Thursday, December 24, 2015

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Today is: Friday, Tevet 13, 5776 · December 25, 2015

CHABAD - TODAY IN JUDAISM: Today is: Friday, Tevet 13, 5776 · December 25, 2015
Candle Lighting
Light Candles before sunset
Daily Quote:
With the Giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai, we were betrothed to G-d as His bride; the Future Redemption will be our wedding[Midrash Rabbah, Exodus 15]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Vayechi, 6th Portion Genesis 49:27-50:20 with Rashi
English / Hebrew Linear Translation | Video Class
• Genesis Chapter 49
27Benjamin is a wolf, he will prey; in the morning he will devour plunder, and in the evening he will divide the spoil." כזבִּנְיָמִין֙ זְאֵ֣ב יִטְרָ֔ף בַּבֹּ֖קֶר יֹ֣אכַל עַ֑ד וְלָעֶ֖רֶב יְחַלֵּ֥ק שָׁלָֽל:
Benjamin is a wolf, he will prey: He is a wolf for he will prey. He (Jacob) prophesied that they were destined to be “grabbers” : “and you shall grab for yourselves each man his wife” (Jud. 21:21), in [the episode of] the concubine [who happened to be] in Gibeah (ibid., chs. 19-21); and he prophesied about Saul, that he would be victorious over his enemies all around, as it is said:“And Saul took the kingdom… and he waged war…against Moab, and against the children of Ammon, and against Edom, etc., and wherever he turned, he caused them to tremble” (I Sam. 14:47). - [From Shitah Chadashah and Gen. Rabbah 98:3] בנימין זאב יטרף: זאב הוא אשר יטרף, נבא על שיהיו עתידין להיות חטפנין (שופטים כא כא) וחטפתם לכם איש אשתו, בפלגש בגבעה, ונבא על שאול שיהיה נוצח באויביו סביב, שנאמר (ש"א יד מז) ושאול לכד המלוכה וילחם וגו' במואב ובאדום ובכל אשר יפנה ירשיע:
in the morning he will devour plunder: Heb. עַד, an expression of plunder and spoil, translated into Aramaic as עִדָאָה. There is another example of its use in Hebrew:“Then plunder and booty (עַד שָׁלָל) were divided” (Isa. 33:23). He (Jacob) is referring to Saul, who arose at the beginning of the“morning (other editions: עַד is the blossoming) and sunrise” of Israel. — [From Esther Rabbah 10:13] בבקר יאכל עד: לשון ביזה ושלל, המתורגם (במדבר לא יב) עדאה. ועוד יש לו דומה בלשון עברית (ישעיה לג כג) אז חולק עד שלל מרבה, ועל שאול הוא אומר שעמד בתחלת פריחתן וזריחתן של ישראל:
and in the evening he will divide the spoil: Even when the sun will set for Israel through Nebuchadnezzar, who will exile them to Babylon, he (Benjamin) will divide the spoil. Mordecai and Esther, who were of [the tribe of] Benjamin, will divide the spoils of Haman, as it is said: “Behold, the house of Haman I have given to Esther” (Esther 8:7) (Esther Rabbah 10:13). Onkelos, however, rendered it as regarding the “spoils” of the priests, i.e., the holy things of the Temple, [namely the priests’ share of the sacrifices]. ולערב יחלק שלל: אף משתשקע שמשן של ישראל על ידי נבוכדנצר שיגלם לבבל, יחלק שלל. מרדכי ואסתר שהם מבנימין יחלקו את שלל המן, שנאמר (אסתר ח ז) הנה בית המן נתתי לאסתר. ואונקלוס תרגם על שלל הכהנים בקדשי המקדש:
28All these are the twelve tribes of Israel, and this is what their father spoke to them and blessed them; each man, according to his blessing, he blessed them. כחכָּל־אֵ֛לֶּה שִׁבְטֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל שְׁנֵ֣ים עָשָׂ֑ר וְ֠זֹ֠את אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּ֨ר לָהֶ֤ם אֲבִיהֶם֙ וַיְבָ֣רֶךְ אוֹתָ֔ם אִ֛ישׁ אֲשֶׁ֥ר כְּבִרְכָת֖וֹ בֵּרַ֥ךְ אֹתָֽם:
and this is what their father spoke to them and blessed them: Now is it not so that some of them he did not bless, but [in fact] chided? Rather, this is what is intended: And this is what their father spoke to them-what is related in this section. One might think that he did not bless Reuben, Simeon, and Levi. Therefore, Scripture states: and he blessed them, meaning all of them. — [From Pesikta Rabbathi 7] וזאת אשר דבר להם אביהם ויברך אותם: והלא יש מהם שלא ברכם אלא קינטרן. אלא כך פירושו וזאת אשר דבר להם אביהם מה שנאמר בענין. יכול שלא ברך לראובן שמעון ולוי, תלמוד לומר ויברך אותם, כולם במשמע:
according to his blessing: With the blessing destined to befall each of them. איש אשר כברכתו: ברכה העתידה לבא על כל אחד ואחד:
he blessed them: Scripture should have said, “each man, according to his blessing, he blessed him.” Why does Scripture say, “he blessed them” ? Since he (Jacob) bestowed upon Judah the might of a lion, and upon Benjamin the power to seize like a wolf, and upon Naphtali the fleetness of a gazelle, I might think that he did not include all of them in all the blessings. Therefore, Scripture states:“he blessed them.” - [From Tanchuam Vayechi 16] ברך אותם: לא היה לו לומר אלא איש אשר כברכתו ברך אותו, מה תלמוד לומר ברך אותם, לפי שנתן ליהודה גבורתו של אריה, ולבנימין חטיפתו של זאב, ולנפתלי קלותו של איל, יכול שלא כללן בכל הברכות, תלמוד לומר ברך אותם:
29And he commanded them and said to them, "I will be brought in to my people; bury me with my fathers, in the cave that is in the field of Ephron the Hittite, כטוַיְצַ֣ו אוֹתָ֗ם וַיֹּ֤אמֶר אֲלֵהֶם֙ אֲנִי֙ נֶֽאֱסָ֣ף אֶל־עַמִּ֔י קִבְר֥וּ אֹתִ֖י אֶל־אֲבֹתָ֑י אֶ֨ל־הַמְּעָרָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר בִּשְׂדֵ֖ה עֶפְר֥וֹן הַֽחִתִּֽי:
I will be brought in to my people: Heb. נֶאֱסָף [The term נֶאֱסָף is utilized] because they brought souls into the place where they are concealed. There are instances of אִסִיפָה in Hebrew that mean bringing in, e.g.“but no one brought them (מְאַסֵּף) home” (Jud. 19: 15);“you shall take it (וַאִסַפְתּוֹ) into your house” (Deut. 22:2); [and]“when you bring in (בְּאָסְפְּכֶם) the produce of the land” (Lev. 23:39). It is [the produce] brought into the house because of the rains. [Another instance is:]“When you bring in (בְּאָסְפּ‏ְ) your labors” (Exod. 23:16). Likewise, every instance of אִסִיפָה mentioned in connection with death is also an expression of“bringing in.” נאסף אל עמי: על שם שמכניסין הנפשות אל מקום גניזתן, שיש אסיפה בלשון עברי שהיא לשון הכנסה, כגון (שופטים יט טו) ואין איש מאסף אותם הביתה, (דברים כב ב) ואספתו אל תוך ביתך, (ויקרא כג לט) באספכם את תבואת הארץ, הכנסתם לבית מפני הגשמים, (שמות כג טז) באספך את מעשיך. וכל אסיפה האמורה במיתה אף היא לשון הכנסה:
with my fathers: Heb. אֶל, lit., to my fathers. [Here it means] with my fathers. אל אבותי: עם אבותי:
30in the cave that is in the field of Machpelah, which is before Mamre in the land of Canaan, which field Abraham bought from Ephron the Hittite for burial property. לבַּמְּעָרָ֞ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר בִּשְׂדֵ֧ה הַמַּכְפֵּלָ֛ה אֲשֶׁר־עַל־פְּנֵ֥י מַמְרֵ֖א בְּאֶ֣רֶץ כְּנָ֑עַן אֲשֶׁר֩ קָנָ֨ה אַבְרָהָ֜ם אֶת־הַשָּׂדֶ֗ה מֵאֵ֛ת עֶפְרֹ֥ן הַֽחִתִּ֖י לַֽאֲחֻזַּת־קָֽבֶר:
31There they buried Abraham and his wife Sarah, there they buried Isaac and his wife Rebecca, and there I buried Leah. לאשָׁ֣מָּה קָֽבְר֞וּ אֶת־אַבְרָהָ֗ם וְאֵת֙ שָׂרָ֣ה אִשְׁתּ֔וֹ שָׁ֚מָּה קָֽבְר֣וּ אֶת־יִצְחָ֔ק וְאֵ֖ת רִבְקָ֣ה אִשְׁתּ֑וֹ וְשָׁ֥מָּה קָבַ֖רְתִּי אֶת־לֵאָֽה:
32The purchase of the field and the cave therein was from the sons of Heth." לבמִקְנֵ֧ה הַשָּׂדֶ֛ה וְהַמְּעָרָ֥ה אֲשֶׁר־בּ֖וֹ מֵאֵ֥ת בְּנֵי־חֵֽת:
33And Jacob concluded commanding his sons, and he drew his legs [up] into the bed, and expired and was brought in to his people. לגוַיְכַ֤ל יַֽעֲקֹב֙ לְצַוֹּ֣ת אֶת־בָּנָ֔יו וַיֶּֽאֱסֹ֥ף רַגְלָ֖יו אֶל־הַמִּטָּ֑ה וַיִּגְוַ֖ע וַיֵּאָ֥סֶף אֶל־עַמָּֽיו:
and he drew his legs: Heb. וַיֶאֱסֹף רַגְלָיו, he drew in his legs. ויאסף רגליו: הכניס רגליו:
and expired and was brought in: But no mention is made of death in his regard, and our Rabbis of blessed memory said: Our father Jacob did not die. — [From Ta’anith 5b] ויגוע ויאסף: ומיתה לא נאמרה בו, ואמרו רבותינו ז"ל יעקב אבינו לא מת:
Genesis Chapter 50
1Joseph fell on his father's face, and he wept over him and kissed him. אוַיִּפֹּ֥ל יוֹסֵ֖ף עַל־פְּנֵ֣י אָבִ֑יו וַיֵּ֥בְךְּ עָלָ֖יו וַיִּשַּׁק־לֽוֹ:
2And Joseph commanded his servants, the physicians, to embalm his father, and the physicians embalmed Israel. בוַיְצַ֨ו יוֹסֵ֤ף אֶת־עֲבָדָיו֙ אֶת־הָרֹ֣פְאִ֔ים לַֽחֲנֹ֖ט אֶת־אָבִ֑יו וַיַּֽחַנְט֥וּ הָרֹֽפְאִ֖ים אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵֽל:
to embalm his father: This involves compounding aromatic spices. — [From Targum Jonathan and Targum Yerushalmi] לחנט את אביו: ענין מרקחת בשמים הוא:
3And forty days were completed for him for so are the days of embalming completed and the Egyptians wept over him for seventy days. גוַיִּמְלְאוּ־לוֹ֙ אַרְבָּעִ֣ים י֔וֹם כִּ֛י כֵּ֥ן יִמְלְא֖וּ יְמֵ֣י הַֽחֲנֻטִ֑ים וַיִּבְכּ֥וּ אֹת֛וֹ מִצְרַ֖יִם שִׁבְעִ֥ים יֽוֹם:
And forty days were completed for him: They completed for him the days of his embalming, when forty days were completed for him. וימלאו לו: השלימו לו ימי חניטתו עד שמלאו לו ארבעים יום:
and the Egyptians wept over him for seventy days: Forty [days] for embalming and thirty for weeping, because a blessing had come to them when he arrived-the famine ended and the waters of the Nile increased. — [From Bereshith Rabbathi , Targum Jonathan] ויבכו אתו מצרים שבעים יום: ארבעים לחניטה, ושלשים לבכיה, לפי שבאה להם ברכה לרגלו, שכלה הרעב, והיו מי נילוס מתברכין:
4When the days of his weeping had passed, Joseph spoke to Pharaoh's household, saying, "If now I have found favor in your eyes, speak now in Pharaoh's ears, saying, דוַיַּֽעַבְרוּ֙ יְמֵ֣י בְכִית֔וֹ וַיְדַבֵּ֣ר יוֹסֵ֔ף אֶל־בֵּ֥ית פַּרְעֹ֖ה לֵאמֹ֑ר אִם־נָ֨א מָצָ֤אתִי חֵן֙ בְּעֵ֣ינֵיכֶ֔ם דַּבְּרוּ־נָ֕א בְּאָזְנֵ֥י פַרְעֹ֖ה לֵאמֹֽר:
5'My father adjured me, saying, "Behold, I am going to die. In my grave, which I dug for myself in the land of Canaan, there you shall bury me." So now, please let me go up and bury my father and return.' " האָבִ֞י הִשְׁבִּיעַ֣נִי לֵאמֹ֗ר הִנֵּ֣ה אָֽנֹכִי֘ מֵת֒ בְּקִבְרִ֗י אֲשֶׁ֨ר כָּרִ֤יתִי לִי֙ בְּאֶ֣רֶץ כְּנַ֔עַן שָׁ֖מָּה תִּקְבְּרֵ֑נִי וְעַתָּ֗ה אֶֽעֱלֶה־נָּ֛א וְאֶקְבְּרָ֥ה אֶת־אָבִ֖י וְאָשֽׁוּבָה:
which I dug for myself: Heb. כָּרִיתִי. According to its simple meaning, it (כָּרִיתִי) is similar to“If a man digs (יִכְרֶה)” (Exod. 21:33) (Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel). Its midrashic interpretation also fits the language [of the text here] [viz., that it is] like קָנִיתִי, I bought. Rabbi Akiva said,“When I went to [some] cities by the sea, they called selling (מְכִירָה) כִּירָה ” (Rosh Hashanah 26a). [Similarly, it may have been used for“buying.”] Another midrashic interpretation is that it is a term derived from כְּרִי, a stack, [meaning] that Jacob took all the silver and gold that he had brought from Laban’s house and made it into a stack. He said to Esau, “Take this for your share in the cave” (Tanchuma Buber, Vayishlach 11; Gen. Rabbah 100:5). See Rashi on 46: 6. אשר כריתי לי: כפשוטו כמו (שמות כא לג) כי יכרה איש. ומדרשו עוד מתיישב על הלשון, כמו אשר קניתי. אמר רבי עקיבא כשהלכתי לכרכי הים היו קורין למכירה כירה, ועוד מדרשו לשון כרי, דגור, שנטל יעקב כל כסף וזהב שהביא מבית לבן ועשה אותו כרי, ואמר לעשו טול זה בשביל חלקך במערה:
6And Pharaoh said, "Go up and bury your father as he adjured you." ווַיֹּ֖אמֶר פַּרְעֹ֑ה עֲלֵ֛ה וּקְבֹ֥ר אֶת־אָבִ֖יךָ כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֥ר הִשְׁבִּיעֶֽךָ:
as he adjured you: But were it not for the oath, I would not permit you [to go]. He (Pharaoh) was afraid to tell him (Joseph) to transgress the oath, however, lest he say, “If so, I will transgress the oath that I swore to you that I would not reveal that I understand the holy tongue (Hebrew) in addition to seventy languages of the nations of the world, but you do not understand it (Hebrew),” as is found in Tractate Sotah (36b). כאשר השביעך: ואם לא בשביל השבועה לא הייתי מניחך, אבל ירא לומר עבור על השבועה, שלא יאמר אם כן עבור על השבועה שנשבעתי לך שלא אגלה על לשון הקודש שאני מכיר עודף על שבעים לשון ואתה אינך מכיר בו, כדאיתא במסכת סוטה (דף לו ב):
7So Joseph went up to bury his father, and all Pharaoh's servants, the elders of his house, and all the elders of the land of Egypt went up with him, זוַיַּ֥עַל יוֹסֵ֖ף לִקְבֹּ֣ר אֶת־אָבִ֑יו וַיַּֽעֲל֨וּ אִתּ֜וֹ כָּל־עַבְדֵ֤י פַרְעֹה֙ זִקְנֵ֣י בֵית֔וֹ וְכֹ֖ל זִקְנֵ֥י אֶֽרֶץ־מִצְרָֽיִם:
8and Joseph's entire household and his brothers and his father's household; only their young children and their flocks and cattle did they leave in the land of Goshen. חוְכֹל֙ בֵּ֣ית יוֹסֵ֔ף וְאֶחָ֖יו וּבֵ֣ית אָבִ֑יו רַ֗ק טַפָּם֙ וְצֹאנָ֣ם וּבְקָרָ֔ם עָֽזְב֖וּ בְּאֶ֥רֶץ גּֽשֶׁן:
9And chariots and horsemen also went up with him, and the camp was very numerous. טוַיַּ֣עַל עִמּ֔וֹ גַּם־רֶ֖כֶב גַּם־פָּֽרָשִׁ֑ים וַיְהִ֥י הַמַּֽחֲנֶ֖ה כָּבֵ֥ד מְאֹֽד:
10And they came to the threshing floor of the thornbushes, which is on the other side of the Jordan, and there they conducted a very great and impressive eulogy, and he made for his father a mourning of seven days. יוַיָּבֹ֜אוּ עַד־גֹּ֣רֶן הָֽאָטָ֗ד אֲשֶׁר֙ בְּעֵ֣בֶר הַיַּרְדֵּ֔ן וַיִּ֨סְפְּדוּ־שָׁ֔ם מִסְפֵּ֛ד גָּד֥וֹל וְכָבֵ֖ד מְאֹ֑ד וַיַּ֧עַשׂ לְאָבִ֛יו אֵ֖בֶל שִׁבְעַ֥ת יָמִֽים:
the threshing floor of the thornbushes: It was surrounded by thornbushes. Our Rabbis, however, interpreted it [that it was called the threshing floor of the thornbushes] to commemorate the event, when all the people of Canaan and the princes of Ishmael came to [fight a] war. When they saw Joseph’s crown hanging on Jacob’s coffin, they all stood up and hung their own crowns on it and surrounded it with crowns, like a threshing floor surrounded by a fence of thorns. — [From Sotah 13a] גרן האטד: מוקף אטדין היה. ורבותינו דרשו על שם המאורע שבאו כל מלכי כנען ונשיאי ישמעאל למלחמה, וכיון שראו כתרו של יוסף תלוי בארונו של יעקב, עמדו כולן ותלו בו כתריהם, והקיפוהו כתרים כגורן המוקף סייג של קוצים:
11The Canaanite[s], the inhabitant[s] of the land, saw the mourning at the threshing floor of the thornbushes, and they said, "This is an intense mourning for the Egyptians." Therefore, they named it Abel Mizraim (Egypt mourns), which is on the other side of the Jordan. יאוַיַּ֡רְא יוֹשֵׁב֩ הָאָ֨רֶץ הַכְּנַֽעֲנִ֜י אֶת־הָאֵ֗בֶל בְּגֹ֨רֶן֙ הָֽאָטָ֔ד וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ אֵֽבֶל־כָּבֵ֥ד זֶ֖ה לְמִצְרָ֑יִם עַל־כֵּ֞ן קָרָ֤א שְׁמָהּ֙ אָבֵ֣ל מִצְרַ֔יִם אֲשֶׁ֖ר בְּעֵ֥בֶר הַיַּרְדֵּֽן:
12And his sons did to him just as he had commanded them. יבוַיַּֽעֲשׂ֥וּ בָנָ֖יו ל֑וֹ כֵּ֖ן כַּֽאֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוָּֽם:
as he had commanded them: What was it that he had commanded them?- [What the Torah elaborates in the following verse.] כאשר צום: מהו אשר צום:
13And his sons carried him to the land of Canaan, and they buried him in the cave of the field of Machpelah, which field Abraham had bought for burial property from Ephron the Hittite before Mamre. יגוַיִּשְׂא֨וּ אֹת֤וֹ בָנָיו֙ אַ֣רְצָה כְּנַ֔עַן וַיִּקְבְּר֣וּ אֹת֔וֹ בִּמְעָרַ֖ת שְׂדֵ֣ה הַמַּכְפֵּלָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר קָנָה֩ אַבְרָהָ֨ם אֶת־הַשָּׂדֶ֜ה לַֽאֲחֻזַּת־קֶ֗בֶר מֵאֵ֛ת עֶפְרֹ֥ן הַֽחִתִּ֖י עַל־פְּנֵ֥י מַמְרֵֽא:
And his sons carried him: But not his grandsons, for so he had commanded them: “Neither shall any Egyptian carry my coffin nor any of your sons, for they are born of the daughters of Canaan, but you [alone].” He designated a position for them [by his coffin], [so that] three [of them would carry] on the east, and so on for [all] four directions. [This was] similar to their arrangement in the traveling of the camp [in the desert] of the groupings [of the tribes as] they were designated here. [He also ordered,] “Levi shall not carry it because he (i.e., his tribe) is destined to carry the Ark. Joseph shall not carry it because he is a king. Manasseh and Ephraim shall carry it instead of them.” That is the meaning of “Each one according to his group with signs” (Num. 2:2), according to the sign that their father gave them to carry his coffin. — [From Tanchuma Bamidbar 12] וישאו אתו בניו: ולא בני בניו, שכך צום אל ישאו מטתי, לא איש מצרי, ולא אחד מבניכם שהם מבנות כנען, אלא אתם, וקבע להם מקום, שלשה למזרח וכן לארבע רוחות, וכסדרן למסע מחנה של דגלים נקבעו כאן. לוי לא ישא שהוא עתיד לשאת את הארון, ויוסף לא ישא שהוא מלך, מנשה ואפרים יהיו תחתיהם, וזהו (במדבר ב ב) איש על דגלו באותות, באות שמסר להם אביהם לישא מטתו:
14And Joseph returned to Egypt, he and his brothers, and all who had gone up with him to bury his father, after he had buried his father. ידוַיָּ֨שָׁב יוֹסֵ֤ף מִצְרַ֨יְמָה֙ ה֣וּא וְאֶחָ֔יו וְכָל־הָֽעֹלִ֥ים אִתּ֖וֹ לִקְבֹּ֣ר אֶת־אָבִ֑יו אַֽחֲרֵ֖י קָבְר֥וֹ אֶת־אָבִֽיו:
he and his brothers, and all who had gone up with him: Here, when they returned, [Scripture] places his brothers before the Egyptians who had gone up with him, whereas when they left, [Scripture] places the Egyptians before his brothers, as it is said: “and all Pharaoh’s servants…went up with him” (verse 7), and afterwards, “And Joseph’s entire household and his brothers” (verse 8). But because they (the Egyptians) saw the honor that the kings of Canaan had bestowed, (i.e.,) that they hung their crowns on Jacob’s coffin, they treated them (Joseph’s brothers) with respect. — [From Sotah 13b] הוא ואחיו וכל העלים אתו: בחזרתן כאן הקדים אחיו למצרים העולים אתו, ובהליכתן הקדים מצרים לאחיו, שנאמר (לעיל פסוק ז) ויעלו אתו כל עבדי פרעה וגו' ואחר כך (שם ח) כל בית יוסף ואחיו, אלא לפי שראו הכבוד שעשו מלכי כנען שתלו כתריהם בארונו של יעקב נהגו בהם כבוד:
15Now Joseph's brothers saw that their father had died, and they said, "Perhaps Joseph will hate us and return to us all the evil that we did to him." טווַיִּרְא֤וּ אֲחֵֽי־יוֹסֵף֙ כִּי־מֵ֣ת אֲבִיהֶ֔ם וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ ל֥וּ יִשְׂטְמֵ֖נוּ יוֹסֵ֑ף וְהָשֵׁ֤ב יָשִׁיב֙ לָ֔נוּ אֵ֚ת כָּל־הָ֣רָעָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר גָּמַ֖לְנוּ אֹתֽוֹ:
