Daily Quote:
The term "chassid" is an ancient one that the Sages had even applied to Adam. It describes perfection and excellence in intellect or in emotive character-traits, or in both. In Chabad Chassidic doctrine, the appelation "chassid" refers to one who recognizes his own essence-character and his standing in the knowledge and study of Torah, as well as his situation in observing mitzvot. He knows what he lacks and he is concerned and takes pains to fill that void. He is diligent in obedience in the manner of "accepting the yoke of Heaven."[Hayom Yom, 21 Adar I]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Bereishit, 6th Portion Genesis 4:23-5:24 with Rashi
• Chapter 4
23Now Lemech said to his wives, "Adah and Zillah, hearken to my voice; wives of Lemech, incline your ears to my words, for I have slain a man by wounding (him) and a child by bruising (him). כגוַיֹּאמֶר לֶמֶךְ לְנָשָׁיו עָדָה וְצִלָּה שְׁמַעַן קוֹלִי נְשֵׁי לֶמֶךְ הַאֲזֵנָּה אִמְרָתִי כִּי אִישׁ הָרַגְתִּי לְפִצְעִי וְיֶלֶד לְחַבֻּרָתִי:
hearken to my voice: For his wives separated from being intimate with him because he had slain Cain and Tubal-cain, his (Lemech’s) son. [The story was] that Lemech was blind, and Tubal-cain was leading him. He spotted Cain, who appeared to him as an animal, and he told his father to draw the bow, and he killed him. As soon as he learned that it was his grandfather Cain, he clapped his hands together [in anguish] and clapped his son between them and killed him. So his wives separated from him, and he attempted to appease them. שמען קולי: שהיו פורשות ממנו מתשמיש לפי שהרג את קין ואת תובל קין בנו, שהיה למך סומא ותובל קין מושכו, וראה את קין ונדמה לו כחיה ואמר לאביו למשוך בקשת, והרגו. וכיון שידע שהוא קין זקנו, הכה כף אל כף וספק את בנו ביניהם והרגו, והיו נשיו פורשות ממנו והוא מפייסן:
hearken to my voice: to hearken to me to agree to live with me, for was the man I killed, killed because of my wounding? Did I wound him intentionally, that the wound should be attributed to my name? And the child I killed, was he killed by my bruising, i.e., on account of my [intentional] bruising? This is a question. Did I not do it inadvertently and not intentionally? This is not my wound, and this is not my bruise. פֶּצַע is a wound inflicted by a sword or an arrow, machadure in Old French. שמען קולי: להשמע לי (לתשמיש), וכי איש אשר הרגתיו לפצעי הוא נהרג, וכי אני פצעתיו מזיד שיהא הפצע קרוי על שמי, וילד אשר הרגתי לחבורתי נהרג, כלומר על ידי חבורתי, בתמיה, והלא שוגג אני ולא מזיד, לא זהו פצעי ולא זהו חבורתי. פצע, מכת חרב או חץ נברידור"א בלע"ז [פצע]:
24If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold, then for Lemech it shall be seventy seven fold." כדכִּי שִׁבְעָתַיִם יֻקַּם קָיִן וְלֶמֶךְ שִׁבְעִים וְשִׁבְעָה:
If Cain be avenged sevenfold: Cain, who killed intentionally, was given an extension until seven generations. How much more should I, who have killed unintentionally, be given many times seven. כי שבעתים יוקם קין: קין שהרג מזיד נתלה לו עד שבעה דורות, אני שהרגתי שוגג לא כל שכן שיתלה לי שביעיות הרבה:
seventy-seven fold: Heb. שִׁבְעִים וְשִׁבְעָה An expression meaning many sevens is used here. So did Rabbi Tanchuma explain it. [This does not appear in extant editions of Tanchuma, but in Yalkut Shim’oni it is quoted from Tanchuma]. In Midrash Genesis Rabbah (23:4): Lemech did not kill anyone, but his wives separated from him after they had fulfilled [the commandment of] propagation, because a decree had been issued to destroy Cain’s seed after seven generations. They said, “Why should we give birth in vain? Tomorrow, the Flood will come and inundate everything!” He answered them, “Have I slain a man for whom I should be wounded? Did I slay Abel, who was a man in stature and a child in years, that my seed should be annihilated for that iniquity? If Cain, who killed, was given an extension of seven generations, I, who did not slay- how much more so should I be given an extension of many sevens!” Now this is an absurd deduction from a minor to a major case, [because] if so, the Holy One, blessed be He, could not exact His debt nor fulfill His word. שבעים ושבעה: לשון רבוי שביעיות אחז לו. כך דרש רבי תנחומא (אות יא). ומדרש בראשית רבה (כג ד) לא הרג למך כלום ונשיו פורשות ממנו משקיימו פריה ורביה, לפי שנגזרה גזרה לכלות זרעו של קין לאחר שבעה דורות, אמרו מה אנו יולדות לבהלה, למחר המבול בא ושוטף את הכל. והוא אומר להן וכי איש הרגתי לפצעי, וכי אני הרגתי את הבל שהיה איש בקומה וילד בשנים, שיהא זרעי כלה באותו עון, ומה קין שהרג נתלה לו שבעה דורות, אני שלא הרגתי לא כל שכן שיתלו לי שביעיות הרבה. וזהו קל וחומר של שטות, אם כן אין הקב"ה גובה את חובו ומקיים את דברו:
25And Adam knew his wife again, and she bore a son, and she named him Seth, for God has given me other seed, instead of Abel, for Cain slew him. כהוַיֵּדַע אָדָם עוֹד אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וַתֵּלֶד בֵּן וַתִּקְרָא אֶת שְׁמוֹ שֵׁת כִּי שָׁת לִי אֱלֹהִים זֶרַע אַחֵר תַּחַת הֶבֶל כִּי הֲרָגוֹ קָיִן:
And Adam knew, etc.: Lemech came to the first man (Adam) and complained about his wives. He (Adam) said to them, “Is it for you to be so strict concerning the decree of the Omnipresent? You perform your commandments, and He will do His.” They [the wives] said to him, “Correct yourself first. Haven’t you separated from your wife already 130 years since death was decreed because of you?” Immediately,“And Adam knew, etc.” What is the meaning of עוֹד [again]? This is to say that his desire [for Eve] was increased above his previous desire [Genesis Rabbah 23:4: 5]. See also Eruvin 18b. וידע אדם וגו': בא לו למך אצל אדם הראשון וקבל על נשיו, אמר להן וכי עליכם לדקדק על גזירתו של מקום, אתם עשו מצותכם והוא יעשה את שלו. אמרו לו קשוט עצמך תחלה, והלא פרשת מאשתך זה מאה ושלשים שנה משנקנסה מיתה על ידך, מיד וידע אדם עוד וגו'. מהו עוד, ללמדך שנתוספה לו תאוה על תאותו:
26And to Seth also to him a son was born, and he named him Enosh; then it became common to call by the name of the Lord. כווּלְשֵׁת גַּם הוּא יֻלַּד בֵּן וַיִּקְרָא אֶת שְׁמוֹ אֱנוֹשׁ אָז הוּחַל לִקְרֹא בְּשֵׁם יְהֹוָה:
then it became common: Heb. הוּחַל, is an expression of חוּלִין profaneness: to name people and idols with the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, to make them idols and to call them deities. — [from Gen. Rabbah 23:7; Baraitha of 49 Methods, quoted in Yalkut Shimoni] אז הוחל: (לשון חולין) לקרא את שמות האדם ואת שמות העצבים בשמו של הקב"ה לעשותן עבודה זרה ולקרותן אלהות:
Chapter 5
1This is the narrative of the generations of man; on the day that God created man, in the likeness of God He created him. אזֶה סֵפֶר תּוֹלְדֹת אָדָם בְּיוֹם בְּרֹא אֱלֹהִים אָדָם בִּדְמוּת אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֹתוֹ:
This is the narrative of the generations of man: Heb. סֵפֶר. This is the narrative of the generations of man, and there are many Aggadic midrashim. זה ספר תולדות אדם: זו היא ספירת תולדות אדם, ומדרשי אגדה יש רבים:
on the day that God created, etc.: This tells us that on the day that he was created, he begot children. — [from Gen. Rabbah 24:7] ביום ברא וגו': מגיד שביום שנברא הוליד:
2Male and female He created them, and He blessed them, and He named them man (Adam) on the day they were created. בזָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בְּרָאָם וַיְבָרֶךְ אֹתָם וַיִּקְרָא אֶת שְׁמָם אָדָם בְּיוֹם הִבָּרְאָם:
3And Adam lived one hundred and thirty years, and he begot in his likeness after his image, and he named him Seth. גוַיְחִי אָדָם שְׁלשִׁים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בִּדְמוּתוֹ כְּצַלְמוֹ וַיִּקְרָא אֶת שְׁמוֹ שֵׁת:
one hundred and thirty years: Until then, he had separated from his wife. — [Tanchuma Buber, Bereishith 26]. שלשים ומאת שנה: עד כאן פירש מן האשה:
4And the days of Adam after he begot Seth were eight hundred years, and he begot sons and daughters. דוַיִּהְיוּ יְמֵי אָדָם אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת שֵׁת שְׁמֹנֶה מֵאֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
5And all the days of Adam that he lived were nine hundred and thirty years, and he died. הוַיִּהְיוּ כָּל יְמֵי אָדָם אֲשֶׁר חַי תְּשַׁע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וּשְׁלשִׁים שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת:
6And Seth lived one hundred and five years, and he begot Enosh. ווַיְחִי שֵׁת חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת אֱנוֹשׁ:
7And Seth lived after he had begotten Enosh eight hundred and seven years, and he begot sons and daughters. זוַיְחִי שֵׁת אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת אֱנוֹשׁ שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
8And all the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years, and he died. חוַיִּהְיוּ כָּל יְמֵי שֵׁת שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וּתְשַׁע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת:
9And Enosh lived ninety years, and he begot Kenan. טוַיְחִי אֱנוֹשׁ תִּשְׁעִים שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת קֵינָן:
10And Enosh lived after he had begotten Kenan eight hundred and fifteen years, and he begot sons and daughters. יוַיְחִי אֱנוֹשׁ אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת קֵינָן חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
11And all the days of Enosh were nine hundred and five years, and he died. יאוַיִּהְיוּ כָּל יְמֵי אֱנוֹשׁ חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וּתְשַׁע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת:
12And Kenan lived seventy years, and he begot Mahalalel. יבוַיְחִי קֵינָן שִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת מַהֲלַלְאֵל:
13And Kenan lived after he had begotten Mahalalel eight hundred and forty years, and he begot sons and daughters. יגוַיְחִי קֵינָן אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת מַהֲלַלְאֵל אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
14And all the days of Kenan were nine hundred and ten years, and he died. ידוַיִּהְיוּ כָּל יְמֵי קֵינָן עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים וּתְשַׁע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת:
