Today in Jewish History:
• Great Flood Begins (2105 BCE)
The rains began to fall on the 17th of Cheshvan of the year 1656 from creation (2105), flooding the earth and rising above the highest mountains. Only Noah and his family survived, in the ark built to that end by Divine command, and a pair of each animal species, who entered with him into the ark.
The following is a chronology of the Flood, as indicated by the dates and time periods given in the Torah's account and calculated by Rashi:
Cheshvan 17: Noah enters ark; rains begin.
Kislev 27: Forty days of rain end; begin 150 days of water's swelling and churning, during which the water reaches a height of 15 cubits above the mountain peaks.
Sivan 1: Water calms and begins to subside at the rate of one cubit every four days.
Sivan 17: The bottom of the ark, submerged 11 cubits beneath the surface, touches down on the top of Mount Ararat.
Av 1: The mountain peaks break the water's surface.
Elul 10:Forty days after the mountain peaks becom visible, Noah opens the ark's window and dispatches a raven.
Elul 17: Noah sends the dove for the first time.
Elul 23: The dove is sent a second time, and returns with an olive leaf in its beak.
Tishrei 1: Dove's third mission. Water completely drained.
Cheshvan 27: Ground fully dried. Noah exits ark.
(This chronology follows the opinion of the Talmudic sage Rabbi Eliezer; according to Rabbi Joshua's interpretation, the Flood began on Iyar 17, and all above dates should be moved ahead six months.)
Total time that Noah spent in the ark: 365 days (one solar year; one year and 11 days on the lunar calendar).
Link: See the Torah's account of the Great Flood, Rashi's commentary, and insights and interpretations from sages, scholars and mystics through the ages on the Noach Parshah Page
Daily Quote:
One who studies Torah but does not review his learning, is like one who sows but doesn't reap[Yalkut Shimoni, Joshua 1]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Vayeira, 6th Portion Genesis 21:22-21:34 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Genesis Chapter 21
22Now it came to pass at that time, that Abimelech and Phicol his general said to Abraham, saying, "God is with you in all that you do. כבוַֽיְהִי֙ בָּעֵ֣ת הַהִ֔וא וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אֲבִימֶ֗לֶךְ וּפִיכֹל֙ שַׂר־צְבָא֔וֹ אֶל־אַבְרָהָ֖ם לֵאמֹ֑ר אֱלֹהִ֣ים עִמְּךָ֔ בְּכֹ֥ל אֲשֶׁר־אַתָּ֖ה עֹשֶֽׂה:
God is with you: Because they saw that he had come out of the region of Sodom unscathed, and that he had fought with the kings and they fell into his hand, and that his wife was remembered [with a child] in his old age. — [from Gen. Rabbah 54:2] א-להים עמך: לפי שראו שיצא משכונת סדום לשלום, ועם המלכים נלחם ונפלו בידו, ונפקדה אשתו לזקוניו:
23And now, swear to me here by God, that you will not lie to me or to my son or to my grandson; according to the kindness that I have done with you, you shall do with me, and with the land wherein you have sojourned." כגוְעַתָּ֗ה הִשָּׁ֨בְעָה לִּ֤י בֵֽאלֹהִים֙ הֵ֔נָּה אִם־תִּשְׁקֹ֣ר לִ֔י וּלְנִינִ֖י וּלְנֶכְדִּ֑י כַּחֶ֜סֶד אֲשֶׁר־עָשִׂ֤יתִי עִמְּךָ֙ תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה עִמָּדִ֔י וְעִם־הָאָ֖רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־גַּ֥רְתָּה בָּֽהּ:
or to my son or to my grandson: Thus far is a father’s compassion for his son. — [from Gen. Rabbah 54:2] ולניני ולנכדי: עד כאן רחמי האב על הבן:
according to the kindness that I have done with you, you shall do with me: when I said to you (above 20:15):“Here is my land before you.” - [from Gen. Rabbah 54:2] כחסד אשר עשיתי עמך תעשה עמדי: שאמרתי לך (לעיל כ טו) הנה ארצי לפניך:
24And Abraham said, "I will swear." כדוַיֹּ֨אמֶר֙ אַבְרָהָ֔ם אָֽנֹכִ֖י אִשָּׁבֵֽעַ:
25And Abraham contended with Abimelech about the well of water that the servants of Abimelech had forcibly seized. כהוְהוֹכִ֥חַ אַבְרָהָ֖ם אֶת־אֲבִימֶ֑לֶךְ עַל־אֹדוֹת֙ בְּאֵ֣ר הַמַּ֔יִם אֲשֶׁ֥ר גָּֽזְל֖וּ עַבְדֵ֥י אֲבִימֶֽלֶךְ:
And Abraham contended with Abimelech: Heb. הוֹכִיח ַאֶת. He disputed with him concerning this. — [from Targum Jonathan] והוכח: נתוכח עמו על כך:
26And Abimelech said, "I do not know who did this thing, neither did you tell me, nor did I hear [of it] until today. " כווַיֹּ֣אמֶר אֲבִימֶ֔לֶךְ לֹ֣א יָדַ֔עְתִּי מִ֥י עָשָׂ֖ה אֶת־הַדָּבָ֣ר הַזֶּ֑ה וְגַם־אַתָּ֞ה לֹֽא־הִגַּ֣דְתָּ לִּ֗י וְגַ֧ם אָֽנֹכִ֛י לֹ֥א שָׁמַ֖עְתִּי בִּלְתִּ֥י הַיּֽוֹם:
27And Abraham took flocks and cattle, and gave them to Abimelech, and they both formed a covenant. כזוַיִּקַּ֤ח אַבְרָהָם֙ צֹ֣אן וּבָקָ֔ר וַיִּתֵּ֖ן לַֽאֲבִימֶ֑לֶךְ וַיִּכְרְת֥וּ שְׁנֵיהֶ֖ם בְּרִֽית:
28And Abraham placed seven ewe lambs by themselves. כחוַיַּצֵּ֣ב אַבְרָהָ֗ם אֶת־שֶׁ֛בַע כִּבְשׂ֥ת הַצֹּ֖אן לְבַדְּהֶֽן:
29And Abimelech said to Abraham, "What are these seven ewe lambs, which you have placed by themselves?" כטוַיֹּ֥אמֶר אֲבִימֶ֖לֶךְ אֶל־אַבְרָהָ֑ם מָ֣ה הֵ֗נָּה שֶׁ֤בַע כְּבָשׂת֙ הָאֵ֔לֶּה אֲשֶׁ֥ר הִצַּ֖בְתָּ לְבַדָּֽנָה:
30And he said, "For these seven ewe lambs you shall take from my hand, in order that it be to me for a witness that I dug this well." לוַיֹּ֕אמֶר כִּ֚י אֶת־שֶׁ֣בַע כְּבָשׂ֔ת תִּקַּ֖ח מִיָּדִ֑י בַּֽעֲבוּר֙ תִּֽהְיֶה־לִּ֣י לְעֵדָ֔ה כִּ֥י חָפַ֖רְתִּי אֶת־הַבְּאֵ֥ר הַזֹּֽאת:
in order that it be to me: [In order that] this [be for me]. בעבור תהיה לי: זאת:
for a witness: Heb. לְעֵדָה, an expression of testimony in the feminine form, like (below 31:52):“and the monument is a witness (וְעֵדָה).” לעדה: לשון עדות של נקבה, כמו (להלן לא נב) ועדה המצבה:
that I dug this well: Abimelech’s shepherds were contending about it and saying,“ We dug it.” They agreed among themselves that whoever would appear beside the well and the water would rise toward him-it [the well] was his. And they [the waters] rose toward Abraham. כי חפרתי את הבאר: מריבים היו עליה רועי אבימלך ואומרים אנחנו חפרנוה, אמרו ביניהם כל מי שיתראה על הבאר ויעלו המים לקראתו שלו הוא, ועלו לקראת אברהם:
31Therefore, he named that place Beer sheba, for there they both swore. לאעַל־כֵּ֗ן קָרָ֛א לַמָּק֥וֹם הַה֖וּא בְּאֵ֣ר שָׁ֑בַע כִּ֛י שָׁ֥ם נִשְׁבְּע֖וּ שְׁנֵיהֶֽם:
32And they formed a covenant in Beer-sheba, and Abimelech and Phicol his general arose, and they returned to the land of the Philistines. לבוַיִּכְרְת֥וּ בְרִ֖ית בִּבְאֵ֣ר שָׁ֑בַע וַיָּ֣קָם אֲבִימֶ֗לֶךְ וּפִיכֹל֙ שַׂר־צְבָא֔וֹ וַיָּשֻׁ֖בוּ אֶל־אֶ֥רֶץ פְּלִשְׁתִּֽים:
33And he planted an eishel in Beer-Sheba, and he called there in the name of the Lord, the God of the world. לגוַיִּטַּ֥ע אֵ֖שֶׁל בִּבְאֵ֣ר שָׁ֑בַע וַיִּ֨קְרָא־שָׁ֔ם בְּשֵׁ֥ם יְהֹוָ֖ה אֵ֥ל עוֹלָֽם:
an eishel: Heb. אֵשֶׁל [There is a dispute between] Rav and Samuel. One says that it was an orchard from which to bring fruits for the guests at the meal, and one says that it was an inn for lodging, in which there were all sorts of fruits. We find the expression of planting (נְטִיעָה) used in conjunction with tents, as it is written (Dan. 11:45):“And he will pitch (וְיִטַע) his palatial tents.” - [from Sotah 10a, Gen. Rabbah 54:6] אשל: רב ושמואל, חד אמר פרדס להביא ממנו פירות לאורחים בסעודה, וחד אמר פונדק לאכסניא ובו כל מיני פירות. ומצינו לשון נטיעה באהלים, שנאמר (דניאל יא מה) ויטע אהלי אפדנו:
and he called there, etc: By means of that “eishel” , the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, was called “God of the whole world.” After they would eat and drink, he would say to them, “Bless the One of Whose [food] you have eaten. Do you think that you have eaten of my [food]? [You have eaten of the food] of the One Who spoke and the world came into being!” - [from Sotah 10a, Gen. Rabbah 54:6] ויקרא שם וגו': על ידי אותו אשל נקרא שמו של הקב"ה אלוה לכל העולם. לאחר שאוכלים ושותים אומר להם ברכו למי שאכלתם משלו, סבורים אתם שמשלי אכלתם, משל מי שאמר והיה העולם אכלתם:
34And Abraham dwelt in the land of the Philistines for many days. לדוַיָּ֧גָר אַבְרָהָ֛ם בְּאֶ֥רֶץ פְּלִשְׁתִּ֖ים יָמִ֥ים רַבִּֽים:
for many days: more than those in Hebron. In Hebron he spent twenty-five years, and here twenty-six. For he was seventy-five years old when he left Haran. That year, (above 13:18): “and he came, and he dwelt in the plain of Mamre [in Hebron].” For we do not find prior to this that he settled anywhere but there, for everywhere, he was a wayfarer, camping and continually traveling, as it is stated (ibid. 12:6): “And Abram passed” ; (ibid. verse 8): “And he moved from there” ; (ibid. verse 10): “And there was a famine in the land, and Abram descended to Egypt.” In Egypt he spent only three months, because Pharaoh sent him away. Immediately, (ibid. 13:3): “And he went on his journeys” until (ibid. verse 18): “and he came, and he dwelt in the plain of Mamre, which is in Hebron.” There he dwelt until Sodom was overturned. Immediately, (ibid. 20:1): “Abraham traveled from there,” because of the disgrace caused by Lot, and he came to the land of the Philistines. He was ninety-nine years old, for on the third day of his circumcision, the angels came to him. This totals twenty-five years [from the year he left his father’s house and settled in Hebron until he came to the land of the Philistines]. It is written here [that he lived in the land of the Philistines]“many days” [meaning] more than the preceding [days in Hebron]. Scripture does not come to obscure but to clarify, for if they [the days in the land of the Philistines] exceeded [the days in Hebron] by two years or more, it would have stated so plainly. You must conclude that they did not exceed them by more than one year, hence twenty-six years [in the land of the Philistines]. He immediately left there and returned to Hebron, and that year preceded the binding of Isaac by twelve years. So it is explained in Seder Olam (ch. 1). ימים רבים: מרובים על של חברון, בחברון עשה עשרים וחמש שנה וכאן עשרים ושש. שהרי בן שבעים וחמש שנה היה בצאתו מחרן, אותה שנה (לעיל יג יח) ויבא וישב באלוני ממרא, שלא מצינו קודם לכן שנתיישב אלא שם, שבכל מקומותיו היה כאורח חונה ונוסע והולך, שנאמר (שם יב ו) ויעבור אברם, (שם ח) ויעתק משם, (שם י) ויהי רעב בארץ, וירד אברם מצרימה, ובמצרים לא עשה אלא שלשה חדשים שהרי שלחו פרעה, מיד (שם יג ג) וילך למסעיו, עד (לעיל יג יח) ויבא וישב באלוני ממרא אשר בחברון, שם ישב עד שנהפכה סדום, מיד (שם כ א) ויסע משם אברהם מפני בושה של לוט ובא לארץ פלשתים, ובן תשעים ותשע שנה היה, שהרי בשלישי למילתו באו אצלו המלאכים, הרי עשרים וחמש שנה וכאן כתיב ימים רבים, מרובים על הראשונים, ולא בא הכתוב לסתום אלא לפרש, ואם היו מרובים עליהם שתי שנים או יותר היה מפרשם, ועל כרחך אינם יתירים יותר משנה הרי עשרים ושש שנה, מיד יצא משם וחזר לחברון, ואותה שנה קדמה לפני עקידתו של יצחק שתים עשרה שנים, כך שנויה בסדר עולם (פרק א):
Daily Tehillim: Chapters 83 - 87
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 83
A prayer regarding the wars against Israel in the days of Jehoshaphat, when the nations plotted against Israel.
1. A song, a psalm by Asaph.
2. O God, do not be silent; do not be quiet and do not be still, O God.
3. For behold, Your enemies are in uproar, and those who hate You have raised their head.
4. They plot deviously against Your nation, and conspire against those sheltered by You.
5. They say, "Come, let us sever them from nationhood, and the name of Israel will be remembered no more.”
6. For they conspire with a unanimous heart, they made a covenant against You-
7. the tents of Edom and the Ishmaelites, Moab and the Hagrites,
8. Geval and Ammon, and Amalek; Philistia with the inhabitants of Tyre.
9. Assyria, too, joined with them, and became the strength of the sons of Lot, Selah.
10. Do to them as to Midian; as to Sisera and Yavin at the brook of Kishon,
11. who were destroyed at Ein Dor, and were as dung for the earth.
12. Make their nobles like Orev and Ze'ev, all their princes like Zevach and Tzalmuna,1
13. who said, "Let us inherit the dwellings of God for ourselves.”
14. My God, make them like whirling chaff, like straw before the wind.
15. As a fire consumes the forest, and a flame sets the mountains ablaze,
16. so pursue them with Your tempest and terrify them with Your storm.
17. Fill their faces with shame, and they will seek Your Name, O Lord.
18. Let them be shamed and terrified forever; let them be disgraced and perish.
19. And they will know that You, Whose Name is the Lord, are alone, Most High over all the earth.
Chapter 84
In this psalm of prayers and entreaties, the psalmist mourns bitterly over the destruction of Temple from the depths of his heart, and speaks of the many blessings that will be realized upon its restoration. Fortunate is the one who trusts it will be rebuilt, and does not despair in the face of this long exile.
1. For the Conductor, on the gittit,1 a psalm by the sons of Korach.
2. How beloved are Your dwellings, O Lord of Hosts!
3. My soul yearns, indeed it pines, for the courtyards of the Lord; my heart and my flesh [long to] sing to the living God.
4. Even the bird has found a home, and the swallow a nest for herself, where she lays her young on the [ruins of] Your altars, O Lord of Hosts, my King and my God.