Now Joseph’s brothers saw that their father had died: What does it mean that they saw? They recognized his (Jacob’s) death in Joseph, for they were accustomed to dine at Joseph’s table, and he was friendly toward them out of respect for his father, but as soon as Jacob died, he was no longer friendly toward them. — [From Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel; Tanchuma Buber, Shemoth 2] ויראו אחי יוסף כי מת אביהם: מהו ויראו, הכירו במיתתו אצל יוסף, שהיו רגילים לסעוד עמו על שולחנו של יוסף והיה מקרבן בשביל כבוד אביו, ומשמת יעקב לא קרבן:
Perhaps Joseph will hate us: Heb. לוּ [The word] לוּ has many different meanings. לוּ is used as an expression of request or to denote “if only,” [as in these examples:]“If only (לוּ) it would be as you say” (Gen. 30:34);“If only (לוּ) you would listen to me” (ibid. 23:13);“If only (לוּ) we had been content” (Josh. 7:7);“If only (לוּ) we had died” (Num. 14:2). לוּ sometimes means“if” (אִם) or“perhaps” (אוּלַי) , e.g.,“If (לוּ) they had been wise” (Deut. 32:29);“Had (לוּא) you hearkened to My commandments” (Isa. 48: 18);“And even if (וְלוּ) I should weigh on my palms” (II Sam. 18:12). לוּ sometimes serves as an expression of “perhaps,” [as in]“Perhaps (לוּ) will hate us” (Gen. 50:15). And there is no similar use [of this word] in Scriptures. It is [used as] an expression of“perhaps” (אוּלַי) , like“Perhaps (אוּלַי) the woman will not follow me” (Gen. 24:39), which denotes“perhaps.” There is also an example of אוּלַי [used as] an expression of a request, e. g.,“If only (אוּלַי) the Lord will see [the tears of] my eye” (II Sam. 16:12);“If only (אוּלַי) the Lord will be with me” (Josh. 14:12). This is similar to“If only (לוּ) it would be as you say” (Gen. 30:34). Sometimes אוּלַי is an expression of “if” :“If (אוּלַי) there are fifty righteous men” (Gen. 18:24). - [From Targum Onkelos] לו ישטמנו: שמא ישטמנו. לו מתחלק לענינים הרבה, יש לו משמש בלשון בקשה ולשון הלואי, כגון (לעיל ל לד) לו יהי כדבריך, (שם כג יג) לו שמעני, (יהושע ז ז) ולו הואלנו, (במדבר יד ב) לו מתנו. ויש לו משמש בלשון אם ואולי, כגון (דברים לב כט) לו חכמו, (ישעיה מח יח) לו הקשבת למצותי, (שמואל ב' יח יב) ולו אנכי שוקל על כפי. ויש לו משמש בלשון שמא לו ישטמנו, ואין לו עוד דומה במקרא, והוא לשון אולי, כמו (לעיל כד לט) אולי לא תלך האשה אחרי לשון שמא הוא, ויש אולי לשון בקשה כגון (שמואל ב' טז יב) אולי יראה ה' בעניי, (יהושע יד יב) אולי ישיב ה' אותי, הרי הוא כמו, (לעיל ל לד) לו יהי כדבריך, ויש אולי לשון אם, (לעיל יח כד) אולי יש חמשים צדיקים:
16So they commanded [messengers to go] to Joseph, to say, "Your father commanded [us] before his death, saying, טזוַיְצַוּ֕וּ אֶל־יוֹסֵ֖ף לֵאמֹ֑ר אָבִ֣יךָ צִוָּ֔ה לִפְנֵ֥י מוֹת֖וֹ לֵאמֹֽר:
they commanded [messengers to go] to Joseph: Like “and He commanded them to the children of Israel” (Exod. 6:13). [That is,] he commanded Moses and Aaron to be messengers to the children of Israel. In this case, too, they (the brothers) commanded their messenger to be a messenger to Joseph to say this to him. Whom did they command? Bilhah’s sons who were frequently with him, as it is said:“and he was a lad [and was] with the sons of Bilhah” (Gen. 37:2). - [From Targum Yerushalmi as quoted by Chizkuni] ויצוו אל יוסף: כמו (שמות ו יג) ויצום אל בני ישראל, צוה למשה ולאהרן להיות שלוחים אל בני ישראל, אף זה ויצוו אל שלוחם להיות שליח אל יוסף לומר לו כן. ואת מי צוו, את בני בלהה שהיו רגילין אצלו, שנאמר (לעיל לז ב) והוא נער את בני בלהה:
Your father commanded: They altered the facts for the sake of peace. — [From Yeb. 65b, Tanchuma Toledoth 1]. אביך צוה: שינו בדבר מפני השלום, כי לא צוה יעקב כן שלא נחשד יוסף בעיניו:
17'So shall you say to Joseph, "Please, forgive now your brothers' transgression and their sin, for they did evil to you. Now please forgive the transgression of the servants of the God of your father." ' " Joseph wept when they spoke to him. יזכֹּה־תֹֽאמְר֣וּ לְיוֹסֵ֗ף אָ֣נָּ֡א שָׂ֣א נָ֠א פֶּ֣שַׁע אַחֶ֤יךָ וְחַטָּאתָם֙ כִּֽי־רָעָ֣ה גְמָל֔וּךָ וְעַתָּה֙ שָׂ֣א נָ֔א לְפֶ֥שַׁע עַבְדֵ֖י אֱלֹהֵ֣י אָבִ֑יךָ וַיֵּ֥בְךְּ יוֹסֵ֖ף בְּדַבְּרָ֥ם אֵלָֽיו:
please forgive the transgression of the servants of the God of your father: Although your father is dead, his God is alive, and they are His servants. — [From Tanchuma Buber, Shemoth 2] שא נא לפשע עבדי אלהי אביך: אם אביך מת אלהיו קיים, והם עבדיו:
18His brothers also went and fell before him, and they said, "Behold, we are your slaves." יחוַיֵּֽלְכוּ֙ גַּם־אֶחָ֔יו וַיִּפְּל֖וּ לְפָנָ֑יו וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ הִנֶּ֥נּוּ לְךָ֖ לַֽעֲבָדִֽים:
His brothers also went: in addition to sending messengers. וילכו גם אחיו: מוסף על השליחות:
19But Joseph said to them, "Don't be afraid, for am I instead of God? יטוַיֹּ֧אמֶר אֲלֵהֶ֛ם יוֹסֵ֖ף אַל־תִּירָ֑אוּ כִּ֛י הֲתַ֥חַת אֱלֹהִ֖ים אָֽנִי:
for am I instead of God?: Heb. הִתַחַת. Am I perhaps in His place? [The prefixed “hey” denotes] wonder. If I wanted to harm you, would I be able? Did not all of you plan evil against me? The Holy One, blessed be He, however, designed it for good. So how can I alone harm you? כי התחת א-להים אני: שמא במקומו אני, בתמיה, אם הייתי רוצה להרע לכם, כלום אני יכול, והלא אתם כולכם חשבתם עלי רעה והקב"ה חשבה לטובה, והיאך אני לבדי יכול להרע לכם:
20Indeed, you intended evil against me, [but] God designed it for good, in order to bring about what is at present to keep a great populace alive. כוְאַתֶּ֕ם חֲשַׁבְתֶּ֥ם עָלַ֖י רָעָ֑ה אֱלֹהִים֙ חֲשָׁבָ֣הּ לְטֹבָ֔ה לְמַ֗עַן עֲשׂ֛ה כַּיּ֥וֹם הַזֶּ֖ה לְהַֽחֲיֹ֥ת עַם־רָֽב:
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Daily Tehillim: Chapters 69 - 71
Hebrew text
English text
• Chapter 69
1. For the Conductor, on the shoshanim,1 by David.
2. Deliver me, O God, for the waters have reached until my soul!
3. I have sunk in muddy depths without foothold; I have come into deep waters, and the current sweeps me away.
4. I am wearied by my crying, my throat is parched; my eyes pined while waiting for my God.
5. More numerous than the hairs on my head are those who hate me without reason. Mighty are those who would cut me off, those who are my enemies without cause. What I have not stolen, I will then have to return.
6. O God, You know my folly, and my wrongs are not hidden from You.
7. Let not those who hope in You be shamed through me, O my Lord, God of Hosts; let not those who seek You be disgraced through me, O God of Israel,
8. because for Your sake I have borne humiliation, disgrace covers my face.
9. I have become a stranger to my brothers, an alien to my mother's sons,
10. for the envy of Your House has consumed me, and the humiliations of those who scorn You have fallen upon me.
11. And I wept while my soul fasted, and it was a humiliation to me.
12. I made sackcloth my garment, and became a byword for them.
13. Those who sit by the gate speak of me, and [of me] are the songs of drunkards.
14. May my prayer to You, Lord, be at a gracious time; God, in Your abounding kindness, answer me with Your true deliverance.
15. Rescue me from the mire, so that I not sink; let me be saved from my enemies and from deep waters.
16. Let not the current of water sweep me away, nor the deep swallow me; and let not the pit close its mouth over me.
17. Answer me, Lord, for Your kindness is good; according to Your abundant mercies, turn to me.
18. Do not hide Your face from Your servant, for I am in distress-hurry to answer me.
19. Draw near to my soul and liberate it; redeem me, so that my enemies [not feel triumphant].
20. You know my humiliation, my shame, and my disgrace; all my tormentors are before You.
21. Humiliation has broken my heart, and I have become ill. I longed for comfort, but there was none; for consolers, but I did not find.
22. They put gall into my food, and for my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink.
23. Let their table become a trap before them, and [their] serenity, a snare.
24. Let their eyes be darkened so that they cannot see, and let their loins continually falter.
25. Pour Your wrath upon them, and let the fierceness of Your anger overtake them.
26. Let their palace be desolate, let there be no dweller in their tents,
27. for they persecute the one whom You struck, and tell of the pain of Your wounded ones.
28. Add iniquity to their iniquity, and let them not enter into Your righteousness.
29. May they be erased from the Book of Life, and let them not be inscribed with the righteous.
30. But I am poor and in pain; let Your deliverance, O God, streng-then me.
31. I will praise the Name of God with song, I will extol Him with thanksgiving!
32. And it will please the Lord more than [the sacrifice of] a mature bull with horns and hooves.
33. The humble will see it and rejoice; you seekers of God, [see] and your hearts will come alive.
34. For the Lord listens to the needy, and He does not despise His prisoners.
35. Let heaven and earth praise Him, the seas and all that moves within them,
36. for God will deliver Zion and build the cities of Judah, and they will settle there and possess it;
37. and the seed of His servants will inherit it, and those who love His Name will dwell in it.
FOOTNOTES
1.A musical instrument shaped like a shoshana, a rose (Metzudot).
Chapter 70
David prays that his enemies be shamed and humiliated for their shaming him and reveling in his troubles. Then the righteous will rejoice, and chant songs and praises always.
1. For the Conductor, by David, to remind.
2. O God, [come] to rescue me; O Lord, hurry to my aid.
3. Let those who seek my life be shamed and disgraced; let those who wish me harm retreat and be humiliated.
4. Let those who say, "Aha! Aha!" be turned back in return for their shaming [me].
5. Let all who seek You rejoice and delight in You, and let those who love Your deliverance say always, "May God be exalted!”
6. But I am poor and needy; hurry to me, O God! You are my help and deliverer; O God, do not delay!
Chapter 71
In this awe-inspiring prayer, David speaks of his enemies' desire to kill him, declaring him deserving of death.
1. I have taken refuge in You, O Lord; I will never be shamed.
2. Rescue me and deliver me in Your righteousness; incline Your ear to me and save me.
3. Be for me a sheltering rock, to enter always. You have ordered my salvation, for You are my rock and my fortress.
4. O my God, rescue me from the hand of the wicked, from the palm of the scheming and violent.
5. For You are my hope, O my Lord, God, my security since my youth.
6. I have relied on You from the womb; You drew me from my mother's innards; my praise is of You always.
7. I became an example to the masses, yet You were my mighty refuge.
8. Let my mouth be filled with Your praise, all day long with Your glory.
9. Do not cast me aside in old age; do not forsake me when my strength fails;
10. for my enemies say of me, and those who watch my soul conspire together,
11. saying, "God has forsaken him. Give chase and catch him, for there is no rescuer.”
12. O God, do not distance Yourself from me; my God, hurry to my aid.
13. Let the adversaries of my soul be shamed and consumed; let those who seek my harm be enwrapped in disgrace and humiliation.
14. But as for me, I will always hope; I will add to all Your praises.
15. My mouth will tell of Your righteousness, all day long of Your deliverance, for I do not know their number.
16. I come with the strength of my Lord, God; I mention Your righteousness, Yours alone.
17. O God, You have taught me since my youth, and to this day I tell of Your wonders.
18. Even into old age and hoariness, O God, do not abandon me, until I tell of Your might to the generations, and of Your strength to all who are to come.
19. Your righteousness, O God, reaches the high heavens, for You do great things; O God, who is like You!
20. You, Who has shown me many and grievous troubles, You will revive me again; You will lift me again from the depths of the earth.
21. You will increase my greatness; You will turn and console me.
22. I too1 will thank You on the lyre for Your faithfulness, My God; I will sing to You on the harp, O Holy One of Israel.
23. My lips will rejoice when I sing to you, as well as my soul which You have redeemed.
24. My tongue will also utter Your righteousness all day, for those who seek my harm are shamed and disgraced.
FOOTNOTES
1.As you increase my greatness, so will I increase your praise (Metzudot).
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Tanya: Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 9
Lessons in Tanya
• English Text
Hebrew Text
• Audio Class: Listen | Download
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• Friday, Tevet 13, 5776 · December 25, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, middle of Chapter 9
אך הנה כתיב: ולאום מלאום יאמץ
It is written,1 however, “One nation shall prevail over the other nation.”
The verse refers to Jacob and Esau. In terms of a Jew’s spiritual life it is understood as an allusion to the divine soul and the animal soul respectively, who are constantly warring with each other.
כי הגוף נקרא עיר קטנה, וכמו ששני מלכים נלחמים על עיר אחת, שכל אחד רוצה לכבשה ולמלוך עליה
For the body is called2 a “small city.” The two souls, in relation to one’s body, are just as two kings who wage war over a city, which each wishes to capture and dominate even against its will and to rule with the consent of the populace;
דהיינו להנהיג יושביה כרצונו, ושיהיו סרים למשמעתו בכל אשר יגזור עליהם
that is to say, each king wishes to direct its inhabitants according to his will, so that they obey him in all that he decrees upon them.
כך שתי הנפשות — האלקית, והחיונית הבהמית שמהקליפה — נלחמות זו עם זו על הגוף וכל אבריו
So, too, do the two souls — the divine soul and the vitalizing animal soul, which originates from kelipahand is therefore the very antithesis of the divine soul — wage war against each other over the body and all its organs, the body being analogous to the city and the organs to its inhabitants.
Here, too, each soul wishes to direct the city’s inhabitants according to its will, as follows:
שהאלקית חפצה ורצונה שתהא היא לבדה המושלת עליו ומנהיגתו
The divine soul’s will and desire is that she alone rule over the person and direct him,
וכל האברים יהיו סרים למשמעתה ובטלים אליה לגמרי
so that all the organs be subject to her discipline, following and obeying her dictates, and furthermore that they surrender themselves completely to her, i.e., that they not only obey her, but also surrender their will to her,
ומרכבה אליה
and she desires further still that all the organs become a “chariot” for her.
The divine soul desires that the organs not only surrender their will to it, implying that they do indeed have a will of their own, though it is surrendered to the soul, but rather it desires also that they have no will other than its own — similar to a chariot, which has no independent will, but is merely an instrument of its driver.
ויהיו לבוש לעשר בחינותיה וג׳ לבושיה הנזכרים לעיל, שיתלבשו כולם באברי הגוף
Moreover, the divine soul desires that [the organs] be also a garment, an instrument of expression, for her ten faculties and three garments of thought, speech and action mentioned above,3 all of which should clothe the limbs of the body,
ויהיה הגוף כולו מלא מהם לבדם
and the entire body should be permeated with them alone.
The body’s being harnessed in service of the divine soul might not preclude its serving the animal soul, too, on occasion. The Alter Rebbe therefore adds the phrase: “the entire body should be permeated [by the divine soul] alone,” emphasizing the divine soul’s desire to have exclusive use of the body as an instrument of expression, leaving no place for the faculties and garments of the animal soul.
ולא יעבור זר בתוכם ח״ו
No alien would then [so much as] pass through the organs, G‑d forbid, i.e., the animal soul would exert no influence whatever on the body.
The above forms a general description of the divine soul’s desire to pervade the whole body. The Alter Rebbe now turns to specifics: which organs would give expression to each particular faculty or garment of the divine soul.
דהיינו: תלת מוחין שבראש יהיו ממולאים מחב״ד שבנפש האלקית
That is to say, [specifically:] the three brains — the three sections of the brain, which correspond to the three intellectual faculties: Chochmah, Binah, Daat — would be permeated with the ChaBaD of the divine soul,
שהיא חכמת ה׳ ובינתו
namely, [in] discerning G‑d and understanding Him, i.e., applying the faculties of Chochmah and Binah to the understanding of G‑dliness,
להתבונן בגדולתו אשר עד אין חקר ואין סוף
by pondering His unfathomable and infinite greatness with these two faculties;
ולהוליד מהן, על ידי הדעת, היראה במוחו ופחד ה׳ בלבו
through applying to this meditation the faculty of Daat (knowledge) [as well], i.e., through immersing oneself in the subject of G‑d’s greatness with the depth typical of Daat, so that one not only understands this greatness, but actually feels it, they i.e., his aforementioned faculties of Chochmah and Binah engaged in pondering G‑d’s greatness will give birth to an awe [of G‑d] in his mind, and dread of G‑d in his heart.4
Thus, not only his mind but also his heart will be permeated with the faculties of the divine soul: the mind — with the divine soul’s CHaBaD faculties pondering G‑d’s greatness, and the heart — with the divine soul’s emotions (the fear just mentioned and the love soon to be discussed) arising from this contemplation.
ואהבת ה׳ כאש בוערה בלבו כרשפי שלהבת
There will also be born of this contemplation a love of G‑d, burning in his heart like a flame, like fiery flashes.
