Daily Quote:
The mind and heart of man are never empty. If there is no life-nourishing "water," there are "snakes and scorpions in it"[The Chassidic Masters]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Vayeira, 2nd Portion Genesis 18:15-18:33 with Rashi
• English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class• Genesis Chapter 18
1Now the Lord appeared to him in the plains of Mamre, and he was sitting at the entrance of the tent when the day was hot. אוַיֵּרָ֤א אֵלָיו֙ יְהֹוָ֔ה בְּאֵֽלֹנֵ֖י מַמְרֵ֑א וְה֛וּא ישֵׁ֥ב פֶּֽתַח־הָאֹ֖הֶל כְּחֹ֥ם הַיּֽוֹם:
2And he lifted his eyes and saw, and behold, three men were standing beside him, and he saw and he ran toward them from the entrance of the tent, and he prostrated himself to the ground. בוַיִּשָּׂ֤א עֵינָיו֙ וַיַּ֔רְא וְהִנֵּה֙ שְׁלשָׁ֣ה אֲנָשִׁ֔ים נִצָּבִ֖ים עָלָ֑יו וַיַּ֗רְא וַיָּ֤רָץ לִקְרָאתָם֙ מִפֶּ֣תַח הָאֹ֔הֶל וַיִּשְׁתַּ֖חוּ אָֽרְצָה:
3And he said, "My lords, if only I have found favor in your eyes, please do not pass on from beside your servant. גוַיֹּאמַ֑ר אֲדֹנָ֗י אִם־נָ֨א מָצָ֤אתִי חֵן֙ בְּעֵינֶ֔יךָ אַל־נָ֥א תַֽעֲבֹ֖ר מֵעַ֥ל עַבְדֶּֽךָ:
4Please let a little water be taken, and bathe your feet, and recline under the tree. דיֻקַּח־נָ֣א מְעַט־מַ֔יִם וְרַֽחֲצ֖וּ רַגְלֵיכֶ֑ם וְהִשָּֽׁעֲנ֖וּ תַּ֥חַת הָעֵֽץ:
5And I will take a morsel of bread, and sustain your hearts; after[wards] you shall pass on, because you have passed by your servant." And they said, "So shall you do, as you have spoken." הוְאֶקְחָ֨ה פַת־לֶ֜חֶם וְסַֽעֲד֤וּ לִבְּכֶם֙ אַחַ֣ר תַּֽעֲבֹ֔רוּ כִּֽי־עַל־כֵּ֥ן עֲבַרְתֶּ֖ם עַל־עַבְדְּכֶ֑ם וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ כֵּ֥ן תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֥ר דִּבַּֽרְתָּ:
6And Abraham hastened to the tent to Sarah, and he said, "Hasten three seah of meal [and] fine flour; knead and make cakes." ווַיְמַהֵ֧ר אַבְרָהָ֛ם הָאֹ֖הֱלָה אֶל־שָׂרָ֑ה וַיֹּ֗אמֶר מַֽהֲרִ֞י שְׁל֤שׁ סְאִים֙ קֶ֣מַח סֹ֔לֶת ל֖וּשִׁי וַֽעֲשִׂ֥י עֻגֽוֹת:
7And to the cattle did Abraham run, and he took a calf, tender and good, and he gave it to the youth, and he hastened to prepare it. זוְאֶל־הַבָּקָ֖ר רָ֣ץ אַבְרָהָ֑ם וַיִּקַּ֨ח בֶּן־בָּקָ֜ר רַ֤ךְ וָטוֹב֙ וַיִּתֵּ֣ן אֶל־הַנַּ֔עַר וַיְמַהֵ֖ר לַֽעֲשׂ֥וֹת אֹתֽוֹ:
8And he took cream and milk and the calf that he had prepared, and he placed [them] before them, and he was standing over them under the tree, and they ate. חוַיִּקַּ֨ח חֶמְאָ֜ה וְחָלָ֗ב וּבֶן־הַבָּקָר֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר עָשָׂ֔ה וַיִּתֵּ֖ן לִפְנֵיהֶ֑ם וְהֽוּא־עֹמֵ֧ד עֲלֵיהֶ֛ם תַּ֥חַת הָעֵ֖ץ וַיֹּאכֵֽלוּ:
9And they said to him, "Where is Sarah your wife?" And he said, "Behold in the tent." טוַיֹּֽאמְר֣וּ אֵלָ֔יו אַיֵּ֖ה שָׂרָ֣ה אִשְׁתֶּ֑ךָ וַיֹּ֖אמֶר הִנֵּ֥ה בָאֹֽהֶל:
10And he said, "I will surely return to you at this time next year, and behold, your wife Sarah will have a son." And Sarah heard from the entrance of the tent, and it was behind him. יוַיֹּ֗אמֶר שׁ֣וֹב אָשׁ֤וּב אֵלֶ֨יךָ֙ כָּעֵ֣ת חַיָּ֔ה וְהִנֵּה־בֵ֖ן לְשָׂרָ֣ה אִשְׁתֶּ֑ךָ וְשָׂרָ֥ה שֹׁמַ֛עַת פֶּ֥תַח הָאֹ֖הֶל וְה֥וּא אַֽחֲרָֽיו:
11Now Abraham and Sarah were old, coming on in years; Sarah had ceased to have the way of the women. יאוְאַבְרָהָ֤ם וְשָׂרָה֙ זְקֵנִ֔ים בָּאִ֖ים בַּיָּמִ֑ים חָדַל֙ לִֽהְי֣וֹת לְשָׂרָ֔ה אֹ֖רַח כַּנָּשִֽׁים:
12And Sarah laughed within herself, saying, "After I have become worn out, will I have smooth flesh? And also, my master is old." יבוַתִּצְחַ֥ק שָׂרָ֖ה בְּקִרְבָּ֣הּ לֵאמֹ֑ר אַֽחֲרֵ֤י בְלֹתִי֙ הָֽיְתָה־לִּ֣י עֶדְנָ֔ה וַֽאדֹנִ֖י זָקֵֽן:
13And the Lord said to Abraham, "Why did Sarah laugh, saying, 'Is it really true that I will give birth, although I am old?' יגוַיֹּ֥אמֶר יְהֹוָ֖ה אֶל־אַבְרָהָ֑ם לָ֣מָּה זֶּה֩ צָֽחֲקָ֨ה שָׂרָ֜ה לֵאמֹ֗ר הַאַ֥ף אֻמְנָ֛ם אֵלֵ֖ד וַֽאֲנִ֥י זָקַֽנְתִּי:
14Is anything hidden from the Lord? At the appointed time, I will return to you, at this time next year and Sarah will have a son." ידהֲיִפָּלֵ֥א מֵֽיהֹוָ֖ה דָּבָ֑ר לַמּוֹעֵ֞ד אָשׁ֥וּב אֵלֶ֛יךָ כָּעֵ֥ת חַיָּ֖ה וּלְשָׂרָ֥ה בֵֽן:Daily Tehillim: Chapters 69 - 71
• Hebrew text
• English text• Chapter 69
1. For the Conductor, on the shoshanim,1 by David.
2. Deliver me, O God, for the waters have reached until my soul!
3. I have sunk in muddy depths without foothold; I have come into deep waters, and the current sweeps me away.
4. I am wearied by my crying, my throat is parched; my eyes pined while waiting for my God.
5. More numerous than the hairs on my head are those who hate me without reason. Mighty are those who would cut me off, those who are my enemies without cause. What I have not stolen, I will then have to return.
