Today in Jewish History:
• Passing of R. Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev (1809)
Passing of the great Chassidic leader and advocate for the Jewish people, Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev (1740-1810). Rabbi Levi Yitzchak was a close disciple of the second leader of the Chassidic movement, Rabbi DovBer, the Maggid of Mezritch. He is best known for his love for every Jew and his impassioned words of advocacy on their behalf before the Almighty.
Link: Kol Nidrei; more on R. Levi Yitzchak
• Passing of Chatam Sofer (1839)
Tishrei 25th is the yahrtzeit of Rabbi Moshe Sofer of Pressburg (1762-1839), known as "Chatam Sofer" after his work of Rabbinic responsa. Rabbi Moshe was an outstanding Halachic authority and community leader, and was at the forefront of the battle to preserve the integrity of traditional Judaism in the face of the various "reformist" movements of his time.
Daily Quote:
I will bring you out from under the hardship of Egypt, and I will save you from their bondage;I will redeem you with an outstretched arm and with great judgments. I will take you to Myself as a nation, and I will be to you a G‑d . . .[The “Four Expressions of Redemption,” Exodus 6:6–7]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Bereishit, 5th Portion Genesis 4:19-4:22 with Rashi
• Chapter 4
19And Lemech took himself two wives; one was named Adah, and the other was named Zillah. יטוַיִּקַּח לוֹ לֶמֶךְ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים שֵׁם הָאַחַת עָדָה וְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁנִית צִלָּה:
And Lemech took himself two wives: It was not necessary to elaborate on all this, but it did so to teach us from the end of the section that the Holy One, blessed be He, kept His promise when He said, “vengeance will be wrought upon Cain sevenfold,” and Lemech arose after he had begotten sons and raised the seventh generation, and he slew Cain. This is what is meant by [Lemech’s statement] “for have I slain a man by my wounding, etc.” - [from sources quoted on verse 23] ויקח לו למך: לא היה לו לפרש כל זה, אלא ללמדנו מסוף הענין שקיים הקב"ה הבטחתו שאמר שבעתים יוקם קין, עמד למך לאחר שהוליד בנים ועשה דור שביעי והרג את קין, זהו שאמר (פסוק כג) כי איש הרגתי לפצעי וגו':
two wives: So was the custom of the generation of the Flood, one [wife] for propagation and one for marital relations. The one who was for marital relations would be given a potion of roots to drink, so that she should become sterile (in some editions, the following does not appear), and he would adorn her like a bride and feed her delicacies, but her companion was neglected and was mourning like a widow. This is what Job explained (24:21): “He feeds the barren woman who will not bear, but he does not adorn the widow.” [This is] as explained in the Aggadah of Chelek (Sanh. ch. 10) (not found in our edition, but in Gen. Rabbah 23:2). שתי נשים: כך היה דרכן של דור המבול, אחת לפריה ורביה ואחת לתשמיש, זו שהיא לתשמיש משקה כוס של עקרין כדי שתעקר ומקושטת ככלה ומאכילה מעדנים, וחברתה נזופה ואבלה כאלמנה, וזהו שפירש איוב (איוב כד כא) רועה עקרה לא תלד ואלמנה לא ייטיב, כמו שמפורש באגדת חלק:
Adah: She was the one for propagation, called so because she was despicable to him and removed from him. עָדָה is the Aramaic translation of סוּרָה, turn away. עדה: היא של פריה ורביה, ועל שם שמגונה עליו ומוסרת מאצלו. עדה תרגום של סורה:
Zillah: She was the one for marital relations.[so named]because whe would always sit in his shadow (בְּצִלּוֹ). These are the words of Aggadah in Genesis Rabbah . צלה: היא של תשמיש על שם שיושבת תמיד בצלו, דברי אגדה הם בבראשית רבה (כג ב):
20Now Adah bore Jabal; he was the father of those who dwell in tents and have cattle. כוַתֵּלֶד עָדָה אֶת יָבָל הוּא הָיָה אֲבִי ישֵׁב אֹהֶל וּמִקְנֶה:
the father of those who dwell in tents and have cattle: He was the first to pasture animals in uncultivated places and dwell in tents, one month here and one month here for the sake of his flocks. When the pasture in this place was depleted, he went and pitched his tent elsewhere (Targumim). According to the Midrash Aggadah (Gen. Rabbah 23:3), he would build houses for idol worship, as it is said (Ezek. 8:3), "The image of jealousy that provokes (God to) jealousy (הַקִּנְאָה הַמַּקְנֶה). And so did his brother grasp the lyre and the flute to sing to pagan deities. (Bereishith Rabbathi, p. 49) אבי יושב אהל ומקנה: הוא היה הראשון לרועי בהמות במדברות, ויושב אהלים חדש כאן וחדש כאן בשביל מרעה צאנו, וכשכלה המרעה במקום הזה הולך ותוקע אהלו במקום אחר. ומדרש אגדה בונה בתים לעבודה זרה, כמה דאת אמר (יחזקאל ח ג) סמל הקנאה המקנה, וכן (פסוק כא) אחיו תופש כנור ועוגב לזמר לעבודה זרה:
21And his brother's name was Jubal; he was the father of all who grasp a lyre and a flute. כאוְשֵׁם אָחִיו יוּבָל הוּא הָיָה אֲבִי כָּל תֹּפֵשׂ כִּנּוֹר וְעוּגָב:
22And Zillah she too bore Tubal-cain, who sharpened all tools that cut copper and iron, and Tubal-cain's sister was Na'amah. כבוְצִלָּה גַם הִוא יָלְדָה אֶת תּוּבַל קַיִן לֹטֵשׁ כָּל חֹרֵשׁ נְחשֶׁת וּבַרְזֶל וַאֲחוֹת תּוּבַל קַיִן נַעֲמָה:
Tubal-cain: He refined the craft of Cain. Tubal is related to the word תַּבְלִין (spices). He “spiced” and “refined” Cain’s craft to make weapons for murderers- [from Gen. Rabbah 23:3]. תובל קין: תובל אומנתו של קין. תובל לשון תבלין, תיבל והתקין אומנתו של קין לעשות כלי זיין לרוצחים:
who sharpened all tools that cut copper and iron: Heb. לֹטֵשׁ. He sharpened the tools [for working with] copper and iron, like (Job 16:9): “sharpens (יִלְטוֹשׁ) his eyes upon me.” חֹרֵשׁ is not an expression of פּוֹעֶל (a noun) but an expression of פּוֹעֵל (a verb), because it is vowelized with a small “kamatz” (i.e., a tzeireh) and the final syllable is accented, i.e., he sharpens and burnishes all implements of the craft of copper and iron. לוטש כל חרש נחשת וברזל: מחדד אומנות נחשת וברזל, כמו (איוב טז ט) ילטוש עיניו לי. חורש אינו לשון פועל אלא לשון פועל שהרי נקוד קמץ קטן. וטעמו למטה, כלומר מחדד ומצחצח כל כלי אומנות נחשת וברזל:
Na’amah: She was Noah’s wife. (Genesis Rabbah 23:3) נעמה: היא אשתו של נח:
Daily Tehillim: Chapter 119, Verses 1-96
• Verses 1-96
David composed this prominent psalm in alphabetical sequence-eight verses for each letter. Every verse contains one of the following words (referring to different aspects of Torah): Way; Torah; Testimony; Precept; Commandment; Statement (translated here as Word or Promise); Word; Judgement (or Laws); Righteousness; Statute. Replete with morals and prayers, this psalm should be recited daily, as a powerful preparation for the service of God. (In verses beginning with one of the letters of the mnemonic PeReTZ BeN DaMaH, the word "עדותיך" is pronounced "eidvotecha.")
1. Fortunate are those whose way is artless, who walk with the Torah of the Lord.
2. Fortunate are those who keep His testimonies, who seek Him with all their hearts.
3. Indeed, they have not done iniquity; they walk in His ways.
4. You have commanded Your precepts to be observed diligently.
5. My wish is that my ways be directed to keep Your statutes.
6. Then I will not be ashamed, when I behold all Your commandments.
7. I will give thanks to You with uprightness of heart, when I learn Your righteous judgments.
8. I will keep Your statutes; do not utterly forsake me
9. How can a young man keep his way pure? By observing Your word.
10. With all my heart I have sought You; do not let me stray from Your commandments.
11. I have harbored Your word in my heart, that I might not sin against You.
12. Blessed are You, O Lord; teach me Your statutes.
13. With my lips I have declared all the judgments of Your mouth.
14. I have rejoiced in the way of Your testimonies, as I would with all riches.
15. I will speak of Your precepts, and gaze upon Your ways.
16. I will delight in Your statutes; I will not forget Your word.
17. Deal kindly with Your servant, that I may live to keep Your word.
18. Unveil my eyes, that I may behold wonders from Your Torah.
19. I am a sojourner on earth; do not hide Your commandments from me.
20. My soul is crushed with a longing for Your judgments every moment.
21. You have rebuked the accursed scoffers, those who stray from Your commandments.
22. Remove insult and contempt from me, for I have kept Your testimonies.
23. Though princes sat and spoke against me, Your servant speaks of Your statutes.
24. Indeed, Your testimonies are my delight; they are my counsellors.
25. My soul cleaves to the dust; revive me in accordance with Your word.
26. I have spoken of my ways, and You answered me; teach me Your statutes.
27. Make me understand the way of Your precepts, and I will speak of Your wonders.
28. My soul drips away out of grief; sustain me according to Your word.
29. Remove from me the way of falsehood, and graciously endow me with Your Torah.
30. I have chosen the way of faith; Your judgments have I laid before me.
31. I held fast to Your testimonies, O Lord; put me not to shame.
32. I will run on the path of Your commandments, for You will broaden my heart.
33. Teach me, O Lord, the way of Your statutes, and I will keep it to the last.
34. Grant me understanding and I will keep Your Torah; I will observe it with all my heart.
35. Direct me in the path of Your commandments, for that is my desire.
36. Incline my heart to Your testimonies, and not to greed.
37. Avert my eyes from seeing vanity; by Your ways give me life.
38. Fulfill for Your servant Your promise, which brings to the fear of You.
39. Remove my shame which I fear, for Your judgments are good.
40. Behold, I have longed for Your precepts; give me life in Your righteousness.
41. And let Your kindness come to fruition for me, O Lord, Your salvation as You promised.
42. I will offer a retort to those who taunt me, for I trust in Your word.
43. Do not at all remove the word of truth from my mouth, for I hope [to fulfill] Your judgments.
44. I will keep Your Torah continually, for ever and ever.
45. And I will walk in spacious paths, for I seek Your precepts.
46. I will speak of Your testimonies before kings, and I will not be ashamed.
47. And I will delight in Your commandments, which I love.
48. I will lift up my hands to Your commandments, which I love, and I will speak of Your statutes.
49. Remember the word [promised] to Your servant, by which You gave me hope.
50. This is my comfort in my affliction, for Your word has given me life.
51. [Though] the wicked ridicule me severely, I have not strayed from Your Torah.