15And Mahalalel lived sixty five years, and he begot Jared. טווַיְחִי מַהֲלַלְאֵל חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת יָרֶד:
16And Mahalalel lived after he had begotten Jared eight hundred and thirty years, and he begot sons and daughters. טזוַיְחִי מַהֲלַלְאֵל אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת יֶרֶד שְׁלשִׁים שָׁנָה וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
17And all the days of Mahalalel were eight hundred and ninety five years, and he died. יזוַיִּהְיוּ כָּל יְמֵי מַהֲלַלְאֵל חָמֵשׁ וְתִשְׁעִים שָׁנָה וּשְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת:
18And Jared lived a hundred and sixty two years, and he begot Enoch. יחוַיְחִי יֶרֶד שְׁתַּיִם וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וּמְאַת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת חֲנוֹךְ:
19And Jared lived after he had begotten Enoch eight hundred years, and he begot sons and daughters. יטוַיְחִי יֶרֶד אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת חֲנוֹךְ שְׁמֹנֶה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
20And all the days of Jared were nine hundred and sixty two years, and he died. כוַיִּהְיוּ כָּל יְמֵי יֶרֶד שְׁתַּיִם וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וּתְשַׁע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיָּמֹת:
21And Enoch lived sixty five years, and he begot Methuselah. כאוַיְחִי חֲנוֹךְ חָמֵשׁ וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד אֶת מְתוּשָׁלַח:
22And Enoch walked with God after he had begotten Methuselah, three hundred years, and he begot sons and daughters. כבוַיִּתְהַלֵּךְ חֲנוֹךְ אֶת הָאֱלֹהִים אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת מְתוּשֶׁלַח שְׁלשׁ מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת:
23And all the days of Enoch were three hundred and sixty five years. כגוַיְהִי כָּל יְמֵי חֲנוֹךְ חָמֵשׁ וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וּשְׁלשׁ מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה:
24And Enoch walked with God, and he was no longer, for God had taken him. כדוַיִּתְהַלֵּךְ חֲנוֹךְ אֶת הָאֱלֹהִים וְאֵינֶנּוּ כִּי לָקַח אֹתוֹ אֱלֹהִים:
And Enoch walked: He was a righteous man, but he could easily be swayed to return to do evil. Therefore, the Holy One, blessed be He, hastened and took him away and caused him to die before his time. For this reason, Scripture changed [the wording] in [the account of] his demise and wrote, “and he was no longer” in the world to complete his years. — [from Gen. Rabbah 25:1] ויתהלך חנוך: צדיק היה וקל בדעתו לשוב להרשיע, לפיכך מיהר הקב"ה וסילקו והמיתו קודם זמנו [וזהו ששינה הכתוב במיתתו לכתוב ואיננו בעולם למלאות שנותיו:
for God had taken him: Before his time, like (Ezek. 24:16):“behold I am taking from you the desire of your eyes.” - [from Gen. Rabbah 25:1] כי לקח אותו: לפני זמנו] כמו (יחזקאל כד טז) הנני לוקח ממך את מחמד עיניך:
Daily Tehillim: Chapter 119, Verses 97-176
• Verses 97-176
97. O how I love Your Torah! All day it is my discussion.
98. Your commandments make me wiser than my enemies, for they are ever with me.
99. From all my teachers I have gained wisdom, for Your testimonies are my discussion.
100. I will be more perceptive than elders, because I have guarded Your precepts.
101. I have restrained my feet from every evil path, that I might keep Your word.
102. I have not turned away from Your judgments, for You have instructed me.
103. How sweet are Your words to my palate, [sweeter] than honey to my mouth!
104. From Your precepts I gain understanding, therefore I hate every path of falsehood.
105. Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.
106. I have sworn-and I will fulfill it-to keep Your righteous judgments.
107. I am afflicted to the extreme; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your promise.
108. Accept with favor, O Lord, the offerings of my lips, and teach me Your laws.
109. My soul is in danger always, yet I have not forgotten Your Torah.
110. The wicked laid a snare for me, yet I have not strayed from Your precepts.
111. I have taken Your testimonies as an eternal heritage, for they are the joy of my heart.
112. I have inclined my heart to perform Your statutes, forever, to the last.
113. I despise vain thoughts, but I love Your Torah.
114. You are my refuge and my shield; I place hope in Your promise.
115. Turn away from me, you evildoers, and I will keep the commandments of my God.
116. Support me according to Your promise, and I will live; let me not be shamed because of my hope.
117. Sustain me, and I will be saved, and I will be engrossed in Your statutes always.
118. You trample all who stray from Your statutes, for their ploy is a lie.
119. You have purged all the wicked of the earth like dross, therefore I love Your testimonies.
120. My flesh bristles from fear of You, and I am in awe of Your judgments.
121. I practiced justice and righteousness; leave me not to my oppressors.
122. Guarantee Your servant goodness; let not the wicked exploit me.
123. My eyes long for Your salvation, and for the word of Your righteousness.
124. Treat Your servant according to Your kindness, and teach me Your statutes.
125. I am Your servant; grant me understanding, that I may know Your testimonies.
126. It is time to act for the Lord; they have abrogated Your Torah.
127. Therefore I love Your commandments more than gold, even fine gold.
128. Therefore I affirmed all Your precepts; I have hated every path of falsehood.
129. Your testimonies are wondrous, therefore does my soul guard them.
130. Your opening words illuminate, enlightening the simple.
131. I opened my mouth and swallowed, because I craved Your commandments.
132. Turn to me and favor me, as is [Your] law for those who love Your Name.
133. Set my steps in Your word, and let no iniquity rule over me.
134. Deliver me from the oppression of man, and I will keep Your precepts.
135. Let Your face shine upon Your servant, and teach me Your statutes.
136. My eyes shed streams of water, because they do not keep Your Torah.
137. Righteous are you, O Lord, and Your judgments are upright.
138. You commanded Your testimonies in righteousness and great faithfulness.
139. My zeal consumes me, because my enemies have forgotten Your words.
140. Your word is very pure, and Your servant cherishes it.
141. I am young and despised, yet I do not forget Your precepts.
142. Your righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and Your Torah is truth.
143. Trouble and anguish have taken hold of me, yet Your commandments are my delight.
144. Your testimonies are righteous forever; give me understanding, that I may live.
145. I call out with all my heart; answer me, O Lord; I will keep Your statutes.
146. I call out to You; save me, and I will observe Your testimonies.
147. I rose before dawn and cried out; my hope is in Your word.
148. My eyes preceded the night watches, that I may discuss Your word.
149. Hear my voice in keeping with Your kindness; O Lord, grant me life as is Your practice.
150. Those who pursue mischief draw near; they are far from Your Torah.
151. You are near, O Lord, and all Your commandments are truth.
152. From the beginning I discerned from Your testimonies that You had established them forever.
153. Behold my affliction and deliver me, for I have not forgotten Your Torah.
154. Wage my battle and redeem me; grant me life for the sake of Your word.
155. Salvation is far from the wicked, for they seek not Your statutes.
156. Your mercies are great, O Lord; grant me life as is Your practice.
157. My pursuers and my enemies are many, yet I did not turn away from Your testimonies.
158. I saw traitors and I quarreled with them, because they do not keep Your words.
159. Behold how I love Your precepts; grant me life, O Lord, according to Your kindness.
160. The beginning of Your word is truth, and forever are all Your righteous judgements.
161. Princes have pursued me without cause, but it is Your word my heart fears.
162. I rejoice at Your word, like one who finds abundant spoil.
163. I hate falsehood and abhor it, but Your Torah I love.
164. Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous judgments.
165. There is abundant peace for those who love Your Torah, and there is no stumbling for them.
166. I hoped for Your salvation, O Lord, and I performed Your commandments.
167. My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them intensely.
168. I have kept Your precepts and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You
169. Let my prayer approach Your presence, O Lord; grant me understanding according to Your word.
170. Let my supplication come before You; save me according to Your promise.
171. My lips will utter praise, for You have taught me Your statutes.
172. My tongue will echo Your word, for all Your commandments are just.
173. Let Your hand be ready to help me, for I have chosen Your precepts.
174. I long for Your salvation, O Lord, and Your Torah is my delight.
175. Let my soul live, and it will praise You, and let Your judgment help me.
176. I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out Your servant, for I have not forgotten Your commandments.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 25• Lessons in Tanya
• Friday, Tishrei 26, 5776 · October 9, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 25
וכנודע מה שאמר הבעל שם טוב ז״ל על פסוק: לעולם, ה׳, דברך נצב בשמים
The teaching of the Baal Shem Tov, of blessed memory, on the verse,1 “Forever, O G‑d, Your word stands firm in the heavens,” is well known:
As mentioned above in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 1, the Baal Shem Tov expanded and disseminated the following concept that appears in Midrash Tehillim:
שצירוף אותיות שנבראו בהן השמים, שהוא מאמר יהי רקיע כו׳
The combinations of the letters with which the heavens were created, i.e., the creative utterance,2 “Let there be a firmament...,”
הן נצבות ועומדות מלובשות בשמים לעולם, להחיותם ולקיימם
stand and remain vested in the heavens forever, to animate and sustain them.
