Today's Laws & Customs:
• Omit Tachanun in the Afternoon
Starting in the afternoon, Tachanun (confession of sins) and similar prayers are omitted.
Daily Quote:
The lower waters weep: "We desire to be in the presence of the King"[Zohar]
Daily Study:
Chitas and Rambam for today:
Chumash: Va'etchanan, 5th Portion Deuteronomy 5:19-6:3 with Rashi
• Chapter 5
19The Lord spoke these words to your entire assembly at the mountain out of the midst of the fire, the cloud, and the opaque darkness, with a great voice, which did not cease. And He inscribed them on two stone tablets and gave them to me. יטאֶת הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה דִּבֶּר יְהֹוָה אֶל כָּל קְהַלְכֶם בָּהָר מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ הֶעָנָן וְהָעֲרָפֶל קוֹל גָּדוֹל וְלֹא יָסָף וַיִּכְתְּבֵם עַל שְׁנֵי לֻחֹת אֲבָנִים וַיִּתְּנֵם אֵלָי:
which did not cease: Heb. וְלֹא יָסָף, interpreted by the Targum [Onkelos]: וְלָא פְּסָק“and it did not cease.” [Because it is human nature that one is unable to utter all his words in one breath, but he must pause, whereas the characteristic of the Holy One, blessed is He, is not so. God did not pause, and since He did not pause, He did not have to resume,] for His voice is strong and exists continuously (San. 17a). Another explanation of וְלֹא יָסָף : He never again revealed Himself so publicly [as He did on Mount Sinai. Accordingly, we render: and He did not continue]. ולא יסף: מתרגמינן ולא פסק כי קולו חזק וקיים לעולם. דבר אחר ולא יסף לא הוסיף להראות באותו פומבי:
20And it was, when you heard the voice from the midst of the darkness, and the mountain was burning with fire, that you approached me, all the heads of your tribes and your elders. כוַיְהִי כְּשָׁמְעֲכֶם אֶת הַקּוֹל מִתּוֹךְ הַחשֶׁךְ וְהָהָר בֹּעֵר בָּאֵשׁ וַתִּקְרְבוּן אֵלַי כָּל רָאשֵׁי שִׁבְטֵיכֶם וְזִקְנֵיכֶם:
21And you said, "Behold, the Lord, our God, has shown us His glory and His greatness, and we heard His voice from the midst of the fire; we saw this day that God speaks with man, yet [man] remains alive. כאוַתֹּאמְרוּ הֵן הֶרְאָנוּ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֶת כְּבֹדוֹ וְאֶת גָּדְלוֹ וְאֶת קֹלוֹ שָׁמַעְנוּ מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה רָאִינוּ כִּי יְדַבֵּר אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאָדָם וָחָי:
22So now, why should we die? For this great fire will consume us; if we continue to hear the voice of the Lord, our God, anymore, we will die. כבוְעַתָּה לָמָּה נָמוּת כִּי תֹאכְלֵנוּ הָאֵשׁ הַגְּדֹלָה הַזֹּאת אִם יֹסְפִים | אֲנַחְנוּ לִשְׁמֹעַ אֶת קוֹל יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ עוֹד וָמָתְנוּ:
23For who is there of all flesh, who heard the voice of the living God speaking from the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived? כגכִּי מִי כָל בָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע קוֹל אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים מְדַבֵּר מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ כָּמֹנוּ וַיֶּחִי:
24You approach, and hear all that the Lord, our God, will say, and you speak to us all that the Lord, our God, will speak to you, and we will hear and do. כדקְרַב אַתָּה וּשֲׁמָע אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ וְאַתְּ | תְּדַבֵּר אֵלֵינוּ אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֵלֶיךָ וְשָׁמַעְנוּ וְעָשִׂינוּ:
And you speak to us: Heb. וְאַתְּ, a feminine form]-You weakened my strength as that of a female, for I was distressed regarding you, and you weakened me, since I saw that you were not anxious to approach God out of love. Would it not have been preferable for you to learn [directly] from the mouth of the Almighty God, rather than to learn from me? ואת תדבר אלינו: התשתם את כחי כנקבה שנצטערתי עליכם ורפיתם את ידי כי ראיתי שאינכם חרדים להתקרב אליו מאהבה. וכי לא היה יפה לכם ללמוד מפי הגבורה ולא ללמוד ממני:
25And the Lord heard the sound of your words when you spoke to me, and the Lord said to me, "I have heard the sound of the words of this people that they have spoken to you; they have done well in all that they have spoken. כהוַיִּשְׁמַע יְהֹוָה אֶת קוֹל דִּבְרֵיכֶם בְּדַבֶּרְכֶם אֵלָי וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֵלַי שָׁמַעְתִּי אֶת קוֹל דִּבְרֵי הָעָם הַזֶּה אֲשֶׁר דִּבְּרוּ אֵלֶיךָ הֵיטִיבוּ כָּל אֲשֶׁר דִּבֵּרוּ:
26Would that their hearts be like this, to fear Me and to keep all My commandments all the days, that it might be well with them and with their children forever! כומִי יִתֵּן וְהָיָה לְבָבָם זֶה לָהֶם לְיִרְאָה אֹתִי וְלִשְׁמֹר אֶת כָּל מִצְוֹתַי כָּל הַיָּמִים לְמַעַן יִיטַב לָהֶם וְלִבְנֵיהֶם לְעֹלָם:
27Go say to them, 'Return to your tents.' כזלֵךְ אֱמֹר לָהֶם שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם:
28But as for you, stand here with Me, and I will speak to you all the commandments, the statutes, and the ordinances which you will teach them, that they may do them in the land which I give them to possess. כחוְאַתָּה פֹּה עֲמֹד עִמָּדִי וַאֲדַבְּרָה אֵלֶיךָ אֵת כָּל הַמִּצְוָה וְהַחֻקִּים וְהַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר תְּלַמְּדֵם וְעָשׂוּ בָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי נֹתֵן לָהֶם לְרִשְׁתָּהּ:
29Keep them to perform [them] as the Lord your God has commanded you; do not turn aside either to the right or to the left. כטוּשְׁמַרְתֶּם לַעֲשׂוֹת כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם אֶתְכֶם לֹא תָסֻרוּ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל:
30In all the way which the Lord, your God, has commanded you, you shall go, in order that you may live and that it may be well with you, and so that you may prolong your days in the land you will possess. לבְּכָל הַדֶּרֶךְ אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם אֶתְכֶם תֵּלֵכוּ לְמַעַן תִּחְיוּן וְטוֹב לָכֶם וְהַאֲרַכְתֶּם יָמִים בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר תִּירָשׁוּן:
Chapter 6
1This is the commandment, the statutes, and the ordinances that the Lord, your God, commanded to teach you, to perform in the land into which you are about to pass, to possess it. אוְזֹאת הַמִּצְוָה הַחֻקִּים וְהַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם לְלַמֵּד אֶתְכֶם לַעֲשׂוֹת בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם עֹבְרִים שָׁמָּה לְרִשְׁתָּהּ:
2In order that you fear the Lord, your God, to keep all His statutes and His commandments that I command you, you, your son, and your son's son, all the days of your life, and in order that your days may be lengthened. בלְמַעַן תִּירָא אֶת יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לִשְׁמֹר אֶת כָּל חֻקֹּתָיו וּמִצְוֹתָיו אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּךָ אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ וּבֶן בִּנְךָ כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ וּלְמַעַן יַאֲרִכֻן יָמֶיךָ:
3And you shall, [therefore,] hearken, O Israel, and be sure to perform, so that it will be good for you, and so that you may increase exceedingly, just as the Lord, the God of your fathers, spoke to you, a land flowing with milk and honey. גוְשָׁמַעְתָּ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְשָׁמַרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֲשֶׁר יִיטַב לְךָ וַאֲשֶׁר תִּרְבּוּן מְאֹד כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵי אֲבֹתֶיךָ לָךְ אֶרֶץ זָבַת חָלָב וּדְבָשׁ:Daily Tehillim: Psalms Chapters 72 - 76
• Chapter 72
David composed this psalm for Solomon, praying that he be granted the wisdom to provide justice for the poor.
1. For Solomon. O God, impart Your justice to the king, and Your righteousness to the son of the king.
2. May he judge Your people with righteousness, Your poor with justice.
3. May the mountains bear peace to the nation, also the hills, in [reward for their] righteousness.
4. May he judge the nation's poor, save the children of the destitute, and crush the oppressor,
5. so that they will fear You as long as the sun [shines] and the moon endures, generation after generation.
6. May [his words] descend like rain upon cut grass, like raindrops that water the earth.
7. In his days may the righteous flourish, with much peace until the moon is no more.
8. And may he rule from sea to sea, and from the river until the ends of the earth.
9. May nobles kneel before him, and may his enemies lick the dust.
10. The kings of Tarshish and the islands will return tribute, the kings of Sheba and Seba will offer gifts.
11. All kings will bow to him, all nations will serve him;
12. for he rescues the needy one who cries out, the poor one who has no one to help him.