52. When I remember Your judgments of old, O Lord, I take comfort.
53. Trembling seized me because of the wicked, those who forsake Your Torah.
54. Your statutes have been my songs in the house of my wanderings.
55. At night I remembered Your Name, O Lord, and I kept Your Torah.
56. All this came to me because I kept Your precepts.
57. The Lord is my portion; I pledged to keep Your words.
58. I pleaded before You with all my heart: have compassion upon me according to Your word.
59. I contemplated my ways, and returned my feet to Your testimonies.
60. I hurried and did not delay to keep Your commandments.
61. Bands of wicked men plundered me, [but] I did not forget Your Torah.
62. At midnight, I rise to thank You for Your righteous judgments.
63. I am a friend to all who fear You, and to those who keep Your precepts.
64. Your kindness, O Lord, fills the earth; teach me Your statutes.
65. You have dealt goodness to Your servant, O Lord, in accord with Your promise.
66. Teach me the goodness and wisdom of the [Torah's] reasons, for I believe in Your commandments.
67. Before I afflicted myself, I would blunder; but now I observe Your word.
68. You are good and benevolent; teach me Your statutes.
69. The wicked have smeared me with lies, [when in truth] I keep Your precepts with all my heart.
70. Their hearts grew thick as fat; but as for me, Your Torah is my delight.
71. It is for my good that I was afflicted, so that I might learn Your statutes.
72. The Torah of Your mouth is better for me than thousands in gold and silver.
73. Your hands have made me and prepared me; grant me understanding, that I may learn Your commandments.
74. Those who fear You will see me and rejoice, because I hoped in Your word.
75. I know, O Lord, that Your judgments are just; righteously have You afflicted me.
76. Let Your kindness be my comfort, as You promised to Your servant.
77. Let Your mercies come upon me, that I may live, for Your Torah is my delight.
78. Let the scoffers be shamed, for they have maligned me with falsehood; but I will meditate upon Your precepts.
79. May those who fear You return to me, and those who know Your testimonies.
80. May my heart be perfect in Your statutes, so that I not be shamed.
81. My soul longs for Your salvation; I hope for Your word.
82. My eyes long for Your promise, saying, "When will You comfort me?”
83. Though I became [dried out] like a wineskin in smoke, I did not forget Your statutes.
84. How many are the days of Your servant? When will You execute judgment upon my pursuers?
85. The wicked have dug pits for me, in violation of Your Torah.
86. All Your commandments teach truth, [yet] they pursue me with lies, help me!
87. They nearly consumed me upon the earth, but I did not forsake Your precepts.
88. As befits Your kindness, grant me life, and I will keep the testimony of Your mouth.
89. Forever, O Lord, Your word stands firm in the heavens.
90. Your faithfulness persists for all generations; You established the earth, and it stands.
91. They stand ready today [to execute] Your judgments, for all are Your servants.
92. Had Your Torah not been my delight, I would have perished in my affliction.
93. Never will I forget Your precepts, for through them You have sustained me.
94. I am Yours; save me, for I have sought Your precepts.
95. The wicked hope to destroy me, but I meditate upon Your testimonies.
96. To every goal I have seen a limit, but Your commandment is immensely broad.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 25• Lessons in Tanya
• Thursday, Tishrei 25, 5776 · October 8, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, beginning of Epistle 25
This letter comments on a discourse (in Tzavaat HaRivash, sec. 120 in the Kehot editions) in which the Baal Shem Tov explains that though all things emanate from G‑d through His attributes of love and awe, these attributes can find themselves in a state of exile.
The Baal Shem Tov goes on to say that in the same way, a worshiper who finds that his endeavors to concentrate are being disturbed by someone speaking should consider: “Why did G‑d bring me here, where this talker is disturbing my prayers? After all, everything is Providential.”
Indeed it is, explains the Baal Shem Tov: this man’s talk is a spark of the radiance of the Shechinah that has descended and now “abides” in his mouth, in order that the worshiper should exert himself so strenuously that he will be able to ignore the disturbance. (The verb used in the above-quoted version of the teaching is “abides” — שרתה; as the Alter Rebbe will soon explain, the proper term is “vested” — נתלבשה.)
Especially so, the text there goes on to say, if the person speaking is a heathen or a child, then the realization that theShechinah has (as it were) contracted itself to such a degree should surely bring the worshiper to ever-increasing fervor.
It would seem that the opponents of Chassidism seized upon this statement of the Baal Shem Tov: they could not understand how one could possibly say that the Shechinah “abided” (or even was “vested”) within a heathen.
The Alter Rebbe explains this in the present letter, beginning with the teaching of the Sages that “Whoever is in a rage resembles an idolater.” A Jew, he explains, must know that everything comes from G‑d. When someone strikes him or angers him with words, he should remind himself that at that very moment, a glimmer of the Divine Presence — which provides life to all creatures and to this individual as well — has vested itself within that person.
The Alter Rebbe goes on to prove this from King David’s response when Shimi ben Geira cursed him. King David said: “For G‑d told him, ‘Curse!’” Although we do not find it explicitly stated that G‑d told Shimi to curse David, still, since G‑d’s spirit animated Shimi at the moment that he cursed David, thus providing him with the strength to do so, David considered this as if “G‑d told him to curse.” Indeed, as the Alter Rebbe goes on to explain, a glimmer or irradiation of the Shechinahvests itself even in kelipot.
Throughout this discussion the Alter Rebbe does not actually quote the Baal Shem Tov’s teaching nor the above objection to it. The reason for the latter omission may perhaps be understood in light of the fact that the Alter Rebbe was prepared for mesirut nefesh, literally risking his life, not to be sundered from any teaching or even the slightest gesture of the Baal Shem Tov, even if it would only appear to be so in the eyes of the beholder.1
It is thus reasonable to assume that here as well, the Alter Rebbe chose not to even mention an objection raised against a teaching of the Baal Shem Tov; he merely clarifies the concepts involved, and the objection falls away as a matter of course.
להבין אמרי בינה
“To comprehend the words of understanding,” i.e., the words of Torah,2
מה שכתוב בספר הנקרא צוואת ריב״ש
stated in the book called Tzavaat Rivash3 (“The Testament of the Baal Shem Tov),”
הגם שבאמת אינה צוואתו כלל, ולא ציוה כלל לפני פטירתו
though in fact it is not at all4 his will or testament, and he did not ordain anything before his passing;
רק הם לקוטי אמרותיו הטהורות
they (i.e., the teachings in this book) are merely gleanings of his pure sayings
The adjective (“pure”) recalls the phrase in the morning blessings, טהורה היא, that describes the pristine purity of a soul before it descends from the World of Atzilut; likewise the verse,5 כעצם השמים לטוהר (“as pure as the very heavens”).
שלקטו לקוטי בתר לקוטי
that were gathered as6 “compilations after compilations,”
ולא ידעו לכוין הלשון על מתכונתו
and [the compilers] did not know how to phrase his teachings exactly.
For the Baal Shem Tov used to speak in Yiddish, and the teachings in Tzavaat HaRivash are recorded in Hebrew.
אך המכוון הוא אמת לאמיתו
The connotation, however, of the teachings is absolutely true.
The Alter Rebbe now begins to explain the statement in Tzavaat HaRivash, sec. 120.
והוא בהקדים מאמר רז״ל: כל הכועס, כאילו עובד עבודת כוכבים ומזלות
And this [will be understood] by first considering the teaching of our Sages, of blessed memory:7“Whoever is in a rage resembles an idolater.”
והטעם מובן ליודעי בינה
The reason [for this] is clear to those who8 “know un-derstanding,”
לפי שבעת כעסו, נסתלקה ממנו האמונה
because at the time of his anger, faith in G‑d and in His individual Divine Providence has left him.
כי אילו היה מאמין שמאת ה׳ היתה זאת לו, לא היה בכעס כלל
For were he to believe that what happened to him was G‑d’s doing, he would not be angry at all.
ואף שבן אדם, שהוא בעל בחירה, מקללו או מכהו או מזיק ממונו
True, it is a person possessed of free choice that is cursing him, or striking him, or causing damage to his property,
ומתחייב בדיני אדם ובדיני שמים על רוע בחירתו
and [therefore] guilty according to the laws of man and the laws of heaven for his evil choice.