להיות נכספה וגם כלתה נפשו בחשיקה וחפיצה, לדבקה בו באין סוף ברוך הוא בכל לב ונפש ומאד
His soul will thirst and pine with desire and longing to cleave to the blessed Ein Sof with all his heart, soul, and might — as it is written,5 “And you shall love G‑d, your L‑rd, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might.”
“With all your heart” means that the heart is filled with the love of G‑d; “with all your soul” implies that the love spills over beyond the heart, to affect all the organs of the body — the feet, for example, will move with alacrity to do a mitzvah;“with all your might” means loving G‑d to the point where one will sacrifice his life for Him.
מעומקא דלבא שבחלל הימני
This love will rise from the depths of the heart, that is, from the right ventricle — the seat of the divine soul’s emotional faculties, as mentioned above.
שיהיה תוכו רצוף אהבה, מלא וגדוש
The kind of love that the divine soul desires entails that [the heart] be inlaid with love from within,6 and furthermore, not only would the love be (as it were) on the “surface” of the heart, but the heart would also be full, with the love occupying its entire space, as it were; and furthermore, it would be, indeed, filled to overflowing — i.e., the love would overflow into the left part of the heart, to affect the emotional faculties of the animal soul which reside there, as the Alter Rebbe continues:
עד שתתפשט גם לחלל השמאלי, לאכפיא לסטרא אחרא, יסוד המים הרעים שבה
[The love] would thus inundate the left part [of the heart] as well, to crush the sitra achra; specifically, the element of Water in it — in the animal soul,
שהיא התאוה שמקליפת נוגה
meaning the lust emanating from kelipat nogah.
As mentioned in ch. 1, the animal soul’s element of Water gives rise to lust for physical pleasures derived from kelipat nogah. Now, the animal soul’s spirit of lust is the kelipah counterpart of the divine soul’s spirit of love (for G‑d). Thus, the divine soul’s intense love of G‑d has the power to crush the animal soul’s lust for physical pleasures.
לשנותה ולהפכה מתענוגי עולם הזה לאהבת ה׳
The effect of the divine soul on the animal soul’s element of Water would be to change and transform it from [a lust for] mundane pleasures to a love of G‑d,
כמו שכתוב: בכל לבבך, בשני יצריך
as it is written,7 [“You shall love G‑d]... with all your heart” — which our Sages interpret8 (basing themselves on the use of the dual form of the word — לבבך instead of לבך, which allows the verse to imply “with all your hearts”): “With both your natures, with your good inclination and also with your evil inclination.”
Accordingly, the evil inclination (i.e., the lust of the animal soul) must also come to love G‑d, and this too is part of the divine soul’s battle-plan.
The Alter Rebbe now describes the specific level of love of G‑d that accomplishes this:
והיינו, שיעלה ויבא ויגיע למדרגת אהבה רבה וחיבה יתירה ממדרגת אהבה עזה כרשפי אש
This transformation of the animal soul’s lust to a love of G‑d entails rising to attain to the level of ahavah rabbah(“abundant love”), a love surpassing even the level of the “powerful love, like fiery flashes” that was mentioned earlier.
FOOTNOTES
1.Bereishit 25:23.
2.Kohelet 9:14Nedarim 32b.10. Chs. 3 and 4.
3.Chs. 3 and 4.
4.For the difference between "awe" and "dread", and their relationship to the mind and heart, respectively, see ch. 3, note 6.
5.Devarim 6:5.
6.Shir HaShirim 3:10.
7.Devarim 6:5.
8.Berachot 54a.
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Rambam:
• Sefer Hamitzvos:
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download | Video Class
• Friday, Tevet 13, 5776 · December 25, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Nusach HaTefila
Today we continue with Maimonides' "Order of Prayer." (The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of three chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. This is what is being studied today according to the three-chapter-a-day-schedule.)
We have not translated this order into English, because the point of it is not to provide a translation of the prayers, but to lay out the way Maimonides structured his prayer book.
As such, we present you today with the final section (part five) of the original Hebrew "Order of Prayer."
     -------------------------------------------------------------
Part 5
נוסח ברכת המזון:
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם הזן את העולם כולו בטובו בחן ובחסד וברחמים ומפרנס לכל כאמור פותח את ידך ומשביע לכל חי רצון ומכין מזון לכל בריותיו אשר ברא ברוך אתה יי' הזן את הכל נודה לך יי' אלהינו ונברכך מלכנו כי הנחלת את אבותינו ארץ חמדה טובה ורחבה ברית ותורה על שהוצאתנו מארץ מצרים ופדיתנו מבית עבדים על תורתך שלמדתנו על חוקי רצונך שהודעתנו על כולם יי' אלהינו אנו מודים לך ומברכים את שמך כאמור ואכלת ושבעת וברכת את יי' אלהיך על הארץ הטובה אשר נתן לך ברוך אתה יי' על הארץ ועל המזון רחם יי' אלהינו על ישראל עמך ועל ירושלים עירך ועל ציון משכן כבודך ועל הבית הגדול והקדוש שנקרא שמך עליו ומלכות דוד משיחך תחזיר למקומה בימינו ובנה ירושלים בקרוב כאשר דברת ברוך אתה יי' בונה ברחמיו את ירושלים ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם האל אבינו מלכנו אדירנו בוראנו גואלנו קדושנו קדוש יעקב המלך הטוב והמטיב שבכל יום ויום גומלנו חן וחסד ורחמים וכל טוב הרחמן ישתבח לדור דורים הרחמן יתפאר לנצח נצחים הרחמן יזכנו לימות המשיח ולבנין בית המקדש ולחיי העולם הבא מגדול ישועות מלכו וגו' כפירים רשו ורעבו וגו' הודו ליי' כי טוב כי לעולם חסדו:
המפטיר בנביא מברך לפניה:
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם אשר בחר בנביאים טובים ורצה בדבריהם הנאמרים באמת ברוך אתה יי' הבוחר בתורה ובמשה עבדו ובישראל עמו ובנביאי האמת והצדק ומברך לאחריה:
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם צור כל העולמים צדיק בכל הדורות האל הנאמן האומר ועושה מדבר ומקיים אשר כל דבריו אמת וצדק נאמן אתה הוא יי' אלהינו ונאמנים דבריך ודבר אחד מדבריך אחור לא ישוב ריקם כי אל נאמן אתה ברוך אתה יי' האל הנאמן בכל דבריו רחם על ציון כי היא בית חיינו ולעגומת נפש (תושיע) מהרה בימינו ותבנה מהרה ברוך אתה יי' בונה ירושלים את צמח דוד עבדך מהרה תצמיח וקרנו תרום בישועתך ברוך אתה יי' מגן דוד על התורה ועל העבודה ועל הנביאים ועל יום המנוח הזה שנתת לנו יי' אלהינו לקדושה לכבוד ולתפארת על הכל אנו מברכין שמך ברוך אתה יי' מקדש השבת וביום טוב הוא אומר ועל יום טוב מקרא קדש הזה שנתת לנו לששון ולשמחה ברוך אתה יי' מקדש ישראל והזמנים ואם היה שבת ויום טוב כולל שניהם וחותם מקדש השבת וישראל והזמנים כנוסח שהוא חותם בתפלה בברכה אמצעית באותו היום כך הוא חותם בברכה אחרונה זו:
(העניינות שנהגו רוב העם לקרות מן הנביאים בכל שבת ושבת ומפטירין בהן ואלו הן:
) בראשית הן עבדי אתמך בו עד אלה הדברים עשיתים ולא עזבתים בישעיה תולדות נח רני עקרה לא ילדה עד הטו אזנכם ולכו אלי בישעיה לך לך ואל מי תדמיוני ואשוה עד כי אני יי' אענם אלהי ישראל בישעיה וירא אליו ואשה אחת מנשי בני הנביאים עד ותשא את בנה ותצא במלכים ויהיו חיי שרה תחלת הספר עד יחי אדוני המלך לעולם במלכים תולדות יצחק משא דבר יי' אל ישראל ביד מלאכי עד וערבה ליי' מנחת וגו' בתרי עשר ויצא יעקב ועמי תלואים למשובתי עד ובנביא העלה בתרי עשר וישלח יעקב חזון עובדיה עד סוף ספרו בתרי עשר וישב יעקב על שלשה פשעי ישראל עד אריה שאג מי לא יירא בתרי עשר ויהי מקץ וייקץ שלמה והנה חלום עד ויהי המלך שלמה מלך במלכים ויגש אליו ואתה בן אדם קח לך עץ אחד עד וידעו הגוים כי אני יי' ביחזקאל ויחי יעקב ויקרבו ימי דוד למות עד ושלמה ישב על כסא דוד אביו במלכים ואלה שמות בן אדם הודע את ירושלים עד ויצא לך שם ביחזקאל וארא (ולא יהיה עוד לבית) ישראל עד ביום ההוא אצמיח קרן לבית ישראל ביחזקאל בא אל פרעה משא מצרים עד אשר ברכו ה' צבאות בישעיה ויהי בשלח שירת דבורה מן ויכנע אלהים עד ותשקוט הארץ ארבעים שנה בשופטים וישמע יתרו בשנת מות המלך עוזיהו עד למרבה המשרה בישעיה ואלה המשפטים הדבר אשר היה אל ירמיהו עד לא יכרת איש ליונדב בן רכב בירמיה:
ויקחו לי ויי' נתן חכמה לשלמה עד ושכנתי בתוך בני ישראל במלכים ואתה תצוה הגד את בני ישראל את הבית עד ורציתי אתכם ביחזקאל כי תשא ודבר יי' היתה אל אליהו עד וירכב אחאב וילך במלכים ויקהל וישלח המלך שלמה ויקח את חירם מצר עד ותתם מלאכת במלכים ואלה פקודי ויעש חירם עד והפתות לדלתות הבית ויקרא עם זו יצרתי לי עד כה אמר יי' מלך ישראל בישעיה צו את אהרן עולותיכם ספו על זבחיכם עד באלה חפצתי נאם יי' בירמיהו ויהי ביום השמיני ויוסף עוד דוד את כל בחור בישראל עד כל אשר בלבבך במלכים אשה כי תזריע ואיש בא מבעל שלישה עד וילך אתו כברת ארץ במלכים זאת תהיה וארבעה אנשים (ומדלג) עד ולא השליכם מעל פניו במלכים אחרי מות התשפוט התשפוט עד ונחלת בך לעיני הגוים ביחזקאל קדושים תהיו באו אנשים מזקני ישראל עד צבי היא לכל הארצות ביחזקאל אמר אל הכהנים והכהנים הלוים בני צדוק עד כל נבלה וטרפה ביחזקאל בהר סיני יי' עוזי ומעזי עד רפאני יי' וארפא בירמיה אם בחוקתי הנבא על רועי ישראל עד והצלתים מיד העובדים בהם ביחזקאל:
במדבר סיני והיה מספר בני ישראל עד וארשתיך לי באמונה בתרי עשר נשא ויהי איש אחד מצרעה עד ויגדל הנער ויברכהו יי' בשופטים בהעלותך רני ושמחי בת ציון עד ידי זרובבל יסדו הבית בתרי עשר שלח לך וישלח יהושע בן נון עד וגם נמוגו כל יושבי וגו' ביהושע ויקח קרח ויאמר שמואל אל העם עד כי לא יטוש יי' את עמו בשמואל זאת חקת התורה ויפתח הגלעדי עד מימים ימימה בשופטים וירא בלק והיה שארית יעקב עד והצנע לכת עם אלהיך בתרי עשר פנחס ויד יי היתה אל אליהו עד ויקם וילך אחרי אליהו במלכים ראשי המטות ויתן משה למטה בני ראובן עד מחלק את הארץ ביהושע אלה מסעי אלו הנחלות עד ויתנו בני ישראל ללוים ביהושע:
אלה הדברים אשר דבר יי' אל ישראל עד והייתם לי לעם בירמיה ואתחנן ואתפלל אל יי' אחרי תת את ספר המקנה עד שדות בכסף יקנו בירמיה והיה עקב הלוך וקראת באזני ירושלים עד והתברכו בו כל גוים ובו יתהללו בירמיה ראה אנכי הנה ימים באים נאם יי' והקימותי עד אם יסתר איש במסתרים בירמיה שופטים ויהי כאשר זקן שמואל עד ויאמר שמואל אל אנשי ישראל לכו בשמואל כי תצא ויאספו פלשתים את מחניהם עד ויי' יהיה עמך בשמואל והיה כי תבא אז יבנה יהושע מזבח עד ולא היה כיום ההוא ביהושע אתם נצבים ויאסף יהושע את כל שבטי ישראל עד כרמים וזיתים אשר לא נטעתם ביהושע האזינו ולקחתי אני מצמרת הארז עד והשיבו וחיו ביחזקאל וזאת הברכה ויהי אחרי מות משה עבד יי' ומדלג עד ויהי יי' את יהושע ביהושע כל שבת שקורין בה שתי פרשיות מפטירין בה מענין פרשה אחרונה וזו המנהג ברוב המקומות וכן נהגו רוב העם להיות מפטירין בנחמות ישעיהו מאחר תשעה באב עד ראש השנה בשבת שאחר תשעה באב נחמו נחמו עמי בשניה ותאמר ציון בשלישית עניה סערה ברביעית אנכי אנכי הוא מנחמכם בחמישית קומי אורי בששית רני עקרה בשביעית שוש אשיש ביי':
נגמר ספר שני ומנין פרקיו ששה וארבעים הלכות ק"ש הלכות תפלה וברכת כהנים הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה הלכות ציצית הלכות ברכות הלכות מילה:
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Positive Commandment 154
Resting on Shabbat
"And on the seventh day you shall rest"—Exodus 23:12.
We are commanded to rest on the Shabbat. This commandment, which is repeated numerous times in the Torah, also applies to our livestock and slaves.
Full text of this Mitzvah »
Resting on Shabbat
Positive Commandment 154
Translated by Berel Bell
The 154th mitzvah is that we are commanded to rest on Shabbos.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement1, "And on the seventh day you shall rest."
This commandment is repeated many2 times in the Torah.
G‑d (exalted be He) has clearly stated that this cessation from melachah3 applies to us, our animals, and our servants.4
The details of this mitzvah are explained in tractate Shabbos and also in tractate Yom Tov.5
FOOTNOTES
1.Ex. 23:12.
2.In Introductory Principle Nine, the Rambam says that there all 12 such verses. See Kapach, 5731, note 66.
3.See N320 (Lessons 39, 40).
4.Ex. 20:10.
5.Also known as Beitzah.

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• 1 Chapter: Terumot Terumot - Chapter 1
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• Terumot - Chapter 1
Halacha 1
According to Scriptural Law, [the obligation to separate] the terumot1 and the tithes2 applies only in Eretz Yisrael.3[It applies] whether the Temple is standing or not.4 The prophets ordained that these obligations should be observed in Babylon as well, because it is adjacent to Eretz Yisrael and the majority of the Jewish people journey to and from there.5 The Sages of the early generations6 ordained that they also be observed in the lands of Egypt and the lands of Ammon and Moab, because they are on the peripheries ofEretz Yisrael.
Halacha 2
Whenever Eretz Yisrael is mentioned, the intent is the lands conquered by the King of Israel or a prophet with the consent of the entire Jewish people. This is called "a conquest of the community."7 If, however, an individual Jew, a family, or a tribe go and conquer a place for themselves - even in the land given to Abraham8 - it is not considered as Eretz Yisrael in the sense that one is obligated to observe all the mitzvot there.9 For this reason, Joshua10 and his court divided the entire Land of Israel into tribal portions11 even though it was not conquered [entirely] at that time. In this way, when every tribe would ascend and conquer its portion, it would not be considered as merely an individual conquest.
Halacha 3
The lands which [King] David conquered outside of the Land of Canaan, e.g., Aram Naharaim, Aram Tzovah, Achlab,12 and the like, even though he was a King of Israel and he was acting with the consent of the High Court,13 is not considered as the Land of Israel with regard to all matters, nor is it like the Diaspora, i.e., Babylonia and Egypt with regard to all matters. Instead, it was removed from the category of the Diaspora, but did not enter the category ofEretz Yisrael.
Why was its level considered lower than that of Eretz Yisrael? Because David conquered them before he conquered all of Eretz Yisrael.14 Instead, there were still member of the seven nations there. If, however, he had conqueredEretz Yisrael entirely, in all of its boundaries, and afterwards conquered15other lands,16his entire conquest would have been equivalent to Eretz Yisraelwith regard to all matters.17 The lands which [King] David conquered are called Syria.
Halacha 4
There are dimensions of [the laws that apply to] Syria that resemble [the laws that apply in] Eretz Yisrael18 and there are dimensions of [its laws] that resemble [those which apply] in the Diaspora.19 A person who purchases landed property [in Syria] is comparable to one who purchases [land] in Eretz Yisrael with regard to terumot, tithes, and the Sabbatical year.20 All [the laws that apply] in Syria are of Rabbinic origin.21
Halacha 5
All of the lands that [the Jews] who ascended from Egypt took possession of were sanctified in the first consecration [of the land]. When they were exiled, that sanctity was nullified.22 [The rationale is that] the initial consecration came about because of the conquest. [Hence,] its consecration was effective for the time [it was under their rule], but not for all time.23 When, by contrast, the descendants of the exiles ascended [from Babylon] and took possession of a portion of the land,24 they consecrated it a second time.25 [This consecration] is perpetuated forever, for that time and for all time.26
[The Sages] left those places that had been settled by [the Jews who] ascended from Egypt, but were not settled by those who ascended from Babylon in their previous [halachic status] and did not exempt them from [the obligations of] terumah and tithes so that the poor could rely upon them in the Sabbatical year.27 Our holy teacher28released Beit Shan29 from those places which [the Jews] who ascended from Babylon did not take hold of. He decided that Ashkelon should be exempted from the tithes.30
Halacha 6
Thus the entire earth is divided into three categories in relation to those mitzvot involving the land: Eretz Yisrael, Syria, and the Diaspora. Eretz Yisrael itself is divided into two categories: a) those portions settled by the Jews who ascended from Babylonia, and b) those portions that were settled only by the Jews who ascended from Egypt.
The Diaspora is divided into two categories: a) Egypt, Babylon, Ammon, and Moab in which the mitzvot are observed according to the decrees of the sages and the prophets and the other lands in which [the obligations of] theterumot and the tithes are not observed.
Halacha 7
What are [the boundaries of] the land settled by the Jews who ascended from Egypt? From Rekem which is in the east of Eretz Yisrael until the Mediterranean Sea. From Ashkelon31 which is in the south of Eretz Yisraeluntil Acre which is in the north. As one proceeds from Acre to Kziv,32 the area to one's right, on the east, can generally be assumed to be of the Diaspora - it is impure as is the lands of the nations33 and is exempt from [the mitzvot of] the tithes and the Sabbatical year - unless it is known that it was part of Eretz Yisrael. The area to one's left, to the west, can generally be assumed to be part of Eretz Yisrael - it is pure [from the impurity associated with] the lands of the nations and is obligated with regard to [mitzvot of] the tithes and the Sabbatical year - unless it is known to be part of the Diaspora.34 With regard to the entire area that slopes downward from the Samnum Mountains:35 The inner [portion]36 is Eretz Yisrael, the portion outside the Samnum Mountains is the Diaspora.
With regard to the islands in the sea, we consider their [status dependent] on an [imaginary] line extended from the Samnum Mountains until the River of Egypt.37 Those within this line are part of Eretz Yisrael. Those outside this line are part of the Diaspora. This is a depiction of the matter.38
Halacha 8
Which area did the Jews who ascended from Babylonia settle in? [The area] from Kziv inward toward the east. They did not, however, take possession of the area from Kziv outward until Amana which is Samnum until the river, i.e., the River of Egypt.39 And they did not take possession of Kziv itself.
Halacha 9
What constitutes Syria? From Eretz Yisrael and below40 parallel to Aram Naharaim and Aram Tzovah, the entire region of the Euphrates until Babylonia, e.g., Damascus, Achalev, Charan, Minbag, and the like until Shinar41 and Tzahar. These are considered like Syria. Acre, by contrast, is considered part of the Diaspora, like Ashkelon.42 These are the boundaries ofEretz Yisrael.