5. Fortunate are those who dwell in Your House; they will yet praise You forever.
6. Fortunate is the man whose strength is in You; the paths [to the Temple] are in his heart.
7. For those who pass through the Valley of Thorns, He places wellsprings; their guide will be cloaked in blessings.2
8. They go from strength to strength; they will appear before God in Zion.
9. O Lord, God of Hosts, hear my prayer; listen, O God of Jacob, forever.
10. See our shield,3 O God, and look upon the face of Your anointed one.
11. For better one day in Your courtyards than a thousand [elsewhere]. I would rather stand at the threshold of the house of my God, than dwell [in comfort] in the tents of wickedness.
12. For the Lord, God, is a sun and a shield; the Lord bestows favor and glory; He does not withhold goodness from those who walk in innocence.
13. O Lord of Hosts! Fortunate is the man who trusts in You.
Chapter 85
In this prayer, lamenting the long and bitter exile, the psalmist asks why this exile is longer than the previous ones, and implores God to quickly fulfill His promise to redeem us. Every individual should offer this psalm when in distress.
1. For the Conductor, a psalm by the sons of Korach.
2. O Lord, You favored Your land; You returned the captives of Jacob.
3. You forgave the iniquity of Your people, and covered all their sin forever.
4. You withdrew all Your fury, and retreated from Your fierce anger.
5. Return us, O God of our salvation, and annul Your anger toward us.
6. Will You forever be angry with us? Will You draw out Your anger over all generations?
7. Is it not true that You will revive us again, and Your people will rejoice in You?
8. Show us Your kindness, O Lord, and grant us Your deliverance.
9. I hear what the Almighty Lord will say; for He speaks peace to His nation and to His pious ones, and they will not return to folly.
10. Indeed, His deliverance is near those who fear Him, that [His] glory may dwell in the land.
11. Kindness and truth have met; righteousness and peace have kissed.
12. Truth will sprout from the earth, and righteousness will peer from heaven.
13. The Lord, too, will bestow goodness, and our land will yield its produce.
14. Righteousness shall walk before him, and he shall set his footsteps in [its] path.
Chapter 86
This psalm contains many prayers regarding David's troubles, and his enemies Doeg and Achitophel. It also includes many descriptions of God's praise. Every individual can offer this psalm when in distress.
1. A prayer by David. Lord, turn Your ear, answer me, for I am poor and needy.
2. Guard my soul, for I am pious; You, my God, deliver Your servant who trusts in You.
3. Be gracious to me, my Lord, for to You I call all day.
4. Bring joy to the soul of Your servant, for to You, my Lord, I lift my soul.
5. For You, my Lord, are good and forgiving, and exceedingly kind to all who call upon You.
6. Lord, hear my prayer and listen to the voice of my supplications.
7. On the day of my distress I call upon You, for You will answer me.
8. There is none like You among the supernal beings, my Lord, and there are no deeds like Yours.
9. All the nations that You have made will come and bow down before You, my Lord, and give honor to Your Name,
10. for You are great and perform wonders, You alone, O God.
11. Lord, teach me Your way that I may walk in Your truth; unify my heart to fear Your Name.
12. I will praise You, my Lord, my God, with all my heart, and give honor to Your Name forever.
13. For Your kindness to me has been great; You have saved my soul from the depth of the grave.
14. O God, malicious men have risen against me; a band of ruthless men has sought my soul; they are not mindful of You.
15. But You, my Lord, are a compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger and abounding in kindness and truth.
16. Turn to me and be gracious to me; grant Your strength to Your servant, and deliver the son of Your maidservant.
17. Show me a sign of favor, that my foes may see and be shamed, because You, Lord, have given me aid and consoled me.
Chapter 87
Composed to be sung in the Holy Temple, this psalm praises the glory of Jerusalem, a city that produces many great scholars, eminent personalities, and persons of good deeds. It also speaks of the good that will occur in the Messianic era.
1. By the sons of Korach, a psalm, a song devoted to the holy mountains [of Zion and Jerusalem].
2. The Lord loves the gates of Zion more than all the dwelling places of Jacob.
3. Glorious things are spoken of you, eternal city of God.
4. I will remind Rahav Egypt and Babylon concerning My beloved; Philistia and Tyre as well as Ethiopia, "This one was born there.”
5. And to Zion will be said, "This person and that was born there"; and He, the Most High, will establish it.
6. The Lord will count in the register of people, "This one was born there," Selah.
7. Singers as well as dancers [will sing your praise and say], "All my inner thoughts are of you."
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 28• Lessons in Tanya• English Text
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Friday, Cheshvan 17, 5776 · October 30, 2015
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Friday, Cheshvan 17, 5776 · October 30, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 28
In the previous Epistle, written to console the chassidic brotherhood after the passing of the saintly R. Mendele Vitebsker, the Alter Rebbe quotes from the Zohar to the effect that a tzaddik is even more accessible in this world after his passing than while he was still alive. Moreover, after his passing his chassidim continue to receive from him both spiritual benefactions which enhance their Torah study and divine service, and protection in material matters.
Following that Epistle the original editors1 placed the present discourse, which the Alter Rebbe wrote by way of consolation to his illustrious colleague, relative-by-marriage, and dear friend, R. Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev, following the tragic passing of his son. Here the Alter Rebbe explains how the passing of a tzaddik “effects salvations in the midst of the earth,” atoning even for intentional sins.
מה שכתב למחותנו, הרב הגאון המפורסם, איש אלקים קדוש ה׳, נר ישראל, עמוד הימני, פטיש החזק
This letter was written [by the Alter Rebbe] to his relative-by-marriage — the famous rabbi and Gaon, the G‑dly man, the holy man of G‑d,2 Lamp of Israel, pillar of the right hand, mighty hammer3 —
מורנו הרב לוי יצחק, נשמתו עדן, אב בית דין דקהלה קדושה בארדיטשוב
our master, R. Levi Yitzchak (may his soul rest in Eden), head of the Rabbinical Court of the holy community of Berditchev,
לנחמו על פטירת בנו, הרב החסיד מורנו ורבנו הרב מאיר, נשמתו עדן
to console him on the passing4 of his son, the pious rabbi, R. Meir (may his soul rest in Eden).
* * *
למה נסמכה פרשת מרים לפרשת פרה
“Why was the passage concerning the passing of Miriam5 adjoined to the passage concerning the Red Heifer6?
לומר לך: מה פרה מכפרת וכו׳
— To teach you that just as the Heifer effects atonement, [so, too, does the passing of the righteous].”
Commenting on this quotation from the Gemara,7 Tosafot8 explains that the Red Heifer atones for the sin of the Golden Calf, and in the same way the passing of the righteous effects atonement.
וצריך להבין למה נסמכה דוקא לפרה אדומה
Now it needs to be understood why [the passage concerning the passing of Miriam] was adjoined specifically to [the passage concerning] the Red Heifer
הנעשה חוץ לשלש מחנות, אלא דחטאת קרייה רחמנא
(which was prepared outside the three camps,9 and as such was not a sacrifice proper, except that the Torah calls it10 a sin-offering),11
ולא נסמכה לפרשת חטאת, הנעשה בפנים על גבי המזבח, כפרה ממש
and it was not adjoined to the passage concerning the sin-offering that was prepared within, on the altar, [and as such effects] actual atonement.
Alternatively, the Hebrew text could be understood to mean “on the actual altar of atonement,” or (preferably) that thesin-offering was “actual atonement,” unlike the Red Heifer which was primarily a rite of purification.
To revert to the question concerning the juxtaposition of the two passages, the Alter Rebbe explains that an offering connoted an “arousal from below,” from the soul of the animal that derives from kelipat nogah. This, in turn, elicited a reciprocal “arousal from Above,” drawing down a finite order of Divine light that can permeate the finite world and be integrated and ingested within it. (This characteristic explains why offerings are referred to as the “food of the altar.”) Being finite, this contracted order of Divine light was only able to effect atonement of unwitting sins, those that derive from undue domination by the animal soul which derives from kelipat nogah.