The perpetrator for his part cannot plead innocence on the grounds that he is merely an instrument in the hands of Divine Providence.
אף על פי כן, על הניזק כבר נגזר מן השמים
Nevertheless, as regards the person harmed, this [incident] was already decreed in heaven,
והרבה שלוחים למקום
and9 “G‑d has many agents” through whom He can act.
Hence, even if the offending party had chosen otherwise, the incident would have befallen the victim in any case.
This discussion recalls the teaching of the Mechilta cited by Rashi on the verse,10 והאלקים אנה לידו — “and G‑d caused it to happen to him.” For to such a case the Mechilta applies the verse,11 “From evildoers there emerges evil.” This means that though it was decreed from above that someone should sustain an injury, G‑d brings it about that a particular person should inflict it.
That context, however, speaks of an unwitting injury. In the case of a potentially willful offender, if instead of choosing freely to act in an evil manner he chose to do otherwise, the event would still have occurred, for “G‑d has many agents,” as quoted above.
At any rate, it is thus clear that the victim has no cause to be angry with the offender, for the true cause of the offense was not him, but a heavenly decree.
The Alter Rebbe now takes this one step further: Not only does the heavenly decree give the offender an undefined potential to do harm, but moreover, the particular thought to do it and the power to do it, all come about from G‑d. (At the same time, since man has freedom of choice, he can of course choose to reject such a thought and refrain from doing such a deed.)
Anger thus remains unjustifiable. For the offended party is not angry that the other party made an evil choice; what angers him is the damage done to him. His anger thus results from his lack of belief that the true cause for his mishap is not a particular individual’s evil choice, but a heavenly decree.
ולא עוד
And not only this, that a heavenly decree gave permission in principle and made it possible that he suffer injury,
אלא אפילו בשעה זו ממש, שמכהו או מקללו
but even at that very moment at which [the offender] strikes or curses him,
מתלבש בו כח ה׳ ורוח פיו יתברך, המחייהו ומקיימו
there is vested in him (in the offender) a force from G‑d and the breath of His mouth, which animates and sustains him;
וכמו שכתוב: כי ה׳ אמר לו, קלל
as it is written:12 “For G‑d told him, ‘Curse!’”
והיכן אמר לשמעי
Now where did He say so to Shimi? Where do we find it written that G‑d told him to curse David?
אלא שמחשבה זו, שנפלה לשמעי בלבו ומוחו, ירדה מאת ה׳
But this thought that occurred in Shimi’s heart and mind to curse David, descended from G‑d, Who was thus responsible for such a thought entering Shimi’s mind;
ורוח פיו, המחיה כל צבאם
and13 “the breath of His mouth, [which animates] all the hosts [of heaven],”
החיה רוחו של שמעי, בשעה שדיבר דברים אלו לדוד
animated the spirit of Shimi at the time he spoke those words to David.
כי אילו נסתלק רוח פיו יתברך רגע אחד מרוחו של שמעי, לא יכול לדבר מאומה
For if the breath of G‑d’s mouth had departed from the spirit of Shimi for a single moment, he could not have spoken at all.
* * *
וזהו כי ה׳ אמר לו בעת ההיא ממש: קלל את דוד
(14And that is the meaning of the statement, “For G‑d told him (at that very moment when Shimi was speaking these words), ‘Curse David!’
I.e., G‑d did so by providing Shimi at that time with life and the power of speech.
ומי יאמר לו וגו׳
And who shall say to him, [‘Why did you do so?’]”
In the Table of Glosses and Emendations (Luach He’arot VeTikkunim) which is appended to standard editions of theTanya, the Rebbe notes that the words “to him” (לו) seem to be unnecessary, inasmuch as the above-quoted verse simply states, without this addition, “And who shall say, ‘Why did you do so?’”
It has been suggested that the Rebbe notes that these words merely “seem” superfluous, rather than stating outright that they are, because at this point the Alter Rebbe is actually referring to another verse:15 “For the word of a king rules, and who shall say to Him, ‘What are You doing?’”
However, rather than adopt this labored assumption, that the Alter Rebbe suddenly changes direction and interpolates one word from another verse, it appears more reasonable to say that the words “to Him” are not intended as a quotation. Rather, since some commentators hold that the conclusion of our verse (“And who shall say to him...”) refers to Shimi, the Alter Rebbe here makes it clear that it in fact speaks of G‑d. I.e., having first related that G‑d “told” Shimi what to do, the verse ends by asking, “Who can possibly say to Him, ‘Why did You do so?’”
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | HaTamim, Issue II, p. 56. |
| 2. | “Words of understanding” (Mishlei 1:2) has the same meaning as בינה in Shabbat 104a, which Rashi explains to mean “Torah”. |
| 3. | The abbreviation is an acronym of the Heb. for “Rabbi Yisrael Baal Shem.” |
| 4. | In the standard editions of Tanya the word כלל (“at all”) does not appear. It has been added in accordance with an emendation of the Tzemach Tzedek, quoted in Luach HaTikkun at the end of the Hebrew editions of Tanya. |
| 5. | Shmot 24:6. |
| 6. | Taanit 6b. |
| 7. | Zohar I, 27b; III, 179a; Rambam, Hilchot De’ot 2:3 in the name of the “earliest sages” (חכמים הראשונים); et al. |
| 8. | For an exposition of why the Alter Rebbe specifically uses the phrase “those who ‘know understanding,’” see Likkutei Levi Yitzchak on this passage. |
| 9. | Zohar III, 36b; cf. Taanit 18b. |
| 10. | Shmot 21:13. |
| 11. | I Shmuel 24:14. |
| 12. | II Shmuel 16:10. |
| 13. | Tehillim 33:6. |
| 14. | Parentheses are in the original. |
| 15. | Kohelet 8:4. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
Today's Mitzvah
Thursday, Tishrei 25, 5776 · October 8, 2015
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 199
Making Collateral Available to the Debtor when Needed
"As the sun sets, you shall surely return the pledge to him"—Deuteronomy 24:13.
A creditor is commanded to return a debt collateral to its Jewish owner when he is in need of it. If the collateral is an item he needs during the daytime – e.g., the tools of his trade or an article of clothing – the creditor must return it to the debtor every day, and only take possession of it during the nighttime. If the collateral is an item needed by night – e.g., linens, blankets or pajamas – he must return it at night and only take possession of it again in the morning.
Making Collateral Available to the Debtor when Needed
Positive Commandment 199
Translated by Berel Bell
The 199th mitzvah is that we are commanded to return a security deposit to its Jewish owner when he needs it. If the objects are needed during the day, such as tools he works with, you must give them to him during the day and hold them only at night. If they are needed at night, such as a mat and blanket for sleeping, you must give them to him during the night and hold them only during the day.
In the words of the Mechilta: "The verse,1 'You must return it to him before sunrise' refers to a garment worn during the day, which you give to him for the entire day. What is the source for the law that a garment worn at night must be given to him for the entire night? The verse,2 'Return the security to him before the sun sets.' " Therefore our Sages said, "A day garment may be held at night and a night garment held during the day; the day garment is returned for the day and the night garment for the night."
It has already been explained in tractate Makkos3 that the verse4 "[When you make any kind of loan to your neighbor,] do not go into his house to take something as security" is a lav she'nitak l'aseh (a prohibition with a remedial positive commandment) — the positive command being "Return the security to him." In the words of the Sifri: "The verse 'Return [the security to him]' teaches that an article that is used during the day must be returned for the day, and one used at night for the night. A quilt is returned for the night and a plow for the day."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 9th chapter of tractate Bava Metzia.5
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:25.
2.Deut. 24:13.
3.16a.
4.Deut. 24:10.
5.113a.
Full text of this Mitzvah » ___________________________________________________________
Negative Commandment 240
Withholding Collateral from the Debtor when it's Needed
"You shall not sleep while holding his security"—Deuteronomy 24:12.
It is forbidden for a creditor to withhold a debt's collateral from its owner, the debtor, when he cannot do without it due to his poverty (see Positive Commandment 199). Rather he must return the collateral to him—an item used during the daytime must be returned for the duration of every day, and an item used at night must be returned for the duration of every night. As the Mishnah says, "He must return the pillow at night and the plow for the day."
Withholding Collateral from the Debtor when it's Needed
"You shall not sleep while holding his security"—Deuteronomy 24:12.
It is forbidden for a creditor to withhold a debt's collateral from its owner, the debtor, when he cannot do without it due to his poverty (see Positive Commandment 199). Rather he must return the collateral to him—an item used during the daytime must be returned for the duration of every day, and an item used at night must be returned for the duration of every night. As the Mishnah says, "He must return the pillow at night and the plow for the day."
Withholding Collateral from the Debtor when it's Needed
Negative Commandment 240
Translated by Berel Bell
The 240th prohibition is that we are forbidden from holding someone's security deposit during the time that he needs it. An article which is used during the day must be returned for the day, and one used at night for the night, as the Mishneh says,1 "A pillow is returned for the night and a plow for the day."
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement2 (exalted be He), "you may not go to sleep with his security." The Sifri explains, "[The verse means] 'you may not go to sleep with his security' in your possession." Instead, anything which he cannot replace due to his poverty must be returned to him, as explained in the verse,3 "[If you take your neighbor's garment as security, you must return it to him before sunset.] This alone is his covering, the garment for his skin."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 9th chapter of tractate Bava Metzia.
FOOTNOTES
1.Bava Metzia 113a.
2.Deut. 24:12.
