Today's Laws & Customs:
• Today's 'Nasi': Levi
After reading the "Nasi" describing the gifts brought by the princes of the 12 Tribes of Israel for the dedication of the Tabernacle during the first 12 days of Nissan (see "Nasi of the Day" in Nissan 1), today we read the passage (the opening verses of the Torah portion of Bahaalotecha) describing G-d's instructions to Aaron regarding the lighting of the Menorah, which represents the contribution of the "13th tribe" ofLevi.
Text of today's Nasi in Hebrew and English.
• Search for Chametz Tonight
In preparation for the festival of Passover, in which even the possession of any form of leavened food ("chametz") is strictly forbidden, a final search is conducted after nightfall to remove every last crumb of chametz from our homes and property.
Click here for a step-by-step "Getting-Rid-of-Chametz" wizard. Click here for instructions on how to conduct the search, and here for the time for searching chametz in your location.
Links:
Sell your chametz online
About Leaven
Today in Jewish History:
• Abraham's Brit (1714 BCE)
According to one account in the Midrash, on the 13th of Nissan of the year 2048 from creation (1714 BCE), G-d appeared to Abram, changed his name to Abraham ("father of a multitude of nations") and commanded him to circumcise himself and all members of his household--and all future descendents at the age of eight days--so that "My covenant (brit) shall be in your flesh, as an eternal covenant." Abraham was 99 years old at the time, and his son Ishmael, 13. (Isaac, who was born a year later, was the first Jew to be circumcised at eight days).
Link: More on the Covenant of Circumcision
• Haman's Decree (357 BCE)
In the 12th year of his reign (357 BCE), King Achashverosh of Persia endorsed Haman's plan "to destroy, kill and annihilate all Jews, from young to old, infants and women, on a single day, on the 13th day of the 12th month, the month of Adar." On Nissan 13 (11 months before the date chosen for the massacre) proclamations of the decree were drafted and dispatched to all 127 countries of the Persian Empire. Mordechai told Esther to go before the king and plead for her people. Esther asked that a three-day fast be proclaimed (Nissan 14, 15 and 16--including the first two days of Passover) in which all Jews would repent and pray for the success of her mission.
Links:
The Story of Purim
Timeline of the events connected with the Purim miracle
• Passing of R. Joseph Caro (1575)
Nissan 13 is the anniversary of the passing of Rabbi Joseph Caro (1488-1575), author of the Shulchan Aruch ("Code of Jewish Law").
Link: Original Ideas
• Passing of Tzemach Tzeddek (1866)
The third Rebbe of Chabad, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn of Lubavitch (1789-1866; known as the "Tzemach Tzeddek" after his Halachic work by that name), passed away on Nissan 13.
Links:
A short biography
More on the Tzemach Tzeddek
Daily Quote:
"He that kills a person accidentally... shall remain [exiled in the "city of refuge"] until the death of the High Priest" (Numbers 35:11, 25). Why is the High Priest to blame? ... Said a venerable old scholar: I heard an explanation at one of the seasonal lectures of Raba, that he failed to pray for his generation. As was the case of that fellow who was devoured by a lion some three parasangs from Rabbi Joshua ben Levi's town, and Elijah the Prophet refused to visit Rabbi Joshua on that account for three days...[Talmud, Makot 11a]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Shemini, 5th Portion Leviticus 10:16-10:20 with Rashi
• Chapter 10
16And Moses thoroughly investigated concerning the sin offering he goat, and behold, it had been burnt! So he was angry with Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron's surviving sons, saying, טזוְאֵת | שְׂעִיר הַחַטָּאת דָּרשׁ דָּרַשׁ משֶׁה וְהִנֵּה שׂרָף וַיִּקְצֹף עַל אֶלְעָזָר וְעַל אִיתָמָר בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן הַנּוֹתָרִם לֵאמֹר:
the sin-offering he-goat: The he-goat of the רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ מוּסְפֵי, the additional offerings of Rosh Chodesh . On that day [Rosh Chodesh Nissan], three sin-offering goats were sacrificed: a) “[Take] a he-goat [as a sin-offering]” (Lev. 9:3); b) the he-goat of Nahshon [the son of Aminadab, leader of the tribe of Judah] (Num. 7:16); and c) the he-goat [of the additional offering] of Rosh Chodesh. Now, of all of these, the only one burnt was this one [i.e., this additional offering of Rosh Chodesh. And why did they burn it?] The Sages of Israel are divided on the matter (Torath Kohanim 10:52; Zev. 101a). Some said that it was burnt on account of uncleanness that had come into contact with it, [while] others said that it was burnt because [Aaron’s sons were] אוֹנְנִים, because this [sacrifice came under the category of] holy [sacrifices] that would also be sacrificed in [future] generations. [Thus they deemed it fit for burning, as the law would require for future generations.] However, when it came to holy [sacrifices] that were [brought] only at that time [like the other two goat offerings], they relied on Moses, who had said to them regarding the meal-offering, “eat it as unleavened loaves” (verse 12) [even though they were אוֹנְנִים, assuming that since that meal-offering was brought only at that time (see Rashi on verse 12), so must Moses’ command apply to all holy sacrifices brought at that time only]. שעיר החטאת: שעיר מוספי ראש חודש. ושלשה שעירי חטאות קרבו בו ביום שעיר עזים, ושעיר נחשון ושעיר ראש חודש, ומכולן לא נשרף אלא זה. ונחלקו בדבר חכמי ישראל יש אומרים, מפני הטומאה שנגעה בו נשרף. ויש אומרים, מפני אנינות נשרף, לפי שהוא קדשי דורות, אבל בקדשי שעה סמכו על משה שאמר להם במנחה (פסוק יב) ואכלוה מצות:
thoroughly investigated: Heb. דָרשׁ דָרַשׁ. [This double expression signifies] two investigations. [Moses asked:] a) “Why has this sacrifice been burnt?” and b) “Why have the other sacrifices been eaten?” Thus it is taught in Torath Kohanim (10:52). דרש דרש: שתי דרישות הללו מפני מה נשרף זה, ומפני מה לא נאכלו אלו, כך הוא בתורת כהנים:
[he was angry] with Eleazar and Ithamar: Out of respect for Aaron, Moses turned towards his sons and was angry [with them, even though he was angry with Aaron as well, regarding what had happened]. — [Torath Kohanim 10:53] על אלעזר ועל איתמר: בשביל כבודו של אהרן הפך פניו כנגד הבנים וכעס:
saying: He said to them, “Answer my questions!” - [Torath Kohanim 10:53] לאמר: אמר להם, השיבוני על דברי:
17"Why did you not eat the sin offering in the holy place? For it is holy of holies, and He has given it to you to gain forgiveness for the sin of the community, to effect their atonement before the Lord! יזמַדּוּעַ לֹא אֲכַלְתֶּם אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ כִּי קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הִוא וְאֹתָהּ | נָתַן לָכֶם לָשֵׂאת אֶת עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה:
Why did you not eat the sin-offering in the holy place?: But had they eaten it outside the holy place? Had they not burnt it? What then [did Moses mean] when he said, “in the holy place?” But, [by phrasing the question in this way,] Moses was asking [Aaron’s sons]: "Perhaps that sacrifice went out of the hangings [of the courtyard], thereby becoming invalid [and that was why you burned it]? מדוע לא אכלתם את החטאת במקום הקדש: וכי חוץ לקדש אכלוה, והלא שרפוה, ומה הוא אומר במקום הקדש, אלא אמר להם שמא חוץ לקלעים יצאה ונפסלה:
For it is a holy of holies: which becomes invalid by going out [of the hangings].“ They answered him, ”No.“ [So Moses] said to them: ”Well, since it remained within the holy place, why did you not eat it?" - [Torath Kohanim 10:54] כי קדש קדשים הוא: ונפסלת ביוצא, והם אמרו לו לאו. אמר להם הואיל ובמקום הקדש היתה, מדוע לא אכלתם אותה:
and He has given it to you to gain forgiveness [for the sin of the community]: For the kohanim eat [the sacrifice], and [thereby] its owners are granted atonement. — [Torath Kohanim 10:54] ואתה נתן לכם לשאת וגו': שהכהנים אוכלים ובעלים מתכפרים:
to gain forgiveness for the sin of the community: From here, we learn that it [the he-goat that was burned] was the he-goat of Rosh Chodesh, which atones for the sin of uncleanness concerning the sanctuary and its holy [sacrificial] food, for the sin-offering of the eighth day [of the investitures] and the sin-offering of Nahshon [Ben Aminadab] were not brought to effect atonement. — [Torath Kohanim 10:52] לשאת את עון העדה: מכאן למדנו ששעיר ראש חודש היה, שהוא מכפר על עון טומאת מקדש וקדשיו, שחטאת שמיני וחטאת נחשון לא לכפרה באו:
18Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within, so you should have surely eaten it within holy [precincts], as I commanded!" יחהֵן לֹא הוּבָא אֶת דָּמָהּ אֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ פְּנִימָה אָכוֹל תֹּאכְלוּ אֹתָהּ בַּקֹּדֶשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוֵּיתִי:
Behold, [its blood] was not brought: For if [its blood] had been brought [into the Holy], then indeed you would have been required to burn it, as it is said, “But any sin-offering some of whose blood [was brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the Holy, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire]” (Lev. 6:23). - [Torath Kohanim 10:55] הן לא הובא וגו': שאילו הובא היה לכם לשרפה, כמו שנאמר (ויקרא ו כג) וכל חטאת אשר יובא מדמה וגו':
so you should have surely eaten it: [I.e.,] “You should have surely eaten it,” even though you are אוֹנְנִים. אכל תאכלו אתה: היה לכם לאכלה אף על פי שאתם אוננים:
as I commanded: you, regarding the meal-offering. כאשר צויתי: לכם במנחה:
19And Aaron spoke to Moses, "But today, did they offer up their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord? But [if tragic events] like these had befallen me, and if I had eaten a sin offering today, would it have pleased the Lord?" יטוַיְדַבֵּר אַהֲרֹן אֶל משֶׁה הֵן הַיּוֹם הִקְרִיבוּ אֶת חַטָּאתָם וְאֶת עֹלָתָם לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה וַתִּקְרֶאנָה אֹתִי כָּאֵלֶּה וְאָכַלְתִּי חַטָּאת הַיּוֹם הַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינֵי יְהֹוָה:
And Aaron spoke: The expression דִּבּוּר [in Scripture, unless followed by the expression לֵאמֹר] always denotes boldness, as it is said, “And the people [thus] spoke (וַיְדַבֵּר) [against God and Moses, ‘Why did you bring us up from Egypt to die in the desert…?’” (Num. 21:5). Thus, in this verse, Aaron boldly responded to Moses’ investigation.] Is it possible that Moses addressed his anger to Eleazar and Ithamar, and Aaron answers? However, this [demonstrates to us that the behavior of Aaron’s sons] was only out of respect [for their father and their teacher]. They said, “It is inappropriate that while our father is sitting [in front of us], we should answer in his presence, and it is also inappropriate that a disciple should refute his master.” One might suggest that [the sons did not respond] because Eleazar was not capable [i.e., he did not have the courage] to answer. Scripture, [however,] says, “And Eleazar the kohen spoke to the men of the army…” (Num. 31:21). Thus, we see that when Eleazar wanted to, he spoke before Moses and before the princes [and hence, here, he was deliberately silent]. I found this [explanation] in the second version of the Sifrei. — [Sifrei Zuta on Numbers, ed. Horowitz, p. 329, Yalkut Bamidbar on Num. 31: 21] וידבר אהרן: אין לשון דיבור אלא לשון עז, שנאמר (במדבר כא ה) וידבר העם וגו'. אפשר משה קצף על אלעזר ועל איתמר, ואהרן מדבר, הא ידעת שלא היתה אלא מדרך כבוד. אמרו אינו בדין שיהא אבינו יושב ואנו מדברים לפניו, ואינו בדין שיהא תלמיד משיב את רבו. יכול מפני שלא היה באלעזר להשיב, תלמוד לומר (במדבר לא כא) ויאמר אלעזר הכהן אל אנשי הצבא וגו', הרי כשרצה, דבר לפני משה ולפני הנשיאים, זו מצאתי בספרי של פנים שני:
But today, did they offer up: What is he saying? [He could have simply said, “Such tragic events like these have befallen me….”] Rather, Moses said to them, “Did you perhaps sprinkle its blood while you were אוֹנְנִים, and [as you probably know,] an אוֹנֵן who performs the service renders [that sacrifice] invalid?” So Aaron answered him,… הֵם הִקְרִיבוּ, i.e., “But did they who offer up [the sacrifices]?” They are ordinary kohanim [for whom the law of invalidation by an אוֹנֵן applies.] I offered [them] up! For I am a Kohen Gadol, and [a Kohen Gadol] is permitted to offer [a sacrifice] while he is an אוֹנֵן] [Zev. 101a] הן היום הקריבו: מהו אומר, אלא אמר להם משה שמא זרקתם דמה אוננים, שהאונן שעבד חילל. אמר לו אהרן וכי הם הקריבו, שהם הדיוטות, אני הקרבתי, שאני כהן גדול ומקריב אונן:
But [if tragic events] like these had befallen me: [By these words, Aaron was effectively saying: “My point would be just as valid] even if those who died were not my sons, but other relatives for whom I am obligated to mourn as an אוֹנֵן like these,” such as all those enumerated in the parashah of the kohanim [i.e., Parashathאֱמוֹר, Lev. 21:13], for whom a kohen may become unclean. — [Torath Kohanim 10:59] ותקראנה אותי כאלה: אפילו לא היו המתים בני אלא שאר קרובים שאני חייב להיות אונן עליהם כאלו, כגון כל האמורים בפרשת כהנים שהכהן מטמא להם:
and if I had eaten a sin-offering today: [Lit., “and I ate a sin-offering.” However, here the meaning is:] “But if I had eaten [the sin-offering],” would it have pleased [the Lord]? ואכלתי חטאת: ואם אכלתי הייטב וגו':
[If I had eaten the sin-offering] today: [today it would not have been pleasing to the Lord; however, tonight I could have eaten it, because] an אוֹנֵן is permitted [to eat sacrifices] at night, for one is considered an אוֹנֵן only on the day of burial. — [Torath Kohanim 10:59; Zev. 101b] היום: אבל אנינות לילה מותר, שאין אונן אלא יום קבורה:
would it have pleased the Lord?: If you heard this [special law that an אוֹנֵן may eat] holy sacrifices brought exclusively for a special occasion [like the people’s sin-offering goat and Nahshon’s goat, both offered just today], you have no right to be lenient [regarding this law] regarding holy sacrifices offered for [future] generations [like the sacrifice on Rosh Chodesh, about which you asked us, “Why did you not eat…?”]. — [Zev. 101a] הייטב בעיני ה': אם שמעת בקדשי שעה אין לך להקל בקדשי דורות:
20Moses heard [this], and it pleased him. כוַיִּשְׁמַע משֶׁה וַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינָיו:
and it pleased him: [Moses] admitted [that Aaron was correct,] and was not ashamed, [for he could have covered up by] saying, “I have not heard [of this law.” Rather, Moses frankly said to Aaron, “You are right! I did hear that an אוֹנֵן must not eat from sacrifices that will be offered in future generations, but I forgot!”]. — [Torath Kohanim 10:60; Zev. 101a] וייטב בעיניו: הודה ולא בוש לומר לא שמעתי:Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 69 - 71
• Chapter 69
1. For the Conductor, on the shoshanim,1 by David.
2. Deliver me, O God, for the waters have reached until my soul!
3. I have sunk in muddy depths without foothold; I have come into deep waters, and the current sweeps me away.
4. I am wearied by my crying, my throat is parched; my eyes pined while waiting for my God.
5. More numerous than the hairs on my head are those who hate me without reason. Mighty are those who would cut me off, those who are my enemies without cause. What I have not stolen, I will then have to return.
6. O God, You know my folly, and my wrongs are not hidden from You.
7. Let not those who hope in You be shamed through me, O my Lord, God of Hosts; let not those who seek You be disgraced through me, O God of Israel,
8. because for Your sake I have borne humiliation, disgrace covers my face.
9. I have become a stranger to my brothers, an alien to my mother's sons,
10. for the envy of Your House has consumed me, and the humiliations of those who scorn You have fallen upon me.
11. And I wept while my soul fasted, and it was a humiliation to me.
12. I made sackcloth my garment, and became a byword for them.
13. Those who sit by the gate speak of me, and [of me] are the songs of drunkards.
14. May my prayer to You, Lord, be at a gracious time; God, in Your abounding kindness, answer me with Your true deliverance.
15. Rescue me from the mire, so that I not sink; let me be saved from my enemies and from deep waters.
16. Let not the current of water sweep me away, nor the deep swallow me; and let not the pit close its mouth over me.
17. Answer me, Lord, for Your kindness is good; according to Your abundant mercies, turn to me.
18. Do not hide Your face from Your servant, for I am in distress-hurry to answer me.
19. Draw near to my soul and liberate it; redeem me, so that my enemies [not feel triumphant].
20. You know my humiliation, my shame, and my disgrace; all my tormentors are before You.
21. Humiliation has broken my heart, and I have become ill. I longed for comfort, but there was none; for consolers, but I did not find.
22. They put gall into my food, and for my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink.
23. Let their table become a trap before them, and [their] serenity, a snare.
24. Let their eyes be darkened so that they cannot see, and let their loins continually falter.
25. Pour Your wrath upon them, and let the fierceness of Your anger overtake them.
26. Let their palace be desolate, let there be no dweller in their tents,
27. for they persecute the one whom You struck, and tell of the pain of Your wounded ones.
28. Add iniquity to their iniquity, and let them not enter into Your righteousness.
29. May they be erased from the Book of Life, and let them not be inscribed with the righteous.
30. But I am poor and in pain; let Your deliverance, O God, streng-then me.
31. I will praise the Name of God with song, I will extol Him with thanksgiving!
32. And it will please the Lord more than [the sacrifice of] a mature bull with horns and hooves.
33. The humble will see it and rejoice; you seekers of God, [see] and your hearts will come alive.
34. For the Lord listens to the needy, and He does not despise His prisoners.
35. Let heaven and earth praise Him, the seas and all that moves within them,
36. for God will deliver Zion and build the cities of Judah, and they will settle there and possess it;
37. and the seed of His servants will inherit it, and those who love His Name will dwell in it.
Chapter 70
David prays that his enemies be shamed and humiliated for their shaming him and reveling in his troubles. Then the righteous will rejoice, and chant songs and praises always.
1. For the Conductor, by David, to remind.
2. O God, [come] to rescue me; O Lord, hurry to my aid.
3. Let those who seek my life be shamed and disgraced; let those who wish me harm retreat and be humiliated.
4. Let those who say, "Aha! Aha!" be turned back in return for their shaming [me].
5. Let all who seek You rejoice and delight in You, and let those who love Your deliverance say always, "May God be exalted!”
6. But I am poor and needy; hurry to me, O God! You are my help and deliverer; O God, do not delay!
Chapter 71
In this awe-inspiring prayer, David speaks of his enemies' desire to kill him, declaring him deserving of death.
1. I have taken refuge in You, O Lord; I will never be shamed.
2. Rescue me and deliver me in Your righteousness; incline Your ear to me and save me.
3. Be for me a sheltering rock, to enter always. You have ordered my salvation, for You are my rock and my fortress.
4. O my God, rescue me from the hand of the wicked, from the palm of the scheming and violent.
5. For You are my hope, O my Lord, God, my security since my youth.
6. I have relied on You from the womb; You drew me from my mother's innards; my praise is of You always.
7. I became an example to the masses, yet You were my mighty refuge.
8. Let my mouth be filled with Your praise, all day long with Your glory.
9. Do not cast me aside in old age; do not forsake me when my strength fails;
10. for my enemies say of me, and those who watch my soul conspire together,
11. saying, "God has forsaken him. Give chase and catch him, for there is no rescuer.”
12. O God, do not distance Yourself from me; my God, hurry to my aid.
13. Let the adversaries of my soul be shamed and consumed; let those who seek my harm be enwrapped in disgrace and humiliation.
14. But as for me, I will always hope; I will add to all Your praises.
15. My mouth will tell of Your righteousness, all day long of Your deliverance, for I do not know their number.
16. I come with the strength of my Lord, God; I mention Your righteousness, Yours alone.
17. O God, You have taught me since my youth, and to this day I tell of Your wonders.
18. Even into old age and hoariness, O God, do not abandon me, until I tell of Your might to the generations, and of Your strength to all who are to come.
19. Your righteousness, O God, reaches the high heavens, for You do great things; O God, who is like You!
20. You, Who has shown me many and grievous troubles, You will revive me again; You will lift me again from the depths of the earth.
21. You will increase my greatness; You will turn and console me.
22. I too1 will thank You on the lyre for Your faithfulness, My God; I will sing to You on the harp, O Holy One of Israel.
23. My lips will rejoice when I sing to you, as well as my soul which You have redeemed.
24. My tongue will also utter Your righteousness all day, for those who seek my harm are shamed and disgraced.
Tanya: Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 40• Lessons in Tanya
• Thursday, Nissan 13, 5775 · April 2, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Likutei Amarim, beginning of Chapter 40
In ch. 39 the Alter Rebbe explained that the ascent of one’s Torah and mitzvot is commensurate with the level of kavanah that one invests in study and performance. If one’skavanah stems from love and fear of G‑d created by one’s understanding of His greatness, his Torah and mitzvot ascend to the Sefirot of Beriah, a World of intellect. If one’s kavanah stems from natural love and fear, his Torah and mitzvot ascend to the Sefirot of Yetzirah, a World of emotion.
If, however, one’s study and observance are not lishmah (“for its own sake”), because he feels no love or fear of G‑d, his Torah and mitzvot cannot ascend at all to “stand before G‑d” by being absorbed in the Sefirot. This is true even where his observance is not strictly shelo lishmah (not for its own sake), i.e., for some selfish motive, but even where he acts out of habit. In the case of Torah studied by rote, however, the Torah ascends before G‑d when he reviews the subject lishmah, joining it to his present study.
אך כל זמן שלא חזר ולמד דבר זה לשמה
But as long as he does not review this subject lishmah,
אין לימודו עולה אפילו בי׳ ספירות המאירות בעולם היצירה והעשיה
his study does not ascend even to the Ten Sefirot which radiate in the Worlds ofYetzirah and Asiyah (not to mention the Sefirot of Beriah).
כי הספירות הן בחינת אלקות, ובהן מתלבש ומתייחד אור אין סוף ברוך הוא ממש
For the Sefirot are a level of G‑dliness, and the blessed Ein Sof-light is clothed within them and is united with them; and therefore, were this person’s Torah to ascend into the Sefirot, it would actually ascend to the Ein Sof-light,
ובלא דחילו ורחימו לא יכלא לסלקא ולמיקם קדם ה׳, כמו שכתוב בתיקונים
and without fear and love [the Torah] cannot rise to stand before G‑d — the Ein Sof-light — as is written in Tikkunei Zohar.
