we do not take the species of the father of the animal into consideration. Although this matter is not determined definitively, since "when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him," the priest cannot claim the presents definitively either (Siftei Cohen61:10).
27.
Presents need not be separated when an animal is killed without ritual slaughter - or when the ritual slaughter is performed improperly and the animal is forbidden to be eaten (Tosefta, Chulin9:1). Nevertheless, if the slaughter is performed properly, the presents must be given to a priest, regardless of the reason for which the animal was slaughtered. This is derived from a comparison to the covering of the blood after the slaughter of an animal (Ra'avad).
28.
The use of the plural term implies that the law applies even if there are many for whom the animal is being slaughtered (seeChulin 136a).
29.
For even though that produce must be destroyed at the appropriate time, while it is in a person's possession, it is his personal property. See Bechorot 12b.
30.
As above, when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him. And it is impossible for a priest to prove that the Levite is obligated.
From Chulin 131a, it is obvious that a Levite does not have the right to receive presents (Siftei Cohen 61:12).
31.
For now they are in the possession of the priest. He may therefore retain them, for the Levite cannot prove that he is exempt.
The Rambam's view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:23). The Rama maintains that since the law is that a priest is not entitled to take it, if he takes it by force, he is required to return it. This difference of opinion reflects a divergence on an issue of a greater scope. SeeHilchot Bechorot 5:3, where the Rambam rules that when there is a question concerning whether an animal is a firstborn or not, a priest is not permitted to take possession of it. If he takes possession of it, however, it is not expropriated from him. In that instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 315:1) follows the Rambam's approach and the Rama differs.
32.
That the priests are exempt from giving presents.
33.
During which he is allowed to keep the presents for himself.
34.
Since he sells the meat, he is acting on behalf of others and they are not absolved from the obligation of giving the presents. See the gloss of Rav Yosef Korcus who debates whether this is a Scriptural Law or a Rabbinic decree.
35.
See Hilchot Talmud Torah, ch. 6.
36.
We are speaking about a situation where the animal belongs entirely to the priest or the gentile. It is the ownership of the animal, not the identity of the slaughterer which is significant. Since neither the priest nor the gentile would be required to give these presents, a slaughterer who acts on their behalf is also exempt.
37.
Hence, if he does not give a priest the presents, people will suspect him of withholding them.
38.
And thus it is evident that they are partners.
39.
The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 61) differs with the Rambam, explaining Chulin 133a,b (the Rambam's source) differently. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam's interpretation (even though at the outset, he states that the interpretation of the Turappears more appropriate to the simple meaning of the passage. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:25), he follows the Tur's interpretation.
40.
And we nevertheless assume that the presents were in the gentile's portion.
41.
Rashi (in his commentary to Chulin 132a, the source for the Rambam's ruling) and similarly, theTur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:29) interpret this as referring to a sale and not a partnership agreement.
42.
Even if they were not marked [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:3)].
43.
The Radbaz explains that the rationale is that his stipulation runs contrary to the Torah - for the Torah requires that the presents be given - and whenever a person makes a stipulation that runs contrary to Torah law, the stipulation is nullified. Hence, it is as if the stipulation was never made and the priest's partner must separate the presents as stated in the previous halachah.
44.
The commentaries note an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Ma'aser 6:19 where he states:
When a priest sells a field to an Israelite and tells him: "[I am selling it] on the condition that the tithes from it belong to me forever," they belong to him. [The rationale is that] saying "on the condition that" is tantamount to setting aside for himself [the portion of the field] where the tithes [grow].
Although there are explicit Talmudic sources for both rulings, their logic appears contradictory. Among the resolutions offered is that here, the Rambam is speaking about the ownership of an animal, while in Hilchot Ma'aser, he is speaking about landed property and the principles of ownership are different in these two instances.
45.
The new concept taught by this halachah is that one can be exempt from part, but not all, of the presents.
46.
Because at that time, he was not obligated, as stated in Halachah 10.
47.
Hence, the convert may retain possession of the presents. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 8, Halachah 9, when a similar situation arises concerning challah, the Rambam rules that the convert is liable to separate the dough. Nevertheless, a distinction between the two can be made because of the severity of that prohibition.
48.
In which instance, it is forbidden to partake of the produce until the terumah and the tithes are separated.
49.
In contrast to the produce where the terumah and tithes must be separated from the produce as a whole.
50.
I.e., he has no legal obligation to make financial restitution. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro questions whether the person has a moral and spiritual obligation to make restitution and in hisShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:15), he rules that he does.
51.
There is no one priest who can claim that the presents are his and they must be returned to him, for until they are given, the owner has the right to give them to any priest he desires.
52.
I.e., the maw.
53.
For they belong to him.
54.
Since it was obvious that the maw was among the organs he purchased, the purchaser should have realized that it was not included in the price. Instead, he was paying him for the remainder of the meat (Kessef Mishneh).
55.
Since the maw did not belong to the butcher - for it must be given to the priest - he had no right to sell it (ibid.). See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4) which states that it is forbidden to buy the presents, because by doing so, one would be aiding theft.
56.
I.e., some of the organs that have to be given the priest.
57.
For we do not suspect that a person sinned. Instead, the recipient assumes that the sender purchased the presents from a priest; alternatively, there were no priests in the area and he followed the advice given in the following clause.
58.
And thus there is no one to give the presents to.
59.
For if he sets them aside, they will spoil. There is no difficulty in doing so, for the presents are not consecrated at all.
60.
See the notes of Rav Kapach to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4). There he writes that the original version of the Rambam's Commentary did not contain this law, but the later version did.
61.
For even a portion of the organs of an ox are of a significant size.
62.
The Turei Zahav 61:1 states that this is derived from the fact that the prooftext speaks of "the foreleg," i.e., the important one. An animal's foreleg is comprised of three bones. According to the Rambam, the lower two are given to the priest. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4).
63.
Chulin 134b states that one should take the jaw until the place where the animal is slaughtered. See the accompanying diagrams.
64.
This fat is forbidden to be eaten (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 7:6).
65.
Chulin 134b explains that this is an act of generosity on the part of the priests. Since the presents are their personal property without any sanctity at all, they can do with them as they see fit. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:4), however, it appears that this custom is not universally accepted.