The Red Heifer, by contrast, produces the “sanctifying purification waters” (Kiddush mei chatat); i.e., it draws down an illumination from the most supremely sanctified levels of Divinity (Kodesh HaElyon) that utterly transcend this world. This intense illumination can transform the darkness of Tohu into the light of Tikkun, and secure purification for even the harshest degree of impurity (Avi Avot HaTumah), which is far lower than kelipat nogah.
In the same way, the passing of a tzaddik draws down a Divine illumination that transcends the world, deriving as it does from that element within the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy which is called the Tikkun of Notzer. The name of this Tikkun, which comprises the same letters as Ratzon, brings about an et ratzon, “an auspicious time,” and secures atonement for the sins of the generation, even those that are committed willfully and that derive from the three completely impure kelipot.
In this regard, the passing of a tzaddik is thus more akin to the Red Heifer than to a sin-offering.
אמנם נודע מזהר הקדוש והאריז״ל, סוד הקרבנות שעל גבי המזבח
Now,12 the mystical principle of the sacrifices offered on the altar is known from the sacred Zohar13 and from R. Isaac Luria,14 of blessed memory:
הן בחינת העלאת מיין נוקבין, מנפש הבהמית שבנוגה
They are an instance of the elevation of mayin nukvin (lit., “feminine waters”; i.e., a mortally-initiated spiritual arousal) deriving from the animal soul, [which receives its life-force from] kelipat nogah,
אל שרשן ומקורן
[this elevation ascending] to their root and source,
הן בחינת ד׳ חיות שבמרכבה, הנושאות את הכסא
i.e., the forms of the four Animals of the Celestial Chariot which bear the Throne,15 as described in Ezekiel, ch. 1:
פני שור ופני נשר וכו׳
the Face of the Ox, and the Face of the Eagle, and so on.
The former level of Divinity is the source of the souls of all animals, the latter is the source of the souls of all birds, these being the two categories of creatures from which offerings are brought. (The other two categories, the Face of the Lion and the Face of Man, are alluded to in the closing phrase, “and so on.”)
Offerings thus constitute an elevation and an “arousal from below” from a willing recipient toward the level of Divinity (here called the four Animals of the Chariot) which is the Source of all things within the finite world and which hence has a connection with it.
ועל ידי זה, נמשכים ויורדים מיין דוכרין מבחינת אדם שעל הכסא, הנקרא מלכא וזעיר אנפין
As a result, reciprocating this arousal, the mayin duchrin (the “male waters” from the benefactor Above) are elicited and descend from the level of Divinity called (in Ezekiel) “the Man upon the Throne,” Who is [also] referred to as Malka (“King”) and Z’eir Anpin (i.e., the bracket of six “masculine” attributes preceding the recipient or “feminine” Sefirah of Malchut).
The resultant illumination flows down to the world and becomes vested and integrated within it. Hence, as mentioned above, offerings are termed “food for the altar,” for they draw down a level of Divine light which can be spiritually ingested.
אכן בשריפת הפרה אדומה, הנה על ידי השלכת עץ ארז ואזוב וכו׳
As for the burning of the Red Heifer, however, it is on account of the throwing in of the cedar wood and the hyssop, and so on, the function of both of which is hamshachah, i.e., drawing down sanctity from Above,16
ונתינת מים חיים אל האפר
and [moreover] the placing of running water into the ashes,
נקרא בשם קידוש מי חטאת במשנה
that in the Mishnah17 [this process] is called the “sanctification (Kiddush) of the purifying waters.”
והיא בחינת קדש העליון, הנקרא בשם טלא דבדולחא
This relates — not only etymologically — to Kodesh HaElyon (“the supreme sanctity”), referred to as Tala DiBedulcha (lit., “the Dew of Bdellium”; cf. the Torah’s descriptions of the manna18).
Unlike the heavenly benefactions that are termed “rain”, for rain results from an “arousal from below” (as it is written,19“And a vapor rose from the ground and watered...”), the above-described “dew” is a spontaneous “arousal from Above” that transcends dependence on any antecedent “arousal from below.”
כמו שכתוב בזהר הקדוש, שהיא בחינת חכמה עילאה ומוחא סתימאה דאריך אנפין
As stated in the sacred Zohar,20 this [Tala DiBedulcha] is an expression of the Supreme Chochmah and the Mocha Setimaah of Arich Anpin; i.e., it is the level of Chochmah within Keter which entirely transcends the world.
ועלה איתמר בדוכתי טובא בזהר הקדוש: בחכמה איתברירו
Of this [level of Chochmah and Mocha Setimaah] it is said in many places in the sacred Zohar that “through Chochmah they are refined” and rectified;21
ואתהפכא חשוכא לנהורא, דהיינו: עולם התיקון
and then, when by means of the “sanctification of the purifying waters” Divine light is drawn down from this level,darkness is converted to light, that is, [to] the World of Tikkun,
שנתברר ונתתקן על ידי מוחא סתימאה דאריך אנפין
which becomes refined and rectified by means of the Mocha Setimaah of Arich Anpin;
מעולם התהו ושבירת הכלים שנפלו בבריאה, יצירה ועשיה וכו׳
[i.e., the World of Tikkun is refined and rectified] from the World of Tohu and the Breaking of the Vessels [whose sparks] fell into [the Worlds of] Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, and so on,
כנודע
as is known.
The spiritual task of the Jew is to extract, refine and elevate these sparks.
ולזאת מטהרת טומאת המת
This is why [the Red Heifer] purifies one from defilement [contracted by contact] with a corpse,
אף שהוא אבי אבות וכו׳, ולמטה מטה מנוגה
even though this [corpse] is the ultimate degree [of impurity], and far, far lower than Nogah.
For the “sanctification of the purifying waters” is drawn down from the supreme Chochmah and the Mocha Setimaah ofArich Anpin, an illumination that transcends the world so utterly that it is able to transform the world’s darkness into light.
* * *
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Note of the Rebbe: “See the ‘Approbation of the ... sons ... of the ... author’ which appears at the beginning of Tanya, [and which states that they were responsible for arranging the manuscript letters of Iggeret HaKodesh for publication].” |
| 2. | Cf. II Melachim 4:9. |
| 3. | Cf. the metaphors used by the Sages in Berachot 28b to denote resounding scholarship. |
| 4. | Note of the Rebbe: “In the year 5566 [1806].” |
| 5. | Bamidbar 20:1ff. |
| 6. | Ibid., ch. 19. |
| 7. | Moed Katan 28a. |
| 8. | S.v. Mah parah. See also Rashi on the beginning of Parshat Chukat. |
| 9. | Cf. Rashi on Bamidbar 19:3, based on Yoma 68a. |
| 10. | Cf. Rashi on verse 9, based on Avodah Zarah 23b and Chullin 11a. |
| 11. | Text and parentheses here follow a gloss of the Rebbe in He’arot VeTikkunim, concerning a variant ms. reading which omitted the six Hebrew words here translated as “the three camps, except that the Torah calls it a sin-offering.” There the Rebbe refers the reader to the “Important Notification” (Modaah Rabbah) at the beginning of the edition of 5660 [1900], which states that Iggeret HaKodesh was carefully proofread against various mss. for that edition, which was not the case with earlier printings. |
| 12. | Note of the Rebbe: “Concerning the text which follows, see at length in Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshat Chukat.” |
| 13. | I, 64b. |
| 14. | Likkutei Torah of the AriZal, Parshat Vayikra. |
| 15. | Bechaye, Parshat Terumah 25:10, et al. |
| 16. | Note of the Rebbe: “So it is explained here. But see Likkutei Torah, Chukat, loc. cit., especially the conclusion of the passage beginning Tosefet Biur on the maamar beginning VeYikchu Eilecha (p. 61b), [where the Alter Rebbe explains that the cedar wood and the hyssop relate to the avodah of elevation, whereas only the addition of the waters is anavodah of drawing Divine energy downward].” |
| 17. | Parah, ch. 6. |
| 18. | Bamidbar 11:7 and Shmot 16:13. |
| 19. | Bereishit 2:6. |
| 20. | Cf. Zohar III, 128b. |
| 21. | Gloss of the Rebbe to Likkutei Biurim LeTanya by Rabbi Yehoshua Korf: “See Torah Or, Parshat Bereishit, the discourse beginning VaYomer ... Hein HaAdam; ibid., Megillat Esther, the discourse beginning U’vevoah; in the supplements there, the discourse beginning LeHavin Inyan Chalav U’Dvash, sec. 2. See also Zohar II, 254b; Etz Chayim, Shaar 18, sec. 5;Mavo She’arim, Shaar 5, 1:2; Sefer HaMitzvot by the Tzemach Tzedek, Issur Avodat Baal-Mum; et al; — where these contradictions are resolved.” |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
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• Today's Mitzvah
Friday, Cheshvan 17, 5776 · October 30, 2015
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 315
Cursing Judges
"You shall not curse the judge"—Exodus 22:27.