3.Ex. 22:26
Full text of this Mitzvah »
___________________________________________________________
• 1 Chapter: Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 17
• 1 Chapter: Ma'achalot Assurot Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 17
Ma'achalot Assurot - Chapter 17
Halacha 1
When the meat of a nevelah or a crawling animal or teeming animal was cooked in an earthenware pot,1 one should not cook the meat of a ritually slaughtered animal in that pot on that same day. If he cooked a type of meat [in the pot that day], the dish is forbidden.2 If he cooked another substance in it, [it is forbidden if] its flavor can be detected.3
Halacha 2
The Torah forbade only [the use of] a pot that was [cooked with the forbidden substance] on that day.4 For [in that time,] the flavor of the fat absorbed in the pot had not been impaired.5
According to Rabbinic Law, one should never cook in it again.6 For this reason, one should never purchase used earthenware utensils from gentiles to use them for hot foods, e.g., pots and plates. This applies even when they are coated with leaded. If one purchased such a utensil and cooked in it from the second day onward, the food is permitted.7
Halacha 3
[The following rules apply when] a person purchases metal or glass dinnerware from a gentile. Utensils that [the gentile] did not use at all should be immersed in the waters of a mikveh. Afterwards, it is permitted to eat and drink with them.8
Utensils that he used for cold [food and drink], e.g., cups, flasks, and pitchers, he should wash them thoroughly9 and immerse them. [Afterwards,] they are permitted. Utensils that he used for hot food: large pots, kettles, and pots used to heat foot, should be purged through hagaalah,10 and immersed in themikveh.11 Afterwards, they are permitted. Utensils that he used by exposing them to fire, e.g., spits and grills, should be exposed to fire12 until they become white-hot and their outer surface falls off.13 They may then be immersed and become permitted for use.
Halacha 4
How is [the purging process of] hagaalah achieved? A small pot is placed into a large pot and they are filled with water until the smaller one is submerged.14Then one must boil it very thoroughly.15
If a large pot was [forbidden],16 one should place dough or mud along its edge [so that] he could fill it with water so that it will flow over its edge.17He [then] boils it.
In all instances, if he used them before boiling [water in them for hagaalah], washing them thoroughly, making them white hot, or immersing them, [the food] is kosher. For any fat [absorbed] in them imparts an unpleasant flavor, as explained.18
Halacha 5
The immersion of the dinnerware that is purchased from gentiles to allow it to be used for eating and drinking is not associated with ritual purity and impurity. Instead, it is a Rabbinic decree.19
There is an allusion20 to this [in Numbers 31:23 that describes Moses' instructions with regard to the spoils taken from Midian:] "Everything that can be passed through fire, you shall pass through fire and it will become pure." According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that the verse is speaking only about purifying [the utensils] from gentile cooking, not from ritual impurity. For there is no ritually impurity that is dispelled by fire. All those who are impure ascend from their impurity through immersion and the impurity stemming from [contact with] a human corpse is [dispelled] through the sprinkling [of water and the ashes of the red heifer]. There is no concept of fire [employed in this context], rather [it is employed] with regard to purification from gentile cooking. Since the verse states "and it will become pure," our Sages said: "Add to it another dimension of purity after passing it through fire to cause it to be permitted because [of its contact] with gentile cooking."21
Halacha 6
[Our Sages] obligate this immersion only for metal22 dinnerware utensils23 that were purchased from a gentile. When, however, a person borrows [such utensils] from a gentile or a gentile left him such utensils as security, it is only necessary to wash them thoroughly, boil them, or expose them to fire. He does not have to immerse [them].24 Similarly, if one purchased wooden or stone utensils, it is only necessary to wash them thoroughly, boil them, or expose them to fire. Similarly, earthenware utensils need not be immersed.25 If, however, they are coated with lead, they are considered as metal utensils and require immersion.26
Halacha 7
When a person purchases a knife from a gentile, he must expose it to fire until it become white hot or have it honed in its sharpener.27 If it was a perfectly [smooth] knife without any blemishes, it is sufficient to insert it in hard earth ten times.28 [Afterwards,] one may eat cold food with it.29 If it had blemishes or it was perfectly [smooth], but one desired to use it to eat hot food or to slaughter with it, he should expose it to fire until it becomes white hot or hone it in its entirety.30 If he slaughtered [an animal] with such a knife before purifying it, he should wash thoroughly the place of slaughter.31 If he removes the surface [of the meat around the place of slaughter], it is praiseworthy.32
Halacha 8
When a knife was used to slaughter an animal that was trefe, one should not slaughter with it [again] until it is washed thoroughly, even with cold water or wiped clean with worn-out clothes.33
Halacha 9
There are other substances which are forbidden by the Sages. Even though there is not a basis for their prohibition in Scriptural Law, they decreed against their use34 to separate from the gentiles so that Jews will not intermingle with them and intermarry. They are: It is forbidden to drink [alcoholic beverages] with them35even in a place where there was no suspicion that the wine was poured as a libation. And they forbade eating from their bread or cooked dishes36even in a place where there is no suspicion that the food was forbidden.37
Halacha 10
A person should not drink at a party of gentiles even though boiled wine which is not forbidden38 [is being served] or he is drinking from his own utensils. If the majority of the attendants of the party are Jewish, it is permitted.39We may not drink the beer that they make from dates, figs, or the like. [This is forbidden] only in the place where they are sold.40 If, however, one brought the beer home and drank it there, it is permitted. For the fundamental point of the decree is that one should not feast with [a gentile].
Halacha 11
It is permitted to drink wine from apples, pomegranates, and the like in every place. [Our Sages] did not institute a decree in an uncommon situation. Raisen wine is like ordinary wine and is used for libations.41
Halacha 12
Although [our Sages] forbade bread [baked] by gentiles, there are places were leniency is shown regarding this matter and bread baked by a gentile baker is purchased in a place where there is no Jewish baker and it is in a field, because this is a pressing situation.42 There is, by contrast, no one who will rule that leniency may be shown with regard to bread baked by a homeowner.43 For the primary reason for [our Sages'] decree was [to prevent] intermarriage. If one will eat the bread of a [gentile] homeowner, [it is likely that] he will feast with him.
Halacha 13
[The bread] is permitted [in the following situations]: A gentile lit the oven and a Jew baked within it, a Jew lit the oven and the gentile baked within it, the gentile both lit the oven and baked, but the Jew stirred the fire or reduced it, since he was involved in the baking tasks, [we rule leniently]. Even though he did not do more than throw one piece of wood into the oven, he caused all the bread in it to be permitted. [The rationale is that this requirement] is only to make a distinction that [a gentile's] bread is forbidden.44
Halacha 14
When a gentile cooks wine, milk, honey, quince,45 or the like, i.e., any entity that is usually eaten raw, it is permitted. [Our Sages] issued their decree only with regard to entities that are not eaten at all raw, e.g., meat, unsalted fish, an egg, and vegetables. If a gentile were to cook them from the beginning to the end without the Jew participated in the cooking at all, they are forbidden because they were cooked by gentiles.
Halacha 15
When does the above apply? To [food] that would be served on the table of kings46 to be eaten together with bread,47 e.g., meat, eggs, fish, and the like. When, by contrast, [food] would not be served on the table of kings to be eaten together with bread, e.g., vetch48 cooked by gentiles, it is permitted despite the fact that it is not eaten uncooked. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. For the fundamental purpose of the decree was to prevent intermarriage, by [hindering] a gentile from inviting [the Jew] to a feast. And when [food] would not be served on the table of kings to be eaten together with bread, a person would not invite a friend [to share a meal] of it.
Halacha 16
When small fish were salted by a Jew or a gentile,49 it is as if they have undergone part of their cooking process. [Therefore] if a gentile roasted them afterwards, they are permitted.50 [Similarly,] whenever a Jew performs a small part of the cooking process, whether at the beginning or at the end, [the food] is permitted. Accordingly, if a gentile placed meat or a pot on the fire and the Jew turned over the meat or stirred the pot or, conversely, the Jew placed [the food on the fire] and the gentile completed [the cooking process], [the food] is permitted.51
Halacha 17
When a gentile salts fish or smokes fruit and in this way prepares them to be eaten, they are permitted. With regard to this decree,52 salted food is not considered as if it were boiling hot, nor is smoking considered as cooking. Similarly, kernels of grain roasted by a gentile are permitted. They were not included in the decree, for a person will not invite a colleague53 to [come and eat] roasted kernels of grain.
Halacha 18
Beans, peas, lentils, and the like that have been cooked by gentiles and are sold are forbidden because of [the decree against] gentile cooking in places where they are served on the tables of kings54 as a relish. [They are also forbidden,] because of prohibited foods in all places for perhaps they were cooked together with meat55 or in a pot in which meat had been cooked.56Similarly, doughnuts that are fried by gentiles in oil are forbidden because of prohibited foods.57
Halacha 19
When a gentile cooked without intending to cook, [the product] is permitted.58What is implied? A gentile lit a fire in a swamp to clean away the overgrowth and grasshoppers were roasted, it is permitted to eat them. [This applies] even in places where they are served on the tables of kings as a relish. Similarly, if he scorches a [kosher animal's] head to remove its hair, it is permitted to partake of the strings of meat and the tips of the ears that were roasted at the time of the scorching.
Halacha 20
[The following rules apply to] dates that were cooked by gentiles. If, initially, they were sweet, they are permitted.59 If they were bitter and the cooking sweetened them, they are forbidden. If they were of intermediate sweetness, they are forbidden.
Halacha 21
Roasted lentils that were kneaded with water or with vinegar are forbidden.60When, however, roasted kernels of wheat or barley are kneaded with water, they are permitted.