13. He pities the impoverished and needy, and saves the souls of the destitute.
14. He redeems their soul from deception and violence, and their blood is precious in his eyes.
15. He revives [the poor], and gives him of the gold of Sheba; and so [the poor] pray for him always, and bless him all day.
16. May there be abundant grain in the land, upon the mountaintops; may its fruit rustle like the [cedars of] Lebanon, and may [people] blossom from the city like the grass of the earth.
17. May his name endure forever; may his name be magnified as long as the sun [shines]. And all nations will bless themselves by him, they will praise him.
18. Blessed is the Lord God, the God of Israel, Who alone performs wonders.
19. Blessed is His glorious Name forever, and may the whole earth be filled with His glory, Amen and Amen.
20. The prayers of David, son of Jesse, are concluded
1
Chapter 73
This psalm addresses the question of why the righteous suffer while the wicked prosper, and prays for an end to our long exile. Read, and you will find repose for your soul.
1. A psalm by Asaph. Truly God is good to Israel, to the pure of heart.
2. But as for me, my feet nearly strayed; in an instant my steps would have been swept aside.
3. For I envied the revelers when I saw the tranquility of the wicked.
4. For there are no bonds1 to their death, and their health is sound.
5. They have no part in the toil of men, nor are they afflicted like other mortals;
6. therefore they wear pride as a necklace; their bodies are enwrapped in violence.
7. Their eyes bulge from fat; they surpassed the fantasies of their heart.
8. They consume [others], and talk wickedly of oppression-from on high do they speak.
9. They set their mouths against Heaven, while their tongues walk upon the earth.
10. Therefore His people return here,2 and suck the full [cup of bitter] waters.
11. And they say, "How can it be that God knows? Is there knowledge in the Most High?”
12. Behold these are the wicked, and they are ever tranquil, they have gained much wealth.
13. Surely in vain have I purified my heart, and washed my hands in cleanliness;
14. for I was afflicted all day, and my rebuke came each morning.
15. Were I to say, "I shall tell it like it is," behold I would turn the generation of Your children to rebels.
16. And when I pondered to understand this, it was unjust in my eyes;
17. until I came to the sanctuaries of God, and perceived their end.
18. Only on slippery places do You set them, You cast them into darkness.
19. How they have become desolate in an instant! They came to an end, they were consumed by terrors,
20. like a dream upon awakening. O my Lord, disgrace their image in the city.
21. When my heart was in ferment, and my mind was sharpened,
22. I was a boor and did not understand, like an animal was I with You.
23. Yet I was always with You; You held my right hand.
24. Guide me with Your counsel, and afterward, receive me with honor.
25. Whom do I have in heaven [besides You]? And when I am with You I desire nothing on earth.
26. My flesh and my heart yearn; God is the rock of my heart and my portion forever.
27. For behold, all those who are far from You perish, You cut down all who stray from You.
28. But as for me, the nearness of God is my good; I have put my trust in my Lord, God, that I may recount all Your works.
Chapter 74
The psalmist mourns and weeps over all the synagogues and study halls that have been burned: the Philistines destroyed the Tabernacle of Shiloh; Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the first Temple. We have been in exile for so long, without seeing any signs of redemption! When will the redemption come? Read, and you will find lamentation and consolation.
1. A maskil1 by Asaph. Why, O God, have You abandoned us forever, does Your wrath fume against the sheep of Your pasture?
2. Remember Your congregation which You acquired long ago, the tribe of Your inheritance whom You redeemed [and brought to] Mount Zion, where You rested Your Presence.
3. Lift Your steps to inflict eternal ruin, because of all the evil done by the enemy in the Sanctuary.
4. Your foes roared in the midst of Your meeting place; they considered their omens to be [genuine] signs.
5. The axes in the thicket of trees2 were reckoned as bringing [an offering] to the Above.
6. And now, all her ornaments together are smashed by hammer and hatchet.
7. They set Your Sanctuary on fire; they desecrated the Abode of Your Name to the ground.
8. Their rulers thought together in their hearts; they burned all the meeting places of God in the land.
9. We have not seen our signs; there is no longer a prophet, and there is none among us who knows how long.
10. How long, O God, will the adversary disgrace, will the enemy blaspheme Your Name forever!
11. Why do You withdraw Your hand, even Your right hand? Cast it out from within Your bosom!
12. For God is my King from long ago, working salvations in the midst of the earth.
13. In Your might, You divided the sea; You shattered the heads of the sea-monsters on the waters.
14. You crushed the heads of the Leviathan,3 leaving him as food for the nation [wandering in] the wilderness.
15. You split [the rock, bringing forth] fountain and brook; You dried up mighty streams.
16. Yours is the day, the night is also Yours; You established the moon and the sun.
17. You set all the boundaries of the earth; summer and winter-You created them.
18. Remember this, how the enemy reviled the Lord, and the vile nation blasphemed Your Name.
19. Do not give the soul of Your turtledove to the wild beast; do not forget the life of Your poor forever.
20. Look to the covenant, for the dark places of the earth are filled with dens of violence.
21. Do not turn back the oppressed in disgrace; [then] the poor and needy will praise Your Name.
22. Arise, O God, champion Your cause; remember Your insults from the perverse all day long.
23. Forget not the voice of Your adversaries; the tumult of Your opponents ascends always.
Chapter 75
How great is Israel! During their holidays they do not engage in frivolity, but in song and praise, and the study of the holiday's laws. Also, when they proclaimed (at the giving of the Torah), "We will do and we will hear!" they allowed the world to remain in existence. This psalm also admonishes those who indulge in worldly pleasures and attribute their prosperity to their own efforts.
1. For the Conductor, a plea not to be destroyed. A psalm by Asaph, a song.
2. We gave thanks to You, O God, we gave thanks; and Your Name was near [when] they1 told of Your wonders.
3. When I choose the appointed time, I will judge with fairness.
4. When the earth and all its inhabitants were melting, I established its pillars forever.
5. I said to the perverse, "Do not pervert [Israel]," and to the wicked, "Do not raise your pride.”
6. Do not raise your pride heavenward, nor speak with an arrogant neck
7. For not from the east or the west, nor from the desert does greatness come.
8. For God is Judge; He humbles one, and elevates the other.
9. For there is a cup [of punishment] in the hand of the Lord, with strong wine of full mixture; He pours from this, and all the wicked of the earth will drink, draining even its dregs.
10. But as for me, I will tell of it forever; I will sing to the God of Jacob.
11. I will cut off all glory of the wicked, but the glory of the righteous will be raised up.
Chapter 76
This psalm contains the prophecy of when the vast army of Sennacherib was seized with a deep slumber that rendered the hands of the soldiers powerless to raise their weapons; thus did they all fall in battle.
1. For the Conductor, with instrumental music, a psalm by Asaph, a song.
2. God is known in Judah, His Name is great in Israel.
3. His Tabernacle was in Shalem,1 and His dwelling place in Zion.
4. There He broke the flying arrows of the bow, the shield, the sword and battle-forever.
5. You are illumination, mightier than the mountains of prey.
6. The stout-hearted were without sense, they slept their sleep, and all the warriors were unable to find their strength.
7. At Your rebuke, O God of Jacob, chariot and horse were stunned.
8. You, awesome are You! Who can stand before You once You are enraged.
9. From heaven You let the verdict be heard; the earth feared and was still,
10. when God rose to pass judgement, to save all the humble of the earth forever.
11. The anger of man will cause us to thank You;2 You will restrain the residue of wrath.
12. Make vows to the Lord your God and fulfill them; all who surround Him will bring tribute to the Awesome One.
13. He cuts down the spirit of nobles; He is awesome to the kings of the earth.
Tanya: Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 5• Lessons in Tanya
• Thursday, Menachem Av 14, 5775 · July 30, 2015
Today's Tanya Lesson
Iggeret HaKodesh, middle of Epistle 5
Until this point the Alter Rebbe has explained the Talmudic teaching that the World to Come was created by the letteryud: the Sefirah of Chochmah, which this letter represents, is the spiritual source of Gan Eden which is in the World to Come.
However, according to the above, since the letters of the Supernal creative speech derive from Chochmah, it would seem that this world, which was also created by the letters of Divine speech, was likewise created from the letter yud that representsChochmah. Why, then, do our Sages teach that only the World to Come was created from the letter yud, while this world was created from the letter hei?
The Alter Rebbe therefore now goes on to explain that the letters of speech are composed of “matter” and “form” — the “body” and “soul” (or: the external and internal aspects) of the letters. While the “form” of the letters does indeed derive fromChochmah, the “matter” of the letters of speech merely derives from the heart.
So, too, Above: the internal aspect of the letters derives from Chochmah; from this aspect are created the higher spiritual beings which are able to apprehend G‑dliness. However, the external aspect of the Supernal letters of speech derives from the “breath” — the hei of the Divine Name. It is from this lesser level that this physical world was created.