6. O God, You know my folly, and my wrongs are not hidden from You.
7. Let not those who hope in You be shamed through me, O my Lord, God of Hosts; let not those who seek You be disgraced through me, O God of Israel,
8. because for Your sake I have borne humiliation, disgrace covers my face.
9. I have become a stranger to my brothers, an alien to my mother's sons,
10. for the envy of Your House has consumed me, and the humiliations of those who scorn You have fallen upon me.
11. And I wept while my soul fasted, and it was a humiliation to me.
12. I made sackcloth my garment, and became a byword for them.
13. Those who sit by the gate speak of me, and [of me] are the songs of drunkards.
14. May my prayer to You, Lord, be at a gracious time; God, in Your abounding kindness, answer me with Your true deliverance.
15. Rescue me from the mire, so that I not sink; let me be saved from my enemies and from deep waters.
16. Let not the current of water sweep me away, nor the deep swallow me; and let not the pit close its mouth over me.
17. Answer me, Lord, for Your kindness is good; according to Your abundant mercies, turn to me.
18. Do not hide Your face from Your servant, for I am in distress-hurry to answer me.
19. Draw near to my soul and liberate it; redeem me, so that my enemies [not feel triumphant].
20. You know my humiliation, my shame, and my disgrace; all my tormentors are before You.
21. Humiliation has broken my heart, and I have become ill. I longed for comfort, but there was none; for consolers, but I did not find.
22. They put gall into my food, and for my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink.
23. Let their table become a trap before them, and [their] serenity, a snare.
24. Let their eyes be darkened so that they cannot see, and let their loins continually falter.
25. Pour Your wrath upon them, and let the fierceness of Your anger overtake them.
26. Let their palace be desolate, let there be no dweller in their tents,
27. for they persecute the one whom You struck, and tell of the pain of Your wounded ones.
28. Add iniquity to their iniquity, and let them not enter into Your righteousness.
29. May they be erased from the Book of Life, and let them not be inscribed with the righteous.
30. But I am poor and in pain; let Your deliverance, O God, streng-then me.
31. I will praise the Name of God with song, I will extol Him with thanksgiving!
32. And it will please the Lord more than [the sacrifice of] a mature bull with horns and hooves.
33. The humble will see it and rejoice; you seekers of God, [see] and your hearts will come alive.
34. For the Lord listens to the needy, and He does not despise His prisoners.
35. Let heaven and earth praise Him, the seas and all that moves within them,
36. for God will deliver Zion and build the cities of Judah, and they will settle there and possess it;
37. and the seed of His servants will inherit it, and those who love His Name will dwell in it.
Chapter 70
David prays that his enemies be shamed and humiliated for their shaming him and reveling in his troubles. Then the righteous will rejoice, and chant songs and praises always.
1. For the Conductor, by David, to remind.
2. O God, [come] to rescue me; O Lord, hurry to my aid.
3. Let those who seek my life be shamed and disgraced; let those who wish me harm retreat and be humiliated.
4. Let those who say, "Aha! Aha!" be turned back in return for their shaming [me].
5. Let all who seek You rejoice and delight in You, and let those who love Your deliverance say always, "May God be exalted!”
6. But I am poor and needy; hurry to me, O God! You are my help and deliverer; O God, do not delay!
Chapter 71
In this awe-inspiring prayer, David speaks of his enemies' desire to kill him, declaring him deserving of death.
1. I have taken refuge in You, O Lord; I will never be shamed.
2. Rescue me and deliver me in Your righteousness; incline Your ear to me and save me.
3. Be for me a sheltering rock, to enter always. You have ordered my salvation, for You are my rock and my fortress.
4. O my God, rescue me from the hand of the wicked, from the palm of the scheming and violent.
5. For You are my hope, O my Lord, God, my security since my youth.
6. I have relied on You from the womb; You drew me from my mother's innards; my praise is of You always.
7. I became an example to the masses, yet You were my mighty refuge.
8. Let my mouth be filled with Your praise, all day long with Your glory.
9. Do not cast me aside in old age; do not forsake me when my strength fails;
10. for my enemies say of me, and those who watch my soul conspire together,
11. saying, "God has forsaken him. Give chase and catch him, for there is no rescuer.”
12. O God, do not distance Yourself from me; my God, hurry to my aid.
13. Let the adversaries of my soul be shamed and consumed; let those who seek my harm be enwrapped in disgrace and humiliation.
14. But as for me, I will always hope; I will add to all Your praises.
15. My mouth will tell of Your righteousness, all day long of Your deliverance, for I do not know their number.
16. I come with the strength of my Lord, God; I mention Your righteousness, Yours alone.
17. O God, You have taught me since my youth, and to this day I tell of Your wonders.
18. Even into old age and hoariness, O God, do not abandon me, until I tell of Your might to the generations, and of Your strength to all who are to come.
19. Your righteousness, O God, reaches the high heavens, for You do great things; O God, who is like You!
20. You, Who has shown me many and grievous troubles, You will revive me again; You will lift me again from the depths of the earth.
21. You will increase my greatness; You will turn and console me.
22. I too1 will thank You on the lyre for Your faithfulness, My God; I will sing to You on the harp, O Holy One of Israel.
23. My lips will rejoice when I sing to you, as well as my soul which You have redeemed.
24. My tongue will also utter Your righteousness all day, for those who seek my harm are shamed and disgraced.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 27• Lessons in Tanya
• English Text
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Monday, Cheshvan 13, 5776 · October 26, 2015
Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
• Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
• Video Class• Monday, Cheshvan 13, 5776 · October 26, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 27
וזהו שכתוב בזהר הקדוש, דצדיקא דאתפטר אשתכח בכלהו עלמין יתיר מבחיוהי
This, then, is the meaning of the statement in the sacred Zohar,1 that “When a tzaddik departs he is to be found in all the worlds more than during his lifetime.”