Halacha 22
The oil of gentiles is permitted. One who forbids it commits a great sin, for he rebels61 against [the teachings] of the [High] Court who permitted it.62 Even if the oil was cooked, it is permitted. It is not forbidden because of gentile cooking, because we partake of oil uncooked. Nor is it forbidden, because of prohibited foods,63 because meat impairs [the flavor of] oil and spoils it.
Halacha 23
Similarly, when gentile honey was cooked and sweets were made from it, it is permitted for the same reason.64
Halacha 24
Date dregs65 of gentiles that were heated in hot water, whether in a large pot or a small pot, are permitted.66 For the [flavor of forbidden meat absorbed in the pot] impairs its flavor. Similarly, pickled foods to which it is not customary to add vinegar or wine or pickled olives or pickled grasshoppers that are brought from the storehouse are permitted.67 Nevertheless, grasshoppers and pickled foods over which wine is sprinkled are forbidden.68 Similarly, they are forbidden if vinegar - even vinegar made from beer - is sprinkled over them.69
Halacha 25
Why is gentile vinegar made from beer forbidden? Because they cast the dregs of wine into it. Therefore [vinegar] taken from a storage room is permitted.70
Halacha 26
[Gentile] fish brine, in places where it is customary to mix wine into it, is forbidden. If the wine is more expensive than the fish brine, it is permitted. We rule this way in all instances where we suspect that the gentiles mixed a forbidden substance [into a permitted substance]. For a person will not mix something expensive into something that is low-priced, for he will lose. He will, however, mix the low-priced into the expensive, for then he profits.
Halacha 27
When a child eats forbidden foods or performs a forbidden labor on the Sabbath,71 the Jewish court is not commanded to make him cease, because he is not intellectually capable.72
When does the above apply? When he acts on his own initiative.73 It is, however, forbidden [for an adult] to give him [non-kosher food] by hand. [This applies even] to foods forbidden by Rabbinic decree. Similarly, it is forbidden to make him accustomed to desecrating the Sabbath and the festivals.74 [This applies even] to even [performing] activities forbidden as a shvut.75
Halacha 28
Although the Jewish court is not commanded to separate a child from transgressions, his father is commanded to rebuke him so that he withdraws in order to train him in holy conduct, as [Proverbs 22:6] states: "Educate a child according to his way."76
Halacha 29
Our Sages77 forbade [a person from partaking of] food and drink from which the souls of most people are revolted, e.g., food and drink that were mixed with vomit, feces, foul discharges, or the like.78 Similarly, our Sages forbade eating and drinking from filthy utensils from which a person's soul languishes, e.g., the utensils of a lavatory, the glass79 utensils of medical attendants that are used to let blood, and the like.
Halacha 30
Similarly, they forbade eating with unclean and soiled hands and with dirty utensils. All of these matters are included in the general [prohibition]: "Do not make your souls detestable." A person who partakes of these foods is given stripes for rebellious conduct.80
Halacha 31
Similarly, it is forbidden for a person to delay relieving himself at all, whether through defecation or urination.81 Anyone who delays relieving himself is considered among those who make their souls detestable in addition to the severe illnesses he brings upon himself and becoming liable for his life. Instead, it is appropriate for a person to train himself [to eliminate] at specific times so that he will not have to separate himself in the presence of others and not have to make his soul detestable.
Halacha 32
Whoever is careful concerning these matters82 brings an additional measure of holiness and purity to his soul and purges his soul for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, as [Leviticus 11:44] states: "And you shall sanctify yourselves and you will be holy, for I am holy."
Blessed be God who grants assistance.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
If the pot was made out of metal, it is possible to purge the flavor of the non-kosher food the pot absorbed through hagaalah. This process is not effective with regard to an earthenware pot.
|
| 2. |
Since the dish contains meat and the flavor of the forbidden meat was absorbed in the pot, the laws applying to a forbidden substance mixed with its own type apply. Since we do not know how much of the forbidden substance is absorbed in the pot, we assume that the entire pot is forbidden. For this reason, the Rambam does not mention that if there is 60 times the amount of the forbidden food in the kosher food, the kosher food is permitted. For it is very rare that a pot be able to contain sixty times its own volume (Radbaz).
|
| 3. |
According to the Rambam, it should be tasted by a gentile to determine whether the forbidden flavor is detectable or not, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 30. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 98:1) accepts the Rambam's premise, but the Rama states that in the present age, we do not rely on the statements of a non-Jew who tasted food to determine whether it is kosher or not.
|
| 4. |
The meaning of the Rambam's words is not clear. Rashi (Avodah Zarah 75b) interprets the term as meaning "which has not been left overnight." Tosafot, by contrast, states that it means "that has not been left for 24 hours." The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 103:5) follows the latter view.
|
| 5. |
After that time, however, the flavor is impaired and thus will not cause a substance cooked in the pot to become forbidden.
|
| 6. |
This is a safeguard less cooking in a pot that had not been used for non-kosher food for a day lead to cooking in one that had been used for non-kosher food that day (Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.).
|
| 7. |
Our Sages did not enforce their decree after the fact. Nevertheless, at the outset, an earthenware pot that was used for non-kosher food may never be used.
|
| 8. |
See Halachah 5 regarding the obligation for this immersion.
|
| 9. |
Lest any forbidden food be stuck to them.
|
| 10. |
This will purge any forbidden food that was absorbed in them. There should be at least one day between the last time a pot was used for non-kosher food and the time when hagaalah is performed.
|
| 11. |
See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 121:2 which discusses what must be done if they were immersed in the mikveh before hagaalah was performed.
|
| 12. |
That the forbidden article and the utensil were in direct contact with fire without a medium of water or any other liquid.
|
| 13. |
Only then will the forbidden flavor that was absorbed be purged.
|
| 14. |
In that way, there will not be any portion of it that is not exposed to the water.
|
| 15. |
I.e., we follow the principle: "As it absorbed a forbidden flavor, so it purges it." Hence boiling it thoroughly will cause any forbidden taste that is absorbed to be purged.
|
| 16. |
And thus it would be difficult to submerge it a larger pot.
|
| 17. |
And thus the boiling water will also cover the edge.
|
| 18. |
In Halachah 2.
|
| 19. |
As the Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 5:15) states, this immersion was instituted to mark the article's transition from the impurity of the gentiles.
|
| 20. |
Most commentaries understand the Rambam as explaining that the requirement for immersion is an asmachta, i.e., an obligation that is essentially Rabbinic in origin. Although our Sages cited a verse that can be seen to allude to it, the intent is not that the obligation is derived from the verse. Instead, the verse is merely a hint which the Rabbis found to allude to their teaching (Rabbenu Nissim).
There are, however, others who note that the Rambam occasionally employs the term he employs here - midvrei sofrim - to refer to obligations and laws that are of Scriptural origin. They are not explicitly stated in the verse, but instead derived through the principles of Biblical exegesis. According to this view, the obligation is of Scriptural origin (the Rashba, Vol. III, Responsum 255, 259).
|
| 21. |
I.e., after you have purged it from the taste absorbed because of gentile cooking, add another dimension of purity through immersion.
|
| 22. |
This requirement also applies to glass dinnerware, as stated in Halachah 3.
Avodah Zarah 75b explains the association with metal utensils as follows. Our Sages associated this obligation with the purification of the spoil taken in the war against Midian and the verse which mentions those spoils (Numbers 31:22) refers to metal utensils. Glass utensils are also included, because, halachically, they share similarities to metal utensils.
|
| 23. |
I.e., utensils used to prepare, serve, or partake of food. Even utensils that are used in the preliminary phases of preparation of food, e.g., a knife used to slaughter or skin an animal, are required to be immersed according to certain authorities [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 120:5)].
|
| 24. |
For even though he has permission to use them, he has not become their owner. The Kessef Mishneh quotes certain opinions that maintain that utensils taken as security must be immersed, because if the debt is not repaid, they are considered as payment [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 120:5).
In this context, there are many authorities who question why the utensils that are "purchased" by a gentile before Pesach are not required to be immersed.
|
| 25. |
Needless to say, plastic utensils need not be immersed.
|
| 26. |
The Rama ((Yoreh De'ah 120:1) states that they should be immersed without a blessing.
|
| 27. |
By exposing the knife to fire, the person will burn away any non-kosher substances. By honing it, he will grind away its surface and together with it, the taste of the forbidden substance it absorbed.
|
| 28. |
One must insert it in ten different places in the earth. It is not sufficient to insert it in the same place ten times [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 121:7)].
|
| 29. |
For sticking it into the earth will remove any traces of forbidden fat on its surface and the taste of forbidden food that is absorbed will not be released when it is used for cold food.
|
| 30. |
These activities may cause any forbidden taste absorbed by the knife to be released. Hence before the knife is used, the traces of the forbidden flavor must be removed as above.
The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 121:7) quotes opinions that maintain that honing the knife is not sufficient to allow it to be used for hot foods. He states that this is accustomed practice. Even so, after the fact, if a person slaughtered an animal with a knife that was honed in a grinder, thre is no prohibition involved (Siftei Cohen 121:20).
|
| 31. |
To remove any traces of forbidden fat that might be present.
This is permitted only after the fact. At the outset, it is forbidden to slaughter with such a knife unless measures are taken to remove the absorbed fat (Siftei Cohen 10:8).
|
| 32. |
For according to some opinions, through the slaughter of the animal, the forbidden fat on the knife can become absorbed in the surface of the meat where the animal was slaughtered. Hence it is necessary that it be removed. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 10:1) rules that it is necessary to take this measure and remove the surface of the meat.
|
| 33. |
To remove any trace of forbidden blood or fat. Nothing more is necessary, we do not say that the blood or fat became absorbed in the knife.