As the Alter Rebbe explained in greater detail in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, chs. 1 and 2, this is also the case with regard to all created beings.
ולא כהפלוסופים שכופרים בהשגחה פרטית
This differs from the view of the philosophers who deny the individual Providence of the Creator over each and every one of His creations.
ומדמין בדמיונם הכוזב את מעשה ה׳, עושה שמים וארץ, למעשה אנוש ותחבולותיו
Using their false analogy, they liken the work of G‑d, the Maker of heaven and earth, to the work of man and his devices.
כי כאשר יצא לצורף כלי, שוב אין הכלי צריך לידי הצורף
For when a metal-smith has completed a vessel, [it] no longer needs the hands of the smith;
שאף שידיו מסולקות הימנו, הוא קיים מעצמו
though his hands are removed from it, it remains intact by itself.
Some philosophers apply this model to the creation of heaven and earth, and imagine that once G‑d created them they need Him no more, G‑d forbid. These thinkers thus deny hashgachah pratit, individually-directed Divine Providence — the Creator’s constant and ongoing contact with His created beings.
וטח מראות עיניהם ההבדל הגדול שבין מעשה אנוש ותחבולותיו
But their eyes are bedaubed so that they cannot see the great difference between man’s work and schemes,
שהוא יש מיש
which is [the production of] something out of something (yesh miyesh),
רק שמשנה הצורה והתמונה
where he merely changes the form and the appearance,
The shapeless piece of silver that a craftsman transforms into a vessel (a) already existed, and (b) was innately malleable. The craftsman has thus innovated nothing, and the vessel once shaped will therefore not be dependent on him.
The philosophers, however, do not see the difference between this,
למעשה שמים וארץ, שהוא יש מאין
and the creation of heaven and earth, which is creatio ex nihilo (yesh me’ayin), creating something out of nothing.
As the Alter Rebbe will soon point out, something brought into existence out of nothing cannot continue to exist unless the power that creates it remains constantly vested within it.
והוא פלא גדול יותר מקריעת ים סוף, על דרך משל
This — the creation of heaven and earth ex nihilo — is an [even] greater wonder than, for example, the splitting of the Red Sea,
אשר הוליך ה׳ ברוח קדים עזה כל הלילה, ויבקעו המים
which G‑d drove back3 “by a strong east wind all that night,... and the waters were divided,” and stood upright like a wall.
ואילו פסק הרוח כרגע, היו המים חוזרים וניגרים במורד, כדרכם וטבעם, ולא קמו כחומה
If the wind had ceased even for a moment, the waters would again have flowed downward, as is their way and nature, and they would not have stood upright like a wall,
In the corresponding passage in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, the Alter Rebbe adds the words “without a doubt.”
אף שטבע זה במים, הוא גם כן נברא ומחודש יש מאין
even though this characteristic of water — to flow downward — is also created and innovated ex nihilo.
As the Rebbe explains, not only the water itself, but also its characteristic of fluidity, was created ex nihilo.
Thus, when the wind caused the water to stand like a stone wall, this fluid nature had only to be replaced by the capability of a solid, so that it could stand erect. Nevertheless, since this quality is uncharacteristic of water, this innovation had to be constantly and continuously brought about by the power that first made it possible. (Indeed, were the wind to cease, the water would have reverted to its former self.) Thus, even when a yesh is merely changed into another yesh, the activating force must be constantly present.
The Alter Rebbe now goes on to show how the property of fluidity is not intrinsic to water, but must be created within it.
Certain characteristics do not need to be created separately from a particular being, for they are intrinsic to all created beings; for example, all created beings occupy space. Water, however, need not necessarily flow. Other created beings exist quite happily without this property, and when water exists as a solid (as ice) it too possesses the quality of rigidity. The quality of fluidity is thus not intrinsic to water.
This is what the Alter Rebbe now goes on to say:
שהרי חומת אבנים נצבת מעצמה, בלי רוח, רק שטבע המים אינו כן
For a wall of stone stands erect by itself, without [the assistance of] any wind, but the nature of water is not so.
As stated above, the property of fluidity was something that G‑d created within the already existing entity of water. Though the wind had only to change one yesh to another, replacing the property of fluidity by the property of solidity, this is still considered a wondrous event. And in order for this to have been accomplished, the activating force — in this case, the wind — had to be working constantly.
How much more will this be the case, the Alter Rebbe will soon conclude, with regard to creating a yesh out of utter nothingness. And indeed, the Divine Source responsible for the innovation of the entire universe out of nothing, must be consistently vested within it, in order to enable it to endure and not revert to nothingness. Such a corollary should have been imperative even according to the philosophers. They thus err on two grounds — in their above-mentioned reliance on a misleading analogy, and in their failure to realize that the activating force must constantly be invested within the created being.
Thus, to resume the above argument, if for the miraculous splitting of the Red Sea that only involved the changing of oneyesh to another, the continuous action of G‑d was necessary, —
וכל שכן וקל וחומר בבריאת יש מאין, שהוא למעלה מן הטבע, והפלא ופלא יותר מקריעת ים סוף
How much more so, with respect to the creation of an existent being out of nothing, for this transcends nature, and is far more wondrous than the splitting of the Red Sea;
על אחת כמה וכמה שבהסתלקות חס ושלום כח הבורא יש מאין מן הנברא, ישוב הנברא לאין ואפס ממש
surely if the creative power that creates an existent being out of nothing were (heaven forfend) to be withdrawn from a created being, that being would revert to utter naught and non-existence.
אלא צריך להיות כח הפועל בנפעל תמיד, להחיותו ולקיימו
Rather,4 the activating force of the Creator, which initially brings every created being into existence, must continuously be present within the thing created, to give it life and continued existence.
ובחינה זו היא דבר ה׳ ורוח פיו שבעשרה מאמרות, שבהן נברא העולם
This5 [force] is the “word of G‑d” and the “breath of His mouth,” that are to be found in the Ten Utterances by which the universe was created.
The Ten Utterances are the source of the “letters of speech” by means of which all of creation is brought into existence. Moreover, as explained in the first chapter of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, even those created beings which are not specifically mentioned in the Ten Utterances, likewise derive their vitality from the Ten Utterances by means of various combinations, substitutions and transpositions of these letters.
ואפילו ארץ הלזו הגשמית, ובחינת דומם שבה
And even as regards this physical earth and its inorganic component,
Earth6 possesses a potential (ko’ach hatzomeiach) that enables vegetation to grow. In the case of created beings that are part of the vegetative realm, growth thus visibly testifies to the presence of an activating force. Created beings that are part of the inanimate or inorganic realm that is represented in the earth, demonstrate no signs of life at all, not even growth.
חיותן וקיומן הוא דבר ה׳ מעשרה מאמרות, המלובש בהן ומקיימן, להיות דומם ויש מאין
their life-force and continued existence is the “word of G‑d” that is to be found in the Ten Utterances that is vested in them, maintaining them as inorganic matter and as substantiality ex nihilo,
ולא יחזרו לאין ואפס ממש, כשהיו
so that they will not revert to the absolute naught and nothingness they had been prior to their creation.
וזהו שאמר האריז״ל, שגם בדומם כאבנים ועפר ומים, יש בהם בחינת נפש וחיות רוחניית
And this is the meaning of the statement of R. Isaac Luria, of blessed memory,7 that there is a kind of soul and spiritual life-force even in inorganic matter such as stones and dust and water, entities that display no signs of life.
This “soul” and spiritual life-force is the “word of G‑d,” the potent Divine speech that continuously creates all beings; i.e., the Shechinah.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | Tehillim 119:89. |
| 2. | Bereishit 1:6. |
| 3. | (18) Shmot 14:21. |
| 4. | ׳Cf. Kuzari III, 11. |
| 5. | The Heb. זה has been emended to זו, according to the Table of Corrections (Luach HaTikkun) compiled by the Rebbe. |
| 6. | Note of the Rebbe: “It seems that the above comment understands eretz to mean ‘earth’ [in the sense of soil or dust], (as in the verse, ‘Let the soil bring forth...’). To me, however, it appears that eretz here is intended as a contrast to ‘heavens’ in the above-quoted phrase, ‘[Your word, O G‑d, stands firm in the] heavens,’ and likewise in contrast to ‘the upper and lower worlds’ [in the corresponding passage] (in ch. 1 of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah; see there). [The Alter Rebbe’s text should thus be translated, ‘And even as regards this physical world....’] The distinction drawn in the above comment between [those categories of created beings which have] the power of growth [and those which have not], etc., is thus not necessary. Moreover, [the Alter Rebbe] immediately goes on to speak explicitly of ‘inorganic matter such as stones and dust....’” |
| 7. | Etz Chayim, Shaar 39, ch. 3; see also Shaar 50. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:Today's Mitzvah
Friday, Tishrei 26, 5776 · October 9, 2015
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 241
Taking Collateral from a Widow
"Nor shall you take a widow's garment as security"—Deuteronomy 24:17.
It is forbidden for a creditor to take collateral for a debt from a widow—whether she is wealthy or poor.
Taking Collateral from a Widow
Negative Commandment 241
Translated by Berel Bell
The 241st prohibition is that we are forbidden from taking a security deposit from a widow, regardless of whether she is rich or poor.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not take a widow's garment as security for a loan."
In the words of the Mishneh:2 "One may not take a security deposit from a widow, regardless of whether she is rich or poor, as the verse says, 'Do not take a widow's garment as security for a loan.' "
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 9th chapter of tractate Bava Metzia.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 24:17.