Surely this should only apply to the higher worlds. How can this be true of this world? How is he to be found here to a greater extent than while he was alive?
דהיינו שגם בזה העולם המעשה
That is, even in this world of action, in the mundane world of which it is written,
היום לעשותם
“this day — to do them,”2
As the Gemara states,3 “Today is the time to do them; tomorrow is the time to receive their reward.” Man’s primary task in this world is the actual fulfillment of the commandments, while the receipt of rewards or anything akin to rewards belongs to “tomorrow”, to the World to Come.
In any event, even in this “world of action,”
אשתכח יתיר
[the departed tzaddik] is found more [than during his lifetime],
כי המעשה גדול גדל והולך, גידולי גידולין
because the action of his disciples continues to produce successive generations of offshoots,
מן אור זרוע לצדיק בשדה אשר ברכו ה׳
from the4 “light implanted for the righteous” in5 “the field which G‑d has blessed,” i.e., in the Garden of Eden.
As will soon be explained, this refers to the illumination that is drawn down into the Sefirah of Malchut in the World ofAtzilut, which is known as “the field which G‑d has blessed.” The Torah and mitzvot of the tzaddik draw down into theSefirah of Malchut an additional flow of Divine energy from the six higher Sefirot (collectively known as Z"a of Atzilut). This current arouses within his disciples thoughts of repentance and good deeds, which the Alter Rebbe calls “successive generations of offshoots” — harvests of the second generation.
המאיר לארץ וחוצות
[This light] radiates to the earth and to the outside places, i.e., to the Holy Land and outside the Holy Land,
וגם אנחנו אלה פה היום, כולנו חיים בדרכיו
and also to us, those who are here this day, all of us who live in his ways,
דרך הקדש יקרא לה
“the holy way shall it be called.”6
זאת בעבודת ה׳, במילי דשמיא
The above, regarding the increased presence of the departed tzaddik, relates to the service of G‑d, to heavenly i.e., spiritual matters; in these areas his disciples can now receive even more guidance and benefit from him than they did during his lifetime.
ובמילי דעלמא, בפירוש אתמר בזוהר הקדוש, דצדיקיא מגינין על עלמא, ובמיתתהון יתיר מבחייהון
As for mundane matters,i.e., the flow of material blessings which tzaddikim draw down to this world, it is stated explicitly in the sacred Zohar7 that the tzaddikim shield the world, and after their death even more than during their life;
ואלמלא צלותא דצדיקיא בההוא עלמא, לא אתקיים עלמא רגעא חדא
moreover, were it not for the prayer of the tzaddikim in the other world, this world would not endure a single moment.
וכל הקרוב קרוב אל משכן ה׳ בחייו, קודם לברכה
And whoever is closer to the habitation of G‑d8a [through being close to the tzaddik] during his lifetime, has precedence to the blessing that comes from and through the tzaddik.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | III, 71b. |
| 2. | Devarim 7:11. |
| 3. | Eruvin 22a. |
| 4. | Tehillim 97:11. |
| 5. | Cf. Bereishit 27:27. |
| 6. | Cf. Yeshayahu 35:8. |
| 7. | Cf. Bamidbar 17:28. |
| 8. | Cf. Bamidbar 17:28. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:• English Text | Hebrew Text |
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
• Today's Mitzvah
Monday, Cheshvan 13, 5776 · October 26, 2015
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 310
Allowing a Sorcerer to Live
"You shall not allow a witch to live"—Exodus 22:17.
It is forbidden to allow a sorcerer to live [rather, he must be put to death].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Positive Commandment 224
Punishment by Flogging
"The judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him"—Deuteronomy 25:2.
Transgressors of certain sins are to be punished with flogging.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Negative Commandment 300
Flogging a Defendant more than He can Bear
"He shall give him forty lashes; he may not exceed"—Deuteronomy 25:2-3.
A judge may not sentence a person (found guilty of an offense that calls for flogging) to be flogged even one lash more than his body can physically bear.
A person who is sentenced to flogging is given 39 lashes. However, no person is flogged until [a doctor] estimates how many lashes the defendant can bear—taking in consideration his age, constitution and physique. If the defendant cannot bear the full 39 lashes, he is given as many as he is capable of receiving—not less, however, than three lashes. [In the event that he is only capable of bearing less than three lashes, he is not flogged at all.]
Included in this prohibition is adding even one lash on the 39 requisite lashes [even for one capable of bearing it].
Also included in this mitzvah is the prohibition against striking a fellow Jew. If we are admonished not to strike a sinner [more than he deserves], how much more so the innocent!
It is even forbidden to raise one's hand against a fellow, threatening to strike, even if one has no intention of actually hitting. As our Sages say, "One who [just] raises his hands on his fellow is called evil."
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Monday, Cheshvan 13, 5776 · October 26, 2015
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Negative Commandment 310
Allowing a Sorcerer to Live
"You shall not allow a witch to live"—Exodus 22:17.
It is forbidden to allow a sorcerer to live [rather, he must be put to death].
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Allowing a Sorcerer to Live
Negative Commandment 310
Translated by Berel Bell
The 310th prohibition is that we are forbidden from allowing a sorceress to live.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,1 "Do not allow a sorceress to live."
If we would exempt a sorceress from the death penalty, we would transgress a prohibition. This is unlike exempting from execution another type of transgressor, which would constitute only the nullification of a positive commandment.2
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 22:17.
2.Not a prohibition, as in the case of a sorceress. The positive commandment nullified would be the one for that particular type of execution (P226-P229; Lessons 314-415).
_____________________________________Positive Commandment 224
Punishment by Flogging
"The judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him"—Deuteronomy 25:2.
Transgressors of certain sins are to be punished with flogging.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Punishment by Flogging
Positive Commandment 224
Translated by Berel Bell
The 224th mitzvah is that we are commanded to lash with a strap those who transgress certain commandments.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1 (exalted be He), "The judge shall make him lean over and have him flogged."
In our list of the prohibitions we will point out which mitzvos are punishable by flogging.
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Makkos.2
FOOTNOTES
1.Deut. 25:2.
2.Chapter 3.
______________________________________Negative Commandment 300
Flogging a Defendant more than He can Bear
"He shall give him forty lashes; he may not exceed"—Deuteronomy 25:2-3.
A judge may not sentence a person (found guilty of an offense that calls for flogging) to be flogged even one lash more than his body can physically bear.