The Turei Zahav 10:15 states that unlike a knife used by gentiles mentioned in the previous halachah, it was not used frequently with a non-kosher substance. Hence washing it thoroughly is sufficient.
|
| 34. |
These decrees were about the eighteen decrees passed when the students of the School of Shammai outnumbered the students of the School of Hillel, as related in Shabbat 1:3 (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 2:6).
|
| 35. |
See the following halachah.
|
| 36. |
See Halachot 12-24.
|
| 37. |
E.g., the food was cooked by gentiles on Jewish premises (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
|
| 38. |
See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.
|
| 39. |
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not mention this restriction or the accompanying leniency. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 112) explains the Rambam's logic as follows: Avodah Zarah 30a relates that one of the Sages, Shmuel was sitting with Abalat, a gentile. They were served boiled wine. Abalat withdrew, lest he touch the wine and cause it to become forbidden. Shmuel called him back, telling him there was no prohibition against boiled wine.
Rabbenu Asher asks: Since the prohibition against gentile wine was instituted as a protection against intermarriage, what difference does it make whether the wine is boiled or not? He answers that boiled wine is not common. Hence our Sages did not include it in their decree.
Rambam maintains that boiled wine is common and hence included in our Sages' decree. For this reason, it is forbidden to drink it together with gentiles. How then could Shmuel drink with Abalat? Because there were a majority of Jews at the gathering and such a situation is not included in our Sages' decree.
|
| 40. |
Thus according to the Rambam [and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 114:1) who quotes his ruling, it is forbidden to drink at a bar frequented primarily by gentiles. The Rama mentions that it is customary in the Ashkenazic community to rule leniently with regard to alcoholic beverages made from honey and grain.
|
| 41. |
Hence a gentile's touch renders it forbidden.
|
| 42. |
Because bread is a staple of life and there is no Jewish bread available, our Sages allowed for leniency when purchasing bread from a commercial baker. For buying from him will not lead to close personal relationships. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam, this leniency is granted only: where there is no Jewish bakers and in the fields, not in the cities. The Shulchan Aruch(Yoreh De'ah 112:2) rules more leniently and does not forbid this in a city. The Rama rules even more leniently and allows the purchase of bread from a gentile baker even in places where bread from a Jewish baker is available.
|
| 43. |
There are opinions which maintain when there is no bread from a commercial baker available, one may even use bread baked by a gentile homeowner [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 112)]. The Rama states that one may accept this leniency.
|
| 44. |
The Radbaz states that this leniency applies only with regard to baking bread. With regard to cooking, a Jew must take a more active role in the cooking process. This ruling is quoted by theShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 113:7). The Rama, however, differs and maintains that kindling the oven is sufficient for cooking as well.
|
| 45. |
There is a slight difficulty with the Rambam's statements, because quince are only edible when cooked.
|
| 46. |
Today, when monarchy is a point of history, the phrase "fit to be served on the table of kings" refers to food served at a dinner for the President or dignitaries of similar status.
|
| 47. |
Avodah Zarah 38a gives this and the leniency mentioned in the previous halachah as alternate explanations when food cooked by gentiles is permitted. Since the matter is left unresolved by the Talmud, the Rambam and the subsequent authorities rule leniently in both situations.
|
| 48. |
A legume used as cattle fodder, but also served to humans on occasion.
|
| 49. |
The Radbaz that this is speaking about fish that are frequently served salted even without being cooked (e.g., sardines or herring served in brine). It is permitted to eat such fish for, as the Rambam states in the following halachah, in this context, salting is not considered as cooking. This leniency does not apply to large fish, for they are unfit to be eaten unless they are cooked or roasted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 103:12) mentions this ruling, but also a dissenting view that allows leniency even with regard to large fish.
|
| 50. |
Since they were fit to be eaten before they were roasted, the fact that they were roasted by a gentile afterwards does not cause them to be forbidden. This applies even when a gentile performed the salting. For that salting did not cause the fish to become forbidden and yet, it made it fit to be eaten (ibid.).
|
| 51. |
In his Kessef Mishneh, R. Yosef Caro rules that this applies only when the cooking process would have been completed without the gentile's activity; the gentile merely hastened it. He does not, however, quote this ruling in his Shulchan Aruch. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 113:6) rules that even if the food would not have cooked without the gentile's activity, it is permitted. The Turei Zahav113:6 and the Siftei Cohen 113:8, however, raise questions concerning that leniency.
|
| 52. |
In contrast to certain other halachic contexts.
|
| 53. |
See the conclusion of Halachah 15.
|
| 54. |
Implied is that the designation of a food as important enough to be served on the tables of kings is a relative matter, determined by each locale in accordance with its own practice (Makor Mayim Chayim).
|
| 55. |
For this is frequently done in order to flavor beans.
|
| 56. |
I.e., cooked that day. The Kessef Mishneh states that, according to the Rambam, we assume that a pot owned by a gentile had been used to cook non-kosher food that day. This is not the view of the majority of Halachic authorities.
|
| 57. |
For we fear that the gentile used non-kosher fat or that the fryer in which they are prepared was used that day for non-kosher meat.
|
| 58. |
When quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 113:5) emphasizes that if the gentile intends to cook, even if he did not intend to cook a particular substance, that substance is forbidden. For example, when a gentile lit an oven with the intent of cooking food without realizing that there was meat in the oven, the meat is forbidden.
|
| 59. |
Since they can be eaten fresh, they are not forbidden when cooked (Halachah 14).
|
| 60. |
Avodah Zarah 38b relates that it was customary to eat a dish made from roasted lentils mixed with vinegar. This was considered like cooking. As a safeguard against partaking of such a mixture, they also forbade roasted lentils mixed with water. It was not, however, customary to partake of grain mixed with vinegar. Hence, there was no reason to forbid grain mixed with water.
|
| 61. |
The wording the Rambam uses alludes to the Biblical prohibition of the rebellious elder (see Deuteronomy, ch. 17, and Hilchot Mamrim, ch. 3). The Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 2:8) relates that Rav once refused to partake of gentile oil. Shmuel ordered him to do so. "If not," he threatened, "I will have you labeled a rebellious elder."
|
| 62. |
Avodah Zarah 35b states that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and his court permitted gentile oil to be used.
|
| 63. |
I.e., the flavor of forbidden meat absorbed in the pot.
|
| 64. |
I.e., because it is ordinarily eaten raw and because meat spoils its flavor.
|
| 65. |
Which would be boiled to make beer.
|
| 66. |
Avodah Zarah 38b originally postulates that only date dregs cooked in small pots with openings to narrow to put in non-kosher meat are forbidden. The conclusion of the passage, however, permits even date dregs cooked in large pots for the reason mentioned by the Rambam.
|
| 67. |
In some halachic contexts, pickling is considered as cooking. Nevertheless, with regard to this prohibition, our Sages ruled leniently. We do not forbid them because of the suspicion that wine or vinegar will be sprinkled over them, because wine or vinegar would not be sprinkled over them in the storeroom, only in a retail outlet [Rashi (Avodah Zarah 39b)].
|
| 68. |
Because of the gentile wine.
|
| 69. |
As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 13, vinegar made from gentile wine is forbidden. And as indicated in the next halachah, other types of vinegar are also forbidden.
|
| 70. |
For if wine dregs were cast into the vinegar in the storage room, it would spoil (Avodah Zarah32b). In a store, however, we assume that it will be sold quickly and in that brief time, it will not spoil (Turei Zahav 114:5).
|
| 71. |
Although the Rambam's wording in Hilchot Shabbat 24:11 might lead one to think that one must rebuke a child for performing a task forbidden by Scriptural Law, both the Maggid Mishneh and theKessef Mishneh explain that his statements there should be interpreted within the context of his statements here.
|
| 72. |
Hence, he is not responsible for his actions.
|
| 73. |
Note, however, the Rama (Orach Chayim 243:1) which quotes opinions that maintain that once a child has reached the age where he is fit to be educated in the observance of the mitzvot, the court - and every individual person - is obligated to rebuke for transgressing.
|
| 74. |
To give a contemporary example, a parent cannot have a child turn lights on and off on the Sabbath.
|
| 75. |
As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 21:1, the term shvut refers to activities forbidden by Rabbinic Law, because they resemble forbidden labors or because they might lead one to commit a forbidden labor.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 243:1 which rules that when there is a necessity, not even a severe necessity, Rabbinic prohibitions can be overstepped with regard to a child.
|
| 76. |
This is a general charge, applying to the Torah and its mitzvot in their totality.
|
| 77. |
See the notes to the following halachah with regard to whether these restrictions are of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin.
|
| 78. |
The Radbaz states that one partake of such foods for curative purposes if necessary.
|
| 79. |
The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 116) states that this also applies to metal utensils. The Rambam mentions glass only because that was the ordinary practice at that time.
|
| 80. |
See the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 116) who debates whether the prohibition mentioned in this and the previous halachah are of Rabbinic or Scriptural origin. It is possible to explain that the restrictions were instituted by the Rabbis and they employed the Biblical verse merely as anasmachta, an allusion and a hint, but not a source per se.