In the words of the Alter Rebbe:
אך האותיות הן בבחינת חומר וצורה, הנקרא פנימית וחיצונית
However, the letters exist on planes of “matter” and “form”, which are also referred to as their “internal” aspect (i.e., the “form”, which is their “soul”) and their “external” aspect (i.e., the “matter”, which is their “body”).
כי הגם שמקורן הוא מקדמות השכל ורצון הנפש
Although their source is the primordial stage of the intellect and the will of the soul, for as soon as the soul desires to speak these letters are formed, as explained above,
זו היא בחינת צורת שינוי המבטא שבכ״ב אותיות
this is but the “form” of the differentiation in the pronunciation of the twenty-two letters.
אבל בחינת החומר וגוף התהוותן, והוא בחינת חיצוניותן, הוא ההבל היוצא מהלב
The “matter” and “body” of their formation, however, i.e., the aspect of their “externality”, is the breath issuing from the heart.
שממנו מתהוה קול פשוט היוצא מהגרון
From this breath is formed a simple sound which proceeds from the throat,
ואחר כך נחלק לכ״ב הברות וביטוי כ״ב אותיות
and which is then divided into the twenty-two kinds of enunciation and expression of the twenty-two letters,
בה׳ מוצאות הידועות: אחה״ע מהגרון
[these divisions taking place] through the five known organs of speech: alef, chet, hei and ayin1 through the throat;
גיכ״ק מהחיך כו׳
gimmel, yud, kaf and kuf through the palate, and so on; e.g., beit, vav, mem and pei from the lips, and so on;
ומבטא ההבל הוא אות ה׳, אתא קלילא כו׳
while the breath itself, which has its own sound independent of the letter being spoken, is uttered by the letter hei2— “the light letter,” inasmuch as it lacks the substance of a complete letter,
והוא מקור החומר וגוף האותיות טרם התחלקותן לכ״ב
which is the source of the “matter” and “body” of the letters before their division into twenty-two.
The hei is thus the source of each letter’s “body”.
ולכן אמרו רז״ל שעולם הזה נברא בה׳
And that is why our Sages, of blessed memory, said that “this world was created by the hei”: it was created by the external aspect, or “body”, of the Supernal letters whose source is the hei of the Divine Name.
* * *
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. | “The reason for the change in order (אחה״ע instead of the alphabetical order of אהח״ע) may be understood by reference to the statement in Zohar II, 123a. (See also Etz Chayim, Shaar Derushei HaTzelem, p. 2.)” ( — Note of the Rebbe.) |
| 2. | Akdamut Millin, verse 6 (Siddur Tehillat HaShem, p. 400). |
• Sefer Hamitzvos:Thursday, Menachem Av 14, 5775 · July 30, 2015
Today's Mitzvah
A daily digest of Maimonides’ classic work "Sefer Hamitzvot"
Important Message Regarding This Lesson
The Daily Mitzvah schedule runs parallel to the daily study of 3 chapters of Maimonides' 14-volume code. There are instances when the Mitzvah is repeated a few days consecutively while the exploration of the same Mitzvah continues in the in-depth track.
Positive Commandment 98
Ritual Impurity of Food and Drink
We are commanded regarding food and drink that have contracted ritual impurity. [I.e., one must follow all the laws associated with this impurity.]
Ritual Impurity of Food and Drink
Positive Commandment 98
Translated by Berel Bell
The 98th mitzvah is that we are commanded to rule according to the appropriate laws regarding the tumah of food and drink.1 This mitzvah includes all the laws of tumas ochlin u'mashkin.2
FOOTNOTES
1.Lev. 11:34.
2.See Hilchos Ochlin 1:1-4.
Ishut - Chapter Twenty Two
Halacha 1
The husband takes precedence over any other person with regard to the inheritance of his wife's estate.1
When does the husband acquire this right? When his wife leaves her father's domain, even though she has not entered the chuppah.2 Since the woman has entered her husband's domain, he [has the right] to inherit [her estate].
Halacha 2
What is implied? When a woman has been consecrated and her father hands her over to her husband or to his agents, or the agents of the woman's father hand her over to her husband or to his agents, and the woman dies on the way, before she enters the chuppah, her husband inherits her estate, even though her dowry is still in her father's home.3
Similarly, if the father or his agents went together with the husband, and the husband entered into privacy in a courtyard together with [his bride] with the intent of marriage,4 and afterwards she dies, her husband inherits [her estate].
If, however, [the woman and] her husband or his agents are still accompanied by her father or his agents on their journey to the husband's house, her father inherits [her estate] if she dies, even if her dowry is already in her husband's home. [This law applies even if the woman] and her husband entered a courtyard together to spend the night, as travelers lodge together in one inn.5[The rationale is that] she is accompanied by her father or his agents, and [her husband] has not entered into privacy with her for the sake of marriage.
Halacha 3
Halacha 4
Although a man marries a woman with whom he is forbidden [to have relations], if she dies [during his lifetime], he inherits her estate when his consecration of her is binding.8 Similarly, a man who marries a k'tanah [after her father's death]9 inherits her estate if she dies in his lifetime, even though his consecration of her is not binding entirely.
When, by contrast, a mentally capable man marries a deaf mute, he is not entitled to inherit her estate when she dies.10 When, however, a deaf mute marries a mentally capable woman and dies, he should inherit her estate. For she is capable of understanding and married him voluntarily. [In doing so,] she gave him a right to her property.11
Halacha 5
When a k'tanah was consecrated with her father's consent, but married without his consent - whether in his presence or outside his presence - her father has a right to object, as we have explained.12 [In such a situation,] if the girl dies, her husband should not inherit her estate, even if the father remains silent, unless he expressed his consent to her marriage.
Halacha 6
The geonim ruled that when a woman falls sick and asks her husband to divorce her so that he will not inherit her estate, her words are of no consequence, [even if] she [agrees to] forfeit her ketubah. Even if she says: "I hate him and no longer desire to live with him," her words are not heeded, and she is not judged as a woman who rebels against her husband.13 This is a desirable ruling.
Halacha 7
During a woman's lifetime, her husband enjoys the benefits of all the property she owns, regardless of whether it is classified as nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log. If she dies in her husband's lifetime, her husband inherits everything.
Therefore, if the woman sold property classified as nichsei m'log after she married, even if she became the owner of that property before she became consecrated, her husband may expropriate the income from that property from the purchasers throughout his wife's lifetime. He may not, however, expropriate the land itself, for he has no right to the land itself, if it is classified as nichsei m'log, until his wife dies.14
If she dies in his lifetime, he may expropriate the land from the purchasers15without paying them for it.16 If the actual money that [the woman] took from the purchasers still exists, however, it must be returned to the purchasers. The husband cannot say: "Perhaps this money was found [by my wife]" [and on that basis take it as his own].17
Halacha 8
When does the above apply? With regard to property about which the husband knew.18 When, however, a woman inherits property in another country without her husband's knowledge and sells it, the sale is binding.19
Similarly, if a woman sells [property]20 between her consecration and the consummation of the marriage bond, the sale is binding. For the husband has no right to his wife's property until their marriage is consummated.
Halacha 9
When a woman signs over all21 of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if she becomes a widow, this present is nullified - as will be explained in Hilchot Matanah22 - her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.
[The rationale is] that she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband's lifetime, the recipient of the present acquires full title to it.
Moreover, [the same laws apply] even if she gave away a portion of her property - or all her holdings - before she married and wrote [in the deed of transfer] to the recipient: "Acquire the property from this time onward, [dependent] on my consent."23 [Although] the recipient does not acquire complete ownership until the woman expresses her consent,24 her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.25
Halacha 10
While a woman is waiting for her yavam [to marry her according to the rite ofyibbum], she may sell or give as a present property that she acquires during the time she is in this status.26 Until he marries the yevamah, the yavam has no right to benefit from the property, even the nichsei tzon barzel,27 that she brought to his [deceased] brother's household.
If the yevamah dies in this status, her heirs from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log28 and half of her nichsei tzon barzel.29 Her husband's heirs inherit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah30 and the remaining half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and they are responsible for her burial.31
Halacha 11
The money due a yevamah by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a lien on her [late] husband's estate. Therefore, a yavam is not entitled to sell any of his brother's property32 - neither before yibbum nor after yibbum.
If he sells the deceased's property, gives it away as a present, divides it with his brothers - whether before yibbum or after yibbum - his actions are of no consequence. For it is already obligatory to make this property available to the widow so that she can collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from it.
Halacha 12
When a man marries his yevamah at a time when there is produce growing on the land left by her husband, this produce should be sold,33 and the proceeds used to purchase land from which the yavam will derive the benefit that accrues.
Halacha 13
When, [by contrast, the deceased] left produce that was already harvested, money or movable property, it becomes the property of the yavam. He may use it as he sees fit, and [the yevamah's] objections are of no consequence.