A person who is sentenced to flogging is given 39 lashes. However, no person is flogged until [a doctor] estimates how many lashes the defendant can bear—taking in consideration his age, constitution and physique. If the defendant cannot bear the full 39 lashes, he is given as many as he is capable of receiving—not less, however, than three lashes. [In the event that he is only capable of bearing less than three lashes, he is not flogged at all.]
Included in this prohibition is adding even one lash on the 39 requisite lashes [even for one capable of bearing it].
Also included in this mitzvah is the prohibition against striking a fellow Jew. If we are admonished not to strike a sinner [more than he deserves], how much more so the innocent!
It is even forbidden to raise one's hand against a fellow, threatening to strike, even if one has no intention of actually hitting. As our Sages say, "One who [just] raises his hands on his fellow is called evil."
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Flogging a Defendant more than He can Bear
Negative Commandment 300
Translated by Berel Bell
The 300th prohibition is that a judge is forbidden [to order] to lash a transgressor so severely as to threaten his physical integrity. The explanation of this is as follows: one who is to be punished by lashing receives a maximum of 40 lashes [i.e. 39,] as explained in the Oral Tradition.1 But a person is never given lashes before his tolerance is determined in accordance with his age, condition, and size. If he will be able to survive the full number of lashes, they are all administered. If he will not survive the full number, he is given as many lashes as [it is estimated that] he is able to take — with a minimum of three. This is learned from G‑d's statement, (exalted be He),2 "[have him flogged] according to his wickedness." The maximum number of lashes is 39,3 and this prohibition comes to forbid even one extra lash above the number determined by the judge.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement4 (exalted be He), "[Have him flogged] according to his wickedness. Do not go beyond the limit and give him forty lashes."
The Sifri5 says, "If one adds on to the number of lashes, one transgresses a prohibition. This teaches the prohibition only for one who adds on to the 40 lashes. What is the source of the prohibition for one who adds on the estimation of the High Court? From the phrase, 'Do not go beyond the limit.' "
This prohibition also forbids one to strike any Jew:6 If it is prohibited even to strike a transgressor [even one extra time] how much moreso for striking another person! Our Sages also prohibited one from threatening to hit another, even without actually doing so. They said,7 "Anyone who lifts his hand against another to strike him is called wicked, as it is written,8 'And he said to the wicked one, Why did you hit your neighbor?' "
FOOTNOTES
1.He is actually given no more than 39 lashes. See Kapach, 5731, footnote 60.
2.Deut. 25:2. See Sanhedrin 23a.
3.This is because the lashes must be given in multiples of three; anything beyond 39 would exceed 40.
4.Deut. 25:2-3.
5.Ibid.
6.Sanhedrin 85a.
7.Ibid., 58b.
8.Ex. 2:13. In this case, the person had only lifted his hand, and not yet struck the other.
Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
• Shvuot - Chapter 4
Hayom Yom:
• English Text | Video Class• Monday, Cheshvan 13, 5776 · 26 October 2015
"Today's Day"
Thursday Cheshvan 13 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayeira, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 69-71.
Tanya: (XXVIIb). It is stated (p. 567) ...effect, as known. (p. 567).
The Baal Shem Tov used to instruct his disciples in a regular Gemara study-session. His style of study was with great acuity and brilliance, and included a study of Rambam, Alfasi, Rosh and other commentaries of the Rishonim (early commentators) germane to the Gemara-text under examination. The Baal Shem Tov would translate the words (of the text) into Yiddish. When studying in Eirchin 15b the passage "The third tongue1 kills three persons," the Baal Shem Tov translated and explained:Lashon hara (the evil tongue; slander) kills all three, the inventor of the slander, the one who relates it and the listener. This is all in spiritual terms, which is more severe than physical murder.
FOOTNOTES
1. The "third tongue" refers to the person relating a previously-heard slander. He acts as a "third party" or intermediary between the originator of the slander and the listener. See also Likutei Sichot, Vol. 5, p. 44 note 47.• Daily Thought:
Halacha 1
When a person takes an oath that he will not eat anything on that day and he ate less than an olive-sized portion of food, he is not liable. For "eating" does not involve a quantity less than an olive-sized portion.1 It is as if he partook of less than the minimum measure of a nevelah, a trefe, or the like.2
If he said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this substance," and he ate it, he is liable even if the substance concerning which he took the oath is one mustard seed or smaller.3
Halacha 2
If he took an oath that he would not taste anything and partook of even the smallest amount of food, he is liable.4
Halacha 3
When a person takes an oath that he will not eat on a specific day and drinks, he is liable, because [a prohibition against] eating includes drinking.5 Therefore, if he both ate and drank, he is liable only for one set of lashes6 if he acted willfully or one sin offering if he transgressed inadvertently.
Halacha 4
When a person took an oath not to drink on a given day, he is permitted to eat, because [a prohibition against] drinking does not include eating. How much must he drink for him to be liable? It appears to me7 that he is not liable unless he drinks a revi'it8 as is the case with regard to other prohibitions.9
Halacha 5
When a person takes an oath that he will not eat on a particular day and partook of many types of food, or he takes an oath that he will not drink on a particular day and partakes of many types of beverages, he is only liable once.10 Even if he said: "[I am taking] an oath that today I will not eat meat, bread, or beans," and he eat all [these types of food]. He is only liable once. All [of these foods] can be joined together to reach the measure of an olive-sized portion.11
Halacha 6
When a person takes an oath that he will neither eat nor drink and then eats and drinks, he is liable twice. Although drinking is included in eating, since he specifically said: "And I will not drink," he revealed his intention not to include drinking in eating.12 Thus it is as if he took an oath on this independently and this independently. Therefore he is liable twice.
Halacha 7
Similarly, if a person said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat bread from wheat, bread from barley, or bread from buckwheat," he is liable for each one individually if he partakes of them. He mentioned "bread" three times13 to make a distinction and cause him to be liable for each one individually.
Halacha 8
[The following laws apply when a person's] colleague was persistently imploring him to eat at his [home], telling him: "Come and drink with me, wine, milk, and honey." If he answers: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not drink wine, milk, and honey," he is liable for each one individually if he partakes of them. [To be liable only once,] he should have said: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not drink anything," or "...[that I will not drink] what you said." Since he repeated the phrase, stating each one individually,14 he revealed his intention that he obligated himself with an oath for each and every type [of beverage] individually. Therefore [the beverages] are not combined with each other [to reach the minimum measure]15 and the person is liable only when he eats the minimum measure from each one individually. Since a sin offering is required for each one individually, they are like fat and blood which cannot be combined for [the measure of] an olive-sized portion as explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.16
Halacha 9
Halacha 10
Similarly, if one said: ["I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today,"21 and then took an oath concerning a loaf that he would not eat it up, [even though] he eats the entire [loaf] that day, he is not liable only once.22 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.23 [The rationale is that] an oath does not take effect when another is already in effect.24
If, however, one took an oath that he would not eat up a loaf and afterwards, took an oath that he would not eat anything or that he would not eat this loaf, he is liable twice. [The rationale is that] at the time he took the oath that he would not eat it up, he would not be liable unless he ate the entire loaf. Thus when he took a second oath that he would not eat anything or that he would not eat the loaf, he is liable [for the latter oath,] when he eats an olive-sized portion. And when he eats the entire [loaf], he is liable for his first oath.