רק לימודו עולה להיכלות ומדורין, שהן חיצוניות העולמות
Instead, his Torah study rises to the “chambers” and “abodes” of Yetzirah andAsiyah, which are the externality of the Worlds,
The Sefirot are the internal aspect of each World, i.e., its divine creative power; the “chambers” constitute the (created) World itself.
שבהן עומדים המלאכים
where the angels are situated.
וכמו שכתב הרב חיים ויטל ז״ל בשער הנבואה פרק ב׳, שמהתורה שלא בכוונה נבראים מלאכים בעולם היצירה, ומהמצות בלי כוונה נבראים מלאכים בעולם העשיה
Rabbi Chayim Vital, of blessed memory, writes in ch. 2 of his Shaar HaNevuah(“The Portal of Prophecy”) that from Torah [studied] without kavanah angels are created in the World of Yetzirah, and from mitzvot [performed] withoutkavanah angels are created in the World of Asiyah.
This indicates that Torah and mitzvot without kavanah are not absorbed in the Sefirot, but rise only to the level of angels, who are created beings and are thus on the level of the “externality” of the Worlds.
But one might argue that Rabbi Chayim Vital’s statement cannot be cited in support of the Alter Rebbe’s statement: the former speaks of Torah and mitzvot “without kavanah,” while the latter deals with Torah and mitzvot that were not observed “lishmah”. Perhaps the meaning of “without kavanah‘” is that one recited words of Torah or performed a mitzvah in a mechanicalmanner, without involving his thought at all. Accordingly, we might say that only such a lowly level of observance is incapable of rising any higher than the level of angels, whereas Torah and mitzvot lacking only the quality of “lishmah” may indeed — we might argue — rise to be absorbed into the Sefirot.
To forestall such an argument the Alter Rebbe adds to Rabbi Chayim Vital’s words:
וכל המלאכים הם בעלי חומר וצורה
Now, all angels are possessed of matter and form.
Similarly with angels created of Torah and mitzvot: the angels‘ “matter” is formed by the “matter” of Torah and mitzvot, and their “form” — by the “form” of Torah and mitzvot.
Thus, any mitzvah of which an angel is created must consist of more than mere mechanicalaction, which is the “matter” of a mitzvah; it must also contain some thought (such as an understanding of the words of Torah that one recites, or the realization that he is performing amitzvah); and this thought is the “form” of the mitzvah.
Clearly, then, Rabbi Chayim Vital is not dealing with mechanical observance when he says that Torah and mitzvot “without kavanah” produce angels in Yetzirah or Asiyah. The term “without kavanah” (as used here) must refer to Torah and mitzvot lacking the intention oflishmah.1 Yet, for lack of lishmah the Torah and mitzvot can ascend only to the level of angels, not to the Sefirot.
All the aforesaid concerns Torah and mitzvot which lack the intention of lishmah, but which were not performed expressly shelo lishmah, for personal motives.
אבל תורה שלא לשמה ממש, כגון להיות תלמיד חכם, וכהאי גוונא
But Torah [studied] strictly shelo lishmah, for selfish reasons, as, for example, for the purpose of becoming a scholar and the like,
אינה עולה כלל למעלה, אפילו להיכלות ומדור המלאכים דקדושה
does not ascend on high at all, not even to the “chambers” or to the abode of the holy angels (for even the “externality” of the Worlds is, after all, in the realm of holiness; therefore Torah studied with such intention does not ascend even to this level),
אלא נשארת למטה בעולם הזה הגשמי, שהוא מדור הקליפות
but remains instead below, in this physical world, which is the abode of thekelipot.* Since the selfish motive stems from kelipah, the Torah study that it elicits remains in the abode of kelipot.
הגהה
כמו שכתוב בזהר חלק ג׳, דף ל״א עמוד ב׳, ודף קכ״א עמוד ב׳, עיין שם:
*NOTE
Note Zohar, Part III, pp. 31b and 121b, where it is similarly written,
ההיא מלה סלקא ובקעא רקיעין כו' ואתער מה דאתער
“That [spoken] word ascends and pierces the heavens...and evokes what it evokes:
אי טב טב כו'
if [the word is] good — a word of Torah or the like — [it evokes] good...“; note there.
ע"ש ודף ק"ה ע"א מלה דאורייתא אתעביד מיניה קלא וסליק כו'
Note also on p. 105a: “From a word of Torah a voice is formed which rises...”;
וד' קס"ח ע"ב קלין דאורייתא וצלותא בקעין רקיעין כו'
and on p. 168b: “The voices of Torah and prayer [ascend on high and] pierce the heavens....”
END OF NOTE
All three passages from the Zohar indicate that words of Torah ascend on high, rending the heavens.
וכמו שכתוב בזהר על פסוק: מה יתרון לאדם מכל עמלו שיעמול תחת השמש
It is similarly written in the Zohar, commenting on the verse,2 “What profit has a man of all his toil that he labors under the sun?”
Our Sages point out that only man’s labor “under the sun,” i.e., toil in mundane matters, does not realize any profit; the labor of Torah, however, is “above the sun” and does indeed profit a man. The Zohar, though, stipulates:
דאפילו עמלא דאורייתא, אי עביד בגין יקריה כו׳
“Even with the toil of Torah, if one does it for his own glory... it belongs to the category of ‘labor under the sun,’ and there is no profit in it.”
וזה שאמרו: אשרי מי שבא לכאן ותלמודו בידו
This is also the meaning of the saying [of our Sages]:3 “Happy is he who arrives here on high with his Torah study in his hand,”
פירוש: שלא נשאר למטה בעולם הזה
meaning that [his Torah study] did not remain below in this world.
The saying thus means: “Happy is he who studies Torah lishmah, so that his Torah ascends on high.” Had he not studied Torah lishmah his Torah would not be with him (“in his hand”) when his soul ascends, but would have remained in this world.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | The commentary on the phrase, “all angels are possessed of matter and form,” is from the distinguished rav of Yekaterinoslav, Rabbi Levi Isaac Schneerson, of blessed memory, as transmitted by his son, the Rebbe. |
| 2. | Kohelet 1:3. |
| 3. | Pesachim 50a. |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:Thursday, Nissan 13, 5775 · April 2, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Positive Commandment 94
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
"That which issues from your lips you shall keep and perform"—Deuteronomy 23:24.
We are commanded to carry through that which we pledge to do [or not to do].
Fulfilling Verbal Obligations
Positive Commandment 94
Translated by Berel Bell
The 94th mitzvah is that we are commanded to fulfill every verbal obligation we have taken upon ourselves, whether an oath, a vow, a korban,1 etc.
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement,2 "You shall be careful to carry out whatever you say."
Although our Sages have split up this verse and explained each word separately as referring to something different, the general meaning of everything they say is: it is a positive commandment for a person to fulfill every verbal obligation he has taken upon himself, and a prohibition not to do so. This will be explained in our discussion of the prohibitions.3
The Sifri says, "The verse, 'Whatever you say,' constitutes a positive commandment." You find it obvious that the words, "whatever you say" by themselves have no meaning whatsoever. The intention [of the Sifri] is therefore as I explained above — that the plain meaning of the verse is that a person is obligated to carry out his verbal commitments.
This commandment is stated a second time in G‑d's statement,4 "A person must fulfill all he has verbally said."
The details of this mitzvah — i.e. how exactly the person must fulfill his obligation, and how he can be released [from his obligation] when in doubt regarding his statement — are explained in a number of passages in Sh'vuos, Nedarim, the end of Menachos, as well as in Kinim.
FOOTNOTES
1.Literally, a sacrifice. When a person says, "a sacrifice that I won't eat something of yours," he means to say that he considers that person's food to be forbidden for him to eat just as a sacrifice is forbidden to him. This constitutes a vow not to eat that person's food.
2.Deut. 23:24.
3.N157.
4.Num. 30:3.
Shabbos - Chapter One
Halacha 1
Resting from labor on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, for [ibid.20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on it]."
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, he is liable for karet; if witnesses who administer a warning are present, he should be stoned [to death]. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression, he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.
Commentary Halacha
Resting from labor - Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)
The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities - even those that are not forbidden labors - which would disrupt this tranquility.
From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.)
on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment - Sefer HaMitzvot(Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." - InSefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah.Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular.
Anyone who performs labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, - Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective.
for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor on it." - Sefer HaMitzvot(Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly - i.e., without being forced by others
as a conscious act of defiance - and not inadvertently.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת , the Rambam merely states "as a conscious act of defiance."
The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary.
he is liable for karet - כרת means "cut off." Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being "cut off in this world" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come.
if witnesses who administer a warning are present - As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed.
he should be stoned [to death]. - See Numbers 15:35. This is the most severe form of execution.
If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression -accidentally, performing a forbidden labor or doing so without awareness of the transgression involved
he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature. - The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required from a קרבן עולה ויורד - a guilt offering - which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.
Halacha 2
Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is liable" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for karet, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering.1
Halacha 3
Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.2
In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic3 in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."4Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion5 is given "stripes for defiance."
Halacha 4
Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act.6 Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]7
Halacha 5
It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty8 - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor9 will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.10
What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench11 and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.12
Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair.13 Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.
Halacha 6
[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable14 even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].
What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken,15 he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 7
Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.16
What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing,17 but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.
Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him,18 and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 8
Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.19
What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.
How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit,20 and instead, the stone passed into the public domain.21 He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable.22 For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground,23 he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 9
Should a person intend24 to pick black figs and pick white figs instead25 - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable.26 He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade.
Halacha 10
When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable,27 for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.28
To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being]29 and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.
Halacha 11
One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.30] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.31
If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable.32 The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.33
Halacha 12
Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable.34 If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.35
What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.
Halacha 13
[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt36 and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.37
Halacha 14
Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability,38 he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.39
For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.40
Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands.41 Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.
Halacha 15
Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself,42 they are [both] free of liability.43
This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.
Halacha 16
When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].44 For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone,45 and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.
[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all.46 The same applies in other similar situations.
Halacha 17
Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.47 What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,48 one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.
A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.49 Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.
Halacha 18
Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable.50 For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place,51 one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.
The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.52
Halacha 19
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally,53 he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.
One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning.54 Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature55 when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
The Rambam is explaining that by performing a forbidden act on the Sabbath, a person incurs liability. The nature of this liability depends on his intent and on whether witnesses are present. These factors are common, however, to all the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore, in the future, all that is necessary to say is that "the person is liable," and based on the principles stated here, we can determine what his liability is.
|
| 2. |
Shabbat 3a makes a similar statement of principle, but states that there are three exceptions to this rule. When discussing these exceptions, the Rambam deviates from the terminology used in the Talmud and states that these three acts are "permitted."
|
| 3. |
Our translation reflects the usual interpretation of the Hebrew expression
|
| 4. |
The Rambam discusses this punishment in Hilchot Edut 18:6, explaining that the person is flogged to the extent of the court's discretion (in contrast to the number of lashes received for the violation of a Torah command, which is fixed at 39). Other authorities offer different interpretations.
|
| 5. |
Shoshanat Ha'amakim states that this expression implies that a person must be given a warning before such a punishment is administered.
|
| 6. |
I.e., there is no prohibition whatsoever for performing the act in question.
|
| 7. |
This expression implies that, at the outset, it is improper to perform such an act. Nevertheless, doing so does not warrant punishment (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 8. |
If, however, it is certain that the forbidden labor will be performed, it is prohibited to perform the permitted act, as explained in the following halachah.
|
| 9. |
Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 9), explains that by using the term "forbidden labor" in this and the following halachah, the Rambam implies that there is a difficulty only if a prohibition from the Torah is involved. If merely a Rabbinic prohibition is concerned, it is permitted without question. This question is also discussed by the Mishneh L'Melech.
|
| 10. |
The Rambam's decision is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (See Beitzah 23b and other sources.) Rabbi Shimon maintains that although a forbidden labor results from a person's activity, since he did not desire that this labor be performed, he is not held liable. Rabbi Yehudah, in contrast, holds the person liable, for his actions brought about the performance of a forbidden labor.