66.
In Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:1 describes a challalah as a woman born from relations forbidden to the priesthood or a woman who is forbidden to the priesthood who engaged in relations with a priest.
67.
The term challal refers to the offspring of relations forbidden to a priest.
68.
Hence, just as the presents may not be given to a challal, they may not be given to a challalah.
The concept that challalim are not priests applies in many contexts. See Hilchot Nesiat Kapayim15:5, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:5, Hilchot Terumah 6:7, et al.
69.
The Siftei Cohen 61:5 states that a priest should not give or sell them to gentiles or feed them to dogs unless they are no longer fit for human consumption.
70.
The Rambam's source (Chulin 133a) mentions that the recipient of these presents must be a Torah scholar. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:14) also mention that point. Apparently, the Rambam thinks that it is not an absolute necessity.
71.
Once they are given to him, however, there are no restrictions on what he may do with them.
72.
Turei Zahav 61:12 states that this is derived from the word "and you shall give" in the prooftext. Implied is that the presents should be given. They should not be taken by the priests on their own initiative.
73.
See parallels in Hilchot Terumah 12:18.
74.
If, however, a priest prefers to eat them in another manner, he may. It is not an obligation to partake of them in the manner described (Tosafot, Chulin 132b).
75.
This verse does not speak about the presents of meat explicitly, but rather the portions of the sacrifices given to the priests. Nevertheless, the concepts can be derived one from the other. See Rashi, Chulin, loc. cit..

Bikkurim - Chapter 10

Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment to give a priest the first shearings [of an animal],1as [Deuteronomy 18:4] states: 'Give him the first shearings of your flock.' Levites are considered like Israelites with regard to this mitzvah.2 There is no minimum measure for these shearings according to Scriptural law. According to Rabbinical Law, one should not give less than a sixtieth. It applies only in Eretz [Yisrael],3 whether the Temple is standing or not like the first of the grain.4 It applies to ordinary animals, but not to consecrated ones.
Halacha 2
What is implied? A person consecrated animals for the Temple treasury5and then sheared them. Is he obligated to redeem them and give [the first shearings] to the priests? Or if one consecrated an animal with the exception of its shearings, is he obligated in the first shearings? It is written [ibid.]: "your sheep,' [i.e., the obligation applies only to "your sheep.'
Halacha 3
There is an obligation [to give a priest] the first shearing of any consecrated animals6 that possessed a permanent blemish before they were consecrated and were [then] redeemed.7 If, however, they were consecrated before they were blemished or it had a temporary blemish before it was consecrated,8 and afterwards, it received a permanent blemish and it was redeemed, it is exempt from the first shearing.9
Halacha 4
The only animals whose first shearings we are obligated [to give a priest] are sheep, both male and female, for their wool is fit [to make] garments. If their wool was stiff and not fit for [making] garments, they are exempt from the first shearings, for this present is given to the priest for the sole purpose of providing him with garments.10
Halacha 5
Since the Holy One, blessed be He, granted [a priest] the terumot which provide him with bread and wine11 and He granted him the presents of meat12and the sacrificial meat of the Temple for meat,13 He provided them with the first shearings for their garments and [restitution for property] stolen from a [childless] convert,14 devotion offerings,15 ancestral fields [that were consecrated and not redeemed],16 and the redemption of the firstborn,17for their expenses and for their other needs. [These are granted to the priests,] because they are not granted an ancestral portion of the land, nor a share in the spoils of war.18
Halacha 6
If [a sheep's] wool was [naturally] red, black, or brown, there is an obligation [to give the priest] the first shearings. If, however, the wool was shorn and dyed, before it was given [to a priest], he is exempt from the first shearings.19 If one bleached it before he gave it [to the priests], he is obligated to set [the wool] aside after he bleaches it.20 When a person pulls out the wool of ewes by hand instead of shearing it, he is obligated in the first shearings.
Halacha 7
There is an obligation [to separate] the first shearings from hybrids [of sheep],21ko'i,22 and a sheep that is mortally il1.23 If, however, one shears a dead sheep, he is exempt.24
Halacha 8
When a person sets aside the first shearings and they are lost, he is responsible to make restitution until he gives them to the priest.25
When a person says: 'Let all of my shearings be considered as the first shearings,' his words are of consequence.26
Halacha 9
A person who purchases the shearings of a gentile's sheep after the gentile has shorn them is exempt from the first shearings.27 When he purchases [the gentile's] sheep for their shearing,28 he is obligated even though the wool grew in the gentile's domain and the sheep are returned to the gentile after the shearing. Since the shearer is Jewish and the shearings belong to him, he is obligated. For the obligation takes effect only at the time of shearing.
Halacha 10
[The following laws apply when] a person purchases the shearings of a fellow Jew. If the seller left a portion of his sheep to shear,29 the seller is obligated to separate from [the shearing of] the remainder [the appropriate amount] for the entire [flock. This applies] even if the seller has not begun to shear [his sheep.30The rationale is that we operate under] the assumption that a person will not sell the presents to be given the priests.31 If [the seller] did not leave any [sheep to shear], the purchaser is obligated to separate [the first shearings].32
Halacha 11
[A different rule applies it] there are two types of shearings, e.g., white wool and brown wool, or wool from males and wool from females, and one sold one and retained possession of the other. Both [the purchaser and the seller] should give the first shearings, [the purchaser] on what he purchased and the seller on what he retained.33
Halacha 12
When a convert converts and he possesses sheep that are being shorn and it is not known whether they were shorn before he converted or after he converted, he is exempt. [The rationale is when] one desires to expropriate property from a colleague,34 the burden of proof is upon him.
Halacha 13
How many sheep must there be for [a flock] to be obligated for the first shearings? No less than five,35 provided their shearings is not less than the weight of 60 sela36 and the shearings of each one will not be less than the weight of 12 sela. If the shearings of one of them is less than the weight of twelve sela, [the flock] is exempt from the first shearing, even if [the wool of] the five of them weighs 60 selaim or more.