Halacha 11
[When a person takes] an oath not to eat figs and afterwards, takes an oath not to eat figs and grapes, he is liable twice for [eating] figs. [The rationale is that] he included the figs which were forbidden in the first oath with grapes that were permitted. Since the second oath took effect with regard the grapes, it also took effect with regard the figs and he becomes liable for two oaths, as we explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.25
Halacha 12
[If one said: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat eight [of this item]," "...an oath that I will not eat nine," and "...an oath that I will not eat ten," he is liable only once whether he ate eight, nine, or ten.26
Halacha 13
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat figs," and then takes another oath that he will not eat figs and dates together.29 If he forgot, ate figs, and set aside a sacrifice,30 afterwards, forgot, and ate grapes, he is not liable for the grapes. [The rationale is that] this is like half the measure [for which one is liable]31 and one does not bring a sacrifice for half the measure.
Halacha 15
Similar [laws apply if] one took an oath that he would not eat ten, and then took an oath that he would not eat ten and nine.32 If he ate ten, separated a sacrifice,33 and then forgot and ate nine, this is like half the measure and one does not bring a sacrifice for half the measure. For the final oath concerned not eating nineteen.34
Halacha 16
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will not eat this large loaf it I eat this small loaf," if he forgets this stipulation when he eats the smaller loaf and afterwards willfully eats the larger [loaf], he is liable [for lashes].35
Halacha 17
If he ate the small one while he remembered the stipulation and knew that by eating it, the larger one would become forbidden and then forgot and ate the larger one while thinking that it was not forbidden yet, he is exempt.36 If he ate both of them unintentionally,37 he is exempt.38 [If he ate them] both willfully, he is liable,39 regardless of whether he ate the larger one first40 or last.
Halacha 18
Halacha 19
If he ate the first one willfully, but the second one inadvertently, he is exempt. [If he ate them] both willfully, he is liable.43
Halacha 20
[When a person says: "I am taking] an oath that I will eat this loaf today," and the day passes without him eating it, should he have acted unintentionally, he must bring an adjustable guilt offering. If he acted willfully, he is not liable for lashes, because he did not perform a deed,44 even though he violated [the prohibition against] taking a false oath.
Halacha 21
Why is a person who took an oath that he ate liable for lashes [if] he did not eat and one [who took an oath] that he did not eat [liable] if he did eat, even though he did not perform a deed. Because at the time he took the oath, he was taking a false oath.45 If, however, a person takes an oath that he will perform [a particular activity], it is not a false oath at the time it was taken.
Halacha 22
[The following laws apply when] a person tells a colleague: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat at your [home],"46 or [his colleague] was persistently imploring him to eat at his [home] and he refuses. If he takes an oath and says: "My oath [will take effect] if I eat at your [home]," or if he says: "There will be no oath if I do not eat at your [home],"47 these all bring about prohibitions. [It is considered that] he took an oath that he would not eat at his [home]. If he used all of these expressions [together] and transgressed and ate, he is only liable once.48
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
This is a principle applying to all of the Torah's prohibitions concerning eating.
|
| 2. |
In such an instance, as stated in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4,:7-8, the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, but the violator is not punished. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 238:1) rules that it is forbidden for the person who took such an oath to partake of even the slightest quantity of food.
|
| 3. |
Because he singled out a specific article and by partaking of it broke his oath.
|
| 4. |
For tasting does not imply eating a full measure of food. Since he used that expression, it is clear that his intent was to forbid partaking of even the slightest measure of food.
|
| 5. |
Sh'vuot 22b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 14:23: "And you shall eat before God, your Lord... the tithes of your grain, your wine, and your oil." Implied is that partaking of wine and oil is also eating.
|
| 6. |
As in Halachah 5.
|
| 7. |
This expression indicates a conclusion derived by the Rambam from logic without any explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source.
|
| 8. |
I.e., a fourth of a log. In contemporary measure, a revi'it is equivalent to 86 cc. according toShiurei Torah and 150 cc. according to Chazon Ish.
|
| 9. |
The Radbaz explains that since this is the measure which the Torah considered significant in other contexts, one can extrapolate that anything less is not considered significant enough to warrant liability. Alternatively, with regard to oaths and vows, we follow the commonly accepted implications of the terms used and people do not consider partaking of a smaller measure as "drinking."
|
| 10. |
I.e., for one set of lashes or one sacrifice. As will be explained, this applies only when the transgressor did not become aware of his oath between eating.
|
| 11. |
The minimum measure for which one is liable as stated in Halachah 1. The Radbaz states that the superficial implication of the Rambam's words is that it is not necessary for one to partake of such a portion of each of the foods separately to be liable. He differs and maintains that the person must partake of all of them to be liable.
|
| 12. |
Otherwise, it would be considered as eating as stated in Halachah 3.
|
| 13. |
If, however, he mentioned "bread" only once, he is liable only once. See Halachah 5.
|
| 14. |
I.e., the emphasis is one repeating his colleague's words, while stating each one individually. That shows that his intent is focused on each one individually. If, however, he made such a statement on his own initiative, without repeating his colleague's words, they are not considered to have been singled out [Rav Kapach's edition of the Rambam's Comemntary to the Mishneh (Sh'vuot3:4)].
|
| 15. |
I.e., if he drank half of a revi'it of wine and half of a revi'it of milk, he is not liable.
|
| 16. |
Chapter 4, Halachah 16.
|
| 17. |
We assume that his intention when taking the oath was to interpret the term eating according to its halachic definition (Radbaz).
|
| 18. |
Since he spoke in a colloquialism, we assume that he was not referring to the halachic meaning and instead, meant the entire loaf.
|
| 19. |
Whether an olive-sized portion or the entire loaf.
|
| 20. |
Because once eating an olive-sized portion of the loaf is forbidden by an oath, a second oath concerning that same loaf cannot take effect, as the Rambam states in the following halachah.
|
| 21. |
The implication is that he would not eat an olive-sized portion of food that day.
|
| 22. |
The Ra'avad accepts the principle stated by the Rambam, but explains that this is not a good example of it. For in this instance, the second oath does take effect, for it applies not only on the day that the first oath applies, but for all time. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would agree that the second oath will take effect as soon as the day on which the first oath is in effect ends. This he maintains is why the Rambam mentions eating it "that day."
|
| 23. |
For example, that mentioned in Halachah 12.
|
| 24. |
The rationale for this principle is that a sh'vuat bitui applies only with regard to matters that are dependent upon one's volition, not on those forbidden by the Torah (Chapter 5, Halachah 17). Accordingly, once something is forbidden by an oath, it is no longer a matter dependent on one's volition. Hence, a sh'vuat bitui cannot take effect (Kiryat Sefer).
