Today in Jewish History:
• First New York Synagogue (1728)
In 1684, a group of Spanish and Portuguese Jews who fled the Inquisition (see "Today in Jewish History" for Tevet 22) held a Rosh Hashanah service in New Amsterdam, thereby founding congregation Shearith Israel ("Remnant of Israel"). On this 17th of Tevet in 1728, the congregation purchased a lot in Lower Manhattan to erect the first synagogue in New York.
• Passing of Toldot Aaron (1754)
Rabbi Aaron Zelig ben Joel Feivush of Ostrog, Russia, author of Toldot Aaron, passed away on Tevet 17 of the year in 5515 from creation (1754).
• Passing of Maggid of Dubna (1841)
Tevet 17 is also the yahrtzeit of Rabbi Yaakov Wolf Krantz (1740-1804), the Maggid (itinerant preacher) of Dubna, particularly known for the parables (meshalim) he employed in his sermons and writings.
Daily Quote:
Even when I walk in the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for You are with me[Psalms 23:4]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Shemot, 3rd Portion Exodus 2:11-2:25 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Exodus Chapter 2
11Now it came to pass in those days that Moses grew up and went out to his brothers and looked at their burdens, and he saw an Egyptian man striking a Hebrew man of his brothers. יאוַיְהִ֣י | בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֗ם וַיִּגְדַּ֤ל משֶׁה֙ וַיֵּצֵ֣א אֶל־אֶחָ֔יו וַיַּ֖רְא בְּסִבְלֹתָ֑ם וַיַּרְא֙ אִ֣ישׁ מִצְרִ֔י מַכֶּ֥ה אִֽישׁ־עִבְרִ֖י מֵֽאֶחָֽיו:
Moses grew up: Was it not already written: The child grew up ? Rabbi Judah the son of Rabbi Ilai said: The first one (וַיִּגְדַּל) [was Moses growth] in height, and the second one [was his growth] in greatness, because Pharaoh appointed him over his house. [From Tanchuma Buber, Va’era 17] ויגדל משה: והלא כבר כתיב ויגדל הילד (פסוק י) אמר רבי יהודה ברבי אלעאי הראשון לקומה והשני לגדולה, שמינהו פרעה על ביתו:
and looked at their burdens: He directed his eyes and his heart to be distressed over them. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:27] וירא בסבלתם: נתן עיניו ולבו להיות מיצר עליהם:
an Egyptian man: He was a taskmaster appointed over the Israelite officers. He would wake them when the rooster crowed, [to call them] to their work. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:28] איש מצרי: נוגש היה, ממונה על שוטרי ישראל והיה מעמידם מקרות הגבר למלאכתם:
striking a Hebrew man: He was lashing and driving him, and he [the Hebrew man] was the husband of Shelomith the daughter of Dibri [who was mentioned in Lev. 24:10], and he [the taskmaster] laid his eyes on her. So he woke him [the Hebrew] at night and took him out of his house, and he [the taskmaster] returned and entered the house and was intimate with his wife while she thought that he was her husband. The man returned home and became aware of the matter. When that Egyptian saw that he had become aware of the matter, he struck [him] and drove him all day [From Exod. Rabbah 1:28] מכה איש עברי: מלקהו ורודהו. ובעלה של שלומית בת דברי היה, ונתן בה עיניו, ובלילה העמידו והוציאו מביתו, והוא חזר ונכנס לבית ובא על אשתו, כסבורה שהוא בעלה, וחזר האיש לביתו והרגיש בדבר, וכשראה אותו מצרי שהרגיש בדבר, היה מכהו ורודהו כל היום:
12He turned this way and that way, and he saw that there was no man; so he struck the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. יבוַיִּ֤פֶן כֹּה֙ וָכֹ֔ה וַיַּ֖רְא כִּ֣י אֵ֣ין אִ֑ישׁ וַיַּךְ֙ אֶת־הַמִּצְרִ֔י וַיִּטְמְנֵ֖הוּ בַּחֽוֹל:
He turned this way and that way: He saw what he [the Egyptian] had done to him [the Hebrew] in the house and what he had done to him in the field (Exod. Rabbah 1:28). But according to its simple meaning, it is to be interpreted according to its apparent meaning, i.e., he looked in all directions and saw that no one had seen him slay the Egyptian. [ ויפן כה וכה: ראה מה עשה לו בבית ומה עשה לו בשדה. ולפי פשוטו כמשמעו:
and he saw that there was no man: [I.e., he saw that] there was no man destined to be descended from him [the Egyptian] who would become a proselyte [i.e., a convert]. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:29] וירא כי אין איש: עתיד לצאת ממנו שיתגייר:
13He went out on the second day, and behold, two Hebrew men were quarreling, and he said to the wicked one, "Why are you going to strike your friend?" יגוַיֵּצֵא֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַשֵּׁנִ֔י וְהִנֵּ֛ה שְׁנֵֽי־אֲנָשִׁ֥ים עִבְרִ֖ים נִצִּ֑ים וַיֹּ֨אמֶר֙ לָֽרָשָׁ֔ע לָ֥מָּה תַכֶּ֖ה רֵעֶֽךָ:
two Hebrew men were quarreling: Dathan and Abiram. They were the ones who saved some of the manna [when they had been forbidden to leave it overnight, as in Exod. 16:19, 20]. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:29] שני אנשים עברים: דתן ואבירם הם שהותירו מן המן:
quarreling: Heb. נִצִּים, fighting. נצים: מריבים:
Why are you going to strike: Although he had not struck him, he is called wicked for [merely] raising his hand [to strike him]. [From Sanh. 58b] [ למה תכה: אף על פי שלא הכהו, נקרא רשע בהרמת יד:
your friend: A wicked man like you. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:29] רעך: רשע כמותך:
14And he retorted, "Who made you a man, a prince, and a judge over us? Do you plan to slay me as you have slain the Egyptian?" Moses became frightened and said, "Indeed, the matter has become known!" ידוַיֹּ֠אמֶר מִ֣י שָֽׂמְךָ֞ לְאִ֨ישׁ שַׂ֤ר וְשֹׁפֵט֙ עָלֵ֔ינוּ הַֽלְהָרְגֵ֨נִי֙ אַתָּ֣ה אֹמֵ֔ר כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֥ר הָרַ֖גְתָּ אֶת־הַמִּצְרִ֑י וַיִּירָ֤א משֶׁה֙ וַיֹּאמַ֔ר אָכֵ֖ן נוֹדַ֥ע הַדָּבָֽר:
Who made you a man: You are still a youth. [From Tanchuma, Shemoth 10] מי שמך לאיש: והרי עודך נער:
Do you plan to slay me: lit., Do you say to slay me. From here we learn that he slew him with the ineffable Name. [From Tanchuma, Shemoth 10] הלהרגני אתה אמר: מכאן אנו למדים שהרגו בשם המפורש:
Moses became frightened: [To be explained] according to its simple meaning [that Moses was afraid Pharaoh would kill him]. Midrashically, it is interpreted to mean that he was worried because he saw in Israel wicked men [i.e.,] informers. He said, Since this is so, perhaps they [the Israelites] do not deserve to be redeemed [from slavery]. [From Tanchuma, Shemoth 10] ויירא משה: כפשוטו. ומדרשו דאג לו על שראה בישראל רשעים דלטורין, אמר מעתה שמא אינם ראויין להגאל:
Indeed, the matter has become known: [To be interpreted] according to its apparent meaning [that it was known that he had slain the Egyptian]. Its midrashic interpretation, however, is: the matter I was wondering about, [i.e.,] why the Israelites are considered more sinful than all the seventy nations [of the world], to be subjugated with back-breaking labor, has become known to me. Indeed, I see that they deserve it. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:30] אכן נודע הדבר: כמשמעו. ומדרשו נודע לי הדבר שהייתי תמה עליו, מה חטאו ישראל מכל שבעים אומות להיות נרדים בעבודת פרך, אבל רואה אני שהם ראויים לכך:
15Pharaoh heard of this incident, and he sought to slay Moses; so Moses fled from before Pharaoh. He stayed in the land of Midian, and he sat down by a well. טווַיִּשְׁמַ֤ע פַּרְעֹה֙ אֶת־הַדָּבָ֣ר הַזֶּ֔ה וַיְבַקֵּ֖שׁ לַֽהֲרֹ֣ג אֶת־משֶׁ֑ה וַיִּבְרַ֤ח משֶׁה֙ מִפְּנֵ֣י פַרְעֹ֔ה וַיֵּ֥שֶׁב בְּאֶֽרֶץ־מִדְיָ֖ן וַיֵּ֥שֶׁב עַל־הַבְּאֵֽר:
Pharaoh heard: They informed on him. וישמע פרעה: הם הלשינו עליו:
and he sought to slay Moses: He delivered him to the executioner to execute him, but the sword had no power over him. That is [the meaning of] what Moses said, “and He saved me from Pharaoh’s חֶרֶב ” (Exod. 18:4). [From Mechilta, Yithro 1, Exod. Rabbah 1:321] ויבקש להרג את משה: מסרו לקוסטינר להרגו, ולא שלטה בו החרב, הוא שאמר משה (יח ד) ויצילני מחרב פרעה:
(He stayed in the land of Midian: Heb. וַיֵּשֶׁב, he tarried there, like Jacob dwelt וַיֵּשֶׁב (Gen. 37:1).) וישב בארץ מדין: נתעכב שם, כמו (בראשית לז א) וישב יעקב:
and he sat down by a well: Heb. וַיֵּשֶׁב, an expression of sitting. He learned from Jacob, who met his mate at a well. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:32, Tanchuma, Shemoth 10] [The comment on the sentence He stayed in the land of Midian does not appear in some editions of Rashi. Therefore, it is enclosed within parentheses. The first sentence of the second paragraph does not appear in the Miraoth Gedoloth. It does, however, appear in all other editions of Rashi. Perhaps it was unintentionally omitted. Rashi intends here to differentiate between the first וַיֵּשֶׁב and the second וַיֵּשֶׁב He explains that the first וַיֵּשֶׁב means staying, residing, or tarrying, signifying that Moses resided in Midian. The second וַיֵּשֶׁב denotes, literally, sitting, meaning that Moses sat down by a well. The Sages of the midrashim teach us that Moses sat there intentionally, for he expected to meet his mate, just as Jacob had met Rachel and Eliezer had met Rebecca when he sought a mate for Isaac. Otherwise, Moses would not have sat by the well simply to watch how the flocks were being watered.] וישב על הבאר: לשון ישיבה, למד מיעקב שנזדווג לו זווגו על הבאר:
16Now the chief of Midian had seven daughters, and they came and drew [water], and they filled the troughs to water their father's flocks. טזוּלְכֹהֵ֥ן מִדְיָ֖ן שֶׁ֣בַע בָּנ֑וֹת וַתָּבֹ֣אנָה וַתִּדְלֶ֗נָה וַתְּמַלֶּ֨אנָה֙ אֶת־הָ֣רְהָטִ֔ים לְהַשְׁק֖וֹת צֹ֥אן אֲבִיהֶֽן:
Now the chief of Midian had: Heb. וּלְכֹהֵן מִדְיָן, i.e., the most prominent among them. He had abandoned idolatry, so they banned him from [living with] them. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:32, Tanchuma, Shemoth 11] ולכהן מדין: רב שבהן ופירש לו מעבודה זרה ונידוהו מאצלם:
the troughs: Pools of running water, made in the ground. את הרהטים: את בריכות מרוצת המים העשויות בארץ:
17But the shepherds came and drove them away; so Moses arose and rescued them and watered their flocks. יזוַיָּבֹ֥אוּ הָֽרֹעִ֖ים וַיְגָֽרְשׁ֑וּם וַיָּ֤קָם משֶׁה֙ וַיּ֣וֹשִׁעָ֔ן וַיַּ֖שְׁקְ אֶת־צֹאנָֽם:
and drove them away: because of the ban. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:32, Tanchuma, Shemoth 11] ויגרשום: מפני הנידוי:
18They came to their father Reuel, and he said, "Why have you come so quickly today?" יחוַתָּבֹ֕אנָה אֶל־רְעוּאֵ֖ל אֲבִיהֶ֑ן וַיֹּ֕אמֶר מַדּ֛וּעַ מִֽהַרְתֶּ֥ן בֹּ֖א הַיּֽוֹם:
19They replied, "An Egyptian man rescued us from the hand[s] of the shepherds, and he also drew [water] for us and watered the flocks." יטוַתֹּאמַ֕רְןָ אִ֣ישׁ מִצְרִ֔י הִצִּילָ֖נוּ מִיַּ֣ד הָֽרֹעִ֑ים וְגַם־דָּלֹ֤ה דָלָה֙ לָ֔נוּ וַיַּ֖שְׁקְ אֶת־הַצֹּֽאן:
20He said to his daughters, "So where is he? Why have you left the man? Invite him, and let him eat bread." כוַיֹּ֥אמֶר אֶל־בְּנֹתָ֖יו וְאַיּ֑וֹ לָ֤מָּה זֶּה֙ עֲזַבְתֶּ֣ן אֶת־הָאִ֔ישׁ קִרְאֶ֥ן ל֖וֹ וְיֹ֥אכַל לָֽחֶם:
Why have you left the man: He recognized him [Moses] as being of the seed of Jacob, for the water rose toward him. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:32, Tanchuma Shemoth 11] למה זה עזבתן: הכיר בו שהוא מזרעו של יעקב, שהמים עולים לקראתו:
and let him eat bread: Perhaps he will marry one of you, as it is said: except the bread that he ate (Gen. 39:6) [alluding to Potiphar’s wife]. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:32, Tanchuma, Shemoth 11] ויאכל לחם: שמא ישא אחת מכם, כמה דאת אמרת (בראשית לט ו) כי אם הלחם אשר הוא אוכל:
21Moses consented to stay with the man, and he gave his daughter Zipporah to Moses. כאוַיּ֥וֹאֶל משֶׁ֖ה לָשֶׁ֣בֶת אֶת־הָאִ֑ישׁ וַיִּתֵּ֛ן אֶת־צִפֹּרָ֥ה בִתּ֖וֹ לְמשֶֽׁה:
consented: Heb. וַיּוֹאֶל, as the Targum [Onkelos] renders: (וּצְבִי), and similar to this: Accept (הוֹאֶל) now and lodge (Jud. 19:6); Would that we had been content (הוֹאַלְנוּ) (Josh. 7:7); Behold now I have desired (הוֹאַלְךְתִּי) (Gen. 18:31). Its midrashic interpretation is: וַיּוֹאֶל is] an expression of an oath (אלה), he [Moses] swore to him that he would not move from Midian except with his consent. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:33, Tanchuma, Shemoth 12] ויואל: כתרגומו. ודומה לו (שופטים יט ו) הואל נא ולין, ולו הואלנו (יהושע ז ז), הואלתי לדבר (בראשית יח כז), ומדרשו לשון אלה, נשבע לו שלא יזוז ממדין כי אם ברשותו:
22She bore a son, and he named him Gershom, for he said, "I was a stranger in a foreign land." כבוַתֵּ֣לֶד בֵּ֔ן וַיִּקְרָ֥א אֶת־שְׁמ֖וֹ גֵּֽרְשֹׁ֑ם כִּ֣י אָמַ֔ר גֵּ֣ר הָיִ֔יתִי בְּאֶ֖רֶץ נָכְרִיָּֽה:
23Now it came to pass in those many days that the king of Egypt died, and the children of Israel sighed from the labor, and they cried out, and their cry ascended to God from the labor. כגוַיְהִי֩ בַיָּמִ֨ים הָֽרַבִּ֜ים הָהֵ֗ם וַיָּ֨מָת֙ מֶ֣לֶךְ מִצְרַ֔יִם וַיֵּאָֽנְח֧וּ בְנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֛ל מִן־הָֽעֲבֹדָ֖ה וַיִּזְעָ֑קוּ וַתַּ֧עַל שַׁוְעָתָ֛ם אֶל־הָֽאֱלֹהִ֖ים מִן־הָֽעֲבֹדָֽה:
Now it came to pass in those many days: that Moses sojourned in Midian, that the king of Egypt died, and Israel required a salvation, and Moses was pasturing, and a salvation came through him. Therefore, these sections were juxtaposed [i.e., the section dealing with the king of Egypt’s affliction, and that dealing with Moses pasturing flocks]. [From an old Rashi] ויהי בימים הרבים ההם: שהיה משה גר במדין, וימת מלך מצרים והוצרכו ישראל לתשועה. ומשה היה רועה וגו' (ג א) ובאת תשועה על ידו, ולכך נסמכו פרשיות הללו:
that the king of Egypt died: He was stricken (נִצְטָרַע), and he would slaughter Israelite infants and bathe in their blood. [From Exod. Rabbah 1:34] וימת מלך מצרים: נצטרע והיה שוחט תינוקות ישראל ורוחץ בדמם:
24God heard their cry, and God remembered His covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob. כדוַיִּשְׁמַ֥ע אֱלֹהִ֖ים אֶת־נַֽאֲקָתָ֑ם וַיִּזְכֹּ֤ר אֱלֹהִים֙ אֶת־בְּרִית֔וֹ אֶת־אַבְרָהָ֖ם אֶת־יִצְחָ֥ק וְאֶת־יַֽעֲקֹֽב:
their cry: Heb. נַאִקָתָם, their cry, similar to From the city, people groan (יִנְאָקוּ) (Job 24:12). נאקתם: צעקתם, וכן (איוב כד יב) מעיר מתים ינאקו:
His covenant with Abraham: Heb. אֶת אַבְרָהָם, the equivalent of עִם אַבְרָהָם, with Abraham. את בריתו את אברהם: עם אברהם:
25And God saw the children of Israel, and God knew. כהוַיַּ֥רְא אֱלֹהִ֖ים אֶת־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וַיֵּ֖דַע אֱלֹהִֽים:
He focused His attention [lit., He set His heart] upon them: and did not conceal His eyes from them. וידע א-להים: נתן עליהם לב ולא העלים עיניו:
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Daily Tehillim: Chapters 83 - 87
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 83
• English text• Chapter 83
A prayer regarding the wars against Israel in the days of Jehoshaphat, when the nations plotted against Israel.
1. A song, a psalm by Asaph.
2. O God, do not be silent; do not be quiet and do not be still, O God.
3. For behold, Your enemies are in uproar, and those who hate You have raised their head.
4. They plot deviously against Your nation, and conspire against those sheltered by You.
5. They say, "Come, let us sever them from nationhood, and the name of Israel will be remembered no more.”
6. For they conspire with a unanimous heart, they made a covenant against You-
7. the tents of Edom and the Ishmaelites, Moab and the Hagrites,
8. Geval and Ammon, and Amalek; Philistia with the inhabitants of Tyre.
9. Assyria, too, joined with them, and became the strength of the sons of Lot, Selah.
10. Do to them as to Midian; as to Sisera and Yavin at the brook of Kishon,
11. who were destroyed at Ein Dor, and were as dung for the earth.
12. Make their nobles like Orev and Ze'ev, all their princes like Zevach and Tzalmuna,1
13. who said, "Let us inherit the dwellings of God for ourselves.”
14. My God, make them like whirling chaff, like straw before the wind.
15. As a fire consumes the forest, and a flame sets the mountains ablaze,
16. so pursue them with Your tempest and terrify them with Your storm.
17. Fill their faces with shame, and they will seek Your Name, O Lord.
18. Let them be shamed and terrified forever; let them be disgraced and perish.
19. And they will know that You, Whose Name is the Lord, are alone, Most High over all the earth.
FOOTNOTES
1.These were the Midianite leaders who were captured (see Judges 7:25)
Chapter 84
In this psalm of prayers and entreaties, the psalmist mourns bitterly over the destruction of Temple from the depths of his heart, and speaks of the many blessings that will be realized upon its restoration. Fortunate is the one who trusts it will be rebuilt, and does not despair in the face of this long exile.
1. For the Conductor, on the gittit,1 a psalm by the sons of Korach.
2. How beloved are Your dwellings, O Lord of Hosts!
3. My soul yearns, indeed it pines, for the courtyards of the Lord; my heart and my flesh [long to] sing to the living God.
4. Even the bird has found a home, and the swallow a nest for herself, where she lays her young on the [ruins of] Your altars, O Lord of Hosts, my King and my God.
5. Fortunate are those who dwell in Your House; they will yet praise You forever.
6. Fortunate is the man whose strength is in You; the paths [to the Temple] are in his heart.
7. For those who pass through the Valley of Thorns, He places wellsprings; their guide will be cloaked in blessings.2
8. They go from strength to strength; they will appear before God in Zion.
9. O Lord, God of Hosts, hear my prayer; listen, O God of Jacob, forever.
10. See our shield,3 O God, and look upon the face of Your anointed one.
11. For better one day in Your courtyards than a thousand [elsewhere]. I would rather stand at the threshold of the house of my God, than dwell [in comfort] in the tents of wickedness.