It is forbidden to curse a judge.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Negative Commandment 281
Listening to a Single Litigant
"You shall not raise a false report"—Exodus 23:1.
A judge may not listen to the arguments of one of the parties in a case if the other party is not present. This because, for the most part, arguments presented by a party when not in the presence of the opposing party are false. This mitzvah ensures that the judge doesn't approach the case with any untrue prejudice.
This prohibition also includes:
The defendant may not present his case to the judge when not in the presence of his opponent [i.e., the prohibition applies to both the judge and the litigant].
Speaking lashon hara (evil gossip).
Listening to and believing lashon hara.
Giving false testimony.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Negative Commandment 316
Cursing a Leader
"Nor shall you curse the ruler of your people"—Exodus 22:27.
It is forbidden to curse the nasi. The term nasi applies to the individual in the highest position of power—whether that authoriy is governmental (i.e., the king), or in the realm of Torah (i.e., the sage who presides over the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court).
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Friday, Cheshvan 17, 5776 · October 30, 2015
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 315
Cursing Judges
"You shall not curse the judge"—Exodus 22:27.
It is forbidden to curse a judge.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Cursing Judges
Negative Commandment 315
Translated by Berel Bell
The 315th prohibition is that we are forbidden from cursing a judge.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "You shall not curse the judges."
One who transgresses this prohibition is punished with lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:27.
_______________________________________Negative Commandment 281
Listening to a Single Litigant
"You shall not raise a false report"—Exodus 23:1.
A judge may not listen to the arguments of one of the parties in a case if the other party is not present. This because, for the most part, arguments presented by a party when not in the presence of the opposing party are false. This mitzvah ensures that the judge doesn't approach the case with any untrue prejudice.
This prohibition also includes:
The defendant may not present his case to the judge when not in the presence of his opponent [i.e., the prohibition applies to both the judge and the litigant].
Speaking lashon hara (evil gossip).
Listening to and believing lashon hara.
Giving false testimony.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Listening to a Single Litigant
Negative Commandment 281
Translated by Berel Bell
The 281st prohibition is that a judge is forbidden from hearing the claims of one of litigants if the other is not present.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not accept a false report."
The reason for this prohibition is that the majority of claims brought by one litigant without the other being present are false. The Torah therefore prohibited the judge from hearing such words, in order to keep him from having false and improper ideas in his mind.
The Mechilta2 says, "The verse, 'Do not accept a false report,' prohibits a judge from hearing the claim of one litigant without the other being present, and prohibits the litigant from speaking to the judge without the other litigant being present." Regarding this same prohibition the Torah commands,3 "Keep away from anything false," as explained in the 4th chapter of tractate Shavuos.4
Our Sages said that this prohibition also includes the prohibition against speaking loshon hora, listening to loshon hora, and giving false testimony, as explained in tractate Makkos.5
FOOTNOTES
1.Ibid., 23:1.
2.Ibid.
3.Ibid. 23:7.
4.31a.
5.23a.
_______________________________________Negative Commandment 316
Cursing a Leader
"Nor shall you curse the ruler of your people"—Exodus 22:27.
It is forbidden to curse the nasi. The term nasi applies to the individual in the highest position of power—whether that authoriy is governmental (i.e., the king), or in the realm of Torah (i.e., the sage who presides over the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court).
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Cursing a Leader
Negative Commandment 316
Translated by Berel Bell
The 316th prohibition is that we are forbidden from cursing a Nasi.1
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "A Nasi of your people do not curse."
The term Nasi is used in Scripture to refer to a king who has ruling authority, as in G‑d's statement,3 "If the Nasi sins..." As used in the words of our Sages, it refers solely to the head of the 70-member Sanhedrin. Throughout the Talmud and Mishneh we find mention of, "Nesi'im and heads of the High Court"; "Nasi and head of the High Court."4 Our Sages also said,5 "If a Nasi wants to overlook his honor, his honor may be overlooked. If a king wants to overlook his honor, his honor may not be overlooked."6
You should be aware that this prohibition includes both the Nasi [mentioned in the Talmud] and the king. The mitzvah comes to prohibit cursing anyone who is in the highest position of authority, regardless of whether his authority is in rulership [i.e., the king] or in Torah, i.e. the Yeshivah. This is apparent from the detailed description of this mitzvah.
One who transgresses this prohibition is punished with lashes.
FOOTNOTES
1.A leader (see below).
2.Ex. 22:27
3.Lev. 4:22.
4.See Chagigah 16b.
5.Sanhedrin 19b.
6.It is therefore clear that when the Sages use the term "Nasi," they do not refer to a King. Nevertheless, as the Rambam continues, this prohibition applies to both cases.
English Text | Hebrew Text |
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• Shvuot - Chapter 8
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Friday, Cheshvan 17, 5776 · 30 October 2015
"Today's Day"
Monday Cheshvan 17 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Chayei Sara, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 83-87.
Tanya: Now, it is (p. 573) ...waters of lustration..." (p. 575).
Time must be guarded. It is urgent to "accept the yoke of Torah." Every bit of time, every day that passes, is not just a day but a life's concern. Days go by; as the Talmud says (Yerushalmi Berachot 1:1), "A day enters and a day departs, a week enters etc.,... a month etc.,... a year etc.,..." My father quoted the Alter Rebbe: A summer day and a winter night are a year.
• Daily Thought:
Halacha 1
A person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situation]: He stole an ox belonging to a colleague and slaughtered it or sold it.1His colleague lodged a claim against him, telling him: "You stole my ox and you slaughtered it or sold it." [The defendant] responded: "I stole it, but did not slaughter it or sell it" and took an oath to support his claim.
[The reason for his exemption is that] were he to have acknowledged that he slaughtered or sold [the ox] on his own accord, he would not have been required to pay four and five times its worth for this is a fine, as explained inHilchot Genevah.2 Thus it is as if he did not deny a financial obligation. Therefore he is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for ash'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath, saying that he did not slaughter [the ox], when [in fact] he did.
Halacha 2
Similarly, a person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situations]. A person lodged a claim against him saying: "Your ox killed my servant," and he denied the incident and took an oath.3 A servant lodged a claim against his master saying: "You knocked out my tooth" or "You blinded my eye."4 For if he acknowledged the claim, he would not be obligated to pay because it is a fine.5 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
When a person lodges a claim against a colleague concerning a matter that involves both a fine which he would not be obligated to pay if he admits his liability on his own initiative as explained [above] and a financial claim which he is liable to pay on his own admission, he denies the entire claim, and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon.6
What is implied? A person lodged a claim [against a colleague,] telling him: "You raped or you seduced my daughter."7 [The defendant] responded: "I did not rape or seduce her" and took an oath to this effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For although he would not be required to pay the fine were he to have admitted [his guilt], he is obligated to pay for the embarrassment and damages even on his own admission.8
Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "You stole my ox," and he says, "I did not steal it" and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Although he would not obligated to make the double payment [for a stolen object] on the basis of his own admission,9 he would be obligated to pay the principal on the basis of his own admission.