Halacha 14
Partners are obligated in [the mitzvah of] the first shearings, provided each one's share is equal to the minimum measure [mentioned above]. It: however, there are only five sheep belonging to two partners, they are exempt.37
Halacha 15
The mitzvah is to set aside the first shearing at the outset.38 If, however, one set it aside in the middle or at the end, he fulfilled his obligation.
When a person owns five sheep, but [did not shear them together, i.e.,] he had one shorn alone and sold its wool, and then had another shorn alone and sold its wool, and then a third, etc., all of these are combined [to obligate him in the mitzvah of] the first shearing,39 even if this takes place over the course of several years. He may separate from the new shearings for the old shearings and from [the shearings of] one type of sheep for another.40 If, however, he had one sheep, he sheared it and set aside its shearings, purchased a second sheep and set aside its shearings, [and continued doing so until he sheared five sheep], their shearings are not combined.41
Halacha 16
When a person has several shearings from the first shearings that he desired to divide among the priests, he should not give any priest less than the weight of five selaim of white wool, enough to make a small garment.
The intent is not that he should whiten it and give it to them. Instead, he should give each of them [at least enough] unrefined wool to produce five selaim42 or more of wool after it has been whitened. [This is derived from Deuteronomy 18:14:] 'Give it to him,' i.e., give him a significant present.
Halacha 17
The first shearings are ordinary property in every regard. Therefore, I maintain that they may be given to a woman of the priestly family even if she is married to an Israelite like the presents of meat.43 It appears to me that they are governed by the same laws.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 144) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 508) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
2.
I.e., as opposed to the presents described in the previous chapter, the Levites are required to separate these shearings.
3.
But not in the Diaspora. Thus it resembles terumah - for both are called "first" and hence share similarilities in many laws - and not the presents of meat. Although the Mishnah (Chulin 11:1) states that this mitzvah also applies in the Diaspora, according to the Rambam, the halachah does not follow that view.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 333:1) follows the Rambam's view. The Tur and the Rama state that theoretically, this mitzvah should also be observed in the Diaspora, but in practice, that view is not followed.
4.
I.e., terumah. See Hilchot Terumah 1:1.
5.
I.e., needless to say this law would apply if the animal was consecrated for the sake of sacrifice on the Altar, for in that instance, the animal is forbidden to be shorn and it is forbidden to work with it. Moreover, even if the animal is consecrated only for the sake of the Temple treasury, in which instance, it will ultimately be redeemed for personal use, since while it is consecrated, it is not "your sheep,' as the Rambam continues to explain, there is no obligation to give its first shearings.
6.
I.e., even if the animal was consecrated only for the sake of the Temple treasury, as above, these laws apply. The rationale is that a blemished kosher animal that is consecrated to the Temple treasury is redeemed with the intent to be used as a sacrifice.
7.
Since it was blemished at the time it was consecrated, the animal was never fit to be offered on the altar. Hence, the consecration never affected the actual physical substance of the animal. Accordingly, once it is redeemed, it is considered as an ordinary animal and its first shearings must be given to a priest
8.
Since the temporary blemish will be healed, it is considered as if did not exist.
9.
Since when consecrated, the animal was fit for sacrifice, the consecration affected its physical substance. Hence, even after it was redeemed, it is not considered as an ordinary animal and it is exempt from the first shearings. See the parallel in Chapter 9, Halachah2.
10.
Rav Yosef Corcus explains that the Rambam (based on one of the opinions in Chulin 137a) is referring to the priestly garments which are made from wool and linen. For, otherwise, goats' wool is also fit to make ordinary garments. This explanation is also quoted by Siftei Cohen 333:2. The intent is not, however, that the first shearings should be used only for priestly garments, for as the Rambam states in the following halachah, the first shearings were given to the priests for their personal garments.
11.
According to the Rambam, the terumot also include oil and other fruits.
12.
Described in Chapter 9.
13.
I.e., the portions of the sin offerings, guilt offerings, and peace offerings which are granted to the priests.
14.
See Hilchot Gezeilah, Chapter 8.
15.
See Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim, Chapter 6.
16.
Which becomes the property of the priests; see Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim4:19.
17.
See Chapters 11 and 12.
18.
See Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel, Chapter 13, with regard to both these points.
19.
He is considered to have acquired the wool because he made a significant change in its nature. This ruling applies after the fact. As an initial preference, it is forbidden to make such a change [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 11:3; Rav Kappach's edition)].
20.
For this is not considered as a significant change.
21.
The Radbaz explains that this law depends on the concept stated in Halachah 4: If the wool of a hybrid (the offspring of a sheep or a goat) is soft, the first shearings must be separated. If not, it is exempt.
22.
As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 9, Halachah 5, the Rambam understands the term ko'i as referring to an animal which our Sages were unable to classify as a domesticated animal or a wild beast.
23.
For the animal is alive at present and the removal of its wool is considered as shearing.
24.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that this is derived from the very definition of the mitzvah, 'the shearing of the sheep.' A dead sheep is not considered a sheep and cutting its wool is not considered as shearing.
25.
The Radbaz questions why the first shearings are different than all the other presents given to the priests where such a law is not found. He explains that the other presents involve grain and meat and a granary or a slaughter house are not located at a great distance from the residential area of a city. Hence, it is not very difficult for a priest to go and collect them. Sheep, by contrast, may not be allowed to pasture near residential areas. Hence, since it is far more difficult for a priest to collect them, the Torah made the owners responsible for the shearings.
26.
Chulin 136b notes that in this respect, although they are also called "the first," the first shearings are different from terumah and challah. With regard to these separations, if one designates his entire crop as terumah 0r his entire dough as challah, his statements are of no consequence. The Radbaz explains that the term terumah - and challah is also called terumah - implies elevating one portion of a group from another portion. Hence, there must always be something left behind. The term 'the first shearings' does not have such a connotation.
Rav Yosef Corcus notes that Chulin 136b associates this ruling with the Rabbi Ila'ai's opinion that the first shearing applies in the Diaspora as well as in Eretz Yisrael. Thus there is an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Halachah 1 that the mitzvah of the first shearing applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Rav Yosef explains that the Rambam's ruling in Halachah 1 is based on custom and not on the acceptance of the opinions that differ with Rabbi Ila'ai.