2.Bava Metzia 115a.
Full text of this Mitzvah »__________________________________________________________________________
Negative Commandment 242
Taking Food Preparation Utensils as Collateral
"One shall not take the upper or lower millstone for a pledge, for he is taking a life as a pledge"—Deuteronomy 24:6.
It is forbidden for a creditor to take food preparation utensils – e.g., grinders, kneading bowls, pots, and knives – as collateral for a debt.
Taking Food Preparation Utensils as Collateral
Negative Commandment 242
Translated by Berel Bell
The 242nd prohibition is that we are forbidden from taking as security any objects that are used in food preparation, such as those used for grinding, kneading, cooking, slaughtering animals, or any other type of food preparation.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "Do not take an upper or lower millstone as security for a loan, since that is like taking a life as security."
In the words of the Mishneh,2 "The verse does not refer only to millstones, but to anything used in food preparation, as the verse says, 'since that is like taking a life as security.' "3
We now need to explain the statement of our Sages,4 "A person transgresses for both items, as the verse says, 'Do not take an upper or lower millstone.' " From this, one could be mislead into thinking that they count as two mitzvos. This is indicated even more strongly in their statement,5 "One transgresses one prohibition for the upper millstone and one for the lower millstone."
The explanation of these statements is as follows: if a person takes an object used for food preparation as security, he transgresses this prohibition, as we explained. If he took many articles, of which all are used for preparing food — such as one article that is used for grinding, another that is used for baking, and a third that is used for kneading — he would be committing a separate transgression for each article. This is [obvious and] unnecessary to explain. It is as if the person took one garment as security from Reuven's widow, one from Shimon's widow, and one from Levi's widow, in which case he would be guilty of 3 transgressions.
The explanation of the phrase "both items," is that it refers to a case where both items are used in preparing food, and one cannot be used without the other. In this case, since they are only effective when used together, we would be uncertain whether to count them as one case; or, since they are two articles, to count them as two transgressions. Therefore, our Sages explained to us that the person is punished for two transgressions, even though the act can only be done with the two together — such as the upper and lower millstone, where one cannot be used to grind without the other. If a person took these millstones as security, it would be as if he took a kneading trough and a slaughtering knife, each of which are used for different acts. This is the intention of the phrase, "A person transgresses for both items" — not that they count as two separate mitzvos.
The language of the Sifri regarding this that I've just explained: "Just as the upper and lower millstones are two articles that are used for a single act, and nevertheless each counts as a separate prohibition; so too for any two articles that are used for a single act, each counts as a separate prohibition." This means that although they are used for a single act, each one nevertheless counts as a separate prohibition.
If one transgresses this prohibition and takes the object as security, we take it back from him and return it to the poor person.6 If the object was lost or burned before he was able to return it, he receives lashes. The same applies to taking a widow's garment as security.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 9th chapter of tractate Bava Metzia.
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 24:6.
2.Bava Metzia, ibid.
3.From this phrase we see that the verse does not care only about millstones, but about anything that involves sustaining life, i.e. food preparation.
4.Bava Metzia 115a.
5.Ibid., 116a.
6.See Kapach, 5731, footnote 31. Following the Rav Kook version, Chavel translates, "owners."
Full text of this Mitzvah »
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• 1 Chapter: Shechitah Shechitah - Chapter 1
Shechitah - Chapter 1
Halacha 1
It is a positive commandment1 for one who desires to partake of the meat of a domesticated animal, wild beast, or fowl to slaughter [it] and then partake of it,2as [Deuteronomy 12:21] states: "And you shall slaughter from your cattle and from your sheep." And with regard to a firstborn animal with a blemish,3[ibid.:22] states: "As one would partake of a deer and a gazelle." From this, we learn that a wild beast is [governed by] the same [laws] as a domesticated animal with regard to ritual slaughter.
And with regard to a fowl, [Leviticus 17:13] states: "that will snare a beast or a fowl as prey... and shed its blood." This teaches that shedding the blood of a fowl is analogous to shedding the blood of a wild beast.4
Halacha 2
The laws governing ritual slaughter are the same in all instances.5Therefore one who slaughters a domesticated animal, beast, or fowl should first6 recite the blessing: "[Blessed...] who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning7 ritual slaughter." If he did not recite a blessing, either consciously or inadvertently, the meat is permitted.8
It is forbidden to partake of a slaughtered animal throughout the time it is in its death throes.9 When a person partakes of it before it dies, he transgresses a negative commandment. [This act] is included in the prohibition [Leviticus 19:26]: "Do not eat upon the blood." He does not, however, receive lashes.10
It is permitted to cut meat from it after it has been ritually slaughtered, but before it dies. That meat should be salted thoroughly, washed thoroughly,11and left until the animal dies. Afterwards, it may be eaten.
Halacha 3
Fish and locusts need not be slaughtered. Instead, gathering them causes them to be permitted to be eaten. [This is indicated by Numbers 11:22]: "Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them that will suffice them? If all the fish of the sea would be gathered for them...." This indicates that gathering fish is like slaughtering cattle and sheep. And with regard to locusts, [Isaiah 33:4] states: "the gathering of the locusts," i.e., gathering alone [is sufficient]. Therefore if fish die naturally in the water, they are permitted.12 And it is permitted to eat them while they are alive.13
Halacha 4
The slaughter which the Torah mentions without elaboration must be explained so that we know: a) which place in the animal is [appropriate] for ritual slaughter?, b) what is the measure of the slaughtering process?, c) with what do we slaughter?, d) when do we slaughter?, e) in which place [on the animal's neck] do we slaughter? f) how do we slaughter, g) what factors disqualify the slaughter? h) who can slaughter?14
We were commanded concerning all of these factors in the Torah with the verse [Deuteronomy 12:21]: "And you shall slaughter from your cattle... as I commanded you." All of these factors were commanded to us orally as is true with regard to the remainder of the Oral Law which is called "the mitzvah," as we explained in the beginning of this text.15
Halacha 5
The place where an animal should be slaughtered is the neck. The entire neck is acceptable for slaughtering.
Halacha 6
Halacha 7
Where is the place of slaughter with regard to the windpipe? From the slant of its cap22 downward until the beginning of the flank of the lung when the animal extends its neck to pasture,23 this is the place of slaughter with regard to the windpipe. The area opposite this place on the outside is called the neck.
Halacha 8
When the animal strained itself and extended its neck exceedingly or the slaughterer applied exertion to the signs and extended them upward, but slaughtered in the neck at the place of slaughter, there is an unresolved doubt24 whether [the animal] is a nevelah. For the place where the gullet and windpipe were cut is not the place where [the animal] is [usually] slaughtered.25
Halacha 9
The slaughterer must slaughter in the center of the neck. If he slaughters to the side, it is acceptable.26
What is the measure of slaughter? That one [cut] the two identifying marks, the windpipe and the gullet.27 Superior slaughter involves cutting both of them, whether for an animal or a fowl and a slaughterer should have this intent. [After the fact,] if one cut the majority of one of them for a fowl and the majority of both of them for an animal or a beast, the slaughter is acceptable.
Halacha 10
When one cut one sign entirely and half28 of the other sign when slaughtering an animal, his slaughter is unacceptable. If he cut the majority of both signs, even though in each instance he cuts only a hair's breadth more than half, it is acceptable. Since he cut even the slightest amount more than half,29 he has cut the majority.
Halacha 11
If he cut half30 of one and half of the other - even in a fowl - the slaughter is unacceptable. When a windpipe is half slit31 and one cut a little more on the place of the slit, making the cut a majority, the slaughter is acceptable. [This applies] whether one begins [on a portion of the windpipe] that is intact and reaches the slit or one inserts the knife into the slit and [increases its size until it] reaches the majority.
Halacha 12
Halacha 13
During its lifetime, every animal is considered to be forbidden until it is definitely known that it was slaughtered in an acceptable manner.35
Halacha 14
With what can we slaughter? With any entity, with a metal knife, a flint, glass, the edge of a bulrush,36 or the like among the entities that cut. [This applies] provided its edge is sharp and does not have a barb. If, however, there was a spike at the edge of the entity with which one slaughters, even if the spike is very small,37 the slaughter is unacceptable.38
Halacha 15
If the spike was on only one side of the knife, one should not slaughter with it [at the outset]. [After the fact,] if one slaughtered with it using the side on which the blemish was not detectable, the slaughter is acceptable.
Halacha 16
What is implied? There was a knife that was checked by passing it [over one's finger] and no blemish was felt on it, but when one drew it back, one felt that it had a blemish. If one slaughtered with it by passing it forwards and did not draw it back, the slaughter is acceptable. If one drew it back, the slaughter is unacceptable.39
Halacha 17
When a knife ascends and descends [in a curve] like a snake40 but does not have a blemish, one may slaughter with it as an initial and preferred option. When the edge of a knife is smooth, but is not sharp, one may slaughter with it, since it does not have a blemish.41 Even though one passes it back and forth the entire day until the slaughter [is completed], the slaughter is acceptable.42
Halacha 18
When a sharp knife has been whetted, but its [blade] is not smooth, instead, touching it is like touching the tip of an ear of grain which becomes snarled on one's finger, [nevertheless,] since it does not have a blemish, one may slaughter with it.43
Halacha 19
When a person uproots a reed or a tooth or cuts off a flint or a nail, if they are sharp and do not have a blemish, one may slaughter with them.44 If one stuck them into the ground, one should not slaughter with them while they are stuck into the ground. [After the fact,] if one slaughtered [in such a situation],45 one's slaughter is acceptable.46
Halacha 20
When one slaughtered with these entities when they were connected from the beginning of their existence, before they were uprooted, the slaughter is unacceptable47 even if they do not have a blemish.