Halacha 4
Halacha 5
[A watchman] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person entrusted his ox to an unpaid watchman, the ox died, and he lodged a claim against the watchman, saying: "Where is the ox I entrusted to you?" The watchman responded: "You did not entrust anything to me," "You entrusted it, but it was stolen," or "...lost"12 and took an oath [to that effect]. [The rationale is] that had he admitted and related the matter as it occurred, he would not have been liable to make financial restitution, because he is an unpaid watchman.13He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 6
[Similarly, a person] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person lent his ox to a colleague and then demanded its return, saying: "Where is the ox you borrowed from me?" Now the ox had died, but the borrower said: "It was stolen" or "...lost" and took an oath to this effect. [The rationale is that] he did not free himself from making restitution by his denial and is nevertheless liable to pay whether the animal died, was stolen, lost, or taken captive because he was a borrower, as will be explained in the appropriate place.14 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
This is the general principle: Whoever does not free himself from financial responsibility unless he makes this denial is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he takes an oath. [This applies] whether he took the oath on his own initiative or the plaintiff administer the oath and he stated his denial even though he did not answer Amen nor utter the oath himself.
Halacha 8
[A thief] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: He stole his colleague's ox. [The colleague] demanded payment, telling him: "You stole my ox."
[The thief] responded: "I did not steal it."
Why, then, is it in your possession?"
"You entrusted it to me [for safekeeping]" and he took an oath to that effect.15
[The rationale is that] had he admitting stealing it, he would have been liable to pay the value in any case.16 By saying now that it is an entrusted object, he exempts himself from liability for theft and for loss,17 i.e., were the ox to be lost or stolen after this admission, he is not obligated to pay.
Halacha 9
Similarly, if he were to claim that he rented it and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability in the cases of injury or death. Similarly, if he claimed: "You lent it to me" and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability if it dies while performing its work, as will be explained in Hilchot Sheilah.18
Halacha 10
Therefore if one says: "I did not steal it. Instead, you entrusted it to me...", "...hired me to watch it...", or "...lent it to me. Here is your ox. Take it." If he took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon,19for he admitted owing the principle and did not exempt himself from any liability with this denial.20
Halacha 11
Similarly, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he uses any of the following excuses and takes an oath to that effect: "You sold it to me, but I have not paid for it yet. If you want, take the money for it. If not, here is your ox," "You gave it to me as payment for work which I will perform for you. If you desire, I will perform the work. If you do not desire, take it and depart," "I found it wandering on the road and did not know that it was yours. Now that I know, take it and depart," or "It chased after my ox. Here, it's yours." He is, however, liable for ash'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.
Halacha 12
When a person is financially obligated to two partners, one demands payment from him, he denies his obligation and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon21 for he denied a financial obligation. If they both demanded payment from him and he admitted the entire obligation to one of them, but said: "I borrowed only from this one,"22 should he take an oath to this effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he did not free himself from any liability. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui.
Halacha 13
Similarly, if there was a person who owed a debt supported by a promissory note, but he denied it and took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for ash'vuat hapikadon. [The rationale is that because of] the promissory note, [the person's] landed property is placed under lien. Thus the person is denying [an obligation involving] landed property. And as we have already explained,23 a person who denied a claim involving landed property is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.24
Halacha 14
If a person owed a debt to which there were witnesses, he denied [his obligation], and took an oath [to that effect], he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For by denying his obligation, he freed himself from the liability of paying immediately. When the witnesses will come, he will be obligated to pay and thus his denial will not be effective.25 It is, however, effective in that perhaps the witnesses will not come, they will come and their testimony will not be substantiated,26 or they will be disqualified.27 Therefore28 he is liable.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
In which instance, he is obligated to pay five times the value of the ox (Exodus 21:37).
|
| 2. |
Hilchot Genevah 1:5. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2 above.
|
| 3. |
In which instance, the owner of the ox is liable to pay a fine of 30 shekalim to the owner of the servant (Exodus 21:32).
|
| 4. |
In which instance, the owner is required to free the servant (Exodus 21:26-27).
|
| 5. |
For in these instances, the person is not paying the worth of the damage, but an arbitrary amount that could be either more or less.
|
| 6. |
For he is denying a financial claim. The fact that it also includes a fine is not significant.
|
| 7. |
I.e., a virgin girl between the ages of three and twelve and a half (Hilchot Na'arah Betulah 1:1).
|
| 8. |
As explained in Hilchot Na'arah Betulah 2:1-2, a person who seduces a girl is required to pay a fine of 50 silver pieces, as stated in Exodus 22:15, for the embarrassment he causes her, and the damages due to her reduction in her value. A rapist must also pay for the pain he causes. The embarrassment and the damages are considered as financial obligations.
|
| 9. |
For that is a fine.
|
| 10. |
For the damages (more particularly, the unemployment assessment, the medical fees, and the allocation for embarrassment) he must pay his colleague for the wound are considered as a financial obligation and not as a fine (see Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:7; Hilchot To'en V'Nitan 1:16).
|
| 11. |
Here as well, the damages one ox causes another are considered as a financial obligation. This applies with regard to an ox that has been distinguished as one which gores. If an ox is not known to have such a tendency, the half-payment for the damages that it causes is considered as a fine (see Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8).
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| 12. |
Since he would not have been liable had he told the truth, the fact that he took a false oath does not obligate him for a sh'vuat hapikadon.
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| 13. |
He is not liable in cases involving death or other losses due to forces beyond his control.
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| 14. |
Hilchot Sechirut 1:2; Hilchot Sheilah Ufikadon 1:1.
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| 15. |
On his own volition; he is under no obligation to do so.
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| 16. |
I.e., even if it dies or is destroyed by forces beyond his control.
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| 17. |
Since he reduces his liability through his statements, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon.
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| 18. |
Hilchot Sheilah UFikadon 1:1.
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| 19. |
He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui since he took a false oath.
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| 20. |
For he told the owner to take his ox.
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| 21. |
This applies even if he admits owing a portion of the debt to the other partner. Since he denied part of the debt, he is liable.
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| 22. |
I.e., he admitted the entire debt, but said that he owed it only to one person and not to both partners.
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| 23. |
Chapter 7, Halachot 2-3.
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| 24. |
The Radbaz notes that this statement is seemingly redundant; it is made more than ten times in this and the previous chapter. He explains that it would appear that taking a false sh'vuat hapikadon is more severe than taking a false sh'vuat bitui, yet the punishment for a false sh'vuat bitui, lashes, is more severe than that for a false sh'vuat hapikadon, bringing a sacrifice. Hence, it is necessary for the Rambam to state the point explicitly each time.
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| 25. |
And thus there is room to say that he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, as indicated by Halachah 7.
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| 26. |
I.e., it will be disqualified through the process of cross-examination.
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| 27. |
And thus be prevented from testifying.
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| 28. |
I.e., because his denial has an immediate - and perhaps long-term - effect, he is liable.
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Audio: Listen | Download• Sanhedrin veha`Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 22
Halacha 1
When two people come before a judge, one soft and one harsh - before he hears their words, or even after he hears their words, but does not know the direction in which the judgment is leaning - he has the license to tell them: "I will not involve myself with you," lest the harsh litigant be held liable and seek vengeance from the judge.
After he hears their words and knows in which direction the judgment is leaning, he does not have the license to tell them: "I will not involve myself with you," asDeuteronomy 1:18 states: "Do not be intimidated by any person." That verse implies that one should not say: "So-and-so is wicked, maybe he will kill my son, set fire to my crops, or cut down my trees." If he was an expert appointed to judge the many, he is obligated to involve himself with them in all circumstances.
Halacha 2
Similarly, if a student was sitting before his master and became aware of a factor that would vindicate a poor person and obligate his rich adversary, he transgresses the above commandment if he remains silent. Concerning such matters, Exodus 23:7 states: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."
What is the source which teaches that a judge should not have an underdeveloped student sit before him? It is written: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."
Halacha 3
What is the source which teaches that a student who sees his teacher erring with regard to a judgment should not say: "I will wait until he renders judgment. Then I will refute his ruling and then construct a new one so that the judgment will be quoted in my name"? It is written: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."