[The rationale is that the woman's right] to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from movable property stems only from an enactment of thegeonim, and this enactment does not have the power to prevent [the yavamfrom taking possession] of his brother's property,34 and cause him to be restrained from dealing with them because of this lien.
Halacha 14
[The following rules apply when] a yevamah's [first husband was not obligated to] grant her a ketubah35 or [when] she waived her ketubah in his favor. Theyavam acquires his brother's estate and may sell [portions of it] or give them away as he desires. When he marries his yevamah, he is obligated to compose a ketubah for 100 [zuz]. All of his property will be considered as being on lien for the ketubah, [i.e., the same laws apply to her] as apply to other women who have a ketubah.36
Halacha 15
Halacha 16
[Should the husband] sell movable property that is classified as nichsei tzon barzel39 - although he is not allowed to make such a sale - the sale is binding.40
If both [the husband and the wife] sell nichsei m'log, the sale is binding,41regardless of whether the purchaser purchased the property from the husband first and then from the wife, or if he first purchased it from the wife and then from the husband.
Halacha 17
Similarly, when a woman sells her nichsei m'log to her husband or gives them to him as a present, the sale or the gift is binding. She cannot rationalize her actions by saying, "[This was not my true intent.] I did it [only] to appease my husband."42 With regard to other property, however, she may offer such a rationalization.
Halacha 18
What is implied? When a woman sells her nichsei tzon barzel to her husband or gives them to him as a present, her husband does not acquire this property. [This applies to] landed property and movable property [in this category], to a field that was designated for her from which [she could collect the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, a field belonging to her that was specifically mentioned in her ketubah or a field that [her husband mentioned in herketubah] as his present to her [to be included in her dowry].43
[In all the above instances,] even though [the husband] formalized the transaction with his wife through an act of contract that she voluntarily agreed to, she has the prerogative of recanting whenever she desires.44 [We assume that] she gave the present or made the sale only for the sake of maintaining peace in her home.45
Halacha 19
It appears to me that a woman is not entitled [to nullify her statements, based on the rationale]: "I did it [only] to appease my husband," when her nichsei tzon barzel were lost or stolen, and she waived the debt in favor of her husband. [This applies even when the commitment] is formalized in the presence of witnesses.48
To what can this be compared? To a man and a woman who formalized an agreement in which she forgoes the responsibility [he had taken for property that had been classified as nichsei tzon barzel] and considers it instead nichsei m'log.49 For the husband is not bringing a proof for the sake of taking possession or maintaining possession of property, merely to free himself of the obligation to pay a claim [his wife will issue].50
If, by contrast, she gives him movable property that exists and was considered to be nichsei tzon barzel, the husband does not acquire it. For the wife may rationalize her conduct saying: "I did this to appease my husband."
Halacha 20
When a husband sells [the right to] the benefits from landed property [that belongs to his wife, to another person, while the legal owner of the property remains his wife, the sale] is of no consequence. [The rationale is that] the reason our Sages granted a man [the right to] the benefit that accrues from his wife's property is [to afford him additional income] so that he will spend more generously on the household expenses.51
[Based on that rationale,] if he sells the benefit to be derived [from the landed property to another person] and takes the money and invests it in a business [which offers profit], he is given that prerogative.
Halacha 21
[The following laws apply if] the woman possesses financial resources [that she brings to the household]. If they are nichsei tzon barzel, her husband may use them for commercial enterprises.52
If they are nichsei m'log - regardless of whether she brought them to the household at the time of marriage or she inherited them or received them as a present53 [- landed property should be purchased with them, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues].54 [Similarly,] if she inherited or was given movable property, it should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
Halacha 22
Halacha 23
[The following law applies when] a woman inherits servants [while she is married]. Even if they are old, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household.
[The following law applies when] she inherits olive trees or vines, but did not [inherit] the land on which these trees were planted. If they produce enough to pay for their upkeep, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. If they do not, they should be sold as firewood, land should be purchased with the proceeds, from which the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
Halacha 24
When [a married woman] inherits produce that is still attached to the land [on which it is growing], it becomes her husband's [property].57 When the produce has been uprooted from the land, it should be sold and used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
When, however, a husband divorces his wife, and there was produce that was still attached to the ground, it belongs to the woman. If it has already been reaped, it belongs to the man.58
Halacha 25
A husband is obligated to provide for the sustenance and all the needs of the servants59 and livestock that belong to his wife and are classified as nichsei m'log. They must work for him, and he is entitled to the benefit that accrues. Therefore, a baby born to a maid classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband. And a calf born to a cow that is classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband.
If, however, the husband divorces his wife and she desires to pay the worth of a child born from a maidservant who is classified as nichsei m'log and take the child as her property because this brings honor to her family's household, she is given that prerogative.60
Halacha 26
[The following laws apply when] a woman brings two utensils or two maidservants to the household and has them classified as nichsei tzon barzel. They were [originally] evaluated at 1000 zuz; afterwards, their value increased and they were evaluated at 2000 zuz. If the woman's husband divorces her, she is entitled to one [utensil or maidservant] for the 1000 zuz that she is owed. With regard to the other - if she desires to pay its value and take it because of the honor it brings to her father's household, she has that prerogative.
Halacha 27
When a man gives a present to his wife - regardless of whether he gave her landed property, or he gave her money and she bought landed property - her husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from the present [that was given].61
Similarly, when a man gives a woman a present on the condition that her husband not be entitled to derive the benefits from it, but rather the benefits that accrue will belong to the wife to be used for whatever she desires,62 [the provision is binding, and] the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from this present.
Similarly, if a woman sells the rights to her ketubah [in the event of her divorce or her husband's death],63 the money she receives belongs to her, and her husband is not entitled to derive the benefit that accrues from it.
Halacha 28
When a calf born from cattle that was classified as nichsei m'log is stolen, and the thief is apprehended and forced to pay twice the amount, the woman receives the extra payment. [The rationale is that] this is not the benefit that our Sages granted [the husband].64
Halacha 29
[The following rules apply when] a husband sells landed property [that he owns] to his wife. If the husband knew about the funds with which she purchased the land previously, the sale is binding,67 and the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from that land.
If, however, [the existence of] these funds was concealed, she does not acquire the land. For the husband may [explain that he did not really intend to complete the sale]. [His intent was] to reveal the existence of funds that his wife had hidden. The funds that were revealed should be used to purchase landed property,68 from which the husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue.69
Halacha 30
When funds or movable property are discovered in a woman's possession, and she claims that they were given her as a present, while her husband claims that they stem from the fruits of her labor and hence belong to him, it is the woman's claim that is accepted.70 [The husband] may, however, have a ban of ostracism [conditionally] issued against anyone who makes false statements.71[The funds should be used] to purchase landed property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefit that accrues.72
If the woman claims that the funds were given to her with the provision that her husband have no control over them, but rather that they be used for whatever purpose she desires, she must bring proof [that such a provision was made].73[The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that a husband has the right to the benefits from all the funds found in a woman's possession, unless she brings proof otherwise.
Halacha 31
If [a wife] tells [her husband]: "You gave me [these funds] as a present," she is required to take a Rabbinic oath that her husband gave her [the funds]. [After she takes that oath,] her husband is not entitled to the benefit [from the property purchased with these funds].74
Halacha 32
One should not accept an article for safekeeping that was given by a wife, a servant or a minor.75 If one transgressed and accepted [an article given by] a woman, one should return it to the woman.76 If she dies, one should return it to her husband.77
If one accepted [an article given by] a servant, one should return it to the servant. If he dies, one should return it to his master. If one accepted [an article given by] a minor, one should purchase a Torah scroll with the proceeds or an article that will provide [the minor] with benefit.78
[The following rules apply] with regard to all [the abovementioned individuals], if at the time of their death, they say: "The article I gave for safekeeping belongs to so and so." If the person caring for the article operates under the presumption that the person who entrusted it to him is true to his word, he should carry out the command he was given. If not, he should give [the article] to the person's heirs.
Halacha 33
[The following rules apply when] a woman has financial resources sufficient [to purchase property] from which the husband would derive the benefits [but they disagree with regard to the property fit to purchase]; he suggests that this type of property be purchased, and she desires that another type be purchased. A property should be purchased that brings a large revenue and requires little upkeep,79 regardless of whether this is the article desired by [the husband] or by [the wife]. We do not purchase any article that does not renew itself,80 lest the entire property be used and the principal lost.
Halacha 34
[The following rule applies when] a woman brings to her husband's household a goat [that she is entitled] to milk, a sheep [that she is entitled] to shear or a date palm whose fruit [she is entitled to take], although she is entitled only to these benefits [and not to the principal]. [Her husband] is entitled to [these benefits] although the principal is dwindling.81
Similarly, if she brought utensils or articles of clothing to his household that were classified as nichsei m'log, he may use them, wearing them or using them as spreads or as covers until the articles themselves are destroyed. If he divorces [his wife], he is not required to pay for any nichsei m'log that became worn out.