Halacha 21
Halacha 22
When one made a knife white-hot in fire and slaughtered with it, the slaughter is acceptable.50 If one side of a knife is [jagged-edge like] a sickle and the other side is desirable, [i.e., smooth,] one should not slaughter with the desirable side as an initial and preferred measure. [This is] a decree lest one slaughter with the other side. If one slaughtered [with it], since one slaughtered with the desirable side, the slaughter is acceptable.
Halacha 23
A slaughterer must check the knife at its tip and at both of its sides [before slaughtering]. How must he check it? He must pass it over and draw it back over the flesh of his finger and pass it over and draw it back51 over his fingernail on three edges, i.e., its tip and both of its sides so that it will not have a blemish at all. [Only] afterwards, should he slaughter with it.
Halacha 24
It must [also] be inspected in this manner after slaughter.52 For if a blemish is discovered on it afterwards, there is an unresolved doubt whether the animal is a nevelah.53 For perhaps [the knife] became blemished [when cutting] the skin and when he cut the signs, he cut them with a blemished knife.54
For this reason, when a person slaughters many animals or many fowl,55 he must inspect [the knife] between each [slaughter]. For if he did not check, and then checked [after slaughtering] the last one and discovered [the knife] to be blemished, there is an unresolved doubt whether all of them - even the first - are nevelot56 or not.57
Halacha 25
When one inspected a knife, slaughtered with it, but did not inspect it after slaughtering, and then used it to break a bone, a piece of wood, or the like, and afterwards, inspected it and discovered it to be unacceptable, his slaughter is acceptable. [The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that the knife became blemished on the hard entity which it was used to break.58 Similarly, if one was negligent and did not check his knife [after slaughtering] or the knife was lost before it could be checked, the slaughter is acceptable.59
Halacha 26
Whenever a slaughterer60 does not have the knife with which he slaughters inspected by a wise man61 and uses it to slaughter for himself, we inspect it. If it is discovered to be desirable [and passes] the examination, we, nevertheless, place him under a ban of ostracism [lest] he rely on himself on another occasion and then the knife will be blemished, but he will still slaughter with it. If [upon examination] the knife is discovered to be blemished, he is removed from his position and placed under a ban of ostracism. We pronounce all the meat that he slaughtered to be unacceptable.62
Halacha 27
Halacha 28
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 146) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 451) include this among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As mentioned at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, the Ra'avad differs and does not consider this a mitzvah.
|
| 2. |
The Rambam's wording echo his statements in Hilchot Berachot 11:2: "There are other mitzvot that are not obligations, but resemble voluntary activities, for example, the mitzvah of mezuzah.... A person is not obligated to dwell in a house that requires a mezuzah in order to fulfill this mitzvah." Similarly, in the instance at hand, a person is not obligated to slaughter. If, however, he desires to eat meat, he must fulfill this mitzvah.
|
| 3. |
Note the Kessef Mishneh who elaborates, explaining that although Rashi does not interpret the verse in the same manner the Rambam does, there is support for the Rambam's interpretation.
|
| 4. |
I.e., in both instances, ritual slaughter is required. The Kessef Mishneh notes that Chulin 27b derives this equivalence from another source and explains why the Rambam cites this verse instead.
|
| 5. |
See the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who explains that there are some differences between the laws governing the slaughter of each of these types of animals.
|
| 6. |
For the blessings for all mitzvot must be recited before their observance (Pesachim 7b).
|
| 7. |
We do not, however, say "to slaughter," for, as above, the mitzvah to slaughter is not obligatory. It is dependent on the person's desire (Hilchot Berachot 11:15).
|
| 8. |
For after the fact, the recitation of the blessings is not essential (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 9. |
Partaking of the meat at this time does not, however, represent a transgression of the prohibitions against eating a limb or flesh from a living animal (see Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot, ch. 5). For once the animal has been slaughtered, these prohibitions no longer apply.
|
| 10. |
This prohibition is considered as a prohibition of a general nature (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3), i.e., prohibitions that include several diverse and unrelated acts, and lashes are not given for the violation of such prohibitions.
|
| 11. |
The Rambam's words provoke a question: Of course, this meat must be salted thoroughly as must all meat so that its blood will be removed (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 6:10). Why would one think that this meat is different?
It would appear that the explanation is that other meat may be eaten if it is roasted or its blood sealed by being cast into vinegar (ibid.:12) and these options do not apply with regard to the meat in question.
|
| 12. |
One might think that man would have to gather them alive for them to be permitted. Hence the Rambam emphasizes that this is not so (Kessef Mishneh). The general principle is: Whenever the mitzvah of ritual slaughter does not apply, the prohibitions against eating flesh from a living animal and eating a dead animal do not apply.
|
| 13. |
The commentaries note that Shabbat 90b states that one who eats a live locust violates the prohibition: "Do not make your souls detestable." [See also Rama (Yoreh De'ah 13:1) who issues a similar warning with regard to partaking of live fish.) How the can the Rambam say that it is permitted?
Among the resolutions of this question are:
a) The passage in Shabbat refers only to a non-kosher locust, not a kosher one.
b) The Rambam, here, is saying that one may cut off part of a living locust and eat it, but not that one may eat an entire locust alive.
c) Here the Rambam is speaking with regard to the laws regarding ritual slaughter. He is not focusing on those involving other prohibitions.
|
| 14. |
In the following chapters, the Rambam proceeds to answer all of these questions.
|
| 15. |
I.e., in the Introduction that precedes Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah. There the Rambam explains that the Oral Law is called "the mitzvah," because it gives us instruction concerning the observance of the mitzvot. Without it, we would not know how to fulfill them.
|
| 16. |
As will be explained in Halachah 9, ritual slaughter involves cutting the gullet and the windpipe. In this halachah, the Rambam defines where the gullet may be cut.
|
| 17. |
In contrast to the surface of the gullet which is smooth.
|
| 18. |
I.e., the end of the throat, where it is attached to the jaw..
|
| 19. |
The animal is considered a nevelah and it is forbidden to partake of it. See Chapter 3, Halachah 18 (Kessef Mishneh, note Siftei Cohen 20:5).
|
| 20. |
This is the Rambam's interpretation of Chulin 44a. Rashi interprets that passage as referring to a space the size of four fingers. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 20:2) follows the Rambam's understanding, while the Rama cites that of Rashi.
|
| 21. |
The first of the fowl's stomachs. The crop is not considered part of the gller and it is forbidden to slaughter there.
|
| 22. |
The windpipe is made up of a series of rings. Above the top ring, there is a slanted covering that is called the cap.
|
| 23. |
When the animal extends its neck, the flanks of its lungs rise upward.
|
| 24. |
See Chulin 45a which discusses these questions but leaves them unresolved.
|
| 25. |
I.e., the place of slaughter on the neck should be aligned with the place of slaughter on the windpipe and the gullet in their natural position. In this instance, the external place of slaughter - the position on the neck - was correct, but the signs were not cut in the usual place.
|
| 26. |
This applies only after the fact. At the outset, one must slaughter in the center of the neck.
|
| 27. |
Since the acceptability of the slaughter is dependent on them, they are referred to as the simanim, "signs," i.e., indications that the slaughter is acceptable.
|
| 28. |
But not the majority.
|
| 29. |
See the Turei Zahav 21:2 who emphasizes that the difference in size need not be significant. As long as more than half is cut, the slaughter is acceptable.
|
| 30. |
But no more than half.
|
| 31. |
This is speaking about a situation where the animal is alive. The fact that an animal's windpipe is slit slightly does not cause it to be considered as a trefe. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 21:5) adds that we must be careful that the gullet has not been punctured, for that would render the animal trefe. See the Turei Zahav 21:4 and the Siftei Cohen 21:5 who debate whether it is possible to rely on this leniency at present. See also Chapter 3, Halchot 6-7.
|
| 32. |
To make sure that the minimal measure for slaughter was slit.
|
| 33. |
Obviously, once the head is cut off, it is no longer possible to check.
|
| 34. |
Because of the doubt involved. See the following halachah.
|
| 35. |
This is the rationale for the stringency stated in the previous halachah (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 36. |
The Kessef Mishneh notes that many marsh plants splinter easily and they are unacceptable for they will perforate the gullet.
|
| 37. |
Generally, it is accepted that a spike that can be detected by a fingernail disqualifies an animal. Nevertheless, the Rambam appears to be referring to an even smaller measure. His approach is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:2) which speaks of a spike that is even the size of a hairsbreadth being sufficient to disqualify a knife.
Alternatively, it can be understood that the two are synanomous. This understanding is reflected by Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:14 which speaks about "a stone being blemished so that a fingernail would become caught in it like a knife used for ritual slaughter."
|
| 38. |
For the spike will perforate the gullet, rendering the animal trefe before the slaughter was completed (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 39. |
The commentaries offer two explanations for this ruling. The Rambam's position is that when the spike is felt only on one side of the knife, one may slaughter with that side. Others add that the blemish must be positioned to the very far end of the knife, either near its point or near its handle. In such an instance, it is possible that the blemish never actually touched the signs and thus did not disqualify the ritual slaughter. See Shulchan Aruch [Yoreh De'ah and Rama (18:4)].
|
| 40. |
Who raises his head and tail, creating a curve for its body (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 41. |
Since it does not have a blemish, it will not disqualify the signs.
|
| 42. |
Provided one does not interrupt the slaughter in the middle as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.
|
| 43. |
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah18:6) writes that since it is difficult to understand what exactly is meant by such a knife, we do not permit this leniency.
|
| 44. |
As apparent from Halachah 14.
|
| 45. |
For example, by passing the animal's neck back and forth below the knife [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 6:4)].
|
| 46. |
As indicated by the following halachah, an entity may not be used for ritual slaughter if it is connected to its source. When an entity is stuck into the ground, it is not connected to its source and hence, after the fact, the slaughter is acceptable. Nevertheless, because of the similarity to the forbidden situation, initially, one should not use such an entity for slaughter.
|
| 47. |
Chulin 16a states that it is a Scriptural decree that the cutting edge used for slaughter must be a separate entity, something that one could take in his hand.
|
| 48. |
I.e., a blade with a jagged edge which is unacceptable as stated above.
|
| 49. |
Since the jaw as a whole is moveable, we are not concerned with the fact that the tooth is in a fixed position (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 50. |
We do not say that rather than cut the signs, the knife burnt them. The latter would disqualify the slaughter.