12. For the Lord, God, is a sun and a shield; the Lord bestows favor and glory; He does not withhold goodness from those who walk in innocence.
13. O Lord of Hosts! Fortunate is the man who trusts in You.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument crafted in Gath (Metzudot).
2.God provides water for the pilgrims to Jerusalem, leading them to bless their guides for choosing a water-laden route (Metzudot)
3.Remember the Temple [and rebuild it](Metzudot).
Chapter 85
In this prayer, lamenting the long and bitter exile, the psalmist asks why this exile is longer than the previous ones, and implores God to quickly fulfill His promise to redeem us. Every individual should offer this psalm when in distress.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by the sons of Korach.
2. O Lord, You favored Your land; You returned the captives of Jacob.
3. You forgave the iniquity of Your people, and covered all their sin forever.
4. You withdrew all Your fury, and retreated from Your fierce anger.
5. Return us, O God of our salvation, and annul Your anger toward us.
6. Will You forever be angry with us? Will You draw out Your anger over all generations?
7. Is it not true that You will revive us again, and Your people will rejoice in You?
8. Show us Your kindness, O Lord, and grant us Your deliverance.
9. I hear what the Almighty Lord will say; for He speaks peace to His nation and to His pious ones, and they will not return to folly.
10. Indeed, His deliverance is near those who fear Him, that [His] glory may dwell in the land.
11. Kindness and truth have met; righteousness and peace have kissed.
12. Truth will sprout from the earth, and righteousness will peer from heaven.
13. The Lord, too, will bestow goodness, and our land will yield its produce.
14. Righteousness shall walk before him, and he shall set his footsteps in [its] path.
Chapter 86
This psalm contains many prayers regarding David's troubles, and his enemies Doeg and Achitophel. It also includes many descriptions of God's praise. Every individual can offer this psalm when in distress.
1. A prayer by David. Lord, turn Your ear, answer me, for I am poor and needy.
2. Guard my soul, for I am pious; You, my God, deliver Your servant who trusts in You.
3. Be gracious to me, my Lord, for to You I call all day.
4. Bring joy to the soul of Your servant, for to You, my Lord, I lift my soul.
5. For You, my Lord, are good and forgiving, and exceedingly kind to all who call upon You.
6. Lord, hear my prayer and listen to the voice of my supplications.
7. On the day of my distress I call upon You, for You will answer me.
8. There is none like You among the supernal beings, my Lord, and there are no deeds like Yours.
9. All the nations that You have made will come and bow down before You, my Lord, and give honor to Your Name,
10. for You are great and perform wonders, You alone, O God.
11. Lord, teach me Your way that I may walk in Your truth; unify my heart to fear Your Name.
12. I will praise You, my Lord, my God, with all my heart, and give honor to Your Name forever.
13. For Your kindness to me has been great; You have saved my soul from the depth of the grave.
14. O God, malicious men have risen against me; a band of ruthless men has sought my soul; they are not mindful of You.
15. But You, my Lord, are a compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger and abounding in kindness and truth.
16. Turn to me and be gracious to me; grant Your strength to Your servant, and deliver the son of Your maidservant.
17. Show me a sign of favor, that my foes may see and be shamed, because You, Lord, have given me aid and consoled me.
Chapter 87
Composed to be sung in the Holy Temple, this psalm praises the glory of Jerusalem, a city that produces many great scholars, eminent personalities, and persons of good deeds. It also speaks of the good that will occur in the Messianic era.
1. By the sons of Korach, a psalm, a song devoted to the holy mountains [of Zion and Jerusalem].
2. The Lord loves the gates of Zion more than all the dwelling places of Jacob.
3. Glorious things are spoken of you, eternal city of God.
4. I will remind Rahav Egypt and Babylon concerning My beloved; Philistia and Tyre as well as Ethiopia, "This one was born there.”
5. And to Zion will be said, "This person and that was born there"; and He, the Most High, will establish it.
6. The Lord will count in the register of people, "This one was born there," Selah.
7. Singers as well as dancers [will sing your praise and say], "All my inner thoughts are of you."
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 10
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Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, end of Chapter 10
ועוד נקראים בני עליה
Another reason for their designation of bnei aliyah:1
מפני שגם עבודתם בבחינת ועשה טוב, בקיום התורה ומצותיה, הוא לצורך גבוה ומעלה מעלה עד רום כל המעלות
Even their divine service in the area of “doing good,” in their fulfillment of Torah and its mitzvot, is for the sake of the Above, and their service is directed toward a most high level, toward the loftiest heights.
ולא כדי לדבקה בו יתברך בלבד, לרוות צמאון נפשם הצמאה לה׳
[Their divine service] is not [intended] merely to attach themselves to G‑d by serving Him through Torah andmitzvot, so as to quench the thirst of their soul which thirsts for G‑d,
The divine service of tzaddikim of lower levels may indeed be for the purpose of stilling their thirst for G‑d and their desire to cleave to Him; for indeed, the fulfillment of Torah and mitzvot satisfies these needs —
כמו שכתוב: הוי כל צמא לכו למים
as it is written:2 “Ho, exclaims the prophet, all who are thirsty for G‑dliness, should go to the waters of Torah,” i.e., let them engage in Torah, which is likened to water,
וכמו שכתוב במקום אחר
as is explained elsewhere, that the “thirsty ones” of this verse refer to those who thirst for G‑dliness.
The prophet’s words prove this point. Were he addressing those who thirst for Torah, he need not exclaim “Ho,” nor direct them to its “waters”. Whoever thirsts for Torah will find it readily available for study. Rather, the prophet is addressing those who thirst for G‑d, advising them to slake their thirst for Him through Torah, which binds one to G‑d.
The “men of ascent,” however, whom we have been discussing, are beyond this level of divine service. They do not study Torah or perform mitzvot with the intention of quenching their own thirst for G‑dliness, for such service is — in a subtle sense — self-serving, as it is motivated by one’s desire for a certain spiritual profit, namely, the bliss of closeness to G‑d.
אלא כדפירשו בתיקונים: איזהו חסיד, המתחסד עם קונו, עם קן דיליה
Rather their service of G‑d is as the Tikkunei Zohar3 explains that which our Sages have said: “Who is a pious one(chassid)? He who is benevolent (mischassed) with his Creator (kono).” The Tikkunei Zohar comments, thatkono (usually translated “his Creator”) is here to be interpreted as “his nest” (derived from the root ken — “nest”), and thus, the chassid is he who is benevolent “with his nest” — i.e., his Source, G‑d. This “benevolence” towards G‑d consists of —
לייחדא קודשא בריך הוא ושכינתיה בתחתונים
“uniting the Holy One, blessed be He, with His Shechinah (the Divine Presence), so that the light of this union reach and be felt even in the lowest worlds.”
וכמו שכתוב ברעיא מהימנא, פרשת תצא: כברא דאשתדל בתר אבוי ואימיה, דרחים לון יתיר מגרמיה ונפשיה ורוחיה ונשמתיה כו׳
As is also explained in Ra‘aya Mehemna on Parshat Tetze: “In the manner of a son who exerts himself for his father and mother, whom he loves more than himself, [more than] his own Nefesh, Ruach andNeshamah,
ומסר גרמיה למיתה עלייהו למיפרק לון כו׳, וכמו שכתוב במקום אחר
and who sacrifices his life for their sake to redeem them, should they be held in captivity,“ and as is also explained elsewhere.
Such is the divine service of “men of ascent”: it is wholly altruistic, motivated only by a desire to please G‑d and make His presence felt everywhere.
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to explain that the two aforementioned interpretations of the term “men of ascent” accord with each other and are in fact complementary.
It is a kabbalistic axiom that the “elevation of mahn” (מ"ן — initials of mayin nukvin, lit., “feminine waters”) effects a corresponding “descent of mahd” (מ"ד — initials of mayin dechurin, lit., “masculine waters”). This means that the arousal of the “feminine” level, i.e., the recipient (which in our case means the efforts of man below, in actions directed “upward” toward G‑d), causes a reciprocal arousal of the “masculine” level, i.e., the giver (meaning, in our case, G‑d’s benevolence as it “flows downward” and is bestowed upon man).
Applying this to the service of “men of ascent” we find the following. That aspect of their service mentioned in the first interpretation — that they elevate evil and convert it to good — constitutes an “ascent of mahn.” The aspect mentioned in the second interpretation — that by their service of love they draw down G‑d’s Presence upon earth — constitutes a “descent ofmahd,” for every mitzvah that they perform (as a channel for the descent of G‑d’s Presence) is an expression of G‑d’s benevolence. Thus, the two interpretations are complementary, since the “ascent of mahn” is what causes the “descent ofmahd” as stated above.
(The Alter Rebbe employs kabbalistic terms in his explanation, which are explained in Chassidut at length; they will become clearer in the course of further study.)
In the Alter Rebbe’s words:
ושניהם עולים בקנה אחד. כי על ידי הבירורים שמבררים מנוגה מעלים מיין נוקבין
(4Both interpretations are complementary. For by refining [the good found in] kelipat nogah, as the “men of ascent” do by converting their animal soul (which is derived from kelipat nogah) to good, one elevates “feminine waters” (mahn),
ונעשים יחודים עליונים להוריד מיין דכורין
effecting unions in the higher realms, so as to cause “masculine waters” (mahd) to descend to this world.
שהם הם מימי החסדים שבכל מצוה ומצוה מרמ״ח מצות עשה, שכולן הן בחינת חסדים ומיין דכורין
These [“masculine waters”] are the “waters” of kindness that flow into and are contained in each of the 248 positive mitzvot, which are all in the nature of “kindness”, or benevolence, and “masculine waters.”
דהיינו המשכת קדושת אלקותו יתברך מלמעלה למטה להתלבש בתחתונים, כמו שכתוב במקום אחר
This term “masculine waters” as applied to mitzvot means that the mitzvot draw G‑d’s holiness from above, i.e., from the higher realms, downward, so that [G‑d’s holiness] be clothed in and revealed within the lowest realms, i.e., our physical world, as explained elsewhere.) Thus the two interpretations of the term “men of ascent” are complementary.
——— ● ———
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The Rebbe notes that two reasons are given for the use of the name bnei aliyah for the same level of tzaddikim, viz., the higher level. One reason corresponds to the appellation “complete tzaddik,” while the other corresponds to the term“tzaddik who knows only good.” (As we have seen, the “complete tzaddik” is so called because of the degree of his love of G‑d; the explanation appropriate here is the latter — that his love is utterly selfless. The “tzaddik who knows only good” is so called because of his eradication and conversion of evil; the explanation appropriate to him is the former — that he elevates evil to holiness.) |
| 2. | Yeshayahu 55:1. |
| 3. | Introduction to Tikkunei Zohar 1b. See Zohar II, 114b; III, 222b; 288a. |
| 4. | Parentheses are in the original text. |
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Rambam:
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• Tuesday, Tevet 17, 5776 · December 29, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 322
Administering the Death Penalty on Shabbat
You shall not kindle fire throughout your settlements on the Shabbat day"—Exodus 35:3.
It is forbidden for the courts to administer punishments on Shabbat. The Sages interpreted the above verse as an injunction against executing a criminal via burning (one of the four methods of capital punishment employed by the courts) on Shabbat—and the same rule applies to all other forms of capital punishment. From this verse the Sages also extrapolated the prohibition against holding any court proceedings on Shabbat.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 322
Administering the Death Penalty on Shabbat
You shall not kindle fire throughout your settlements on the Shabbat day"—Exodus 35:3.
It is forbidden for the courts to administer punishments on Shabbat. The Sages interpreted the above verse as an injunction against executing a criminal via burning (one of the four methods of capital punishment employed by the courts) on Shabbat—and the same rule applies to all other forms of capital punishment. From this verse the Sages also extrapolated the prohibition against holding any court proceedings on Shabbat.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Administering the Death Penalty on Shabbat
Negative Commandment 322
Translated by Berel Bell
The 322nd prohibition is that we [i.e. the Beth Din] are forbidden from inflicting punishment upon transgressors and carrying out judgments on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "Do not burn any fire [wherever you may live on the Shabbos day]."
The meaning of this is, "Do not burn someone who has been convicted and condemned to execution by s'reifa (burning).2" This applies to the other methods of execution as well.3
The Mechilta4 says as follows: "[The verse says,] 'do not burn any fire'; but the act of making a fire is already prohibited5! However, it is mentioned separately to teach us a different law — that just as burning is distinctive in that [in spite of the fact that] it is one of the types of judicial execution and [therefore a mitzvah,6 but nevertheless it] does not override the prohibition of Shabbos, so too the other forms of execution do not override Shabbos."
The Gemara7 says that making a fire "l'lav yotzas"8 [it is singled out because it is "only" a regular prohibition]. However, this opinion is not accepted as the final halachah9. Rather, the Gemara concludes l'chalek yotzas [it is singled out to show that each melachah is treated separately], and therefore one must bring an offering for every single melachah which was performed, as explained there.10
[Therefore, according to the Gemara's conclusion, there is no particular prohibition in this verse and it can be used to teach us this prohibition of inflicting punishment on Shabbos.
The Rambam now brings a source which extends the prohibition to all kinds of judicial punishment11]
The Jerusalem Talmud12 quotes [the end of the verse, " 'Do not burn fire] wherever you may live.' Rav Ilah quotes Rav Yanai as saying that we learn from this verse that a beth din is not allowed to judge on Shabbos."13
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 35:3.
2.See P228.
3.See P226, P227, P229. Malkos (flogging) and other punishments are also prohibited on Shabbos (Hilchos Shabbos, 24:7). See Jerusalem Talmud quoted at the end of the mitzvah.
4.On Ex. 35:3. The Mechilta explains why this verse cannot be interpreted literally, i.e. a prohibition against making a fire.
5.Under the general prohibition, "do not do melachah on Shabbos." See N320.
6.See Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Shabbos 24:7.
7.Shabbos 70a.
8.This Gemara poses the same question as the Mechilta which the Rambam has just quoted: If all forms of melachah are already prohibited, why was making a fire mentioned separately? The Gemara brings two answers to this question: "l'lav yotzas"or"l'chalek yotzas."
The first answer (l'lav yotzas) is that fire is singled out because it is different from other melachos. This opinion holds that while other melachos are capital offenses punishable by kores, etc. (see N320 and footnotes there), the prohibition against making a fire is only punished by flogging. This is called "l'lav yotzas," — that it was singled out ("yotzas") from all the prohibited acts of Shabbos to be treated like other prohibitions of the Torah ("lav") , i.e. punishable by flogging instead of kores.
The second answer ("l'chalek yotzas") is that fire is the same as any other melachah, but is singled out to teach something about all the melachos. This opinion holds that if a person does several melachos on Shabbos, each one is treated separately. We know that if a person did a melachah on Shabbos unintentionally, he must bring a sin-offering (see N320, ibid.). If he did two types of melachah (e.g. cooking and writing), he would bring two sin-offerings. This is called "l'chalek yotzas," — that it was singled out ("yotzas") from all the prohibited acts of Shabbos to teach that each melachah must be treated separately ("l'chalek") regarding the sacrifices.
9.According to the opinion "l'lav yotzas," the verse has already been used to teach us a separate prohibition — that one may not make a fire on Shabbos. We are now left with a question on our commandment N322; how can we learn two prohibitions from the same verse?
The Rambam answers this question by pointing out that the Gemara concludes not like that opinion, but rather "l'chalek yotzas". Therefore, making a fire is included in the general prohibition, and since there is no separate prohibition learned from the verse, it is free to be used for this mitzvah. See Yad Halevi, N322. (See also Chinuch 114, for another explanation of the Rambam's intention in quoting this Gemara.)
10.See Einayim L'mishpat, Yevamos 6b (p.12) regarding the precise choice of words the Rambam uses.
11.See Derech Mitzvosecha (Tzemach Tzedek) p. 88a. Sefer Hamitzvos (Heller) p. 181, note 9. Sources quoted in Mishneh Torah, Kapach, 5746, Hil. Shabbos, Ch. 24, note 19. But see Rif Perlow Vol. 2, p. 392a.
12.Sanhedrin 4:6.
13.The phrase, "wherever you may live," is used in Num. 35:29 to refer to Beth Din. That teaches us that the phrase here also refers to a Beth Din. This Talmudic passage teaches that the prohibition includes all types of judgment, not only execution.
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• 1 Chapter: Terumot Terumot - Chapter 5 • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
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• Terumot - Chapter 5
Halacha 1
We should separate terumah only from the most choice [produce], as [implied by Numbers 18:30]: "When you separate its most choice portion from it."1 If, however, there is no priest accessible,2 one should separate terumah from produce that will last3 even though there is more choice produce but it will not last.
What is implied? A person should separate fresh figs as terumah for dried figs.4 In a place where there are no priests, he should separate dried figs for fresh figs.5 If he is accustomed to dry fresh figs, he may separate fresh figs as terumah for dried figs even in a place where there is no priest.6 In a place where there is a priest, by contrast, dried figs are never separated as terumahfor fresh figs, even in a place where it is customary to dry fresh figs.
Halacha 2
One may separate an entire onion as terumah even if it is small,7 but not half an onion, even if it is large in all places.8 We do not separate one type of produce as terumah for another type of produce, as [implied by Numbers 18:30]: "As grain from the granary and as wine from the vat."9 If one made such a separation, it is not considered terumah.
Halacha 3
Zucchini and cucumbers are considered as one species.10 All of the types of wheat are one species. All of the types of figs,11 dried figs, and blocks of figs are one species. [In the above instances,] one may separate terumah from one type for the other. [By contrast,] all types of produce which are considered as a mixture of species may not be separated as terumah for each other, even when one separates the choicest produce as terumah for produce of lesser quality.
What is implied? A person has 50 se'ah of wheat and 50 se'ah of barley in one building. If he separates two se'ah of wheat [as terumah] for the entire amount, his separation is not effective.12 When types of produce are not considered as a mixture of species, one may separate the better type as terumah for the lesser type, but not the lesser type as terumah for the better type. If one did separate [the lesser type of produce as terumah for the better type, after the fact,] the separation is effective with one exception. Zunin13may not be separated as terumah for wheat, because it is not used as food for humans.
Halacha 4
We do not separate terumah from produce for which all the work [in preparing it] was completed14 for produce for which the work [in preparing it] is incomplete, from produce for which the work [in preparing it] is incomplete for [other] produce for which the work [in preparing it] is incomplete, nor from produce for which the work [in preparing it] is incomplete for produce for which all the work [in preparing it] was completed.15 [This is also derived from the above prooftext:] "As grain from the granary and as wine from the vat."16[Implied is that terumah should be separated from produce] for which [all work] was completed for similar produce. If, however, one separated terumah [in any of the above instances], the separation is effective [after the fact].17
Halacha 5
When should terumah be separated from a granary? When the kernels are separated.18 If a person separated part [of the grain], he may designate the kernels he separated as terumah for the produce that was not separated. When one brings stalks of grain into his home to eat husked grain, he should separate terumah while the grain is in the stalks.19
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
We should not separate terumah from ritually pure produce for produce that is not ritually pure.22 If, however, one separated terumah [in this manner], the separation is effective [after the fact].
It is a halachah conveyed to Moses at Sinai that when a portion of a cake of dried figs has become impure, we may separate terumah from the pure portion of it for the impure portion of it as an initial preference.23 This applies not only to a cake of dried figs which appears as one mass, but also to a bundle of vegetables and even a mound of wheat.24 If a portion of it became impure, one may separate terumah from the pure portion for the impure portion.
If, however, there were two cakes of dried figs, two bundles of vegetables, or two mounds of wheat, one impure and one pure at its side, as an initial preference, one should not separate terumah from the produce that is pure for the produce that is impure.25 One may, however, separate terumat ma'aserfrom produce that is pure for produce that is impure as an initial preference. [This is derived from Numbers 18:29:] "its sacred portion from it." [Implied is that] one should take from the sacred portion in it.26
Halacha 8
We may not separate produce that is ritually impure as terumah for produce that is ritually pure.27 If one made such a separation inadvertently, the portion separated is terumah.28 If one made the separation intentionally, he did not fulfill the obligation for the remainder [of the produce], but [the produce] separated is terumah. He must separate terumah a second time.
When does the above apply? When he did not know of the impurity. If, however, he knew of the impurity, but erred in that he thought it was permitted to separate produce that is ritually impure as terumah for produce that is ritually pure, he is considered as if he acted intentionally.29 Similar laws apply with regard to terumat ma'aser.