The wording of the Rambam here and his statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 179) imply that the prohibition itself is Scriptural in origin. The only reason a person is not given lashes is because the simple meaning of the verse refers to the prohibition against teeming animals.
|
| 81. |
See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Mahadura Basra 3:11 which mentions several points concerning this restriction:
a) Our Sages did not, however, require their ordinance to override considerations of public embarrassment. For example, [a person is allowed to wait] until he finds a private place to relieve himself or until he will not be causing an interruption in prayer.
b) The Rashba maintains that the prohibition "not [to] make your souls detestable" does not apply to deferring urination. c) Whenever one can contain himself, whether from urinating or from eliminating, for the length of time it takes to walk a parsah (a Persian measure equal to approximately four kilometers), all opinions agree that the prohibition "not [to] make yourselves loathsome" does not apply.
|
| 82. |
It would appear that the Rambam's intent is not only the subjects spoken about in the last halachot, but also the totality of the laws of kashrut.
|
• 3 Chapters: Malveh veLoveh Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 10, Malveh veLoveh Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 11, Malveh veLoveh Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 12
Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 10
Halacha 1
Just as it is permitted for a seller to take an order based on the market price; so, too, it is permitted to give a loan of produce without any conditions, to be returned without any conditions, without establishing a time when it must be returned once the market price has been established.
What is implied? If there was a fixed market price for wheat that was known by both the borrower and the lender, when the borrower borrows ten se'ah of wheat from a colleague, he is obligated to return ten se'ah, even though the price of wheat increased. The rationale is that when he borrowed the wheat from him, the market price was known. If he had wanted to, he could have purchased wheat and returned it, since a minimum term of the loan was not established.
Halacha 2
If the borrower possesses some of the type of produce that he seeks to borrow, it is permissible for him to borrow this produce without any conditions, to be returned without any conditions, without establishing a time when it is due. Even if he possesses only a se'ah, he may borrow many se'ah because of it. Even if he possesses only a drop of oil or wine, he may borrow several jugs of wine and oil because of it.
If he did not possess any of that type of produce and the market price was not established yet, or the borrower and the lender did not know the market price, it is forbidden to lend a se'ah of produce for a se'ah to be returned at a later date. Similarly, with regard to other types of produce, a person should not lend them out until he establishes a financial equivalent. The following rules apply when a person makes a loan of produce without establishing a financial equivalent, and it decreases in value. The borrower must return the measure or the weight of the fruit he borrowed. If they increased in value, the lender may take only the amount they were worth at the time of the loan.
Even if a person possesses that type of produce, or the market price had already been established, it is forbidden to make a loan of produce that must be repaid on a specific date. Instead, the loan must be made without any stipulation, and it can be repaid whenever the borrower desires to repay it.
Halacha 3
A person should not tell a colleague: "Lend me a kor of wheat and I will return akor to you at the time when wheat is brought to the granaries." He may, however, tell him: "Lend me wheat until my son comes, or until I find the key to my storehouse."
Halacha 4
The following rules apply if a person lent out produce until a fixed date: If the produce diminished in value, the borrower should return the produce at the time set. If the produce increased in value, the borrower should pay him the money that it was worth at the time of the loan.
Halacha 5
A person may lend wheat to his sharecroppers to be used as seed, in return for wheat to be paid back after the harvest. This applies both before the sharecropper enters the field and after he entered the field.
When does this apply? In a place where it is customary that the sharecropper supplies the seed for the crops. For the owner of the field has the right to remove the sharecropper from the field whenever he does not supply it.
Different laws apply in places where it is customary for the owner of the field to provide the seed. If the sharecropper did not enter the field yet, it is permitted for the owner to lend wheat for wheat to be returned in the future, for he still has the prerogative of removing the sharecropper from the field. Thus, when the sharecropper entered the field, he entered with the intent of returning the wheat the owner lent him.
If, however, the loan was made after the sharecropper entered the field, since the owner can no longer have him removed, he is like any other person. It is forbidden to lend him wheat for seed in return for wheat to be paid back at a later date. He may, however, lend him wheat according to its market value if he does not make any stipulations.
Halacha 6
A loan may not be repaid with a loan of produce. To explain: A person owed a colleague money. The lender told the borrower: "Give me my money, because I want to purchase wheat with it."
The borrower responded: "Go out and establish the money I owe you as a debt of wheat according to the present market price."
If the borrower possesses an equivalent quantity of wheat, this is permitted. If, however, he does not have that type of produce, this is forbidden. For our Sages said that it is permitted to place an order based on a commodity's market price, even though the seller does not possess any of that commodity, only when the purchaser is paying money for the acquisition. It is, however, forbidden to transfer a debt of money into a debt of produce unless the borrower possesses the produce.
The concept can be extended when, in the above situation, the borrower did possess wheat and the debt was transferred into a debt of wheat. Similar rules apply if afterwards the lender comes and tells him: "Give me the wheat, because I want to sell it and use the money to purchase wine," and in response, the borrower tells him: "Go out and consider the debt as a debt of wine, according to the present market price of wine." If he possesses wine, it is permitted and it is considered as if he owes him wine. If he does not possess wine, it is forbidden.
If the borrower did not possess the commodity desired, but nevertheless, transgressed and transferred the debt into a debt of that commodity, he is not required to pay the debt in the commodity. Even though he did purchase the commodity afterwards, he should pay the lender the money he lent him.
Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 11
Halacha 1
When a person lends money to a colleague in the presence of witnesses, or a borrower tells witnesses: "Serve as witnesses for me that I owe this person amaneh" or "You are my witnesses that I owe this person a maneh," the obligation established is referred to as a milveh b'al peh, "a loan supported by an oral commitment." Such a debt need not be repaid in the presence of witnesses.' Therefore, if the debtor claims: "I repaid the debt," he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset and is discharged.
When, by contrast, a person lends money to a colleague and has the debt supported by a promissory note, the debtor must repay him in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, if the debtor claims: "I paid this promissory note," his words are not accepted. Instead, we tell him: "Bring witnesses who testify that you paid or "Arise and pay the debt you owe him."
Therefore, when a person tells witnesses: "Serve as witnesses for me that I owe this person a maneh" they may not write down a record of their testimony and give it to the lender, unless the borrower tells them: "Write a promissory note, sign it and give it to the lender. The rationale is that their testimony, which is only oral, should not be given the legal power of a promissory note. Even when the borrower gives such instructions, they should consult with him after they have signed the promissory note. Only afterwards, may they give the promissory note to the lender in his hand.
If they performed a kinyan with the borrower affirming that he owes the lender amaneh, the witnesses may write a promissory note and give it to the lender, even though the borrower did not instruct them to do so. The rationale is that when a kinyan is performed without any further instructions, it is ready to be recorded in a legal document. There is no need to consult the borrower.
Halacha 2
When a borrower writes a document by himself and witnesses write testimony upon it and give it to the lender, it is an acceptable promissory note.
Similarly, should the borrower compose a promissory note - even when there are no witnesses who sign it - and give it to the lender in the presence of witnesses, the loan is considered to be backed by a promissory note, provided that it is written with a script that cannot be forged and that the witnesses in whose presence it was transferred read it.
There are Geonim who ruled that the borrower should tell the witnesses in whose presence the promissory note was transferred: "Sign the note or testify that it was transferred in your presence."
Halacha 3
If the lender produces a note written by the borrower , which states that he owes the lender money, but there are no witnesses who have signed it, it is considered as merely a loan supported by an oral commitment with regard to all matters. This applies even if the authenticity of his writing was verified.
Hence, if the borrower claims to have paid the debt, and the lender denies receiving payment, the borrower need only take a sh'vuat hesset before being dismissed. Nor may the lender use this note to expropriate property from the heirs, nor from the purchasers.
Halacha 4
Whenever a loan is supported by a promissory note, the lender may use this note to expropriate property from the heirs and from the purchasers, as will be explained. When, by contrast, a loan is merely supported by an oral commitment, the lender may expropriate payment from the heirs, but not from the purchasers. The rationale for this restriction is that such a loan does not become public knowledge. Therefore, the lender may not expropriate property because of such an obligation.
A loan supported by a promissory note, by contrast, does become public knowledge. Therefore, it may be used to expropriate property that was sold. The purchaser of such property caused himself a loss, because he did not inquire to the extent that he discovered that the property of the person he purchased it from was on lien because of the loan that person had taken. For according to Scriptural Law, all property belonging to a borrower is on lien to the loan.
Halacha 5
When a person sells his field in the presence of witnesses, and a creditor of the seller expropriates the field from the purchaser, the purchaser may expropriate the money due him from property that was on lien to the sale that had been sold to others, as will be explained. The rationale is that whenever a person makes a sale, it is done in public and becomes common knowledge.
Halacha 6
A loan that is supported by an oral commitment alone may be collected from heirs only in one of the following three instances:
a) the person who is liable admits his debt, and while mortally ill stated that he still owes so-and-so a debt;
b) the loan was given for a specific time, and the time for payment had not come; we operate under the presumption that a person will not pay a debt until it is due;
c) because of his failure to pay, the debtor was placed under a ban of ostracism until he would make restitution, and he died while under that ban.
In all these instances, the creditor may collect the debt from the heirs without having to take an oath. If, however, witnesses come and testify that the deceased owed a colleague a maneh, or that he borrowed money in their presence, the creditor may not collect anything from the heirs, because it is possible that the deceased repaid the loan. For a person who borrowed money from a colleague in the presence of witnesses does not have to repay him in the presence of witnesses. Similarly, if a person shows heirs a note from their father stating that he owes the claimant money, he may not collect anything because of it, as we have explained.
Halacha 7
The following rules apply when a borrower does not own movable property, but does own landed property. If the court is aware that he has deposited his money in the hands of other people, we compel him to sell the landed property and pay his creditor.
If this is not known to them, they issue a ban of ostracism against anyone who knows that the debtor possesses movable property and does not bring it to court. Afterwards, they take possession of property he owns that is of intermediate worth and expropriate it for the creditor, as will be explained.
