Come and Go Sunday School Lesson with Dr. Herb Prince & Dr. Frank Carver “Long Ago God Spoke--Part 33B: The Binding of Isaac” at First Church of the Nazarene in San Diego, California, United States
Long Ago God Spoke
Part 33B: The Binding of Isaac
Hebrews 11:
17 By trusting, Avraham, when he was put to the test, offered up Yitz’chak as a sacrifice. Yes, he offered up his only son, he who had received the promises,18 to whom it had been said, “What is called your ‘seed’ will be in Yitz’chak.”[Hebrews 11:18 Genesis 21:12] 19 For he had concluded that God could even raise people from the dead! And, figuratively speaking, he did so receive him.
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Genesis 22:1 (vii) After these things, God tested Avraham. He said to him, “Avraham!” and he answered, “Here I am.” 2 He said, “Take your son, your only son, whom you love, Yitz’chak; and go to the land of Moriyah. There you are to offer him as a burnt offering on a mountain that I will point out to you.”
3 Avraham got up early in the morning, saddled his donkey, and took two of his young men with him, together with Yitz’chak his son. He cut the wood for the burnt offering, departed and went toward the place God had told him about.4 On the third day, Avraham raised his eyes and saw the place in the distance.5 Avraham said to his young men, “Stay here with the donkey. I and the boy will go there, worship and return to you.” 6 Avraham took the wood for the burnt offering and laid it on Yitz’chak his son. Then he took in his hand the fire and the knife, and they both went on together.
7 Yitz’chak spoke to Avraham his father: “My father?” He answered, “Here I am, my son.” He said, “I see the fire and the wood, but where is the lamb for a burnt offering?” 8 Avraham replied, “God will provide himself the lamb for a burnt offering, my son”; and they both went on together.
9 They came to the place God had told him about; and Avraham built the altar there, set the wood in order, bound Yitz’chak his son and laid him on the altar, on the wood. 10 Then Avraham put out his hand and took the knife to kill his son.
11 But the angel of Adonai called to him out of heaven: “Avraham? Avraham!” He answered, “Here I am.” 12 He said, “Don’t lay your hand on the boy! Don’t do anything to him! For now I know that you are a man who fears God, because you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me.” 13 Avraham raised his eyes and looked, and there behind him was a ram caught in the bushes by its horns. Avraham went and took the ram and offered it up as a burnt offering in place of his son. 14 Avraham called the place Adonai Yir’eh [Adonai will see (to it), Adonai provides] — as it is said to this day, “On the mountain Adonai is seen.”
15 The angel of Adonai called to Avraham a second time out of heaven. 16 He said, “I have sworn by myself — says Adonai — that because you have done this, because you haven’t withheld your son, your only son, 17 I will most certainly bless you; and I will most certainly increase your descendants to as many as there are stars in the sky or grains of sand on the seashore. Your descendants will possess the cities of their enemies, 18 and by your descendants all the nations of the earth will be blessed — because you obeyed my order.”
19 So Avraham returned to his young men. They got up and went together to Be’er-Sheva, and Avraham settled in Be’er-Sheva.
By faith Abraham, when put to the test, offered up Isaac (Heb. 11:17a)
Abraham “drew the knife, and still he believed.”[ Louis Mackey, “The View from Pisgah: A Reading of Fear and Trembling,” Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Josiah Thompson (Doubleday & Company, 1972), 401. ]
Can a command of God suspend our obligation to act morally?[Murray Rae, “The Risk of Obedience: A Consideration of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, International Journal of Systematic Theology 1/3 (November 1999): 309.]
Review
This morning is the second of three sessions relating to the binding of Isaac. A bit of review may be helpful since there are two weeks between lessons. To do so we repeat the Hebrews summation of the longer account in Genesis 22:1-19:
By faith Abraham, when put to the test, offered up Isaac. He who had received the promises was ready to offer up his only son, of whom he had been told, “It is through Isaac that descendants shall be named for you.” He considered the fact that God is able even to raise someone from the dead—and figuratively speaking, he did receive him back (Heb. 11:17-19).