The commentaries explain Rabbi Shimon's opinion based on the principle (Chaggigah 10b) that "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." A deed is forbidden only when it is associated with a purposeful intent. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
The concept discussed in this halachah,
Although this principle is applicable to the Sabbath laws in particular, the difference of opinion between these two sages on this issue is relevant, not only to the Sabbath laws, but to all other prohibitions in the Torah as well.
Based on Pesachim 25b-26b, it appears that one is allowed to perform an activity that may result in the incidental performance of a forbidden labor even when one has an alternative manner of accomplishing one's objective, which does not involve any risk of a forbidden labor being performed. See Hilchot Kilayim 10:16.
|
| 11. |
Our text follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, which quotes the text ofShabbat 22b. The original manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute
|
| 12. |
Digging a groove is forbidden because it is included in the category of forbidden labor, plowing. Nevertheless, since one did not intend to perform this labor, the fact that it was performed is of no consequence. Similarly, all the subsequent activities mentioned by the Rambam involve the performance of a forbidden labor without the intent to do so.
|
| 13. |
See Chapter 22, Halachah 13.
|
| 14. |
As mentioned in Halachah 2, the use of this term implies that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham). Although some authorities have explained that since the person had no intent for the labor itself, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature, from the Rambam's perspective it appears that since he knows that the labor will be performed, it is considered as if he performed it intentionally.
|
| 15. |
The addition of the word "merely" implies that the person has a desire to slaughter the fowl. Albeit, his desire may not be to kill the fowl for food, but even for use as a toy it is preferable that the fowl be dead than alive.
This leads to another concept. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:18) gives an example of this situation: The plug of a barrel of wine was closed with flax. Although some wine will inevitably be squeezed out when the barrel is unplugged - and squeezing is a forbidden labor - since the wine that is squeezed out will be lost, there is no prohibition.
This opinion is not, however, accepted by all authorities. Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher in their glosses on Shabbat 103a differ and maintain that, since it is inevitable that a forbidden labor will be performed, such an act is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch's statements, it would appear that it is preferable to follow the more stringent view, but that the more lenient perspective has become popularly accepted.
|
| 16. |
This also represents a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as evident from Shabbat 29b-30a, 73b, and other sources.
As in the laws mentioned in Halachah 7, the source of their difference of opinion is Rabbi Shimon's principle, "the Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." To explain: The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is derived from the labors performed to construct the Sanctuary (see the commentary on Chapter 7, Law 1), and with regard to the construction of the Sanctuary, the Torah uses the expression,
For this reason, Rabbi Shimon maintains - as explained in Halachah 5 - that when a person performs a forbidden labor without the intention to do so (
In the situation at hand, a
Rabbi Yehudah differs on both issues, maintaining that since the performance of a forbidden labor results from this person's conscious activity, he is held liable. The Rambam (following the opinion of Shemuel, Zevachim 92a) accepts Rabbi Shimon's view with regard to
The difference between these opinions can be explained based on the interpretation of the command
What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the destruction of leaven must be utter and complete as possible, while the Sages maintain that all that is necessary is to negate its usefulness (potential for purposeful use). Similarly, in the present instance, Rabbi Yehudah explains that all semblances of labor are forbidden on the Sabbath. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that only purposeful labor is forbidden; only when both the activity and the intent for which it is performed are analogous to the activities performed to construct the Sanctuary is a transgression committed. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 7, p. 190-191.)
Shemuel and the Rambam take an intermediate position. They agree with Rabbi Shimon that an activity must be coupled with a purposeful intent, but maintain that since a
It must be noted that the Rambam's view is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra'avad, Tosafot(Zevachim, ibid.) and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities state that Rabbi Shimon's opinion is accepted in both these instances. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1, 334:12) acceptsTosafot's decision. Nevertheless, even the authorities who accept Rabbi Shimon's view maintain that, if there is no danger to the community involved, a
|
| 17. |
I.e., his intent in extinguishing the lamp was not to produce coals to use for kindling an even flame, the purpose for which extinguishing was performed in constructing the Sanctuary.
|
| 18. |
I.e., when constructing the Sanctuary, articles were transported because they were desired, and coals were extinguished to use for kindling an even flame.
|
| 19. |
Although the instance stated by the Rambam is not found in the Talmud, it is a logical extension of the principle stated in Keritot 19b and Shabbat 97b (and expressed in the following halachah), "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." Since the labor ultimately performed was not the one originally intended, this is not considered to be "purposeful work."
|
| 20. |
As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, a carmelit is a domain in which the Sages applied the prohibitions against transporting and throwing articles which apply in the public domain by virtue of Torah law. Thus, the person had the intent of violating merely a Rabbinic law.
|
| 21. |
The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Chapter 13, Halachah 21, which states that even when a person intended to throw an object four cubits in the public domain and instead the object traveled eight cubits, he is not held liable, because he did not accomplish his intent. Hence, he explains that the intent is not that the public domain is beyond the carmelit and the object did not rest in thecarmelit as intended, but rather continued to the public domain.
Instead, the Rambam is referring to an instance where a person is standing in a private domain with both a public domain and a carmelit before him. Although he intended to throw the object into the carmelit, it traveled into the public domain.
|
| 22. |
See Hilchot Shegagot 7:11. This halachah represents a progressive sequence. In the first instance mentioned, the forbidden activity the person intended to perform was not performed at all. In the second instance, he intended to perform the forbidden activity - removing an object from his property - but his intent was not to transgress a Torah prohibition. In this third instance, the person had the intent of performing the activity that he performed for the sake of the result that activity produced. Nevertheless, since he desired to perform this activity with a permitted entity and that aspect of the desire was not fulfilled, he is not held liable (Rav Kapach).
|
| 23. |
The Maggid Mishneh offers two different interpretations of the Rambam's words: one that the person cut a different plant from the one he intended to cut, and one that he thought the plant he intended to cut had been detached from the earth, and discovered that it was attached. Although, both interpretations are halachically acceptable, the Maggid Mishneh favors the second one. TheKovetz and other authorities, however, favor the first.
|
| 24. |
This halachah develops the theme stated in the previous halachah, giving a further example of a case where a person is not held liable for a forbidden activity he performed, because of the principle, "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]."
|
| 25. |
The difference in the color of the figs causes them to be regarded as two different types of fruit. This is significant, as is obvious from the contrast to the following halachah.
|
| 26. |
The Ra'avad takes issue with this point, arguing that since the person picking the fruit accomplished his objective, he should be held liable. It is insignificant that the order in which he picked them differed from that which he originally intended.
It can be explained, based on Keritot 19b, that the Rambam's understanding is that for a person to be held liable, not only must he accomplish his ultimate intent, but also, while he is performing the labor, his actions must be controlled by his thoughts.
Commenting on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh notes that there is no difference regarding practical halachah at present. The only difference will be in the Era of the Redemption, at which time there will be a question whether it is necessary for such a person to bring a sin offering or not, and in that era, "the righteous instructor (Mashiach) will come" and render a decision.
|
| 27. |
This is the text of Keritot 20a according to the Rambam and others. Our text of Keritot differs and frees a person of liability in such an instance. On this basis, the Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's position.
|
| 28. |
In contrast to the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person does not derive any advantage from kindling or extinguishing either candle; he merely wants to kindle or distinguish a candle. The same effect results from kindling or extinguishing one as the other. Hence he is liable, for he performed a forbidden labor, and he is considered to have performed it willfully. Were there to be an advantage to kindling or extinguishing one of the two candles, the situation would resemble that described in Halachah 11.
|
| 29. |
The intent does not appear to be that he desired to kill a person, for it is highly unlikely that there would be no difference killing one person or the other. Rather, the Rambam appears to be referring to the killing of an insect or an animal, an act that is also forbidden on the Sabbath.
|
| 30. |
The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Keritot 20a.
|
| 31. |
As in Halachah 9, the fact that the person did not perform the tasks in the order in which he originally intended indicates that, at the time he performed them, he was not in control of his deeds. Hence, this is not considered to be "purposeful work." In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs and holds the person liable.
The new concept this halachah teaches is that even when the tasks which the person intended to perform involve two separate labors (as opposed to Halachah 9 when only a single forbidden labor is involved), he is held liable only when he performs the tasks in the order he originally intended.
|
| 32. |
Since the order in which the person desired to perform the activity was not reversed, his actions are "purposeful work."
|
| 33. |
Rashi, Keritot 19b, differentiates between this type of behavior, referred to as
|
| 34. |
Although he accepts the Rambam's premise, the Ra'avad objects to the wording the Rambam chose, explaining that there is an instance - a person who desired to write the name
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, the person also had the intent to write the letters of the name
|
| 35. |
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the expression "he is not liable," means that a person should not be punished - nor is he liable to bring a sin offering - for his deed. Nevertheless, performing such a deed constitutes the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. As mentioned, this concept is applicable throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the Mishneh Torah as a whole.
|
| 36. |
Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:4. Rashi and others offer alternate definitions of the term.
|
| 37. |
The intent here is that since it is usual for the article to shift position in such an instance, this is considered to be part of the person's original intent.
Although this law is more specific than most mentioned in this chapter, it is still worthy of mention, because it illustrates how a person's intention can be general in nature and include several different possible ways in which a forbidden labor could be performed.
|
| 38. |
Here the Rambam introduces a new concept,
A similar concept applies with regard to other prohibitions. For example, with regard to most forbidden foods one is not held liable unless one eats an amount equivalent to the size of an olive.
[Yoma 74 discusses whether a person who performs a forbidden activity, but does so involving less than a
|
| 39. |
One might think that since the person did not complete his intended objective, his activity is not considered "purposeful labor." The Rambam explains, however, that since the work the person did complete was performed "purposefully," and since he completed a significant amount of work (a
|
| 40. |
See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.
|
| 41. |
See Chapter 9, Halachah 18.
|
| 42. |
A situation in which a forbidden labor requires the efforts of more than one individual is discussed in the following halachah.
|
| 43. |
Shabbat 3a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, explaining that that verse teaches that one is liable only "when one performs the entire labor and not a portion of it; when one person performs the labor and not two."
See also Rashi, Shabbat 93a and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:7 explain that a person is not liable for performing a labor in this manner, because this is not the ordinary manner in which the labor is performed.
|
| 44. |
Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the same applies when a forbidden labor is performed by three or more individuals and the performance of the forbidden labor requires the efforts of all the individuals involved. Nevertheless, if three individuals perform a forbidden labor and it requires only the efforts of two, none of the individuals is held liable, for no one is capable of performing the task alone.
|
| 45. |
Tosafot, Shabbat 93a emphasizes that the matter is not dependent on strength alone. Even when a person has sufficient strength to carry an object alone, but requires a second person's assistance because of the object's bulk, neither is liable. In practice, the transfer of the object requires both their efforts.
|
| 46. |
This principle is also applied in other contexts aside from the laws of the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Tum'at Mishkav UMoshav 7:6 and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 5:18. See also the commentary to the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.)
|
| 47. |
As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.