27.
This point is obvious. The Rambam (and his source, Chulin 138a) mention it only because of the contrast to the following laws. Rashi, however, interprets that passage differently. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 333:7) follows the Rambam's understanding, while the Tur and the Rama follow Rashi's view.
28.
I.e., he never becomes the real owner of the sheep; he acquires them only for the right to shear their wool.
29.
And that portion contains the minimum measure mentioned in Halachah 13.
30.
Since the seller has not begun shearing the sheep at all, it would seem reasonable to say that each person should give the first shearings from his portion. Nevertheless, the ruling is not so.
31.
And thus they remain in his portion. Selling these presents is prohibited and we assume that the person would not desire to transgress.
32.
Chulin 138a explains that the seller tells the purchaser: 'I did not sell you the first shearings. The money I took from you is for the remainder of the wool that is not the priest's portion. I merely gave you the opportunity to give the presents to the priest of your choice."
33.
Even though one may separate the first shearings from one type of wool for another type as evident from Halachah 15, in this instance, since the two types are owned by two separate people, each should separate the first shearings from his own wool.
34.
I.e., the priest desires to expropriate the first shearings from the owner. See the parallel in Chapter 9, Halachah 13. The Radbaz explains that this ruling follows the principle: When there is a doubt concerning a prohibition, we rule stringently. When there is a doubt concerning financial matters, we rule leniently.
35.
Chulin 11:1 derives this from a non-literal interpretation of II Samuel 25:18.
36.
sela is approximately 20 grams in contemporary measure.
Chulin 11:2 states that this measure is required, for only then will the gift to the priest be significant, for it will be possible to make a small garment from it.
37.
I.e., the Rambam follows the opinion (Chulin 135a) that the partnership is not recognized as a single entity. Hence, it is necessary for the share of each of the partners to comprise at least the minimum amount. The Kessef Mishneh notes the parallel to Chapter 6, Halachah 20.
38.
The Radbaz states that this is implied by the very term 'the first of.'
39.
Because at the time he sheared the first sheep, he possessed a flock of the minimum size. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 333: 12) states that this applies even if he sold some of his sheep after shearing them.
40.
One should not, however, separate the shearings of inferior sheep for those of superior sheep [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 333:12)].
41.
Because at the time he sheared the first sheep, he did not have a flock of the minimum size.
42.
Five selaim is 100 grams in contemporary measure. This measure of wool was sufficient to fashion a sash (avneit) for a priest (Chulin 138a).
43.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 20.

Bikkurim - Chapter 11

Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment1 for every Jewish man2 to redeem his son who is the firstborn of his Jewish mother, as [Exodus 34:19] states: "All first issues of the womb are mine" and [Numbers 18:15] states: "And you shall surely redeem a firstborn man."
Halacha 2
A woman is not obligated to redeem her son,3 for one who is obligated to redeem himself is obligated to redeem his son.4 If the father transgressed and did not redeem his son, when he comes of age,5 he is obligated to redeem himself.6
Halacha 3
If it is necessary to redeem both the person himself and his son, he should redeem himself first and then his son.7 If he only has enough [money] for one redemption, he should redeem himself.
Halacha 4
If [a father] had to redeem his son and the time arrived for him to make a festive pilgrimage [to Jerusalem] and he does not have the resources for both, he should redeem his son and then make the pilgrimage. [This is alluded to inExodus 34:20:] which states: "You shall redeem all your firstborn sons" and afterwards [continues]: "Do not behold My countenance8 emptyhanded."9
Halacha 5
A person who redeems his son should recite the blessing: "[Blessed are You...] who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning the redemption of a son."10 Afterwards, he recites the blessing Shehechiyanu11 and then gives12 [the money for] the redemption to the priest. If [a son] redeems himself, he should recite the blessing: "[Blessed... who commanded us] to redeem the firstborn"13 and he should recite the blessing Shehechiyanu.
Halacha 6
This mitzvah is practiced in every place and at all times.14 For how much should the son be redeemed? Five selaim,15 as [Numbers 18:16] states: "And those to be redeemed: from one month you shall redeem [according to the valuation of five silver shekalim]." [The redemption may be paid] in silver16 or in articles worth silver, i.e., movable property that is of financial worth like the shekalimare. Therefore one may not redeem [a firstborn] with landed property or with servants. Nor may promissory notes [be used], because they are not of inherent worth.17 If one redeemed a firstborn with these, he is not redeemed.18
Halacha 7
When a father writes to a priest that he is obligated to give him five selaim, the obligation takes effect,19 but the son is not redeemed.20If he gives him a utensil that is not worth five selaim in the market, but the priest accepts it as if he was given five selaim, the son is redeemed.21 If he divides the five selaim among ten priests,22 whether at once or one after the other, he fulfils his obligation.23
Halacha 8
If the priest desires to return [what was given for] the redemption to [the father], he may. He should not, however, give it to him with the intent that he return it. If he did so, and [the priest] returned it, his son is not redeemed.24 [Instead,] he must give it to him with the resolution that he is giving him a present without any reservations. Afterwards, if the priest desires to return it, he may return it.25Similarly, if he gives it to him as a present with the stipulation that it be returned, his son is redeemed.26
Halacha 9
The priests and the Levites are exempt from the redemption of their firstborn, as evident from a logical deduction: If they served as the redemption of the Israelites firstborn in the desert,27 certainly, they themselves are exempt.
Halacha 10
An Israelite who is born to a woman of the priestly or Levite family28is exempt, for this matter is not dependent on the father, but rather on the mother, 7as [indicated by the phrase]:29 "the first issue of the womb in Israel."