Halacha 10
When a gentile purchases land in Eretz Yisrael, he does not cause it to be absolved from [the observance of] the mitzvot.43 Instead, its holiness is still intact.44 Therefore, if a Jew purchases this land from [the gentile], it is not considered as a private conquest.45 Instead, he should separate the terumotand the tithes and bring the first fruits. All these [obligations] are Scriptural in origin, as if it was never sold to a gentile. When a gentile acquires land in Syria, his acquisition has the power to absolve [the land] from the obligations of tithes and the Sabbatical year,46 as will be explained.47
Halacha 11
[The following laws apply with regard to] produce belonging to a gentile that grew on land that he purchased in Eretz Yisrael. If all the work involving the produce was completed in the possession of a gentile and the gentile straightened the edges of the grain heap,48 they are exempt, because [the verse mentioning the obligation to separate terumahDeuteronomy 18:4] mentions "your grain," [thus excluding] the grain of a gentile.49
If a Jew purchases [the produce] after it was harvested, but before the tasks involved with it were completed and they were completed by a Jew, all [of the agricultural obligations apply with regard to the produce] according to Scriptural Law.50 He must separate the great terumah and give it to a priest and [separate] the terumat ma'aser and sell it to a priest.51 The first tithe belongs to him,52 because he can tell a Levite with regard to the tithes and a priest with regard to the terumat ma'aser: "I am coming in the stead of a person53 from which you could not have collected anything."54
Why do we say that he should not give the terumat ma'aser to a priest as [he gives him] the great terumah?55 Because with regard to terumat ma'aser, it is written: "When you take the tithes from the children of Israel...."56 [Implied is that from] untithed produced that you purchase from a Jew, you should separate terumat ma'aser and give it to a priest, but from untithed produce that you purchase from a gentile, you need not give the priest the terumat ma'aseryou separate from it. Instead, you sell it to the priest and take the money.
Halacha 12
[The following laws apply if] a gentile sold his produce to a Jew while it was connected to the earth. If [he sold it] before it developed to a stage when he is obligated to separate tithes57 and the work [associated with it] was completed while it was owned by the Jew, [the Jew] is responsible for all of the agricultural obligations and should give the terumot and the tithes to their [appropriate] owners.58 If [the gentile] sold [the produce] after it developed to a stage when he is obligated to separate tithes, he should separate terumat ma'aser and the tithes and give them to their [appropriate] owners according to the [acceptable] reckoning.
What is implied? If he purchased grain that had been sown from a gentile after it reached a third of its growth and the work associated with its completion was performed while it was in the possession of a Jew, he should separate the terumot and the tithes, as we explained.59 He should give two thirds of the tithes to a Levite.60 [With regard to the] terumat ma'aser, he should give two thirds to the priest and sell him one third.61
Halacha 13
[The following laws apply if] a Jew sold his produce to a gentile before it developed to a stage when he is obligated to separate tithes and the work [associated with it] was completed by the gentiles, it is exempt from theterumot and the tithes.62 If [he purchased it] after it developed to a stage when the tithes are obligated to be separated, even if the gentile completed the work associated with it, all of the agricultural obligations are incumbent upon it according to Rabbinic decree.63
Similarly, if a gentile completed [the work associated with] produce belonging to a Jew,64 since the work associated with them was completed by a gentile, the obligation for terumot and tithes is incumbent upon them, but it is only Rabbinic in origin.65
Halacha 14
If a gentile sold produce that was still connected to the earth after it reached the stage when the tithes are obligated to be separated and [another] gentile straightened the edges of the grain heap in the possession of a Jew, [the produce] is not obligated in the terumot or the tithes.66 Since the produce reached the stage when the tithes are obligated to be separated in the possession of a gentile and a gentile straightened the edges of the grain heap,67 [the fact] the produce belongs to a Jew [is not significant].68
Halacha 15
When a person purchases a field in Syria, he is obligated by Rabbinic decree to separate terumot and tithes like one who purchases [a field] in Jerusalem69according to Scriptural Law, as we explained.70 If, however, a person [merely] purchases produce from a gentile - whether it was harvested or [still] connected to the earth - he is exempt, because [the produce] does not come from his land.71 [This applies] even if [he purchases the produce] before it develops to a stage when the tithes are obligated to be separated [and] even though a Jew straightened the edges of the grain heap.72
Halacha 16
[The following laws apply when a person] purchases land in Syria to which produce is attached. If it reached a stage when the tithes are obligated to be separated while in the possession of a gentile, it is exempt.73 [Conversely,] if it did not reach a stage when the tithes are obligated to be separated [in his possession],74 [the Jewish purchaser] is obligated to tithe it, since he purchased it together with the land.
Halacha 17
When a Jew is working as a sharecropper for a gentile in Syria, his produce is exempt from the tithes, because he does not own the land itself at all. A gentile's purchase of land in Syria causes it to be absolved from [the obligation of] the tithes, as we explained.75 The same laws apply when one rents a field, but stipulates that the payment will be made in produce,76 enters into a sharecropping agreement as a mekabel,77 or rents a field for money from a gentile in Syria, he is absolved [from the obligations of] terumot and tithes.78
Halacha 18
[The following law applies when] a Jew purchases a field from a gentile in Syria before [the crops] reached a third of their development and sells it to a gentile after the crops reach a third of their development. If a Jew purchases it a second time,79he is obligated [to separate] the terumot and the tithes,80because [the field] incurred that obligation in the possession of a Jew.81
Halacha 19
When a Jew owns land in Syria and he hired a sharecropper and the sharecropper sent him produce,82 he is not obligated to separate [the terumotand tithes], for it is possible to say that [the sharecropper] purchased [the produce he gave him] from the marketplace.83 [This applies] provided this species is available in the marketplace.
Halacha 20
There is an obligation [to separate] the terumot and the tithes [from crops grown on land owned in] partnership with a gentile.
What is implied? When a Jew and a non-Jew purchased a field in partnership - even if they divided the field while the grain was standing,84 and needless to say, if they divided it after it was collected in a grain heap85 - tevel86and ordinary produce are mixed together in each and every stalk of grain in the gentile's share.87 [This applies] even if the gentile straightened the edges of the grain heap and thus the obligation is Rabbinic in origin,88 as explained.89
Halacha 21
When does the above apply? In Eretz Yisrael, where [the obligation to] tithe is Scriptural in origin, and according to Scriptural Law, the principle of bereirahdoes not apply. If, however, he purchased a field in Syria, since [the obligation to] tithe there is Rabbinic in origin, even if they divided a grain heap, the portion of the gentile is exempt entirely.90
Halacha 22
When produce from Eretz Yisrael is taken to the Diaspora, it is exempt from the obligations of challah, the terumot, and the tithes, [for one of the prooftexts requiring the separation of these gifts, Numbers 15:18]91states: "[the land] to which I am bringing you." [Implied is that] these obligations exist there alone. In the Diaspora, one is exempt.92 If [the produce] was taken to Syria, one is obligated by Rabbinic decree.
Conversely, we are obligated [to separate] challah from produce from the Diaspora that was brought into Eretz Yisrael, as [suggested by the phrase] "to which." [Implied is that] one is liable [to make these gifts] there, whether the produce is from Eretz Yisrael or the Diaspora. If the obligation [to separatechallah or the tithes] was established [because of the actions] of a Jew after the produce entered Eretz Yisrael, there is an obligation of Rabbinic origin to separate the tithes.93
Halacha 23
When earth from the Diaspora is brought to Eretz Yisrael by ship, if the ship's [bottom] comes in contact with the earth [of Eretz Yisrael],94 terumah and tithes must [be separated from produce] growing on [the earth in the ship] and the Sabbatical laws must be observed as if [the produce] was growing inEretz Yisrael itself.95
Halacha 24
When a tree is standing in the Diaspora and its foliage leans into Eretz Yisraelor it is standing in Eretz Yisrael and its foliage leans into the Diaspora, [the determination of its status] depends on its roots.96 If some of its roots were inEretz Yisrael and others were in the Diaspora - even if they were separated by glistening stone, [it is considered as if] tevel and ordinary produce are mixed together [throughout the entire produce].
Halacha 25
[The following rules apply when] a plant in a flowerpot with a hole has not sprouted roots [outside the flowerpot]. If its roots where in Eretz Yisrael and its foliage in the Diaspora, [the determination of its status] depends on its foliage.97
Halacha 26
In the present era, even in the areas settled by the Jews who ascended from Babylonia, even those [settled] in the era of Ezra,98 [the obligation to separate]terumah does not have the status of a Scriptural commandment, merely that of a Rabbinic decree. [The rationale is that] the Scriptural [commandment to separate] terumah applies only in Eretz Yisrael and only when the entire99Jewish people are located there. [This is derived from the phrase]100 "When you enter...." [Implied is that] the entire [Jewish people] must enter [the land], as they did when they took possession of the land originally101 and as will happen in the future when they take possession of the land a third time.102 In contrast, the second time [the people] took possession of the land, in the time of Ezra, only a portion entered.103Hence, they were not obligated according to Scriptural Law.104 Similarly, it appears to me that the same concept applies with regard to the tithes.105 In the present era, this obligation [as well] has the status of a Rabbinic decree like terumah.106
FOOTNOTES
1.
The plural term is used in this halachah and in many instances in this text, because there are two types of terumot: a) "the great terumah," i.e., the terumah separated initially, and b) terumat ma'aser, the terumah the Levites separate from the tithes that are given them. See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim, ch. 6, for details regarding the separation of these allocations.
2.
Here also the plural term is used because there are several tithes: the first tithe given to Levites, the second tithe which must be brought to Jerusalem, and the tithe for the poor. See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim, loc. cit.
3.
Kiddushin 36b states that all the mitzvot involving the produce of the earth apply only in Eretz Yisrael.
4.
Although the agricultural laws apply even when the Temple is not standing, there is a restriction to the time when they apply according to Scriptural Law. The entire Jewish people must be located in our holy land, as stated in Halachah 26. (See also Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 10:8-9.)
5.
Even though Babylonia is further away than the other lands mentioned in this halachah, it had a larger Jewish community and there was far more contact between its populace and the Jewish community of Eretz Yisrael. Hence, the prophets gave it precedence over the other lands (Radbaz).
6.
The Sages of the generation that followed Ezra [Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura (Yadayim 3:3).
7.
See also Hilchot Melachim 5:6.
8.
The Rambam speaks of the land being given to Abraham, not merely being promised to him, since from the time God said that the land was his, spiritually, it became his possession. Moreover, as the Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 5:1) states, from Abraham's time onward, even though the land was still possessed by the Canaanites, the Jews were already its legal owners. See also Bava Batra 119b.
9.
I.e., the agricultural mitzvot that must be observed in Eretz Yisrael.
10.
A king and a prophet.
11.
I.e., since Joshua and his court had made this division, when the tribe went to conquer its portion, it was acting on behalf of the entire Jewish people.
12.
These regions are located in contemporary Syria.
13.
The wars to conquer these lands are classified as voluntary wars, and a voluntary law requires the consent of the High Court (Hilchot Melachim 5:1).
14.
See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 6:11) where he criticizes King David for this approach, quoting the Sifri (Parshat Ekev) that states that he did not act in accordance with the Torah. Since the designation of the land as Eretz Yisrael is through Divine fiat as expressed through the Torah. Accordingly, a conquest that is not in accord with the Torah cannot bring about such a designation (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. V, p. 9).
15.
With the consent of the High Court.
16.
Even lands outside of the homeland promised to Abraham (Radbaz).
17.
And the agricultural laws would have to be observed there.
18.
In addition to those points the Rambam mentions below, among the other examples of this principle are: its air is not considered as a source of impurity (Hilchot Tuma'at Meit 11:6); it is permitted to have a gentile compose a deed of purchase for land there on the Sabbath so that one will acquire the land (Hilchot Shabbat 6:11).
19.
Among the examples of the relevant laws: its earth is considered as a source of ritual impurity (Hilchot Tuma'at Meit, loc. cit.); a servant from Eretz Yisrael sold there is granted his freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:6).
20.
See Halachah 15.
21.
For according to Scriptural Law, it is not part of Eretz Yisrael.
22.
In Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:16, the Rambam states: "It was no longer Eretz Yisrael," i.e., none of the halachic obligations apply there.
23.
Since it was established by conquest, it could be nullified by conquest. See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah, loc. cit. The Radbaz explains that when the Jews ascended from Egypt, they did not make a statement, consecrating the land. Therefore its holiness could be nullified.
24.
As Yevamot 16a states: "Much of the land that was conquered by [the Jews who] ascended from Egypt was not conquered by [the Jews who] ascended from Babylon.
25.
Nevertheless, since the entire Jewish people did not return together with Ezra, this consecration is only of Rabbinic origin.
26.
And thus at present, Ezra's consecration of the land is still effective.
In his gloss to Hilchot Beit HaBechirah, loc. cit., the Kessef Mishnah finds these statements difficult to accept because of the following questions:
a) On what basis is chazakah considered a more effective means of acquisition than conquest?
b) After the initial conquest of Eretz Yisrael, the Jewish people manifested their ownership over it and thus, effected a chazakah. If so, why is Ezra's chazakah, which was not preceded by conquest, more effective than the chazakah which followed the original conquest? Why should the conquest detract from the consecration of the land?
To explain: As mentioned above, the Jewish people's ownership of the land began with God's promise of the land to Abraham. The sanctity of the land, by contrast, did not begin until the Jewish people actually took possession of it, upon their reentry into the land after the exodus from Egypt and the journey through the desert. At that time, they were commanded to conquer the land and take it forcefully from the Gentiles (see Numbers 32:29,Deuteronomy 3:21et al). Since God made the consecration of the land dependent upon its conquest by the Jewish people, it follows that conquest by a Gentile nation can nullify its holiness.
In contrast, Ezra was not commanded to reconquer Eretz Yisrael, but to settle it. In this instance, God made the sanctity of the land dependent on the Jewish people manifesting their ownership over it. In other words, the sanctity came from manifesting the true reality: that Eretz Yisrael is a Jewish land. Accordingly, since Eretz Yisrael remains our land, regardless of how many times it has been conquered by Gentiles, the sanctity effected by that manifestation of ownership also continues eternally (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XV, pp. 102-109).
27.
And receive the tithe of the poor.
28.
Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi.
29.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that Beit Shan was released only from those obligations that are of Rabbinic origin.
30.
The Kessef Mishneh relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi released these cities from the obligation of the tithes, because they were not populated by Jews and were not close to the area settled by Jews.
31.
Ashkelon - and similarly, the other cities the Rambam refers to - is located near, but not exactly on the same cite - as the city presently called by that name. With regard to Ashkelon in particular, there is discussion of the issue by the commentaries, for some sources (see Radbaz and Kessef Mishneh) explain that it was part of the land conquered by the Jews who ascended from Egypt. It was not, however, conquered by the Jews who ascended from Babylonia.
32.
I.e., proceeding northward.
33.
Our Sages decreed that merely touching the earth of the Diaspora is sufficient to impart ritual impurity. See Hilchot Tuma'at Meit, ch. 11.
34.
I.e., as depicted in the map drawn by the Rambam to accompany the Mishneh Torah, the borders of Eretz Yisrael ascend northward from Acre to Kziv, but there is a strip of land in the center that did not become part of Eretz Yisrael.
35.
Our text is based on authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah as cited in the Rav Shabsie Frankel edition. The standard printed text refers to the Umenum Mountains. See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 6:1).
In the map the Rambam drew to depict this matter, the Samnum Mountains are located in the southeastern corner of Eretz Yisrael, near Ashkelon. Most of the other commentaries understand this term as referring to the Umenum Mountain range in Northern Lebanon.
36.
I.e., to the south.
37.
According to the Radbaz, this refers to Wadi el Arish and not the Nile. Most other commentaries, however, identify "the River of Egypt" as the Nile.
38.
I.e., the Rambam included the accompanying map so that the matter would be clearly understood.. This reflects his thrust throughout the Mishneh Torah: to provide his readers with an applicable text without any ambiguity.
39.
Thus it appears that the entire coastal range of Eretz Yisrael was not settled by the Jews who ascended from Babylon.
40.
The term "below" in this context is problematic. It does not mean "south," because significant portions of Syria are more northerly than Eretz Yisrael. Some commentaries understand it as meaning in height, because as Kiddushin 69b states, Eretz Yisrael is higher than other lands.
41.
Shinar itself, however, is part of the Diaspora, as evident from Halachah 1.
42.
As mentioned above, there are commentaries who consider Ashkelon to be part of the land conquered by the Jews who ascended from Egypt, but not that conquered by the Jews ascending from Babylonia. Some also place Acre in this category.
43.
See the following halachah for the practical application of this principle.
44.
Gittin 47a derives this concept from Leviticus 25:23: "The entire land is Mine." Implied is that the land belongs to God and His ownership cannot be absolved through conquest by any earthly power.
This ruling was a point of question for the Rambam. As indicated by the notes of Rav Kappach to his translation of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 4:9; Gittin 4:9, et al), the Rambam changed his mind concerning the issue several times and amended his text of the Commentary to the Mishnah accordingly. At first, he stated the opinion quoted here, then adopted the opposite view, that a gentile's acquisition does cause the agricultural obligations to be absolved, and finally returned to his original position. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 331:3-4) follow the Rambam's ruling here. See also Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 4:29 where this issue is also discussed.
45.
In which instance, the agriculture laws would not be applicable, as stated in Halachah 2.
46.
The entire obligation to observe the agricultural laws in Syria is Rabbinic in origin (Halachah 4) and our Sages did not enforce their decrees in this instance.
47.
Halachot 15-19.
48.
I.e., completed the work involved in preparing them. See Hilchot Ma'aser 3:13.
49.
From the interpretation of the term by the Sages (Bechorot 11b), the intent seems to be that not only that the grain must belong to a Jew, but that he must perform the work to complete its preparation for use.
50.
I.e., for the produce to be obligated in the agricultural laws according to Scriptural Law, it must belong to the Jew and the Jew must complete the work involved with preparing it. If only one of these conditions was met, the obligations must be fulfilled only because of Rabbinic decree. See Halachah 13.
51.
The terumat ma'aser is sold to the priest and not given to him for the reason explained shortly afterwards by the Rambam. It cannot be kept by the owner, because he is forbidden to partake of it. Instead, it is consecrated and must be eaten by a priest in a state of ritual purity (Siftei Cohen 331:10).
52.
I.e., he must separate the first tithe to fulfill the agricultural obligations incumbent upon the produce, but is not obligated to give it to the Levites. There is no difficulty in him keeping the tithes, because, as the Rambam explains, he is not obligated to give them to the Levite and there is no prohibition against him partaking of them, because they are not consecrated at all and any person may partake of them, even when he is not in a state of ritual purity.
53.
The gentile.
54.
Had the gentile completed the tasks associated with preparing the grain, he would not have been under any obligation to make any of these separations. Hence, although the Jew is obligated to separate the various allocations, the obligation is primarily a ritual one and not a financial one. With the exception of the great terumah, he is not obligated to accept any loss and may keep the first tithes for himself.
55.
I.e., like the first tithe, the terumat ma'aser must be separated, but it need not be given to the priest.
56.
There is, by contrast, no such verse stated with regard to the great terumah. Hence, it is not considered the property of the owner, but instead, must be given - and not sold - to a priest.
57.
See below and Hilchot Ma'aserot 2:5 for a definition of this concept.
58.
I.e., the tithes to a Levite and the terumot to a priest. It is as if the produce grew on land belonging to the Jew from the outset.
59.
I.e., as explained in the previous halachah and notes, the terumot and the tithes must be separated even if they - or a portion of them - are kept by the owner.
60.
He may keep one-third of the tithes as his own. The rationale is that since the produce reached one third of its growth in the possession of the gentile, the Jew is not liable to give away theterumat ma'aser and the tithes for that portion of the crop. With regard to that portion, the concepts stated in the previous halachah apply. With regard to the remaining two thirds, it is considered as produced owned by a Jew and is obligated in all agricultural laws.
61.
As stated in the previous halachah, he must give the great terumah to the priest without receiving any return whatsoever.
62.
It is as if the produce grew in the possession of the gentile from the outset in which instance, they are exempt from all agricultural obligations, as stated in Halachah 11.
The Ra'avad objects to this ruling based on the principle stated in Halachah 10: "When a gentile purchases land in Eretz Yisrael, he does not cause it to be absolved from [the observance of] the mitzvot. Instead, its holiness is still intact." The Radbaz explains that this principle applies only when the gentile purchases the land, but not when he purchases merely produce. TheShulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 331:6) quotes the Rambam's view.
63.
I.e., if the produce is later sold to a Jew, the Jew must separate the terumot and the tithes. The rationale is that since the produce grew in a Jew's possession, it is considered as Jewish produce.
64.
Our translation is based on the interpretation of Rav Yosef Corcus as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh. He explains that, based on the exegesis of Deuteronomy 18:4 by Bechorot 11b (see Halachah 11 and notes), as long as the work is completed by a gentile, the fact that the produce belongs to a Jew is not significant.
65.
In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes (based on Menachot 67a) that this decree was enacted lest Jewish landowners have gentiles complete the work associated with the crops to avoid having to separate the tithes.
66.
I.e., even according to Rabbinic Law.
67.
I.e., performs the task which completes the work associated with the produce at which time the obligation to separate the terumot and tithes takes effect.
68.
I.e., it is as if the produce belonged entirely to the gentile and the laws stated in Halachah 11 apply.
69.
The Rambam is referring to the wording of Challah 4:11: "One who purchases [land] in Syria is comparable to one who purchases [land] in the suburbs of Jerusalem."
70.
Halachah 4.
71.
Since the entire obligation to separate the terumot and tithes in Syria is Rabbinic in origin, our Sages applied it only when the Jew owned the land itself. Since the obligation to separate tithes when one purchases produce alone is merely Rabbinic in origin even in Eretz Yisrael, our Sages did not apply it in Syria.