(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.)
|
| 48. |
However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion.
|
| 49. |
The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a
|
| 50. |
Indeed, several of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath - e.g., tearing, erasing, and demolishing - involve activities that are essentially destructive in nature. Nevertheless, when one performs these activities for an ultimate constructive intent, one is held liable.
|
| 51. |
The commentaries note the contrast between the Rambam's wording in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 15, where he omits the expression, "in its place." Accordingly, the commentaries question whether one is liable for demolishing a building for the sake of building another, when the other building will not be built in the place of the first. (See the gloss of the Or Sameach on Chapter 10, Halachah 12.)
|
| 52. |
For example, the minimum measure (
|
| 53. |
The definition of "unintentionally" (
|
| 54. |
See Halachah 1.
|
| 55. |
See Halachah 1.
|
Nedarim - Chapter 1
Halacha 1
There are two categories of vows: The first is to forbid oneself [from benefiting] from entities permitted to him;1 e.g., he said: "The produce from this-and-this country is forbidden to me for 30 days" or "...forever." "This type of produce is forbidden to me" or "This produce is forbidden." Regardless of the language in which the prohibition is stated,2 they become forbidden to him, even though there is no oath at all, nor did it mention God's name or a term used to describe Him.3 Concerning this, the Torah [Numbers 30:3] states: "To cause a prohibition to take effect upon his soul," i.e., to cause permitted entities to become forbidden to him. Similarly, such a vow takes effect if he says: "They are forbidden to me." I call this category: "vows involving prohibitions."
Halacha 2
The second category is to obligate himself for a sacrifice that he is not required to bring. For example, he said: "I obligate myself [to bring] a burnt offering," "I obligate myself to bring a peace offering," "...a meal offering," or "This animal is a burnt offering," or "...a peace offering."
When he says: "I obligate myself [to bring]...", this is called a vow.4 When he says: "This is...", it is called a donation.5 Donations and vows are of the same type [of pledges], but [the one making the pledge] is responsible for a vow.6With regard to a donations, by contrast, he is not responsible.7 Concerning these the Torah states [Deuteronomy 12:17]: "Your vows which you pledge and your donations...." This category, I refer to as "vows of sanctification."
Halacha 3
The laws concerning the first category and its relevant matters are [the subject] we will discuss in these halachot. The laws concerning vows of sanctification and their particulars will be discussed in their appropriate place in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot.8
Halacha 4
It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for a person to carry out his oath or vow9 whether it be a vow involving prohibitions or a vow of sanctification, as [Deuteronomy 12:23] states: "Heed the utterances of your mouth and do as you vowed." And [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth."10
Halacha 5
When a person forbids himself from partaking of a particular type of food, e.g., he said: "Figs are forbidden to me," "Figs from such-and-such a country are forbidden to me," "These figs are forbidden to me," or the like, if he partakes of any amount of them, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law,11 as [Numbers, Ibid.] states: "He shall not desecrate his word."
There is no minimum measure [for the desecration of] a vow, for by taking a vow [not to partake of] a substance, it is as if one explicitly stated that he would not partake of even the slightest amount.12 If one said: "It is forbidden for me to eat the produce of this-and-this country" or "...to eat these fruit," he does not receive lashes unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion.
Halacha 6
If a person forbade himself from eating figs and grapes - whether in two vows or in one - the two can be combined to make up the measure of an olive-sized portion.13 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
When a person says: "This produce is considered like a sacrifice," or he tells a colleague: "Everything that I partake of with you is a sacrifice,"14 "...like a sacrifice," "or considered like a sacrifice for me," they are forbidden to him. For it is possible that a person will make a vow for a sacrifice and make an animal that is ordinary a sacrifice and thus be forbidden for him.15
Halacha 8
If, however, a person says: "This produce is considered for me...", "This type of produce is considered for me...", "What I will eat with so-and-so will be considered as pig meat," "...as a false deity," "...as nevelot and trefot," or the like, they are permitted and no vow takes effect. [The rationale is that] it is impossible for a person to make something that is not pig meat as pig meat.16
Halacha 9
This is the general principle [that applies] whenever anyone attempts to have permitted entities considered as forbidden entities: If he could have endowed that forbidden entity with its status by taking a vow,17 [the permitted entities] are forbidden. If he cannot endow it with its status by taking a vow,18 [the permitted entities] remain permitted.
Halacha 10
Sin-offerings and guilt-offerings cannot be brought as vows or as donations, as will be explained in the appropriate place.19 Nevertheless, it is possible for a person making a vow to offer them as a result of his vow. For a person who takes a nazirite vow must bring a sin offering,20 and if he becomes impure,21 he must bring a guilt offering, as will be stated.22 Accordingly, when one says: "This produce is considered for me like a sin-offering" or "...like a guilt-offering," or he says: "It is a sin-offering" or "It is a guilt-offering," it is forbidden. Needless to say, if he says: "It is a burnt-offering," "...a peace-offering," "...a meal-offering," or "...a thanksgiving-offering," it is forbidden, for all of these offerings can be brought as vows or as donations.23
Halacha 11
Halacha 12
Halacha 13
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like the tithe-sacrifice of an animal,"30 it is forbidden, for the sanctity [of the tithe-sacrifices] is conveyed upon them by mortals.31 If he says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a firstborn,"32it is permitted, for the sanctity [of the firstborn] is not conveyed by mortals.33It cannot be designated [for another sacred purpose] with a vow, as [Leviticus 27:26] states: "A man should not consecrate it."34
Halacha 14
If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a devotion offering for Above,"35 it is forbidden, for the devotion offering for Above are [set aside] for improvements within the Temple.36
[A vow takes effect and produce] becomes forbidden although the person did not mention a sacrifice [if he makes any of the following statements]: "[This produce] is considered for me like the donations for the chamber,"37 "...like the daily sacrifices," "...like the storage rooms,"38 "...like the wood,"39 "...like the fire-offerings,"40 "...like the altar," or "...like any of the utensils of the altar," e.g., he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like the altar rakes,"41 "...like the ewers [for the blood of the sacrifices],"42 "...like the altar forks,"43 or the like. [This law also applies] if he says: "This produce] is considered for me like the Temple,"44 "...like Jerusalem."45 [The rationale is that] all of these statements are similar to saying: "[This produce] is considered for me like a sacrifice."
Halacha 15
[When there was] sacrificial meat - even meat from a peace offering whose blood had been poured [on the altar] which is permitted to non-priests - before a person and he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like this meat," it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] he attached [his vow] to the fundamental element of the meat, and that was forbidden.46
[Different rules apply if] the meat was from a firstborn sacrifice. If its blood had not been poured [on the altar], [the produce] is forbidden.47 If it had been poured, it is permitted.
Halacha 16
There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.
What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban. Cherek, cheref, and cherech are all terms referring to a cherem (dedication offering).
Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We follow the language used by people at large in that place and at that time.48
Halacha 17
Just as a person can make a vow forbidding entities to himself with such terms, so, too, if he consecrates an entity with such terms, the entity is consecrated. Nicknames for such terms,49 however, are not binding50 whether for vows involving prohibitions or vows involving the consecration of property.
Halacha 18
If a person tells a colleague: "Whatever I eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food," "...will not be kosher," or "...will not be pure,"51 it is as if he told him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be like a sacrifice,"52 which is forbidden. Similarly, if he tells him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be an impure [sacrifice]," "...notar," or piggul,"53 it is forbidden.
Halacha 19
When a person tells a colleague: "Not ordinary food will I not eat from your [property]," it is as if he told him:54 "What I will eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food, but instead, like a sacrifice."55
Similarly, if he tells him: "The sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," or "Like a sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden [to eat from his property].56 If, by contrast, he tells him: "The sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," "Like a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "For a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," or "Not a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted in all of these instances.57 For all of these expressions do not have any implication other than he is taking an oath by a sacrifice that he will not eat from his [property] and taking an oath on a sacrifice is not binding. Alternatively, [his intent can be interpreted] as taking a vow that he will not partake of a sacrifice with him.
Halacha 20
[If he tells him:] "Ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Like ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat not with you," "Like ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," it is permitted for him [to eat from his property].58
Halacha 21
If, by contrast, he says: "No impure [sacrifices] will I eat from your [property]," "No notar, will I eat from your [property]," or "No piggul will I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden. [The vow takes effect, because] the intent of his statements appears to be: "What I will eat will be piggul or impure. Therefore, I will not eat from your [property]."59
Halacha 22
[If he says:] "By the Temple, I will eat from your [property]," "The Temple, I will eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will eat from your [property]," [the vow is effective,60 and] it is forbidden. "The Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," "Like the Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted.61 For this is like taking an oath by the Temple, that he will not eat from his [property]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 23
When a person tells a colleague, "I am taking a vow from you," his statement implies that he will not speak with him.62 "I am separate from you" implies that he will not do business with him. "I am distant from you" implies that he will not sit within four cubits of him. That same implication is conveyed by telling him: "I am ostracized from you" or "I am banned from you."63
If, however, says "I am taking a vow from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," "I am separate from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," or "I am distant from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he is forbidden to eat from his [property].64 If he eats an olivesized portion [of food] from any of his property, he is liable for lashes for [violating the prohibition]: "He shall not desecrate his word."
Halacha 24
Halacha 25
Halacha 26
If one says: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked..." or "...like the pledges of the upright73 that I will eat from your [property]," or "...if I eat from your property," he is forbidden [to do so], even if he did not make an explicit statement.74
If he said: "Like the vows of the upright," his statement is of no consequence, for the upright do not take vows to prohibit things out of anger. If he says: "I am like the vows of the wicked," and a nazirite was passing before him, he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow.75 If he says: "I am responsible, like the vows of the wicked," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice.76 "Like the vows of the wicked, I will not eat from it,"77 he is liable for an oath.78
Halacha 27
When a person takes a vow by the Torah, i.e., he says: "This produce is considered for me like this,"79 his statements are of no consequence80 and he need not ask a sage to release him from it.81 [An exception is made if] he is a common person so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.82
Halacha 28
Halacha 29
Halacha 30
When a person tells his wife: "You are considered to me as my mother," "...as my sister,"87 "...as orlah," or "...as mixed species in a vineyard,"88 it is as if one says concerning produce: "May it be like pig meat." Just as he is permitted to partake of that produce, as explained,89 so, too, he is permitted [to engage in relations] with his wife.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
For the intent of a vow is not to forbid what the Torah has prohibited, and certainly not to permit what the Torah has prohibited (Radbaz).
|
| 2. |
I.e., it need not be stated in Lashon HaKodesh (Biblical Hebrew).
|
| 3. |
As stated in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:2, an oath must mention God's name or one of the terms used to describe Him.
|
| 4. |
I.e., he is personally responsible to bring a sacrifice; there is no set animal designated for that purpose.
|
| 5. |
I.e., the animal is designated to be offered as a sacrifice; there is no obligation on the person.
|
| 6. |
I.e., if the animal which he originally intended to be sacrificed is lost, he must provide another one, because he accepted personal responsibility. See Halachot 25 and 26 with regard to the distinction between the two terms.
|
| 7. |
For it was only the one animal that was designated as a sacrifice.
|
| 8. |
See Chapters 6 and 9 of those halachot which explain the difference between these types of sacrifices. There are also occasional references to such vows in these halachot. See, for example, Halachah 17 of this chapter.
|
| 9. |
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 575) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 10. |
Although there are two different verses which point to the same commandment, they are counted only as one mitzvah. For the verse from Deuteronomy could be interpreted as a reinforcement for the negative commandment mentioned in the following verse and the verse from Numbers can be interpreted as referring only to vows involving prohibitions (Radbaz). In his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban considers these as two separate mitzvot.
|
| 11. |
As is the punishment prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment. Sefer HaMitzvot(negative commandment 157) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 407) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
|
| 12. |
As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, were the person to have mentioned "eating" in his vow, we would have interpreted the prohibition as involving an olive-sized portion, the minimum measure for eating that applies with regard to other prohibitions. Since he did not, the implication is that even the slightest amount is forbidden. Compare to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:1.
|
| 13. |
This does not apply with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:8). Even with regard to vows, it applies only when one uses the expression "eating." The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the law applies only when the two are included in the same oath. Their difference of opinion revolves around the understanding of Sh'vuot 22a.
|
| 14. |
I.e., the person wants to forbid himself from eating together with his colleague.
|
| 15. |
Just as a person cannot partake of a sacrifice until it is offered, so, too, he cannot partake of an entity forbidden by a vow. Just as the consecration of a sacrifice comes about because of a person's vow and his vow is what causes the sacrifice to become forbidden, so too, a vow causes an entity to be forbidden.