It must be noted that the Tur (see also the gloss of the Radbaz) quotes the Rambam as ruling that the slaughter is unacceptable for the above reason. This approach is also followed by many otherRishonim. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that the Rambam rules that the slaughter is acceptable. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 9:1), however, he quotes both views without stating which should be followed. All authorities agree that such a knife should not be used as an initial and preferred option.
|
| 51. |
Using the same motions as he would use to slaughter an animal.
|
| 52. |
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that after ritual slaughter, no inspection is necessary unless the person desires to use the knife to slaughter another animal immeidately. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro justifies the Rambam's ruling and he cites it in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:3).
|
| 53. |
This ruling also depends on the principle stated in Halachah 13, that during its lifetime, an animal is forbidden. Hence it is not permitted unless we are certain that it was slaughtered in a proper manner (Radbaz; Siftei Cohen 18:2).
|
| 54. |
And this would cause the slaughter to be unacceptable as mentioned above.
|
| 55. |
The Kessef Mishneh notes that since the skin of a fowl is soft, it is not very probable that this caused the blemish on the knife. Nevertheless, our Sages adopted this stringency.
|
| 56. |
See Chapter 3, Halachah 18, for the ramifications of this ruling.
|
| 57. |
I.e., it is possible that the knife could have become blemished when cutting the skin of the first animal. Hence, that animal - and all the subsequent ones - were slaughtered with an unacceptable knife.
|
| 58. |
Since he checked the knife at the outset and it was acceptable, we rely on probability. As long as we have a way of explaining how the knife was blemished, we do not say it was blemished on the animal's skin, for the likelihood of that happening is very low.
|
| 59. |
Here also, since the knife was inspected initially, there is no reason to suspect that the slaughter was unacceptable, we do not disqualify it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:12)] .
|
| 60. |
This is referring to a slaughterer who slaughters on behalf of people at large, not only for his own private purposes.
|
| 61. |
The Radbaz notes that the Rambam's words appear to differ slightly from the simple meaning ofChullin 18a, his source. From Chullin, it appears that the necessity to show the knife to the wise man is a mere token of respect, while from the Rambam it appears that it is a necessary safeguard to check that the slaughter is kosher.
The difference between these approaches can lead to a variance in practice. If we say that this inspection is merely for the sake of respect, then the sages may forgo the respect due them and allow an expert to slaughter even though he does not present his knife. If, however, it is a necessary precaution to insure that the slaughter is performed correctly, an inspection is always necessary.
Both of these perspectives have continued to be given emphasis throughout the Rabbinic literature, although the halachah as prescribed by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:17) is that a sage may forgo the honor due him. The present custom in many slaughtering houses today is for the slaughterers to work in pairs and for one to check the knife of the other. At times, a visiting Rabbinic authority comes and he inspects the knives of all of the slaughterers.
|
| 62. |
I.e., we assume that not only on this occasion, but on others, he slaughtered using an unacceptable knife, thus disqualifying the meat.
|
| 63. |
As will be explained, ritual slaughter is accomplished by drawing the knife back and forth across the neck. If a knife is two small to enable this, it should not be used [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah8:1)].
|
| 64. |
See the Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 24:2) who quotes opinions that require a knife used to slaughter a animal to be twice the length of the animal's neck. The custom is also to use a knife of such measure for a fowl.
|
| 65. |
Two candles are considered a torch [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 11:1)].
|
| 66. |
Otherwise, it is possible that the animal will be slaughtered incorrectly without him realizing.
|
| 67. |
Nevertheless, it is forbidden to do so as an initial and preferred option [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 11:1)].
|
| 68. |
I.e., he was not aware that the day was either the Sabbath or Yom Kippur; alternatively, he did not know that it was forbidden to slaughter on these holy days.
|
| 69. |
The Turei Zahav 11:2 states that one must, nevertheless, wait until the conclusion of the Sabbath or Yom Kippur before partaking of the meat, as is the law when one cooks on the Sabbath.
|
| 70. |
For slaughtering on the Sabbath.
|
| 71. |
If he does so intentionally, he is considered as an apostate who desecrates the Sabbath and his slaughter is disqualified (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Chullin 1:1; see Chapter 4, Halachah 14). The Siftei Cohen 11:23 states that in certain instances the leniency would also apply if he slaughters intentionally.
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• 3 Chapters: Malveh veLoveh Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 13, Malveh veLoveh Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 14, Malveh veLoveh Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 15
Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 13
Halacha 1
The following laws apply when a lender comes to expropriate property on the basis of a promissory note in his possession and the borrower is not present: If it is possible to send a messenger to the borrower and notify him so that he can confront the lender in judgment, we send a messenger and notify him.
If it is impossible to notify the borrower speedily, we instruct the lender to take an oath, and then to expropriate property belonging to the borrower, either landed property or movable property. We do not consider the possibility that the borrower repaid the debt and the lender gave him a receipt.
This law is an ordinance of the Sages, enacted so that people at large would not take money belonging to a colleague and go to dwell in another city. For this would hinder the possibilities of loans being granted in the future
Halacha 2
The lender must bring proof of three matters to the court before he can expropriate property from the borrower outside his presence:
a) he must verify the authenticity of the promissory note in his possession; b) he must prove that the debtor is in another city and is not present to defend himself in court;
c) he must prove that the property that he wishes to expropriate belongs to so-and-so, the borrower.
Halacha 3
The following rules apply when a lender comes to the court, bringing security that is in his possession" and says: "This security belongs to so-and-so, and I desire to sell it to receive payment of the debt he owes me." The court does not take action and does not tell him: "Wait until the borrower comes and lodges his claim." The rationale is that had the lender desired to say that the security had been purchased his word would be accepted. The court advises him to sell the security in the presence of witnesses, so that the borrower will know for how much the security was sold.
Similarly, when a person gives a loan to a colleague and receives security in return, and then both the borrower and the lender die - regardless of whether the borrower or the lender dies first the lender's heirs may take an oath and collect the debt.
The lender's heir must take an oath holding a sacred object, before he takes payment from the security, as is done by all those who take an oath and collect their due. His word is accepted, because he is taking payment from property that is in his physical possession. Had he desired, he could have said that he had purchased the property.
Why is the creditor not required only to take a sh'vuat hesset? Because he is not taking an oath that the security is his, but rather that the money is owed him. If he lodged a claim concerning the article itself, saying "You sold it to us," or "You gave it to us," he would be able to take a sh 'vuat hesset and be freed of responsibility. If, by contrast, there were witnesses who would testify that this article was given to the lender as security, but they did not know for what amount, he would be able to collect the money only after taking an oath. Since there are no witnesses, the lender would be able to claim: "It is mine." Therefore, we accept his word when he says: "So-and-so much money is owed to me and this is security for that debt," provided that he takes the same oath he would take if there were witnesses who would testify that the article was given as security.
We do not free him of the responsibility of the oath, because we do not employ the principle of miggo to free a person of the responsibility to take an oath, but only to free him of financial responsibility - i.e., he is not required to return the security before he takes what he claim.
Halacha 4
The following rules apply when a person lends money to a colleague and receives security for the loan. Should the security be lost or stolen in a manner that is not beyond the lender's control, the lender is liable for the value of the security, as explained. If the lender says: "I lent you a sela for that security, but it was worth only two dinarim" and the borrower says: "You lent me a sela for that security, and it was worth a sela" the lender must first take the oath taken by watchmen that the article is not in his possession. The borrower then must take a sh'vuat hesset that the security was worth the amount of the debt, and he is freed of responsibility.
If the lender says: "I lent you a sela for that security, but it was worth only twodinarim" and the borrower says: "You lent me a sela for that security, and it was worth three dinarim" the lender must first take an oath that the article is not in his possession. Afterwards, the borrower must take a Scriptural oath how much the article was worth; this is required because he acknowledged a portion of the plaintiff's claim.33 He then pays the dinar that he admits to owing.
If the borrower says: "You lent me a sela for that security, and it was worth twosela'im" and the lender says: "I lent you a sela for that security, and it was worth a sela" the lender must take an oath that the article is not in his possessions and include in that oath that the security was worth only the amount of the debt.
If the borrower says: "You lent me a sela for that security, and it was worth twosela'im," and lender says: "I lent you a sela for that security, and it was worth only five dinarim, the lender must take an oath that the article is not in his possession and include in that oath that the security was not worth more than five dinarim. He must then pay the dinar.
If the lender says: "I lent you a sela for that security, but it was worth only twodinarim" and the borrower says: "I do not know how much it was worth," the lender must take an oath that the article is not in his possession and include in that oath that the security was worth only two dinarim. The borrower must then pay the remainder of the debt. The rationale is that he definitely knows that he is liable for the two dinarim and does not know whether or not he repaid the debt.
If the borrower says: "You lent me a sela for that security, and it was worth twosela'im" and lender says: "I lent you a sela for that security, and I do not know how much it was worth," the lender must take an oath that the article is not in his possession and include in that oath that he does not know that the security was worth even a p'rutah more than the debt. He is then freed of responsibility, because he did not obligate himself at all. If, however, the lender said; "I know that the security was worth more than the loan, but I do not know how much more," he must pay everything that the borrower demands; the borrower is not even required to take an oath. This resembles an instance when a plaintiff lodges a claim for a 100 zuz, and the defendant responds: "I owe you 50, but I do not know whether or not I owe you the other 50." Such a person is obligated to take an oath, but cannot take the oath. Therefore, he must pay, as will be explained. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued against anyone who makes a false claim.