Halacha 4
At the outset, it is a mitzvah to ask the litigants: "Do you desire a judgment or a compromise?" If they desire a compromise, a compromise is negotiated. Any court that continuously negotiates a compromise is praiseworthy. Concerning this approach, Zechariah 8:16 states: Adjudicate a judgment of peace in your gates." Which judgment involves peace? A compromise. Similarly, with regard to King David it is stated: "And David carried out justice and charity for his entire people." When does justice involve charity? When a compromise is made.
When does the above apply? Before a judgment is rendered. Even though the judge has already heard their arguments and knows the direction in which the judgment is heading, it is a mitzvah to negotiate a compromise. Once the judgment is rendered and he declares: "So-and-so, your claim is vindicated; so-and-so, you are liable," he may not negotiate a compromise. Instead, let the judgment pierce the mountain.
Halacha 5
Although the litigants agreed to a compromise in court, the judges have the authority to demand a judgment until the litigants confirm their commitment to the compromise with a kinyan.
Halacha 6
A compromise has greater legal power than a judgment. If two ordinary people rendered a judgment, their judgment is not binding and the litigants need not accept it. If, however, such individuals negotiated a compromise and the litigants affirmed their agreement with a kinyan, they may not retract.
Halacha 7
After leaving the court, it is forbidden for any of the judges to say: "I was the one who vindicated you or held you liable and my colleagues differed with me. What could I do? They outnumbered me." If he says this, he is among those to whom the words of censure, Proverbs 11:13,: "He proceeds gossiping, revealing secrets" is applied. An incident occurred with regard to one student who revealed the private conversations in the House of Study 22 years later. The court had him removed from the House of Study and denounced him as "a revealer of secrets."
Halacha 8
If either of the litigants asks the court to compose a record of the judgment, they write it for him in the following manner: "So-and-so came to this-and-this court with so-and-so, the opposing litigant, claiming this-and-this. He was vindicated" or "...held liable." The record is given to him without it mentioning the names of those who vindicated him or those who held him liable. Instead, it says merely "From the statements of the court of such-and-such, so-and-so was vindicated."
Halacha 9
This was the custom of the men of Jerusalem: "They would bring the litigants into the court and listen to their statements and claims. They would then bring in the witnesses and listen to their statements. Afterwards, the judges would have all others removed and would debate the matter among themselves until they came to a decision. Afterwards, they would call the litigants in and the judge of the greatest stature declares: "So-and-so, your claim is vindicated; so-and-so, you are liable." In this way, the litigants do no know which judge vindicated him and which judge held him liable.
10 When a judge knows that a colleague is a robber or a wicked person, it is forbidden for him to sit in judgment with him, as it is stated: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."
This is the practice that would be followed by Jerusalem's men of refined character: They would not sit to participate in a judgment unless they knew who would sit with them. They would not sign a legal document unless they knew who would sign with them. And they would not enter a feast until they knew who would be joining them.
Sanhedrin veha`Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 23
Halacha 1
Deuteronomy 16:19 states: "Do not take a bribe." Needless to say, this command applies if the intent is to pervert judgment. The verse is teaching that it is forbidden for a bribe to be given even to vindicate the just and to obligate the one who is liable; the judge transgresses a negative commandment. Such a person is included in the malediction, Deuteronomy 27:25: "Cursed by he who takes a bribe." He is required to return the bribe if he is demanded to by the giver.
Halacha 2
Just as the recipient transgresses a negative commandment; so, too, does the giver, as [Leviticus 19:14] states: “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind1.”
Halacha 3
Any judge who sits and seeks to amplify his reputation in order to cause the wages of his attendants and scribes to be enhanced is included among those who seek after profit. This is what the sons of Samuel did. Hence I Samuel 8:3describes them as being "inclined to profit and taking bribery."
The above applies not only to a bribe of money, but a bribe of all things. An incident occurred concerning a judge who stood up in a small boat, as he was crossing a river. A person extended his hand and helped him as he was standing. Later that person came before the judge with a case. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you."
Another incident took place where a person removed a feather from a fowl from a judge's scarf and another person covered some spittle that was lying before the judge and the judge told them: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." Another incident took place concerning a person who brought one of the presents given to priests to a judge who as a priest. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you."
And another incident took place concerning a sharecropper of a field belonging to a judge who would bring him figs from his field every Friday. Once he came earlier and brought him the figs on Thursday, because he had a judgment over which he desired that the judge preside. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." This applies although the figs belonged to the judge. Since he brought them earlier than the ordinary time, that favor caused him to be disqualified as a judge.
Halacha 4
Whenever a judge borrows an article, he is unacceptable to serve as a judge for the person who lent him the article. When does the above apply? When the judge does not have articles to lend him in return. If, however, the judge possessed articles to lend in return, it is acceptable for him to serve as a judge, for that person will also borrow from him.
Halacha 5
Whenever a judge takes a wage for adjudicating a case, his judgments are nullified. This applies only when it is not evident that he is receiving compensation for losing his wages. If, however, he was involved in his profession and two people came to him for a judgment and he told them: "Provide me with a person who will work in stead of me and I will adjudicate your case or pay me for the wages that I will forfeit," this is permitted.
This leniency is permitted provided it is evident that the wage is merely in lieu of his hire, but no more and he takes equal payment from both of the litigants, receiving payment from each one in the presence of the other.
Halacha 6
A judge may not adjudicate the case of a friend. This applies even if the person is not a member of his wedding party or one of his more intimate companions. Similarly, he may not adjudicate the case of one he hates. This applies even if the person is not his enemy and one whose misfortune he seeks. Instead, the two litigants must be looked upon equally in the eyes and in the hearts of the judges. If the judge does not know either of them and is not familiar with their deeds, this is the fairest judgment that could be.
Halacha 7
Whenever two Torah scholars hate each other, they are forbidden to act as judges together. For this will lead to a contorted judgment. The hatred each one of them bears for the other will cause him to overturn his colleague's words.
Halacha 8
A judge should always see himself as if a sword is drawn on his neck and Hell is open before him. He should know Who he is judging, before Whom he is judging, and Who will ultimately exact retribution from him if he deviates from the path of truth, as indicated by Psalms 82:1: "God stands among the congregation of the Almighty." And II Chronicles 19:6 states: "See what you are doing. For you are not judging for man's sake, but for God's."
Halacha 9
Whenever a judge does not render a genuinely true judgment, he causes the Divine presence to depart from Israel. Whenever a judge expropriates money from one litigant and gives it to the other unlawfully, God exacts retribution from his life, as Proverbs 22:23 states: "He will exact payment from the soul of one who exacts payment."
Conversely, when a judge adjudicates a case in a genuinely true manner for even one moment, it is as if he has corrected the entire world and he causes the Divine Presence to rest within Israel, as implied by the verse: "God stands among the congregation of the Almighty." If a judge will ask: "Why should involve myself in this difficulty?" He should know that it is written: II Chronicles,loc. cit.: "He is with you in the matter of judgment." Nor should the judge worry about erring. A judge may only base his judgment on what his eyes see.
Halacha 10
At the outset, a judge should always look at the litigants as if they were wicked and operate under the presumption that both of them are lying. He should adjudicate according to his perception of the situation. When they depart, having accepted the judgment, he should view them both as righteous, seeing each of them in a favorable light.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | As the Rambam states in Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14, this prohibition forbids placing moral stumbling blocks in a person’s path. |
Sanhedrin veha`Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 24
Halacha 1
A judge may adjudicate cases involving monetary law bases on factors that he is inclined to regard as true and concerning which he feels strongly in his heart are correct even though he does not have proof of the matters. Needless to say, that if he personally knows that a matter is true, he may judge the case according to his knowledge.
What is implied? A person was obligated to take an oath by the court. A person who the judge regards as trustworthy and upon whose word the judge relies tells him that this person is suspect to take a false oath. The judge may reverse the obligation for the oath and place it on the other litigant, allowing him to take an oath and collect his claim because the judge relied on the statements of this person.