See Hilchot Meilah 4:9-10 which explains that with regard to the person forbidden by the vow, the article becomes like consecrated property. Hence, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice in atonement if he benefits from the article.
|
| 16. |
For these substances are inherently forbidden; they do not become prohibited because of man's statements. An animal consecrated as a sacrifice, by contrast, is inherently permitted. It is only man's statements that cause it to become forbidden.
|
| 17. |
As a person can cause a sacrifice to become forbidden.
The Rambam is explaining a fundamental principle with regard to vows. A vow becomes effective when a person establishes an equation between an entity (e.g., produce) and another entity (e.g., a sacrifice), provided it is possible for him to cause the latter entity to become forbidden on the basis of his vow alone.
|
| 18. |
I.e., objects which are inherently forbidden.
|
| 19. |
See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:8, Hilchot Shegagot 1:1. These sacrifices are required when a person transgresses a prohibition. If he does not transgress, he may not bring such a sacrifice and if he does transgress, he is compelled to do so. Offering it is not dependent on his vow.
|
| 20. |
Hilchot Nazirut 6:11; 8:1.
|
| 21. |
Due to contact with a human corpse (ibid. 7:2).
|
| 22. |
Ibid. 6:11; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:1.
|
| 23. |
And thus bringing them is obviously dependent on his making a vow.
|
| 24. |
Challah refers to a portion that must be separated from dough and given to a priest. Terumahrefers to a portion of grain that must be separated and given to a priest. Since they may not be eaten by a non-priest, one might think that they could be the subject of a vow. Aaron is mentioned, because he is the progenitor of the priestly family.
|
| 25. |
A person is required to separate these portions from his dough or grain. Although the amount he gives and the designation of the priest to whom he gives them is dependent on his will, he is obligated to make the gift. The Ra'avad offers a different rationale for this law.
|
| 26. |
Sacrificial meat that was left after its prescribed time and hence, forbidden to be eaten.
|
| 27. |
Sacrifices that were offered with the intent that they be eaten at a time when it was forbidden to do so and hence, become forbidden to be eaten.
|
| 28. |
And is thus forbidden to be eaten.
|
| 29. |
It is beyond his capacity to make the object concerning which he is taking a vow bound by any of the prohibitions mentioned. Nevertheless, all of these prohibitions involve sacrificial meat and sacrificial meat is forbidden to be eaten before it was offered in a proper way, because of his oath as above. Hence, the vow can take effect.
|
| 30. |
As Leviticus 27:32 states, a person must bring every tenth animal born to his herd as a tithe offering. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
|
| 31. |
Although we are required to separate these offerings, the tithing process through which the holiness is conveyed upon the animal is a result of man's actions.
It is possible to differentiate between such offerings and terumah, for even before the terumahwas separated, the grain was not permitted to be eaten, because it was tevel. The animals, by contrast, could have been slaughtered, before the tithe was separated (see Radbaz, quoting Rabbenu Asher).
|
| 32. |
Which is sanctified from birth and offered as a sacrifice.
|
| 33. |
Instead, it is sanctified from birth.
|
| 34. |
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham who addresses the following question that was posed to him: The prooftext from Leviticus has been interpreted by the Sifri as teaching that a firstborn may not be consecrated as another sacrifice (see Hilchot Temurah 4:11 where the Rambam quotes this concept). Moreover, although the firstborn is intrinsically holy, it is a mitzvah to consecrate it for that sacrifice (quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Bechorot 1:5), and thus seemingly, the holiness is conveyed upon it by a mortal's actions.
Rav Avraham replies that since the holiness of the firstborn is inherent and it cannot be changed to that of another sacrifice, that is a proof that a vow cannot affect it. With regard to using a first born as the basis for a vow, see also Halachah 15 and notes.
|
| 35. |
See Hilchot Arachin V'Charamim 6:1 for a description of the nature of this pledge.
|
| 36. |
And are forbidden to be used for mundane purposes. Thus they represent an entity that was forbidden by man's pledge.
|
| 37. |
The Hebrew term terumat halishkah refers to the money collected from the half-shekel donations collected from the Jewish people and used for the communal sacrifices offered in the Temple. SeeHilchot Shekalim, ch. 2.
|
| 38. |
I.e., the chambers in the Temple. This and several of the following interpretations are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:3).
|
| 39. |
For the altar.
|
| 40. |
I.e., the portions of the sacrifices offered on the Temple altar.
|
| 41. |
Used to rake the ashes on the altar.
|
| 42. |
Used to collect the blood from the sacrifices and then pour it on the altar.
|
| 43. |
Used to move portions of the sacrifices around on the altar's fire, so that they would be consumed by it.
|
| 44. |
I.e., like the sacrifices offered in the Temple.
|
| 45. |
Like the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem.
|
| 46. |
Since fundamentally, before its blood was poured on the altar, the meat was forbidden, that is the factor that we consider. We do not take into consideration the fact that afterwards it became permitted. This ruling is the subject of an unresolved question in Nedarim 11b. Hence, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 47. |
For then it is forbidden to everyone. Hence one might say that just as his designation of the firstborn causes the meat to be forbidden, making a vow using a firstborn sacrifice as a basis is effective.
This ruling has created difficulty among the commentaries, because in Halachah 13 the Rambam ruled that a firstborn animal cannot be used as the basis of a vow. Similarly, as the Ra'avad points out, the Rambam's ruling does not appear to be consistent with either of the positions mentioned inNedarim 12b, the source for this halachah. This leads the Kessef Mishneh to conclude that there was a printing error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is "[the produce] is permitted." He states that he found an ancient text that reads this way. Similarly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read in that manner, omitting the last phrase entirely.
The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham defends the ruling in the existing text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining that there is a difference between a firstborn sacrifice and the meat of a firstborn sacrifice.
|
| 48. |
For this is representative of the person's intent. Taking this concept further, the Rama Yoreh De'ah 207:1) quotes opinions that maintain that this surely applies to vows made in gentile languages. And conversely, he also mentions views that maintain that if someone makes a vow using the wording of our Sages without understanding what he is saying, it does not take effect.
|
| 49. |
Nedarim 10b gives examples: miknamna, miknachna, and miknasna.
|
| 50. |
For they are very distant from the original wording [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 207:1)]. Kin'at Eliyahu states that apparently, they also would not have been recognized universally as having the desired intent.
|
| 51. |
The Rambam states this expression twice: once in Aramaic and once in Lashon HaKodesh.
|
| 52. |
I.e., the opposite of ordinary food is sacrificial food that is consecrated. Similarly with regard to his statement about impure food, we assume that his intent is an impure sacrifice in which instance, his vow is effective. Although it is possible that his intent is impure terumah (in which instance, his vow would not be binding), we follow the principle (Chapter 2, Halachah 7): Whenever there is a doubt concerning the effectiveness of a vow, we rule stringently (Rabbenu Nissim).
|
| 53. |
See Halachah 11 for a definition of these terms.
|
| 54. |
I.e., we interpret his statement as the Rambam explains.
|
| 55. |
And hence, forbidden to be eaten (Nedarim 11b).
|
| 56. |
Even though none of these expressions is precise, they are still close enough to imply that his intent is that he is forbidding eating with his colleague like a sacrifice is forbidden.
|
| 57. |
I.e., his oath is not binding, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain.
|
| 58. |
Because he does not mention a sacrifice in any of these expressions. The Ra'avad mentions that from Nedarim 11a, it would appear that some of these expressions would involve a vow. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's rulings.
|
| 59. |
Based on Nedarim 10b, the Lechem Mishneh explains that we offer this interpretation, because we assume that a person will not make statements unnecessarily. Hence, since his statements could be interpreted as implying a vow, we offer such an interpretation. The Kessef Mishnehstruggles with the meaning of the Rambam's words and suggests that perhaps an error crept into the text.
|
| 60. |
For he is forbidding himself from eating with his colleague, like he is forbidden to partake of the Temple's sacrifices.
|
| 61. |
Concluding with a negative expression implies that this is his intent, as in Halachah 19 (Radbaz). In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's wording.
|
| 62. |
This and the subsequent statements of this clause do not imply that he is forbidden to partake of the other person's food.
|
| 63. |
For this restriction applies when a person is under a ban of ostracism (see Hilchot Talmud Torah7:4).
The Turei Zahav 206:1 mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that these vows are not effective at all.
|
| 64. |
He may, however, speak to him (Radbaz).
Although the person does not mention the terms "prohibition" or "sacrifice" in his vow, since his intent is obviously to prohibit himself from benefiting from the other person, that prohibition takes effect. This reflects the principle (Nedarim 3a): "The handles of vows are as vows." The intent is that even a statement that, like a handle to a cup, is merely an auxiliary to a vow is binding like a vow itself. See also a responsum authored by the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which explains that even when the intent of one's statements are not entirely clear, as in the present instance, they may constitute a vow, provided their intent is somewhat clear. This principle is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:1).
|
| 65. |
From Nedarim 7a, it appears that this expression creates an unresolved question whether the one taking the vow was merely promising not to come within four cubits of the other person or whether he intended to forbid partaking of that person's property. Because of the doubt, he is forbidden to partake of the property, but is not given lashes.
|
| 66. |
The term the Rambam uses relates to the Hebrew words na and nad which mean "wander" and "roam." Nevertheless, Nedarim 7a states that all authorities agree that this expression creates a binding commitment.
|
| 67. |
Since he does not use the words "eat" or "partake," we assume that he intended to create a more encompassing prohibition.
The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the expression means that he is not allowed to partake of his property in his presence. That interpretation is also discussed by the Kessef Mishneh.
|
| 68. |
The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person (Halachah 2). See also Chapter 13, Halachah 25, which states that it is undesirable to make vows.
|
| 69. |
I.e., he must accept a nazirite vow, bring a burnt offering, and is liable for lashes for taking a falsesh'vuat bitui.
|
| 70. |
See Chapter 13, Halachah 23.
|
| 71. |
The term the Rambam refers to "donations," i.e., animals which the person designates as a sacrifices, but if lost do not create a lien on his person (Halachah 2).
|
| 72. |
To uphold a nazirite vow and to bring a sacrifice. He is not, however, liable for an oath, because he did not mention an oath in his statements, since the upright do not take oaths casually.
|
| 73. |
In either case, his statement implies a binding commitment for the wicked make vows and the upright make pledges.
|
| 74. |
I.e., he did not explicitly attach his vow to a sacrifice. This is another example of "the handles of vows" mentioned above (Radbaz).
|
| 75. |
Since the nazirite was passing before him, we assume that this was his intent.
|
| 76. |
This applies even when an animal is not in his sight, for this appears to be his intent (Radbaz).
|
| 77. |
I.e., a loaf of bread [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:4)].
|
| 78. |
I.e., if he partakes of the food, he is liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
|
| 79. |
I.e., a Torah scroll.
|
| 80. |
For the holiness of a Torah scroll is inherent. It is not established by man's actions.
|
| 81. |
See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Sh'vuot, ch. 6, which describe this practice.
|
| 82. |
I.e., the vow is not binding. Nevertheless, we make it appear that it is and require him to seek to be released for the reason stated by the Rambam. See the parallels in Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13 and Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:4-5.
|
| 83. |
The Rambam's explanation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:3). With regard to oaths, by contrast, his intent is focused on God's name.
|
| 84. |
Since he knows what is written in the Torah and is holding it in a reverent manner, we assume that he is not making his statements in vain. Hence, we interpret them as referring to an option for which he would be liable.
|
| 85. |
Nedarim 8a derives this concept from Ezekiel 3:22-23 which states: "And He said to me: "Arise and go out to the valley and there I will speak to you. I arose and I went out to the valley and there the glory of God was standing." Since God promised to reveal Himself to Ezekiel, He kept his word, appearing even before Ezekiel arrived there.
|
| 86. |
From Nedarim 8a, it appears that although this statement establishes a binding commitment, it does not have the full power of a vow. The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 213:2) consider this statement as an actual vow.