72.
I.e., performs the task which completes the work associated with the produce at which time the obligation to separate the terumot and tithes takes effect.
73.
I.e., it is considered as if it was the gentile's produce entirely.
74.
The previous growth of the produce is not significant.
75.
Halachah 10.
76.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's definition of the term chocher in Hilchot Sechirut 8:1.
77.
Both the terms aris and mekabel refer to sharecropping agreements. The difference between them is that an aris is working for the owner of the field for a percentage of the crops (see Hilchot Shluchin 8:5), while a mekabel is renting the field from the owner for a percentage of the crops (Hilchot Sechirut 8:2).
78.
The motivating principle behind these laws is that renting the field is not equivalent to purchasing it, for the land itself does not become his (Avodah Zarah 15a).
In Eretz Yisrael, by contrast, a person entering any one of these types of agreements would be obligated to separate the tithes (Radbaz).
79.
See the Kessef Mishneh who debates whether, to be obligated, the Jew must purchase the field or it is sufficient for him to purchase the produce alone without purchasing the land. It appears that he concludes that if one does not purchase the field, he is exempt as indicated by Halachah 15.
80.
The Radbaz states that the Jew may not deduct from the tithes the portion of the produce that grew in the gentile's possession. Since it incurred the obligation for tithes while in the Jew's possession and was completed by him, everything else is not of consequence.
81.
I.e., when it reached a third of its development.
82.
As payment of the produce due the owner from his field.
83.
I.e., we allow for the possibility that the sharecropper sold the produce from the field and then purchased other produce to pay the owner his due. The rationale for this leniency is that since the obligation to tithe in Syria is Rabbinic in origin, as long as we are not definitely certain that it applies, we rule leniently. In Eretz Yisrael, he would have to separate the tithes (Radbaz).
84.
In such a situation, there is room to say that the principle of bereirah applies. Bereirah means that retroactively, it is considered as if the division that was ultimately made was made at the outset (see Hilchot Ma'aser 7:1). To explain within the context of the present situation: Were a portion of the field to belong to the gentile, there would be no obligation to separate the tithes from the grain that grew in that portion. To apply the principle of bereirah would mean that, after the division of the crops, it is clarified that at the outset, the portion of the field where the crops given to the gentile grew belonged to him. There is a debate among the Sages whether the principle ofbereirah can be applied and with regard to halachah, the accepted general principle is that in question of Scriptural Law, it does not apply. Thus in Eretz Yisrael, where the obligation to tithe is one of Scriptural Law, we do not accept this principle and maintain that the Jew has a share in the grain given to the gentile and hence, it is under obligation to be tithed.
85.
In this instance, all authorities agree that the principle of bereirah is not applied.
86.
Produce which is forbidden because the terumot and the tithes were not separated from it.
87.
Hence if a Jew purchases that produce, he must separate the terumot and the tithes.
88.
In such an instance, there is room to say that the principle of bereirah should be applied, because the obligation to separate the tithes is Rabbinic in origin. Nevertheless, since the fundamental obligation is Scriptural, we rule stringently even with regard to this dimension which is Rabbinic (Radbaz).
89.
Halachah 13.
90.
When quoting these laws, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 331:11) states that in the present age, when the obligation to separate terumot and tithes in Eretz Yisrael is Rabbinic in origin (see Halachah 26), the laws applying to produce grown in Syria also apply to produce grown in Eretz Yisrael.
91.
And from that verse which speaks of the obligation to separate challah, we learn that one is also obligated to separate the terumot and the tithes.
92.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the exemption from the obligation to tithe applies only according to Scriptural Law. According to Rabbinic Law, all authorities agree that one is obligated, for this produce is comparable to that of Ammon and Moav. The Radbaz does not accept this perspective, stating that there is no source which maintains that a Rabbinic obligation exists. The Radbaz does, however, qualify the Rambam's ruling, explaining that it applies only when the work that makes the produce obligated to be tithed is completed in the Diaspora. If this work is completed in Eretz Yisrael, the obligation to separate the tithes has already been incurred and they must be separated even if the produce was later taken to the Diaspora. For this reason, in most instances, terumah and tithes must be separated from produce that is grown inEretz Yisrael in the present age and later exported to the Diaspora. This, however, applies to fruits only, not vegetables as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 6.
93.
The Kessef Mishneh questions why the obligation to separate the tithes is only of Rabbinic origin. Since the concept is based on the exegesis of the same Biblical term as mentioned above, if the work that made the produce obligated to be tithed was performed in Eretz Yisrael, why is the obligation not Scriptural in origin? The Kessef Mishneh answers that since the prooftext mentions "the bread of the land," one can conclude that the obligation applies only to produce grown in the Holy Land itself. Alternatively, the Kessef Mishneh suggests that indeed if the work that makes the produce obligated to be tithed is completed only in Eretz Yisrael, the obligation is indeed Scriptural in origin. This ruling is quoted by the Siftei Cohen 331:22.
94.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 2:2).
95.
Even if it does not have a hole, since wood is porous, it is as if the earth on the ship is connected to the earth in Eretz Yisrael.
96.
I.e., if the trunk is located in Eretz Yisrael, the tithes must be separated from the produce. If it is located in the Diaspora, they need not.
The Rambam LeAm notes that the laws in this halachah must be qualified on the basis of Halachah 22. For if as stated there, everything depends on where the work that makes the produce obligated in the tithes is completed, of what difference does it make where the produce grows. That text explains that if the person separates tithes from produce that grew in the Diaspora before the work that makes the produce obligated in the tithes is completed, even if that work is completed in Eretz Yisrael, the tithes separated are not significant. For at the time, they were separated, there was no obligation to tithe the produce.
97.
Generally, if there is a hole in the bottom of a flowerpot, it is considered as if the plant is connected to the earth beneath it. Nevertheless, in this instance, Gittin 22a teaches that we follow the foliage of the plant and not the position of the hole in the flower pot.
98.
Who brought about a consecration of Eretz Yisrael that is effective until the present day, as stated in Halachah 5.
99.
More precisely, the majority of the Jewish people, for the majority is considered equivalent to the entire whole.
100.
There is no such phrase in the Torah stated with regard to terumah or the tithes. The commentaries explain that Ketubot 25a makes such a statement with regard to the mitzvah ofchallah based on Numbers 15:18 and the laws regarding terumah are derived from it. See also a parallel ruling in Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 10:8.
101.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the obligation to separate terumah has the status of a Scriptural commandment in the present age. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam's position and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah331:2), he rules accordingly.
102.
In the era of Mashiach. At that time, the observance of all the agricultural laws will return to Scriptural status, as stated in Hilchot Melachim 11:1.
103.
Indeed, we find several sources (Yoma 9b) where our Sages criticized the majority of the people for remaining in Babylonia.
104.
The commentaries point to Ezra 2:62-63 as indicating that in the era of the Second Temple,terumah was still observed with the status of a Scriptural mitzvah. For Ezra and Nechemiah restricted the priests whose lineage was not affirmed from partaking of it. Nevertheless, it can be explained that at that time, they were expecting the majority of the people to return and then, the status of the mitzvah would revert to that of Scriptural origin. Lest confusion arise concerning these priests were this to occur, they enforced these restrictions.
105.
See Hilchot Ma'aser 1:7 which points to several dimensions of the equivalence between terumahand the tithes.
106.
Although in Halachah 1, the Rambam writes that the Scriptural status of terumah and the tithes is not dependent on the Temple, there is no contradiction to this halachah. If the majority of the Jewish people are located in Eretz Yisrael, these mitzvos have the status of Scriptural Law, even if the Temple is not standing. Conversely, even if the Temple is standing, if the majority of the Jewish people are not located in Eretz Yisrael (as was the case in the Second Temple era), the status of these commandments is Rabbinic (Radbaz).
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• 3 Chapters: Order of Prayers Order of Prayers - The Text of the Grace After Meals, Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter One, Shabbat Shabbat - Chapter Two
• English Text | Hebrew Text | Audio: Listen | Download• Order of Prayers - The Text of the Grace After Meals
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם הזן את העולם כולו בטובו בחן ובחסד וברחמים ומפרנס לכל כאמור פותח את ידך ומשביע לכל חי רצון1 ומכין מזון לכל בריותיו אשר ברא ברוך אתה יי' הזן את הכל
נודה לך יי' אלהינו ונברכך מלכנו כי הנחלת את אבותינו ארץ חמדה טובה ורחבה ברית ותורה על שהוצאתנו מארץ מצרים ופדיתנו מבית עבדים על תורתך שלמדתנו על חוקי רצונך שהודעתנו על כולם יי' אלהינו אנו מודים לך ומברכים את שמך כאמור2 ואכלת ושבעת וברכת את יי' אלהיך על הארץ הטובה אשר נתן לך ברוך אתה יי' על הארץ ועל המזון
רחם יי' אלהינו על ישראל עמך ועל ירושלים עירך ועל ציון משכן כבודך ועל הבית הגדול והקדוש שנקרא שמך עליו ומלכות דוד משיחך תחזיר למקומה בימינו ובנה ירושלים בקרוב כאשר דברת ברוך אתה יי' בונה ברחמיו את ירושלים
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם האל אבינו מלכנו אדירנו בוראנו גואלנו קדושנו קדוש יעקב המלך הטוב והמטיב שבכל יום ויום גומלנו חן וחסד ורחמים וכל טוב הרחמן ישתבח לדור דורים הרחמן יתפאר לנצח נצחים הרחמן יזכנו לימות המשיח ולבנין בית המקדש ולחיי העולם הבא מגדול ישועות מלכו וגו'3 כפירים רשו ורעבו וגו'4 הודו ליי' כי טוב כי לעולם חסדו:5
המפטיר בנביא מברך לפניה – One who reads the Haftorah from the works of the Prophets should recite the following blessing before the reading:
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם אשר בחר בנביאים טובים ורצה בדבריהם הנאמרים באמת ברוך אתה יי' הבוחר בתורה ובמשה עבדו ובישראל עמו ובנביאי האמת והצדק
ומברך לאחריה - After the reading, he should recite the following blessings:
ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם צור כל העולמים צדיק בכל הדורות האל הנאמן האומר ועושה מדבר ומקיים אשר כל דבריו אמת וצדק נאמן אתה הוא יי' אלהינו ונאמנים דבריך ודבר אחד מדבריך אחור לא ישוב ריקם כי אל נאמן אתה ברוך אתה יי' האל הנאמן בכל דבריו
רחם על ציון כי היא בית חיינו ולעגומת נפש תושיע מהרה בימינו ותבנה מהרה ברוך אתה יי' בונה ירושלים
את צמח דוד עבדך מהרה תצמיח וקרנו תרום בישועתך ברוך אתה יי' מגן דוד
על התורה ועל העבודה ועל הנביאים ועל יום המנוח הזה שנתת לנו יי' אלהינו לקדושה לכבוד ולתפארת על הכל אנו מברכין שמך ברוך אתה יי' מקדש השבת
וביום טוב הוא אומר- On a Festival, One Says
ועל יום טוב מקרא קדש הזה שנתת לנו לששון ולשמחה ברוך אתה יי' מקדש ישראל והזמנים
ואם היה שבת ויום טוב כולל שניהם וחותם
If the day is both the Sabbath and a festival, one should combine the two and conclude the blessing:
מקדש השבת וישראל והזמנים
כנוסח שהוא חותם בתפלה בברכה אמצעית באותו היום כך הוא חותם בברכה אחרונה זו
He concludes this last blessing in the same manner as he concludes the intermediate blessing of the Shemoneh Esreh that day.
הענינות שנהגו רוב העם לקרות מן הנביאים בכל שבת ושבת ומפטירין בהן ואלו הן:
The Passages from the Prophets that Most of the People are Accustomed to Read Each Sabbath as the Haftorah:
בראשית הן עבדי אתמך בו עד אלה הדברים עשיתים ולא עזבתים בישעיה6
תולדות נח רני עקרה לא ילדה עד הטו אזנכם ולכו אלי בישעיה7
לך לך ואל מי תדמיוני ואשוה עד כי אני יי' אענם אלהי ישראל בישעיה8
וירא אליו ואשה אחת מנשי בני הנביאים עד ותשא את בנה ותצא במלכים9
ויהיו חיי שרה תחלת הספר עד יחי אדוני המלך לעולם במלכים10
תולדות יצחק משא דבר יי' אל ישראל ביד מלאכי עד וערבה ליי' מנחת וגו' בתרי עשר11
ויצא יעקב ועמי תלואים למשובתי עד ובנביא העלה בתרי עשר12
וישלח יעקב חזון עובדיה עד סוף ספרו בתרי עשר13
וישב יעקב על שלשה פשעי ישראל עד אריה שאג מי לא יירא בתרי עשר14
ויהי מקץ וייקץ שלמה והנה חלום עד ויהי המלך שלמה מלך במלכים15
ויגש אליו ואתה בן אדם קח לך עץ אחד עד וידעו הגוים כי אני יי' ביחזקאל16
ויחי יעקב ויקרבו ימי דוד למות עד ושלמה ישב על כסא דוד אביו במלכים17
ואלה שמות בן אדם הודע את ירושלים עד ויצא לך שם ביחזקאל18
וארא ולא יהיה עוד לבית ישראל עד ביום ההוא אצמיח קרן לבית ישראל ביחזקאל19
בא אל פרעה משא מצרים עד אשר ברכו ה' צבאות בישעיה20
ויהי בשלח שירת דבורה מן ויכנע אלהים עד ותשקוט הארץ ארבעים שנה בשופטים21
וישמע יתרו בשנת מות המלך עוזיהו עד למרבה המשרה בישעיה22
ואלה המשפטים הדבר אשר היה אל ירמיהו עד לא יכרת איש ליונדב בן רכב בירמיה23
ויקחו לי ויי' נתן חכמה לשלמה עד ושכנתי בתוך בני ישראל במלכים24
ואתה תצוה הגד את בני ישראל את הבית עד ורציתי אתכם ביחזקאל25
כי תשא ודבר יי' היתה אל אליהו עד וירכב אחאב וילך במלכים26
ויקהל וישלח המלך שלמה ויקח את חירם מצר עד ותתם מלאכת במלכים27
ואלה פקודי ויעש חירם עד והפתות לדלתות הבית (במלכים)28
ויקרא עם זו יצרתי לי עד כה אמר יי' מלך ישראל בישעיה29
צו את אהרן עולותיכם ספו על זבחיכם עד באלה חפצתי נאם יי' בירמיהו30
ויהי ביום השמיני ויוסף עוד דוד את כל בחור בישראל עד כל אשר בלבבך בשמואל31
אשה כי תזריע ואיש בא מבעל שלישה עד וילך אתו כברת ארץ במלכים32
זאת תהיה וארבעה אנשים ומדלג עד ולא השליכם מעל פניו במלכים33
אחרי מות התשפוט התשפוט עד ונחלת בך לעיני הגוים ביחזקאל34
קדושים תהיו באו אנשים מזקני ישראל עד צבי היא לכל הארצות ביחזקאל 35
אמר אל הכהנים והכהנים הלוים בני צדוק עד כל נבלה וטרפה ביחזקאל36
בהר סיני יי' עוזי ומעזי עד רפאני יי' וארפא בירמיה37
אם בחוקתי הנבא על רועי ישראל עד והצלתים מיד העובדים בהם ביחזקאל38
במדבר סיני והיה מספר בני ישראל עד וארשתיך לי באמונה בתרי עשר39
נשא ויהי איש אחד מצרעה עד ויגדל הנער ויברכהו יי' בשופטים40
בהעלותך רני ושמחי בת ציון עד ידי זרובבל יסדו הבית בתרי עשר41
שלח לך וישלח יהושע בן נון עד וגם נמוגו כל יושבי וגו' ביהושע42
ויקח קרח ויאמר שמואל אל העם עד כי לא יטוש יי' את עמו בשמואל43
זאת חקת התורה ויפתח הגלעדי עד מימים ימימה בשופטים44
וירא בלק והיה שארית יעקב עד והצנע לכת עם אלהיך בתרי עשר45
פנחס ויד יי' היתה אל אליהו עד ויקם וילך אחרי אליהו במלכים46
ראשי המטות ויתן משה למטה בני ראובן עד מחלק את הארץ ביהושע47
אלה מסעי אלו הנחלות עד ויתנו בני ישראל ללוים ביהושע48
אלה הדברים אשר דבר יי' אל ישראל עד והייתם לי לעם בירמיה49
ואתחנן ואתפלל אל יי' אחרי תת את ספר המקנה עד שדות בכסף יקנו בירמיה50
והיה עקב הלוך וקראת באזני ירושלים עד והתברכו בו כל גוים ובו יתהללו בירמיה 51
ראה אנכי הנה ימים באים נאם יי' והקימותי עד אם יסתר איש במסתרים בירמיה52
שופטים ויהי כאשר זקן שמואל עד ויאמר שמואל אל אנשי ישראל לכו בשמואל53
כי תצא ויאספו פלשתים את מחניהם עד ויי' יהיה עמך בשמואל54
והיה כי תבא אז יבנה יהושע מזבח עד ולא היה כיום ההוא ביהושע55
אתם נצבים ויאסף יהושע את כל שבטי ישראל עד כרמים וזיתים אשר לא נטעתם ביהושע56
האזינו ולקחתי אני מצמרת הארז עד והשיבו וחיו ביחזקאל57
וזאת הברכה ויהי אחרי מות משה עבד יי' ומדלג עד ויהי יי' את יהושע ביהושע58
כל שבת שקורין בה שתי פרשיות מפטירין בה מענין פרשה אחרונה וזו המנהג ברוב המקומות וכן נהגו רוב העם להיות מפטירין בנחמות ישעיהו מאחר תשעה באב עד ראש השנה
On every Sabbath, that two parshiyot are read, the Haftorah follows the theme of the last parshah. This is the custom in most places. Similarly, the majority of the people follow the custom of reading Haftorot from the comforting prophecies of Isaiah from after Tishah B'Av until Rosh HaShanah.
בשבת שאחר תשעה באב – נחמו נחמו עמי59 – On the Sabbath follow Tishah B'Av
בשניה ותאמר ציון60 – On the second Sabbath
בשלישית עניה סערה61 - On the third
ברביעית אנכי אנכי הוא מנחמכם62 - On the fourth
בחמישית רני עקרה63 - On the fifth
בששית קומי אורי64 - On the sixth
בשביעית שוש אשיש ביי'65
– On the seventh
בריך רחמנא דסייען
נגמר ספר שני ומנין פרקיו ששה וארבעים
הלכות ק"ש – 4 פרקים
הלכות תפלה וברכת כהנים – 15 פרקים
הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה – 10 פרקים
הלכות ציצית – 3 פרקים
הלכות ברכות – 11 פרקים
הלכות מילה – 3 פרקים
Blessed be the Merciful One Who grants assistance.
This concludes the second volume with the help of the Almighty. There are a total of 46 chapters in this volume.

Hilchot Kri'at Shema - 4 chapters
Hilchot Tefillah UVirkat Kohanim - 15 chapters
Hilchot Tefillin UMezuzah V'Sefer Torah - 10 chapters
Hilchot Tzitzit - 3 chapters
Hilchot Berachot - 11 chapters
Hilchot Milah - 3 chapters
FOOTNOTES
1.
2.
3.
II Samuel 22:51. It is common custom to recite this verse only on the Sabbath and festivals and during the week to recite a similar verse, Psalms 18:51. The latter verse implies a progression towards redemption and is thus appropriate during the week when the challenges of exile are acutely felt. The verse cited by the Rambam looks forward to the time when the redemption will be an established fact and, hence, is fitting for these days of spiritual content.
4.
5.
Ibid. 136:1.
6.
Isaiah 42:1-16. At present, the custom is to read from 42:5-43:10.
7.
Ibid. 54:1-55:3. At present, Sephardic custom is to conclude with 54:10 and Ashkenazic custom to conclude with 55:5.
8.
Ibid. 40:25-41:17. At present, the custom is to read from 40:27-41:16.
9.
II Kings 4:1-37. Sephardic custom is to conclude with verse 23.
10.
11.
Malachi 1:1-3:4. At present, the custom is to conclude with 2:7.
12.
Hoshea 11:7-12:14. At present, in many communities, Sephardic custom is to conclude with 12:12. Ashkenazic custom is to begin with 12:13 and to conclude with 13:10.
13.
Ovadiah 1:1-21. This represents the custom in Sephardic and some Ashkenazic communities. Other Ashkenazic communities read Hoshea 11:7-12:14.
14.
Amos 2:6-3:8.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Ezekiel 16:1-14. At present, Sephardic custom is to read from Jeremiah 1:1-2:3. Ashkenazic custom is to read from Isaiah 27:6-28:13, 29:22-23.
19.
20.
Isaiah 19:1-25. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 46:13-28.
21.
Judges 4:23-5:31. At present, Sephardic custom is to begin from 5:1. Ashkenazic custom is to begin from 4:4.
22.
Isaiah 6:1-7:6, 9:5-6. This represents the contemporary Ashekenazic custom. Sephardic custom is to conclude with 6:13.