Halacha 9
We may not separate produce that is still attached to the earth as terumah for produce that has already been detached.30 Nor may produce that has already been detached be separated as terumah for produce that is still attached to the earth.
What is implied? A person had produce that was detached and said: "This produce will be terumah for this produce which is attached to the earth" - and even if he said "...when [the attached produce] is detached,"31 his words are of no consequence. [This ruling also applies] if he possessed two rows [of produce] and said: "The produce of this row which is detached will be terumahfor this row which is attached," or "The produce of this row which is attached will be terumah for this row which is detached."
[Diferent rules apply should] he say: "The produce of this row which is detached will be terumah for this row when it will be detached," if [the produce] is [later] detached - since it is within his potential to detach it32 - when they are both detached, his words are binding, provided both [types of produce] had attained at least a third of their standard size33 at the time he made his statements.
Halacha 10
We may not separate fresh produce as terumah for dried produce, nor dried produce as terumah for fresh produce. If, however, one made such a separation, it is effective.34
What is implied? One reaped a type of vegetable one day and then reaped the same [type of vegetable] the following day. One may not separate one asterumah for the other unless this vegetable remains fresh for two days. Similarly, if a vegetable usually remains fresh for three days, e.g., cucumbers, all [of that type of vegetable] that are harvested for three days may be joined together and terumah may be separated from one for the other. When a type of vegetable remains fresh for only one day and one harvested some in the morning and some in the evening, one may separate one as terumah for the other.
Halacha 11
One may not separate produce from the present year as terumah for produce of the previous year,35 nor may one separate produce from the previous year as terumah for produce of the present year. If one made such a separation, it is not effective,36 as [indicated by Deuteronomy 14:22]: "From year to year."37Thus if one harvested a vegetable on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah before sunset and harvested another after sunset, one may not separate terumah from one for the other. For one is considered "old" and the other, "new."
Similarly, if one harvested an esrog38 on the day before the fifteenth of Shvat on the evening before sunset and harvested another one after sunset [that day], one may not separate terumah from one for the other.39 [The rationale is that] the first of Tishrei is the Rosh HaShanah for tithing grain, legumes, and vegetables and the fifteenth of Shvat is Rosh HaShanah for tithing [of the produce] of trees.
Halacha 12
We may not separate produce from Eretz [Yisrael] as terumah for produce of the Diaspora, nor may produce of the Diaspora be separated for produce fromEretz Yisrael,40 nor may produce of Eretz Yisrael be separated for produce from Syria, and nor may produce of Syria be separated for produce fromEretz Yisrael.41
Similarly, [we may not separate terumah] from produce for which terumahneed not be separated, e.g., leket, shichachah, and pe'ah42 or from produce from which terumah was already separated for produce for which terumahmust be separated. Nor may we separate terumah from produce for whichterumah must be separated for produce for which there is no obligation.43[Even] if the terumah was separated, the separation is not of consequence.
Halacha 13
When a person separates terumah [for other produce] from produce that was designated as the first tithe, but from which its terumah44 had not been separated45 or from produce which was designated as the second tithe46 or that had been consecrated,47 but which had not been redeemed, the separation is not effective.48
Halacha 14
We may not separate terumah from produce for which we are required to separate terumah according to Scriptural Law for produce for which we are required to separate terumah [only] according to Rabbinic Law,49 nor from produce for which we are required to separate terumah [only] according to Rabbinic Law for produce for which we are required to separate terumahaccording to Scriptural Law.50 If one separated terumah [in the above instance], the produce separated is considered as terumah,51 but he must separate terumah again [for the obligation incumbent on this produce to be fulfilled].52
Halacha 15
A flowerpot with a hole is considered as [connected] to the earth.53 How large must the hole be [for this law to apply]? Large enough for a small root to pass through it.54 This is smaller than an olive.
[The following rules apply when a person] planted grain in a flowerpot that did not have a hole and it reached a third of its maturity.55 Afterwards, he perforated [the flowerpot]56and the grain completed [its growth] while [the flowerpot] was perforated. It is, [nevertheless,] considered as if it grew in [a flowerpot] without a hole. [This ruling changes] only when [the flowerpot] was perforated before [the grain] reached a third of its maturity.
Halacha 16
When a person separates terumah from produce which grows in the earth for produce that grows in a perforated flowerpot or from produce which grows in a perforated flowerpot for produce which grows in the earth, the separation is effective.57
If he separates terumah from [produce growing] in a [flowerpot] that was not perforated for [produce growing] in a perforated [flowerpot], the produce separated is considered as terumah,58 but he must separate terumah again.59
If he separates terumah from [produce growing] in a perforated [flowerpot] for [produce growing] in a [flowerpot] that was not perforated, the produce separated is considered as terumah. [Nevertheless, the priest to whom it was given] should not partake of it until [the owner] separates terumah and tithes for [the portion separated] from other produce.60
Halacha 17
When a person separates terumat [ma'aser] from produce that is demai61 for other produce that is demai or from produce that is demai for produce from which we are certain that the tithes were not separated, the produce separated is considered as terumat [ma'aser].62 [Nevertheless,] he should separate terumah again for each type of produce individually.63
When he separates terumah from produce from which we are certain that the tithes were not separated for produce that is demai, the produce separated is considered as terumat [ma'aser].64 [Nevertheless, the priest to whom it was given] should not partake of it until [the owner] separates terumah and tithes for [the portion separated].65
Halacha 18
We may not separate stalks of grain as terumah for kernels of grain, olives [as terumah] for oil, or grapes [as terumah] for wine.66 If one made such a separation, it is not effective.67 This is a decree [enacted] lest one cause the priest to undertake the difficulty of treading [on the grapes] or pressing [the olives].
One may, however, separate oil as terumah for olives that are in a press68 or wine as terumah for grapes that are being dried as raisins. What does this resemble? To separating terumah from two species that are not consideredkilayim, separating from the good for the bad.69
Similarly, one may separate terumah from olives from which oil will be squeezed70 for olives that will be pickled,71 but not from olives that will be pickled for olives from which oil will be squeezed.72 [One may separateterumah] from wine that has not been boiled for wine that has been boiled,73but not from [wine] that has been boiled for [wine] that has not been boiled. [One may separate terumah] from [wine that is] clear74 for [wine that is] not clear, but not from [wine that is] not clear for wine [that is] clear.
[One may separate terumah] from a specific number of fresh figs for a specific number of dried figs75 and from a measure of dried figs for a measure of fresh figs,76 but not from a measure of fresh figs for a measure of dried figs, nor for a specific number of dried figs for a specific number of fresh figs. [The rationale for all the above is that] one should always separate terumah in a generous manner.77
Halacha 19
We do not separate terumah from oil for olives that are being pressed, nor [do we separate terumah] from wine for grapes that are being tread, for this resembles separating terumah from produce for which all work has been completed for produce for which the work has not been completed.81 If he did separate terumah [in such a situation], the produce separated is considered as terumah, but he must separate terumah from the olives and the grapes from them themselves.82
Halacha 20
When a person separated oil as terumah for olives that he intended to eat or he separated olives for olives when he intended to eat the entire quantity and then changed his mind and decided to press the olives [for oil] and indeed pressed them after separating terumah for them, he is not required to separateterumah again.87 [This law also applies if] one separated wine for grapes that he intended to eat or grapes for grapes when he intended to eat the entire quantity and then changed his mind and decided to tread the grapes for wine and indeed had them tread upon after separating terumah for them.
Halacha 21
We do not separate vinegar as terumah for wine,88 but we may separate wine as terumah for vinegar, for wine and vinegar are one type of produce.89 If one had the intent of separating wine for wine and it was discovered that what he separated was vinegar, the separation is not effective.90 If one had the intent of separating vinegar for vinegar and it was discovered that what he separated was wine, the separation is effective.91
Halacha 22
[The following rules apply when a person] separates a barrel of wine asterumah for wine and it is discovered to be vinegar. If it was known to be vinegar before it was separated, the separation is not effective.92 If it became vinegar after it was designated as terumah, the separation is effective.93 If there is a doubt, the separation is effective,94 but he should make a second separation.95 The same laws apply when one separates squash as terumahand it is discovered to be bitter or one separates a watermelon as terumahand it has become spoiled96 or perforated.97 If he separated a barrel of wine as terumah and it was discovered to have been left open in which instance, it is forbidden to drink it,98 it is terumah, but he should make a second separation.99
Halacha 23
What is implied? If one [of the two portions separated as terumah] fell into ordinary produce, it does not cause it to be considered as dimua. If the other [portion] fell into other produce, it does not cause it to be considered asdimua.102If, however, both fell into the same produce, it is considered asdimua according to the size of the smaller of the two.103
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply when a person] checks a barrel [of wine]107 and then leaves it to separate terumah [from it] on other [wine] until it becomesterumah in its entirety, [at which point,] he would give it to the priest.108 After a certain time, he checked the barrel again and discovered that it had become vinegar.109 [We rule that the wine] certainly remained wine for three days after the inspection. [The obligations for terumah] have certainly been met for all of the wine for which he considered the wine in the barrel as its terumah during those [three days]. From that time afterwards, there is a doubt [whether the wine had already turned to vinegar] and a second separation [of terumah] must be made.110
Halacha 25
At three times [during the year], it is necessary to check the wine that one set aside to separate terumah from111 lest it have become vinegar. They are: When the east wind blows after the Sukkos holiday, when grapes form,112when fluid begins to enter the unripened grapes.113 [When one has wine] from the vat,114he may use it for the separation [of terumah] for 40 days with the presumption that it is still wine.115
Halacha 26
[The following rules apply when a person] sets aside produce to separateterumah from until [the entire amount] becomes terumah.116 Although as an initial preference, one should separate terumah only from the same collection of produce,117 if one separates terumah [in such a manner], we operate under the presumption that the produce continues to exist. If he discovers that they perished, he should entertain doubts that all [the produce for which he thought he separated terumah is in fact tevel].118 For perhaps, he did not make any separation until [the produce set aside] perished. Therefore he should separate terumah a second time for them.119
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Chelbo, translated as "most choice portion," literally means "fat."
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 331:52) states that in the present age, when terumah will be destroyed regardless, there is no need to separate the most choice portions as terumah.
See also the Ramban's Hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Mitzvah 7) which considers the adjuration against separating lower quality produce as terumah as one of the Torah's 613 prohibitions.
|
| 2. |
And thus the terumah will not be able to be given to the priest immediately.
|
| 3. |
I.e., since there is no priest immediately available, it is preferable to separate produce that will not spoil, so that ultimately, it can be given to a priest.
|
| 4. |
For fresh figs are tastier and considered as a higher grade produce.
|
| 5. |
I.e., since there is no priest immediately available, it is preferable to separate produce that will not spoil, so that ultimately, it can be given to a priest.
|
| 6. |
For he will dry the figs himself and prevent them from spoiling before they are given to the priest.
|
| 7. |
A whole onion is considered more important and choicer than a portion of an onion [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 2:5)].
|
| 8. |
I.e., in places where a priest is present or those where he is not present, for a whole onion will keep longer than a cut one (ibid.).
|
| 9. |
Implied is that the terumah and the produce for which it is being separated must be of the same species.
|
| 10. |
They are also considered as one species with regard to the prohibition against kilayim (Hilchot Kilayim 3:3).
|
| 11. |
I.e., light figs and dark figs.
|
| 12. |
Because wheat and barley are different species. Moreover, it is considered as if terumah has not been separated even from the wheat alone. The rationale is that separating terumah is considered equivalent to taking a vow and if a portion of a vow has been nullified, the entire vow is nullified.
|
| 13. |
A coarse species of wild wheat.
|
| 14. |
At which point the obligation to separate terumah and the tithes falls upon it (see Chapter 1, Halachah 11, and notes).
|
| 15. |
The commentaries note that the order of the clauses employed by the Rambam deviates slightly from the order of his source, Terumot 1:10.
|
| 16. |
The Rambam and previous Rabbinic sources cite several prooftexts for this law. Nevertheless, the Siftei Cohen 331:80 maintains that the law is a Rabbinic decree and the prooftexts are merelyasmachteot, allusions cited for support. For that reason, after the fact, the separation is effective.
|
| 17. |
See Halachot 18-20 for more particulars concerning this issue.
|
| 18. |
When the grain has been threshed and winnowed and then the kernels separated from the chaff. Different commentaries suggest a slight change in the Rambam's wording which would cause the produce to be considered as complete at an earlier stage.
|
| 19. |
Because they will not be processed any further.
|
| 20. |
For then, the wine has been separated from the grapes.
|
| 21. |
For then, the oil has been separated from the olives.
|
| 22. |
The Jerusalem Talmud (Terumot 2:1) derives this concept from the prooftext cited above: "As grain from the granary and as wine from the vat." It is impossible that a vat will be partially pure and partially impure, so, too, terumah and the produce for which it is being separated must be either pure or impure."
|
| 23. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 2:1), the Rambam explains the rationale for this law. Since the cake of figs is made from several discrete elements, it is not considered as a single entity with regard to the laws of ritual impurity. Hence, the fact that one portion has been touched by a source of ritual impurity does not cause another portion to become impure. Nevertheless, since it is one body of produce, terumah can be separated from one portion for the other.
|
| 24. |
In these instances as well, since the whole is made up of discrete entities, the fact that they are connected or somewhat associated is not of consequence (ibid.; see also Hilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 6:14).
|
| 25. |
For the two are not considered as being "in the same place" (min hamukaf). After the fact, however, the separation is acceptable.
|
| 26. |
The verse indicates that when one is separating terumat ma'aser, it is possible that there be a "sacred." i.e., pure, portion, and a portion that is not "sacred," i.e., impure, and the pure should be separated for the impure. As stated at the conclusion of ch. 3, the produce separated asterumat ma'aser need not be located together with the produce for which it is being separated.
|
| 27. |
The Radbaz states that this is a Rabbinic decree instituted so that the priest will not suffer a loss.
|
| 28. |
For according to Scriptural Law, the separation is effective. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 2:2), the Rambam explains that this is speaking about a situation where initially, at the time the obligation to separate terumah took effect, the produce separated as terumah was pure. If, however, it became impure before the work associated with its preparation was completed, even if it was inadvertently separated as terumah, the separation is not effective.
|
| 29. |
And he must make another separation.
|
| 30. |
The Sifri derives this from the exegesis of Numbers 18:26: "And you shall separate from it...." Since the produce is still attached to the earth, it is not considered as the same type as the produce which is detached.
|
| 31. |
To reconcile the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and that in the following clause, the commentaries explain that here we are speaking of attached produce that does not belong to the person who wishes to separate terumah. Ordinarily, if a person separatedterumah from produce belonging to him for produce that does not belong to him, his separation is valid, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 2. In this instance, however, since the attached produce does not belong to him and he has no control of when it will be detached, he does not have the potential to designate his own produce as terumah for it.
|
| 32. |
This is his own produce which he is allowed to detach.
|
| 33. |
For until produce reaches this size, there is no obligation to separate terumah, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 10. Therefore, even if one separated terumah for it, the separation is not effective.
|
| 34. |
The Siftei Cohen 331:83 states that this is a Rabbinic decree, enacted as a safeguard so that one will not separate produce from one type over another. Hence, after the fact, the separation is effective.
|
| 35. |
To clarify the point under discussion in this halachah: As indicated by the concluding phrase of the halachah, "produce from the previous year" does not necessarily mean produce that is a year old. Instead, every Rosh HaShanah, the year of the agricultural cycle changes with regard to vegetables (Rosh HaShanah 14b). As the Rambam proceeds to explain, a Scriptural decree causes such produce to be considered as a discrete entity, distinct from the same type of produce harvested in the present year.
|
| 36. |
Even after the fact.
|
| 37. |
In its entirety, the verse reads: "Tithe all the crops of your sowing produced by the field, year by year." Implied is an exclusion: that the produce of each year is a separate entity. Although the verse refers to the tithes, the same principles also apply to terumah.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 1:5), the Rambam cites a different prooftext for the derivation of this principle.
|
| 38. |
In that era, esrogim were eaten as fruit, not only used for the mitzvah on Sukkot.
|
| 39. |
An esrog is singled out, because unlike other fruit, the time when it is picked - and not the time it reaches the stage of development when we are required to separate the tithes - determines the year of the agricultural cycle we follow. See Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 1:1-4.
|
| 40. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 1:5), the Rambam explains that this concept is derived from Leviticus 27:30: "All the tithes of the land from the plantings of the land." Implied is that both the tithes and the produce must be from "the land," from Eretz Yisrael. Although the verse speaks of the tithes, the principle derived is also applied to terumah.
|
| 41. |
For according to Scriptural Law, Syria is also part of the Diaspora.
|
| 42. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
|
| 43. |
In this instance, the fundamental point the Rambam is emphasizing is the following clause: that even if the terumah was separated, the separation is not of consequence.
|
| 44. |
I.e., terumah ma'aser, the terumah that must be separated from the tithes.
|
| 45. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 1:5, Rav Kapach's edition), the Rambam explains that this is referring to a situation in which a Levite took produce that he had been given as tithes by an Israelite, but from which he had not separated terumat ma'aser and desired to use it to separate terumah for produce from his own field from which he is obligated to separate terumah. This is unacceptable, because there is no longer any obligation to separate terumah from the produce given as tithes, even though there is an obligation to separate terumat ma'aser from it.
This explanation is somewhat unique. Most commentaries interpret the mishnah as referring to a situation where the person tithed his crop, but did not separate terumah from it. Nor did he separate terumat ma'aser. Afterwards, he desired to separate terumah for other produce from the tithes. The Rambam's interpretation avoids several difficulties that arise according to the other approach.
|
| 46. |
Produce separated as the second tithe must be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity. It is not considered as the person's private property.
|
| 47. |
Since it is consecrated, there is no obligation to separate terumah or the tithes from it.
|
| 48. |
In all these instances, the produce that is being separated is holy and is not the owner's individual property. (For even the tithes which the Levites own have a dimension of holiness to them, because of the terumat ma'aser that has not been separated.) The Ra'avad raises objections to the Rambam's ruling. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh respond to them. If, however, they would have followed the Rambam's explanation in his Commentary to the Mishnah as explained above, the difficulties would not arise.
|
| 49. |
According to Scriptural Law, there is no obligation to separate terumah from this produce. Hence, it is as if one is separating terumah from produce obligated in terumah for produce for which there is no obligation. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this general principle is derived from the law quoted in the following halachah.
|
| 50. |
For this is as if one is separating terumah from produce for which there is no obligation to separate terumah, for produce for which such an obligation exists.
|
| 51. |
This is a Rabbinic stringency. According to Scriptural Law, the separation is of no consequence at all.
|
| 52. |
According to the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh, this applies only to the second clause. The laws regarding the situation described in the first clause are explained in Halachah 16.
In the situation described in the second clause, the priest is allowed to partake of the produce, for although according to Scriptural Law, the separation is insignificant, there is no difficulty in having the priest partake of the produce for there is no obligation incumbent upon it.
|
| 53. |
Because the nurture from the power of growth in the earth is drawn to the earth in the flowerpot through the hole. This concept is relevant not only in this particular context, but in many others.
|
| 54. |
For then it can be considered to have derived nurture from the earth through its root. Hence, we are obligated to separate terumah from produce which grows within such a flowerpot according to Scriptural Law [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 5:10)].
|
| 55. |
If produce grows in a flowerpot without a hole, there is no obligation to separate terumah from it according to Scriptural Law (ibid.). Here a question arises, because the flowerpot was perforated afterwards. The Rambam clarifies that as long as the produce reaches a third of its growth, the point at which we are obligated to separate terumah, under conditions in which we are not obligated to separate terumah, an obligation is not incurred even though afterwards, those conditions change. See Halachah 9; see also Chapter 1, Halachot 11-13.
|
| 56. |
And thus enabled the produce to derive nurture from the earth.
|
| 57. |
For in both instances, we are obligated to separate terumah from both sets of produce according to Scriptural Law.
|
| 58. |
This is a Rabbinic decree, as stated in Halachah 14 and notes.
|
| 59. |
In order to fulfill the obligation of terumah as stated in Halachah 14.
|
| 60. |
The setting aside of the produce as terumah is not effective according to Scriptural Law. Hence, according to Scriptural Law, not only is this produce not terumah, it remains tevel, produce from which terumah and the tithes were not separated. Although our Sages ruled stringently and determined that it must be considered as terumah, they did not change its status as tevel. Hence, for the priest to partake of it, it is necessary that he separate terumah and tithes for it from other produce [see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 5:10)].