Halacha 11
When a woman of the Levite family was impregnated by a gentile, her son is exempt.30 If, however, a woman of the priestly family was impregnated by a gentile, her son is obligated,31 for his mother was disqualified from the priestly family because of relations with the gentile.32
Halacha 12
When a priest fathers a son who is a challal33 and the father dies within 30 days [of the son's birth], the son is obligated to redeem himself,34because the father did not acquire the redemption.35 If [the father] dies after 30 days [have passed], the son is not obligated to redeem himself, because the father acquired the redemption.36
Halacha 13
If a maidservant was freed - or a gentile woman converted - while she was pregnant and then she gave birth,37 since he was born in holiness,38 [the child] is obligated [to redeem himself] even though he was not conceived in holiness, as [indicated by] the phrase:39 "the first issue of the womb in Israel." For this child is the first issue of a womb in Israel. If it is not known whether the woman gave birth before she converted or afterwards,40 [we follow the principle:] When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.41
Halacha 14
When a gentile woman or a maidservant gave birth and then converted or was freed and then gave birth again, [the second child] is exempt,42 as [indicated by] the phrase "the first issue of the womb," and this is not [the woman's] first issue of the womb.43
Similar concepts apply when a son is born after a nefal.44 Whenever the mother is ritually impure due to birth because of a nefal,45a son born afterwards is not considered the first issue of the womb. Whenever a nefal does not cause the mother to be ritually impure due to birth,46 e.g., a woman who miscarries and the issue resembles a fish or a grasshopper,47 a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day [after conception],48 or the like, a son born afterwards is [under obligation] to the priesthood and must be redeemed.
Halacha 15
When a fetus in a woman's womb was cut up and removed limb by limb, a son born afterwards is not considered to be "the first issue of her womb."49 When the head of a fetus that was carried for eight months emerged alive50 and then was withdrawn back to the womb where it died - or the head of a stillborn fetus that was carried for nine moths emerged and then was withdrawn - and afterwards the [twin] brother [of the fetus] emerged as [a viable] birth, the viable birth is not considered the first issue of the womb, for [all subsequent births] became exempt with the [emergence of] the head of the first [fetus]. As soon as its forehead emerged, it exempted those born afterwards.51
Halacha 16
When a baby is born by Caesarian section, both it and the next birth are exempt: the first because it did not emerge from the womb,52 and the second, because it was preceded by another birth.53
Halacha 17
When does the obligation for redemption take effect? When the baby completes 30 days of life,54 as [Numbers 18:16] states: "And those to be redeemed should be redeemed from the age of a month." If the son died within the thirty days - even on the thirtieth day - or it became mortally ill,55 there is no obligation [to pay the priest] five selaim.56 If he gave the priest [the money for] the redemption beforehand, he should return it.57 If the baby died after its thirtieth day, the father is obligated to redeem him.58 If he did not give [the money to the priest], he should.
Halacha 18
[The following rules apply when] one redeems his son within 30 days of his birth: If he tells [the priest]: "I am redeeming him at this time," his son is not redeemed.59 If he tells him that [the gift should take effect] after 30 days, his son is redeemed even if the coins no longer exist after 30 days.60
Halacha 19
If there is a doubt whether a son is obligated to be redeemed or not, he is exempt. [The rationale is that when] one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.61 If a father dies within 30 days [of his son's birth], we operate under the assumption that the son was not redeemed unless he brings proof from his father that he redeemed him62 before he died. If the father died after 30 days [following the son's birth], we operate under the assumption that he was redeemed63 unless he informed us that he was not redeemed.64
Halacha 20
When a person's wife has never given birth and she gives birth to a male and a female, but it is not known which emerged first,65 there is no obligation to give the priest anything.66
If she gave birth to two males, even if it is not known which is the firstborn, [the father] must give five selaim to the priest.67 If one of them dies within 30 days, [the father] is exempt, [based on the principle, when] one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him].68 If the father died - whether he died within 30 days of the birth of his sons or afterwards, whether the sons divided his estate69 or not - five selaim should be given from the estate to the priest, because an obligation was already established upon the estate.
Halacha 21
[The following rules apply when a man has] two wives who have not yet given birth and they give birth to two sons and [the father] gives ten selaim to the priest [within 30 days of their birth].70 If one dies within 30 days and he had given [the ten selaim] to one priest, he should return five selaim to him.71 If he gave the money to two priests,72 he cannot expropriate the money from them, since he did not specify which son he is redeeming and each can tell him: "Have my colleague refund you."73
Halacha 22
When a man has two wives who have not given birth yet and they give birth to a male and a female or two males and a female [and it is not known which mother gave birth to which child and which is the order of the children's births], he should give five selaim to a priest. [The rationale is that] it is impossible that among them there will not be one male who is the first issue of the womb.74
Halacha 23
[In the above situation, if the women] give birth to two females and a male or two males and two females and it is not known which was born first, the priest is not entitled to anything. For [with regard to each mother], it is possible to say a female was born first and then a male.75
Halacha 24
[When a man has] two wives, one who has already given birth and one who has not yet given birth, and they give birth to two sons who become mixed together, he must give five selaim to a priest.76 If one of the sons dies within thirty days, the father is exempt.77 If the father died,78 five selaim should be paid from his estate.79
Halacha 25
[In the above situation, if the two wives] gave birth to a male and a female or two males and a female, the priest is not entitled to anything. For it is possible to say that the woman who did not give birth yet gave birth to a female first and then a male and the one who had given birth already gave birth to a male.80
Halacha 26
When there are two men who have wives who had not yet given birth and they both gave birth to males and they became mixed together,81 each father must give five selaim.
[The following rules apply if] they both gave [that amount] within thirty days and then one of the sons died within that time. If they gave the money to two priests, they cannot expropriate it from them.82 If they both gave it to the same priest, one should write a document giving power of attorney to the other and then the one with power of attorney should expropriate five selaim from the priest.83
Halacha 27
[In the above situation, if the women] gave birth to a male and a female and they became mixed together, the fathers are exempt84 and the son is obligated to redeem himself.85 Similar [laws apply when] a woman who has not given birth previously does not wait after [being divorced from] her [first] husband three months [before marrying] and gives birth [to a child, whose lineage is doubtful]. It is not known whether he is the first [husband's] son having been born after nine months or the last husband's son, having been born after seven. Both fathers are exempt86 and the son is obligated to redeem himself.87
Halacha 28
[In the above situation, if the women] gave birth to two females and a male or two females and two males, the priest is not entitled to anything.88
Halacha 29
[The following laws apply when] there are two wives of two men and one gave birth previously and one did not [and they gave birth and the infants became mixed together]. If they gave birth to two males, the father whose wife had not given birth previously must give five selaim to a priest.89 If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest does not receive anything.90
Halacha 30
[In the above situation, if the women] gave birth to two males and a female, the man whose wife had not given birth previously should give five selaim. The rationale is that his exemption implies a compounded doubt. For if his wife gave birth to a male only, he is obligated. And if she gave birth to a male and a female, he is obligated unless she gave birth to the female first. Since the probability of this is distant, he should give the money for the redemption.91
FOOTNOTES
1.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 80) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 392) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This obligation was established in commemoration of the slaying of the Egyptian firstborn before the Exodus.