23.
Jeremiah 35:1-19. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 34:8-22, 33:25-26.
24.
25.
26.
I Kings 18:1-46. At present, the Ashkenazic custom is to conclude at verse 39. Sephardic custom is to conclude at that verse, but to begin at verse 20.
27.
I Kings 7:13-22. At present, the Sephardic custom is to conclude at verse 26. Ashkenazic custom is to read verses 40-50.
28.
I Kings 40:50. This represents the contemporary Sephardic custom. Ashekenazic custom is to read Ibid. 7:51-8:21.
29.
Isaiah 43:21-44:6. At present, the custom is to continue to 44:23.
30.
Jeremiah 7:21-9:23. At present, the custom is to read until 8:3 and conclude with 9:22-23.
31.
II Samuel 6:1-7:3. At present, the Sephardic custom is to conclude at verse 6:19. Ashkenazic custom is to read until 7:17.
32.
33.
II Kings 7:3-20, 13:23.
34.
Ezekiel 22:1-16. This represents the contemporary Sephardic custom. Ashekenazic custom is to read Amos 9:7-15.
35.
Ezekiel 20:1-15. At present, Sephardic custom is to begin from 20:1 and conclude at 20:20. Ashkenazic custom is to read Ezekiel 22:1-16.
36.
Ibid. 44:15-31.
37.
Jeremiah 16:19-17:14. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 32:6-27.
38.
Ezekiel 34:1-27. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 16:19-17:14.
39.
40.
Judges 13:2-24. At present, the custom is to read until 13:25.
41.
Zechariah 2:14-4:9. At present, the custom is to conclude at 4:7.
42.
43.
44.
Judges 11:1-40. Contemporary custom is to conclude at verse 33.
45.
46.
I Kings 18:46-19:21. At present, the custom is to read this passage only when Shabbos Parshas Pinchas does not fall in the Three Weeks of Mourning.
47.
Joshua 13:15-14:5. As stated in Hilchot Tefilah 13:19, at present, the custom on this and the other two Sabbaths before the fast of Tishah B'Av is to read Haftorot warning of the destruction of Jerusalem. On the Sabbaths after Tishah B'Av until Rosh HaShanah, the custom is to readHaftoros of consolation as the Rambam states.
48.
Ibid. 19:51-21:3.
49.
50.
Ibid. 32:16-44.
51.
Ibid. 2:1-4:2.
52.
Ibid. 23:5-24.
53.
54.
Ibid. 17:1-37.
55.
Joshua 8:30-10:14.
56.
Ibid. 24:13. Significantly, the Rambam does not mention a Haftorah for Parshas VaYeilech. That omission can possibly be explained on the basis of the words of Rav Saadia Gaon in his Siddurthat at times Parshas Nitzavim is divided, while in other instances, he speaks of combining twoparshiyot. Thus there is only one Haftorah for Nitzavim-Vayeilech (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 19). In practice, when VaYeilech is read separately, it falls on Shabbat Shuvah and the Haftorahhighlights the theme of that Sabbath including the following readings: Hoshea 14:2-10. Joel 2:11-27, Michah 7:18-20.
57.
At present, the custom is to read the song of David, II Samuel 22:1-41.
58.
Joshua 1:1-18, 6:27.
59.
60.
Ibid. 49:14-51:3.
61.
Ibid. 54:11-55:5.
62.
Ibid. 51:12-52:2.
63.
Ibid. 54:1-10. This follows the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text reverses the order of this and the following Sabbath.
64.
Ibid. 60:1-22.
65.
Ibid. 61:10-63:9.

Shabbat - Chapter One

Halacha 1
Resting from labor on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, for [ibid.20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on it]."
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, he is liable for karet; if witnesses who administer a warning are present, he should be stoned [to death]. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression, he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.
Commentary Halacha 1
Resting from labor - Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)
The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities - even those that are not forbidden labors - which would disrupt this tranquility.
From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.)
on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment - Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." -In Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah.Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular.
Anyone who performs labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, - Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective.
for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor on it." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly - i.e., without being forced by others
as a conscious act of defiance - and not inadvertently.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, the Rambam merely states "as a conscious act of defiance."
The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary.
he is liable for karet - כרת means "cut off." Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being "cut off in this world" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come.
if witnesses who administer a warning are present - As explained inHilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed.
he should be stoned [to death]. - See Numbers 15:35. This is the most severe form of execution.
If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression - accidentally, performing a forbidden labor or doing so without awareness of the transgression involved
he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature. - The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required from a קרבן עולה ויורד - a guilt offering - which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.
Halacha 2
Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is liable" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for karet, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering.1
Halacha 3
Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.2
In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic3 in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."4Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion5is given "stripes for defiance."
Halacha 4
Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act.6 Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]7
Halacha 5
It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty8 - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor9 will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.10
What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench11 and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.12
Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair.13 Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.
Halacha 6
[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable14 even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].
What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken,15 he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 7
Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.16
What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing,17 but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.
Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him,18 and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 8
Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.19
What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.
How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit,20 and instead, the stone passed into the public domain.21 He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable.22 For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground,23 he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 9
Should a person intend24 to pick black figs and pick white figs instead25 - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable.26 He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade.
Halacha 10
When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable,27 for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.28
To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being]29 and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.
Halacha 11
One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.30] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.31
If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable.32 The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.33
Halacha 12
Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable.34 If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.35
What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.
Halacha 13
[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt36 and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.37
Halacha 14
Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability,38 he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.39
For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.40
Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands.41 Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 15
Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself,42 they are [both] free of liability.43
This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.
Halacha 16
When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].44For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone,45 and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.
[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all.46 The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 17
Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.47 What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,48 one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.
A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.49 Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.
Halacha 18
Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable.50 For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place,51 one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.
The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.52
Halacha 19
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally,53 he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.
One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning.54 Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature55 when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Rambam is explaining that by performing a forbidden act on the Sabbath, a person incurs liability. The nature of this liability depends on his intent and on whether witnesses are present. These factors are common, however, to all the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore, in the future, all that is necessary to say is that "the person is liable," and based on the principles stated here, we can determine what his liability is.
2.
Shabbat 3a makes a similar statement of principle, but states that there are three exceptions to this rule. When discussing these exceptions, the Rambam deviates from the terminology used in the Talmud and states that these three acts are "permitted."
3.
Our translation reflects the usual interpretation of the Hebrew expression מדברי סופרים. There are commentaries (e.g., the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut 2:1) who cite the Rambam's statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2) and explain that this expression can refer to a prohibition of the Torah which is derived through the accepted traditions of Biblical exegesis. In this instance, however, the Rambam's intent is clear; the term refers to prohibitions that the Rabbis instituted on their own initiative as safeguards.
4.
The Rambam discusses this punishment in Hilchot Edut 18:6, explaining that the person is flogged to the extent of the court's discretion (in contrast to the number of lashes received for the violation of a Torah command, which is fixed at 39). Other authorities offer different interpretations.
5.
Shoshanat Ha'amakim states that this expression implies that a person must be given a warning before such a punishment is administered.
6.
I.e., there is no prohibition whatsoever for performing the act in question.
7.
This expression implies that, at the outset, it is improper to perform such an act. Nevertheless, doing so does not warrant punishment (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh).
8.
If, however, it is certain that the forbidden labor will be performed, it is prohibited to perform the permitted act, as explained in the following halachah.
9.
Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 9), explains that by using the term "forbidden labor" in this and the following halachah, the Rambam implies that there is a difficulty only if a prohibition from the Torah is involved. If merely a Rabbinic prohibition is concerned, it is permitted without question. This question is also discussed by the Mishneh L'Melech.
10.
The Rambam's decision is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (See Beitzah 23b and other sources.) Rabbi Shimon maintains that although a forbidden labor results from a person's activity, since he did not desire that this labor be performed, he is not held liable. Rabbi Yehudah, in contrast, holds the person liable, for his actions brought about the performance of a forbidden labor.
The commentaries explain Rabbi Shimon's opinion based on the principle (Chaggigah 10b) that "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." A deed is forbidden only when it is associated with a purposeful intent. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
The concept discussed in this halachah, אינו מתכוין, differs from an ordinary example of a labor performed unintentionally. When we speak of a labor performed unintentionally (בשוגג), the person had no thought whatsoever of performing a forbidden activity. In the case of אינו מתכוין, by contrast, the person performs an act consciously with the knowledge that there is a possibility that it may lead to a forbidden act. Nevertheless, since there is no certainty that the transgression will be committed, he is not held liable.
Although this principle is applicable to the Sabbath laws in particular, the difference of opinion between these two sages on this issue is relevant, not only to the Sabbath laws, but to all other prohibitions in the Torah as well.
Based on Pesachim 25b-26b, it appears that one is allowed to perform an activity that may result in the incidental performance of a forbidden labor even when one has an alternative manner of accomplishing one's objective, which does not involve any risk of a forbidden labor being performed. See Hilchot Kilayim 10:16.
11.
Our text follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, which quotes the text ofShabbat 22b. The original manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute מגדל, "cabinet," instead ofספסל, "bench."
12.
Digging a groove is forbidden because it is included in the category of forbidden labor, plowing. Nevertheless, since one did not intend to perform this labor, the fact that it was performed is of no consequence. Similarly, all the subsequent activities mentioned by the Rambam involve the performance of a forbidden labor without the intent to do so.
13.
See Chapter 22, Halachah 13.
14.
As mentioned in Halachah 2, the use of this term implies that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham). Although some authorities have explained that since the person had no intent for the labor itself, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature, from the Rambam's perspective it appears that since he knows that the labor will be performed, it is considered as if he performed it intentionally.
15.
The addition of the word "merely" implies that the person has a desire to slaughter the fowl. Albeit, his desire may not be to kill the fowl for food, but even for use as a toy it is preferable that the fowl be dead than alive.
This leads to another concept. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). In his notes on Chapter 10, Halachah 17, Rabbenu Chayim Soloveitchik states that the Rambam also subscribes to this opinion.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:18) gives an example of this situation: The plug of a barrel of wine was closed with flax. Although some wine will inevitably be squeezed out when the barrel is unplugged - and squeezing is a forbidden labor - since the wine that is squeezed out will be lost, there is no prohibition.
This opinion is not, however, accepted by all authorities. Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher in their glosses on Shabbat 103a differ and maintain that, since it is inevitable that a forbidden labor will be performed, such an act is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch's statements, it would appear that it is preferable to follow the more stringent view, but that the more lenient perspective has become popularly accepted.
16.
This also represents a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as evident from Shabbat 29b-30a, 73b, and other sources.
As in the laws mentioned in Halachah 7, the source of their difference of opinion is Rabbi Shimon's principle, "the Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." To explain: The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is derived from the labors performed to construct the Sanctuary (see the commentary on Chapter 7, Law 1), and with regard to the construction of the Sanctuary, the Torah uses the expression, מלאכת מחשבת, "contemplative work." Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the Torah's prohibition against labor is related to thought. Only when one's actions are purposeful can they be forbidden.
For this reason, Rabbi Shimon maintains - as explained in Halachah 5 - that when a person performs a forbidden labor without the intention to do so (אינו מתכוין), he is not liable. Although a forbidden activity results from his conduct, since his thought was not involved in the matter, his work does not resemble the labor that was necessary to construct the Sanctuary. Hence, one is not held liable for such labor on the Sabbath.
In the situation at hand, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, the person performing the forbidden labor is doing so intentionally. Nevertheless, since his intent is not the same as that ordinarily associated - or according to some authorities, associated at the time of the construction of the Sanctuary - with this labor, he is not held liable. (See the comments of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh.)
Rabbi Yehudah differs on both issues, maintaining that since the performance of a forbidden labor results from this person's conscious activity, he is held liable. The Rambam (following the opinion of Shemuel, Zevachim 92a) accepts Rabbi Shimon's view with regard to אינו מתכוין, but follows Rabbi Yehudah's view with regard to a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
The difference between these opinions can be explained based on the interpretation of the command תשבות, "rest," on which basis we observe the Sabbath laws. We find another difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and the other Sages (Pesachim 27a) concerning a word with a similar root. With regard to the command (Exodus 12:15)תשביתו שאור, "destroy leaven," Rabbi Yehudah maintains that leaven must be burned. The other Sages (including Rabbi Shimon) maintain that leaven may be destroyed be other means.
What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the destruction of leaven must be utter and complete as possible, while the Sages maintain that all that is necessary is to negate its usefulness (potential for purposeful use). Similarly, in the present instance, Rabbi Yehudah explains that all semblances of labor are forbidden on the Sabbath. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that only purposeful labor is forbidden; only when both the activity and the intent for which it is performed are analogous to the activities performed to construct the Sanctuary is a transgression committed. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 7, p. 190-191.)
Shemuel and the Rambam take an intermediate position. They agree with Rabbi Shimon that an activity must be coupled with a purposeful intent, but maintain that since a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is an intentional act, it is forbidden as such a combination.
It must be noted that the Rambam's view is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra'avad, Tosafot(Zevachim, ibid.) and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities state that Rabbi Shimon's opinion is accepted in both these instances. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1, 334:12) acceptsTosafot's decision. Nevertheless, even the authorities who accept Rabbi Shimon's view maintain that, if there is no danger to the community involved, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree.
17.
I.e., his intent in extinguishing the lamp was not to produce coals to use for kindling an even flame, the purpose for which extinguishing was performed in constructing the Sanctuary.
18.
I.e., when constructing the Sanctuary, articles were transported because they were desired, and coals were extinguished to use for kindling an even flame.
19.
Although the instance stated by the Rambam is not found in the Talmud, it is a logical extension of the principle stated in Keritot 19b and Shabbat 97b (and expressed in the following halachah), "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." Since the labor ultimately performed was not the one originally intended, this is not considered to be "purposeful work."
20.
As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, a carmelit is a domain in which the Sages applied the prohibitions against transporting and throwing articles which apply in the public domain by virtue of Torah law. Thus, the person had the intent of violating merely a Rabbinic law.
21.
The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Chapter 13, Halachah 21, which states that even when a person intended to throw an object four cubits in the public domain and instead the object traveled eight cubits, he is not held liable, because he did not accomplish his intent. Hence, he explains that the intent is not that the public domain is beyond the carmelit and the object did not rest in thecarmelit as intended, but rather continued to the public domain.
Instead, the Rambam is referring to an instance where a person is standing in a private domain with both a public domain and a carmelit before him. Although he intended to throw the object into the carmelit, it traveled into the public domain.
22.
See Hilchot Shegagot 7:11. This halachah represents a progressive sequence. In the first instance mentioned, the forbidden activity the person intended to perform was not performed at all. In the second instance, he intended to perform the forbidden activity - removing an object from his property - but his intent was not to transgress a Torah prohibition. In this third instance, the person had the intent of performing the activity that he performed for the sake of the result that activity produced. Nevertheless, since he desired to perform this activity with a permitted entity and that aspect of the desire was not fulfilled, he is not held liable (Rav Kapach).
23.
The Maggid Mishneh offers two different interpretations of the Rambam's words: one that the person cut a different plant from the one he intended to cut, and one that he thought the plant he intended to cut had been detached from the earth, and discovered that it was attached. Although, both interpretations are halachically acceptable, the Maggid Mishneh favors the second one. TheKovetz and other authorities, however, favor the first.
24.
This halachah develops the theme stated in the previous halachah, giving a further example of a case where a person is not held liable for a forbidden activity he performed, because of the principle, "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]."
25.
The difference in the color of the figs causes them to be regarded as two different types of fruit. This is significant, as is obvious from the contrast to the following halachah.
26.
The Ra'avad takes issue with this point, arguing that since the person picking the fruit accomplished his objective, he should be held liable. It is insignificant that the order in which he picked them differed from that which he originally intended.
It can be explained, based on Keritot 19b, that the Rambam's understanding is that for a person to be held liable, not only must he accomplish his ultimate intent, but also, while he is performing the labor, his actions must be controlled by his thoughts.
Commenting on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh notes that there is no difference regarding practical halachah at present. The only difference will be in the Era of the Redemption, at which time there will be a question whether it is necessary for such a person to bring a sin offering or not, and in that era, "the righteous instructor (Mashiach) will come" and render a decision.
27.
This is the text of Keritot 20a according to the Rambam and others. Our text of Keritot differs and frees a person of liability in such an instance. On this basis, the Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's position.
28.
In contrast to the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person does not derive any advantage from kindling or extinguishing either candle; he merely wants to kindle or distinguish a candle. The same effect results from kindling or extinguishing one as the other. Hence he is liable, for he performed a forbidden labor, and he is considered to have performed it willfully. Were there to be an advantage to kindling or extinguishing one of the two candles, the situation would resemble that described in Halachah 11.
29.
The intent does not appear to be that he desired to kill a person, for it is highly unlikely that there would be no difference killing one person or the other. Rather, the Rambam appears to be referring to the killing of an insect or an animal, an act that is also forbidden on the Sabbath.
30.
The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Keritot 20a.
31.
As in Halachah 9, the fact that the person did not perform the tasks in the order in which he originally intended indicates that, at the time he performed them, he was not in control of his deeds. Hence, this is not considered to be "purposeful work." In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs and holds the person liable.
The new concept this halachah teaches is that even when the tasks which the person intended to perform involve two separate labors (as opposed to Halachah 9 when only a single forbidden labor is involved), he is held liable only when he performs the tasks in the order he originally intended.
32.
Since the order in which the person desired to perform the activity was not reversed, his actions are "purposeful work."
33.
Rashi, Keritot 19b, differentiates between this type of behavior, referred to as מתעסק, and an inadvertent transgression of a commandment (שוגג) as follows: When a person transgressesבשוגג, he willfully performs the forbidden activity, but is unaware of the prohibition involved. In all the situations described as מתעסק, the person may be aware of the prohibition, but is not consciously controlling his behavior.
34.
Although he accepts the Rambam's premise, the Ra'avad objects to the wording the Rambam chose, explaining that there is an instance - a person who desired to write the name שמעון and instead, wrote the name שם - where a person does not fulfill his intention and is still liable.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, the person also had the intent to write the letters of the name שם and is therefore held liable, as implied by Halachah 14. By putting the focus on intent, the Rambam emphasizes that the leniency stated in this halachah is also an outgrowth of the principle that "The Torah prohibited purposeful work."
35.
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the expression "he is not liable," means that a person should not be punished - nor is he liable to bring a sin offering - for his deed. Nevertheless, performing such a deed constitutes the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. As mentioned, this concept is applicable throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the Mishneh Torah as a whole.
36.
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:4. Rashi and others offer alternate definitions of the term.
37.
The intent here is that since it is usual for the article to shift position in such an instance, this is considered to be part of the person's original intent.
Although this law is more specific than most mentioned in this chapter, it is still worthy of mention, because it illustrates how a person's intention can be general in nature and include several different possible ways in which a forbidden labor could be performed.
38.
Here the Rambam introduces a new concept, שיעור, the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. When the Torah forbade the performance of labor on the Sabbath, it also specified that a person is not held liable unless his activities are sufficient to bring about a significant result. Thus, a particular שיעור was established for every specific labor.
A similar concept applies with regard to other prohibitions. For example, with regard to most forbidden foods one is not held liable unless one eats an amount equivalent to the size of an olive.
[Yoma 74 discusses whether a person who performs a forbidden activity, but does so involving less than a שיעור, is considered to have violated a prohibition from the Torah (although he is not liable for punishment or a sin offering) or whether he is considered to have violated merely a Rabbinic commandment.]
39.
One might think that since the person did not complete his intended objective, his activity is not considered "purposeful labor." The Rambam explains, however, that since the work the person did complete was performed "purposefully," and since he completed a significant amount of work (a שיעור), he is held liable.
40.
See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.
41.
See Chapter 9, Halachah 18.
42.
A situation in which a forbidden labor requires the efforts of more than one individual is discussed in the following halachah.
43.
Shabbat 3a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, explaining that that verse teaches that one is liable only "when one performs the entire labor and not a portion of it; when one person performs the labor and not two."
See also Rashi, Shabbat 93a and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:7 explain that a person is not liable for performing a labor in this manner, because this is not the ordinary manner in which the labor is performed.
44.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the same applies when a forbidden labor is performed by three or more individuals and the performance of the forbidden labor requires the efforts of all the individuals involved. Nevertheless, if three individuals perform a forbidden labor and it requires only the efforts of two, none of the individuals is held liable, for no one is capable of performing the task alone.
45.
Tosafot, Shabbat 93a emphasizes that the matter is not dependent on strength alone. Even when a person has sufficient strength to carry an object alone, but requires a second person's assistance because of the object's bulk, neither is liable. In practice, the transfer of the object requires both their efforts.
46.
This principle is also applied in other contexts aside from the laws of the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Tum'at Mishkav UMoshav 7:6 and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 5:18. See also the commentary to the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.)
47.
As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.
(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.)
48.
However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion.
49.
The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (see Halachah 7), for the digger has no desire for the pit, the object of the work. As mentioned, other authorities free a person in such an instance; the Rambam, however, would normally hold one liable.
50.