Moreover, even if he regards a woman or a servant as trustworthy, should he feel strongly that the matter about which they are speaking is correct, he may rely on their statement and judge accordingly. Needless to say, if he himself knows that a person is suspect to take a false oath, he may judge accordingly.
Similarly, when a promissory note comes before him and a person upon whom he relies - even a woman or a relative - says that it has been repaid, if he trusts his word, he may tell the bearer of the note: "Payment will be required only when an oath is taken." Similarly, if the alleged debtor is also indebted to another person, the judge may have the debtor pay the creditor whose promissory note was not impugned at all and leave the promissory note that was impugned by the person's testimony unpaid. Or he may reject the promissory note and not consider it in judgment if he sees fit.
Similar laws apply if a person comes and claims that he entrusted an article to so-and-so who died and identified the article with extremely precise descriptive marks. If the claimant did not frequent the home of the deceased, and if the judge knows that the deceased did not have the means to own such an article and he firmly believes that the article did not belong to the deceased, the article may be expropriated from the heirs and given to the person provided he has the means to own it and identified it with descriptive marks. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
These matters are solely given over to the heart of the judge to decide according to what he perceives as being a true judgment. Why then did the Torah require two witnesses? Because when two witnesses appear before a judge, he must judge according to their testimony whether or not he knows it to be true.
Halacha 2
All of the matters mentioned above are the fundamental standard of law. Nevertheless, when courts which were not fitting - not necessarily courts which were not upright, but even those whose deeds were just, but whose judges were not sufficiently wise and masters of understanding - proliferated, the majority of the courts among the Jewish people agreed not to reverse oaths unless there was clear proof that a litigant was suspect of taking a false oath. Similarly, they agreed not to disqualify a promissory note on the basis of the testimony of a woman or an unacceptable witness, nor accept their testimony with regard to all other judgments, nor to judge according to the inclinations of one's thoughts without firm knowledge.
The rationale for this stringency is to prevent any simple person from saying: "My heart trusts this person's words and my mind relies on this." Similarly, we do not expropriate property from orphans unless there is clear proof . We do not rely on the judge's opinion, the evaluation of the deceased's financial capacity, or that of the claimant. Even though a trustworthy person delivered testimony concerned a certain matter and the mind of the judge was inclined to believe that he was telling the truth, he should hesitate in judgment. He should not reject his testimony. Instead, he should mediate between the litigants until they accept the testimony of the witness or agree to a compromise. Alternatively, the judge may withdraw from the case.
Halacha 3
What is the source which teaches that a judge who knows that a claim is contrived should not say: "I will deliver a judgment and the responsibility will lie with the witnesses"? It is written Exodus 23:7: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."
What shall he do? He should question and cross-examine the witnesses exceedingly, following the cross-examination process employed in cases involving capital punishment. If it appears to him according to his understanding that there is no deception, he should deliver a judgment. If, however,
a) he still has hesitations because he feels that deception is involved,
b) he does not rely on the testimony of the witnesses although he cannot disqualify them,
c) he feels that one of the litigants is a deceiver and a beguiler and misled the witnesses even though they are fit to testify and testified honestly, it is only that the litigant led them astray, or
d) that from the things that were said, he feels that there are hidden factors which they do not desire to reveal,
in these and in all similar matters, it is forbidden for him to deliver a ruling. Instead, he should withdraw from this judgment and allow it to be decided by someone whose heart is at peace with the matter. These matters are given over to a person's heart. Concerning these Deuteronomy 1:17 states: "Judgment is God's."
Halacha 4
A court has the authority to administer lashes to a person who is not required to receive lashes and to execute a person who is not liable to be executed. This license was not granted to overstep the words of the Torah, but rather to create a fence around the words of the Torah. When the court sees that the people have broken the accepted norms with regard to a matter, they may establish safeguards to strengthen the matter according to what appears necessary to them. All the above applies with regard to establishing directives for the immediate time, and not with regard to the establishment of halachah for all time.
An incident occurred where they had a man lashed for engaging in relations with his wife under a tree. And an incident occurred concerning a person who rode on a horse on the Sabbath in the era of the Greeks and they brought him to the court and had him stoned to death. And an incident occurred and Shimon ben Shetach hung 80 women on one day in Ashkelon. All of the required processes of questioning, cross-examination, and warnings were not followed, nor was the testimony unequivocal. Instead, their execution was a directive for that immediate time according to what he perceived as necessary.
Halacha 5
Similarly, at any time, and in any place, a court has the license to give a person lashes if he has a reputation for immorality and people gossip about him, saying that he acts licentiously. This applies provided the rumor is heard continuously, as we explained, and he does not have any known enemies who would spread this unfavorable report. Similarly, a person with such an unsavory reputation may be humiliated and scorn may be heaped on his mother in his presence.
Halacha 6
Similarly, at all times, a court has the prerogative to declare money belonging to others as ownerless. It may destroy those funds or give them to whomever they see fit to close any breaches in the faith and to strengthen its observance or to penalize a stubborn and difficult person. The Book of Ezra 10:8 states: "Whoever fails to come in three days according to the advice of the officers and the elders will have all of his property confiscated." From this we learn that when a court declares property ownerless, their declaration is effective.
Halacha 7
Similarly, a judge may apply a ban of ostracism or excommunication to a person to whom these measures would not ordinarily be applied according to his perception of what is necessary at that time. He should state that he is ostracizing him or excommunicating him on his own conviction and should publicize his transgression in public. This is indicated by Judges 5:23: "'Curse Meroz,' said the angel of G-d. 'Curse him. Those who dwell with him are cursed, because they did not come to the aid of God's people.'"
Halacha 8
Similarly, a judge may enter into a controversy with a person with whom it is necessary to enter into controversy, cursing him, having him beaten, having his hair pulled out, and compelling him to take an oath to God against his will so that he will not perform or that he did not perform a specific action, as Nechemiah 13:25 states: "I entered into controversy with them; I cursed them; I beat people among them; I tore their hair out, and I made them take an oath to God."
Halacha 9
Similarly, he may have a person's hands and feet bound. He may imprison him and have him pushed to the ground and dragged, as Ezra 7:26 states: "Judgment will be speedily administered to him, to be executed, to be uprooted, to be punished by a loss of property, and to be imprisoned."
Halacha 10
All of the above measures should be applied according to the judge's perception that it is appropriate that the violator be punished in this manner or the situation at large requires it. All of his deeds should be for the sake of heaven and the honor of people at large should not be light in his eyes. For consideration of their honor overrides the observance of a Rabbinic prohibition. Certainly, this applies with regard to the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who uphold the Torah of truth. He must take care not to ruin their honor and act only to increase the honor of the Omnipresent. For whenever a person debases the Torah, his person will be degraded for people at large. Conversely, when a person honors the Torah, his person will be honored by people at large. And there is no other honor for the Torah except to follow its statutes and judgments.
• English Text | Video Class• Friday, Cheshvan 17, 5776 · 30 October 2015
"Today's Day"
Monday Cheshvan 17 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Chayei Sara, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 83-87.
Tanya: Now, it is (p. 573) ...waters of lustration..." (p. 575).
Time must be guarded. It is urgent to "accept the yoke of Torah." Every bit of time, every day that passes, is not just a day but a life's concern. Days go by; as the Talmud says (Yerushalmi Berachot 1:1), "A day enters and a day departs, a week enters etc.,... a month etc.,... a year etc.,..." My father quoted the Alter Rebbe: A summer day and a winter night are a year.
• Daily Thought:
Engaged
Our job is to keep Him engaged. When the Creator’s mind is engaged, our world comes alive. It resonates with His presence. Miracles happen.
If we lose His interest, He acts as though He is not there, as though He is sleeping. Madness breaks loose.
He needs to see things that interest Him happening down here. Something more than an everyday world going about its everyday stuff. More than the patterns and rhythms of the nature He created. Even angels singing His praises all day can get tedious after a millennium or so.
But an earthly being doing a G‑dly act—now that’s something to wake up to.[Maamarei Purim 5700 and 5744.]
_____________________
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