Halacha 35
The geonim [issued the following] ruling. A husband takes responsibility for the diminished value of nichsei tzon barzel. Nevertheless, if [such property] exists [at the time a woman's ketubah is due for payment,] and still serves its initial purpose, the woman must take it regardless of its condition at that time.82
If they are no longer fit to serve their initial purpose, it is as if they were stolen or lost, and the husband is obligated to pay the value appraised originally at the time of the marriage.
This is the common custom. Whenever a man marries, he accepts responsibility for [the woman's] dowry as contingent on this custom.83 On the basis of this custom, just as the husband does not pay for the depreciation of the article, so too, he does not take the appreciation of the property if it increases in value.
A husband has the right to compel some of the servants and maidservants who belong to his wife to serve him84 in the home of another woman he has married.85 [This applies] regardless of whether the servants are classified asnichsei m'log or nichsei tzon barzel. The husband may not, however, take these servants to another city without his wife's consent.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| 1. |
As explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 3 and notes, this is one of the four privileges our Sages granted a husband as part of the marriage contract. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 1:8.)
|
| 2. |
The second phase of marriage, nisu'in, does not start until the woman enters the chuppah, and it is only at that time that the marriage contract takes effect. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, as explained in the following halachot and notes.
|
| 3. |
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 57:1) cites the opinion of the Tur and other Ashkenazic authorities, which is that the husband does not have a right to inherit his wife's dowry until it enters his possession.
|
| 4. |
Moreover, if the courtyard belongs to the husband, it is assumed that the couple entered for the sake of marriage, even when they do not explicitly state so. This is the view of all authorities, and the Maggid Mishneh explains that it is also shared by the Rambam.
|
| 5. |
If the courtyard belonged to her, this intent is understood even when it is not explicitly stated.
|
| 6. |
This law applies even if the widow is still a minor, as reflected in Chapter 3, Halachah 12.
|
| 7. |
Once she is met by her husband or his agents, however, he is entitled to inherit her estate.
|
| 8. |
See Chapter 1, Halachot 6 and 7; Chapter 4, Halachah 14.
|
| 9. |
Or after she becomes divorced or widowed in her father's lifetime (Chapter 4, Halachot 7 and 8).
|
| 10. |
The rationale is that she is not entitled to a ketubah (Chapter 11, Halachah 4). Moreover, since she is not responsible for her actions, she has no right to transfer her property.
|
| 11. |
Although the Ra'avad objects to this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:3) quotes the Rambam's view.
|
| 12. |
Chapter 3, Halachah 13.
|
| 13. |
See Chapter 14, Halachah 8.
|
| 14. |
The advantage in the purchaser's continuing to own the land itself is that if the husband dies before his wife, her sale is binding, and the land becomes the purchaser's property. From this time onward, he is entitled to benefit from the land as well.
Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam on this issue and maintains that the husband has the right to take the property from the purchaser, even during his wife's lifetime. The Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 90:9) follows the Rambam's view, while the Ramah quotes that of Rabbenu Asher.
|
| 15. |
Even the Ramah and Rabbenu Asher accept this ruling.
|
| 16. |
There is a difference of opinion with regard to this matter among the geonim, but all the later authorities accept this view. The rationale is that the husband's right to the land supersedes that of the purchaser. The money that the purchaser paid is considered to have become a debt owed him by the woman's estate, and the husband is not required to pay his wife's debts.
|
| 17. |
A husband is entitled to any ownerless object discovered by his wife. His claim is not accepted, however, if he states that money that appears to have come from the sale of property came from the discovery of a lost object. There is no need for witnesses to testify that this is the money from the sale. It is sufficient that it appears to be so. If, however, the money has been changed into a different coinage or currency, the husband is not required to return it (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 18. |
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 8:2), the Rambam states that this refers to property located in the bride and groom's city or the surrounding locale, as opposed to property owned by her in more distant locales. It is questionable, however, if the same geographic restrictions apply in today's global village.
|
| 19. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:11) states that preferably, a woman should not sell this property, because her husband is entitled to inherit it.
The commentaries explain that when the husband knows of his wife's financial holdings, it is an implicit part of the marriage contract - and perhaps part of his intent in entering into the marriage relationship - that he will inherit this property. When, however, he is unaware of her ownership of property, this motive cannot be given as the reason for his desire to enter this relationship.
It must be added that as soon as the husband becomes aware of this property, it is considered to be part of the woman's nichsei m'log and is bound by all the laws pertaining to such property (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12). Moreover, if the woman dies without selling this property, her husband is entitled to inherit it, although he was never aware of his wife's ownership of it during her lifetime.
|
| 20. |
The Tur (Even HaEzer 90) states that the woman has the full right to sell any property that she owned before she was consecrated. With regard to property that she acquired after she was consecrated, it is preferable that she not sell it - but if she sells it, the husband has no claim to it.
|
| 21. |
As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, slightly different rules apply if the woman signed over only a portion of her property.
|
| 22. |
Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:12. It is clearly obvious that the woman's intent in giving the present is to protect her holdings from being inherited by her husband.
|
| 23. |
In his gloss on Ketubot 79a, Rabbenu Nissim explains that the Rambam equates this provision with the one mentioned in the previous clause. The only difference between the two is one of tact. The provision in this clause is more gently worded, so that the intent to free the woman's holdings from her husband is less obvious.
|
| 24. |
Unlike the Rambam, Rabbenu Asher and other authorities maintain that the woman need not explicitly mention her consent to the present. All that is necessary is that she refrain from nullifying it.
|
| 25. |
Rabbenu Nissim asks, according to the approach of the Rambam (in contrast to the approach of Rabbenu Asher mentioned in the previous note): If the woman did not explicitly mention her consent to the present before her death, why does her husband have no right to inherit her property? The provision on which the present was based was never fulfilled.
Seemingly, this property can be compared to a woman's property of which her husband was unaware. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the husband has the right to inherit such property, and thus he should also inherit the property mentioned in this clause.
Rabbenu Nissim explains that since the Rambam maintains that a husband's right to inherit his wife's property is a Rabbinical ordinance, there is room for leniency when, as in the present case, it is obvious that the woman did not desire her husband to inherit her estate. Obviously motivated by the same question, but unwilling to offer such a resolution, Rav David Arameah explains that the Rambam's ruling applies in an instance when the woman in fact expressed her consent to the present before her death.
|
| 26. |
As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 8, preferably a woman should not sell property she acquires after her consecration. One might think that the same principle applies to a yevamah, for she also shares a bond to her yavam. There is, however, a distinction between the two: a woman who is consecrated will most likely be married, while a yevamah may be freed from her obligation through chalitzah. Hence, there are no restrictions placed upon her with regard to the sale of her holdings.
|
| 27. |
The difference between nichsei m'log and nichsei tzon barzel is that with regard to nichsei m'log, the object itself belongs to the woman, while the property regarded as nichsei tzon barzel is considered to belong to her late husband. He was, however, obligated to pay his wife for the value designated at the time of marriage (Chapter 16, Halachah 1).
Since the nichsei tzon barzel are considered to belong to the yevamah's late husband's estate, one might think that the yavam would have a right to them. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that he is given this right only after marriage.
As mentioned by the Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh, most authorities differ with the Rambam on this point. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the yavam is entitled to half of the benefit that accrues from the nichsei tzon barzel. This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer160:6). (The Rambam's opinion is also quoted, but it appears that the other opinion is favored.) The Ramah mentions the opinion of the Ra'avad which goes even further and gives the yavamrights to half the benefits of nichsei m'log that the yevamah acquired while she was married to her deceased husband.
|
| 28. |
For this property belongs to her outright.
|
| 29. |
A division is necessary because this property is considered to belong to the yevamah's late husband, as explained above. Therefore, his heirs have a claim to it. Nevertheless, since he died in his wife's lifetime, and she did not receive payment for this property, her own heirs also have a claim.
This ruling is also disputed by other authorities, who maintain that all the nichsei tzon barzel are considered the property of the husband's heirs, together with the woman's ketubah. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ramah quotes that of the other authorities.
The Ramah also adds that these laws do not apply in the Ashkenazic community in the present era - or in other communities - where the rite of yibbum is not practiced, and instead, the yevamahis freed from her obligation through the rite of chalitzah. Since the yevamah will not marry theyavam, he has no rights with regard to her property.
|
| 30. |
I.e., both the essential requirement of the ketubah and any additional amount added by her deceased husband.
|
| 31. |
For our Sages associated a woman's burial with the inheritance of her ketubah (Chapter 12, Halachah 14).
|
| 32. |
Even if the value of the property left by the deceased brother is many times the value of the woman's ketubah, none of the property may be sold, lest the remaining property be destroyed and the woman have difficulty collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the purchasers (Ketubot 81b).
|
| 33. |
I.e., since the produce requires the land, it is considered as if it were landed property, and the money received from the sale has the same status as the landed property mentioned in the previous halachah.
|
| 34. |
The Maggid Mishneh, the Rivash (Responsa 365 and 366), and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 168:5) emphasize that the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the husband did not follow the suggestion (Chapter 16, Halachah 8) of stating explicitly in the ketubah that the woman may collect from movable property the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (There are other authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that even if the provision is not stated explicitly in the woman's ketubah, the movable property should be sold and land purchased.)
|
| 35. |
E.g., he died after he consecrated her, but before he consummated the marriage - in which instance, the woman is obligated to undergo either yibbum or chalitzah, and yet her deceased husband was not obligated to grant her a ketubah.
|
| 36. |
Since she has no claim to her deceased husband's property, she is not judged by the laws pertaining to a yevamah, but rather by those pertaining to other women.
|
| 37. |
If she sells the land to her husband, the sale is rescinded because she can claim that she did not sell it willingly; she did so only to appease her husband (Bava Batra 49b). If she sells the land to others, the sale is rescinded because her husband has a right to benefit from her property, and she cannot take away this right from him without his consent. If, however, the husband agrees to her sale, it is binding, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3).