Indeed, several of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath - e.g., tearing, erasing, and demolishing - involve activities that are essentially destructive in nature. Nevertheless, when one performs these activities for an ultimate constructive intent, one is held liable.
51.
The commentaries note the contrast between the Rambam's wording in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 15, where he omits the expression, "in its place." Accordingly, the commentaries question whether one is liable for demolishing a building for the sake of building another, when the other building will not be built in the place of the first. (See the gloss of the Or Sameach on Chapter 10, Halachah 12.)
52.
For example, the minimum measure (שיעור) for which one is liable for the constructive act of writing is two letters. Therefore, one is liable for erasing two letters. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 9, a person is liable when he erases one letter which is large enough for two to be written in its place.
53.
The definition of "unintentionally" (בשוגג) is that one is unaware that the activity is forbidden, or one is unaware that the day is the Sabbath. Thus, the situation described by the Rambam would involve, for example, writing one letter knowing that it is the Sabbath and that it is forbidden to do so, and writing a second letter having forgotten either of these factors.
54.
See Halachah 1.
55.
See Halachah 1.

Shabbat - Chapter Two

Halacha 1
The [laws of] the Sabbath are suspended1 in the face of a danger to life,2 as are [the obligations of] the other mitzvot. Therefore, we may perform - according to the directives of a professional physician3 of that locale4 - everything that is necessary for the benefit of a sick person whose life is in danger.
When there is a doubt whether or not the Sabbath laws must be violated on a person's behalf, one should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf, for the Sabbath laws are suspended even when there is merely a question of danger to a person's life. [The same principles apply] when one physician says the Sabbath laws should be violated on a person's behalf and another physician states that this is not necessary.5
Halacha 2
[The following laws apply when physicians] determine on the Sabbath that a person needs [a treatment to be administered] for eight days. We do not say that we should wait until the evening so that it will not be necessary to violate two Sabbaths on his behalf.6 Instead, the treatment is begun immediately, on the Sabbath, and even one hundred Sabbaths may be violated on his behalf.
As long as a person is dangerously [ill] - or even if there is a question whether or not he is dangerously [ill] - and requires treatment, [the Sabbath] should be violated [on his behalf]. A lamp may be lit on his behalf and extinguished on his behalf.7 [Animals] may be slaughtered on his behalf, [food] baked and cooked on his behalf, and water heated for him, whether to drink or to use for bathing.
The general principle for a person who is dangerously ill is that the Sabbath should be considered as a weekday regarding all his needs.8
Halacha 3
When such treatment is administered, it should not be administered by gentiles,9 by children,10 by servants, or by women,11 so that they will not view the Sabbath flippantly.12 Instead, the treatment should be administered by the leaders of Israel13 and the wise.
It is forbidden to hesitate before transgressing the Sabbath [laws] on behalf of a person who is dangerously ill,14 as [reflected in the interpretation in the phrase of Leviticus 18:5,] "which a person shall perform to live through them," as "['to live through them'] and not to die through them."
This teaches that the judgments of the Torah do not [bring] vengeance to the world, but rather bring mercy, kindness, and peace to the world. Concerning those non-believers who say that [administering such treatment] constitutes a violation of the Sabbath and is forbidden,15 one may apply the verse [Ezekiel 20:25]: "[As punishment,] I gave them harmful laws and judgments through which they cannot live."16
Halacha 4
When a person's eyes are ailing - i.e., when he has a secretion from either one or both of them, when tears flow from them due to great pain, when blood flows from them, or when they are affected by fever,17 or by other afflictions of this like - he is considered among those individuals who are dangerously ill.18The Sabbath may be violated on his behalf, and anything necessary for his treatment may be performed for him.19
Halacha 5
Similarly, a person who has a wound20 in his body cavity - from his lips inward,21 whether in his mouth, his digestive organs, his liver or spleen, or any of the other organs in his body cavity - is considered to be dangerously ill and does not require [a physician's] assessment [of his condition]. His ailment is serious, and we should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf immediately without [waiting for] an assessment.22
A wound on the back of the hand or on the back of the foot is considered equivalent to a wound in the body cavity. It does not require [a physician's] assessment [of his condition] for us to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. A fever that causes the flesh to wince23 is considered equivalent to a wound in the body cavity, and we should violate the Sabbath laws on this person's behalf.
Similarly, we should violate the Sabbath laws whenever a physician24assesses an ailment as dangerous, even when it affects only the exterior of a person's skin.
Halacha 6
When a person swallows a leech, water may be heated for him on the Sabbath, and any medical treatment that is necessary may be administered, since his life is in danger. Similarly, when a person is bitten by a rabid dog25 or a poisonous snake or other reptile, any medical treatment that is necessary to save him may be administered. [The same laws apply] even when there is merely a question of whether or not [the bite] can cause death.
Halacha 7
When physicians assessed that a sick person required a fig, and ten people ran and brought26 him ten figs at once,27 they are all absolved of liability entirely.28
[The same decision applies] if the ten people brought the figs one after another, even when he recuperated after the first fig, for all of them had license to bring them.
Halacha 8
If a sick person required two figs, and two figs could be found only on two separate stems - while three figs were found on another stem - we should remove the stem that has three figs, even though only two are required.29 [It is preferable] to cut only one stem and not two stems, so as not to increase [the performance of the forbidden labor of] gleaning.30 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 9
When food is cooked for a sick person on the Sabbath and the sick person leaves some over after eating, a healthy person is forbidden to eat from the remainder, lest [this cause] more food to be added for him.31
When, however, an animal is slaughtered for a sick person on the Sabbath, it is permissible for a healthy person to partake of uncooked meat32 [from that animal].33 A decree was not enacted, because there is no possibility of an additional [activity] being performed [for a healthy person].34 The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 10
When a sick person is not dangerously ill,35 all his needs should be cared for by a gentile. What is implied? We may tell a gentile to perform [forbidden labors]36 on his behalf and he performs them. [This includes] cooking, baking, bringing medicine from one domain to another and the like. Similarly, one may have one's eyes treated37 by a gentile on the Sabbath even though there is no danger involved.
Furthermore, if [the sick] require treatment that does not involve the performance of [forbidden] labors,38 they may be treated even by Jews. For this reason, it is permitted to perform [physical activities for the benefit of the sick]; for example, one may lift [the tendons of] the ears, lift up cartilage around the heart,39 restore broken bones to their places, or perform other activities of this like.
Halacha 11
When a woman in the process of childbirth squats to give birth,40 her life is considered in danger and the Sabbath laws may be violated on her behalf. A midwife may be called from a distant place41 and the umbilical cord may be cut and tied.
If she requires a light when she cries out because of labor pains, a candle may be lit for her. [This leniency is granted] even if she is blind, because light has a calming influence42 even if she does not see.
If she needs oil or the like, it may be brought for her. If possible, the items that are brought should be brought in an uncharacteristic manner; for example, a friend should bring a utensil tied in her hair.43 If this not possible, it may be brought in the ordinary manner.44
Halacha 12
We should not help an idolatress45 give birth on the Sabbath, even if payment is offered. We do not worry about the possibility of ill-feelings being aroused.46[This applies even when] there is no violation [of the Sabbath laws] involved.
[In contrast,] one may offer assistance to a daughter of a ger toshav who gives birth, since we are commanded to secure his well-being.47 We may not, however, violate the Sabbath laws on her behalf.
Halacha 13
From the time a woman in childbirth has a flow of blood48 until the birth - [and indeed,] after birth for three days49 - the Sabbath laws may be violated on her behalf, and all her needs should be met.50 [This applies] regardless of whether she says she requires such treatment or she maintains that she does not require such treatment.
Between the third and the seventh day [after childbirth], if she maintains that she does not require treatment, the Sabbath laws should not be violated on her behalf. If she remains silent,51 and certainly if she maintains that she requires treatment,52 the Sabbath laws should be violated on her behalf. Between the seventh and the thirtieth day, her status is analogous to that of a sick person who is not dangerously ill. Even if she maintains that she requires treatment, [forbidden] labors should be performed on her behalf only by a gentile.53
Halacha 14
A fire may be kindled54 for a woman after she has given birth55 even in the summer, since cold is very difficult for a woman to bear after childbirth in the cold regions. In contrast, a fire should not be kindled for other sick people to warm themselves.56 Nevertheless, if a person let blood and became chilled, a fire may be kindled for him even in the summer.
After cutting his umbilical cord,57 we may wash a new born baby on the day he is born, even when this requires heating the water on the Sabbath.58Herbal powder59 can be applied to his skin and his limbs can be tied,60 for it is dangerous not to perform these activities for him.
Similarly, a baby may be washed before circumcision, after circumcision,61and on the third day after circumcision62 with water that is heated on the Sabbath,63 because of the danger [to him].
Halacha 15
When a woman dies while in labor on the Sabbath, a knife should be brought - even if it must be carried through the public domain - and the woman's womb cut open and the fetus removed, for it is possible that it will still be alive.64
[The rationale for this ruling is] that the Sabbath laws are violated even when there is only a possibility of saving a life,65 and even in such instances, where there is no chazakah on which to base our presumption that the fetus is alive.66
Halacha 16
[All] activities necessary to save a life should be performed on the Sabbath; there is no necessity to receive license from the court. The more zealous one is [in this regard], the more praiseworthy.
What is implied?67 If one sees that a child has fallen into the sea, one may spread out a net and hoist him up, although one catches fish together with him. If a person hears that a child fell into the sea and spreads out a net to hoist him up, but raises up only fish, he is absolutely free of liability.68
If he intended to raise up fish and [in fact] lifted up both fish and a child, he is not held liable.69 Since he lifted up a child together with the fish, he is not held liable even when he did not hear that the child had fallen into the water.70
Halacha 17
If71 a child fell into a pit, a person may dislodge a clod of earth, and lift [the child] up, even though he creates a step when he dislodges it. If a door was locked with a child inside, a person may break the door down and take the child out, even though he chops it into pieces of wood which are appropriate to use for work,72 lest the child become frightened and die.
If a fire broke out and a person is inside the building and we fear that he may be consumed by the flames,73 a person may extinguish the fire to save him, although he prepares a pathway while extinguishing the fire. Whoever acts first to save him is praiseworthy. One does not need to ask permission from the court in all instances when there is a danger to a person's life.
Halacha 18
When an avalanche has fallen, and there is a doubt whether or not74 it has fallen over a person,75 it may be cleared. If the person was discovered to be alive, but was crushed [by the fallen debris] to the extent that it is impossible that he will recover, [the debris] may be cleared and the person taken out to enable him to live [however] long he does.76
Halacha 19
If [in the process of clearing the debris,] they [reached] his nose and saw that he was not breathing, he should be left there,77 for he has died already.78
Although it is discovered that people on the upper level of a landslide have died, one should not assume that those on the lower levels have died. Instead, [the debris] should be cleared away from all of the people, for in a landslide it is possible that those on the upper level will die, while those on the lower level will remain alive.
Halacha 20
When an avalanche fell on a courtyard in which were located both gentiles and Jews - even if there were a thousand gentiles and only one Jew, we should remove all [the debris] for the sake of the Jew.79 Should one80 of the individuals leave and enter another courtyard and that courtyard collapse upon him, we should remove [the debris]. Perhaps the person who departed was a Jew, and [all] those who remain were gentiles.81
Halacha 21
When they all left this courtyard to go to another courtyard, and as they were proceeding, one of them whose identity is unknown departed and entered a third courtyard and was covered by an avalanche, [the debris] should not be removed from him.82
Since they left their original place, [the presence of] a Jew is not accepted as an established fact. Hence, we assume that anyone who separated from this group as it was proceeding was part of the majority. Accordingly, if the majority were Jewish,83 even a person separated from them [who entered] another courtyard after they left their original place - should he be covered by an avalanche, we should remove [the debris] from him.
Halacha 22
A person who is traveling in the desert and does not know which day is the Sabbath should count84 six days and consider the seventh day as holy. He should recite the blessing of the day [Kiddush] and recite Havdalah at the conclusion of this "Sabbath" day.85
Every day, even on the day on which he recites Kiddush and after which he recites Havdalah, he is allowed86 to earn87 only enough for his livelihood, so that he will not die. It is forbidden for him to earn more than his livelihood, for there is a possibility that every day is the Sabbath.
If the person knows that the day is the eighth day or the fifteenth day after his departure, he is allowed to work on that day, for it is certain that he did not depart on the Sabbath.88 On the other days, he is allowed to earn merely his livelihood.
Halacha 23
[The following rules apply] when gentiles lay siege to Jewish cities:89 If their intent was financial gain, the Sabbath laws should not be violated because of them, nor are we allowed to wage war against them.90 If a city is located near the border, however, we should march against them with weapons and wage war against them even when they are demanding hay or straw.91
In any location, if the gentiles' intent was Jewish lives, or if they engaged in battle with a city or laid siege to it without stating a specific intention,92 we must wage war against them, and the Sabbath laws should be violated because of them. It is a mitzvah93 for every member of the Jewish people who can come [to their assistance] to go out and aid their brethren who are under siege and save them from the gentiles [although it is the] Sabbath. It is forbidden to wait until Saturday night.
After they have saved their brethren, they may return home with their weapons on the Sabbath, so that a dangerous situation will not be created in the future.94
Halacha 24
Similarly, if a ship is sinking at sea95 or a city is surrounded by a [flooding] river, it is a mitzvah to go out on the Sabbath and use every possible means to save them.
Even when a single individual is being pursued by gentiles, by a snake, or by a bear with the intent to kill him, it is a mitzvah to save him, even when it is necessary to perform several forbidden labors on the Sabbath. It is even permitted to forge weapons to save him. Similarly, we should cry out [to God] on their behalf, make supplications,96 and sound the trumpets97 to summon help for them.98
We should not cry out [to God] or make supplications because of plague99 on the Sabbath.
Halacha 25
We should lay siege to gentile cities [at least] three days before the Sabbath.100 We may wage war with them on any day, even on the Sabbath, until we conquer [the city], even if the war is voluntary in nature.101 The oral tradition,102 interprets [Deuteronomy 20:20] "until you have subjugated it," as teaching that [one should wage war] even on the Sabbath.
Surely, the above applies103 with regard to a war that we are obligated to wage. Indeed, it was on the Sabbath that Joshua conquered Jericho.104
144
FOOTNOTES
1.
The Rambam uses the expression דחויה, which, as evident from Pesachim 77a and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:15, implies that although a prohibition is not enforced, it has not been lifted entirely. In contrast, the term הותרה would imply that no trace of the prohibition remains.
The Kessef Mishneh and other authorities question the implications and the appropriateness of the Rambam's choice of terms. [In a responsum (Vol. 1, 689), the Rashba illustrates the difference between these terms. A person was in need of meat on the Sabbath and there was non-kosher meat available. If the Sabbath laws are דחויה, it would be proper to eat the non-kosher meat. If the Sabbath laws are הותרה, it would be preferable to slaughter a kosher animal on the sick person's behalf. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:14) states that, in such a situation, one should slaughter a kosher animal, implying that the laws are הותרה. (Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:16 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:39.)]
See the Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim, Responsa 455, which explains the concept of הותרה as meaning that, with regard to this person, it is as if the laws of the Sabbath were never commanded. (See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which explains that although the Rambam stated that a threat to Jewish life overrides the observance of all the mitzvot of the Torah in Hilchot Yesodei Torah, Chapter 5, he emphasizes this concept with regard to the Sabbath laws for the following reason. The other prohibitions are דחויה in the face of a threat to life, while the Sabbath laws are הותרה.
2.
Yoma 85b uses the expression, "Violate one Sabbath on his behalf, so that he will be able to observe many Sabbaths [in the future]." This expression, however, is not halachically exact. Even when one knows that the person will not live to observe many other Sabbaths, as long as he is alive we are obligated to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. See Halachah 18.
3.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:10), which cites an opinion that states that we may rely on the evaluation of experienced God-fearing individuals, even if they are not physicians.
4.
Rav Kapach explains that, with this expression, the Rambam implies that we may rely on a local physician and need not seek the advice of a greater expert who lives further away.
5.
See Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:8, which gives further details regarding a difference of opinion between physicians.
6.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:13 states that this applies even if there is no danger that the person will die immediately. Since there is a danger that he may die later if the treatment is not administered at this time, the Sabbath laws may be violated.
7.
Note that the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:5, specifies that the leniency to extinguish a lamp is granted only when it is impossible to move it - or, alternatively, the sick person - to another place or veil the lamp's light.
8.
There is a question among the Rabbis if this statement is to be interpreted literally or not. As mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, there is a difference of opinion if the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life. According to the opinion that they are merely דחויה, an attempt should be made to minimize the violation of the Sabbath laws if doing so does not constitute a threat to the person's life. (See Tzafenat PaneachShulchan Aruch HaRav, ibid. and the Mishnah Berurah 328:14.)
9.
Gentiles are not obligated to observe the Sabbath, and thus having them administer the treatment would not involve the violation of a Torah commandment. Nevertheless, they should not be entrusted with the care of the sick for the reason stated by the Rambam.
10.
Since they are below the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah, according to the Torah itself the observance of the mitzvot is not incumbent upon them, and only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.
11.
Although women and servants are obligated to observe the Sabbath laws, since in many areas of Torah and mitzvot, their obligations are less than men, having them violate the Sabbath laws in this instance could cause the Sabbath to be regarded flippantly, as explained in the next note.
12.
The Rambam's choice of wording, based on Yoma 84b, has raised several questions among the commentaries. The most literal interpretation is given by the Merkevat HaMishneh, who explains that when people see that the Sabbath laws are violated by the gentiles for Jews or by women or children, they may get the impression that the observance of these laws is not very crucial, and leniencies may be taken on other occasions - even when there is no valid reason. If, however, it is Torah Sages who violate the laws, the common people will realize that it is only the seriousness of the situation that allowed for this leniency.
Among the other interpretations given why the laws should not be violated by women and children, is that this might cause them to violate the Sabbath laws in the future (Kessef Mishneh).
Significantly, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:12) explains that the reason the treatment should not be administered by gentiles is the possibility for delay. Accordingly, if there is no delay involved and one can be sure that the same quality of treatment will be given, it is preferable that the treatment be administered by gentiles.
The commentaries explain that the difference between his opinion and that of the Rambam (quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.) depends on the question discussed above: Are the Sabbath laws הותרה or merely דחויה in the face of a danger to life.
[See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which states that the Rambam's wording here indicates that he sees the violation of the Sabbath laws in such situations as an expression of reverence and regard for the Sabbath.]
13.
This also is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Yoma, ibid. Others (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:12) understand the phrase גדולי ישראל in that passage as meaning simply "adult males."
14.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 8:5) states, "A person who [administers treatment] quickly is praiseworthy, and one who raises questions is considered as if he shed blood.
15.
The Rambam is referring to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and others who do not accept the oral tradition.
16.
The Rambam seems to be interpreting the verse as meaning that since these individuals purposefully misinterpret the Torah, God causes their misinterpretations to be cruel and harsh so that they will not live and spread such an approach.
17.
Significantly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state קדח, "piercing pain" (the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Avodah Zarah 28b), rather than קדחת, "fever."
18.
Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., explains that there is a connection between the eyes and the heart, and such a person is therefore considered to be dangerously ill.
19.
From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:9), it appears that once an eye ailment is nearly healed, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. See also Hilchot Milah16.
20.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:3) states that this can also apply to an infection. Disquiet and pain are not, however, considered sufficient cause to violate the Sabbath laws.
21.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) substitutes "teeth" for "lips," and explains that a toothache can also be considered cause to violate the Sabbath laws. The Ramah and subsequent commentaries, however, qualify this statement, explaining which types of toothaches can be treated by Jews and which can be treated only by gentiles. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:3 and Mishneh Berurah 328:8.)
22.
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ramban as explaining that this applies only when we are unsure if the wound is dangerous or not. In such a situation, we are not required to wait for a physician's assessment and may treat the wound immediately. If, however, we know - or a physician says - that a wound is not dangerous, a Jew may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. It may, however, be treated by a gentile. This ruling is also quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:4).
23.
This phrase is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Avodah Zarah 28a and refers to an extremely high fever. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:7) appears to interpret it as referring to a type of malaria that causes fever and chills simultaneously.
24.
From the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:5), it would appear that if the sick person himself says that the Sabbath laws should be violated on his behalf, his word should be heeded.
25.
See Yoma 10:4 and the Rambam's commentary on that mishnah.
26.
Either they brought the figs from the public domain or picked them from the tree. Both of these activities involve the performance of labors forbidden on the Sabbath.
27.
This situation refers to an instance where none of the ten know of the others' activities. Alternatively, each one thought that he would be able to bring the fig before the other person (Mishnah Berurah 328:42).
28.
I.e., they need not bring a sin offering, nor do their actions cause them any spiritual blemishes. Indeed, to quote the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:15), "all of them receive a bountiful reward from God" for their actions. 29. If, however, there are two figs on a single stem, it would be preferable to pick them so as not to bring any additional figs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim328:16). (See also Halachah 9.)
29.
30.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim, loc. cit.) emphasizes that if there is any danger of delay or difficulty, the threat to a Jew's life overrides all these considerations.