As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 17, if the person has the first oath nullified, the second oath takes effect.
|
| 25. |
Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 8:6 states that although one prohibition does not take effect when an object is already prohibited, there are exceptions. One of them is when the second prohibition includes other entities that were not included in the first prohibition (issur kollel). Similarly, in this instance, since the second oath includes something which is not prohibited by the first oath (grapes), it takes effect.
|
| 26. |
For he cannot eat nine or ten without first eating eight. Hence, the second and third oaths do not take effect, for one oath does not take effect when the objects it concerns are already forbidden. As mentioned in the Radbaz and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 238:12), there are instances where the second oath can take effect according to the principle of issur kollel, a more inclusive prohibition.
|
| 27. |
For each oath was separate. After he took the oath forbidding ten, nine were still permitted. And after he took the oath forbidding nine, eight were still permitted. Hence, the later oaths take effect.
|
| 28. |
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 238:13) states that if the person specifies 10 specific items in his oath, he is not liable if he later reduces their number to eight, for all ten have become forbidden to him.
|
| 29. |
I.e., he takes an oath against eating an olive-sized portion of each type of fruit. He does not violate his oath unless he eats both of these portions. Since the second oath also includes grapes, it takes effect with regard to the figs based on the principle of issur kollel.
|
| 30. |
For breaking his first oath.
|
| 31. |
For to be liable he must eat grapes and figs together. By realizing his transgression, he makes a distinction between the figs he ate and the grapes.
|
| 32. |
I.e., his first oath involved ten specific items. His second oath involved nine additional items from a larger group. The Ra'avad claims the Rambam's ruling is a distortion of Sh'vuot 28b. See also Rashi and Tosafot who discuss the proper wording of that source.
|
| 33. |
For breaking his first oath.
|
| 34. |
This version, slightly different from that of the standard printed text, is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The intent is that the second oath included the original ten, plus a second nine. In this instance as well, had he not realized his first transgression, he would have been liable twice for eating the second nine.
|
| 35. |
This ruling follows the version of Sh'vuot 28a suggested by Rabbenu Chananel. The standard published text of the Talmud reverses the ruling. Thus in the instance stated by the Rambam, one would be exempt as the Ra'avad notes. The ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:16) follows that of the standard printed text of the Talmud.
The Rambam's rationale can be explained as follows: Since the person willfully transgressed by eating the larger loaf, he is liable for lashes. The fact that he inadvertently caused the oath to take effect is not of consequence.
The person is liable for lashes only when he is given a warning before transgressing. From this we see that even if a warning is given conditionally, it is effective.
|
| 36. |
He is exempt for lashes. Nor is he required to bring a sacrifice, for as explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 6, and notes. This is considered as violated an oath due to forces beyond one's control.
The Rambam's rationale is that he did not perform the transgression knowingly. At the time, he partook of the larger loaf, he was not aware that it was forbidden. In this instance as well, the Rambam's ruling does not follow the standard printed text of the Talmud. Hence there are authorities who differ.
|
| 37. |
I.e., without awareness of the oath.
|
| 38. |
For both lashes and a sacrifice as in the previous clause.
|
| 39. |
For lashes (Ra'avad).
|
| 40. |
And thus it becomes forbidden only retroactively. Although it was already eaten, when he eats the smaller loaf, his eating the larger loaf becomes a prohibited act.
|
| 41. |
I.e., not only the large loaf dependent on the smaller loaf as in the previous instance, but each one was dependent on the other as the Rambam continues to explain.
|
| 42. |
For lashes as in Halachah 16. Again, this runs contrary to the standard published text of the Talmud and there are other authorities who differ.
|
| 43. |
As stated in Halachah 17.
|
| 44. |
See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2. Note the following halachah.
|
| 45. |
Hence he is liable for lashes, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 3, 7.
|
| 46. |
In the Hebrew, the Rambam restates this phrase using slightly different wording.
|
| 47. |
The double negative implies that an oath will take effect if he does eat. See Tosafot, Sh'vuot 36b.
|
| 48. |
I.e., it is not considered as if each one is an independent oath, because an oath cannot take effect when an object is already forbidden by another oath.
The Radbaz explains that the Rambam is interpreting Nedarim 16a. One might think that the passage means that the person took an oath that he would not eat at his colleague's home. Afterwards, his colleague implored him to eat and to appease him, he took an oath that he would eat at his home. Seemingly, this resembles an oath taken in vain, for he is taking an oath to nullify the observance of a mitzvah - the fulfillment of his previous oath. For this reason, the Rambam explains that all of these expressions should be interpreted to mean that he is taking an oath not to eat. Only one of them takes effect, because one oath does not take effect when an object is already forbidden.
|
Audio: Listen | Download• Sanhedrin veha`Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 10
Halacha 1
When one of the judges in a case involving capital punishment rules to acquit the defendant or to hold him liable, not because this is his own opinion which he arrived upon the basis of his own decision, but rather he was swayed after his colleague's words, he commits a transgression, as implied by Exodus 23:2: "Do not respond to a dispute with an inclination." According to the Oral Tradition, this command is interpreted to mean that, when the judges are determining the verdict, a person should not say: "It is sufficient for me to adopt so-and-so's understanding." Instead, he should say what he thinks himself.
Halacha 2
Included in this interdiction is a prohibition against a judge who had proposed a rationale to exonerate a defendant in a capital case to propose a rationale to convict him. This is also implied by: "Do not respond to a dispute with an inclination."
When does the above apply? In the give and take among the judges. At the time of the verdict even a judge who had proposed a rationale for acquittal may join the others who vote for conviction.
Halacha 3
When a scholar offers a rationale for acquittal and then dies, we consider it as if he is alive and advocating this position.
Halacha 4
If a judge says: "I can offer a rationale to acquit him" and then lost the power of speech or died before he could explain the rationale for acquittal, it is as if he does not exist.