Halacha 5
When a person lends money to a colleague and establishes a date when the loan must be repaid, even though he does not affirm the matter with a kinyan,he may not demand payment until the conclusion of that period of time. This applies regardless of whether the loan is supported merely by an oral commitment, by a promissory note, or by security, or whether the borrower or the lender dies.
When no other term is mentioned, the term of a loan is 30 days. This applies regardless of whether the loan is supported merely by an oral commitment, by a promissory note or by security. If the lender stipulated that he could demand payment whenever he desires, he has the right to demand payment even on the day the loan was given. The rationale is that this is a stipulation involving monetary issues.
Halacha 6
If the lender claims: "Today is the conclusion of the term I established for the loan," and the borrower responds: "You granted me another ten days," the borrower must take a sh'vuat hesset to support his claim. If there is one witness who testifies that the loan was due that day, the borrower must take a Scriptural oath, as is the law with regard to other claims.
If the lender claims: "There are only five days left before the loan is due," and the borrower responds: "There are ten days left," we tell the lender: "Wait until the end of the five days and then have the borrower take an oath that five days remain."
Halacha 7
If the loan was supported by a promissory note and the borrower claims: "You established a time for me to pay the debt," it appears to me that the creditor should take a sh'vuat hesset that he did not place any time limit on the loan. He may then collect the loan immediately.
Halacha 8
Payment for a loan may be demanded in any place.
What is implied? When a person lends money to a colleague in a settled place and demands payment from him in a desert, the borrower may not postpone payment. Instead, he is obligated to pay him wherever he demands payment.
If the borrower seeks to repay the loan in the desert, the lender is given the option. If he desires, he may accept payment. If he desires, he may tell him: "Pay me back only in a settled area, just as I gave you the money in a settled area." The money then remains the borrower's responsibility until he pays the lender in a settled area.
Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 14
Halacha 1
In the following situations, despite the fact that he possesses a promissory note, a lender may collect payment only after taking an oath that resembles one required by Scriptural Law:
a) a person who impairs the legal power of a promissory note;
b) a person who produces a promissory note that one witness testifies has been paid.
c) a person who seeks to collect payment outside the borrower's presence;
d) a person who expropriates property from purchasers;
e) a person who seeks to collect a debt from heirs, whether below majority or above majority.
When such a person comes to take the oath, we tell him: "Take the oath and collect your due." If the loan was not due until a specific time, and he demands payment on the day the loan was due, he may collect payment without taking an oath. Once the day the loan is due has passed, he may collect payment only after taking an oath.
Halacha 2
The following rules apply when a person demands payment from a colleague for a debt recorded in a promissory note, the borrower claims that he paid this promissory note, and the possessor of the note claims that he did not pay anything. The court tells the borrower: "Pay him."
If the borrower demands: "Have him take an oath for me that I did not pay him and then collect the debt," the court requires the lender to take an oath while holding a sacred object, that he did not pay him at all or that he paid him only such-and-such. Afterwards, he may collect his claim. If the lender is a Torah scholar, the court does not require him to take an oath.
Halacha 3
There is a difference of opinion among the Geonim in the following situation. The lender produces a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified. The borrower claims: "This promissory note is false, I never wrote it," "This promissory note involves interest," "... or a shade of interest," "It was given on faith," "I wrote it with the intention of borrowing, but I never took the loan" - i.e., he issues a claim that if acknowledged by the lender would nullify the promissory note. The lender maintains that the promissory note is genuine and that the borrower is issuing a false claim. The borrower demands that the lender take an oath before collecting.
There is one opinion that rules that the holder of the promissory note is obligated to take an oath that resembles a Scriptural oath, just as when the borrower claimed that he paid the debt. My teachers by contrast ruled that the lender should not be compelled to take an oath unless the borrower claims that he paid him. The rationale is that he acknowledged the validity of the promissory note, and that debt is fit to be repaid. We do not, by contrast, accept the borrower's word with regard to all these other claims to nullify the legal power of a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified. Instead, the borrower should pay, and afterwards lodge any claim against the lender that he desires. If the lender acknowledges the claim, he will return the money to him. If he denies it, he will take a sh'vuat hesset. My opinion also leans towards this view.
Halacha 4
Our Sages issued these rulings in the following situation: A lender produced a promissory note, demanding payment from a colleague. He claims that he was not paid at all. The borrower claims that he repaid half the debt, and witnesses testify that the entire debt was repaid. The borrower must take an oath and then pay the other half. The rationale is that he admits to owing a portion of the debt. He is not considered to be comparable to a person who returns a lost object, because the promissory note causes him to be afraid. The lender may expropriate this half of the debt only from landed property that is within the borrower's possession. He may not attach property that has been sold. The rationale is that the purchasers will say: "We rely on the testimony of the witnesses and they have nullified the legal power of this promissory note."
Halacha 5
The following rules apply when a lender produces a promissory note whose authenticity he is not able to verify, and the borrower says: "It is true that I wrote this promissory note, but I repaid it," "It was given on faith," "I wrote it with the intention of borrowing, but I never took the loan," or another claim of this nature. Since the borrower could have claimed, "This never happened," and our acceptance of the promissory note is dependent on his statements, his word is accepted. He may take a sh'vuat hesset and be freed of responsibility.
If the lender is able to verify the authenticity of the promissory note afterwards in court, it is considered as any other promissory note.
Halacha 6
The lender's claim is not accepted in the following situation. The lender produces a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified, and the borrower claims: "It is a forgery, and I never wrote it," or "It was given on faith." The lender states: "That is true, but I had an acceptable promissory note and it was lost." Although it was the lender who invalidated his promissory note, and had he desired, he could have said: "It is not a forgery," for its authenticity was verified by the court, he cannot use it to expropriate property at all. Instead, the borrower may take a sh'vuat hesset and be freed of responsibility, for the promissory note is likened to a shard.
Halacha 7
When a promissory note was used for a loan and then repaid, it may not be used again. For the lien it created was already waived, and it is likened to a shard.
Halacha 8
The following laws apply when the lender produces a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified demanding payment from a colleague, the borrower replies: "Did I not pay you," and the lender answers: "You did, but I returned the money to you and then lent it to you a second time." The promissory note that he repaid is nullified, and it is likened to a shard.
If, however, the lender says: "I returned the money to you, because the coins were not good so that you could exchange them," he did not nullify the promissory note, and the lien it created still exists.
Halacha 9
A promissory note is disqualified in the following situation. A lender produces a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified that indicates that the borrower owes him a maneh. The borrower states: "Did I not pay in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so." Those witnesses come and testify that the borrower indeed repaid the lender, but did not mention the promissory note. The lender replies: "It is true that you paid me, but you repaid me for another debt that you owed me." The lender's word is not accepted, and the promissory note is nullified.
When does the above apply? When the witnesses testify that the borrower gave the lender the money as repayment of a debt. If, however, they saw him give him money, but did not know whether it was given as repayment of a debt, for safekeeping or as a present different rules apply.
If the possessor of the promissory note says: "He never repaid me," he is established as a liar, and the promissory note is nullified. If he says: "It was payment for another debt," his word is accepted. He must take an oath and then he may collect the money mentioned in the promissory note. The rationale is that the borrower did not repay him in the presence of witnesses. Hence, since the borrower can claim: "You gave them to me as a present," his word is accepted if he says that the money was given him as repayment for another debt.
A promissory note is, by contrast, nullified in the following situation. The borrower told the lender: "This promissory note was composed for the price of a steer that I purchased from you, and you collected the money for its meat already." The lender replied: "Yes. The promissory note was composed for that purpose, but I collected the money for that debt with the understanding that the promissory note would apply to another debt that you owe me." The rationale is that the lender himself admitted that the debt mentioned in the promissory note was for the meat of the steer, and that he received payment for that debt. This applies even if there are no witnesses that the money was given for the payment of that debt. Hence, all that is necessary is that the borrower take ash'vuat hesset that he paid the debt. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 10
When a lender produces a promissory note that is signed by one witness and the borrower claims that he paid the debt, the borrower is obligated to take an oath. And since he cannot take that oath, he must make financial restitution.
If the borrower demands of the lender: "Take an oath that I did not pay the debt," he must take the oath. The rationale is that even if two witnesses were signed on the promissory note and the borrower demanded: "Take an oath that I did not pay the debt," the lender would be obligated to take that oath, as we have explained.
Halacha 11
Similarly, my teachers ruled that when a person denies a loan supported by an oral commitment in a court, and one witness testifies that he borrowed the money, the defendant is required to take a Scriptural oath. If the defendant reversed his position and said: "Yes, I took the loan, but I repaid it," "... the lender waived payment in my favor," or "... owes me money because of another matter," we consider him to be a person who is required to take an oath, but who cannot take the oath, and must therefore make financial restitution.
Halacha 12
The following rules apply when a defendant claims that he paid a promissory note, but says: "Let the lender take an oath. If he does, he can collect the debt." We tell the defendant: "Bring your money to the court. Then he will take the oath and collect the debt." If the defendant does not have the funds to pay, we require him to take an oath, as ordained by the Geonim, that he has no financial resources. When he acquires resources, he must pay the creditor, but first he may require him to take an oath that the debtor did not repay him previously. Afterwards, the debtor must pay him.
Halacha 13
The following laws apply when a person is owed a debt by a colleague that is supported by a promissory note, the promissory note becomes lost, but the witnesses are still present. Even though the debt was affirmed in the presence of the witnesses by a kinyan, if the borrower claims that he paid the debt, he is required only to take a sh'vuat hesset.