2.
I.e., the obligation is incumbent on the baby's father, not his mother, as stated in the following halachah.
3.
The P'nei Meivin, Yoreh De'ah, Responsum 226, infers from the wording "a woman is not obligated," that she may do so if she desires. Eidut LiYisrael states that this is the common custom if the child does not have a father.
4.
The Rambam's wording implies that the obligation is incumbent on the son. Nevertheless, as a newborn, the son cannot fulfill it and so, the obligation becomes his father's. See the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 392), the Siftei Cohen 305:11, Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XI, p. 44ff., and others who debate whether the mitzvah is primarily the father's or the son's. This difference is not merely theoretical. Among the practical question that result is: If the father did not redeem the son until the son was thirteen, who has the fundamental responsibility to observe the mitzvah, the father or the son?
5.
13, at which age he is obligated to observe the mitzvot. See Minchat Chinuch, loc. cit., who discusses a situation where the son redeemed himself beforehand.
6.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 305:15) states that a silver plaque should be placed around the child's neck as a reminder that he has not been redeemed. See also Halachah 11. The Sifei Cohen305:20 states that this is not practical. In many instances, the silver plaque will become lost before the child comes of age and he will not be aware of the responsibility incumbent upon him. Instead, it is preferable that the redemption be performed by the Jewish court. Eidut LiYisrael also mentions that if the child's grandfather is alive, there are opinions that he should perform the redemption.
7.
For the mitzvah incumbent on his own person takes precedence (Kiddushin 29a,b).
8.
I.e., make a pilgrimage to the Temple to behold the Divine presence.
9.
Even though he could possibly redeem his son afterwards, and he will not be able to make this pilgrimage again, the redemption of his son takes precedence.
10.
This follows the Rambam's rulings in Hilchot Berachot 11:11 where he writes that a person who performs a mitzvah involving his own person should praise God who "commanded us to...." If the mitzvah involves others, by contrast, the blessing should conclude "commanded us concerning...." The commentaries, however, note that in ibid.:12 and in Hilchot Milah 3:1, the Rambam writes that one who circumcises his own son should recite the blessing concluding "to circumcise...," for the mitzvah is incumbent on his own person. Seemingly, this should also apply with regard to the redemption of a son.
It is possible to resolve the question as follows: The mitzvah of redeeming the son is primarily the child's/ Hence, the father uses the form "concerning...." The mitzvah of circumcision, by contrast, is primarily the father's. Hence he uses the form "to...."
11.
This blessing is recited as an expression of thanks whenever one performs a mitzvah infrequently (Hilchot Berachot 12:9). Even though one recited this blessing at the child's circumcision, it should be recited again at his redemption, for the two are separate mitzvot to be performed at separate times (Radbaz). Similarly, as an expression of thanks, it is customary to mark the redemption with a celebratory feast. This feast is considered a seudat mitzvah, a feast associated with a mitzvah.
12.
For the blessing should precede the observance of the mitzvah.
13.
For he is certainly performing a mitzvah involving himself. The Rambam's ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:10). The Tur and the Rama rule that even in such a situation, the conclusion of the blessing should be "...concerning the redemption of the firstborn."
14.
I.e., its observance is not limited to Eretz Yisrael, nor to the time when the Temple is standing.
15.
Shiurei Torah defines this as 101 or 96 grams of pure silver.
16.
We have translated kessef as "silver" and not "money" to allude to the concepts stated below.
17.
This includes not only promissory notes given by a particular individual, but also the fiat currencies of the present day, for such currency does not have any inherent value. In practice, silver coins are almost always used for the redemption of the firstborn.
18.
And he must be redeemed again.
19.
As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 11:15, when a person undertakes a financial obligation, even though according to law he was not liable, he is bound by his commitment.
20.
This applies even if he actually pays him the five selaim, for that money is being paid to satisfy the obligation he voluntarily undertook and not to discharge the obligation the Torah placed upon him (Bechorot 49b).
The Turei Zahav 305:2 and the Siftei Cohen 305:3 explain that according to Scriptural Law, the commitment is effective in redeeming the son. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that it is unacceptable lest a person attempt to redeem his son with promissory notes from other people.
21.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro debates this ruling at length and in his Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 305:5), he rules that the utensil must be worth five selaim to a person in a given situation. If, however, there is no way that it would be considered as worth five selaim, the son is not redeemed. The Turei Zahav 305:5 and the Siftei Cohen 305:5, however, maintain that the Rambam's words should be understood simply.
22.
Giving each a half-sela.
23.
The Pitchei Teshuvah 305:10 states that it is not desirable to redeem one's son in this manner. As an initial preference, one should give all five selaim to one priest, at one time.
24.
Since the father expected the present to be returned, it is as if he never really intended to give it to the priest (Bechorot, loc. cit., Radbaz). This applies only when the priest actually returns what he was given, for if he does not return it, we assume that after the fact, the father consents that the priest retain possession and as a result, the son is redeemed.
25.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:8) states that the priest should not frequently return what is given to him for the redemption. It should only be done occasionally, when the father is poor.
26.
A present given with the intent that it be returned is considered as a valid present (Kiddushin 6b). Thus the father's gift was within the limits of law. Hence, it is acceptable. In the first instance, by contrast, since the present was not given wholeheartedly, it is as if it was never given. Nevertheless, receiving the redemption as a present with the stipulation that it be returned is frowned upon by our Rabbis. The Shulchan Aruch describes a priest who does so as having "transgressed."
27.
See Numbers 3:45 which commands "Take the Levites in place of all the firstborn of the children of Israel."