The terumah and the tithes for this produce must be separated from other produce, lest one think that what remains is ordinary produce and can be eaten be a person other than a priest (Tosafot, Yevamot 89b).
|
| 61. |
The term demai refers to produce concerning which we are uncertain whether the tithes were separated from it or not. According to Rabbinic Law, we are required to separate terumat ma'aser, terumah which the Levites are required to separate from the tithes from such produce (see Hilchot Ma'aserot, Chapter 9).
|
| 62. |
By Rabbinic decree. According to Scriptural Law, the produce separated is not terumat ma'aser, because it is possible that previously tithes and terumat ma'aser had been separated from the produce that was demai. Were that to be the case, one would be separating terumat ma'aserfrom produce for which one is obligated to make a separation from produce for which no such obligation exists. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.).
|
| 63. |
Since it is possible that the separation of the terumat ma'aser is not effective, the owner must make a second separation.
In this instance, the priest is allowed to partake of the produce given him. The rationale is that in the second instance, when one separates terumat ma'aser from produce that is demai for produce from which we are certain that the tithes were not separated, the priest is certainly allowed to partake of the produce given him. If terumat ma'aser had not been separated from such produce previously, it is being made at present. And if it had been made previously, according to Scriptural Law, the produce to be given the priest is ordinary produce that may be consumed.
If the separation was made from produce that is demai for other produce that is demai, there is a difficulty, for it is possible that a separation had previously been made for the produce for which the terumat ma'aser is being separated, but not from the produce from which the separation is being made at present. Since such a separation is invalid according to Scriptural Law, in such an instance, the priest is being given produce from which tithes and terumat ma'aser have not been separated. Nevertheless, since the majority of the people do in fact separate tithes and the prohibition of demai is just a stringency, in this instance, our Sages were lenient (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).
|
| 64. |
This is a Rabbinic stringency as mentioned above.
|
| 65. |
For as in the previous halachah, if the original separation of terumat ma'aser is not effective - as would be the case if a separation had been made from the produce classified as demai - there is an obligation to separate terumat ma'aser from the produce being separated as terumat ma'aser. Hence, until that separation is made, the priest is forbidden to partake of the produce given him.
There is, however, a difference between this halachah and the previous one. In the previous instance, the separation had to be made from other produce, while in this instance, the separation can be made from the produce given to the priest. In the previous instance, care had to be taken because of the impression that might be created, i.e., an onlooker might not realize that there is a Rabbinic obligation to separate terumot and tithes from produce growing in a flowerpot that is not perforated. No such difficulty exists in this instance, because the obligations incumbent on demai are well known. See the gloss of Ra'avad to Hilchot Ma'aser 13:19.
|
| 66. |
This applies even if one separates a measure of produce sufficient to produce the said quantity of wheat, wine, or oil.
|
| 67. |
The Radbaz states that, after the fact, if a priest agrees to accept such produce, the separation is acceptable, for there are times when one will consider that preferable.
|
| 68. |
But have not been squeezed yet.
|
| 69. |
This is permissible as stated in Halachah 3.
|
| 70. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 2:6), the Rambam explains that the Hebrew terms refers to olives that contain much oil and their oil is of high quality.
|
| 71. |
I.e., these olives have little oil. Hence, they are set aside to be used for pickling. Thus making such a separation would be considered as separating terumah from higher quality produce for lower quality produce which is permitted as stated above.
|
| 72. |
For this is considered as separating terumah from lower quality produce for higher quality produce which is forbidden as an initial preference, as stated in Halachah 3.
|
| 73. |
Boiling detracts from wine's flavor. Hence, one is separating terumah from higher quality produce for lower quality produce.
|
| 74. |
I.e., does not have dregs suspended in it.
|
| 75. |
When a priest is present and he is being given the figs, fresh figs are obviously considered as more desirable than dried figs.
|
| 76. |
For the measure of dried figs will be more compact than that of fresh figs. Thus the priest will be receiving a greater quantity of fruit.
|
| 77. |
E.g., giving and produce of a higher quality or giving more ample portions.
|
| 78. |
Kernels of wheat are considered as having an advantage over grain, because a) one can use them for whatever purposes one desires, and b) they store longer than grain.
|
| 79. |
i.e., how many kernels of wheat it would take to produce this quantity of bread.
|
| 80. |
As stated in Halachah 3. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:63) states that in the present era when the produce separated as terumah is discarded, there is no need to show these precautions.
|
| 81. |
See Halachah 4 above. In the situation described in that halachah, the person is not required to make a second separation, because our Sages felt that people understood that terumah should not be separated in such an instance and did not see the need for an additional safeguard. In this situation, since work with that produce has already begun, they felt that a safeguard was necessary (Rambam LeAm). Other commentaries offer different rationales for the difference in the rulings.
|
| 82. |
I.e., after he completed pressing the olives or treading the grapes, he should separate terumah a second time for that oil or wine [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 1:8)].
|
| 83. |
A mixture of terumah and ordinary produce, as mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 2.
|
| 84. |
I.e., even if it is not mixed with the produce separated a second time in contrast to the situation described in Halachah 22. The rationale is that, in this instance, after the fact, the first separation is effective, as stated in Halachah 4 above.
|
| 85. |
See Chapter 6, Halachah 6.
|
| 86. |
For it is terumah only as a result of Rabbinic decree.
|
| 87. |
For at the time the terumah was separated, the work associated with this produce was completed according to his intent at that time [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 1:9)]. Although he changed his mind, we do not penalize him for making such a decision (Radbaz).
|
| 88. |
For this is equivalent to separating produce of inferior quality for produce of superior quality which should not be done at the outset, as stated in Halachah 3. Nevertheless, if one made such a separation, after the fact, the separation s effective.
|
| 89. |
For when wine sours, it becomes vinegar.
|
| 90. |
For his separation was made in error and the error lowers the quality of the terumah (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 91. |
For in this instance, his error improves the quality of the terumah (Kessef Mishneh; Siftei Cohen331:95).
|
| 92. |
As in the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person had the intent of separating wine as terumah. If, however, he intended to separate vinegar, the separation is effective after the fact (Radbaz).
|
| 93. |
For at the time of the separation, wine was separated as the person intended. The fact that it soured afterwards is not his responsibility.
|
| 94. |
Because of the doubt involved. Perhaps it had not become sour at the time it was separated and the first separation was effective.
|
| 95. |
For perhaps it was sour before the first separation was made and thus the separation was not effective.
|
| 96. |
I.e., its contents are not fit for consumption [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 3:1)].
|
| 97. |
In which instance, we fear that the holes were made by a poisonous snake which deposited its venom in the watermelon.
|
| 98. |
Because of the danger involved. We fear that perhaps a poisonous snake or the like deposited venom in it (Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat Nefesh 12:2).
|
| 99. |
This appears to be speaking about a situation in which he is unsure when the snake drank from the wine before the terumah was separated or not.
|
| 100. |
I.e., since we are unsure which of the separations is effective, neither alone is considered asterumah.
|
| 101. |
As is required when one partakes of terumah inadvertently, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 6.
|
| 102. |
Although one of the two is obviously dimua, since we do not know which one, we rule leniently with regard to both.
|
| 103. |
In this instance, the terumah has obviously become mixed with the ordinary produce. Nevertheless, since we do not know which of the two is terumah, we require him to be concerned only with the smaller amount.
|
| 104. |
As is required when one partakes of terumah inadvertently, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 6.
|
| 105. |
Although both must be considered as terumah, because he does not have a definite obligation to give either to a priest.
|
| 106. |
For he is obligated to give at least the value of the smaller portion to the priest; for the remainder the priest must pay. Nevertheless, the price he pays for produce designated as terumah is less than that than he would pay for ordinary produce.
|
| 107. |
To make sure that it had not become vinegar.
|
| 108. |
I.e., the person took a barrel of wine and set it aside with the intent that he would consider an appropriate measure of wine from it as terumah for all the wine that he would continue to produce until the barrel became terumah in its entirety.
|
| 109. |
Thus there is a question regarding the status of the produce that he separated previously. For if the barrel had become vinegar earlier, the separation of terumah would not be effective, as stated above.
|
| 110. |
As explained above.
|
| 111. |
I.e., the person took a barrel of wine and set it aside with the intent that he would consider an appropriate measure of wine from it as terumah for all the wine that he would continue to produce until the barrel became terumah in its entirety.
|
| 112. |
When the flowers of the grape vine fall and the actual fruit begins to form.
|
| 113. |
When the juice of the grape begins to collect within the fruit.
Since these are times of change for grapes, there is also a possibility that wine will also be affected.
|
| 114. |
I.e., freshly squeezed grape juice.
|
| 115. |
For it is unlikely to turn into vinegar before then.
|
| 116. |
I.e., he sets aside produce to serve the same purpose as the wine mentioned in Halachah 24.
|
| 117. |
See Chapter 3, Halachah 17. As explained there, after the fact, such a separation is acceptable.
|
| 118. |
I.e., he should entertain the possibility that perhaps from the outset, the separation of theterumah was not acceptable.
|
| 119. |
As explained in Halachah 22.
|
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• 3 Chapters: Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Twelve, Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Thirteen, Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Fourteen • English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Shabbat - Chapter Twelve
• 3 Chapters: Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Twelve, Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Thirteen, Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Fourteen • English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download• Shabbat - Chapter Twelve
Halacha 1
A person who kindles even the smallest fire is liable,1 provided he needs the ash that it creates.2 However, should a person kindle a fire with a destructive intent, he is not liable, for he is causing ruin.3
Nevertheless, a person who sets fire to a heap of produce or a dwelling belonging to a colleague is liable, because his intent is to take revenge on his enemies. [Through this act,] he calms his feelings and vents his rage. He is comparable to a person who rends his garments over a deceased person or in rage [on the Sabbath],4 or a person who injures a colleague in an argument.5 These individuals are all considered to be performing a constructive activity, because of their evil inclinations.
Similarly, a person who lights a candle or wood, whether to generate warmth or light, is liable.6
A person who heats iron in order to strengthen it by submerging it in water is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of kindling.7
Halacha 2
A person who extinguishes [a fire]8 of even the smallest size is liable.9 [This includes both] one who extinguishes a candle and one who extinguishes a coal that comes from wood.10 In contrast, a person who extinguishes a glowing piece of metal is not liable.11
If, however, the person's intent is to purify the metal, he is liable. This indeed is the practice of blacksmiths; they heat the iron until it glows like a coal, and extinguish it in water to seal it. This is the process of purification for which one is liable. It is a derivative [of the category of forbidden labor] of extinguishing.
It is permissible to extinguish a glowing piece of metal12 in the public domain so that many people will not be injured by it.13
A person who pours oil into a burning lamp is liable for kindling. [Similarly,] a person who takes oil from a lamp is liable for extinguishing.14
Halacha 3
Should a fire break out on the Sabbath, a person is liable if he extinguishes it because of fear of monetary loss.15 It is only the threat of loss of life,16 and not monetary loss, that supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions.17
Therefore, all people should leave [the area of the blaze] so they do not die. They should let the fire continue to burn, even if it consumes the entire city.18
Halacha 4
It is permissible to construct a barrier using any type of container - whether full or empty - so that a fire will not spread. One may even construct a barrier using new earthen vessels filled with water, although they will surely break and extinguish [the fire].19 It is permissible to cause [a fire to be] extinguished [indirectly].20
Halacha 5
Halacha 6
When a garment [that is folded] catches on fire, one may spread it out and don it; if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant.25 Similarly, if a Torah scroll has caught fire, one may unroll it and read from it, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant. One may place water26on the portion that has not yet caught fire, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant.27
Halacha 7
If a fire broke out on the Sabbath and a gentile comes to extinguish it, we may not tell him, "Extinguish it," nor [must we tell him,] "Do not extinguish it," for his resting is not our responsibility.31
Halacha 8
Transferring36 objects from one domain to another is one of the categories of labor [forbidden on the Sabbath].
Although this [prohibition], as all other elements of the body of Torah law, was communicated orally by Moses [as he received them] from Sinai, it is also [alluded to within] the Torah itself. [Exodus 36:6] relates: "[Moses ordered that an announcement be made:] 'No man or woman should do any further work concerning the donations to the Sanctuary.' And the people stopped bringing [their gifts]." From this, one can infer that bringing [an article from one domain to another] is [also] referred to as "labor."37
Halacha 9
A person who transfers an object from one domain to another is not liable until he transfers an object of sufficient size to be useful from a private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to a private domain.
Similarly, one must remove the article from one domain and place it down in the second domain. A person is not liable if he merely:
removed the article and did not place it down [and another person took it from his hand and placed it down],
placed it down [after taking it from the hand of the person who removed it], but did not remove it [himself], or
transferred less than an amount [that is useful].
Similarly, a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is not liable unless he removes an article of significant size from one side [of the square] and places it down on the other side [of the square].
Commentary Halacha 9
A person who transfers an object from one domain to another is not liable until - his act meets the following three criteria:
a) he transfers an object of sufficient size to be useful - As explained in the notes on Chapter 1, it is "purposeful work," מלאכת מחשבת, which the Torah has forbidden. Accordingly, if an object is not of sufficient size to be useful, transferring it on the Sabbath is not considered labor. This minimum amount is referred to with the term שיעור. In Chapter 18, the Rambam lists the minimum amounts of specific substances that are considered useful.
b) from a private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to a private domain. - One is not liable for transferring an article from one private domain to another, nor is one liable for transferring an article from a private domain into a carmelit, a domain which is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The definitions of the various domains with regard to the Sabbath laws are found in Chapter 14.
c) Similarly, one must remove the article from one domain - This is referred to as עקירה.
and place it down in the second domain. - This is referred to as הנחה. Unless a person performs both these actions himself, he is not liable.
A person is not liable if he merely: removed the article and did not place it down [and another person took it from his hand and placed it down] - This situation is described in the opening Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. If a homeowner picked something up to give to a poor man standing outside, and the poor man took it from his hand - since the homeowner did not place the article down (הנחה), he is not liable.
placed it down [after taking it from the hand of the person who removed it,] but did not remove it [himself], or - In the example cited above, since the poor man did not pick the article up (עקירה), he is not liable. As the above-mentioned mishnah elaborates, there are several different possibilities for two people to combine in transferring an object, one performing the עקירה, and the other the הנחה.
transferred less than an amount [that is useful].
Similarly - Since carrying in the public domain is a derivative of transferring from one domain to another
a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is not liable unless he removes - performing the עקירה himself
an article of significant size - so that his act is of value
from one side [of the square] and places it down on the other side [of the square]. - performing the הנחה himself.
Halacha 10
A person who throws an article from one domain40 to another or who hands41[an article from one domain to a person in another domain]42 is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.
Similarly a person who throws or passes an article by hand from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.
A person who throws in an abnormal manner is not liable.43
Halacha 11
A person who transfers part of an object from one of these two domains [a private domain or a public domain] to the other is not liable until he transfers the entire object from one domain into the other.
[For example,] if a container is filled with articles, even if it is filled with mustard [seed],44 and a person transferred the majority of it from one domain to the other, the person is not liable unless he transfers the entire container.45The same applies in other similar situations. [The rationale is that] the container causes all the articles within it to be considered a single entity.46
Halacha 12
A person who transfers an article in the ordinary fashion in which the article is transferred is liable, whether he transferred it [by carrying it] in his right hand, in his left hand,47 or in his bosom, or whether he transfers money bound up in a cloth.48
Similarly, one is liable if one transferred the articles on one's shoulder. [This applies] although the article is [being carried] more than ten handbreadths high in the public domain,49 for this was the manner in which the sons of Kehat would carry50 [the sacred articles] of the Sanctuary above ten handbreadths high as [Numbers 7:9] states, "They shall carry them on their shoulders."51 As mentioned, all [the obligations for Sabbath] labors are derived from the Sanctuary.
Halacha 13
In contrast, a person is not liable for transferring an article on the back of his hand,52 with his foot, in his mouth,53 in the crook of his arm,54 in his ear, in a pocket sewn into his garment when the opening of the garment is facing downward,55 between one garment and another,56 in the hem of one's garment,57 in his shoe, and in his sandal. [The rationale is that] he did not transfer the articles as people usually do.
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] a person transfers a burden, carrying it on his head: If the burden was heavy58 - e.g., a full sack, a chest, a cabinet, or the like - and the person places it on his head and holds it with his hands,59 he is liable. This is the normal manner in which these articles are transferred, and this is thus equivalent to a person carrying an article on his shoulder or in his hand.
If, however, the person placed a light article - e.g., a garment, a book, or a knife - on his head and transferred them without holding them in his hand,60 he is not liable. He did not transfer them in the ordinary manner, for most people do not transfer articles by placing them on their heads.61
A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head.62
Halacha 15
It is permissible for a person to move objects in the public within a square four cubits by four cubits adjacent to the place where he is standing. He is allowed to move articles [freely] throughout this square.63
These cubits are measured according to the size of the person's arm.64 If, however, his arms are dwarf-sized,65 he is granted four cubits according to the size of an average person's arms.66
According to the oral tradition,67 this is the interpretation of the Torah's statement [Exodus 16:29]: "Every person should remain in his place," that every person should not move an article outside this square, only within it. [This square] represents the length of a human body when one extends one's hands and feet; only within it is one allowed to move objects.68
Halacha 16
When two people [are standing near each other] and a portion of the four cubits [in which one may carry] extends into the four cubits [in which the other may carry],69 they may both bring [food] and eat in the center, provided one does not take something from [the area which is solely] his and bring it into [the area which is solely] his colleague's.
Halacha 17
Based on the above, it is permitted for a person to lift up an article from the public domain and give it to a colleague who is near him, within his four cubits.72 The colleague may give it to another colleague standing at his side [who may pass it further]. Even if the article changes hands hundreds of times or is transferred several millim73 on the Sabbath, this is permissible,74because each individual moved it only within the four cubits [granted] him.
Halacha 18
Since each person is allowed to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits, he is permitted to carry along the diagonal of this square which is five and three-fifths cubits long.75 Accordingly, a person who carries or throws an article in the public domain is not liable unless he moves it beyond five and three-fifths cubits [from its original place].76
Whenever we have mentioned [the phrases], "from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square]" or "one who carries an object four cubits is liable," the intent was [the distance] from the beginning of the diagonal of a four cubit [square] until its end. If a person carries an object for a shorter distance, he is not liable.
Halacha 19
Thus, there are three [levels of responsibility that apply when] a person lifts up an object from one place in the public domain and places it down in another place in the public domain: If there are less than four cubits between these two places, the act is permitted.
If there are more than four cubits but less than five and three-fifths cubits between the two places, [the act is forbidden, but the person] is not liable.77 If there are more than five and three-fifths cubits, the person is liable, because he moved an article beyond the diagonal of a square [four cubits long].
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath.
|
| 2. |
In the construction of the Sanctuary, it was necessary to kindle a fire in order to cook the herbs used for the dyes. Similarly, much of the metal work was perfomed after the metals were heated in a fire.
|
| 3. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.
|
| 4. |
See Chapter 8, Halachah 8.
|
| 5. |
See Chapter 10, Halachah 10.
|
| 6. |
Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Kuntres Acharon 495, which explains that in this halachah, the Rambam outlines two types of fires for which one is liable. He begins the halachah with the statement that a person is liable for kindling a fire, "provided he needs the ash that it creates." This refers to a fire kindled for no purpose other than the production of ash.
Afterwards, the Rambam begins to describe when a person is liable for kindling fires that are used for constructive activity. e.g., to generate warmth or to cook. In these instances, there is no requirement that one require the ash.
|
| 7. |
The commentaries have raised many questions concerning this ruling and have also noted the apparent contradiction to the ruling in Chapter 9, Halachah 6, which holds a person who heats metal liable for cooking.
There are three positions among the Rishonim in this regard:
a) That of the Rambam, mentioned in this and the following halachah, which holds one liable for heating and extinguishing iron in order to strengthen it;
b) That of the Ra'avad, which exempts a person for both kindling and extinguishing metal. He maintains, however, that a person who performs these actvities is liable, the liability stemming from other categories of forbidden labors;
c) That of Rashi (Shabbat 42a, 134a), which holds a person liable for kindling metal, but exempts him for extinguishing. (See also the Sefer Yereim, which explains that, in the construction of the Sanctuary, the heating of metal and its refinement was necessary for the goldsmiths and silversmiths.)
Rav Kapach explains the Rambam's position, emphasizing that there is a difference between iron and other metals. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. In contrast, as iron is made into steel, it becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, just as the labors of kindling and extinguishing are associated with making charcoal - a new entity - so, too, it is these categories of labor that relate to the process of making steel. (See also the responsum of Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentioned in the notes on the following halachah.)
|
| 8. |
This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. Extinguishing was necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary, because it was used to create coals that were needed for the fires used to cook the herbs used for dye. Although these fires could also have been heated with wood, a fire heated with coals burns better (Kiryat Sefer).