The previous time together featured the introduction of Søren Kierkegaard’s book Fear and Trembling (FT) as a way into Hebrews 11:17-19 and Genesis 22:1-19.[Johannes de Silentio, Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s Writings VI , edited and translated by Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton University Press, 1983), 112. ] The book is based on the Genesis account. Søren Kierkegaard (SK) provides a framework of ideas and issues as we continue our exploration of faith in Hebrews 11. In Murray Rae’s words, in writing FT “Kierkegaard is reading the Bible so as to find light for his own path, rather than imposing the pattern of his own life upon his reading of the Bible” (309). Rae’s point is important since it is easy to slide into the genetic fallacy given the personal circumstances that surround SK’s life.
Kierkegaard published FT with a pseudonym as author, Johannes de Silentio (i.e., John the Silent). In doing so the pseudonymous author acquires an identity of his own and is referenced as author even by SK.[Kierkegaard wrote a number of books under pseudonyms (e.g., Hilarius Bookbinder, the ‘editor’ of Stages on Life’s Way. This practice allowed him the luxury of criticizing a pseudonymous author he had invented for a stance or position taken in a given volume! ] Kierkegaard’s own views then may or may not be what is reflected in the book. What is evident is that Fear and Trembling is meant to confront the challenge of what it meant to be a Christian for those living in 19th century Denmark and by implication ours, too.
With the help of Ronald Green, we are following his read of SK’s Fear and Trembling. He sees four levels or four ways of looking at the book as a whole:
1. a call to Christian commitment,
2. the psychology of faith,
3. the shape of Christian influence, and
4. as a book on sin and forgiveness.[Ronald M. Green, “’Developing’ Fear and Trembling,” The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, edited by Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 257-281. ]
The first two were covered in the previous session. Viewing the book as a call to Christian commitment highlights the shortcomings of cultural Christianity in 19th century Denmark. It is not simply that the Christendom of Denmark falls short of the Christian ideal but that the demand of faith was diluted. The faith was sold, as Johannes puts it, “at a bargain price” (5). In the midst of spiritual lethargy, Abraham is seen as the “knight of faith” in his encounter with the divine command to offer up his son. Who would understand? No one! Even Johannes himself must confess, “I cannot understand Abraham—I can only admire him” (FT, 112).
So faith is to be defined primarily not in thinking and reasoning as in a creed but in willing and acting. Abraham’s faith is that he will get Isaac back “by virtue of the absurd,” by what goes beyond the best that human logic can devise.[“The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence in time; that God has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, etc. . . . ” See SK’s pseudonymous work by ‘author’ Johannes Climacus, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, edited by Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Writings XII.I, trans. Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton University Press, 1992), 210. Published in 1846 SK lists himself as editor, thereby marking a move toward direct communication under his own name. His final pseudonym appears in 1850 with Anti-Climacus as author of Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard’s Writings XX, trans. Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton University Press, 1991). ] With God all things are possible! So the Christian is to live a dedicated life to God, exercising faith in spite of the cultural values of the time.
Second, at a deeper level Fear and Trembling shows the psychology of faith that focuses on the quiet and difficult movements of the human spirit. Faith takes a double movement. The first movement, infinite resignation, is accomplished by relinquishing one’s heart’s desire. The knight of faith also embodies a second movement. He says nevertheless, I have faith that I will get Isaac back—that is, by the virtue of the absurd, by virtue of the fact that for God all things are possible. He obeys God’s command and willingly relinquishes Isaac but gets him back! He enjoys “once again to be happy in Isaac” (FT, 35). To become a knight of faith is possible for everyone.
Abraham: No Tragic Hero!
We move now to the third way of reading Fear and Trembling. This is what Ronald Green terms “the normative shape of Christian influence.” To speak of a norm or standard typically means ethics. Given Genesis 22 and the command by God for Abraham to offer up Isaac, what should Abraham do?
Perhaps the significance of Abraham’s ethical situation can be seen when the intellectual framework of 19th century Denmark is considered. There are two prominent names identified with German Idealism at the time, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). For whatever differences there are in their respective idealistic philosophies, they agree that human actions are not to be judged arbitrarily or casually. Both are dedicated to principles supportive of proper community practices. This morning we take Hegel as the main point of reference.