Halacha 5
When two judges mention one rationale, even if they cite different prooftexts, they are only counted as one.
Halacha 6
According to the Oral Tradition, we learned that with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we do not ask the judge of the highest stature to render judgment first, lest the remainder rely on his opinion and not see themselves as worthy to argue against him. Instead, every judge must state what appears to him, according to his own opinion.
Halacha 7
Similarly, with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we do not begin with a condemnatory statement, but rather one which points towards acquittal.
What is implied? We tell the presumed transgressor: "If you did not commit the transgression concerning which testimony was given concerning you, do not fear the words of the witnesses.
Halacha 8
When one of the scholars makes a statement with regard to a case involving capital punishment: "I can teach a rationale which would convict him," we silence him. If he states: "I can teach a rationale which will exonerate him," he is raised up and included in the Sanhedrin. If his words are of substance, we heed his statements and he never descends. If his words are not of substance, he does not descend from the court for that entire day.
Even if the defendant himself says: "I can teach a rationale which will exonerate myself," we heed his statements and he is counted among the judges, provided his words are of substance.
Halacha 9
When a court errs with regard to a case involving capital punishment and convict an innocent person, ruling that he is guilty, and later they discover a rationale that would require that the ruling be nullified and he be vindicated, they nullify the ruling and retry the case. If, however, they erred and acquitted a person liable to be executed, the judgment is not nullified and the case is not retried.
When does the above apply? When they erred with regard to a matter that the Sadducees would not acknowledge. If, however, they erred with regard to a matter that the Sadducees acknowledge, we retry the case to convict him.
What is implied? If they said that a person who has adulterous or incestuous anal intercourse is not liable and they released him, he is retried and executed. If, however, they said a person who merely entered the woman's anus with the crown of his organ is not liable, and they released him. He is not retried. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.
Sanhedrin veha`Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 11
Halacha 1
What are the differences between cases involving financial matters and cases involving capital punishment? Cases involving financial matters are adjudicated by three judges, while cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated by 23. In cases involving financial matters, we begin the judgment either with a statement to the defendant's detriment or his advancement, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we begin with a statement which points towards acquittal, as we explained, and we don't begin with one which points toward his conviction.
In cases involving financial matters, we make a decision based on a majority of one whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we acquit him on the basis of a majority of one, but convict him only when there is a majority of two. In cases involving financial matters, we retry a judgment whether doing so is to the defendant's detriment or his advancement, while with regard to cases involving capital punishment, we retry a judgment if it will lead to acquittal, but not if it will lead to conviction, as we explained.
In cases involving financial matters, everyone - both the judges or the scholars - is entitled to advance any rationale whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, everyone - even the students - may advance a rationale leading to acquittal, but only the judges may advance a rationale leading to conviction. In cases involving financial matters, a person who advanced a rationale to the defendant's detriment may change his mind and advance a rationale in his support. Conversely, one who advanced a rationale in the defendant's support may change his mind and advance a rationale to his detriment. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, a judge who advanced a rationale for conviction may advance a rationale for acquittal, but a judge who advanced a rationale for acquittal may not change his mind and advance a rationale for conviction. At the time the judgment is being rendered, however, he may vote to be counted among those favoring conviction, as we explained.
Cases involving financial matters are adjudicated during the day, but the verdict may be rendered at night. Cases involving capital punishment are adjudicated during the day and the verdict must also be rendered during the day. The verdict in cases involving financial matters is rendered on that very day, whether it is to the defendant's detriment or in his support. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, by contrast, a verdict of acquittal is rendered on that very day, but a verdict of conviction is not rendered until the following day.
Halacha 2
For this reason, we do not adjudicate cases involving capital punishment on Fridays, nor on the days preceding festivals. The rationale is that the defendant may be convicted and it is impossible to execute him on the following day, but it is forbidden to postpone his execution until after the Sabbath. Hence, we imprison him and begin his trial on Sunday.
Halacha 3
According to Scriptural Law, cases involving financial law can be adjudicated at all times, as Exodus 18:22 states: "They shall judge the people at all times." According to Rabbinic Law, cases are not adjudicated on Fridays.
Halacha 4
All of the same laws that apply to cases involving capital punishment apply also to cases involving lashes and exile, except that cases involving lashes are adjudicated by three judges. None of these distinctions are made with regard to the judgment of an ox that is stoned except for one, that the judgment is adjudicated by 23 judges.
Halacha 5
The laws which pertain to a mesit, a person who entices others to serve false divinities, differ from those pertaining to others liable for capital punishment. We hide witnesses to observe his act. He does not need a warning as must be given to others who are executed. If he departed from the court after being acquitted, and someone said: "I know a rationale that will lead to his conviction," he is returned and retried. If he was sentenced to death and someone said: "I know a rationale that will lead to his release," he is not retried. The court does not advance arguments in defense of a mesit. An elderly person, a eunuch, and a person who does not have sons are placed on the court which judges him, so that they will not have mercy on him. For cruelty to those who sway the people after emptiness brings mercy to the world, as implied by Deuteronomy 13:19: "so that God will turn away from His fierce anger and grant you mercy."
Halacha 6
With regard to cases involving monetary matters and similarly questions of ritual purity and impurity, the judge of the greatest stature gives his ruling first and the other judges hear his ruling. With regard to laws involving capital punishment, we begin from the side. The words of the judge of the highest stature are not heard until the end.
Halacha 7
With regard to cases involving monetary matters and similarly questions of ritual purity and impurity, a father and his son and a teacher and his student are counted as two judges. With regard to cases involving capital punishment, lashes, and the sanctification of the moon and the declaration of a leap year, a father and his son and a teacher and his student are counted as one.
Halacha 8
The concept that a father and a son are counted as one or as two applies when one is a member of the Sanhedrin and the other was one of the students attending the court who said: "I can contribute a rationale that will lead to his vindication," or "...to his being held liable." We listen to his words and enable him to participate in the debate, and he is counted in the polling of the judges.
Halacha 9
At the time of the final judgment, relatives are not included. For judges who are related to each other are not acceptable to rule together, as will be explained.
10 When a student was wise and understanding but is lacking sufficient knowledge of the tradition, his master may convey to him the tradition which he requires with regard to these laws and then he may serve as a judge even in cases regarding capital punishment.
Halacha 11
All individuals are acceptable to judge cases involving financial laws, even a convert, provided his mother is a native-born Jewess.