See also the Sefer Yereim which mentions that extinguishing was necessary for the work of the goldsmiths and silversmiths.
|
| 9. |
Regardless of the size of the fire, a piece of charcoal is created.
|
| 10. |
As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 7, this ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that one is liable for the performance of a [forbidden] labor even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed (a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה).
As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 27:1, 334:27, differ and do not hold a person liable in such an instance. According to these authorities, a person is liable for extinguishing only when he requires the coals produced.
|
| 11. |
In one of his responsa, Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentions the difference between a glowing piece of metal and a coal that comes from wood. When a fire fueled with wood is extinguished, a new entity - charcoal - is produced. Hence, one is liable for performing a forbidden labor. In contrast, when a glowing piece of metal is extinguished, no change is made in the metal itself unless the metal was heated with the intent of purifying it.
It must be noted that there are authorities who preceded the Rambam - Rav Yehudai Gaon, Rav Hai Gaon, and Rabbenu Chanan'el - who hold a person liable for extinguishing a glowing piece of metal. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, most of the authorities in the Rambam's era, and surely those in the subsequent eras, exempt a person for such an activity.
It also must be noted that different rulings apply with regard to extinguishing an electric light or heater. In this instance, there are recent authorities who maintain that one is surely liable for kindling and extinguishing glowing metal. (See Achiezer, Vol. III, Responsum 60 and Tzafenat Paneach, Responsum 273.)
|
| 12. |
According to the Rambam, this applies only with regard to a glowing piece of metal and not to a burning coal. The authorities who maintain that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, however, would allow one to extinguish a burning coal in this instance. Because of the danger involved, the Rabbinic prohibition against performing such an activity is waived (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:27).
|
| 13. |
As mentioned above, although there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, it is waived because of the danger.
|
| 14. |
The Maggid Mishneh states that seemingly the opinions that do not accept Rabbi Yehudah's view regarding a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה would not hold the person liable unless his intent in extinguishing the candle was for the charcoal produced. See the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:1).
|
| 15. |
As the Ra'avad emphasizes, this ruling follows those views which maintain that a person is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. According to the view which differs, even though it is forbidden to extinguish a fire to save one's money, one would not be liable. This allows for greater leniencies, as will be explained.
|
| 16. |
Needless to say, if there is a threat to life the fire may be extinguished.
|
| 17. |
See Chapter 2, Halachah 23.
|
| 18. |
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 334:26) follows the view that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צ ריכה לגופה, and the prohibition against extinguishing a fire is merely Rabbinic in nature. Accordingly, he states that in the present time, it is permissible to extinguish a fire that has begun to blaze in a city.
In his time, it was common for the commotion caused by a fire to serve as an invitation for the gentiles to raid the Jewish quarters of the city, rampaging, pillaging, and creating havoc. In such a situation, it was very possible that Jewish lives would be threatened. Hence, he maintains that it is preferable for the fire to be extinguished than for such a situation to be created. Furthermore, in the cramped conditions of the ghettos, it was highly possible that the lives of the children, the elderly, and the disabled would be threatened by a fire.
Nevertheless, even the Ramah did not grant wholesale leniency on this matter and stated that, in practice, the ruling must be determined on the basis of our appreciation of whether there is a threat to life according to the circumstances at hand. Contemporary authorities add that because of the threat of electrical fires, gas explosions, and the like, a fire constitutes a real danger and should not be allowed to spread.
|
| 19. |
Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against even indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished, this prohibition is waived in the face of property loss (Ramah, Orach Chayim 334:22).
|
| 20. |
The printed text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2) states "It is forbidden to cause [indirectly] a fire to be extinguished." Rav Kapach notes, however, that in authoritative manuscripts of that text, this line is erased. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 13.
This equivocation in the Rambam's mind is also reflected in a difference of opinion between theShulchan Aruch and the Ramah. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:22) quotes the Rambam's ruling that it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly. The Ramah, however, states that this is permitted lest a loss occur. This implies that there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, but that the prohibition is waived because of the possibility of property loss.
|
| 21. |
This act is permitted on the Sabbath itself. Although the bowl is being used for the sake of the beam, an article which may not be moved on the Sabbath, there is no prohibition involved (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 277:8; Mishnah Berurah 277:23).
|
| 22. |
Needless to say, the bowl must be suspended in a manner that allows enough ventilation for the lamp to continue burning.
|
| 23. |
Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's version of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:5).
|
| 24. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that a goat skin will become singed by a fire, but will not burst into flames.
|
| 25. |
I.e., one is not liable. Furthermore, it is permissible to do so. Since it is not a certainty (פסיק רישא, see Chapter 1, Halachah 6) that the fire will be extinguished, this was not forbidden.
The Tur (Orach Chayim 334) states that one may not have the intention of extinguishing the fire, but merely of preventing it from spreading further. Note the difference of opinion between theMagen Avraham and the Turei Zahav if that ruling is accepted.
|
| 26. |
Tosafot, Shabbat 120a, accept the basis of the ruling cited by the Rambam, but maintain that one must use liquids other than water. Pouring water over a garment resembles the forbidden activity of laundering and is not permitted on the Sabbath, even in this situation. The Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 334:24) favors Tosafot's opinion.
|
| 27. |
Based on Shabbat (loc. cit.), Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Ra'avad differ and forbid this leniency. They maintain that although it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly, placing water in such proximity to the fire is no longer considered an indirect activity. As obvious from the previous note, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this opinion.
|
| 28. |
I.e., it was not placed there with the intention that it remain there on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah277:12).
|
| 29. |
The commentaries have raised many questions about this ruling, since it is almost certain that the candle will be extinguished when it falls. Although the person does not intend to extinguish the candle, since this is an inevitable result of his actions (פסיק רישא), seemingly, it should be forbidden, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6. (Note, however, Mishnah Berurah 277:14). For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:3) states that this applies only with regard to a wax candle or an oil lamp if the oil has already burned out. In this instance, it is possible that the candle will continue burning even if it falls. In contrast, an oil lamp that contains oil may not be moved in this manner.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that the Rambam's ruling can be accepted even with regard to an oil lamp which contains oil. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). To apply that concept to the present situation, although spilling the oil from the lamp is considered as extinguishing the lamp, since th person did not intentionally desire to spill it and he regrets the loss of the oil, he should not be held liable. The commentaries also point to several other rulings that indicate that the Rambam accepts this principle.
|
| 30. |
Our translation is a slight extension of the actual text of the Mishneh Torah, which states לטלטלו, concluding with a masculine suffix that seemingly refers to the candle, rather than the board. Nevertheless, as the commentaries point out, it is self-evident that the candle is forbidden to be moved. The new concept brought out by this law is that since the candle was intentionally left on the board before the commencement of the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 25, Halachah 17, the board is considered a base for a forbidden object and is also muktzeh, forbidden to be moved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
|
| 31. |
As explained in Chapter 6, our Sages forbade a Jew to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Jew's behalf on the Sabbath. We are not, however, obligated to prevent the gentile from performing a forbidden labor for his own sake. Thus, we cannot tell him to extinguish the fire, nor are we required to tell him to refrain from doing so. Indeed, this portion of the halachah is quoted in Halachah 4 of that chapter.
|
| 32. |
Exodus 20:10 states, "Do not perform any work, neither you, your son, your daughter,..." implying that a father is responsible for seeing that his children rest on the Sabbath. For this reason, any forbidden labor that will benefit his father may not be performed by a child (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 33. |
The expression "the court" refers to the communal authorities of the Jewish people. In a larger sense, it refers to the community as a whole.
From Chapter 24, Halachah 11, it would appear that the Jewish court is required to restrain a child from performing any violation of the Sabbath laws that originates in the Torah itself. This contradicts the Rambam's statements here and in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27. Among the resolutions of this difficulty is that in the halachah cited, the Rambam is speaking about an activity that will benefit the child's father. See the notes on that halachah.
|
| 34. |
Shabbat 121a, Ketubot 70b.
|
| 35. |
I.e., as long as one does not instruct a gentile to extinguish the fire, one may indirectly encourage him to do so. Since the gentile has not been promised anything specific, he is considered to be working on his own behalf.
|
| 36. |
Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The translation of the standard printed version of the text would be "Bringing articles or removing articles from...." Whether one is bringing an article in or removing it, one is transferring it. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1).
The wording of the manuscripts avoids the difficulties mentioned by the Lechem Mishneh and others that arise from Shabbat 96b.
|
| 37. |
Tosafot, Shabbat 2a, explain that this verse is necessary because, in contrast to the other activities classified as forbidden labors, transferring articles is "an inferior labor" - i.e., we would not ordinarily conceive of it as being forbidden. (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, which states that transferring articles does not appear to be an activity fit to be considered a forbidden labor.)
Eruvin 17b derives the prohibition against the transfer of articles from one domain to another from the exegesis of Exodus 16:29. Tosafot (Eruvin, loc. cit.; Shabbat, loc. cit.) explain that both verses are necessary: one to teach that bringing an article in from the public domain to a private domain is forbidden, and the other to teach the converse, that it is forbidden to take an article out from the private domain to the public domain.
The Rambam (particularly according to the version of the Mishneh Torah we have quoted) appears to view the concept of transferring as one activity which is prohibited on the basis of the oral tradition. Nevertheless, unlike the other categories of forbidden labor, in this instance there are allusions within the Torah itself. To make this point, he quotes the most obvious allusion, leaving the one in Eruvin for the scholars.
|
| 38. |
Shabbat 96b.
|
| 39. |
The bracketed additions are based on Halachot 15 and 18.
|
| 40. |
Rashi (Shabbat 8a) states that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the craftsmen would throw their needles to each other.
|
| 41. |
The Maggid Mishneh defines passing over as dragging an article along the ground. The Merkevet HaMishneh and others interpret it as passing an article from hand to hand. It appears that theMaggid Mishneh does not accept that interpretation, because the opening passage of Shabbatdescribes the transfer of objects from hand to hand as transfer (הוצ אה) and not handing over (הושטה). (See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to this halachah.)
|
| 42. |
In the construction of the Sanctuary, the beams for the walls of the Sanctuary were passed from the public domain to the storage wagons, which were considered as private domains (Shabbat11:2). Tosafot, Shabbat 2a explain that, in contrast to the other categories of forbidden labor, the consequence of the fact that the status of transferring is "an inferior labor," is that if the derivatives had not been found in the construction of the Sanctuary, they would not had been forbidden.
|
| 43. |
As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 14, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath unless he performs it in an ordinary manner.
|
| 44. |
Mustard seed is very small. The Rambam chooses this example for certainly a sufficient quantity of mustard seed will have been transferred to the other domain if the majority of the container has been transferred. In contrast, were the container to hold larger articles, it is possible that no one article would have been transferred. Nevertheless, even when the contents are mustard seed, the person is not liable for the reasons stated by the Rambam.
|
| 45. |
Based on Shabbat 91b, the Merkevet HaMishneh draws attention to an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's decision here and in Hilchot Geneivah 3:2.
|
| 46. |
This reflects the Rambam's interpretation of the expression, Shabbat, loc. cit., אגד כלי שמיה אגד. Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan'el interpret this phrase slightly differently.
In this context, it is worthy to note Rabbi Akiva Eiger's reference to Tosafot, Pesachim 85b. There it is explained that this principle applies only to a container that has a receptacle. If, however, an entity is suspended from a stave, different rules apply.
|
| 47. |
As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 14, usually a right-handed person is not liable if he performs a labor with his left hand. With regard to carrying, however, this is not the case, since a person will frequently carry an object with his weaker hand.
|
| 48. |
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:39 interprets this as referring to a cloth that one is wearing. Even though the person is not holding the money in his hand, he is liable for transferring it. From this ruling, it is clear that a person who transfers objects in his pockets is liable just as if he transferred them by hand.
|
| 49. |
As the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7, the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying an object on his shoulders, for surely it would be held above that height.
|
| 50. |
When the Jews broke camp in their journeys through the desert, the Sanctuary was taken down, and erected again at the site of the new encampment. The boards, coverings, and curtains of the Sanctuary would be transported by the other Levite families on wagons. The sons of Kehat would carry the ark, the table, the menorah, and the altars on their shoulders.
|
| 51. |
More specifically, the verse cited states, "the labor of the Sanctuary is upon them." Since the Torah specifically refers to carrying in this fashion as "labor," although, as explained above, there is reason to exempt a person who carries an object on his shoulder, the person is held liable.
|
| 52. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:3). Others render this term as "in an abnormal manner."
|
| 53. |
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this does not refer to food. If a person walks from one domain to another while eating, he is liable for carrying the food he is holding in his mouth. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 3.)
|
| 54. |
Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.).
|
| 55. |
With this phrase, the Rambam explains the term אפנדתו, Shabbat, loc. cit., according to his Commentary on the Mishnah. Others render this term as "money belt."
|
| 56. |
But not in a pocket.
|
| 57. |
Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.).
|
| 58. |
Bava Metzia 105b relates that it was customary to carry a burden weighing four kabbim or more on one's head. In contemporary measure, this figure is approximately five and a half kilograms or twelve pounds.
|
| 59. |
The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that a person who does not hold the article with his hand is not liable. Balancing a heavy article on one's head is a skilled task that only few individuals are capable of performing. Hence, it is not considered an ordinary manner of transferring an article.
|
| 60. |
The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that in this instance, even if one holds the article in one's hands, one is not liable, since this is not the ordinary way in which an article is transferred.
|
| 61. |
This law applies universally, even in places where it is common to carry articles on one's head. See Shabbat 92a regarding the practice of the inhabitants of Hotzel, a city in Babylon (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 62. |
As mentioned above, the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7 that the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying if he lifts an object above that height while transferring it in the public domain. Nevertheless, since the article does not come to rest in the makom patur, one is held liable (Shabbat 8b,9a).
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's interpretation of that Talmudic passage and offers an alternative, which is accepted by the Rashba and Tosafot. The Rambam's interpretation is also offered by Rashi. (Alternatively, it is possible to explain that the Rambam's intent is that this is an ordinary, and not an abnormal, manner of carrying.
|
| 63. |
As reflected in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and Chapter 20, Halachah 7, the Rambam does not place any restrictions on carrying within a square of four cubits in the public domain.
In contrast, the Ra'avad maintains that the leniency to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits in the public domain was granted a person only in abnormal situations - e.g., when one established this portion of the public domain as the place where he would spend the Sabbath or when he left the Sabbath limits. Under ordinary circumstances, one is not permitted to carry in the public domain at all. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:1) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
|
| 64. |
I.e., the distance from his elbow to the tip of his middle finger. This measure is adapted to each individual instead of establishing a single uniform figure to allow every individual the opportunity of moving articles from his head to his feet when he is lying down (Eiruvin 48a). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
|
| 65. |
But his body is of ordinary size (Rashi, Eiruvin 48a, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:1).
|
| 66. |
According to Shiurei Torah, a cubit is 48 centimeters; according to Chazon Ish, it is 57.7 centimeters
|
| 67. |
Eruvin 48a, Mechilta, Beshalach 5, and other sources.
|
| 68. |
The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to a difference of opinion among the Sages, Eruvin 48a, regarding the extent to which one is allowed to carry in the public domain. Although the prevailing view is that one is allowed to carry in a square four cubits long, there are interpretations that state that one may carry four cubits in any direction. This means that although one may not carry an object eight cubits, one may carry an object four cubits on one side and four cubits on the other side.
The view that the Rambam appears to accept, however, maintains that one may carry only in a single square four cubits long. (See also Chapter 27, Halachah 11.)
|
| 69. |
I.e., they are less than eight cubits apart. There was no Rabbinic prohibition instituted lest one carry beyond the permitted space.
|
| 70. |
I.e., the individuals on the extremes are standing between eight cubits and twelve cubits from each other. Thus the squares four cubits long of those on the extremes do not overlap, yet each share a certain portion with the person in the center.
|
| 71. |
Although they are forbidden to share with each other directly, as explained in the following halachah, each of them may pass an article to the person in the center, who may pass it to the other.
|
| 72. |
As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the transfer must take place within the four cubits, the colleague may be standing slightly further removed.
|
| 73. |
A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.
|
| 74. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, noting that this leniency was mentioned in Eruvin95b only with regard to an extreme situation - i.e., an instance where tefillin or other sacred articles might be desecrated. He contends that it should not be extended beyond that context.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:3) quotes the Rambam's ruling, some of the later authorities (see Turei Zahav 349:1) raise questions about this leniency.
|
| 75. |
The Rambam is not speaking in exact figures; the actual length of the diagonal is a fraction larger.
|
| 76. |
The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there were earlier authorities who maintain that one is liable for moving an article a measure of four cubits. Nevertheless, all the later authorities accept the law stated by the Rambam.
|
| 77. |
Based on Eruvin 98b, Rashi, Tosafot, and Rabbenu Asher (see also the gloss of the Ra'avad) do not accept the Rambam's ruling and place no restrictions on carrying within five and three-fifths cubits. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:2) mentions the Rambam's view, it accepts the decision of the other authorities. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:2, however, states that at the outset, the Rambam's view should be followed.
|
Shabbat - Chapter Thirteen
Halacha 1
A person who transfers an object from one domain into another1 or one who carries an object beyond four cubits in the public domain is not liable unless he lifts the object up from a place that is [at least] four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and places it down in a place that is [at least] four handbreadths by four handbreadths.2
Halacha 2
A person's hand is considered equivalent to a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size.3 Therefore, a person who removes an object from another person's hand in one domain and places it in the hand of a third person in a second domain is liable.4
Similarly, a person is liable if he was standing in one of these two domains and stretched his hand into the other, removed an article from there or from the hand of a person standing there, and then returned his hand. [This applies] even though he did not place down the article in the domain in which he is standing.5 Since it is in his hand, it is considered as if it were placed on the ground.
Halacha 3
When a person was eating and passed from one domain to another, he is liable if he thought to carry the food in his mouth from one domain to the other. Although this is not the ordinary way in which articles are transferred,6 his intent causes his mouth to be considered as a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size.
Similarly, if a person who was standing in one domain urinated or spit into the other domain, he is liable, because he removed [a substance] from one domain and placed it down in another. His conscious [performance of this activity] causes it to be considered as if he removed [an object] from a space four [handbreadths by four handbreadths]. If a person is standing in one domain and the opening of his penis is in a second domain and he urinates into that domain, he is not liable.7
Halacha 4
If a person standing in one of two domains extended his hand into the other, removed water from a pit full of water,8 and transferred it [to another domain], he is liable.9 The entire [quantity of] water is considered as if it is placed on the ground.
In contrast, when a container of fruit is floating on the water, a person who extends his hand and takes some of the fruit and transfers it [to the domain in which he is standing] is not liable. Since the fruit was not resting on the ground, the person did not remove [an object] from a space four [handbreadths by four handbreadths].10
Halacha 5
As mentioned above,13 a person who transfers [an object] from one domain to another is not liable unless he removes the object from its place and places it down [in a new place]. When, however, one removes [an object], but does not place it down or places it down without lifting it up, one is not liable.
Therefore, when a person standing in one of two domains extends his hand into another domain while holding an object, and another person takes it from him, or if another person places an article in his hand and he retracts his hand, neither is liable,14 neither the person who removed the article nor the one who placed it down.15
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
When one person is standing in either of these two domains and a colleague extends his hand from the second domain, takes an object from the person standing in the first domain and brings it in, or [the colleague] takes an object from his [domain] and places it in the hand of the person who is standing, the person who is standing [is not liable at all].18 He did absolutely nothing; it was [his colleague who] placed the object in his hand or took it from his hand. The colleague is therefore liable, for he removed the object [from its original place] and put it down [in a new place].
Halacha 8
When a person is standing in either of these two domains and a colleague puts an object in his hand or [loads it] on his back, and the [first] person goes out to another domain [carrying] this object, he becomes liable [when] he stands [still]. Removing his body while bearing the object is considered as removing the object from that domain, and standing while carrying the object is considered as placing the object down on the ground where he is standing. Therefore, if he went out holding the object in his hand or [carrying] it on his back and did not stand [still] in the second domain, but rather returned to the first domain while he was still holding the object, he is not liable. [This applies] even if he goes in and out [carrying the object] for the entire day until its conclusion. Although he removed [the object from its original place], he did not put it down [in a new place].19 Even if he stands [still] to adjust his load, he is not liable.20 [To be held liable, he must] stand [still] to rest.