The Rambam's perspective appears to be that a vow involves making an object forbidden. This instance where the person accepts a commitment upon himself bears a closer resemblance to the obligation incurred when making an oath. Nevertheless, since the person did not employ the wording associated with an oath, it is not binding as an oath. Nonetheless, since a mitzvah is involved, a binding commitment is established.
|
| 87. |
With whom it is forbidden for him to engage in relations.
|
| 88. |
Of which it is forbidden to partake. See Leviticus 19:23, Deuteronomy 22:9.
|
| 89. |
Halachot 8-9. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 13.
|
| 90. |
A man is obligated to give his wife conjugal rights. Hence, he is not allowed to forbid himself from engaging in relations with her. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the vow also involves satisfaction that he could forbid him, it also includes this form of satisfaction.
|
| 91. |
For he did not forbid relations, but instead, the satisfaction relations bring him. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
|
Nedarim - Chapter 2
Halacha 1
[The same laws apply] whether one took the vow on his own [volition] or another person states a vow for him and he answers Amen or says something which like Amen implies that he accepts the matter.1
Halacha 2
A person who takes an oath is not forbidden [to partake of] the entity which he forbade to himself until he makes a verbal statement to that effect2 and his statements must match his intent, as we explained with regard to oaths.3
If, by contrast, one intended to take a nazirite vow and instead, vowed to bring a sacrifice, [intended to vow to bring] a sacrifice and instead, took a nazirite [vow], [intended to take] an oath and instead, [took] a vow, [intended to take] a vow and instead, [took] an oath, intended to say "figs" and instead, said "grapes," both are permitted to him.4 There is no vow.
Halacha 3
When a person takes a vow dependent on the intent of others, it is like he took an oath dependent on the intent of others.5 Similarly, if one takes a vow and retracts6 immediately thereafter or someone rebuked him immediately thereafter and he accepted their statement, he is permitted [to use the article mentioned].7 The laws applying to all these matters with regard to vows are the same as those applying to oaths.8
Halacha 4
[The following laws apply when] a person issued a stipulation before he made a vow, saying: "I am retracting from any vow that I will take from now until ten years in the future," "They are nullified," or other similar statements, and then took a vow: If he remembered the stipulation at the time he made the vow, the vow is effective, for by taking the vow, he nullified the stipulation.9 If, however, he did not remember the stipulation until after he made the vow, the vow is nullified10 even if [immediately after taking the vow], he brought the stipulation to mind and maintained it. Although he did not verbalize his retraction at the time [he made the vow], the retraction preceded the vow and he verbalized it beforehand.11 There is an authority who rules stringently and says that he must remember the stipulation immediately thereafter taking the vow.12
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when] one made a stipulation [similar to that mentioned above]13 for a year or for ten years and afterwards took a vow, remembering at the time that he took the vow that he had made a stipulation, but forgetting the subject of that stipulation or what it involved. If [when taking the vow], he said:14 "I am acting according to my original intention,"15 his vow is not effective, for he has nullified it. If he does not make such a statement, he has nullified the stipulation and upheld the vow, for, at the time he took the vow, he remembered that there was a stipulation and, nevertheless, took the vow.16
Halacha 6
There are some of the Geonim who maintain that all of these statements are applicable only with regard to vows and not to oaths,17 but there is an authority who maintains that the laws pertaining to vows and oaths are the same in this regard. Thus one may issue a stipulation nullifying an oath [beforehand] in the same manner as was stated with regard to vows.18
Halacha 7
[When a person takes] a vow whose object is not clear,19 we rule stringently.20If he interprets them, there is room for both leniency and stringency.
What does this imply? If one says: "Let this produce be considered as salted meat and as wine poured as a libation for me," we ask him what his intent was. If he explained himself, saying "My intent was that salted meat refers to sacrificial meat21 and wine poured as a libation refers to libations poured on the Temple altar," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].22 If, however, he says: "My intent was a sacrifice offered to a false deity23 and wine poured as a libation to it," he is permitted.24 If he took the vow without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 8
Similar principles apply when one says: "This produce is considered as cherem(a dedication offering) for me." If [his intent was] a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple, he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].25 If [his intent] was a dedication offering for the priests, he is permitted, because [these offerings] become [the priests'] personal possessions and are not forbidden [to others].26 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 9
[If he states:] "May they be considered like the tithes for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the tithe taken from animals, [it becomes] forbidden, because these are sacrifices that he consecrates through his actions, as we explained.27 [If his intent was] the tithe taken from grain, it is permitted.28 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
Halacha 10
[If he states:] "May they be considered like terumah for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the money donated for the sacrificial offerings,29 it is forbidden. If his intent was terumah [separated from] the grain heap, it is permitted.30 If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 11
When does the above31 apply? In a place where the terms used have these two possible meanings. In a place where the term cherem without any further definition is used only to refer to the dedication offerings for the upkeep of the Temple,32 if he says: "[This produce is considered] as cherem for me," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].33 Similarly, if their custom was to use the term cherem without any further definition to refer only to dedication offerings given the priests, he is permitted. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations, for with regard to vows, we follow the connotations understood by the people in that place in that era.34
Halacha 12
[The ensuing rules apply] in all situations analogous to those exemplified: i.e., situations when a person takes a vow which appears to everyone to involve a prohibition, but he says: "My intent was for this and this specific instance,"35 for example, he takes a vow based on a cherem,36but [afterwards] said: "My intent was a sea cherem, i.e., a fishing net,"37 he took a vow based on an offering, but said: "My intent was an offering brought to the king," He told a colleague: "Myself is like a sacrifice for you," and then explained: "My intent was only to forbid him from [benefiting from] a bone38that I set aside so that I could take a vow as a lark," he took a vow that his wife could not benefit from him and then explained that his intent was his first wife whom he had divorced.
[In all the above situations,] if the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].39 If the one who took the vow is a common person, we make it appear to him that it is a vow, yet we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow.40 Whether he is a Torah scholar or a common person, we rebuke him and teach him not to conduct himself in this manner with regard to vows and not to take vows as a lark or a caper.
Halacha 13
Similarly, when a person tells his wife: "You are considered as my mother to me," or he says: "Let this produce be considered as pig meat for me," the vow is not effective, as we explained.41 If the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].42 If the one who took the vow is a common person, he must ask a sage [for the vow to be released]. We make it appear to him that his wife is forbidden to him and that the produce is forbidden,43 but we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow in order that people not act frivolously with regard to vows.44
Halacha 14
Although declaring property ownerless is not a vow,45 it resembles a vow, for the person is forbidden to retract.
What is meant by declaring property ownerless? A person says: "This property is free for everyone"46 to acquire. It applies to both movable property and landed property.
What is the law [applying to property] declared ownerless? Whoever comes first and acquires it,47 becomes the owner. He acquires it as his own and it becomes his. Even the person who declared the property ownerless has the same rights as others with regard to it. If he comes first and acquires it, it becomes his.48
Halacha 15
When a person declares his property ownerless [so that it can be acquired by] the poor, but not by the rich, it is not ownerless.49 He must declare it ownerless for everyone like the produce of the Sabbatical year.
Halacha 16
When a person declares landed property ownerless, whoever comes first and manifests his ownership52 over it acquires it.
According to Scriptural Law, even when a person declares his property ownerless in the presence of one person, it becomes ownerless and one is not required to tithe its produce,53 as will be explained in its place.54 According to Rabbinic decree, however, [property] is not ownerless until one declares as such in the presence of three people so that one can acquire it and two can act as witnesses.
Should one say: "This is ownerless and this," there is an unresolved doubt whether the second entity is ownerless.55 If he said: "...and this is like this" or "...and also this," he has associated the second entity [with the first], and it is definitely ownerless.
Halacha 17
When a person declares his field ownerless and no one else acquires it,56during the first three days, he may retract.57 After these three days, he may not retract unless he comes first and acquires it.58 He is like one acquiring ownerless property.59 [There is no difference] between him and another person.
Halacha 18
When a person says: "This field is declared ownerless for one day," "...for one week," "...for one month," "...for one year," or "...for one seven-year cycle," he may retract before he or another person acquires it.60 Once it is acquired, whether by the person himself or by someone else, he may not retract.
Why does he have the right to retract before it was acquired? Because this is an uncommon matter. [Generally,] a person will not declare [property] ownerless for a limited time.
Halacha 19
When a person comes and watches over ownerless property, looking at it so that another person will not take it, he does not acquire it by looking at it. Instead, he must lift it up if it were movable property61 or manifest ownership over it if it were landed property,62 as purchasers acquire property.63
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
See the parallels in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:1.
|
| 2. |
I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions "the expression of her lips," implying that one must express his intent verbally.
|
| 3. |
Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term "expression" implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one's thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one's thoughts, it is not an "expression" (Kiryat Sefer).
|
| 4. |
The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them.
|
| 5. |
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:15.
|
| 6. |
He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 210:3)].
|
| 7. |
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17-18. As mentioned there, the term "immediately thereafter" has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made.
|
| 8. |
For Numbers 30:3 associates the two together (Kessef Mishneh). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:1).
|
| 9. |
For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (seeNedarim 23b).
|
| 10. |
Kiryat Sefer explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: "He shall not desecrate his word," that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect.
|
| 11. |
Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz.
|
| 12. |
Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:2) mentions the Rambam's view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority's view. The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it.
As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidreiprayer recited at the beginning of Yom Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De'ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.
|
| 13. |
In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:3)].
|
| 14. |
In one of his response, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart.
|
| 15. |
I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement.
|
| 16. |
I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.
|
| 17. |
For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God's name must be invoked. (See Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach.
|
| 18. |
The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for the nullification of vows rite recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei prayer mention oaths as well as vows.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person's original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague's statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.
|
| 19. |
I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi, Nedarim18b).
|
| 20. |
We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid.). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4.
|
| 21. |
For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13).
|
| 22. |
For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9).
|
| 23. |
For the gentiles would also salt their offerings.
|
| 24. |
For there is no way, he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9).
|
| 25. |
For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed.
|
| 26. |
Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden.
|
| 27. |
Chapter 1, Halachah 13.
|
| 28. |
For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people. Moreover, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir who rules that ordinary people may not partake of these tithes, they are not forbidden due to a vow. Instead, it was forbidden to partake of the grain before they were separated and once, they were separated, they remain forbidden (Ritba, Nedarim 18b).
|
| 29. |
Terumat halishkah in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used.
|
| 30. |
See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.
|
| 31. |
That we explore the person's intention.
|
| 32. |
Nedarim 18b explains that in the Galilee, it was not common for priests to live. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple.
|
| 33. |
For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests.
|
| 34. |
See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
|
| 35. |
I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a permitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect.
|
| 36. |
I.e., he said: "Let this produce be like a cherem."
|
| 37. |
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15 which employs such a term.
|
| 38. |
The Hebrew word atzmi means "myself," but it can also mean "my bone." Initially, it was thought that the person's intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was "his bone."
|
| 39. |
His word can be accepted when he says: "This was my intent." Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5.
|
| 40. |
I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required.
|
| 41. |
Chapter 1, Halachah 30.
|
| 42. |
For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De'ah205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters.
|
| 43. |
The Rama (loc. cit.) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters.
|
| 44. |
If the common person was allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.
|
| 45. |
This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz,Ketzot HaChoshen 273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances.
Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one's own ownership over or does it involves transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless.
|
| 46. |
Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim 7a). See the following halachah.
|
| 47. |
Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19.
|
| 48. |
I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).
See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.
|
| 49. |
This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit.).
|
| 50. |
I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:13).
|
| 51. |
Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.
|
| 52. |
Through a formal kinyan, e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence.
|
| 53. |
Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 273:7) states that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law.
|
| 54. |
See Hilchot Terumah 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one's own, not those acquired from ownerless property.
|
| 55. |
Nedarim 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:12).
|
| 56. |
If, however, another person acquires, it becomes that person's property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 57. |
According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding.
|
| 58. |
Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:13).
|
| 59. |
And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh).
|
| 60. |
I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz).
|
| 61. |
Performing the kinyan of hagba'ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective.
|
| 62. |
Performing the kinyan of chazzakah.
|
| 63. |
See Hilchot Mechirah 1:3, 3:1.
|
Nedarim - Chapter 3
Halacha 1
There are four differences between a vow and a sh'vuat bitui:
a) With regard to a sh'vuat bitui, one oath cannot take effect while another is already in effect,1 and with regard to vows, a vow can take effect while another is already in effect.
b) When one attempts to extend the scope of an oath taken previously, he is not liable,2 and with regard to vows, one is.
c) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect only with regard to actions that are left to one's choice,3 while vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice.
d) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect with regard to entity of substance and an entity that is not of substance, 4 while vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance.
Halacha 2
What is meant by the statement that a vow can take effect while another is already in effect? If a person says: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat this loaf [of bread]," [repeats]: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat it," he is liable [to bring a sacrifice] for every oath that he takes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 3
What is meant by the statement that one who extends the scope of a vow taken previously is liable? He heard his colleague take a vow and said: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter,5 he is forbidden [to partake of] the substance that his colleague deemed forbidden.6 If a third person heard the second person say: "And I am like you," and he also said: "I am like you," [he is also forbidden]. Even if there are one hundred and each one says: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter the statements of the previous one," they are all forbidden.
Halacha 4
Similarly, when one says: "This meat is considered forbidden to me,' and even after several days7 says: "This bread is like this meat," [the prohibition] is extended to the bread and it becomes forbidden. If afterwards, he said: "And this honey is like this bread, and this wine is like this honey," even if he mentions 100 [substances], they are all forbidden.
Halacha 5
[The following rules apply when a person's] father or teacher died on a particular day and he took a vow to fast that day8 and [actually] fasted.9 If after years past, he said: "Let this day10 be considered as the day on which my father - or my teacher - died," he is forbidden to eat on that day. For he attached this day [to his existing vow] and caused it to be forbidden as the day which is forbidden for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 6
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice? When a person says: "Matzah is forbidden to me on Pesach night," "Dwelling in a sukkah on that holiday is forbidden to me," or "I am forbidden to take hold of tefillin," they are forbidden to him. If he ate matzah, dwelled in a sukkah, or took tefillin, he is liable for lashes.11 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: "I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat matzah on Pesach night," is obligated to bring a sacrifice.12 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
Halacha 7
Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath.13 When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him.14 Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai.
Halacha 8
When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a sh'vuat bitui, [Leviticus 5:4] states: "Whether he will do harm or do good," i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained,15 e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall do everything uttered by his mouth," without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition.
Halacha 9
When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast16 for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained.17 Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur18 falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary.19 Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree.
Halacha 10
What is meant by the statement that vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance? If one says: "My speech is like a sacrifice for you,"20 he is not forbidden to speak to him, because speech is not an entity of substance. Similarly, if he tells him: "My speech is forbidden to you," it is not like his saying: "my produce is forbidden to you," or "My produce is like a sacrifice for you," in which instance, [the produce] would be forbidden.
Therefore, if a person tells a colleague: "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not speak with you," "...that I will not act on your behalf," or "...that I will not go with you," or he told his wife, "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not be intimate with you," his vow does not take effect in all these instances. For this is as if he is saying: "My speech, going, actions, or intimacy is like a sacrifice, and none [of these are] entities of substance.21
Halacha 11
When, by contrast, a person says: "Let my mouth be forbidden to speak, my hands to act, my feet to walk, and my eyes to sleep," his vow is effective with regard to them.22 Therefore if a person tells a colleague: "My mouth is like a sacrifice with regard to speaking with you, my hands [are so] with regard to acting on your behalf, and my feet [are so] with regard to going with you," he becomes forbidden.
Similarly, one who tells a colleague: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I speak to so-and-so" or "...if I don't speak to so-and-so," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice if he violates this commitment. Similarly, if he took a vow in which he said: "[If] I spoke [to so-and-so, I must bring a sacrifice]" or "[If] I did not speak..." or the like, [he is liable]. For these are not vows in which he accepts prohibitions upon himself23 whose ground rules we are explaining here, but vows of dedication.24
Halacha 12
Although when a person takes a vow concerning entities that are not of substance and forbids them, the vow does not take effect with regard to them, we do not rule that he should act as if they are permitted. [Instead,] since he willingly [took a vow] forbidding them to him, [according to Rabbinic decree]25the vow took effect with regard to them. Although they are not forbidden, we give him an opportunity [to ask for the vow's release] from another vantage point and then release the vow, so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.26
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:9-10. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachah 2.
|
| 2. |
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:8-9. The reverse rulings with regard to vows are described in Halachot 3-5.
|
| 3. |
See Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:14-16. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachot 6-9.
|
| 4. |
This concept can be explained as follows: As stated in Halachah 6, an oath creates a prohibition on the person taking the oath (the gavra), i.e., the article is essentially permitted, he has accepted a prohibition on himself not to partake of it. Hence, it is not significant whether the article is of substance or not. With regard to vows, by contrast, the article itself (the cheftzah) becomes forbidden. Hence, for that prohibition to take effect, the article must be of substance (Radbaz). See Halachah 10 for an illustration of how this principle is effective with regard to vows.
|
| 5. |
This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Elecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
|
| 6. |
I.e., he is extending the scope of his colleague's vow, so that it includes not only his colleague, but he himself.
Here also the concept can be explained according to the above difference. Since an oath involves an obligation on the person taking the oath (gavra), it cannot be extended to include another individual, for each person must take his own oath. With regard to a vow, by contrast, since the prohibition caused by the vow is associated with a substance (cheftzah), another person can also extend the prohibition to himself (Rabbenu Nissim).
|
| 7. |
In this instance, it is not necessary to make the statement immediately thereafter the first vow. Since the meat is visible before us, one can attach a vow to it. With regard to the previous halachah, by contrast, we are speaking about a subject that cannot be seen. Hence, unless the statements are made immediately after each other, there is no way we can be certain of the meaning of the statement: "And I am like you" (Radbaz).
|
| 8. |
This is a common practice in many communities.
|
| 9. |
If, however, he never fasted on that day, he cannot attach another day to this vow (Chazon Yechezkel).
|
| 10. |
I.e., any given day.
|
| 11. |
For breaking his vow. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 215:1) mentions a view that maintains that the person should be given corporal punishment for taking such a vow and should be compelled to ask to have the vow released.
|
| 12. |
For he can fulfill the mitzvah and bring the sacrifice (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah,Nedarim 2:2).
|
| 13. |
I.e., the prohibition involves the gavra, the person himself. It cannot take effect if he is already bound to act otherwise.
|
| 14. |
I.e., the prohibition involves the cheftzah, the article. Once it is forbidden, it is forbidden to fulfill the mitzvah by partaking of it or using it, for a positive commandment does not supercede a negative commandment. It would be a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression which is a forbidden act (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).
|
| 15. |
Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:16.
|
| 16. |
Despite the fact that by doing so he negates the mitzvah of taking pleasure in the Sabbath and festivals. The Ra'avad clarifies that the matter is dependent on the wording he used in his oath. If on the Sabbath, he said: "I will fast today," he is forbidden to keep his vow.
|
| 17. |
In the three preceding halachot.
|
| 18. |
When it is a mitzvah to eat in preparation for the fast (Rosh HaShanah 9a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 604:1).
|
| 19. |
In contrast to the Sabbath and festivals where the obligation to eat is of Scriptural origin. This is a general principle in Talmudic Law. There are times when our Sages gave their decrees greater power than Scriptural Law, for Scriptural Law is revered by the people at large and does not require reinforcement. If, by contrast, Rabbinic Law was abrogated in such instances, it might lead people to take leniencies even when uncalled for (see Ta'anis 17b; Kessef Mishneh). The Radbaz explains that if keeping one's vow was allowed to override a Rabbinic decree, then there would be no point in making such decrees. For people could nullify them by taking vows. For example, a person could take a vow to drink ordinary gentile wine.
The Kessef Mishneh also explains that although the obligation to eat on Rosh Chodesh and the day preceding Yom Kippur is also of Rabbinic origin, since our Sages found an allusion to it in the Torah, it is less likely that people will treat it lightly.
|
| 20. |
I.e., he takes a vow against the other person listening to his speech.
|
| 21. |
If, however, he states: "The satisfaction that I receive from any of the above is forbidden," his vow is effective, for the satisfaction is considered substantial. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
|
| 22. |
For these organs are objects of substance (Nedarim 13b).
|
| 23. |
And apply only to entities of substance.
|
| 24. |
Which are described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, chs. 6 and 9. See also Chapter 1 where the Rambam makes a distinction between these two types of vows.
|
| 25. |
See Nedarim 15a. Similarly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:1), the Rambam writes that the prohibition against desecrating one's word applies with regard to these vows. Compare to Chapter 4, Halachah 4.
|
| 26. |
See Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13.
|
• Thursday, Nissan 13, 5775 · 02 April 2015
"Today's Day"
Torah lessons: Chumash: Acharei Mot, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 69-71.
Tanya: And whilst (p. 207)...or to his king. (p. 209).
Yahrzeit of the Rebbe Tzemach Tzedek. He passed away in the year 5626 (1866) in Lubavitch and was interred there.
My grandfather related: At the age of 12 the Tzemach Tzedek began to write scholarly dissertations in the field of Talmud and halacha as well as in chassidic philosophy.
Daily Thought:
Escape
On our own, we cannot reach higher than our own fingertips lifted high.
We cannot break out of our own skin;
we cannot lift ourselves up by pulling at our own hair;
all of our achievements are tied to our own ego;
all that we may comprehend is defined by our own subjective perception.
We are prisoners by virtue of existence.
So G‑d threw us a rope:
He gave us tasks to fulfill that are beyond our grasp;
thoughts to fathom that take us outside the hollow of our subjective universe.
All that is needed is our willingness to leave ourselves.
We are all prisoners. But we sit on the keys.
___________________________________
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