When does the above apply? When payment is collected from the debtor himself. When, however, a person comes to collect payment from heirs -whether they are above or below majority - he does not have the right to collect from the movable property belonging to the estate even if it was entrusted or loaned to another person. For movable property inherited by heirs is not under lien according to Scriptural Law. '
Halacha 8
It is a mitzvah for the heirs to pay a debt left by their father from the movable property that he left. If an heir does not desire to make restitution, however, he is not compelled to do so. If the creditor seized property belonging to the debtor in the debtor's lifetime, he may collect his due from it.
If a creditor claims that he seized property during the debtor's lifetime, and the debtor's heir claims that the creditor seized the property after the debtor's death, the heir has the responsibility of proving his claim. Alternatively, the lender must take an oath that he was owed so-and-so much - he can claim up to the value of the property in his possession - and include in his oath that he seized the property in the debtor's lifetime.
If the property that he seized included promissory notes, and the lender claims that he is holding them as security for a debt and that he seized them during the debtor's lifetime, the lender must prove that he seized them during the debtor's lifetime. If he cannot bring proof, he should return them to the heirs. The difference is that with regard to promissory notes, he is not claiming the acquisition of the obligation itself, but rather proof that such an obligation exists.
Halacha 9
When heirs expropriated landed property because of a debt that others owed their father, a creditor of their father's can expropriate it from them. The rationale is that this land was in effect their father's.
Halacha 10
The above principles can be extended and applied in the following situation. Reuven sold a field to Shimon, accepting financial responsibility for the sale. Shimon did not pay immediately, but instead had Reuven consider the price of the field as a loan. Reuven died afterwards. Reuven's creditor then came to expropriate the field from Shimon. Instead of giving the creditor the field, Shimon appeased him with money, and he departed.
According to the law, Reuven's heirs may come and demand that Shimon pay the debt that he owed Reuven, for that loan is not on lien to Reuven's creditor.
Therefore, if Shimon is clever, he should give Reuven's heirs the land he purchased from them as payment for the debt that he accepted upon himself. He can then expropriate the property from them, because of the money that he gave to Reuven's creditor so that he would not expropriate it from him. This option is available because Reuven took financial responsibility for the field Shimon purchased.
Halacha 11
All of the Geonim have ordained, however, that a creditor may expropriate movable property from the heirs in payment for a debt. This judgment is enforced universally in all courts of law.
In the West, however, they would have a provision written in the promissory notes giving the creditor the right to collect the debt from either landed property or movable property in the creditor's lifetime or after his death. Thus, this provision gives the creditor more power to collect the debt than the ordinance of the Geonim.
This is a great safeguard, because it is possible that the borrower will not have known about ordinance, and thus the property of the heirs will be expropriated unjustly, because an ordinance of the later Sages does not have the legal power to be binding upon heirs.
Malveh veLoveh - Chapter 12
Halacha 1
We do not expropriate payment from heirs unless they are past majority. When the heirs are below majority, by contrast, we do not collect a debt supported by a promissory note from them.
Halacha 2
Even if the promissory note contains all the stipulations in the world, the creditor may not use it to collect the debt until the heirs attain majority, lest they have proof that would disavow the promissory note.
Halacha 3
If the loan was a debt at interest owed to a gentile, we appoint a guardian, attach the property that the minor inherited, sell it, and pay the debt. The rationale is that the interest consumes the estate.
Similarly, if a woman demands payment of the money due her by virtue of herketubah - whether she is the deceased's widow or divorcee - we appoint a guardian for the heirs and attach the deceased's property, so that the woman will gain favor in the eyes of others; i.e., so that she will have a minimum of property so that she will remarry. Hence, if the woman hurried and remarried and then came to demand payment of the money due her by virtue of herketubah from the estate acquired by the heirs, we do not pay heed to her until the heirs come of age." The rationale is that she is no longer entitled to receive her sustenance from the estate of the deceased, and she has remarried.
Halacha 4
Several of the Geonim have ruled that if the estate left to the heirs does not have more than the money due the woman because of her ketubah, or it contains less than that amount, we do not pay heed to her. For the heirs will have no benefit from paying the money due the woman because of herketubah.
According to this opinion, our Sages said: "We attach the estate left to heirs to pay a woman the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from it," only so that the estate would not become devalued because of the need to pay for the widow's sustenance." And in this instance, since the woman takes everything, of what value is it to the heirs who are below majority that the property is attached? These views were not concerned with increasing the favor of the woman in the eyes of others.
Halacha 5
If the testator gave a command, saying: "Give a maneh to so-and-so," we pay heed to the claim, after appointing a guardian for the heirs to advance arguments on behalf of the interests of the heirs. If the testator says: "Give thismaneh to so-and-so" or "... this field to so-and-so," we make the endowment; there is no need to appoint a guardian for the heirs.
Halacha 6
If it is discovered that land in the estate does not rightfully belong to the heirs, but instead, the plaintiff claims that the property was stolen by the person whose property they inherited, we pay heed to the claim and appoint a guardian to argue and enter into litigation on their behalf. If it is discovered that the property was in fact stolen, we return it to its owners.
Similarly, if a minor had his servants mount an attack and enter property belonging to a colleague and take control of it, we do not say that we will wait until he attains majority before the matter is adjudicated. Instead, we expropriate the property from him immediately. When he attains majority, if he has witnesses who support his claim, he should bring his witnesses.
Halacha 7
When land is presumed to be the property of minors, the land is not expropriated from them until they attain majority even in the following situation. Another person comes and claims that he had purchased that land from the person from whom they inherited it, and the purchaser has witnesses who will testify that he established his possession of this land and benefited from it for three years in the lifetime of the deceased. The rationale is that we accept the testimony of witnesses only when delivered in the presence of the litigant against whom they are testifying. And the minor is considered as if he is not present.
If, however, the plaintiff produced a deed of sale that states that the field is property that he purchased, he must validate the authenticity of the deed of sale. Afterwards, he may expropriate the property from the heirs after a guardian is appointed for them.
Halacha 8
When the court attaches property belonging to heirs for the purpose of selling it, they evaluate the property and then announce the sale for 30 consecutive days or on Mondays and Thursdays over the span of 60 consecutive days. Announcements are made in the morning and the evening, when workers enter the city, and when workers are sent out to their tasks. Whoever desires to purchase the property can bring his workers there to investigate it.
When an announcement is made, the borders of the field are clarified. They make known its yield, the evaluation given by the court and the reason it is being sold - to repay a creditor or to pay a woman the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. For there are some people who desire to repay a creditor and others who desire to pay a woman the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
Halacha 9
When an adrachta is written with regard to property belonging to heirs -whether they are above majority or below majority - the court must write: "And we identified the property as belonging to so-and-so, the deceased." If they did not write this, the adrachta is invalid, and a purchaser may not benefit from the proceeds of the property even though the announcements of the property's sale were completed.
Halacha 10
When a court sells property without announcing its sale beforehand, it is considered as if they erred in a matter explicitly stated in the Mishnah. The sale is nullified, and the property is sold again after announcements are made.
When a court sells property, the financial responsibility for it is incumbent on the heirs.
Halacha 11
When a court made announcements in the proper manner, investigated the matter thoroughly and carefully evaluated the property, their sale is binding even though they erred and sold property worth a maneh for 200, or property worth 200 for a maneh.
The following rules apply when, by contrast, the court was not careful in evaluating the property or did not compose a notice of evaluation, which details its assessment and the announcement of the sale of the property, and it erred in its appraisal. If they evaluated it at a sixth more than its value or at a sixth less than its value, the sale is nullified. If the error was less than a sixth, the sale is binding.
Similar concepts apply if a court sold landed property at a time when it was not necessary to announce its sale beforehand. If it erred and devalued the property by a sixth or overvalued it by a sixth, their sale is nullified. This applies even if it announced the sale beforehand. If their error was less than a sixth, its sale is binding even though it did not announce the sale. For an announcement was not necessary in these situations.
In which situations is it not necessary to make announcements before the sale of property? When land is sold to bury the deceased, for the sustenance of his wife and his daughters, or to pay the head-tax to the king, it is not necessary to announce the sale, because the matter is pressing.
Similar concepts apply if a court sold types of property whose sale need not be announced beforehand. If it erred and devalued the property by a sixth or overvalued it by a sixth, the sale is nullified. If the error was less than a sixth, the sale is binding.
These are the types of property whose sale need not be announced beforehand: servants, promissory notes and movable property; servants, because they may flee; promissory notes and movable property, because they may be stolen. Instead, these articles should be evaluated by the court and sold immediately. If the market place is close to the city, they should be taken to the market place and sold there.
Hayom Yom:
• Thursday, Tishrei 25, 5776 · 08 October 2015
"Today's Day"
Sunday Tishrei 25 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Noach, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 119, 1-96.
Tanya: XXV. "To comprehend (p. 533) ...spoken at all. (p. 535).
Ten melodies, some only singular stanzas, are attributed to the Alter Rebbe as having been composed by him.
Those attributed to the Mitteler Rebbe were composed in his time and sung in his presence, but he did not compose them. He had a group of musically-gifted young men known as "the Mitteler Rebbe's kapelle," divided into two groups, vocalists (baalei shir) and musicians who played various instruments (baalei zimra).
Daily Thought:
Dancing With Feet
On Simchat Torah we dance with our feet, not with our heads.
We are celebrating the Torah, and the Torah is something we study with our heads. But we dance with our feet, not with our heads.
If we would dance with our heads, each one would dance a different dance, each in a different space, some with friends but not with others, some as lonesome souls.
One head is higher, one is lower, one is here on earth, the other in the clouds or beyond, and some minds know only their own space that no one else can know.
But we dance with our feet, and all our feet are here on the same earth—none higher and none lower. So now we can all dance as one, with one heart, as a single being.
Now there is no loneliness, only joy.[Likkutei Sichot, vol. 20, p. 370.]
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