Halacha 9
For this reason, a person who is carrying a burden on his shoulders and running is not liable until he stands, even if he runs the entire day. He must, however, be running. If he is walking slowly, it is tantamount to having removed the article and having placed it down. [Hence,] this is forbidden.21For this reason, a person who was carrying an article on his shoulders when the Sabbath commences should run with it until he reaches his home and then throw it inside in an abnormal manner.22
Halacha 10
When a person removes an article from its place in the public domain and walks, [carrying] it less than four cubits and stands, [he is not liable].23[Moreover, even if he continues this pattern[ the entire day, carrying the article less than four cubits, stopping, and then proceeding further, he is not liable.24When does the above apply? When he stands in order to rest.25 If, however, he stands to adjust his load [within four cubits], it is considered as if he is still walking. Thus, when he stands after moving four cubits [from his original place], he is liable.26 The [latter ruling applies, however,] when he stops [a second time] after moving four cubits [from his original place] for the purpose of resting. If he stops for the purpose of adjusting his load [again], he is considered as if he is still walking. He is not liable until he stood to rest more than four cubits [from his original place].
Halacha 11
[The following rules apply when] a pole, spear, or the like is lying on the ground: If a person lifts up one end without lifting the other from the ground, and then thrusts the pole forward, [he is not liable]. [Moreover, even if he continues this pattern,] picking up the second end which had remained in contact with the earth [while leaving the other end in contact with the earth], and thrusting it forward, and continuing to do so until the object moved severalmillim, he is not liable. [The rationale is that] the person never lifted the object from the earth.27 If, however, he pulls the article and drags it on the ground from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square], he is liable. [The rationale is that] rolling the article is comparable to picking it up from its place.28
Halacha 12
When a person removes an article from one corner [of a private domain] with the intent of placing it down in another corner [of the same domain], the removal of the article in such a manner is permitted. Should he then change his mind and take the article out to another domain, he is not liable.
[The rationale is that] the removal [of the article from its original place] was not [performed] with that intent.29 Thus, the placement of the article was [performed in a forbidden manner], but not its removal.
Similarly, a person is not liable if he removes an article [from its original position] and places it on the back of a colleague who is walking, but removes it from his colleague's back when30 the latter desires to stand.31 The removal of the article was [performed in a forbidden manner], but not its placement.
Halacha 13
A person who throws an object from one domain to another, or from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] is not liable if another person caught it in his hands,32 a dog caught it, or it was consumed by flames before it came to rest. [The rationale is that] this was not the manner in which the thrower intended that the article come to rest. Accordingly, if this, in fact, was his intent, he is liable.33
Halacha 14
A person is not liable if he throws an article that is tied to a rope he is holding in his hand from one domain to another, if he can pull the article back to him. [The rationale is that] the article is not considered to have been placed down in a definitive manner.34 Thus, the person is considered to have removed the article [from its original place],35 but not to have placed it down [in a new place].
Halacha 15
[The following rules apply when] a person throws an object and it comes to rest in the hands of a colleague: If the colleague stood in his place and received the object, the person who threw it is liable, for he both removed [the object from its original place] and caused it to come to rest.36 If the colleague [was forced to] leave his place to receive it, the one who threw it is not liable. If a person threw an article and then ran after the article himself and caught it in his hands in another domain or beyond four cubits [in the public domain], he is not liable. It is as if [the intended recipient was forced to] leave his place to catch it.37 [The rationale for these rulings is: The person who throws an article is not considered to have] caused [the article] to come to rest in a definitive manner until it comes to rest in the place in which it was intended to come to rest when it was removed [from its original place].
Halacha 16
A person who throws an article from one private domain to another private domain is not liable, even if the article passes through the space of a public domain that separates them from each other.38 [The above applies] provided the article passes more than three handbreadths above the ground.39 If, however, the article passes less than three handbreadths above the earth and comes to rest on another object,40 the person is liable even though [afterwards,] the object [continues to] move and rolls into the other private domain.41[Nevertheless,] it is considered as if it had remained in the public domain. Therefore, the person is liable. Similarly, when a person throws an article from one public domain to another public domain that is separated from the first by a private domain, the person is not liable.42 If, however, the article passes less than three handbreadths above the earth and comes to rest on another object, the person is liable even though [afterwards,] the object rolls into the other public domain.43 [Nevertheless,] it is considered as if it had remained in the private domain. Therefore, the person is liable.
Halacha 17
A person is, however, liable if he carries44 an object more than four cubits [in the public domain as he proceeds from] one public domain to another [although he passes through a private domain in the interim].45 The rationale is that the total of four cubits [can be reached by] combining [the area traversed in] both public domains, because the object did not come to rest in the domain between them.
Halacha 18
A person is liable if he passes46 an article from one private domain to another private domain when they are separated by a public domain.47 [This law applies] even when he passed the article above the space of the public domain, for this was [part of] the service of the Levites in the Sanctuary.48 They would pass the boards from wagon to wagon.49 [This is analogous to the above situation, because] the public domain passed between each wagon and each wagon was considered as a private domain.50
Halacha 19
When does the above apply? When the two private domains are positioned [parallel to each other] along the length of the public domain,51 as the wagons would proceed behind each other in the public domain. If, however, the two private domains are positioned opposite each other on either side of the public domain,52 one is not liable even if one passes53 an article from one domain to the other.
Halacha 20
[The following rules apply when] a person forgot54 and reached his hand out from one courtyard with the intent of extending it into another courtyard to its side55 
while he was holding fruit: If he remembered before his hand entered [the other courtyard], and his hand is thus extended above the space of the public domain,56 he is permitted to return it to the courtyard in which he [is located]. He is, however, forbidden to extend it into the second courtyard, so that he will not accomplish the intent he had in mind when he performed this act inadvertently. If he extended his hand with a conscious intent to violate [the Sabbath laws and then changed his mind], he is [even] forbidden to return it. [The Sages] punished him [and decreed] that his hand must remain extended until nightfall.57
while he was holding fruit: If he remembered before his hand entered [the other courtyard], and his hand is thus extended above the space of the public domain,56 he is permitted to return it to the courtyard in which he [is located]. He is, however, forbidden to extend it into the second courtyard, so that he will not accomplish the intent he had in mind when he performed this act inadvertently. If he extended his hand with a conscious intent to violate [the Sabbath laws and then changed his mind], he is [even] forbidden to return it. [The Sages] punished him [and decreed] that his hand must remain extended until nightfall.57
Halacha 21
When a person intended to throw an article eight cubits in the public domain, but the article came to rest [just] beyond four cubits, he is liable, because the minimum measure of the forbidden labor was performed and the person's intent was completed. [Why is this so?]58 Because it is known that an article cannot reach a range of eight cubits without first passing through every space within that distance.59 In contrast, if a person intended to throw an article [just beyond] four [cubits] and the article came to rest at a distance of eight cubits, he is not liable, because the article came to rest in a place where he did not expect it to pass and certainly not to come to rest. Accordingly, if a person threw an object with the intent that it come to rest wherever it [landed], he is liable.
Halacha 22
When a person throws an article [within] four cubits and it rolls beyond that distance, he is not liable.60 [The following rules apply] if a person throws an article beyond four cubits and it rolls back within four cubits: If it came to rest on an object beyond four cubits and afterwards rolled back within four cubits, he is liable.61 If it did not come to rest at all [beyond four cubits], he is not liable.62
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to the fact that there are authorities who hold a person liable if he places an object down on a place in a private domain that is smaller than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. (See the notes on Chapter 14, Halachah 17.)
|
| 2. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam explains the rationale for this law: An object of significant size will not remain at rest if put down in such a small place. Therefore, one is not liable for placing down any objects there.
An object that is positioned on a person, animal, or utensil located in a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths is considered as if it has been placed down on a place that size.
|
| 3. |
This concept is also explained in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1): The adroitness and dexterity of a human hand makes it fit to hold even very large articles that are placed in it. Therefore, an object placed in a person's hand is considered as if it were placed on the ground on which he was standing.
|
| 4. |
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 1:1) as stating that a person is not liable for placing an object in the hand of another person standing in the public domain unless the latter's hand is held below ten handbreadths high. Nevertheless, as Chapter 12, Halachah 14, appears to indicate, the Rambam does not necessarily make such a distinction.
|
| 5. |
It must be emphasized that a person's hand is considered as equivalent to a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size only when that hand is located in the same domain as he is. When, however, a person is standing in the public domain and his hand is extended into a private domain, an object placed in his hand is not considered to have been put down in the private domain. See Chapter 15, Halachah 1.
|
| 6. |
See Chapter 12, Halachah 13.
|
| 7. |
Eruvin 99a questions whether a person would be held liable in such an instance, and leaves the matter unresolved. Therefore, the Rambam rules that a person is not held liable.
|
| 8. |
Rav David Arameah emphasizes that this halachah is speaking about an instance in which the water is at rest and not flowing.
|
| 9. |
In contrast, if a person in a similar situation catches rain water in his hand and transfers it, he is not liable, because it is not considered to have come to rest (Shabbat 5a,b).
|
| 10. |
In this instance as well, since our Sages (Shabbat 5b) do not resolve whether or not a person should be held liable in such an instance, the Rambam exempts him.
|
| 11. |
The Rambam appears to interpret the passage cited above as emphasizing that an object that floats on water is not considered to be at rest. Hence, the criteria from removing an object from a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths cannot be met. See (Tosafot, Shabbat, loc. cit.), which interprets the passage slightly differently.
|
| 12. |
Although the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, the majority rule that since oil remains a distinct entity and floats on the water (see Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 8:3), it is not considered to be resting in place.
|
| 13. |
Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
|
| 14. |
This is the contents of the first Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat.
|
| 15. |
The rationale for this decision is that a person is liable only when he both begins and completes a forbidden labor himself. There is no liability when one person begins a forbidden labor and it is completed by another. Shabbat 93a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, "when one performs one...," as implying that "a person who completes its performance, and not one who performs only a portion [of the forbidden labor]." (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, and also Chapter 1, Halachah 15.)
|
| 16. |
One of the principles of Torah law that is applied in several other different contexts (e.g., constructing an eruv or a sukkah) is l'vud - i.e., that an object less than three cubits away from another entity is considered to be connected to it.
|
| 17. |
And thus, in addition to the removal of the article from its place, he is considered to have performed the hanachah, the placement of the article in its new place (Rashi, Shabbat 92a).
Rashi also emphasizes that although the person is standing in another domain and holding the article in his hand, the fact that his hand is attached to his body does not prevent us from considering the object as having been placed on the ground.
In this context, the commentaries note the contrast to Halachah 14. The Or Sameach explains that the leniency mentioned there applies only when one throws an object, and not when one moves it from domain to domain by hand.
|
| 18. |
This halachah is also based on the opening mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. Although the person standing is not liable at all with regard to the Sabbath laws, he transgresses the prohibition (Leviticus 19:14), "Do not place a stumbling block in the path of the blind." See Tosafot, Shabbat3a, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 347.
|
| 19. |
There appears to be a slight difference between the Rambam's interpretation of the source for this law, Shabbat 5b, and that of Rashi. Note the commentaries of the Lechem Mishneh and Merkevet HaMishneh.
|
| 20. |
Unless a person's intent is to rest, his standing is not significant, for it is only circumstance and not conscious decision that causes him to stand still. He is still in the midst of the activity he is performing and has not come to rest. See Halachah 10 and notes.
|
| 21. |
By using the term "forbidden" rather than "liable," the Rambam emphasizes that the prohibition is Rabbinic in nature. Since this does not represent a departure from one's ordinary conduct, there is the possibility that one will stop, and thus perform an activity for which one is liable. Hence, the Rabbis forbade such conduct (Rashi, Shabbat 153b, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 266:11). Others explain that the Sages issued this prohibition because this leniency might cause the person to carry on a future occasion, or because others might carry after they saw him do so.
|
| 22. |
Shabbat (loc. cit.) emphasizes that there are two difficulties involved in the person's conduct: a) carrying the object four cubits in the public domain, and b) taking the object from the public domain to his home, a private domain (for most likely, the person stopped at least momentarily before entering).
Since the person began carrying the object before the commencement of the Sabbath, he has not removed the article from its place (akirah) in a forbidden manner. Hence, carrying the object four cubits in the public domain does not constitute a difficulty. In contrast, transferring the object from the public domain into one's home is problematic. Nevertheless, since this transfer is carried out in an abnormal manner, one is not liable.
Shabbat (loc. cit.) mentions this law with regard to a person carrying a package. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:12) questions whether the same leniency applies when a person is carrying a wallet or another small article of that nature. The commentaries explain that since a person does not usually run when carrying a burden, the fact that he runs is a sufficient departure from the norm to remind him that stopping is forbidden. In contrast, since it is not a departure from the norm for a person to run while carrying a wallet, the Rabbis forbade doing so.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:13 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:34 state that in their time, when according to most authorities there is no concept of a public domain, one may follow the lenient view. There is some question, however, if this applies at present.
(See also the notes on Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7. See also the comments of the Mishnah Berurah266:29, which states that preferably one should have even a package carried by a gentile or an animal, or one should walk with it less than four cubits at a time.)
|
| 23. |
As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 15, one is allowed to carry within one's four cubits.
|
| 24. |
The Rambam uses the past tense, implying that this ruling applies only after the fact, בדעיבד. At the outset, לכתחילה, one is allowed to carry an object less than four cubits at a time only in certain extraordinary situations. (See Chapter 20, Halachah 7, and notes.)
This represents the perspective taken by most commentaries (see Shulchan Aruch HaRav349:5). Rav Kapach, however, cites manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state מותר, "permitted," rather than פטור, "not liable," implying that there are no restrictions against carrying in this manner.
|
| 25. |
Only then is he considered to have placed the article down (hanachah). (See Halachah 8.)
|
| 26. |
The first time he stood, he is not considered to have performed a hanachah. In contrast, when he stood the second time, he is considered to have done so. Hence, he is liable for carrying.
|
| 27. |
One is liable for moving an article only when there is akirah and hanachah. In this instance, neither of these actions had taken place.
|
| 28. |
The difference between dragging and rolling and the previous instance appears to be that although the article remains in contact with the ground while being rolled, the entire article is moved from its original place at the same time. In contrast, when one lifts up the pole, one side always remains in its original place.
|
| 29. |
Rashi (Shabbat 5b) explains that since the person did not perform the akirah with the intent of transferring the article to the public domain, he is not considered to have performed the forbidden labor as a purposeful act. Since it is purposeful activity, מלאכת מחשבת, that the Torah forbade on the Sabbath, he is not liable at all. Although he did perform the transfer and the hanachahintentionally, since he did not have such a thought when performing the akirah, the entire action is considered to have been performed unintentionally.
According to the Rambam, however, the rationale appears to be that since the entire labor was not performed in a forbidden manner, one is not held liable.
|
| 30. |
I.e., before.
|
| 31. |
Were the person carrying the object to have stood still, he would have performed a forbiddenhanachah, as mentioned in Halachah 8. Although even in such circumstances, neither of the two would have been liable (as stated in Halachah 5), when the article is taken in the manner described by the Rambam, neither is considered to have performed a forbidden hanachah.
There is no prohibition in taking an article off a colleague's back in the public domain, even when the latter is walking. Taking the article from a person in this manner is not considered a continuation of the first transfer of the article, but rather an independent act. (See also the notes on Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7.)
|
| 32. |
Rashi (Shabbat 102a) states that this refers to a situation where the other person had to leave his original place to catch the article which was thrown. The Sefer HaKovetz and the Merkevet HaMishneh state that according to the Rambam, the thrower is not liable even if the other person who caught the article did not move, for the article did not come to rest in the place intended by the thrower.
|
| 33. |
Even if the dog's mouth or the opening of the fire is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (see Halachah 1), the person is liable. The fact that this was the person's intent causes the place the article comes to rest to be considered as significant (Shabbat, loc. cit.).
|
| 34. |
The commentaries note the contrast to Halachah 6. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Or Sameach differentiates between throwing an object and moving it by hand.
|
| 35. |
In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger emphasizes that the rope is not considered part of the article itself (in which case the person would be exempted because he did transfer the entire article). (See Chapter 12, Halachah 11.)
|
| 36. |
Throwing the object into his hands is equivalent to placing it there. If the recipient of the article must move in order to catch it, he is not liable, because the article did not come to rest in the desied place.
|
| 37. |
Shabbat 5a questions whether these two separate actions, throwing and catching the article, are considered as having been performed in one continuum or not. Since this matter is left unresolved, the Rambam does not hold one liable.
|
| 38. |
Although Rabbi Akiva maintains that an object that passes through the space above a domain is considered as if it came to rest in that domain, his opinion is not accepted by the majority of the Sages. The halachah follows the majority opinion (Shabbat 11:1).
|
| 39. |
As mentioned previously, the space within three handbreadths of the ground is considered asl'vud, an extension of the ground.
|
| 40. |
There are several other opinions among the Rishonim on this issue. Rashi (Shabbat 100a) states that this ruling applies even if the article is being blown by the wind and pauses in its progress in the midst of the air. Since it is less than three handbreadths above the ground, it is considered as being in contact with the ground. Nevertheless, if it does not pause even momentarily in its progress towards the other domain, it is not considered to have come to rest.
Both the Rambam's ruling and that of Rashi are based on the opinion of Ravvah (Shabbat 97a). That Talmudic passage also mentions another opinion, that of Rav Chilkiyah who maintains that, based on the principle of l'vud, the article is considered to have come to rest even though its progress is not halted even momentarily. Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Ramban accept this view.
|
| 41. |
If, however, the article passes more than three handbreadths above the ground, the person who throws it is not liable even if it comes to rest. As mentioned in Halachah 1, a person is not liable unless the article comes to rest on a surface at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Lechem Mishneh).
|
| 42. |
Note, however, the following halachah.
|
| 43. |
In his gloss to the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger draws attention to Chapter 14, Halachah 17, which appears to indicate that the Rambam does not require an object to be placed down on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths in the private domain. From this halachah, however, it would appear that he maintains that such a condition is necessary. Otherwise, there would be no difference whether the article was thrown three handbreadths above the ground or not.
|
| 44. |
Although Shabbat 97b-98a, the source for this halachah, states this concept with regard to a person who throws an article, the Rambam alters the wording and mentions "a person who carries...." He did not make this change to exclude one who throws an article, but rather to emphasize that a person who carries an article in this manner is also liable.
The commentaries offer several reasons why this emphasis is necessary. Among them: A person who throws an article does not have it in his power to return it. Hence, it is logical to assume that the area in the two public domains can be combined. In contrast, a person carrying an article can change his mind at any time. Therefore, it would have been possible to think that his entrance into the second public domain is an independent act. Hence, it is necessary for the Rambam to mention carrying (Or Sameach).
Alternatively, the Rambam's choice of wording was intended to differentiate between the instance described here, and the circumstances described in Chapter 18, Halachah 24 (Sefer HaKovetz).
|
| 45. |
E.g., the person was standing two cubits from the end of one public domain. He carried or threw an article over a private domain and it came to rest more than three and a third cubits within a second public domain. Although the article did not travel four cubits in either of the two public domains, when the sum of the space it traveled in both public domains is taken, it exceeds the diagonal of a square of four cubits. Hence, he is liable. See the diagram on the opposite page.
|
| 46. |
As the Rambam emphasizes in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:2), a person is liable only when he passes an article in this fashion, and not when he throws one. The circumstances in which one is liable are derived from the Sanctuary, and in that instance the Levites would pass the boards only; they would not throw them.
|
| 47. |
The description of this situation is completed in the following halachah.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that it would be logical to assume that a person who passes in article from one private domain to another in this manner would also be exempt, as explained in the following note. Nevertheless, since this constituted part of the service of the Levites in the Sanctuary, one is held liable.
|
| 48. |
Generally, the space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is considered a makom patur, and one is not held liable for transferring an object through it (Chapter 14, Halachah 7). Nevertheless, since the service of the Levites involved carrying in this manner, one is liable under such circumstances as well.
The Merkevet HaMishneh questions the Rambam's use of the word "even," which implies that one is surely liable for passing an article in the manner described above when one passes the article below ten handbreadths. This is problematic: Since logically a person would not be held liable in such an instance, and the obligation stems only from the parallel to the service of the Levites, why is it extended beyond the parameters of their service? Since they would pass the boards more than ten handbreadths above the ground, why is one liable when passing an article at a lower height? (See Tosafot, Shabbat 4a.)
|
| 49. |
As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 12, during the Jews' journey through the desert they would dismantle, transport, and re-erect the Sanctuary. In this process, the boards for the walls of the sanctuary were carried on four wagons. They would line up in pairs on either side of the Sanctuary. The boards would be lifted from the ground to the front wagon and then passed from one wagon to the other above the space of the public domain. See the accompanying diagram taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.).
|
| 50. |
Since the wagons were ten handbreadths above the ground, each of them was considered a separate private domain.
|
| 51. |
The Mishnah (Shabbat 11:2) gives an example of such a situation: Two balconies in a row above the public domain. Note the diagram on the opposite page taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah.
|
| 52. |
E.g., two balconies on either side of a street (Shabbat, loc. cit.).
|
| 53. |
The word "even" is used to imply that not only is one free of liability when one throws from one balcony to another, even when an article is passed by hand in this fashion, one is exempt.