Note the ruling of the Ramah (Even HaEzer 90:13), who writes that if the husband dies, the sale made by the woman is effective retroactively. (But see also the gloss of the Beit Shmuel 90:46.)
|
| 38. |
With regard to nichsei m'log, it is obvious that the husband's sale is of no consequence, for the woman owns this type of property. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, which are considered to be the husband's property, there are authorities (e.g., the Ra'avad) who differ with the Rambam and maintain that the sale is valid until the time comes when the woman desires to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
The commentaries support the Rambam's opinion, explaining that even though the woman has the potential to expropriate the property afterwards by force of law, the sale should be nullified. For women are not comfortable presenting claims in court. If the sale were allowed to remain binding, the only way the woman could receive her due would be by lodging a legal claim. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:13) quotes the Rambam's view.
|
| 39. |
If the woman is divorced, she is entitled to this property. Hence, the husband does not have the prerogative of selling it.
|
| 40. |
The husband is allowed to destroy this property through frequent use. Therefore, the woman does not rely on receiving this property, and thus if he sells it the sale is binding (Maggid Mishneh, gloss on Hilchot Mechirah 30:5; Chelkat Mechokek 90:45).
This is the opinion of the Rambam and Rabbenu Tam, and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:14). Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba and others differ and maintain that the sale is of no consequence. Their view is quoted by the Ramah.
|
| 41. |
Although both the husband and his wife have a share in the property, since the purchaser dealt with both of them, the sale is binding.
|
| 42. |
Since this property itself belongs to her, there is no reason for her husband to become upset if she does not desire to sell it to him.
|
| 43. |
See Chapter 23, Halachah 11; Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if similar laws apply when a woman waives her claim to property mentioned in her ketubah in favor of her husband. The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher maintain that her deed is of consequence, while the Rashba and the Ramban state that it is not. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam subscribes to the latter view.
|
| 44. |
The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that until the woman recants, the transaction is binding. The Beit Meir, however, objects, explaining that the Rambam's wording in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3 does not indicate such a distinction.
|
| 45. |
Her husband will pressure her by saying, "You are either planning my death or considering a divorce. Otherwise, you would not hesitate to sell this property to me" (Bava Batra 49b, 50a).
|
| 46. |
Even if he has a deed or witnesses that testify to the claim, his wife may also negate his claim based on the above rationale.
|
| 47. |
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:16) states that if the woman explicitly accepts responsibility for the field if expropriated from the husband, then the transaction is binding.
|
| 48. |
Based on the Rambam's statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, it is questionable why witnesses are necessary. See Chelkat Mechokek 90:1, Beit Shmuel 90:6.
|
| 49. |
A husband is not obligated to pay for nichsei m'log that have been destroyed, lost or stolen, while in such situations, he is obligated to pay the original value for nichsei tzon barzel. Thus, by changing the status of her property, the woman is in effect waiving a financial obligation due her from her husband.
There is reason to say that just as a woman can say that she was forced to give or sell this property to her husband to appease him, she could also say that she was also forced to waive her husband's obligation in the loss or theft of this property. The Rambam, however, does not accept this rationale. Since this obligation is due only after the husband's death or divorce, there is nothing pressuring her husband to pay it. If he demands that his wife waive this obligation, she may refuse, asking him: "Is it because you want to divorce me that you are asking me to waive this obligation?" (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 50. |
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling. Nevertheless, it is the Rambam's decision which is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:18).
|
| 51. |
If, at the outset, the husband sold the rights to benefit from the property for a lump sum, it is possible that all that money would be spent in a short period of time and that afterwards, there would be nothing left for household expenses (Chelkat Mechokek 85:41).
|
| 52. |
For their value is explicitly stated in the woman's ketubah and will be returned to her in the event of divorce or her husband's death.
|
| 53. |
For money that a woman acquires while married is automatically considered to be nichsei m'log.
|
| 54. |
In this way, the woman is assured that the principal will remain hers. If the husband desires to use the money for commercial enterprises, he may afterwards sell the right to benefit from the property, as mentioned in the previous halachah.
|
| 55. |
E.g., people other than her husband. If her husband himself injures her, he is not entitled to benefit from the proceeds of her property, as mentioned in Halachah 28.
|
| 56. |
Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:15. As stated in that source, the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds to which his wife has no right.
|
| 57. |
Although in most instances, produce that is still attached to land is considered equivalent to landed property, an exception is made in this case, because the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from his wife's property.
|
| 58. |
For he is entitled to receive all the benefit from her property throughout the duration of their marriage.
|
| 59. |
See Hilchot Avadim 9:7, which states that a husband does not have the prerogative of telling a servant: "Work for me, but I will not provide for your sustenance."
|
| 60. |
The Rambam's wording implies that the concept of maintaining the honor of one's household applies only with regard to the children of one's servants, and not to the offspring of one's livestock. See the Beit Shmuel 85:38, which quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis on this issue.
|
| 61. |
Bava Batra 51b states that a person who gives a present gives with a generous spirit. Therefore, we may assume that the husband gives the gift to his wife without wanting to restrict her in any way.
|
| 62. |
The specific wording of the provision that the giver must make is discussed in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13.
|
| 63. |
The person purchasing the rights to the woman's ketubah is taking a risk, because it is possible that she will die in her husband's lifetime and then he will not receive anything.
|
| 64. |
Our Sages entitled a husband to derive the benefit that would ordinarily accrue from property belonging to his wife - e.g., produce that grows on a field, rent from a home, labor from a servant. They did not grant him rights to benefits that arise from abnormal circumstances.
|
| 65. |
The Rambam does not mention two other payments that a person who inflicts an injury would ordinarily pay: shevet - reimbursement for the wages that were not earned during the period of convalescence, because the husband is entitled to his wife's wages - and ripui - payment for the medical treatment required, because a husband is always required to pay for his wife's medical care.
|
| 66. |
Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:16. This differs from instances in which the injury is inflicted by other parties, in which case the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds, to which his wife has no right.
|
| 67. |
The husband cannot claim that the funds belonged to him, but since he could not take them from his wife in any other way, he sold the property to her as a ruse. This applies even if he makes a definite claim (ta'anat bari) that the funds belong to him (Chelkat Mechokek 85:22,24).
|
| 68. |
This ruling depends on the halachah to follow, which states that a woman's claim is accepted with regard to money found in her possession.
|
| 69. |
The Rambam's ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 85:9). The Ramah mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the husband makes a definite claim that the hidden funds belong to him, his claim is accepted.
|
| 70. |
The Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 6:1) states that a present will be spoken about. Therefore, the woman will be afraid to claim that she was given a present unless the claim was true.
|
| 71. |
He cannot, however, require his wife to take an oath unless he lodges a definite claim against her (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 72. |
If, however, a woman was given responsibility to deal freely with the property belonging to her husband's household, and she claims that funds discovered in her possession belong to her privately, her claim is not accepted (Bava Batra 52b; Ramah, Even HaEzer 85:12).
|
| 73. |
Although the giving of a present will become public knowledge, the details of the present might not. Therefore, the woman is required to substantiate her statements. Otherwise, we assume that this present was given without any extraordinary conditions (Ma'aseh Rokeach).