28.
I.e., the father is an Israelite and thus the son is an Israelite.
29.
The commentaries have noted that there is no exact verse in the Torah that corresponds to the Rambam's wording. Similar phrases are found in Exodus 13:2 and Numbers 3:12.
30.
The identity of the father does not change the status of the mother or the child and it is just as if the child was from a Jewish father. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:3.
31.
I.e., he is obligated to redeem himself when he comes of age, for as stated in Halachah 2, there is no obligation for a woman to redeem her son. There are authorities who maintain that, in the present age, the Jewish court should redeem such children, for it is possible that when the child comes of age, he will not be aware of the mitzvah and will fail to observe it.
32.
Such relations - even if she is raped - caused her to be deemed a zonah and she is disqualified from the priestly family. Her children do not bear its holiness, nor does she have any of the rights granted to its members (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:1).
33.
The children born from relations between a priest and a woman forbidden because of the unique prohibitions incumbent upon the priests, as explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:3-6.
34.
I.e., if the son is the first issue of his mother's womb.
35.
I.e., were the father to have lived until the son was 30 days old, there would have been an obligation to redeem the child. Nevertheless, since the father was a priest - and the fact that he entered into a forbidden relationship does not disqualify him from the priesthood - it is considered as if he paid himself and the child was redeemed (Turei Zahav 305:17).
36.
Because he died after the obligation took effect, as indicated by Halachah 17.
37.
For the first time, as obvious from the following halachah.
38.
I.e., as a Jew.
39.
I.e., the father is an Israelite and thus the son is an Israelite.
40.
Implied is that we do not rely on her word alone.
41.
The priest is considered as if he desires to expropriate property - the five selaim of the redemption - from the child. Since the priest cannot prove that the child was born as an Israelite, the child is not obligated. See parallels in Chapter 9, Halachah 13, and Chapter 10, Halachah 12.
42.
As the Radbaz mentions, this child may be considered as the father's firstborn and receive a double share of his inheritance. Nevertheless, in this context, he is not considered as a firstborn.
43.
Even though it is her first Jewish child.
44.
A stillborn, aborted, or miscarried fetus.
45.
See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 10:1 which states: "Every woman who gives birth is impure like a niddah, even if she did not suffer uterine bleeding. [This applies whether] a woman gives birth to a living child or one which is stillborn, and even if she miscarries [and discharges a fetus]." The remainder of that chapter mentions different questionable circumstances involving such miscarriages.
46.
In the instances mentioned, the embryo that was miscarried is not given the halachic status of a fetus and none of the laws applying to childbirth apply.
47.
See ibid. 5:15.
48.
ibid. 10:2.
49.
Even though it was removed from the womb piece by piece, the mother is considered impure as if she gave birth (Ibid.:6) and the subsequent child is not considered as a firstborn.
50.
From the Rambam's wording, the commentaries have inferred that if the baby emerges dead, a boy born next is considered as the mother's firstborn. The rationale is that a baby born in the eighth month is considered as if it would never be a viable birth. This ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:23).
51.
For the emergence of the forehead is considered as birth in several halachic contexts (e.g.,Hilchot Nachalot 2:2).
52.
And the Torah obligated only the first issue of a woman's womb.
53.
These concepts also apply with regard to the definition of a firstborn with regard to the inheritance (ibid.:11).
54.
I.e., as soon as the thirty-first day begins. These days are counted from sunset to sunset and not from hour to hour. It is customary to redeem the son on his thirty-first day of life, because one should not delay the observance of a mitzvah. If, however, the thirty-first day is the Sabbath or a festival, the redemption is performed at the earliest possible opportunity afterwards.
55.
Treifah, the Hebrew term used by the Rambam, is interpreted as referring to an ailment that will cause the person to die within a year.
56.
For the obligation to redeem the child never took effect.
57.
For that gift is not effective in redeeming the child, as stated in the following halachah.
58.
When quoting this law, the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 305:12) states that the father must also recite the blessing for the redemption. He does not, however, recite the blessing Shehechiyanu.
59.
Because the obligation to redeem him has not taken effect. This ruling applies even if the coins remain in the priest's possession until after the thirtieth day. For the redemption to take effect, the priest must return the money to the father and then he must give it to him again. See Siftei Cohen305:18.
60.
There is a difference of opinion concerning this issue in the Talmud (Bechorot 49a,b). The Rambam's ruling follows the position of Shmuel, even though Rav differs and rules that the son is not redeemed. Although ordinarily, in such differences of opinion, the halachah follows Rav with regard to questions involving Torah prohibitions, in this instance, the Talmud explicitly states that the halachah follows Shmuel. There is, however, a question regarding the proper version of the Talmudic text and the Rambam's ruling does not follow the standard published version (Radbaz). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:13) quotes the Rambam's ruling, while the Rama rules that if the money no longer exists, the redemption is not effective.
61.
As explained above, the priest is considered as if he desires to expropriate property - the fiveselaim of the redemption - from the father. The rationale is based on the fact that the money is presently in possession of the father. There are commentaries who maintain that if the priest would seize the five selaim, he would be entitled to retain possession of them, because the father would now have to prove that he is not obligated and that is likewise impossible. They support this conclusion with the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Bechorot 5:3 that if there is an animal whose status is unclear and there is a doubt whether it is a firstborn, should a priest seize possession of it, we do not expropriate it from his property. Others, however, differentiate between the two instances, explaining that in Hilchot Bechorot, the priest has seized a specific entity concerning which an unresolved doubt exists. In this halachah, by contrast, although there is a question whether the father is under obligation to the priest, the money that the priest seizes definitely belongs to the father. Hence, it must be returned (Machaneh Ephrayim, Hilchot Zechiyah, sec. 8; see also Radbaz to Halachah 21).
62.
In the manner described at the conclusion of the previous halachah. This is an uncommon occurrence. Hence, unless there is specific knowledge that the father redeemed him in this manner, we assume he did not.
63.
For we assume that the person fulfilled the mitzvah incumbent upon him at the earliest possible opportunity.
64.
I.e., he made such statements on his deathbed [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:14)].
65.