The reason for this exemption is that the Levites would pass the boards from wagon to wagon along the length of the public domain, but not across it. As mentioned above, logically one would not necessarily infer that a person should be held liable for transferring an article in this manner. Nevertheless, since we find that the Levites would transfer the boards in this manner, one is held liable. This applies, however, only when one transfers an article in the same manner as they would transfer the boards.
|
| 54. |
I.e., forgot that it was the Sabbath or forgot that it was forbidden to transfer articles in this manner on the Sabbath. Hence, the person is considered as having performed the act בשוגג, "inadvertently."
|
| 55. |
Seemingly, this law is dependent on the situation described in the previous two halachot. A person desired to pass an object (fruit) from one courtyard (a private domain) to another courtyard, which was separated from the first by the public domain. Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 348:2 states that it also applies when taking the article into the other courtyard would not make one liable for a sin offering - e.g., when they are positioned on opposite sides of the public domain.
|
| 56. |
Rav Moshe Cohen and the Maggid Mishneh maintain that this law applies only when the person's hand is held less than ten handbreadths above the public domain. If, however, the person extends his hand higher then ten handbreadths from the ground, he is allowed to return it, since it is being held in a makom patur. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 348:1) accepts this interpretation.
|
| 57. |
I.e., the conclusion of the Sabbath. The Rashba in his notes on Shabbat 3a states that this restriction applies only when a person extended his hand to transfer the article before the commencement of the Sabbath. If he extended his hand outward after the commencement of the Sabbath, he is allowed to return it, lest he drop the article into the public domain, and in doing so perform a forbidden labor.
(According to the Rambam, he would not be liable in such an instance. Even if he dropped the article, it would not have been placed down in the place he originally intended. Hence, he would be exempt, as stated in Halachah 15.)
Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rashba's view, it rules according to the Rambam. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 348:1 quotes solely the Rambam's view. The Mishnah Berurah348:8, however, mentions authorities who accept the Rashba's opinion.
|
| 58. |
The question is based on the concept expressed in Halachah 15: A person is liable for transferring an article only when it comes to rest in the place where he intended it to when he removed it from its original place.
|
| 59. |
Accordingly, it is considered as if this was implicit in his original intent.
Rashi and Tosafot differ with the Rambam in their interpretation of the source for this halachah,Shabbat 97b. According to their perspective, the thrower is liable only when it makes no difference to him where the article lands. If his intent was for it to travel eight cubits, he is not liable.
See the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 254), which explains the theoretical difference between this view and the Rambam's ruling.
|
| 60. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:3), the Rambam explains that the person is not liable because he did not intend to throw the article beyond the permitted distance.
The Rashba offers a different explanation of this Mishnah, that the article came to rest momentarily within four cubits and then rolled beyond that distance. Since the Rambam does not mention the object coming to rest at all in this clause, he does not follow this interpretation.
The Rambam would surely agree that one is not liable in the situation described by the Rashba. It is a matter of question, however, whether the Rashba would agree that the person is not liable in the situation described by the Rambam.
|
| 61. |
Since the object came to rest, albeit momentarily, it is considered as if his intent were completed.
|
| 62. |
Because there is no forbidden hanachah.
|
Shabbat - Chapter Fourteen
Halacha 1
There are four domains1 [referred to by our Sages with regard to transferring objects on the Sabbath]: a private domain,2 a public domain,3 a carmelit,4 and a makom patur.5
What constitutes a public domain?6 Deserts,7 forests,8 marketplaces, and the thoroughfares leading to them, provided that the thoroughfares are sixteen cubits wide9 and are not covered by a roof.10
What constitutes a private domain? A mound that is at least ten handbreadths high and at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area;11
a groove that is at least ten handbreadths deep and at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area;
a place that is surrounded by four walls that are [at least] ten handbreadths high and whose inner space is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area. Even if such an area is several millim in size, [it is considered a private domain] if it was enclosed for the purpose of [creating] a dwelling12 - e.g., a city surrounded by a wall whose gates are closed13 at night14 and a lane that has three walls and a lechi at its fourth side.15 Similarly, a courtyard, a corral, and a stable that were enclosed for the purpose of [creating] a dwelling16 are considered private domains in a complete sense.
Halacha 2
Halacha 3
The span of the walls of the private domain is considered to be like the private domain.20 If the [walls] create a distinction [from the public domain] for another [area - i.e., the space they contain], surely they create a distinction for themselves.
Halacha 4
What is a carmelit? A mound that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area and between three [handbreadths]23and ten [handbreadths] high.24 For a carmelit occupies only the space ten [handbreadths] or less above the ground and is not less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths in area].25
Each of the following is [also considered] a carmelit:
a groove that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area and between three [handbreadths] and ten [handbreadths] deep,26
a place that is surrounded by four walls that are between three and ten27[handbreadths] high28 and enclose an area at least four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths],29 a corner next to the public domain - i.e., an area surrounded by three walls with the public domain on the fourth side30 - e.g., a passageway that does not have a lechi or a korah on the fourth side,31 seas, a valley [of fields],32 whether in the summer or in the rainy season.33
Halacha 5
The space above a carmelit is considered equivalent to a carmelit for ten handbreadths. The space ten handbreadths above a carmelit, however, is considered a makom patur.34
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
What is meant by a makom patur? An area that is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths43 in area and more than three handbreadths above the earth, even if it reaches the heavens themselves. An elevation less than three handbreadths high, by contrast, is considered as [being on] ground level.44
Even brambles, briers, and dung that are located in the public domain45 and are more than three [handbreadths] high and less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] are deemed a makom patur.
Similarly, a groove that is less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] and more than three handbreadths deep, even if it reaches the earth's very depths, and a place that is surrounded by walls, but is not four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area and is more than three handbreadths high, are both considered a makom patur.46 Even if they are one thousand millim long, but the length of a barley corn less than four handbreadths wide, [they are still considered as a makom patur.
Also considered a makom patur is the space above a public domain and the space above a carmelit that is more than ten handbreadths high.
Halacha 8
A place that is exactly nine handbreadths high, neither more or less, in the public domain is considered part of the public domain. [It is placed in this category47] regardless of its width or length - whether large or small - because many people use it to arrange their loads.48
If, however, it is more49 or less than nine handbreadths high, [different rules apply]: If it is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] or more [in area], it is a carmelit. If it is less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths in area], it is a makom patur.
Halacha 9
When a roof that is less than ten handbreadths [high]50 is located in proximity to the public domain and many use it for their loads, it is forbidden to carry on this roof51 unless a ladder [leading to the owner's courtyard] is permanently affixed52 there. [If this is done,] it is permitted [to carry on the roof].53
A pillar that is located in the public domain and is ten handbreadths high and four [handbreadths by four handbreadths in area] is deemed a private domain.54 If, however, one inserted a spike in its side,55 even if [the spike is] less than three handbreadths high,56 since articles may be hung from it or it may be used [for other purposes], it reduces the height of the pillar and it is deemed to be a carmelit.57 [The pillar's] height is calculated beginning from the highest spike.
Even if [the pillar] was filled entirely with spikes, its height is reduced, since articles may be hung from these spikes, or they may be used [for other purposes].
Halacha 10
Holes [in the wall of] a private domain58are [considered part of] the private domain.59 Holes in the public domain, by contrast, [are not considered part of the public domain, but rather] are judged according to their size.
What is implied? Holes located at the side of the public domain which are four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] and ten [handbreadths] high60 are considered as a private domain.61 If they [are this length and width, but] are not ten [handbreadths] high, they are considered to be a carmelit. If they are smaller than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], they are considered to be a makom patur.
Halacha 11
It is permitted to carry throughout a private domain and a makom patur. Even if such a domain is several millim long, one is permitted to carry throughout the entire area. In contrast, one may carry only within [a square of] four cubits in a public domain and in a carmelit.
If a person carried [an article], passed [it] to another person or threw [it] beyond four cubits in the public domain, he is liable. In a carmelit, one is not liable, since the prohibition against [carrying in] a carmelit is a Rabbinic decree, [enacted because] the area resembles a public domain and [the Sages were concerned] that a distinction between the two would not be made.
Accordingly, if one removed [an article] for which one had no purpose - e.g., one removed a thorn from a carmelit64 so that people would not be injured by it, the act is permitted. This applies even if one carries it several cubits. The same applies in other similar instances.
Halacha 12
Just as one is permitted to carry within a makom patur, so too, is one permitted to transfer articles from it to a private domain, a public domain, and, needless to say, a carmelit. Similarly, one may transfer articles to it from a private domain, a public domain, and, needless to say, a carmelit.65
Halacha 13
Just as one is forbidden to carry within a carmelit, so, too, is one forbidden to remove articles from it to a private domain or a public domain. [Similarly, it is forbidden] to bring in an article from a private domain or a public domain to acarmelit.66 If one removes or brings in [an article], one is not liable.
Halacha 14
A person is not liable for transferring an article from one private domain to another private domain via a carmelit,67 nor [is he liable for transferring an article] from one public domain to another public domain via a carmelit.68Similarly, a person who passes or throws an article from either of these types of domains to another similar domain via a carmelit is not liable.
When a person transfers an article from the public domain to a carmelit, puts it down in the latter domain, and afterwards, picks it up from the carmelit and brings it into a private domain, [he is not liable].69 [Similarly, a person who transfers an article] from a private domain to a carmelit, puts it down in the latter domain, and afterwards, picks it up from the carmelit and brings it into a public domain, is not liable.
Halacha 15
A person is liable if he transfers an article from a private domain to a public domain even though he passes through a makom patur, because a person who is walking is not considered to have stood [in the places through which he passed].70 Surely, when a person throws an article through a makom patur, the article is not considered to have come to rest.71
A person is not liable if, while standing in a makom patur, he took an article from a private domain or from a person standing there and placed it down in the public domain or in the hands of a person standing there.72 Similarly, if one brought an article from a public domain to a private domain [via a] makom patur and stood in the latter domain, one is not liable.73
Halacha 16
A pillar that is located in the public domain [is considered] a private domain [in the following situation]: It is ten [handbreadths] high and [possesses an upper surface] of four [handbreadths by four handbreadths] in area, but a lower surface that is not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths]. [This applies even] when its smaller end is more than three [handbreadths] high.74[Therefore,] if a person throws an article from the public domain and it lands on [this pillar], he is liable.
Halacha 17
When a person throws an article from the public domain and it lands upon a reed77 - even one that is 100 cubits high - which is implanted in a private domain, he is liable, for a private domain extends until the very heavens.
When a tree's [trunk] is located in a private domain and its branches extend into the public domain, a person who throws [an article from the public domain that] lands in its branches is not liable, because the branches78 are not [automatically considered as being] in the same domain as the stem.
Halacha 18
When a person throws an article that lands upon a reed with a basket79 at its top which is implanted in a public domain, he is not liable,80 for a public domain extends only ten [handbreadths high].81
[The following rules apply when] a person throws an article in the public domain and it comes to rest on a wall - e.g., one threw fats or dough and they became attached to the wall: If they become attached above ten handbreadths [from the ground], it is considered as if he threw the article into the air, for the space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is amakom patur.
Halacha 19
If a person throws a reed or a spear from a private domain [to a public domain] and [the spear] becomes implanted in the public domain in an upright position, he is not liable, for a portion [of the article] is in a makom patur.85
If a person throws a large utensil which is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths in area] and ten handbreadths high, he is not liable. The utensil itself constitutes a private domain, and thus the person is considered as one who transfers an article from one private domain to another.86
Halacha 20
When a person uproots a clod of earth from the bottom of a pit that is nine handbreadths deep,87 and [by doing so] makes it ten handbreadths deep, he is not liable. [This decision is rendered] despite the fact that the removal of the article and the creation of the domain occur simultaneously, because the domain was not originally ten [handbreadths] deep.88
[Conversely,] if a person throws a clod of earth into a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and [by doing so] causes it to become less than ten handbreadths [deep], he is not liable. [This decision is rendered] because the placement of the article and the nullification of the domain occur simultaneously.
Halacha 21
A person is not liable if he throws a board that lands on spikes [implanted] in the public domain [even when] by doing so, he creates a private domain.89[This applies] although a utensil was on the board. [The rationale for this decision is] that the creation of the domain occurs at the same time that the utensil comes to rest.90
Halacha 22
When a person throws a mat from91 a public domain into a pit that is ten handbreadths deep and [precisely] eight handbreadths wide, [and the mat falls in an upright position in the exact center of the pit,] dividing the width of the pit in half, he is not liable.92 
[The rationale is] that when the article lands, it nullifies the domain, causing each of the halves to be less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths].93
[The rationale is] that when the article lands, it nullifies the domain, causing each of the halves to be less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths].93
Halacha 23
When a person throws an article into a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and four [handbreadths by four handbreadths] in area and is filled with water, he is liable although the article lands on the water, for the water does not nullify the domain.94
[In contrast,] were [such a pit] to be filled with produce, a person who throws [an article] into it would not be liable, for the produce reduces the size of the pit.95
Halacha 24
[The following rules apply to] an irrigation ditch that contains water that passes through the public domain, and which people [usually] walk through: If it is not ten handbreadths deep, it is considered to be a public domain regardless of whether it is four cubits [or more] wide or less than four handbreadths wide. [It is placed in this category, despite the fact that, in the latter instance,] most people would jump over it, rather than walk through it.96 [Regardless of its width,] since it is not ten handbreadths deep, it is considered to be [part] of the public domain.97
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
An ancient commentary on the Mishneh Torah from Egypt emphasizes that the word רשות, translated as "domain," means "authority." Thus, in the context of space, a "private domain" would refer to a place that is controlled by a single authority, and a "public domain" to a place that is not controlled by such an authority. See Hilchot Eiruvin 1:4-5.
|
| 2. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam describes a private domain as "a place that is not traversed by many people."
|
| 3. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam describes a public domain as "a place traversed by many people."
|
| 4. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains the meaning of this term: ארמלית is the Aramaic for "widow" and the prefix כ means "like." Thus, the term means "like a widow" - i.e., neither an unmarried maiden nor a married woman. Similarly, since a carmelit is not a place traversed by many people (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 345:14), it is not classified as a public domain. Nevertheless, it is not set off from the public sufficiently to meet the criteria of a private domain.
(Others, based on the Jerusalem Talmud, define carmelit as having its root in the word carmel, which means "partially ripe grain." The intent is also similar, an intermediate state. Note also the interpretation of Rashi mentioned below.)
The restrictions against carrying in a carmelit are Rabbinic in origin. According to the Torah, all the places defined as a carmelit are considered as a makom patur (or in certain unique instances, a private domain).
|
| 5. |
This term literally means "a place with no liability." It refers to a place that is neither a public domain, nor a private domain. The forbidden labor of transferring objects was derived from the Sanctuary and involved carrying from the private domain to the public domain or vice versa. Accordingly, one is not held liable for carrying to, from, or within any place that does not meet the criteria of these categories.
|
| 6. |
Significantly, the Rambam does not mention that a public domain must have 600,000 people passing through it. Rashi (Eruvin 6a) mentions this opinion, and it was accepted by the Ashkenazic authorities after him. The rationale for this ruling is that all the forbidden labors - and particularly, the labor of transferring - are derived from the construction of the Sanctuary. The public domain in that time was the encampment of the Jewish people in which 600,000 lived.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:7) mentions this view, but does not accept it. Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:11 and the Mishnah Berurah 345:23 write that it has already become public custom to accept the view that there is no possibility of a public domain in the present age. These texts do suggest that a God-fearing person should act stringently and should not rely on this leniency.
(It also must be noted that in many major cities today - e.g., New York, London, Paris - there are 600,000 people walking through a particular area. Hence, in a metropolis of this size, there are definitely places which could be categorized as public domains.)
|
| 7. |
This statement has raised many questions among the commentaries based on Shabbat 6b, which appears to imply that a desert was considered a public domain only when the Jews were encamped there. At the present time, a desert is considered as a carmelit and not as a public domain (Maggid Mishneh).
The Kessef Mishneh attempts to resolve these difficulties by quoting a responsum of the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham. Rabbenu Avraham explains that the deserts his father refers to are those wastelands that are frequently used as caravan routes. These are traversed by many merchants and are not under the control of any authority. Hence, these can surely be referred to as a public domain.
When defining a public domain and a carmelit in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:7, 14), Rabbi Yosef Karo does not mention a desert at all. (See also the Bayit Chadash, Orach Chayim345.)
|
| 8. |
With regard to this particular as well, the Maggid Mishneh raises a question, noting that many authorities consider forests a carmelit. Indeed, Rashi (Shabbat 3b) interprets the meaning of the term carmelit as referring to a "wood."
The Kessef Mishneh also attempts to resolve this objection, explaining that the intent is a forest with paths that many people enter to collect wood. Thus, it refers to a place used by the public and not under the authority of a single owner.
|
| 9. |
Shabbat 99a derives the necessity for the thoroughfares to be sixteen cubits wide from the way in which the boards of the Sanctuary were transferred. There were two wagons that traveled side by side, each five cubits wide. There were five cubits between them and a half a cubit on either side for a Levite to stand (Rashi). The same passage also specifies that these thoroughfares must be at least sixteen cubits in length.
Michah diagram
|
| 10. |
Shabbat 5a also derives this concept from the encampment of the Jews in the desert. There, the public domain was not covered by a roof. Therefore, even if an area meets the other criteria of a public domain, it is not considered to be in this category if it has a roof. (See Halachah 6.)
|
| 11. |
A space that is smaller in height or area is not fit to be used for any significant purpose (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:1).
|
| 12. |
The Rambam's intent is not that an area that is not enclosed for the purpose of dwelling is not considered a private domain at all. Rather, as obvious from his decisions in Chapter 16, Halachah 1, it is a private domain according to Torah law. Therefore, a person who transfers an object to it from a public domain is liable. Nevertheless, if such an area is very large, the Rabbis forbade carrying within it as explained in Chapter 16.
|
| 13. |
See Chapter 17, Halachah 10, and the Kessef Mishneh, which deal with the question of whether these walls must actually be closed.
|
| 14. |
See Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-2, where the Rambam states that although a city of this type is considered a private domain according to Torah law, the Rabbis forbade carrying within such a city unless an eruv is made.
|
| 15. |
The lechi serves in place of the fourth wall. (See Chapter 17, Halachah 2.) Rav Moshe Cohen quotes an opinion that maintains that three walls are sufficient for an area to be considered a private domain. This difference of opinion is explained in the opening halachot of Chapter 17.
|
| 16. |
The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that by mentioning these places, the Rambam implies that we can generally assume that they have been enclosed to serve as a dwelling.
|
| 17. |
This refers to a vessel of this size that is placed in the public domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav345:10; Mishnah Berurah 345:13).
|
| 18. |
This refers to both the inside and the upper surface of the vessel (Shulchan Aruch HaRav345:10; Mishnah Berurah 345:16).
|
| 19. |
If the container is round, its surface must be large enough to contain a square of that size (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:10; Mishnah Berurah 345:15).
|
| 20. |
This applies even when the upper surface of these walls is less than four handbreadths wide (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 345:3). This ruling was rendered, because it is possible to place a board on the walls and place articles upon it. Furthermore, the width of the walls can be added to the width of the private domain to reach a total of four cubits (Shulchan Aruch HaRav345:7)
|
| 21. |
See Halachah 17.
|
| 22. |
See Halachah 18. The difference between a private domain and a public domain in this particular case stems from the fact that the space above a person's domain belongs to him. He will build his own property high and place objects within this space. In contrast, the public domain is set aside for people to pass through, and no one has permission to build in the space above it (Kinat Eliyahu).
|
| 23. |
If the mound is less than three handbreadths high, the principle of l'vud is applied, and it is considered part of the public domain (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1).
|
| 24. |
Just as a public domain does not occupy the space ten handbreadths above the ground, so too, a carmelit does not extend above that height.
|
| 25. |
A mound with a smaller area is a makom patur, as mentioned in Halachah 7.
|
| 26. |
The converse of the principles applying to a mound apply in this instance.
|
| 27. |
See Halachah 8 with regard to a pillar nine handbreadths high.
|
| 28. |
These walls are sufficiently high to separate the place from the public domain, but not high enough to set it off as a private domain.
|
| 29. |
Were the space to be smaller than this, it would not be considered significant, and would be classified as a makom patur.
|
| 30. |
As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, many authorities differ with the Rambam and also consider such an area a private domain. This issue is discussed in Chapter 17. (See also Halachah 6.)
|
| 31. |
See Chapter 17, Halachah 2.
|
| 32. |
These fields are not surrounded by fences ten handbreadths high (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 33. |
Even in the winter, when crops do not grow, it is not common for people to walk through fields. (See also Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah 20:1-6).)
|
| 34. |
As mentioned in Halachah 3, the space more than ten handbreadths above the public domain is considered as a makom patur and not a public domain. Surely, this applies with regard to acarmelit, which - in most instances - is a makom patur according to the Torah and was taken out of this category only by Rabbinic decree.
|
| 35. |
The practical ramifications of this concept are mentioned in Chapter 15, Halachah 20.
|
| 36. |
I.e., even if the sea is hundreds of cubits deep, the entire depth is considered a carmelit, and the leniencies of a makom patur are not granted. See also the responsum of the Rambam quoted by the Kessef Mishneh Chapter 27, Halachah 3.
|
| 37. |
The text of the Rambam's wording in this halachah and its interpretation are a subject of debate among the commentaries. Some texts of the Mishneh Torah read "A storage vat in a carmelit is considered a carmelit even if it is 100 cubits deep and four [handbreadths by four handbreadths]." (Note Rav Kapach's text of the Mishneh Torah, which follows the latter version with a slight emendation, "even if it is 100 cubits deep and 100 cubits wide.")