The Maggid Mishneh mentions the opinion of the Rashba, who differs and maintains that the woman's claim is also accepted in this instance as well. This opinion is mentioned by the later authorities.
|
| 74. |
The rationale is that a woman will not be brazen enough to make false statements in her husband's presence with regard to a matter that he knows to be true (Maggid Mishneh).
|
| 75. |
For the likelihood is that the article belongs to the husband, master or father, respectively. It is forbidden to assist a person who takes property that is not his or her own. Moreover, if no one accepts the article for safekeeping, it is likely that it will be returned (Bava Batra 51b).
|
| 76. |
For there is no proof that the article was stolen.
|
| 77. |
For even if the article is rightfully hers, he inherits her property.
|
| 78. |
The entrusted article should not be given to the minor, for it is possible that he will not care for it properly and it will be destroyed (Rashbam, Bava Batra 52a).
|
| 79. |
In every society, the nature of the type of article purchased depends on the conditions prevalent at that time (Chelkat Mechokek 85:33).
|
| 80. |
The Hebrew literally means "whose bark is renewed" - i.e., reaping the benefits one year will not prevent them from being reaped in the future.
|
| 81. |
I.e., in this instance, the goat's milk is not sold and the money used to purchase property that produces benefit, but rather the goat's milk is used for the household.
|
| 82. |
Even if they are worth substantially less than they were originally.
|
| 83. |
As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, at different times and in different countries, other customs have prevailed. It is the prevalent custom in one's own locale that is binding.
|
| 84. |
The servants may be compelled to serve the husband; they may not, however, be compelled to serve his second wife (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 85).
|
| 85. |
For having the woman's servants serve her husband in his other wife's home, also elevates the woman's own standard of living (Ketubot 80b).
|
Tum'at Okhalin - Chapter 13
Halacha 1
When a person draws water with a cylinder, the water remaining in the cylinder is considered as having been willfully uprooted for three days. After being left for three days, however, it is not considered to have been uprooted willfully. Instead, if liquid remains there, it does not make foods subject to impurity.
Halacha 2
When wood was exposed to liquids willfully, but rain fell upon it against the person's will, if there was more rain than liquid, all of the liquid on the wood is considered to have come against the person's will. If he brought wood out so that the rain would fall upon it, even though there is a majority of rainwater, all of the liquid is considered as having been poured on the wood willfully.
When a person's feet or the feet of his animal were filled with mud and he crossed a river and rinsed them, if he was happy, the water on his or their feet is considered to have been uprooted willfully. If he was not happy, they are not considered as uprooted willfully.
Halacha 3
When a person brings wooden wheels and implements used for oxen into water during the summer when the east wind blows so that the cracks in the wood will seal, the water that ascends with them is considered as having been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 4
When a person leads an animal down to a stream to drink, the water that ascend with its mouth is considered as having been uprooted willfully. The water that ascends on its feet are not considered as having been uprooted willfully, unless he had the intent that its feet be rinsed. When the animal's feet are diseased, and in the threshing season, even the water on its feet is considered as having been uprooted willfully.
If a deafmute, a mentally or emotionally compromised person, or a minor brought the animal to drink, even if he intended that its feet be washed, the water that ascends on its feet is not considered to have been uprooted willfully, because the deeds of such individuals are halachically significant, but their intent is not.
Halacha 5
When a person immerses himself in water, the water on his body is considered to have been uprooted willfully. If, however, one passes through water, all of the water on his body is not considered to have been willfully uprooted.
Halacha 6
When a person immerses himself in a river and there was another river before him and he crossed it, the second water nullifies the presence of the first water and the water on his body is not considered as having been uprooted willfully.
Similarly, if a person's friend pushed him or his animal into a pool, the presence of the first water is nullified. If, however, he pushed him in jest, the second water does not nullify the first and the water that is on his body is considered as having been uprooted willfully.
If a person immerses himself in a river and ascended and then, rain fell upon him, should there be more rainwater than river water on his body, the rainwater nullifies the presence of the first water and the water on his body is not considered as having been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 7
When a person is swimming on the surface of water, the water he splashes is not considered as having been uprooted willfully. The water on his body, however, is considered as having been uprooted willfully. If he intended to splash water on a friend, the water he splashes is considered as uprooted willfully.
Halacha 8
When a person makes a squirting spout in the water, the water squirted from it and within it are not considered as uprooted willfully.
Halacha 9
When a person measures a cistern to find out how deep it is, the water that ascends on his hand and on the article with which he measures is considered as having been uprooted willfully. If he measures its width, the water that ascends on his hand and on the article with which he measures is not considered as having been uprooted willfully.
If a person extends his hand or foot into a cistern to see whether it contains water, the water that ascends on his hand or foot is not considered as having been uprooted willfully. If he extends them to see how much water is there, the water that ascends on his hand or foot is considered as having been uprooted willfully. If he casts a stone into a cistern to see if it contains water, the water that is splashed is not considered as uprooted willfully. Similarly, the water on the stone is not considered as uprooted willfully.
Halacha 10
If a person beats a hide from which the wool has not been separated while it is outside the water, the water that is expelled from is considered as having been uprooted willfully, for his desire is that the water be expelled. If, however, he beats it while it is in the water, the water is not considered as having been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 11
The water that ascends on a ship, its reservoir, and its oars is not considered to have been uprooted willfully. Similarly, the water on the snares, nets, and meshes is not considered to have been uprooted willfully. If one shakes them out, it is considered to have been uprooted willfully.
Similarly, the water on the table-coverings or coverings for bricks is not considered to have been uprooted willfully. If one shakes them out, it is considered to have been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 12
When a person takes a ship out to the Mediterranean Sea to strengthen it, takes a peg out to the rain to harden it, or takes a firebrand out to the rain to make it a coal, the water on them is considered to have been uprooted willfully. If, however, one takes a glowing peg or a firebrand out to the rain to quench their fire, the water on them is not considered to have been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 13
When one lowers a chain with a hook into a cistern to lift up a container or a pitcher or one lowered a basket into a cistern so that a chicken would sit on it, the water on these objects is not considered to have been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 14
When one smoothes out cress to remove the water on it or one squeezes the water on his hair into his garments, the water that emerges is considered to have been uprooted willfully. The water that remains is not considered to have been uprooted willfully, because he desired that all of the water be purged originally.
The cress itself becomes susceptible to impurity, because the water makes it susceptible to impurity when it departs. If he removed the water from it with all his power, it does not become susceptible to impurity.
Halacha 15
When a person shakes a tree to cause food that had been placed there or an impure object to descend, the water which sputters from it is not considered to have been uprooted willfully. If he shook it to remove the liquids, the liquids that fall are considered to have been uprooted willfully. The liquids that remain inside it are not considered to have been uprooted willfully even though they moved from place to place, because his intent was that they be removed entirely. Similarly, if the liquids sputter on produce that is connected to the ground, they are not considered to have been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 16
When a person shakes a tree and water from it falls on another tree or a branch and then the water fell on other branches under which there were plants and vegetables attached to the ground, the water on the plants or the vegetables are not considered to have been uprooted willfully.
Halacha 17
As explained in Hilchot Terumot , when one poured water over wine dregs that were terumah, the first and second batches produced are forbidden to non-priests. If the dregs had come from grapes consecrated for improvements for the Temple, even the third batch is forbidden. And if the grapes were consecrated for use for the Altar, all mixtures are forbidden. If the grapes are definitely from the second tithe, only the first batch is forbidden.
Just as these groundrules were established with regard to prohibitions, so too, they are applied with regard to the mixture making foods susceptible to ritual impurity. For example, water became mixed with dregs on its own accord and an animal drank one mixture after another. An animal is mentioned, because if, by contrast, a person would remove the first water, even though the water fell on its own accord, since a person gave thought to it and objected to its presence, it is considered significant and imparts impurity.
Tum'at Okhalin - Chapter 14
Halacha 1
When water from a drainpipe descends into produce and the owner mixed the produce so that it would dry, the produce does not become susceptible to impurity.
Halacha 2
When a person brings his produce to the roof so that it does not become worm-infested and dew descends upon it, it does not become susceptible to impurity. If he intended that the dew descend upon it, it becomes susceptible to impurity. Therefore, if a deafmute, a intellectually or emotionally compromised individual, or a minor brought the produce up to the roof, even if they had the intent that dew descend upon it, it does not become susceptible to impurity. The rationale is that their deeds are significant according to Scriptural Law, but their intent is not significant, even according to Rabbinic Law.
If minors turned the produce over on the roof, it becomes susceptible to impurity. For if the intent of a minor is obvious from his actions, his intent has an effect according to Rabbinic Law.
Halacha 3
When a person brings bundles of vegetables, dried figs, or garlic to a roof so that they will be preserved and dew descended upon them, they do not become susceptible to ritual impurity. We do not say that since everyone knows that dew will descend, it is as if he willfully exposed them to water. The rationale is that he brought them up to the roof solely so that they should be preserved.
Halacha 4
When a person brings wheat to be ground into flour and rain falls upon it, if he was happy, it becomes susceptible to impurity. When his olives had been placed on the roof and rain descended, if he was happy, they were made susceptible to impurity. When donkey-drivers were crossing a river and their sacks fell into the water, and they lifted them up, if they were happy that the produce became wet, the produce was made susceptible to impurity. The water that is on the sacks is considered as having been uprooted willfully, for they were happy that the sacks became wet.
Halacha 5
When a sack that was filled with seeds and was placed on the edge of a river, at the opening to a cistern, or on the steps leading to a storage cavern of water, if they absorbed water, they become susceptible to impurity.
Halacha 6
When an earthenware jug containing produce was placed in liquids or a jug containing liquids was placed among produce and the produce absorbed the liquids, it becomes susceptible to impurity.