A convert may judge a fellow convert even if his mother is not a native-born Jewess. Similarly, a mamzer and a person who is blind in one eye are acceptable to adjudicate financial disputes. Cases involving capital punishment, however, may be judged only by priests, Levites, and Israelites with lineage acceptable to marry into the priesthood. not one of them may be blind even in one of his eyes, as we explained.
Sanhedrin veha`Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 12
Halacha 1
How are cases involving capital punishment judged? When the witnesses come to the court and say: "We saw this person violate such-and-such a transgression," the judges ask them: "Do you recognize him? Did you give him a warning?"
If they answer: "We do not recognize him," "We are unsure of his identity," or "We did not warn him," the defendant is exonerated.
Halacha 2
Both a Torah scholar and a common person need a warning, for the obligation for a warning was instituted only to make a distinction between a person who transgresses inadvertently and one who transgresses intentionally, lest the person say: "I transgressed inadvertently."
How is a warning administered? We tell him: "Desist..." or "Do not do it. It is a transgression and you are liable to be executed by the court..." or "to receive lashes for it." If he ceases, he is not liable. Similarly, if he remains silent or nods his head, he is not liable for punishment. Even if he says: "I know," he is not liable for punishment until he accepts death upon himself, saying: "It is for this reason that I am doing this." In such a situation, he is executed.
He must commit the transgression directly after receiving the warning, within the time to offer a salutation. If he waits longer than that, a second warning is necessary.
The warning is acceptable whether it was administered by one of the witnesses or by another individual, even a woman or a servant. Even if the transgressor hears the voice of the person administering the warning, but does not see him, and even if he himself administers the warning, he should be executed.
Halacha 3
If the witnesses say: "He was given a warning and we recognize him," the court intimidates them.
How do they intimidate them in cases involving capital punishment? They say: "Maybe you are speaking on the basis of supposition, or on the basis of hearsay, one witness from another witness, or maybe you heard from a trustworthy person?" "Maybe you do not know that ultimately we will subject you to questions and crossexamination?"
"Know that cases involving capital punishment do not resemble those involving financial matters. With regard to financial matters, if there is any deceit, a person can make financial restitution and receive atonement. With regard to capital punishment, the victim's blood and the blood of his unborn descendants are dependent on the murderer until eternity. As it is said with regard to Cain, 'The voice of the blood of your brother is crying out.' The Torah uses the plural form of the word blood, implying his blood and the blood of his descendants.
"For this reason, man was created alone in the world. This teaches us that a person who eliminates one soul from the world is considered as if he eliminated an entire world. Conversely, a person who saves one soul is considered as if he saved an entire world.
"All the inhabitants of the world are created in the image of Adam, the first man, and yet no one person's face resembles the face of his colleague. Therefore each person can say: 'The world was created for me.'
"If you might say: 'Why should we enter this difficulty?' It is written Leviticus 5:1: 'If he witnessed, observed, or knew....' If you will say: 'Why should we become responsible for shedding the defendant's blood? It is already said: 'At the destruction of the wicked, there is joy. '
If they stand by their word, the witness of the greater stature is brought into the court alone and he is questioned and cross-examined, as will be explained inHilchot Edut. If his testimony appears to be factual, the second witness is brought into the court, and he is questioned as the first one was. Even if there are 100 witnesses, each one is questioned and cross-examined.
If the testimony of all the witnesses is accurate, we begin the judgment with a statement that tends to acquittal as stated. We tell him: "If you did not transgress, do not fear their words." Then we judge him. If grounds for acquittal are found, he is released. If they do not find grounds for acquittal, the defendant is imprisoned until the following day.
On that day, the Sanhedrin divides itself into pairs and they examine the judgment. They eat little and do not drink wine throughout that entire day. They debate the matter throughout the night, each one with his comrade or alone. On the morrow, they come to the court early. Each of those who voted for acquittal state: "I am the one who voted for acquittal yesterday, and I still favor that ruling." Each of those who voted for conviction state: "I am the one who voted for conviction yesterday, and I still favor that ruling," or "...I have changed my mind and I vote for acquittal." If they erred in that regard, or did not know who voted for conviction or who voted for acquittal on the basis of one rationale and hence are considered only as one, as we explained, the two scribes of the court remind them, for they write down the rationale given by each one of them.
We begin the judgment. If they find a rationale to acquit him, they acquit him. If it is necessary to add judges, they add. If there is a majority of judges who seek to convict him, and he is convicted, he is taken out to be executed immediately.
The place where the court conducts the execution is outside the court and removed from it, as implied by Leviticus 24:14: "Take the blasphemer outside the camp...." It appears to me that it should be approximately 6 mil , the distance between the court of Moses our teacher which was before the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and the extremities of the camp of the Jewish people.
Halacha 4
After a defendant has been convicted, we do not delay the matter, but instead execute him immediately. Even if a woman is pregnant, we do not wait until she gives birth. Instead, we give her a blow against the womb so that the fetus will die first. If, by contrast, she is already in the throes of labor, we wait until she gives birth.
Whenever a woman is executed, it is permitted to benefit from her hair.
Halacha 5
When a person is being taken out to be executed and a sacrifice of his has already been slaughtered, we do not execute him until the blood of his sin offering or guilt offering has been sprinkled on the altar for his sake. If, however, he was already convicted and the animal designated as a sacrifice has not been slaughtered already, we do not wait until the sacrifice is brought, for we do not prolong his judgment.
• English Text | Video Class• Monday, Cheshvan 13, 5776 · 26 October 2015
"Today's Day"
Thursday Cheshvan 13 5704
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vayeira, Chamishi with Rashi.
Tehillim: 69-71.
Tanya: (XXVIIb). It is stated (p. 567) ...effect, as known. (p. 567).
The Baal Shem Tov used to instruct his disciples in a regular Gemara study-session. His style of study was with great acuity and brilliance, and included a study of Rambam, Alfasi, Rosh and other commentaries of the Rishonim (early commentators) germane to the Gemara-text under examination. The Baal Shem Tov would translate the words (of the text) into Yiddish. When studying in Eirchin 15b the passage "The third tongue1 kills three persons," the Baal Shem Tov translated and explained:Lashon hara (the evil tongue; slander) kills all three, the inventor of the slander, the one who relates it and the listener. This is all in spiritual terms, which is more severe than physical murder.
FOOTNOTES
1. The "third tongue" refers to the person relating a previously-heard slander. He acts as a "third party" or intermediary between the originator of the slander and the listener. See also Likutei Sichot, Vol. 5, p. 44 note 47.• Daily Thought:
Un-change
That which can be grasped will change.
That which does not change cannot be grasped.[Maamar Tziyon B’Mishpat 5736.]
____________________________
No comments:
Post a Comment