The essence of the issue is as follows: Were the vat to be more than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it would be appropriate to consider it to be a private domain, since it meets all the criteria mentioned in Halachah 1. (Rav Kapach, however, maintains that in this instance, because the vat is filled with water and located in a carmelit, the fact that it meets the criteria of a private domain is insignificant.)
On the other hand, the Rashba and other authorities object to the Rambam's ruling as stated in our text. Since this vat can be considered an independent entity, seemingly, it would be more appropriate that it be considered a makom patur and not a carmelit. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the decision quoted in our text, explaining that since a carmelit is itself a makom patur according to Torah law, it is impossible for a makom patur to be established within it. Instead, the entire area is considered a single carmelit. Note a similar concept in Chapter 17, Halachah 11. This rationale is accepted as halachah by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 345:18-19).
|
| 38. |
E.g., in Talmudic times, a market place with a roof; in contemporary situations, a shopping mall.
|
| 39. |
The encampment of the Jewish people in the desert, the source for the prohibition against carrying, was not covered and had paths that were sixteen cubits wide. Accordingly, although an area would for all intents and purposes be considered a public domain, it is not placed in that category with regard to the Sabbath laws unless it confirms to these criteria.
|
| 40. |
Where merchants display their wares.
|
| 41. |
The commentaries to Eruvin 94a describe this as referring to the space left between the public domain and a house built in an abnormal manner that causes obstructions to passersby.
|
| 42. |
The Rashba and others differ with the Rambam's ruling and maintain that the space between the pillars is not considered part of the public domain, because the merchants hang their wares there. Moreover, the very structure of the space does not allow people to walk there comfortably.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:14) appears to accept the Rambam's ruling, and this decision is accepted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:21. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah345:50, which maintains that the majority of halachic authorities follow the more lenient view.
|
| 43. |
Since it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is not considered significant enough to be deemed a private domain.
|
| 44. |
Because of the principle of l'vud.
|
| 45. |
A makom patur can exist only in the public domain, and, according to certain opinions, in acarmelit. (With regard to a carmelit, note the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Rashba mentioned in the previous halachah.) In a private domain, by contrast, there is no concept of a makom patur.
|
| 46. |
The concept that a private domain must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths and not merely sixteen square handbreadths is derived from two laws mentioned in Shabbat 8b. Thus, amakom patur may have a very large total area.
|
| 47. |
According to the general principles mentioned previously, it would be classified as either acarmelit or a makom patur, as is obvious from the conclusion of the halachah. Nevertheless, since its height is appropriate to unload and load burdens, it is used frequently by the passersby in the public domain. Hence, it is considered an extension of that domain.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ra'avad as maintaining that the pillar must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths to be considered part of the public domain. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:10) does not place a limit on the pillar's size.
|
| 48. |
Most authorities have interpreted the Rambam's words to mean that since the pillar is this height, it is fit to be used to load and unload. Even if it is not used for this purpose, since it is suited for it it is considered part of the public domain.
The Ra'avad and others do not accept this decision and maintain that such a pillar is not considered part of the public domain unless people actually use it frequently to arrange their loads. (Note the Sha'ar HaTziyun 345:36, which cites opinions that interpret the Rambam's words in accordance with the Ra'avad's decision.)
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the Ra'avad's decision. Nevertheless, the Eliyahu Rabbahsuggests respecting the popular interpretation of the Rambam's view.
|
| 49. |
In his gloss on Shabbat 8a, Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that a pillar that is between nine and ten handbreadths high is also considered par4t of the public domain. This slight addition in height does not make it uncomfortable to use. Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes this view as well, the Rambam's ruling is accepted by most authorities (Mishnah Berurah 345:36).
|
| 50. |
Although the roof is less than ten handbreadths high when measured from the side of the public domain, it is ten handbreadths high from the side of the courtyard (Maggid Mishneh citing the Rashba).
|
| 51. |
According to the Torah, this roof is a private domain and there is no reason why it should not be used by its owner. Nevertheless, since it is easily accessible from the public domain and is used by passersby there during the week, the Rabbis forbade its owner from carrying upon it on the Sabbath (Eruvin 84b).
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 361:1), which accepts a differing interpretation of the passage offered by the Rashba and permits carrying on the roof, but prohibits transferring an article from the adjoining courtyard to the roof.
|
| 52. |
I.e., it remains there during the week as well as on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 53. |
Since the owner has set up a ladder leading to the roof from the adjoining courtyard, it is obvious that he intends to use the roof and that it is part of his domain. This makes it distinct from the public domain.
|
| 54. |
Since it is ten handbreadths high, it is not part of the public domain, and since it is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is of significant size to be considered a domain in its own right.
|
| 55. |
This ruling follows Rabbenu Chanan'el's interpretation of Eruvin 78a. Rashi and the Ra'avad interpret that passage differently.
|
| 56. |
And thus is considered to be an extension of the ground, because of the principle of l'vud.
|
| 57. |
Since these spikes are used by the passersby in the public domain, they are considered part of that domain. Therefore, the height of the pillar is calculated from the highest spike. If it is not ten handbreadths high from that point upward, it is not considered to be a private domain. See the above diagram.
|
| 58. |
This refers to holes in the wall that face the private domain. Even if they extend through the entire breadth of the wall and also open up to the public domain, they are considered part of the private domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:8; Mishnah Berurah 345:9).
|
| 59. |
The Rambam does not not make any specifications regarding the size or the height of these holes. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:4), although otherRishonim differ.
|
| 60. |
The intent is not necessarily that the hole be ten handbreadths high, but that its floor be ten handbreadths above the ground.
|
| 61. |
An area that is four handbreadths by four handbreadths is significant enough to be considered a separate domain.
|
| 62. |
This ruling applies even if the holes are four handbreadths by four handbreadths and thus are of significant enough size to be be considered a separate space. Since they are within three handbreadths of the ground, they are considered part of the public domain (Mishnah Berurah345:46).
|
| 63. |
Because of the principle of l'vud.
|
| 64. |
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, according to the Rambam, who maintains that one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, this leniency applies only in a carmelit and not in the public domain. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities differ with the Rambam and maintain that the prohibition against performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is Rabbinic in origin. Therefore, it is bypassed when there is a danger involved. This view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1).
|
| 65. |
Accordingly, if a person discovers that he is unwittingly carrying an object in the public domain, he should deposit it in a makom patur.
|
| 66. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 346:2) states that one may pass an article from onecarmelit to another - e.g., from a sea to a valley [of fields] - provided one does not pass it more than four cubits. See also Chapter 16, Halachah 2.
|
| 67. |
One is, however, liable for transferring an article from a private domain to a public domain via acarmelit, provided one does not stand in the carmelit (Shabbat 5b). (See also the notes on the following halachah.)
|
| 68. |
This ruling applies only when one does not carry the article more than a total of four cubits in both public domains combined, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 17.
|
| 69. |
A person is liable for transferring an article only when he removes an article from either a private or a public domain and places it down in the other in one uninterrupted sequence.
|
| 70. |
This concept is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Shabbat 5b). Although the majority of the Sages follow the ruling quoted by the Rambam, ben Azzai differs. He maintains that a person who walks through a domain - even though he does not stop to rest - is considered to have stood there. Thus, in the above instance, the article the person is carrying is considered to have been placed down in the makom patur. Hence, he would not be held liable.
|
| 71. |
The Maggid Mishneh mentions that in this halachah, the term makom patur also applies to acarmelit, since according to Torah law, a carmelit is also a makom patur.
|
| 72. |
The rationale for the Rambam's ruling can be understood based on the comments of the Radbaz cited in the notes to Chapter 15, Halachah 1. According to the Rambam, a person is liable for transferring an article only when he is standing in one of the domains involved in the prohibited transfer. If he is standing in another domain, he is not liable. As mentioned in the notes to that halachah, most other authorities do not accept the Rambam's basic principle. Needless to say, even according to the Rambam, transferring an article in this manner is forbidden.
Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 346:2, which states that if the person transfers the article immediately, without resting his hand at all in the makom patur, he is liable.
|
| 73. |
This ruling applies only when one stands to rest. Should the person stand merely to adjust his load, he is liable. See Chapter 13, Halachot 8 -10.
|
| 74. |
The pillar is considered to be a private domain because it is ten handbreadths high. Were the smaller surface to be less than three handbreadths above the ground, there would be no difficulty in such a statement, because of the principle of l'vud. The new concept taught by this ruling, which is based on Shabbat 101a, is gud acheit mechitzata, "pull down and extend the partition downward" - i.e., the circumference of the pillar is considered to extend to the ground, and thus the entire pillar is considered as being ten handbreadths high.
The above explanation follows the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah, which have the support of some early texts. It parallels Rashi's understanding of the above Talmudic passage. Tosafot and the Rashba, however, interpret that passage differently and maintain that there is a proviso that must be met in regard to the principle gud acheit mechitzata: It is accepted only when young goats are not able to pass under the partition in question. Therefore, in this instance, since the narrow portion of the base is small, it would appear that young goats would be able to pass under the open portion. Accordingly, they offer a different interpretation, stating that this ruling is applicable only when the lower surface of the pillar is less than three handbreadths above the ground.
There are many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah whose text indicates that the Rambam subscribes to this latter view. Furthermore, this perspective parallels the Rambam's rulings in Hilchot Sukkot 4:4. This view is quoted as halachah by the Magen Avraham345:1. It must be emphasized, however, that the halachot that follow and their interpretation appear - although not conclusively so - to indicate that the Rambam subscribes to the principle ofgud acheit in other contexts similar to the situation described here.
|
| 75. |
Note Rabbi Levi ibn Chaviv, Responsum 19, who emphasizes that the distance of four cubits refers not to the length of the incline (the hypotenuse of the triangle), but rather to the distance on the ground itself. (See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Eruvin 5:5.)
|
| 76. |
Rashi (Shabbat 100a) explains that since the incline is so steep, it is not easy for people to walk there, and it is therefore considered a private domain. If, however, the incline is milder - e.g., it ascends ten handbreadths in five cubits - people can walk there easily. Therefore, it is not considered to be a distinct entity, but part of the public domain.
|
| 77. |
The mention of a "reed" by Shabbat 7a, the source for this halachah, is very significant, because a reed is narrow. In Chapter 13, Halachah 1, the Rambam states that a person is not liable for transferring an article unless he places it down on a surface that is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths. A reed is obviously not that size.
Based on that passage, Rashi, the Ramban, and the Rashba maintain that the above principle applies only in the public domain and not within a private domain. The Maggid Mishneh and others interpret the Rambam as accepting this principle as well. Accordingly, they question why he did not state this exception in Chapter 13, when laying down the general principles regarding this forbidden labor.
The Ma'aseh Rokeach offers an alternative to this explanation, noting that Shabbat 102b holds one liable for throwing an article into the mouth of a dog or into the mouth of a furnace even though they are less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Why? Since this was the person's desire, this intent causes the place to be considered as if it were the required size. Similarly, in this instance, if one desired the article to rest on top of the reed, that intent is sufficient to cause one to be liable.
|
| 78. |
Rav David Arameah states that the branches are considered to be a makom patur. Surely this would be true if the branches are ten handbreadths high.
|
| 79. |
Although Rav David Arameah offers a different interpretation, most commentaries render טרסקל as "basket.
|
| 80. |
This ruling applies regardless of whether the article is thrown from a private domain or a public domain. Were the article to have been thrown from a private domain, the person would not be liable, for the space more than ten handbreaths above a public domain is not considered to be part of that domain.
Were the article to have been thrown from the public domain, the person is not liable, for the basket is not considered to be a private domain. This decision applies even when the basket is four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Shabbat 101a relates that one might think that since the surface is four handbreadths by four handbreadths and it is more than ten handbreadths high, it would meet the criteria for a private domain. Nevertheless, this is possible only based on the principle gud acheit mechitzata, "pull down and extend the partition downward" - i.e., that the edges of the basket would be considered as extending to the ground.
This principle is not applicable in the present instance. The p rinciple gud acheit is applicable (see Halachah 16) only when the area through which one would like to "extend the partition" could not be "entered by young goats." Since the entire area beneath the basket is open, the principle cannot be applied.
|
| 81. |
The Ra'avad objects to the addition of the latter phrase, maintaining that even if the basket were less than ten handbreadths high, it would be considered a carmelit, and a person who threw an object into it would not be liable.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam was not focusing on that dimension, but rather was differentiating between this halachah and the previous one, which describes a reed implanted in a private domain. The intent was to emphasize that unlike a private domain, the rules governing a public domain apply only within ten handbreadths.
See also the Or Sameach, who brings a proof from Halachah 19 that although utensils can create a private domain, they cannot create a carmelit.
|
| 82. |
Provided the article traveled four cubits. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:3), the Rambam mentions that the four cubits are measured in a direct line from where the person is standing to where the article became attached to the wall.
|
| 83. |
The same ruling would apply if the hole were less than ten handbreadths high. The Rambam quotes this law in this fashion to negate the opinion of Rabbi Meir, Shabbat 7b.
|
| 84. |
If, however, the hole is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, he is liable, as stated in Halachah 10.
|
| 85. |
Since the reed is more than ten handbreadths high, its upper end is in a makom patur. One is liable only when the entire article comes to rest in the public domain (Rashi, Shabbat 8a). Compare to Chapter 13, Halachah 11.
|
| 86. |
The Rambam's interpretation of this law is paralleled by Tosafot, Shabbat 8a. Note Rashi, who offers a different i nterpretation.
|
| 87. |
As mentioned in Halachah 1, if the pit is ten handbreadths deep, it is considered to be a private domain. If its depth is even slightly less, it is considered to be a carmelit, and one is not liable for throwing an article into it from the public domain.
|
| 88. |
Shabbat 99b leaves this and the law mentioned in the latter clause of this halachah as unresolved questions. Therefore, the Rambam rules that the person is not liable.
|
| 89. |
Such a situation could arise if the spikes were more than ten handbreadths high, and the board - four handbreadths by four handbreadths. In such a situation, the criteria for a private domain would be met.
The Rashba questions this, noting that "goats could enter" the space beneath the spikes, and thus, the principle gud acheit mechitzata could not apply, as explained in the notes on Halachah 18. He interprets this as referring to a situation where spikes were implanted in a wall at the side of a private domain.
Note also the interpretation of Tosafot, Shabbat 99b who interpret this as referring to a situation in which the spikes on two sides of the board are close enough to constitute an actual wall. Therefore, the roof can be considered as creating the third and fourth sides. According to the Rambam, as is explained in Chapter 17, Halachot 3 and 35, three walls of spikes would be required.
|
| 90. |
Although the article comes to rest slightly after the board does, the Talmud does not resolve the question whether this brief amount of time is of consequence or not. Therefore, the Rambam does not hold the person liable.
|
| 91. |
Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text reads "in a public domain," which is enigmatic.
|
| 92. |
Shabbat 100a mentions a difference of opinion regarding this matter. The Rambam follows the opinion of Abbaye, for he is the latest of the Sages to venture an opinion on this question.
The Rashba notes that this law applies only when one intends to leave the mat in this place permanently. If one intends to remove it, it is not considered to have divided the pit.
|
| 93. |
Since the mat has a minimal thickness of its own, each side of the pit is slightly less than four handbreadths.
|
| 94. |
Rav Kapach explains that this law does not represent a contradiction to Chapter 13, Halachah 4, for in a private domain it is not necessary that an object come to rest on a surface that is four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Nevertheless, with regard to the removal of an object, it is necessary that it be at rest on a surface of four handbreadths by four handbreadths for the person to be liable.
|
| 95. |
The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between water and a pit as follows: The water is clear and the contours of the pit can be seen. Therefore, the domain is not considered to be nullified. In contrast, the produce covers the pit and prevents its contours from being seen. Therefore, it is considered to have reduced its size.
The Maggid Mishneh also mentions opinions of the geonim who maintain that the produce in question must be of a type that the person intends to continue storing within the pit. A similar thrust is apparent in the Rashba's interpretation of this law as referring to produce that is teveland may not be moved on the Sabbath.
Note the Or Sameach, who cites Hilchot Eruvin 3:13, which states that an article that can be taken on the Sabbath does not reduce the size of a domain. Accordingly, he suggests an original explanation, stating that this law refers to a pit filled with produce that the public could walk on - e.g., nuts or grain. Since people at large will not hesitate to walk over such a surface, the pit is no longer considered to be a private domain.
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| 96. |
Although a place is not considered a public domain unless people actually walk through it, since there are some individuals who walk through this ditch - although they are in the minority - it is still placed in this category.
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| 97. |
Although a pit between three and ten handbreadths deep is usually regarded as a carmelit if it is four handbreadths wide, or a makom patur if it is narrower, an exception is made in this instance. Since the traffic of the public domain continues to pass, albeit with difficulty, through this ditch, it is not considered to be a separate domain (Shabbat 100b).
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| 98. |
Since it has walls steep enough to be considered a domain of its own, it may not be considered part of the public domain.
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| 99. |
The Or Sameach questions why this irrigation ditch is not considered to be a private domain; he explains that since water is flowing through it rapidly, it may not be used as a private domain. A similar conception is also reflected in the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:15,19 which states that according to the Torah, this would be considered as a private domain. Nevertheless, since it resembles a sea, the Rabbis applied the laws of a carmelit to it.
See also the Pri Megadim 345:11 which deals with this difficulty, based on a principle explained by the Maggid Mishneh cited above. He explains that this halachah refers to a ditch with dirty water. Hence, its contours cannot be seen and therefore it is not considered as a private domain.
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| 100. |
Hence, the area would be considered to be a makom patur.
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Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Tuesday, Tevet 17, 5776 · 29 December 2015
"Today's Day"
Friday Tevet 17 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vay'chi, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 83-87.
Tanya: A further explanation (p. 43)...as explained elsewhere). (p. 43).
The reason for not studying Torah on nittel-night,1 I heard from my father, is to avoid adding vitality.
My father once said: Those diligent students who begrudge those eight hours and cannot tear themselves away from study - I am not fond of them. This (abstaining from study) applies only until midnight.
FOOTNOTES
1. The non-Jewish festival commonly celebrated on December 25th.---------------------• Daily Thought:
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Tuesday, Tevet 17, 5776 · 29 December 2015
"Today's Day"
Friday Tevet 17 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vay'chi, Shishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 83-87.
Tanya: A further explanation (p. 43)...as explained elsewhere). (p. 43).
The reason for not studying Torah on nittel-night,1 I heard from my father, is to avoid adding vitality.
My father once said: Those diligent students who begrudge those eight hours and cannot tear themselves away from study - I am not fond of them. This (abstaining from study) applies only until midnight.
FOOTNOTES
1. The non-Jewish festival commonly celebrated on December 25th.---------------------• Daily Thought:
Decisions
If every blade of grass and every speeding electron is directed with meaning and purpose by the One who created them, all the more so your thoughts and decisions. You only need to put aside your own self-interest, resolve to do the right thing, and His holy hand guides you on the right path.
This is what confidence in G‑d is all about: A conviction that since He is the essence of good, therefore all things are for the good—the obvious good. Including your own sincere decisions.
If so, what are you worried about? Why are you confused? Even when your own mind determines what to do and how—even then He is there.
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