Merold Westphal observes that Fear and “Trembling opens with a preface that makes it clear that Hegel and “our [19th century] age” are in mind in the retelling of the Abraham account. Faith is taken for granted while the real challenge is to “go further,” to understanding. Hegel, who identified with Christianity, was not just interested in this event or that event, this nation or that nation, but in the Whole, in history as the reconciliation of Absolute Spirit.
Understanding of the dialectical process by which all that takes place in history was Hegel’s goal. Opposites (thesis/antithesis) conflict but out of the exchange emerges a synthesis. Both parties, as it were, contribute something to the synthesis. As an example think as Hegel did of marriage. A child is the result (synthesis) of the union of a man and a woman (thesis/antithesis).[In Hegel’s dialectic it is the antithesis that is the driver of history. ] In turn new oppositions emerge over time and the process toward reconciliation of opposites continues on to a new stage or synthesis of world history. In our age, Johannes writes, “everyone is unwilling to stop with faith but goes further” (FT, 7). Increasingly the reconciliation process is overcoming divisions, all differences. Spirit is reconciling within itself and for itself. The bit, so to speak, to “go further” is always in the mix! So goes the inevitable steady movement in Hegel’s reading of history, from ages long past in the East to modern Germanic nations in the West.
For the author of FT, the word for Hegel’s philosophy is “system.” Nine times in Johannes’ preface the word “system” appears, all appearing in the final paragraph. The systematic enemy (Hegel) is front and center from the outset! Thus Fear and Trembling can be read as a confrontation between Abraham and Hegel. As Westphal says, the book’s central theme is the incomparability of Hegelian philosophy with biblical faith, of which Abraham is the paradigm in both the Jewish and the Christian Bibles. Contrary to its own central claim, the system is the abolition rather than the perfection of Christian faith (108).
Three problems having to do with Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac are at the heart of Johannes’ concerns.
- Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?
- Is there an absolute duty to God at work in the account? and
- Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from others mentioned in the text, from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?
Reflection upon these three ‘problems’ is set up the same way. The formula in each case is something like this: if such and such is the case then Hegel is right but then Abraham is wrong (see FT, pp. 54-6; 68-70; 82). Let’s address these “problemata” (Johannes’ term) in this and the next lesson with more attention focused on the first this morning.
The first question is interesting: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical in Genesis 22? That is, is the end (telos) or the purpose in view such that an action requires the moral law to be suspended? First off, it must be clear that one’s ethical life is not separate from one’s religious life. Assuming a Hegelian background here, it will not do for both Johannes and Hegel to just separate ethics from one’s religious life. It is not the case that how one lives or believes on Sunday is different from how one lives or believes on Monday. Both Hegel and Johannes agree on that point. Neither author wants to say that religious faith is in conflict with the moral law.
Three examples are offered by Johannes to make the point that at times there are cases where the moral law is violated but it is acceptable. Jephthah, Agamemnon, and Brutus illustrate the point (FT, 58). Similar to Abraham, the three individuals are called upon to sacrifice a loved one. The circumstances vary but the demand is the same, take the life of one’s child. All three comply. Jephthah and Agamemnon each kill a daughter, Brutus kills a son. In the interests of time and space only the biblical example is given in what follows.
Jephthah (Judges 11:30-40), a valiant judge, saves Israel by sacrificing his daughter.
30And Jephthah made a vow to the Lord, and said, “If you will give the Ammonites into my hand, 31then whoever comes out of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return victorious from the Ammonites, shall be the Lord’s, to be offered up by me as a burnt offering.” 32So Jephthah crossed over to the Ammonites to fight against them; and the Lord gave them into his hand. . . . .
34Then Jephthah came to his home at Mizpah; and there was his daughter coming out to meet him with timbrels and with dancing. She was his only child; he had no son or daughter except her. 35When he saw her, he tore his clothes, and said, “Alas, my daughter! You have brought me very low; you have become the cause of great trouble to me. For I have opened my mouth to the Lord, and I cannot take back my vow.”