Thus there is a question whether the son must be redeemed or not, for if the female emerged first, the son need not be redeemed.
66.
Since there is a doubt concerning the obligation, the burden of proof is on the priest, as stated in Halachah 19. Not only does this apply with regard to the father, the son is under no obligation to redeem himself when he comes of age. This is the underlying principle governing many of the situations described in the following halachot.
67.
For one of his sons is certainly a firstborn and hence, he is required to redeem him. Although the father does not know which of his sons he is redeeming, he is obligated to perform the redemption (Radbaz).
68.
For the father can claim that the son who died was the firstborn and since he died within 30 days of his birth, there is no obligation to redeem him, as stated in Halachah 17.
69.
In which case, each of the sons could argue that perhaps the other was in fact the firstborn and hence, he is not required to give toward the redemption. This ruling represents a reversal of the Rambam's opinion from his ruling in his final version of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot8:3). [Apparently, the issue was one that the Rambam debated back and forth, because his earlier version of that text does not mention an exemption.] The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:265) quotes the Rambam's ruling here. The Tur and the Siftei Cohen 305:30 rule that the sons are exempt if the father died before the passage of the 30 days. The rationale they give is that each of the sons can claim that the obligation is on the other.
70.
For their redemption in the maaner stated in Halachah 18.
71.
For there is no obligation to redeem a son who died before he reaches the age of 30 days.
72.
Giving each five selaim for one of the sons, without specifying which one.
73.
I.e., each priest can maintain that he received the redemption for the son that is alive and it is the other priest who is required to return the funds.
74.
In the second instance, however, he need not redeem both sons, because it is possible that his daughter's birth preceded the birth of one of them. Thus with regard to that child, we follow the principle stated in Halachah 19.
75.
Although two mothers and two pairs of children are involved, the situation is abstractly the same as that described in Halachah 20.
76.
For the woman who had not given birth previously obviously gave birth to a firstborn son. The fact that his identity is unknown is not significant.
77.
Because it is possible that the firstborn died and therefore, there is no obligation if he dies within thirty days of his birth.
78.
Whether within 30 days of the sons' birth or afterwards, as in Halachah 20. See, however, note 68.
79.
Although the entire sum could not be expropriated from either of the sons - for each one could claim that it is the other who is liable - it can be expropriated from the estate. For the father was certainly obligated and that obligation is transferred to his estate.
80.
The commentaries question the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that seemingly the instance here is analogous to the case described in Halachah 30. What difference does it make if the two women mentioned are the wives of one man or two? The Radbaz explains that since we are speaking about one man with two wives and one is exempt, we assume that the exemption will continue unless it is indicated otherwise.
81.
So that it was not known which woman was the mother of which child.
82.
For, as in Halachah 21, each priest can claim that he received the redemption for the son who is presently alive.
83.
The priest owes one of the two five selaim, but there is no way of determining which one. Thus if each approached him and demanded money individually, he could avoid paying, claiming that the father must prove that it was his son that died. When, however, he is approached by the two fathers in a single claim, he has no recourse other than to pay [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:5)].
84.
Because there is no way it can be proven who is the father of the male and thus responsible for his redemption.
85.
I.e., when he attains majority. For there is no question that he is a firstborn (Turei Zahav 305:23).
86.
The priest owes one of the two five selaim, but there is no way of determining which one. Thus if each approached him and demanded money individually, he could avoid paying, claiming that the father must prove that it was his son that died. When, however, he is approached by the two fathers in a single claim, he has no recourse other than to pay [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:5)].
87.
Because there is no way it can be proven who is the father of the male and thus responsible for his redemption.
88.
Because it is impossible to prove that a male was born first. See Halachah 23. From the Rambam's wording, it could be inferred that different rules apply when the women gave birth to two males and one female. It would appear that according to the Rambam, each of the males would have to redeem himself when he comes of age. The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 305) rules that in such a situation, the sons are exempt. See Turei Zahav 305:24.
89.
Even though the identity of his son is not firmly established, his wife definitely gave birth to a firstborn son and he is obligated to redeem him.
90.
For there is no way of proving that the woman who had not given birth previously was the mother of the male. Hence, the exemption is granted not only to the father, but also to the son when he comes of age.
91.
More specifically, there are five possibilities regarding this situation:
a) the woman who had not given birth before gave birth to one male (and the other woman gave birth to a male and a female);
b) she gave birth to two males (and the other woman gave birth to a female);
c) she gave birth to a male and then a female (and the other woman gave birth to a male);
d) she gave birth to a female and then a male (and the other woman gave birth to a male);
e) she gave birth to a female (and the other woman gave birth to two males).
Since her husband would be obligated in the first three of this situations, he is considered as obligated, because of the higher probability.
As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 25, there is a difference of opinion among the commentaries with regard to the rulings in the two halachot. The Ra'avad reverses the Rambam's ruling in both instances, maintaining that here, the father is exempt and there, he is obligated. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:31) rule that he is exempt in both instances. These differences of opinion depend on textual differences in the versions of Bechorot 49a and differences in the interpretation of that passage.
Hayom Yom:
• Tuesdaay, 
Iyar 16, 5775 · 05 May 2015
Iyar 16, 31st day of the omer
Torah lessons: Chumash: B'har, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 79-82.
Tanya: But His blessed (p. 255)..as is explained elsewhere. (p. 255).
After my father pared his nails, he would place a small piece of wood among them before burning them.
In terms of scholarship and aptitude the Chassid Reb Elyeh Abeler was a simple man. Once, when he came into yechidus, my grandfather said to him: "Elyeh, I envy you. You travel to various fairs, you meet many people. Sometimes, in the middle of a business transaction, you get into a warm discussion about a Jewish saying, a saying from theEin Yakov etc., and you arouse the other fellow's interest in studying nigleh (Talmud,halacha etc.) and Chassidus. This causes joy On High, and the A-lmighty rewards such "trade" with the blessings of children, health and sustenance; the larger the fair the more work there is and the greater is the livelihood earned."

Daily Thought:
Female Redeeming Power
When you look carefully into the story of the Exodus, you see that the true redeeming force was the faith of the women.
Today, history is repeating itself.
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