31.
On Saturday night, however, a healthy person may eat from the remainder. Moreover, there is no need for him to wait the amount of time necessary to cook the food [(כדי שיעשוShulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 318:2, and commentaries].
32.
The meat need not be salted to remove the blood. Although this is generally done as a preparation for the cooking process, it is necessary only because blood will move from place to place within the meat during cooking. There is no prohibition against eating raw meat even though it has not been salted (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 67:1-2).
The Kiryat Melech Rav notes that this explanation is appropriate according to the interpretation of the Tosafot (Chulin 14a). The Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:12), however, requires even uncooked meat to be salted before one partakes of it. Several different explanations are offered for this difficulty. See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.
33.
For this leniency to be granted, the Ra'avad requires that the sick person have been ill before the commencement of the Sabbath, and his attendants to have thought of slaughtering the animal for him at that time. Otherwise, the animal is considered muktzeh. Although the latter prohibition is waived on behalf of the sick person, it is still enforced as regards the healthy individual.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:2 and Shulchan Aruch Haravibid 318:5) explain that in this instance, the prohibition of muktzeh does not apply at all.
34.
Slaughtering an animal is a single activity which will provide enough meat for both the sick person and the healthy individual. Allowing the healthy person to eat from the meat will not cause any increase in the violation of the Sabbath laws.
35.
This refers to ailments which, although not threatening to a person's life, are after all serious, and cause him to be confined to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17) or which cause him to feel weakness throughout his entire body (Ramah, loc. cit.). In contrast, if the person merely feels ill or has a minor ailment in a particular limb, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against taking medication even when the performance of forbidden labors is not involved. (See Chapter 21, Halachah 31.)
36.
As is explained in Chapter 6, the Rabbis forbade a Jew to tell a gentile to perform work on his behalf on the Sabbath. This prohibition is, however, relaxed because of the sick person's condition.
37.
The Hebrew word כוחל refers to the application of powder or eye-paint to the area around the eyes. Although certain Talmudic passages appear to indicate that this was merely a cosmetic practice, in certain instances it had medical value. The leniency to treat the eyes is granted, because, as explained in the notes on Halachah 4, there is a connection between the eyes and the heart.
38.
There is a question regarding activities in which a Rabbinic prohibition must be transgressed. Although asking a gentile to perform a forbidden labor is also prohibited by the Rabbis, some commentaries make a distinction between such a prohibition and a prohibition that involves the performance of an activity.
The wording chosen by the Rambam in this halachah and in Chapter 21, Halachah 31, has left room for speculation concerning his ruling on this question. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam allows the performance of any activity even when there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved. The Kessef Mishneh differs, and explains that according to the Rambam, any activity forbidden by the Rabbis may not be performed despite the fact that a person is bedridden by illness.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) does not follow either of the interpretations of the Rambam's view, but instead suggests following the opinion of the Ramban, who permits the performance of any activity forbidden by the Rabbis, provided that it is performed in an abnormal manner. Furthermore, if there is a danger to a specific limb, the Rabbinic prohibitions are waived, and such activities may be performed in the normal manner. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:19 is even more lenient and allows one to perform activities that are forbidden by the Torah itself, provided one performs them in an uncharacteristic manner.
39.
There are times when the cartilage around the heart becomes compressed against the body and it must be lifted up in order to facilitate breathing (Avodah Zarah 29a).
40.
Our translation is based on the description of the techniques of midwifery used in Talmudic and post-Talmudic times. Others translate the term as a woman being bent over with labor pains. Compare to Halachah 13, which mentions the possibility of performing forbidden labors on a woman's behalf from the time "when there is a show of blood." See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:3), which mentions both these terms and also refers to the condition when a woman is overcome by labor pains to the point where she must be carried by her friends. Any one of these three conditions constitutes a danger to life for which the Sabbath laws may be broken.
41.
The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:3) states that this leniency applies even when she lives beyond the Sabbath limits (see Chapter 27). Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav330:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:9, which state that a mid-wife may be called in the preliminary stages of labor.
42.
She feels more secure knowing that she will be cared for properly in the light than if she were cared for in the dark (Tosafot, Shabbat 128b).
43.
These rulings are based on Shabbat, ibid. In his commentary on that text, the Ramban explains that this principle applies regarding all instances when the Sabbath laws are violated because of a danger to life. If it is possible to reduce the extent to which they are violated, one should do so.
The Maggid Mishneh postulates that the Rambam would not require such stringencies at all times. Were that the case, the Rambam would have stated this principle earlier. Instead, this is a specific ruling applicable with regard to a woman in childbirth. Greater stringency is applied in this instance, because although there is a threat to the woman's life, the probability of a woman's actually dying is very low. (It can be explained that the difference of opinion between the Ramban and the Maggid Mishneh revolves around the question whether the Sabbath laws are דחויה orהותרה in the face of a danger to life, as explained in the notes on Halachot 1 and 2.)
44.
Note Sefer HaChasidim, which states that it is preferable that a woman prepare everything necessary for childbirth from the ninth month onward, so that if she gives birth on the Sabbath, only a minimal amount of forbidden labor will have to be performed.
45.
The term "idolatress" is used here to refer to a gentile who actually worships idols. In contrast, the term ger toshav refers to a gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:1-2 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.)
In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, the Rambam writes that it is forbidden to offer medical treatment to an idolater even for a fee. Accordingly, this halachah extends that principle to include a woman in childbirth. The question is raised, however, concerning the majority of the gentiles in the present age. Although the Rambam considers Christianity as idol worship, many authorities do not. According to the latter opinions, although these gentiles are not idolaters, they have not gone through the formal process of acceptance of the seven laws commanded to Noach and cannot therefore be considered as gerim toshavim.
Many authorities (see the commentary on the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim) maintain that it is permitted to treat such people during the week. On the Sabbath, however, one may not perform forbidden labors on their behalf. (See the Mishnah Berurah 330:8, which speaks very critically about physicians who violate the Sabbath laws on behalf of gentiles.) According to these authorities, one would be allowed to treat these gentiles on the Sabbath provided that there was not any forbidden labor involved. Note, however, Rav Kapach, who quotes Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state "gentile" instead of "idolatress."
46.
According to the generally accepted interpretation of Avodah Zarah 26b, the intent is that the non-Jews will understand that the Sabbath is a sacred day for the Jews. Even when they see that the Sabbath laws are violated for the sake of saving a Jew's life, they will accept the rationalization that the Sabbath laws may be violated only on behalf of an individual who observes the Sabbath.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:8 mention that if a physician fears that ill-feeling will be generated by his refusal to care for gentiles, he may deliver their babies, provided that he does not perform labors that are forbidden by the Torah itself.
47.
Based on Leviticus 25:35Avodah Zarah 65a states that the Jews are required to maintain the well-being of such gentiles and, if necessary, the Jews should support the gentiles from their charitable funds.
48.
The Rambam chooses the more lenient of the opinions mentioned in Shabbat 129a, for a woman can begin bleeding well before she gives birth.
49.
Although the Lechem Mishneh states that the counting of the three days should begin from the time the uterus opens, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the three days start from birth. (See the Be'ur Halachah 330.)
50.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:12 explain that this refers to activities that a woman's friends will customarily perform on her behalf after she gives birth. A doctor need not be consulted about these matters. Nevertheless, if a doctor says that these activities are unnecessary, they should not be performed.
51.
From the Rambam's wording (and indeed, this is the ruling of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:14), it appears that the woman is still considered to be dangerously ill. Hence, unless she protests to the contrary, it is assumed that this treatment is necessary.
52.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Mishnah Berurah, loc. cit., state that the woman's word is accepted even against the opinions of many doctors.
53.
According to the halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah330:21), there is one exception. A fire may be kindled for a woman within thirty days after she has given birth. See the notes on the following halachah.
54.
Preferably, the fire should be kindled by a gentile. If, however, there is no gentile available, the fire may be kindled by a Jew (Mishnah Berurah 330:21).
55.
The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears to him that the Rambam (and Shabbat 129b, upon which this halachah is based) is speaking about a woman who gave birth less than a week previously. Although weight is given to this view (see Be'ur Halachah 330), the Shulchan Aruch(Orach Chayim 330:6) states that it refers to a woman within a month of childbirth.
56.
The commentaries question whether this refers to a person who is dangerously ill or to a person who is merely seriously ill, but in no danger of dying. According to the latter view, a fire may be kindled on behalf of someone who is dangerously ill.
57.
Sefer HaKovetz states that cutting the umbilical cord involves the violation of a forbidden labor and is permitted only because of the danger involved. Most authorities, however, maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.
58.
As mentioned above, most authorities maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition may be waived on behalf of a new-born. Thus, this is interpreted as referring to water that was heated on the Sabbath by a gentile.
59.
מלח is usually rendered as "salt." Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:3. (See also Mishnah Berurah 330:24.)
60.
This is useful in straightening the child's limbs.
61.
See Hilchot Milah 2:8. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 331:9) writes that although in Talmudic times, washing a baby at this time was considered as a matter of vital importance, it is no longer common practice. The Ramah (loc. cit.) explains that it is customary to wash the baby before the circumcision with water that was heated on Friday, and to wash him after the circumcision on Saturday night.
62.
There is greater discomfort on the third day after the circumcision, as explained by the commentaries on Genesis 18:1 and 34:25.
63.
At present, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if it appears necessary, the baby may be washed with water that was heated before the Sabbath. Needless to say, in all situations, should a doctor state that such a washing is necessary, his advice should be followed.
64.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 330:5) states that it is no longer customary to follow this practice even during the week. We wait a considerable time after the woman loses consciousness, because we are afraid that she did not die, but merely fainted. Hence, by the time we are certain that she has died, we can assume that the fetus is also no longer alive.
Needless to say, at present, when our improved technology makes it possible to monitor the physical functioning of both the mother and the fetus, the physicians should decide on the basis of the information before them. Regardless of the practical application of this ruling today, the principles on which it is based are significant and should be applied in other circumstances.
65.
Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:7, which adds that this ruling is granted despite the fact that the fetus will normally die in such a situation. Although probability (רוב in Hebrew) is a significant factor in halachah, the possibility of saving a life overweighs it.
66.
Generally, a living person can be assumed to continue to live (chezkat chayim) until we are certain that he has died. Although such a presumption cannot be made with regard to this fetus, permission is, nevertheless, granted for the Sabbath laws to be violated on its behalf.
67.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:13) rephrases the concepts stated in this halachah slightly, connecting the praise given a person for being zealous in saving a life with the situation concerning catching fish described afterwards. According to the Shulchan Aruch, this situation teaches us that a person is considered praiseworthy for saving a life on the Sabbath even if he accrues personal benefit through his actions - for example, in the case at hand, in addition to saving a life, the person also receives a catch of fish.
68.
The Rambam adds the term "absolutely" to indicate that it is desirable to spread out and raise one's nets to try to save the child (Lechem Mishneh). Significantly, the Jerusalem Talmud,Shabbat 13:6, states that the person is not held liable even if he intended to catch the fish together with the child.
69.
The Or Sameach writes that he is given "stripes for rebelliousness" (the punishment usually given for the violation of a Rabbinic ordinance), since he intended to perform a forbidden activity. See a parallel ruling, Hilchot Nedarim 12:18.
Significantly, when mentioning this instance in Hilchot Shegagot 2:15, the Rambam states that the person acted בשוגג when catching the fish - i.e., he was unaware that it was the Sabbath or was unaware that it is forbidden to fish on the Sabbath.
70.
This reflects the Rambam's decision regarding a difference of opinion between the Sages inMenachot 64a. One opinion holds the person liable for it considers his intent of primary importance, while the other frees him of liability for it views his actions as most significant.
71.
These instances are cited by Yoma 84b as a continuation of the development of the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may perform an activity to save someone else's life, although in the process of doing so, one derives benefit. The Talmud explains why it is necessary to mention all these different instances.
72.
The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam alters the text of the Talmud slightly to imply that the person breaking down the door did not do so with the intent of using the wood. Rav Kapach differs, noting that, as mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Rambam absolves the person of liability even when he has an intent to benefit from his actions. (See also the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.)
73.
Yoma, ibid., explains that this leniency is granted even when the fire breaks out in a courtyard other than that in which the person was located. If the fire appears to pose a danger to his life, it may be extinguished.
74.
I.e., a person was seen in the vicinity of the avalanche and we are unsure whether or not he was able to escape or not.
75.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this leniency is granted even when there are several doubts involved: Perhaps the person was not trapped under the avalanche. Even if he was trapped, perhaps he is no longer alive and the performance of the labor of clearing will be to no avail.
76.
This communicates a fundamental concept in Torah law: Even a fleeting moment of a Jew's life is precious enough for all possible efforts to be performed to save him even if it is necessary to violate Torah law.
77.
Although we are commanded to show respect for a corpse and not to leave it exposed, we are not allowed to violate the Sabbath laws for such a purpose. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yoma 8:5.)
78.
Based on Genesis 7:22, "all that has the breath of the spirit of life," Yoma 88b states that whether a person is breathing or not is the determining factor of whether he is considered alive or not. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:11 rule that even if we see that his heart is not beating, he is not considered dead until we are certain that he is not breathing.
The conception of breath as the determinant of life is significant in the present age, when it is possible that a person will continue to breathe despite brain death. The question of whether such a person is considered alive has been raised today within the context of many contemporary medical issues. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah, Vol. II, Responsum 174) and other authorities of the present age have ruled that breath is still the fundamental determinant whether or not a person is alive.
79.
This halachah is based on the following principles:
a) As mentioned in Halachah 12, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to save a gentile's life.
b) כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה - "Whenever there is a doubt concerning the identity of objects in a fixed position, we consider the probability as 50%." Since there is at least one Jew in this courtyard, until his body is located, it is considered as if there is a 50% probability that every body found is the Jew. (See also Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 8:11.)
80.
Even if several people departed, the same rule would apply, as long as the entire group did not leave its original place. See the following halachah.
81.
The Rambam's decision depends on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's text of Yoma 84b. There the Talmud explains that although in general we follow the principle, כל דפריש מרובא פריש - "Whenever an entity separates itself from a group, we assume that it was part of the majority" - in this instance, since the matter involves a possible threat to a Jewish life, this principle is given a slightly different interpretation. Since the group remains in its place, its fixed nature (קביעות) is not disrupted.
It must be emphasized that the Ra'avad, Rashi, and the Ramban have a different approach to the passage in Yoma. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 329:2) follows the opinion quoted by the Rambam.
82.
Again this ruling depends on Rav Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Yoma 84b. Other authorities differ, as mentioned above.
83.
This implies that if a person of unknown origin is found buried under a landslide in a place whose population is primarily gentile, we are not allowed to remove the debris from him. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:26.) This is a matter of question on which there is a responsum attributed to the Rambam (although its origins are disputed). (See also Shulchan AruchEven HaEzer 4:34, which quotes the Rambam's opinion, and the Ramah, loc. cit., who allows the debris to be removed.)
84.
He should start counting the six days immediately on the day on which he realizes that he has lost touch with the weekly calendar.
85.
Similarly, in his daily prayers, he should recite the prayers of the Sabbath on that day. The recitation of these prayers was instituted so that the person should not lose consciousness of the observance of the Sabbath entirely.
86.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 344:1) states that as long as the person has means, he is not allowed to work at all. Permission to work is granted only when it is a life and death matter. This explains why this halachah is included in this chapter.
87.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that although there is a prohibition against walking beyond the Sabbath limits, it is not as serious as the prohibition against forbidden labors. Hence, it is waived in order to allow this person the opportunity to reach a settled area and observe the Sabbath in a proper manner.
88.
If he earns enough on that day to support himself for several days, he must cease work until his means are exhausted (Mishnah Berurah 344:11).
89.
Although these laws surely apply to Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael, these same laws are also relevant to Jewish communities in the diaspora.
90.
Since their intent is only financial, the Sabbath laws may not be violated for this reason. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:17, which state that at present, even when gentiles initially come only for pillage and plunder, since they have no compunctions about killing Jews, particularly if one will defend his property, any gentile raid on a Jewish community is considered a question of life and death warranting the violation of the Sabbath laws.
91.
The rationale is that if a border city is conquered, the enemies will have a vantage point from which to conquer the entire land. This concept has relevance beyond the Sabbath laws. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe Shelita has explained that these principles are relevant to the territorial disputes between Jews and gentiles in Eretz Yisrael today. Returning any territory to the Arabs would jeopardize the safety of the entire land.
92.
War must be waged against them because it is possible that their intent is to kill. Hence, we follow the principle that the Sabbath laws may be violated even where there is merely a question of a threat to life.
93.
I.e., an obligation. See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 1:14, which describes the mitzvah (Leviticus 19:16): "Do not stand by idly while your neighbor's life is in danger."
It is told that in the Maccabean revolt, the Greeks once attacked the Jews on the Sabbath. The people, unaware of this law, refused to take up arms in defense and thousands died. Afterwards, the Rabbis publicized this ruling.
94.
Eruvin 45a relates that originally it was forbidden for the people to return with their weapons, and they would leave them in a home within the city's wall. Once the enemy forces saw that the Jews were returning unarmed and attacked them. More Jews were killed in the confused scramble for their weapons than by the enemy attack. After this event, the Sages allowed those who come to assist a besieged city to return with their weapons.
95.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this applies only when one knows that there are Jews on the ship. If we do not have such information, it would appear that we should assume that the passengers of the ship are gentiles and should not endeavor to save their lives.
96.
Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that it is a mitzvah to cry out to God for assistance in the event of any distressing situation that affects a Jewish community. On the Sabbath, however, it is only proper to make such requests when there is an immediate threat to human life. Just as such requests are made on behalf of a community, they should also be made on behalf of a single individual whose life is threatened (Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6, Hilchot Shabbat 30:12).
97.
Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that, as part of the mitzvah of entreating God's mercy, trumpets should be sounded. Nevertheless, trumpets should be not be sounded for this purpose on the Sabbath, since sounding the trumpets violates a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Shofar 2:7). Here, however, the intent in sounding the trumpets is to alert the Jews in the surrounding area and to summon them. The prohibition is waived for this purpose. (See Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6.)
98.
Just as one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew's life, one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew who is being forced to adopt a gentile way of life (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:29 and the Mishnah Berurah 306:57).
99.
See Ta'anit 22b.
100.
In Chapter 30, Halachah 13, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted "so that the soldiers' minds will be settled and they will not be overly preoccupied on the Sabbath." Although the war will require violation of the Sabbath laws, efforts should be made to minimize the tension and anxiety experienced by the soldiers to the greatest degree possible.
See Hilchot Melachim 6:11 which states that we can lay siege to gentile cities "on the Sabbath." The Kessef Mishneh notes the contradiction and suggests amending the text of Hilchot Melachimin light of our halachah. The Lechem Mishneh, however, explains that this clause of our halachah speaks of a milchemet reshut, a war which we are not obligated to wage, while Hilchot Melachimspeaks of a milchemet mitzvah, a war which we are obligated to wage.
101.
Hilchot Melachim describes a voluntary war, a milchemet reshut, as a war fought "to expand the borders of Israel or magnify [the king's] greatness and reputation." In contrast, a war that is obligatory in nature, a milchemet mitzvah, refers to "the war against the seven nations [who occupied Eretz Yisrael], the war against Amalek, and [a war] fought to assist Israel against an enemy which attacks her."
102.
Sifre on Deuteronomy (loc. cit.), Shabbat 19a.
103.
According to the Kessef Mishneh's (Hilchot Melachim 6:11), this refers to the leniency of waging war on the Sabbath. The restriction of laying siege to a city three days before the Sabbath, in contrast, applies only with regard to voluntary wars. In an obligatory war, we may lay siege to a city even on the Sabbath itself.
104.
Rav Kapach notes that the citation of a historical event as proof of a law is extremely out of character for the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah. He explains that the Rambam's statements are directed against statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who writes that Jericho did not fall on the Sabbath.
It is possible to explain the Rambam's statements from another perspective. Joshua was instructed concerning the conquest of Jericho by Divine command. Indeed, according to human reason, there was no reason why Jericho should have been conquered on the Sabbath. Hence, the fact that God delivered such a command is a clear directive that one may begin a milchemet mitzvah on the Sabbath.
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Hayom Yom:
English Text | Video Class
• Friday, Tevet 13, 5776 · 25 December 2015
"Today's Day"
Monday Tevet 13 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Vay'chi, Sheini with Rashi.
Tehillim: 69-71.
Tanya: It is written, however (p. 35)...to burning coals. (p. 37).
Where a lantern is placed, those who seek light gather around - for light attracts.1
FOOTNOTES
1. See Likutei Sichot, Vol. 10, p. 294.
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Daily Thought:
Wondrous By Design
What is wondrous about nature is that it explains itself; and the more it explains itself, the more mysterious it becomes.
Each thing says, “I do this because I am this way.” As though each were its own being, guided by its own design.
Until a pattern emerges, and a greater pattern, and yet greater, until a wondrous wholeness emerges in which there are no things. There is only one.
Nature reveals its oneness through the art of concealment.
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