36She said to him, “My father, if you have opened your mouth to the Lord, do to me according to what has gone out of your mouth, now that the Lord has given you vengeance against your enemies, the Ammonites.” 37And she said to her father, “Let this thing be done for me: Grant me two months, so that I may go and wander on the mountains, and bewail my virginity, my companions and I.” 38“Go,” he said and sent her away for two months. So she departed, she and her companions, and bewailed her virginity on the mountains.39At the end of two months, she returned to her father, who did with her according to the vow he had made.
For Johannes de Silentio, what Abraham did is similar to the three who killed their offspring but dissimilar at the same time. Abraham’s relation to Isaac is simple: the father shall love the son more than himself (FT, 57). For the author of FT, Abraham can be considered a ‘murderer’ for he intended to sacrifice Isaac. His hand was stayed by obeying the command of the angel but his intention defines him ethically. However Abraham is different from the other three because he is not a “tragic hero.”
Johannes sees Jephthah, Agamemnon, and Brutus as tragic heroes who remain entirely within the ethical dimension. A tragic hero can do what he does through his own strength. Killing was justified and the fathers in the three cases comforted in their sorrow due to social laws and customs operative in their respective cases. The moral law, so to speak, was “not only of their people but also by their people and above all for their people.” Merold Westphal goes on to say,[Merold Westphal, “Kierkegaard and Hegel,” The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 109.]
“Its highest requirements are the needs of the nation, the state, and society, and these needs prevail over the otherwise protected needs of the family. But no such larger social need motivates or justifies Abraham, whose society only asks that he love and protect his son.”
Thus Abraham is lost and a murderer in the eyes of the law unless the customs of his people are only penultimate norms rather than ultimate. If penultimate, it would mean that there is a higher ‘law’ at work. It is this position of something higher that allows for a teleological suspension of the ethical, in Abraham’s case. This is not a claim that religious faith is in conflict with the moral law and one’s duties to self and neighbor. It is a claim that Abraham’s religious faith is to a higher allegiance than to a people and their conception of the Good. Is one’s ultimate faith in society or God? Johannes is clear that it is to be in God, concluding
“The story of Abraham contains, then, a teleological suspension of the ethical. As the single individual he became higher than the universal. This is the paradox which cannot be mediated. How he entered into it is just as inexplicable as how he remains in it (FT, 67),”
That is to say, the ethical as such is the universal and as the universal it applies to everyone and at all times. An individual is a particular and as a member of society is bound to abide by the moral law as that has been established by the state. That is a part of what it means to be a member of a society or community. There are norms, expectations, rules to follow, as it were. These provide order and provide a sense of identity applicable for everyone. To just allow anything and everything to take place is disruptive. Every society in its organization and practice attempts to provide not only a sense of personal security but means for society to survive. So states Hegel, in his influential book, The Philosophy of Right.
However what occurs if an individual asserts one’s self as an individual?
As soon as the single individual asserts himself in his individuality before the universal, he sins, and only by acknowledging this can he be reconciled again with the universal. Every time the single individual, after having entered the universal, feels an impulse to assert himself as the single individual, he is in a spiritual trial (Anfagtelse), from which he can work himself only by repentantly surrendering as the single individual in the universal (FT, 54).
If what has just been said is right, then Hegel is right but Abraham is wrong! For Abraham set himself against the moral law that says that a parent should protect one’s son and not murder him.
Hegel is wrong in speaking about faith; he is wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly against Abraham’s enjoying honor and glory as a father of faith when he ought to be sent back to a lower court and shown up as a murderer (FT, 55).
Faith, then, for Johannes,
“is namely the paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal—yet, please note, in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that after having been in the universal, he as the single individual isolates himself as higher than the universal. If this is not faith, then Abraham is lost . . . (55).”
The Risk of Obedience
Kierkegaard confronted his generation with a question: what is to be done with Abraham? The question remains for us. What is to be done with this ‘knight of faith’ who could not be accommodated within the prevailing account of what constitutes a life well pleasing to God? Can there ever be a demand upon us that properly requires a suspension of the categorical imperative? What am I to do? Abraham can hardly serve as the model! More on that note next time.
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