My teachers ruled that even if the debt was given for a specific time, and the due date had not yet arrived, when a promissory note was written, it is no longer in his possession and the borrower claims that he repaid the debt, the borrower's word is accepted provided that he takes an oath that he paid the lender. The rationale is that we suspect that he paid him and for that reason he tore the promissory note or destroyed it by fire.
Similarly, my teachers ruled that even if the promissory note is in the possession of another person and the borrower claims: "It fell from my possession after I paid it," he must take a sh'vuat hesset, and then he is released from all obligations. This applies even if the due date of the promissory note has not arrived. Since the promissory note is not in the possession of the lender, we do not operate under the presumption that the debt is outstanding.
Halacha 14
The following laws apply when both the borrower and the lender are holding on to the promissory note, and the lender says: "It is mine and I took it out to demand payment from you," and the borrower says: "I repaid you and it fell from my possession." If the authenticity of the promissory note can be verified, both claimants are each required to take an oath that no less than half the value of the promissory note belongs to them. The borrower then pays half. If the authenticity of the promissory note cannot be verified, the borrower must take a sh'vuat hesset, and then he is released from all obligations.
Halacha 15
Our Sages ordained that precautions be adopted to protect the borrower's interest in the following situation. A person claims of his colleague: "You owe me a maneh." The colleague responds: "I do not owe you anything" or "I paid you." The plaintiff demands: "Take a sh'vuat hesset for me," and the borrower responds: "You have a promissory note concerning this debt. You want to compel me to take an oath first and then produce the promissory note and use it to collect payment."
We tell the lender: "Produce the promissory note." If the lender says: "I never had a promissory note against this person," or "I had a promissory note and I lost it," my teachers ruled that we tell the lender: "Nullify the legal power of any promissory note you possess until the present time. Afterwards, you can require him to take a sh'vuat hesset. Alternatively, have a conditional ban of ostracism issued and go and seek until you find the promissory note.
Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 15
Halacha 1
When a person lends money to a colleague in the presence of witnesses and tells the borrower: "Do not repay me outside the presence of witnesses," the borrower must repay him in the presence of witnesses because of this stipulation. This applies whether he made this stipulation at the time the loan was given or after the loan was given.
If the borrower claims: "I fulfilled the stipulation and repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they journeyed overseas or died," his word is accepted. He may take a sh'vuat hesset, and then he is freed of responsibility.
Similarly, if the lender states: "Repay me only in the presence of Torah scholars," or "... in the presence of doctors," and the borrower claims: "I repaid you in their presence, but those witnesses in whose presence I repaid you died or journeyed overseas," his word is accepted. He may take a sh'vuat hesset,and then he is freed of responsibility.
If, however, the lender stipulates: "Do not repay me except in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so and so," and the borrower claims: "I repaid you in the presence of other witnesses, and they died or journeyed overseas," his word is not accepted. Indeed, the lender stipulated: "Do not pay me except in the presence of Reuven and Shimon," who are standing with him, so that the borrower will not rebuff him, saying: "I repaid you in the presence of other people, and they journeyed away."
Halacha 2
There are versions of the Talmud that state that when a person tells a colleague: "Do not repay outside the presence of witnesses," and the borrower claims: "I fulfilled the stipulation and repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they journeyed overseas or died," his word is not accepted. This is a scribal error. For this reason, the halachic authorities erred because of those texts. I have researched ancient versions of the text and I found that they state that the borrower's word is accepted. In Egypt, a portion of an ancient text of the Talmud written on parchment, as was the custom in the era approximately 500 years before the present era, came to my possession. I found two versions of this law among those parchments. Both state: "If he claims: 'I fulfilled the stipulation and repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they journeyed overseas or died,' his word is accepted."
Because of the error that occurred with regard to some texts, there are severalGeonim who ruled that if the lender stipulates: "Do not repay me except in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so," and the borrower repaid him in the presence of others, the borrower's word is not accepted even if he brought witnesses, and they testify that he paid him in their presence. This is also a great mistake. The true law is that if witnesses come and testify that he paid the lender in their presence, the borrower is freed from responsibility; there is no place for suspicion.
This ruling also stems from those texts that state with regard to a lender who tells his colleague: " 'Repay me in the presence of witnesses who study Torah law,' and the borrower repaid him in the presence of ordinary witnesses...." This is also a scribal error. In the above-mentioned parchments, I found it written: "And he went and paid him in private."
Although these texts have been carefully edited, this appears to be the ruling based on the judgment of the Talmud. Moreover, these concepts make sense: "What should the borrower do? The lender told him: "Do not repay me except in the presence of witnesses," and he repaid him in the presence of witnesses. Should he have locked the witnesses in prison for their entire lives so that they do not depart? Besides, what could he do if they died? Thus, the borrower will be forced to pay the lender time after time until he brings witnesses to court. This makes this testimony equivalent to testimony recorded in a legal document. Thus, by saying: "Do not repay except in the presence of witnesses," the lender endows the loan with the strength of a loan recorded in a promissory note. There is no one who would think that this is correct.
Instead, certainly, if the lender stipulated: "Do not repay me except in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so," the borrower caused himself a loss if he repaid the loan in the presence of other witnesses who departed. If, however, these witnesses come and testify that he repaid the debt, there is no question that the borrower should not be held responsible. This is the manner in which judgment should be rendered and instruction should be given.
Halacha 3
If the lender had the borrower agree to the stipulation that the lender's word would be accepted whenever he claimed that the borrower did not pay him, he may collect the debt without taking an oath. This applies even though the borrower claims that he paid him. If, however, the borrower brings witnesses who testify that he paid him, the lender is not entitled to expropriate any funds.
Halacha 4
If the lender had the borrower agree to the stipulation that the lender's word would be accepted as the testimony of two witnesses, even if the borrower brings witnesses who testify that he paid him, he may collect the debt without taking an oath. For he accepted his word as that of two witnesses. ) This law applies even if the borrower brought 100 witnesses that he paid the lender, for the legal power of two witnesses is the same as that of 100 witnesses.
If, however, the borrower told the lender: "I accept your word as that of three witnesses," since he mentioned a number, if the borrower pays the lender in the presence of four witnesses, we consider the debt to be paid. When a person accepted the lender's word as equivalent to that of two witnesses, how can he correct the matter? When he pays, he should have the promissory note ripped up, the lender testify that he nullifies every promissory note he has against so-and-so, the borrower, or the lender give testimony against himself outside the presence of the borrower that he received payment for all debts owed to him by so-and-so the borrower.
Halacha 5
If the borrower pays the lender, the lender claims that he was not paid, and the borrower paid him a second time because of the stipulation, the borrower can lodge a suit against the lender claiming: "You owe me such and such, because I paid you twice." If the lender acknowledges the borrower's claim, he must repay him. If he denies the claim, he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset, stating that the borrower paid him only once. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 6
When the borrower had the lender agree to the stipulation that the borrower's word would be accepted whenever he claimed that he paid the debt, the lender may not collect this debt on the basis of this promissory note - neither from the borrower's heir, nor from a person who purchased property from him. Moreover, even if the borrower said: "I did not pay this debt," the lender may not use this promissory note to expropriate property from a person who purchased property from the borrower. The rationale is that we suspect that the lender and the borrower perpetrated an act of deception to take the purchaser's property.
If the borrower claims to have paid a portion of the debt recorded in this promissory note, and the lender claims that he did not pay anything, the borrower is required to pay the portion that he admitted to owing. With regard to the remainder, he is required to take a sh 'vuat hesset. The rationale is that the lender accepted his word. If he originally stipulates that his word would be accepted without having to take a sh'vuat hesset, he is not required to take that oath.
Halacha 7
If the lender stipulates that his word will be accepted without his having to take an oath, he may collect the debt without taking an oath. If, however, he must collect the debt from the borrower's heirs, he must take an oath; only afterwards may he collect the debt. If, however, he stipulated that he would also be able to collect from the heirs without taking an oath, he may collect the debt from them without an oath.
Similarly, if the lender stipulates that he will be able to expropriate the most valuable property owned by the borrower, he may expropriate that property, even from the heirs. The rationale is that any stipulation made with regard to financial matters is binding.
If the lender comes to collect from a person who purchased property from the borrower, he may expropriate the property only after taking an oath. The rationale is that the borrower may not accept a stipulation that will cause a colleague a loss.
Hayom Yom:
• Friday, Tishrei 26, 5776 · 09 October 2015
"Today's Day"
Monday Tishrei 26 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Noach, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 97 to end.
Tanya: (And that is (p. 535) ...dust, and water. (p. 537).
The interpretation of the verse, "Forever, O G-d, Your word stands firm in the heavens."1 (Tanya II:I and IV:25) is quoted by the Alter Rebbe in the Baal Shem Tov's name although that interpretation is found in Midrash Tehillim, as quoted in Likutei Torah in the maamar Ki bayom hazeh yechapeir. But the Alter Rebbe had a special reason for this: It was on the second day of Creation when G-d said: "Let there be a Heaven,"2 and it is this utterance which "stands firm in the Heavens." Associating the quotation with the Baal Shem Tov was to be an eternal memorial that the Baal Shem Tov was born on the second day of the week,3 on the eighteenth (chai) of Elul.
FOOTNOTES
1. Tehillim 119:89.
2. Bereishit 1:6.
3. Monday; paralleling the second day of Creation.
Daily Thought:
Dancing With Feet
On Simchat Torah we dance with our feet, not with our heads.
We are celebrating the Torah, and the Torah is something we study with our heads. But we dance with our feet, not with our heads.
If we would dance with our heads, each one would dance a different dance, each in a different space, some with friends but not with others, some as lonesome souls.
One head is higher, one is lower, one is here on earth, the other in the clouds or beyond, and some minds know only their own space that no one else can know.
But we dance with our feet, and all our feet are here on the same earth—none higher and none lower. So now we can all dance as one, with one heart, as a single being.
Now there is no loneliness, only joy.[Likkutei Sichot, vol. 20, p. 370.]
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