With regard to which liquids was the above said: With regard to water, wine, and vinegar. Other liquids are not absorbed through the walls of earthenware containers causing produce to be made susceptible to ritual impurity.
Halacha 7
The following rules apply when a person removes a hot loaf of bread from an oven and places it on the opening of a jug of wine: If the loaf was from wheat flour, it does not become susceptible to impurity. If it was from barley flour, it does become susceptible to impurity, because barley is absorbent. Similarly, if the wine was impure, if the loaf was from wheat, it is pure. If it was from barley, it becomes impure, because it absorbed impure liquids.
Halacha 8
When a person sprinkles water on the floor of his house and then placed wheat upon it and it became moist, if it became moist because of the water, it becomes susceptible to impurity. If it became moist because of the stone, it does not become susceptible to impurity.
When a person washes his garment in a kneading trough and afterwards he placed wheat in it and it became moist, if it became moist because of the water, it becomes susceptible to impurity. If it became moist because of the kneading trough, it does not become susceptible to impurity.
Halacha 9
When a person buries his produce in sand so that it will become moist, it becomes subject to impurity. When he buries it in dry mud, if the mud is moist enough that a hand that touches it will become wet, the produce becomes subject to impurity. If not, it does not.
Halacha 10
When a person sprinkles water on his grainheap, he need not worry that his wheat became susceptible to impurity if the kernels came in contact with water even though he is satisfied that this happened.
Halacha 11
When a person gathers grasses upon which dew had descended to use for covering wheat, the wheat does not become susceptible to impurity. If this was his intent, it does become susceptible.
Halacha 12
When a person sprinkles impure water on the floor of his house and then placed stalks of grain there and they become moist, they become impure if there is enough moisture upon them that the hand of one who touches them also becomes moist. If not, they are pure.
Halacha 13
When a person shakes a bunch of vegetables that had liquid on them and the liquid descended from the upper ones to the lower ones, they do not become susceptible to impurity.
Halacha 14
When a person lifts sacks full of produce from the river and places them one on top of the other, the lower one becomes susceptible to impurity because of the water descending from the upper one, for he willfully placed one on top of the other.
Halacha 15
When a person blows on lentils to see if they are good for the purpose of cooking, if water collects on them, they become susceptible to impurity because of the moisture in his breath which is a derivative of water. Similarly, when a person eats sesame seeds with his finger, they become susceptible to impurity because of the moisture in his breath and on his finger.
Halacha 16
When a person bites food and then it falls from his hand, the liquid on the food is not considered as having been placed there willfully. If a person was eating olives that had been broken open, moist dates, or any other produce whose pit he desired to suck, but it fell from his mouth, the liquid on it is considered as having been placed there willfully. If he was eating dry olives, dried dates, any other produce whose pit he does not desire to suck, and it fell from his mouth, the liquid on it is not considered as having been placed there willfully.
Halacha 17
We have already explained that when a person gathered endives for an animal and washed them, but changed his mind afterwards and thought to use them for human consumption, they need to be exposed to water a second time to make foods susceptible to impurity. If, however, there was tangible moisture on them when he thought to use them for human consumption, they are susceptible to impurity.
Tum'at Okhalin - Chapter 15
Halacha 1
Water that is in a container contracts impurity, whether it entered the container willfully or against one's desires. It imparts impurity to foods and keilim whether it came in contact with them willfully or against one's will. Water collected on the earth, by contrast, e.g., water in a cistern, storage trench, or storage cavern or water in a pit that does not contain 40 se'ah, does not contract impurity unless it comes in contact with the source of impurity willfully, nor does it impart impurity unless it comes in contact with the food willfully.
What is implied? When there was less than 40 se'ah of water collected on the ground, whether it was drawn or it was not drawn, and a human corpse fell into this water or an impure person walked through it, it is pure. If, however, an impure person drank from this water, one filled an impure container with it, or impure liquids willfully fell into it, the water becomes impure even though it is still collected on the ground. If a pure person drank from this water after it became impure on the ground or one filled a pure container with it, the person who drank and the container with which the water was drawn becomes impure, because he drank or the container was filled intentionally.
If a loaf that was terumah fell into such water, it is pure as it was originally, because the water imparts impurity only when foods come in contact with it willfully. Therefore, if one washed his hand and removed a loaf, the loaf contracts impurity from the water on the person's hand, because it was removed willfully.
Halacha 2
The following laws apply to water that is collected in a pit and other types of water collected on the ground, e.g., water in a cistern, storage trench, or storage cavern, rainwater that stopped flowing and collected in one place ormikveot that do not contain 40 se'ah that became impure. If rain then descended, causing there to be more rainwater than the water originally collected, even if the original water did not flow out, those bodies of water become pure. Therefore, during the rainy season, all water collected on the ground, e.g., water collected in a pit or the like, is assumed to be pure.
Halacha 3
Different laws apply when the rains cease. When such bodies of water are close to a town or a thoroughfare, they are impure, because it can be assumed that an impure person drank from them and/or water was drawn from them in impure containers. Those that are distant are pure until the majority of people begin walking. Once they do, they are all assumed to impure, because those who journey on caravans drink from them.
When does the above apply? With regard to water in a pit from which it is possible to drink. If, however, there is water in a pit that it is impossible to drink from except through great effort, it is assumed to be pure unless the footprints of a person or large animal were evident. If, however, the footprints of a small animal were found, the water is pure, because it is possible that the animal descended on its own accord.
Halacha 4
In the rainy season, it can be assumed that the mud and the water in the hollows at the entrance of stores in the public domain are pure. When the rains cease, they are considered as drainage water. The ruling concerning water in the marketplace depends on the majority. .
When wine, milk, or honey fall into a pit filled with water, the ruling depends on the majority. When oil falls into it, the mixture can contract and impart impurity without the owner's desire even when it congeals. The rationale is that it is impossible that droplets will not remain mixed with the water.
Halacha 5
Oil and other liquids aside from water are governed by the same laws whether they are collected in the earth or in containers.
Halacha 6
Streams of rainwater that are still flowing - even if they do not contain 40 se'ah, since they are on the earth and their water is flowing - do not contract ritual impurity. Even if an impure person drank from them, drew water from them with an impure container, or poured impure water into them, they are still pure with regard to all matters.
Halacha 7
When a person was eating terumah with impure hands, e.g., a dried fig that had not come into contact with water, if he inserted his hand into his mouth to remove a pebble, were he to turn over his finger while doing so, the fig would become impure because of his saliva. For the saliva would become impure because of the person's hand, because he uprooted the saliva from its place. If, however, he did not turn over his finger, it is pure. The rationale is that, before he turns over his finger or sucks it, the liquid in his mouth is comparable to water on the earth that was not uprooted from its place, but instead, is on the ground. As explained, such water only contracts and imparts impurity due to willful actions. This person desired only to remove the pebble.
The following rules apply when, in addition to the dried fig, there was apundiyon in his mouth and he extended his hand to remove it and the fig from his mouth. If he had placed the coin in his mouth because he was thirsty, the saliva on it is considered as removed from its place and the fig contracts impurity from the moisture in his mouth that contracted impurity because of his hand.
Halacha 8
The following rules apply when a woman was partaking of food that is terumahwhich had not been made susceptible to impurity while she was removing the coals from an impure oven. If she was poked by a splinter that caused her to bleed and she was sucking her finger because of the blood or she burnt her finger and inserted it into her mouth, the terumah in her mouth contracted impurity.
• Thursday, Menachem Av 14, 5775 · 30 July 2015
"Today's Day"
Sunday Menachem Av 14 5703
Torah lessons: Chumash: Eikev, first parsha with Rashi.
Tehillim: 72-76.
Tanya: And this is (p. 405) ...be (His) will. (p. 407).
Tachanun is not said at Mincha.
The 14th of Menachem Av 5701 (1941) marked fifty years since my father told me to begin recording the stories he told me. When the Tzemach Tzedek began writing on Talmudic and chassidic subjects, the Alter Rebbe said to him: Uknei l'cha chaver1 (lit. "acquire a friend for yourself"); read v'kaneh l'cha chaver (a slight change in vowels) - "the quill shall be your friend."
My father once quoted the Alter Rebbe, "v'kaneh etc..., the quill shall be your friend" - and elaborated: This refers to the quill of the heart, meaning that whatever one learns one must experience emotionally.
FOOTNOTES
1. Avot 1:6.
Daily Thought:
Mandate Unmasked
As impossible as it sounds, as absurd as it may seem: The mandate of darkness is to become light; the mandate of a busy, messy world is to find oneness.
We have proof: for the greater the darkness becomes and the greater the confusion of life, the deeper our souls reach inward to discover their own essence-core.
How could it be that darkness leads us to find a deeper light? That confusion leads us to find a deeper truth?
Only because the very act of existence was set from its beginning to know its own Author.
As it says, “In the beginning . . . G‑d said, ‘It shall become light!’”[Maamar V’nachah Alav 5725; Likkutei Sichot, vol. 10, pp. 7ff.]
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